Imperial Warlord

Imperial Warlord
Sinica Leidensia
Edited by
Barend J. ter Haar
Maghiel van Crevel
In co-operation with
P.K. Bol, D.R. Knechtges, E.S. Rawski,
W.L. Idema, H.T. Zurndorfer
VOLUME 99
Imperial Warlord
A Biography of Cao Cao 155–220 AD
By
Rafe de Crespigny
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2010
This book has been published with financial aid from the Chiang Ching-kuo
Foundation.
Cover illustration: The cover shows the first section, Guan canghai, of the Jieshi
Poem of Cao Cao translated at the end of Chapter Five. Calligraphy by Chiang Yee.
Photograph by Darren Boyd.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
De Crespigny, Rafe.
Imperial warlord : a biography of Cao Cao, 155–220 AD / by Rafe de Crespigny.
p. cm. — (Sinica Leidensia ; v. 99)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-18522-7 (hbk. : alk. paper)
1. Cao, Cao, 155–220. 2. Statesmen—China—Biography. 3. Politicians—China—
Biography. 4. China—History—Han dynasty, 202 B.C.–220 A.D. 5. Cao, Cao, 155–
220—Military leadership. 6. China—History, Military—221 B.C.–960 A.D. I. Title.
II. Series.
DS748.16.T76D39 2010
931’.04092—dc22
[B]
2010022325
ISSN 0169-9563
ISBN 978 90 04 18522 7
Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

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For Nicholas and Alexander
CONTENTS
List of Maps and Tables .................................................................... xi
Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
A Summary Chronology of Cao Cao ......................................... 6
Chapter One Grandson of a Eunuch 155–189 ........................... 9

Chronology ...................................................................................... 9
The problems of Later Han .......................................................... 9
The eunuch connection ................................................................. 16
Young man about town ................................................................ 25
Yellow Turbans ............................................................................... 35
Ruin of Government ...................................................................... 41
Chapter Two To Guard the Emperor 190–196 .......................... 51

Chronology ...................................................................................... 51
To govern Yan province 190–192 ............................................... 52
Fight for survival 193–195 ............................................................ 68
Welcome to Xu city 196 ................................................................ 81
Captive Emperor ............................................................................ 92
Chapter Three To Battle at Guandu 197–200 ............................ 97

Chronology ...................................................................................... 97
Troublesome neighbours 196–198 .............................................. 98
Conduct at court ............................................................................ 111
Approaches to Guandu 199–200 ................................................. 121
Yuan Shao’s Call to Arms ............................................................. 128
Decisive victory 200 ....................................................................... 135
The Guandu campaign: a reappraisal ......................................... 147
Chapter Four The Conduct of Civil War .................................... 153

The heritage of Later Han ............................................................. 153
Rebels, bandits, gentry and self-defence groups:
the development of hereditary troops .................................... 160
Weapons and tactics ...................................................................... 167
Numbers, supply and control ...................................................... 181
Casualties, prisoners, hostages and the behaviour of
gentlemen .................................................................................... 193
viii contents
Chapter Five Conquest of the North 201–207 ........................... 203

Chronology ...................................................................................... 203
The fall of the Yuan clan 201–204 .............................................. 203
Settlement of the North 204–206 ................................................ 217
White Wolf Mountain 207 ........................................................... 230
Chapter Six Red Cliffs 208 ............................................................. 241

Chronology ...................................................................................... 241
Government of the empire ........................................................... 241
To defeat in Jing province ............................................................ 258
War on water: weapons, techniques and tactics ....................... 278
Chapter Seven Military Matters 209–217 .................................... 287

Military Chronology ...................................................................... 287
Northwest and southeast 209–214 .............................................. 288
Liu Bei and Sun Quan 209–214 ................................................... 306
Two surrenders: Zhang Lu and Sun Quan 215–217 ................ 311
Cao Cao and the Art of War ........................................................ 319
Chapter Eight Court and Capital .................................................. 333

The elegance of Ye and the Masters of Jian’an ......................... 333
Poems and an Apologia ................................................................. 349
Character and style of government ............................................. 364
Chapter Nine Tensions of Loyalty 210–217 ............................... 381

Chronology ...................................................................................... 381
The Trappings of power ................................................................ 382
Imperial consorts ............................................................................ 397
Women and children ..................................................................... 400
A question of succession ............................................................... 407
217: the year of the plague ............................................................ 420
Chapter Ten The Last Years 218–220 .......................................... 423

Chronology 218–220 ...................................................................... 423
Chronology from 220 .................................................................... 424
Liu Bei in Hanzhong 218–219 ..................................................... 424
Guan Yu and Lü Meng in Jing province 219 ............................ 430
Posthumous emperor 220 ............................................................. 438
The later history of Cao Wei ........................................................ 450
contents ix
Chapter Eleven Another Life: History, Anecdote

and Fiction ....................................................................................... 463
Pei Songzhi, Fan Ye and Shishuo xinyu ..................................... 463
Story-tellers, poets, playwrights and Pinghua ........................... 479
Revisionist history, Romance and the Peking opera ................ 490
Marxist debate and the modern actor ........................................ 499
Why Cao Cao? ................................................................................ 504
Bibliography ......................................................................................... 507

Early Sources: Standard Histories ............................................... 507
Early Sources: Works by Cao Cao .............................................. 508
Early Sources: Other Texts ........................................................... 508
Modern Works ............................................................................... 510
Index ..................................................................................................... 525

LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES
Table 1. The Cao, Xiaohou and Ding families ............................. 21
Map 1. Sili Province: the capital region ........................................ 47

Map 2. Approaches to Luoyang ..................................................... 53
Map 3. North China in the 190s ................................................... 59
Map 4. Yan Province under Cao Cao ........................................... 65
Map 5. The Expulsion of Yuan Shu 193 ....................................... 69
Map 6. Xu and Qing Provinces ..................................................... 73
Map 7. Imperial Travels 195–196 ................................................. 83
Map 8. Rival Warlords 190–200 ................................................... 122
Map 9. Operations about Guandu 199–200 ................................ 138
Map 10. Ji Province under the Yuan family 191–205 .................. 207
Map 11. Waterways about Ye City 204–220 ................................. 215
Map 12. Cao Cao in the northeast 206–207 .................................. 232
Map 13. Jing Province ....................................................................... 260
Map 14. The Red Cliffs Campaign 208 ........................................... 267
Map 15. The Lower Wei Valley and the Huayin
Campaign 211 ..................................................................... 297
Map 16. The Lower Yangzi and the Huai ...................................... 302
Map 17. The Hanzhong Region 215–219 ....................................... 312
Map 18. Ye City 210–220 ................................................................. 337
Map 19. The provinces arranged by Cao Cao 213 ........................ 392
Map 20. The Campaigns of 219 ....................................................... 436
Map 21. The Empire of Han in 189 AD ......................................... 555
INTRODUCTION
In the years and centuries since his time, Cao Cao has been remem-
bered as one of the great villains of Chinese history, talented and pow-
erful, but cruel, immoral, and ultimately fated to failure.
On the other hand, Cao Cao lived at a time when the dynasty of Han
was collapsing and the empire was falling into ruin, and he became a
leader in a time of destruction and civil war. He proved himself on the
battlefield as a brilliant tactician and strategist, he restored a degree of
civil government over the greater part of north China, and not only
was he a fine poet in his own right, but he presided over one of the
most splendid periods of literature in early China. Few men in any
society have demonstrated such talent and achievement, and still fewer
have received such attention from posterity.
For a man who lived so long ago, there is a remarkable amount
of information available, from historical texts, from archaeology and
from his own writings. The standard official history of the Three King-
doms period, the Sanguo zhi of Chen Shou, was compiled quite close
to Cao Cao’s time, and the commentary attached by Pei Songzhi in the
early fifth century includes parallel accounts, some of them compiled
by Cao Cao’s direct contemporaries. Unlike many traditional chron-
icles, Sanguo zhi provides alternative versions of events, and a wealth
of detail and opinion. Endorsed by imperial authority, the transmis-
sion of the text is quite reliable, and the quantity of material concern-
ing Cao Cao makes it possible to attempt a rounded interpretation of
his life.1
Cao Cao was born a subject of Han and maintained that position
until his death. Though he would claim to defend the imperial dynasty,
his son Cao Pi ended the sovereignty of Han and Cao Cao received
posthumous title as Martial Emperor Wu of Wei, the successor state
1
The historiography of Sanguo zhi and the commentary of Pei Songzhi are discussed
by deC, Records of the Three Kingdoms, Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” and the Prolegomenon
of Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Consorts. Chapter 9 of deC, Generals of the South,
has a survey of the texts with particular emphasis on sources for the history of Wu.
The major work on Cao Cao’s poetry is that of Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao.
2 introduction
which divided the territory of China with the rival kingdoms of Shu-
Han and Wu.
At the time of Cao Cao’s birth, in the middle of the second century
AD, the empire of China was already in difficulty. Constant trouble on
the northern frontier had caused a steady migration of settlers to the
south, weakening Han control and encouraging raiding and disrup-
tion by the erratic tribes of the steppe. The costs of such warfare put
excessive strain upon the resources of the central government, and
that government itself was badly affected by a succession of rulers who
came to the throne as minors and were subject to regencies by the
great clans of relatives by marriage.
In 159 the cycle of dependency was broken by the youthful Emperor
Huan, who destroyed the over-powerful Liang family with the aid of
the eunuchs of his harem, but the favour which he showed to these
allies disturbed the gentlemen of Confucian principles who served as
imperial officials. In 168 the eunuchs confirmed their authority by a
successful coup to overthrow the regent Dou clan which had sought
to establish a regency government for Emperor Huan’s successor,
Emperor Ling, and the division between the court and the landed
gentry in the provinces—core alliance of traditional China—was
confirmed by a great Proscription of those who opposed the eunuch
regime.
In 184 these quarrelling parties were faced by a more potent threat
from the religious rebellion of the Yellow Turbans, which looked for a
destruction of the old world and the coming of a new millennium. The
rising was defeated within a year, but at the cost of a massive loss of
life and vast damage to the heartland of China across the North China
plain. At the same time, continuing difficulty on the frontier culmi-
nated in a mutiny and rebellion in the northwest, which removed a
valuable region from the resources of the empire. Finally, in 189, the
death of the weak and extravagant Emperor Ling brought chaos to the
imperial capital, Luoyang, where a slaughter of the eunuchs by young
men of family created opportunity for the frontier general Dong Zhuo.
As the usurper took power and put his own nominee on the throne,
armies were raised to oppose him, and within less than a year the boy
Emperor Xian was notional sovereign of a gigantic battleground.
This was the background into which Cao Cao was born. His father
Cao Song had been adopted by the powerful eunuch Cao Teng and
introduction 3
became wealthy enough to buy his way into the highest position in
the bureaucracy. The family was on the margins of acceptable society,
but wealth and power did much to cover an unorthodox origin, and
the collapse of social and political order gave Cao Cao the opportu-
nity to display his abilities. He was fortunately placed to do so: his
father’s money meant that he was able to acquire a good education
and take junior rank in the imperial service by his early twenties; he
held military command against the Yellow Turban rebels in 184; and
he received senior provincial appointment before he was thirty.
When the political situation at the capital collapsed in 189, Cao
Cao collected a small contingent of troops and joined the loyal reb-
els who claimed they sought to restore the dynasty. His background
was not distinguished enough to guarantee pre-eminence, but he had
some success fighting bandits, and in 192 he became the ruler of Yan
province, a large and prosperous territory on the Yellow River. The
first years were dangerous and difficult, and he made several serious
mistakes, but he managed to survive and he learned from experience.
In 196 he took control of the young emperor, and in 200 he defeated
his chief rival Yuan Shao in hard-fought campaign at Guandu by the
Yellow River. Within a few years Cao Cao controlled north China.
Besides the Guandu campaign, which may serve as a model for the
art of war ascribed to Sunzi, Cao Cao’s two greatest victories were
achieved against the Wuhuan people of the northeast in 207 and the
north-western warlords in 211; both are dramatic examples of the
indirect approach. They are traditionally over-shadowed by his defeat
at the Red Cliffs on the middle Yangzi, an engagement which deter-
mined the division of China between north and south for centuries to
come; but that decision was essentially a matter of demography—for
the people of the south were now numerous enough to hold the north
at bay.
Though Cao Cao thus failed to restore the unified empire, he did
rebuild a viable state among its ruins. His civil government, notably
through a system of agricultural colonies, gave people displaced by
war the opportunity to settle and rebuild their lives, and his capital
at Ye city became a cultural centre worthy to compare with the finest
of the past. His own poetry was among the first to offer a personal,
refreshing style of expression, and his son Cao Zhi is recognised as one
of the greatest literary figures of all Chinese history.
Cao Cao’s was a career opened by talent: though wealth and family
gave an initial advantage, many were better placed yet achieved far
4 introduction
less. Once he gained the opportunity to command, he sought men of

ability to serve him, and he several times observed that he was con-
cerned with competence and skill, not with status or morality:
I have never heard that a state could be established or restored when its
officials were incompetent and its soldiers would not fight. . . . In times of
peace we may admire fine virtue, but in time of trouble it is achievement
and ability which obtain rewards.2
This was a leader with no particular interest in class or clan, but only
with personal quality—and while Cao Cao had many women, he chose
a former sing-song girl to become his chief wife.
Besides the historical record compiled by others, we have Cao Cao’s
poems, a number of proclamations and an autobiographical Apologia.
The Apologia is a political document, and the poems were also for
public consumption, but they nonetheless present a strong character,
self-confident and courageous:3
Each season gives way to another;
Days and nights become years. . . .
The years may pass, but without regrets,
Only concern for the troubles of the world.
Life and death have their purpose,
And it is foolish to be concerned.
Let us voice our ambitions with song
As each season gives way to another.
Though a great part of Cao Cao’s story has been confused by the slan-
ders of his enemies and the romantic enthusiasm of later generations,
a core of fact remains; indeed there are few people from such a distant
past of whom so much can be known. Seeking the history behind the
legend, this book offers an interpretation of one of the exceptional
men of China—a strategist, a statesman, a reformer and a poet.
2
SGZ 1:24 PC quoting Wei shu, and see Chapter Five at 212 and note 17.
3
On Cao Cao’s Apologia, a proclamation issued on 1 January 211, see Chapter
Eight at 356 ff. On his poetry, see Chapter Eight at 349–356. The passage which follows
is a stanza from the second of two “Songs of Qiu Hu,” further discussed and translated
in Chapter Eight at 352.
introduction 5
Some Technical Matters
All dates are given as AD unless otherwise specified. While recognis-

ing that the Chinese year ends in late January or early February of
the West, unless precise dating is required I follow the convention
which expresses the Chinese year by its major Western equivalent in
the Julian calendar.
Renderings of offices and titles follow those used in de Crespigny,
A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (Leiden
2006); cited as LH3K. The system is largely based on that devised by
Professor H H Dubs and developed by Professor Hans Bielenstein.
LH3K also provides a summary biography for most individuals
mentioned in the text.
Acknowledgements
I am most grateful for the advice and support I have received from many
different scholars, and in particular the late Professor Liu Ts’unyan of the
Australian National University, who for very many years was a constant
source of encouragement and advice. I also thank Amanda Brown of the
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Andrew Chittick of Eckerd College,
Jean-Pierre Diény, Feng Suiping of the Hanzhong Municipal Museum,
Howard L Goodman, Christoph Harbsmeier of the University of Oslo,
Hsing I-tien of Academic Sinica in Taiwan, Huang Yijun of the Central
University for Nationalities at Beijing, David Jupp, Michael Loewe of
Cambridge, Anne McLaren of Melbourne University, John Minford and
John Makeham of ANU, Ilkka Syvänne, and William G Crowell. Other
colleagues whom I have consulted with great profit include Robert Joe
Cutter, Nicola di Cosmo, Igor de Rachewiltz, Burchard Mansvelt Beck,
Michael Nylan and Hans van Ess. I offer special thanks to the staff of
the Menzies Library at the Australian National University, particularly
Darrell Dorrington and Renata Osborne, for their constant assistance
and for their maintenance of a splendid collection.
The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation has made a grant to assist in pre-
paring the manuscript for publication. The original maps were drawn by
Winifred Mumford, and the index, with editorial work, has been created
by Greg Young. Patricia Radder and her colleagues at Brill have given
constant assistance since my initial proposal.
Rafe de Crespigny
June 2010
6 introduction
A Summary Chronology of Cao Cao
155 birth of Cao Cao

174 Cao Cao commences his official career
177 Cao Cao becomes a county magistrate
178 Cao Cao dismissed from office
184 Cao Cao holds military command against the Yellow Tur-
ban rebels, then becomes Chancellor of Ji’nan
187 Cao Cao retires from office
188 Cao Cao appointed a colonel of the Western Garden Corps
189 massacre of the eunuchs at Luoyang; Dong Zhuo takes power
190 Cao Cao joins the “loyal rebels” in the east led by Yuan
Shao
191 Cao Cao named Administrator of Dong commandery
192 Cao Cao takes over in Yan province; he persuades Yellow
Turbans to surrender
193 Cao Cao attacks Xu province
194 Lü Bu invades Yan province
195 Cao Cao drives Lü Bu away
Emperor Xian escapes from Chang’an
196 Emperor Xian comes to Xu city under Cao Cao’s control
197–198 unsuccessful campaigns against Zhang Xiu in Nanyang
198 Cao Cao captures and kills Lü Bu at Xiapi
200 Yuan Shao attacks Cao Cao but is defeated at Guandu
203–206 Cao Cao takes north China from the Yuan family
207 Cao Cao defeats the Wuhuan at White Wolf Mountain
208 Cao Cao named Imperial Chancellor
Cao Cao occupies Jing province, but is defeated at the
Red Cliffs on the Yangzi by the forces of Sun Quan and
Liu Bei
211 Cao Cao defeats the warlords of the northwest at the battle
of Huayin
214 Liu Bei takes Yi province
215 Zhang Lu surrenders Hanzhong to Cao Cao
216 Cao Cao takes title as King of Wei
introduction 7
219 Liu Bei defeats Cao Cao’s general Xiahou Yuan at Dingjun
Mountain and takes Hanzhong
Liu Bei takes title as King of Hanzhong; Liu Bei’s general Guan
Yu attacks northwards in Jing province; he is driven back by
Cao Cao’s troops and then destroyed by Sun Quan’s general Lü
Meng
220 Cao Cao dies at Luoyang
he is succeeded by his son Cao Pi, who later receives the abdica-
tion of Emperor Xian of Han and proclaims himself Emperor of
the Wei dynasty; Cao Cao is awarded posthumous honours as
Emperor Wu of Wei
CHAPTER ONE
GRANDSON OF A EUNUCH 155–189
The problems of Later Han

The Cao family and the eunuch connection
Young man about town
Yellow Turbans
Ruin of Government
Chronology
155 birth of Cao Cao

174 Cao Cao is nominated Filial and Incorrupt and becomes a gen-
tleman cadet
175 Commandant of the Northern Division of Luoyang county
177 Magistrate of Dunqiu county in Dong commandery
Cao Ang born to Cao Cao’s wife the Lady Liu
178 Cao Cao dismissed from office and retires to Pei
179 Cao Cao takes the Lady Bian as a concubine
180 Cao Cao returns to Luoyang as a Consultant
184 Yellow Turban rebellion; Cao Cao becomes Commandant of
Cavalry, then Chancellor of Ji’nan; rebellion in Liang province
187 Cao Cao resigns office and retires again to Pei [conspiracy of
Wang Fen?]; birth of Cao Pi, Cao Cao’s eldest son by the Lady
Bian
188 Cao Cao appointed a Colonel of the Western Garden
189 death of Emperor Ling; massacre of the eunuchs; Dong Zhuo seizes
power; Cao Cao flees the capital to join the “loyal rebels”
The problems of Later Han1
In the mid-second century AD, the empire of Han was matched only
by that of Rome, at the opposite end of the Eurasian continent. Its
1
Much material on the second half of the second century AD is discussed in deC,
Huan and Ling, and deC, Establish Peace, which present an annotated translation
10 chapter one
power extended from the Korean peninsula to the coast of Vietnam,

and there was a claim to authority over the oasis states of present-day
Xinjiang. Except for these last, the territory was controlled by thirteen
provinces supervising the administration of a hundred commandery
units. Below the commanderies were some 1100 counties, and the
registered population was just under fifty million. Provinces, com-
manderies and counties were governed by inspectors, administrators
and magistrates appointed from the capital, Luoyang, and the empire
as a whole was managed by a bureaucracy of some seven and a half
thousand commissioned, literate officials.2
The structure was remarkably successful, but its effect was limited.
The average population of each county throughout the empire was
between forty-five and fifty thousand, with some very much larger,
and each was governed by a single magistrate, appointed for a limited
term, and guided by local staff. Taxes were collected, corvée service
was enforced, and most major crimes could be dealt with—frequently
by brutal means—but otherwise the day-to-day life of the community
was largely unaffected by official intervention, and magistrates were
vulnerable to pressure, particularly from the leading families of their
territory whose members were either colleagues in the imperial ser-
vice or who provided the officers who advised and assisted them. As a
result, behind a façade of country peace, there was endemic exploita-
tion of the poor by the rich, punctuated by oppressive violence and
family feuding, and illustrated now by the tomb-models of fortified
houses and texts advising land-owners about weapons and training.3
of the Zizhi tongjian chronicle compiled by Sima Guang for the years 157 to 220. A
short account of Later Han is provided in the introductory material of deC, LH3K,
xvi–xxxi.
2
The Treatise on the Bureaucracy 百官志, HHS 114/24–118/28, is discussed by
Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 196–226. Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, and deC, LH3K, 1216–
1241, describe the administrative structure based upon the Treatise and other texts.
Below the commissioned officials were a further 145,000 officers of lesser rank, rang-
ing from senior and trusted clerks to guards, police and yamen runners: deC, “Recruit-
ment Revisited,” 5, citing Tong dian 36:205c.
The Treatise on Administrative Geography 郡國志, HHS 109/19–113/23, lists the
provinces, commandery units and counties of the empire in the early 140s, with
their population. Based upon household returns, they are arranged by provinces
and commanderies with figures precise to the last digit, and total figures are given
at 113/23:3533 with commentary citing additional records. See Bielenstein, “Census,”
and Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 175–195.
3
The Simin yueling almanac, a guide for the management of a country estate
compiled in the mid-second century by the gentleman Cui Shi, identifies the times
grandson of a eunuch 155–189 11
These matters, however, were of no great concern to the impe-

rial regime. If disorder or banditry became too great, troops could
be raised to deal with the problem, and if the situation became more
serious then larger forces were sent. The threat was normally sufficient
to restrain the magnates from abusing their power too greatly, while
the vast majority of peasants, bound to their farms by tenancy and tax,
could only accept the dominance of their local masters and the distant
authority of the emperor.
Such a system of government generally kept the people settled and
controlled, but it was not well equipped to deal with major changes,
and by the early 150s the empire of Han was faced by a number of
challenges: weakness on the northern frontier; shortage of government
revenue; a series of immature rulers; and a concomitant growth of
alternative sources of power at the capital, notably the eunuchs of the
palace and the great families which were connected to the throne by
marriage.
In the late 40s AD the founding Emperor Guangwu of Later Han had
been fortunate enough to benefit from a succession quarrel among
the Xiongnu, dominant tribespeople of the steppe. The weaker of the
claimants, Prince Bi, was driven to take refuge with the Han, who rec-
ognised him as Shanyu. He was granted access to land in the Ordos
and maintained a court there under Chinese supervision, while his
forces served as auxiliaries against the Northern Xiongnu state which
controlled the steppe from the region of Ulan Bator in present-day
Mongolia. Some forty years of occasional rapprochement and frequent
raiding followed, but in 89 a great expedition led by the general Dou
Xian, brother of the Empress-Dowager who was regent for Emperor
He, drove the Northern Shanyu away to the west and established a
notional hegemony over the steppe. Aided by this, the Protector Ban
Chao restored Chinese authority over the Western Regions, the Tarim
Basin and Turfan.4
of the year for maintenance and exercise of weapons: Hsü, Han Agriculture, 215–228.
And tomb models of the Han period include many examples of fortified houses, some
with armed men inside.
4
On the dealings of Han with the Xiongnu during the first century AD, see deC,
Northern Frontier, 219–283. On the achievement of Ban Chao, see deC, “Some Notes
on the Western Regions,” 12–16 and 23–24.
12 chapter one
Success was short-lived, however, for the Chinese could not main-
tain control of such distant territories, while the puppet state of the
Southern Xiongnu was split by tension between old loyalists and their
newly-surrendered enemies. Most of the former subjects of the North
turned to the Xianbi, a loose confederation of tribes which was press-
ing in from the east, and within a few years the comparatively stable
state of the Northern Shanyu had been replaced by these erratic and
warlike newcomers. The frontier was now less secure than it had been
before.
In 107, moreover, the Qiang people of the northwest turned on their
Chinese neighbours in Liang province. The turmoil which followed
was not ended until 118, and the devastation which accompanied it
not only ruined the economy of the region but drove great numbers of
settlers to seek safety elsewhere. There were attempts at resettlement,
but they were frustrated by further rebellion and raiding, and a second
Qiang rising in 140, this time joined by dissident Xiongnu, compelled
the government to withdraw the headquarters of several commanderies
to places of greater security. Though administrative boundaries were
formally retained within the Ordos loop of the Yellow River, the ter-
ritory was largely beyond the control of any civilian regime. Chinese
presence was maintained by military means, with a standing army in
Wuyuan and occasional preventive or punitive exercises to keep the
tribespeople under control.5
By the 170s, however, as the Xianbi warleader Tanshihuai estab-
lished a broad dominance among his people, frontier raiding became
increasingly severe, and in 177 a major Chinese expedition, with
Xiongnu auxiliaries, was destroyed on the open steppe. The Southern
Shanyu lost all authority over his people, and Han was forced perma-
nently onto the defensive.6 Fortunately for China, Tanshihuai died in
the early 180s, and his successors were less dangerous, but the fron-
tier was thoroughly unstable, and frequent incursions had to be dealt
with—not always successfully—by conscripted troops with the aid of
local militia.
5
On the command of the General on the Liao stationed at Wuyuan near present-
day Baotou, see deC, Northern Frontier, 252–253, and on the campaigns of the gen-
erals Huangfu Gui, Zhang Huan and Duan Jiong during the 160s and early 170s,
Northern Frontier, 318–329.
6
On Tanshihuai, the campaign of 177 and its aftermath, see Northern Frontier,
331–342.
This history of confusion and retreat had two major effects. Firstly,
the Chinese population, bedevilled by rebellion and raiding, and faced
with erratic government policy and constant demands for military ser-
vice, steadily migrated to the south. The registered population of the
northern commanderies fell from 4.5 million in 2 AD to some 750,000
in the mid-second century, too few to maintain an effective presence
against the non-Chinese; while the lands south of the Qin Ling ranges
and the middle and lower Yangzi gained very considerably—a devel-
opment which would prove significant for the future unity of the
empire.7
More immediately, the devastation of the north and northwest
brought a serious reduction in tax revenue. Throughout the dynasty
there had been problems making a proper survey of arable land,
while increasing numbers of peasant farmers commended themselves
as clients or tenants to great families in order to avoid government
demands, and monopoly rights of salt and iron established by For-
mer Han were farmed out to private interests. As a result, though the
empire as a whole was prosperous, the imperial regime was unable to
obtain an adequate share of its resources. For most of the first century
AD, income was largely sufficient, but the great expedition of Dou
Xian against the Xiongnu was more than the government could afford,
and within a few years the Dowager Deng, regent for Emperor An, had
introduced economy measures, reducing ceremonies and offices and
selling official positions.
The situation was rendered very much worse by the continuing trou-
ble on the frontier. Not only was the court faced with heavy military
expenditure, but the loss of tax from the devastated territories meant
that the shortfall had to be sought elsewhere, notably from the settled
and prosperous provinces of the North China plain. The government,
however, lacked the machinery to enforce its requirements against
entrenched local interests, and the very attempt to do so brought
resentment and disruption. The great land-owning families, success-
fully defending themselves against the demands of the state, became
increasingly wealthy and powerful, while for most of the second cen-
tury the Later Han government was effectively bankrupt, unable to
7
On the withdrawal from the north, see deC, Northern Frontier, 143–146 and 243–
246, with Tables 1 and 2 and Map 9 at 310. On the increase in the south, see deC,
Generals of the South, 25–29 and 47–52, and Chapter Ten at 453–455.
14 chapter one
offer meaningful assistance in time of famine or other misfortune, and

suffering in consequence from a lack of authority and respect.
The financial problems of the regime were compounded by the politi-

cal situation at the court and the capital. When Emperor Zhang died in
88 AD, his son and heir Emperor He was just ten sui, nine years old by
Western reckoning, and the Empress-Dowager Dou held the regency.
From that time on, for the next hundred years every emperor came to
the throne as a minor, and every reign began with a regency controlled
by a dowager empress and her family. None of these arrangements
ended well: the Dou clan was destroyed by Emperor He in 91; the
Dowager Deng held power until her death in 120, but Emperor An
then took his revenge upon her kinsmen; in 125 the regency of the
Lady Yan was ended by a eunuch coup on behalf of Emperor Shun;
and though the Liang clan of the consort of Emperor Shun managed to
hold power for almost twenty years, they were eventually overthrown
by Emperor Huan, aided by eunuchs of the imperial palace. This last
coup took place in 159, four years after Cao Cao’s birth.8
The power of the imperial relatives by marriage was largely accepted
by the officials of the bureaucracy, and by the Confucianist gentry
which provided the greater part of their number. Most empresses
and senior concubines were chosen for their family background, and
the Dou, Deng and Liang clans had been respected for generations.
Emperor Huan might have objected to his own weak position, but the
majority of gentlemen who served the regime were content to give
allegiance to the regency: when the emperor at last seized power, so
many officials were proscribed for their collusion that it is said the
court was empty.
On two occasions eunuchs had played a decisive role in restoring the
authority of their sovereign, and Emperor Huan in particular, unable
to obtain effective support from the regular officials, was obliged to
seek their aid in a secret plot. Following that success, these allies and
favourites of Emperor Huan gained increasing influence at court, and
in 168, when the death of their patron allowed another generation of
the Dou clan to acquire the regency, they attacked directly. Persuad-
8
The fall of the Liang clan is described by HHS 34/24:1186–87 and 78/68:2520,
summarised by ZZTJ 54:1745–46; deC, Huan and Ling, 11–13, and Bielenstein, Lo-
yang, 91–95.
ing the young Emperor Ling to endorse their actions, the eunuchs
arranged the dismissal of Dou Wu, head of the family. Dou Wu and
his allies sought to gather troops, but after a brief confrontation they
were arrested and executed, and for the next twenty years the eunuchs
held a dominant role in government.9
To a true Confucian, eunuchs were unacceptable: mutilated creatures
incapable of maintaining a true lineage, they were inherently vicious
and corrupt. Dou Wu and his party, moreover, had been patrons of
a reform movement which sought to purify the administration and
restore good conduct throughout the empire; their defeat was all the
more bitter. There were wide-spread protests, answered by the perse-
cution and proscription of those who opposed the regime, and many
men now rejected the idea of public service, refused nomination and
appointment, and were honoured for doing so. The division between
the court and the gentry was maintained until both groups were faced
by a greater threat: the Yellow Turban rebellion of 184.
The problem, however, reached further than the struggle for power
at the capital. Leading eunuchs had received marks of imperial favour
in the past, and Zheng Zhong, who had supported Emperor He
against the Dou family in the early 90s, was awarded a marquisate.
His adopted son was permitted to inherit the fief, and in 135 Emperor
Shun formally endorsed the practice.10 Following this precedent, other
eunuchs were enfeoffed, and their original and adoptive kinfolk shared
their good fortune. Relatives and associates of high-ranking eunuchs
now began to develop estates in the provinces, and used the backing
of the court to extend their privileges. They were often opposed by
the established families and local officials,11 but many acquired great
stretches of land and vast amounts of property, so that their wealth
rivalled that of the greatest in the empire and their status matched
their neighbours.
9
The destruction of the Dou clan is described by HHS 66/56: 2169–70 and
69/59:2241–44, summarised by ZZTJ 54:1808–11; deC, Huan and Ling, 95–101, and
Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 95–98.
10
On Zheng Zhong, see HHS 78/68:2512–13; Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, 463–464.
On Emperor Shun’s edict, see HHS 6:264 and 78/68:2518.
11
For examples of local opposition to eunuchs and their associates, see deC,
“Political Protest,” 8–9, citing HHS 78/68:2522–23 and 67/57:2210 and 2212; also the
accounts of Hou Lan, Teng Yan and Zhang Jian in deC, LH3K, sub voce.
16 chapter one
The eunuch connection12
Cao Cao’s father Song was the adopted son of Cao Teng, a high-ranking
eunuch at the imperial court who came originally from Qiao county in
the kingdom of Pei, on the North China plain by present-day Boxian
in northern Anhui.13 The family held property in their home country,
but Cao Song had already embarked upon an official career, largely
at the capital, Luoyang; though we know that Cao Cao was born in
155 AD, it is not certain whether it was at Luoyang or at Qiao.14
The Annals/Biography of Cao Cao in Sanguo zhi says that Cao Teng
was descended from the Chancellor Cao Shen, adviser to the founding
Emperor Gao of Former Han more than three hundred years before.15
The same claim was made by other holders of the surname through-
out China, and the lineage was traced to the fief awarded to a brother
of the legendary King Wu of Zhou; by this means one could go still
further back, to the ancient Sovereign Shun or the mythical Yellow
Emperor, and such ideal genealogy was popular at the time.16 Though
it would be irrelevant to a son or daughter adopted from an unrelated
12
The Annals/Biography of Cao Cao occupies the first chapter of Sanguo zhi, and
much of the information about his life is taken from that text and the supporting
commentary of Pei Songzhi. In 210, however, Cao Cao himself published an Apologia,
with an account of his career which differs in some places from those histories. Where
appropriate, these variants are noted and discussed. Other sources, such as biogra-
phies in Hou Han shu and Sanguo zhi, may likewise be identified and compared.
13
The biography of Cao Teng is at HHS 78/68:2519, followed by that of his adopted
son Cao Song. The family history is also discussed at the beginning of Cao Cao’s
biography, SGZ 1:1–2.
Liu Fu, son of Emperor Guangwu by his first empress, was named King of Pei in
44, and his descendants held the title until the end of the dynasty in 220. Under Later
Han, the difference between a commandery and a kingdom was essentially one of
form: a kingdom was headed by a Chancellor and a commandery by an Administra-
tor, but both officials were appointed by the central government, and kings had no
executive authority in their nominal territories.
14
Cao Cao died in 220, at the age of 66 sui: SGZ 1:53. It is perhaps notable that
there is no record of any portent attending his birth, nor is he said to have had any
special physical features. The mothers of Emperor Xian of Han and of Sun Quan,
future Emperor of Wu, are said to have dreamt of the sun [HHS 10B:449 and SGZ Wu
5:1195 PC], while Liu Bei, future Sovereign of Shu-Han, is said to have had exception-
ally long ears and a remarkable mulberry tree [SGZ Shu 2:871–72]. Though Cao Cao
would prove to be a man of comparable and even greater distinction, he received no
such marks of supernatural favour.
15
SGZ 1:1; SGZJJ 1:2b–3a. The personal name of Cao Shen 參 has the alternative
reading Can; biographies are in SJ 54 and HS 39; Loewe, QHX, 20–22.
16
For example, Ebrey, “Stone Inscriptions,” 340–344, translating a stele preserved
at Xi’an which honours the magistrate Cao Quan from the far northwest.
family, there may in fact have been a connection between Cao Teng
and his adopted son Song.
Cao Teng’s father, whose personal name was probably Meng,17
appears to have been a farmer. The Xu Han shu of Sima Biao tells how
one of his neighbours lost a pig and thought he recognised it among
Cao Meng’s herd. An honest and generous man, Cao Meng passed the
animal over without demur. When the original pig returned home of
its own accord, its owner returned Cao Meng’s property with profuse
apologies; Cao Meng laughed and accepted it.
Xu Han shu goes on to say that Cao Meng sired four sons, and
had Cao Teng, the youngest, castrated so he could enter service in
the imperial palace.18 In 120 the Empress-Dowager Deng, who con-
trolled the government of Emperor An, ordered the Prefect of the Yel-
low Gates, head of the eunuch office, to recommend a suitable boy to
attend the emperor’s only son, Liu Bao. Cao Teng was chosen and
became study companion to the Heir. Liu Bao was five years old by
Western reckoning at that time, and Cao Teng may have been five or
even ten years older. He remained close to the future Emperor Shun,
and though he played no major role in the events of his reign he rose
to be a Regular Attendant, highest rank that a eunuch could aspire to,
and comparable to a minister in the imperial bureaucracy.
When Emperor Shun died in 144, the government came into the
hands of his widowed Empress Liang, now regent Dowager, and her
brother Liang Ji. The emperor’s only son died in infancy a few months
after his father’s death, and in such circumstances the Dowager had
17
Xu Han shu is quoted by SGZ 1:1–2 PC with the personal name as Jie, but the
variorum edition of Qijia Hou Han shu, at XHS 5:11b, cites one version of the text
which gives it as Meng. The Empress Cao of Emperor Xian, an adoptive great-great-
granddaughter of this man, had the personal name Jie, and this would appear to
offend the principle which placed taboo on the name of an ancestor. The reading
Meng may therefore be correct.
18
HHS 78/68:2510, cited by Jugel, Eunuchen, 47, refers to “voluntary” castration
at the behest of the parents—probably before puberty—with a view to a career in a
rather special civil service.
During the second half of the first century AD, castration was used in some cases
as a substitute for the death penalty—women were subject to solitary confinement:
Jugel, Eunuchen, 62–63. Castration, however, was not regarded as one of the regular
mutilating punishments, and the provision was repealed by the regent Dowager Deng
about 120, on the advice of the Minister of Justice Chen Zhong: e.g. HHS 1:80 and
46/36:1556. Cao Teng suffered the operation about this time, but there is no sugges-
tion that it was administered on criminal grounds; indeed there is no record of any
palace eunuch having suffered his castration as penalty for a crime.
18 chapter one
absolute right to choose any male of the imperial clan for the succes-
sion.19 The Dowager and her brother selected the seven-year-old Liu
Zuan, but after he showed signs of resenting their control he became
ill and died. Several ministers now argued that a mature man be given
power, but Cao Teng encouraged Liang Ji and his sister to maintain
their prerogatives. The fourteen-year-old Liu Zhi, future Emperor
Huan, was duly placed upon the throne, and Cao Teng was rewarded
with enfeoffment as Marquis of Bi Village.20 More generally, it was
said that he served for thirty years without making a mistake, and he
was admired for the manner in which he sponsored men of quality
for office.
As a consequence of Cao Teng’s success and influence, several full
men among his kinfolk reached high rank in the imperial service, and
a group of family tombs near Boxian, excavated in the mid-1970s, con-
tained impressive grave goods and inscriptions referring to Adminis-
trators of commanderies and Chancellors of kingdoms, senior positions
in the provincial administration; the eulogistic text of an inscription to
Cao Teng himself, set up in 160, has been preserved separately.21
19
The tradition had been established in Former Han, and the precedent was con-
firmed by the Dowager Deng of Emperor He in 106, who chose the younger son of
her late husband. When that child died a few months later, she again passed over
his elder brother and brought a cousin, Emperor An, to the throne: HHS 5:195–203,
10A:421–23, and LH3K, 1216–17.
20
In present-day Mandarin the character of the name of the village 費 can be
sounded either Bi or Fei. It is not possible to identify the place, but it was quite pos-
sibly in the area of the Cao family home in Qiao. The holder of a marquisate, however,
had no direct authority over his nominal fief, but only the right to a pension based
upon the revenue of the territory.
21
The tomb complex is mentioned in SJZ 23:743, and the excavation is described
in Wenwu 1978/8:32–45, discussed by Tian Changwu at 46–50. The inscription to Cao
Teng is quoted in Li shi 15:3a-4b, and this and other stele are described at 20:14b-
15a. Besides the grave goods, the tombs also contained fragments of “jade armour”
shrouds, a privilege awarded by the emperor. Some of the brick inscriptions are state-
ments of mourning or commemoration, but there are a few with informal and pre-
sumably concealed comments by those working on the construction of the tomb; see
note 75 below.
Powers, Art and Political Expression, 330–333, discusses the complex and its dat-
ing to the time of Emperor Ling [though he mistakenly ascribes Cao Teng’s inscrip-
tion to 170 rather than 160]. Noting that the tombs had been robbed, and considering
the fine goods which were left, he fairly concludes at 331 that the original deposits
must have been of remarkable quality: “Presumably, the grave robbers considered all
these [remaining items] to be of too little value to take along!”
Powers further identifies the “decorative” style of the tombs with the attitude of
nouveau riche eunuchs, whose sophisticated taste presented a “challenge and an asser-
tion” to the classical rhetoric of the scholar gentry: 371–377, particularly 375–376.
Much of the information from the tomb complex is fragmentary,

but the Cao appear to have been somewhat more than ordinary peas-
ants. They were connected by marriage to the Xiahou, a leading clan in
the county, and though eunuchs may have been generally disapproved
of, once the change had been made there was advantage to a reason-
able background. It is probable that Cao Teng owed his initial contact
to Emperor Shun because he was well spoken and had some educa-
tion. His family may have been in straits, but they had pretensions to
gentility, and the inscriptions make proud references to literary and
scholarly ability.22
The chief purpose of adoption was to provide for ancestral sacrifices
where male heirs were lacking:23 thus Cao Cao’s future rival Yuan Shao
was adopted by his father’s elder brother, who had no son to succeed
him.24 Conservative commentators such as Ying Shao regarded such
adoption within the male lineage as the only proper and effective pro-
cedure, but there is evidence that in Han times “outside” adoption was
acceptable, to salvage a related family which lacked a male heir,25 and
eunuchs used the process for similar reasons.26 The adoption of Cao
22
On references to literature and scholarship, see Wenwu 1978/8:48, and on the
connection to the Xiahou clan indicated by inscriptions, see Tian Changwu at 48 and
49. The Xiahou claimed descent from Xiahou Ying, a senior minister at the beginning
of Former Han: SGZ 9:267; Loewe, QHX, 596–597.
23
The general topic is considered by Brown and deC, “Adoption in Han China.”
24
See HHS 74/64A:2373 TC quoting the Hou Han shu of Yuan Shansong, and
SGZ 6:188–89 PC note 2. Both sources indicate that Yuan Shao was the natural son
of Yuan Feng by a concubine, adopted across to maintain the lineage of Yuan Feng’s
elder brother Cheng. Such a system had been endorsed by the Former Han confer-
ence in the Shiqu Pavilion [or Hall of the Stone Conduit/Canal] in 51 BC: e.g. Tjan,
White Tiger Hall I, 130.
Biographies of Yuan Shao are in HHS 74/64A and at SGZ 6:188–201; those of
his half-brother and adoptive cousin Yuan Shu are at HHS 75/65:2438–43 and SGZ
6:207–10.
25
Thus Sun He of Wu was adopted into the Yu family of his aunt to revive a male
lineage [SGZ Wu 6:1214], Zhu Zhi of Danyang adopted a son of his sister [SGZ Wu
11:1305] and Chen Jiao was born into the Liu surname but was adopted out [SGZ
22:644 PC quoting the Weishi chunqiu “Chronicle of the House of Wei” by Sun Sheng
of the fourth century]. On this last, see note 32 below.
On Ying Shao’s opinion, see the Yiwen 佚文 chapter of his Fengsu tongyi 風俗
通義 “A Compendium of Popular Customs” at 591, debated by Brown and deC,
“Adoption,” 229–231.
26
HHS 78/68:2521 tells how the eunuch favourites of Emperor Huan took women
of good family as titular concubines, and adopted children of different surnames
異姓 and even slaves to maintain their lineages and inherit their fiefs. There are also a
number of references to adoptive daughters, who were obviously supernumerary. Such
extravagance, however, is recorded under Huan and Ling, and may be exaggerated by
the historian. Earlier eunuchs such as Cao Teng were probably more conservative.
20 chapter one
Song was not unusual, and in due course he succeeded to Cao Teng’s
marquisate.
The historian Chen Shou claimed that no-one knew the natural
origins of Cao Song, and there has been extensive debate on the mat-
ter, particularly about his connection to the Xiahou. The anonymous
Cao Man zhuan “Biography of Cao Man” and Wei-Jin shiyu “Tales
of the Generations of Wei and Jin” by Guo Ban both claim that Cao
Song was a younger brother of the father of Xiahou Dun, which lat-
ter became a trusted associate of Cao Cao.27 Many other Xiahou came
later to join Cao Cao, and despite Chen Shou’s doubts, Chapter 9 of
his Sanguo zhi combines biographies of members of both families. The
recently excavated tombs of the Cao family, moreover, have inscrip-
tions which confirm the relationship, and Table 1 presents a summary
of the likely connections between the families.28
27
SGZ 1:2 PC note 3. We are told that Cao Man zhuan “The Biography of Cao
Man” was compiled, probably in the mid-third century, by a subject of Wu, rival to
the state of Wei founded by Cao Cao. In a previous citation, Cao Man zhuan says that
Cao Cao had the secondary personal name of Jili and a childhood name of A’man, and
it is generally accepted that the title of the book was chosen as a means to denigrate
him by a show of familiarity.
As Kroll, “Portraits,” points out at 124 and 203 note 23, the character man indi-
cates deception and cheating. “A’man” could have been an affectionate term, “Little
Trickster,” for a small boy, but the book itself, dealing with the career of the grown
man, may be understood, less favourably, as “The Account of Cao the Deceiver.” See
further at 25–26 below.
Guo Ban wrote some fifty years later, in the late third and early fourth century.
Though he had no such obvious motive as the author of Cao Man zhuan, his work
contains a number of anecdotes which reflect badly on Cao Cao: see in particular page
49 below.
28
Though the adoptive lineage through Cao Meng/Jie to Cao Teng and then to Cao
Song and Cao Cao is clear enough, and the Xiahou connection is discussed imme-
diately below, it must be recognised that there are several other areas of uncertainty.
Little is known of the elder brothers of Cao Teng, though Cao Chi fathered the twins
Ren and Chun who became generals under Cao Cao. SGZ 1:1 gives the styles Boxing,
Shuxing and Zhongxing, but the personal name of one brother has not been recorded
and the order of birth is unknown, so the styles cannot be attributed.
Again, though Cao Hong, like Cao Ren and Cao Chun, served Cao Cao with dis-
tinction, there is contradiction and confusion whether he was a son or a grandson of
the unnamed brother of Cao Teng; i.e. whether he was of the same generation of Cao
Song or of Cao Cao.
There is further discussion in deC, LH3K, 32–51 sub voce; such questions, of course,
are only marginal as regards Cao Song and Cao Cao and their connection to the
Xiahou.
Table 1 A Summary of the Alleged Connections Between

the Cao, Xiaohou and Ding Families of Pei
Cao Shen/Can
[Former Han]
unknown generations
Cao Meng/Jie marriage connection? Xiahou

( fl.100 AD) clan
Cao Bao Cao Ding Cao ? Cao Teng [eunuch]

personal name (d.c.160)
unknown [ youngest son]
Cao Chi ∨ Xiahou
∨ personal name
twins ? adopted unknown
Cao Ren Cao Chun ∨
(168–223) (168–210) ∨ <<< adopted out <<<
adoptive cousins of Cao Cao [ formerly Xiahou; surname changed to Cao]
Cao Song Xiahou
Cao Hong [ younger brother] [elder brother]
(d.232) married a Lady Ding personal name
adoptive (d.193) unknown
cousin of Cao Cao
Cao Cao (155–220) Cao Bin Cao Yu Cao De Xiahou Dun

[eldest son] (c.160–c.185?) (c.160–c.185?) (c.160–193) (d.220)
first marriage
to a Lady Ding ? ? ?
[no sons]
second marriage one son [Cao Anmin (d.197)] + two daughters

to the Lady Bian details of parentage unknown
many other concubines

and casual partners
Cao Ang Cao Pi Cao Zhang Cao Zhi Cao Xiong eldest m Xiahou
(c. 177–197) (187–226) (c.190–223) (192–232) (dates unknown) daughter Mao
born of the born of the born of the born of the born of the born of the [second
Lady Liu Lady Bian Lady Bian Lady Bian Lady Bian Lady Liu son]
Cao Chong nineteen other the Lady Cao Jie other

(196–208) sons (d.260) daughters
born of the Empress of
Lady Huan Emperor Xian
For further details of Cao Cao’s children, see Chapter Nine at 403.
22 chapter one
Given the statements of Cao Man zhuan and Guo Ban, and his own
compilation of Sanguo zhi 9, it is hard to explain why Chen Shou
should have discounted the connection to the Xiahou. He may have
been subject to political influence, but several early commentators
followed his example, questioning the degree of kinship or even its
existence.29 Evidence from the tombs now appears convincing, but the
controversy raised several points on perceptions of eunuchs, lineage
and marriage at that time.
It has been argued that the Xiahou, a family of gentry quality, would
not have allowed one of their sons to be adopted by a eunuch, but we
may doubt that disapproval was so strongly felt as to prohibit such
contact. True Confucianists may have felt distaste, and there was com-
petition across the countryside, but much of our present perspective is
owed to accounts of the endemic political conflict between the inner
court, where eunuchs played a significant and sometimes decisive
role, and the outer bureaucracy composed of gentlemen and scholars.
Since these latter compiled the histories, eunuchs have often received
a worse press than they deserved.
Some men, however, dealt with eunuchs in straight-forward fashion
as players in politics and society. The Yuan family of Runan and the
Yang of Hongnong, for example, had members at the highest level
of the bureaucracy in a regime dominated by eunuchs. They suffered
no criticism for their subservience but were admired for the positions
they attained. The Xiahou clan may have been well regarded locally
and could claim a fine ancestry, but none of its members had held
notable office for several generations. Cao Teng had a good reputation,
and for those prepared to ignore the fact of his castration, connec-
tion with such a person could be valuable. If Cao Song was Xiahou
by birth, he gained greatly in wealth and rank from his adoption, and
had a most successful political career. He was criticized for extrava-
gance and corruption, but there is no record of any disapproval for
his background.
The second major argument adduced against Cao Song’s origin in
the Xiahou family relates to the fact that his son Cao Cao arranged
for one of his daughters to marry Xiahou Mao, son of Xiahou Dun.
29
The debate is well summarised by Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 48–52, though his con-
clusion that there was no connection with the Xiahou appears disproven by the Cao
family tombs, excavated after he wrote.
If Cao Song was a younger brother of Xiahou Dun’s father, then Cao
Cao and Xiahou Dun were first cousins, and since Cao Man zhuan
and Guo Ban are known to have been hostile to the Cao, it has been
suggested that the kinship was invented to embarrass the family by a
charge of consanguinity.30
The natural connection was not close, for it would have been a mar-
riage of second cousins, well outside Western prohibitions of consan-
guinity. Han custom, however, held that persons of the same surname
should not wed,31 and some claimed that a man should not marry a
woman of his former lineage; this latter restriction, however, appears
to have been honoured as much in the breach as in the observance.32
30
See, for example, the comments of the Qing scholar Zhao Yiqing quoted in SGZJJ
9:1a.
In further argument against any close relationship between the Cao and the Xia-
hou, Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 51–52, suggests that if the two families had been connected
by blood, it would have been unnecessary to strengthen the tie by marriage: Cao Cao
was thus “wasting” an opportunity to establish connection with another powerful fam-
ily. I do not find this a convincing point, for the most effective use of “dynastic” mar-
riages was to confirm a family association rather than to create one; otherwise, as in
the West, they were more likely to cause trouble and embarrassment.
There are certainly examples of marriage connections—or attempts at them—
among warlords at this time: Lü Bu and Yuan Shu [Chapter Three at 101 and 109],
Cao Cao and Sun Ce [note 43 below and Chapter Three at 103], Cao Cao and Yuan
Tan [Chapter Five at 214] and Sun Quan and Liu Bei [Chapter Seven at 290]. In none
of these cases did the marriage create an effective alliance.
SGZJJ 20:1a–b has collected the surviving records of Cao Cao’s various daughters
and their marriages; they are discussed in Chapter Nine. Apart from three who were
placed in the harem of Emperor Xian, it appears that Cao Cao arranged their mar-
riages as recognition of service—as to the son of his senior adviser Xun Yu—rather
than as attempts at alliance. Cf. however, note 54 to Chapter Three.
31
Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, 35–36 citing, inter alia, Bohu tong 9:12b; Tjan,
White Tiger Hall I, 255. Lee, “Women and Marriage,” 53 ff, points out, however, that
although the prime reason for surname exogamy was to avoid in-breeding, there was
uncertainty and disagreement whether the marriage of maternal cousins was permit-
ted: they did not share the same surname, but they were just as closely related. She
cites the Zheng lun “On Proper Conduct” by the third-century moralist Yuan Zhun
[quoted in Tong dian 60:346b], who objected to the practice, but notes that his stric-
tures were largely ignored. Marriage between the Cao and Xiahou families might have
offended Yuan Zhun and those who agreed with him, but that is not to say that they
were a matter of public scandal.
32
A case commonly cited is that of Chen Jiao, mentioned above as adopted from
the Liu surname: see note 25 above. The Weishi chunqiu of Sun Sheng, cited in com-
mentary to Chen Jiao’s biography in SGZ 22:644 PC, says that Chen Jiao married a
woman of his birth-name and faced prosecution for doing so, but Cao Cao issued a
proclamation stating that the turmoil of civil war had damaged good custom, and all
such cases before the year 200 were to be ignored. JS 46:1308–09 gives further details:
that the father of Chen Jiao’s wife was named Liu Song, that he was threatened with
24 chapter one
Cao Cao had small concern for these niceties. The Lady Bian, who
became his principal wife, had been a singing girl, and Cao Cao was
also quite prepared to take the wife of Qin Yilu as a concubine when
her husband was still alive.33 Besides giving his daughter to Xiahou
Mao, he further offended propriety by proposing a union of dead
children: when his twelve-year-old son Chong died in 208, Cao Cao
suggested to his civil officer Bing Yuan, whose daughter had also died
young, that the two might be buried together. Bing Yuan refused on
moral grounds, but Cao Chong was eventually buried with a girl of
the Zhen family.34
There were—and are—two different approaches to this matter.
Mainstream Confucians would follow Mencius, who expressed the
strongest disapproval to the burial of even images in tombs as com-
panions for the deceased, not to mention actual humans.35 There is,
however, a long tradition, continuing to the present day, of burying
the body of a woman with that of a man, otherwise unconnected, so
that they might find company in the grave.36 Bing Yuan held to the
first opinion; Cao Cao and the Zhen parents to the second.
impeachment by the censorial official Liu You, but that the official Chen Qian halted
the process.
The modern commentary of SGZJJ 22:21a–b, however, quotes Yao Fan of Qing,
who notes that Chen Jiao died in 237, more than sixty years before the death of his
putative father-in-law Liu Song in 301, while the editor Lu Bi adds that Chen Qian
was actually a son of Chen Jiao. Combined into a whole, the story becomes incoher-
ent and unreliable.
Furthermore, the commentator Pan Mei of Qing cites a passage from Weishi chun-
qiu, quoted by TPYL 541:6a, which describes how Wang Ji, a high official of Wei, also
married a woman of his birth-clan. Wang Ji was known as a fine Confucian, and may
be assumed to have followed approved morality of the time.
33
SGZ 3:100.
Similarly, when the Lady Zhen, wife of the enemy Yuan Xi, was captured in 204,
Cao Cao’s son Cao Pi took her as his wife though Yuan Xi was still alive. Her son Cao
Rui, who was recognised as Cao Pi’s heir and succeeded him as emperor of Wei, was
probably born before Yuan Xi died in 207: SGZ 5:160; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses
and Consorts, 97.
34
SGZ 11:351 and SGZ 20:580. ZZTJ 55:2096 records Bing Yuan’s comments, but
does not mention the successful conclusion of Cao Cao’s project: deC, Generals of the
South, 401–02.
35
See the well-known passage in Mencius IV:6; Legge, Classics II, 133–134.
In Handai hunsang lisu kao, 214, Yang Shuda observes that the custom of burying
together (hezang 合葬) children below marriageable age ( jia shang 嫁殤) did exist
during Han, though it was disapproved by Zhou li 4:12a; Biot, Rites des Tcheou I, 307.
36
Zuo zhuan Wen 6 tells how Duke Mu of Qin 秦穆公, who died in 620, had three
senior officers join him in death, and the event is mourned by the Yellow Birds 黃鳥
The critics were men of high principle, but they did not necessar-
ily reflect common opinion, and though enemies might denigrate his
conduct there is no reason to believe that Cao Cao or his associates
were troubled by their accusations. In other words, though the claim
of kinship with Xiahou Dun was perhaps intended as hostile propa-
ganda, it may also have been true, and Cao Cao would have been in
no way embarrassed. He followed a different morality.37
Even allowing for the bias of two leading texts, therefore, it is likely
that the family of Cao Teng was connected to the Xiahou and, given
the necessary tolerance, the link by adoption could have been valu-
able and appropriate for both parties. As in the examples of Sun He
and Zhu Zhi, if an adoptive son was to come from outside the lin-
eage, he was commonly sought among families related by marriage.
If there were no spare males of the Cao family, a cadet of the Xiahou
would have been a good candidate for adoption by the prosperous
Cao Teng.38
Young man about town
Cao Song was around twenty-five when his formal wife the Lady Ding
gave birth to their first son.39 The child was given the personal name
[名 ming] of Cao 操, and the official style [子 zi] or intimate personal
Ode of Shi jing, the Classic of Poetry; Legge, Classics V, 244 and IV, 198–200. In the
same tradition, members of the harem of the First Emperor of Qin who had born him
no sons were killed at his death: SJ 6:265; Nienhauser, GSR I, 155.
More recently, a certain Mr Song of Hebei province was arrested as a “corpse
trader:” charged with murdering six women and selling their bodies to families which
wished to arrange marriages for dead men. Several others were involved, and the cus-
tom is apparently widespread from Shanxi to Guangdong. Xinhua News Agency, cited
by Jonathan Watts in The Guardian, London, 18 May 2007.
37
As a later example of this relaxed attitude to formal propriety, we may notice Cao
Cao’s step-son He Yan (c.190–249). He Yan’s mother was taken as a concubine by Cao
Cao, and gave birth to a daughter, He Yan’s half-sister, whom He Yan later married:
SGZ 9:292 PC quoting the anonymous Weimo zhuan “The Story of the Last Years of
Wei.” He Yan rose to high rank and influence at court.
38
It is possible, of course, that Cao Song was actually a male of the Cao family, a
son of one of Cao Teng’s three brothers who was transferred to the childless uncle
in the same way as Yuan Shao [note 24 above]. Given the fact that the histories have
some details of Cao Meng/Jie’s sons, however, it would be surprising if such a con-
nection was not well known, and Chen Shou’s expressed uncertainty about Cao Song’s
origins indicates that the situation was somewhat more complicated.
39
The surname of Cao Cao’s mother is known only because in 220 her grandson
Cao Pi had her honoured by Emperor Xian of Han: SGZ 2:59. She probably came also
26 chapter one
name of Mengde 孟德 “Great Virtue.” The character cao 操 sounded

in the level tone indicates the verb “to grasp” or “to manage;” in the
oblique, falling tone, it is understood as “that which is held on to,” or
“principle.” In Han times there was usually a correlation between the
meaning of the ming and of the zi, and Cao Cao’s personal name thus
indicates that he should hold firmly to that which is right.40 Cao Man
zhuan, however, claims that he was known in his childhood as A’man
阿瞞 “Little Trickster,” and also that he had a second personal name,
Jili 吉利 “Fortunate and Profitable;” the term li was specifically con-
demned by Mencius; but Cao Man zhuan is known as a hostile source,
not always reliable, and the name Jili appears in no other text.41
Cao Cao’s adoptive grandfather Cao Teng died about 160, when
Cao Cao was still very young, and Cao Song inherited his fief. We have
few details of Cao Song’s official career and none of his early years,
though we know that he became Director of Retainers, head of the
capital province and a senior officer of the Censorate, and that during
the 170s and early 180s he was Minister of Finance and then Minister
Herald under the eunuch-dominated regime of Emperor Ling. In 187,
through a system of fines and bribes which had been introduced to
benefit the private imperial purse, Cao Song paid a hundred million
cash to become Grand Commandant, highest position in the imperial
civil service. The extraordinary sum demonstrates not only the corrup-
tion of the court and the bureaucracy but also the family’s wealth. He
held the position for less than six months.42
Cao Song had three other sons, Bin, Yu and De, all younger than
Cao Cao, but no daughters are mentioned in the texts. There are sur-
prisingly limited references to these brothers, and no account of their
lives, but between them they left one son and at least two daughters.43
from Pei, and may well have been of the same family as Cao Cao’s own first wife, her
future daughter-in-law.
40
See also Kroll, “Portraits,” 32 note 32 quoting Sung Yü-wen, Sanguo zatan, 241–
242, and Karlgren, GSR, item 1134m.
41
On Cao Man zhuan, see note 27 above. On Confucian disapproval of the search
for li profit, see Mencius IA; Legge, Classics II, 125–127.
42
On the system of purchases or fines introduced by Emperor Ling, see deC,
“Recruitment Revisited,” 40–43.
43
While SGZ 9 contains major biographies of the members of the Cao and Xia-
hou families, as discussed on page 20 above, SGZ 20 provides short notices of lesser
figures:
SGZ 20:588 says that Cao Cao’s son Jun was appointed to maintain the lineage of
his uncle Cao Bin, younger brother of Cao Cao, who had been granted posthu-
We know that Cao Song and his youngest son Cao De were killed in
193,44 but Cao Bin and Cao Yu are referred to only posthumously. It
seems probable that they died before 190, for if either had been avail-
able and active Cao Cao would surely have used them in his adminis-
tration or his army. Anyone involved in a developing civil war needed
all the family support he could get.
Though Cao Song’s high rank surely reflected usefully upon his son,
there does not appear to have been any close connection between them.
We know little of Cao Song apart from his official career—notably the
extraordinary price that he paid to become an Excellency—and his
unfortunate death at the hands of Tao Qian, for which Cao Cao would
exact a filial vengeance.
mous title as Respectful Duke of Ji, a county in Guangyang. [Confusingly, there

was a distant cousin who also had the personal name Bin: SGZ 9:282.]
SGZ 20:589 says that Cao Cao’s son Hui was appointed to maintain the lineage
of his uncle Cao Yu, also a younger brother of Cao Cao, who had been granted
posthumous title as Lamented Marquis of Langling, a county in Runan.
On children of the three brothers, who would have been nephew and nieces of Cao
Cao, we have scattered information:
SGZ 1:14 says that when Cao Cao was defeated by Zhang Xiu in Nanyang in
197, one of the casualties was his nephew Cao Anmin. There is no record of
Anmin’s father.
SGZ 9:272 says that Xiahou Heng, a son of Xiahou Yuan and his wife, Cao Cao’s
sister-in-law [note 47 below], married the daughter of an unnamed brother of
Cao Cao whose posthumous title was Lamented Marquis of Haiyang in Liaoxi.
There is no mention of this fief elsewhere, but the state of Wei changed the
sites of its feudatories quite frequently, and since the posthumous appellation of
Cao Yu was “Lamented” (as above) it may have been his daughter who married
Xiahou Heng. Cf. SGZJJ 9.9b.
In 198, moreover, Cao Cao confirmed an alliance with the young southern
warlord Sun Ce by marrying another of his nieces to Sun Ce’s brother Sun
Kuang: SGZ Wu 1:1104. There is no indication whose daughter she was.
44
HHS 78/68:2519 and SGZ 1:11 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu “Tales of the Genera-
tions of Wei and Jin” tell how Cao Song and his youngest son Cao De were killed in
Xu province in 193. There is some confusion about the young man’s given name:
HHS 78/68 has the character ji 疾, and punctuates it as part of a name, but it
should be interpreted here as “urgently” or “hurriedly,” describing the manner in
which Cao Song and his son sought to escape from the disturbances;
ZZTJ 60:1945 punctuates the name as Deqiu 德秋; but the context of Wei-Jin
shiyu makes it clear that qiu belongs at the beginning of the following sentence
as “In the autumn . . . :” deC, Establish Peace, 119.
The young man’s name was certainly De, but though we are told how sons of Cao Cao
were appointed to maintain the lineages of Cao Bin and Cao Yu, such a courtesy is not
recorded for Cao De. It is just possible that he left an unnamed son.
28 chapter one
As well as the Xiahou, Cao Song and his family were associated
with the Ding clan of Pei, for Cao Song and Cao Cao both married
women of that surname. During the 180s Ding Gong of Pei served as
Administrator and Inspector in the far south, returned to the capital
as Minister of the Household and became an Excellency.45 Later there
was Ding Chong, also from Pei, described as an old companion of
Cao Cao, assisted him in his dealings with the emperor in 196.46 Ding
Chong died in a drinking bout, but his two sons, Ding Yi and Ding I,
were close friends of Cao Cao’s son Cao Zhi and would play an unsuc-
cessful part in his competition with Cao Cao’s elder son Cao Pi for the
succession to their father’s state.
Though Pei was a large territory, it seems likely the Cao, Xiahou and
Ding families had a common association in their local community,
several times expressed by marriage,47 and it was probably not entirely
coincidental that Cao Song and Ding Gong became Excellencies about
the same time. Despite such successes, however, this was a small clique
and not a very important one when compared to the truly great official
families such as the Yang of Hongnong and the Yuan of Runan; and
its position at the capital would soon be overtaken and destroyed by
events. Cao Cao had some family connections, but he would in the end
be compelled to make his own way by his own abilities.
We may assume that Cao Cao spent most of his childhood on the
family property in Qiao, possibly with excursions to Luoyang. He
certainly maintained connection with his home country, and he very
likely studied with private tutors, for the Imperial University at that
time was neither an impressive nor an effective institution.48 In 174,
45
HHS 8:354–58, SGZ 6:175, SGZ Wu 4:1191; LH3K, 141.
46
HHJ 28:336–37, HHS 72/62:2342, SGZ 19:561–62; LH3K, 141. Though the histo-
ries make no reference to the relationship, it is possible that Ding Chong was a son
or nephew of Ding Gong.
47
Xiahou Yuan, a distant cousin of Xiahou Dun who later became one of Cao Cao’s
leading generals, was connected to Cao Cao by marriage, probably through the Ding
clan. SGZ 9:272 describes his wife as a neimei 內妹 [sister-in-law] of Cao Cao. Given
that Cao Cao and Xiahou Yuan were about the same age and that the Lady Ding was
Cao Cao’s principal wife until the late 190s, we may assume Xiahou Yuan married a
sister of the Lady Ding; a connection to Cao Cao’s second wife the Lady Bian is far
less likely.
48
See, for example, deC, “Scholars and Rulers,” 71. The University suffered severely
for its involvement in anti-eunuch politics during the late 160s, and was purged in
172. Morale and conduct became so low that in 175 the government ordered the texts
however, at the age of twenty sui Cao Cao was nominated Filial and
Incorrupt and came to the capital as a gentleman cadet.
Nomination as Filial and Incorrupt was made by the head of a man’s
commandery unit, in this case the Chancellor of Pei, who was required
to propose two men each year.49 After preliminary assessment at the
capital, the candidates entered one of three corps of Gentlemen under
the Minister of the Household. Formally they served as guards and
attendants to the sovereign, but that function was rather decorative
than practical; in reality they were being assessed for commissioned
office in the imperial civil service. The period of probation varied, but
was normally three years.50
For a young man with substantial family property and a father in
senior office, such procedures were largely a matter of form, but the
time spent as a gentleman cadet gave opportunity to take part in life
at the capital, and Cao Cao appears to have made the most of it. There
are several accounts of his activities, summed up by Chen Shou:
As a young man Cao Cao was clever and calculating, but also violent and
immoral,51 and he did not attend to his duties. So people at that time
thought little of him.
Chen Shou, of course, was a historian of Shu-Han, rival to Cao Cao’s
state of Wei,52 and he later served the Sima family of Jin which had
of Confucian classics to be inscribed on stele, as a means to prevent forgery by Acad-

emicians: HHS 79/69A:2547; deC, Huan and Ling, 132 and 481–83.
49
The population of Pei was just over 200,000, and an edict of 92 required each
commandery unit to recommend one candidate for every hundred thousand head
of population, giving a total of some two hundred throughout the empire: HHS
37/27:1268.
50
DeC, “Recruitment Revisited,” 10.
51
SGZ 1:2: the damning terms are 任俠放蕩. Of these, 俠 xia is frequently under-
stood and rendered as “knight-errant,” or “redresser-of-wrongs,” echoing Western
ideals of chivalry. This, however, is not the way it was [any more than in the West]:
xia describes a man of physical prowess, who was more likely to cause trouble than
to rescue women and children in distress. To act as a xia was an entertainment for
gentleman and their retainers; among men of more humble birth it was largely indis-
tinguishable from simple brigandry.
52
In 214 the condottiere Liu Bei established himself in Yi province of Later Han,
present-day Sichuan extending into Yunnan. He traced a distant descent from
Emperor Jing of Former Han, who had ruled in the second century BC, and in 219 he
proclaimed himself King of Hanzhong, the territory which had been held by Emperor
Gao, founder of Han. In 221, after the deposition of Liu Xie, Emperor Xian, by Cao
Cao’s son Cao Pi, Liu Bei claimed to continue the dynasty and took the imperial title
for himself. The formal name of his state was thus Han, but it is commonly known as
Shu-Han; Shu being the ancient name for the territory. I follow that convention.
30 chapter one
subverted the Wei. He had therefore no reason to protect Cao Cao’s

reputation, and his strictures are supported by a variety of tales from
similarly hostile sources. Cao Man zhuan, for example, says that Cao
Cao was addicted to falconry and dog-racing, and tells how he dis-
credited an uncle who sought to reveal his misconduct to his father
Cao Song.53 The Yitong zayu “Comparisons and Comments” by Sun
Sheng of the fourth century records that on one occasion Cao Cao
broke into the mansion of the powerful eunuch Zhang Rang, and
when he was discovered he danced with a hand-axe in the courtyard,
then leapt over the wall to make his escape.54 Sun Sheng goes on to
say that his fighting skills made it impossible for anyone to harm
him, but we may assume that his family connections also served to
protect him.55
53
SGZ 1:2 PC note 1. Nothing more is known of this uncle, who is described as
叔父 and was thus a younger brother of Cao Song. It seems unlikely that he too had
been adopted by Cao Teng, so he would have kept the original family surname—
possibly Xiahou—but evidently came to the capital to gain some benefit from the new
circumstances.
54
SGZ 1:3 PC note 2 quoting Yitong zayu, also cited by the commentary of Liu Jun
to SSXY XXVII:1; Mather, Tales of the World, 441–442.
Sun Sheng (c.302–c.375) has a biography in JS 82:2147–48, sharing the chapter
with other historians of the period such as Chen Shou and Sima Biao. A man from
Taiyuan, he fled to the south after the fall of Western Jin, served as a staff officer
under the transplanted Eastern Jin, was enfeoffed for his military achievements, and
later became a scholar in the imperial library. He composed two substantial histori-
cal works, Weishi chunqiu 魏氏春秋 “Chronicle of the House of Wei,” already cited
above, and Jin yangqiu 晉陽秋 “Chronicle of Jin.” [The character chun in the title of
the latter work was changed to avoid taboo on the personal name of the Lady Zheng
Achun 鄭阿春, mother of Emperor Jianwen 簡文 of Eastern Jin, who was posthu-
mously honoured as an empress; the titles of many such works were later returned to
their original form, but this one was not.]
Sun Sheng had a jaundiced eye for all the rivals of the Three Kingdoms, and
besides his two formal histories he compiled notes on events. These are quoted by
Pei Songzhi and others under a variety of titles: Yitong zayu “Comparisons and Com-
ments,” Zaji “Miscellany,” Yitong ping “Comparisons and Criticisms” and sometimes
simply Ping “Criticisms;” the different citations probably refer to the same collection
of essays: deC, Records, 74, and Generals of the South, 566.
55
Though he may have been skilled and agile, it does not appear that Cao Cao was
a big man. Another story about a later time, when he was King of Wei, says that as an
envoy from the Xiongnu came to court he felt that his own physique was too slight to
impress the visitor and chose one of his more imposing courtiers to act in his stead.
See further in Chapter Eleven at 476.
In commentary to SSXY XIV:1, moreover, Liu Jun quotes Sun Sheng, whose Weishi
chunqiu says that though Cao Cao had great presence, he was short of stature. This
does not preclude him being agile and skilled in combat when he was young; he was
in his early sixties when he became King of Wei in 216.
Another anecdote, preserved in the anthology Shishuo xinyu, tells

how Cao Cao and Yuan Shao raided a wedding party. Cao Cao broke
into the bride’s tent, threatened her with a sword and raped her. The
two men then fled, but Yuan Shao became entangled in some bram-
bles. Then Cao Cao called out “Here’s the villain!” so that the pursu-
ers turned on Yuan Shao; he barely escaped, torn and bleeding, while
Cao Cao left unscathed. Such conduct may have been common among
young thugs about town, but it is probable that the story is symbolic
rather than real, for it presents a close parallel to the political situa-
tion of the late 190s. Then, as we shall see, Cao Cao held Emperor
Xian as a puppet under his control, and accused Yuan Shao of lacking
obedience and failing in his duty to the throne. As the position of the
emperor resembled that of the young woman in the anecdote, while
the blame cast upon Yuan Shao is common to both, one may conclude
that Shishuo xinyu has preserved an analogy rather than the record of
a real event.56
There are positive references to Cao Cao at this time, mostly describ-
ing how perceptive men foretold his future success. His friend Wang
Jun is said to have observed that Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu would
cause trouble throughout the world, and Cao Cao was the only one
capable of restoring order; like other records of allegedly private con-
versations, this has limited authority.57 More significant were the com-
ments of the Excellency Qiao Xuan and the official He Yong, respected
judges of character, both of whom saw danger for the empire, with
Cao Cao as the man to save it. Qiao Xuan further suggested that Cao
Cao consult Xu Shao, doyen in this field and, when pressed, Xu Shao
gave the celebrated reply that he would be “a good servant in time of
peace, a dangerous chieftain in time of trouble.” Cao Cao was pleased,
and Xu Shao’s comments helped make his name.58
56
SSXY XXVII:1; Mather, Tales of the World, 441 [Guile and Chicanery], also in the
collection Xiaoshuo compiled by Yin Yun of the sixth century: GXSGC at 75–76. The
term I render as “rape” is 劫 jie; Mather prefers the more neutral “made off with her,”
but that does not fit well with the escape which followed. Regardless of fact, the story
may have been developed from the alleged incident in Zhang Rang’s courtyard.
57
SGZ 1:31 PC quoting Yishi zhuan “Biographies of Gentlemen in Retirement” by
Huangfu Mi (215–282). Some fifteen years older than Cao Cao, Wang Jun never held
office, but after his death in the early 200s Cao Cao paid him special honours.
58
SGZ 1:2–3 and PC quoting Wei shu “The [Official] History of Wei.” This text,
naturally favourable to Cao Cao, claims that Qiao Xuan was so impressed he under-
took to entrust his wife and children to Cao Cao, so he might protect them in the time
of troubles which was coming after his own death.
32 chapter one
Regardless of conduct, Cao Cao gained a good education. He became

a noted poet, but in these early years he was particularly attracted to
books on military affairs. He compiled Jieyao 接要 “Summary of the
Essentials,” based upon a study of all military texts, and he also wrote
a commentary to Sunzi Bingfa, “The Art of War” ascribed to Sun Wu
of the Warring States period, which was already recognised as a major
work. Jieyao has long disappeared, but Sunzi continues well-known
and popular, and Cao Cao’s commentary is still included in the canon
of the classic. Though it is remarkable in being compiled by a man who
would hold the highest command, the commentary is unfortunately
brief and even cryptic, and reflects little of his personal experience.
Cao Cao’s scholarly interests are mentioned at this point in his
biography in Sanguo zhi, and his work on Jieyao and Sunzi probably
began about this time, but it is not known when they were completed.
It is likely that a great part was written during his period of enforced
retirement in the late 170s, on which see below, and perhaps during
the 180s. Thereafter he was intensely engaged in practical aspects of
warfare, and probably had less time for theory.59
About 175, after little more than a year as gentleman cadet, Cao Cao
took commissioned office as Commandant of the Northern Division
of Luoyang, the county which controlled the imperial capital. The two
Commandants, north and south, held important positions, though it
is said that Cao Cao had hoped to be made Prefect of Luoyang, head
of the county itself. His ambition was frustrated by Liang Gu, who was
the Master of Writing in the Imperial Secretariat responsible for such
appointments, and Cao Cao was obliged to content himself with the
lesser post.60 It would in any case have been remarkable for a young
As Leban observes, however, the comments and their attribution are in some cases
confused, and they may have been devised later, as propaganda for Cao Cao’s cause
in the civil war; “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 54–55.
More generally, we may note that there was widespread interest at this time in “pure
judgements” (淸議 qingyi) often expressed in short and pithy epigrams, sometimes
rhyming. Practitioners of the art were greatly admired and acquired considerable
influence in their communities, and during the 160s and early 170s the students of the
University had chanted slogans in support of their political heroes. See, for example,
deC, “Political Protest,” 19–21, and “Politics and Philosophy,” 57–58.
59
Cao Cao’s interest in books on military matters is mentioned by Sun Sheng’s
Yitong zayu at SGZ 1:3 PC. For a more detailed discussion of his work in this field,
see the section on Cao Cao and the Art of War in Chapter Seven.
60
SGZ 1:31 PC quoting Siti shu shi xu by Wei Heng of Jin, being the Preface to
a study of calligraphy. Liang Gu was a celebrated calligrapher, who later took refuge
with Liu Biao in Jing province. As Cao Cao took over that territory in 208 Liang
man barely twenty to be granted such responsibility, and though the

regular period of probation may have been reduced through the influ-
ence of Cao Cao’s family, such a sensitive position was at that time
out of his range.
According to Cao Man zhuan, Cao Cao carried out his duties with
utmost energy: he set multi-coloured staves at the entrance to his
office complex, and anyone who offended the law was beaten to death.
This process culminated when an uncle of the leading eunuch Jian
Shi was killed for disobeying the curfew. As a result of such ferocity,
regulations were followed with the utmost care, but the favourites of
Emperor Ling were predictably furious. They could not harm Cao Cao
directly, but they did have him transferred to be magistrate of Dun-
qiu county in Dong commandery, on the Yellow River 250 kilometres
northeast of Luoyang.61
Some of this sounds false. Capital punishment could be inflicted by
local magistrates, and many men died under the bastinado, but it is
most unlikely that a junior official in the imperial capital could exer-
cise such power of life and death. Cao Cao was always an energetic
ruler, but Cao Man zhuan, a hostile text, has surely exaggerated his
conduct at this time.
Years later, in 214, Cao Cao left his son Cao Zhi in charge of his
capital while he went on campaign to the south. Exhorting him to
take the opportunity to show his ability, he observed that he had been
twenty-three sui, the same age as Cao Zhi, when he went to Dunq-
iu.62 So that was in 177. Nothing is recorded, however, of Cao Cao’s
government there, and it lasted little more than a year. In the winter
of 178 the Empress Song, consort of Emperor Ling, was dismissed on
allegations of witchcraft. They may have been false slanders, or the
Lady may have sought to regain her husband’s fading affections by
some magical means, but she “died of grief ” in the harem prison,63
and the disgrace extended to her family. A female cousin of Cao Cao
had married Song Qi, brother of the late empress, and while Song Qi
Gu went with bound hands to apologise for his former conduct. Cao Cao had long
admired his writing, however, and he took him onto his personal staff.
61
SGZ 1:3 PC.
62
SGZ 19:557.
63
The phrase 以憂死 appears frequently on occasions such as this. It is a cliché
which may indicate suicide or even murder.
34 chapter one
was executed Cao Cao was dismissed from office.64 It appears that he
returned to his home country in Pei.
Cao Cao had already embarked on an active and fruitful sexual life.
At one time or another he had two wives and at least thirteen concu-
bines, with many less permanent liaisons, and he recognised twenty-
five sons and at least seven daughters.65 His first formal wife was the
Lady Ding—very likely from the same clan as Cao Cao’s mother—
but his first son, Cao Ang, was born to his concubine the Lady Liu
about 177. The Lady bore two more children, a son Cao Shuo, and a
daughter, but she died soon afterwards. The Lady Ding took care of
the orphans, and became particularly attached to Cao Ang. Cao Cao
took another concubine, the Lady Bian.66
Wei shu, official history of the state and dynasty, says that the Lady
Bian was born in the winter at the end of 160, while the main text of
Sanguo zhi says that she was twenty sui when Cao Cao took her into
his household; this would have been in 179, the same time as the death
of the Lady Liu.
The Lady Bian’s background is uncertain. Wei shu says that she came
from the kingdom of Qi, by the base of the Shandong peninsula, while
Sanguo zhi gives her formal place of origin as Kaiyang in Langye. Both
were a long way from Qiao county in Pei: Kaiyang lay three hundred
kilometres to the northeast and Qi was even further, and it appears
that the Lady’s family was peripatetic. Sanguo zhi says that she was a
singing girl, so she may have travelled for trade. Though the phrase
used to describe her occupation, changjia 倡家, sometimes understood
as “sing-song girl,” is often used as a euphemism for a prostitute, the
Lady Bian was probably of a higher grade. Her career may have been
64
SGZ 1:3 PC note 4. There are no further details on this “younger cousin” 從
妺. She was perhaps a daughter of the uncle who attempted to censure Cao Cao [30
and note 53 above], but there may have been other family members who came to the
imperial court.
65
Accounts of the wives and consorts of Cao Cao and later rulers of Wei appear
in SGZ 5, translated by Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Consorts. His sons and their
mothers are listed at SGZ 20:579, with biographies in SGZ 19 and 20, and the material
is discussed in Chapter Nine.
We have observed at note 39 that Cao Cao’s first wife may have come from the
same clan as his mother the Lady Ding, wife of Cao Song. An account of this second
Lady Ding is given at SGZ 5:156–57 PC quoting Wei lue “An Account of Wei;” Cutter
& Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 91–92.
66
The biography of the Lady Bian, with an account of her family, is at SGZ
5:156–59, translated and discussed in detail by Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Con-
sorts, 90–95.
that of a Japanese geisha or an ancient Greek hetaera, an entertainer

skilled in music but who also possessed intelligence and education; the
very fact that she travelled indicates some quality.67 Certainly the Lady
Bian was competent, and she would play a substantial and trusted role
in Cao Cao’s career. Her first son Cao Pi, however, was not born until
187, eight years after she entered Cao Cao’s household.
We may assume that Cao Cao’s father Cao Song had also been dis-
missed on account of the family connection to the late Empress. He
was, however, soon restored to office, while Cao Cao returned to court
as a Consultant, probably in 180: Wei shu says that he was appointed
because of his understanding of ancient learning, and in the summer
of that year an edict called for men who were expert in the Classic of
Poetry, the History, Zuo zhuan or the Guliang commentary to Chunq-
iu.68 Consultant was a comparatively junior rank, though it could serve
as a holding position for higher office. In this case we are told only that
Cao Cao presented two memorials, both opposed to eunuch influence
over the emperor and to government corruption. Predictably, nei-
ther was well received and Cao Cao did not repeat the exercise. He
remained in his lowly position for the next several years.
Yellow Turbans
The cult of Huang-Lao, popular during Han, claimed that the com-
bination deity of the mythical Yellow Emperor and the sage Laozi
could manifest itself from one generation to another. The cult was not
inherently anti-dynastic, and Emperor Huan had offered worship to
Huang-Lao, but it did inspire several rebellions.69 Confucian scholars
67
Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 90, state specifically that the Lady
Bian had worked in a brothel. On the other hand, the art of singing was recognized
and appreciated for its own sake, with no indications of sexual licence. In 216 Cao Cao
granted his officer Xiahou Dun a troupe of fine musicians and celebrated singers (伎樂
名倡 jiyue mingchang), and in a proclamation he compared this reward to that which
an ancient ruler of Jin made to his successful servant Wei Jiang 魏絳: SGZ 9:268 and,
on the award to Wei Jiang, SJ 39:1682; Chavannes, MH IV, 329. It is clear from con-
text, and from the publicity which Cao Cao gave the matter, that no impropriety was
involved. In his Baihua translation to this passage, Su Yuanlei interprets mingchang as
倡優 changyu, the modern term for prostitutes, but he is surely mistaken.
68
SGZ 1:3 PC note 4 quoting Wei shu and HHS 8:344. The likely connection was
pointed out by Jiang Ou in Cao Cao nianbiao, 189; Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 57.
69
See deC, “Politics and Philosophy,” 73–80, also Stein, “Taoisme politico-religieux”
and Seidel, “Image of the Perfect Ruler.”
36 chapter one
identified such trouble-makers as yaoze 妖賊 “religious rebels,” but the

term means only that their doctrines were alien to the orthodoxy of
state and society, not that the various sects were necessarily related.
By the time of Emperor Ling, however, many of these teachings had
obtained a common bond. The Annals of that reign contain references
to widespread illness in 171, 173, 179, 182 and 185.70 Before then, epi-
demics had been reported from the southeast in 38–39 and 119, and
at the capital in 125. Under Emperor Huan in 151 there was again
sickness in the capital and in the southeast, but in 161 there was a fur-
ther outbreak for which no specific area is mentioned and, like those
which followed in the 170s and 180s, it appears to have spread widely
across China. Roman history records that for fifteen years from the
mid-160s the empire was afflicted by the so-called Antonine plague,
and it is very likely that the epidemic was transported across the whole
Eurasian continent. No symptoms are recorded by any Chinese texts
dealing with the second century, and the Annals are not necessarily
comprehensive, but there is clear indication of dangerous disease and
death, returning to attack the people with frightening frequency.71
As a natural consequence of this epidemic, there was notable
growth in faith-healing, and the Dian lue “An Authoritative Account
of Events” by Yu Huan of the third century remarks that during the
170s and early 180s there were a number of sects in different parts of
the empire, all of which explained illness as the result of wrong-doing
and required those afflicted to confess their faults. The religious leader
Zhang Lu would later establish a theocratic state in Hanzhong, but the
most dramatic teaching, of immediate effect, was that of Zhang Jue
from Zhuo commandery in the northeast, who propounded a Way of
Great Peace.72
70
The term used is 大疫 dayi.
71
This matter is discussed further in LH3K, 514, citing Hopkins, Princes and
Peasants, 22, McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 103–104, the Roman physician Galen and
the Chinese Ge Hong 葛洪 of the fourth century. The virulence of the disease may be
attributed to the fact that it made a “species jump” from non-human populations to
attack mankind for the first time, in the same fashion as modern AIDS, but opinions
vary as to whether it was smallpox or measles, or possibly the two arriving at different
times; it was not until the sixteenth century that European physicians recognised that
they were separate diseases: McNeill at 105. Twitchett, “Population and Pestilence,”
62 note 26, observes that an accepted date for the appearance of smallpox is 347 AD,
but that there has been a deal of debate and disagreement on the matter.
72
Dian lue is quoted at SGZ 8:264, PC. The major account of Zhang Jue and his
Taiping dao 太平道 is in HHS 71/61:2299 ff, being the biography of Huangfu Song,
Like the worship of Huang-Lao, the concept of a utopian age of

Great Peace had been known under Former Han, and a book entitled
Taiping jing, “The Classic of Great Peace,” was presented to Emperor
Shun of Later Han, probably in the 130s.73 Though the work and its
doctrines were not specifically anti-dynastic, it was widely believed that
the rule of Han would be brought to an end by the power of Yellow.
At one level, this accorded with the cycle of the Five Powers, whereby
the red Fire of Han would give way to the Yellow of Earth,74 but some
opinion went further: no doubt expecting another reincarnation of the
Yellow Emperor, it claimed that the blue sky of Han would be replaced
by the Yellow Heaven of a new age and order. This latter prophecy was
taken up by Zhang Jue, who foretold that the apocalypse would come
in the next jiazi year, 184, first of a new sexagenary cycle.75
Over several years from the 170s, Zhang Jue acquired followers
across the North China plain and in the capital, and as forecast of the
change to come the characters jiazi were chalked onto the walls and
gates of the imperial capital and of official buildings in the provinces.
The local officials, however, took an optimistic and blinkered view,
they did not report these signs of potential hostility to the central gov-
ernment, and many men in authority regarded the sect as just one
more populist movement. The very fact that its adherents included
palace eunuchs and other citizens of Luoyang must have made it seem
less threatening, and some believers may indeed have had no ill inten-
tion. There were isolated warnings of danger, but they were ignored.
who played a leading role in putting down the rebellion. See also deC, Huan and
Ling, 88–96.
The other sects mentioned by Dian lue, including that of the “Way of the Five
Dou of Rice” later controlled by Zhang Lu, are discussed further in Chapter Seven at
291–294.
73
See deC, Portents of Protest, 31–32, and Generals of the South, 201–202, and on
the date and transmission of Taiping jing, Seidel, “Image of the Perfect Ruler,” Kalten-
mark, “Ideology of the T’ai-p’ing-ching,” Mansvelt Beck, “Date of the Taiping jing,”
Kandel, Taiping Jing, and Petersen, “Transmission of the Taiping jing.”
74
Theories of Wuxing 五行 [also rendered as Five Elements or Five Forces] as
they affected ideas on the succession of dynasties in the time of Han are discussed by
Loewe, “Concept of Sovereignty,”737–739.
75
The slogan of Zhang Jue, as recorded in HHS 71/61: 2299, was 蒼天已死; 黃天
當立. 歲在甲子, 天下太吉: “The Blue Heaven is dead, and a Yellow Heaven will take
its place. When the year is jiazi, all the world will rejoice.” As early as 170 a workman
at the Cao family tombs inscribed a brick with the phrase “Heaven is dead:” Wenwu
1978/8:34, 45 [Figure 22.5] and 50.
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 79, and others interpret the phrase zangtian 蒼天 as “Green
Heaven,” but though zang “the colour of nature” can refer to the green of foliage, it is
better understood in this context as indicating the azure sky.
38 chapter one
Zhang Jue, however, was determined on rebellion. He had disciples

throughout the east of China, and the loyalty of great numbers of poor
people, and he prepared a co-ordinated rising for the magical year of
Western 184. It was probably planned for the summer, after seasonal
planting, but the plot was discovered and the rising had to be called
ahead of time. As symbol of the new heaven which should replace the
old, the rebels wore yellow bands about their heads, and they were
known as the Yellow Turbans.76
Once the emergency was discovered, the imperial post could carry
messages faster than any system available to rebels, so many would-be
insurgents were held down by rapidly-recruited government troops.
Others would have been distracted by the needs of their crops, but
even if the rebellion was thus limited the numbers involved were
massive, amounting to the tens of thousands, and the effects were
devastating.
The chief centres of disturbance were to the north in Zhang Jue’s
own territory of present-day Hebei, in Yingchuan and Runan east of
Luoyang, and in Nanyang to the south of present-day Henan. The
government, however, raised troops from commanderies about the
capital, and by mid-year the rebels in Yingchuan and Runan had
been defeated and put to flight. With the centre of the enemy posi-
tion destroyed, Dong commandery on the Yellow River was dealt with
next, and the offensive then moved to north, where Zhang Jue and his
brothers were defeated and killed in the autumn. In the south, how-
ever, Wan city, capital of Nanyang and one of the great metropolises
of Later Han, had been seized by the rebels and was fiercely contested
until final victory in the winter.
Taken by surprise, the imperial forces were at first hard-pressed and
suffered set-backs, but they recovered surprisingly well and Zhang Jue
and his followers were eliminated within nine months. The fighting
had been ferocious, however, with slaughter and enormous casualties
76
“Yellow Turban” is not a good rendering of 黃巾, for the headgear was a simple
strip of cloth, often seen in religious context in present-day China and Japan, and in
no way so complex as an Indian turban.
Accounts of the rebellion appear in deC, Huan and Ling, 174–89, and Mansvelt
Beck, “Fall of Han,” 338–340. Chapter 3 of Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” contains a most
detailed discussion, citing and criticizing Michaud, “Yellow Turbans,” and others. He
argues convincingly for the planned date of mid-summer, though his suggestion at
71–75 that the Yellow Turbans were in some way allied to dissident gentry is not well
supported, but rather contradicted, by the records.
on both sides, and the mass mobilisation and disruption left govern-
ment control shaken and weakened over much of the heartland of
the empire. Rebellion and banditry became endemic, and though the
heart of the Yellow Turbans had been destroyed there were many
groups which drew inspiration from the example and maintained the
tradition.
At the beginning of the rebellion Cao Cao was appointed a Com-
mandant of Cavalry and sent to join the army in Yingchuan. Equal in
rank to a colonel, the office of Commandant could be a sinecure dur-
ing peace but gave command of troops when the army was expanded
for war. The size of his force is uncertain. A colonel in the regular
Northern Army had fewer than a thousand men in his regiment, but
in an emergency such as this Cao Cao may have held charge of two
or even five thousand. His followers, however, were conscript militia
from the inner commanderies of the empire: they had limited training
and no experience in formation combat.
With these troops, Cao Cao joined Huangfu Song and Zhu Jun,
imperial commanders in Yingchuan, where decisive victory was gained
in the sixth month. Zhu Jun was then ordered south into Nanyang
and Huangfu Song went to Dong commandery, while Cao Cao was
sent further down the Yellow River to be Chancellor of Ji’nan in Qing
province. This was not a full military command, but it was high office,
and a substantial step for a young man barely thirty. It is likely that
he was chosen to keep control of a territory vulnerable to Yellow Tur-
ban influence, and he showed the same energy as when he had been a
county Commandant at Luoyang.
In the early second century BC Liu Zhang, King of Chengyang in
Qing province, played a leading role in the overthrow of the usurping
Lü clan of the Dowager of Emperor Gao, and Former Han had autho-
rised shrines and services in his honour. All the province joined in the
rituals, but Ji’nan eventually became the major centre with a multitude
of extravagant sacrifices, while many families profited from the pilgrim
trade. Such local cults had been forbidden by Emperor Huan,77 but the
prohibition was not enforced and the ceremonies continued. We may
assume they had long lost any real connection to the dynasty, but they
were maintained in their own right and actually rivaled the cult of the
77
HHS 7:314; deC, “Politics and Philosophy,” 79.
40 chapter one
state. Given the crisis of the Yellow Turbans, such unorthodoxy could
be seen as a potential threat.
As soon as he arrived in Ji’nan, therefore, Cao Cao halted the wor-
ship and destroyed the shrines, emphasising the principles of state
Confucianism and purging officials in several subordinate counties. He
naturally offended a number of leading families, and he later claimed
that his policy of making honest recommendations for office interfered
with some associates of the palace eunuchs. After a year or more in his
post Cao Cao decided that he had aroused such hostility his family was
in danger, and he resigned on grounds of ill health.
There are several accounts of this period, one from the main text
of Sanguo zhi, two from Wei shu quoted by Pei Songzhi, and a fourth
from Cao Cao’s own Apologia, issued in the winter of 215/6.78 They dis-
agree whether he resigned direct from Ji’nan [the Apologia], whether
he was offered appointment as Administrator of Dong commandery
and refused [Sanguo zhi], or whether he returned to the capital for a
short time, again as a Consultant [Wei shu]. In any event, he probably
left office during 187, and Cao Pi, his eldest son by the Lady Bian and
future emperor of Wei, was born that year in Qiao. Cao Cao himself
said that he planned a life of rustic retirement in his native village,
building a simple home where he might read or hunt, depending upon
the season, while he waited for the troubles of the empire to pass away.
It appears to have been a strategic political withdrawal.
A story is told of this time how Wang Fen, Inspector of Ji province,
made plans with some like-minded gentlemen to seize the emperor
when he came on tour to the north, then depose him in a favour of a
distant kinsman, an unnamed Marquis of Hefei. One of the conspira-
tors was a certain Zhou Jing of Pei, and he told his fellow-countryman
Cao Cao. Cao Cao refused to join, and the emperor was later warned
by an omen. As he abandoned the journey, the plot came to nothing,
and Wang Fen killed himself.
The incident is mentioned by Chen Shou, the Xu Han shu of Sima
Biao has a more detailed account, and Wei shu presents a speech by
Cao Cao as he rejected the proposal. There are several anachronisms,
78
SGZ 1:4 and PC notes 1 and 2, also SGZ 1:32 PC quoting Wei-Wu gushi “Mem-
oirs of Emperor Wu of Wei.” This last, a remarkable early essay in autobiography, is
discussed further in Chapter Eight at 356–363.
however, and the whole affair is doubtful.79 Firstly, the emperor is said
to have been planning to visit Hejian, where he had lived before he
was brought to the throne, but Emperor Ling was never a great travel-
ler, and a journey at this time of rebellion would have been remark-
ably dangerous. Secondly, an Inspector did not hold high rank, and
although he might call up provincial troops in time of emergency it
would be surprising if Wang Fen could expect to gather sufficient men
to overwhelm the imperial escort. Thirdly, Hefei was a long way south,
beyond the Huai River, and a marquis from that region, whose name
is not recorded but who must have come from a distant and junior
lineage, was unlikely to have been accepted by any substantial group
within the empire. If there was such a plot, it was remarkably amateur-
ish and foredoomed to failure.
In light of future events, there is some piquancy in Cao Cao argu-
ing that “to depose one emperor and set up another is a most unfor-
tunate business for the empire,” but we may best take his speech as
the literary embellishment of a historian. On the other hand, if any-
one thought he might be willing to take part in such a venture, Cao
Cao was in an embarrassing and dangerous position. A year or two in
retirement may have been a very wise move.
Ruin of government
Though there was at this time no alternative to the current imperial

regime, it is clear that in the years which followed the Yellow Turban
rebellion the government of Emperor Ling displayed an extraordi-
nary level of insensitivity and incompetence. Despite the fact that vast
tracts of the most prosperous regions of his empire had been ravaged
by a brutal insurgency, brutally suppressed, with immense loss of life
and damage to society and the economy, the ruler and his eunuch
favourites continued their extravagant conduct and added still greater
imposts upon officials and the people. In 185 the Southern Palace at
Luoyang was damaged by fire, and funds were gathered for its restora-
tion. The damage was certainly serious, but the project was used by the
eunuchs, and even by the emperor, as an opportunity for peculation
79
The account of the plot appears in SGZ 1:4 and PC, placed chronologically, but
surely anachronistically, to 184. ZZTJ 59:1890; deC, Huan and Ling, 207–208, includes
much of the incident, but dates it more logically to 188.
42 chapter one
and waste—and while the eunuchs built great mansions at the capital
and bought up farmland in the provinces, the ruler amused himself in
the Western Garden.80
Favoured pleasure-ground of Emperor Ling, the Western Garden
served not only for the entertainment of the sovereign and the ladies of
his harem, but also contained his personal treasury. Some money was
acquired by forced transfer from the public purse, but great sums came
also from the sale of offices: like many others, Cao Cao’s father Cao
Song was required to pay a fine or bribe at the Western Garden office
when he became Grand Commandant in 187. Such private corrup-
tion by the ruler was inherently absurd, but we are told that Emperor
Ling had been poor when he was young, before he was brought to the
throne, and that he never recovered from the uncertainty.
While corruption continued at Luoyang, moreover, there were fur-
ther disturbances outside the capital, some of them serious. At the end
of 184, even as the last resistance of the Yellow Turbans was being
eliminated, a mutiny in the northwest triggered a widespread rebel-
lion. Swiftly gaining control in Liang province, the insurgents cut
communication with central Asia and then came east to threaten the
old imperial capital of Chang’an. They were eventually driven back,
but they were not destroyed, and much of the region and its revenues
was lost to the government of Han. At the same time, north of the
capital in the Taihang ranges of present-day Shanxi, a loose confedera-
tion known as the Black Mountain bandits became so successful that
their leader Zhang Yan was recognised as an imperial official, with
right to nominate candidates for office.81 Elsewhere the name of Yel-
low Turbans was taken by a variety of insurgents, from Yi province in
the west to Xihe commandery in the north.82 Few of these had more
than minimal connection with the teachings of Zhang Jue, but in 188
a major rising of Yellow Turbans in Qing and Xu provinces was prob-
80
HHS 8:351 and HHS 78/68:2535, also ZZTJ 58:1876–77; deC, Huan and Ling,
191–192.
81
The biography of Zhang Yan, also known as Zhang Feiyan, Flying Swallow
Zhang, is in SGZ 8. Black Mountain was the name given to a south-eastern ridge of
the Taihang Shan west of present-day Qi county in northern Henan. This territory, in
the northern corner of Henei in Sili, gave access to Ji, Yan and Bing provinces, and
the bandits’ depredations extended widely.
82
DeC, Huan and Ling, 192–208, and, on the rebellion in Liang province, North-
ern Frontier, 146–161. In future years, Cao Cao would have dealings with rebels and
warlord opponents in all these territories.
ably an extension and some form of revival of the defeated cause.83

In addition, there was rebellion in the south, trouble with dissident
clans of the Xiongnu in the north and with the Wuhuan people of the
northeast, while the Xianbi tribes of the northern steppe made fre-
quent raids along the frontier. Still closer to home, the rebels of Liang
province again sought to break out into the lower valley of the Wei.84
After eighteen months retirement at Qiao, Cao Cao returned to the
imperial capital some time in 188. In the autumn of that year Emperor
Ling set up a new military unit, the corps of the Western Garden, and
Cao Cao was named Colonel Who Arranges the Army, ranked fourth
among eight. Yuan Shao was second, while the eunuch Jian Shi, a close
companion of the emperor known for his physical prowess and sense
of strategy, was head of the new force, with military authority even
over the General-in-Chief He Jin, brother of the Empress.85
The emperor had provided some funds from the Western Garden
to assist in the struggle against the Yellow Turbans, and this estab-
lishment under eight colonels was evidently intended as a new corps
of professional soldiers to match the regular troops of the Northern
Army stationed at the capital. In the winter two months later, after
suitable recruits had been trained and equipped, there was a grand
review at which the emperor inspected the ranks and was hailed as
“General Supreme.” It is impossible to tell, however, what longer-term
plans he may have had for his new model army, for the structures of
Han fell to ruin soon afterwards.
Emperor Ling had two sons. The elder, Liu Bian, was the child of
his Empress He, while the younger, Liu Xie, had been born to a con-
cubine nee Wang in 181. When the jealous Empress He killed the
Lady Wang, the emperor was furious and intended to dismiss her,
but the palace eunuchs managed to dissuade him. It was customary
and generally expected that the eldest son of the formal wife should
succeed his father, but imperial inheritance did not always follow that
rule, and it is possible the sovereign’s choice would have fallen upon
83
See further Chapter Two at 63.
84
On the northern peoples at this time, see deC, Northern Frontier, 146–162 [Qiang
et al.], 346–348 [Xiongnu], 397–402 [Wuhuan] and 342–345 [Xianbi]. On southern
rebellions, see deC, Generals of the South, 103–105.
85
HHS 8:356 and SGZ 1:5, also ZZTJ 59:1891; deC, Huan and Ling, 208 and 579–
580. In his Apologia, Cao Cao says that he had earlier been appointed as a Comman-
dant, possibly a restoration of his previous position as Commandant of Cavalry, held
before he became Chancellor of Ji’nan: SGZ 1:32 PC.
44 chapter one
Liu Xie.86 In the summer of 189, however, before he had announced

any decision, Emperor Ling died. He was aged thirty-four, his death
was unexpected, and it was suspiciously convenient for the Lady He
and her family.
By the constitution of Han, if an emperor died without having named
an Heir, the choice was made by his Dowager Empress; and if the suc-
cessor was under age the Dowager acted as regent. The principle had
been established during Former Han and was confirmed several times
during Later Han: Emperor An, Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling,
together with three short-lived young rulers, had been brought to the
throne by the undisputed decisions of Dowagers, each of whom then
held regency power.87 So the Lady He had no difficulty in placing her
son Liu Bian upon the throne, and as he had not yet formally come of
age she also controlled the government.
It is possible that Emperor Ling had planned for Jian Shi to serve
as a balance to the Dowager and her brother the General-in-Chief He
Jin, but his sudden death left Jian Shi no chance to play such a role. He
was arrested and killed within a few days, his troops were taken over,
and it is likely that the Western Garden force was largely disbanded.
The Dowager Dong, the natural mother of Emperor Ling who had
cared for the younger prince Liu Xie, also sought some power, but her
son Dong Zhong was promptly stripped of his office and committed
suicide, while the Lady Dong was sentenced to exile and also killed
herself.
The authority of the Dowager and her brother was now uncon-
tested, but their background was poor—it was claimed that the fam-
ily had been butchers—and He Jin felt insecure. He was impressed
and influenced by young men of family such as Yuan Shao, and this
energetic group persuaded him to purge all eunuchs from the court.
Many eunuchs, however, had been supporters of the He family, and
the Dowager refused to approve any action against them. Urged on
by Yuan Shao and his colleagues but opposed by his sister, He Jin
dithered. He did, however, call some troops from the provinces, nota-
bly the frontier general Dong Zhuo, in the vague hope that threats
from outside might persuade the Dowager to change her mind and the
86
Perhaps in part through his previous affection for the Lady Wang, Emperor Ling
showed consistent favour to her son, personally giving him the name Xie “resembles
me:” HHS 9:267.
87
See 17–18 and note 19 above.
eunuchs to go quietly. The plan did not work, but the eunuchs became
increasingly concerned and suspicious.
Cao Cao was still at the capital, but had no part in any of these
intrigues. He is said to have remarked that He Jin and his associates
were making a deal of fuss about very little: eunuchs were essential
to the proper conduct of the imperial harem, but there was no rea-
son they should hold power. The whole problem could be settled by
punishing the most notorious wrong-doers, and there was certainly
no need for an army from outside. This sensible comment may again
be apocryphal, but Cao Cao does not appear to have had interest one
way or the other, and the fact that his family owed its prosperity to
the connection with a eunuch was not a matter of concern. He was
only five years old when Cao Teng died, so he had minimal personal
contact and it was all a long time ago. As an official, he had dealt with
eunuchs and their influence when problems arose, in the same fashion
as he dealt with powerful families, and though sticklers for propriety
such as the Yuan may have thought little of his background, Cao Cao
himself appears to have been accepted without stigma.88
On 22 September 189, as He Jin visited the palace for another argu-
ment with his sister, the eunuchs sent one of their number to hide and
report the conversation. They were now convinced that He Jin was
determined to attack them, and as he left the Dowager’s apartments
they called him back on some pretext, then confronted and killed him.
Seeking to control the government, they nominated their allies to hold
office in the new regime, and when members of the Secretariat ques-
tioned their authority they rolled the head of He Jin through the hall.
Eunuchs had carried out successful coups in the past, but the situ-
ation this time was different, for they did not control the person of
the emperor and they had no ready access to any troops at the capi-
tal. Instead officers of He Jin, joined by Yuan Shao and his fellows,
brought their men to burn the gates of the Southern Palace, broke into
the compound and slaughtered every eunuch they found. On 24 Sep-
tember they attacked the Northern Palace and continued the massacre,
for a total of perhaps two thousand dead. On 25 September a remnant
group of eunuchs seized the young Emperor and his brother and fled
88
As Yuan Shao was preparing to attack Cao Cao about 200, he issued a Call to Arms
abusing Cao Cao and raising his eunuch lineage against him: HHS 74/64A:2393–98
and SGZ 6:197–99 PC quoting Weishi chunqiu; Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 50, and Chapter
Three at 129. This, however, was a matter of propaganda, and was recognised as such.
46 chapter one
the city, but they were chased and killed. As the children were brought
back to Luoyang, they came into the hands of Dong Zhuo.89
Dong Zhuo was a general from Longxi in the northwest of the
empire. He had served with varying success against the Yellow Tur-
bans and the rebels of Liang province, and earlier that year he was
named Governor of Bing province on the northern frontier. Refusing
to leave his troops, however, he moved into Hedong, north of the Yel-
low River from Luoyang, and though he received a reprimand for his
insubordination no further action was taken. On the contrary, He Jin
soon afterwards called him to the capital as a threat to the eunuchs,
and towards the end of September Dong Zhuo was in camp twenty
kilometres southwest of Luoyang. Seeing flames in the sky from the
burning palaces, he brought his army forward to occupy the capital.
Dong Zhuo had no lawful right to be in Luoyang, but there was no
force strong enough to match him, and Yuan Shao and his colleagues
were compelled to accept his power. When some ministers sought to
protest, Dong Zhuo silenced them with the observation that it was
their collective failure which had brought chaos to the state, and he
made proclamations of good will, including posthumous rehabilitation
of reformers who had opposed the eunuchs in the past. A few days
later, however, on 28 September, he deposed the young emperor Liu
Bian and placed his half-brother Liu Xie upon the throne. Commonly
known by his posthumous title as Emperor Xian, Liu Xie would be the
last sovereign of Han.90
It is said that Dong Zhuo had been unimpressed by Liu Bian’s bear-
ing when they met, while he favoured Liu Xie because he had been
cared for by the Dowager Lady Dong, who shared his surname. The
change was also a clear sign of his authority and removed all status
from the Dowager He, who died a few days later, probably by poison;
her son suffered the same fate early in the following year. The usurpa-
tion, however, produced instant counter-reaction: Yuan Shao fled the
capital even before Liu Bian was deposed, and others soon followed
his example. Dong Zhuo did attempt to appoint men of good reputa-
tion, but several of those whom he sent out to the provinces promptly
turned against him, and by the end of the year an army of “loyal reb-
89
The murder of He Jin and the destruction of the eunuchs is described by ZZTJ
59:1894–1902; deC, Establish Peace, 2–19, and by Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 98–101.
90
HHS 8: 359, 72/62:2324, SGZ 8:174–75, and ZZTJ 59:1904; deC, Establish Peace,
22–24.
grandson of a eunuch 155–189
47
Map 1. Sili Province: the capital region

48 chapter one
els” had gathered along the eastern and southern borders of the capital
commandery Henan.91
Although he was at Luoyang, there is no account of Cao Cao’s activ-
ities during the turmoil which followed the death of He Jin. Soon after
Liu Xie had been named as emperor Dong Zhuo nominated Cao Cao
as Colonel of Resolute Cavalry, presumably to help bring some order
to the riotous troops who were ravaging the city. Cao Cao had no wish
to be involved, however, for Dong Zhuo and his associates appeared
brutal and unreliable. Leaving the capital and travelling under a false
name, he fled by side-roads to the east.92
There are two stories told of his journey. Firstly, Dong Zhuo was
angry and concerned at being deserted by so many leaders and men
of family, and he sent orders for Cao Cao’s arrest. Carried by courier,
such a message would have moved more swiftly than Cao Cao, and it
is said that a post-master became suspicious of the traveller, arrested
him and sent him to county headquarters. A local officer there recog-
nised him, but believed he could assist the state in such difficult times,
and persuaded the magistrate to let him go.93
The second story has developed into one of the most celebrated
accounts of Cao Cao’s dangerous and treacherous nature. It is told in
a series of anecdotes:94
Wei shu, the official history of the state founded by Cao Cao, says that he
realised Dong Zhuo would fall, so he refused appointment and sought
to return to his home country. With a small escort of horsemen, he
passed by the house of an old friend, Lü Boshe of Chenggao county
in eastern Henan, presumably looking for a place to rest on his flight.
91
The loyal rebels (義兵 yibing) were also known as the troops “east of the moun-
tains” (山東 shandong), that is east of the passes which guarded the capital; in this
context the phrase was not related to present-day Shandong province.
92
SGZ 5:156; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 90, says that Cao Cao’s
chief concubine the Lady Bian had been with him in Luoyang and stayed there after
his flight, reassuring friends when rumours spread that he had been killed. If true,
this would indicate that Dong Zhuo was not anxious to press Cao Cao, for he could
surely have used the Lady Bian and her son Cao Pi as hostages. On the other hand, he
was swift to massacre all available members of the Yuan clan once he heard that Yuan
Shao and Yuan Shu had taken the lead against him [Chapter Two at 54], and he would
surely have had no hesitation in taking the same measures against Cao Cao’s family.
The Lady Bian’s biography does not say when or how she made her escape from the
capital, nor where she went. It is possible the story is no more than hagiography for
a future empress.
93
SGZ 1:5 with PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu.
94
The three accounts are preserved in SGZ 1:5 PC.
Lü Boshe was not there, but his sons led out a group of retainers to
attack the travellers, hoping to take their horses and goods. Cao Cao
and his men fought back and killed several of the raiders.
Wei-Jin shiyu, composed by Guo Ban about the turn of the fourth cen-
tury, says that when Cao Cao arrived Lü Boshe was not at home, but
his five sons welcomed him as a guest. Cao Cao, however, knowing
that Dong Zhuo had issued a warrant against him, was afraid they
might seize him in hope of reward. He therefore made his escape
during the night, and killed eight people as he did so.
The Zaji “Miscellany” compiled by Sun Sheng of the fourth century adds
more detail: It was the sound of people preparing food that made Cao
Cao believe they were planning to arrest him, and when he found out
his mistake he sighed with regret but remarked that “I would rather
betray others than have them betray me.”
The first of the three versions has Cao Cao as the innocent party, but
the second and third portray him as suspicious and violent, and the
saying reported by Sun Sheng became a catch-phrase for later percep-
tions of his character.
Sanguo yanyi “The Romance of the Three Kingdoms,” adds further
treachery to the tale:
Lü Boshe had gone out to get wine for the welcome feast when Cao
Cao heard someone in the kitchen say, “Do we tie them up before we
kill them?” Convinced they were planning against him, he broke in
and killed everyone there. Then, however, they found two pigs; these
were what the unfortunate servant had been referring to. Finally, as
he made his escape Cao Cao met Lü Boshe and killed him too, lest he
raise the alarm.95
This last account has no historical authority, but though the facts of the
incident cannot be determined, the embellishments reflect Cao Cao’s
later reputation as a treacherous villain, and did much to enhance it.
Cao Cao did escape successfully to Chenliu, where the armies were
gathering against Dong Zhuo. We are told that he sold family property
to raise troops, though he did not himself return to his homeland of
Pei. We are also told that he was aided by a local gentleman, Wei Zi,
who may have advanced him the money,96 and that he was joined by a
contingent of two thousand men under Zhou Yu, one of three brothers
95
This extended story is in Chapter 5 of Sanguo yanyi, referred to hereafter as
Romance. The drama Zhuo fang Cao “Capture and Release of Cao Cao,” deals with
the flight from Luoyang and includes the incident of Lü Boshe.
96
SGZ 22:645 says that Wei Zi, a man of family with high principles, had refused
nomination and invitations to join the imperial service. He now met Cao Cao for the
50 chapter one
from Kuaiji in the southeast. It is not known how they came into con-
tact, but at one time or another all the brothers were involved with
Cao Cao; they gained, however, small profit from the connection.97
Altogether, by the winter at the turn of Western 189/190, Cao Cao
had collected some five thousand men, and with this comparatively
small force he joined the allied army against Dong Zhuo.
first time; the two men admired one another and Wei Zi joined the campaign against
Dong Zhuo.
Wei-Jin shiyu, cited by SGZ 1:6 PC, implies that Wei Zi provided all the money.
This is unlikely, for Cao Cao’s family was certainly wealthy, though it may have taken
time for funds to be transferred from his home country in Pei. As the modern editor
and commentator Lu Bi observes, the contribution of Wei Zi may be seen as an invest-
ment for the future; the warlord Liu Bei was similarly sponsored by a wealthy kinsman
at the beginning of his career: SGZ Shu 2:871. Wei Zi did not live long enough to enjoy
the fruits of his generosity, but his son Wei Zhen rose to high rank in Wei.
97
The three brothers were Zhou Yu, Zhou Ang and Zhou Xin. The texts are con-
fused and contradictory on their careers, but I have chosen to follow the account pro-
vided by Wu lu “Record of Wu” and Kuaiji dianlu “Authoritative Record of Kuaiji,” as
cited in SGZ Wu 6:1100 PC. See also deC, Generals of the South, 131–132 note 71. The
brothers’ later careers will be described below, but we may note here that this Zhou
Yu 周喁 must be distinguished from Zhou Yu 周瑜 the future general of Wu, victor
at the Red Cliffs in 208. The personal names are written with different character, and
the family of Zhou Yu 周瑜 came from Lujiang, not Kuaiji: LH3K, 1151–1152.
CHAPTER TWO
TO GUARD THE EMPEROR

190–196
To govern Yan province 190–192

Fight for survival 193–195
Welcome to Xu city 196
Captive Emperor
Chronology
190 spring: Cao Cao at Suanzao with the “loyal rebels” as General
Who Displays Firmness
Dong Zhuo moves the imperial court west to Chang’an
Cao Cao defeated at Rongyang in Henan
Cao Cao gathers reinforcements in the southeast
191 spring: Yuan Shu’s general Sun Jian captures then abandons
Luoyang; Dong Zhuo retreats to Chang’an
summer: the alliance east of the passes begins to break up
autumn: Yuan Shao takes over Ji province; war between Yuan
Shao and Liu Biao against Yuan Shu and Gongsun Zan
Cao Cao attacks Black Mountain bandits in Yan province, then
becomes Administrator of Dong commandery
192 spring: Yuan Shao defeats Gongsun Zan in Ganling
Cao Cao defeats bandit raiders in Dong commandery
summer: Cao Cao takes charge of Yan province to oppose the
Yellow Turbans from Qing province
Dong Zhuo killed at Chang’an; his officers Li Jue and Guo Si seize
power
winter: Cao Cao persuades the Yellow Turbans to surrender;
they are reformed as the Qingzhou Troops; Cao Cao endorsed
by the government at Chang’an
193 spring: Cao Cao drives Yuan Shu away to Yang province
Cao Cao’s father Cao Song is killed in Xu province
autumn: Cao Cao attacks Tao Qian, Governor of Xu province,
and slaughters the people
52 chapter two
194 spring: Cao Cao withdraws from Xu province

summer: Cao Cao embarks on a second campaign into Xu
province; Chen Gong and Zhang Miao invite Lü Bu to take
over Yan province; Cao Cao comes back to oppose the invader
at Puyang
autumn: Cao Cao and Lü Bu both withdraw from Puyang
195 spring: Cao Cao recaptures Shanyang
summer: Cao Cao holds Jiyin; death of Tao Qian in Xu province,
succeeded by Liu Bei
autumn: Cao Cao gains decisive victory in Shanyang; Lü Bu flees
to Xu province
Emperor Xian escapes from Chang’an
winter: Cao Cao acknowledged by Emperor Xian as Governor of
Yan province
Emperor Xian establishes his temporary court at Anyi in Hedong
196 spring: Cao Cao takes control of Chen, Yingchuan and Runan;
he receives title as a general from Emperor Xian and is granted
enfeoffment
summer: Cao Cao sets his capital at Xu city in Yingchuan, where
he develops agricultural colonies
autumn: Emperor Xian returns to Luoyang
Cao Cao brings the emperor to Xu city; he quarrels with Yuan
Shao and takes title as Excellency of Works
To govern Yan province 190–192
By the beginning of 190, the “loyal rebels” against Dong Zhuo’s usurp-
ing regime at Luoyang were arrayed in four main divisions. Command
north of the Yellow River in Henei was held by Yuan Shao, aided by
Wang Kuang the self-styled Administrator of that commandery, while
a number of lesser leaders gathered their forces at Suanzao in Chenliu,
just south of the River. Further still to the south Kong Zhou, who had
been appointed Inspector of Yu province by Dong Zhuo, had occupied
Yingchuan but then turned against his former master, while Yuan Shu
had his own camp in Nanyang. Not long afterwards, Kong Zhou died
and Yuan Shu took over his position.1
1
Major sources for the war against Dong Zhuo are his biographies at HHS
72/62:2327–30 and SGZ 6:172–79, that of Yuan Shao in HHS 74/64A:2375–78, and
that of Cao Cao in SGZ 1:5–8, supplemented by his Apologia: Chapter Eight at 358.
to guard the emperor 190–196 53
Map 2. Approaches to Luoyang

54 chapter two
The rebel army was largely recruited from the followers of leading
gentry clans, and the leaders had no necessary skill in war. Cao Cao
and his contingent were typical: some family retainers, and other men
who had gathered to the standard in hope of pay and loot. The great
campaigns against the Yellow Turbans and the endemic troubles which
had plagued the empire since their defeat meant that many men, even
in the more settled regions of the inner empire, had fought in the
field and were ready to take up arms for any chieftain who would
offer a profitable career. They were not, however, hardened fighters
like the frontier troops who followed Dong Zhuo, and though some
of their leaders had held military rank, they were not experienced
generals.
Cao Cao had held a short-term colonel’s command against the Yel-
low Turbans, but was then sent to administer Ji’nan. Among other
leaders, Wang Kuang, Zhang Miao and his brother Zhang Chao were
known for their generous treatment of retainers, with a certain amount
of tough talk and violent action, but Liu Dai was admired for his fine
conduct, and Kong Zhou had been celebrated for his skill in Pure Con-
versation, the elegant philosophical repartee popular among literati at
that time. There is no record of Yuan Shao or Yuan Shu on active
service, and Yuan Shao in particular, during all the disturbances of the
early 180s, had been in six years mourning, first for his mother and
then for his adopted father.2 Despite this, he was proclaimed leader of
the alliance, with a grand ceremony and a formal oath of loyalty. He
styled himself General of Chariots and Cavalry, one of the highest in
the system of Han, while Yuan Shu became General of the Rear and
their colleagues likewise claimed temporary commissions and flowery
titles: Cao Cao became General Who Displays Firmness.
Furious at the opposition of Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu, Dong
Zhuo slaughtered those members of their family who had mistak-
enly remained in the west: among his victims were the former Excel-
lency Yuan Wei, the minister Yuan Ji and some fifty others, including
infants in arms. At the same time, though he may have despised his
opponents as amateurs, Dong Zhuo was sufficiently concerned at their
The events of 190 and early 191 have been placed in chronicle order by ZZTJ
59:1908–17; deC, Establish Peace, 36–61, and they are discussed by Leban, “Ts’ao
Ts’ao,” 151–172. There is some uncertainty in the details, however, and in the narra-
tive which follows I offer alternative suggestions.
2
HHS 74/64A:2373 and SGZ 6:186 PC quoting Hanmo yingxiong ji.
numbers that in the spring of 190 he compelled the young emperor

and all his court to transfer from Luoyang to Chang’an, ancient capital
of Former Han and three hundred kilometres to the west, by present-
day Xi’an in Shanxi. In a cultural disaster, vast quantities of mate-
rial were abandoned or lost upon the road, while soldiers looted and
burned the city and plundered the imperial tombs. Furthermore, as
the armies in the east had cut off supplies from much of the empire,
the revenue of the central government was drastically reduced and the
regime was obliged to melt down bronze statues and treasure in order
to mint more coinage. The staple wushu coins of Han had been noted
for the fact that their face value matched their weight, but the pieces
produced by Dong Zhuo to replace them had no defined edge and no
statement of their value. The result was a dramatic inflation.3
Nonetheless, as Dong Zhuo himself remained at Luoyang, the
eastern armies were reluctant to attack, and the base at Suanzao was
noted rather for feasting than for military activity. Impatient at this,
Cao Cao argued that the withdrawal of the capital to Chang’an was
a sure sign of the enemy’s weakness, and he embarked on an offen-
sive of his own. With the five thousand men of his personal follow-
ing and a contingent under Wei Zi, who was nominally in the service
of Zhang Miao, he moved west up the Yellow River into Henan. The
result bore out the more cautious policy of his colleagues, for he was
heavily defeated at Rongyang, a major supply base at the head of the
Vast Canal which supplied the capital region. Wei Zi was killed and
Cao Cao was wounded, as was his horse; he escaped only through the
devotion of his young cousin Cao Hong. We are told the enemy com-
mander Xu Rong was so impressed by the firm defence put up by Cao
Cao’s small force that he did not pursue them, but the enterprise had
certainly been a failure. In fact the newly-formed and comparatively
amateurish troop under Cao Cao’s command had encountered a pro-
fessional body of frontiersmen—with predictable results.
Unchastened by defeat, Cao Cao returned to Suanzao and proposed
a general advance: Yuan Shao should take an army along the north of
the Yellow River; the other commanders should press forward in the
3
HHS 72/62:2325: ZZTJ 59:1916; deC, Establish Peace, 54. A shu weight in Han
times was just under two-thirds of a gram, and a wushu “Five-shu” coin weighed
about 3.25 grams: Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 587–589. JS 26:794;
Yang, “Economic History,” 157, says that, as well as statues and other bronze items,
Dong Zhuo melted down any wushu coins he could find.
56 chapter two
centre, to hold Dong Zhuo’s main forces near Rongyang; and Yuan
Shu should threaten the south. Having learned something from his
own experience, Cao Cao emphasised that the allies should not seek
to face the enemy directly, but should establish strong-points and for-
ward defence lines. The main aim was to make a show of activity in
order to attract wider support and demoralize the enemy. His col-
leagues paid no attention to his proposals.
If they were not prepared to fight, however, they were prepared to
kill. During the summer Dong Zhuo sent a group of envoys seeking
peace. They included the ministers Han Rong and Yin Xiu, and the
senior officials Wu Xiu, Wang Gui and Humu Ban. Han Rong, Yin Xiu
and Humu Ban were men of fine reputation, and there is no reason
to believe the other two were not of comparable standing, but Yuan
Shao ordered they be executed. Wang Kuang dealt with Wu Xiu and
Wang Gui, and also with Humu Ban, who was a fellow-countryman
and his own brother-in-law. As Yuan Shu likewise accounted for Yin
Xu, only Han Rong was spared to return to the imperial capital. Given
Dong Zhuo’s slaughter of his family a few months earlier, Yuan Shao’s
reaction was perhaps inevitable, but the bloodshed confirmed the rift
between the two parties.
Dong Zhuo’s response was not long in coming. In a lightning attack,
he surrounded Wang Kuang’s forces across the Yellow River north of
Luoyang and utterly destroyed them. Wang Kuang fled to his home
country of Taishan, where he was later killed by kinsmen of his former
victim Humu Ban.4
By this time, Cao Cao too had withdrawn from the front. After his
losses at Rongyang, he needed reinforcements. Not only were the allies
at Suanzao reluctant to take action, but there was internecine feuding
and signs of an approaching break-up; the more men he had under his
command the better. With his cousin Xiahou Dun he travelled south-
east to Yang province, where the Inspector Chen Wen and the Admin-
istrator of Danyang Zhou Xin provided him with four thousand men.
Chen Wen was an old family friend, and Zhou Xin was a brother of
Zhou Yu, who had gone north to join Cao Cao some months earlier.5
The new levies, however, unwilling to leave their homeland, raised a
4
On Cao Cao’s involvement in his fate, see note 7 below.
5
Chapter One at 50 and note 97. The biography of Zhou Xin from Kuaiji dianlu,
quoted by SGZ Wu 6:1206 PC, says that at one time or another he sent more than
ten thousand troops to aid Cao Cao. This first attempt, however, was evidently not
mutiny. Cao Cao’s tent was set on fire, and though he and a few loyal-
ists fought their way out of the camp, the majority of the conscripts
made their escape and his new command was reduced to five hundred
men.6
Making his way back to his home territory of Pei, Cao Cao was
more successful and obtained another thousand men. He then returned
north to join Yuan Shao with perhaps a few more than his original
five thousand troops.7 For the time being at least, he was just one of a
number of subordinate officers under the head of the alliance, and his
position was further weakened as his former associate Zhou Yu was
recruited into the direct service of Yuan Shao.
We are told that about this time Yuan Shao was proposing to name
Liu Yu, a member of the imperial clan who was at that time Governor
of You province in the northeast, as emperor in rivalry to the puppet
controlled by Dong Zhuo.8 Such a move might have given the “loyal
rebels” a figure-head, but it was opposed by many of the leaders, nota-
bly Yuan Shu who had plans of his own, and was in any case rejected
by Liu Yu himself. Cao Cao’s biography records that he argued against
such a disruptive policy and protested his loyalty to the legitimate sov-
ereign now at Chang’an: Liu Xie may have owed his throne to Dong
Zhuo, but he was nonetheless a son of the late Emperor Ling. We may
doubt Cao Cao had great influence in the debate, for his only claim
to status lay in his temporary title as a general, with few men under
his direct command. It appears, however, that he was suspicious of
successful, and we cannot be certain whether there were indeed further contingents or
whether the historian has exaggerated his contribution.
The relationship of Xiahou Dun to Cao Cao is discussed in Chapter One at 20–23.
6
Cao Cao biezhuan “Secondary Biography of Cao Cao,” in a passage preserved by
TPYL 467:12a, says that Cao Cao was wounded in the foot and spent several days in
the care of a village headman before borrowing an ox-cart and making his way to meet
his own men searching for him: Kroll, “Portraits,” 280–281.
7
In his Apologia of 210/211, Cao Cao says that he gained an additional three thou-
sand men from this recruitment.
SGZ 1:6–7 PC quoting the Hou Han shu of Xie Cheng says that Cao Cao joined
forces with members of the Humu clan to kill Wang Kuang in Taishan [see above at
note 4], but it is difficult to fit this with his other activities at the time. He could have
travelled to Taishan in search of new recruits, though it would have been a very con-
siderable detour. Or it may be that Wang Kuang was not dealt with until 192, when
Cao Cao had become Inspector of Yan province and would be anxious to eliminate
any potential source of opposition [below]. Both scenarios, however, seem unlikely,
and it is more probable that Xie Cheng is mistaken.
8
The biography of Liu Yu is at HHS 73/63:2353–57.
58 chapter two
Yuan Shao’s ambitions, and he had now expressed public opposition,

so relations between the two became uneasy.9
In any event, by the end of 190 the pattern of the campaign against
Dong Zhuo had changed. The army at Suanzao disbanded, partly
through a lack of supplies but also on account of personal quarrels, as
the Inspector of Yan, Liu Dai, killed Qiao Mao the Administrator of
Dong commandery and appointed a certain Wang Gong in his place.
They and many of their colleagues now joined Yuan Shao north of
the Yellow River, and though the alliance was foundering Yuan Shao’s
authority as head of the nominal covenant became all the greater. In
the summer of 191 he used his apparent military strength to turn
against Han Fu, Governor of Ji province, and persuaded him with a
mixture of threat and bluff to cede this most prosperous territory. Han
Fu died soon afterwards, and Yuan Shao controlled the greater part of
north China from his new capital at Ye city in Wei commandery.
Such manoeuvrings were largely irrelevant to Dong Zhuo, but the
southern front was different. At the same time as his opposition in
the north disintegrated, the army of Yuan Shu was advancing from
the south. This was less an achievement of Yuan Shu than that of his
general Sun Jian, a fighting man from the southeast who had gained
experience against the Yellow Turbans and the rebels of Liang prov-
ince, and who had military ability to match Dong Zhuo and his gener-
als. In the spring of 191 Sun Jian drove Dong Zhuo away to the west
and occupied Luoyang. The former imperial capital was now in ruins
and could not be defended, so Sun Jian offered sacrifices and with-
drew, but not before one of his men had found what was claimed to
be the Great Seal of State hidden in a well. The sacred relic was passed
to Yuan Shu.10
As Dong Zhuo now established himself at Chang’an, much of Henan
became a wasted no-man’s land. In the following year, 192, Dong
Zhuo was killed by his trusted attendant Lü Bu in a plot arranged by
the minister Wang Yun, but within a few weeks the new regime was
9
SGZ 1:8.
10
The biography of Sun Jian is at SGZ Wu 1:1093–1101, translated by deC, Biogra-
phy of Sun Chien, and his career is discussed in deC, Generals of the South, 70–145.
The imperial Seal of Han (傳國璽 chuanguo xi: lit. “Seal Which Transmits the
State”) and its history at this time is discussed in Generals of the South, 138–145.
At SGZ Wu 1:1100 PC, Pei Songzhi suggests that Sun Jian and his family kept the
Seal, but the records indicate clearly that it was taken by Yuan Shu and subsequently
handed over to Cao Cao. Assuming that the object found by Sun Jian was indeed the
Seal of Han, it was probably lost at some time in the turmoil of the third century.
Map 3. North China in the 190s

60 chapter two
overthrown by a group of Dong Zhuo’s former officers led by Li Jue

and Guo Si, and for the next few years this ramshackle junta held
sway in the imperial capital. They were largely irrelevant to the rest of
the empire, and the collapse of central government meant that China
became a battleground for warlord and bandit armies.
The formal structures of Han were not entirely broken down: the
administrative units, provinces and commanderies, generally kept the
same boundaries, and the major contenders took appropriate titles
and paid lip-service to the absent ruler.11 There were, however, sub-
stantial groups of rebels and bandits to whom such a façade meant
nothing, and even gentry chieftains, for all their official courtesies, had
no hesitation in dealing forcefully and bloodily with their enemies of
every rank.
Yuan Shu and Yuan Shao were members of a distinguished admin-
istrative family, and their ancestors had held the highest positions in
the empire. Their relationship, however, was complicated: Yuan Shu
was the son of the Excellency Yuan Feng by his principal wife, while
Yuan Shao was only the son of a concubine; but Yuan Shao had been
adopted to maintain the lineage of Yuan Feng’s elder brother Cheng,
and so became a senior cousin to his half-brother Yuan Shu. The two
men had long been rivals, Yuan Shu in particular being envious and
resentful of Yuan Shao’s popularity among the leaders of the time.12 In
191 their enmity broke into the open, and even as Yuan Shu’s general
Sun Jian was engaged against Dong Zhuo, Yuan Shao sent Zhou Yu
to attack his base-camp. Sun Jian drove Zhou Yu away in a counter-
attack, and this conflict between members of such a great clan forced
many of the leaders in the east to choose one or the other.
Gongsun Zan, a fighting man of the northern frontier, had sent his
cousin Gongsun Yue to aid Sun Jian, and when Gongsun Yue was
killed in battle he swore revenge and attacked Yuan Shao. For his
part, Yuan Shu sent Sun Jian south against Liu Biao, Governor of Jing
province in present-day Hubei and Hunan. That conflict came to a
stand-still when Sun Jian was killed in a skirmish, but Gongsun Zan
11
In particular, it was standard procedure that any official appointment was
“memorialized” (表 biao) to the throne, even though the emperor was powerless to
approve it; and the formula was used even when the nominal official was fighting
against those who controlled the ruler.
12
See note 24 to Chapter One. On one occasion Yuan Shu referred to Yuan Shao as
“our family slave 吾家奴,” and in a letter to Gongsun Zan [as below] he claimed that
Shao was “not a true member of the Yuan clan 非袁氏子:” HHS 75/65:2439.
advanced against Yuan Shao with initial success. Early in 192, how-
ever, he was heavily defeated at Jie Bridge in Ganling, on the Qing
River north of the Yellow River, and when he attacked once more at
the end of the year he suffered a second defeat in the same area. Forced
onto the defensive, Gongsun Zan continued to pose a threat to Yuan
Shao, but he never regained the initiative.13
In the mean time Cao Cao had received his first territorial com-
mand. A large group of Black Mountain bandits from the Taihang
ranges came down to plunder in Wei and Dong commanderies, on the
south of Yuan Shao’s sphere of interest. Wang Gong, named Adminis-
trator a few months earlier, proved unable to deal with them, and Yuan
Shao sent Cao Cao to assist him. Cao Cao defeated one of the chief-
tains, Bo Rao, at Puyang, the capital of the commandery, and Yuan
Shao then appointed him to replace Wang Gong.14 No matter what
disagreements they might have had, Cao Cao was obviously compe-
tent; but he shifted his capital to Dongwuyang, north of the River by
present-day Shen in Shandong, and this may have been required by
Yuan Shao as a means to keep him under some control. Over the next
several months Cao Cao cleared the territory of bandits and restored
a degree of order.
Dong commandery, which extended from east to west on either side
of the Yellow River, had been recorded with some 600,000 people by
a census about 140 AD,15 in the middle range of such units across
the empire, and Cao Cao’s appointment was a notable step. He had
been Chancellor of Ji’nan, a smaller territory, in the middle 180s, but
since the outbreak of civil war the only troops he had held under
command were those he had raised himself or been granted—with
13
HHS 74/64A:2380–81; deC, Establish Peace, 89 and 110.
14
As discussed in note 11 above, the appointment is dignified by the term biao
“memorialized;” in fact Yuan Shao had full control of the decision.
15
The census results for the empire are listed in the Treatise of Administrative
Geography, HHS 109/19–113/23. The Treatises of Hou Han shu were originally part
of the Xu Han shu of Sima Biao of the third century, drawing ultimately on original
records, and they were combined with the Hou Han shu of Fan Ye by the commenta-
tor Liu Zhao of the sixth century. On their historiography and reliability, see Bielen-
stein, “Census,” and Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 175–195. The date of 140 appears at
HHS 109/19:3389, but at 187–189 Mansvelt Beck produces evidence to show that the
information extends over a number of years after that date.
The census figures for Yan province are recorded at HHS 111/21:3447–58, and those
for Dong commandery appear at HHS 111/21:3450. The kingdom of Ji’nan in Qing
province, mentioned below, is described at HHS 112/22:3471 with a population of
453,308.
62 chapter two
limited long-term effect—by friends and allies such as Chen Wen or

the Zhou brothers. Now, however, he had a government of his own,
with authority to collect taxes, to enforce labour services, and, most
important, to raise and maintain a local army which might be num-
bered in the thousands, far more than he had before.
On the other hand, despite success against Bo Rao, the threat from
the Black Mountains continued. Cao Cao maintained a defensive posi-
tion in his old county of Dunqiu, north of the Yellow River at the
western end of his territory, but early in 192 the bandit leader Poison
Yu by-passed him to attack Dongwuyang.16 Though his officers urged
him to relieve the city, Cao Cao moved instead to strike at the enemy’s
bases in the Taihang ranges. Poison Yu immediately abandoned his
offensive, but before he could return Cao Cao had defeated another
of the Black Mountain groups and the Xiongnu chieftain Yufuluo at
Neihuang in the south of Wei commandery.17 For the time being at
least, the bandits were forced to withdraw.
A few weeks later the region was faced with a new threat from the
opposite direction. During the rebellion of the Yellow Turbans in 184
Qing province, based upon the Shandong peninsula, had not been
a centre of concern, but in subsequent years a large group of ban-
dits appeared there under that name; it is not possible to determine
whether they were followers of Zhang Jue’s teachings or whether they
simply adopted the name and insignia without the doctrine. Their
depredations extended over the eastern part of the North China plain,
affecting Ji and Xu provinces to the north and south. Driven from Xu
province by the Inspector Tao Qian, in the winter of 191 they raided
Taishan in Yan province. The Administrator Ying Shao drove them
away to the north, and they were defeated in Bohai by Gongsun Zan,
who slaughtered them as they fled across the Yellow River.18 Forced
16
Many leaders of the Black Mountain group were known by nicknames. Bo Rao
may be a genuine surname and personal name, but it is possible it had some such
significance as “White Circles:” deC, Huan and Ling, 567–568.
17
Yufuluo had been the heir of the Southern Shanyu allied to Han, but in 188 he
was driven out by a group of powerful clans. He was now seeking to make his career
as a soldier of fortune, and had a loose association with the Black Mountain bandits:
SGZ 1:9; deC, Northern Frontier, 347–349.
18
Ying Shao was a noted scholar, author of several works on law and administra-
tion, and also of Fengsu tongyi “A Compendium of Popular Customs:” Nylan, “Feng
su t’ung yi.” His biography is at HHS 48/38:1609–15, and the account of how he ral-
lied his people to defeat the invaders, capturing quantities of their people and their
baggage, is at 1610. The account of Gongsun Zan’s slaughter of the Yellow Turbans
back into their place of origin and reluctant to face Gongsun Zan
again, they still sought provisions and plunder, and in the summer of
192 they moved once more into Yan province.
Cao Cao was not at first involved, for Dong commandery was not
on the front line, and it was Liu Dai, the provincial Inspector allied to
Yuan Shao, who was responsible for dealing with the invaders.19 Ignor-
ing all warnings, however, Liu Dai led his men in a direct attack. He
was defeated and killed.
In such an emergency there was urgent need for a new man to
command the provincial troops. Fresh from his success against the
Black Mountain bandits, Cao Cao was an obvious candidate, and he
was supported by the Chancellor of Jibei Bao Xin, who had admired
and befriended him when they were together with Yuan Shao. Cao
Cao’s own subordinate Chen Gong also approached the Attendant and
Headquarters Officers of the province, two leading members of the
local staff, and persuaded them to support Cao Cao.20 There was gen-
eral consensus, and in a show of formality Bao Xin led a deputation
to invite Cao Cao to take command as Governor of Yan province. He
accepted.21
is in his biography at HHS 73/63:2359. See also ZZTJ 60:1925; deC, Establish Peace,
76–77.
19
For reasons of state security, heads of commandery units were forbidden to move
outside their territory, so in time of military emergency the Inspector was authorised
to command the provincial army. On the varied authority and responsibilities of an
Inspector, see below and also deC, “Inspection and Surveillance,” LH3K, 1228, and
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 92–93.
20
The Attendant Officer (biejia congshi; Aide-de-Camp) accompanied an Inspector
or Governor when he went on tour, while the Headquarters Officer (zhizhong congshi;
Attendant Clerk for the Bureau of Headquarters) was responsible for local appointments
and recommendations of men for commissioned office. The other senior member of
staff was the Registrar (zhubu; Master of Records); there is no mention of such an
officer at this time, and it is possible he had shared the fate of his master Liu Dai.
21
Cao Cao’s accession as Governor is recorded by SGZ 1:9, but the parallel pas-
sage in ZZTJ 60:1935 describes him as Inspector, and other citations give his title in
both forms, sometimes relating to the same date: e.g. HHS 54/44:1788 and 72/62:2342,
both referring to 196. There is a slight balance of evidence to support the reading of
Governor; it is possible he first became Inspector and took the higher title shortly
afterwards.
Given his recent success against the Yellow Turbans, Ying Shao might have been a
candidate for the position, but the possibility is not discussed by the texts. In 196, when
the emperor had just come under Cao Cao’s control, Yuan Shao presented a memo-
rial of self-justification: HHS 74/64A:2386–87. He claimed there to have arranged Cao
Cao’s appointment as Governor so that he could deal with the Yellow Turbans, and
he may have had some influence on the decision.
64 chapter two
Inspectors had been in charge of provinces for most of Later Han, but
with rank/salary at only 600 shi, well below the 2000 shi of an Admin-
istrator or Chancellor, they were entitled only to report wrong-doing
to the throne, and could take no direct action against their superiors.
In 188, however, as disturbance spread through the empire, Gover-
nors of ministerial status had been appointed to some provinces with
executive control over the whole of their territory. During the civil war
which followed it became common for a leading warlord to take title
as Governor of one province and to name a subordinate as Inspector
of another which he controlled or sought to control: thus Yuan Shao
was Governor of Ji province, and his junior ally Liu Dai had been
Inspector of Yan. As Yuan Shao was concerned with Gongsun Zan in
the north, however, Cao Cao acquired a degree of independence, and
with title as Governor he ranked himself equal to Yuan Shao.
Cao Cao’s first move against the Yellow Turbans proved disastrous,
for as he went on reconnaissance with only a thousand men he came
unexpectedly on the main camp of the enemy. He was defeated with
many casualties, and his friend and ally Bao Xin died in the fighting.
It is said that Cao Cao offered a reward for recovery of the body, and
when it could not be found he had a wooden statue carved in Bao
Xin’s likeness and held mourning sacrifice before the effigy.
At the beginning of the invasion, Bao Xin had warned Liu Dai
against a direct attack, arguing that:
The bandits number a million, the people are frightened, and our own
men lack the fighting spirit to face them.
On the other hand, the enemy have no supplies, nothing but what
they can plunder. The first thing is to gather your troops and establish
firm defences. The enemy will seek to fight but will not be able to, and
when they attack they will not succeed. Their army will certainly break
apart, and when that happens you should send your best men to occupy
strategic places and attack them. This is the way to win.22
Liu Dai had not followed such a plan, but after the false start it appears
that Cao Cao did:
Cao Cao’s soldiers were few and weak, but he cared for his men and
encouraged them, made open rewards and clear punishments, and
looked for enemy weaknesses to spring his own surprises. They fought
22
SGZ 1:9 and ZZTJ 60:1935; deC, Establish Peace, 96–97.
Map 4. Yan Province under Cao Cao

66 chapter two
day and night, and each time he took some prisoners. The rebels with-
drew and fled.23
We are told that Cao Cao pursued the retreating horde into Jibei, and
in the winter of that year, the turn of Western 192/193, he received
the surrender of 300,000 soldiers and 700,000 dependents, women and
children, recruiting the best of their fighters into a special unit known
as the Qingzhou Troops, the men of Qing province.24
Leban has questioned the terms of the “surrender,” and doubts
that so many bandits could have been brought to submit by the lim-
ited local forces which Cao Cao had available. He suggests that Cao
Cao sought repeatedly to make terms with the raiders, and that his
final agreement provided them with a number of privileges, includ-
ing autonomy under his personal command and an amnesty for their
previous depredations.25 This may well be true, and there are many
examples of gentry leaders who were pleased to accept the accession of
former bandits to their cause. The Han rebellion against Wang Mang,
for example, depended for its success upon the support of commoner
Troops, and Liu Xiu, founding Emperor Guangwu of Later Han, was
once nicknamed the “Bronze Horse Emperor” after a large group of
rebels which was persuaded to join his forces.26
For the Yellow Turbans of Qing province, moreover, despite their
numbers—and the figures are surely exaggerated27—there was reason
23
SGZ 1:10 PC quoting Wei shu and ZZTJ 60:1936; deC, Establish Peace, 99.
24
SGZ 1:9–10.
25
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 191–202. At 192–196 Leban posits an active correspond-
ence, and cites SGZ 1:10 PC quoting Wei shu, where a letter from the enemy accuses
Cao Cao of desecrating sacred sites during his time in Ji’nan. These religious objec-
tions, however, did not prove insuperable to a later agreement.
26
On the importance of the various Troops to the Liu family rebellion against
Wang Mang, see, for example, Bielenstein, RHD I, 106–111, and LH3K, xvi and
sub Chen Mu, Wang Chang, Wang Kuang et al. On the nickname “Bronze Horse
Emperor” 銅馬帝 applied to Liu Xiu, see HHS 1A:17; Bielenstein, RHD II, 82, and
RHD I, 106–110.
27
SGZ 1:9 says that a million Yellow Turbans entered Yan province—300,000 fight-
ing men and 700,000 dependents, but Yuan Shao’s memorial of 196, cited at note
20 above, mentions only 100,000: HHS 74/64A:2386. Cao Cao’s Apologia gives the
number of those whom he compelled to surrender as three hundred thousand.
In the middle of the second century, some fifty years earlier, Qing province had
some 3.7 million people [HHS 112/22:3471–76], and since the province extended over
the Shandong peninsula, broken by hills and mountain country, it is hard to believe
the Yellow Turbans comprised more than a quarter of that. If the 100,000 of Yuan
Shao refers to the number of men of fighting age, the total, including dependents,
could have been about 300,000.
to submit. They had been defeated by Tao Qian in Xu province, by

Ying Shao in Taishan, and were then slaughtered by Gongsun Zan,28
while raiding and plunder had gained them no great profit. They had
evidently exhausted the territory they occupied, and even the most
basic scorched-earth policy, withdrawing obvious stores of food from
the open country-side, would put them in difficulty whichever direc-
tion they went. We know nothing of their leaders, but it is unlikely
they were well organized or had any practical plans for the future. Cao
Cao could offer them a form of legitimacy and the hope of security,
and they might well find it more profitable to fight for him than for
themselves, with every man’s hand against them.
Nothing is recorded of the organization of the Qingzhou Troops,
and the very few citations refer rather to their lack of discipline than
to their military prowess,29 but the accession of so many experienced
fighters at this time certainly added to Cao Cao’s apparent strength,
and his success in removing the threat of invasion gave him a source
of authority to deal with any opposition in his newly-acquired terri-
tory of Yan province.
Soon after the death of Liu Dai, Dong Zhuo’s government at
Chang’an had sent the gentleman Jin Shang to replace him as Inspec-
tor of Yan province, but Cao Cao had no difficulty in driving him
away, and Jin Shang took refuge with Yuan Shu. Now, after his suc-
cess against the Yellow Turbans, and without regard for his nominal
patron Yuan Shao, he sent his officer Wang Bi to the capital to seek
endorsement. By this time Dong Zhuo had been killed, and his former
officers led by Li Jue and Guo Si had seized power.
Wang Bi’s way to Chang’an led through Henei, where the Admin-
istrator Zhang Yang was at first inclined to refuse him passage. Zhang
Yang’s adviser Dong Zhao, however, persuaded him that Cao Cao was
a man of increasing importance, and that his friendship was worth
cultivating.30 So Zhang Yang endorsed the embassy and sent Wang Bi
28
Gongsun Zan is said to have taken 70,000 prisoners, who may likewise have been
obliged to join his forces.
29
They were put to flight at Puyang in 194, and they plundered in Nanyang in
197: see page 78 below and note 19 to Chapter Three. They are not heard of again
until Cao Cao’s death in 220, a generation after the original surrender, when we are
told that the Qingzhou troops [presumably descendants of the original veterans] left
their barracks in a noisy demonstration and had to be placated with cartes-blanches
to obtain provisions.
30
The biography of Dong Zhao 董昭 is at SGZ 14:436–42. To avoid taboo on the
personal name of Sima Zhao, a founder of the Jin dynasty, whose personal name was
68 chapter two
on to the capital. In turn, and on the advice of the Gentleman Zhong

Yao, Li Jue and Guo Si sent a courteous reply. It does not appear
that they endorsed Cao Cao as Governor of Yan province,31 but they
presumably approved his office as Inspector. Though the formalities
were irrelevant, for no regime at Chang’an had influence upon events
in the east and the future of China would be determined by alliances
and hostilities between independent warlords, Cao Cao had confirmed
his loyalty to the emperor of Han and gained a measure of legitimacy
to support his practical power.
Fight for survival 193–19532
The major conflict was now that of Yuan Shao against his kinsman
Yuan Shu in alliance with the northern warlord Gongsun Zan. Gong-
sun Zan had commanded troops on the frontier against the Wuhuan
and Xianbi, and though he had twice been defeated by Yuan Shao
he had been successful against the Yellow Turbans of Qing province.
Liu Yu the Governor of You province, Yuan Shao’s candidate for the
imperial throne, had sought to control Gongsun Zan, but Gongsun
Zan destroyed him in 193 and thereafter held military control in the
north of the plain.33 He named three of his subordinates as Inspectors
of Ji, Qing and Yan, in defiance of Yuan Shao’s position in Ji province
and likewise threatening Cao Cao’s authority. His nominee Shan Jing
came to occupy Pingyuan, just north of Yan province, but Cao Cao
made a successful attack and drove him away. In doing so, he acted in
association with Yuan Shao, and his next move was against Yuan Shu,
but there is no question that it was his own position he was concerned
to establish and develop.
written with the same character, Dong Zhao is sometimes referred to as Zhao 照 or
Yao 曜.
Dong Zhao came from Jiyin in Yan province. There is no record of any previous
close contact with Cao Cao, but he became a most active and valued supporter.
31
Cf. note 21 above. Page 81 below refers to Cao Cao’s formal appointment as
Governor three years later.
32
Major sources for Cao Cao’s campaigns from 193 to 195 are SGZ 1:10–13, the
biographies of Lü Bu and Zhang Miao at HHS 75/65:2445–46 and SGZ 7:219–22,
and that of Tao Qian at HHS 73/63:2367–68 and SGZ 8:248–50. They are presented
in chronicle order by ZZTJ 60–61:1942–75; deC, Establish Peace, 113–179, and are
discussed by Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 207–248.
33
See, for example, ZZTJ 60:1946: deC, Establish Peace, 121–122.
Map 5. The Expulsion of Yuan Shu 193

70 chapter two
Yuan Shu had not ruled his territory in Nanyang well, and the death
of Sun Jian had deprived him of his most effective general. Early in
193 Liu Biao the Governor of Jing province managed to cut his sup-
plies and force him away to the north. Moving into Chenliu, Yuan Shu
made contact with the Black Mountain bandits and the exiled Xiongnu
chieftain Yufuluo. His chief target was Yuan Shao, but Chenliu was
in Yan province, and Cao Cao’s response was swift. With initial help
from Yuan Shao, he broke Yuan Shu’s defences and then, in a light-
ning campaign, drove him three hundred kilometres south to Jiujiang
commandery in Yang province. Cao Cao’s old friend Chen Wen had
died the year before, and Yuan Shu took over the territory, styling
himself also as Lord of neighboring Xu province. He was, however, no
longer in contention in the region of the Yellow River.
Cao Cao thus held firm control of Yan province, but he soon after-
wards embarked on what would become his most dangerous and mis-
taken campaign.34
Cao Cao’s father, the former Excellency Cao Song, had gone east to
Langye in search of refuge from the growing disorder, and Cao Cao
arranged for Ying Shao, Administrator of Taishan and his formal sub-
ordinate, to invite him. Wealthy as he was, Cao Song travelled with a
baggage train in hundreds of carts, and before the escort sent by Ying
Shao could reach him a group of soldiers in the service of Tao Qian
attacked the convoy. Cao Song, his wife and his son Cao De, younger
brother of Cao Cao, were all killed in the affray.35
34
Diény, “Une Guerre de Cao Cao,” studies Cao Cao’s campaigns against Tao Qian
in Xu province in 193 and 194. His detailed analysis of the various sources, and the
contradictions between them, has been of the greatest value to my own discussion.
35
ZZTJ 60:1945; deC, Establish Peace, 118–119, describes this incident and dates
the murder of Cao Song to the year 193. Powers, Art and Political Expression, 332,
suggests that he fled from Pei in 191 and was killed that same year, but that Cao Cao
waited until 193 before seeking his revenge.
SGZ 1:11 says that Cao Song had left his lands in Qiao at the time of the trouble
with Dong Zhuo, which indicates a date of 190 or 191. Wei-Jin shiyu, however, quoted
in PC to that passage, says that he was at Hua county in Taishan when Cao Cao
ordered Ying Shao to arrange his travels: Cao Cao was not appointed to Yan province
until 192, and he would have had no authority to give instructions to Ying Shao until
then. Indeed, it is unlikely he was in a position to invite Cao Song to join him until
193, and if Cao Song was killed at that time Cao Cao reacted quite promptly.
The geography is somewhat confused, for we are told that the troops which attacked
Cao Song and his convoy were based on Yinping, while Cao Song himself is said to
have been at Hua. The Later Han census list of 140 AD lists Yinping county under
Donghai kingdom [HHS 111/21:3458], while there is no Hua county recorded under
Sources disagree whether the murders should be blamed on ren-

egade troops, or whether Tao Qian, Governor of Xu province, was
personally involved:36
The biography of Tao Qian in Hou Han shu says that he sent a contin-
gent of troops from Yinping in Donghai to escort Cao Song, but the men
were greedy for plunder and mutinied;
an extract from Wu shu, the official history of the later rival state of
Wu ruled by Sun Quan, which is quoted by Pei Songzhi in his commen-
tary to the biography of Cao Cao in Sanguo zhi, largely agrees with this
account, giving the name of the officer commanding the detachment as
Zhang Kai, but says that he led the attack and then fled to the south of
the Huai; Cao Cao nonetheless blamed Tao Qian;
another version of the Wu shu text, in commentary to the Sanguo zhi
biography of Tao Qian, says simply that Cao Cao put the blame onto
Tao Qian;
the main text of Cao Cao’s biography says specifically that Tao Qian
was responsible for the death of Cao Song, and makes it clear that was
the reason for Cao Cao’s attack;
Taishan [HHS 111/21:3453]. Hua city had been a county seat under Former Han; it
was absorbed into Fei county in Taishan, and may have been restored as a county after
140. The modern pronunciation of the name of the county 費 is Fei, though ZZTJ
commentary says it should be Bi. The variation reflects changes over time, and I have
accepted the modern form; this serves also to distinguish it from Bi Village, written
with the same character, which was the family fief of the Cao family, probably in Qiao
country of Pei: note 20 to Chapter One.
Tao Qian had taken over Hua and Fei a few months earlier [SGZ 1:10], so Cao Song
was presumably under his control and protection, but if he was at this time near Fei he
was a hundred kilometres north of Yinping, and surely beyond the convenient range
of any troops stationed there.
So there is uncertainty about the times and the places of Cao Song’s movements
up to his death, as well as the circumstances. It seems probable, however, that he
had left Qiao, on the western edge of Pei kingdom, about 191, and travelled some
two hundred kilometres northeast to the region of Yinping and Fei, in the west of
Donghai and the south of Taishan. He remained in that area for perhaps two years,
but then moved once more to join Cao Cao in Yan province, and at that point he was
attacked and killed.
36
The variant texts are discussed by Diény, “Une guerre de Cao Cao,” 321–325. The
references are: HHS 73/63:2367; SGZ 1:11 PC quoting Wu shu; SGZ 8:249 PC quoting
Wu shu; SGZ 1:11; SGZ 1:11 PC quoting Wei-Jin chunqiu; HHS 48/38:1610.
Wei-Jin chunqiu tells how Cao De was cut down at the entrance to their lodging,
and Cao Song and his wife then attempted to escape by breaking through the wall at
the rear, but the lady was too fat to fit. Cao Song took refuge in the lavatory, but was
found there and killed.
It seems unlikely that the wife of Cao Song who was killed with him was Cao Cao’s
mother the Lady Ding, for Cao Cao made no particular mention of her and expressed
all his anger at the death of his father. One assumes that the Lady Ding had died
earlier and Cao Song had taken a second formal consort.
72 chapter two
the Wei-Jin shuyu of Guo Ban says that Tao Qian personally sent sev-
eral thousand horsemen to attack Cao Song;
and the biography of Ying Shao in Hou Han shu says that Tao Qian
was hostile to Cao Cao, that he had several times made attacks on his
territory, and again that he sent horsemen to attack Cao Song’s party.
In any case, even as Ying Shao, naturally concerned at Cao Cao’s reac-
tion, fled north to Yuan Shao, Cao Cao placed the blame directly upon
Tao Qian. Commentators have debated whether he was justified in
doing so: did Tao Qian send men to protect or to attack Cao Song and
his party? As Diény points out, Wu shu, compiled by enemies of the
Cao family, suggest that Tao Qian was innocent, but Chen Shou and
Guo Ban, both associated with the tradition of Wei, justify Cao Cao’s
accusation. The Hou Han shu of Fan Ye presents both versions in dif-
ferent chapters, and Sima Guang preserved the contradiction.37
The text of Wu shu, however, as quoted by commentary to SGZ 8,
continues with a long account of how Cao Cao, in hope of weakening
Tao Qian, had the emperor issue an edict calling all sides to disarm,
but Tao Qian recognised the trap and refused to obey. As Pei Songzhi
remarks, the story is unlikely, for Cao Cao at this time had no influ-
ence at Chang’an, and Diény observes that no other text mentions
such an incident.38
Though Diény does not go so far, I suggest that this extra story
discredits the account in Wu shu. Furthermore, since Wu shu is the
major early source to exculpate Tao Qian, but appears in this instance
to be no more than false propaganda, we should discount its evidence.
Tao Qian was very likely responsible for the incident, and he sent
Zhang Kai not to escort but to attack Cao Song; Wu shu echoes his
false excuses.
There was already cause for hostility between Cao Cao and Tao
Qian. We are told that Tao Qian had previously joined the rebel Que
Xuan of Xiapi in raiding Rencheng. He later eliminated Que Xuan
and took over his troops, but he also occupied the southern part of
Taishan,39 and both Rencheng and Taishan were in Cao Cao’s Yan
37
Diény, “Une Guerre de Cao Cao,” 324–325. On the discrepancy of Fan Ye’s
accounts, compare the first and the last citations in the list above.
38
SGZ 8:249 PC quoting Wu shu, and Diény, “Une Guerre de Cao Cao,” 325.
39
Que Xuan [whose surname also appears as Yan] styled himself Son of Heaven, so
Sima Guang doubts whether Tao Qian, with formal authority as a legitimate official of
Han, would ever have associated with him: ZZTJ 60:1944 Kaoyi; Diény, “Une Guerre
de Cao Cao,” 320–321.
Map 6. Xu and Qing Provinces

74 chapter two
province.40 For the longer term, Tao Qian was aligned with Gongsun
Zan against Cao Cao’s patron Yuan Shao, and he was a potential rival
to Cao Cao. It made sense, therefore, that as soon as Cao Cao was
established in Yan province he should seek to have his family join him
there. Whether he was generally anxious about the future or specifi-
cally planning an offensive, it was wise to extract potential hostages
from Tao Qian’s territory.
The slaughter of his kinsmen, however, brought an immediate crisis,
for Cao Cao’s personal prestige and that of his family were at stake. In
the autumn of 193 he attacked Tao Qian in Xu province.
Even if Cao Cao had already made plans to attack Xu province, the
nature of his campaign indicates that he was truly angry. Bypassing
Hua and Fei, he moved directly south through the western part of
Donghai into Pengcheng. He captured ten cities by storm, including
Yinping, from where Zhang Kai is said to have led his band of escort/
attackers. Tao Qian brought troops to make a stand at Pengcheng city,
but was heavily defeated and withdrew to his capital, Tan in Donghai,
present-day Tanxian in Shandong. Cao Cao continued southeast along
the Si River into Xiapi, where he captured three counties and slaugh-
tered their people.
The death-toll was heavy. It is said that tens of thousands died at
Pengcheng, so that bodies blocked the flow of the Si River, and that in
the second attack on Xiapi he massacred civilians, many of them—like
his father—refugees from the troubles at the capital. He also devas-
tated the country where he passed, so that “no-one was left alive; even
the chickens and dogs were gone.”41
There is disagreement about the circumstances of such wholesale
killing. Routed troops were particularly vulnerable as they sought to
cross a river—Gongsun Zan had inflicted high casualties on the Yellow
Turbans of Qing province under similar conditions in the previous
40
When Cao Song was attacked near Hua he was formally within the borders of
Taishan in Yan province, but we are told that the territory was at that time under Tao
Qian’s jurisdiction.
41
Diény, “Une Guerre de Cao Cao,” 328–329, discusses the accounts of these mas-
sacres, citing Cao Man zhuan from SGZ 10:310 PC, the biography of Tao Quan in
HHS 73/63:2367, and a more general statement in SJZ 25:814 (SJZS 47b). This last
places the killing in the region of Xiapi city, but dates it to 194, which is probably
wrong: Cao Cao ravaged that area in 193; in 194 he was operating further north in
Donghai [see below].
year—so the defeat at Pengcheng may well have brought heavy loss
of life, while civilians or refugees were always at risk. The hostile text
Cao Man zhuan places the slaughter of unarmed people and refugees
at Pengcheng, in the aftermath of the battle with Tao Qian, while Tao
Qian’s biography in Hou Han shu attributes it to the march on Xiapi.
Even the Annals/Biography of Cao Cao, however, refers to the ferocity
of his campaign. It is doubtful such a policy made military sense, and
it was certainly a major error for a warlord who might hope to take
over the land and its people.42 It may be that Cao Cao was blinded
by anger at the death of his father, or at any rate that he was deter-
mined to demonstrate that no-one could attack him or his family with
impunity.
One effect of Cao Cao’s devastation in the south of Xu province was

that his troops began to run short of supplies, while Tao Qian sought
aid from Tian Kai, Inspector of Qing province for Gongsun Zan. Tian
Kai brought an army to assist him, so that when Cao Cao turned to
attack Tan city directly he was forced to a halt, either by these rein-
forcements, or by the threat of their imminent arrival. We may assume
that Tao Qian had taken advantage of the respite to strip the country-
side of food, so Cao Cao could neither advance nor maintain himself.
In the spring of 194 he withdrew to his own territory.43
Soon afterwards, however, Tian Kai went back to Qing province,
and in the summer a few weeks later Cao Cao embarked on a second
42
See the comments of Xun Yu at 79 below.
43
As Diény points out at 327, it seems certain that Cao Cao suffered a check out-
side Tan city. Diény, however, tends to follow the order of events presented by Cao
Man zhuan in SGZ 10:310 PC—which in turn is followed by ZZTJ 60:1945; deC,
Establish Peace, 119–120. According to this account, after his victory at Pengcheng
Cao Cao pursued Tao Qian to Tan city, but was unsuccessful. He then turned south
again to ravage Xiapi.
This, however, is a strange strategy. After a setback at Tan, it would have been
extremely dangerous to return to the south, leaving Tao Qian and any reinforcements
from Tian Kai behind him and in a position to cut his communications to Yan prov-
ince. Furthermore, to go from the Si River at Pengcheng northeast to Tan, and then
back to the Si River at Xiapi, seems a tiring, cumbersome and fairly pointless set of
marches.
I suggest that Cao Cao followed his success at Pengcheng with further raiding and
slaughter down the Si River into Xiapi; and only after that did he turn back to attack
Tan city. By that time, however, Tao Qian had received support from Tian Kai and
had had time to prepare his defences, including scorched earth. Cao Cao was thus
forced to retreat.
76 chapter two
offensive. This time he drove into Donghai and Langye, moving past
Tan city to plunder and kill in the eastern part of the province before
turning back to deal with Tao Qian.
Among the officers who had accompanied Tian Kai to the relief of
Tao Qian was the fighting man Liu Bei, who held title at that time as
Chancellor of Pingyuan and commanded a few thousand men. Tao
Qian gave him a few thousand more and Liu Bei changed to enter his
service. He and Tao Qian’s regular officer Cao Bao sought to block
Cao Cao’s return from the east, but they were brushed aside. Cao Cao
marched around Tan and prepared to attack the city.
At this point, however, Cao Cao was faced with a great and quite
unexpected threat from some of his closest supporters and allies, nota-
bly Zhang Miao and Chen Gong, who invited the fighting man Lü Bu
to take over Yan province.
Lü Bu, a man from the northwest, had been a protégé of the military
commander Ding Yuan, also a frontiersman, and when Ding Yuan
became Bearer of the Mace, chief of police under the regency of the
Dowager He, Lü Bu went with him to Luoyang. When Dong Zhuo
first arrived, he was concerned Ding Yuan might present a problem,
so he persuaded Lü Bu to kill his patron, then took him as his own
attendant and body-guard. He expressed the utmost trust in him, and
the two men swore an oath as father and son. In 192, however, Lü Bu
was persuaded by the Excellency Wang Yun to turn against his new
master, and he carried out the assassination.44 A short time later, as
Dong Zhuo’s former officers Li Jue, Guo Si and others attacked and
captured Chang’an, Wang Yun was killed but Lü Bu fled to the east
with a number of followers. Relying upon the fact that he had avenged
their kinsmen murdered by Dong Zhuo, he first sought to join Yuan
Shu and then went to Yuan Shao. Both men were uneasy about his
intentions and concerned at the lack of discipline among his troops,
and Yuan Shao eventually tried to kill him. Escaping, Lü Bu took ref-
44
SGZ 7:219 and HHS 75/65:2445 say that Dong Zhuo had put Lü Bu in charge
of the guard of his harem, but Lü Bu took the opportunity to have an affair with one
of his concubines. Concerned that Dong Zhuo would find out, he was ready to be
recruited into Wang Yun’s plans.
Chapter 8 of Romance develops this story, naming the woman as Diaochan 貂蟬
“Sable Cicada,” and telling how she served Wang Yun, who used her to attract Dong
Zhuo and seduce Lü Bu, thus driving a wedge between them. There is no historical
authority for such details.
uge with Zhang Yang in Henei, while his former enemies at Chang’an
named him Administrator of Yingchuan.
The moving spirit of the conspiracy against Cao Cao was Chen
Gong, the very man who had arranged for him to become Gover-
nor. Cao Cao, however, had lately killed Bian Rang of Chenliu, a
well-known poet and retired official, who had spoken disrespectfully
of him.45 Bian Rang’s comment may have related to Cao Cao’s fam-
ily, and many gentlemen felt uneasy at the sensitivities of their new
master, while the devastation of Xu province displayed a remarkable
brutality. Known for his energy and initiative, Chen Gong shared this
anxiety, and he persuaded other members of Cao Cao’s provincial staff
to join him. They then approached Zhang Miao.
As Administrator of Chenliu in 190, Zhang Miao had lent troops
to Cao Cao for his unsuccessful offensive against Dong Zhuo. He still
held the same position, but as Governor of the province Cao Cao was
now his formal superior. The two men were friends of long standing,
and Cao Cao had told his family that if he died in battle they should
turn to Zhang Miao. On the other hand, Zhang Miao had lately quar-
relled with Yuan Shao, hitherto also an old friend, and Yuan Shao
asked Cao Cao to kill him. Cao Cao refused, but Zhang Miao became
uneasy.
As Lü Bu escaped from Yuan Shao, moreover, he stayed for a time
with Zhang Miao, and two men got on well. Still more annoyed, Yuan
Shao again asked Cao Cao to kill Zhang Miao. Zhang Miao became
seriously concerned, and when Chen Gong urged that he invite Lü
Bu to join him in seizing Yan province from Cao Cao, he agreed to
do so. Cao Cao had entrusted Chen Gong with a large force in Dong
commandery, so the plotters had small difficulty in gathering suffi-
cient troops to make a rising and call in Lü Bu, and while Cao Cao
was committed to the attack on Xu province his opponents gained
control of the greater part of his home territory. Within a very short
time there were only three cities still loyal to Cao Cao: Juancheng in
Jiyin, and Fan and Dong’a in Dong commandery. They formed only a
small enclave along the south-eastern bank of Yellow River, but they
guarded the eastern part of the province.
45
The biography of Bian Rang is at HHS 80/70B:2640–47. He had served with lim-
ited success as Administrator in Jiujiang, and returned home about this time, possibly
to avoid Yuan Shu. HHS 80/70B dates his death to the Jian’an period, after 196, but the
reference to 193 seems more circumstantial: cf. Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 229–231.
78 chapter two
At the core of the resistance were Cao Cao’s cousin Xiahou Dun and
his adviser Xun Yu, and they sent Cheng Yu to encourage the defence
of Fan city and Dong’a.46 Zao Zhi the magistrate of Dong’a was ready
and willing, but Lü Bu had captured the mother of Jin Yun, magis-
trate of Fan, and other members of his family. Cheng Yu nonetheless
persuaded Jin Yun to defy the enemy even at the cost of his kinfolk;
predictably, there was scathing comment on such a lack of filial piety
and, despite his loyalty at this time, Jin Yun does not appear again in
the records.47
As Zhang Miao remained in Chenliu, Lü Bu occupied Puyang in
Dong commandery. His attack on Juancheng failed, however, while
Cheng Yu held the Cangting Crossing of the Yellow River against Chen
Gong on the north-western bank. Despite this, Lü Bu should have had
no difficulty in passing the loyalist line to the south and blocking Cao
Cao’s return, for he would have to come through or past the south of
the Taishan massif and the roads could easily be held. When Lü Bu
failed to do so, Cao Cao remarked on his incompetence. Bringing his
army back from Xu province, he advanced on Puyang.
Through his opponents’ lack of initiative Cao Cao had regained the
eastern half of the province, but the enemy still controlled the great
commandery of Chenliu, and Lü Bu may have had access to resources
from his nominal territory of Yingchuan. Puyang, roughly in the mid-
dle of Yan province, was the critical place.
In his first attack, Cao Cao drove in Lü Bu’s forward positions and
the powerful Tian clan changed sides and allowed him into the city.
He set fire to the eastern gate to show he had no intention of retreat,
but then his Qingzhou Troops broke and fled before a counter-attack
by Lü Bu’s cavalry. Cao Cao lost his horse and burnt his hand, and he
46
The biography of Xun Yu is at SGZ 10:307–19, that of Xiahou Dun is at SGZ
9:267–68, and that of Cheng Yu, who came himself from Dong’a, at SGZ 14:425–29.
As Lü Bu made his first attack, some of Xiahou Dun’s troops mutinied and took
him prisoner, but he was rescued by his officer Han Hao. Han Hao became a trusted
officer of Cao Cao, and played a role in the establishment of tuntian agricultural colo-
nies: see note 67 below.
47
SGZ 1:16 has another story, which presents Cao Cao himself in a most favourable
light. When Zhang Miao made his rebellion, Cao Cao’s Attendant Officer Bi Chen was
with the army but the rebels captured his mother, wife and brothers. Cao Cao gave
Bi Chen permission to leave, and assured him that he would not hold it against him
if he went to the enemy camp. Years later, when Cao Cao destroyed Lü Bu in 198, Bi
Chen was among those who surrendered. Pardoning his service with the enemy, Cao
Cao made him Chancellor of Lu.
was briefly captured by Lü Bu’s men, but then they asked him which
was Cao Cao and he set them in pursuit of another man.
The campaign continued for three months, with fierce fighting in
which Cao Cao was personally involved. Eventually, towards the end
of autumn, a plague of locusts appeared, both sides were short of pro-
visions, and each drew back. Cao Cao retreated to Juancheng while Lü
Bu went south into Jiyin, presumably in search of supplies; his troops
must have been greatly weakened, for he was defeated by the local
leader Li Jin and forced east into Shanyang.
For his part, we are told that Cao Cao was exhausted and depressed,
and when Yuan Shao sent an invitation to join him he was prepared
to abandon his independence and accept. Cheng Yu dissuaded him,
arguing that he was a far more able leader than Yuan Shao, he still had
an army of ten thousand men, and there was every hope for the future.
Cao Cao accepted his advice. Early in 195 he moved into Shanyang,
captured the capital and defeated Lü Bu as he sought to bring relief. In
the summer Lü Bu sent two of his generals to re-establish a position
in the north of Jiyin, but Cao Cao attacked and killed them, and again
defeated Lü Bu when he came in support.
About this time Tao Qian died in Xu province, and Cao Cao con-
sidered going to gather men and supplies there before renewing the
attack on Lü Bu. His counsellor Xun Yu warned him, however, that
memory of his previous conduct meant the people would be most
unlikely to support him, and Yan province was the heart of his power
and hope for the future. His chief concern should be to gather the
harvest and secure his supplies, then Lü Bu could be dealt with easily.
Cao Cao accepted this advice.
Soon afterwards he was supervising the autumn harvest in Shanyang
when Lü Bu and Chen Gong combined their forces to advance against
him. Many of Cao Cao’s troops were scattered in the fields, but he set
women and other followers to guard the camp, placed his few men in
ambush in woodland and behind a dyke, sent skirmishers to distract
the enemy as they approached, then launched his attack and gained a
complete victory. Lü Bu was driven from the field, and retreated that
same night. As Cao Cao followed up his success, opposition collapsed
before him and Lü Bu fled east into Xu province.
Zhang Miao now abandoned Chenliu. Leaving his younger brother
Zhang Chao with some family retainers to hold the city of Yongqiu,
near the commandery capital by present-day Jixian in Shandong, he
went to seek aid from Yuan Shu. He was killed, however, by a mutiny
80 chapter two
of his own men, and four months later, at the beginning of Western
196, Yongqiu was captured. Zhang Zhao killed himself, and his family
was massacred.
So Cao Cao had regained control of the greater part of Yan prov-
ince. He was fortunate that his powerful neighbour Yuan Shao had
not sought to take any great advantage of his difficulty. Yuan Shao was
sufficiently preoccupied with Gongsun Zan in the north and the Black
Mountain bandits on the west that he had no wish to stir up more
trouble to the south. He did, however, recognise the fighting man Liu
Bei as Governor of Xu province in replacement for Tao Qian, which
was a potential rebuff to Cao Cao’s hopes in that territory, and he also
appointed his officer Zang Hong as Administrator of Dong command-
ery with his capital at Dongwuyang: Dong commandery was formally
part of Yan province, so Yuan Shao was encroaching on Cao Cao’s
territory at least as far as the Yellow River.
Zang Hong, however, was a former subordinate of Zhang Zhao,
and when Zhang Zhao was attacked he wrote to him for help. Yuan
Shao, however, refused Zang Hong permission, and when Yongqiu fell
Zang Hong, shamed and resentful, rebelled against his master. Yuan
Shao attacked him, and the desperate siege of Zang Hong’s capital at
Dongwuyang was maintained for several months. Yuan Shao had no
wish to press so hard, but Zang Hong held out to the bitter end, and
though he was at last forced to surrender he remained defiant. Yuan
Shao had no recourse but to kill him, and when Zang Hong’s fellow
country-man, Chen Rong, spoke on his behalf he too was executed.
Yuan Shao’s attendants were appalled: “How could he kill two such
heroes on the same day?”48
Despite this embarrassment, Yuan Shao had maintained formal neu-
trality in the struggle for Yan province. The Yellow River now formed
a frontier between Yuan Shao and Cao Cao, and neither was anxious
to disturb it. At the same time, the threat to Yuan Shao from Gongsun
Zan was significantly reduced, for in 195 a group of Liu Yu’s former
officers, aided by Wuhuan and Xianbi, joined with Yuan Shao’s gen-
eral Qu Yi to inflict a heavy defeat. Abandoning all his territory north
of present-day Beijing, Gongsun Zan withdrew into a great citadel at
48
Biographies of Zang Hong are in HHS 58/48 and SGZ 7:231–37. A great part of
the two texts are occupied by a celebrated letter to justify his rebellion, as Yuan Shao
had refused to allow him to show his loyalty to his friend: also ZZTJ 61:1976–77; deC,
Establish Peace, 178–182.
Yi in Hejian, amidst a complex of watercourses on the frontier of Ji

and You provinces. Though he took no offensive action on his own
account, he still commanded sufficient forces to threaten Yuan Shao,
and he announced that it was his intention to hold himself secure and
await opportunity.49
As for Cao Cao, in the winter of 195 and even before his final vic-
tory at Yongqiu, he received formal endorsement of his title as Gover-
nor of Yan province from the itinerant Emperor Xian in the west. The
courtesy was largely meaningless, but it removed any further question
about his title and authority, and it paved the way for the remarkable
political coup which followed.
Welcome to Xu city 19650
Cao Cao had been close to disaster in Yan province, but the experi-
ence would prove of great value. At the beginning of the civil war
gentlemen such as Wang Kuang and Cao Cao himself could offer
small opposition to fighting men such as Dong Zhuo, Lü Bu and other
commanders from the frontier. The one man of the eastern alliance to
match them was Yuan Shu’s officer Sun Jian, who had spent a life-time
fighting rebels and bandits from one end of the empire to the other.
Without Sun Jian, Yuan Shu was militarily insignificant, as proven by
Cao Cao’s dramatic successes against him early in 193.
To recapture Yan province, however, Cao Cao had faced and
defeated the celebrated warrior Lü Bu, and had taken personal part in
battle. While gentlemen such as Yuan Shao and Liu Biao gave orders
to their armies, Cao Cao had fought in the ranks with his men; he
had suffered defeat and set-backs, but he had planned his tactics and
49
HHS 73/63:2363; Yi was in the vicinity of present-day Xiong county in Hebei.
Gongsun Zan apparently chose the site of his refuge on account of a popular rhyme—
commonly regarded as portentous—and went to great lengths to secure himself. Pei
a complex of great towers, surrounded by moats, where he lived with his concubines,
refusing to allow any of his officers to approach and keeping out all males over the age
of seven. To communicate, he had documents hauled up and down the walls, and also
trained his woman to shout in chorus, so that orders could be heard at a distance. See
ZZTJ 61:1978; deC, Establish Peace, 183–184, based on SGZ 8:244–45 and PC.
50
Cao Cao’s campaigns of 196, and the process which brought Emperor Xian
into his care, are summarised at SGZ 1:13. The confused history of the emperor’s
escape from Chang’an and his return to the east are in HHS 72/62:2338–43 and SGZ
6:145–47, presented in chronicle order by ZZTJ 61–62:1959–88; deC, Establish Peace,
148–200, and discussed by Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 248–261.
82 chapter two
strategy and emerged victorious. Exceptional for his background, the

brutal experience had tempered him into a match for any fighting man
in China.
At the same time, Cao Cao was recognised as a member of the gen-
try. His adoptive eunuch ancestry was largely irrelevant, for his father
had held the highest office in the state and he was himself formally
qualified as a senior official. In that regard, he was quite different to
Dong Zhuo, Lü Bu, Li Jue and the other commanders who controlled
the ramshackle regime at Chang’an after the death of Dong Zhuo, let
alone such bandit chieftains as Zhang Yan of the Black Mountains
or the unnamed heads of the various groups of Yellow Turbans. In a
word, Cao Cao was acceptable.
Remarkably, the imperial appointment as Governor of Yan province
came from a ruler who was for a moment independent. From the time
they captured Chang’an in 192 the junta of generals, Li Jue, Guo Si
and their fellows, had created turmoil with their quarrels and alliances,
plundering the people and holding the highest ministers as hostages,
so that the land about the capital was ruined and the people fled or
starved. Eventually, in the autumn of 195, the young Emperor Xian,
now fifteen years old, bluffed his way out of the city and fled to the
east. His former guardians were too disorganised to agree on a means
to bring him back under control, and a variety of small-scale war-
lords, bandits and local leaders formed a fluctuating escort. After three
months on the road with intermittent fighting, the miserable cortege
came to the banks of the Yellow River in Hongnong, just above the
Sanmen Gorges. The emperor and a small party managed to cross to
the north, but most of the men and women of the court were left to
the mercy of the soldiers. In the depths of winter at the turn of West-
ern 196, the emperor came to Anyi, capital of Hedong commandery
under the protection of the Administrator Wang Yi, and established
a temporary court:
The emperor lodged among thorns and wattles, his gates could not be
fastened, and when the Son of Heaven met with his ministers the com-
mon soldiers hid in bushes to watch, pushing and jostling one another
to make a laugh.51
51
Wei shu, quoted in ZZTJ 61:1969; deC, Establish Peace, 166. The story of the
emperor’s flight is told in ZZTJ 61:1965–69; deC, Establish Peace, 159–168, based
largely on HHS 72/62 and SGZ 6.
to guard the emperor 190–196
Map 7. Imperial Travels 195–196

83
84 chapter two
On the other hand, in a gallant attempt to restore imperial author-

ity through ritual, in the first month of the New Year the ruler offered
sacrifice to the Sovereign on High, declared an amnesty, and changed
the reign-title to Jian’an “Establishing Peace;” the appellation would be
maintained for twenty-five years of conflict.52
It was during this time of flight that Emperor Xian sent Cao Cao the
letter confirming him as Governor of Yan province, and he probably
made similar approaches to other leaders in the east: we know that
Yuan Shao was named General of the Right at this time.53 Though he
had escaped from Li Jue and Guo Si, however, the emperor was still
surrounded by a motley crew of military men who were jealous of
their charge. Zhang Yang the Administrator of Henei sent assistance
and offered to receive the refugee court,54 and though the offer was
rejected by the emperor’s guardians it was clear that a broader horizon
offered the best chance to restore a degree of imperial authority.
Yuan Shao likewise sent his officer Ju Shou to the court at Anyi, and
he considered inviting the sovereign to join him. Ju Shou encouraged
him, arguing that a display of loyalty would confirm the Yuan fam-
ily’s long association with the Han and would give him authority over
his rivals. His advisers Guo Tu and Chunyu Qiong claimed, however,
that the power of the dynasty was ended, that the empire was ripe for
conquest by a new chieftain, and that the imperial presence would
limit Yuan Shao’s freedom of action: “If you obey him you lose your
independence, but if you disobey you will be opposing the Mandate.”
52
The sacrifice to the Sovereign on High (上帝 Shang di) was offered with prayers
for a good harvest, and it could be accompanied by the Ploughing of the Sacred Field
耕藉田; both were imperial prerogatives: Bodde, Festivals, 225.
The reign-title Jian’an 建安 may have been chosen to celebrate the emperor reach-
ing a degree of safety at Anyi 安邑, written with the same character an. It had been
preceded, however, by the reign-titles Chuping 初平” Beginning Pacification” and
Xingping 興平” Pacification Restored,” and the last years of Emperor Ling had been
known by the slogan Zhongping 中平” Pacification Achieved,” so this may also be
seen as one more attempt at optimism in a time of turmoil. It is clear, in any case,
that the young emperor had no wish to set his residence at Anyi, but was anxious to
return to the former capital at Luoyang: e.g. deC, Establish Peace, 187–189.
53
HHS 74/64A:2382. The emperor may also have made contact with Liu Biao and
Yuan Shu, but there is no record of this. As will appear below, Yuan Shu had ideas
of his own.
54
There is a biography of Zhang Yang at SGZ 8:250–51. Originally from Yunzhong
in Bing province, he had an erratic career in the region of Henei until he was appointed
Administrator of that commandery by Dong Zhuo. A fighting man who occasionally
acted unlawfully, we are also told that he was generous and forgiving, and was eventu-
ally killed by a mutinous officer of his command.
Yuan Shao accepted their advice and made no further move in that
direction.55
On his part, having recaptured Chenliu Cao Cao continued to
advance, for since his expulsion of Yuan Shu three years earlier, Yu
province had no strong master. At the beginning of the Chinese New
Year he moved south into Chen state and received the surrender of
the Yuan Shu’s Chancellor Yuan Si.56 Further to the south and west,
in Yingchuan and Runan, some bandit groups styling themselves Yel-
low Turbans had a loose alliance with Yuan Shu, and in the second
month Cao Cao turned against them. Killing several of their leaders,
he brought their followers to surrender and incorporated them into
his own forces.57 As he consolidated his position in these new territo-
ries during the following months, the imperial court in Henei awarded
him title as General Who Establishes Virtue;58 in the summer he was
promoted General Who Maintains the East in Peace and received the
succession to his father’s marquisate of Bi Village.59 More significantly,
Cao Cao now controlled a broad swathe of prosperous country east
and south of the former capital district about Luoyang, and he set his
55
HHS 74/64A:2382–83 and SGZ 6:195 PC quoting Xiandi zhuan “Biography of
Emperor Xian” [probably the same work as the Xiandi ji by the contemporary Liu
Ai]. Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 251–252, notes the main text of SGZ 6:194 says that Guo Tu
was the envoy and made the proposal to receive the emperor. Ju Shou, however, had
offered the same advice on an earlier occasion [SGZ 6:192], and Sima Guang accepts
the version of Xiandi zhuan: ZZTJ 61:1969–70; deC, Establish Peace, 169–170.
56
Yuan Si had been appointed by Yuan Shu, but nothing more is known of him;
he was probably not a member of the great clan.
There is some confusion about the history of Chen state in this period. HHS
50/40:1669–70 tells how the king Liu Chong and his Chancellor Luo Jun maintained
the fief as an island of prosperity and security during the period of civil war, but
Yuan Shu sent assassins and took over the territory. ZZTJ 62:1999; deC, Establish
Peace, 222–223 places this incident in the chronicle for 197, but SGZ 1:13 mentions
Yuan Si holding office for Yuan Shu in Chen in 196. It appears Yuan Shu must have
taken over the territory before then, perhaps in 193, when he was first driven south
by Cao Cao.
57
SGZ 1:13; deC, Establish Peace, 187.
58
As member of the alliance against Dong Zhuo, Cao Cao had taken title as a
general, but that was a long time ago. This new endorsement gave him authority to
operate outside the territory of his province.
59
The fief had originally been awarded to Cao Teng, and his adoptive son Cao
Song succeeded him: HHS 78/68:2519. Though inheritance of a fief normally passed
from the father to the eldest son by his official wife, the succession required imperial
approval. By this time, of course, the confirmation was no more than a courtesy, and
the fief itself was of little value.
86 chapter two
new headquarters at Xu city in Yingchuan, present-day Xuchang in

Henan.
Despite, or perhaps because of, his recent military success and the
various marks of favour which he had received, Cao Cao had some dif-
ficulty in making direct contact with the court at Anyi. It is said that
even at the time of his first incursion into Chen he had it in mind to
bring the emperor under his protection, and that while some of his
officers were concerned at the idea, his close advisers Xun Yu and
Cheng Yu encouraged him. When he sent his cousin Cao Hong with
some troops to present the proposal, however, they were faced by the
General of the Guards Dong Cheng and others,60 and could not get
through.
Like that of Zhang Yang, this first initiative by Cao Cao was prob-
ably too blatant, but the military men at Anyi were no more unified
than the generals at Chang’an, and as they quarrelled amongst them-
selves the emperor found some room for manoeuvre. In the summer
he sent Dong Cheng to take charge of reconstruction work at Luoy-
ang, while Liu Biao in Jing province and Zhang Yang in Henei sent
material and workmen to assist him. Then early in autumn the young
ruler persuaded Dong Cheng, Yang Feng and Han Xian to escort him
to the former capital. He reported his return at the ancestral temple,
held sacrifice once more to the Sovereign on High, and proclaimed
another amnesty. Though the situation continued to be confused and
disorderly, the Consultant Dong Zhao was now able to play a crucial
role on Cao Cao’s behalf.61
Despite his comparatively low rank at this time, Dong Zhao was
an experienced and competent official. In 192 he had held Julu for
60
Dong Cheng was one of the commanders who had helped Emperor Xian escape
from Chang’an. SGZ Shu 2:875 says that he was related to the emperor as jiu 舅 a
“maternal uncle,” and Pei Songzhi adds that he was a nephew of the Dowager Dong,
mother of Emperor Ling. SGZJJ Shu 2:8a, however, quotes Zhao Yiqing of the Qing
dynasty, who points out that Dong Cheng first appears as a colleague of Li Jue and
Guo Si, and that the term jiu refers simply to the fact that one of his daughters became
an Honoured Lady in the imperial harem: connected through a woman, he was a form
of father-in-law to the emperor. Lu Bi endorses this argument, and indeed it seems
more likely that Dong Cheng was originally a man of the frontier, kin to Dong Zhuo
rather than to the Dowager Dong.
Besides the opposition from Dong Cheng, at least one of the passes was held by
Chang Nu, described as a general of Yuan Shu. Yuan Shu had been driven to the
southeast, but Chang Nu had apparently retained a position in the west.
61
The biography of Dong Zhao is at SGZ 14:436–42. A man from Jiyin, he would
have had no connection to Dong Zhuo or Dong Cheng, nor to the Dong family of
the late Empress-Dowager.
Yuan Shao against Gongsun Zan, and had cleared Wei commandery
of bandits, but he later quarrelled with Yuan Shao and went to join
the emperor at Chang’an. Zhang Yang intercepted him, and treated
him as a trusted adviser. In 193 Dong Zhao had encouraged Zhang
Yang to approve Cao Cao’s embassy to Chang’an and now, having at
last transferred to the imperial service, he held considerable influence
among the various chieftains. Yang Feng, a former bandit, had accom-
panied the emperor in his escape from Chang’an and commanded a
substantial troop at Luoyang, but he evidently felt isolated from his
colleagues and vulnerable. Claiming that it came from Cao Cao, Dong
Zhao presented him with a letter which praised his achievements and
offered him alliance. Delighted with such recognition, Yang Feng per-
suaded his fellows to grant Cao Cao the second appointment as general
and succession to his father’s fief. In the mean time, moreover, Dong
Cheng had been attacked by his colleague Han Xian, also a former
bandit chieftain, and though previously reluctant, he too was ready to
seek support from Cao Cao.
With this endorsement and with no substantial opposition, Cao
Cao came to Luoyang in the eighth month. He was accompanied by a
strong escort, and his battle-hardened men were more than a match
for the rag-tag gangsters who surrounded the emperor. Han Xian held
title as Director of Retainers, but fled to refuge with Yang Feng, and
as Cao Cao took his place he also received authority over the Imperial
Secretariat.
The Director of Retainers was head of the capital province with high
censorial powers, while “authority over the affairs of the Secretariat”
gave control of the government. Such appointments had been made
often enough in recent years, and had limited value of themselves,
but Cao Cao’s military position was strong enough for him to use his
notional authority. He promptly executed a number of officials—per-
haps with justification, though one must suspect some factional blood-
letting—and also arranged some enfeoffments and promotions. He
then sought Dong Zhao’s advice on how he might proceed further.
There was no possibility of the imperial court remaining at Luo-
yang: the city had been devastated and the latest repairs can have had
only limited effect. More importantly, it was well away from the heart
of Cao Cao’s power, separated by mountain passes which could easily
be blocked, and vulnerable to any of the petty warlords, bandits and
other armed groups of the north and west. Naturally enough, Cao Cao
wanted to bring the emperor back into his own territory, but he was
88 chapter two
concerned that Yang Feng and Han Xian, now in camp southeast of
the capital, might intervene.
At Dong Zhao’s recommendation, however, Cao Cao sent another
flattering letter to Yang Feng, explaining that he was moving the court
to be closer to food and other supplies, but would remain near at hand.
Yang Feng was suitably deceived, and realised his error only when
the imperial party travelled through the Huanyuan Pass and moved
directly towards Xu city. He and Han Xian came in pursuit, but they
were defeated in a series of ambushes, and when they sought to pro-
voke an open battle by raiding further south, Cao Cao made a surprise
attack on their base camp. Cut off from their former homeland, the
two leaders fled southeast to join Yuan Shu.
In the mean time, early in the ninth month the emperor had been
brought to Xu city, where another set of national altars and an impe-
rial ancestral temple were established for the new capital, last of the
Han: Emperor Xian did not travel again until his abdication and the
end of the dynasty twenty-five years later. For his part, Cao Cao had
spent little more than two weeks in the old capital region, and he paid
it no further attention: the territory remained a wasteland of devasta-
tion, disorder and neglect.
Though he had cleverly and successfully brought the court under
his control, Cao Cao’s first actions afterwards were politically incau-
tious and potentially dangerous. He immediately had himself named
General-in-Chief, and arranged for an edict to be sent to Yuan Shao,
accusing him of failing to give support to the throne and of setting up
a faction in his own interest: the very word “faction” was anathema
to the concept of unified rule under a benevolent sovereign, and had
been used in the recent past to punish and proscribe men for treason.62
Predictably indignant, Yuan Shao sent a detailed memorial to justify
his conduct, noting his previous sponsorship of Cao Cao as Governor
of Yan province. He was then offered appointment as Grand Com-
mandant, highest of the three Excellencies, together with enfeoffment
as marquis of his capital at Ye city. Angrily, however, he observed that
62
Accusations of dang 黨 “faction” or “party” were used on several occasions dur-
ing Han to damage political opponents. Most dramatic was the series of incidents
in the late 160s which led to the Great Proscription lasting until 184. An account of
the Proscribed Party (黨錮 danggu), and biographies of several of its members and
associates, who suffered for their opposition to the eunuch-dominated government of
Emperor Ling, is in HHS 67/57, and there is a chronicle account in ZZTJ 55:1794–
56:1822; deC, Huan and Ling, 78–115. See also deC, “Political Protest.”
the Grand Commandant was inferior in rank to Cao Cao’s new posi-
tion as General-in-Chief, and he refused the appointment.
At last concerned that he had gone too far, Cao Cao hastily gave up
his title in Yuan Shao’s favour and appointed himself only as Excel-
lency of Works, lowest of the three, with acting authority as General
of Chariots and Cavalry, which was likewise the third-ranking gen-
eral’s command under the old empire. In the following year the senior
official Kong Rong was sent to award Yuan Shao insignia as General-
in-Chief, with authority over the four provinces of Ji, Qing, You and
Bing, and also granting him bows and arrows, a battle-axe, and the
right to maintain a hundred guards Rapid as Tigers: these were spe-
cial marks of imperial favour, and were numbered among the Nine
Distinctions,63 Yuan Shao had successfully humbled his rival.
There can have been small doubt that Cao Cao and Yuan Shao were
heading for direct conflict, but neither was yet prepared to force the
issue. Though Gongsun Zan was isolated in his fortress at Yi, Yuan
Shao was still concerned at the possibility of an attack, and was reluc-
tant to commit himself against the south until he was certain there was
no major threat from the north. Gongsun Zan had planned to wait for
his rivals to exhaust themselves, then seize the opportunity to resume
the offensive, and though Yuan Shao sent his son Yuan Tan into Qing
province to attack Gongsun Zan’s officer Tian Kai, the two sides had
fought one another to a stand-still, while his general Qu Yi was unable
to make any substantial inroads on Gongsun Zan’s core territory.
For his part, Cao Cao recognised that he was still too weak to chal-
lenge Yuan Shao, and he had two immediate priorities: to establish a
strong position about Xu city and to expand his power east and south.
The first of these would be achieved by development in farming and
settlement based upon the establishment of tuntian, a term best ren-
dered as “[military] agricultural colonies.”
The essential principle of the tuntian was that men were settled on
vacant land, which they and their dependents both farmed and pro-
tected, so they were essentially self-supporting both in food and in
military terms. Unlike the traditional system of Han, which left the
peasants to till their land and then called for taxes and physical service,
members of tuntian were granted supplies and material assistance,
and returned a share of their produce to the official granaries and
63
HHS 74/64A:2389. On the Nine Distinctions, see Chapter Nine at 387–388 and ff.
90 chapter two
treasury. As the farmers had a direct relationship with the govern-

ment, the influence of landlords and other private interests was largely
removed, and there was no need for complex and potentially corrupt
surveys of the quantity and quality of the land.
Such a system had been used before, and the concept of the self-
supporting soldier-farmer would become an important element in the
frontier defence of the empire.64 Within China, Gongsun Zan had such
settlements about his fortress at Yi, Tao Qian in Xu province may have
had them earlier,65 and many of the small self-defence groups which
formed in this time of troubles must have operated on the same sys-
tem. The achievement of Cao Cao and his advisers was to develop the
basic principle into a full-scale system for the control and resettlement
of lands and people devastated by civil war. Whereas previous colonies
had been used primarily for military purposes, the new establishments
were designed as much for the value of their civilian production as for
military defence. Tenants were expected to be able to protect them-
selves in time of emergency, and on occasion they could take part in
major work on dams and canals, but they were not conscripted for
extra corvée labour, nor for general military service—their function
was to produce food, the sinews of war, and they were protected from
any interference with that duty.66
64
A celebrated example is the system set up by the Former Han general Zhao
Chongguo during his campaign against Qiang tribes of the Xining valley in 61–60
BC. At that time, he presented a detailed memorial, with calculations to justify his
policy, and this locus classicus has been translated and discussed by many scholars,
notably Loewe, Crisis and Conflict, 226–227, Hsü, Han Agriculture, 236–237 and deC,
Northern Frontier, 62–65. In his recent article, however, Dreyer has pointed out that
Zhao Chongguo was planning only a limited occupation of territory for strategic pur-
poses, and never intended to make his tuntian into permanent settlements: “Zhao
Chongguo,” 693–699, especially 694.
Zhao Chongguo’s short-term establishment, however, was by no means the only
example in Former Han, and both Han dynasties used tuntian to control ground on
the frontier and in the Western Regions. See, for example, Loewe, RHA I, 56 [at Juyan
and in the Gansu corridor], HHS 85/75:2815 [in the far northeast] and 88/78:2909;
deC, “Western Regions,” 10–11.
65
On Gongsun Zan, see HHS 73/63:2363. Tao Qian had appointed a Colonel in
Charge of Agriculture, and such an office was in later years associated with the tuntian
system of Cao Cao: SGZ 7:230 PC quoting Xianxian xingzhuang “Conduct and Char-
acter of Worthy Men of the Past;” deC, Establish Peace, 143, and see note 68 below.
66
Good discussions of the tuntian system may be found in Zhang Weihua, Cao-
Wei tuntian yu Xi-Jin zhantian, and Crowell, “Government Land Policies,” 144–182.
On the concern for agricultural production see SGZ 15:481 and SGZ 28:761, cited by
Tang Changru, Wei-Jin nanbeichao shilun cong, 41. SGZ 12:388–89 records a memorial
from Sima Zhi about 230, protesting at colonists engaging in trade and not attending
A good deal of debate took place before details were settled. Since
the government provided land and equipment, including oxen for
ploughing, it was argued that farmers should pay a fixed sum, regard-
less of the value of the crop. Zao Zhi, however, the loyal magistrate
of Dong’a at the time of the invasion by Lü Bu, now played a leading
role in developing the new system. He urged a levy based on yield: a
share-cropping system encouraged higher production, while even if a
fixed sum was set, in time of poor harvest the payment would have
to be waived in whole or in part. This argument was accepted, and
it appears that the government generally received 50% of the annual
yield from the tenant of a garrison, or 60% when the oxen used were
owned by the state.67
The first colonies about Xu city were set up under the administra-
tion of Ren Jun, a close adviser to Cao Cao who was named Commis-
sioner for Agriculture with authority comparable to that of the head
of a commandery—the colonies themselves were independent of the
commanderies and counties.68 The system was later extended over
many areas under Cao Cao’s control.
As a means of physical and political resettlement, tuntian proved
remarkably successful, for they confirmed Cao Cao’s control of the
ground and gave displaced people, whether former rebels, surrendered
bandits or simple refugees, commitment to the regime which spon-
sored them.69 Economically, the system deployed the resources of land
to farming: “[Cao Cao] set up tuntian specifically to concentrate upon agriculture and
silk-farming.” Much of the text is translated by Hsü, Han Agriculture, 320. See also
deC, “Three Kingdoms and Western Jin” I, 25–28.
67
The biography of Han Hao from Wei shu, quoted in SGZ 9:269 PC, refers to at
least one formal assembly to consider policy, and echoes of the discussion may be
found in a eulogy issued by Cao Cao in honour of Zao Zhi, who died soon after the
plan was put into effect: note 69 below.
On Han Hao’s support at the time of Lü Bu’s attack in 194, see note 46 above. He
became Protector of the Army, responsible for discipline, under Cao Cao, and was a
senior and trusted officer.
68
The biography of Ren Jun is at SGZ 16:489–90. According to commentary to HHS
116/26:3591, quoting a work entitled Wei zhi [probably a variant text from Sanguo
zhi], a Commissioner for Agriculture (diannong zhonglang jiang: notionally “General
of the Household in Charge of Agriculture”) had the same rank as the Administrator
of a commandery; a Colonel in Charge of Agriculture (diannong xiaowei) [see note 65
above] was just below that; and a Commandant in Charge of Agriculture (yihe duwei)
was comparable to a junior county magistrate. On the independence of the colonies
from local authorities, see SGZ 15:481.
69
Zao Zhi has no individual biography in SGZ, but that of Ren Jun at SGZ 16:489
remarks that “the wealth of the army and the state began with Zao Zhi and reached
92 chapter two
and people on terms which provided regular supplies for government

and the army, and Cao Cao’s enterprise gave him a notable advantage
against his competitors.70 In effect, Cao Cao was turning his warlord
state into the greatest land-owner of the region, with colonies like pri-
vate estates and their inhabitants as tenants and retainers.71 On this
basis, though still under threat from Yuan Shao’s power in the north,
he could look with some confidence at his neighbours and rivals to the
south, east and west.
Captive Emperor72
The young man who came to set his puppet court at Xu city had expe-
rienced a great deal. His mother, the Beauty Wang, was favoured by
Emperor Ling in 180 and became pregnant by him. The Empress He,
however, was known for her hatred of any rival, and the Lady Wang
was so frightened that she attempted to procure an abortion. She was
unsuccessful, and her son was born on 2 April 181, first day of the
third month of the Chinese year. Seven days later the Empress indeed
had the Lady Wang poisoned.73
Emperor Ling had a great many concubines, but he was bitterly
angry at the death of the Lady Wang, and though the palace eunuchs
fulfilment with Ren Jun” and a fragment of Wei-Wu gushi “Memoirs of Emperor Wu
of Wei” in SGZ 16:490 PC quotes the eulogy that Cao Cao composed in his honour.
See Hsü, Han Agriculture, 319 and JS 26:783–84; Yang, “Economic History,” 163.
70
SGZ 1:14 and PC quoting Wei shu. Wei shu emphasises the success of Cao Cao’s
program by describing how the soldiers of Yuan Shao in the north were reduced to
scavenging for mulberries and jujubes, while those of Yuan Shu on the Huai looked
for oysters and clams. The same parallel is presented by JS 26:782; Yang, “Economic
History,” 158. According to SGZ 1:12, when Cao Cao was fighting Lü Bu for Yan
province two years before, the price of a single hu 斛 of grain (about 20 litres) had
reached more than half a million cash.
71
Lewis, China Between Empires, 55.
72
HHS 9 has the Annals/Biography of Emperor Xian; his experiences to 196 are
described at 367–80.
73
A short biography of the Lady Wang appears at HHS 10B:450. Her family was of
gentry rank, for her grandfather had been a General of the Household, while the Lady
herself could read and write and had some knowledge of mathematics. A Beauty held
second rank among the imperial concubines, below the empress and the Honoured
Ladies.
The details of the Lady Wang’s pregnancy and the date of her delivery are given by
HHS 10B:449 and the Xu Han shu of Sima Biao 1:19a. We are told that after the drugs
she took to procure the abortion failed to have effect, she dreamt several times that
she was carrying the sun; this last is quite a common trope: e.g. SGZ Wu 5:1195 PC.
persuaded him not to dismiss his Empress he mourned the Lady with
a hymn in her honour and a rhapsody to her memory. He and his
predecessor took many women to their beds, but they left few children
to survive them: Emperor Huan is recorded as having three daughters,
and Emperor Ling just two sons and a daughter.74 Apart from the nat-
ural dangers of childbirth and infancy, there is strong suspicion that
the respective Empresses Liang and He were responsible for several
failed births or fatalities.
After the death of the Lady Wang her baby was placed in the care
of his grandmother the titular Dowager Dong, mother of the emperor.
The boy became known as Lord Dong, while his elder half-brother Liu
Bian, son of the Empress He, received instruction from a Taoist tutor
named Shi Zimiao, and was referred to as Lord Shi.75
Some believed that Emperor Ling intended to name Liu Xie as his
formal Heir, but when he died in 189 he had made no appointment.
Liu Xie was just over eight years old by Western reckoning, and his
supporters were in no position to contend for power with the He fam-
ily of the Empress-Dowager, who would in any case have been regent
for a minority ruler. Within a few weeks the Dowager Dong had been
driven into her grave, and other members of her family and her party
were likewise eliminated.
One can barely contemplate the effect on the imperial children of
the chaos and disorder which followed the assassination of He Jin.
As the palace buildings were stormed and burned by furious soldiers,
hundreds of eunuchs were slain before their eyes, and when the two
boys were taken in flight from Luoyang their party was overtaken by a
posse of insurgents and their last, most senior attendants were forced
to kill themselves. On the following day the young emperor and his
brother returned to the capital riding in a farm-cart—symbol of the
humiliated dynasty—and were received there by Dong Zhuo and his
frontier troops. Three days later Liu Bian was deposed and Liu Xie
was set upon the throne in his place; the Dowager He was poisoned
two days after that, and Liu Bian shared her fate early in the following
year.
74
The daughters of emperors who were enfeoffed as princesses are listed at the end
of the collection of biographies of empresses; those of Huan and Ling appear at HHS
10B:462. In contrast, Liu Kui the King of Bohai, twin brother of Emperor Huan, had
seventy children: HHS 55/45:1798.
75
HHS 10B:449 TC and 450.
94 chapter two
It is said that Dong Zhuo had been impressed by Liu Xie’s conduct
and bearing, and that he was also taken by his connection to the late
Dowager Dong: though he had no relationship but the surname, it
gave him a sense of patronage. He appears to have behaved kindly
to the young emperor, but he was a capricious and violent man and
Liu Xie had no close companions. Taken to Chang’an early in 190,
he remained in that city for five years, surrounded and controlled by
military men. Dong Zhuo was assassinated in 192, but was succeeded
soon afterwards by his former officers Liu Jue, Guo Si and others, even
more brutal and quarrelsome, while the government and the capital
fell steadily further into ruin.
Liu Xie had a few small successes. Having taken the cap of man-
hood in 194 at the age of fourteen sui, he refused to establish a formal
harem until his mother the Lady Wang had been granted posthumous
title as a empress and ritually buried with his father Emperor Ling;
a special mission was sent to Luoyang early in the following year to
carry out his wishes amid the plundered tombs. And when relief grain
was issued in short measure he punished the official responsible and
forced an honest distribution. Such actions showed suitable morality
and good will, but the young sovereign had no influence on broader
matters of government.
Li Jue and Guo Si, however, became increasingly suspicious of one
another, and as the quarrel reached breaking point early in 195 Li Jue
took Liu Xie hostage while Guo Si kidnapped a number of his minis-
ters. Even as the young emperor and his officials sought to restore a
measure of peace, soldiers fought in the streets, the palace buildings
were plundered and burnt, and cross-bow bolts hit the imperial lodg-
ings. Li Jue sought to justify his conduct, and addressed the emperor
with every show of respect, but he kept Liu Xie and his attendants on
short rations of grain and a few old bones, while barbarian auxiliaries
came to the gates in search of women. Strangely enough, in the midst
of the turmoil Liu Xie took the Lady Fu Shou as his Empress; his
mother had now been suitably honoured.
After six months hardship and threat, Liu Xie and his civilian minis-
ters managed to take advantage of the disorder and make their escape
from Chang’an. We are told that the cortege left by the north-eastern
Xuanping Gate, with the emperor riding in a covered carriage, and as
Li Jue and Guo Si’s men prepared to block the road with their fighting
he showed himself and rebuked them. Suitably awed by the authority
of the Son of Heaven, the two sets of opponents drew back to let him
go, and as he crossed the bridge they hailed him together with “Ten
Thousand Years!”76
The leaders escorting the emperor were as confused and quarrelsome
as Li Jue and Guo Si: they included Dong Cheng, who may have been a
relative of the late Dong Zhuo, the senior general Yang Ding, and Yang
Feng a former bandit; the latter two were not related. At Huayin, by
the junction of the Wei and the Yellow River, the local warlord Duan
Wei offered support but the other three were old enemies and wanted
to attack him. Though the emperor refused permission, Yang Ding
and his fellows ignored him and engaged Duan Wei. Li Jue and Guo
Si, however, had made up their quarrel as they saw their prize escap-
ing, and when they came in pursuit Yang Ding abandoned the field.
The rest of the imperial party fled east through Hongnong. They
suffered a heavy defeat, but then made alliance with bandit groups led
by Han Xian and Li Le, together with a roaming troop of the Xiongnu
led by the chieftain Qubi, and with these informal reinforcements they
escaped once more. Again, however, they were pursued and defeated.
Li Le offered the emperor his horse, but the young man refused to
abandon his people, and the fugitives maintained a running fight till
they reached a crossing-place on the Yellow River. Amid scenes of utter
disorder as Li Jue and his men attacked, the emperor was let down a
cliff-face on salvaged rolls of bloody silk while men and women fought
for places in a boat. Most of them were left behind to be captured and
robbed, the women were stripped and raped, and many died of shock
and exposure.
Liu Xie himself and his Empress Fu reached the northern bank with
Li Le, Han Xian, Dong Cheng and a few of their men. Riding in an
ox-cart—the second time he had used such a humble conveyance—the
emperor reached temporary refuge in Hedong, and after some months
of contention and uncertainty he persuaded his quarrelling escorts
to allow his return to the ruins of Luoyang. Once there, he accepted
Cao Cao’s invitation to Xu city and what was, in reality, a permanent
captivity.
As Liu Xie entered Xu city on 16 October 196 he was fifteen years
old in Western terms, and had spent half his life in poverty and
oppression. He had seen his closest attendants and servants killed, he
76
HHS 72/62:2339 TC and SGZ 6:186 PC, both quoting Xiandi chunqiu “Chronicle
of Emperor Xian;” deC, Establish Peace, 159.
96 chapter two
had been surrounded by military turmoil and defeat, and he had been
forced to depend upon an ever-changing group of disorganized, ill-
educated and unreliable fighting men. After the turmoil of the years
just past, Xu city provided a stable place of refuge, while the hegemony
of Cao Cao was surely an improvement on the confused and brutal
regimes of his predecessors.
At the same time, while there was no chance the authority of Han
could be restored in any meaningful fashion, there were still people
whose loyalty to the dynasty and the ideals of the past led them to
hope for some form of revival. Liu Xie himself had occasional ideas
of independence, there were a number of plots and plans among his
entourage and even among Cao Cao’s own followers, and though
the presence of the sovereign did indeed provide some advantage
to his new protector, the relationship was never entirely secure or
trustworthy.
CHAPTER THREE
TO BATTLE AT GUANDU
197–200
Troublesome neighbours 196–198

Conduct at court
Approaches to Guandu 199–200
Yuan Shao’s Call to Arms
Decisive victory 200
The Guandu campaign: a reappraisal
Chronology
195 summer: Liu Bei succeeds Tao Qian as Governor of Xu province

autumn: Lü Bu joins Liu Bei
196 summer: Lü Bu changes sides to help Yuan Shu defeat Liu Bei;
soon afterwards Liu Bei surrenders to Lü Bu and renews their
alliance
winter: Liu Bei is attacked by Yuan Shu; he is saved by Lü Bu,
who then turns against him once more; Liu Bei flees to Cao
Cao, who establishes him in Pei
197 spring: Cao Cao attacks Zhang Xiu in Nanyang, but is defeated;
Yuan Shu takes the imperial title; he is attacked and defeated
by Lü Bu; Cao Cao forms a distant alliance with Sun Ce and
with Lü Bu
autumn: Yuan Shu occupies Chen state, but Cao Cao drives him
away
winter: Cao Cao’s second campaign against Zhang Xiu in Nanyang
198 spring: Cao Cao’s third campaign against Zhang Xiu
summer: Cao Cao retreats, but defeats Zhang Xiu and Liu Biao’s
forces at Anzhong
autumn: Lü Bu attacks Liu Bei in Pei; Cao Cao marches against
Lü Bu
winter: Cao Cao besieges Xiapi city, captures and kills Lü Bu;
Cao Cao settles with Zang Ba and other leaders about Mount
Tai and largely controls Xu province
98 chapter three
199 spring: Yuan Shao destroys Gongsun Zan in the north; Emperor
Xian orders Dong Cheng to conspire against Cao Cao
summer: Cao Cao establishes Wei Chong in Henei; Liu Bei into
Xu province; he declares against Cao Cao; Yuan Shu dies in
Jiujiang
winter: Zhang Xiu in Nanyang allies with Cao Cao
200 spring: Dong Cheng’s plot is discovered and the conspirators
are executed; Cao Cao attacks Liu Bei and drives him from Xu
province; Yuan Shao advances to Liyang in Wei commandery
summer: Cao Cao’s victories at Boma and the Yan Crossing
autumn: two missions of Liu Bei into Runan; the armies of Cao
Cao and Yuan Shao face each other at Guandu
winter: Cao Cao defeats Chunyu Qiong and destroys Yuan Shao’s
supply depot; Zhang He and Gao Lan attack Guandu without
success, then surrender; his army defeated, Yuan Shao aban-
dons the field
Troublesome neighbours 196–1981
As Cao Cao was engaged against Lü Bu and occupied in his deal-

ings with the emperor, there were changes to his south and east. In
194 Tian Kai had brought his officer Liu Bei to aid Tao Qian against
Cao Cao in Xu province. Liu Bei then took service with Tao Qian,
who named him Inspector of Yu province, and Liu Bei camped in Pei.
Later, in the summer of 195 Tao Qian became seriously ill, and on his
death-bed he urged his officers to make Liu Bei his successor. When he
died they issued the invitation, and after a suitable show of reluctance
Liu Bei was persuaded to accept.
Liu Bei is one of the most celebrated figures of the Three Kingdoms,
and his reputation in the Romance matches and perhaps surpasses
that of Cao Cao.2 He claimed descent from Emperor Jing of Former
Han, who had enfeoffed his son Liu Sheng as King of Zhongshan.3
1
Major sources for Cao Cao’s campaigns from 196 to 198 are SGZ 1:13–17, the
biographies of Lü Bu at SGZ 7:222–29, of Yuan Shu at HHS 75/65:2441–42 and SGZ
6:209–10, and of Liu Bei at SGZ Shu 2:873–75. They are presented in chronicle order
by ZZTJ 62:1979–2008; deC, Establish Peace, 187–239, and are discussed by Leban,
“Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 264–308.
2
The biography of Liu Bei (161–223), First Sovereign of Shu-Han, is in SGZ Shu 2.
3
Liu Sheng was enfeoffed in 154 BC and died in 112. When his tomb and that of
his wife were excavated at Mancheng in Hebei in 1968, a great quantity of funerary
to battle at guandu 197–200 99
One of Liu Sheng’s sons, Liu Zhen, became a village marquis in Zhuo
commandery, and though he lost his fief in 112 BC for failing to pres-
ent proper dues to the throne, the family remained in that territory.
Liu Bei’s grandfather Liu Xiong was a county magistrate in Dong
commandery, and his father Liu Hong became an officer in the local
administration, but when he died his widow was left poor, and she and
her son made sandals and mats for a living. Liu Bei set great store by
his imperial lineage, but it was a long time ago and very tenuous, and
there were a great many others of the Liu surname who could make
a similar claim.4
Despite his apparent poverty, we are told that when he was aged
fourteen Liu Bei spent time at the University in Luoyang, where Gong-
sun Zan was one of his fellow students. He later became friends with
Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, also men of the north, and these two became
his closest associates.5 We are told that Liu Bei grew to be seven foot
five inches tall [173 cm], that his hands reached below his knees, and
his ears were so large that he could see them when he turned his head;
accurate or otherwise, these were signs of a future hero. His spell at the
University had not made him a scholar, but he took pleasure in hunt-
ing, music and fine clothing. He was known to treat his subordinates
well, so that many came to join him, and some wealthy men provided
him with the means to recruit more followers. He served against the
Yellow Turbans, in frontier wars on the northeast and in Danyang
south of the Yangzi.
As civil war broke out in 190, Liu Bei went to join Gongsun
Zan, and he took part in the first successes against Yuan Shao. He
was named Chancellor of Pingyuan as reward, but when Yuan Shao
defeated Gongsun Zan in 192, Liu Bei and his leader Tian Kai were
driven away to the east, and when Tian Kai went to assist Tao Qian in
Xu province Liu Bei saw better opportunities there. Though his new
items was discovered, including the first complete examples of the celebrated “jade
armour,” a privilege granted by the emperor.
4
Leaving side the fact that Liu is one of the most common surnames in China, the
biography of Liu Sheng at HS 55:2425 records that he sired 120 sons and daughters;
the lineage was not exclusive.
5
The biographies of Guan Yu and Zhang Fei are in SGZ Shu 6. Zhang Fei came
from Zhuo, the same commandery as Liu Bei; Guan Yu was originally from Hedong,
but had fled to Zhuo to escape enemies, probably on account of some vendetta. The
three men are said to have treated one another like brothers, but there is no his-
torical authority for the celebrated Oath of the Peach Garden, described in Romance
Chapter 1.
100 chapter three
base at Pei city was in Yu province, his nominal position as Inspector

had small significance, for the bulk of the territory was well out of Tao
Qian’s control. Liu Bei was delighted with the title, however, and for
many years afterwards he was known as Liu of Yu province.
By the time Liu Bei succeeded Tao Qian, Cao Cao had withdrawn to
deal with the threat from Lü Bu, and his immediate interest thereafter
was with the emperor’s approach from the west and his settlement at
Xu city. At the same time, since Cao Cao had forced him away into
Jiujiang in 193, Yuan Shu had consolidated his position in Yang prov-
ince. With his capital at Shouchun, he had taken Lujiang to the west,
and his youthful commander Sun Ce, son of his late general Sun Jian,
held Danyang south of the Yangzi.6 Yuan Shu had earlier laid claim to
Xu province, and in the summer of 196 he launched an attack.
Following his defeat by Cao Cao in Yan province, Lü Bu fled for
refuge with Liu Bei. As with Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu, he sought to
ingratiate himself with his new protector, this time on the basis that
they were both men of the frontier. Liu Bei was little impressed, and
it does not appear that Lü Bu was a man who inspired confidence and
trust, but they nonetheless agreed upon a form of alliance.
Leaving his comrade Zhang Fei to guard his base at Xiapi, capital
of the commandery, Liu Bei went to face Yuan Shu’s troops on the
line of the Huai River. The first engagements were inconclusive, but
then Zhang Fei, a hasty and brutal man, quarrelled with Cao Bao the
Chancellor of Xiapi and killed him.7 As riots broke out in the city,
Yuan Shu wrote to persuade Lü Bu to intervene, and promised him
help with his supplies. Lü Bu accepted the offer and attacked Zhang
Fei. The city gates were opened by dissidents, Zhang Fei fled, and Liu
Bei’s position collapsed. Retreating east into Guangling, he was chased
and again defeated by Yuan Shu’s army.
By this time, however, Lü Bu had become angry with Yuan Shu for
failing to provide the supplies he had promised, and Liu Bei surren-
dered to him and made peace. In a ludicrous volte-face, they formed a
new alliance with Liu Bei as the junior partner, and drove Yuan Shu
back. Lü Bu named himself Governor of Xu province, and Liu Bei
6
The biography of Sun Ce (175–200) is in SGZ Wu 1. His career is discussed in
Chapter Three of deC, Generals of the South.
7
Cao Bao had formerly been an officer of Tao Qian and a colleague of Liu Bei. He
had no connection to Cao Cao.
returned to Pei city, reduced to his previous title as Inspector of Yu

province.
Yuan Shu now approached Lü Bu once more, offering one of his
sons as a husband for Lü Bu’s daughter, Lü Bu agreed, and Yuan Shu
promptly sent troops to attack Liu Bei. Liu Bei asked Lü Bu for help,
and despite his undertaking to Yuan Shu, and the advice of his officers
that he had an opportunity to eliminate one of his rivals, Lü Bu believed
Yuan Shu would become too powerful if Liu Bei was destroyed. So he
went to the rescue, and both the histories and Romance agree on what
happened next:8
When [Yuan Shu’s general] Ji Ling and the others heard that Lü Bu
had come, they halted their troops. Lü Bu camped southwest of Pei city,
and sent one of his orderlies to invite them. As Ji Ling and his fellows
returned the invitation, Lü Bu went to them, and they then drank and
ate with Liu Bei.
Then Lü Bu said to Ji Ling and his party, “Xuande [Liu Bei] is my
younger brother.9 He is in trouble with you, and I have come to help
him. I am not the sort of person who likes to sow discord: I much prefer
to be a peace-maker.”
Lü Bu ordered a captain to set up a halberd at the gate of the camp. He
bent his bow, looked around and said, “You will all see me shoot at the
small spike on that halberd. If I hit it, both sides draw back your men.
If I miss, then you may stay to settle your quarrel.” Lü Bu fired a single
shot, and hit square on the spike.
Ji Ling and the others were amazed. “General,” they said, “you have
the authority of Heaven.” Next day they met to drink again, and after-
wards each side withdrew.
This is a splendid story, but though Yuan Shu’s troops are said to have
numbered more than thirty thousand, it is probable that Lü Bu’s relief
force added some conviction to his argument for peace and his feat
of arms.
As Liu Bei sought to recruit more men, however, the capricious Lü
Bu became concerned that he was becoming too strong and came to
attack him. Utterly defeated, Liu Bei abandoned the territory and fled
to join Cao Cao. For the time being, Lü Bu held Xu province, Yuan
8
The story is told in the biographies of Lü Bu, HHS 75/65:2447–48 and SGZ
7:222–23, also in ZZTJ 62:1991; deC, Establish Peace, 206, and it appears in Romance
Chapter 16.
9
Xuande was the style, or intimate personal name, of Liu Bei. The reference to Liu
Bei as a younger brother here is no more than a sign of close friendship; the two men
had taken no specific oath.
102 chapter three
Shu remained in Yang, and the Huai River served as an approximate

border between them.
When Liu Bei came to his camp towards the end of 196, Cao Cao
was uncertain how to deal with him. Several advisers urged that he
hold him prisoner or even kill him, for Liu Bei was known to be an
ambitious man, there was no reason to believe he would be content
to remain in a subordinate position, and he could be a dangerous
opponent in future. Cao Cao’s counsellor Guo Jia, however, observed
that Liu Bei had already acquired a fine reputation, and if he were
not treated well it would damage Cao Cao’s own position. Cao Cao
accepted the argument: he named Liu Bei once more as Governor of
Yu province, provided him with additional soldiers and supplies, and
sent him back to Pei to regroup his troops and act as a threat against
Lü Bu.
Early in the following year, 197, the situation in the southeast was
changed by the extraordinary decision of Yuan Shu to claim the impe-
rial title in succession to Han. At one level he may have appeared to
have some justification: he controlled Yang province and part of Yu
province, and he was in contention for Xu province; as representative
of a great official family he could hope to have influence across the
whole of China; and he publicised a number of auspicious signs and
omens to support his new position.10 Despite his pretensions, however,
Yuan Shu was neither a competent administrator nor an effective mili-
tary commander. He had earlier lost his position in Nanyang because
of his poor government, and though he had direct control of a sub-
stantial territory between the Yangzi and the Huai he had done noth-
10
The most noteworthy of these was a prophecy which claimed that “the one who
shall succeed to Han will be ‘High Road’ 塗高.” Yuan Shu argued that since the char-
acter of his personal name 術 could mean “road” or “street,” while his style, Gonglu
公路, meant “public road,” he matched the omen: HHS 75/65:2439 and SGZ 6:210
PC quoting Dian lue.
In fact, it is likely the prophecy originated with a group of rebels in Dangtu 當塗
county in Jiujiang, who may have promulgated it to aid their cause: see HHS 6:276
and 112/22:3486, discussed by Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 186, and deC, Generals of the
South, 174. As commentary to HHS 75/65 points out, moreover, the character for Cao
Cao’s own state and dynasty of Wei, which did indeed succeed to Han, could bear
the meaning “high.”
Yuan Shu also held the imperial Seal of State of Han, which had been found by his
general Sun Jian in the ruins of Luoyang in 191. We cannot be certain whether the
account of the discovery is true, nor whether the Seal was the original [Chapter Two
at 58 and particularly note 10], but its possession gave some support to Yuan Shu’s
claim.
ing to develop it as a base. Furthermore, as in the earlier campaign of

Sun Jian towards Luoyang and the recent attack of Ji Ling against Liu
Bei, he regularly sent others to command his armies in the field.
In practical terms, the decision was disastrous. No leading men of
the empire were willing to accept office under the usurper, and his
general Sun Ce, who had conquered several commanderies south of
the Yangzi on his behalf, immediately renounced his allegiance, barred
the river crossings, and called his kinfolk and associates to leave Yuan
Shu and come to join him. Yuan Shu again offered a marriage alliance
to Lü Bu, but Lü Bu refused and sent Yuan Shu’s envoys to be executed
as traitors at Xu city. Yuan Shu sent an army against him, and made
an alliance with the free-lance leaders Han Xian and Yang Feng,11 but
as the enemy came to Xiapi Lü Bu took the advice of his counsellor
Chen Gui, and persuaded Han Xian and Yang Feng to change sides
in the middle of the battle. Yuan Shu’s men were utterly defeated, and
as the allied forces advanced to the Huai in a display of strength Yuan
Shu was driven back to his capital of Shouchun.
Soon afterwards, Han Xian and Yang Feng were eliminated. With
no secure base, their hungry troops continued to ravage the territory
north of the Huai, and Lü Bu turned against them. Yang Feng went
to ask help from Liu Bei in Pei, but Liu Bei arrested and killed him.
Now isolated, Han Xian sought to return to his homeland in the north,
but was slain by a local leader. With an augmented army, Lü Bu con-
trolled the southern part of Xu province from his base in Xiapi, and
he had contact with a number of self-defence or bandit groups which
had established themselves on the slopes of Mount Tai, further to the
north.
Cao Cao was surely pleased to see his rival Yuan Shu so weakened
by his own presumption. On the authority of the emperor of Han,
he recognised Sun Ce as Administrator of Kuaiji, his family’s home
commandery, with title as a general and succession to his father’s
marquisate, and he also arranged a marriage alliance.12 The awards
11
Han Xian and Yang Feng had joined in the escort of Emperor Xian to Luoyang,
but were then driven away by Cao Cao.
12
Cao Zhang, second son of Cao Cao by the Lady Bian, was married to a daughter
of Sun Ce’s cousin Sun Ben, while the daughter of one of Cao Cao’s younger brothers
or cousins was given in marriage to Sun Ce’s younger brother Sun Kuang: SGZ Wu
1:1104.
It is doubtful that these unions were either realistic or significant. Cao Zhang was
born about 190 [his elder brother Cao Pi had been born in 187, and his younger
104 chapter three
themselves, however, were not great: Sun Ce was at first named only
as a Commandant of Cavalry, while Cao Cao sent his own supporter
Chen Yu to be Administrator of Wu commandery, rivalling Sun Ce’s
authority in his heartland. Sun Ce had to press the point to obtain his
general’s rank, and he sent an expeditionary force to defeat Chen Yu
and drive him away to join Yuan Shao. Clearly, the relationship was
not going to be straightforward.13
Cao Cao also made alliance with Lü Bu, though dealings with his
old enemy were naturally uneasy, with little faith on either side. Lü Bu
had previously been inclined to accept Yuan Shu’s marriage connec-
tion rather than join with Cao Cao, but Chen Gui reminded him how
poorly Yuan Shu had received him when he first came to the east, and
Lü Bu was persuaded to support the notional authority of Han. Then
Cao Cao sent a letter in his own hand, with appointment as General
on the Left; delighted at the courtesy, Lü Bu sent Chen Gui’s son Deng
as envoy to Xu city.
Though trusted by Lü Bu, Chen Gui was primarily concerned to
restore a measure of peace to the empire. He did not believe Lü Bu was
the right man, and he was anxious to keep him away from Yuan Shu.
When Chen Deng saw Cao Cao, therefore, they agreed that he and his
father would act as agents in Lü Bu’s camp. On the other hand, though
Lü Bu had asked to be confirmed as Governor of Xu province, Cao
Cao refused him the honour. This was the same pattern as his dealings
with Sun Ce, but it placed Chen Deng in an awkward position, the
more so as Cao Cao had named him Administrator of Guangling; he
needed some fast talking to regain Lü Bu’s confidence.14
Having lost his territory north of the Huai, Yuan Shu held only Jiu-
jiang and a part of Lujiang, but he continued to maintain an extrava-
brother Cao Zhi was born in 192], so he was only seven or eight at this time; Sun Ben
was born about 174, and was now in his early twenties, so his daughter too would have
been very young. Similarly, Sun Kuang had been born about 185, and may not yet
have taken the cap of manhood; it is unlikely that his unnamed bride was any older.
These so-called marriages were probably more promise than practice, and may
at best be understood as betrothals: the women probably stayed where they were
and there is no evidence that the notional ceremonies were consummated in later
years—or even that the parties ever met.
13
On the political and military manoeuvring between Cao Cao and Sun Ce at this
time, see deC, Generals of the South, 175–180.
14
A detailed biography of Chen Deng appears as a supplement to that of Lü Bu
in SGZ 7:229–31. On the negotiations with Cao Cao, see also deC, Establish Peace,
217–219.
gant court. As the region suffered from famine, he attempted to expand

to the northwest once more and obtain supplies from Chen in Yu
province; Cao Cao promptly brought an army to protect his interests
there.15 As usual, Yuan Shu left his officers to face the enemy, but they
were swiftly defeated, captured and killed, and Yuan Shu was driven
back to the line of the Huai. His situation continued to deteriorate,
and he ceased to play any political or military role beyond his limited
borders.
Returning to Xu city, Cao Cao concentrated once more on Nan-
yang to his west. His immediate opponent was Zhang Xiu, another
frontiersman who had come east from Chang’an. Formerly an officer
of Dong Zhuo, Zhang Xiu accompanied Li Jue and Guo Si as they
seized power at the capital in 192. He was given title as a general, but
quit the city to join his elder kinsman Zhang Ji in Hongnong. When
Emperor Xian made his escape, Zhang Ji and his followers were left
isolated and hungry. Zhang Ji brought his people southeast through
the passes into Nanyang, but was killed in a skirmish. Succeeding to
leadership of the group, Zhang Xiu was treated most generously by
Liu Biao, Governor of Jing province, and he and his men agreed to
hold and protect Nanyang commandery on his behalf; Liu Biao’s own
defences were evidently stretched in that region.16
At the beginning of 197, soon after he had established the impe-
rial court at Xu city, Cao Cao led his army against Zhang Xiu. As
he approached Wan, capital of Nanyang, Zhang Xiu came to surren-
der. The swift success made Cao Cao over-confident, and he appears
to have thought little of an opponent who gave up so easily. In any
event, he treated Zhang Xiu with remarkable contempt: he took the
widow of Zhang Ji into his bed, and gave gold to one of Zhang Xiu’s
most trusted followers, presumably attempting to suborn his loyalty.17
15
Cao Cao had seized Chen from Yuan Shu at the beginning of 196.
16
A biography of Zhang Xiu is at SGZ 8:262–63, but there are more details of his
early career, and that of his patron Zhang Ji, at HHS 74/64B:2421.
17
The Fuzi of Fu Xuan, one source of this incident, is quoted by SGZ 8:263 PC,
which punctuates the name of Zhang Xiu’s follower as Hu Che’er. Leban, “Ts’ao
Ts’ao,” 279, reads the characters by their meaning as “a non-Chinese chariot-boy,”
but though he may have been non-Chinese, he was surely not a chariot-boy, for he is
said to have been the bravest man in Zhang Xiu’s army. Cf. also the reference to [Hu?]
Chi’er at SGZ 6:182, and LH3K, sub voce. [We may note that in Romance Chapter 16
Hu Che’er is presented as a mature man of great strength and skill. Such an interpre-
tation is not decisive evidence, but it may be indicative. See also Chapter Eleven at
498–499, discussing the drama Zhan Wancheng “Fighting at Wan City.”]
106 chapter three
Angry and anxious, Zhang Xiu made a sudden attack, and Cao Cao’s
men fled in confusion. Cao Cao was hit by an arrow and had his horse
killed under him, while his eldest son Ang, his nephew Anmin, and
several of his officers were slain.18 As the commander of his body-
guard, Dian Wei, held back the enemy for a time, Cao Cao managed
to rally some horsemen to halt their advance, while his officer Yu Jin
established a defensive camp, with walls and a deep moat, where the
army could regroup. Dian Wei died fighting, and Cao Cao mourned
him deeply, while Yu Jin was rewarded with a marquisate.19
This was a thorough defeat. Cao Cao retreated to Xu city, while
Zhang Xiu resumed his former allegiance with Liu Biao. He had evi-
dently found Wan city too exposed, for he withdrew his headquarters
fifty kilometres southwest to Rang. For his part, Cao Cao retained a
toe-hold in Nanyang, where Cao Hong garrisoned the city of She,20
some ninety kilometres northwest of Wan and seventy to the southeast
of Xu city.
Encouraged by the debacle and its evidence of Cao Cao’s weak-
ness, Yuan Shao became more confident. However, though he sent an
insulting letter which infuriated Cao Cao, he was still concerned with
Gongsun Zan in the north, and Cao Cao’s advisers Guo Jia and Xun
Yu encouraged him to deal with Lü Bu before he could join Yuan Shao
and threaten him from two sides.
Concerned that Yuan Shao might gain allies in the former capital
region and outflank him on the west, Cao Cao appointed Zhong Yao
as Director of Retainers to deal with the warlords of that disorganised
territory. A man of family from Yingchuan and a noted calligrapher,
Zhong Yao had held office at Chang’an and helped Cao Cao gain
18
Wei-Jin shiyu, quoted by SGZ 1:15 PC, says that Cao Ang was killed after he gave
his own horse to his father.
19
The biography of Dian Wei is at SGZ 18:543–45; that of Yu Jin is at SGZ
17:522–24.
In the confusion of this time, a group of Qingzhou troops, the former Yellow Tur-
bans, attacked some other men of Cao Cao’s army, but were dealt with firmly by Yu
Jin. They complained to Cao Cao, but he endorsed Yu Jin’s conduct: e.g. ZZTJ 62:1994;
deC, Establish Peace, 213.
20
The name of this city, 葉, can be transcribed as She or as Ye. I use the former
reading to distinguish it from the city of Ye 鄴 in Wei commandery, north of the Yel-
low River and sometime capital of Yuan Shao.
recognition from the imperial government in 192.21 He accompanied

Emperor Xian in his escape, but now returned to make use of con-
tacts established in previous years. In a first success, he persuaded two
major leaders, Ma Teng and Han Sui, to send sons to Xu city as hos-
tages for good behaviour, and with that front secure Cao Cao was able
to lead his army towards the Huai in the autumn, driving Yuan Shu
back and confirming his hold on the south of Yu province.
That campaign was concluded in just a few weeks, and Cao Cao
returned to Xu. Zhang Xiu and his patron Liu Biao had continued to
apply pressure on Cao Hong at She, and the threat was too close to
ignore. In the winter, therefore, Cao Cao resumed the offensive. Cap-
turing Wan city, he drove Liu Biao’s forces back to the line of the Han,
then returned to Xu at the beginning of the new year, both to confirm
his position and to prepare more troops. Two months later, in the late
spring of 198 he returned to lay siege to Zhang Xiu in Rang.
After several weeks Cao Cao had gained no success, and Liu Biao
sent troops to Zhang Xiu’s aid. Though Cao Cao had a line of camps
to guard his rear, the enemy threatened his communication with Xu
city, while he also received a report that Yuan Shao was contemplat-
ing an attack.22 As he broke off the siege and withdrew, Zhang Xiu
came in pursuit, and when Cao Cao’s men came to Anzhong, twenty
kilometres east of Rang, they found Liu Biao’s troops waiting for them
too. The enemy held positions front and rear, but during the night Cao
Cao set some of his men in ambush, then feigned flight and panic.
Suitably deceived, the enemy joined in pursuit of such easy prey, but
they were surprised by the ambush and heavily defeated. Discussing
the battle at a later time with Xun Yu, Cao Cao explained that he had
deliberately placed his army in a desperate situation, a “death place,”
21
See page 68 above. The biography of Zhong Yao (151–230) is at SGZ 13:391–99.
His writing of the kai shu 楷書 Standard Script is said to have inspired the fourth-
century master Wang Xizhi 王羲之.
22
Arguing that Xu city was on marshy and unhealthy ground, Yuan Shao had sug-
gested the imperial capital be shifted to Juancheng in Dong commandery, which was
part of Cao Cao’s territory but lay close to their common frontier. Cao Cao predict-
ably refused, and we are told that Yuan Shao’s adviser Tian Feng then encouraged him
to attack. Yuan Shao, however, took no further action at this time.
108 chapter three
so they would fight the more fiercely; it is possible he was justifying

his conduct after the event.23
Though the campaigns in Nanyang had not been particularly suc-
cessful or decisive, Cao Cao had established a position in that terri-
tory. He could now be reasonably certain that Zhang Xiu would stay
on the defensive, while Liu Biao had never shown signs of aggression
or ambition.24 Yuan Shao remained a threat, but he had still not dealt
23
On this campaign of 198 and Cao Cao’s comments to Xun Yu, see SGZ 1:15–16,
with parallel text in ZZTJ 62:2003; deC, Establish Peace, 231. SGZ 10:322, however,
tells how Xun Yu’s cousin Xun You warned Cao Cao against extending himself too
far, and when he was in difficulty against the combined forces of Zhang Xiu and Liu
Biao he remarked to Xun You that, “It is because I failed to take your advice that I
am now in such trouble.”
It is not easy to work out the details of Cao Cao’s tactics, but it appears from SGZ 1
that he and his men were in a comparatively narrow river valley, and that during the
night he dug an “earth road” 地道 to conceal a contingent of his troops. When dawn
broke, he sent his baggage train forward, with every appearance of haste and confu-
sion, but as the enemy came in close pursuit they were attacked and defeated by the
men in ambush. We have been told that he was faced by Liu Biao and Zhang Xiu to
his front and rear, and Liu Biao had cut his line of retreat, but we must assume that the
baggage train and the signs of panic were so tempting that his enemies left their strong
positions and came together to take advantage of their demoralized opponents.
The summary in ZZTJ 62 omits all reference to the earth road and to the baggage
train—which simplifies matters and provides an example of Sima Guang’s historical
technique. The commentary of Hu Sanxing to ZZTJ, however, quotes SJZ 31:994 (SJZS
23b), which tells how there was a deep gully in this region, creating a creek off the
river. It is possible that Cao Cao made use of this to hide some of his men. Cf. also
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 297, and the description of the operations in Romance Chapter
18.
24
The biography of Zhang Xiu’s adviser Jia Xu, at SGZ 10:329, tells how Zhang Xiu
chased after Cao Cao but was promptly defeated. Jia Xu told him to try again, and this
time he was successful. When he asked about it, Jia Xu explained that there had been
no apparent reason for Cao Cao to withdraw, and it must have been some message
from his headquarters (i.e. the warning about Yuan Shao). For this reason his troops
were in good order, Cao Cao himself was in the rear-guard and he was ready for an
attack. After that, however, he left subordinates in the rear and pressed on ahead, so
his army was less well commanded and thus more vulnerable.
ZZTJ 62:2003–04; deC, Establish Peace, 232 places this set of events immediately
after the reference to the battle at Anzhong, and the commentary of Hu Sanxing,
evidently accepting that chronology, suggests that Zhang Xiu’s second, victorious,
engagement was only a skirmish.
The story is designed to show Jia Xu’s prescience, and it is not placed in the context
of the campaign as a whole, described in SGZ 1; its position in ZZTJ 62 does not nec-
essarily indicate that the events took place after the battle at Anzhong. Leban, “Ts’ao
Ts’ao,” 296–297 suggests they preceded that more significant encounter, and this
appears probable: the victory at Anzhong was sufficiently conclusive that the defeated
enemy had no stomach for further pursuit.
with Gongsun Zan in the north. The more immediate problem lay to
the southwest, where Lü Bu had revived his erratic alliance with Yuan
Shu and attacked Liu Bei in Pei. Cao Cao sent his kinsman Xiahou
Dun with assistance, and prepared to intervene himself. Some warned
that it could be dangerous to get involved so far from the base at Xu
city, but Xun You argued it was important to deal with Lü Bu before
he became too powerful. Cao Cao agreed.
Even before he could move, Lü Bu’s men had taken Pei city and
put Liu Bei to flight, while the minor warlords about Mount Tai sig-
nalled their support for him. As Cao Cao approached, however, Lü
Bu remained in Xiapi and made no move. He explained that he was
waiting until the invaders were worn out by their march, and he would
trap them in the meanders of the Si River. Cao Cao therefore faced no
opposition as he advanced. Having collected Liu Bei and his remnant
forces, he occupied Pengcheng, storming the capital and capturing the
Chancellor appointed by Lü Bu, and as he entered Xiapi commandery
he was joined by Chen Deng with troops from Guangling in the east.
Despite his hopes and plans, Lü Bu was defeated in one battle after
another and was forced back into Xiapi city.
As Cao Cao laid siege, Lü Bu sought to resurrect the alliance with
Yuan Shu. Yuan Shu was reluctant, but Lü Bu hoped to encourage him
by bringing his oft- and long-promised daughter for the marriage with
Yuan Shu’s son. Tying the young woman to his horse behind him,
he attempted to break through the siege, but was driven back by Cao
Cao’s pickets and returned to the city. Yuan Shu did raise troops to
bring relief, but they had no effect, and though Lü Bu planned a sortie
to cut Cao Cao’s supply lines he was persuaded by his wife that he had
no-one he could trust to command the defence: Chen Gong could not
be relied upon, for although he had betrayed Cao Cao before he might
still hope for a reconciliation. So Lü Bu could only wait.
After several weeks of static warfare, Cao Cao and his men were
indeed weary, but Xun You and Guo Jia encouraged him, and by
channelling the Si River to flood the city he confirmed Lü Bu’s isola-
tion. Increasingly discouraged, Lü Bu spoke of surrender but Chen
Gong, anxious about his own fate at Cao Cao’s hands, persuaded him
to hold on. Then in the last days of winter a group of his officers held
a party to celebrate the fact that one of their colleagues, Hou Cheng,
had recovered a lost horse. When they invited Lü Bu, however, he
was furious that they had disobeyed his orders against wine-drinking,
110 chapter three
and accused them of plotting against him. Frightened, Hou Cheng

and his fellows did indeed mutiny, and they opened the gates to the
attackers.25
Withdrawing to a gate-tower, Lü Bu urged his remaining followers
to cut off his head and use it to buy their own freedom, but when they
refused he went himself to surrender. He was brought before Cao Cao,
with Liu Bei in attendance.
Lü Bu saw Cao Cao and said, “This is the day the empire is settled.”
“Why do you say that?” asked Cao Cao.
“I was the only man to be a danger to Your Excellency,” explained Lü
Bu, “and now I have submitted to you. Give me charge of cavalry while
you command the infantry, and the empire will present no difficulties.”
Turning to Liu Bei he said, “Xuande, you are guest in a high place and
I am captive. These ropes are tight. Will you not speak one word for
me?”
Cao Cao laughed and said, “If I bind a tiger I must bind him tightly,”
but he gave orders to loose Lü Bu’s bonds.
“You should not do that,” said Liu Bei. “Do you not recall how Lü
Bu treated Ding Jianyang [Ding Yuan] and the Grand Master Dong
[Zhuo]?” Cao Cao nodded in agreement. Lü Bu glared at Liu Bei. “Big-
ears,” he said, “you’re a crook!”26
Details of the incident vary slightly, but most versions tell how Liu
Bei spoke against Lü Bu and Lü Bu in turn remarked on Liu Bei’s
untrustworthiness. It is doubtful, however, that Liu Bei had the deci-
sive voice, and Cao Cao did not need anyone’s advice to rid himself of
a dangerous and unreliable enemy; any hesitation, indeed, may have
been designed as a test of Liu Bei.
25
As observed in Chapter Seven at 326, Cao Cao’s commentary to Sunzi refers to
his capture of Lü Bu at Xiapi. Strangely, however, he claims that he surrounded Lü
Bu with overwhelming force and captured the city; there is no mention of gates being
opened from the inside.
26
This text is based on HHS 75/65:2451 and SGZ 7:227 and 228 PC, adapted by
ZZTJ 62:2006–07; deC, Establish Peace, 237, and discussed by Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,”
306–307.
Xuande was the style of Liu Bei, and he is said to have had exceptionally large ears:
page 99 above.
In 189 Lü Bu murdered his patron Ding Yuan [style Jianyang] and became the
bodyguard and confidant of Dong Zhuo. Dong Zhuo took title as Grand Master at
Chang’an in 191; he was killed by Lü Bu in the following year: see pages 56 and 78
above. Besides these incidents, Lü Bu had always been erratic in his dealings with
Liu Bei and Yuan Shu; it would indeed have been most unwise for Cao Cao to trust
him.
Lü Bu, Chen Gong and Lü Bu’s best general Gao Shun were all
executed, but his officer Zhang Liao managed to negotiate a surren-
der; he was granted enfeoffment and became one of Cao Cao’s lead-
ing military commanders. The counsellor Chen Gui had retired from
active politics, but his son Chen Deng continued as Administrator of
Guangling and was promoted to be a general. For his own part, Cao
Cao took the Lady Du, wife of Lü Bu’s officer Qin Yilu, as his concu-
bine.27
The destruction of Lü Bu gave Cao Cao undisputed dominance of
the region between the Yellow River and the Huai. Yuan Shu, further
south, was weak and irrelevant, and as the leaders about Mount Tai
offered submission they were named Administrators of their various
territories: the chief of them, Zang Ba, apparently a man of gentry
origin, became Administrator of Langye.28 This was not direct con-
trol, but the area was marginal, and such recognition kept the region
quiet and reasonably secure. Cao Cao was free to concentrate upon
the affairs of imperial government and the coming confrontation with
Yuan Shao.
Conduct at court
When Emperor Xian first returned to the east in 195, Yuan Shao had
not sought to receive him, for his advisers believed it would restrict
his freedom of movement. He soon discovered his mistake, for Cao
Cao had no difficulty using the imperial name for his own purposes,
and though Yuan Shao forced Cao Cao to grant him high honours
he was compelled to recognise his rival’s reflected authority. Even if
the throne had lost all real power, Cao Cao’s control of the emperor
greatly enhanced his position in the disordered empire.
At the same time, the relationship between an ambitious warlord
and his nominal sovereign was hardly straightforward, and there was
27
Qin Yilu had been sent by Lü Bu on embassy to Yuan Shu. He was not in Xiapi
when the city fell, and Yuan Shu gave him a woman of the imperial Liu family to
replace the Lady Du. Yuan Shu died in the following year and, despite Cao Cao’s
appropriation of his wife, Qin Yilu then joined his service: SGZ 3:100 PC quoting
Weishi chunqiu.
28
The biography of Zang Ba is in SGZ 18:536–38. His father had been a county offi-
cial in Taishan, but he offended the Administrator and was arrested. Zang Ba gathered
retainers to rescue him. Both the local appointment and the use of retainers imply that
the family had some status in the community.
112 chapter three
obvious potential for friction between the officials of the emperor and
the servants of Cao Cao. For many, there was a conflict of loyalty: did
a man owe public duty to the imperial state? or personal allegiance to
the military leader who controlled the government? This debate had
already arisen in the later years of Han, and one of the weaknesses of
the empire had been the tendency of Confucian gentlemen to choose
their patron—the man who nominated them for appointment or who
was their senior in an office—rather than to devote themselves to the
more abstract concept of service to the nation as a whole.29
In practical terms, therefore, there were three groups at court: the
officials who had served during the exile in Chang’an and had accom-
panied Emperor Xian in his escape to the east; the men who had given
personal allegiance to Cao Cao; and a number of gentlemen who had
traditional loyalty to the imperial ideal but were prepared to attend
upon the real ruler of the day.
As soon as the emperor came into his hands at Xu city in 196, Cao
Cao arranged the resignation of the Grand Commandant Yang Biao
and the Excellency of Works Zhang Xi. He took Zhang Xi’s title for
himself and offered the honour of Grand Commandant to Yuan Shao:
the Excellency over the Masses Zhao Wen was allowed to keep his
position.30 All three Excellencies had been appointed by the junta of
Li Jue and Guo Si, but none had held any real authority and they
had been pawns in the conflict between the quarrelling generals. Their
position was now little better; the critical office was the Imperial Secre-
tariat, which controlled official correspondence and the proclamation
of edicts, and Cao Cao immediately appointed his trusted counsellor
Xun Yu to be its Director.31
29
See, for example, deC, “Politics and Philosophy,” 52–55, and “Recruitment
Revisited,” 40.
30
On the negotiations with Yuan Shao on this matter, see Chapter Two at 88–89;
in the following year, 197, Yuan Shao took the higher title of General-in-Chief.
Though he was evidently a man of official family, little is known of Zhang Xi’s
career. His personal name 喜 sometimes appears as Jia 嘉.
The biography of Zhao Wen (137–208) is at HHS 27/17:949–50. In the time of
Emperor Huan he had been a successful Administrator of Ba commandery.
On Yang Biao see further below.
31
There are biographies of Xun Yu (163–212) at HHS 70/60:2280–90 and SGZ
10:307–19, and the family history at this time is discussed by Ch’en, Life and Reflec-
tions, and deC, “A Question of Loyalty,” 35–37. The title shangshu ling, which I render
as Director of the Secretariat, also appears as Prefect of the Masters of Writing.
Xun Yu’s grandfather Xun Shu had been a local magnate of Yingch-
uan with some pretensions to scholarship and contacts in the central
government. The family had not previously been distinguished, and
Xun Shu held no high office, but by the time Xun Yu was born in 163
the Xun had acquired local respect and a national position, and his
father Xun Kun became Chancellor of Qi.
During the period of proscription under Emperor Ling, some mem-
bers of the family took a leading role against the eunuchs; one was
executed and others were excluded from the court and the capital. In
the provinces, such activists were admired for their courage and prin-
ciple. Several of Xun Yu’s kinsmen established a reputation for their
private scholarship and his uncle Xun Shuang, in exile and hiding, was
celebrated for his moral commentaries on the Confucian classics.
At the time of the Yellow Turban rebellion in 184, the proscription
was abandoned, but the Xun were in no hurry to return to public life
and Xun Shuang rejected invitations to civil office. In 189, however, he
was obliged to accept a summons from Dong Zhuo and was appointed
an Excellency. He died at Chang’an in 190.
Xun Yu had served as a county magistrate in Liang, but as the allied
armies gathered against Dong Zhuo he left his post and returned home.
He warned his family that the region was vulnerable to the ravages of
civil war, and though many paid no attention Xun Yu went north to
join Yuan Shao. His brother Xun Shen had helped persuade Han Fu
to yield Ji province and was now one of Yuan Shao’s advisers, but
although he was well received Xun Yu soon left Yuan Shao’s service to
go to Cao Cao. About this time troops of Dong Zhuo indeed attacked
Yingchuan, several members of the family were killed, and their estates
were ruined. Like many other gentry embroiled in the war, Xun Yu
and his relatives were cast adrift from their former landed base and
were obliged to rely upon their personal abilities.
We are told that Xun Yu joined Cao Cao because he saw better
opportunities in his service, and the two men appear to have estab-
lished an early rapport. The decisive moment came in 194, when Lü
Bu attacked Yan province and Xun Yu led the defence which held the
enemy at bay until Cao Cao could return from his campaign in Xu
province. Two years later Xun Yu urged Cao Cao to take the court
under his protection, and he was appointed head of the Imperial Sec-
retariat and given high rank as a Palace Attendant, with personal access
to the emperor. There is no further record of Xun Yu’s brother Xun
114 chapter three
Shen, who presumably remained with Yuan Shao, but another brother,
Xun Yan, also entered Cao Cao’s service,32 while their cousin Xun Yue,
a more scholarly man, was made Custodian of the Private Library and
commissioned to prepare a chronicle of Former Han.33 Emperor Xian
was interested in scholarship, and Xun Yu, Xun Yue and the scholar
Kong Rong had permission to enter the private apartments at any time
to hold academic discussions.34
Xun Yu also recommended his kinsman Xun You. In 192 Xun You
had joined a conspiracy against Dong Zhuo at Chang’an, but though
the plot was discovered and Xun You was arrested, he was released
when Dong Zhuo was assassinated. The new regime of Wang Yun
named him Administrator of Shu commandery, but when Li Jue and
his fellows captured the city soon afterwards Xun You fled south
into Jing province. Cao Cao wrote to invite him, naming him first as
Administrator of Runan and then a Master of Writing in the Secre-
tariat. With personal contact, Cao Cao became increasingly impressed,
and he appointed Xun You as his Master of the Army, chief of staff.
While Xun Yu held authority in Xu city, Xun You accompanied his
campaigns.35
Cao Cao’s other leading counsellor at this time was Guo Jia, also a
man from Yingchuan, who had likewise gone first to Yuan Shao but
then took service with Cao Cao. Xun Yu had earlier recommended Xi
Zhicai, who became a favourite of Cao Cao but died soon afterwards.
When Cao Cao asked Xun Yu if he knew of anyone who might replace
him, Xun Yu recommended Guo Jia. Guo Jia had hitherto held only
minor positions, but Cao Cao interviewed him, was impressed, and
32
SGZ 10:316 tells how Xun Yan later held Ye city for Cao Cao against a surprise
attack by Gao Gan in 205.
33
The biography of Xun Yue (148–209) is at HHS 62/52:2058–63. He is discussed
by Ch’en, Life and Reflections, Mind of Late Han China, and “Confucian, Legalist, and
Taoist Thought,” 804–806. His Han ji has been transmitted, largely complete, to the
present day: Hulsewé in Early Chinese Texts, 113–114. On his Shen jian “Extended
Reflections,” see Mind of Late Han China and Chapter Eight at 205.
34
Biographies of Kong Rong (153–208), at HHS 70/60:2261–79 and SGZ 12:370–73,
contain several stories of his cleverness. See also SSXY II:3; Mather, Tales of the World,
26. He is discussed further below at 116–117.
35
The biography of Xun You (157–214) is at SGZ 10:321–25. Master of the Army
(軍師 junshi) had not been a regular post under Han, but was a new development
at this time, evidently a senior military adviser, possibly functioning in part as an
adjutant.
appointed him Libationer to the Army of the Excellency of Works, a

parallel position to that held by Xun You.36
The sensitive position of Prefect of Xu county, controlling the new
imperial capital, was given to Man Chong of Shanyang.37 Compara-
tively young, Man Chong had been an Assistant Officer to Cao Cao
in Yan province and was then a member of his staff as an Excellency.
Soon after his appointment as Prefect, he arrested a number of retain-
ers of Cao Hong who had been causing trouble, and when Cao Hong
persuaded Cao Cao to pardon the offenders, Man Chong promptly
killed them. Typically, Cao Cao admired Man Chong’s energy and
attention to duty.
In contrast to such men as these, who gave personal loyalty to Cao
Cao, officials associated with the tradition of Han presented more
problems. Notable among them was Yang Biao.38
The Yang family had held office for generations, and Yang Biao’s
father, grandfather and great-grandfather had all been Excellencies. A
noted scholar, Yang Biao had worked on Dongguan Hanji, the dynas-
tic history of Later Han, but he also held a number of senior posi-
tions, and he gained reputation as an opponent of the eunuchs. He
was appointed an Excellency by Dong Zhuo, but was dismissed when
he argued against the move of the capital to Chang’an. He again held
Excellency office under Li Jue and Guo Si, but was nearly killed when
he remonstrated against them.
Yang Biao supported the emperor on his escape to the east in 195,
and he came to Xu city in 196, but he had never been a friend of Cao
Cao and his wife was a sister of Yuan Shu. When Yuan Shu claimed
the imperial title in 197, therefore, Cao Cao had Yang Biao arrested.
When Man Chong was given charge of the case, Xun Yu and Kong
Rong urged him not to question Yang Biao too harshly, and specifi-
cally not to flog him. Man Chong nonetheless applied normal proce-
dures, but then reported to Cao Cao that Yang Biao had continued
to claim his innocence of any treachery, and it would be a mistake to
punish such a well-known man without better cause. Because Man
36
The biography of Guo Jia is in SGZ 14:431–35. The title Libationer (祭酒 jijiu)
had hitherto indicated a senior civil or clerical officer; it too now appears as an advi-
sory position on the staff of an army.
37
The biography of Man Chong is at SGZ 26:721–25. We are told that he held local
county office in the late 180s, at the age of eighteen, so he was not yet thirty at this
time; he died in 242 as an Excellency of Wei.
38
A biography of Yang Biao (142–225) is at HHS 54/44:1786–90.
116 chapter three
Chong had applied full process, Cao Cao was prepared to accept his
advice and Yang Biao was restored to office. It was obvious, however,
that he and his colleagues had no power, and his example was a warn-
ing to any potential dissident.
On a lower level, moreover, there were firm restrictions on the rul-
er’s access to the outside world. At an early stage of his residence at
Xu city, the Consultant Zhao Yan had regularly visited Emperor Xian
and kept him informed on current affairs. Disapproving of this, Cao
Cao had Zhao Yan arrested and killed. The lesson was no doubt learnt,
and few regular officials ventured to establish any informal or close
contact with the palace.39
Not all men, however, were prepared to pay proper attention to such
signs of danger, and the scholar-official Kong Rong was a hero to
many such mavericks.
Kong Rong’s family claimed descent from Confucius, and there
are several anecdotes of his precocious intelligence as a child. With
a strong sense of his own talents and importance, he became known
during the 180s for his independent spirit and for his opposition to
the eunuchs. His reputation was so great that no-one was willing to
punish him, and even when Dong Zhuo took power Kong Rong was
prepared to contradict him.
In 190 he was sent out as Chancellor to Beihai. The territory was
in serious disorder, and in idealistic fashion Kong Rong sponsored
schools and rituals, and celebrated scholars. His court became a centre
of intellectual elegance, but he ignored his more practical advisers and
achieved small success against the Yellow Turbans and other rebels.
On the other hand, when he was besieged by bandits in 193 he asked
aid from Liu Bei in Xu province. Delighted that Kong Rong had heard
of him, Liu Bei sent troops to his rescue and later nominated him as
Inspector of Qing province.
Kong Rong sought to maintain his independence from both Cao
Cao and Yuan Shao, but in 196 Yuan Shao’s son Yuan Tan came to
39
There is a biography of Zhao Yan at HHS 82/72B:2732, among those men skilled
in mystical arts; Ngo, Divination, magie et politique, 112–113 and DeWoskin, Doc-
tors, Diviners and Magicians, 71–72. He had been active in 160, so was presumably
now quite elderly. The account of his execution by Cao Cao does not appear in that
biography, but in Yuan Shao’s proclamation of 200. See 132 below, deC, LH3K, 1110,
and Establish Peace, 480.
attack him. Though the conflict lasted several months we are told that
Kong Rong paid small attention, preferring his literary pursuits and
elegant conversation, and when the enemy at last entered his capital he
abandoned his wife and children, fled to Cao Cao, and took ministerial
appointments at the puppet court of Han.
With his gift for rhetoric, Kong Rong had influence on some
marginal matters, successfully opposing a proposal to restore
mutilating punishments, but he several times used his skills to criticise
Cao Cao and even to taunt him. As before, Cao Cao was persuaded
that his reputation was so high it would be a mistake to punish him,
but eventually, in 208, Kong Rong went too far, arguing that Cao Cao
should leave the capital and go to his fief; this was a serious attack on
the basis of Cao Cao’s power. Chi Lü accused Kong Rong of breaking
the law and had him dismissed, while Cao Cao sent a personal letter
to warn him. Kong Rong replied with defiant self-righteousness, and
although he was restored to office he continued to be a focus for
criticism and dissent, with a substantial following.
A renewed attack by Chi Lü, with other members of Cao Cao’s staff,
now claimed that Kong Rong had planned treason when he was in
Beihai, that he had held secret talks with envoys of Sun Quan, and
that he and his friend Ni Heng had compared themselves to Confucius
and his close disciple Yan Hui. This ragbag of charges was classified
by the pejorative terms Great Refractoriness and Impiety, and Kong
Rong was arrested and killed with his family. Cao Cao had a statement
circulated, condemning Kong Rong’s conduct and seeking to justify
the punishment, but it was not a good mark for his regime.
Though the death of Kong Rong harmed Cao Cao’s reputation,
there had to be a limit to his tolerance. Ultimately, the power of a
warlord depends upon respect and fear, and Cao Cao could not afford
to be perceived as weak or unready to take violent action. A show of
generosity, on the other hand, was equally necessary so that potential
followers might not be scared away. It was a delicate balance: we are
told that one man, He Kui, who later became a senior minister, heard
that Cao Cao was strict and sometimes had his officers beaten. He
kept poison by him so that he might never suffer such humiliation,
but fortunately he never needed it.40
40
The biography of He Kui is at SGZ 12:378–81. Though a distant relative of Yuan
Shu by marriage, he refused to join his imperial court.
118 chapter three
Kong Rong’s friend Ni Heng was another brilliant man, but he

despised most others and his eccentric behaviour sometimes verged
upon madness. Besides his literary skill, he was an expert drum-
mer. On one occasion he was asked to play for a feast, he appeared
in shabby clothes, and when he was criticised he took them off and
performed naked. Cao Cao initially admired Ni Heng’s ability, but
became annoyed by his antics as they became increasingly insulting
and abusive. He took no direct action, however, remarking that
Ni Heng is a fool, and I should kill him like a sparrow or a rat. I realise,
however, that he has gained a wide if undeserved reputation, so that if I
kill him, people will say I am lacking in tolerance.
Instead, about 198 he arranged for Ni Heng to go to Liu Biao in Jing
province, where he likewise made enemies among Liu Biao’s atten-
dants. They persuaded Liu Biao to send Ni Heng to his military com-
mander Huang Zu. Huang Zu’s son She admired him greatly, but
there came a time Huang She was away and Ni Heng abused Huang
Zu during a banquet; Huang Zu had him executed. Cao Cao had thus
avoided the blame and let Ni Heng dig his own grave elsewhere, but
Liu Biao was criticised for sending the embarrassing genius to the bru-
tal Huang Zu.41 For his part, Kong Rong failed to take Cao Cao’s hint,
and was himself later executed.
Besides these officials and scholars of varying affiliation, Cao Cao had
also to deal with the emperor and his immediate entourage. Power-
less though he might be, Emperor Xian resented his situation and had
41
Biographies of Ni Heng are at HHS 80/70B:2652–58 and SGZ 10:311–12 PC
quoting Wenshi zhuan “Biographies of Literary Gentlemen,” Fuzi and other texts: deC,
Establish Peace, 209–210. He died about 199 at the age of 26, and there were a number
of anecdotes concerning his unusual conduct. Most of his literary compositions have
disappeared, but Yingwu fu the “Parrot Rhapsody” survives, in which the composer
combines formal thanks to his patron Huang She with personal statements on his
isolation and effective captivity, like a parrot in a cage. See SSXY II:8; Mather, Tales of
the World, 30–31, and Graham, “Rhapsody on a Parrot.”
As regards Wenshi zhuan, the commentary of Pei Songzhi cites a work of that name
with three different authors: SGZ 9:280 PC quotes from Wenshi zhuan by Zhang Yin
張隱; at 10:312, PC quotes Wenshi zhuan by Zhang Heng 衡 [probably an error]; and
at 21:598, PC quotes Wenshi zhuan by Zhang Zhi 騭. There is disagreement among
the sources whether the work should be ascribed to Zhang Yin or to Zhang Zhi, both
men of the late third and early fourth centuries. See SGZJJ 9:23a; it is possible, albeit
unlikely, that there were two works of the same name by authors of similar personal
names.
not abandoned hope of restoring imperial power. To achieve this, he

would have to eliminate Cao Cao or at least subvert a number of those
closest to him, and though he was not always the instigator of plots
against his unwanted guardian, his very existence could be an inspira-
tion to malcontents. This, of course, was the reverse of a medal: Cao
Cao needed to maintain the façade of imperial authority for his own
purposes, but the ideal was itself a potential threat.
The first imperial plot we know of was led by Dong Cheng, one of
the military men who had escorted Emperor Xian in his flight east
from Chang’an. When the imperial party arrived at Luoyang, Dong
Cheng initially obstructed Cao Cao’s approach, but then changed his
mind and acted as an ally, and as the emperor came to Xu city he was
enfeoffed for his good work. One of Dong Cheng’s daughters became
an Honoured Lady in the imperial harem, and in the summer of 199
Dong Cheng was promoted from General of the Guards to be Gen-
eral of Chariots and Cavalry, with the right to maintain offices like an
Excellency.42
Some time in 199 Emperor Xian issued an edict to Dong Cheng to
kill Cao Cao. Dong Cheng took the document and approached the
lieutenant-general Wang Fu, the colonel Chong Ji and, most notably,
Liu Bei. The first two were of comparatively low rank,43 but Liu Bei
had been named General on the Right, and though none of Cao Cao’s
advisers considered him trustworthy, he had made him a regular com-
panion. It was at this time that we are told how:
Cao Cao, speaking casually, observed, “You and I are the only brave men
in the empire. People like Benchu [Yuan Shao] simply don’t count.” Just
42
HHS 9:381 and 72/62:2343. It is uncertain when the Lady Dong entered the
harem, but it is likely that Dong Cheng’s promotion to General of Chariots and
Cavalry coincided with her appointment as an Honoured Lady. She was pregnant at
the beginning of the following year [HHS 10B:453 and see below], and it is possible
that her condition was known in that preceding summer.
Maintaining offices like an Excellency was a privilege that had been granted in the
past to a General-in-Chief such as He Jin, brother of the Empress, and had also been
assumed by the junta generals Li Jue, Guo Si and their fellows. Apart from a degree
of administrative control over the government, it gave the right to make nominations
for entry into the imperial commissioned service. In the case of Dong Cheng, it was
presumably little more than a formal courtesy.
43
Details of the plot are given in the Biography of Liu Bei, SGZ Shu 2:875; deC,
Establish Peace, 267–268. Little more is known of Wang Fu, but Chong Ji had been a
Palace Attendant at Chang’an, and joined Xun You and others in conspiracy against
Dong Zhuo in 192. He accompanied the court to the east and was rewarded with
enfeoffment.
120 chapter three
then Liu Bei was eating, and he dropped his spoon and chopsticks [in
his flurry]. At that moment there was thunder in the sky, and Liu Bei
said, “The sage has it, ‘On a sudden clap of thunder, or a violent wind,
he would change composure.’ Very much like me.”44
About this time Cao Cao heard that Yuan Shu was going to abandon
his position in Jiujiang and go north to join Yuan Shao, and though
Xun Yu, Guo Jia and Dong Zhao all warned him not to, he sent Liu
Bei to intercept him. Liu Bei promptly established himself once more
in Xu province, gathered allies and made contact with Yuan Shao.
Liu Bei had chosen a good time to escape, for at the beginning of the
following year Dong Cheng’s plans were discovered and the conspira-
tors were executed. Determined to root out the plotters, Cao Cao sent
officers into the palace to arrest the Honoured Lady Dong; though she
was pregnant at the time, the emperor pleaded for her life without suc-
cess. All the kinfolk of Dong Cheng and his fellows were killed.45
It appears that Emperor Xian had given Dong Cheng a written
order—presumably so that he had some evidence and authority to
approach potential co-conspirators—so Cao Cao must have been
aware of his involvement, and the ruthless pursuit of the Lady Dong
served to punish him too. Nothing more could be done, however, for
there was no natural heir to the young sovereign, and if Cao Cao had
replaced him by some distant member of the imperial clan, he would
have been in the same position as Dong Zhuo before him and would
lose all political credit. Though neither enjoyed the connection, Cao
Cao and the emperor were bound to one another.
Horrified at the death of the Lady Dong, the Empress Fu was con-
cerned for her own fate, and she urged her father Fu Wan to organise
another conspiracy against Cao Cao. Fu Wan had more sense. When
the imperial party came to Xu city in 196 he had been named a gen-
eral and given rank with the Excellencies, but he was anxious to avoid
a high profile and asked for a lesser position as colonel. He kept out
of politics thereafter, but though he may have dissuaded his daugh-
ter from her perilous course, some evidence remained and her pro-
44
SGZ Shu 2:875 PC quoting Huayang guo zhi “Record of the Countries to the
South of Mount Hua,” a local history of the Sichuan region compiled in the fourth
century. Benchu was the style of Yuan Shao. The phrase describing the conduct of
Confucius appears in Lun yu X.16.5; Legge, Classics I, 236. The story of the plot and
of Liu Bei’s embarrassment is dramatised in Chapter 21 of Romance.
45
HHS 10B:453 and 9:381.
posal was discovered after his death in 209. The consequences were
predictable.
For the time being, however, following the failure of Dong Cheng’s
conspiracy, and under the watchful eye of his loyal bodyguards, Cao
Cao was reasonably secure against assassination.46 His great problem
was Yuan Shao, who had at last removed the threat of Gongsun Zan
and could now concern himself with the south.
Approaches to Guandu 199–20047
The struggle of Yuan Shao against Gongsun Zan had lasted a surpris-
ingly long time. The quarrel broke out initially in 191, soon after Yuan
Shao had taken over Ji province, and by the end of 192 Gongsun Zan
had suffered two heavy defeats and was forced onto the defensive. In
the following year, however, he destroyed Liu Yu, Governor of You
province and his nominal superior, and for the time being he had
no further opposition in the north. The eastern part of You province,
present-day Manchuria and northern Korea, had been taken over by
the warlord Gongsun Du—the two men were not related—but from his
capital at Ji city in Guangyang, by present-day Beijing, Gongsun Zan
had access south along the coast through Bohai, while his officer Tian
Kai held a position in Qing province on the Shandong peninsula.
From 195, following the rebellion of Liu Yu’s former officers and
the defeat by Yuan Shao’s general Qu Yi, Gongsun Zan lost much
of his territory. As Guangyang became untenable, he was forced to
establish his fortress at Yi in Hejian, and he held no more than a nar-
row strip of ground in the north of Ji province and the south of You.
During the same period, moreover, in an exhausting conflict Tian Kai
steadily lost ground in Qing province to Yuan Shao’s son Yuan Tan,
and about 196 he too abandoned the field.
Though his enemy was now vulnerable, Yuan Shao made no firm
move against him, nor did he take any direct action against Cao Cao.
46
SGZ 18:542 says that while Cao Cao was with his army there was an attempt on
his life by junior officers led by a certain Xu Tuo. As they approached Cao Cao’s tent,
however, the commander of Cao Cao’s body-guard, Xu Chu, thought they looked
suspicious, and he killed them. The men may have been involved with Dong Cheng
and the emperor, but it is more probable they had been suborned by Yuan Shao.
47
The chronicle of the years 199–200 is presented by ZZTJ 63:2002–40; deC, Estab-
lish Peace, 247–298.
122
chapter three
Map 8. Rival Warlords 190–200

In the early 190s, soon after taking over Ji province, he embarked on

an energetic campaign against the Black Mountain bandits in the west-
ern hills, and after many of them had surrendered he gave his nephew
Gao Gan title over Bing province, while sending Yuan Tan into Qing.
Though he had reduced Gongsun Zan to an isolated defensive, and
we are told that he maintained some pressure, Yuan Shao was slow to
administer the coup de grace, and at one stage he offered to treat for
peace. Gongsun Zan may have been more powerful than the histories
indicate, or Yuan Shao may have lacked energy, but his conduct is
in strong contrast to Cao Cao’s, who repeatedly engaged himself on
several fronts. Furthermore, while Cao Cao set up agricultural colo-
nies about Xu city to ensure supplies for his army, it does not appear
that Yuan Shao made any special attempt to develop the economic
resources of his territory.
At last, however, in 198 Yuan Shao embarked on a major attack.
Gongsun Zan’s forward defences were swiftly destroyed, aided by his
policy of refusing to reinforce outlying garrisons—he believed that if he
sent assistance his officers would always expect support and so would
be less committed; in practice, feeling abandoned, they were swift to
surrender—and by the end of the year Yuan Shao’s army had laid siege
to the fortress at Yi. When a relief force came from the Black Moun-
tains, Gongsun Zan attempted a sortie, but his troops were ambushed
and he was driven back into his last stronghold. Yuan Shao’s men dug
a mine under one of the towers, then set the wooden supports on fire
so that the walls above collapsed. As his chief officers died in battle,
Gongsun Zan slew his women-folk, and he was taken and killed as he
prepared a funeral pyre.
Though he had eliminated his enemy, Yuan Shao did not gain a great
deal more from the victory. He established a loose hegemony over
the north, granting seals and insignia to various Wuhuan chieftains,
but several local Chinese leaders maintained their independence, and
Xianyu Fu in Yuyang, a former officer of Liu Yu, sent envoys to Cao
Cao and was named Area Commander over six commanderies of You
province; the appointment was meaningless, but indicates that Yuan
Shao had limited authority in the region.48 He was, on the other hand,
now free to concentrate his attention against Cao Cao.
48
Towards the end of Later Han there are references to military men with the
character du 督 in their title. Some were senior staff officers, but the term dudu 都督
124 chapter three
It appears that Yuan Shao began to gather his forces for an attack
about the middle of 199, soon after his final defeat of Gongsun Zan
and his summary settlement of the far north, but he did not formally
announce his intentions and begin his advance until the spring of 200.
In expectation of the assault, Cao Cao had set forward positions by the
Yellow River, but his main line of defence was seventy kilometres fur-
ther back about Guandu. That city, north of Zhongmou in Henan, lay
on a slight terrace above a section of the Bian River, itself part of the
Vast Canal system which connected the capital region of Han to the
agriculture of the south and east.49 It was a good defensive position,
with water and some high ground guarding the approaches to Xu city,
a hundred kilometres further south and a central point for supplies.
On the west, a broad expanse of the Putian marshland anchored the
flank, and any approach by the enemy on the east would be hampered
by minor waterways and similar flooded ground.
For the most part Cao Cao divided his time between the military
position at Guandu and his headquarters at Xu city, but though his
chief concern lay to the north he had also to deal with neighbours on
the east, south and west who might join Yuan Shao to out-flank him
or take him in the rear. The months of waiting and military prepara-
tion were thus filled with diplomacy and smaller-scale skirmishes.
South of the Huai, Yuan Shu’s would-be imperial state had collapsed.
He was obliged to abandon his territory in Jiujiang, and as his former
officers turned against him he wrote at last for help to his brother/
cousin Yuan Shao. Before he could make his way north, however, he
was intercepted by Cao Cao’s troops and forced back to the Huai, and
in the summer of 199 he died in humble lodgings in a village east of
his former capital, Shouchun. The errant Seal of State, said to have
been found at Luoyang by the general Sun Jian in 191, was forwarded
to Xu city by one of Yuan Shu’s former attendants.50
later described a high-ranking officer with wide authority over a contested frontier.
The appointment of Xianyu Fu at this time is an early example of this usage, which
later became established, and in that context I render the title as Area Commander:
JS 24:729; LH3K, 1235.
49
The Bian River and its various supplementary canals, including the Ji River men-
tioned below at 133, were in the general area of the present-day course of the Yellow
River. The Yellow River at this period flowed well to the north: note 79 below.
50
The Seal remained in dynastic hands until the fall of Western Jin in the early
Some members of Yuan Shu’s court and a number of his soldiers

made their way west to take refuge with Liu Xun, the Administrator
of Lujiang appointed by Yuan Shu, but the young general Sun Ce then
attacked Liu Xun, drove him away to take refuge with Cao Cao, and
took over his troops and his people. Formerly an officer of Yuan Shu,
Sun Ce was now establishing a state for himself on the south of the
Yangzi. Though nominally an ally of Cao Cao, he was too far away and
pre-occupied with local matters to play any role in the affairs of the
north,51 and the country between the Yangzi and the Huai was left in
the hands of petty chieftains and small-scale bandits.
Immediately north of the Huai, Liu Bei had certainly prevented
Yuan Shu’s escape, but he then declared his opposition to Cao Cao
and made alliance with Yuan Shao. Cao Cao sent two junior officers
against him, the Chief Clerk Liu Dai and the General of the Household
Wang Zhong, but Liu Bei’s reputation rapidly gained him a following
across the eastern seaboard, and Cao Cao’s men could make no head-
way. Though Yuan Shao in the north was the primary concern, Liu Bei
presented a dangerous distraction to his rear, and at the beginning of
200 Cao Cao risked a swift attack into the southeast. Defeating Liu Bei
in Pei, he stormed Xiapi city and captured Liu Bei’s lieutenant Guan
Yu. As Liu Bei fled to Yuan Shao, Cao Cao returned to the north, tak-
ing Guan Yu with him. He treated him with similar favour as he had
shown Liu Bei, and even gave him a military command.
Some sources say that a number of Yuan Shao’s counsellors urged
him to attack before Cao Cao could return from the attack on Liu
Bei, but Yuan Shao was reluctant. The biography of Cao Cao’s general
Yu Jin, however, claims that he was stationed by the Yan Crossing of
the Yellow River, and that he was running an active and successful
fourth century, though we cannot be sure that it had not been replaced by a forgery
at some stage of its chequered history.
51
On Sun Ce’s capture of Lujiang, see deC, Generals of the South, 188–189.
Some sources claim that Sun Ce was planning a raid on Xu city at this time, to take
advantage of Cao Cao’s preoccupation with Yuan Shao and to seize control of the
emperor for himself: SGZ Wu 1:1111–12 and PC. The stories are confused, however,
and the story is quite improbable. Sun Ce was fully occupied with establishing control
in the lower Yangzi and with his attacks on Huang Zu. Even if he had by extraordinary
chance made a successful raid through Cao Cao’s southern territory and captured the
emperor, his personal background and authority were too slight to allow him to profit
from the coup. As shown by the fate of Yuan Shu, such presumption would have
brought swift destruction. See Generals of the South, 208–211.
126 chapter three
campaign of harassment against enemy positions to the north.52 In any

case the opportunity, such as it may have been, passed. For the time
being Liu Bei remained at Yuan Shao’s court but took no active role,
for his close companion Guan Yu, now in Cao Cao’s hands, was an
effective hostage.
To the west, Xiahou Dun appears to have controlled Henan while
Zhong Yao maintained a measure of control over the various warlords
about Chang’an;53 neither Liu Zhang, Governor of Yi province, nor
the religious leader Zhang Lu in Hanzhong were close enough to be
relevant. The greatest potential for trouble came from Cao Cao’s near
neighbours to the west and south: Liu Biao the Governor of Jing prov-
ince was a notional ally of Yuan Shao, and his associate Zhang Xiu in
Nanyang had successfully defied Cao Cao in 197 and 198.
Liu Biao, however, was disinclined to involve himself outside his
own territory, and he had other matters to deal with: Zhang Xian
the Administrator of Changsha had made himself independent and
dominated the southern part of the province, while Sun Ce on the
lower Yangzi was threatening to move upstream against Liu Biao’s
local commander Huang Zu. It is said that Liu Biao promised support
to Yuan Shao but did not send any, and despite their association he
had no good reason to defy the imperial authority as represented by
the court under Cao Cao’s control.
More dramatically, Liu Biao’s subordinate Zhang Xiu transferred
his allegiance to the former enemy. It appears that Yuan Shao sent to
ask his support, but Zhang Xiu’s adviser Jia Xu persuaded him that
52
SGZ 1:18 and HHS 74/64A:2392, followed by ZZTJ 64:2024; deC, Establish Peace,
271, ascribe the delay simply to Yuan Shao’s procrastination, but the biography of Yu
Jin at SGZ 17:523 tells of his energetic raiding.
In this region at this time the Yellow River flowed well north of its present course,
and the Yan Crossing lay north of present-day Yanjin in Henan; the modern city
preserves the name of the old crossing-place.
In his Call to Arms, discussed below, Yuan Shao claimed that Cao Cao had planned
to attack him while he was engaged with Gongsun Zan, and had even prepared a pon-
toon bridge across the Yellow River. There is no other reference to such an offensive
in the texts, and it may be that Yuan Shao’s complaint relates to these activities of
Yu Jin.
53
Xiahou Dun later appears as Administrator/Intendant of Henan, and Leban,
“Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 341, suggests that he had already taken the position.
On Zhong Yao’s appointment as Director of Retainers in 197, see page 106 above.
The Imperial Clerk Wei Ji was sent to the region on embassy to Liu Zhang at this
time. Observing the difficulties Zhong Yao faced in resettling the people, he encour-
aged Cao Cao to restore the imperial salt monopoly as a means to provide funds for
the purpose; his biography is at SGZ 21:610–12.
Cao Cao, with control of the emperor, had right on his side and, prob-
ably more important, that he would be grateful for assistance in this
time of crisis. In the winter of 199, therefore, Zhang Xiu made formal
submission and was indeed received with honours: welcomed with a
banquet, he was given appointment as a general, and his daughter was
married to Cao Cao’s son Cao Jün.54 Jia Xu was named Bearer of the
Mace in the imperial entourage and was enfeoffed as a marquis.55
Some time before this, in 198, Zhang Yang the Administrator of
Henei had been killed in a mutiny. Sui Gu, a former leader of Black
Mountain bandits who had taken service with Zhang Yang, took con-
trol of the territory and established an alliance with Yuan Shao, but in
the summer of 199 Cao Cao sent his officer Shi Huan and his cousin
Cao Ren north across the Yellow River and they destroyed Sui Gu.56
Cao Cao appointed a certain Wei Chong as Administrator of Henei,
then brought his troops back to the defence lines about Guandu.
This was a considerable show of trust, for Wei Chong had a dubi-
ous record. A man of Yan province, probably from Dong command-
ery, he had been nominated Filial and Incorrupt by Cao Cao, who
was confident of his loyalty. When Zhang Miao rebelled in 194 and
called in Lü Bu, however, Wei Chong fled to Henei. Cao Cao was furi-
ous and swore vengeance, but now that he had captured Wei Chong
his admiration and affection returned: he forgave his past faults and
entrusted him with responsibility for all his military positions north-
west of the Yellow River. This was not critical territory at the time,
54
The personal name of this young man, who was the son of Cao Cao’s concubine
the Lady Zhou, is transcribed to differentiate it from that of his half-brother, a son of
the Lady Qin. In contrast to the examples listed in note 30 to Chapter One, we may
note that this is one case where a marriage was successful in confirming an alliance.
It was not, however, an alliance between equals, but the accession of Zhang Xiu to
the service of Cao Cao.
55
Zhang Xiu served with Cao Cao in the fighting about Guandu, and later accom-
panied him against the Wuhuan in 207. He died on that campaign.
The biography of Jia Xu (147–223) is at SGZ 10:326–31. A man from Wuwei in
the northwest, it is said that he came from an old official family which had recently
moved there, and he was certainly a politician rather than a military man. After the
assassination of Dong Zhuo in 192, Jia Xu encouraged Li Jue and his fellows to attack
Chang’an and take over the government, and he remained as an adviser, attempting
to maintain some semblance of order among the quarrelling warriors. After the escape
of Emperor Xian Jia Xu moved east, joined Zhang Xiu, and established himself as a
trusted counsellor.
Treating Cao Cao always with respect and caution, Jia Xu rose in his service, and
in the early 220s he became Grand Commandant of the new dynasty of Wei under
Cao Pi.
56
The biography of Cao Ren is at SGZ 9:274–76.
128 chapter three
but it did secure Cao Cao’s left against Yuan Shao, and though noth-
ing more is heard of Wei Chong—who may have died soon after the
conclusion of the campaign in the following year—it appears that he
held his position and that there was indeed no reason for concern in
that direction.57
On the eastern flank, the bandit chieftain Zang Ba, based in north-
ern Langye and the region about Mount Tai, had formerly been an
ally of Lü Bu, but after the destruction of Lü Bu in 198 he and his
colleagues accepted Cao Cao’s suzerainty. Zang Ba retained a degree
of independence,58 but he had not supported Liu Bei in 199, and Cao
Cao now entrusted him with general command on his behalf over the
lower reaches of the Yellow River and encouraged him to attack Qing
province, largely controlled by Yuan Shao’s son Tan. Zang Ba was only
too pleased to keep the Yuan family away from his sphere of influ-
ence. Raiding Qi and Beihai, he occupied the attention of a number
of enemy troops and ensured that Cao Cao faced no threat from that
direction.59
By the end of 199, therefore, Cao Cao was reasonably prepared
for Yuan Shao’s direct attack, and had secured himself as well as he
might against threats from either flank. Behind him, however, Runan
was the home country of the Yuan, and there were followers of the
family across all the commandery. Cao Cao appointed the energetic
Man Chong, hitherto Prefect of Xu, as Administrator. We are told that
Man Chong led just five hundred retainers to over-run some twenty
camps and settlements, then invited a number of local leaders to a
conference, trapped and killed them. Despite or perhaps because of
this harsh treatment, however, Runan remained an area of potential
disruption, with a number of disaffected rebel groups.
Yuan Shao’s Call to Arms
Early in 200, seeking to rally support and allies, Yuan Shao had his
secretary Chen Lin compose a Call to Arms, rehearsing his grievances
57
Wei Chong is mentioned only at SGZ 1:17; deC, Establish Peace, 249.
58
Soon after Zang Ba’s nominal submission, Cao Cao sent to require him to send
some renegades for execution. Explaining that the men were now under his protec-
tion, Zang Ba refused the demand. Cao Cao accepted this and expressed admiration,
but he had in any case no means to enforce his request.
59
SGZ 1:17 and 18:537.
against Cao Cao and blackening his name, his heritage and his past
conduct. Cao Cao later captured Chen Lin, but forgave even his most
offensive words and appointed him to a sensitive position on his staff.
The proclamation remained in circulation, however, and provided a
source for later anecdotes and attitudes.60
The text begins with references to the weak and foolish Second
Emperor of Qin, who brought his state to ruin by excessive reliance
upon the scheming eunuch Zhao Gao, and how the Han dynasty
was later rescued from the power of the Lü clan by Zhou Bo and Liu
Zhang, who restored legitimate rule and brought Emperor Wen to the
throne. Zhou Bo and Liu Zhang are models of loyal statesmen and, as
von Zach observes, Yuan Shao classifies himself with them and Cao
Cao with Zhao Gao and the Lü usurpers.61
As to Cao Cao:
The grandfather of the Excellency of Works [Cao Cao] was the Regular
Attendant Cao Teng, who joined Zuo Guan and Xu Huang in wicked-
ness, greed and lawlessness, harming good custom and oppressing the
people. Cao Cao’s father Cao Song was adopted from a family of beg-
gars; so he hoarded cash and bribed his way into office, using wagon-
loads of gold and treasure to purchase the favour of powerful families.
Stealing the rank of Excellency, he disgraced that high position.
Revolting remnant from a succession of castrates and parasites,62 Cao
Cao lacks all virtue. Frivolous and thuggish, he takes pleasure in mischief
and disorder.
60
HHS 74/64A:2393–98 and Weishi chunqiu quoted by SGZ 6:197–99 PC have a
text of this Call to Arms (檄 xi), and Pei Songzhi identifies it as the work of Chen
Lin. Wen xuan has a longer version, which also names Chen Lin as the author: WH
44:2b-7a; von Zach, Chinesische Anthologie II, 811–818. [On Cao Cao’s later treatment
of Chen Lin, see Chapter Eight at 339–340.]
HHS 74/64A and Weishi chunqiu describe the Call to Arms as a general proclama-
tion, but the Wen xuan text is addressed specifically to Liu Bei, described as Inspector
of Yu province 爲袁紹檄豫州; on Liu Bei’s use of that title, see above at 100.
61
On Zhao Gao, see for example Loewe, QHX, 705. It is possible that Yuan Shao/
Chen Lin wished to relate his conduct with the dominance of Emperor Xian by Cao
Cao, adopted grandson of a eunuch. More likely, however, it is presented simply as a
well-known example of disloyalty and treachery.
On the achievements of Zhou Bo and of Liu Zhang, King of Chengyang, see QHX,
729–731 and 405–406.
62
The Chinese phrase is 贅閹遺醜: HHS 74/64A:2393, SGZ 6:197 and WH 44:5a.
130 chapter three
[By contrast,] I the Generalissimo [Yuan Shao]63 led fierce fighting

men to eliminate evil and rebellion.64 Then Dong Zhuo appeared, seiz-
ing office and bringing the state to ruin. At this, I drew my sword and
had drums beaten to raise the east of China against him. Casting my net
widely for bravos and bullies, I discounted their faults so long as they
were useful to the cause. For this reason I shared my plans with Cao Cao,
believing that he had the qualities of a hawk or a hunting dog, and that
his claws and teeth could be of service.
Then, however, he displayed foolhardiness and a lack of forethought.
Attacking in haste, he was swiftly driven back, suffering many casual-
ties and fleeing to base with heavy loss of life.65 I promptly allocated
further troops to make good his losses, and recommended him to be
Acting Administrator of Dong commandery and later Inspector of Yan
province.
By this means I gave [the sheep] a tiger-skin cloak,66 awarding him
military rank and raising him to authority and power. Like the ancient
duke of Qin, I hoped for some report of success [after the previous
failure],67 but Cao Cao continued to act in the same erratic manner.
Tyrannical and cruel, he plundered and oppressed the people, bringing
harm to worthy men, and death to the good.
Bian Rang, for example, former Administrator of Jiujiang, was known
throughout the empire for his courage and ability, for his direct speech
and his refusal to flatter. He was killed and his body was exposed, while
his wife and children were likewise destroyed.
As a result of such conduct, all the gentlemen of Yan province were
bitterly angry, and resentment among the common people knew no
bounds. If just one man raised his arm, the whole province would
respond;68 and so when Cao Cao was defeated in Xu province his terri-
63
Yuan Shao refers to himself with the phrase mofu 幕府 “encampment,” here
indicating the head of an army. The phrase appears elsewhere in Han texts, and in
more modern times, transcribed as bakufu, described the Shogunate government of
Tokugawa Japan.
64
This refers to the slaughter of the eunuchs after the death of Emperor Ling and
the assassination of He Jin. As we have observed in Chapter Two at 54, Yuan Shao
had played no role in the struggle against the Yellow Turbans.
65
This refers to Cao Cao’s defeat at Rongyang.
66
This refers to a proverb, where a sheep is disguised with a tiger-patterned cover-
ing 虎文.
67
Zuo zhuan Xi 23 and Wan 3; Legge, Classics V, 225 and 235, tells how Duke Mu
of Qin sent his general Meng Mingshi to attack the state of Jin. The army was defeated
and Meng Mingshi was captured. Jin sent him back, expecting he would be executed
for his failure, but Duke Mu gave him command for a second campaign, and this time
Meng Mingshi was victorious.
68
Presumably influenced by the reference below to Cao Cao’s campaign in Xu
province, von Zach identifies this “one man” with Tao Qian. I believe, however, that
it is a more general expression. There is no evidence that Tao Qian was attempting
tory was seized by Lü Bu. Distraught and confused, he had no recourse

but to take refuge in the easternmost part [of the province].
Bearing in mind the principle that a strong trunk must support weak
leaves, and that it was wrong to endorse a rebel,69 I raised my banners
once more, girded on armour, and made all preparations for war. As
soon as my gongs and drums were sounded, Lü Bu’s troops were bro-
ken and took to flight. So I rescued Cao Cao from death and ruin, and
restored him to his position: this was no favour to the people of Yan
province, but it was a great service to Cao Cao.70
Soon afterwards the imperial cortege returned to the east [from
Chang’an], but a host of rebels disrupted the government [at Luoyang].
Just at that time there was an emergency in the north of Ji province, and
I could not leave my post. I therefore sent my staff officer Xu Xun with
orders to Cao Cao, that he should restore the imperial and suburban
sacrifices [at Luoyang], and guard and assist the sovereign.71 Instead,
however, Cao Cao took it upon himself to act independently, forcing
the transfer of the imperial residence [to Xu city], and humiliating the
emperor. Defying all law and precedents, he took control of the Secre-
tariat and seized power in the government.72 Rewards and honours were
granted at his whim, punishments and execution at no more than the
expression of his wish. Those whom he favoured were glorified for five
generations of ancestors; those whom he disliked were slaughtered with
their families. Anyone who criticised suffered public execution, while
anyone who expressed private disapproval was slain in secret. Officials
kept their mouths shut, as people on the roads dared only to exchange
to raise Yan province against Cao Cao, nor does it appear that Yuan Shao is claiming
he did so.
69
The first of these phrases may be taken as a proverb; disapproval of a rebel reflects
Zuo zhuan Xiang 1; Legge, Classics V, 412–413.
70
In the account of Cao Cao’s struggle against Lü Bu, there is no other mention of
Yuan Shao’s role, nor was the matter determined so swiftly: Chapter Two at 77–80.
71
The emergency in the north of Ji province relates to Yuan Shao’s continuing
conflict with Gongsun Zan, who had been driven back to his defences in Yi city but
remained a potential threat. On the other hand, we are also told that Yuan Shao
rejected the opportunity to take the emperor under his protection; so the emergency
of Gongsun Zan may have been no more than an excuse for his failure to act.
Xu Xun is not recorded elsewhere. His title was Attendant Gentleman of the House-
hold, being an officer ranked at 600 shi, adviser to a general: Bielenstein, Bureaucracy,
124.
72
The text here refers to the Three Terraces (三壹 san tai), the Imperial Agencies
which included the Secretariat and the offices of the Censorate and the Internuncios:
e.g. deC, LH3K, 1226–1227. Through control of the Secretariat, Cao Cao had direct
access to all functions of government: 87 above.
132 chapter three
glances.73 The clerks of the Secretariat did no more than record the pro-
ceedings of the court, and senior ministers stood by like dummies.74
Referring to the arrest and torture of the former Excellency Yang Biao
and to the killing of the emperor’s adviser Zhao Yan, the proclama-
tion repeats the accusations of Cao Cao’s control of the people, with
spies and harsh laws, so that the masses were reduced to misery: at no
time in all recorded history had there been such abuse of power. At
the same time Cao Cao robbed the tombs of the dead, notably that of
Liu Wu, son of Emperor Wen of Former Han and brother of Emperor
Jing, and he established officials to supervise such ravages:75 “Though
he occupied the highest position in government, he conducted himself
in this barbarous fashion, ruining the state and oppressing the people,
and the harm which he did extended even to the spirits of the dead.”
Yuan Shao explains that he had himself been too occupied with
Gongsun Zan in the north to deal properly with Cao Cao, and had
granted him leeway in hope his conduct would improve. “Like a wolf
or a jackal,” however, Cao Cao continued his course, with clear inten-
tion to subvert the house of Han and overthrow the state. Even as
Yuan Shao was engaged in the final struggle with Gongsun Zan, more-
over, Cao Cao was in communication with the enemy and, while pre-
tending that he sought to aid the loyal cause, in fact prepared a stab
in the back:
Leading his troops to the banks of the Yellow River, he was going to
construct a bridge of boats and cross to the north. A traveller, how-
73
This is a common expression to describe an unpopular government which none
dare criticise openly.
74
The officers of the Secretariat, the Excellencies and other senior ministers had
formal right to comment upon policy, but none dared do so.
75
HHS 74/64A:2396, SGZ 6:198 and WH 44:5a; von Zach, Chinesische Anthologie
II, 815, cited by Howard et al., Chinese Sculpture, 60. Liu Wu, King of Liang, died in
the middle 140s BC. He had been known for his luxurious and extravagant life-style:
Loewe, QHX, 367–369. His tomb was presumably near the capital of Liang, which in
Later Han was in the northern part of Yu province, close to the border of Yan. Yuan
Shao claims that the tomb was marked by a mound and planted with trees, so it is
somewhat surprising that the treasure had not been stolen during the intervening
three and a half centuries. There is no other reference to this particular occasion of
plunder.
Yuan Shao claims that Cao Cao appointed a Commissioner for Opening Tombs
(發丘中郎將 faqiu zhonglangjiang) and a Colonel Who Seeks for Gold (摸金校尉
mojin xiaowei) to organise his depredations. Though he may have institutionalised
such theft, he would not have been the only military commander to plunder tombs as
a means to obtain resources for his army.
ever, revealed his intention, and at about the same time Gongsun Zan
killed himself with his family. So Cao Cao’s offensive was checked and
he could not carry out his plans.76
I then took my main army to clear the western hills. The Chuge [tribe
of the Xiongnu] and [the bandit known as] Enclosure on the Left came
with bound hands to present hostages, contending as to who would be
first to do so. The others, like dogs or sheep, fled and scattered among
the hills and valleys.77
At this, Cao Cao’s forces trembled for fear. They fled day and night,
and have now set camp at the Ao Granary, protected by the Yellow Riv-
er.78 They hope there to resist my advance, like a swarm of insects before
a mighty chariot.
Now I have raised the spiritual authority of Han for a battle to deter-
mine the fate of the world. I command a million men with long spears,
and a thousand squadrons of barbarian cavalry, all inspired by the vir-
tues of the heroes of the past, and encouraged by the force of good bows
and strong crossbows. The troops of Bing province are moving through
the Taihang Mountains, the troops of Qing province are moving up the
Ji and the Ta;79 and as my main army crosses the Yellow River to attack
his front the troops of Jing province will come past Wan and She to
strike his rear.80 Thunderously, with the pace of a tiger, our combined
forces will meet at the rebel camp. It will be like a great conflagration
76
There is no reference elsewhere to such a planned offensive, though Cao Cao may
indeed have wished to take advantage of Yuan Shao’s pro-occupation in the north. As
discussed above at 125–126 and note 52 above, however, it may be that this refers only
to Yu Jin’s skirmishing across the River.
77
This paragraph appears in Wen xuan, but not in the other two versions.
The Chuge had emerged as an influential group among the Xiongnu of the Ordos
region during the second century, generally hostile to Han: see deC, Northern Fron-
tier, 351, and on the pronunciation of the name and its varied formats, note 3 at
529–531.
Zuoxiao had been taken as a soubriquet by one of the leaders of the Black Moun-
tain bandits during the 180s. It is probable that the name was taken from the title
of the official in charge of convict labourers under the Court Architect: Bielenstein,
Bureaucracy, 81. See HHS 71/61:2310; deC, Huan and Ling, 566 note 12.
78
The Ao Granary was close to Rongyang, by the point where the Bian River of
the Vast Canal complex met the Yellow River. It was at the western end of Cao Cao’s
defence position centred on Guandu.
79
The Ji and the Ta [the character ta 漯 is elsewhere transcribed as luo] were rivers
of the North China plain which flowed roughly parallel to the course of the course
of the Yellow River; the Ji to the south and the Ta to the north: see, for example,
Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 44–45. An approach from this direction would bring an army
to threaten Cao Cao’s position in Jibei and Dong commandery of Yan province.
80
Wan city was the capital of Nanyang commandery, and She city lay some hundred
kilometres to the northeast. This was the natural route to attack Cao Cao’s position
from the south, but there is no good evidence that Liu Biao had any such intention,
while his local commander Zhang Xiu changed sides to join Cao Cao.
134 chapter three
consuming a flimsy weed, or a tide of the sea overwhelming a spark of

fire. How can he avoid destruction?
At this point the texts of the proclamation in Hou Hanshu and Weishi
chunqiu conclude with a brief passage pointing out that Cao Cao has
set seven hundred men about the emperor, ostensibly to guard him
but in fact to keep him prisoner, and that in such a time of weakness
for the house of Han it is the duty of all men of loyalty and good will
to join against the usurper. How can they fail to respond to the call?
The text in Wen xuan, however, continues in slightly different fashion.

Firstly, before the final passage cited above, it argues that Cao Cao’s
own forces are weak and confused. Many of his men came from You
and Ji provinces in the north, or had formerly served Yuan Shao: given
opportunity, they will swiftly revert to their former allegiance. Among
the rest of his troops, from Yan and Yu provinces, many had served
against him under Lü Bu, so their loyalty too was uncertain, while his
own long-term followers had been campaigning for years on end and
were exhausted, often affected by old wounds. Such a disparate group
would collapse at the first sign of attack.
Following the reference to his hold over the emperor, Yuan Shao
expresses concern that Cao Cao’s false claim to act on behalf of the
dynasty might deceive some isolated people, who lacked true knowl-
edge of the situation. Those properly informed, however, would rally
to save the sovereign from his sad position, and join to overthrow the
rebel.
Now was the time for the troops of the northern provinces to
advance, and as soon as the call reached Jing province Liu Biao and
Zhang Xiu should join the attack. Success was then assured, and the
nation would be preserved. Whoever took Cao Cao’s head would be
granted enfeoffment and fifty million cash, but those of his following
who surrendered would suffer no harm.
Let this announcement of grace and fidelity be published far and wide
throughout the empire, so that all may know the straits in which our
sacred sovereign finds himself. This document has the authority of an
imperial order.
The Call to Arms is an impressive piece of writing in fine literary style.
It makes a forceful case against Cao Cao, from his shameful origins
and unattractive character to his usurpation and abuse of power. Yuan
Shao is presented as his patron and indeed his saviour, and his failure
to attend to Cao Cao earlier is explained first by his mistaken leniency

and later by his broader responsibilities to deal with other sources of
rebellion. Now, however, this rebel minister, whose achievements in
battle are minimal and whose army is vulnerable to any assault, will
suffer the combined attack of all those loyal to the true dynasty of Han.
The result is a foregone conclusion.
Leaving aside the self-serving spin which Yuan Shao put upon Cao
Cao’s previous history, the military situation was not nearly so certain
as he claimed. Whereas the first part of the document speaks with
confidence of the overwhelming force which is to be deployed against
the rebel, from the north, west, east and south, the last section makes
it clear that though the orders have been given they have not yet been
acknowledged, still less carried out. Liu Biao made no move, and
Zhang Xiu, as we have seen, had in fact allied with Cao Cao. It was
indeed a call to arms, but the southern allies did not respond.
Based upon the attribution in Wen xuan, the Call may best be dated
to the beginning of 200, when Liu Bei was still defying Cao Cao in the
southeast, and the fine quality of the writing makes it probable that it
was designed to elicit support not only from Liu Biao but more gen-
erally among the gentry of Yu province. The Yuan family came from
Runan, and there was a fair possibility of opening a second front in
that region, which would also threaten Cao Cao from the rear.
In the event, Liu Bei was driven away and Liu Biao and Zhang Xiu
ignored or rejected the call, but the document achieved wide circu-
lation, and though it had small effect upon the course of events its
alternative, hostile view of Cao Cao has influenced historians and writ-
ers for centuries since that time. It will be discussed again in Chapter
Eleven.
Decisive victory 20081
The Guandu campaign was critical to the civil war, for it determined
control of the North China plain and the greater part of the ruined
empire. The Red Cliffs battle eight years later, where the armies of three
successor states faced one another, has attracted greater attention from
81
The account of the fighting at Guandu is presented by ZZTJ 63:2025–40; deC,
Establish Peace, 272–298. There is a detailed discussion in Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 316–381.
136 chapter three
literary tradition, but the importance of events at Guandu meant that

accounts of this engagement too were liable to exaggeration, hyperbole
and occasional cliché. So the history must be read with caution.
As Yuan Shao was planning his offensive, his advisers disagreed on

policy. His most senior assistant, Ju Shou, and his officer Tian Feng
both recommended restraint and delay: he should develop the terri-
tory currently under his control while keeping his army as a distant
threat, but send raiding parties against the enemy, wearing him out
with marches and counter-marches; in this way he could keep Cao
Cao off balance and weaken him without major effort. Shen Pei and
Guo Tu, however, rivals of Ju Shou, urged immediate action, Yuan
Shao agreed, and when Tian Feng persisted he was arrested and
imprisoned. Ju Shou had formerly held overall command of the expe-
dition, but the army was now divided into three, and the other two
divisions were awarded to Guo Tu and Chunyu Qiong, both positive
and optimistic.82
Cao Cao is said to have had great respect for Tian Feng: when he
heard that Yuan Shao had left him behind he forecast his certain
defeat, and he later observed that if Yuan Shao had used Tian Feng’s
strategy the affair would have been quite uncertain.83 Though Cao Cao
had managed to secure his flanks and rear for the time being, and was
prepared for a frontal assault, it is generally agreed that Yuan Shao
had more men under arms and greater potential resources. Had he
followed Tian Feng’s advice, concentrated on developing his economic
base, and maintained a military presence on the Yellow River while
sending raids into Cao Cao’s territory and applying pressure to his
allies and those who remained neutral, he might have caused serious
82
The advice of Tian Feng is recorded in HHS 74/64A:2392–93 and SGZ 7:200,
that of Ju Shou at HHS 74/64A:2390–91 and SGZ 7:196–197; ZZTJ 63:2015 and 2025.
Details and timing of the debate, which evidently took place over several months, are
slightly confused by the sources, but the substance, and the identity of the protago-
nists, is clear.
Before this, when the emperor came to the east, Ju Shou had urged Yuan Shao to
take him under his protection, but Guo Tu and Chunyu Qiong successfully spoke
against the plan. There is evidence, endorsed by the historians, that other senior offi-
cials were jealous of Ju Shou and formed a faction against him.
As commanders of the three divisions of Yuan Shao’s army, Ju Shou, Guo Tu and
Chunyu Qiong held title as dudu, which may here be rendered as Chief Controllers;
cf. note 48 above.
83
SGZ 6:201 PC quoting Xianxian xingzhuang.
trouble. Instead he embarked on a venture far into hostile territory,

with small attempt at manoeuvre.
In the second month of the Chinese year Yuan Shao brought his
army forward to Liyang in Wei commandery.84
For most of Later Han, Liyang had been a training camp for sol-
diers of the North China plain recruited to serve on the northern
frontier,85 and it was now Yuan Shao’s major base in the south of his
territory. Facing it across the Yellow River was Boma city, held by
Cao Cao’s Administrator of Dong commandery Liu Yan, while the
city of Juancheng, also in Dong commandery but downstream to the
east, was occupied by his general and old follower Cheng Yu. The gar-
rison was only seven hundred men, but when Cao Cao offered to send
additional troops Cheng Yu argued that his command was too small
to attract Yuan Shao’s attention. If it was increased, however, it would
become liable to attack and would certainly be overwhelmed; better to
hope the enemy passed it by. Impressed by such thoughtfulness and
courage, Cao Cao accepted his advice.86
In a first attack, Yuan Shao sent his general Yan Liang across the
Yellow River against Boma, and at the beginning of summer Cao Cao
brought troops to assist the defence. Rather than going direct to the
beleaguered city, however, he moved almost due north to the Yan
Crossing, some twenty-five kilometres to the east. From there he sent
men across the River as if to take the enemy in the flank, then led a
light-armed force directly to Boma. As Yuan Shao sent a detachment
to guard against the feint, Cao Cao passed the front of the enemy’s
main position and took Yan Liang by surprise.87 Zhang Liao and Guan
84
The campaign which follows is described by ZZTJ 63:2025–36, quoting from
variety of sources including SGZ 1:19–22, HHS 74/64A:2392–2401, SGZ 6:199–201,
SGZ 10:323–24 and SGZ Shu 2:876. It is discussed by Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 316–381
and deC, Establish Peace, 273–290, with a preliminary discussion in deC, “Civil War
in Early China,” and by Eikenberry, “Campaigns of Cao Cao,” 58–59.
85
On Liyang as a recruitment and training centre for the army of the General on
the Liao, see deC, Northern Frontier, 253. On the Trans-Liao command, see note 90
below.
86
It is in any case doubtful whether an attack on Juancheng would have been worth
while: Yuan Shao’s real objective was Cao Cao’s position at Guandu, and Juancheng
was well away from that line. Seizure of the city would have removed some of his
troops and would not have outflanked Cao Cao’s position.
87
SGZ 1:19 attributes the strategic advice to Cao Cao’s counsellor Xun You.
138
chapter three
Map 9. Operations about Guandu 100–200

Yu led the attack, the enemy were scattered and Yan Liang was killed,
apparently by the hand of Guan Yu.88
Following the defeat of Yan Liang, Yuan Shao abandoned the
bridgehead at Boma, and instead brought his troops southwest up the
Yellow River to the Yan Crossing. Ju Shou now renewed his cautious
advice: hold back the main body but send an advance guard towards
Guandu, for if the whole force was committed too heavily it would
be difficult to extract it in the event of a set-back. Yuan Shao paid no
attention but ordered a full offensive, and Ju Shou pleaded illness and
asked to retire. Permission was refused and he was obliged to remain
with the army, but he was stripped of his command and his troops
were added to those of Guo Tu.89
For his part, to prevent Yuan Shao gaining benefit from its cap-
ture, Cao Cao ordered that Boma be abandoned and its troops and
people brought back to the west. Then as now, the open plain about
the Yellow River was protected by a number of dykes, of which the
major ones are some distance from the regular stream to make space
for seasonal flood-waters. As the baggage from Boma lumbered along
open ground to their front, Cao Cao had his cavalry dismount and
hide behind the main southern dyke. A vanguard of Yuan Shao’s cav-
alry, commanded by Liu Bei and the general Wen Chou, crossed the
River and came towards them, and some of the enemy broke away to
plunder the baggage train. Cao Cao gave the order to attack, and his
men leaped on their horses and charged. He had only six hundred in
his troop, heavily outnumbered by Yuan Shao’s men, but the enemy
were taken by surprise and again defeated. Wen Chou was killed, and
as he and Yan Liang had been two of Yuan Shao’s best fighting men,
their loss had considerable effect upon morale.
Despite these successful skirmishes, however, Cao Cao had not
prevented Yuan Shao from crossing the Yellow River, and he now
88
SGZ Shu 6:939 says that Guan Yu rode his horse into the midst of the enemy and
killed Yan Liang in personal combat. He was rewarded for his success with enfeoff-
ment as Marquis of Hanshou Village; the site of the fief is not known, but Guan Yu
is referred to on a number of later occasions by that title.
89
SGZ 6:200 PC and HHS 74/64A:2399; cf. page 136 above, describing the arrange-
ment of Yuan Shao’s army into three divisions, each under a Chief Controller (dudu).
From the fact that the other commander, Chunyu Qiong, appears later in charge of a
baggage train and supply depot, while Guo Tu is involved in a major attack on Cao
Cao’s defences, it is probable that Chunyu Qiong’s division was responsible for lines
of communication and supplies, while Guo Tu commanded all front-line troops under
the general authority of Yuan Shao.
140 chapter three
withdrew to his main defence position at Guandu. Yuan Shao’s army

is said to have numbered more than a hundred thousand men, and it
appears he had at least a local superiority. By autumn the battle lines
had been drawn up at Guandu, though both sides were making some
attempts to disrupt the enemy’s rear.
We are told that as he came to Guandu Cao Cao received a messen-
ger from Yan Rou, one of the leaders in You province, while Xianyu
Fu came to him in person; they presumably approached through the
hill country to the west, the Taihang Shan. Xianyu Fu had made con-
tact before, and was now named a General on the Liao. Yan Rou had
taken title as Protector of the Wuhuan during the rising against Gong-
sun Zan and had been recognised in that office by Yuan Shao; he now
changed allegiance. Their titles, however, had no practical significance
at this time,90 and it does not appear that Yuan Shao was troubled by
any distractions in the north. Cao Cao, on the other hand, was vulner-
able to a more serious threat close behind him.
After his triumph against Yan Liang, Guan Yu believed he had
repaid the favour Cao Cao had shown him, and he made no secret
of his intention to return to his comrade Liu Bei. Cao Cao appears to
have accepted his decision with resignation and tolerance, and Guan
Yu made his escape without great difficulty.91 He probably rejoined Liu
Bei within a few days of the engagement at Boma, for one may doubt
Liu Bei would have led front-line cavalry at the Yan Crossing if Guan
Yu had still been in enemy hands. Soon afterwards Liu Bei was sent by
Yuan Shao to cause trouble behind Cao Cao’s lines.
90
SGZ 8:247. Under Later Han, the Protector of the Wuhuan was responsible for
dealings with the non-Chinese Wuhuan and Xianbi along the frontier of You province.
Yan Rou had lived among these peoples as a child, he was trusted by them, and he had
brought tribesmen to assist the rising against Gongsun Zan in 195.
Though the Liao River flows through Manchuria, and gave its name to two
commanderies of that region, Liaodong and Liaoxi, the General on the Liao under
Later Han had been stationed on the frontier of Bing province, on the northern loop
of the Yellow River by present-day Baotou, with responsibility for keeping the Xiongnu
under control. From the mid-second century, however, as the Xiongnu state largely
disintegrated, the situation in that region became increasingly disorganised, and by
the mid-170s it appears the Trans-Liao command had ceased to be maintained: e.g.
deC, Northern Frontier, 321–324 and 341. It was revived many years later, in 237, with
relevance to the northeast once more [SGZ 28:762: Fang, Chronicle I, 546], but Xianyu
Fu’s appointment, like that of Yan Rou, is again little more than a courtesy.
91
Compare, however, the fictional accounts of his escape described in Chapter
Eleven at 486.
A group of bandits calling themselves Yellow Turbans had risen

against Cao Cao in Runan, and Liu Bei led a contingent to support
them. It seems likely that he approached by an eastern route through
his old territory of Xu province, and as the rebellion spread quickly
there was increasing threat to Xu city from the south. Cao Cao was
concerned, but Cao Ren argued that Liu Bei and his allies had not had
time to grow accustomed to one another, and he led a troop of cavalry
against the insurgents. Liu Bei was indeed defeated and driven back to
Yuan Shao, while Cao Ren and his troop were kept as a mobile reserve
to deal with any further distractions.92
Given that Runan was the home of the Yuan family, and a number
of local leaders had shown their support, it is surprising that Yuan
Shao had sent Liu Bei, a man from the distant north with no previous
connection to the region, to act as his agent there. It is likely the ini-
tiative came from Liu Bei himself and, despite his first failure, he per-
suaded Yuan Shao to send him again, this time with a commission to
contact Liu Biao in Jing province. Though he returned to Runan, and
allied with another bandit group, Cao Cao does not appear to have
regarded him as a significant threat. He sent one of his junior officers,
whom Liu Bei defeated and killed, but he did not do anything more.
For his part, Liu Biao continued to take no action, and he was in
any case isolated from the conflict: his former subordinate Zhang Xiu
was now a supporter of Cao Cao, while Cao Cao’s officer Li Tong
controlled a marcher territory in the southwest of Runan, separating
Liu Biao from Liu Bei.93 In general, Yuan Shao’s “southern strategy”
appears to have been chiefly inspired by Liu Bei’s desire to get away;
we are told that he was concerned to escape his dependence upon
Yuan Shao, while Yuan Shao himself was concentrating on the direct
attack against Guandu.
By the early autumn Yuan Shao had established his headquarters

at Yangwu, near present-day Yuanyang in Henan, fifty kilometres
southwest of the Yan Crossing and half that distance from Cao Cao’s
92
SGZ Shu 2:876, SGZ 9:274; deC, Establish Peace, 280 and 282.
93
The biography of Li Tong is at SGZ 18:534–36, and that of his adviser Zhao Yan
is at SGZ 23:668–71. Li Tong had been made Commandant of Yang’an, controlling
two counties of Yingchuan on the border with Jing province. Fiercely loyal, he had
been approached by both Yuan Shao and by Liu Biao, but rejected both overtures and
killed Yuan Shao’s messenger.
142 chapter three
position at Guandu. Again Ju Shou urged him to pause, maintaining

pressure on the southerners and forcing them to exhaust themselves
and their stores as they waited for his attack; but again Yuan Shao
insisted upon the advance. In the eighth Chinese month, the middle
of autumn, he brought his men forward against Cao Cao’s defences.
The armies faced one another there for two months, with a contested
front line which extended almost a hundred kilometres east and west.94
Cao Cao tried one early sortie, but was driven back and remained
thereafter on the defensive.
Though Yuan Shao had immediate superiority in numbers, it does
not appear that Cao Cao was in danger of being seriously out-flanked,
so he must have had sufficient men to maintain a presence against the
enemy along the whole of the line.95 Ju Shou urged Yuan Shao to set
up a mobile force to guard against further attacks by Cao Cao, and
the adviser Xu You proposed a night raid by light troops in hope of
capturing Xu city. Yuan Shao did send his officer Han Xun in a loop
west of the Putian marshland towards Xu, but Cao Cao had placed
Cao Ren in that area for just such an eventuality and Han Xun was
driven back.96 Making no further attempt at such manoeuvring, Yuan
Shao committed himself and his main army to a direct assault.
Cao Cao had been preparing his fortifications for several months,
with walls which were probably of tamped earth but possibly included
a palisade, and as Guandu lay on a ridge above the Bian Canal we may
assume that his defences were on higher ground and had a water-way
to serve as a natural moat; any assailants were thus obliged to advance
up-hill. Yuan Shao’s men raised hills of earth and built wooden towers
so they could aim into Cao Cao’s defences, and they dug tunnels to
approach and undermine his ramparts. Under a barrage of arrows, we
are told that the defenders were obliged to carry shields on their heads
each time they moved in the open, but they built rival towers and
94
The estimate of distance is based upon the position of Yuan Shao’s two known
supply depots, at Gushi and Wuchao, discussed below. Some sixty kilometres apart,
they would have supported a somewhat broader front. As we have observed above,
however, the terrain was restricted on the west by the Putian marshland, and access
in many areas was complicated by minor waterways and boggy ground.
95
On the numbers and nature of the troops involved, see the section below on
Reappraisal. Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 381, rightly emphasises that the term shao 少 “few”
is best taken in a relative rather than an absolute sense: Cao Cao may not have had as
many men as Yuan Shao, but his troops were not necessarily few in number.
96
SGZ 9:274 describes Han Xun as commander of a detachment, and he was evi-
dently not a full general.
counter-tunnels, and used “thunder-cars” hurling stones to destroy

Yuan Shao’s works above ground.97 The defence was stretched, how-
ever, and though there was no immediate problem with supplies Cao
Cao was concerned how long they might last. At one point we are
told that he considered the possibility of further withdrawal, to make
a final stand at Xu city, but Xun Yu wrote and urged him to hold on:
Your force is only a tenth of his, yet you have marked the ground and
hold it. You have him by the throat and he cannot get forward, and you
have maintained that position for half a year. It is obvious his strength is
almost exhausted. Here is the decisive moment, and this is the occasion
to surprise him. Do not miss your chance.98
There is surely exaggeration, for Yuan Shao’s forces were not ten times
as many, and though the campaign had been under way since early
in the year, the direct conflict at Guandu lasted no more than two
months. We can nonetheless be sure that further retreat, from posi-
tions so deliberately prepared, would have broken the morale of Cao
Cao’s men, and it is unlikely he could have reconstructed a successful
defence at Xu city.
On the other side, as Xun Yu observed, Yuan Shao was in still
greater difficulty. His attack was making no headway, and his lines of
communication extended 160 kilometres, one hundred miles, north-
east across the Yellow River as far as Liyang. Just as Cao Cao had
withdrawn people and baggage when he abandoned Boma, so we may
assume he left little of value to the enemy as he retreated to Guandu.
In any case, Yuan Shao’s great host would have soon exhausted any
local provisions, and had then to rely upon its long supply line.
There were two major depots providing Yuan Shao’s forward
troops with food and equipment: one on the west at Gushi, north of
97
The struggle at Guandu is described in the biographies of Yuan Shao, at HHS
74/64A:2400–01 and SGZ 6:199, and in that of Cao Cao at SGZ 1:20–21; summa-
rised by ZZTJ 63:2032–35; deC, Establish Peace, 284–289. There are elements of cli-
ché and contradiction in some passages: as here, for example, one may question how
Cao Cao’s men could work stone-throwing machines if they were constantly holding
shields above their heads to guard against enemy missiles.
The “thunder-cars” (霹靂 pili) were probably mobile ballistas: Chapter Four at 177.
We are told that the name was given by Yuan Shao’s troops, presumably referring to
the sound of the stones as they arrived.
SJZ 22:720 remarks that remnants of the siege works, including a tower or terrace
which formed part of Cao Cao’s defensive works, could still be seen three centuries
later.
98
SGZ 10:314, from the biography of Xun Yu.
144 chapter three
present-day Zhengzhou in Henan; the other by the Wuchao marsh,

southeast of present-day Yanjin. Sixty kilometres apart, they were sup-
plied by portage across the watershed from the Yellow River, and were
linked east-west by the Ji River, a branch of the Vast Canal network
behind the front line. As we are told that Chunyu Qiong commanded
one division of Yuan Shao’s army, and later events indicate that he was
responsible for supplies, the transport convoys and the stores should
have been well-defended. It appears, however, that the guards became
complacent.
After some weeks of siege and assault, Xun You proposed that Cao
Cao send the lieutenant-general Xu Huang to attack Gushi, behind the
enemy lines. The defence of Gushi was under the command of Yuan
Shao’s officer Han Xun, who was described as a brave man but lacking
in caution. The raid was a complete success, Han Xun was defeated
and put to flight, and the enemy baggage was burnt and destroyed.99
This was a set-back for Yuan Shao, but his situation was not yet
critical. At the beginning of winter, however, Xu You, former coun-
sellor of Yuan Shao, went over to Cao Cao, ostensibly because his
proposal for an attack behind Cao Cao’s lines had not been properly
followed. He was also said to be corrupt, however, and to have been
angry when a member of his family was arrested for some wrong-
doing. He told Cao Cao of another, larger convoy of supplies that
was approaching Wuchao under the personal command of Chunyu
Qiong, and he encouraged him to attack.100 Cao Man zhuan describes
the expedition:
99
The biography of Xun You at SGZ 10:323 refers to a supply convoy, but that of
Xu Huang at SGZ 17:528 says that he attacked the depot at Gushi directly.
SGZ 10 has the name of Yuan Shao’s commander as Han Meng, but this was prob-
ably the same man as had been defeated by Cao Ren a short time before: above at 142
and SGZ 9:274. See further LH3K, 303. SGZ 9:274 says that Cao Ren and Shi Huan
also took part in the raid.
100
Cao Man zhuan, quoted by SGZ 1:21–22 PC, says that Xu You asked Cao Cao
about his supplies, and after repeated pressure Cao Cao confessed that he had barely
enough for another month. The impression is that his situation was serious.
On the other hand, we are told that about this time Cao Cao greeted one of his
supply convoys, saying, “Another fortnight, and I shall have defeated Yuan Shao for
you:” SGZ 1:21: ZZTJ 63:2033; deC, Establish Peace, 285. This does not sound like a
general who is concerned about his provisions, nor one who lacks confidence in the
outcome.
I suspect that, as with the numbers of the two armies, Cao Cao’s problem with sup-
plies has been exaggerated in order to enhance his achievement. We should note that
the conversation with Xu You was probably not witnessed, for it is hard to believe
Cao Cao was very pleased. Leaving Cao Hong and Xun You to hold
the camp, he chose out [five thousand] of his best horsemen and foot-
soldiers.101 Carrying flags of the Yuan army, with the men gagged and
the mouths of the horses tied, they travelled by night and followed side-
paths. The men carried bound firewood, and if anyone questioned them
as they passed they explained that “Lord Yuan is afraid Cao Cao may
attack his after-guard, so he is sending reinforcements.” Those who were
told this believed it, and they went on as before.102
Certainly the raid was carried out in secret and deception. Tying up
the horses’ mouths and gagging the men was to ensure their silence,
and carrying firewood was designed to make them look like scav-
engers. It is hard to imagine, however, how a large group of men,
gagged to silence and each carrying a load of wood, could explain to
any watchman that they were military reinforcements. The history has
over-played the clichés, but it is clear that the surprise was successful.
Cao Cao had his men light fires about their camp to throw the enemy
into confusion, and though Chunyu Qiong came out to attack at dawn
he was swiftly driven back behind his defences.
Yuan Shao must have realised that the defection of Xu You meant
many of his plans would be known to the enemy, and it was only a
question of where Cao Cao would choose to strike. As news came of the
assault on Chunyu Qiong, however, he decided to let him defend him-
self, and instead take advantage of Cao Cao’s absence to make another
attack on Guandu. He sent only light troops to assist at Wuchao, while
his generals Zhang He and Gao Lan led a major force forward against
the enemy positions. Zhang He protested that this was too risky, for
the supplies held by Chunyu Qiong were essential, but Guo Tu argued
against him and Yuan Shao held to his plan. As Cao Hong and Xun
You repelled the assault on Guandu, however, Cao Cao inspired his
men to defeat Chunyu Qiong and the relief troops.
Fighting for their lives, his men quickly defeated the enemy. They took
the heads of Chunyu Qiong and others, burnt the supplies and killed
more than a thousand soldiers. Then they cut the noses from the men,
that any commander would discuss such concerns in public. It may have been falsely
reported.
101
Cao Man zhuan does not give a figure, but SGZ 6:199 says the detachment num-
bered five thousand men.
102
SGZ 1:21–22 PC, followed by ZZTJ 63:2034; deC, Establish Peace, 287.
146 chapter three
and the lips and tongues from the cattle and horses, and displayed them
before Yuan Shao’s army.103
Again the text of Cao Man zhuan is surely exaggerated: such barba-
rous display was not unknown, but it is unlikely to have taken place
on this occasion. Cao Cao’s troops were isolated behind enemy lines
as a fierce attack was launched against his own positions, and despite
the possibilities of propaganda he could hardly afford the time to des-
ecrate corpses.
In any event, as news came through that the direct assault had failed,
Guo Tu put the blame onto his front-line commanders. Fearing the
worst, Zhang He and Gao Lan ordered their men to burn their siege
engines, and surrendered to Cao Hong and Xun You.104 Defeated at
front and rear, with their supplies destroyed and their generals defect-
ing, Yuan Shao’s men fell into disarray. Abandoning their positions,
they fled north to the Yellow River, pursued by their victorious oppo-
nents. Yuan Shao, Yuan Tan and their staff made their escape, but
many of their soldiers were killed or captured, and all their baggage,
maps and documents came into Cao Cao’s hands; he ostentatiously
burned the correspondence without reading it.
In a formal report of his triumph to the throne, Cao Cao would claim
that over seventy thousand of the enemy had been killed,105 but this
is highly unlikely: even if Yuan Shao’s army had numbered a hun-
dred thousand, a seventy per cent casualty rate cannot be credited.106
We are told, moreover, that as Yuan Shao abandoned the field he was
accompanied by an escort of eight hundred cavalry, and that after
103
HHS 74/64A TC quoting Cao Man zhuan, followed by ZZTJ 63:2034; deC,
Establish Peace, 288.
104
Zhang He, whose biography is at SGZ 17:524–27, later became a commander
of shock troops for Cao Cao and rose high in his service. Gao Lan is not heard of
again.
105
SGZ 1:22 PC quoting Xiandi qijuzhu “The Diary of Activity and Repose of
Emperor Xian,” echoed in ZZTJ 63:2035; deC, Establish Peace, 289.
Traditionally, the Diaries of Activity and Repose recorded the day-to-day activities
of the emperor and the court, and provided basic material for later compilation of
the imperial annals and other sections of the dynastic history: Hulsewé, “Notes on
Historiography,” 41. Formally speaking, therefore, this quotation should preserve the
actual words of Cao Cao’s report; but there are naturally problems of transmission,
and in any case he and his scribes were not necessarily concerned to be accurate.
106
Though a defeated and fleeing enemy could suffer heavy casualties, the Roman
army which was surrounded and slaughtered by Hannibal’s troops at the battle of
Cannae in 216 BC had “only” 50,000 dead out of 80,000 who took the field.
he had re-established himself at the camp in Liyang large numbers

of his men came back to join him.107 Similarly, though several cit-
ies in Ji province rebelled against him, he was able to regain control
quickly and without great difficulty.108 He had suffered a major defeat,
and there was small likelihood of another offensive against the south,
but the battle was not so immediately disastrous as the texts might
indicate.
Just as the results of a conflict may be exaggerated, moreover,
so may be the faults of the losing side. Cao Cao and his advisers at
Guandu come out well: flexible, imaginative and swift to recognise
and seize opportunity. Yuan Shao, on the other hand, is presented
as hide-bound in his approach, ignoring cautious advisers such as Ju
Shou and Tian Feng, making few attempts to attack Cao Cao behind
his lines, but marching his great army directly against the enemy with
ultimately disastrous results. Some such criticism appears justified by
the evidence, for an alternative strategy, holding Cao Cao by the threat
of attack while using Liu Bei and others to disrupt his core position,
was certainly an option. In the event, the defeat at Guandu was not
necessarily fatal, but it left Yuan Shao weakened, and within a few
years quarrels over his succession brought ruin to his family.
The Guandu campaign: a reappraisal
The section above provides an account of the Guandu campaign

according to the various histories, and we may accept that in general
terms it is correct. Having gathered a large army, Yuan Shao advanced
directly across the Yellow River against Cao Cao’s defences at Guandu.
Though his troops were more numerous than Cao Cao’s, they were
unable to achieve a break-through, and when Cao Cao destroyed his
supply depots and a baggage train Yuan Shao’s army withdrew in con-
fusion. Some of his advisers had urged him to keep his main force as a
threat to hold Cao Cao, while sending raids against the enemy’s flank
and rear where he may have been vulnerable, but Yuan Shao largely
neglected that possibility: he used only the junior commander Han
Xun and the independently-minded Liu Bei.
107
HHS 74/64A:2401; deC, Establish Peace, 290.
108
HHS 74/64A:2401 and 2403; deC, Establish Peace, 290 and 292.
148 chapter three
The heart of the story is based upon the assumption that Yuan Shao
had far the greater force and that he used it poorly, embarking on a
mistaken offensive without flexibility. There is, however, a problem:
we cannot be certain that Yuan Shao had any more men under his
command than did Cao Cao.
The question was first raised by Pei Songzhi himself, with a sub-
stantial essay in his commentary to the account of the campaign in the
biography of Cao Cao.109 He notes that Cao Cao had been successful
in many battles, which allowed him to take over enemy troops and
amalgamate them with his own; one notable example is that of the
alleged 300,000 Yellow Turbans who became the Qingzhou Troops.
Pei Songzhi also notes that Cao Cao was able to hold an extended
front, and he further considers the story of how he killed seventy or
even eighty thousand of the enemy, raising doubts that so many men
could have been dealt with if Cao Cao’s own command was very much
smaller. “Yet Yuan Shao’s great masses tied their own hands and went
to the slaughter; what could have impelled them to act in such a way?”
He concludes that the disparity was exaggerated in order to emphasise
the achievement.
As Leban observes, few later commentators have followed Pei Song-
zhi’s argument, and even amongst those who did the consensus has
been that Yuan Shao controlled superior numbers and held the initia-
tive.110 His plan of attack, therefore, was an example of overweening
confidence, and the defeat which followed was the penalty of obstinacy
and hubris. If we consider the human resources that the two sides con-
trolled, however, and the overall strategic situation, then the picture
may change.
According to the Treatise of Administrative Geography of Hou Han
shu, at the middle of the second century AD Yuan Shao’s later terri-
tory of Ji province contained 908,005 households and 5,440,340 indi-
viduals, while Yan province, now controlled by Cao Cao, had 799,302
households and 3,394,597 individuals, and Yingchuan commandery,
109
SGZ 1:20 PC, translated by Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 331–332.
110
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 333–335. At 335 Leban accepts Pei Songzhi’s conclusion
that the forces were roughly equal, though he suggests that “[the notional] parity may
have been due in part to the fact that the smaller force on defense [i.e. Cao Cao’s], with
short supply lines over a small area, may surely equal a rather larger force on offense
some distance from its home base.” Leban accepts the common agreement that Yuan
Shao’s army outnumbered Cao Cao’s, and emphasises Yuan Shao’s control of four
provinces [Ji, Qing, You and Bing]; on this, however, see below.
at the centre of his power about Xu city, had 263,440 households and
1,436,513 individuals. The total difference was little more than half a
million people.111
It is true that Yuan Shao laid claim to Qing province to his east
and Bing province to the west, and he had lately destroyed Gong-
sun Zan and taken nominal control of the northern part of the North
China plain. The greater part of You province, however, remained in
the hands of local chieftains such as Xianyu Fu and Yan Rou, who
inclined to Cao Cao. Similarly, though Yuan Shao had destroyed many
of the Black Mountain bandit groups of the Taihang Shan, and had
named his nephew Gao Gan as Governor of Bing province, the terri-
tory was by no means secure, while Zhang Yan, former leader of the
Black Mountain group and an erstwhile ally of Gongsun Zan, main-
tained his independence in Changshan. As to Qing province, where
Yuan Shao had named his son Tan as Inspector, large numbers of its
people had joined Cao Cao several years earlier, the territory had been
ravaged by the conflict between Yuan Tan and Gongsun Zan’s officer
Tian Kai, and it was currently under attack from Cao Cao’s ally Zang
Ba. Yuan Tan himself came to take part in the campaign against Cao
Cao, but it is hard to believe he could have afforded to bring many
troops with him.112
On the other side, though Runan was certainly troublesome, Cao
Cao had recently conquered Lü Bu in Xu province, and he certainly
controlled the territory in the southeast of Yu province which con-
nected that region with his base in Yingchuan; in the Later Han census
the population there, including Cao Cao’s own homeland of Pei, had
amounted to some 2.5 million, and that is without counting any part
of Xu province itself. The defeat of Lü Bu, the fall of Yuan Shu and the
111
On the Treatise and its census record, see note 15 to Chapter Two. Ji province
is described in HHS 110/20:3431–37, Yan province in 111/21:2447–58, and Yingchuan
in Yu province is at 110/20:3421–22. I refer hereafter only to figures for individuals.
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 319–320, suggests that some areas such as Yingchuan had
been devastated by the civil war, and economic productivity was drastically reduced.
Cao Cao, however, had been engaged in the resettlement of the territory about Xu city
through the tuntian system for several years, and though the passage of armies and the
depredations of bandits affected many regions, the damage was not necessarily long-
lasting and could be repaired by one good harvest. Prosperity and productivity cannot
have been so great as in more peaceful times, but the resources of the different regions
may still be compared with one another on the basis of their former capacity.
112
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 318, suggests that Yuan Shao had “firmly secured” all the
four provinces of Ji, Bing, You and Qing. I do not believe this is correct.
150 chapter three
successful expulsion of Liu Bei meant that Cao Cao had no significant
rival north of the Huai, and though he certainly needed to maintain
a military presence and garrisons to keep order, the resources of the
region were well available to him.
By 199, therefore, though Yuan Shao had at last eliminated Gong-
sun Zan, he was faced with an ever-increasing threat from the south.
He might have hoped for support in his home country of Runan, but
it appears that Cao Cao’s agent Man Chong had either destroyed his
followers or driven them into hiding, and his notional ally Liu Biao in
Jing province showed no sign of intervening: he had to deal with the
rebel Administrator Zhang Xian in the south, while his general Huang
Zu was struggling against Sun Ce on the lower Yangzi.113 On the con-
trary, when Zhang Xiu joined Cao Cao in 199, he brought with him
much of the potential of the great commandery of Nanyang, which
numbered more than two million people.
At the same time, the facts that Yuan Shao had taken so long to
achieve final victory over Gongsun Zan, and had failed to take advan-
tage of Cao Cao’s earlier pre-occupations and occasional defeats,
implies that his military strength and energy were less than has been
commonly claimed. By the beginning of 200 he was facing pressure
from Cao Cao on two sides: to the west Hedong, north of the Yel-
low River, was under Cao Cao’s control, and on the east Cao Cao’s
agent and ally Zang Ba was moving north into Qing province. Far
from dominating the north of China, Yuan Shao held little more than
Ji province, and directly or indirectly Cao Cao was beginning a pincer
movement against him there.
Seen in this light, Yuan Shao’s attack represents not so much an
offensive against a weaker opponent, but rather an attempt to strike
the enemy heartland in hope of inflicting serious damage before it
was too late. It was, of course, enormously risky to advance so far into
hostile territory, with an extended supply line, and to invest so much
on a single battle. It was not, however, that Yuan Shao was proud
113
Zhang Xian died in 200, and Liu Biao was then able to regain control of his ter-
ritory, but this surely took some time: SGZ 6:211–12, HHS 74/64B:2421. At the end
of 199, on the other hand, Sun Ce achieved a major victory against Huang Zu, and
Liu Biao was obliged to send significant reinforcements: SGZ 46/Wu 1, 1108; deC,
Generals of the South, 190–192. Sun Ce died in the following year, but the pressure
was maintained by his brother and successor Sun Quan.
and over-confident; but rather that he embarked upon the campaign

in desperation, before he was squeezed and crushed by Cao Cao’s
expanding power.
In this scenario, Yuan Shao indeed raised a large army, and the fact
that he was accompanied by his son Yuan Tan, normally in charge of
Qing province, indicates that he gathered as many troops as he could,
leaving defensive garrisons elsewhere. In similar fashion, it was Liu
Bei, not one of his own commanders, whom he sent to Runan, and
the raid against Xu city, defeated by Cao Ren, was led by Han Xun,
who was not a full general. It was not that Yuan Shao was neglectful
of the possibilities, but he did not have men to spare from his major
attack on Cao Cao.
There was a chance the gamble might succeed, for Yuan Shao did
manage to concentrate a superior force against the centre of Cao Cao’s
line. Cao Cao was quite properly concerned, for if Yuan Shao achieved
a break-through he would demoralise his army and could roll up his
defences from behind. By his fighting retreat from the Yellow River,
however, Cao Cao drew the enemy into a well-prepared position on
his home ground, where Yuan Shao’s lengthy supply lines and rear
depots were clearly vulnerable. Far from being generally outnum-
bered, moreover, in the final stages of the campaign he was able to
take a major raiding party against Chunyu Qiong at Wuchao, while
still leaving sufficient forces at Guandu to defy the last attack of Zhang
He and Gao Lan.
From such a perspective, the Guandu campaign looks different.
Whether by military weakness, ill fortune or lack of initiative, over a
period of ten years and despite some successes Yuan Shao had failed to
develop the position he obtained when he first seized Ji province from
Han Fu. During the same time, on the other hand, albeit with difficulty
and danger, Cao Cao had achieved remarkable success between the
Yellow River and the Huai. By 199, though Yuan Shao had at last dis-
posed of Gongsun Zan, he was faced with steady incursion from Cao
Cao and his allies. In a last throw of the dice, he sought to overwhelm
his rival with a direct and concentrated attack, but Cao Cao was ready
for him, and in a well-planned campaign he compelled Yuan Shao to
extend himself and then broke his supply lines. Yuan Shao was unsuc-
cessful, but his immediate strategy was not so foolish as historians
and commentators have made it appear, and he was faced by a most
experienced and competent opponent. Cao Cao’s strategy, indeed,
152 chapter three
was a model of that proposed by his ancient mentor Sunzi: he drew

his enemy into mistaken action, compelled him to fight on ground of
his own choosing, and finally destroyed him by attacking his weakest
point and breaking the morale of his army.114
114
On Cao Cao and Sunzi, see Chapter Seven at 324–332.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONDUCT OF CIVIL WAR
The heritage of Later Han

Rebels, bandits, gentry and self-defence groups: the development of
hereditary troops
Weapons and tactics
Numbers, supply and control
Casualties, prisoners, hostages and the behaviour of gentlemen
His victory at Guandu established Cao Cao as the most powerful fig-
ure of northern China. Yuan Shao was still a force to be reckoned
with and other rivals would appear in the future, so there were many
more battles to come. The campaign at Guandu, however, marked the
end of the first and most confused phase of the civil conflict which
had followed the usurpation of Dong Zhuo. At this stage, therefore, it
may be appropriate to consider the nature of this warfare, the means
by which the various leaders obtained their troops, and the uses they
made of their human and physical resources.
This chapter considers only questions relating to fighting on land.
Many problems presented by naval warfare were different, and Cao
Cao was not involved with them until his occupation of Jing province
in 208; they will be discussed at that stage in his story.1
The heritage of Later Han
At the heart of the military structure of Later Han were the five regi-
ments of the Northern Army, each containing some nine hundred offi-
cers and other ranks under the command of a colonel. There was one
regiment of infantry, the Footsoldiers, one of Archers Who Shoot at
a Sound, and three of mounted men: the Elite Cavalry, the Garrison
Cavalry and the Chang River Regiment; this last composed of horse-
1
War on water in Chapter Six at 278–286.
154 chapter four
men recruited from the Wuhuan people of the northeast.2 Like guards
regiments in many modern armies, the troops of the Northern Army
were highly trained and professional; they protected the imperial court
and capital and could also be used as stiffening for expeditions against
non-Chinese on the frontier or rebels within the empire.
Outside the capital, the northern frontier was guarded by the army
of the General on the Liao, based on the Ordos loop of the Yellow
River near present-day Baotou, and by garrisons spread along the Great
Wall which followed the Gansu corridor from Wuwei to Dunhuang
and the Juyan salient. Neither of these forces was particularly large:
it has been estimated that troops on the Wall may have amounted to
five thousand, and the Trans-Liao command was probably no greater.
They included volunteers, conscripts on short-term service and con-
victs whose sentences had been commuted, but the proportion of the
categories is unknown, and must have varied over time.3
By these calculations, the regular troops of Later Han would have
numbered some fifteen thousand men, while at the other end of the
Eurasian continent the Roman empire of the second century AD had
some thirty legions of citizen soldiers, each six thousand strong. The
regular establishment of Rome was thus more than ten times that of
Han, and it was supported by an equivalent number of non-citizen
auxiliaries.4
During Former Han there had been conscription throughout the
empire: men of military age were called up for training and service
and then joined their local militia, with inspection and manoeuvres
each year and possible summons for further active service. In 30 AD,
however, the founding Emperor Guangwu of Later Han abolished the
2
The Northern Army is described by the Treatise of Bureaucracy, HHS
117/27:3612–13. On the Wuhuan contribution to the Chang River regiment, see deC,
Northern Frontier, 387, citing HHS 117/27:3612–13 and LC quoting Cai Zhi of the
late second century.
3
The numbers required to man the Great Wall in the northwest have been esti-
mated by Loewe, RHA I, 90–91, and he discusses the forms of recruitment or con-
scription at 77–79. In Northern Frontier, 50–52, I suggest that a declining population
in the northern frontier commanderies meant the northern and eastern sections of the
Wall were manned very lightly, if at all, for the concentrated force of the Trans-Liao
encampment had replaced the former line of garrisons. [On the title of the command,
see note 90 to Chapter Three.]
4
Luttwak, Roman Empire, 16, summarises the conclusions of a widespread schol-
arly debate. Further details are given by Farnum, Positioning of the Roman Legions.
We may note that the Northern Army at Luoyang was no larger than the Praetorian
Guard at Rome; and the Praetorian Guard was not counted among the regular legions
of the empire.
the conduct of civil war 155
system. Thereafter men of the inner empire might serve as local militia
against bandits, and they could be called up in emergency, but they
received no formal training or regular exercise. There was a scutage tax
[gengfu], which contributed to the imperial revenue and supported the
small professional army, while men of the frontier commanderies were
liable for conscription and militia service as before. The new policy
reduced the danger of internal rebellion—bandits were less of a threat
if they had not been trained in arms—but it meant that troops raised
within China were generally of small value.5
Despite this, and despite also the fact that the population of com-
manderies along the northern frontier declined dramatically during
the two centuries of Later Han, the government was still able to put
substantial forces into the field for major campaigns: Dou Xian took
forty thousand men to attack the Northern Xiongnu in 89; Duan Jiong
led five thousand cavalry and ten thousand foot to destroy the Qiang
tribes of present-day Shenxi in 168 and 169; and the army defeated by
the Xianbi in 177 numbered thirty thousand men.6
These were large armies, but the Chinese contingents relied heavily
upon support from Wuhuan, Southern Xiongnu and other auxiliaries,
and the defence of the frontier, particularly after the disaster of 177,
became increasingly insecure. The mutiny and rebellion in Liang prov-
ince in 184 was one manifestation of the problems in the north, but
even troops formally loyal to the dynasty presented difficulties. Though
Duan Jiong and his colleagues kept a measure of control during the
160s, there was small connection between the military men of the
frontier and those involved in the central government. Furthermore,
the pattern which they established, of troops owing loyalty to a long-
term leader, was maintained through the following years, and by the
5
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 114 and 191 note 2, claims that general conscription
was suspended only temporarily, but in Northern Frontier, 48–50, I have argued dif-
ferently, and Lewis, “Abolition of Military Service,” adds further support and conclu-
sions. The second-century scholar and official Ying Shao, quoted by HHS 118/28:3622
LC in connection to an army raised against rebel Qiang about 110, remarked that
“sending [such] men into battle without training is just throwing them away.”
6
The campaigns of 89 and 177 are mentioned in Chapter One at 11 and 12, and are
discussed by deC, Northern Frontier, 269–273 and 340–341. Duan Jiong’s attack on
the Qiang is described by Northern Frontier, 135–141. The reliability of the numbers
ascribed to armies must always be kept in question, but the figures for Duan Jiong’s
enterprise are given in a memorial addressed to Emperor Huan in 167, and a fur-
ther memorial of 168 refers to a budget and a time-table: HHS 65/55:2148–51; ZZTJ
56:1803–1807 and 1816–1817; deC, Huan and Ling, 89–94 and 107–109.
156 chapter four
180s such men as Dong Zhuo had men and their families dependent
upon them, both Chinese and non-Chinese, who gave loyalty to their
chieftain rather than to the abstract dynasty or the distant emperor.7
Following the collapse of central government in 189, problems on
the frontier paled into insignificance compared to the internecine
blood-letting within China itself. By good fortune, the Xianbi tribes
of the steppe had also fallen into confusion and quarrelling amongst
themselves, while the Xiongnu of the Ordos region were too weak to
take advantage of Chinese distress. The professional military struc-
ture of Han, however, was largely ruined, and means of war had to be
found from a different part of the tradition.
The heads of provinces, commanderies and counties were responsible

for order within their territories, and were expected to lead troops
against local bandits, rebels and, on the frontiers, raids by non-Chi-
nese; they were, however, essentially civil officials. Unlike Republican
and early imperial Rome, young men of family were not expected to
undertake military service before they embarked on a political career,
and few senior officials had experience in war. Though they surely
benefited from the advice of more practical subordinates, a consider-
able number of commandery heads were killed in battle.
On the other hand, despite the end of universal conscription, there
were men with military experience throughout the empire. Some were
returned soldiers from the Northern Army or the frontier, but many
others had fought at one time or another against local bandits and reb-
els. These latter may not have been formally trained, but they had been
in battle, and they could be called up for future campaigns. While such
internal recruits could be used against trouble-makers within China,
however, the men of the frontier, and notably those who had been
kept there in long-term service, were far more competent and were
7
On the political separation between the factions at the capital and the generals
on the frontier, see Northern Frontier, 425–426, and deC, “Military Culture,” 104 and
106. Lewis, Early Chinese Empires, 262–263, discusses the effective independence of
the northern armies.
In the first months of 189, for example, Dong Zhuo was twice ordered to leave his
army: once to take up a ministerial post at the capital, the second time to transfer to
another senior post on the frontier. On both occasions he refused to obey, claiming
that his troops were devoted to him and dependent upon him. The court had no
means to enforce its demands, and a few months later Dong Zhuo seized power: HHS
72/62:2322 and 71/61:2306; deC, Establish Peace, 9–10.
recognised as such. At the beginning of the civil war the soldiers of the
north were more than a match for troops from the inner commander-
ies, and Cao Cao’s defeat by Xu Rong at Rongyang in 190 showed the
disparity. Within a few years, however, the quarrels among the leaders
at Chang’an brought a total break-down of discipline, and the warlord
armies of the northwest were little better than a rabble.8
There were also, of course, troops of retainers in the service of great

families, and the various bullies who claimed to act as xia “knight-
errants.”9 Some of these informal cavaliers had training in arms, but
many relied upon the size of their following and the weakness of their
victims. A few rose to leadership in the civil war, but most were over-
whelmed when they came to face to face with professional fighting
men. At the beginning, however, they were available for service and
hire: the general Zhu Jun was authorised to call up family troops for a
campaign in the south in 181,10 and when Cao Cao first raised troops
against Dong Zhuo he relied upon such local heroes.
There are limited details of the formal process by which the gov-
ernment obtained soldiers to deal with local insurgency or banditry
within the empire, but we do have one particular example: the fighting
man Sun Jian, whose sons Sun Ce and Sun Quan founded the Three
Kingdoms state of Wu. Because of his family’s later importance, Sun
Jian was honoured with a biography, and this became the first part of
the first chapter of the Wu section of Sanguo zhi.11 There is some hagi-
ography in the account, but it describes how the young man became
a local officer in his native county in Kuaiji, southwest of present-day
Hangzhou. Having distinguished himself against a group of bandits,
8
Besides the troops which had been brought to the capital by Dong Zhuo and his
successors, the professional Northern Army, which had formerly served as an elite
and strategic reserve, was destroyed in the fighting at Chang’an and in the flight of
Emperor Xian to the east. The titles of the former guard regiments were preserved
at the puppet court of Han in Xu city, but they no longer possessed any military
significance.
9
See note 51 to Chapter One.
10
HHS 71/61:2308; deC, Huan and Ling, 167 and 537 note 3, cited by Lewis, Early
Chinese Empires, 261.
11
See deC, Generals of the South, 548, citing the account of the compilation of the
Record and Eulogy of Sun Jian and Sun Ce by Zhang Hong about 200: SGZ Wu 8:1244
PC note 2 quoting Wu shu, official history of the state of Wu.
The early career of Sun Jian is discussed by deC, Generals of the South, 79–88, fol-
lowing SGZ Wu 1:1093–94; deC, Biography of Sun Chien, 29–37. Born about 155, he
was close in age to Cao Cao.
158 chapter four
he was given temporary appointment as Commandant of the county,

responsible for basic police and security work, and for the conscrip-
tion system which applied in this frontier territory.
In 172 the local religious leader Xu Chang rose in rebellion,12 and
the commandery of Kuaiji appointed Sun Jian as a Major, with author-
ity to raise troops. This was a press-gang system, and Sun Jian soon
had a thousand men, most of whom would have had experience in
dealing with local disorder. As the trouble with Xu Chang extended
across the borders of the commandery, the Inspector of Yang province
Zang Min took command of operations. When Xu Chang was finally
destroyed two years later, Sun Jian was commended by the provincial
government and received an imperial letter granting him commission
as an assistant magistrate.
Sun Jian then served as Assistant in three counties between the
Yangzi and the Huai. We are told that he was well received in each
place, and that
. . . there were always hundreds of old friends from his home district and
young adventurers who came to visit him. Sun Jian looked after them
and cared for them like his own family.13
So this junior official gathered a group of followers prepared to sup-
port him in any future trouble.
When the Yellow Turban rebellion broke out in 184, Zhu Jun was
sent as a General of the Household against the insurgents of Yingch-
uan, Runan and Nanyang.14 Himself a man from Kuaiji, he gave Sun
Jian another commission as Major with authority to conscript, and
Sun Jian again brought a thousand men to join the imperial forces. His
contingent included those who had accepted his patronage in time of
peace, but he could also call up local men of military age, together with
travelling merchants or peddlers—vagabonds with few legal rights in
a peasant society. It does not appear, however, that he levied family
troops; these were presumably gathered by their own gentry leaders.
12
There was a common saying at this time that the Han dynasty would end with
xuchang. The prophecy was very likely inspired and spread by the rebel Xu Chang, but
many years later, when Cao Cao’s son Cao Pi took the abdication of Emperor Xian
and proclaimed his own dynasty, he changed the name of Xu city to Xuchang.
13
SGZ Wu 1:1094 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan “Account of the Lands Beyond the
Yangzi;” deC, Generals of the South, 87–88.
14
There is a biography of Zhu Jun at HHS 71/61:2308–13, and another, from the
Xu Han shu of Sima Biao, is quoted by SGZ Wu 1:1094–95 PC.
Having again distinguished himself at the capture of Wan city in

Nanyang, Sun Jian served on the staff of the army sent against the
Liang province rebels of the northwest, and he was later appointed
Administrator of Changsha to deal with bandits south of the middle
Yangzi. At the beginning of the civil war he became the chief gen-
eral of Yuan Shu, but his previous career demonstrates the manner in
which imperial armies were gathered by officers who received special
commissions and authority of impressment.
The Yellow Turban rebellion brought a new development, as vast
armies of rebels and government militia contended with one another
from You province in the far north to Nanyang, south of the capi-
tal. There had nothing on such a scale since the Red Eyebrows rising
against Wang Mang,15 and though major operations lasted less than
a year, the wide-spread conflict meant great numbers of men gained
experience in war, while many people were displaced from their homes
and their lands.
In the first stages of the rebellion against Dong Zhuo in 189, we
are told how Cao Cao used family money and the support of others
to raise troops, and later obtained additional men from Chen Wen
the Inspector of Yang province and Zhou Xin in Danyang. Resenting
the prospect of exile in the north, however, these new recruits muti-
nied and deserted, for although men might be pressed into service by
imperial officials, they could not simply be transferred to anyone who
wanted them. Cao Cao at this time held no official status—his title as
a general was self-proclaimed—and he had no proper authority in the
southeast.
It was not until he gained a formal position in the imperial struc-
ture of Han, first as Administrator of Dong commandery and then
as head of Yan province, that Cao Cao had access to the resources of
his territory to raise a substantial army. In large measure he owed his
appointments to no more than the nomination of Yuan Shao, but he
had earned credit by his defence against the Black Mountain bandits,
and he confirmed it with success against the Yellow Turbans of Qing
province; so there was general acceptance of his local authority.
15
See Bielenstein, RHD I and II, and “Wang Mang, the Restoration of the Han
Dynasty, and Later Han,” also LH3K, sub Wang Kuang et al.
160 chapter four
Rebels, bandits, gentry and self-defence groups: the

development of hereditary troops
Though Zhang Jue’s rebellion was destroyed by imperial armies in the

course of 184, the name Yellow Turbans appears several times in the
chronicle of later years. It may well be that the Yellow Turbans of Qing
province were indeed a group which followed Zhang Jue’s teachings
but had been prevented from joining the original uprising. In 196 Cao
Cao also defeated Yellow Turbans in Yingchuan and Runan, allies of
Yuan Shu, and during the Guandu campaign of 200 another group in
Runan was supported by Liu Bei.
Yingchuan and Runan had been a centre of Zhang Jue’s rebellion in
184, so these too may have been remnants of the original movement
who had maintained themselves in the hill country on the border with
Nanyang in Jing province. When the Annals of Hou Han shu, how-
ever, record that in 207 a group of Yellow Turbans in Ji’nan killed the
king, Liu Yun, then even though Jibei is in Qing province we must
believe the connection with the original cause of Zhang Jue was very
tenuous.16
Further afield, in Yi province in 188 a large group of bandits called
themselves Yellow Turbans and ravaged three commanderies. The
disturbance was put down by local troops, and it is again probable
that the name and the badge were no more than symbols of rebel-
lion. There were several religious leaders in the region at this time, of
which the most celebrated is Zhang Lu, who became head of a theo-
cratic state in Hanzhong and is honoured as a founder of the modern
Taoist church. Zhang Lu’s family came originally from the east, and
some of his doctrines, notably of faith-healing by confession of sins,
resembled those of Zhang Jue, but it does not appear that the two were
closely connected, nor that Zhang Lu was involved in the insurgency
of 188.17
The Annals of Hou Han shu for 188 mention another group of
“remnant Yellow Turbans” who came from Bobo Valley in Xihe com-
mandery to ravage Taiyuan and Hedong.18 This again seems too far
from Zhang Jue’s centre of influence in Zhuo commandery to have
16
HHS 9:384; deC, Establish Peace, 361.
17
On Zhang Lu and his Rice Sect, see Chapter Seven at 291–294.
18
HHS 8:355. The valley was evidently in the southern part of Xihe commandery,
near present-day Fenyang in Shanxi. There is a “Bobo Rampart” (白波壘 Bobo lei)
had any close connection with his teaching or his rebellion; and the
group is commonly known simply as the Bobo bandits. Several of their
leaders, notably Han Xian and Yang Feng, became involved in the
politics about Chang’an in the early 190s and joined the escort which
brought the emperor to the east.
Besides these groups which may or may not have had contact with
Zhang Jue, we have noted the Black Mountain confederacy in the
hill country of the Taihang range. They disclaimed any connection
to the Yellow Turbans, but rose to power during the mid-180s in the
aftermath of that disturbance, plundering the west of the North China
plain. At one time the Han court accepted a nominal surrender and
gave imperial recognition to the leader Zhang Yan, but the breakdown
of government in 189 encouraged the bandits to resume their former
activities.
In 191 Black Mountain bandits raided Dong commandery and were
eventually driven back by Cao Cao. Early in 193, Black Mountain units
appear with the Xiongnu chieftain Yufuluo as associates of Yuan Shu
in Chenliu; but Cao Cao defeated the allies and drove Yuan Shu away
to the south. Soon afterwards, Black Mountain bandits raided Wei
commandery, stormed the capital, Ye city, and killed the Adminis-
trator. In response, Yuan Shao embarked on a campaign of suppres-
sion, destroying many of the bandit camps and killing a number of
their leaders. He was then faced by Zhang Yan, however, supported
by Xiongnu and Wuhuan, and after several days fighting both sides
withdrew.
The punitive campaign restored a measure of order to the troubled
region, but Zhang Yan now maintained himself and his people in
Changshan. In 198 he brought an army to aid Gongsun Zan as Yuan
Shao attacked his last defences; the relief, however, did not get through
and Gongsun Zan was destroyed. Zhang Yan withdrew once more into
the hill country, but he made contact with Cao Cao as he entered Ji
province in 204, and in the following year he offered submission.
The men of the Black Mountains are described as bandits, and they
certainly plundered their neighbours. Amidst the turmoil, however,
southeast of Fencheng in Shanxi: this territory was in the north of Hedong command-
ery during Han, and the fortress may have served as a base for the bandits.
162 chapter four
some informal groups sought no more than to defend themselves and

create a refuge from the troubles which surrounded them.
One example frequently cited is that of Tian Chou of Youbeiping.
A loyal supporter of the deposed Governor Liu Yu, Tian Chou was
known for his opposition to Gongsun Zan, and defied him to his face,
but he escaped punishment, returned to his home country, and estab-
lished himself in the mountains. As members of his clan and others
came to join him, he obtained their consent to set up an independent
community amidst the ruins of the imperial state:
Tian Chou spoke to the elders and said, “Now the people here are as
many as a city, yet there is no government and no law to guide them.
This, I fear, is not the way to keep the peace. Foolish though it may be,
I have a plan, and with your help I would seek to put it into effect. May
I do so?” All replied, “Do so.”
Then Tian Chou proclaimed his code. Those who killed or wounded
one another, those who robbed and those who quarrelled should answer
for their fault according to its severity; the heaviest penalty being death.
There were altogether some twenty articles, and Tian Chou also set out
ceremonies for marriage and for the teaching in schools.
He announced these measures to the people, and all found them easy
to follow. Eventually the government was so well maintained that things
left in the road were never touched [but left there for their owners to
collect].19
This is an idealised account of a simple people, withdrawn from the
world and ruled by common-sense, but other groups followed the same
pattern, either keeping themselves independent in their homelands or
withdrawing into some isolated region and preparing defences. Many
communities were led by members of the gentry whose authority, for-
merly aided by retainers and henchmen, was now untrammelled by
any agents of a central power. Some did no more than maintain their
traditional exploitation of less powerful neighbours, but others, such
as Tian Chou, extended their authority and may indeed have sought
to keep their people safe, at least for a time, from the troubles around
them.
19
ZZTJ 60:1947; deC, Establish Peace, 124. The biography of Tian Chou is at SGZ
11:340–44; on his model of local leadership, see for example Ebrey, “Economic and
Social History,” 630. The description of goods left untroubled on the road is a well-
used cliché of good government.
Though not so strong as the great rebel and bandit federations, these
local groups could play a role in the larger scene. In 194 the support
of the Tian clan of Puyang was useful, at least for a time, to Cao Cao
in his struggle against Lü Bu; later that year, as Lü Bu retreated before
Cao Cao’s attacks he was defeated by a local leader in Jiyin; and in
197 the former general Han Xian was killed by a county magistrate in
Pei. On other occasions local communities and clans might cause or
threaten disruption behind the lines, as in Yuan Shao’s potential allies
in Runan, put down by Man Chong in 200.
All this implies a degree of organisation, whether provided by local
gentry or by the informal leadership of various chieftains, but many
people displaced from their homes could do little more than gather
in uncontrolled camps, with no plan or purpose but to wait until a
measure of order was restored.
In marshland by the Yangzi about 200, for example, on the border
of Yang and Jing provinces there were the encampments of Mo and
Bao. The inhabitants are described as bandits or “hills people,” but
they were most probably refugees from the confused struggle of Yuan
Shu, Liu Bei, Lü Bu and Cao Cao between the Yangzi and the Huai.
They appear to have taken no offensive action and sought no involve-
ment in the civil war, but they were attacked by the warlord Sun Ce,
and were eventually taken over by Sun Ce’s brother and successor Sun
Quan, who settled them in more accessible territory, a human resource
for his growing state.20 The modern world, which has seen displaced
people in Europe after the Second World War, refugee camps in the
Middle East and misery in Africa, can have little difficulty in imagin-
ing how people can be driven from their homes and compelled to stay
in disorganised gatherings until some form of government structure
was available to protect them once more.
For one aspect of this otherwise chaotic situation was the apparent
readiness of even the most numerous and seemingly most powerful
groups of rebels or bandits to offer a form of allegiance to quasi-le-
gitimate authority. Just as we are told that the Black Mountain group
accepted official titles from the imperial court in the 180s, so former
chieftains of the Bobo bandits aided Emperor Xian in his escape from
Chang’an, and the Yellow Turbans of Qing province were prepared to
20
DeC, Generals of the South, 237–239 and 327.
164 chapter four
negotiate a settlement with Cao Cao. In similar fashion, albeit perhaps

more respectably, we find local leaders like Xianyu Fu and Yan Rou in
the north making contact with Cao Cao and later joining his forces.
Such men might hold their independence for a time, they would be
cautious whom they would adhere to, and they would seek to sell their
support at a good price, but they were prepared to follow a compe-
tent leader. In the struggle for power at the beginning of Later Han,
the powerful Ma Yuan told Emperor Guangwu, “In present times, it
is not only the sovereign who selects his subjects. The subjects also
select their sovereign.”21 The same rule applied at this similar time,
and Sanguo zhi describes how refugees and displaced people “came or
wandered away wherever they thought they would find good govern-
ment and peace, with no sense of loyalty to any ruler.”22
Sadly, however, a decade of turmoil in the 190s had demolished any
semblance of traditional government. The security people sought had
now to be fought for, and it was not readily attainable.
To warlords and rulers such as Cao Cao or Sun Quan, the various
independent groups were a threat to good order; but if brought under
control they could become a source of strength. We have seen how Cao
Cao established tuntian agricultural colonies as a means to develop
his base about Xu city. This was a deliberate policy of settlement for
displaced persons, and it proved extremely valuable, but he had also
to deal with more active troops, whether they were an inchoate mass
like the Yellow Turbans of Qing province, were gentry or other local
leaders with their retainers and followers, or were the armies of rival
warlords.
Cao Cao’s first command against Dong Zhuo was based upon a
semi-private recruitment, and many of his officers came with their own
following. As trouble first broke out, for example, Xu Chu from Cao
Cao’s homeland of Pei gathered clansmen and others as a self-defence
force to repel bandits, and he joined Cao Cao only when he took over
the region in 197; he and his followers became Cao Cao’s personal
guard. Similarly, when local leaders such as Tian Chou acceded to
Cao Cao, they brought their people with them and, most dramatically,
when the former enemy Zhang Xiu acceded in 199 he was accompa-
21
HHS 24/14:830; Bielenstein, RHD II, 165.
22
SGZ Wu 2:1115–16.
nied by his whole army. Such accretions could generally be accepted

without difficulty, for the men kept their loyalty to their leaders, and
they in turn gave personal allegiance to Cao Cao.
We should note, moreover, that many of Zhang Xiu’s men came
originally from the northwest: their first leader Zhang Ji, a former offi-
cer of Dong Zhuo, was a man of Wuwei, and his troops would have
been recruited in that region. Zhang Ji had been succeeded in com-
mand by Zhang Xiu, but the new base in Nanyang was far from their
homeland. Whether the men had been accompanied by their wom-
enfolk, or had acquired companions on the road, this was an isolated
community, and the military unit was their only home. The tendency
had appeared already in the armies of Later Han stationed on the fron-
tier, where generals had been responsible for their soldiers and for
their families, but in the uncertainties of civil war such sense of com-
munal identify became widespread throughout China.
In this regard, whether troops had first been raised by private gentry
or had accepted the command of a leader such as Zhang Xiu, we can
see the development of quasi-feudal commendation, and even such
bandits as the Black Mountain group under Zhang Yan followed the
same pattern. When Zhang Yan surrendered to Cao Cao in 205 he
was rewarded with enfeoffment, and we may believe that his men were
incorporated into the army. After the Yellow Turbans of Qing prov-
ince had been persuaded to accept Cao Cao’s authority in 192, they
were recognised as the Qingzhou Troops and retained their identify
for thirty years. And after the defeat of the Wuhuan tribes at White
Wolf Mountain in 207, many of them surrendered and took service
with Cao Cao; following the tradition of the Chang River regiment
under Han, they became known as the finest cavalry in China.23
Like their membership, moreover, leadership of these units became
an almost hereditary right. The system commenced at early stages of
the war, as each chieftain raised his own following, and if the leader
died or was killed, family loyalty gave one of his male relatives some
lien on command of the unit. Besides the succession of Zhang Xiu to
Zhang Ji, we are told how, two years after Sun Jian was killed in the
service of Yuan Shu in 191, his son Sun Ce was granted some of his
23
SGZ 30:835; deC, Northern Frontier, 415, and see note 2 above. On White Wolf
Mountain, see Chapter Five.
166 chapter four
father’s former troops.24 In the same pattern, Cao Cao’s officer Li Dian
took command of the troops of his cousin Li Zheng after the latter’s
death in 195,25 and when the general Sun He was killed in a mutiny in
204, his seventeen-year-old nephew Sun Shao laid claim to his com-
mand and was confirmed by Sun Quan.26
Such appointment, of course, was not automatic—the new com-
mander had to be reliably loyal and militarily competent, and Sun
Shao was obliged to prove himself—but a general expectation grew up,
at least for lower-level units, that leadership should remain with the
same family, and by the time of the Jin dynasty the term buqu “bat-
talions and companies,” originally indicating military units of the Han,
had come to describe dependent families who served in the fields of a
local magnate.27 In effect, once a military group had acquired a leader
and some coherence, there was a tendency for the soldiers and their
families to become bound into an institutional form.
Besides these troops attached to a particular leader, however, Cao
Cao also established a system of “military families,” shijia.28 In a simi-
lar arrangement to the tuntian program of agricultural colonies, the
soldiers and their dependents were directly under the control of the
central government.29 The penalties for escape were severe, extending
to the deserter’s family,30 and eventually, in a form of serfdom, the
children of these troops were likewise bound into military service.
24
SGZ Wu 1:1101; deC, Generals of the South, 151–154. The term used is buqu
[see below].
25
SGZ 18:533.
26
SGZ Wu 6:1216; deC, Establish Peace, 336.
27
On buqu 部曲 in Han, see HHS 114/24:3564. On later development, see Yang
Chung-I, “Evolution of the Status of Dependents,” Wang Zhongluo, Wei Jin Nan-
beichao shi, 164, and Holcombe, Shadow of Han, 57.
28
The development of “military families” shijia 士家, which later became “heredi-
tary troops” shibing 世兵, is discussed by He Ziquan in Dushi ji at 285–287, and by
Gao Min in LSYJ 1989.5.
29
Among examples of dependents attached to military units, we may note how in
195 Cao Cao set women to guard his camp while he led the men to attack Lü Bu and
Chen Gong: SGZ 1:12 PC quoting Wei shu. And the Lady He, who became the wife
of Sun He, Heir of the state of Wu, was the daughter of a cavalry trooper. Sun Quan
noticed her as he was inspecting an encampment, and had her brought to his palace:
SGZ Wu 5:1210; Cutter and Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 131.
30
Wangshi fa 亡士法: the Law against Desertion. In one case, adjudicated in 215,
the wife, children and other relatives of a soldier in camp at Hefei were arrested when
the man deserted: SGZ 24:684, summarised by ZZTJ 67:2134; deC, Establish Peace,
482, and see Chapter Eight at 376–377. In another, about the same time, the wife of a
deserter was spared only because she was just lately married and had never lived with
her husband: SGZ 22:650.
In some cases, members of military families took part in active cam-

paigns, but more often they were settled as garrison or guards. In 208,
as Cao Cao first set his capital at Ye city, in territory formerly held
by the Yuan clan and only recently conquered, he strengthened his
hold by bringing new settlers from other areas. His officer Li Dian,
for example, brought kinsmen and followers from Shanyang,31 while
Cao Cao’s agent in Bing province, Liang Xi, having separated some
tens of thousands of people from their local gentry leaders, transferred
them to Ye.32 Twelve years later, Cao Cao’s son and successor Cao Pi
proposed to transfer a hundred thousand shijia households from Ye to
bolster the defences of Luoyang; he was eventually persuaded to bring
only fifty thousand, but it is clear that the numbers involved were large
and that they were—at least in theory—readily available.33 As with the
Roman empire of the same period, the government obtained a degree
of security by arranging that garrisons were made up of men who were
alien to the area they occupied: they were too far away to cause trouble
in their home territory, and they had no natural sympathy for the local
people whom they guarded.
The system of military families developed only gradually, alongside
agricultural colonies and more regular peasant settlements with obli-
gations of taxation, corvée and military service. In the early stages of
the war, the initial gathering of men into units and the selection of
their chieftains was uncertain and erratic, but by the time of Cao Cao’s
death the troops were far more experienced and professional. On the
other hand, though Wei and its rivals Shu-Han and Wu were states
geared for war, they were never able to construct such a strong cen-
tral power as that of Han, their control of their people was weaker,
and there was room for great families and private interests to operate
behind and below the superficial façade of government.
Weapons and tactics
During the early stages of the war, the vast majority of men recruited
or conscripted were neither disciplined nor well trained in the use of
31
SGZ 18:534: the text refers to more than three thousand households of clansmen
(宗族 zongzu) and followers (部曲 buqu).
32
33
SGZ 15:482 PC quoting Wei lue; Fang, Chronicle I, 2.
168 chapter four
arms. An anecdote of the youthful Lü Meng, future general of Sun

Quan, tells how he had been appointed a Senior Major but was under
threat of losing his command:
When Sun Quan took over the government [after the death of Sun Ce
in 200] he made a survey of his junior officers, with the intention of
combining those troops which were too small or had inadequate sup-
plies and equipment.
Buying secretly on credit, Lü Meng prepared red uniforms for his men
and had them bind their legs with cord. When the day came [for inspec-
tion] he drew up his lines in fine fashion, and his soldiers practiced their
exercises. Pleased with what he saw, Sun Quan increased the number of
men under Lü Meng’s command.34
If a new set of clothing was sufficient to gain promotion, one can only
imagine what other units must have looked like.
We know from the clay figures found in the tomb of the First
Emperor of Qin that many infantrymen carried armour, probably
composed of leather plates bound by cords of the same material. Iron,
however, became increasingly common during Former Han, and by
the time of the Shuowen jiezi dictionary in the early second century the
term kai 鎧, written with a metal radical, was replacing the classical
jia 甲.35 By the end of Later Han there are references to quantities of
“dark armour” (玄鎧 xuankai), while the finest suits, probably of steel,
were described as “shining black” (黑光 heiguang) or “shining bright”
(明光 mingguang) depending on their polish. Yet even these were
still composed of plates connected by leather stitching, while Roman
legionaries had hinged cuirasses riveted to internal leather straps.36
34
The biography of Lü Meng is at SGZ Wu 9:1273–81; this anecdote appears at
1273.
Later, about 210, Lü Meng would argue for the hereditary principle. When three
of his colleagues died, Sun Quan proposed to transfer their troops to him, as he was
stationed close by. Lü Meng objected, however, claiming that the three men had given
good service to the state, and their troops should pass to their male heirs, even though
they were still young. Sun Quan eventually agreed, and Lü Meng sent officers to guide
the young men in managing this human inheritance: SGZ Wu 9:1275.
35
Dien, “Armour,” presents a comprehensive study from earliest times to Sui and
Tang; he deals with the Han period at 11–20.
36
A suit of iron armour from Former Han, formed from plates stitched together,
was found in Inner Mongolia and is reported in Kaogu 1975.4, summarised in Chinese
Archaeological Abstracts 3, 1349–1358, and cited by Di Cosmo, Ancient China and
its Enemies, 234. Dien, “Armour,” 16–17, quotes a memorial of Cao Zhi, son of Cao
Cao, and the Rhapsody on the Arsenal (Wuku fu) by Chen Lin, who died in 217; the
Garrison troops on the Great Wall of Han had been provided with
iron body-armour and helmets,37 but in this time of trouble such pro-
tection was certainly not available to all. We are told that after the
battle of Guandu Cao Cao claimed Yuan Shao had had ten thousand
suits of body-armour; as it is elsewhere claimed that Yuan Shao had
a hundred thousand men, then only a tenth were armoured.38 Other
ranks had to content themselves with leather, plain cloth or padded
jackets, and though some may have carried shields of wood or bam-
boo, in close combat they were very vulnerable to a well-armed foe.
The basic weapons were much the same as those carried four centu-
ries earlier by the tomb figures of the First Emperor: spears, halberds
and swords, with smaller versions for close-quarter fighting and per-
sonal defence.39 Wooden and bamboo bows were used on occasion,
but the most effective was the composite bow, made from horn, bone,
sinews and wood glued together, with a killing range of 150 metres.40
Its use, however, required training and skill; the celebrated feat of
archery by which Lü Bu saved Liu Bei in 196 was surely achieved with
a composite bow. In addition, since at least the fourth century BC the
Chinese had mastered the mechanism of the crossbow, and with a
latter, preserved in TPYL 356:5a, specifically mentions leather stitching. On Roman

equipment, see Connelly, Greece and Rome, 228–238.
37
See, for example, Loewe, RHA I, 86 and II, 163.
38
Dien, “Armour,” 36–37 citing TPYL 356.5b. See further note 44 below.
39
In 192, even while Dong Zhuo still regarded Lü Bu as his son, there was an occa-
sion that the two men quarrelled, and Dong Zhuo threw a hand-axe at his companion.
Lü Bu dodged, but the incident made him more willing to accept Wang Yun’s invi-
tation to join the plot against his patron: HHS 75/65: 2445 and SGZ 7:219–20; deC,
Establish Peace, 92.
40
Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 102–106, discusses the composite bow,
commonly used during Han, with illustrations and a schematic cross-section, and an
essay by Luttwak, Byzantine Empire, 22–28, gives further detail in connection with its
use by the Huns in Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries. Luttwak notes how its
arrows could penetrate armour at ranges hitherto thought impossible in the West, so
that an infantry equipped only with javelins, slings or plain wooden bows was help-
lessly outranged.
At 24, Luttwak observes that “If properly cured, glue extracted from hide or sinew
is stronger than all but the most advanced of contemporary adhesives, but it is hygro-
scopic—it absorbs moisture from the air . . .” As a consequence, Simin yueling tells how
“bows and crossbows with parts of horn” should be taken out of service for the moist
summer months, while plain wooden and bamboo bows were stretched. As composite
bows were brought back into service in the autumn, the others were relaxed: Simin
yueling E1 and H6; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 221 and 225.
170 chapter four
range up to 200 metres this provided good defence for infantry in the
field, even against horsemen armed with the compound bow.41
Here is further contrast to Rome: some legionary troops were trained
with simple bows and sling-shots and used those weapons when
appropriate, notably in sieges and naval fighting. In pitched battle,
however, the first attack was the javelin throw, followed by a charge
with sword and shield; longer-range weapons were left to light-armed
auxiliary troops and skirmishers.42 In China, on the other hand, one of
the five regiments of the professional Northern Army was composed
of archers—probably crossbowmen—while it is very possible that the
Chang River regiment, which comprised Wuhuan auxiliaries, carried
compound bows.
As the nomad confederacies of the steppe, Xiongnu or Xianbi, were

major opponents of China, it is not surprising that the Han paid great
attention to cavalry and their horses. The expeditions of Emperor Wu
to seek the fine horses of Ferghana are well known, and three of the
five regiments of the Northern Army in Later Han were mounted.
During the civil war, though contenders in the east of the empire
had no access to the great horse-breeding parks which had formerly
been maintained in the west, they did have substantial contingents of
41
On the crossbow, see Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 120–44, Lewis,
“Warring States: political history,” 622–623, and Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its
Enemies, 203 and 234–235.
The strength of Han crossbows ranged from 3 shi [hand-held] to 10 shi [for for-
tifications]. Loewe, RHA I, 126, quotes an inspector’s report on equipment: a bow
assessed at some 4.25 shi was able to shoot 185 bu 步 [255 metres]; we may assume
that a 3–shi weapon could reach 200 metres.
42
O’Connell, Arms and Men, 74. The effective range of a javelin thrown by a
footsoldier was twenty to thirty metres. Even if they did not kill, they encumbered
the opponents’ shields and rendered them vulnerable to immediate assault with the
sword. From the second half of the second century BC, however, the Romans also
trained a quarter or a third of their legionaries to use bows and all legionaries to use
slings and to throw stones by hand (Vegetius, De Re Militari, 1.15–16), while at least
from Hadrian’s reign legionary and auxiliary cavalry were trained to use bows and
slings alongside their regular equipment (e.g. Vegetius 2.14). [I am most grateful to
Dr Ilkka Syvänne of Finland for his guidance on this matter.]
The short “Scythian” bow used by the Romans and their allies, however, was far
inferior in range and penetration to the long composite bow used in east Asia, and in
a private communication, Dr Syvänne has observed that the disastrous Roman defeat
at the battle of Carrhae in 53 BC owed a good deal to the fact that the Parthian enemy,
and particularly their Saka allies, were equipped with the east Asian bow. Luttwak,
Byzantine Empire, 27, makes the same point about the Huns in Western Europe in
the fourth and fifth centuries. See also O’Connell, Arms and Men, 85.
cavalry, with remounts presumably brought by trade across the north-

ern frontier. It is said that Yuan Shao at Guandu had 100,000 footsol-
diers and 10,000 horsemen, and while the figures may be exaggerated
they probably reflect the proportion that was aimed for and expected.
Frontiersmen such as Lü Bu, Gongsun Zan, Liu Bei and Guan Yu were
naturally skilled horsemen, but Yuan Shao also rode and Cao Cao was
an active leader of cavalry. It was an advantage for the commander
of an army to be on horseback, for the height gave a better view of
developments and the mobility allowed him to attend to one part of
the battle or another. Even in the south, both Sun Ce and Sun Quan
had horses and were accustomed to their use.43
A number of tomb pictures and figures illustrate the arms and
accoutrements of horse soldiers of Later Han. The procession of offi-
cial chariots and escort excavated at Wuwei in Gansu in 1969 includes
seventeen bronze horsemen dressed in caps, gowns and trousers, and
armed with spears and different forms of halberd. This is ceremonial
dress, for it is known that armour was used for both men and horses;
even if, as with infantry, it was by no means universal.44 The weapons,
however, were designed to be used by shock troops, and the accounts
of Guan Yu at Boma and Cao Cao at the Yan Crossing confirm that
interpretation.
The men who took part in such attacks had to rely upon their sad-
dles and the grip of their knees to maintain their position: there were
no riding stirrups at this time, and the earliest reliable evidence of
their use dates only to the fourth century AD.45 It is true that stir-
rups are necessary to gain the full effect of a charge, but a well-made
saddle with a rigid frame, possibly including side-braces for the legs,
43
Sun Ce, for example, is recorded in a cavalry skirmish with Taishi Ci [SGZ Wu
4:1188; deC, Establish Peace, 172], and Sun Quan wanted to lead a charge at Hefei in
209, but was dissuaded from the risk [SGZ Wu 8:1244–45; deC, Establish Peace, 404].
44
Dien, “Armour,” is again the major source for the discussion, particularly at
36–37. A memorial of Cai Yong about 170 refers to armoured horses (鎧馬 kaima)
[HHS 60/50B:1990], and a lintel relief found at a tomb in Yi’nan, Shandong, dated
to the third century and excavated in the early 1950s, appears to show horses with
protection for the neck and chest: Shih, “I-nan and Related Tombs,” Figure 5 at 287;
Dien, “Armour,” Figure 37 at 55.
Dien also cites TPYL 356.5b, Cao Cao’s remark that at the battle of Guandu his men
had only twenty suits of body-armour and ten of horse armour against Yuan Shao’s
10,000 and 300 [see page 169 above]; as with other figures relating to this campaign,
the difference is exaggerated.
45
Dien, “Stirrup,” 33, also Goodrich, “Riding Astride and the Saddle,” 302–303.
172 chapter four
can provide adequate support for aggressive action, and a skilled rider
could maintain his balance while using sword or lance.46 Riding stir-
rups were a notable improvement and allowed the mounted man to
put far more weight and power behind his weapon, but they were not
essential against a light-armed enemy.47
The Chinese did have mounting stirrups. Attached to the saddle on
one side, they provided a foothold for the rider to get swiftly onto his
horse, and meant that at the Yan Crossing Cao Cao could allow his
men to conceal themselves behind a dyke, confident they could mount
and charge together when opportunity came.
Cao Cao is said to have had only six hundred men under his com-
mand in that skirmish, and though the disparity between the two sides
may have been exaggerated for effect, the use of such a small force,
answerable to a single leader, was common in this type of warfare.
With armies that were little more than loosely organised masses, vari-
ously armed and trained, a commander needed a reliable group to
support him and respond to his orders. There are several references
in the texts to such Companions (親近 qinjin), to their skill and their
self-sacrificing loyalty to their leader. Naturally enough, and at least in
early stages, many were kin to their commander, and while the unit
might serve as a bodyguard, it was also the nucleus of an army and
the heart of its discipline.
One example is Dian Wei, a man of great strength who had for-
merly been a local bully and had taken active and bloody part in a
vendetta. He was celebrated for his appetite for food, for his ability to
drink quantities of wine, and for his favoured weapon, a double-axe
46
Jiuzhou chunqiu “Chronicle of the Nine Provinces,” quoted by SGZ Shu 2:876
PC, preserves a touching anecdote concerning Liu Bei during his time of refuge in
Jing province in the early 200s [deC, Establish Peace, 304]:
On one occasion that Liu Bei was in attendance upon Liu Biao he got up to go
to the lavatory, and when he came back he was weeping. Liu Biao was surprised
and asked him what was wrong. “In earlier times,” replied Liu Bei, “I never left
the saddle, and my thighs were thin. Now that I do not ride any more, they have
become fat and flabby. Days and months pass like a stream, and old age will come,
but I have achieved nothing. That is why I am sad.”
47
Alexander the Great led cavalry charges which broke through Persian lines both
at the Granicus River in 334 BC and at Issus in the following year. Julius Caesar, in
De Bello Gallico IV.4, observes that his German opponents rejected the assistance of a
saddle and evidently managed well enough; his own cavalry was at this time formed
largely of Gallic auxiliaries, who presumably did have saddles.
halberd weighing twenty kilos. During a hard-fought battle with Lü

Bu outside Puyang in 195 Dian Wei led a group of volunteers, clad in
double armour, to break the enemy line and gain Cao Cao a breathing
space to effect his withdrawal.48 Promoted colonel of the bodyguard,
known as the Tiger Warriors, he continued to take the lead in every
engagement, and he met his death as he was defending his master
against Zhang Xiu in 197.
Outside the central core of Companions, the structure and tactics of
an army were likewise based upon groups of men following individual
leaders. The story of how Lü Meng dressed his men and arranged their
weapons training shows that some commanders had ideas of uniforms
and drill, and there are passing references to troops engaged in prac-
tice and preparation for war, but we have no evidence of any regular
program for large-scale exercises. Under the system of Former Han,
each commandery assembled its militia for review in the autumn, but
that required a degree of organisation well beyond a struggling warlord
state. Individual units under energetic and thoughtful officers might
be well-drilled and competent, and there are a number of references
to elite shock troops,49 but the mass of an army remained just that:
a loose assembly of variously incoherent bodies of men, disparate in
training, equipment and leadership, and ill-suited to fighting in forma-
tion or to manoeuvring at the behest of a high command.
In these circumstances, a battle might be decided by no more than
the physical clash of one body charging against another, with premium
on simple weight and force. When numbers were large enough, how-
ever, and as combat became more confused, the rank and file engaged
in such a melee—aggressive, fearful and often exhausted—were vul-
nerable to disruption and disarray. Subject to limits upon having his
orders transmitted and carried out, any commander would seek to
find a way to confuse and frighten the enemy still further, affecting
their will to fight.
One method was to break or disrupt the enemy line. A courageous
leader and his close attendants would act as a spearhead against the
48
SGZ 18:544. SGZ Wu 10:1291 also mentions the use of double armour (兩鎧
liang kai) for soldiers of Sun Quan making a critical attack against a fortified boom
on the Yangzi in 208.
49
Dian Wei, mentioned above, led one such unit for Cao Cao, and we are told that
Gao Shun, an officer under Lü Bu, commanded seven hundred men, always successful
in battle, who were known specifically as the Shock Troops (陷陳營 xianchen ying):
HHS 75/65:2450 TC quoting Han-mo yingxiong ji.
174 chapter four
opposing array, and if successful they could hope to be followed by

further troops, spreading out to attack the enemy position from the
flank and the rear. Such tactics have been used at other times and
places, and the reliance upon mass concentration is a natural tech-
nique for an ill-disciplined force. The leader of such a unit, however,
requires great courage and a high level of personal authority to attract
followers in the charge.
Once a group had broken through, even if success was not imme-
diately followed up the assailants could defend themselves within the
ranks of their opponents, spreading confusion as they did so. The “for-
lorn hope”—literally the “isolated troop”—is a tactic which, though
costly to those taking part, can damage the enemy even more.50
This is direct assault, which the enemy can see approaching, but suc-
cess was more often achieved by the shock of surprise, whether from
ambush or by a sudden display of aggression; so that a determined
small group could challenge and rout one which was substantially
larger.51 At the Jie Bridge battle of 192, for example, we are told how:
Gongsun Zan had thirty thousand men and his attack was very fierce.
Yuan Shao sent Qu Yi against them with eight hundred good soldiers,
while a thousand Strong Bowmen on either side supported his advance.
Thinking little of Qu Yi’s small force, Gongsun Zan sent cavalry to
drive them away. Qu Yi’s men hid behind their shields and made no
move until the enemy were ten or twenty yards away; then they leapt
up together, shouted so that the ground shook, and completely defeated
Gongsun Zan’s army.
. . . . . killing more than a thousand armed men, Yuan Shao’s troops
maintained their pursuit to Jie Bridge. Gongsun Zan regrouped his
troops to turn and fight, but Qu Yi again defeated them. Reaching Gong-
sun Zan’s camp, they captured his standard and the rest of his army
took to flight.52
In similar fashion, at Anzhong in 197, Cao Cao made use of men in
ambush:
50
The term Forlorn Hope is a corruption of the Dutch verloren hoop “lost troop,”
presumably dating from the sixteenth or seventeenth century, but the tactic has often
been used. The heroic Sir Richard Grenville of the Revenge disrupted a Spanish fleet
in 1591 by this means, and the British paratroopers who landed at Arnhem in 1944
were taking part, less successfully, in another version of the technique.
51
See Chapter Seven at 329, discussing the concepts of zheng orthodox or regular
and qi exceptional or unusual forces.
52
SGZ 6:193 PC quoting Hanmo yingxiong ji “Records of the Heroes and Champions
at the End of Han:” ZZTJ 60:1931; deC, Establish Peace, 89.
During the night Cao Cao dug entrenchments in the pass and then
feigned retreat. As the armies of Liu Biao and Zhang Xiu came full force
in pursuit, Cao Cao loosed his soldiers from their concealment, attacked
them with horse and foot from both sides and completely defeated
them.53
His cavalry action against Yuan Shao at the Yan Crossing in 200 relied
similarly upon concealment and surprise.
As Gongsun Zan found to his cost at the Jie Bridge, and many other
commanders on different occasions, once panic has started it may be
impossible to regain control of fleeing men and bring them back to
the fight. It is difficult enough with well-drilled troops in modern war-
fare, but amorphous armies composed of small units with individual
leaders are particularly brittle and volatile. If an attack should fail, if
a critical point in the line was breached, or a notable hero was dis-
comfited or killed, confusion and fear could quickly bring ruin to the
whole enterprise.
In similar fashion, it was not always certain that men would fight,
nor was there any surety that they would keep their allegiance. Cao
Cao suffered mutiny at an early stage of his career, and Yuan Shu’s
attack against Lü Bu in 197 was heavily defeated when two of his nom-
inal allies changed sides as the battle began. With so much depending
upon circumstance and self-interest, and no core concept of religion,
culture, empire or state which might bind men together, few indi-
viduals or groups could be trusted entirely, and no warlord could be
fully confident of the loyalty of his officers or his men. In a city under
siege, it was always possible that some disaffected party might open the
gates to the enemy, as did Lü Bu’s officer Hou Cheng at Xiapi in 197,
while Lü Bu’s earlier plans for a sortie were abandoned when he was
persuaded that there was no-one he could rely upon to maintain the
defence while he was away.
In Science and Civilisation, Needham and Yates present an admirable

account of the history of siege equipment and the various engines which
might be used to defend a city.54 Notable among missile weapons used
53
SGZ 1:15–16: ZZTJ 62:2003; de C, Establish Peace, 231. Cao Cao claimed also to
have placed his men in a “death place” with no route of escape; this inspired them to
fight the more fiercely. See also Chapter Seven at 329–330.
54
Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6. The great crossbows, referred to as arcu-
ballista, are discussed at 184–203. The trebuchet (砲 pao) is described at 203–218, with
176 chapter four
during Han are large crossbows set on frames, probably used at the
Great Wall in northwest China,55 and throwing machines including
the “Mohist catapult,” a form of trebuchet: a beam ten metres long
was balanced on a fulcrum with a sling at one end, and several men
pulled in unison at the other. The beam was made from lengths of
wood bound together and in some forms the fulcrum could be swiv-
elled for aiming. Though Needham suggests that large machines with
a counterweight may have been able to hurl missiles of a hundred
kilograms—enough to inflict substantial damage—some two hundred
metres, it is not certain they were available at this time.56
At Guandu in 200, Yuan Shao’s attack on Cao Cao was very much
like a siege: Cao Cao had prepared fortifications, and Yuan Shao’s
men raised high mounds of earth and constructed towers so that they
might shoot arrows and crossbow bolts over the walls. The towers may
have been intended to move against the ramparts on wheels or rollers,
a table at 216–217. At 207–209 Needham refers to a machine described in chapter 14

of the Mozi 墨子 book, and quotes the analysis and tentative reconstruction prepared
by his associate, Professor Robin Yates.
At 398 ff Needham describes various methods of defence, including movable screens
or curtains held on the face of a wall to diminish the effect of missiles, and burning
torches which were lowered by a sweep onto the attackers and their machines.
55
E.g. Loewe, RHA I, 86.
56
Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 187, and Table 4 at 217, citing Wujing
zongyao “Collection of the Most Important Military Techniques,” an official compila-
tion of the Song in 1044. A machine without a counter-weight had a range of only
about eighty metres, and as Franke, “Siege and Defense of Towns,” observes at 167,
they would have had to have been deployed very close to the walls, where a large
crew would present a vulnerable target. A weapon of such limited range, therefore,
cannot have been particularly useful to an assailant; defenders, on the other hand,
could lob missiles from behind the shelter of a wall, guided by a forward spotter on
the rampart.
Franke at 168 quotes Chen Gui of the twelfth century in Shoucheng lu “Guide to
the Defence of Cities,” saying that a skilled commander could conquer a town by his
use of catapults. He would presumably use machines equipped with counter-weights,
but it is notable that in the description of the battle at Guandu, as immediately below,
we are told how Cao Cao’s troops in defence used missile weapons to destroy Yuan
Shao’s towers, presumably from the shelter of their fortifications. There is no mention
of catapults being used by the attackers, who relied upon bows and crossbows fired
from height.
Also at 167, Franke notes with surprise that the Chinese had not invented the tor-
sion catapult, which could be wound by a comparatively small crew. The Romans
knew it as onager “the wild ass” on account of its kick: Connelly, Greece and Rome at
War, 302. According to Vegetius, De Re Militari 2.25, written in the fourth century
AD, each legion had ten such stone-throwers and fifty-five bolt/missile-shooters (car-
roballistae), and these were used both on the battlefield and on sieges.
but they were destroyed by Cao Cao’s “thunder cars”—it is likely, as

Needham suggests, that these were mobile trebuchets.57
Sunzi, followed by Cao Cao’s commentary, lists several items of siege
equipment, including scaling ladders and protected carts by which
attackers could approach. There were hooks to tear down portions of
the wall, and there was the longer task of raising earth ramps to give
access, or mounds to challenge the walls from a distance.58 Gates could
be either beaten with battering rams or set on fire—as in the riots at
Luoyang in 189—and defenders were sometimes too weak or disor-
ganised to resist: when Sun Jian captured Luoyang in 191, the main
battle was fought among the imperial tombs to the southeast, and the
city fell easily into his hands as Dong Zhuo’s men withdrew; Wang
Yun and Lü Bu were unable to defend Chang’an against Li Jue and
other former officers of Dong Zhuo in 192.
One possibility was direct assault. When Yellow Turbans were
defending Wan city in Nanyang in 184,
Sun Jian led the attack on one sector. Climbing the wall, he was the first
to get in. Others swarmed after him, and the enemy were thoroughly
defeated.59
And there is detail of another success in 214 by officers of Sun Quan
against Huan city, capital of Lujiang commandery, held by Cao Cao’s
forces:
Sun Quan’s officers wanted to raise earth mounds and build machines
for an assault, but Lü Meng said, “If we make engines and earthworks, it
will be days before they are ready. The city will be prepared, a relief force
will arrive, and we shall have gained nothing. Furthermore, the rain and
floods have helped us move in, but if we stay too long the water will go
down and the return journey will be difficult. In my humble opinion the
whole affair can become dangerous.
“But look at this city now: it cannot be very secure. If we attack fiercely
on all sides at once, we can take it by storm . . . . .”
57
Science and Civilisation V.6, 210.
58
Sunzi 3:6a; Minford, Art of War, 137.
59
SGZ Wu 1:1094; deC, Biography of Sun Chien, 32, but cf. Generals of the South,
95. The Roman army awarded a “mural crown” to the first man over a defence wall.
Sunzi, however, disapproves of such “ant attacks” 蟻附 as the mark of an impatient
commander, and warns that they entail very high casualties, up to a third of those
engaged: 3:8a; Minford, Art of War, 137–138.
178 chapter four
Sun Quan approved, and Lü Meng recommended Gan Ning to lead

the assault. With a grapnel-rope of silk in his hands, Gan Ning climbed
the walls and was first into the city. Beating the drum himself, Lü Meng
followed close with well-trained troops. The soldiers all leapt to the fray.
They advanced to the attack just at day-break, and by breakfast-time
they had taken the city.60
Huan city was on the Qian River in present-day Anhui, and no doubt
defended by a moat or lake, but it appears from Lü Meng’s remarks
that Sun Quan’s men had command of the waters outside the walls
and could approach by boat.
City walls were generally constructed of rammed earth, terre pisé,
sometimes faced with brick, and they naturally varied in height, width
and the quality of construction. Some are said to have been as high as
five zhang, fifty Chinese feet or 11.5 metres, with a parapet another 1.5
metres on top. Because of the problems of sheer and stability in such
friable material, the width at the base could be as great as the height,
and the width at the top about half that: five metres would allow easy
movement by the defenders from one section to the other, and space
for some engines of defence.61
The fortress complex constructed by Gongsun Zan at Yi city in
Hejian in 195 was remarkable for this time, though the measurements
may be somewhat exaggerated:
He had ten moats dug around, and within the moats he built motte
fortresses, each five or six zhang high [11.5–14 metres], and on top of
these he put towers. The mound within the central moat was ten zhang
high [over 23 metres], and that was where he lived himself. The gates of
the fortress were made of iron.62
60
SGZ Wu 9:1276: ZZTJ 67:2126–27; deC, Establish Peace, 464–465. Gan Ning was
known for his ostentatious display [SGZ Wu 10:1292 PC quoting Wu shu], so his use
of silk rope need not indicate that it was standard equipment.
61
Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 301–308, quotes a variety of archaeologi-
cal evidence and contemporary texts. Construction techniques are also discussed by
Science and Civilisation IV.3, 38 ff, with an account at 45 of the city wall of Qin and
Han Chang’an: over fifteen metres high, almost as broad at the top. Bielenstein, Lo-
yang, 12, notes that the 1954 survey of the ancient city found remnants of the walls
reaching as high as ten metres. As imperial capitals, of course, both Chang’an and
Luoyang would have been exceptional.
Some cities, including that of Bo county in the homeland of the Cao family, had a
complex of tunnels to aid internal communication and provide sally-gates: they are
described in modern Chinese sources as “underground Great Walls” 地下长城.
62
SGZ 8:243: ZZTJ 61:1978; deC, Establish Peace I, 183–184.
The work, however, was new and so the fortified mounds were
extremely vulnerable to mining. For his final attack in 198,
Yuan Shao had a detachment of his men excavate a tunnel under one
of the towers, setting wooden supports as they advanced. When they
judged they had reached the centre, they set fire to them and the tower
collapsed.63
Mining could be hampered by a moat, but Yuan Shao’s men had pre-
sumably crossed that barrier and were digging in the motte below the
tower. On other occasions there was counter-mining, and we have
been told how Yuan Shao and Cao Cao engaged in subterranean war-
fare at Guandu.
Water could be a weapon of offence as well as defence: in 193, dur-
ing Cao Cao’s drive against Yuan Shu in Chenliu, his enemy attempted
to hold a position in the small town of Taishou, but Cao Cao broke the
dykes of the neighbouring canals to flood him out.64 More commonly
it provided a means to isolate the defenders from outside aid and sup-
plies. When he first attacked Ye city in the spring of 204, Cao Cao
constructed mounds to match the height of the walls and used tunnels
to undermine the fortifications, but he later changed his tactics:
In the fifth month Cao Cao destroyed his hills and tunnels, and ordered
a moat of forty li [sixteen kilometres/ten miles] to be dug right around
the city. At first he had it made shallow, to appear that it could easily
be crossed, and when Shen Pei saw it he laughed and made no move to
attack. But in a single night Cao Cao dug it further, twenty feet wide and
twenty feet deep, and brought in the water of the Zhang River. More
than half the people in the city died from starvation.65
A few weeks later one of Shen Pei’s officers opened the gates to Cao
Cao’s forces.
The walled city of Ye had a circumference of twenty-four li, but
the Zhang River was ten li to the west, so a surrounding moat could
indeed have extended forty li. This appears an extraordinary feat of
swift engineering, but no Chinese commentator casts doubt upon the
story, so we must assume the work was carried out in that limited
63
Hanmo yingxiong ji quoted by SGZ 8:247; ZZTJ 63:2012; deC, Establish Peace
I, 247.
64
SGZ 1:10.
65
SGZ 1:25 and SGZ 6:202, combined by ZZTJ 64:2053; deC, Establish Peace, 326.
Also HHS 74/64B:2416 and SJZ 10:349 (SJZS 19b), which attributes the story to the
Xiandi chunqiu of Yuan Ye.
180 chapter four
space of time, presumably with use of the existing Huan River, which
bounded Ye city on the east and north, and the Yanpi marshes, which
extended to the south. At Xiapi in 198 Cao Cao had likewise sur-
rounded Lü Bu with water, and there too the defence was betrayed by
some of Lü Bu’s own officers.
Even without such liquid aid, strong siege-lines could starve a city
into submission, and if no traitor appeared to let the attackers in, the
long-term effect could be devastating. After his officer Zang Hong
turned against him in 195, Yuan Shao came to besiege the city of
Dongwuyang. The people supported their master:
At first, they could still find rats, old bones and sinews, but then there
was nothing more to be cooked and eaten. His Registrar reported that
there were three dou of rice [about six litres] in the inner kitchen, and
asked for a little to make porridge. Zang Hong sighed and said, “How
can I enjoy this alone?” He had a thin gruel made, and shared it with
all the army, and he killed his favourite concubine to feed his men. All
bowed their heads and wept.
Seven or eight thousand men and women lay dead one on another,
but none went away or turned against him. Then the city fell . . . . .66
Perhaps strangely, once a city is captured, while Chinese texts describe
the fate of the chief defenders, such as Zang Hong or Lü Bu, they say
little of the inhabitants. The practice of slaughter and rapine, however,
well known in the West, was no doubt followed with equal enthusiasm
by the doubtfully disciplined troops of China.
Many constructions described above, whether transport canals, defence

lines, trenches or tunnels, were very considerable, and were sometimes
prepared at remarkable speed. At Anzhong in 198, we are told that
Cao Cao had substantial digging done in the course of a single night.
And in his attack on Ye in 204, discussed above, he first dammed the
Qi River to make a waterway for his supplies, then isolated the city by
cutting into the Zhang River; this last again during the night.
Such work required a great deal of labour. For longer-term projects,
civilians could be conscripted for the purpose, but at Anzhong it is
clear that the troops were engaged, and one must admire the ability
of commanders to get their men to work so swiftly and well. As in the
66
HHS 58/48:1891 and SGZ 7, 236, combined by ZZTJ 61:1976; deC, Establish
Peace, 181.
Roman army, the spade or entrenching tool could be almost as effec-

tive a weapon as the sword, spear or halberd.
Finally on the question of weapons, we may note the ubiquity of fire,

which in favourable conditions could disrupt and destroy an army or a
fleet. We shall see fire-ships have great effect against Cao Cao at the Red
Cliffs in 208, but fire could also be used on land, against the wooden
palisades of a camp or the buildings of a city, against siege engines
as they approached a city wall, and sometimes on open ground. Thus
Gongsun Zan attacked Liu Yu with fire in 193 and defeated him;67 Cao
Cao used fire to startle and confuse Chunyu Qiong’s men by Guandu
in 200; Liu Bei attacked Cao Cao’s general Xiahou Yuan with fire at
Dingjun Mountain in Hanzhong in 219;68 and in 222 the army of Liu
Bei was destroyed by Sun Quan’s general Lu Xun, who had his soldiers
carry bundles of rushes to set the enemy positions ablaze.69
Numbers, supply and control
It is notoriously difficult for a modern historian to assess the accuracy

of numbers given by an ancient text. Even present-day information—as,
for example, the size of a crowd of demonstrators—is open to debate
between organisers and the police, and judgement can be influenced
by a desire to exaggerate or to play down the significance of the event.
How much more does this apply to earlier times, with records at sec-
ond hand or even further from the event, and often an incentive to
exaggerate one way or another.
Notable examples include the Yellow Turbans of Qing province
who acceded to Cao Cao in 192—whether a million or a few hundred
thousand—and the comparative size of Yuan Shao’s and Cao Cao’s
67
HHS 73/63:2357: ZZTJ 60:1946; deC, Establish Peace, 121.
68
Xiahou Yuan had a defence line of abatis, or “deer-horns” (鹿角 lujue), com-
posed of trees and bushes cut down with the branches toward the enemy: SGZ 9:272.
It was an early and often effective form of barbed wire, but was naturally vulnerable
to fire.
69
SGZ Wu 13:1347; Fang, Chronicle I, 102.
In 180 Yang Xuan the Administrator of Lingling used fire-carts against rebels, and
he also tied burning cloth to the tails of horses and had the panic-stricken animals
charge the enemy: HHS 38/28:1288: ZZTJ 57:1858; deC, Huan and Ling, 165. Yang
Xuan also used lime, thrown into the air and aided by wind, to blind the enemy; this
stratagem appears elsewhere on suitable occasions.
182 chapter four
armies at Guandu. For much of Roman history, we can make a fair

assessment of the size of an army based on the number of legions
involved and their official strength, and for Han China we have some
statements in the Treatise of Bureaucracy and, in more general terms,
the records of censuses, notably those of 2 AD and the early 140s. As
we have observed, Later Han armies sent beyond the frontier, albeit
with large contingents of non-Chinese auxiliaries, could number thirty
or forty thousand men, and Former Han and Wang Mang put even
greater numbers of men into the field.70
The civil war not only caused a breakdown of the regular military
administration and command structure. It also saw a vast increase
in the number of people available for service, whether soldiers and
bandits greedy for plunder or refugees seeking food and security. In
either case, their ranks were swelled by dependents: camp-followers of
regular troops or women and children accompanying their wandering
menfolk. The Yellow Turbans of Qing province who surrendered to
Cao Cao in 192 may not have been so many as 300,000 fighters and
700,000 dependents, but the proportions appear realistic, and even a
ratio of parity doubles the nominal size of an army. We can never be
sure when such extras are included in the recorded count.
The population of China under Later Han in the mid-second cen-
tury was almost fifty million, so large armies were possible, and given
the fact that leaders such as Cao Cao and Yuan Shao were sources of
security and stability in a time of turmoil, they may indeed have been
able to marshal as many as a hundred thousand men into battle.71
70
Loewe, “Campaigns of Han Wu-ti,” 92, presents a list of the major forces recorded
for campaigns of Former Han: several are in the vicinity of 200,000 men, and the larg-
est, in 133 BC, was said to have had 300,000; most frequently, however, the figures are
between 100,000 and 50,000.
In the time of Wang Mang it is said that 300,000 men were stationed on the frontier
to intimidate the Xiongnu: HS 99B:4121; Dubs, HFHD III, 306, and see Bielenstein,
RHD III, 96. Such great numbers, however, placed severe strain upon the economy of
the empire, and in the case of Wang Mang this very likely contributed to the failure
of his regime: deC, Northern Frontier 205–209 and 215–216.
71
Armies of the classical West could be similarly large: it has been estimated, with
evidence, that the Persian army of Xerxes which invaded Greece in 480 BC may have
had a quarter of a million men. Later, on a far smaller base, the Athenians committed
fifty thousand men to the unsuccessful attack on distant Syracuse in Sicily between
415 and 413 during the Peloponnesian War; and in 334 Alexander the Great attacked
Persia with thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry—his opponents were
far more numerous. On the Syracuse campaign, see Hanson, War Like No Other, 217;
on Xerxes and Alexander, see Connelly, Greece and Rome, 12 and 66.
We must nonetheless be wary of exaggeration, whether to enhance

the imposing array or, after the event, to glorify the victors by empha-
sising the odds they had faced. I have suggested that Yuan Shao may
have had local superiority at Guandu, but Cao Cao had greater mili-
tary resources. Despite claims to the contrary, he was not outnum-
bered ten to one.
Later, as Cao Cao was moving south through Jing province in 208
he claimed to have eight hundred thousand men under arms. Some
believed him, but Sun Quan and his general Zhou Yu discussed the
real numbers of troops he could put into the field. We are told that the
conversation was private, so it cannot have been recorded directly, but
it probably represents an assessment which was generally agreed:
Zhou Yu said, “When those other people saw Cao Cao’s letter about
eight hundred thousand soldiers and sailors, they all became frightened,
and they offered advice without thinking whether it was a matter of fact
or whether he was only boasting. That was quite pointless.
“Now check the real situation. The troops that Cao Cao brought with
him from central China were no more than a hundred and fifty or a
hundred and sixty thousand, and they have been on hard active service
for a considerable time. Then he got men from Liu Biao, seventy or
eighty thousand at the most, and he cannot be certain of their loyalty.
“So he is using sick and weary men to control others who may well
be disaffected. Even though he has great numbers, there is nothing to
be afraid of. If I have fifty thousand good soldiers I am sure they will be
enough to deal with them. Don’t worry about it.”
Sun Quan clapped him on the back and replied, “Gongjin, you put
things just the way I hoped. Those others are all worried about their
wives and children, they think of nothing but their own interests, and
they make me very disappointed . . .
“It will be difficult to collect fifty thousand men right away, but I have
already chosen thirty thousand, and their ships and supplies and equip-
ment are all ready. You and Zijing [Lu Su] and Lord Cheng [Pu] go
forward as the vanguard. I shall remain in reserve, and I shall continue
to send you men and further supplies.
“If you can deal with him, then everything will be settled in our favour.
If things turn out badly, come back here to me and I shall myself fight
the deciding battle.”72
In contrast, the armies of the Hundred Years War were surprisingly small: the
“great” French army at Agincourt was perhaps ten or fifteen thousand men, and other
armies of the time could be numbered in simple thousands or even hundreds.
72
SGZ Wu 9:1262 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan; Gongjin was the style of Zhou Yu,
Zijing that of Lu Su; Cheng Pu was a senior man and was referred to with special
courtesy as gong 公 “Lord.”
184 chapter four
Sun Quan’s strategy is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, but this
passage does appear to present a serious appraisal of the strength of
two armies: Cao Cao was claiming eight hundred thousand troops, but
had in fact some two hundred thousand, while Sun Quan had thirty
thousand immediately to hand, but planned to raise a further twenty
thousand.
From the discussion above, figures provided by the texts may be
taken as a basis for calculation of the size of an army; and troops could
indeed be numbered by the tens and even hundreds of thousands.
There is no simple formula of interpretation or adjustment, for there is
every possibility of exaggeration in one direction or another—high or
low—and we cannot always be sure how many of those counted were
front-line fighters, how many were involved in supply and communi-
cations, and how many more were simply camp-followers or depen-
dents—perhaps useful to the support of an army, but an impediment
to manoeuvre and a source of confusion in case of retreat or flight.
Indeed the very size of an army rendered it vulnerable, containing
the seeds of its own destruction. Large numbers might produce an
impressive array, but there were times such masses of men literally
got in one another’s way and brought misfortune upon themselves,73
while any substantial group of people carried the threat of sickness,
made heavy demands for supply and transport, and presented major
problems of organisation and control.74
According to the ration scale for regular troops of Han, ten thousand
men received each month some thirty thousand shi (600,000 litres) of
grain and three hundred shi of salt. To transport this quantity required
73
Wason, Battlefield Detectives, 73–75, has suggested that a major cause of the
French defeat at the battle of Agincourt in 1415 was that too many men were attempt-
ing to attack the English on too small a front; they suffered the effects of over-crowd-
ing, like a riot in a modern football stadium, literally pressing one another to death.
Keegan, Face of Battle, 97 ff, makes a similar point, referring to the ripple or “tumbling
effect” to be seen in a disrupted crowd.
74
Goldsworthy, Roman Army, 168, suggests that a “consular force” of two legions—
twenty to thirty thousand men including auxiliaries—was the optimum size. Few
armies are recorded with more than forty thousand, and those which were did not
have a good record, probably because of the difficulty of control. If such concerns
applied to professional, well-trained and coherent Roman troops, they would have
been significant for Han and even more for the contenders in civil war, who could not
have managed such a level of organisation.
a convoy of almost fifteen hundred carts, and fodder for ten thousand
horses probably demanded a similar carrying capacity.75
In this light we may consider Yuan Shao’s army at Guandu, said to
have comprised a hundred thousand footsoldiers and ten thousand
horsemen. I have suggested that one of his three divisions was occu-
pied with the supply system, and perhaps another ten thousand men
and horses were allotted to detachments on the flanks for probing
attacks or defence. If we assume there were seventy thousand men
dealing directly with the enemy, then the infantry alone would have
needed more than ten thousand wagon-loads a month, over 350 a day.
And that, of course, still omits the likelihood of wastage—which could
be very high76—the rations needed by the supply division itself, includ-
ing the beasts that pulled the carts, and assumes that adequate sup-
plies had been gathered and brought to a rear depot such as Liyang,
160 kilometres across the Yellow River. Leban is rightly “appalled at
the staggering load placed upon the economy of the base, and on its
labor force and transportation resources,”77 while Cao Cao’s attacks on
the depots at Gushi and the Wuchao marsh not only removed Yuan
Shao’s immediate supplies and negated weeks of arduous transport,
but brought the disruption and panic which provided him with a deci-
sive victory.
The Guandu campaign was exceptional, in that supplies for both
armies had to be brought by wagon-trains across dry land, and the
Yellow River was an obstacle to Yuan Shao’s transport. More com-
monly, baggage was carried by water: barges carry a great deal more
weight than carts, and require far less effort to pull.78 The Yangzi, the
Han, the Huai and their various tributaries provided access to much of
75
The calculations follow those of Loewe, “Campaigns of Han Wu-ti,” 97, based
upon the well-known memorial of the Han general Zhao Chongguo, who identified
the provisions required for a campaign against the Qiang tribes of the northwest about
60 BC [HS 69:2985] and also the calculations of rations from wooden strips found
in north-western China [Loewe, RHA II, 69]; there are some variations between the
two. Loewe estimates the capacity of a wagon at 25 shi: “Campaigns of Han Wu-ti,”
331 note 134.
76
Loewe, “Campaigns of Han Wu-ti,” 97, quotes HS 24B:1158, which tells of a
90% loss on transport to the far southwest. This was over a long distance and difficult
terrain, however, and may be exaggerated.
77
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 326 note 10; Leban adds further calculations on the agri-
cultural production required to assemble such quantities of stores.
78
Though Yuan Shao and Cao Cao both had to bring supplies to Guandu directly
from the north or south, once in the combat zone there were canals available for
lateral transport behind the lines.
186 chapter four
the south; as did the Wei River and other streams in the west. Much of
the North China plain, moreover, was served by a network of canals,
notably the Vast Canal complex to the south and east, and when canals
were lacking they could often be dug: as he advanced into Ji province
in 204, Cao Cao used the old course of the Yellow River to construct
the White Canal as a transport route; and when he attacked northeast
in 207 he prepared two great trenches to ensure his supplies.
Though the formal structure of military units echoed that of Han, with
generals and colonels and lesser ranks identified in the texts, such hier-
archy in the order of battle conceals the reality of rivalry, conflict and
confusion. We have seen how armies were organised in bands led by
individual fighters, but the very nature of such warfare meant that
leaders were not only skilled in hand-to-hand combat and personally
charismatic; they were also aggressive, over-confident, often prone to
violence, and sometimes a little mad: what sort of man could face a
mass of opponents without certainty that he would be successful, or
even supported?
Such warrior virtues transfer poorly to the requirements for a
coherent chain of command, and there are many accounts of erratic
conduct and fierce quarrels. One may cite Zhang Fei’s murder of the
Chancellor of Xiapi in 196, which lost that territory to Liu Bei, or the
mistaken conduct of Lü Bu under siege by Cao Cao in 198, which
drove his own officers over to the enemy. In similar fashion, three
of Cao Cao’s generals on the front against Liu Biao in Jing province
in 208 were so much at odds that he was obliged to appoint a more
junior officer, Zhao Yan, to keep them under control and co-ordinate
operations.79 To manage such temperamental chieftains, the senior
commander required a high degree of personal authority and control
to ensure that attention was turned rather to the enemy than to indi-
vidual ambition or personal passion.
Brute courage, moreover, does not necessarily indicate a broad
understanding of warfare, and not all impulsive heroes of the front
line had the patience or imagination to see the battlefield as a whole
or to out-manoeuvre the enemy in a strategic campaign.80 For such
79
SGZ 23:668, the biography of Zhao Yan: ZZTJ 65:2080; deC, Establish Peace, 372.
80
The same techniques of warfare and the same problems of command were still
to be seen under the Ming dynasty, 1,400 years later. In discussing a campaign against
advice, the warlord must rely upon members of his staff who may not
have had any great experience or ability in physical combat, but who
were capable of tactical and strategic planning.
In the system of Later Han, a field general was assisted by a staff headed
by a Chief Clerk, and some Chief Clerks could be given independent
authority.81 Towards the end of the dynasty there also appeared Chief
Controllers (dudu), formally responsible for administration and dis-
cipline. A statement of the functions of that office is provided by the
biography of Lü Fan, a follower of the young warlord Sun Ce in 195:
Sun Ce’s officer Lü Fan said to him, “Your responsibilities become
greater each day as your army grows larger, but there are a few items
of administration which are somewhat slack. I wish to act for a time as
Chief Controller to help sort things out.”
“Ziheng,” replied Sun Ce, “as a gentleman of family you have a num-
ber of men under your command, and you have already made a repu-
tation for yourself on active campaign. Why should you accept such a
lowly appointment and seek to attend the petty details of my army?”
“No,” replied Lü Fan, “I did not leave my native country and come to
join you because of my family’s position, but because I want to help in
the work of the world. And this is like men sailing in the same boat: if
one thing goes wrong we shall all of us drown. It is to my own advan-
tage, not just for you!” Sun Ce laughed and made no further objection.
Then Lü Fan went out, changed his ordinary clothing for riding cos-
tume, took up a whip, and went below the council hall to report for duty
the Manchus in 1616, Ray Huang, “Lung-ching and Wan-li,” 580, observes that the
army relied on numbers, and
needed an elite corps of highly seasoned fighters to open up avenues of attack
so that the bulk of the soldiers could then swarm in behind them . . . and exploit
the results. These battle formations were . . . commanded by men of courage, who
were themselves versed in the martial arts and who personally led their soldiers
in valiant charges.
On the other hand,
None of [these commanders] qualified as an ingenious, let alone sound, strate-
gist. . . . . When lieutenant-generals could do no better than function as battalion
commanders, the options of high command were limited.
The same tendency was still apparent in the nineteenth century, even as the Qing
dynasty prepared to face the British in the Opium War: e.g. Wakeman, “The Canton
Trade and the Opium War,” 193; the military examinations of that period were con-
cerned simply with physical skills: Zi, Pratique des examens militaires.
81
Ban Chao, for example, who restored Chinese authority in central Asia at the end
of the first century, held office as Chief Clerk in Command of Troops for much of
his career in that region: deC, “Western Regions,” 13–15. [The same title Chief Clerk
was also held by the senior civil assistants of high-ranking ministers and in frontier
commanderies: Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 239 sub voce.]
188 chapter four
as Chief Controller. Sun Ce awarded him tallies and credentials and gave
him charge of all administration in the army. There was respect and
good feeling among the troops, and regulations were well maintained.82
The significance of the title dudu, however, varied by time and place.
In 199 and 200, for example, Cao Cao used it to give his distant ally
Xianyu Fu broad control in the north, while Yuan Shao named his
advisers Ju Shou, Guo Tu and Chunyu Qiong as dudu, each com-
manding a division of his great army. In later years, such higher-level
responsibility became the standard, and the title dudu was used by all
three rival states for a senior military officer with authority over a wide
sector of frontier; in that context I render it as Area Commander.
Cao Cao’s chief advisers were Xun Yu, whom he named Director
of the Secretariat of Han to keep control of the puppet imperial gov-
ernment at Xu city; Xun Yu’s cousin Xun You, styled Master of the
Army; and Guo Jia, who held the somewhat clumsy title of Libationer
to the Army of the Excellency of Works. At a lower level, and also a
new development about this time, there are references to Advisers to
the Army (can junshi), a term which may initially have been a general
description of counsellors or staff officers, but was later formalised as
a regular office. The fighting man and future general Sun Jian served
as an Adviser to the Army on campaign against rebels in the north-
west in 186, but the title was later awarded by Cao Cao to Hua Xin, a
scholarly man of no military distinction, who had readily surrendered
his territory of Yuzhang when challenged by Sun Ce.83 The system was
eclectic, but the Xun cousins and Guo Jia were important.
82
The biography of Lü Fan, whose style was Ziheng, is at SGZ Wu 11:1309–11; this
incident is recorded at 1309–10 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan: ZZTJ 61:1972–73, deC,
Establish Peace, 173–174. In similar fashion, albeit deceitfully, when Cao Cao was
besieging Ye city in 204 Yuan Shang’s officer Li Fu made his way through the enemy
lines by pretending to be a Chief Controller [SGZ 15:484 PC quoting Wei lue: ZZTJ
64:2054; deC, Establish Peace, 326–327]:
Putting on a flat-topped turban, and accompanied by three horsemen, he went by
night towards Ye. . . . . Every once in a while he found fault with the officers and
men on sentry duty and punished them accordingly, and in this way he passed
through the camp and came to the southern face of the siege position . . . Again, he
found fault with the men on picket duty, arrested them and tied them up. Then
he broke away from Cao Cao’s lines, galloped to the walls and called to the men
above. The guards drew him up with a rope, and so he got in.
83
On Sun Jian as an Adviser to the Army, see SGZ Wu 1:1095; deC, Biography of
Sun Chien, 64. The biography of Hua Xin is at SGZ 13:401–06. He was later a senior
civil official and became an Excellency of the empire of Wei.
In similar fashion, we find men like Jia Xu advising Cao Cao’s oppo-
nent Zhang Xiu, the scholar Zhang Zhao acting as confidant to Sun
Ce and later as effective regent for his younger brother and succes-
sor Sun Quan, and Lü Bu—mistakenly—taking advice from Chen Gui
and Chen Deng. The best-known of all these counsellors, however, is
Zhuge Liang, chief assistant to Liu Bei, who joined him when he was
in Jing province in the early 200s. Aided by the Romance, Zhuge Liang
has become perhaps the most celebrated and over-rated politician and
military commander in Chinese history, attributed with miraculous
powers and engineering genius, including the invention of the wheel-
barrow and a repeating crossbow, coupled with control of winds and
mountain mists; such matters, however, will be discussed further
below.84 There is a natural tendency among historians to emphasise
the achievements of scholars like themselves, but it is clear that Cao
Cao obtained good service and honest, valuable advice from his senior
staff. As his territory expanded in later years, he would need an effective
civil administration—“Though you may conquer an empire on horse-
back, you cannot rule it from there”85—but for the time being, with
his base at Xu city secure, and the new agricultural colonies producing
a fair quantity of supplies for his army, there were battles to be won.
Given the nature of the contending armies, with individual officers

leading their own often unruly units, with no firm hierarchy, and with
the constant threat that some unexpected development could bring
confusion and disruption, the chief concern of any commander was
to keep the host in reasonable order. Often he failed, for we are many
times told how one side broke into panic and flight; and the greater
the number of men the more likely they were to become confused and
vulnerable. If that should happen, the last test of a good general was
how quickly and effectively he could rally his troops and bring them
back to the fray.86
84
For the Romantic tradition of Shu-Han, Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang, see Chapter
Eleven at 481–484.
85
Lu Jia to Emperor Gao of Han: SJ 97:2699.
86
Keegan, Face of Battle, 173, observes that “Inside every army is a crowd struggling
to get out, and the strongest fear with which every commander lives—stronger than
his fear of defeat or even mutiny—is that of his army reverting to a crowd through
some error of his making. For a crowd is the antithesis of an army, a human assembly
animated not by discipline but by mood, by the play of inconstant and potentially
infectious emotion which, if it spreads, is fatal to an army’s subordination.” The quota-
tion comes from his discussion of the battle of Waterloo; Cao Cao and his rivals had
190 chapter four
Manoeuvre was thus fraught with danger, and though soldiers

became increasingly experienced and well-trained over the years of
warfare, there was little room for complex formations and ingenious
tactics in the face of the enemy. The long-lost but lately rediscovered
work ascribed to Sun Bin of the fourth century BC describes several
different ways by which an army could be drawn up for battle, and it
appears that Han made use of the more practical among them, whether
for all-round defence against a powerful enemy or deployment in the
open field. One of the most common was the “Eight Formations,”
which in fact comprised nine divisions formed into a square of three,
with the commander’s unit at the centre. This was flexible, providing
a front line with two rows of support and reserves, and the capacity to
extend and outflank an enemy.87
Sunzi and other texts of military theory make great play of the posi-
tion of the commander as the heart and soul of the army, but his role
during actual combat must have been limited. Among other problems,
in the confusion—and often the dust—of conflict, it was extremely
difficult to transmit orders. Signal flags, trumpets, bells and drums
were used, but they had limited range and small vocabulary, while
the human voice was hard to hear clearly above the din, and mes-
sages carried by runners might be lost, confused or disobeyed.88 The
best method was to make clear plans in advance, ensure the relevant
to deal with troops far less trained and organised than the regiments commanded by
Wellington and Napoleon.
87
Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 58 ff discusses such orders of battle. One
version of the Eight Formations (八陳 bazhen) was attributed to Zhuge Liang of Shu-
Han, and the various units were endowed with symbolic significance and power. More
complex arrangements were based upon the Eight Trigrams and other magical and
mystical designs, but it is doubtful whether such plans had close connection to reality.
For a good attempt to explain the descriptions in Sun Bin Bingfa, see Syvanne, “Han
Battle Tactics.”
88
Tong dian 149:779c–780a, followed by Yang Zhen, Sanguo huiyao 298–300, quotes
a series of ordinances by Cao Cao on the conduct of the army: Wei Wu junling 魏武
軍令; they are also included in the various collections of Cao Cao’s works: e.g. Cao
Cao ji, 55–57, and Cao Cao quanshu, 248–256. The ordinances include instructions
for drumming the advance, sounding gongs to order withdrawal, and the use of flags
to signal manoeuvres right or left. They also provide for penalties—frequently execu-
tion—for those who fail to heed the commands or show reluctance in the attack.
As for messages, there is the classic example of communications problems in mod-
ern warfare: the charge of the British Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854. The com-
manding general, Lord Lucan, saw one set of guns to be protected, but they were not
visible to the Lord Cardigan, head of the cavalry brigade; and the messenger, Captain
Nolan, pointed to the wrong position.
officers were fully aware of them, then hope they carried them out.
Individual units and reserve troops could be committed as need or
occasion arose, but once that was done there was limited room for
amendment. Cao Cao’s commentary to Sunzi tells how the wise gen-
eral makes his plans in the ceremonial temple before battle is joined.89
Whether preparing for immediate combat or a broad campaign,
commanders normally had maps available, but they could also use the
knowledge of local guides. As Sun Jian was attacking Dong Zhuo at
Luoyang in 191, his master Yuan Shu became suspicious of his loyalty
and halted his supplies: Sun Jian hastened back to Yuan Shu’s head-
quarters to explain himself, and he drew on the ground to show his
plans.90 Again, as Cao Cao was attacking the Wuhuan in the north-
east in 207, he was told by the local leader Tian Chou of a side-route
which would take the enemy by surprise; and in operations against the
warlord alliance of the northwest in 211, he made a similar detour to
outflank the enemy defences. Both manoeuvres required good intel-
ligence and knowledge of distant terrain.
As Sunzi observes, compared to the costs of raising and maintaining
an army, the money spent on scouts and agents was of minimal con-
sequence, and the results could be of enormous value.91 Besides such
local knowledge as a man like Tian Chou could provide, spies and
deserters offered a source of information on the state of the enemy’s
army and sometimes of his plans. One had always to be cautious lest
a self-claimed deserter was in fact still acting for his original master,
but when Xu You came over to Cao Cao at Guandu the information
he brought was of critical value.92
Naturally enough, a general would use any means to deceive the
enemy. At the time of the Huayin campaign in the northwest in 211
Cao Cao used his personal contact with the enemy leader Han Sui as
a means to cast doubt and distrust among his opponents, and a good
example of disinformation is recorded from 209, as Sun Quan was
laying siege to Hefei:93
89
廟堂 miaotang: Sunzi 1:1a; Minford, Art of War, 99; also Chapter Seven at 328.
90
SGZ Wu 1:1097; deC, Biography of Sun Chien, 43.
91
Sunzi 13; Griffith, Sun Tzu, 144 ff, Minford, Art of War, 315 ff.
92
Sun Wu would define Xu You as an “internal agent” (內間者 nei jianzhe): Sunzi
13:5a; Griffith, Sun Tzu, 145, Minford, Art of War, 319.
93
Adapted from SGZ 14:450, followed by ZZTJ 66:2097–98; deC, Establish Peace,
404–405.
192 chapter four
After the defeat and withdrawal from the Red Cliffs, Cao Cao’s main
army was still suffering from sickness and could move only slowly. He
sent his general Zhang Xi to relieve the city, but he had only a thousand
horsemen and some recruits from Runan, and these too were affected by
illness. Jiang Ji, however, who was Attendant Officer of Yang province at
Shouchun, spoke privately to the Inspector, and pretended that he had
received a letter from Zhang Xi which said he had forty thousand horse
and foot and was just over a hundred kilometres from Hefei.
The provincial Registrar was accordingly sent to receive Zhang Xi,
while the Inspector also sent three groups of messengers with letters to
the commander of the garrison at Hefei. One party got into the city, but
the other two were captured by Sun Quan. Believing the story, Sun Quan
burnt his siege-works and went away.
Jiang Ji’s ruse was made all the more effective by the fact that he
deceived his own superior officer, the Inspector.94
Finally in strategic terms, comparable to the use of fire or the star-
vation of a city, a general forced onto the defensive could turn to a
scorched-earth policy, destroying crops and stripping the countryside
of anything that might be useful to an advancing enemy. Cao Cao
surely acted like this as he retreated to Guandu, and it is likely that the
same program helped bring the Yellow Turbans of Qing province to
submission in 192.95 It was not always an appropriate course of action,
particularly when two armies were evenly matched and each hoped
for success, and on at least one occasion an opportunity was rejected:
as Liu Bei moved against Liu Zhang, Governor of Yu province in 213,
one of Liu Zhang’s advisers said to him,
[Liu Bei] is attacking us with an isolated army. He has fewer than ten
thousand soldiers, and the men have not yet grown attached to him. His
army has no baggage train and his soldiers must live off the country.
The best plan is to force all the people . . . to come in west of the . . . riv-
ers. Burn the granaries and destroy the grain in the fields. We can then
set firm defences behind high walls and deep ditches, and if the other
fellow offers battle, we refuse.
94
Sun Wu would define the captured messengers as “dead” or “expendable” agents
(死間者 si jianzhe): Sunzi 13:8b; Griffith, Sun Tzu, 146, Minford, Art of War, 320.
95
Similarly, in 195, when Cao Cao was thinking of attacking Xu province as
opposed to fighting Lü Bu for Yan province, his adviser Xun Yu warned him that the
people of Xu, having already experienced his brutal attack, would now be waiting for
him “with strong walls and empty fields. You will not be able to capture anything, and
there will be nothing to plunder. In less than ten days, an army of hundred thousand
men would be in trouble before ever it began to fight:” SGZ 10:309: ZZTJ 61:1963;
If he has to wait without supplies, within three months he will be

forced to retreat; and we attack him as he does so. This way we can
certainly deal with him.
Liu Zhang, however, could not bring himself to treat his people with
such cruelty, and so he was defeated.96 Nice guys seldom did well, and
in commentary to Sunzi Cao Cao remarked that “Civil courtesies can-
not be used to control an army” 禮不可以治兵.”97
We perhaps know more of Cao Cao’s operations than those of his
rivals, but it is notable that on several occasions he used an oblique
approach to attack his enemies where they did not expect him, while
other commanders such as Gongsun Zan, Liu Bei and Yuan Shao fre-
quently moved head-on against their opponents. Even in the broader
strategy of the Guandu campaign, I suggest that Cao Cao was seeking
to out-flank Yuan Shao to east and west, and all but compelled his
opponent to march straight against him. A few years later, in a politi-
cal version of this technique, he played Yuan Shao’s sons and succes-
sors against one another to their ultimate destruction, and he dealt
similarly with the north-western warlords in 211. The great exception
to this sophisticated style was the drive south through Jing province
that led to defeat at the Red Cliffs in 208; as we shall discuss, however,
there may have been good reasons at the time.
Casualties, prisoners, hostages and the behaviour

of gentlemen
Troops defeated in the open field were desperately vulnerable, and the
greatest casualties were suffered by those who turned their backs to
the enemy and sought to flee. Pursuit could be brutal and deadly, and
the body count disproportionate. One major factor was the difficulty
of securing prisoners: when weapons were designed for close-quarter
fighting—or, as with bows and crossbows, for single shots—any num-
ber of captives required almost as many men to hold them in submis-
sion. On a battlefield, moreover, with weapons spread around, a man
who had surrendered had only to pick up a discarded sword or a lance
to be once more armed and dangerous. Unlike modern times, where
a single man with a machine-gun or hand-grenade can hold many at
96
SGZ Shu 7:958: ZZTJ 66:2120; deC, Establish Peace, 450.
97
Sunzi 3:18a; Griffith, Sun Tzu, 81, Minford, Art of War, 144.
194 chapter four
his mercy, the victors had seldom sufficient guards to spare; the safest
prisoner was a dead one.98
There is nonetheless reason to believe that the figures of casualties
were often exaggerated, and one passage, discussing the suppression
of insurgents in Hejian in 211, says so specifically:
When reports were presented concerning the defeat of rebels, one [dead]
was counted as ten, but on this occasion Guo Yuan gave an accurate
tally. Cao Cao asked him why, and Guo Yuan explained: “If I am attack-
ing an enemy outside our borders, I exaggerate the numbers killed
because I wish to emphasise the military achievement and inspire the
people. Hejian, however, is our own territory, and although it is good
to announce the defeat of . . . the rebels, I am ashamed that there should
ever have been need for such a campaign.”99
In general references to casualties, it is difficult to assess the propor-
tion of those killed as opposed to the wounded, nor is there any good
way to judge how many died of their wounds or were permanently
incapacitated, and how many recovered and returned to active service.
Cao Cao was injured at least four times: in 190 he was wounded in bat-
tle against Xu Rong and then in a mutiny a short time later; in 194 he
suffered burns while fighting Lü Bu in Puyang; and he was wounded
again in the surprise attack of Zhang Xiu in 197. On each occasion he
continued to operate effectively, and it does not appear that any of his
wounds festered or caused serious fever later. He was fortunate.
We are told very little about arrangements for the treatment of
wounded, though even before the days of modern medicine people
showed remarkable capacity to recover from serious wounds, so long
as they were external. Discussing the likely fate of those injured at the
battle of Agincourt in 1415, Keegan suggests that lacerations—even
deep cuts—were comparatively clean and would often heal quickly
if they were simply bound up and left; while broken limbs could be
98
It is for such reasons that the battle of Cannae in 216 BC saw a Roman army of
80,000 suffer 50,000 dead, and at Agincourt in 1415 AD Henry V of England ordered
all prisoners to be killed when he feared a French counter-attack.
It is claimed that in the aftermath of the battle at Guandu, some of Yuan Shao’s
men made a false surrender and then attempted to escape back to the north; Cao Cao
had them buried alive. The story may be true, but the number involved is unknown:
SGZ 6:199.
99
SGZ 11:339, the biography of Guo Yuan, ZZTJ 66:2112; deC, Establish Peace, 435.
Guo Yuan was a civilian official, but preparation of military reports evidently came
within his area of responsibility.
successfully set and splinted. Penetrating wounds, however, whether

inflicted by arrows or spears, were generally fatal: in the abdomen,
piercing the intestines, they caused peritonitis; in the upper body,
probably carrying in dirty clothing, they would bring sepsis.100
Where it was possible, however, patching up a damaged veteran was
a sensible investment, as opposed to training a new and inexperienced
recruit, while knowledge that care was available was surely good for
morale. The Roman army had medical staff attached to its legions, and
hospitals to care for those more seriously injured or sick.101 A similar
system may have applied to the armies of imperial Han, but we can
be sure that the confused masses of the early civil war had no such
support: fighters had to rely on their comrades or on camp-followers,
some of whom would acquire practical experience in the treatment of
injuries.102 More professional systems of care may have been developed
as Cao Cao and other leaders established their regimes, but we know
nothing about them. It is likely, however, that some men no longer
fit for direct combat were able to find a livelihood among Cao Cao’s
agricultural colonies.
During the American Civil War, one of the first times such statis-
tics were collected, it was found that some fifteen per cent of those
wounded in battle died later, whether from direct consequence of the
injury, from associated shock or from fever. Discussing these figures,
Rosenstein acknowledges the difficulty of comparison, but suggests
that mortality from wounds inflicted by swords, spears and arrows
could have been less than those from bullets and shells, while care
and treatment in a well-organised army may have been no worse in
ancient times than in the nineteenth century. He observes further
that the death rate from disease was twice as high as that from enemy
action.103
100
Keegan, Face of Battle, 112–113. Though Agincourt took place some twelve hun-
dred years after Han, we may believe that the standard of medical treatment had not
greatly improved.
101
See, for example, Campbell, War and Society, 65–68, and Salazar, Treatment
of War Wounds, in which Part One provides a survey of medical and surgical tech-
niques.
102
Sumption, Hundred Years War III, 761–764, cites a number of wounds that
were treated with success, often simply being cleaned and bandaged by the warrior’s
comrades, sometimes aided by diet and rest.
103
Rosenstein, Rome at War, 24, has the figure for deaths from wounds as 17%, but
Trunkey’s Table 32.1 at 201 says that mortality for US troops wounded in the Mexican
War of 1846–48 was 15%, and in the Civil War it was 14%. The same relationship
196 chapter four
An army and its followers, with so many people in close proximity,

had its own potential for infection and widespread sickness. Strangely
enough, however, though there had been major outbreaks of disease
across the empire before the Yellow Turban rebellion of 184, and the
plague returned in 217, there are few references to such afflictions
amongst the armies of the time. Many of Cao Cao’s men at the Red
Cliffs were unwell, in part due to the change from the drier north to
the wetlands of the Yangzi basin,104 and an embarrassing defeat of Sun
Quan’s army at Hefei in 215 may be attributed to sickness.105 Con-
sidering the numbers gathered for such campaigns, however, and the
conditions under which they were obliged to live, such misfortunes are
few. Other cases may not have been recorded, and some illness was
probably endemic and thus unremarkable, but it is also possible that
the dangers of water-borne infection, common among large groups of
people with limited concern for hygiene, were rendered less acute by
the fact that Chinese boil water for tea and steam their grains, whether
rice, millet or wheat.106
While common soldiers might be killed or wounded, taken prisoner

or compelled to change sides, the situation of their commanders was
different. Many senior officers died in battle, but some were captured
or forced to surrender, and their treatment then depended upon the
interests of their captor and their own value or loyalty. Gongsun Zan
was slain in the ruins of his citadel, but when Liu Bei was defeated by
Lü Bu he was able to renegotiate their alliance, and when Lü Bu came
into Cao Cao’s hands he promptly sought to take service with him; it
was his former erratic conduct that brought his execution.
between disease and enemy action applied to British forces during the Boer War:
Rosenstein, loc. cit.
104
This point was made by Zhou Yu to Sun Quan, as above, and later by Cao
Cao too: SGZ Wu 9:1265 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. Accounts of the campaign
itself likewise tell of sickness in the army: SGZ Wu 9:1262 and SGZ 1:31 PC quoting
Shanyang gong zaiji “Parallel Annals of the Duke of Shanyang” [formerly Emperor
Xian of Han].
105
SGZ Wu 10:1295 and Chapter Seven at 316–317.
106
On the common food of Han times, see Yü in Food in Chinese Culture, where
cooking is described at 79 and the probability that tea was widely used at 70. It has
been suggested that tea drinking began in Sichuan even before Han, and the celebrated
“slave contract” 僮約 Tong yue composed by Wang Bao of the mid-first century BC
refers to the preparation of tea for guests: Wilbur, Slavery, 385; but see his note 19
at 391. The importance of hot foods and boiled water as a means of avoiding many
epidemics is noted by Mote in Food in Chinese Culture at 199.
Gentlemen could do well or badly. Cao Cao forgave the renegade

Wei Chong and gave him charge of Henei, and he showed similar
tolerance to others: he took the hostile propagandist Chen Lin as his
personal secretary, and appointed his old enemy Liang Gu to his staff.
The latter two, of course, were literary rather than fighting men, and it
helped Cao Cao’s reputation to treat them well; his generosity towards
Guan Yu, however, close comrade of his declared enemy Liu Bei, was
extraordinary, and we must assume it was similarly motivated by the
need to show respect for a common-man’s hero.
The defeat of Yuan Shao at Guandu brought several high-ranking
officers into Cao Cao’s hands. Few survived, but blame does not always
lie entirely with Cao Cao:
Cao Man zhuan tells how Chunyu Qiong, defeated commander of the
depot at Wuchao, was taken alive and, like others of his following, had
his nose cut off. He was brought before Cao Cao, who was willing to
spare him, but the turncoat Xu You urged his execution, and Chunyu
Qiong died.107
Very often the critical question was whether the prisoner felt able to
change his allegiance; and whether his captor believed him.
As Ju Shou, senior adviser and sometime commander under Yuan Shao,
was taken by Cao Cao’s men, he cried out loud, “I do not surrender, I
have been captured!”
Cao Cao knew him from former times, and invited him into his ser-
vice: “Yuan Shao had mistaken ideas and refused your advice. There is
still disorder in the empire, and I should be glad of your assistance.”
Ju Shou replied, however, “My uncle, my mother, and my younger
brother are all in Yuan Shao’s hands. I shall be obliged if you will kill
me quickly.”
Cao Cao sighed and said, “If I had had you earlier, the empire would
have been no problem.” He released him and treated him generously,
but then Ju Shou tried to return to Yuan Shao, so he killed him.108
One pattern of behaviour that does not appear is the matter of ransom.
In medieval Europe, where the confusion of warfare was almost com-
parable to the chaos at the end of Han, ransom was not only common-
place but was a recognised reason for fighting and for taking prisoners;
in such respects warfare could appear as a commercial transaction.
107
SGZ 1:21–22 PC: ZZTJ 63:2035; deC, Establish Peace, 290.
108
Adapted from SGZ 6:199 and 200 PC quoting Xiandi zhuan “The Account of
Emperor Xian:” ZZTJ 63:2035; deC, Establish Peace, 289–290.
198 chapter four
Whether ransoms were demanded or not, moreover, many individu-

als were imprisoned or held captive for months and even years. By
contrast, Chinese records of this time contain no references to the
payment of ransom or long-term imprisonment: if a man was unser-
viceable, he was liable to swift execution.109
Hostages were used, though not always with decisive effect. Yang
Lien-sheng has discussed how the imperial government held hostages
from the northern tribes and the city-states of central Asia, and how
in the first century of Former Han “internal hostages” were used to
ensure the loyalty of generals and feudatories.110 About 200 AD the
warlords Ma Teng and Han Sui were persuaded to send sons as hos-
tages to Xu city to confirm their good will towards Cao Cao in his
struggle against Yuan Shao,111 and in 208 Ma Teng himself came, with
his household, as surety for the good behaviour of his son Ma Chao.
Ma Teng was named a minister, but after Ma Chao joined the north-
western alliance against Cao Cao in 211 Ma Teng and his people were
executed in the following year.112
Ma Chao was criticised for this lack of filial piety,113 and the aban-
donment of a father was unusual, but it could be difficult to coerce
a man by threatening the lives of his family. After two sons of Shen
Pei were captured by Cao Cao at Guandu, several advisers warned
Yuan Shao that Shen Pei’s loyalty must now be considered doubtful.
However,
109
See, for example, Sumption, Hundred Years War II, 244, describing a “frenzied
competition for ransoms” among the English after they had defeated the French at
Poitiers in 1356 and [at 555] how, in the aftermath of the battle of Najera in Spain in
1367, “prisoners were . . . traded and fought over for years to come.” On more general
principles of imprisonment and ransom, which could take years to resolve but might
allow a measure of conditional freedom, see Keen, Laws of War, 156–185.
It may be objected that the situation of the Hundred Years War between England
and France should not be compared to that of a civil war in China more than a thou-
sand years earlier, but I would argue that the European conflict was one of feudal
loyalty as much as it was of nationalism, and in both conflicts gentlemen showed
mutual respect and shared a code of conduct: the remarkable thing is how much the
two codes varied.
110
Yang, “Hostages,” 45–46 and 51–52. At 52–53, Yang observes that all Three
Kingdoms later used internal hostages; Cao Cao and his rivals, however, had not fully
established such a system.
111
SGZ 13:392.
112
SGZ 15:472 and SGZ 6:187.
113
For example SGZ Shu 6:946 PC quoting Dian lue, and SGZ 25:701.
Pang Ji had long been Shen Pei’s enemy, but when Yuan Shao asked his
opinion he replied that, “Shen Pei is fiercely honest and always respects
the examples of the ancients. He would never turn traitor just because
his two sons are in the south. You should have no doubts of him.”
“But you have always disliked him?” observed Yuan Shao.
“Our former quarrel,” replied Pang Ji, “that was private. We are talk-
ing now about affairs of state.”
“Excellent!” said Yuan Shao. He did not dismiss Shen Pei, and Shen
Pei became friends with Pang Ji.
We do not know what happened to the two sons, but Shen Pei stayed
loyal to the end.114
Wives and children, indeed, were often treated as disposable goods.
When Kong Rong, out-spoken holder of moral principle, was attacked
by Yuan Tan in Beihai in 196, he abandoned his wife and children as
he fled.115 When Yuan Tan was in difficulty in 203, his officer Guan
Tong left his family behind as he went to assist him; they were killed
by brigands. In 213 Ma Chao held Zhao Yue, son of the loyalist Zhao
Ang, hostage for his father’s good behaviour. Zhao Ang nonetheless
prepared to join a rising against Ma Chao, and when he raised the
matter with his wife she reassured him that “To lose one’s head is of
small moment, if it clears the shame of a lord and father. That applies
still more strongly to a son.”116 Despite the importance of family in the
Confucian tradition, many gave precedence to their personal sense of
loyalty and honour.117
Even in this environment, Liu Bei is outstanding, for he lost his
wife and children no less than three times: twice to Lü Bu, in 196 and
198, though in each case his family was restored to him; and a third
time in 199, when he left Cao Cao and then turned against him in Xu
province. There is no record of Liu Bei seeing that family again—the
women were presumably distributed among Cao Cao’s officers—but
his concubine the Lady Gan accompanied him on campaign and was
later with him in Jing province, where she bore his son and heir Liu
114
Adapted from HHS 74/64A, 2402–03: ZZTJ 63:2036–37; deC, Establish Peace,
291–292. Pang Ji and Shen Pei later formed a party in favour of Yuan Shao’s son
Yuan Shang.
115
HHS 70/60:2264; deC, Establish Peace, 203–204.
116
SGZ 25:703 PC: ZZTJ 66:2123; deC, Establish Peace, 455.
117
In LH3K, 1302–1306, I present a summary list of events in the Later Han period
relating to women; there are several instances throughout the dynasty when wives
and concubines and family took second place to the more public concerns of their
men-folk.
200 chapter four
Shan.118 If Guan Yu’s honoured captivity in Cao Cao’s hands meant

that he was an effective hostage, restraining Liu Bei from active service
on behalf of Yuan Shao,119 then Liu Bei’s comrades were more impor-
tant to him than his women.
It is almost refreshing to find one case where kinship took priority:
In retreat before Cao Cao in 208, the mother of Liu Bei’s adviser Xu
Shu was captured. Making his excuses to Liu Bei, Xu Shu pointed to his
heart and said, “The reason I first sought to plan with you for the hege-
mony was because of this square inch of territory. Now that I have lost
my mother, my heart is confused and I can be no help to your affairs. I
therefore seek leave to go.”
Xu Shu was permitted to join Cao Cao, and he became a senior officer
in the future state of Wei.120
Two special cases of family reunion may be mentioned. After Zhuge
Liang and his elder brother Zhuge Jin were separated as children by
the chances of war, Zhuge Liang became adviser to Liu Bei and Zhuge
Jin joined Sun Quan. They met on occasion, but were always careful to
keep an appropriate distance, and never spoke privately.121
And there is the romantic story of Pang Lin and his wife the Lady
Xi, who were separated in 208 as Pang Lin fled with Liu Bei in Jing
province, but found one another again fifteen years later, when he was
captured by an army of Wei.122
At one level, the conduct of warfare was a matter of tactics and strat-
egy, the control and use of arms and men. In this time of civil conflict,
there was no formal or accepted authority vested in any of the various
118
The record of Liu Bei’s wives is described by SGZ Shu 2:873–75; Cutter & Crow-
ell, Empresses and Consorts, 48–49, and deC, Generals of the South, 294–295. Many
details, however, are summary or unclear.
SGZ Shu 2 says that the Lady Gan “regularly took charge of affairs in the inner
apartments” when Liu Bei was separated from his chief wife or wives; she was pre-
sumably responsible for sexual companionship when he was on campaign. She bore
Liu Shan in 207, but Liu Bei abandoned both mother and infant child as he fled from
Cao Cao in 208. On this fourth occasion, however, Liu Bei’s family was rescued by
his follower Zhao Yun.
119
Chapter Three at 140.
120
Adapted from SGZ Shu 5:914: ZZTJ 65:2084; deC, Establish Peace, 382.
121
SGZ Wu 7:1231–32: ZZTJ 67:2138; deC, Establish Peace, 488. In 208, as Lu Su
came on embassy to Liu Bei, he told Zhuge Liang that he was a friend of Zhuge Jin,
and was promptly received with the greatest courtesy and affection: SGZ Wu 9:1269.
122
SGZ Shu 7:956–57.
warlords: Cao Cao’s hold on the emperor gave him a slight advan-
tage of prestige, but Yuan Shao could readily challenge his legitimacy;
the tyrant Dong Zhuo, after all, had also controlled the throne. As a
result, success depended on personal qualities, or at least the manner
in which they were perceived by others, whether a man was firm or
weak, cruel or generous, competent or inadequate. In this regard, a
leader such as Cao Cao had always to consider how he treated his fol-
lowers, his rivals and opponents, and particularly those who came to
him through good will or by force, as prisoners.
In 197, as Cao Cao was reeling from his unexpected defeat by Zhang
Xiu in Nanyang, and Yuan Shao had written him a gloating letter, his
advisers Xun Yu and Guo Jia sought to encourage him by listing the
ways in which he was superior to Yuan Shao, and so would overcome
him in the end. Both referred to his ability in planning for war and to
his judgement of men, but they also observed that Yuan Shao relied
upon his lineage and emphasised ceremony, while Cao Cao treated
men honestly and directly, and had sympathy for the sufferings of the
common people. Similar comments were made at different times by
Jia Xu and by Yang Fu, and though one may question how much of
the praise was genuine, and whether such agreement is not a little sus-
picious, it is clear that these were the qualities a leader was expected to
display, and that Cao Cao was believed to possess them.123
We discuss below Cao Cao’s policies of government and adminis-
tration—the means by which he exercised and enhanced the author-
ity he gained though success in battle. There was general agreement,
however, that he had a genius for strategy and tactics and that he made
war like a spirit (神武 shenwu); there is a proverb still used to this day
“Speak of Cao Cao, and Cao Cao is here.”124
123
See Chapter Eight at 364–365.
124
Shuo Cao Cao, Cao Cao jiu dao 說曹操,曹操就到; the English proverb “Speak/
Talk of the Devil and he is sure to appear” can be found in various forms from the
late sixteenth century.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONQUEST OF THE NORTH

201–207
The fall of the Yuan clan 201–204

Settlement of the North 204–206
White Wolf Mountain 207
Chronology
201 Liu Bei flees to Liu Biao in Jing province

202 Yuan Shao dies, succeeded by his youngest son Yuan Shang
203 Cao Cao attacks the Yuan brothers, then withdraws
Yuan Tan asks Cao Cao for help against Yuan Shang
204 Cao Cao defeats Yuan Shang and captures Ye city
Cao Cao attacks Yuan Tan
205 Cao Cao destroys Yuan Tan
Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi flee to the Wuhuan in Liaoxi
Cao Cao drives the Wuhuan across the frontier
206 Cao Cao defeats Gao Gan and settles Bing province
207 Cao Cao defeats the Wuhuan at White Wolf Mountain
Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi flee to Gongsun Kang, who kills them
The fall of the Yuan clan 201–2041
The defeat of Yuan Shao at Guandu was decisive, inasmuch as it

ensured that he would not threaten Cao Cao for the foreseeable future,
but it had been a near-run thing and both sides were exhausted. Cao
Cao sent a raiding party across the Yellow River in Dongping com-
mandery, and he also attacked Yuan Shao’s positions at the Cangting
1
Major sources for Cao Cao’s activities from 201 to 204 are SGZ 1:22–26 and the
biographies of Yuan Shao and his sons at HHS 74/64A:2403, 74/64B:2409–16 and SGZ
6:201–06. They are presented in chronicle order by ZZTJ 64:2041–56; deC, Establish
Peace, 303–330.
204 chapter five
crossing in Dong commandery, but he held his main force at the line
of the River and made no major attempt to take advantage of his vic-
tory. For his part, it appears that Yuan Shao was able to recover much
of his army, and though a few cities rebelled against him they were
soon recaptured. After the excitements of 200, the year which followed
was comparatively peaceful, and both sides regrouped.
In the autumn Cao Cao returned to Xu city, and soon afterwards
he dealt with the minor irritation represented by Liu Bei in Runan. It
does not appear that Liu Bei had achieved any substantial success in
his operations behind Cao Cao’s lines, and he had been held at bay by
quite small contingents of Cao Cao’s men. As Cao Cao turned against
him, Liu Bei fled across the hills to refuge with Liu Biao in Jing prov-
ince. His former allies, notably a group of bandits under the local chief-
tain Gong Du, swiftly surrendered, and Cao Cao had now no major
concerns in the prosperous territories of Runan and Yingchuan.
Further to the east about the same time, Cao Cao’s commanders
Xiahou Yuan and Zhang Liao settled Donghai commandery in Xu
province. The local warlord Chang Xi had allied with Lü Bu and then
with Liu Bei, and although he had previously been defeated he had
maintained himself in Tan city, former capital of Tao Qian. Xiahou
Yuan’s army surrounded the place, but as supplies ran short he con-
sidered withdrawal. At this point, however, Zhang Liao engaged in
some diplomacy:
Zhang Liao said to Xiahou Yuan, “Over the past few days, whenever I
walk about the camp Chang Xi has looked at me very carefully, and there
have not been many shots fired. This surely means that he is undecided
and has no heart for the fight. I shall try to talk with him, and I may be
able to win him over.”
He sent a messenger to Chang Xi to say that, “His Excellency [Cao
Cao] has sent a letter for me to hand to you.”2
Then Chang Xi came down and spoke with Zhang Liao, and Zhang
Liao told of Cao Cao’s miraculous ability in war, how he embraced all
the world with his virtue, and how those who joined him early would
receive great rewards. So Chang Xi promised to surrender.
Then Zhang Liao, alone and without escort, went to Chang Xi’s
house and paid respects to his wife and children. Chang Xi was pleased
and accompanied Zhang Liao to Cao Cao. Cao Cao sent him back [to
Donghai].3
2
Cao Cao still held title as Excellency of Works: Chapter Two at 89.
3
SGZ 17:517, from the biography of Zhang Liao; deC, Establish Peace, 304–305.
conquest of the north 201–207 205
Zhang Liao was one of the most interesting of Cao Cao’s commanders.
Originally from Yanmen on the northern frontier, he changed his
name to avoid a vendetta, but later held local office in the command-
ery. Noted for his strength and skill in combat, he was appointed to
the staff of Bing province, and he came to Luoyang with the Inspec-
tor Ding Yuan in 189. When Ding Yuan was killed by Lü Bu, Zhang
Liao took service with the assassin. He accompanied Lü Bu as he fled
east in 192, and fought with success against Cao Cao, but when Lü Bu
was destroyed in 198 Zhang Liao was permitted to surrender, received
junior enfeoffment and was given a middle-ranking command. His
persuasion of Chang Xi was the first of several imaginative coups in
Cao Cao’s service.
With his position in the immediate south and further east secure,
in the spring of 202 Cao Cao brought his main army southeast to Pei,
homeland of his family. Returning through Liang, he paid his respects
at the tomb of his old patron Qiao Xuan, and also arranged the repair
of the Suiyang Trench: part of the Vast Canal complex, the Suiyang
was an important link to the southeast and allowed grain and provi-
sions from that region to be brought to Xu city.
Cao Cao had not seen his family home at Qiao county in Pei since
the beginning of civil war in 190, and the place was now strange to
him, while the family tombs had been looted and destroyed in the
troubles of those years.4 Faced with the devastation, and recalling the
loss of life amongst those who had followed him to war, he issued a
proclamation:5
When I first raised loyal troops [against Dong Zhuo, it was my inten-
tion to use them] to remove oppression and disorder from the empire.
4
Powers, Art and Political Expression, 332, suggests that the tombs were damaged
at the time of the Yellow Turban rebellion of 184, though he also canvasses the pos-
sibility that the destruction took place about 190. The latter scenario appears more
probable, for the Yellow Turban rebellion is not recorded as having affected the terri-
tory of Pei, and the Cao family was still well enough established at Qiao for Cao Cao
to spend some months of enforced retirement there in the late 180s and to raise troops
there in 190. It seems likely that Cao Song stayed there until about 191, and the tombs
were plundered after his departure.
5
SGZ 1:22–23. The term 令 ling “ordinance” traditionally designated an imperial
proclamation, of slightly less prestige than an edict (詔 zhao), frequently associated
with the promulgation of a new law: e.g. Hulsewé, “Ch’in and Han Law,” 526.
As recorded by Sanguo zhi, Cao Cao used the format to give instructions on law
and policy or, on certain occasions, to explain himself to his followers and subjects.
In these circumstances I render the term ling as “proclamation.”
206 chapter five
[Now] almost all the people of my old homeland are dead and gone, and
wherever I go in this kingdom [of Pei] I see no-one that I know. The
sorrow wounds me to the heart.
Since we first gathered those loyal troops, [many of my] officers and
men have died, leaving no descendants to maintain their sacrifices. I am
now seeking members of their kinfolk who may carry on their lineage
and take over their lands. My government will supply them with plough-
oxen, will arrange schools and teachers for them, and will build temples
to maintain sacrifices to their ancestors.
If the spirits [of the fallen dead] have awareness, then [they should
be satisfied with these arrangements], and I and my descendants for a
hundred years shall be safe from their angry resentment.6
Cao Cao thus offered assistance not only in temporal matters of farm-
ing and education, but also in the spiritual responsibilities of family
piety. The grant of oxen for ploughing was a feature of the tuntian
agricultural colonies, set up a few years earlier under Ren Jun about
Xu city, but the present program was designed not so much to settle
wandering people as to restore a local community devastated by war
and the loss of men. The region of Pei, and particularly the county of
Qiao, was naturally important to Cao Cao, and it was a suitable place
to make such an announcement. We may believe that he offered simi-
lar support to other territories under his control, and such work of
reconstruction, with the promise it offered, made a powerful weapon
against more short-sighted rivals.
In the summer of 202, a few weeks after Cao Cao had returned from
the southeast to his military base at Guandu, his enemy Yuan Shao
died at Ye city. Yuan Shao was probably a little older than Cao Cao,
and may have been about fifty at the time, so there is nothing particu-
larly suspicious about his death. In cliché fashion, we are told that he
was ashamed and angry at his defeat and, more practically, that his
illness caused him to spit blood; it was presumably some disorder of
the lungs.
6
For assistance in interpreting this last sentence, I am grateful to advice from Pro-
fessor Miranda Brown of the University of Michigan. The proclamation is discussed
further in Brown and deC, “Adoption,” 242–243, where it is noted that Cao Cao used
the term 親戚 qinqi, referring to kinfolk in general, rather than 宗族 zongzu, which
would restrict the beneficiaries to descendants in the male lineage. In this regard, he
accepted the idea that successors could maintain sacrifices to ancestors of different
surnames, though this position was opposed by conservative scholars such as Ying
Shao: op. cit. 229–231, and Chapter One at 19 and note 25.
Map 10. Ji Province under the Yuan family 191–205

208 chapter five
Yuan Shao had three sons, Yuan Tan, Yuan Xi and Yuan Shang.
We do not know whether they were full or half-brothers, nor which,
if any, had been born to Yuan Shao’s chief wife. Yuan Shao, however,
gave preference to his youngest son, Yuan Shang, above the elder two.
It is said that he was influenced by his later wife, a lady of the Liu
surname, who was not Yuan Shang’s natural mother but who praised
him to his father.7
Yuan Shao had made no formal statement on the succession before
he died, but Yuan Xi was never in contention, and had been away in
the north for several years with appointment as Inspector of You prov-
ince. Yuan Tan had been named Inspector of Qing province as early as
193, he had fought Gongsun Zan for that territory, and he had taken
part in the unsuccessful campaign of Guandu.
At some point Yuan Tan had been adopted across to maintain the
lineage of Yuan Shao’s elder brother; the name of this man is not
recorded, but he was probably the natural son of Yuan Shao’s own
adoptive father Yuan Cheng, whose personal name is unknown but
whose early death left the vacancy which Yuan Shao had been trans-
ferred to fill. In any case, formally speaking Yuan Tan was no lon-
ger Yuan Shao’s son but his nephew, and so the inheritance could be
granted to Yuan Shang.8
The implications of the situation were not lost on Yuan Shao’s
advisers, and Ju Shou for one is said to have criticised his policy and
the uncertainty it threatened. Yuan Tan, he argued, should remain at
court and should not be isolated with a secondary command. Yuan
Shao replied that he was giving his sons experience in government, so
he could decide which was best suited to succeed him. This did noth-
ing to clarify the question. Instead, Xin Ping and Guo Tu joined Ju
Shou in supporting Yuan Tan, while Pang Ji and Shen Pei, who had
quarrelled with Yuan Tan, formed a faction in favour of Yuan Shang.
Immediately after Yuan Shao’s death, there was general expectation
that Tan would take over, but Shen Pei and his associates forged a tes-
tament of Yuan Shao naming Shang as his successor, and by the time
Yuan Tan reached Ye city his brother had been installed in power.
7
On the contest for the succession to Yuan Shao as follows, see HHS 74/64A:2383
and 2403, 74/64B:2409 and SGZ 6:201. The Dian lue of Yu Huan of the third century,
cited by SGZ 6:203 PC, says that Yuan Tan was a gracious man, but Yuan Shang was
very good-looking.
8
HHS 74/64A:2383.
Predictably resentful, Yuan Tan took title as General of Chariots and

Cavalry, one of the senior ranks in the system of Han which his father
had also claimed, and went south to camp at Liyang, close to Cao
Cao’s positions along the Yellow River. Yuan Shang provided him
with a few additional troops and sent Pang Ji to advise him—or rather,
to keep check on his conduct. When Yuan Tan asked for further rein-
forcements, however, Shen Pei and others advised Yuan Shang not to
supply them. Furious, Yuan Tan killed Pang Ji.
At the end of autumn, four months after Yuan Shao’s death, Cao
Cao crossed the River and attacked Yuan Tan. Outnumbered and in
difficulty, Yuan Tan sent for help, and Yuan Shang went to his aid.
The Annals/Biography of Cao Cao in Sanguo zhi provides only a
summary account of the operations, and emphasises his successes.
Based upon the formal records of his state of Wei, it presents him in
the best light possible.9
According to that text, over a period of several months Cao Cao
defeated his enemies’ combined forces in a series of battles, forcing
them to withdraw into defensive positions. In the third month of
203 he attacked these fortifications, and when Yuan Shang and Yuan
Tan came out to fight they were heavily defeated. The brothers were
obliged to make their escape by night, and in the fourth month, at the
beginning of summer, Cao Cao brought his army forward to Ye city.
By the fifth month, however, he had returned to Xu, leaving his officer
Jia Xin in garrison at Liyang.
The post-biographies of Yuan Shao in Hou Han shu and Sanguo
zhi, however, have different accounts. According to Sanguo zhi, the
first operations took place about Liyang, and that fighting lasted from
the ninth month of 202 to the second month of 203. Eventually the
brothers were driven back into the city, and as Cao Cao prepared to
lay siege they withdrew by night and returned to Ye. Cao Cao then
stormed the city of Yin’an, gathered the local harvest, and withdrew
to Xu city.10
Hou Han shu has the same chronology and essentially the same
wording for the first stage of the campaign, describing how the Yuan
were forced to withdraw to Ye. It says, however, that Cao Cao sought
9
SGZ 1:23. The campaign is summarised by ZZTJ 64:2049; deC, Establish Peace,
317. Note 2 to that translation, and the commentary of Lu Bi at SGZJJ 1:54a, raises
some of the questions discussed below.
10
SGZ 6:201–02.
210 chapter five
to follow up this success but Yuan Shang defeated him in a counter-

attack; Cao Cao thereupon led his army back to Xu.11
Despite the suppressio veri of the Wei sources, it is clear that Cao
Cao had taken six months to force the Yuan brothers out of Liyang,
and they then made a successful withdrawal to Ye. Hou Han shu adds,
moreover, that Cao Cao was defeated outside Ye, and all the texts agree
that he retreated from that advanced position.
Liyang lay just north of the Yellow River, and if it took so long to
capture it the fighting must have been closely matched. Other texts
confirm that Cao Cao encountered problems on this campaign: in
his celebrated Second Memorial at the Beginning of a Campaign,
composed in 228, Zhuge Liang of Shu-Han refers to him being hard-
pressed at Liyang;12 and a letter from Liu Biao to Yuan Tan, written
a few months later, refers to the brothers’ defeat of a powerful enemy
by Ye city.13
It appears, therefore, that Cao Cao crossed the Yellow River and
gained early success against Yuan Tan. Yuan Shang then joined the
fray, and the two sides fought for several months with honours even,
until Cao Cao eventually forced his enemies back into Liyang. There
he drove in the outer fortifications, but before he could set siege to the
main city Yuan Shang and Yuan Tan withdrew to Ye, seventy kilo-
metres to the north. Cao Cao followed them, but had evidently over-
stretched himself, for his army was defeated and driven back. He did
succeed in storming the city of Yin’an, sixty kilometres to the north-
west, and as it was summer his troops were able to gather a quantity of
grain from the southern part of Wei commandery. The whole opera-
tion, however, had met with serious opposition and actual defeat, and
though Yin’an may have been captured, it was not necessarily held. In
the end, Liyang was a useful accession, but it represented little more
than a bridgehead north of the Yellow River.
11
HHS 74/64B:2409. The main text here does not say specifically that the broth-
ers were defending Liyang, but the Tang commentary quotes the Shuzheng ji 述征記
“Record of Campaigns” by Guo Yuansheng 郭緣生 of Jin, which says that the remains
of the fortifications of Cao Cao and of the Yuan could still be seen to the west and
the south of Liyang.
12
The text of this Second Memorial [Hou chushi biao 後出師表] is preserved in
SGZ Shu 5:923 PC quoting Han-Jin chunqiu 漢晉春秋 “Chronicle of Han and Jin” by
Xi Zuochi 習鑿齒 of the fourth century: Fang, Chronicle I, 258. The passage is cited
by the commentary of Hu Sanxing to ZZTJ 64:2048, and discussed by deC, Establish
Peace, 317 note 2.
13
HHS 74/64B:2411. On Liu Biao’s letter, see further below at 213.
Even as Cao Cao was occupied in the north, moreover, his subordi-
nates had to deal with two secondary disturbances. One came from Liu
Bei, who had been given command over Liu Biao’s northern frontier
in Nanyang and who sought to raid into Runan. Cao Cao sent Xiahou
Dun, Yu Jin and other officers to face him, and though they suffered
casualties in an ambush Liu Bei was forced to retreat.14
The other problem arose in Hedong. The claimant Shanyu Yufuluo
of the Southern Xiongnu had been driven from his territory by disaf-
fected clansmen in the late 180s, and after a chequered career as a sol-
dier of fortune in the region of present-day Shanxi he had set up a base
at Pingyang, a city on the Fen River in the centre of Hedong. Yufuluo
died in 195 and was succeeded as pretender by his younger brother
Huchuquan. Whether he sought to maintain his independence, or had
taken some aggressive action, Huchuquan was considered hostile to
Cao Cao, and in the latter part of 202 the Director of Retainers Zhong
Yao, senior officer responsible for the province, prepared to attack
him. At this point, however, Yuan Shang named his officer Guo Yuan
Administrator of Hedong and sent him to support the Xiongnu. With
assistance from Gao Gan, a cousin of Yuan Shang who was Inspector
of Bing province, and with the tacit complicity of the western warlord
Ma Teng, Guo Yuan gained immediate success and seized a large part
of the commandery.
Though Zhong Yao was an uncle of Guo Yuan, family ties were no
concern. Leading his men against Pingyang, he sent his officer Zhang
Ji as envoy to Ma Teng.15 Zhang Ji persuaded Ma Teng that it was
better for him to support Cao Cao at this critical time rather than
maintain an uncertain neutrality which would annoy both sides. Suit-
ably impressed, Ma Teng sent troops under his son Ma Chao, and as
Guo Yuan crossed the Fen River on his way to relieve Pingyang his
army was caught and cut to pieces. Guo Yuan was killed and Pang
De, an officer under Ma Chao, brought his head to Zhong Yao. He
offered apologies, but Zhong Yao replied, “Guo Yuan may have been
14
15
This Zhang Ji 張既, who came from Zuopingyi and whose biography is at SGZ
15:471–77, must be distinguished from the Zhang Ji 張濟 of Wuwei, who was an asso-
ciate of Li Jue and Guo Si at Chang’an in the 190s and died fighting Liu Biao in 196.
Zhang Ji 張既 had held local office in Zuopingyi, and had evidently established
a strong relationship with Ma Teng. In 205 he persuaded him to join once more in
operations against Gao Gan, and in 208 he arranged for him to journey into Cao
Cao’s power.
212 chapter five
my nephew, but he was an enemy of the state. There is nothing to

apologise for.”16
Huchuquan now surrendered, and there was no further trouble for
the next several years.
The operations in Hedong may have been a distraction on Cao Cao’s

flank, and perhaps weakened his initial attack on the Yuan broth-
ers in Ji province, but Zhong Yao appears to have settled the mat-
ter by the end of the year, and there was no obvious excuse for the
reversal outside Ye in the summer of 203. Evidently in some disgust,
Cao Cao issued a proclamation providing punishment or loss of rank
for those officers who had been unsuccessful or had suffered defeat,
and followed it with more general comments: that appointments and
rewards should not be given to those who failed to justify them by
their achievements.17
Indeed it is very possible that the reason for Cao Cao’s return to
Xu was not only that he had official business to attend to, but because
he needed to establish a presence there lest dissidents sought to take
advantage of his set-back in the north. He stayed there several months,18
and to confirm his credentials in civil matters a further proclamation
called for the establishment of schools in all counties and districts
under his authority.19
By accident or design, however, the withdrawal proved a useful
political manoeuvre. It is said that Cao Cao was preparing a new offen-
sive when his adviser Guo Jia argued that he should leave the Yuan
brothers alone for the time being:
16
SGZ 13:393, the biography of Zhong Yao, with 393–94 PC quoting Zhan lue
“An Account of the War” by Sima Biao of the fourth century, also the biography of
Pang De in SGZ 18:545 and 546 PC quoting Wei lue. An extensive account is given
by ZZTJ 64:2045–46; deC, Establish Peace, 310–314.
17
SGZ 1:23 and 24 PC quoting Wei shu. The first proclamation is dated to the
jiyou 己酉 day of the fifth month, equivalent to Western 22 June. The second, identi-
fied as the Gengshen Proclamation 庚申令, was evidently issued on that day in the
sixth month, being Western 3 July. In the latter document Cao Cao remarks that
no state can succeed if its officials are incompetent and its soldiers will not fight:
see also the Introduction at page 4. ZZTJ 64 makes no reference to either of these
proclamations.
18
Cao Cao returned to Xu city in the fifth month, and launched an attack on Liu
Biao in the eighth month. There was, however, an intercalary sixth month in this year,
so he was more than three months at Xu city.
19
SGZ 1:24, which dates the proclamation to the seventh month; ZZTJ again fails
to mention it. See also Chapter Eight at 377.
Yuan Shao loved those two sons, but neither was proclaimed as his heir.
Now they are rivals for power and each has his own party. If we press
them hard they will support one another, but if we ease off they will
begin to quarrel. The best plan is to turn south against Jing province and
wait for something to happen. When things have changed, we can attack
them, and the whole affair may be settled in a single blow.20
Cao Cao accepted the advice—and he may well have thought of the
plan for himself. In any case, the new policy worked well.
In the eighth month Cao Cao attacked Liu Biao’s positions on the
border of Runan and Nanyang, the same area Liu Bei had raided the
year before, but while he was thus engaged he received an envoy from
Yuan Tan.
As Cao Cao was withdrawing across the Yellow River, Yuan Tan
had asked his brother for more equipment and better troops, claim-
ing that with reinforcements he could surprise and defeat their enemy.
Yuan Shang, however, already uneasy about his authority, and no
doubt recalling Yuan Tan’s murder of Pang Ji, refused the request.
Angrily, Yuan Tan turned to attack Yuan Shang in Ye, but he was
heavily defeated and withdrew three hundred kilometres northeast
into Bohai, where he occupied the capital Nanpi, now Nanpi in Hebei.
This was in the north of Qing province, where Yuan Tan still held
title as Inspector, and he gained a few troops there, but he also faced
rebellion and his position was very insecure. When Yuan Shang came
to attack, Yuan Tan took refuge in the city of Pingyuan, just north of
the Yellow River by the present-day city of the same name, and at this
point he sent messengers seeking aid from Cao Cao.
In an attempt to halt this dangerous development, Liu Biao wrote
to both men, urging tolerance on each side, and encouraging them to
deal together with Cao Cao before they argued the rights and wrongs
of their father’s inheritance. His remonstrances fell on deaf ears, how-
ever, and the brothers continued their internecine warfare.21
Though Xin Ping had been a supporter of Yuan Tan, he and his
family had remained at Ye under Yuan Shang. He had evidently been
ill, and he died about this time, but his brother Xin Pi had accompa-
nied Yuan Tan to the east, and he was sent on embassy to Cao Cao.
20
SGZ 14:434, the biography of Guo Jia; deC, Establish Peace, 317.
21
See also above at 210. The pair of letters was probably drafted by the scholar
Wang Can: HHS 74/64B:2414 TC; deC, Establish Peace, 319.
214 chapter five
There was some debate, very likely orchestrated by Cao Cao himself,
whether he should continue the attack on Liu Biao or take advantage
of the quarrelling Yuan brothers. Eventually, Cao Cao called Xin Pi to
his presence and asked him point-blank, “Can I trust Yuan Tan? Am
I sure to defeat Yuan Shang?”
Xin Pi now revealed his true sympathies, telling Cao Cao that the
two rivals had fought one another to a standstill and were utterly vul-
nerable. A direct attack on Ye would force Yuan Shang to turn back;
Yuan Tan would follow on his heels, and both could be destroyed. On
the other hand, if Cao Cao failed to act now, the brothers might come
to their senses and the opportunity would be lost. Cao Cao accepted
this advice and Xin Pi, having successfully transferred his allegiance,
became a senior counsellor in his service.
In the winter Cao Cao led his army once more across the Yellow
River to Liyang, and he arranged a marriage between his son Cao
Zheng and a daughter of Yuan Tan. Yuan Shang indeed abandoned
the siege of Pingyuan and came back to protect his base. Some of his
officers went over to Cao Cao; they were rewarded with enfeoffment,
but Yuan Tan offered them seals in an attempt to persuade them to
join him instead. Though Cao Cao regarded this as a breach of the
alliance, he gave no sign of resentment at this stage.
In the spring of 204 Cao Cao prepared to advance on Ye. Using
timbers to make a weir on the Qi, a tributary of the Yellow River, he
diverted part of its stream into the upper reaches of the Qing River,
which flowed northeast past Liyang. The stream was then led into
an old watercourse close to the line of the present-day Wei River in
southern Hebei. After seventy kilometres, as it passed Neihuang, fifty
kilometres southeast of Ye city, this new Bo “White” Canal met the
southern branch of the Huan River. Coming from the Taihang moun-
tains in the west, the Huan divided into two by present-day Anyang:
the northern stream flowed past Ye to join the Zhang River, while the
southern flowed east to Neihuang. As a result, Cao Cao could now
bring supplies by water, first along the White Canal and the Qing, then
up the southern branch of the Huan River to the division of waters
and finally, by the northern branch, to Ye city.22
22
On the waterways of this region, see SJZ 9:306 (SJZS 17a), 9:323 (SJZS 48a) and
9:338–340 (SJZS 76b-82b). The North China plain is in many respects a vast delta of
the Yellow River, with many meanders, so the courses of rivers and canals have altered
several times in the past two thousand years—or have been changed by the works of
Map 11. Waterways about Ye City 204–220

216 chapter five
Despite the obvious threat, Yuan Shang appears to have been besot-
ted with hostility to his brother. He made no attempt to patch up their
feud, but on the contrary left Shen Pei with a garrison to hold Ye city
while he led a renewed attack on Yuan Tan in Pingyuan.
It seems like a death-wish: the combined forces of the family might
have been able to match Cao Cao on their home ground north of the
Yellow River, but Yuan Shang maintained the war against Yuan Tan
even as their mutual enemy was at the gates of his major stronghold.
Some could see the writing on the wall, for as Cao Cao advanced there
were defections from local magistrates, the Black Mountain leader
Zhang Yan offered alliance, and even Shen Pei’s senior colleague Su
You planned to change sides; he was discovered and fled to Cao Cao.
By the beginning of summer Cao Cao had cut the approaches from
Bing province in the west and laid siege to Ye. At first he constructed
mounds and tunnels to challenge and weaken the walls, but a few
weeks later he changed tactics and dug a great moat, filling it over-
night with water from the Zhang River. The city was isolated, and by
the beginning of autumn the defenders were starving.
Yuan Shang at last returned, with a relief force of perhaps ten thou-
sand men. Many believed that since Yuan Tan was behind them his
troops would feel trapped, and it could be dangerous to oppose them.
man—and even Shuijing zhu was compiled some three hundred years after the end
of Han. Some effect of Cao Cao’s work may be observed by comparing the maps at
Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 47–48, and III, 11–12 and 35–36.
The link between the Qi and the Qing did not require a great deal of new work, for
the upper reaches of the Qing occupied part of the bed of the former course of the
Yellow River, which had changed at the end of Former Han and the time of Wang
Mang. The effect, however, combined with the partial damming of the Qi, meant that
the flow of water in the Qing was considerably increased. The whole stream northeast
as far as Neihuang was therefore now known as the White Canal even though, strictly
speaking, it followed the same line as the Qing had in the past.
Strangely, none of the maps in Zhongguo lishi ditu ji show the northern branch of
the Huan River flowing past Ye, but in fact that city was almost entirely surrounded
by water. The Zhang River approached from the southwest and then curved to the
north; while the northern branch of the Huan came from the south, passed by the
east, and then—very probably canalised—turned to flow west along the northern wall.
At the northwest of the city it joined the Zhang River; it was in this region that Cao
Cao would later create the Xuanwu “Dark Warrior” Pond and the park which took its
name. To the south of the city, moreover, lay the Yanpi marshland, which Cao Cao
enhanced, but which surely existed in some form before.
The waterways about Ye are described by SJZ 9 as above and SJZ 10:347–53
(SJZS 15b-28b). A map of the complex arrangement, prepared by Yang Shoujing
from Shuijing zhu, is reproduced by Miyakawa, Rikuchō shi kenkyū, 539; see also
Knechtges I, 434–436 notes to lines 113–114, and further in Chapter Eight at 336–337
and Map 18.
Cao Cao agreed, but argued that this would only be true if Yuan Shang
made a direct attack: if he came from the west, where Gao Gan in
Bing province could offer support from the rear, his men would have
a line of retreat available, would feel more secure, and would fight less
fiercely. Yuan Shang indeed looped past Ye on the north and turned
to approach from the west. When his army was outside Ye city he
sent a messenger to Shen Pei and set signal fires to co-ordinate an
attack,23 but Cao Cao forced Shen Pei’s sortie back inside the walls,
then drove Yuan Shang into the hills and laid siege to his camp. Yuan
Shang asked to surrender but was refused, and as his officers deserted
him he fled north into Zhongshan. Cao Cao captured his baggage,
including his seal and other insignia, and displayed these trophies to
the discouraged defenders of Ye.
Still refusing to surrender, Shen Pei had crossbowmen fire at Cao
Cao as he rode out to view the progress of the siege; they very nearly
hit him. A few nights later, however, Shen Pei’s own nephew Shen
Rong, who was in charge of one of the gates to the city, opened it to
allow the enemy in. After a brief struggle in the streets, the city fell and
Shen Pei was taken alive.
When Xin Pi changed sides to join Cao Cao, the family of his brother
Xin Ping had been taken to the prison of Ye, and though Xin Pi went
immediately to have them released, Shen Pei had already had them
killed. Cao Cao is said to have been prepared to pardon Shen Pei, and
even excused his shooting at him, but Xin Pi and others demanded his
death and Shen Pei, loyal to the last, demanded his own execution. As
he knelt to the headsman he insisted on facing north, where his master
Yuan Shang had taken refuge.
Settlement of the North 204–20624
Yuan Tan was still in the east, his cousin Gao Gan held Bing province
to the west, and Yuan Shang remained for the time in Zhongshan, but
the fall of Ye city marked the end of the family’s power in Ji province.
23
On the deceit by which Yuan Shang’s messenger Li Fan made his way through
Cao Cao’s lines, see note 82 to Chapter Four.
24
Major sources for Cao Cao’s activities from 204 to 206 are SGZ 1:26–27, the
biographies of Yuan Shao’s sons at HHS 74/64B:2416–18 and SGZ 6:206–07, and the
biographies of various protagonists as identified below. They are presented in chroni-
cle order by ZZTJ 64–65:2056–69; deC, Establish Peace, 330–352.
218 chapter five
Among those captured were the Lady Liu, widow of Yuan Shao, and
the Lady Zhen, wife of Yuan Xi; Yuan Xi was in You province to the
north, but the Lady had remained at Ye to act as companion to her
formal mother-in-law. Born to a wealthy official family, she is said to
have been both virtuous and beautiful, and we are told—not necessar-
ily reliably—that Cao Cao had his eye on her. His son Cao Pi got there
first, however, and with an insouciant disregard for the proprieties he
took her as his principal wife even while her first husband, Yuan Xi,
was still living: the couple were married at Ye.25
More decorously, Cao Cao went to pay respects at the tomb of Yuan
Shao, and wept in mourning for his old enemy. He offered condo-
lences to the widowed Lady Liu, returned their treasure to the family,
and granted them silk and cloth and a government pension of grain.
Cao Cao’s success was marked by an imperial decree naming him
Governor of Ji province, but he excused himself from such honour
and continued with his former title as Governor of the smaller Yan
province. Since the court was under his control, the proffered pro-
motion was either an attempt by the emperor to curry favour or an
occasion for Cao Cao to display his modesty; possibly both. Gao Gan
in Bing province offered formal surrender, and Cao Cao confirmed
him in office as Inspector. No-one, however, can have expected that
settlement to last for long.
Otherwise, Cao Cao employed many gentlemen who had held office
under the Yuan, including Cui Yan from a noted family in Boling.
Cui Yan is said to have encouraged Cao Cao to rebuild the country
devastated by the recent wars between the Yuan brothers and, whether
at Cui Yan’s urging or by his own good sense, Cao Cao issued a proc-
lamation that, as they had suffered so long under the maladministra-
tion of the Yuan family, all newly-conquered territories were freed of
tax for that year; the move gained him wide popularity.26 At the same
25
The biography of the Lady Zhen is at SGZ 5:159–164; Cutter and Crowell,
Empresses and Consorts, 95–106. She became the mother of his son Cao Rui, but in
221, soon after Cao Pi had taken the imperial title, he obliged her to commit suicide
on account of her excessive jealousy. When Cao Rui succeeded his father as emperor
of Wei, he gave her posthumous honours as an empress.
Cao Cao’s interest is mentioned by SSXY XXXV:1; Mather, Tales of the World, 484,
though this is not a reliable source: Chapter Eleven at 478.
26
Cui Yan’s biography is at SGZ 12:367–74, and his advice to Cao Cao is recorded
at 367–68; deC, Establish Peace, 330–331. The history of the Cui family over sev-
eral centuries is discussed by Ebrey, Aristocratic Families; see also LH3K, 99–105,
particularly sub Cui Zhuan 崔篆 at 105.
time, Liang Xi in Bing province sent contingents of soldiers and their

families to settle at Ye, and these alien troops served to protect the new
capital from any threat of local revanchism in favour of the Yuan.27
For his part, freed from the pressure of his brother’s offensive, Yuan
Tan had moved east and north. From his base at Pingyuan in Qing
province, he took control of Ganling, immediately across the Yellow
River in Ji province, then extended his sway into Hejian, Anping and
Bohai, and finally drove Yuan Shang out of his refuge in Zhongshan.
Yuan Shang went north to join Yuan Xi in Zhuo commandery, and
Yuan Tan took over many of his troops.
Yuan Tan, however, had provided no support to Cao Cao in his
attack on Ye. As before, when he attempted to recruit officers of Yuan
Shang who had surrendered to Cao Cao, he was seeking to take advan-
tage of Cao Cao’s success in direct fighting and pick up such marginal
gains as he could. Cao Cao now accused him of breaking their alli-
ance: cancelling the marriage contract with Cao Zheng, he sent back
Yuan Tan’s daughter; and in the twelfth month, at the beginning of
Western 205, he brought his army west through Ganling. Yuan Tan
could offer no effective resistance, and as Cao Cao occupied Pingyuan
he withdrew once more to Nanpi in Bohai.
The description of the relationship between Cao Cao and Yuan Tan
is written from the former’s viewpoint, but it appears that Yuan Tan
was seeking to consolidate a position in the east of the North China
plain, and he presumably hoped to maintain some independence and
negotiate a further settlement with his nominal ally, who now held
the major part of the family’s former territory. In doing so, he may
well have neglected his obligations under whatever agreement they
had made—he had no doubt been expected to take an active part in
the attack on Yuan Shang in Ye—but it is most unlikely that Cao Cao
Cao Cao’s short proclamation forgiving taxation for a year is at SGZ 1:26. PC at
this point quotes Wei shu with a text of another proclamation, giving details of the
liabilities of each family, and strict instructions against powerful clans hoarding and
exploiting their wealth at the expense of their poorer neighbours. This was presumably
a more general statement of policy to be applied in future, after the “tax holiday.” It
is discussed further in Chapter Six at 251.
27
See 225–226 below for an account of Liang Xi’s manoeuvres in Bing province.
Zhou Yiliang, Shilun ji, 4–5, suggests that the soldiers and their families transferred to
Ye city at this time were the same as the ten thousand households of “military fami-
lies” (士家 shijia) which Cao Pi planned to transfer from Ye to Luoyang in 220. On
shijia or bingjia 兵家 “soldiers’ families,” see Chapter Four at 166–167.
220 chapter five
had ever intended to maintain the alliance for long. He needed only
an excuse to attack Yuan Tan, and he could now act with a display of
righteous indignation.
Yuan Tan’s recent conquests cannot have been securely held. Driven
from his former territory in Qing province, he had controlled Bohai
and the rest of northern Ji province for no more than a few weeks, and
whatever legacy of goodwill and acceptance Yuan Shao might have left
had been ruined by the warfare between the two brothers. In the first
month of 205 Cao Cao advanced on Nanpi. Yuan Tan came out to
fight, and the battle was at first evenly-matched, with heavy casualties
on both sides. There was talk of withdrawal, but Cao Cao’s cavalry
commander Cao Chun rallied the troops for a last assault, and the
day was won.28 Yuan Tan fled in disguise, but fell from his horse and
was killed. His chief adviser Guo Tu was captured and executed, and
members of his family and of other leaders, probably including those
of Yuan Tan, were also slain.29 On the other hand, it is said that Cao
Cao was persuaded by the local officer Li Fu that the city should not
be sacked.30
The destruction of Yuan Tan confirmed Cao Cao’s authority on the
North China plain. The Black Mountain leader Zhang Yan had previ-
ously offered a form of alliance, and now submitted fully, while the
local officials of Ji and Qing provinces followed suit. With the advice
of Guo Jia, who had served for a time in Ji province under Yuan
Shao, Cao Cao invited leading gentry to join his administration, and
made a fine show of generosity to former enemies. He also ordered
28
Cao Chun was an adoptive cousin of Cao Cao. His grandfather Cao Bao was
an elder brother of the eunuch Cao Teng, who had adopted Cao Cao’s father Cao
Song. Cao Bao’s son, Cao Chi, was the father of Cao Chun and of his twin brother
Cao Ren, both of whom served Cao Cao with distinction. See Table 1 and note 28 to
Chapter One.
29
The death of Guo Tu and the destruction of his family are recorded by HHS
74/64B:2417, while SGZ 6:206 says that Cao Cao killed Yuan Tan, Guo Tu and unspec-
ified others. SGZ 1:27 says that Cao Cao killed (斬 zhan) Yuan Tan and punished (誅
zhu) his wives and children. The character zhu generally indicates death, and though
one must wonder whether Cao Cao really had his former daughter-in-law-elect killed,
nothing more is heard of her, nor any of her kin.
30
SGZ 15:484 PC quoting Wei lue. As Registrar to Yuan Shang in the previous year,
Li Fu had cleverly carried a message for him into the besieged city of Ye: note 82 to
Chapter Four. He later became a senior provincial official under Cao Cao.
the suppression of private feuding and vendetta, and in a first taste of

sumptuary laws to come he forbade excessive funerary rites and tomb
constructions, and the erection of stele.31
The scholar Wang Xiu, a senior adviser to Yuan Tan, had been sent
to Le’an by the mouth of the Yellow River to arrange for supplies of
grain from Qing province. When he learned of Cao Cao’s attack on
Nanpi, he attempted to come to his master’s aid, but Yuan Tan was
defeated and killed before he could arrive. He begged Yuan Tan’s body
for burial, and Cao Cao not only approved but took Wang Xiu into his
service. He was sent once more to Le’an, in charge of grain transport
as before, with additional instructions to kill the Administrator Guan
Tong, who had obstinately refused to surrender. Wang Xiu, however,
felt that Guan Tong displayed an honourable loyalty to the Yuan,
and he sent him to Cao Cao to plead his case. Cao Cao approved: he
allowed Guan Tong to retire into obscurity, and appointed Wang Xiu
to his personal staff.32
The effects of Cao Cao’s success were echoed further north in You
province. Yuan Shang had fled to Yuan Xi, whose headquarters as
Inspector were at Ji county in Guangyang. Yuan Xi’s subordinate Jiao
Chu, however, turned against him and drove the brothers away to the
northeast, where they took refuge with the non-Chinese Wuhuan of
Liaoxi. Proclaiming himself Inspector in place of his former master,
Jiao Chu compelled many local officials to join him in an oath of loy-
alty to Cao Cao.33
The greater part of You province, however, was controlled by indi-
vidual warlords and chieftains, some of whom, such as Xianyu Fu in
the north of Yuyang, had already indicated their support of Cao Cao.
Cao Cao now sent letters to other local leaders, and Wang Song, for
example, who controlled a few counties in the south of Yuyang and
31
SGZ 1:27. On Cao Cao’s sumptuary laws, see further in Chapter Eight at 373.
The proclamation as recorded by SGZ 1 does not mention stele, but the prohibition
(禁立碑 jin li bai) appears in the version at SongS 15:407, cited by Dien, Six Dynasties
Civilization, 205 and 461.
32
SGZ 11:346–47, the biography of Wang Xiu. Two years earlier, Guan Tong had quit
his previous post as Administrator of Donglai, on the tip of the Shandong peninsula, to
come and assist Yuan Tan. His wife and children, whom he left behind in Donglai, were
killed by bandits; he must have wondered whether his loyalty had been worth while.
33
SGZ 1:27 and 6:206.
222 chapter five
Zhuo, offered his territory.34 There was opposition: the local leaders
Zhao Du and Huo Nu of Zhuo commandery, evidently in sympathy
with the Yuan, attacked and killed the Inspector—perhaps Jiao Chu35—
and the local Administrator, while Wuhuan tribesmen attacked Xianyu
Fu. A period of uncertainty and confusion followed but in the autumn,
having confirmed his position in Ji province, Cao Cao attacked and
destroyed Zhao Du and Huo Nu. He went on to relieve Xianyu Fu,
and drove the Wuhuan across the frontier.
Though the Wuhuan remained a potential source of trouble, Cao
Cao could not stay in the north for long, and at the beginning of win-
ter 205 he returned to Ye city. Gao Gan in Bing province had made
formal surrender after the flight of his cousin Yuan Shang, but in the
eleventh month, presumably inspired by hope that support from the
Wuhuan might bring a revival in the family fortunes, he declared his
independence once more. Seizing Cao Cao’s Administrator of Shang-
dang, he garrisoned the Hu Pass, controlling the main route from the
Taihang mountains onto the plain. Cao Cao sent troops to hold the
line there, but the major problem lay south and west, in Hedong com-
mandery.
In 199 Cao Cao had left Wei Chong in charge of Henei commandery,
which curved along the Yellow River and the southern part of the
Taihang range. There had been no reports of trouble since that time,
and the territory blocked any move by Gao Gan south from Shangdang.
Despite Wei Chong’s authority, however, the bandit Zhang Cheng,
one of many who appeared after the turmoil of the Yellow Turbans
twenty years earlier, was still active in the region. He was known as
White Rider Zhang, after the horse that he rode, and it is claimed
that he commanded as many as ten thousand men.36 Though he origi-
nally came from Henei and his base was north of the Yellow River,
34
SGZ 14:456–57, being the biography of Liu Fang, who persuaded Wang Song to
take this step and composed the letter of submission. Cao Cao found it so elegant that
he took Liu Fang onto his staff.
35
Goodman, Ts’ao P’i Transcendent, 197, however, notes that a general with the
personal name Chu and enfeoffment as a village marquis was one of the sponsors of
a stele commemorating Cao Pi’s assumption of the imperial title in 220. He suggests
this was Jiao Chu, who may have taken title as Inspector only later.
36
HHS 71/61:2311; deC, Huan and Ling, 192 and 567 [as White Horse Zhang]; on
the identity of Zhang Cheng with the bandit known as White Rider/White Horse, see
SGZ 14:472 and 18:545; deC, Establish Peace, 343 note 22.
his ravages extended into Hongnong, south of the River and west of
Luoyang, where he was joined by the local leader Zhang Yan.37
Wang Yi, a man from Beidi in the north, had been Administrator
of Hedong when the emperor came in flight from Chang’an in 195,
and he had been rewarded for his support with enfeoffment and title
as a general. He was still there ten years later, but he had no strong
connection to Cao Cao, and he was concerned rather to hold his posi-
tion as a local strongman than to quell the banditry and raiding. With
imperial authority, Cao Cao had him recalled and replaced him with
the Administrator of Xiping, Du Ji.
Du Ji, a man from Jingzhao, was about forty-five years old. He had
held local office before the outbreak of civil war, spent some time as
a refugee in Jing province, then returned to the north and joined Cao
Cao. He served on his staff, was admired and sponsored by Xun Yu,
and was given appointment in the northwest as Protector of the Qiang
and head of the new commandery of Xiping, which had been set up in
the upper Xining valley of western Jincheng. It is doubtful he had actu-
ally been able to visit that distant territory, which was far from Cao
Cao’s direct control, but he had acquired a reputation on the north-
western frontier, and Xun Yu recommended him once more for the
sensitive post in Hedong.
Wang Yi was reluctant to leave his territory, but felt obliged to
obey imperial orders, even if they were issued at Cao Cao’s behest.
In a deliberate snub, he refused to hand over his insignia to Zhong
Yao, Cao Cao’s head of the province, but went direct to Xu city and
returned them to the court of Emperor Xian. In Hedong, moreover,
leading families resented the change and prepared to resist the new
appointment. Headed by Wei Gu, a local officer of the commandery,
and Fan Xian, who had taken title as a General of the Household,
they made contact with Gao Gan, and when Du Ji came to the Shan
Crossing of the Yellow River, he was faced and held back by several
thousand soldiers.
After some months of stalemate, Cao Cao became impatient and
ordered Xiahou Dun to lead troops into the commandery. Du Ji, how-
ever, insisted that an attack might fail against entrenched resistance,
and even if it were successful it would cause heavy civilian casualties
37
This Zhang Yan 張琰 is not the same man as Zhang Yan 張燕 the leader of the
Black Mountain bandits, who had lately surrendered to Cao Cao.
224 chapter five
and damage the value of the territory. On the other hand, Wei Gu
and his fellows were claiming only that they objected to Wang Yi’s
dismissal; they had not formally rebelled. With just a small escort,
therefore, using secondary roads, Du Ji made his way to Anyi, capital
of the commandery.
Seeking to intimidate Du Ji, Wei Gu and Fan Xian killed a number
of local officers in front of his residence, but Du Ji kept his composure
and his presence served as a rallying point. As Wei Gu and Fan Xian
remained confident, Du Ji persuaded them that they could afford to
let some of their men go home. For his own part, he made secret con-
tact with magistrates and other leaders in the surrounding counties
opposed to the dissidents.
Towards the end of the year matters came to a head, as Zhang Cheng
attacked the east of Hedong and Gao Gan sent troops from Shang-
dang. Leaving Anyi, where he was under threat from Wei Gu, Du Ji
established a defensive position outside the city, and the majority of
counties supported him. Wei Gu and his fellows joined Zhang Cheng
and Gao Gan’s forces in an attack, but could make no headway, and
Cao Cao’s officer Zhang Ji brought Ma Teng and other western leaders
to support Du Ji. Gao Gan was driven back and the bandits and insur-
gents were defeated, while Wei Gu and Fan Xian, Zhang Cheng and
Zhang Yan, were all taken and killed. Du Ji was confirmed in his office,
and he ruled successfully in Hedong for the next sixteen years.38
Cao Cao now controlled the southern flank of Gao Gan’s territory,
and at the beginning of 206 he moved to eliminate him. Advanc-
ing into the hill country east from Ye, he made his way through the
Hu Pass with little opposition, and laid siege to Huguan, the city at
its head. As Huguan surrendered in the third Chinese month, Gao
Gan’s resistance was broken. With just a few horsemen, he fled west
to seek aid from the Xiongnu at Pingyuan in Hedong, but the Shanyu
Huchuquan, chastened by his experience of 202, refused to receive
him. Gao Gan turned south towards Jing province, to take refuge with
Liu Biao, but he was taken and executed by a county commandant in
Jingzhao.
38
The complex and courageous manoeuvres of Du Ji are described in ZZTJ
64:2062–64; deC, Establish Peace, 340–344, following his biography in SGZ 16:494–95,
the biography of Zhang Ji in SGZ 15:472 and SGZ 13:394 PC quoting Wei lue.
Cao Cao’s biography in Sanguo zhi claims that all of Bing province
had been pacified, but this is an exaggeration. Though Gao Gan had
held title as Inspector, it is unlikely that he had any real authority out-
side Shangdang, Taiyuan and perhaps Yanmen and the east of Xihe—a
single defeat in Shangdang had left him with no resource but an appeal
to the Xiongnu.
In similar fashion, though Du Ji was now unopposed in Hedong, it
is clear that Huchuquan had some freedom of operation about Ping-
yang, and it is probable that Du Ji held only about half the command-
ery, south of the Fen. North of that river, most of the former frontier
region of Later Han was beyond the control of any one authority, with
scattered settlements of Chinese and Xiongnu or Qiang clansmen liv-
ing in an uneasy relationship and a mixed economy of herding and
farming. Neither the Shanyu of the Xiongnu nor the nominal magis-
trates of the region received any recognition beyond their immediate
headquarters.39
For the time being, however, the important thing was that there
was no further threat from this region. Du Ji was able to restore the
economy in his territory, and Cao Cao appointed Liang Xi as Inspec-
tor of Bing province.
A man from Chen commandery, Liang Xi had been a local officer
and held a series of county magistracies, then joined Cao Cao’s head-
quarters. His experience suited him for the new position, and he was
also given title as a senior major so that he could deal with military
matters without need to declare a state of emergency.
There was still disorder in the region: the barbarians were threatening
and ravaging the territory, officials and people had run away to join the
tribes, and great numbers of fighting men and their families were plun-
dering everywhere.40
Establishing his new regime, Liang Xi encouraged the refugees to
return, while he paid respect to the heads of the most powerful clans
and offered them official positions; when they accepted, he sent them
to Cao Cao at Ye city with his recommendation. As they left, he used
39
The breakdown of authority in this region is discussed in deC, Northern Frontier,
352–353; the rearrangements and the settlement by Cao Cao in 214–216 are described
below in Chapter Seven at 317.
40
From the biography of Liang Xi at SGZ 15:469. The parallel passage of ZZTJ
65:2066–67; deC, Establish Peace, 348, adapts this text.
226 chapter five
his military authority to gather their followers into a volunteer corps,

and when his provincial army went on campaign he had these auxiliary
troops accompany it under the command of regular officers. By this
means, he separated the members of private armies from their former
leaders and placed them under discipline, and he sent others away to
Ye with their families and dependents, where they served as hostages
for good behaviour and provided some security for Cao Cao’s new
capital.41 Much of this recruitment was managed by sleight of hand,
and the out-migration of some thousands of people must have weak-
ened the Chinese position in the territory, but we may well believe that
those who remained were content to serve a substantial government
under the command of a man who knew what he was doing.
Thus armed with an effective force, Liang Xi was strong enough to
overawe or crush local opposition, and increasing numbers returned
to the territory under his control. It was probably limited to the region
south of the Sanggan River and west of the Taihang mountains: Yan-
men, Taiyuan, Shangdang and part of Xihe, but it was reasonably
settled, and as Liang Xi encouraged agriculture we are told that elders
among the people sang his praises and claimed there had never been
such a benevolent and effective ruler.
By the middle of 206, therefore, Cao Cao’s western borders were

secure: Liang Xi was reclaiming the remnants of Bing province, Du
Ji was established in Hedong, and Zhong Yao and others had general
command of the capital province as far as Hongnong. Liu Biao and
his associate Liu Bei in Jing province had shown no further signs of
aggression or interest, and the situation appeared sufficiently safe for
Cao Cao to turn his attention to the further north, where the disor-
ders of You province were comparable to those of Bing province but
potentially more threatening.
You province contained a number of different warlords and local
leaders with varying loyalties. Some had been swiftly settled during
Cao Cao’s first incursion after the destruction of the Yuan in 205:
Xianyu Fu, for example, had been a supporter of Cao Cao from early
years; Wang Song had recently submitted; and Yan Rou had accepted
official appointment from Yuan Shao but changed allegiance to Cao
Cao. The general confusion, however, had allowed the non-Chinese
41
See page 219 above.
Wuhuan people to gain in strength and form a loose confederacy

under the leadership of the chieftain Tadun, and it was Tadun’s pro-
tection and support that Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi sought as they fled
to the north.
Further to the northeast, in the south of present-day Manchuria,
the warlord Gongsun Du had established an independent state, with
extensions into present-day Korea and, for a time at least, across the
Gulf of Bohai to the northern shore of the Shandong peninsula. In 204
Cao Cao sent him insignia as a feudatory and a general, but Gongsun
Du despised the offer, and though he died soon afterwards his son
Gongsun Kang inherited his power and his independent attitude. He
was well beyond Cao Cao’s reach and largely out of his concern,42 but
the problem with the Wuhuan required more immediate action.
During the Han period, the Wuhuan lived in the hill country along
the frontier of You province, squeezed between the Chinese to their
south and the increasing power of the Xianbi in the forests and steppe
to their north. Their customs were similar to those of the Xianbi,
but they lacked the strength and aggression of those neighbours,
and though they are described as warlike they had minimal skills of
organisation. At the end of the third century BC a disastrous defeat by
Modun, founding Shanyu of the Xiongnu, led to a period of subjuga-
tion, but by the end of Former Han the Wuhuan had become loose
though occasionally unruly associates of China.43 The aggression and
insensitivity of Wang Mang turned them once more into allies of the
42
Biographies of Gongsun Du and his son Gongsun Kang are in SGZ 8:250–53.
The history of their state, which survived until its conquest by Wei in 238, is told by
Gardiner, “Kung-sun Warlords.”
The empire of Han had established commandery authority over the north-western
part of the Korean peninsula as far as present-day Pyongyang, but this eastern frontier
of You province had always been vulnerable to attack from its non-Chinese neigh-
bours, notably the Koguryŏ [Ch: Gaogouli] who were at that time based primarily
in present-day Manchuria. See the Accounts of these people at HHS 85/75:2815 and
SGZ 30:844–45, discussed by Gardiner, Early History, 18–25. The state established by
Gongsun Du, however, was a buffer against this troubled region, and Cao Cao never
had to deal with it.
43
Accounts of the Wuhuan for Han and the Three Kingdoms period are in HHS
90/80:2979–84 and SGZ 30:831–35, particularly 832–33 PC quoting Wei shu. Their
history during the first and second centuries BC is discussed by deC, Northern Fron-
tier, 367–372.
The name of the people appears in Hou Han shu as 烏桓 Wuhuan and in Sanguo
zhi as 烏丸 Wuwan. Pronunciation of 桓 and 丸 were identical during Han times:
Karlgren, GSR 163a and 164f; Karlgren observes that the modern Mandarin wan for
丸 is irregular, we should expect a huan.
228 chapter five
Xiongnu, but the division of the Xiongnu in the second half of the 40s
AD induced the Wuhuan to submit to the restored Han government
of Emperor Guangwu. From about 50 a Protector of the Wuhuan
supervised trade and other relations with Wuhuan and Xianbi to the
north of You province, while the Chang River Regiment of the elite
Northern Army at Luoyang was made up of Wuhuan horsemen.44
The settlement with the Wuhuan entailed a withdrawal of Chi-
nese presence along the frontier, but that was a small price to pay
in exchange for what proved to be a long-term peace with few inter-
ruptions, and a useful source of military recruitment and assistance.
Besides the remarkable trust displayed by the use of Wuhuan troopers
to guard the imperial capital, local tribesmen served with the armies
of Han against the Northern Xiongnu, the Xianbi and the Qiang in
the west.
Considerable strain was placed upon the alliance at the beginning
of the second century, however, when the great Qiang rebellion from
107 to 118 stretched the resources of the empire. A few Wuhuan took
advantage of this to take part in raiding, and though the majority
returned to allegiance and fought for Han against the growing power
of the Xianbi, their loyalty was tempered by opportunism, and they
occasionally took sides with the enemies of the dynasty.
The situation deteriorated markedly when a great Han army, includ-
ing contingents from the Wuhuan, was destroyed on the steppe by the
Xianbi leader Tanshihuai in 177, and the rebellion of the Yellow Tur-
bans in 184 was further evidence of Chinese weakness. The Wuhuan
had no direct involvement in that fighting, but as the rebellion in Liang
province broke out at the end of that year, Wuhuan horsemen were
called up to assist the imperial forces in the west. Some were resentful
at the long distance involved, and as the contingent was left to camp
in Guangyang without food or pay, many deserted and returned to
their homes. The display of administrative incompetence encouraged
the malcontents further, and in 187 there was a major rebellion led by
the renegade Chinese Zhang Chun and Zhang Ju, ravaging Youbeip-
ing, Liaoxi and Guangyang, and bringing the death of the Protector
44
The history of Wuhuan dealings with Wang Mang, and the settlement made by
Emperor Guangwu, are discussed by deC, Northern Frontier, 372–385.
On the division of the Xiongnu, with the Northern Shanyu remaining on the steppe
and the Southern Shanyu settled within the Ordos as a subordinate ally of China, see
deC, Northern Frontier, 227–242.
Gongqi Chou. The trouble was settled for a time by the new Governor
Liu Yu, appointed in 188, and the aggressive fighting man Gongsun
Zan, but after Gongsun Zan destroyed Liu Yu in 193, and was in turn
attacked by loyalists in 195, Chinese control was broken and a number
of Wuhuan leaders emerged with their own regimes.45
As early as 168, at the beginning of the reign of Emperor Ling, we
are told that some local chieftains of the Wuhuan had established a
degree of independence. All were comparatively young, and in Sino-
centric fashion they were identified by the commanderies they oper-
ated in. Nanlou of Shanggu was said to have controlled more than
nine thousand household groups, perhaps fifty thousand individuals,
followed by Qiuliju of Liaoxi, with five thousand such groups, and
then Supuyan of the Dependent State of Liaodong and Wuyan of You-
beiping, whose followings were smaller.46
When Qiuliju died some time in the early 190s, his son Louban
was too young to act as an effective war leader, so the command was
taken by Qiuliju’s nephew Tadun. Tadun, indeed, was recognised by
the neighbouring tribes of the Dependent State and Youbeiping, and
he probably led the Wuhuan contingent which came to support Yuan
Shao in the final offensive against Gongsun Zan in 199. In gratitude
for this assistance and to confirm their fealty, Yuan Shao granted seals
and insignia as Shanyu to the various chieftains, including Tadun,
and arranged marriage alliances with them: he claimed to be offer-
ing women of his own family, though they were actually daughters
of some of his officers. Tadun later relinquished his title of Shanyu in
favour of Louban and took the lesser title of king, but he continued
to dominate the council and was effective head of the confederacy.
45
The history of the Wuhuan during the Later Han period, and the troubles of the
180s and 190s, are discussed by deC, Northern Frontier, 386–404.
46
DeC, Northern Frontier, 397. The term luo 落 used here appears to refer to
“campfire” groups, ayil in Mongolian, a common unit of nomad society. See Northern
Frontier, 177, quoting Vladimirtsov, Régime sociale des Mongols, 44 et saepe.
As with the name of the Wuhuan people [note 43 above] there are different writings
of the name of the chieftain whom I refer to as Supuyan. I follow HHS 90/80:2984
and ZZTJ 63:2013; deC, Establish Peace, 248, which has 蘇僕延. SGZ 30:835, however,
has Sufuwan 速附丸, while SGZ 1:29 has Supuwan 速僕丸, and is followed by ZZTJ
65:2072; Establish Peace, 359. All these variants would have had very similar pronun-
ciation at the time: Northern Frontier, note 79 at 549.
Supuyan also styled himself as King Qiao 峭王, the “Severe King,” and Wuyan is
sometimes referred to as the Hanlu 汗魯 King, hanlu being perhaps the transcription
of a Wuhuan equivalent to Shanyu or Khan.
230 chapter five
As Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi fled north from Cao Cao in 205 they took
refuge with Tadun.
There were rumours that Tadun had plans for a broad alliance of
Wuhuan and other northern peoples, but it is doubtful he had any
support beyond his immediate neighbours, and highly unlikely that
any of the Xianbi tribes, now dominant on the steppe, would have
accepted his leadership. On the other hand, the arrival of the Yuan
brothers and their supporters added to his strength, and although esti-
mates of two or three hundred thousand men are surely too high, he
did have a powerful army and was protected by mountains and rivers.
Emphasising his support of the Yuan, Tadun launched a series of raids
to the south.
Such activities cannot have posed any real threat to Cao Cao’s gen-
eral control, nor was there any real possibility that the Yuan might
recover their position with Tadun’s support, but it would be extremely
difficult to settle the north of the plain until the Wuhuan had been
dealt with. Cao Cao resolved to do this as quickly and decisively as
possible.
White Wolf Mountain 20747
The campaign was not without its risks, for the frontier lay seven hun-
dred kilometres from Xu, and that city was well within range of Liu
Biao and Liu Bei in Jing province. There had been little activity from
the south, however, and though several of Cao Cao’s counsellors were
concerned at the possibility of a sudden strike, Guo Jia argued that
Liu Biao would be extremely reluctant to let Liu Bei take any action: if
he were successful he could quickly turn against his master. Cao Cao
accepted the argument and discounted the threat,48 while the success
of his recent campaign in Bing province, and the hold established by
47
Major sources for Cao Cao’s operations against the Wuhuan in 206–207 are SGZ
1:27–30, and the accounts of the Wuhuan in HHS 90/80:2984 and SGZ 30:834–35.
They are presented in chronicle order by ZZTJ 64:2056–74; deC, Establish Peace, 330–
361. The campaign is described by deC, Northern Frontier, 407–413.
48
Guo Jia’s advice is recorded in his biography at SGZ 14:434, and there is further
detail of the debate in SGZ 1:29. Considering what happened when Liu Zhang in Yi
province sought to make use of Liu Bei [Chapter Seven at 307–309], Guo Jia read the
situation well.
Zhong Yao and Du Ji over the former capital region, meant he need
have no concern in that direction.
Other parts of his nominal territory were not yet fully subdued, but
Cao Cao confirmed his authority in the east by driving away the pirate
Guan Cheng, who had been operating near the base of the Shandong
peninsula, south of the mouth of the Yellow River in Beihai; Guan
Cheng was obliged to take refuge among the off-shore islands. Fur-
ther east in Donglai, Chang Xi had submitted in 201 but then rebelled
again; he was attacked, defeated and killed. These operations took place
in mid-autumn of 206, and it was a mark of Cao Cao’s strength that
both enemies were defeated by detachments under his officers Yue Jin,
Li Dian and Yu Jin. It was apparent that in the area where he claimed
control, Cao Cao could delegate many operations to lesser units—and
if these were not successful there remained the imposing threat of the
main army under his personal command.
On this basis, Cao Cao made careful preparations for his attack on
the Wuhuan. Placing his headquarters for the time at Yi city, former
stronghold of Gongsun Zan on the border of Ji and You provinces,
during the second half of 206 he had a series of canals constructed
to bring supplies for the army from the southern part of the plain up
to the north. The exact route of these waterways is uncertain, but it
is probable that the Pinglu “Pacify the Caitiffs” Trench connected the
Hutuo and Gu Rivers south of Yi city, and the Quanzhou Trench ran
parallel to the coast near present-day Tianjin, from the Yi River to the
Baoqiu. From that point, moreover, a further extension, later known
as the Xinhe or New River, led eastwards along the northern shore
of the Gulf of Bohai as far as the Luan—then known as the Ru—and
possibly beyond. By this means, equipment and provisions could be
carried on barges, first to the region of Cao Cao’s base at Yi city, then
down the Gu River to the Yi and towards the coast, then again to the
north and northeast. Quanzhou city, by present-day Tianjin, was the
advance distribution point.49
49
The canals are described in SGZ 1:28, with commentary in SGZJJ at 64b, while
the biography of Dong Zhao at SGZ 14:439 [SGZJJ at 17b] says that he was given
charge of these works and was later enfeoffed for his achievement. The new system is
discussed by deC, Northern Frontier, 407–408 and note 100 at 552–555.
Though it is difficult to reconstruct the courses of ancient waterways on this flat
terrain, and the pattern had changed even by the time of Shuijing zhu in the fifth cen-
tury, it is generally agreed that the Quanzhou Trench ran roughly along the line of the
modern Grand Canal; it took its name from the county in Yuyang which controlled
232
chapter five
Map 12. Cao Cao in the northeast 206–207

Barges moved slowly, but hardly slower than ox-carts, and they
could transport far greater weight and bulk. Though work on the canals
began as winter approached, when the ground became difficult to dig,
much of the construction entailed only the widening and deepening
of channels and meanders which already existed. It was nonetheless an
impressive communications link, and by the summer of 207 Cao Cao
was ready to embark on his offensive.
Tadun was based in the hill country of the Song Ling ranges about
the Daling River, inland from the coastal strip which links the region
of present-day Beijing with the Manchurian plain. This was the ter-
ritory of the Dependent State of Liaodong.50 The natural approach
lay east along the coast, extending the line of the New River, but as
Cao Cao led his army by that route the weather turned against him:
heavy rains and flooding made the roads impassable, and the Wuhuan
defended every crossing.
At this point Cao Cao made contact with the local leader Tian
Chou, whose settlement was in the north of Youbeiping. Though Tian
Chou had hitherto maintained his independence, as Cao Cao’s army
approached he went to visit him in his camp. Some raids of Tadun’s
men had affected his people, and Tian Chou was angry, but he had
formerly been on good terms with the non-Chinese and he knew the
region well. He now advised Cao Cao:51
the territory. The water system about the Trench is described by SJZ 14:463–71 (SJZS
23b); Northern Frontier, note 100 at 552, and the New River by SJZ 14:474 (SJZS 44b);
Northern Frontier, note 100 at 552–553.
Unfortunately, the passages of Shuijing zhu dealing with the area of the Pinglu
Trench have been lost. Maps 11–12 of Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III suggest that it too
followed the line of the Grand Canal, only further south. I have argued, however, that
it lay well to the west, for the distance between the rivers would have been shorter
and the canal itself better protected by Cao Cao’s forces: Northern Frontier, note 100
at 553–555.
50
Here again, I disagree with the compilers of Zhongguo lishi ditu ji. In Volume
II of that series, Maps 61–62 place the Dependent State of Liaodong on the coastal
region at the head of the Bay of Liaodong, separated from the frontier of the empire
by Liaodong and Liaoxi commanderies, which loop to its north. One would expect,
however, that a Dependent State, designed to control semi-submitted barbarians,
would be placed directly on the frontier, and it is far more probable that the north-
western shore of the Bay of Liaodong was controlled by Liaoxi commandery, while
the Dependent State extended west from Liaodong and north of Liaoxi to occupy the
valley of the Daling River: deC, Northern Frontier, 39–40, and note 53 at 460–465.
If this presumption is accepted, the account of Cao Cao’s campaign in the Chinese
histories makes more sense.
51
SGZ 11:342, the biography of Tian Chou, also ZZTJ 65:2071–72; deC, Establish
Peace, 357–358.
234 chapter five
The road along the coast always floods in summer and autumn. The
water is too deep for horses and carts, but too shallow for boats and
barges. These conditions have long been a difficulty for the region.
In former times, however, when the capital of the commandery [of
Youbeiping] was at Pinggang, there was a road which led out by Lulong
and on to Liucheng.52 Since the Jianwu period, two hundred years ago,
it has fallen into ruin, but there are still the remnants of a track which
you can follow.
The enemy commanders will be certain that a major army such as
yours must make a direct attack from Wuzhong, and they will be confi-
dent that since you cannot advance against them now you will be forced
to withdraw. They will feel secure, and will relax their preparations.53
If you turn your army aside, however, and go out through the Lulong
pass into the gorges of the Botan region,54 you will find yourself in unde-
fended territory. The road is close and convenient, and you will be able
to attack them where they least expect it. You can take Tadun’s head
without a single battle.
Guo Jia, who had accompanied the army to the north, endorsed the
proposal, but encouraged Cao Cao to take a minimum of baggage and
travel as swiftly and secretly as possible.
52
This refers to the Former Han period, when the frontier of Youbeiping and other
commanderies extended further to the north. The Jianwu 建武 reign period, cited
below, was proclaimed by Emperor Guangwu at the beginning of Later Han in 25 AD.
Pinggang, capital of Youbeiping under Former Han, was near present-day Ningcheng
in Liaodong; it was now outside the frontier: HS 28B:1624 and Zhongguo lishi ditu ji
II, Maps 27–28.
Lulong is identified as the present-day Xifeng Pass of the Great Wall on the Luan
River in Hebei; as above, the Luan was at that time known as the Ru. SGZ 1:29
describes Lulong as a frontier pass (塞 sai), so it was evidently on the border of the
empire as redrawn under the settlement of Emperor Guangwu.
Liucheng had been a county under Former Han, but was disestablished by Later
Han. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, Maps 27–28, shows it in the valley of the Daling River,
but I have argued that the city was on the coastal plain of Liaoxi, southwest of present-
day Jinxi in Liaoning: deC, Northern Frontier, note 53 at 462–464.
The route proposed by Tian Chou and followed by Cao Cao and his army thus led
first north into the hills, then looped around to the Daling, then known as the Bolang
“White Wolf” River, and finally, at Liucheng city, met the coastal road along the Bay
of Liaodong which was currently blocked by floods.
53
Wuzhong county in Youbeiping was the site of Tian Chou’s settlement, but he
takes it here as a general term for the whole commandery; the direct line of attack is
that which Cao Cao has already attempted and found impassable.
54
Botan had been a county in Yuyang under Former Han, but the territory was
abandoned by Later Han. The ancient site of the city lay west of present-day Chengde,
but Tian Chou here uses the name to describe the basin as a whole; the gorges are
those of the upper reaches of the Ru/Luan River, the difficult route through the moun-
tains required to reach the outpost territory once controlled by Former Han.
Cao Cao accepted the plan. He withdrew his men from the coastal
route—leaving behind a placard which said that he had given up the
enterprise for the time being, but would return in the autumn: it is
said that the enemy read and believed it! Then, in an oblique approach
guided by Tian Chou, he and his troops crossed the mountains into
the Chengde basin, filling gorges and gullies to make the road pass-
able. Skirting the old city of Pinggang, they headed east towards the
Daling River and the road to the coast by Liucheng.
In the eighth month they came to White Wolf Mountain (Bolang
shan), above the Daling valley, and at this point Tadun and his fel-
lows discovered their approach and came in haste and confusion to
face them. It is said that they outnumbered Cao Cao’s forces, and that
his men were likewise startled at the sudden appearance of so many
foe. Cao Cao, however, climbed to a vantage point, saw a weakness
in the opposing lines, and ordered Zhang Liao, commander of the
van, to the assault. As the enemy host was broken, Tadun and many
of his subordinate commanders and various tribal chiefs, including
Wuyan of Youbeiping, were killed in the fighting. Yuan Shang and
Yuan Xi fled once more, this time to the protection of Gongsun Kang.
They were accompanied by the remnants of their following and by a
few thousand Wuhuan under Supuyan of the Dependent State and the
young Louban of Liaoxi,55 but the remainder, said to have numbered
two hundred thousand Chinese and barbarians, all surrendered.
With his enemies eliminated, Cao Cao continued his march to

Liucheng and the sea, and returned to Youbeiping by the coastal route
without apparent difficulty, arriving in the ninth month. He had no
interest in attacking Gongsun Kang, and, just as he had in dealing with
the Yuan brothers a few years earlier, he reduced pressure in hope
that his potential and actual enemies would come into conflict. This
indeed happened, though we are also told that Yuan Shang may have
had some idea of subverting Gongsun Kang’s regime and taking over
his government. In any event, soon after their arrival Gongsun Kang
55
There is some confusion about the fate of the various Wuhuan leaders. SGZ 1:29
says that Tadun and Wuyan were killed at White Wolf Mountain, but SGZ 30:835 says
that they too took refuge with Gongsun Kang, who killed them soon afterwards. HHS
90/80:2984 includes Louban among the refugees, and says that he was also killed by
Gongsun Kang. See further below.
236 chapter five
seized the refugees and dragged them off for execution. He sent the
heads of Yuan Shang, Yuan Tan and Supuyan to Cao Cao.
The effect of the victory at White Wolf Mountain was totally satis-
factory. Not only had the Yuan been finally removed from the scene,
but the embryonic confederation of the Wuhuan was destroyed and
the remaining leaders, notably Pufulu of Dai commandery and Nanlou
of Shanggu, came to submit. Less generous than Yuan Shao, Cao Cao
gave them titles as acting, not as full Shanyu. For the time being at
least, the northern borderlands were settled.
The campaign, however, had been very risky. It was difficult enough
for Cao Cao to embark upon an enterprise so far from his centres of
power about Xu city and Ye, but to take the greater part of his army
on a long and uncharted march beyond the frontier was extremely
dangerous. It was a brilliant strategy, triumphantly executed, but the
consequences of failure would have been disastrous. To emphasise
such possibilities, moreover, winter came early, a dry season with no
rain, so that wells had to be sunk hundreds of feet to find water, and
the army was so short of food that they were obliged to kill many of
their valuable horses. Cao Cao had a list prepared of all those who had
cautioned against the plan: his advisers were concerned they would be
punished for their negative approach, but instead he gave generous
rewards, observing that:
When I embarked on that expedition, I took risks in hope of a good
result. Although I was successful, I was aided by Heaven. This was not
the right way to do things. You presented me with plans which would
have been completely safe, and it is for that reason I give rewards. Never
hesitate to speak up in future.56
It was an unexpected gesture, and brilliant public relations.
By the end of the year Cao Cao had returned to Ye city, resting him-
self and his army for a few months before turning his attention to the
south. It was probably at this time he composed the Jieshi poem, from
the great mountain cliff which he visited as he made his first approach
along the coastal road against Tadun and his allies. The work does not
relate only to that moment, however, for in a Preface and four sections
56
SGZ 1:30 PC quoting Cao Man zhuan.
he reflects on the rigours of campaign in a harsh season, and also on

his hopes for the empire and the reality of his own mortality:57
I Preface (豔 yan)
The clouds travel and the rain advances,
Filling and flooding the banks of the rivers.58
Gazing across a strange landscape,
My heart and mind are wandering,
With no idea which path to follow.
My journey brings me to the Towering Rock,
Vexed and uneasy by the Eastern Sea.
57
碣石: the formal title of the work is Buchu Xiamen xing 步岀夏門行 “Song of
Going out on Foot by the Xia Gate.” This was a yuefu theme, providing the melodic
accompaniment for the work. The nature of such poetry at this time, and other com-
positions of Cao Cao, are discussed in Chapter Eight at 344–345. There was a Xia Gate
at Luoyang, but it is unlikely that it was relevant to Cao Cao’s composition; Diény,
Poèmes de Cao Cao, 130, however, observes that in early Chinese poetry passing out
through the gate of a city—as in Rome on the Appian Way—often brought the travel-
ler to the tombs which lay just outside.
Diény, Poèmes, 130–156, provides a variorum text, translation into French, and
detailed commentary to the Preface and the poems which follow. The work is also
translated by Frankel, “Development of Han and Wei Yüeh-fu,” 265–268, and he adds
a list of earlier renderings.
Kroll, who translates the work at “Portraits,” 93–95, argues fairly that “No other
poet since the time of the Shih ching was able to turn the four-word line to such
effect as Ts’ao has done here,” while the first three stanzas are the earliest examples
of what developed into the great genre of Chinese landscape poetry. Holzman, Land-
scape Appreciation, 75–84, translates and discusses the Preface and the first poem,
but suggests that, though the vision is powerful and splendid, Cao Cao observes the
landscape less for its own sake than as a reflection of his thoughts and ambitions. It is
to Holzman that I owe the rendering of Towering Rock for Jieshi.
The preface is in an erratic metre, with lines of four, six, four and five characters,
followed by three of five characters. The subsequent sections are in regular lines of
four characters each.
The Jieshi peak is part of a mountain ridge near present-day Qinhuangdao. As Diény
discusses at 133–134, there has been debate about the exact site which Cao Cao refers
to, but it is fairly established that it represents the place where the land meets the sea,
in the same fashion that sacred Mount Tai linked Heaven and Earth. Jieshi was visited
by the First Emperor of Qin and other rulers after him, and Cao Cao’s poem presents
echoes of that grand tradition. We may observe also that there is no reason to believe
Cao Cao had ever seen the sea before; it may well have made an impression.
On Mao Zedong’s Beidaihe poem, which echoes some of Cao Cao’s composition,
see Chapter Eleven at 501–502.
58
Jiujiang 九江 “Nine Rivers” often refers to the Yangzi, and there was a com-
mandery of that name in present-day Anhui. The phrase, however, could relate to
other sites, and it is probably intended here as a general term for all the rivers of
China.
238 chapter five
I Guan canghai 觀滄海 “To gaze on the blue of the sea”

East I climb the Towering Rock
To gaze on the blue of the sea.
How tossed and troubled the waters,
How tall and stark the island peaks.
The trees grow crowded together,
Every plant flourishing and green.
The autumn wind sighs and sings
As the great waves break and surge.
The courses of the sun and moon
Seem to rise from the waves;
The Milky Way in splendour and brilliance
Seems to rise from the sea.
Fortune indeed is come
And singing expresses our hopes.
II Dong shiyue 冬十月 “Winter, the tenth month”

The tenth month, first of the winter;
Winds from the north come in fitful gusts.
The air of Heaven is biting cold,
With heavy frosts and driving sleet.
The birds of the wilderness cry to the dawn,59
Wild geese fly to the south.
Birds which hibernate have scattered to shelter,
And bears are huddled in their caves.
The work of spades and hoes is ended,
The farmers have gathered and threshed the grain.
The innkeepers set up tables
To welcome travelling traders.
III Heshuo han 河朔寒 “North of the Yellow River it is cold”

also known as Tu bu tong “Lands are not the same”60
Each region of the world is different;
North of the River it is fiercely cold:
Ice drifts down the streams
And boats find it hard to go on.
59
In his note 5 at 148, Diény discusses the confusing tradition of the kunji 昆雞 bird,
interpreted variously as a crane, a large cock, or a phoenix. A creature of coastal waters,
capable of flying to great heights, it is known also for its cry, symbol of separation and
of the mournful period of autumn and winter in the cold regions of the north.
60
At 150, Diény observes that the statement in the first line, that the various “ter-
roirs” of China differ one from another, is a well-established cliché, but he suggests
that Cao Cao recalls this hackneyed theme as a means to emphasise the problems he
faces in re-unifying such a complex land.
The ground is harder than a spade,

Weeds flourish in the fields.
The water is gone and flows no longer
And the ice is firm enough to walk.
Gentlemen hide in distress,
As bullies care little for the laws.61
Always in my heart are sighing and sorrow,
Much grief, and sympathy for their plight.
IV Shengui sui shou 神龜蜼壽 “Though the sacred tortoise lived long”
The sacred tortoise had a very long life,
But he still reached the end of his days.62
The soaring dragon can ride on the mists,
But he ends as dust and ashes.
The swift steed in old age rests in his stable,
But still thinks of a thousand li.
A brave man may come to his evening years,
But stout heart remains the same.
The times of our life and death,
Do not rest with Heaven alone.
If a man is in harmony with himself,
He may live for long years.63
Born in 155, Cao Cao was now fifty-two years old. Over fifteen years
of warfare he had been remarkably successful, but he would soon face
his greatest challenge and his most serious defeat.
61
Diény, at 149, has 土 tu rather than 士 shi at the beginning of the first line of this
stanza; both readings are supported by variant texts. His rendering, therefore, is
La terre est affligée de pauvreté,
Et les preux chevaliers enclinent au mal.
His interpretation of 勇俠 yongxia [commonly understood as “braves and heroes”] as
“preux chevaliers ‘valiant knights’ ” is more positive than mine: cf. note 51 to Chapter
One. On the other hand, at 151 he observes that Cao Cao is threatening to deal with
such lawless men.
62
This may refer to the sacred tortoise of the ancient state of Chu: Zhuangzi
莊子 17.
63
The previous lines have described the gallant steed and the gallant man, whose
spirit cannot be broken by age and infirmity; a theme echoed in many writings and
anecdotes. At 153, Diény suggests that this third stanza goes further: Cao Cao presents
himself not as a warrior or a man of ambition, but as one tempted by a life withdrawn
from the world and at peace in his mind.
CHAPTER SIX
RED CLIFFS 208
Government of the empire

To defeat in Jing province
War on water: weapons, techniques and tactics
Chronology1
208 Sun Quan destroys Liu Biao’s general Huang Zu and enters the
middle Yangzi
summer: Cao Cao becomes Imperial Chancellor of Han
autumn: Cao Cao moves against Liu Biao in Jing province;
execution of Kong Rong
Liu Biao dies; his son Liu Zong surrenders to Cao Cao
Liu Bei flees to the south, Sun Quan sends troops to assist him
winter: Sun Quan’s general Zhou Yu and the allied army defeat
Cao Cao at the Red Cliffs; he withdraws to the north
Zhou Yu attacks Cao Ren in Jiangling; Sun Quan attacks
Hefei; Liu Bei takes over the commanderies south of the
middle Yangzi
Government of the empire
Fresh from victory in the north, Cao Cao returned to his base territory,
reaching Ye city in the first month of 208. Though the emperor contin-
ued to maintain his puppet court at Xu, and that city was recognised
as the imperial capital, Ye was now Cao Cao’s military headquarters
and the centre of his power. His main army was based there, and he
had the Xuanwu “Dark Warrior” Pond constructed at this time so that
1
Major sources for events in this year are recounted in SGZ 1:30–31, in the biog-
raphies of Liu Biao and his sons at HHS 74/64B:2423–24 and SGZ 6:213–16, and in
the Annals/Biographies of Liu Bei at SGZ Shu 2:877–79 and of Sun Quan at SGZ Wu
2:1117–18. They are presented in chronicle order by ZZTJ 65:2076–96; deC, Establish
Peace, 368–403. Sources on the Red Cliffs campaign are given in notes to that account
from 266 to 275 below.
242 chapter six
the men could gain experience in manoeuvring ships and fighting on

water.2 The campaign in the north had been long and hard, but Cao
Cao was already preparing for an attack towards the Yangzi.
There was no particular urgency to the enterprise, however, and dur-
ing the first half of 208 Cao Cao paid chief attention to the strengthen-
ing and organisation of his government, making a number of changes
and putting new systems in place. It is not always possible to date the
reforms precisely, as many took time to establish and were liable to
amendment according to circumstances and results. They are better
discussed by theme than by order of dates.
Chapter Four has considered the nature of warfare at this time, and
the informal structures which formed the original fighting forces. The
core of Cao Cao’s power, of course, was his main army, developed by
years of warfare into a powerful and experienced fighting force, kept
under his personal command, and this was the instrument by which
he sought to hold or extend his power, whether dealing with the Yuan
family, with the hostile Wuhuan, or with Liu Biao and other rivals.
This striking force was naturally supported by regular troops in
camps and garrisons, and commanders such as Cao Ren on the Han
and Zhang Liao on the Huai had to deal on occasion with heavy attacks
from the south. It was the duty of these subordinates to hold their ter-
ritory with the resources they had to hand, but if need arose Cao Cao
would come in full force to deal with the enemy.
In this regard, while it would be unfair to claim that Cao Cao did
not trust his officers—and many of them showed remarkable loyalty
and courage in his service—it was difficult for him to delegate, and he
had a natural reluctance to allow anyone else to hold military power
2
SJZ 9:338–39 (SJZS 79a–80a) says that the Huan River divided to form two
streams, of which the northern branch flowed past the east of Ye city, then turned
west along the northern wall to join the River Zhang; it was close to this junction that
Cao Cao created the Xuanwu Pond: SJZ 9:338–39 (SJZS 79a–80a).
In his Weidu fu “Rhapsody on the Capital of Wei,” composed some seventy years
later, Zuo Si describes the Xuanwu Pond as a lake at the centre of a pleasure park,
which the commentator Li Shan says lay west of Ye city: WH 6:1345–46; Knechtges I,
447. See further in Chapter Eight at 336.
Zuo Si does not mention the lake being used for practicing naval manoeuvres, and
it appears to have become no more than an ornamental feature. Soon after its con-
struction, Cao Cao gained access to the Han River in Jing province and to the lake-
lands about the Huai in the southeast, and these served his purposes better.
red cliffs 208 243
which might rival his own.3 The policy created problems, for he could
not be everywhere at once, but such a situation is inevitable in a war-
lord state, and despite the façade of civil authority and honour Cao
Cao’s power was that of a warlord.
Over the years, however, as Cao Cao’s area of control extended and
he strengthened his hold on power, his arrangements became more
organised. He still kept command of the main army, but used a mix-
ture of civil and military authority to confirm his position.
In areas which had been settled and appeared reasonably secure, the
forms of Han administration were retained, with traditional capacity
to deal with disorder or rebellion, supported when necessary by troops
from neighbouring units or a central reserve. As in Han, however,
administrators and inspectors combined military authority with their
civil responsibilities, and in some border regions there were new small
commanderies, often controlling no more than one or two counties
and sometimes headed by a Commandant with military responsibili-
ties rather than by an Administrator; these could be established or
abolished according to need.4
Military agricultural colonies (tuntian) were valuable as a means
to consolidate defence and for a regular source of local supply. Such
hybrid units, farms with a capacity for self-defence, had been set up
about Xu city during the 190s, and in the early 200s Liu Fu the Inspec-
tor of Yang province, set a number of them on the frontier along the
Huai.5 Others were established across Cao Cao’s territory as a means to
settle refugees and surrendered enemies, or to confirm a hold on terri-
tory. They formed a parallel structure of civil administration within the
borders of the state, but the basic units of local government remained
the traditional commandery and its subordinate counties.
3
Cao Man zhuan, in SGZ 1:55 PC, claims that Cao Cao was jealous of any subor-
dinate who appeared more able than himself: Chapter Ten at 448.
4
During the late 190s, for example, Li Tong was appointed Commandant of
Yang’an, a commandery formed by two counties from Runan, to guard a section of
the frontier against Liu Biao in Jing province: SGZ 15:535. Later, from 208 onwards,
following Cao Cao’s take-over of Jing province, similar small commanderies were set
up on the western borders facing Yi province, notably in the valley of the Han between
Nanyang and Hanzhong: e.g. Chapter Seven at 295 and Chapter Ten at 429 and 437.
5
The biography of Liu Fu is at SGZ 15:463.
244 chapter six
In the sixth month of 208 Cao Cao re-arranged the highest positions
of the bureaucracy. During the greater part of Former Han, supreme
authority under the sovereign had been entrusted to an Imperial
Chancellor (chengxiang), with a slightly junior colleague, the Impe-
rial Counsellor ( yushi dafu), who acquired censorial responsibilities;
a third member of this senior group, though not regularly appointed,
was the Grand Marshal (da sima). At the end of Former Han, however,
in 8 BC Emperor Ai made considerable changes, creating a triumvirate
of Three Excellencies (san gong): the Grand Commandant (taiwei),
the Excellency over the Masses (situ), and the Excellency of Works
(sikong). Nominally equal in rank and salary, they shared supervision
of the imperial government.6
Following minor amendments by Wang Mang, Emperor Guangwu
of Later Han restored the tripartite structure of Three Excellencies, and
that structure was kept throughout the dynasty, though the authority
of the General-in-Chief (da jiangjun), an office commonly held by the
senior kinsman of a regent Empress-Dowager, could match and even
exceed that of the Excellencies.7 Cao Cao’s restoration of the single
office of Imperial Chancellor in his own favour confirmed his author-
ity at court, but in real terms the government was maintained by mili-
tary means, and the high civilian structure of Han had largely been
destroyed.
The change was natural enough, but it was probably encouraged by
an awkward incident involving Cao Pi. At the beginning of 208 Zhao
Wen, who had become Excellency over the Masses in the government
at Chang’an in 194 and had held that office under many vicissitudes
for almost fifteen years, used his notional authority to nominate the
youthful Cao Pi, at that time just over twenty, as Abundant Talent, a
high level of candidacy for office. An Excellency had authority to make
such a nomination, and the nominee could take office in the imperial
6
On the senior central administration of Former Han, see Bielenstein, Bureau-
cracy, 7–12 and ff. For a summary of later changes, see deC, LH3K, 1221. Though the
Excellencies all held formal rank/salary of Ten Thousand shi of grain, in practice there
was a hierarchy of promotion, with the Grand Commandant as the highest, followed
by the Excellency over the Masses and then the Excellency of Works.
7
As observed in Chapter Two at 89, in 196 Cao Cao had difficulty with Yuan Shao
about their respective titles. Cao Cao was forced to back down, styling himself only
Excellency of Works, third of the triumvirate, and in the following year he arranged
for Yuan Shao to receive insignia as General-in-Chief. Neither appointment, however,
had any practical significance.
red cliffs 208 245
civil service without any period of probation. For Cao Cao, however,
this was gross interference in the affairs of his family: if anyone was
going to arrange appointment for Cao Pi, he would do it himself. Furi-
ous, he advised the emperor that Zhao Wen had shown poor judge-
ment, and insisted he be dismissed. This was done; and Zhao Wen
died a few months later.8
Whether the failed nomination was an attempt to curry favour, or
represented a spark of independence at the puppet imperial court, the
situation was not improved by the fact that, as Excellency over the
Masses, Zhao Wen had slight precedence over Cao Cao as Excellency
of Works. It was well time to clarify who was in charge of the gov-
ernment, and Cao Cao’s appointment as Imperial Chancellor left the
situation in no doubt.
In second position, Cao Cao named a certain Chi Lü as Imperial
Counsellor.9 Sometime a student of the celebrated scholar Zheng
Xuan,10 Chi Lü had come to Xu city in the late 190s, and had been
recommended by Xun Yu. An enemy of Kong Rong, he used his influ-
ence to press for his dismissal and later for his death, but he was not a
man of notable distinction, and we must assume that he owed his high
position rather to his compliance than to any personal abilities.
At the same time as he re-arranged the highest offices of the state, Cao
Cao sought also to establish good practice for the recruitment of more
junior men. At the core of the program were his two clerical officers,
Cui Yan in the Department of the West, which traditionally dealt with
appointments of officials in the central administration, and Mao Jie in
the Department of the East, concerned with provincial offices.11 It is
claimed that they were strict in their demands for personal honesty
8
The biography of Zhao Wen is at HHS 27/17:949–50. The nomination of Cao
Pi and Cao Cao’s response is recorded in SGZ 2:57 PC quoting Xiandi qijuzhu, and
the date of Zhao Wen’s dismissal is given by the Annals at HHS 9:385. The affair is
discussed by ZZTJ 65:2076; deC, Establish Peace, 366.
9
The unusual surname 郗 also appears with the pronunciation Xi.
10
The biography of Zheng Xuan (127–200) is at HHS 35/25:1207–12. Compiler of
several important commentaries to the Confucian classics, in the last years of his life
he received a formal ministerial appointment at the court of Han controlled by Cao
Cao. Chi Lü may have accompanied him at that time.
11
On these two Departments, see the Treatise of Officials at HHS 114/24:3559.
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 13, says that the Department of the East dealt with financial
matters, and the Department of the West with personnel, but this is not supported
by the Treatise.
246 chapter six
and official integrity, rejecting men whom they considered unsuitable,

and that under their supervision even the highest officials wore plain
clothing and bore themselves simply. Though Cao Cao was initially
delighted, he later showed more tolerance of personal idiosyncrasy.12
It was about this time that two brothers from Henei, Sima Lang and
Sima Yi, joined Cao Cao’s staff. Born in 171, Sima Lang had been a
county magistrate in Wei commandery, and he now became Registrar
in the office of the Imperial Chancellor. Sima Yi, eight years younger,
had held local office and was sent as Reporting Officer to the capital in
202.13 Cao Cao wanted to give him an appointment at that time, but
Sima Yi claimed to be ill and excused himself. Called up again in 208,
he once more sought to avoid office, but this time Cao Cao threatened
him with prison, so Sima Yi accepted and became a Senior Clerk for
Literary Scholarship.
Sima Yi became the founder of the imperial fortunes of his family,
and in 266, when his grandson Sima Yan deposed the last ruler of
Cao Cao’s state of Wei and proclaimed the empire of Jin, he received
posthumous honour as Emperor Xuan of the new dynasty.14 His biog-
raphy in Jin shu says that he was intelligent and ambitious, and tells
how he was praised by Cui Yan as possessing abilities far superior to
those of his brother Sima Lang. It goes on to explain that his unwill-
ingness to take office under Cao Cao was due to his loyalty to Han and
his reluctance to be associated with a party which might subvert the
ancient dynasty. But the historian is surely reflecting a cliché: the man
who will hold supreme power should not appear greedy or anxious
for it.15 A Literary Scholar did not have great rank, but it gave Sima
12
SGZ 12:375, the biography of Mao Jie, with PC quoting Xianxian xingzhuang:
ZZTJ 65:2079; deC, Establish Peace, 371.
13
Under the system of Han, heads of commandery units and provinces were
required to present accounts to the court each New Year. The local officer sent to do
so was known for that purpose as the Reporting Officer 上計吏 ([shang] jili), and for
much of the second century he was accepted as a candidate under probation for the
senior imperial service: deC, “Recruitment Revisited,” 19.
14
The biography of Sima Yi is in JS 1. By the time of his death in 251 he had taken
control of the government of Wei, and he was succeeded in this power by his sons
Sima Shi and Sima Zhao, and by Sima Zhao’s son Sima Yan. See Chapter Ten and,
for example, deC, “Three Kingdoms and Western Jin” I, 32–35.
15
A rather strange story casts a special light on Sima Yi’s reluctance. The biography
of his wife the Lady Zhang Chunhua, at JS 31:948, tells how in 202, when he was first
summoned to office under Cao Cao, he avoided the call by pleading that he was inca-
pacitated by rheumatism. As a sudden shower of rain came, however, he forgot that
he was supposed to be paralysed and got up to rescue some books which were exposed
red cliffs 208 247
Yi an introduction to the court, and he became a close and influential

friend of Cao Pi.
Besides the supervisory work of Cui Yan and Mao Jie, Cao Cao insti-
tuted a new system for recruitment and promotion.
Hitherto, the vast majority of entrants into the senior bureaucracy
of Later Han had first been nominated as Filial and Incorrupt by their
commandery unit, or as men of Abundant Talent by the head of a
province or a high official at court. In theory, the judgement of a man’s
suitability for office was made on the basis of his local reputation and
achievements, and Filial and Incorrupt candidates were then required
to serve a period of probation at the capital. This last, however, had
become little more than a formality, while their natural alliance with
government officials of similar background meant that the business of
selection came largely under the control of local gentry: in any case,
the essential qualification of literacy required leisure and opportunity
which were best available to men of means. By the late second century,
the traditional program of recruitment had become rather a means for
great families to extend their patronage than an effective method of
obtaining loyal servants for the state.16
Like many other aspects of the old government, moreover, civil war
had brought the break-down of this system, and Cao Cao had to find
another way to gather competent men into his service. The system
became known as jiupin zhongzheng.17
It was probably about 208 that the scholar-official He Kui, who had
been a successful administrator in the east and was now a member of
Cao Cao’s staff, presented a memorial in which he urged that a man’s
to the storm. They had only one maid-servant in their household, but she saw him.
The Lady Zhang was afraid the woman might tell of the incident and bring disaster
on the family. Though she was still only in her teens, she killed the servant with her
own hand and thereafter did the cooking herself. Sima Yi was very impressed—though
we are not told whether it was his wife’s readiness to kill or her willingness to do the
housework that touched him most deeply.
When the Lady Zhang’s grandson Sima Yan took the imperial title in 265, he
awarded her posthumous title as an empress.
16
On the system used by Later Han, see deC, “Recruitment Revisited.”
17
On the jiupin zhongzheng, see Holzman, “Système médiéval;” deC, “Three King-
doms and Western Jin” I, 27–28; the section on ‘The Nine Rank Systems’ in Graf-
flin, “Reinventing China,” 145–148; and Yan Buke, Pinwei yu zhiwei. Among several
important works in Japanese are Miyazaki, Kyūhin kanjin hō no kenkyū, Miyakawa,
Rikuchō shi kenkyū, seiji shakai hen, 263–314, and Kawakatsu, Sō Sō gunkoku no kōsei
ni tsuite.
248 chapter six
initial appointment to office should be based upon his reputation in

the community, and that his performance should be monitored by his
superiors, without any necessary period of probation. Cao Cao, we are
told, was suitably impressed, and it is likely that the new program was
instituted at this time.18
Under the full procedure Rectifiers (zhongzheng) were appointed in
each commandery, to assess all candidates for office and to grade them
into one of nine categories ( jiupin) according to their quality.19 Under
Han, this responsibility had been entrusted to commandery Admin-
istrators, whose judgement was checked by the period of probation
at the capital. That supplementary assessment was now abandoned,
so the Rectifiers held great authority, and though they were formally
appointed by the central government they worked in their native terri-
tories; Administrators had always been men from outside the territory
they governed.
It may have been hoped that the imperial commission would
encourage Rectifiers to act as well-informed agents of the state rather
than as representatives of local interests, but in the longer term it was
inevitable that such a system would fall under the control of leading
families in each neighbourhood, to an even greater extent than at the
end of Later Han. Despite their notional responsibility to the central
government, Rectifiers were naturally influenced by their powerful
neighbours, and in later years there would be frequent accusations of
favouritism, many of them justified.
18
SGZ 12:381. The concept of “nomination from the district and selection by the
village” 鄉擧里選 was traditionally ascribed to Emperor Wu of Former Han, advised
by the celebrated Confucianist Dong Zhongshu.
Miyakawa, Rikuchō shi kenkyū, 264–265, cited by Holzman “Sept Sages,” 324 note
1, and by Grafflin, “Reinventing China,” 147, identifies 208 as the critical year for
the initial adoption of the program in its first form. He emphasises that the original
intention was to find suitable individuals, not necessarily to entrench the position of
powerful local families.
19
Holzman, “Système médiéval,” 399–401. The nine traditional categories extended
from “high upper” (上上 shangshang) through “high middle” (上中 shangzhong) to
“low lowest” (下下 xiaxia): e.g. HS 20:863 All offices in the empire were likewise
graded into nine ranks, though there was no necessary correlation between the cat-
egory of an official and the rank of his current office. Category was rather a judgement
of potential, so that men of the highest category were regarded as eligible for appoint-
ment to the highest positions.
Rectifiers backed their opinions with a summary description of character in the
style of the “pure judgements” which had become popular as a means to supplement
or contradict the inadequacies of official procedure: note 58 to Chapter One.
red cliffs 208 249
The system nonetheless became a feature of the government struc-

ture of Wei, and was maintained through several succeeding dynas-
ties. It is formally mentioned only after Cao Cao’s death in 220, when
we are told that the senior official Chen Qun was responsible for its
introduction, but we may assume that the basic principles of local
assessment and recommendation—without subsequent probation—
had been established earlier, and that the program of Chen Qun insti-
tutionalised the method first put forward by He Kui.20
Cao Cao had really no alternative to such a scheme. Neither the
puppet court of Han—which he would not have trusted anyway—nor
his own essentially military headquarters had the capacity to carry out
any real probation. In the past, the head of a commandery unit had
been guided on matters of recruitment and nomination by his Officer
of Merit, a close and trusted member of local staff.21 In a sense, there-
fore, the appointment of a Rectifier entailed no more than the granting
of a direct commission, with enhancement in rank, to a local man who
would formerly have served as an Officer of Merit. Candidates were
then presented to the government, with an encomium and a form of
grading. No form of probation was required thereafter, but fitness and
achievements were assessed on the job.
In the long term, despite attempts to maintain a degree of central
authority, the system allowed powerful families to exercise even greater
influence than they had during the last years of Later Han. In a cel-
ebrated memorial of the mid-third century, the official Liu Yi claimed
that “there are no men of humble family in the highest categories,
nor do any representatives of powerful clans appear among the lower
ranks,”22 and later scholars have remarked that the jiupin zhongzheng
system became a means for men of family to entrench themselves in
power.23
20
The biography of Chen Qun at SGZ 22:625 says that he was responsible for estab-
lishing the system, and the placement of the entry implies that it was after Cao Cao’s
death. See also TPYL 265:15b, quoting Fu Xuan (217–278), but cf. TPYL 212:5b and
214:4a, which imply different times. As Holzman, Miyakawa and Grafflin observe, the
sources are confused and a gradual development is more probable.
A summary of the system in its fuller form, taken as a locus classicus by ZZTJ
69:2178, appears in SGZ 23:661 PC quoting the Wei lue biography of Ji Mao: it is dated
vaguely as 先時 “before this:” Fang, Chronicle I, 5 and 25.
21
On the Officer of Merit 功曹 ( gongcao) in a commandery of Later Han, see Biel-
enstein, Bureaucracy, 93 [as Bureau of Merit] and deC, LH3K, 1229.
22
JS 45:1273–77; Holzman, “Système médiéval,” 413.
23
Holcombe, Shadow of Han, 75–81, discusses the significance of the system as a
means of confirming literati power in Jin and its successor dynasties, and at 79–80
250 chapter six
The important consideration for Cao Cao, however, was that he

now controlled a substantial part of the empire of Han and a large
percentage of its population. To govern such an extent of territory
and so many people, he could no longer rely upon his personal fol-
lowing, nor upon military leaders and simple fighting men, so it was
essential to ensure a reliable supply of reasonably effective and loyal
civilian officials. In a celebrated proclamation in the spring of 210, he
made it clear that he sought competence and ability rather than some
particular claim to high morality, and he urged his people to bring
forward any man suitable for office.24 In the same pragmatic fashion,
he was prepared to delegate authority to local leaders, so long as they
provided his government with the necessary number of suitable offi-
cials. Ultimately there was tacit agreement: Cao Cao and his succes-
sors granted rank and influence to the leaders of local communities; in
exchange, members of the great clans gave loyalty to the new regime
and provided the essential civil service to run the government.25
Cao Cao sought also to restore some order to the finances and tax
structure of his growing state. Though agricultural colonies were
remarkably successful for resettlement and defence, it was not practi-
cable to spread such special establishments across the whole of the ter-
ritory which Cao Cao controlled. As ever, the core of the economy was
based upon peasant agriculture, with vast numbers of family farms.
Many of the great land-holdings which had been such an obstacle to
revenue collection under Later Han had survived the time of troubles,
but the system of taxation had largely broken down, and the contend-
ing warlords could support themselves only through quasi-official
he cites the research of Yano Chikara to say that, “[I]n the Wei Kingdom the Nine
Ranks system might have genuinely been concerned with enhancing the bureaucratic
efficiency of the centralized imperial administration,” but during the course of the
third century “the practical administrative concerns of the centralized monarchy were
increasingly overlooked.” Tanigawa, Medieval Chinese Society, 112, comments simi-
larly that “the aristocratic stratum in the Six Dynasties . . . established itself as a ruling
class” and “[T]he most concrete, structural manifestation of their institutionalization
was the Nine Ranks recruitment system for the bureaucracy.”
24
SGZ 1:32: ZZTJ 66:2100; deC, Establish Peace, 410, and see Chapter Eight at
367–368. Some eighteen hundred years later, Deng Xiaoping argued that “Black cat
or white cat; if it catches mice, it’s a good cat.”
25
Grafflin, “Reinventing China,” 147, observes that “Strong, ambitious local leaders
must be given an opportunity to advance in the service of Wei, lest they become a
focus of rebellion.” And at 148, “the assignment of Local Rank immediately attracted
the attention of the powerful families making up the regional elite . . .”
red cliffs 208 251
expropriation or by simple plunder. The success of Cao Cao’s agricul-

tural colonies during the 190s had been contrasted with the desperate
scavenging by the troops of Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu, and the situ-
ation in Ji province had not improved. When he captured Ye city in
204, Cao Cao issued a proclamation with scathing comments on the
greed and unfairness of the Yuan regime as a whole, and particularly
of Shen Pei, chief minister to Yuan Shang:26
The government of the Yuan allowed powerful families to act as they
pleased, and their kinfolk to seize other men’s property. They forced the
ordinary people, poor and weak, to pay taxes in their stead, while they
boasted of their own wealth and paid no attention to orders from above.
Shen Pei and his clan offered a haven for criminals and became leaders
of such lawless men. They thought to attract the people to their cause,
and raise a great force of armoured troops, but how could this be done
in such a way?
Let the land tax be levied at the rate of four sheng per mou,27 and let
each household contribute just two pi of light silk cloth and two jin of
floss silk.28 No additional levies or exactions shall be made.
The Administrators and Chancellors of the commanderies and king-
doms must pay careful attention to this [last provision], and must not
permit powerful persons to maintain secret reserves and evade their
dues at the expense of those who are weak.
By its placement in his commentary, Pei Songzhi relates this procla-
mation to the conquest of Ji province, but the Treatise of Economics
of Jin shu implies that it became a general statement of policy for all
territories under his control, and this is most probable.
26
SGZ 1:26 PC quoting Wei shu. There is a brief parallel text in the Treatise of
Economics of Jin shu, JS 26:782; Yang, “Economic History,” 159.
The main text of SGZ 1 at this point says that Cao Cao issued a proclamation
exempting all the people formerly subject to the Yuan family from paying any tax for
that year. If the extract from Wei shu has been correctly placed, we must assume that
it refers to future obligations, and indeed is a statement of policy, probably for all ter-
ritory under Cao Cao’s control. Cf. Chapter Five at 218 and note 26.
27
A sheng 升 was approximately one-fifth of a litre. Ten sheng comprised a dou 斗,
and ten dou made up one hu 斛 or shi 石, just under twenty litres; hu and shi were two
names for the same unit of capacity: Loewe, “Measurement of Grain,” 64. The procla-
mation as recorded in Wei shu does not identify the type of grain, but JS 26 identifies
it as unhusked grain su 粟, the standard commodity for such purposes.
The area of a mou 畝 at this time was a little over a tenth [0.114] of an English acre,
so fifty mou would have been equivalent to some five acres or two hectares.
28
Quan 絹 is thin silk, and a pi 匹 was 40 chi 尺 feet, equivalent to some 9.5 meters
or 10½ yards English measure. Mian 綿 is floss silk, and a jin 斤 was about 225 grams,
half a pound avoirdupois.
252 chapter six
In 30 AD Emperor Guangwu had established a land tax rate of one-

thirtieth of the production, the same as at the end of Former Han.29
Towards the end of the dynasty Zhongchang Tong, himself a large
land-owner, assessed average fertility as some three hu of grain per
mou,30 which would indicate a tax payment of ten sheng at Guangwu’s
rate. In practice, this was regularly commuted to a fixed sum based
upon acreage, and in Later Han the effective rate of land tax appears
to have been five sheng per mou.31
Using area as the basis for tax removed the need to assess produc-
tion year by year, but it made land registration extremely important,
and it does not appear that the Later Han government, despite its
best efforts, ever achieved a satisfactory survey.32 Furthermore, though
farmland could be categorised into three grades depending on quality
and potential yield, it does not appear that this was reflected in the tax
regime, and—apart from times of declared famine—no account was
taken of variations in harvest from one year to the next.33
29
HHS 1B:50; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 72, cited by JS 26:781; Yang, “Economic His-
tory,” 154. Guangwu’s policy and the tax structure of Later Han are discussed by
Bielenstein, RHD IV, 157–159.
30
HHS 49/39:1656; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 239. On Zhongchang Tong’s proposals
on tax rates, see below; and on his general philosophy, Chapter Eight at 348.
Chao Cuo, a minister of Former Han, made a similar estimate of yield in 178 BC:
HS 24A:1132, the Treatise of Economics. It was based upon an earlier, smaller mou,
and the adjusted result is slightly less, some 2.4 hu per mou. See Hsü, Han Agriculture,
160–163 at 161, and the discussion in Bielenstein, RHD IV, 147–148.
31
In the course of a detailed discussion, Hsü, Han Agriculture, 74, suggests that the
change from a rate based upon production to a rate based upon land was gradual, the
effect of a bureaucracy seeking to formalise the calculation. At 75 he cites a reference
to five sheng per mou for 87 AD, and accepts this as the norm. [HHS 7:315 says that
in 165 it was ordered that tax should be collected in cash, and the Tang commentary
adds that this was done at the rate of ten cash per mou; we do not know, however,
whether this represents no more than an alteration in the manner of payment, or a
change in the rate itself.]
32
Hsü, Han Agriculture, 73, implies that Emperor Guangwu carried out a success-
ful survey about 39 AD, but Bielenstein, RHD IV, 136–137, notes that he encountered
a great deal of opposition, corruption and concealment. We are told how Qin Peng,
Administrator of Shanyang, set up a model system about 80 AD, which was ordered
to be followed throughout the empire, but this in itself implies that the regular records
were inadequate.
33
The reforms of Qin Peng provided for the grading of land, and there are refer-
ences from Former Han, notably a Juyan tablet probably dated to 31 BC. The admin-
istrative complexity of the process, however, and the difficulty of preparing even the
most basic survey of land, make it doubtful if gradation was widely used.
Similarly, the Discourses on Salt and Iron (鹽鐵論 Yantie lun) compiled by Huan
Kuan 桓䩁, an account of a general conference on economics called by Emperor Zhao
of Former Han in 81 BC, records the complaint of the Literati (文學 wenxue), that
red cliffs 208 253
Zhongchang Tong argued to Cao Cao that a tax of one dou in the
hu should be applied, but on his calculations of production this would
be thirty sheng per mou, three times the nominal figure of Han and
far above the commuted five sheng of Han and Cao Cao’s four sheng
per mou. Zhongchang Tong criticised light tax regimes on the grounds
that they starved the government of the funds it needed to function,
but he was known as a non-conformist and authoritarian thinker, and
we may doubt such a level as he proposed could have been enforced
without great difficulty and disorder.34 As Yang Lien-sheng suggests,
the lower rate set by Cao Cao was very likely a means to provide relief
in the hard times of civil war.35
Besides land tax, the subjects of Han had been liable to other levies:
a poll tax (suanfu), at a basic rate of 120 cash for each able-bodied man
or woman; taxes on property (suanzu); and various imposts applied
to fishermen and wood-cutters, merchants and craftsmen, these last
paying a percentage of their income each year.36 Former Han had
also maintained centralised monopolies on salt and iron, but Later
Han transferred them to local authorities and they became steadily
less effectual.37 Under the effect of civil war, moreover, all these
arrangements had quite broken down, and Cao Cao concentrated on
households.38
there was no concession in time of a poor harvest; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 238–239.
Despite this, the same policy appears to have been maintained throughout the two
Han dynasties.
Most probably, the tax was averaged, perhaps with adjustments on the spot accord-
ing to circumstance. We know that the government provided relief and assistance in
time of crop failure or other natural disasters, and it is likely that local officials were
allowed—or took—some discretion, if only to prevent excessive complaint leading to
rioting and banditry: Yu Xie and Dong Muda, “Tiandi zhi jian.
34
Zhongchang Tong’s comments on land yield and a taxation regime appear in
his biography at HHS 49/39:1656; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 239. Hsü also discusses
Zhongchang Tong at 55–56 and 65.
35
Yang, “Economic History,” 140.
36
Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 598–599, and Bielenstein, RHD IV,
157–158.
37
HHS 43/33:1460; Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 606, and deC, LH3K,
1065 sub Zhang Lin 張林; cf. Bielenstein, RHD IV, 155–156 and 229 note 53. There
was a revival of the salt monopoly in the region of Chang’an about 200, but it was in
a limited area and does not appear to have been developed more widely: SGZ 21:610;
deC, Establish Peace, 257–258.
38
Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 601, refers to the household tax
(戶調 hutiao) as an innovation by Cao Cao, developed further by succeeding dynasties
and into the Tang period.
254 chapter six
Cao Cao had introduced a household tax into the territories he con-
trolled even before 200, and we are told he made urgent demands for
payment when he was facing Yuan Shao at Guandu.39 His levy in Ji
province, of two pi of silk cloth and two jin of floss silk from each
household, confirmed the policy and set the rate. It is unfortunately
not possible to assess the exchange between the two types of silk and
the grain required for land tax, for it could vary wildly from one period
to another,40 but the thirteenth-century scholar Ma Duanlin remarked
that levies on households, as opposed to taxes on land, became much
heavier under Wei and Jin, and in this light Yang Lien-sheng makes
two points: that the problems of land survey in such a time of disorder
were all but insuperable, while a light land tax encouraged cultivation,
particularly when farmland might otherwise be abandoned.41 It was
easier to count people than to assess land, and a household or poll-tax
encouraged men to work the fields in order to fulfil their obligations.
The Han had also required corvée labour and military service—the
latter commonly commuted by the gengfu scutage tax—and we can
hardly believe that the long tradition of corvée was abandoned, or
that military service was no longer subject to compulsion in time of
declared emergency. Though Cao Cao gave instructions that no levies
were to be inflicted upon the people other than the land tax and the
household tax he had specified, we may best assume that his limits
related to taxation in cash or kind, and did not exempt able-bodied
men from their obligations of public service. As to his insistence that
wealthy families should fulfil their responsibilities, this may have been
made easier by the dispossession and confusion which accompanied
the disorders of war, but there is every reason to believe that a degree
of inefficiency, coupled with favouritism and corruption, prevented his
orders having full effect. It was a gallant attempt at an equitable and
39
The biography of Zhao Yan, at SGZ 23:668, tells how Li Tong, Administrator of
Yang’an [note 2 above], enforced the collection of the tax due from each household.
Zhao Yan, however, had Xun Yu persuade Cao Cao to greater leniency: ZZTJ 63:2030;
The biography of He Kui, at SGZ 12:380, tells how Cao Cao pressed hard for tax
revenue, but was likewise persuaded by to ease his demands on newly-acquired ter-
ritories: ZZTJ 63:2030–31; deC, Establish Peace, 281–282.
40
Yang, “Economic History,” 145 note 197, quotes a series of ratios from the Tang
period, when one pi equivalent of silk was recorded as being valued at two shi of grain
in 780, as four shi in 810, and as 1.6 shi in 820.
41
Wenxian tongkao 3:48b; Yang, “Economic History,” 147 and 148.
red cliffs 208 255
effective restoration of government and finance, but the times were

not propitious.
The new system, however, encouraged the settlement of people
and the redevelopment of the economy, while Cao Cao continued to
receive great benefit from his agricultural colonies. These were under
official control, so the produce and the profits came directly to serve
the needs of his government. It is impossible to assess their activity
as a proportion of the whole economy, but they did provide a secure
and readily accessible source of revenue and supplies, and removed
some pressure from a potentially over-stretched administration in the
various provinces.
After a number of experiments, the government of Former Han had
established the copper wushu coinage as its official form of exchange;
significantly, and unlike other currencies which had been tried, the
face value of the coin corresponded to its weight. Wang Mang, who
preferred ideal theory to practical use, created a new and complex sys-
tem, and in the confused years of warfare immediately after his fall
there was considerable use of silk, grain and other commodities as
means of exchange. After the wushu was restored by Later Han in 40
AD, however, official salaries were paid half in grain and half in coin,
and the use of cash became so widespread that wealth was measured
in those terms rather than in land, animals or slaves.42
During the early years of Former Han there had been provision
for private mints, but in 113 BC coinage was made a government
monopoly, and the single mint was maintained at the capital. The
policy was followed by Later Han, and the Imperial Mint at Luoyang
was controlled by the Minister of Finance (da sinong). According to
the Treatise of Economics of Han shu, some 28 billion wushu coins
were minted in the course of the first century BC, and though no fig-
ure is provided for any part of the Later Han period, we may assume
that the rate was comparable or even higher.43
42
On the coinage of Han, see Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 586–590,
and Bielenstein, RHD IV, 153. A shu weight was approximately two-thirds of a gram,
and a wushu “Five-shu” coin weighed about 3.25 grams.
As examples of cash used to value property, see Loewe, RHA I, 71–72, dealing with
strips 24.1 and 37.5 from Juyan. We may recall that Cao Cao’s father Cao Song paid
a hundred million cash to be appointed Grand Commandant in 187.
43
Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 589, and Bielenstein, RHD IV, 153.
Bielenstein, following Dubs, renders the ministerial title da sinong as Grand Minister
of Agriculture. On the coin production of Former Han, see HS 24B:1177.
256 chapter six
In 190, isolated and beset by loyalists, Dong Zhuo abandoned the

wushu staple and melted down great numbers of bronze statues to
create his own lighter coins.44 The result was dramatic inflation, and
since Dong Zhuo and his successors at Luoyang and then at Chang’an
controlled the only official mint, the currency of the whole empire was
affected, at least indirectly. Within a very short time, Cao Cao and his
rival warlords were demanding that all levies and revenue be paid in
kind: as above, household and land taxes were now expressed in terms
of grain and silk.
The Treatise of Economics of Jin shu says that when Cao Cao
became Chancellor in 208 he abolished Dong Zhuo’s depreciated cur-
rency and restored the wushu coinage.45 The Annals/Biography of Cao
Cao’s son Cao Pi, however, says that in the third month of 221, soon
after he had taken title as emperor of Wei, he restored the wushu cur-
rency, only to abolish it in the tenth month of the same year because
the price of grain had risen too high.46 In 227 Cao Pi’s son Cao Rui,
Emperor Ming of Wei, who had lately succeeded his father, restored
the system,47 and wushu coins remained in circulation, at least under
the southern dynasties, until the Tang.48
Despite Dong Zhuo’s mistaken mintings, a vast number of wushu
coins remained. Without a regular new supply, however, and without
a uniform system of enforcement, counterfeit production, notably of
coins with value and weight below the true five shu, increased dramati-
cally. Even in periods of effective government, with heavy penalties
applied, false money had been widespread, and the disorders of the
190s created such opportunities that people lost faith in the currency.
Cao Cao’s “restoration” can have had only limited effect: there is no
record of his policy being formally reversed, but the second restoration
by Cao Pi indicates that it had largely failed. As in the years of turmoil
after the fall of Wang Mang, exchange was expressed in terms of grain
or silk, and we may assume that taxation continued in those terms.
44
HHS 72/62:2325: ZZTJ 59:1916; deC, Establish Peace, 54–55; also JS 26:794,
and Chapter Two at 55. HHS 72/62 says that he “destroyed” (壞 huai) the wushu
currency.
45
JS 26:794; Yang, “Economic History,” 191.
46
SGZ 2:78; Fang, Chronicle I, 44 and 56.
47
SGZ 3:92 and JS 26:794–95; Yang, “Economic History,” 191–192.
48
Nishijima, “Economic and Social History,” 587.
red cliffs 208 257
The problem with such goods in kind, of course, was that they pro-
vided even greater opportunity for sharp practice, and though Cao Pi
abandoned his reform because of concern over the cost of grain, Cao
Rui accepted the wushu coinage because the situation was even more
serious: suppliers were wetting grain to increase apparent quantity and
weight, while excessively thin silk was being presented for exchange.49
Well-minted coins were more controllable.
Coins ascribed to the state of Wei have been found in a number of
archaeological sites in recent years, presumably from the time of Cao
Rui and his successors, for it is doubtful any were made in the short
period of Cao Pi’s restoration during 221.50 Similarly, given the evident
weakness and limited effect of his reforms, it is unlikely that Cao Cao
established an official mint at Xu city or Ye: he relied instead on coins
still available from earlier years, recognising them as official currency
for tax and general trading purposes.51
The official requirement for land tax in grain and household tax in
silk must have been subject to formal or informal exchange between
these two commodities and the wushu coins themselves. In his discus-
sion of the economics of Han, Nishijima points out that problems of
transport and storage made coins more convenient to the government
than commodities such as grain and silk. Raising the question how
peasant farmers could pay taxes in cash, he suggests that some sold
their produce on the market or worked for wages, others were permit-
ted to pay in kind, but some were compelled to trade with or borrow
from wealthy land-holders or merchants, often at a discounted price
or a heavy rate of interest. In this regard, he sees Cao Cao’s household
tax of silk as recognising the problem.52 In reality, however, much as
before, government exactions were met by trade between commodi-
ties, whether grain, silk or other goods—and sometimes cash.
49
JS 26:974–75; Yang, “Economic History,” 191–192, cited by ZZTJ 70:2238; Fang,
Chronicle I, 229 and 239. The debate was led by the Minister of Finance Sima Zhi, a
distant cousin of Sima Lang and Sima Yi, whose biography is at SGZ 12:386–89.
50
Cao-Wei wushu kao by Qiao Zhiqin and Xie Shiping provides a helpful summary
of recent finds, and issues of the journal Zhongguo qianbi “Chinese Numismatics” for
1997 and 1998 contain essays on the wushu coinage of Wei, including a discussion by
Zou Zhiliang on the possibility that private mints were permitted to operate. [I am
most grateful to Professor Hsing I-tien of Academia Sinica, Taiwan, for his advice and
guidance in this field.]
51
As Dien, Six Dynasties Civilization, observes at 217, “it can be inferred [that]
many old, Han coins continued to circulate well into the Six Dynasties period.”
52
“Economic and Social History,” 600–601.
258 chapter six
To defeat in Jing province
Militarily speaking, Cao Cao’s borders were secure in the north, and
the agricultural colonies established by his officer Liu Fu confirmed his
hold along the Huai in the southeast. Thanks to the efforts of Zhong
Yao and Du Ji, the near west was largely quiet,53 and the first half of
208 saw a further strengthening as Ma Teng came to the east.
After the escape of the emperor and the collapse of the chaotic
regime of Li Jue, Guo Si and their fellows at Chang’an, a variety of
warlords had continued to operate in the northwest, with Ma Teng
and Han Sui, a former leader of the Liang province rebellion, among
the most powerful. Though nominally linked in oaths of brotherhood,
they were divided by lower-level squabbles between their followers,
and Cao Cao sent Zhong Yao and Wei Duan, his Inspector of Liang
province,54 to make peace between them. Ma Teng came to camp west
of Chang’an, and at this point Zhang Ji was sent once more as envoy
to persuade him to move to a position of honour at the imperial court
under Cao Cao’s control.
Ma Teng at first agreed but then, justifiably, became nervous. Zhang
Ji, however, had all the county offices along his prospective route pre-
pare welcoming parties and greeting ceremonies, and Ma Teng felt
he had no alternative but to follow the general expectation. Leaving
his son Chao in charge of the family forces, he came to Xu city and
was appointed as minister. Ma Chao was named a lieutenant-general,
but other members of the family were moved to Xu city; all of them,
including Ma Teng, now hostages for Ma Chao’s good behaviour.
In Jing province, close at hand to the south, the situation had been
comparatively stable. Liu Biao never undertook a major attack, though
his officers Zhang Xiu and then Liu Bei had sometimes threatened the
region of Xu city. Zhang Xiu had joined Cao Cao before Guandu, then
accompanied his army north in 206 and died during the campaign
against the Wuhuan. At that time there had been some concern about
a possible raid from Liu Bei, who had taken over from Zhang Xiu
in Nanyang, but it was agreed that Liu Biao was unlikely to approve
53
Zhong Yao was Cao Cao’s Director of Retainers, head of the capital province,
now based at Luoyang. Du Ji was his Administrator of Hedong. See Chapter Five at
106 and 224.
54
Wei Duan of Jingzhao had styled himself Governor of Liang province in the late
190s, but then threw in his lot with Cao Cao, who apparently gave him title only as
Inspector.
red cliffs 208 259
such a venture for fear Liu Bei would become too powerful. There had
indeed had been no action, and during the first part of 208 Cao Cao
was able to attend to his government.
In the middle of the year, however, towards the end of summer,
the situation in Jing province changed. Offering a possible source of
danger but also a substantial opportunity, it required prompt and seri-
ous attention.
The first new factor was that Liu Biao, now in his late 60s, became
seriously ill. Cao Cao surely had spies and agents at Xiangyang, and the
likelihood of his old enemy’s demise encouraged him to take advan-
tage of any confusion which might follow. For in the second place,
a succession contest was emerging in similar pattern to that which
had brought down the Yuan family: two rival brothers, with Liu Biao
influenced by his wife to favour the younger. And thirdly, Liu Biao’s
control of the Yangzi and the south was threatened with attack from
the east by the forces of Sun Quan.
When the war against Dong Zhuo began in 190, the fighting man
Sun Jian, at that time Administrator of Changsha, led his men north
to join Yuan Shu. On the way he killed the Inspector of Jing province
Wang Rui, with whom he had an old quarrel, and took over his troops.
Dong Zhuo sent Liu Biao to fill the vacancy.
Born in 142, Liu Biao had played a role in the partisan struggle
against the imperial eunuchs during the late 160s and, with many oth-
ers, he was proscribed from office for most of the reign of Emperor
Ling.55 When Proscription was ended at the time of the Yellow Turban
rebellion in 184, Liu Biao took a clerical position in the offices of the
General-in-Chief He Jin and then became Adjutant of the Northern
Army. These positions were not high but, strictly speaking, neither was
a provincial inspectorate, and Dong Zhuo was no doubt looking for a
man of standing and respect who could keep the territory under some
form of control.
Jing province of Later Han covered present-day Hubei and Hunan,
the basin of the middle Yangzi, together with the prosperous com-
mandery of Nanyang in the southwest of present-day Henan. At that
55
There are biographies of Liu Biao, followed by brief accounts of his sons, at HHS
74/64B:2419–25 and SGZ 6:210–16. A man from Shanyang, he joined a group of fel-
low-countrymen in an association which was denounced by the eunuchs as partisan,
and which became the trigger for the great Proscription of 169: deC, “Political Pro-
test,” 28–33, and “Politics and Philosophy,” 59–60.
260 chapter six
Map 13. Jing Province

red cliffs 208 261
time, however, Nanyang was controlled by Yuan Shu, and Liu Biao
was obliged to make his way surreptitiously to the south. Once there,
he gained support from the local leaders Kuai Yue and others, and
with their assistance he killed or overawed other chieftains and suc-
cessfully established his government at Xiangyang, on the Han River
by present-day Xiangfan in Hubei. Late in 191 he was attacked by
Sun Jian, now in the service of Yuan Shu, but Sun Jian was killed in
a skirmish with Liu Biao’s general Huang Zu, and Liu Biao was able
to take control of the south of Nanyang. Beyond the Yangzi on the
other hand, though several local officials offered formal submission
Liu Biao could exercise little direct authority, and for several years in
the late 190s he was opposed by the rebel Administrator Zhang Xian
of Changsha.56
In 192 the imperial court controlled by Li Jue named Liu Biao as
Governor, with title as a general, and awarded him enfeoffment; but
this was pure formality, for Liu Biao held warlord control of his ter-
ritory. Some criticised his pretensions, such as the use of carriages
in imperial style, but his court became a refuge for gentlemen and
scholars from the north, and he was a serious patron of scholarship
and literature. He had himself worked on the Book of Changes and the
Ritual,57 and under his sponsorship a new and authoritative set of edi-
tions and commentaries to the classics was prepared and circulated.58
Liu Biao had no political ambitions comparable to those of Cao
Cao, Yuan Shao or other leading warlords of the time,59 and he sought
56
On the rebellion of Zhang Xian, see Chapter Three at 126 and 150. Zhang Xian
died in 200, and the insurgency in the south was put down soon afterwards.
57
The Ritual 禮 of the Later Han period comprised the present-day Yi li 儀禮
and Li ji 禮記: Boltz and Riegel in Loewe [ed], Early Chinese Texts, 234–241 and
293–297.
58
On the culture of the court of Liu Biao see, for example, Miao, Wang Ts’an,
69–72, and Chittick, “Liu Biao,” 168–169.
59
Chittick, “Liu Biao,” 166–168, argues that Liu Biao had imperial pretensions like
those of Yuan Shu, but I do not find his evidence convincing. Other warlords, such as
Liu Zhang in Yi province and Gongsun Du in the northeast, also made use of imperial
insignia and privileges, but there is no evidence that they were preparing to make a
claim to the title itself. Such conduct may have been presumptuous and in bad taste,
but it was not fully treasonous. On Liu Zhang, see SGZ Shu 1:867; deC, Establish
Peace, 84. On Gongsun Du see SGZ 8:252; deC, Establish Peace, 59.
At 168, moreover, Chittick himself quotes Lingling xianxian zhuan, quoted by
SGZ 6:216 PC, where Liu Biao’s officer Liu Xian explains to Cao Cao that when the
emperor is weak and there is no way to communicate with him, “to offer sacrifices
to Heaven and Earth is to proclaim one’s fidelity.” The text, as Chittick says, may be
262 chapter six
no role in the confused fighting to his north and east. He maintained

a loose alliance with Yuan Shao, but avoided direct action in his sup-
port. He drove Yuan Shu away in 193, and he defended himself against
Cao Cao with the aid of Zhang Xiu, but he kept aloof from the critical
operations about Guandu in 200. Later, he received Liu Bei and wrote
eloquent letters urging Yuan Shang and Yuan Tan to unite against Cao
Cao. When Cao Cao was in the far northeast in 207 Liu Bei urged an
attack from the rear, but again Liu Biao took no action.
Some commentators have criticised this apparent lack of energy,
but it was no small achievement that Liu Biao kept his considerable
territory largely intact and peaceful, and that he maintained a haven of
culture and scholarship at a time when the rest of China was ravaged
by warfare and banditry. By 208, however, the situation was more dif-
ficult: not only was Liu Biao old and ill—he was now over sixty-five—
but he had confused the succession between his sons and he was faced
in the south by the aggressive army and navy of Wu, approaching
from the lower Yangzi.
The front-line territory against the invaders was Jiangxia command-
ery, whose Administrator, Liu Biao’s general Huang Zu, had com-
manded the troops which killed Sun Jian outside Xiangyang in 191.
During the second half of the 190s Sun Jian’s son Sun Ce had made
a position for himself on the lower Yangzi, and in 199 and 200 he
extended his power westwards to Lujiang, north of the Yangzi, and
into the Poyang district of Yuzhang about the marshland of Pengli,
now the Poyang Lake on the south of the great river. At this point Sun
Ce came into conflict with Huang Zu, who attempted to intervene in
Yuzhang. Huang Zu was driven back, and though Sun Ce was killed
soon afterwards his brother Sun Quan took over his embryo state.
Expansion up the Yangzi would have continued in any case, but the
enterprise gained intensity from the fact that it was pursued in the face
of the family enemy.
uncertain, and the argument is sophistical, but it does present a justification for Liu
Biao’s conduct which precluded any greater ambition.
There is also the example of Du Kui, likewise cited by Chittick at 167: a former
master of the imperial music, he was commissioned by Liu Biao to prepare a program
of court music, ostensibly for the emperor of Han. When Liu Biao asked for it to be
played, however, Du Kui protested that it was only for imperial use, and Liu Biao gave
up the idea: SGZ 23:665; deC, Establish Peace, 209, Chittick, 167. Liu Biao’s restraint
is in some contrast to Cao Cao: Chapter Eight at 339.
red cliffs 208 263
Progress was comparatively slow, however, and it was not until 206
that Sun Quan confirmed his control of the Poyang region and estab-
lished himself at the border of Jing province. Then and in the follow-
ing year a series of attacks led by Sun Quan’s general Zhou Yu drove
Huang Zu back to his base at Xiakou, on the junction of the Han River
with the Yangzi at present-day Wuhan.60 In the spring of 208 a final
attack broke through Huang Zu’s defences, including a well-fortified
boom at the mouth of the Han, and destroyed his army. Huang Zu was
killed as he fled.61 Having no wish to maintain an exposed outpost so
far upstream, Sun Quan withdrew his forces to the provincial border,
but he faced no immediate opposition to the west of that position.
The destruction of Huang Zu was naturally a set-back for Liu Biao,
but the territory was not itself critical. The main communication line
between the north and the south of Jing province lay further to the
west through Nan commandery and Wuling, and the headquarters of
the main Yangzi fleet was at Jiangling, capital of Nan commandery.
In any case, the political struggle at Liu Biao’s capital, Xiangyang, was
attracting greater attention.
Liu Biao had two sons, Liu Qi and Liu Zong; it is not known whether
they were by the same mother. Liu Qi, the elder, resembled his father,
and was at first his favourite. Later, however, Liu Biao was influenced
by his second wife the Lady Cai, whose family had supported Liu Biao
when he first came to the province and whose niece was married to
Liu Zong; his affections began to change. As Liu Qi became increas-
ingly concerned at the situation, he sought the advice of Zhuge Liang,
a refugee scholar from Langye who had a reputation in such matters.62
Zhuge Liang at first would not respond, but eventually the two men
climbed a tower together, and Liu Qi took the ladder away. “Now,”
he said, “we are not high enough to reach the heavens, and not low
60
The lower reach of the Han was also known as the Xia River. [The name of the
commandery of Jiangxia came from a combination of Jiang, the name of the Yangzi,
with Xia, for the Han] It was sometimes also called the Mian, so the name of the junc-
tion with the Yangzi may appear as Xiakou or Miankou. The city, however, was called
Xiakou, and it probably lay north of the Han and the Yangzi, at present-day Hankou:
deC, Establish Peace, 366–367 note 5, and Generals of the South, as below.
61
DeC, Generals of the South, 239–241.
62
The biography of Zhuge Liang (181–234) is at SGZ Shu 5:911–37. He soon after-
wards became chief adviser to Liu Bei, and from 223 he was regent minister of Shu-
Han for Liu Bei’s son Liu Shan.
264 chapter six
enough for the earth. Anything you say will be for my ears alone; can
you not speak?”
With analogy from the tale of the prince Chong’er, who left his
father’s court but later returned and became one of the great hege-
mons of Zhou,63 Zhuge Liang encouraged Liu Qi to seek an appoint-
ment outside Xiangyang. Huang Zu had just been killed, so Liu Qi
asked to take his place in Jiangxia; his wish was granted and he left
the capital.
Though Zhuge Liang has been praised as one of the wisest states-
men of China, one cannot feel that his advice was of great value to Liu
Qi. The new position was obviously dangerous, and Liu Qi’s departure
left the field open to his opponents, notably the Lady Cai’s younger
brother Cai Mao and his nephew Zhang Yun. As Liu Biao lay dying,
Liu Qi returned from the south and sought to visit his deathbed, but
Cai Mao and Zhang Yun were afraid that Liu Biao would favour him
once more. Arguing that he had abandoned his post, they refused
him admission, and Liu Qi was obliged to leave. In the eighth month
Liu Biao died, and Liu Zong took over. He sent the seal of a mar-
quis as compensation to his brother, but Liu Qi, predictably furious,
hurled it to the ground. He planned to return for the funeral and
claim his inheritance, but at this point, in the ninth month of 208, Cao
Cao came south to the borders of Jing province with his main army
behind him.
At first sight, there appears no strong reason for Cao Cao to move
so quickly. The quarrel between Liu Zong and Liu Qi resembled that
of Yuan Shang and Yuan Tan a few years earlier, and at that time Cao
Cao held back and allowed the rivals to exhaust themselves before he
intervened. The situation in Jing province, however, had one major
point of difference: the presence of Liu Bei. A notional kinsman of
Liu Biao and his family, Liu Bei was known as an ambitious fighting
man who set great store on his extremely distant connection to the
Han imperial house. He and his followers had come into Jing prov-
ince some seven years before, and he had cultivated support since that
63
Chong’er, son of the ruler of the state of Jin of the Chunqiu period, was wrong-
fully accused of plotting against his father. He fled into exile, and travelled for many
years until eventually returning to take the throne. Posthumously entitled Duke Wen
of Jin, his traditional dates of rule are from 636 to 628. The story of his difficulties and
his exile is told in Zuo zhuan, notably at Xi 4 and 6, and Xi 23 and 24 [Legge, Clas-
sics V, 141–145 and 186–192], and his life and reign are recorded by SJ 39:1656–69;
Chavannes, MH IV, 283–308.
red cliffs 208 265
time. If the relationship between Liu Zong and Liu Qi came to serious
conflict, it was very likely Liu Bei would offer himself as an honest
broker and then as a compromise candidate, and every possibility that
his bid would be accepted. In such case, Cao Cao would be faced by an
aggressive and experienced enemy, with substantial resources behind
him, very close to the heartland of his power.
The opportunity was obvious, and the threat from Liu Bei could well
be calculated. Cao Cao had gathered his troops as early as the seventh
month, a few weeks before Liu Biao died, and in the ninth month, as
Liu Zong took the inheritance, Cao Cao advanced to Xinye, on the
border of their two territories.
His father’s old servants, notably Kuai Yue and Fu Xuan, a refugee
from Beidi in the north, urged Liu Zong to submit. He followed their
advice and went forward to meet Cao Cao at Xinye.
We are told that one of Liu Zong’s advisers, a certain Wang Wei,
suggested he lay an ambush to capture Cao Cao and take over his
power, while on the other side Cao Cao was at first suspicious of such
swift submission; his adviser Lou Gui, however, reassured him that
Liu Zong was bringing his insignia of office, and was therefore com-
mitted to surrender.64 Wang Wei’s plan was in any case absurd: even
if Cao Cao had been seized or even killed, his followers would have
responded swiftly to such treachery, and the final result would have
been of no benefit to Liu Zong.
Surrender, indeed, was an excellent option. Cao Cao was clearly the
dominant force in central and northern China, and Liu Zong, with a
dissident brother on the Yangzi, Sun Quan to the east, and Liu Bei, of
questionable loyalty, at his side, came well out of a difficult situation.
He evidently shared his father’s lack of external ambition, and one
may question whether Liu Biao would have offered any greater resis-
tance once Cao Cao’s full power was turned against him. Liu Zong was
treated courteously and generously: Cao Cao named him Inspector of
Qing province, a safe distance from his former territory, and had him
enfeoffed as a marquis. He is not heard of again, and in the circum-
stances of the time that is probably a good result.
64
Lou Gui, a local leader of Nanyang, gathered refugees from Chang’an as fol-
lowers, and was initially allied to Liu Biao. Later he joined Cao Cao, who was an
old acquaintance, and accompanied him on campaign against the Yuan family. His
biography is at SGZ 12:373–74.
266 chapter six
Liu Bei had been in camp at Fan, the twin city north of the Han River
from Liu Biao’s and now Liu Zong’s capital of Xiangyang. We are told
he had prepared his troops to oppose the invader, and that he was not
told of Liu Zong’s plan to surrender until Cao Cao had reached Wan
city in Nanyang. Angry at such pusillanimity, he thought briefly of
attacking Xiangyang, but contented himself with abusing Liu Zong,
paying a visit of respect to Liu Biao’s tomb, then withdrawing to the
south. Though he did have widespread support, Liu Bei’s position was
untenable: even if he had succeeded in overthrowing Liu Zong, a new
regime would have had no chance to defend itself against an invader
who was already within the frontier.65
Liu Bei’s flight was encumbered by the multitude of people that
followed him, and some suggested he abandon them and flee alone
with a few companions. Observing, however, that he would lose all
faith with the empire if he deserted those who had trusted him, Liu
Bei continued to travel with his unwieldy horde. Many were inspired
by pointless panic rather than by any justifiable fear of Cao Cao but,
as on similar occasions in history, each infected the other and created
a vulnerable mass of confusion.
Cao Cao stayed only a short time at Xinye, just long enough to
reward Liu Zong and a few of his followers for their decision to receive
him, but then went quickly with light-armed troops to Xiangyang. Liu
Bei had left before he arrived, and Liu Bei’s lieutenant Guan Yu had
commandeered the Han River fleet and was taking it south and east
down that river to the junction with the Yangzi at Xiakou. The main
naval base of the province, however, was at Jiangling, on the Yangzi
itself by present-day Shashi, upstream of the Dongting Lake and
marshlands, and the route there led by land, roughly along the line of
the present railway. With five thousand horsemen Cao Cao hastened
on, and after twenty-four hours hard travel over more than 120 kilo-
metres they caught Liu Bei and his fugitives at the Chang Slope, by
present-day Dangyang in Hubei.
Though Cao Cao and his men were surely tired, Liu Bei’s heteroge-
neous mass could offer no coherent resistance. Once more deserting
his family, Liu Bei fled with a few companions and a small mounted
escort. Most of his followers and all of his baggage fell into Cao Cao’s
65
Liu Bei’s flight is described by his biography at SGZ Shu 2:877–78: ZZTJ
68:2083–84; deC, Establish Peace, 377–382.
red cliffs 208 267
Map 14. The Red Cliffs Campaign 208

268 chapter six
hands, though his comrade Zhang Fei defied the enemy long enough to
destroy a bridge and gain a brief respite, while his loyal follower Zhao
Yun rescued Liu Bei’s concubine the Lady Gan and his son Liu Shan.66
Liu Bei and the remnants of his party now abandoned the road to
Jiangling and turned east, where Guan Yu and his fleet brought them
across the Han River into Jiangxia. Cao Cao continued his march to
the south and occupied Jiangling, while Liu Bei joined forces with Liu
Qi; the two commanders set their base at Fankou, near present-day
Echeng and some seventy-five kilometres downstream from the junc-
tion of the Han and the Yangzi at Xiakou.
Cao Cao’s defeat of Liu Bei at the Chang Slope meant that his army
held the west of the Han River, and his seizure of the provincial fleet
at Jiangling gave him control of the Yangzi as far as Xiakou. The direc-
tion of his operations thus changed from a swift drive southwards to an
advance downstream to the east against Liu Bei and Liu Qi in Jiangxia.
Changsha, Wuling and the other territories south of the Yangzi played
no role: their administrators had owed allegiance to Liu Biao, but now
that his inheritance was divided, with one son accepting Cao Cao and
the other opposing him, it was in the best interest of these officials
to wait for the outcome of the contest which was developing to their
north. We know that Cao Cao sent the clerical officer Liu Ba with
a general brief to supervise Changsha, Lingling and Guiyang on the
upper Xiang and its tributaries, but it is unlikely he did much more.67
So long as the incumbents paid lip service to his new regime there
was no reason to spend time or stir up trouble by forcing replace-
ments into the area, and he did not need reinforcements from such
an uncertain source.
Left on their own to face Cao Cao, Liu Bei and Liu Qi were unlikely
to survive the encounter. Liu Qi had the commandery and frontier
troops of Jiangxia, Liu Bei still had some following, and Guan Yu had
brought the Han River fleet of Jing province. Liu Qi and Liu Bei are
said to have had some ten thousand men each, for a total of twenty
66
Zhang Fei’s heroism is described in his biography at SGZ Shu 6:943. The biog-
raphy of Zhao Yun is at SGZ Shu 6:948–50. SGZ Shu 4:905; Cutter and Crowell,
Empresses and Consorts, 115, records his rescue of the Lady Gan and Liu Shan.
67
SGZ Shu 9:980 and PC quoting Lingling xianxian zhuan. A man from Lingling,
Liu Ba had a fine reputation. He refused appointment from Liu Biao, but took service
with Cao Cao as he arrived in Jing province.
red cliffs 208 269
thousand, but Cao Cao claimed eight hundred thousand.68 Further-

more, just as Liu Bei had been heavily defeated by Cao Cao, so too had
Liu Qi’s men, then under the command of Huang Zu, been routed by
Sun Quan a few months earlier. An alliance with Sun Quan, however,
was now the only hope, and Liu Bei sent Zhuge Liang on embassy to
the east.
Sun Quan’s officer Lu Su was at this time already with Liu Bei. He
had been sent into Jing province to present condolences at the death
of Liu Biao and to assess the situation: was there any possibility of suc-
cessful resistance to Cao Cao?69 As he was still on the road, however,
Liu Zong surrendered to Cao Cao and Liu Bei took flight. When Lu Su
met him, just after the disaster at the Chang Slope, we are told that Liu
Bei talked of seeking refuge in Cangwu commandery of Jiao province
in the far south, where the Administrator was an old friend. Hoping
for an ally against Cao Cao, however, Lu Su persuaded him to fight
one more time, and he accompanied Zhuge Liang to see Sun Quan.70
Sun Quan had already come forward to Chaisang, on the Yangzi
near the Pengli Lake, close to the border with Jing province, where he
received Lu Su and Zhuge Liang. The move indicated an active con-
cern for events, but initially Zhuge Liang played his diplomatic role
badly, emphasising Liu Bei’s claim to the imperial name, his ability at
war, and his vast popularity. Predictably enough, Sun Quan was furi-
ous at the implication that he should be glad to offer support to such
a paragon:
68
The figures for Liu Bei and Liu Qi were given by Zhuge Liang, on his embassy
to Sun Quan described below: SGZ Shu 5:915: ZZTJ 65:2089; deC, Establish Peace,
389. Cao Cao’s claim of eight hundred thousand was made at the same time, but was
heavily discounted by Zhou Yu: SGZ Wu 9:1261 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan: ZZTJ
65:2091; deC, Establish Peace, 394, and see Chapter Four at 183.
69
The biography of Lu Su is at SGZ Wu 9:1267–72. A man of family from Xiapi,
north of the Yangzi, he impressed Sun Quan by his intelligence and skill in planning,
and became his confidential agent. He would later command the forces of Wu in Jing
province: deC, Generals of the South, 303–310 and 373–375.
70
The debate at Sun Quan’s court which followed is described by ZZTJ 65:2088–92;
deC, Establish Peace, 388–395, after accounts in SGZ Shu 5:915, Wu 2:1118, Wu 9:1261
and 1269–70, with related texts in PC. It is also considered in deC, Generals of the
South, 255–260. Much of the discussion was very likely recorded at the time, and may
well be an accurate summary; cf., however, note 72 below.
270 chapter six
I am not going to raise the lands of Wu and a hundred thousand men to

put them under someone else’s orders! I can make my own plans. And
as to the idea that Liu [Bei] is the only man to face Cao Cao; he has just
been defeated, so why should he be successful now?
Realising the error, Zhuge Liang adapted his presentation, arguing that
the twenty thousand men under Liu Bei and Liu Qi were capable of
defending themselves. Though Cao Cao commanded a great host, his
own troops would be fatigued from their fighting and marching, and
had no experience of the rivers and marshlands, while the men from
Jing province had no commitment to his cause. With a celebrated anal-
ogy, he claimed that “The last flight of a strong cross-bow cannot piece
even thin silk from Lu,” and argued that this was a unique opportunity
for Sun Quan: if he would send thirty thousand men, they could drive
Cao Cao back and establish a long-term balance against him.
As Sun Quan was considering the proposal, he received a message
from Cao Cao, in splendid and intimidating style:
I have lately received an imperial command to attack all criminals. My
banners point to the south, and Liu Zong has bound hands. I control
a fleet with eight hundred thousand men, and I plan to come hunting
with you in Wu.
In traditional China, the hunting season of autumn or winter was an
occasion for the review and exercise of troops, so Cao Cao’s intention
was very clear. We are told that when Sun Quan showed the letter to
his advisers they turned pale in fear, and some recommended that he
should swiftly seek terms.71
Lu Su, however, was committed to the alliance against Cao Cao,
and we are told that he followed Sun Quan as he went to the lava-
tory, and there persuaded him to wait for the assessment of Zhou
Yu, his chief general. When Zhou Yu arrived, he too emphasised the
weakness and divisions in Cao Cao’s army: with thirty thousand men,
aided by the forces of Liu Bei and Liu Qi, he undertook to defeat the
invader. Sun Quan accepted his advice, and proclaimed his decision to
fight.72 He gave joint command to Zhou Yu and the veteran Cheng Pu,
71
SGZ Wu 2:1118 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. The senior civilian official Zhang
Zhao is said to have been a leading spokesman for this policy: deC, Establish Peace,
391 note 77.
72
Lu Su’s conversation with Sun Quan in the lavatory was, by definition, private
and not recorded, and after the formal statement to his counsellors Sun Quan also
held a private meeting with Zhou Yu: SGZ Wu 9:1269–70, and Wu 9:1261 PC quoting
red cliffs 208 271
and in the tenth month at the beginning of winter, late November or

early December by the Western calendar, they brought ships and men
east up the Yangzi to join Liu Bei and Liu Qi. The combined forces
then moved further upstream to the region where the Han joins the
Yangzi.
The strategies and expectations of the various protagonists differed

considerably. It is probable that Cao Cao saw his further advance
against Liu Bei and Liu Zong as a probing attack, not a full offensive.
He had defeated Liu Bei just a short time ago, and Liu Zong’s troops
had not done well against Sun Quan a few months earlier. If he could
gain a position across the Yangzi they would very likely be willing to
surrender; he would then have full control of Jing province and could
deal with Sun Quan at his leisure.
For his part, Sun Quan explained his planning to Zhou Yu:
If you can deal with [Cao Cao], then everything will be settled in our
favour. If things turn out badly, however, come back to me here, and I
shall myself fight the deciding battle against him.
Like Cao Cao, he too regarded the coming encounter as preliminary.
He would have the support of allies, the fighting would be outside his
own territory, and if Zhou Yu’s expeditionary force was defeated Sun
Quan could still maintain defence on his home ground or negotiate
good terms of submission.
Any comments about potential disagreements within Cao Cao’s
army and fleet, however, applied with equal force to the troops of Liu
Bei and Liu Zong. The men of Jiangxia commanded by Liu Zong, and
the sailors of the Han River fleet under Guan Yu, would be facing the
Yangzi navy of Jiangling, to which they had in the past looked for help
and support. And they and their commanders were hoping for rescue
from the men of Wu, who had lately been their fiercest enemies. It
cannot have been an easy alliance.
Though Cao Cao claimed eight hundred thousand men, we may
more realistically accept the calculations which Zhou Yu is said to
have presented to Sun Quan: a hundred and fifty or sixty thousand
of his own men, and seventy or eighty thousand from Jing province;
Jiangbiao zhuan. On the latter discussion, particularly dealing with the numbers of
troops, see Chapter Four at 183–184.
272 chapter six
a total of almost a quarter of a million and more than double the

number ascribed to Yuan Shao at the battle of Guandu eight years
before. Certainly his resources were now greater, but we cannot tell
how many of this nominal figure were fit to stand in the front line,
and how many were support troops or simple camp followers, includ-
ing women and children. It must nonetheless have been an impressive
array, far outnumbering the allies who faced him: ten thousand under
Liu Bei, another ten thousand under Liu Zong, and thirty thousand of
Sun Quan’s men led by Zhou Yu and Cheng Pu.
With so many men, Cao Cao advanced on a broad front, and his
army met the Yangzi fleet from Jiangling at a north-flowing stretch of
the river upstrem of present-day Wuhan. Constricted by marshes, the
land route led from Jiangling through the county of Huarong, and it
is probable that Cao Cao’s main body reached the bank of the Yangzi
near Wulin, between present-day Jiayu and Xinti in Hubei.73 As the
line of approach became clear, Zhou Yu, Liu Bei and their comrades
brought their forces southeast to face them and block any attempt to
cross.
Cao Cao’s men were established in a series of camps, extending not
only along the shores of the Yangzi but also some distance inland,
while the ships from Jiangling were moored along the bank. The whole
host occupied a very considerable area, both along the river and in
73
As the waterways, meanders, lakes and marshes of the region have changed over
time, the site of the battle at the Red Cliffs has been the subject of debate for centu-
ries. I have discussed the question in some detail in Generals of the South, 265–266
note 78.
From the pattern of the campaign as described in Sanguo zhi and the texts cited by
its commentary, it is clear that two areas which have been claimed cannot be accepted.
The “First Rhapsody on the Red Cliffs” by the great Song poet Su Shi [style Dongpo]
refers to Cao Cao gazing along a stretch of the Yangzi below the junction with the
Han; this, however, was the rear territory of his enemies, and he never came so far.
Similarly Wuchang, now part of the Wuhan metropolis by ancient Xiakou, was left
behind the allies as they advanced to meet Cao Cao. [On the rhapsodies, and a ci poem
by Su Shi on the same theme, see Chapter Eleven at 482–483.]
Descriptions of the operation contain a number of references to Wulin [e.g. SGZ
Shu 9:990 PC quoting Lingling xianxian zhuan, and SGZ Wu 10:1283], and there is a
modern place of that name on the north of the Yangzi, probably still about the same
site as in Han times. SJZ 35:1093 refers to Wulin, on the left bank, as the place where
Huang Gai made his attack, and soon afterwards, at 1095, identifies the Red Cliffs,
on the right bank, as the site of the battle. A ridge on the southern shore has been
inscribed with the characters 赤壁 “Red Cliff/s” and the nearby city, formerly known
as Puqi 蒲圻, officially changed its name to Chibi in 1998, with considerable advan-
tage for local tourism. Since the opposing armies must have occupied considerable
ground, with extended camps along the Yangzi, it is effectively meaningless to seek an
exact place, but we may believe that the confrontation took place in this area.
red cliffs 208 273
the country behind, while supplies could be brought down the Yangzi
from Jiangling and also by smaller streams and canals through Hua-
rong. Cao Cao did not intend, however, to remain in that position for
long: this was no such siege as Yuan Shao had mounted at Guandu,
but an attempt at breakthrough with a swift attack, building on the
momentum of his recent success.
Though Cao Cao had arranged training exercises on the Xuanwu
“Dark Warrior” Pond at Ye, the water-land of the Yangzi was natu-
rally very different to anything the northern soldiers had experienced,
and although it was winter the damp surroundings harboured diseases
to which they were not accustomed. Many of them, moreover, were
exhausted by the long march to this point, and while Liu Bei’s men
must have been equally distressed, Liu Qi’s men of Jiangxia and the
reinforcements from Wu were comparatively fresh. We are told that
there was sickness in Cao Cao’s camp, and there are many cases in
history where disease has spread rapidly through an army and proved
devastating to its effectiveness.74
The engagement was comparatively brief. Cao Cao made one attempt
to establish a bridgehead across the Yangzi, but his ships and men
were held off by the allies, and both sides withdrew to their respective
camps, with Cao Cao’s fleet moored along the bank. Soon afterwards
Zhou Yu’s officer Huang Gai, commanding a squadron of his fleet,
sent a false offer to surrender. When it was accepted, he filled a set of
ships with dry reeds and wood, soaked them in oil, and set sail across
the river. Cao Cao’s men were prepared to welcome him, but as he was
half way across Huang Gai set fire to the ships, and as he and his men
escaped in boats they had towed behind them, Cao Cao’s positions
were set ablaze both on water and land:
The fire was fierce and the wind was strong, and the ships went like
arrows. The whole of the northern fleet was burnt, and the fire reached
the camps on the bank. In a very short time the smoke and flame
stretched across the sky, and a multitude of men and horses were burned
or drowned and died.
74
On sickness among Cao Cao’s troops, see SGZ 1:31 and Wu 9:1262. On the
“sickness of the host” see, for example, Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History, 154–165, with
many citations of the damage done by dysentery, scurvy, typhoid, smallpox, typhus
and plague. See also Chapter Four at 196.
Some commentators suggest that Cao Cao’s men were suffering from seasickness,
but while they may indeed have found it awkward to fight hand-to-hand on ships, and
some may have been affected by the strange environment, the disease which affected
them was probably far more serious.
274 chapter six
Zhou Yu and the allies led a light-armed force to follow up the assault.
They beat their drums with a mighty roar, and the northern army was
utterly smashed.75
We are also told how the army struggled to retreat:
Cao Cao led his troops back on foot along the Huarong road. They met
with mud and mire, the road became impassable, and a great wind arose.
All the sick soldiers had to carry grass and brushwood on their backs, to
fill the road so the cavalry could get through. Trodden down by men and
horses, they were sunk into the mud and a whole mass of them died.
The text goes on to say that Cao Cao expressed his relief that Liu Bei
had not also set fires to cut his line of retreat along the road.76
Very soon after the campaign was concluded, stories began to col-
lect about the battle at the Red Cliffs: the whole affair became a theme
and a source for many plays and took a central position in the cel-
ebrated Romance of the Three Kingdoms. It is now difficult to discern
the reality behind the accretions, whether fact or fiction, and certainly
hard to assess the nature and scale of the defeat.77 Cao Cao himself
later wrote to Sun Quan, protesting at the exaggerated claims of Zhou
Yu, and arguing that:
During the Red Cliffs campaign [my men] were taken ill, so I burned
my ships and withdrew. There is no good reason for Zhou Yu to claim
such a false reputation.78
75
SGZ Wu 9:1263. This passage and the one immediately following, from Shanyang
gong caiji, are included in ZZTJ 65:2093; deC, Establish Peace, 396.
76
SGZ 1:31 PC quoting Shanyang gong caiji. This text also ascribes the plan for
fireships to Liu Bei, but the story about Huang Gai seems better supported.
The drama entitled Huarong dao “Incident on the Huarong Road” tells how Guan
Yu was sent to trap Cao Cao, but let him go free on account of his earlier courtesy and
favour. The story appears also in Chapter 50 of the Romance, but it has no historical
validity: Chapter Eleven at 498.
77
Romance makes a great deal of Cao Cao’s defeat and forced retreat, and the
account occupies Chapters 45 to 50 at the centre of the novel. There are several tradi-
tional stage dramas on the theme, many of them collected under the general title Qun
ying hui “Meeting of the Heroes:” e.g. Arlington and Acton, Chinese Plays, 201–210,
and two major films on the campaign have lately been made in China: Chapter Eleven
at 498 and 503.
One must nonetheless bear in mind the possibility that very little happened at the
Red Cliffs. In his “Myth of the Battle of the Fei River,” Rogers has suggested that
accounts of that celebrated engagement in 383 have been grossly exaggerated and
that it may never in fact have taken place [though his argument is contested in the
review by Holzman]. I do believe, however, that some fighting between took place at
the Red Cliffs in 208/209.
78
SGZ Wu 9:1265 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan.
red cliffs 208 275
Cao Cao, of course, would say that; but his comments provide some-
thing of a balance.
Forced to retreat up the Han, Cao Cao left his cousin Cao Ren to hold
Jiangling on the Yangzi—now rather an outpost than a base to control
the region—and Sun Quan’s forces under Zhou Yu advanced upriver
to attack the place. Liu Qi remained in Jiangxia, with title as Inspector
of Jing province, but died a few months later, and the commandery
was then taken over by Sun Quan, who thus gained some territory.
Zhou Yu, however, was tied down at Jiangling, and while he was
thus engaged Liu Bei made himself the chief beneficiary of the allied
success.
Leaving Liu Qi north of the Yangzi and Sun Quan’s forces concen-
trated on Jiangling, Liu Bei had occupied the region of the Dongting
Lake and the Xiang valley in the south. As Cao Cao’s agent Liu Ba fled
through the Nan Ling ranges into Jiao province, Liu Bei took control
of Wuling, Changsha, Guiyang and Lingling. He gave Zhuge Liang
charge of the three southern commanderies, with headquarters at
Linzheng in Changsha, while he himself moved into Wuling. Though
Zhou Yu’s operations against Jiangling were immediately to his north,
he offered no assistance.
Further south there had been some re-arrangement of alliances.
During the 190s the local leader Shi Xie had established a loose hege-
mony over the whole of the territory from the Pearl River to his home
country of Jiaozhi commandery on the Red River delta of present-
day Vietnam.79 Liu Biao’s influence in that region had earlier been
constrained by the rebellion of Zhang Xian, but some time after 200,
following his success at Guandu, Cao Cao arranged for the court of
Han to appoint his officer Zhang Jin as Inspector and then Governor
of Jiao province. It was an exposed and isolated position, however,
and though Zhang Jin sought to develop a military force to deal with
his powerful neighbours Liu Biao, Shi Xie and the many local reb-
els and bandits, he was killed in 203 or 204, either by non-Chinese
people or by mutiny among this own troops.80 Liu Biao sent officers
to the region, but then Cao Cao came to an agreement with Shi Xie,
79
The biography of Shi Xie is at SGZ Wu 4:1191–94; deC, Generals of the South,
340–353.
80
On various references to Zhang Jin, see deC, Generals of the South, 348, and
LH3K, 1057.
276 chapter six
granting him title as Administrator of Jiaozhi with authority over all

seven commanderies of the province; and when Shi Xie sent tribute
to Xu city he was rewarded with title as a general and enfeoffment as
a marquis.
Following the Red Cliffs campaign, though Liu Bei took over the
south of Jing province, Sun Quan sent his officer Bu Zhi into Jiao as
Inspector. Swiftly eliminating the former followers of Liu Biao, Bu Zhi
occupied Nanhai and Cangwu in the east about the Bay of Canton,
and established a modus vivendi with Shi Xie, who formally trans-
ferred allegiance to Sun Quan, sending a son as hostage in 217. Cao
Cao had now no position south of the Yangzi.
Even as Zhou Yu was attacking Jiangling, Sun Quan opened a second

front towards the Huai. With success at the Red Cliffs, the troops he
had gathered as reserves were available for an enterprise directly to
the north, and there was hope that Cao Cao’s defeat might affect the
morale of his men elsewhere.
The main objective was Hefei city in Jiujiang, north of the Chao
Lake and midway between the Yangzi and the Huai, but a supplemen-
tary force under Sun Quan’s minister Zhang Zhao was sent to attack
Dangtu, a hundred kilometres further on the Huai itself. This long-
distance venture was presumably intended to confuse and impress the
defenders of Hefei and other cities, but it had no effect, and as Zhang
Zhao was forced to withdraw Sun Quan remained tied down in the
siege of Hefei.81 Cao Cao’s Inspector of Yang province, Liu Fu, had
According to JS 15:464–65, Zhang Jin was first named as Inspector, but later
received the higher rank and title of Governor, presumably in an attempt to add to
his authority. It was probably at this time that the designation of the territory was
changed from Jiaozhi to Jiao province (Jiaozhou). Hitherto, the name Jiaozhi had been
applied to two different units: the province level, headed by an Inspector, which con-
trolled all the far south beyond the Nan Ling, and the commandery in the Red River
basin, headed by an Administrator, which was the base territory of Shi Xie. Though
the nomenclature is confusing, it is not unique: Yi province (Yizhou) in the southwest
of the empire also contained a commandery unit called Yizhou. For further discus-
sion, see deC, Generals of the South, 31–32 and note 57.
81
SGZ Wu 2:1118, the Annals/Biography of Sun Quan. The main text of SGZ 1:31
dates Sun Quan’s attack on Hefei to the twelfth month, which is surely correct, but
then places the battle at the Red Cliffs immediately afterwards. As Pei Songzhi observes,
this must be mistaken; SGZ Wu 2 has the Red Cliffs affair before that of Hefei.
SGZ 1 says that Sun Quan attacked Hefei “on behalf of ” (爲 wei) Liu Bei, but this
is likewise an error, for Sun Quan was at this time the senior partner in the alliance.
He was certainly independent of Liu Bei; and there was indeed never an occasion that
he acted at Liu Bei’s behest.
red cliffs 208 277
died a few months earlier, but the defences he had established, with
military colonies along the Huai and fortifications about Hefei, now
proved their worth.
In the mean time Cao Cao had returned to his base area at Xu city
and Ye. After such a defeat he needed to ensure authority by his pres-
ence there, so that neither the emperor nor anyone else would think
of causing trouble. At the end of an eventful year, he had confirmed
his control over Nanyang and gained the northern part of Nan com-
mandery, but his outpost on the Yangzi at Jiangling was held only
tenuously, and twelve months later, in the winter of 209/210, Cao Ren
was forced to abandon the city and withdraw to the north.
This was far less than Cao Cao had expected when he first advanced
and received Liu Zong’s surrender. The heart of his power in Jing
province was now at Xiangyang, former capital of Liu Biao, and the
real line of his control was some fifty to a hundred kilometres south of
that city, where the comparatively narrow valley of the Han opens out
to the broader plain of the middle Yangzi. His position was reasonably
secure, as was his hold on the Huai, and with a few variations, and
subject to occasional attacks by either side, this would be the frontier
between north and south for the next seventy years. The defeat at the
Red Cliffs may not have been as tactically disastrous as many histo-
rians claim, but it did prove decisive. Cao Cao’s short-lived control
over the greater part of Jing province was broken, and he was faced
by two rival and growing powers, Sun Quan on the lower Yangzi and
the ambitious Liu Bei in the middle basin. He could never dominate
the south of China as he had the north, and the armed forces of Wei
would never cross the Yangzi.
From a different perspective, there is one final point to be consid-
ered: the courage of Sun Quan in supporting Liu Bei at the Red Cliffs
in 208. In retrospect, the policy may appear natural and sensible, and
the result certainly justified the risk. When we compare other alliances
that Cao Cao faced, such as the Yuan and the Wuhuan a few years
earlier, or the grouping of warlords in the northwest in 211, then the
combination of Liu Bei and Zhou Yu was exceptional and deserved suc-
cess. Ultimately, however, it was Sun Quan’s personal decision, against
the advice of the majority of his counsellors, to send a great part of
his army and fleet to operate beyond his territory in co-operation with
the erratic Liu Bei and with troops from Jing province who had no
cause to love the men from Wu. Leaving aside the rhetoric of Zhuge
Liang—who surely had less influence than his admirers claim—a more
traditional ruler would have held to his borders and left Liu Bei to his
278 chapter six
fate. Sun Quan did have the advice of Lu Su and the support of Zhou
Yu, but the challenge was his alone; and his response determined the
history of China for centuries to come.
War on water: weapons, techniques and tactics82
From a military point of view, water is a contradictory element which

may serve as friend or foe. On the one hand, it offers excellent means
of transport, by ship or barge along rivers or canals—so Cao Cao con-
structed canals for his campaign against the Wuhuan; but it can also
be an obstacle and a danger, either blocking the route of an army, or
making it vulnerable when it seeks to cross—many battles turned into
slaughter when one side caught the other half-way. When set about a
city or a fortress, water may provide a defensive moat; but it can also
be a means for an enemy to approach the walls and for attackers to
isolate and starve the place out. In many areas, moreover, particularly
in the warmer climate of the Yangzi basins and the further south, wet-
lands are a breeding ground for disease—whether natural to the region
or brought about because a high water table encourages the mingling
of human waste with drinking water.
Each of these factors played a part in the conflicts between Cao Cao
and his southern rivals, and likewise between Sun Quan, Liu Bei and
others. In many cases, particularly in relation to transport, the situa-
tion could vary from one season to another or might depend upon the
immediate weather conditions. In 214 Lü Meng urged a swift assault
on Huan city before the flood-waters which had aided the army’s
approach began to recede,83 and the region between the Huai and the
Yangzi appears always to have been variable.
82
DeC, Generals of the South, 275–286, contains “Some Notes on Ships and War-
fare,” which complement this section.
83
SGZ Wu 9:1276; Chapter Four at 177.
In similar fashion, there is an apocryphal story about the killing of the wise man
Gan Ji 干吉 [Yu Ji 于吉 in some texts] by the young Sun Ce. It tells how Sun Ce
wanted to invade the north to attack Cao Cao but found that unseasonal dry weather
prevented his barges from moving. Under threat, Gan Ji produced rain, but Sun Ce
killed him nonetheless when his soldiers offered excessive and undisciplined praise:
SGZ Wu 1:1110–11 PC quoting Sou shen ji “Record of Enquiry about the Spirits” by
Gan Bao of the early fourth century. As discussed in note 51 to Chapter Three, how-
ever, it is unlikely that Sun Ce made any such attempt against the north, and while it
is probable that he did have Gan Ji executed, the whole incident is hedged about by a
complex collection of magical stories: deC, Generals of the South, 205–206.
red cliffs 208 279
The Yangzi and its tributaries, however, notably the Han and the
Xiang in the middle basin, and the Poyang complex at the head of the
lower Yangzi, were generally navigable by the ships of the time. The
chief problems, indeed, were caused by the great expanses of water—
the bridge across the Yangzi at present-day Wuhan is a kilometre long,
and the bridge at Nanjing is more than 1500 metres; and these are
among the narrower parts of the relevant reaches—together with the
strength of the currents and the strong possibility of dangerous winds.
To handle wooden craft in such conditions, aided only by oars or sail
against the forces of nature, required practice and skill.
Former Han maintained an Office for Towered Warships in Luji-
ang commandery, evidently a naval headquarters with a dockyard for
construction and maintenance and a depot for seamen.84 Though full
conscription was discontinued by Later Han, we may assume that the
previous establishment continued, providing training for volunteers to
serve against pirates on the rivers. It is possible that the great base in
Lujiang was not the only establishment under Later Han, for we know
that Liu Biao maintained a fleet in Jing province at Jiangling on the
middle Yangzi and another at Xiangyang on the Han. He may have set
them up at his own initiative, but it is also possible that he inherited
them from his predecessors, in which case Yang province too could
have had one or more bases along the lower Yangzi.
More generally, there was a long tradition of river trade, and an
established system of coastal communications from the mouth of the
Yangzi south to the Bay of Canton and present-day Vietnam; and north
past the Shandong peninsula to Manchuria and Korea.85 As indication
84
HS 28A:1567. That text says only that the Office for Towered Warships (louchuan
gong 樓船官) was in the territory of the commandery, but Yen Keng-wang, Regional
and Local Administration I, 204, quotes HS 64A:2787 to identify the site as being at
Xunyang, close to the border with Jing province; it presumably exercised authority
and control over both the middle and the lower Yangzi: see further, however, below.
On the Office for Towered Warships as a shipyard, see Nishijima, “Economic and
Social History,” 582. One of the training possibilities for conscripts during Former
Han was as a sailor or marine in a Towered Warship: see Loewe, RHA I, 162–163,
discussing HS 23:1090, Hanguan yi “Ceremonial of Han Offices” by Ying Shao of the
second century, and other texts.
85
The twin cities of Dongye and Houguan, at the mouth of the Min River by pres-
ent-day Fuzhou, were way-stations for the southern trade, and in 196 Sun Ce sailed
there in pursuit of the fleeing Administrator of Kuaiji, Wang Lang: SGZ 13:407; deC,
Generals of the South, 169–170.
The sea route to the north was more dangerous and probably less used. During
the 230s Sun Quan sought to establish an alliance with Gongsun Yuan, the warlord
280 chapter six
of the scale of traffic on the Yangzi itself, we may note that in 219, as
Lü Meng led an army of Wu to make a surprise attack on Guan Yu in
Jing province, he had sailors in civilian clothes on deck, but most of
his thirty thousand troops were hidden below.86 If so many men could
be concealed in a nominal fleet of traders, there must have been great
numbers of ships on the river.
The description of Lü Meng’s invading force indicates also that mer-

chant and fighting ships were of similar design. In the Mediterranean
there was clear distinction between warships, such as the Classical tri-
reme and later galley, with sails and oars and a capacity for ramming,87
and the slower broader cargo ship, primarily equipped with sails. Both
from texts and through archaeology, we are probably better informed
about Western vessels than we are about Chinese ships of the Han,
particularly since information is scattered in sources which range
over several centuries, and the texts need interpretation—not always
reliable.
A collective term for warships at this time is mengchong doujian:
the phrase is used, for example, to describe Cao Cao’s great fleet at
the Red Cliffs, and also the squadron of Huang Gai’s fireships which
destroyed it.88 Doujian may readily be interpreted as “Fighting Junk”
but mengchong is less straightforward.
The Taibo yin jing “Secret Classic of the Great White Planet” by Li
Quan of the Tang dynasty lists six types of ships at that time, and the
passage has been used by commentaries to earlier texts. The six catego-
ries, from large to small, are louchuan “Towered Ships,” zhanjian or
doujian “Fighting Junks,” haihu “Sea Hawks,” mengchong, zouge “Fly-
ing Barques” and youting “Patrol Boats.”89 The term louchuan was well
of Liaodong, but had great difficulty in doing so, and in 232 one of his embassies
was wrecked off the Shandong peninsula: SGZ 26:728; Fang, Chronicle I, 394, Gar-
diner, “Kung-sun Warlords” II, 151–152. We are also told that Sun Quan attempted
to colonise the islands of Yizhou and Tanzhou, probably Taiwan and the Ryukyus,
but the gains did not repay the costs: deC, Generals of the South, 480–481, and Fang,
Chronicle I, 323.
86
SGZ Wu 9:1278: ZZTJ 69:2168; de C, Establish Peace, 546, and Chapter Ten
at 435.
87
Among many other texts, the development, construction and fighting tech-
nique of the ancient trireme are discussed by O’Connell, Arms and Men, 56–59, and
Hanson, War Like No Other, 236–264.
88
SGZ Wu 9:1261 and 1262. The characters are 蒙衝 and 鬬艦.
89
The Great White Planet (taibo) is Western Venus; in Chinese astrology it is inter-
preted as a symbol of war.
red cliffs 208 281
established in Han, and appears to have been used generally for any
large warship with multiple decks and/or a raised forecastle and poop;
haihu, zouge and youting are not mentioned in texts of this time.
Li Quan thus places mengchong among the lighter ships and Need-
ham, following this, interprets the class as ‘fast destroyers’ and ren-
ders the name as “Covered Swoopers;” reading the character chong as
implying “rushing, violent motion.” From the graphic description of
the defeat of Huang Zu by the troops of Sun Quan in 208, however, it
appears that mengchong were more substantial than that:90
Huang Zu had set two mengchong to guard the channel across the mouth
of the Mian [i.e. the Han River], with great ropes of coir-palm fibre
anchored by stones. Above all this were a thousand crossbow-men to
give covering fire. The bolts poured down like rain, and the army could
not get forward.
Dong Xi and Ling Tong were together in the van, each leading a hun-
dred volunteers clad in double armour.91 Boarding a great barge, they
charged the mengchong, and Dong Xi cut two ropes with his sword. The
mengchong were swept sideways downstream, and so the main army was
able to advance.
These mengchong were clearly large ships which could be used as float-
ing fortresses; they were not light skirmishing craft.
It is probable that the nature of the mengchong changed over the
centuries between Han and Tang, and as it did so the significance of
the character chong 衝 changed too. The “dashing attack” of Needham
may reflect its Tang function, but it had earlier been understood in
the more basic meaning of “break the enemy line:” a powerful vessel,
protected by screens of raw ox-hide or similar substance, and per-
haps equipped with some form of ram, which could split an enemy
formation.
In a different section of Science and Civilisation, Needham notes
that the Shi ming dictionary compiled by Liu Xi in the second century
AD describes mengchong as long and narrow, acting like a battering
Taibo yin jing is quoted in Du You’s Tong dian 160:848c–849a, and this in turn is
quoted by the Song commentary to ZZTJ 65:2089–90. Needham, Science and Civili-
sation IV.3, 424–425, discusses the text along with other sources, and translates it
at 685–686. With the exception of mengchong, as below, I follow his renderings for
the different types of ships: the characters for the last three classes are 海鵃 (haihu),
走舸 (zouge), and 遊艇 ( youting).
90
SGZ Wu 10:1291: ZZTJ 65:2078; deC, Establish Peace, 368–369.
91
The phrase 敢死 gansi, literally “dare-to-die,” is used for a volunteer in a hazard-
ous enterprise.
282 chapter six
ram against enemy ships, while the eighteenth century commentator

Wang Niansun, discussing types of ships listed in the Guang ya dic-
tionary of the third century (which unfortunately gives no description
of the vessels), confirms the analogy of the battering ram and explains
that the character meng 蒙 should be understood as synonymous with
mao 冒, which can refer to a covering but which here held the sense
of “colliding;” chong likewise had the meaning of tu 突 “to break.”
Needham accordingly suggests that meng originally referred to the ram
function, but had been re-interpreted by Tang times as describing the
defensive covering.92 I believe he is correct, but that mengchong had
already gained their armour by the early third century; my preferred
rendering would be “Armoured Breaker.”
Despite the comparisons to battering rams, and the references to
“butting” and “colliding,” it is doubtful that ramming was a significant
technique in war. Unlike the West, traditional Chinese ships lacked a
single strong keel but were built up with separate compartments. As
a result, a large ship such as a maotu or mengchong might run over,
capsize or crush a smaller one, but a death-blow beneath the water-
line was essentially impossible. In contrast to ancient Greece or Rome,
where the trireme was a mobile ram and battle tactics were designed
to manoeuvre such vessels into position to strike, there is no strong
evidence that Chinese fleets sought any such encounters.93
92
Science and Civilisation, IV:3, 680. HHS 17/7:660 describes how in 33 AD
Emperor Guangwu’s general Cen Peng used maotu ships to attack the troops of Gong-
sun Shu by the Yangzi Gorges; like Huang Zu in 208, the defenders had a boom across
the river, guarded by a floating bridge and fortress towers. The Tang commentary says
that maotu ships could chu 觸 “butt” the enemy.
93
The whole question of ramming in Chinese naval warfare is a difficult one, for
it is not always possible to distinguish between ships designed deliberately to hole an
enemy below the waterline, those which were reinforced to withstand a fore-and-aft
shock, and those which may have run into the side of another and gained an almost
accidental advantage. The matter is discussed by Needham, Science and Civilisation
IV.3, 678–680, and also in deC, Generals of the South, 282 note 104.
Similarly, in his excellent discussion of fighting on the Poyang Lake in 1363, Dreyer
observes that “It is also clear from the battle accounts that tactics did not depend upon
the ram, so that warships could do one another damage only by shooting arrows or
other projectiles.” See “The Po-yang Campaign,” 209. That was more than a thousand
years after the engagements considered here, but the style and capacity of the vessels
were probably much the same.
Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 242, citing Tong dian 160 as above, notes that mengchong,
or mengtong 鸏鶇 [written with a bird radical] was a Tang name for the hornbill
bird (Dicheros), while mengtong [written with the ship radical] described the warship.
Schafer understands that the ships possessed a ram at the front: this may have been
so, but the character may have meant only that they were swift and manoeuvrable
red cliffs 208 283
There is likewise no reference to catapults or trebuchets mounted

on ships for use against others. As we have seen, Chinese of this time
do not appear to have had the torsion catapult,94 and though trebu-
chets could be carried on a ship, and might be effective against walled
defences in calm conditions, the difficulties of aiming and the limits of
range and weight of the missile meant they were impracticable against
other vessels on open water.95 In general, therefore, without effective
rams or substantial artillery, Chinese ships of this time were generally
unable to destroy one another.
The great exception, of course, was fire, as in Huang Gai’s strike
against Cao Cao’s fleet at the Red Cliffs, but that required special con-
ditions of wind and surprise. Otherwise there were fire-arrows, though
these could normally be dealt with fairly easily; most importantly it
does not appear that the Han Chinese had the use of any propulsive
flammable material such as Greek Fire.96
As one regular battle-ship could not normally expect to destroy
another, therefore, the vessels were primarily platforms for fighting,
and combat took place between men, either hand-to-hand or by arrows,
enough to dart among the enemy ranks and harass them. Schafer also remarks that
these vessels first appear in history in the account of the Red Cliffs campaign. This is,
of course, not strictly correct, for the Red Cliffs action took place at the end of 208,
some nine months after the defeat of Huang Zu at Xiakou.
94
Note 55 to Chapter Four, quoting Franke, “Siege and Defense of Towns,” 167.
95
Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 227, has an illustration of a four-deck
ship armed with a number of trebuchets, but they are small compared to the vessel
itself. As he remarks on the previous page, moreover, “’gun-laying’ with such devices
would have been impossible with even a slight sea.”
96
Two useful studies on the development and use of Greek Fire are those of
Luttwak, Byzantine Empire, 323–326, and Needham, Science and Civilisation V.7,
73–80.
Like the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean, the Han Chinese had access to petro-
leum (石油 shiyou) through natural seepage, and there is evidence that it formed
part of an arsenal in the late third century. It does not appear, however, to have been
more than a plain inflammable substance, and it is not until the tenth century that the
phrase menghuo you 猛火油 “fierce fire oil” appears to indicate the adoption of Greek
Fire, which could be pumped or thrown in jars against an enemy.
The ingredients of Greek Fire are not known for certain: suggestions include a mix-
ture of pitch and saltpetre, or a distilled petroleum like present-day volatile petrol,
possibly mixed with pine resin to help it stick to the target, like present-day napalm.
Somewhat unusually, this appears to have been a development in warfare where the
Mediterranean world was ahead of China: Greek Fire appears in the eastern Mediter-
ranean in the late seventh century, while Arab armies may have been using incendiar-
ies oils based upon crude oil at about the same time.
None of these, however, were available to the warriors of the Three Kingdoms, and
the oil that Huang Gai used in his fireships at the Red Cliffs is described simply as
gaoyou 膏油 “fatty oil,” presumably from animals or fish.
284 chapter six
crossbow bolts and thrown spears. The mengchong were protected,

probably with hides, and capable of physically disrupting an opposing
formation, while doujian “Fighting Junks” were more manoeuvrable.
The Tang texts describe the doujian as a large open ship, with two ranks
of raised bulwarks pierced with loop-holes. Confusingly, we are told
that they were designed for “combat,” while the mengchong were not,
which seems a strange thing to say about a warship. Needham suggests
that “this may have been an explanation intended for military readers
used to close combat on terra firma,”97 indicating that doujian were
designed for close-quarter combat with missiles or directly by board-
ing. The compound mengchong doujian may thus be interpreted as
describing ships with two different roles: the heavy mengchong which
could fight ship-to-ship, and the lighter doujian which carried men
into combat as boarding parties; the two together served as a general
term for warships. And beside these major categories, of course, there
would be swarms of smaller craft, from light sailing ships to canoes;
anything which could be used for pinprick attacks or skirmishing.
Far more than military action, the greatest threat to ships of this time
was the weather. The dangers of the sea are obvious, and we have
noted how a convoy of Wu en route from Liaodong was wrecked off
the Shandong peninsula in 232.98 That incident had political and mili-
tary significance, but similar accidents must have been common on
the open sea and along the coasts of China. The great rivers and lakes
were not a great deal safer, for ships on such broad expanses of water
could be hit by violent winds. Those with multiple decks were vulner-
able to capsize, smaller craft with open sides were easily swamped, and
the threat was all the greater to warships, for many were either built
too high for safety or were overladen with men and weapons.
One anecdote, though very likely apocryphal or exaggerated, none-
theless indicates the susceptibility of these vessels:
Early in 213, as Cao Cao approached Sun Quan’s defensive positions
on the northern bank of the Yangzi, Sun Quan took ship on the river
to observe the situation. Cao Cao’s army sent out a hail of arrows and
crossbow bolts. The missiles stuck in the side facing the enemy, and
the increased weight threatened to make the vessel capsize. Undaunted,
97
Science and Civilisation IV:3 at 687.
98
Note 85 above.
red cliffs 208 285
Sun Quan turned his ship and presented the other side to enemy fire.
The new collection of arrow-heads levelled the ship and so, lower in the
water but once more on an even keel, he returned safely to his camp.99
More realistically, there are several accounts of riverine disasters: Sun
Quan’s commander Dong Xi was drowned in 217 when his flagship
overturned in a squall and he gallantly went down with the ship,100 and
in 222 a number of Sun Quan’s ships were caught by a storm on the
Yangzi and were wrecked or foundered with the loss of several thou-
sand men.101 In the following year Cao Cao’s officer Du Ji, now in the
service of Cao Pi, died when a ship undergoing trials capsized on the
Yellow River.102
In general, war on water was an extension of war on land, and many
of the same conditions applied. In contrast to the West, where fleets
and ships can lose one another on the high seas,103 rivers and lakes
are reasonably easy to scout, and naval commanders usually had a
good idea where their enemy was. In immediate tactics, as we have
seen, fighting was normally carried out between the men on the ships,
with missile weapons or by boarding and hand-to-hand combat; sel-
dom between the vessels themselves. Ships were often used simply for
transport, and troops disembarked to fight on shore. In 212 Lü Meng
encouraged Sun Quan to construct a fortress at Ruxu on the northern
bank of the Yangzi as a defence measure against Cao Cao’s attack.
More conservative officers criticised the plan:
We climb the bank to attack the enemy, and we wade in the water to
board our ships; what use are land defences?
99
SGZ Wu 2, 1119 PC quoting Wei lue. There is obvious comparison with the
well-known but fictitious incident of Zhuge Liang acquiring a hundred thousand
arrows at the time of the Red Cliffs by enticing Cao Cao’s soldiers to shoot at ships
filled with straw: see Romance Chapter 46, and the drama Caochuan jiejian 草船借
箭 “Borrowing Arrows with Straw Boats,” with further discussion in Chapter Eleven
at 488 and note 78. As in other cases, it is typical of the romantic tradition that the
concept, however distorted, was transferred from the credit of Sun Quan and/or Zhou
Yu to that of Zhuge Liang.
100
SGZ Wu 10:1291.
101
SGZ Wu 11:1311.
102
SGZ 16:497.
103
The enterprise of the Spanish Armada in 1588, for example, required [and failed
to obtain] co-ordination between a fleet sailing from Spain and an army crossing the
Channel in barges from the Netherlands. And the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 was
preceded by an English search for the French and Spanish fleet across the Atlantic to
the West Indies and back before the final engagement.
286 chapter six
“Soldiers may win or lose,” argued Lü Meng, “and no-one can be a

hundred per cent certain of success in battle. Should something unex-
pected happen and the enemy press closely, and our men have no time
to reach the shore, how will they get into their ships?”
Sun Quan approved the plan, and the defences proved their worth on
several occasions, but the essential principle had been well described
by Lü Meng’s opponents.104
Despite mishaps to their ships and the occasional defeat on land,

moreover, the seamanship of the men of the south gave them con-
sistent advantage over invaders from the north. Not only were they
afloat in familiar waters, while their opponents had to improvise from
the shore, but they were more experienced in fleet manoeuvres on
the open river—and whereas troops on land can be overwhelmed by
greater numbers, there are sea battles from Salamis to Sluys which
demonstrate that a small fleet, well-handled, can destroy a larger one.
So the armies of Cao Cao and his successors were regularly halted
by the lower Yangzi, which served as a vast moat protecting Sun
Quan’s territory, while in the middle basin they were likewise held at
bay by marshes, lakes and streams. Though it may not have seemed so
at the time, the setback at the Red Cliffs, followed by the withdrawal
from Jiangling twelve months later, meant that Cao Cao had lost the
struggle for the south. The initial capture of Jiangling had given him
one good chance to match his enemies on their own element, but once
that fleet and its base were gone, and no matter how much training
and exercise was undertaken by the troops of the north, Cao Cao and
his men had neither the resources nor the expertise to contend for
command of the Yangzi and the lands beyond.105
104
SGZ Wu 9:1275 PC quoting Wu lu. The fortress was set at the mouth of the
Ruxu River, which flowed some fifty kilometres south from the Chao Lake to join
the Yangzi upstream of present-day Wuhu in Anhui. This was a natural line for any
attack from the north.
105
See also the discussion of demographic change in Chapter Ten at 454–455.
CHAPTER SEVEN
MILITARY MATTERS 209–217
Northwest and southeast 209–214

Liu Bei and Sun Quan 209–214
Two surrenders: Zhang Lu and Sun Quan 215–217
Cao Cao and the Art of War
Military chronology1
209 Sun Quan attacks Hefei without success; Cao Cao establishes
military colonies
winter: Sun Quan’s forces capture Jiangling and Nan commandery
Liu Bei occupies the south of Jing province
210 Zhou Yu dies; Sun Quan cedes the bulk of Jing province to Liu Bei
211 autumn: Cao Cao defeats the warlords of Liang province at
Huayin
Liu Zhang invites Liu Bei into Yi province
212 winter: Cao Cao attacks Sun Quan on the Yangzi
Liu Bei turns against Liu Zhang
213 summer: Cao Cao returns to Ye, leaving a no-man’s land south
of the Huai
Ma Chao is driven from Liang province; he joins Zhang Lu
214 Xiahou Yuan destroys the warlords of Liang province
summer: Sun Quan’s army captures Huan city in Lujiang
Liu Zhang surrenders to Liu Bei, who takes over Yi province
autumn: Cao Cao attacks Sun Quan without success
215 Sun Quan attacks Liu Bei in Jing province; Liu Bei cedes him
territory
Cao Cao attacks Zhang Lu and receives his surrender in Han-
zhong
1
The major source for Cao Cao’s military activity from 209 to 217 is SGZ 1:32–49.
The operations are presented in chronicle order by ZZTJ 66–67:2097–2148; deC,
Establish Peace, 404–509.
288 chapter seven
216 Cao Cao settles the Xiongnu in Bing province

217 Cao Cao attacks Sun Quan, who makes a formal surrender
After the partial conquest of Jing province in 208, followed by his

defeat at the Red Cliffs, Cao Cao entered a period of several years’
intense and varied activity, leading military campaigns to the south
and west while seeking at the same time to enhance his authority with
an effective civil administration and a splendid court. Now in his mid-
fifties, he displayed great energy in a complex political situation, even
as uncertainty about his ultimate ambitions caused some advisers to
flatter him and others to turn against him.
From one month to the next, Cao Cao had to deal with different
aspects of government, while his rivals to the south re-arranged their
territories. Though the pattern of events is clear enough, this compli-
cated period is better considered by themes than by simple chronol-
ogy. I therefore devote the present chapter to the military enterprises
of Cao Cao and his rivals; following chapters consider Cao Cao’s deal-
ings with the emperor, his internal policies, and such of his personal
thoughts and feelings as may be discerned from his own writings and
the records of discussion at his court.
Northwest and southeast 209–214
At the beginning of the Chinese year 209, Cao Cao was at his base
territory about Xu city and Ye, while two of his armies were on the
defensive in the south: Cao Ren under siege in Jiangling on the middle
Yangzi, and Hefei city attacked by Sun Quan. Sun Quan had sent a
detachment under Zhang Zhao towards the Huai River, but this was
turned back quite quickly, and his main effort was directed at Hefei.
As the offensive was maintained through the first months of the year,
Cao Cao became concerned and led his army to the southeast; for the
time being Cao Ren had to be left to his own resources.
By the third month, Cao Cao and the main body of his troops had
reached Qiao county in Pei, still a considerable distance from Hefei,
but Sun Quan was confused by a false report that relief was close at
hand and was persuaded to withdraw.2 With the immediate danger
past, Cao Cao moved more slowly, downstream to the Huai and then
2
Chapter Four at 192–193.
military matters 209–217 289
up the tributary Fei River to Hefei. Confirming the fortifications there,

he established new military colonies at Shaobei Lake south of Shou-
chun, adding to those which had been founded in this region by Liu
Fu. Eighty kilometres south of Shouchun on the Huai, but backed by
this new settlement, Hefei was now a well-defended salient, and an
advanced base for any future offensive against Sun Quan.3 At the end
of the year, as the army withdrew to Qiao, there was a flurry of rebel-
lion and banditry in Lujiang, but it was swiftly put down by the gen-
eral Zhang Liao. Cao Cao returned to his base, leaving Zhang Liao,
Yue Jin and Li Dian to guard Hefei.
Further west, on the middle Yangzi, the news was not so good, for
Sun Quan’s general Zhou Yu had forced a crossing near Jiangling and
his attacks rendered the city untenable. Heavily outnumbered, Cao
Ren maintained a gallant defence for several months, and though he
was eventually forced to abandon the city he was granted a marqui-
sate. The frontier was thus brought back to the south of Xiangyang,
while on the other side of the Han River Cao Cao’s Administrator of
Jiangxia Wen Ping held the northern part of that commandery against
Sun Quan’s commander Cheng Pu.4
Sun Quan now controlled the line of the Yangzi as far as the Gorges,
but his strategic position in Jing province had been rendered tenuous
by the successes of Liu Bei further to the south. With Changsha, Gui-
yang and Lingling under the authority of Zhuge Liang, and his own
headquarters in Wuling, Liu Bei held the basin of the Xiang; and Sun
Quan found himself squeezed in this region between Cao Cao’s power
3
I follow the regular transcription for the first character of the name of this lake
and reservoir. Traditionally and locally, however, it is known as Quebei.
Many years later in 233, on the advice of the general Man Chong, who was con-
cerned at the isolation of the territory and at the constant threat from Wu, Cao Rui
approved the construction of a New City (新城 Xincheng) at Hefei, which became the
defensive heart of the salient: SGZ 26:724.
4
The biography of Wen Ping is at SGZ 18:539–40. Formerly an officer of Liu Biao,
he had been slow to surrender to Cao Cao, who nonetheless admired his loyalty and
gave him this responsible position of defence which he maintained for more than
thirty years.
Wei lue, quoted at SGZ 18:540 PC, says that on one occasion Sun Quan came to
attack Wen Ping, the fortifications of his city had been washed down by heavy rain
and the people had scattered. Wen Ping ordered his followers to hide themselves,
then set himself at ease on a couch in his residence. Concerned there might be a trap,
Sun Quan led his men away. This Empty City Stratagem 空城計 is also attributed
to Liu Bei’s general Zhao Yun in Hanzhong in 219 and, most famously but without
good authority, to Zhuge Liang: Romance Chapter 95, and see Minford, Art of War,
xii–xiv.
290 chapter seven
in the north and that of his nominal ally Liu Bei in the south. Just at
this time, moreover, their colleague Liu Qi, son of Liu Biao, died, and
Liu Bei persuaded Sun Quan to recommend that he replace Liu Qi
as Inspector of Jing province. Though the formula was meaningless,
for Cao Cao controlled the imperial imprimatur, such recognition of
Liu Bei’s position was fiercely opposed by Zhou Yu. Given Liu Bei’s
de facto control of so much territory, however, Sun Quan had little
choice. He attempted to confirm the alliance by arranging for Liu Bei
to marry his sister, but it does not appear that husband and wife had
any mutual affection or even trust.5
In the following year, 210, Zhou Yu died, and Sun Quan had now
no general to match Liu Bei. On his deathbed, Zhou Yu recommended
that Lu Su succeed him in command, but Lu Su lacked Zhou Yu’s
prestige and authority, and he was concerned at the exposed nature of
the narrow territory along the Yangzi. He persuaded Sun Quan that it
would be wise to grant or “loan” Nan commandery to Liu Bei, and Sun
Quan now held little more than the southern part of Jiangxia—small
reward for the achievements of Zhou Yu at the Red Cliffs and Jiangling.
The settlement was uneasy, and would be disputed further, but Cao
Cao’s old enemy Liu Bei was now his major opponent in the middle
Yangzi.6
For the time being, however, neither Liu Bei nor Sun Quan presented
any immediate threat, and Cao Cao turned his attention to the west,
5
Daughter of Sun Jian by his wife the Lady Wu, the Lady Sun was a full sister of
Sun Quan. A woman of character, she maintained a corps of armed female retainers.
Though she became Liu Bei’s principal wife, it is said that he was always afraid of her:
SGZ Shu 7:960.
In 211, when Liu Bei went into Yi province, the Lady returned to Wu. She attempted
to take Liu Bei’s son Liu Shan with her, but was intercepted by Zhao Yun and Zhang
Fei, who brought the boy back: SGZ Shu 6:949 PC quoting Zhao Yun biezhuan 趙雲
别傳 “Secondary Biography of Zhao Yun,” and 309 below.
6
It appears that Sun Quan and Liu Bei made two agreements during this period.
The first, in 209, endorsed Liu Bei as Inspector and acknowledged his position in the
southern basin of the middle Yangzi. The second, following the death of Zhou Yu in
210, granted Liu Bei access to the north of the river. In particular, Lu Su transferred
his headquarters downstream, from Jiangling to the neighbourhood of present-day
Wuhan. This gave Liu Bei effective control of all the western part of Jing province.
There was propaganda in Wu that the territory had only been lent (借 jie) to Liu
Bei, and that Sun Quan should get it back in due course. In practice, after the death
of Zhou Yu the extended position at Jiangling was all but untenable against Liu Bei,
and Lu Su’s advice did no more than acknowledge reality: the “loan” was a face-saving
formula, and Liu Bei did not recognise the debt.
the old capital province about Chang’an and Luoyang. Zhong Yao,
his chief agent in that region with title as Director of Retainers, had
kept the region reasonably quiet. He sent some support to Cao Cao
at the time of the time of the Guandu campaign in 200, he defeated
Gao Gan’s attack on Hedong in 202, and in 205 he assisted Du Ji to
establish himself in that territory. On the other hand, though Ma Teng
had been an ally, and was persuaded to take appointment at Xu city in
208, the local chieftains and warlords about Chang’an, including Ma
Teng’s son Ma Chao, remained restless and had obliged Zhong Yao
to withdraw to the east. His headquarters were now at Luoyang, and
though Hongnong and Hedong were reasonably secure the Wei River
valley and Chang’an were effectively out of control.
In 211, as the southern front was now quiet, Cao Cao announced an
offensive against Zhang Lu, the theocratic warlord of Hanzhong.
Though Zhang Lu is recognised as one of the founders of the mod-
ern Taoist church and third in the succession of its “Popes,” his ori-
gins and those of his state are obscure and confused. We are told that
the family came originally from Pei, but that Zhang Lu’s grandfather
Zhang Ling, also known as Zhang Daoling, had migrated west into Yi
province and established a religious sect in the mountain country west
of Chengdu in present-day Sichuan. He taught the people from texts
he had compiled himself, and he required offerings of rice from his
followers: the group became known as the “Way of the Five Dou of
Rice”五斗米道 Wudou mi dao, or simply as the Rice Sect.7
7
The biography of Zhang Lu is at SGZ 8:263–66, with parallel at HHS 75/65:2435–37,
and an account of Zhang [Dao]ling appears at the beginning of those texts. The com-
mentaries to both passages quote the Dian lue by Yu Huan of the early third century,
with a comparatively detailed account of the organisation, beliefs and practices of the
Rice Sect.
The dou measure of Han times was a little under two litres. Some scholars have
interpreted the term in this context as a reference to the Chinese constellation Bei
dou 北斗, known in the West as the Big Dipper or Great Bear Ursa Major, which
includes the Pole Star Polaris. As Zhang Lu and his followers are sometimes referred
to pejoratively as the Rice Rebels 米賊, however, it appears that a measure of grain
was an important part of their practice.
Accounts of the early period of the sect in SGZ 8 and HHS 75/65 are summary and
often contradictory, and there are many discussions of Zhang Lu, his predecessors and
rivals. I have considered the matter in Generals of the South, 356–361, and Establish
Peace, 83–84, with particular reference to Seidel, “Image of the Perfect Ruler,” Welch,
Parting of the Way, and Eichhorn, “Chang Jio und Chang Lu.” Other important analy-
ses are those of Maspero, Fukui, Miyakawa and, with caution, Michaud and Levy. I
seek below to present a coherent narrative.
292 chapter seven
Dian lue observes that during the 170s and early 180s there were a
number of religious teachers and groups. They included Zhang Jue,
leader of the Yellow Turbans, with his Way of Great Peace; Zhang Xiu
in Hanzhong, who is described as head of the Five Dou of Rice Sect;
and a certain Luo Yao, who taught a Method of Contemplating the
Concealed and was active in the region about Chang’an. We are told
nothing specific about this last, but the Rice Sect was said to have had
similar techniques to those of Zhang Jue, notably the healing of the
sick by charms and the confession of sins, and I have suggested that
the popularity of such teachings may well have reflected the frequent
outbreaks of sickness throughout China at that time.8
On the other hand, though parts of their teachings may have had
a common origin, and while it is interesting that Zhang Lu’s family
came originally from Pei in the east, it is clear that they had no formal
connection or alliance with Zhang Jue and his Yellow Turbans. Such
unorthodox sects are commonly described as 妖賊 yaoze, but the term
means little more than that their beliefs and teachings were alien to
the traditions of official Confucianism. There were many such groups
throughout China, which may have shared some points of doctrine
but which nonetheless competed fiercely for authority and for follow-
ers. The vast majority have long been forgotten, and Zhang Ling and
his Rice Sect would also have remained nameless nobodies, had it not
been for the later success of Zhang Lu.9
The Annals of Hou Han shu record that in the autumn of 184, at
the time of Zhang Jue’s great uprising of Yellow Turbans in the east,
there was a short-lived rebellion by Zhang Xiu of Ba commandery. The
trouble was settled without great difficulty, and Zhang Xiu was able
to make peace with the government.10 Commentary to that passage
quotes the [Lingdi] ji “Annals of Emperor Ling” by the contemporary
scholar and statesman Liu Ai, which identifies Zhang Xiu as leader of
the Rice Sect, in agreement with Dian lue as above. A few years later in
188, there was a more substantial rising by another group, who styled
themselves Yellow Turbans in echo of Zhang Jue’s defeated rebellion.
They killed the Inspector of Yi province and the Administrator of Ba
8
Chapter One at 36. As above, Dian lue is cited in the commentaries to SGZ 8
and HHS 75/65.
9
See, for example, Seidel, “Image of the Perfect Ruler,” 222–227, discussing the
Dunhuang text of the Laozi bianhua jing 老子變化經 “Sutra of the Transformation of
Laozi” (MS Stein 2295), and Eichhorn, “Chang Jio und Chang Lu,” 317–318.
10
HHS 8:349.
commandery but were then defeated and suppressed by local loyal-

ists. It does not appear, however, that they were in any way connected
to Zhang Xiu or the Rice Sect, and when Liu Yan became Governor
of Yi province he appointed Zhang Xiu to local office. He was also a
patron of Zhang Lu’s mother, receiving her frequently in audience,
and it was presumably through her influence that Zhang Lu first came
to prominence.
The Administrator of Hanzhong Su Gu had been reluctant to accept
the authority of the new Governor, and about 190 Liu Yan sent Zhang
Xiu and Zhang Lu in command of troops against him. The expedition
was successful, but then Zhang Lu killed Zhang Xiu, took title as Lord
Teacher, and set up his own theocratic state.11
Zhang Lu’s position in the upper valley of the Han River allowed
him to block the roads through the Qin Ling ranges, and Liu Yan took
advantage of this to confirm his authority in the rest of Yi province and
keep himself aloof from the troubles of the north. Despite his nominal
rebellion, moreover, Zhang Lu continued to maintain contact with Liu
Yan and, after Liu Yan’s death in 194, with his son and successor Liu
Zhang: Zhang Lu’s mother and other members of the family attended
the provincial court and presumably served as hostages for Zhang Lu’s
good behaviour. About 200, however, there was a break-down in rela-
tions, apparently because Zhang Lu had shown a lack of respect for
Liu Zhang. In any event, Liu Zhang had the Lady Zhang and many
of her kinfolk killed, while Zhang Lu proclaimed independence in
Hanzhong and sought to expand southwards into Ba commandery. As
Liu Zhang sent an army north to face him, the border was stabilised
11
The history is greatly confused by disagreement among the sources about the
relationship between Zhang Lu and Zhang Xiu. In particular, while it is accepted that
Zhang Lu was a leader of the Rice Sect, SGZ 8:263 and HHS 75/65:2435 claim that
he had succeeded to the authority of his grandfather Zhang Ling through his father
Zhang Heng. Dian lue, on the other hand, says that Zhang Xiu founded the sect.
There has been much debate about this apparent contradiction, starting as early
as Pei Songzhi, who suggests that the name of Zhang Heng has been miswritten in
place of Zhang Xiu. This seems unlikely, however, for we are told that Zhang Lu killed
Zhang Xiu, and patricide does not seem a good basis for the development of a suc-
cessful religion. Again, Fukui at 4 has suggested that Zhang Xiu the rebel of 184 and
Zhang Xiu the officer of Liu Yan were two different men; Eichhorn at 317 note 81,
however, discounts the idea.
It is possible that Zhang Xiu and Zhang Lu were rivals for religious authority or
leaders of contending sects, with Zhang Lu claiming authority through his father and
grandfather. His murder of Zhang Xiu, then, allowed him to combine the two groups
and establish his position unopposed, very likely taking over or adapting many of his
former ally’s teachings.
294 chapter seven
and a balance of peace was restored which lasted another fifteen

years.12
Within his territory, which he renamed Hanning “Peace of Han,”
Zhang Lu’s government was comparatively conservative. His chief
officials were named Libationers, a term used for some clerical offices
of Han, but which here related rather to the rituals of a temple. He
followed the traditions of Yue ling “The Ordinances of the Months,” a
calendrical text popular in Han Confucianism, forbidding executions
in spring and summer, and he also prohibited alcohol. As with other
creeds, the Rice Sect associated sickness with wrong-doing—so that an
offender was excused punishment three times, presumably to allow the
spirits to apply their own penalty first. Otherwise, those convicted of
a minor fault were required to pave a hundred paces of roadway; and
“houses of charity” were established at roadsides, with rice and meat
set out for travellers in need.13
Zhang Lu provided a haven for refugees from the troubles of the
north, and as those who came were persuaded to accept his regime
the territory became prosperous. Like other rebels beyond control of
the central government, he was given title as a General of the House-
hold and Administrator of Hanning, and he made some desultory
presentations of tribute. On the other hand, when someone claimed
to have found a jade seal and it was proposed that Zhang Lu should
proclaim himself as a king, his officer Yan Pu argued that such a dis-
play of ambition would be dangerous, while his effective independence
allowed him to observe the affairs of the empire without risk. Zhang
Lu accepted this cautious advice.
A campaign by Cao Cao against Zhang Lu at this time was neither

practicable nor intended. Zhang Lu’s territory on the upper Han River
12
The quarrel is described by SGZ Shu 1:868 and HHS 75/65:2431–32.
13
Dian lue says that Zhang Xiu established “houses of purity” (靜/浮室 jingshe),
where those who were sick were sent to contemplate their sins. Faith-healing and
curing by charms we have noticed already as part of the doctrine of Zhang Jue and
the Yellow Turbans: Chapter One at 36. The technique was also popular in the south-
east, where it was used by the religious leader Gan Ji, who established “spirit houses”
(精舍 jingshe), probably performing the same function as the “houses of purity” of
Zhang Xiu [cf. however, the use of the same term by Cao Cao in an essentially secu-
lar context: note 71 to Chapter Eight]. Zhang Lu’s “houses of charity” (義舍 yishe),
appear to have been simply for the assistance of travellers, but it may nonetheless be
suggested that Zhang Xiu and Zhang Lu, with Zhang Jue and Gan Ji, had each made
a slightly different selection from a common body of belief and practice.
had a narrow border with the east of Jing province, and Cao Cao had
established a new commandery at Fangling, a county in Hanzhong
whose chief city lay on a southern tributary of the Han. The distance
from Fangling to Zhang Lu’s capital at Nanzheng, however, was
three hundred kilometres, and a local chieftain Shen Dan, based on
Shangyong county immediately to the west, would have to be dealt
with first. The route would be long, difficult and slow, with many
positions lending themselves to the defence.14 The shortest and best
route lay further west, past Chang’an, then south by mountain roads
through the Qin Ling ranges. For this, however, the army would need
clear passage from the various warlords of the Wei valley, and it was
doubtful they would provide it.
Indeed, the putative attack on Zhang Lu at this time was no more
than a pretext. Though Ma Chao and his fellows in the northwest paid
lip service to the imperial government controlled by Cao Cao, they had
pressed Zhong Yao back into Luoyang, and had largely re-established
their chaotic independence. Had Cao Cao advanced directly against
them, it would have appeared an unjustified offensive against nominal
tributaries and subordinates. With the notional move against Zhang
Lu, however, Cao Cao obliged them either to accept and assist his pas-
sage through their territory, or make open show of disobedience. They
resolved to fight, and Cao Cao was ready for them.15
The announcement of the campaign against Zhang Lu had been
made in the third month, and within a few weeks the warlords had
declared their defiance and begun preparations for defence. Despite
the loss of Jiangling, it is clear that Cao Ren retained Cao Cao’s confi-
dence, for he was given initial command of operations in the west, but
at the beginning of autumn Cao Cao arrived himself, having left his
eldest son Cao Pi, now twenty-four years old, in nominal command of
headquarters at Ye city. This was the first occasion any of Cao Cao’s
sons had been given such responsibility, and the veteran Cheng Yu
was appointed as Cao Pi’s chief adviser and guardian.
14
On Fangling and Shangyong counties of Later Han, see HHS 113/23:3506, Zhong-
guo lishi ditu ji II, 53–54, and Map 13.
15
In 30 AD Emperor Guangwu had forced a similar confrontation with the war-
lord Wei Ao, who controlled the Wei valley. Preparing for an attack on Gongsun
Shu, claimant emperor in Yi province, Guangwu demanded that Wei Ao give his
troops passage through his territory, and also required his active support. When Wei
Ao rejected the ultimatum, he was attacked and eventually defeated. See Bielenstein,
RHD II, 169.
296 chapter seven
Advancing along the Yellow River through Hongnong, Cao Cao

and his main army were joined by provincial troops under Zhong Yao
and by a contingent from Hedong led by Xiahou Yuan. In the eighth
month they came to the Tong Pass, just south of the junction of the
Wei and the Yellow River, where they faced the combined armies of
the regional warlords.
The mountain ridges at this point are close to the Yellow River, and
the passage is easy to defend. Cao Cao had no intention of a direct
assault, but he kept the main body of his army in camp before the
pass to hold the enemy’s attention while he sent a detachment of four
thousand men under his officers Xu Huang and Zhu Ling to establish
a bridgehead across the Yellow River at Puban.
At its junction with the Wei, the Yellow River makes a right-
angled bend, so that the flow of the stream changes from north-south
to west-east. Xu Huang and Zhu Ling had therefore to cross the River
first from south to north, downstream from the mouth of the Wei,
then march twenty kilometres north to the Puban Crossing, now
Puzhou by the junction with the Su River in Shanxi. In the intercalary
eighth month they crossed from the east bank to the west into Zuop-
ingyi commandery, and with that position secure Cao Cao moved to
join them.
It was an elegant strategy of oblique approach, but the tactics were
less successful. As the main army made its first crossing to the north,
Cao Cao remained on the southern bank of the River with a few
hundred Tiger Warriors as rear-guard. The enemy, however, came
more swiftly and in greater force than had been expected, and Cao
Cao found himself isolated and heavily out-numbered. Though he
may have had problems during the retreat from the Red Cliffs, this
was probably the most dangerous situation he had been in personally
since the old days against Lü Bu more than fifteen years before. He
had badly miscalculated, but as arrows and crossbow bolts fell around
him he presented a picture of confidence, sitting in apparent ease on
a camp-chair.16 Eventually Xu Chu, commander of his body-guard,
16
The huchuang 胡牀 “barbarian bed” was just coming into use at this time. It was
evidently a light stretcher, designed to keep the occupant off the ground, and suit-
able for comfort on campaign. Seating in ancient China, as in present-day traditional
Japan, was cross-legged upon a mat, and the huchuang was probably used initially in
that fashion. The fact that it was raised on legs, however, allowed the occupant to place
his feet upon the ground as in the West, and it became the fore-runner of the chair in
China: Fitzgerald, Barbarian Beds.
military matters 209–217
297
Map 15. The Lower Wei Valley and the Huayin Campaign 211
298 chapter seven
managed to obtain a boat and helped him on board. The boatman was
killed by a stray arrow, but Xu Chu held up a horse’s saddle to protect
his master while manoeuvring the small craft across the river, and one
of his officers, Ding Fei, let loose a number of cattle and horses; the
enemy spent their energy rounding up this booty rather than pressing
the attack.
Cao Cao now made his way north to the Puban Crossing and estab-
lished his position on the western bank. He then marched south, with
the Yellow River on his left and a strong flanking force on the right,
including a convoy of wagons which formed a mobile defence line.
Thus guarded against attack, in the ninth month he and his men came
to the north of the Wei and set up a fortified camp. Outflanked in
their positions at the Tong Pass, Ma Chao and his fellows returned
west to the region of Huayin county and sought to hold Cao Cao on
the banks of the Wei.
At first they were successful, but Cao Cao made a series of feint
attacks to distract his enemies’ attention, and under cover of night he
had a bridge of boats constructed and got men across to set pickets
on the southern bank. Ma Chao and his fellows attacked, but Cao Cao
had prepared an ambush, and the enemy were confused and defeated
in the darkness.17
With both sides now south of the Wei, there followed a period of
negotiations, with protestations of good will on both sides but little
that was concrete. The renegade warlords offered to cede the territory
about Chang’an and also to send hostages, but though Cao Cao made
some show of readiness to parley, he had no interest in returning to
the status quo ante, and was determined to settle the region once and
for all. It is said that as he saw the banners of the hostile army he
expressed increasing satisfaction that so many had joined together: his
victory would be all the more decisive.
At one point the veteran commander Han Sui, an early leader of
the Liang province rebellion in the mid-180s, asked to speak with Cao
Cao; the two men had apparently known one another years before
at Luoyang. Cao Cao agreed to a meeting between the armies, and
17
According to Cao Man zhuan, quoted by SGZ 1:36 PC, Cao Cao’s first attempts
to establish a bridgehead were frustrated by enemy cavalry, and the soil was too sandy
to build a rampart for defence. Eventually, however, on the advice of his staff officer
Lou Gui, he had the troops take waterproof bags with them: the weather had now
turned cold, so as they piled up sand they added the water, and the mixture froze to
make it solid and create a wall.
they spoke in amicable fashion about days gone by, with no reference
to the current dispute. Some of Han Sui’s followers and other men
from the west came forward to see their legendary opponent, and Cao
Cao, apparently unconcerned, joked with them: “You want to see Lord
Cao? He is quite like other men; he doesn’t have four eyes or two
mouths—just a bit of intelligence.”
A few days later, Cao Cao wrote to Han Sui, but the document he
sent had passages struck out or amended by a different hand, so that
Han Sui’s colleagues suspected he had made the changes. Suspecting
he might have some private agreement, they became doubtful of his
loyalty.
Then Ma Chao asked for a similar meeting, and it is said that he
had different plans: to take Cao Cao by surprise and win the war at a
single blow. Cao Cao, however, had Xu Chu attend him, and though
Ma Chao was a big strong man Xu Chu easily matched him and stayed
constantly on guard; so nothing more came of the occasion.18
Eventually the two sides agreed on a day of battle. Cao Cao sent out
light skirmishers to gain the enemy’s attention, then released his elite
Tiger Cavalry onto their flanks. His disparate opponents broke and
fled, several of their leaders were killed, and Ma Chao and Han Sui
abandoned the region of Chang’an and fled west with their remnant
troops into Liang province. For the time being they were not pursued,
but Cao Cao did follow up the local chieftain Yang Qiu of Anding and
forced him to surrender. He left him in charge of the territory, how-
ever, and Yang Qiu, grateful for such leniency, became a loyal officer.
More immediately, Cao Cao now controlled Chang’an, and as he
returned from Anding in the winter he appointed his diplomat clerk
Zhang Ji as Intendant of Jingzhao to restore civil government in the
ancient capital. Xiahou Yuan was given command of military affairs,
with remit to deal further with Ma Chao, Han Sui, and any other war-
lords to the west. Behind the lines Du Ji the Administrator of Hedong
had not only sent troops to join the campaign but also maintained a
steady and generous stream of supplies for the army; he kept the same
position, for he was too valuable to move away, but he received an
increase in rank and salary.
In the first month of the following Chinese year, the spring of 212,
Cao Cao returned to Ye city.
18
SGZ 18:542–43, the biography of Xu Chu.
300 chapter seven
The battle of Huayin was the last significant engagement in which

Cao Cao took a personal role. The skirmishes of his early days against
Dong Zhuo, the Black Mountain bandits and the Yellow Turbans had
led to the brutal invasions of Xu province in 193 and 194, followed
swiftly by the desperate struggle to hold Yan province against Lü Bu,
and the awkward fighting with Zhang Xiu in Nanyang. The struggle of
attrition against Yuan Shao at Guandu in 200 was the first great battle
of his maturity as a military commander, and it was won by a surprise
attack behind the enemy lines. In similar fashion, the victory at White
Wolf Mountain in 207 followed a remarkable oblique approach, and
the campaign which led to Huayin was likewise marked by imagina-
tive manoeuvres to turn his opponents’ flank. Only at the Red Cliffs
did Cao Cao try a direct attack, and in that case the combination of
alien waters and surprise by fire brought his defeat.
On other, lesser, occasions, as in the campaign against the Yuan
brothers and the complex struggle with Yuan Shu, Lü Bu and Liu Bei,
Cao Cao was prepared to use any suitable combination of strategy,
trickery and direct overwhelming force, and we have his own explana-
tion of the manoeuvres before Huayin.
Sanguo zhi tells how some of his officers asked him, “At first, though
the enemy held the Tong Pass, the routes to the north of the Wei River
were open. However, you did not go immediately through Hedong
to attack Zuopingyi, but instead you halted at the Tong Pass, and it
was only later that you crossed to the north. Why was that?” Cao Cao
replied in detail:
The enemy were concentrated at the Tong Pass, but if I had moved
immediately into Hedong they would certainly have sent men to cover
every crossing, and I would never have got to the west of the River.
I therefore increased the number of troops facing the Tong Pass, so
that all the enemy were concerned about that southern approach. They
left the defences west of the River empty, and as a result just two officers
[Xu Huang and Zhu Ling] were enough to take the position [at Puban]
west of the River.
Only when they had done that did I bring my own forces across to
the north, and it was the detachment under those two commanders that
prevented the enemy from interfering with my move to the west of the
River.
Then I joined carts like a palisade to make a protected way and march
southwards. Such a formation ensured that I could not be defeated, but
it also made us look weak.
After I had crossed [to the south of ] the Wei, I made a strong but
defensive camp and when the enemy approached I refused to come out
and face them. That too was a device to make them more confident. As a
result, they did not construct a fortified position of their own, but simply
offered to cede some territory. I replied in agreeable fashion and made
promises, but the reason I appeared to accept their proposals was again
to make them feel at ease, with no need for special preparations. Then we
collected our forces, and the day we attacked it was like “when thunder
comes suddenly, there is no time to cover your ears.”
There is no one way to deal with the changes of war.19
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this exposition is the man-
ner in which Cao Cao sought to convince his enemies that they had a
real chance of success. By showing signs of weakness, both militarily
and in the course of his false negotiations, he encouraged them to
maintain their alliance in hope of defeating him, while also sowing a
measure of doubt between their leaders. It was a delicate balance, bril-
liantly maintained; and it eliminated the greater part of the opposition
in the northwest at a single blow.
One year later, in the tenth month of 212, Cao Cao led his army once
more to the southwest against Sun Quan. We are told that he claimed
to have four hundred thousand men, but such numbers were surely
exaggerated. Advancing by Shouchun, Hefei and the Chao Lake south
of that city, his forces reached the shores of the Yangzi early in 213,
over-running Sun Quan’s defences and capturing his outpost at Ruxu.
Sun Quan, however, brought seventy thousand men to oppose the
invaders, and Cao Cao could not match his control of the Yangzi.
He made one attempt at a night attack on an island by the southern
bank, sending men in a flotilla of boats made of hide, but Sun Quan
surrounded their position and captured three thousand, while many
others were drowned as they sought to escape.20
Towards the end of spring Sun Quan sent a letter to Cao Cao to
warn him of the threat from seasonal rains and flooding, adding that
“I shall have no peace, my friend, until you are dead.” Cao Cao was
19
SGZ 1:35. One must always be suspicious of direct speech in the histories, but
though his statement was not the subject of an official proclamation, it is very likely
Cao Cao made his comments at some semi-formal gathering, and that they were
recorded at the time or recalled later by one of those in attendance.
20
In 223 there was a similar attempt by Cao Ren to capture this island, likewise
without success: SGZ Wu 11:1313. The commentary of Hu Sanxing to the parallel text
at ZZTJ 70:2236 explains that youquan 油船 “oil-boats” were small craft made from
ox-skins, presumably stretched over a framework, which were then sealed with oil:
Fang, Chronicle I, 147.
302
chapter seven
Map 16. The Lower Yangzi and the Huai

impressed, and he also admired the quality of Sun Quan’s ships and
soldiers, remarking to his attendants that Sun Quan would be an ideal
son, far better than the pathetic heirs of Liu Biao.21 Withdrawing to
the north, he reached Xu city in the third month and returned to Ye
a few weeks later.22
About this time, evidently as a counsel of despair, Cao Cao pro-
posed to withdraw everyone living close to the Yangzi into safer coun-
try north of the Huai. Ostensibly this was to avoid raiding by Sun
Quan’s forces, but the idea was also to ensure control of the farmers,
a natural economic resource, and set them to colonise vacant land. The
local adviser Jiang Ji warned him that the people would resent such
a plan, but Cao Cao sought to enforce it nonetheless, and more than
a hundred thousand people fled south across the Yangzi to join Sun
Quan.23 Lujiang commandery was all but deserted, and though there
was an attempt to secure its capital, Huan city, with new settlements,
in the summer of 214 it fell to an assault by Sun Quan.24 A few weeks
later Cao Cao brought his army once more to the southeast, but he
could not restore the situation and returned soon afterwards to the
north. Hefei was now his only strongpoint south of the Huai, but the
region was largely neutralised, and so long as that city held firm Sun
Quan had limited opportunity for expansion.
As Cao Cao was thus dealing with Sun Quan, he left Xiahou Yuan to
continue operations in the northwest, with headquarters at Chang’an
alongside the civilian Intendant Zhang Ji.
21
SGZ Wu 2:1118 and 1119 PC quoting Wu li “Calendar of Wu” by an unknown
author.
22
There is a tradition that Cao Cao established a fortress south of the Chao Lake to
serve as his advanced base for a campaign against Sun Quan—presumably this one—
but when the attack proved unsuccessful he gave it the name Wuwei 無爲 “Nothing
Doing.” It is a good story, but it is not mentioned by Sanguo zhi nor by Shuijing zhu,
and Wuwei appears as an administrative unit only in the time of the Song dynasty, a
thousand years later; it is a county city at the present day. See also note 59 to Chapter
Eleven.
23
SGZ 14:450, the biography of Jiang Ji. It is said that Cao Cao joked with Jiang Ji
about the misjudgement, and named him Administrator of Danyang. Since that com-
mandery, south of the Yangzi, was firmly under the control of Sun Quan, we cannot
be sure this was intended as a compliment.
24
The attack is discussed in Chapter Four at 177–178.
304 chapter seven
A junior cousin of Xiahou Dun, who is said to have been a first

cousin of Cao Cao, Xiahou Yuan was also connected to Cao Cao by
marriage, probably through a sister of Cao Cao’s first wife the Lady
Ding.25 He joined Cao Cao at an early stage of his military career and
served as Administrator of the two important commanderies Chenliu
and Yingchuan. In 200 he was a colonel in the army against Yuan Shao
at Guandu, and he later held charge of supplies for the main army
operating in the north.
In 206 Xiahou Yuan gained his first opportunity for substantial mil-
itary command, initially in association with Yu Jin against the warlord
Chang Xi in Donghai, but then leading commandery troops against a
group of Yellow Turbans in Qing province. In 209 he destroyed the
local chieftain Lei Xu in Lujiang and also put down an outbreak of
banditry in Taiyuan.
With this experience of active service, Xiahou Yuan was given for-
mal charge of the attack on Zhang Lu in 211, though when his initial
advance was opposed by the north-western warlords, he was rein-
forced by Cao Ren and then by Cao Cao himself. After the victory at
Huayin, as Cao Cao returned to headquarters Cao Ren was sent first
to deal with some trouble in the northeast and was then stationed
more permanently at Xiangyang, guarding Nanyang against Liu Bei
and Guan Yu.
Xiahou Yuan remained in the west to settle the remnant opposi-
tion, and had considerable success, defeating an army of Han Sui and
subduing various groups of Chinese, Qiang and Xiongnu in Hanyang
and Anding. By the middle of the year he had dealt with the majority
of the warlords in the Wei valley, either by defeat or forced surrender,
while Han Sui had withdrawn into the Xining valley, the western part
of Jincheng beyond the Yellow River.26
In the summer of 212, soon after his return from the northwest, Cao
Cao had Ma Chao’s father Ma Teng, nominal Minister of the Guards,
executed with other members of his family: their presence in the east
had not guaranteed Ma Chao’s good behaviour and their usefulness as
hostages had come to an end. Though Ma Chao had been driven back
into Longxi, he continued to harbour ambitions to restore his former
25
On the connection of the Xiahou family with the Cao, see Chapter One at 19–25,
and on the marriage of Xiahou Yuan, note 47 to that chapter.
26
The Xining or Huang River flows from the region of the Koko Nor to join the
Yellow River near present-day Lanzhou.
position, and his camp became a rallying point for any Chinese or
non-Chinese who managed to escape Xiahou Yuan. At the beginning
of 213 he returned to the attack with a combined army of Chinese and
Qiang tribesmen,27 aided by ten thousand men from Zhang Lu, who
was naturally anxious to keep Cao Cao’s forces in check to the north
of the Qin Ling ranges.
Ma Chao and his men achieved swift success, over-running all the
Wei valley west of Long Mountain. Ji city, capital of Hanyang com-
mandery, held out for several months, but Xiahou Yuan was unable
to bring relief, and in the autumn the city surrendered. Killing Cao
Cao’s Administrator and his Inspector of Liang, Ma Chao proclaimed
himself chief of Liang and Bing provinces. He was joined by more
non-Chinese, and Xiahou Yuan was forced away, but then the gen-
tlemen Yang Fu, Jiang Xu and Zhao Ang, aided by their courageous
womenfolk, gathered local troops to defeat the invaders. Ma Chao’s
family was caught and killed in Ji city, and Ma Chao fled south into
Hanzhong.28
Zhang Lu received Ma Chao with honour, and at the beginning
of 214 he provided him with reinforcements for another attempt on
Liang province. Ma Chao advanced to Qi Mountain, on the northern
edge of the ranges just south of Ji city, but he was defeated there by
Xiahou Yuan and driven back to the south. Zhang Lu was now unwill-
ing to aid Ma Chao in a third attempt to recover his lost ground in
Liang province, and he was also persuaded by various advisers that
Ma Chao’s lack of family feeling—abandoning his father and kinfolk
to Cao Cao’s revenge—rendered him unworthy of favour. As relations
grew strained, it became clear that Ma Chao had little to look for in
Hanzhong. Taking his remnant following west into the hill country of
Wudu, he sent messengers to Liu Bei. They arrived at an ideal time, for
Liu Bei, as we shall see below, was contending for Yi province with the
Governor Liu Zhang. He invited Ma Chao to join him and sent him
additional troops, and so Ma Chao departed for the south.
27
Ma Teng’s mother, the grandmother of Ma Chao, was a woman of the non-
Chinese Qiang, so Ma Chao had a special connection with those people: SGZ Shu
6:945 PC quoting Dian lue and HHS 72/62: 2335 TC quoting Xiandi zhuan.
28
The story of this rebellion is told in the biography of Yang Fu, SGZ 25:701–02,
with PC quoting the Lienü zhuang of Huangfu Mi of the third century, and is sum-
marised by ZZTJ 66:452–56. It is one of the heroic tales of the time, including the
courage of Yan Wen, the sacrifice by Zhao Ang of his son held hostage by Ma Chao,
and the defiance and death of Jiang Xu’s mother. In recognition of their fine conduct,
eleven men were enfoeffed.
306 chapter seven
With the removal of Ma Chao, Xiahou Yuan faced no further seri-

ous resistance, and towards the end of 214 he advanced to the upper
reaches of the Yellow River, destroyed the isolated kingdom of Song
Jian and persuaded the Qiang people of the region to make formal
submission.29 Early in the following year, moreover, a group of chief-
tains in the Xining valley took Han Sui’s head and sent it to Xiahou
Yuan as sign of good will. Further to the northwest, the route to cen-
tral Asia along the present-day Gansu corridor remained out of reach,
and control over Liang province was somewhat superficial, but as Cao
Cao returned to take command of operations against Zhang Lu, he
faced no challenge in the valley of the Wei and had no threat to his
flank or rear.
Liu Bei and Sun Quan 209–214
Though the major offensive against Sun Quan in 214 had been unsuc-
cessful, and Jiangling in Jing province had been lost in 209, Cao Cao’s
frontier on the lower and middle Yangzi was comparatively static and
reasonably secure. The relationship between Sun Quan and Liu Bei,
however, had changed considerably.
In their first informal arrangement after the victory at the Red Cliffs
in 208, Liu Bei concentrated his attention on securing a position in the
south of Jing province while Sun Quan’s general Zhou Yu attacked
Cao Ren at Jiangling. When that city fell towards the end of 209 Sun
Quan commanded the main stream of the middle Yangzi. There was
some discussion about an advance through the Gorges into Yi prov-
ince, to challenge Liu Zhang the warlord Governor there, but Liu Bei
opposed the plan, arguing that since he was a member of the imperial
clan—in fact a very distant connection—Liu Zhang was a kinsman and
he could not allow him to suffer an unprovoked attack. Given Liu Bei’s
position on the southern flank of any advance by Sun Quan’s forces,
his objection was an effective veto, and the death of Zhou Yu in 210
put an end to such plans for expansion. On the contrary, as we have
29
When rebellion broke out in Liang province in 184, Song Jian took advantage of
the troubles to establish his own small state, based at Fuhan in Longxi, on the upper
Yellow River by present-day Linxia in Gansu. Styling himself King of the Sources
of the River who will Pacify Han, he maintained his position for thirty years: deC,
Northern Frontier, 161 and 165.
seen, Zhou Yu’s successor Lu Su persuaded Sun Quan to withdraw

from Nan commandery, leaving the greater part of the middle Yangzi
to Liu Bei, who transferred his headquarters to Gong’an, a short dis-
tance downstream from Jiangling.30
In the following year, however, Liu Zhang himself asked Liu Bei
to join him. Though formally unopposed in his control of the bulk
of Yi province, Liu Zhang appears to have lacked personal authority,
and he was concerned at Cao Cao’s victory over the north-western
warlords at Huayin. The official reason for the campaign had been
Cao Cao’s intention to attack Zhang Lu, and if Cao Cao continued
to advance it was indeed very likely that he would gain Hanzhong.
In such a case, Liu Zhang would be faced by an aggressive neighbour
far more powerful than Zhang Lu, and his own tenure would be most
precarious. Knowing Liu Bei’s reputation as a fighting man, and trust-
ing his protestations of kinship, he invited him to assist in preventive
action against Zhang Lu.
It was Liu Zhang’s plan to use Liu Bei’s military strength and skill
to defeat Zhang Lu, and to occupy Hanzhong before Cao Cao could
do so. They could then guard the passes of the Qin Ling ranges against
invasion, and hold Yi and Jing provinces together against the north. In
theory, the plan was sensible, but it relied upon Liu Bei’s acceptance of
Liu Zhang’s leadership—and in this regard Liu Zhang was remarkably
naïve. Even before his first approach to Liu Bei, several of his advisers
had made secret contact with the putative ally, and they encouraged
Liu Bei to see the invitation as a first step towards a takeover in the
west. Despite protestations of good faith, there is no reason to doubt
Liu Bei agreed. Leaving Zhuge Liang and Guan Yu to hold Jing prov-
ince, he led several thousand men west through the Gorges; and even
as he was welcomed by Liu Zhang he was already planning to take his
place.31
30
See 290 above.
In Chapters 56 and 57, Romance claims that Zhou Yu actually attempted the inva-
sion of Yi province through the Gorges, but he was frustrated and made a laughing
stock by Zhuge Liang. In Generals of the South, 297–298, however, I have argued
that Liu Bei’s opposition was enough to make the plan impracticable, and it is most
unlikely that any such attempt was made before Zhou Yu’s untimely death.
31
The account of Liu Bei’s arrival in Yi province, and his subsequent seizure of
power from Liu Zhang, as described below, is recorded in ZZTJ 66:2109–67:2129;
deC, Establish Peace, 428–473, quoting the biography of Liu Zhang in SGZ Shu
1:869–70, that of Liu Bei in SGZ Shu 2:881–83, and those of Pang Tong and Fa Zheng
in SGZ Shu 7:955–56 and 957–59, together with texts cited in PC. [Pang Tong was
308 chapter seven
For the time being Liu Bei contented himself with a show of good-
will and generosity to gain support among the people, and he and
Liu Zhang celebrated their new alliance with feasting and an exchange
of compliments and high-sounding titles. Liu Zhang then returned to
his capital at Chengdu while Liu Bei went north with his own men,
and with authority to take command of Liu Zhang’s troops facing
Zhang Lu.
During the course of the following year, 212, Liu Bei maintained
his base at Jiameng in Guanghan commandery, on the upper reaches
of the Jialing Jiang by present-day Jian’ge in Sichuan. There was, how-
ever, little more military activity against Zhang Lu than there had been
before, and it is clear that Liu Bei was concerned only to consolidate
his position with the army and wait for an occasion to turn against his
notional chieftain. At the end of the year his opportunity came as Cao
Cao attacked Sun Quan on the lower Yangzi. It is said that Sun Quan
called for assistance, but this is unlikely: guarded by the great river, he
was well able to deal with Cao Cao’s attack, and it is most improbable
that he would have welcomed intervention by the troops of his uncer-
tain ally—Sun Quan was not Liu Zhang. On the contrary, the fact that
Cao Cao was attacking across the Huai meant that the threat both in
the northwest and in the middle Yangzi was so much the less. For his
part, Guan Yu made no demonstration on the Han which might have
distracted Cao Cao from the Huai.
Liu Bei, however, wrote to Liu Zhang seeking approval for his return
to the east to join the defence, and he also requested additional men
and supplies. Liu Zhang, however, had learned to be uneasy with his
powerful subordinate, and he granted only a part of what Liu Bei asked
for. About the same time, moreover, the treachery of his advisers was
discovered and Zhang Song, Liu Bei’s chief ally at court, was taken and
executed. With a fine display of fury and a quantity of rhetoric about
loyalty and honour, Liu Bei arrested and killed those senior officers
of his army known to be faithful to Liu Zhang and, taking over their
troops, turned south to attack Chengdu.
Despite the advantages of treachery and surprise, the coup and the
campaign were not immediately successful. Liu Bei had only ten thou-
killed during the campaign against Liu Zhang, but Fa Zheng, formerly a member of
staff to Liu Zhang, became a senior adviser to Liu Bei.]
sand soldiers, with few supplies, and Liu Zhang was urged to oppose
him with a scorched-earth policy, withdrawing people before his
advance and stripping the fields of provisions. Concerned at the mis-
ery this would bring upon his people, Liu Zhang rejected the strategy,
and Liu Bei maintained his attack. Some of Liu Zhang’s men went to
join the invader but even so, after twelve months fighting, Chengdu
still held out.
In 214, however, Liu Bei gained a critical accretion of strength as
Zhuge Liang and Zhang Fei brought reinforcements up the Yangzi
from Jing province, while Ma Chao, the warlord of the northwest
who had been driven south to Zhang Lu and then left him to seek
his fortune with Liu Bei, came to join the attack on Chengdu. Liu
Zhang still had substantial forces and adequate supplies, but he had
lost the greater part of the province, and he was unwilling to subject
the people to further fighting. At the end of summer he came out and
surrendered; he was allowed to keep title as a general, but was sent to
captivity in the east. Liu Bei proclaimed himself Governor of Yi prov-
ince and held a great banquet to celebrate his accession to power—but
he also stripped the treasury to reward his officers, and gave his troops
free rein to plunder the city: he had not yet decided whether he was a
true inheritor of Han or a leader of brigands.
Sun Quan could reasonably feel deceived and let down by the political
and military manoeuvring of Liu Bei. In 209 Liu Bei had opposed any
action against Yi province, but two years later he went there himself,
and he had now deposed Liu Zhang and taken over his territory. In
210, moreover, Sun Quan had been obliged to yield him control of the
whole of Nan commandery, but on three occasions since that time he
had been faced by attacks from Cao Cao on the lower Yangzi, while
Liu Bei and his general Guan Yu had made no move to the north
which might have eased the pressure.
As Liu Bei departed through the Gorges in 211, the Lady Sun his
wife abandoned the marriage and returned to her brother. She tried
to take with her the youthful Liu Shan, Liu Bei’s only natural son, no
doubt hoping he could serve as a hostage for his father’s good will
and co-operation. She was unsuccessful, however, for her party was
intercepted by Zhuge Liang and Zhao Yun, and the boy was brought
back. In effect, Sun Quan was now junior partner in the notional alli-
ance: he controlled only Yang province south of the lower Yangzi,
310 chapter seven
together with a fraction of Jing province; while Liu Bei had most of
the middle Yangzi, all the basin of the Xiang, and the greater part of
Yi province.
Sun Quan had gained some additional territory in the far south, for
his officer Bu Zhi had established himself in Nanhai commandery on
the Bay of Canton, and had a peaceful commercial relationship with
the provincial chieftain Shi Xie, who was based on the Red River delta
about present-day Hanoi in Vietnam. Shi Xie and his family had for-
merly controlled all the far south, the Han province of Jiaozhi, but the
family had withdrawn to the west, content with the wealth acquired
from trade with southeast Asia. Through the agency of Bu Zhi, Sun
Quan now shared in this prosperous enterprise.32
As Liu Bei proclaimed himself Governor of Yi province in 214, how-
ever, Sun Quan resolved to obtain some compensation for his nomi-
nal ally’s success. With the capture of Huan city in Lujiang and Cao
Cao’s withdrawal to the north, the lower Yangzi frontier was reason-
ably settled, and Sun Quan could turn his attention to the west. Early
in 215, therefore, in a formal note to Liu Bei, he requested the return
of the territories which had been “lent” five years before. As we have
observed, it is questionable whether the agreement of 210 had in fact
been made in those terms, but it was in Sun Quan’s interest to claim
that it was. Liu Bei prevaricated: he must deal with Liang province
before he made any adjustments in Jing province. Predictably, Sun
Quan took this as refusal and ordered his men to advance. In a brief
campaign, Lu Su held off Guan Yu while his junior colleague Lü Meng
advanced into the Xiang valley and occupied Changsha, Guiyang and
Lingling. Amid mutual accusations of bad faith, both sides negotiated,
Liu Bei’s position being somewhat weakened by the threat of Cao Cao
against Hanzhong. Lingling was returned to him, but the Xiang River
was agreed as a new boundary, so that Sun Quan gained Guiyang and
the greater part of Changsha, with improved access to his holdings in
the far south.33
32
On the history of the far south during this time, see deC, Generals of the South,
340–353. The biography of Shi Xie is at SGZ Wu 4:1191–93; that of Bu Zhi at SGZ Wu
7:1236–40. On the nomenclature of the region, see note 80 to Chapter Six.
33
The campaign and succeeding settlement are described by ZZTJ 67:2136–38; deC,
Establish Peace, 485–488. They are discussed in deC, Generals of the South, 370–375.
The situation was inherently unstable, but both Sun Quan and Liu
Bei had cause to be concerned about the threat from Cao Cao: an attack
could come on any of three fronts: through Hanzhong in the north of
Yi province; down the Han River to the middle Yangzi; or across the
Huai into Yang province on the lower Yangzi. It was clear to all that
if the two southern warlords contended too fiercely, either or both
would be destroyed. And Jing province was particularly vulnerable,
for conflict would be obvious and could swiftly be taken advantage
of. The diplomatic Lu Su continued as Sun Quan’s commander in the
region, and though he had been prepared to face Guan Yu he was well
aware of the need to avoid any further quarrel now that a settlement
had been reached. For the time being at least, both men gave their
chief attention to the enemy position in Nanyang, where Cao Ren held
command for Cao Cao.
Two surrenders: Zhang Lu and Sun Quan 215–217
In the spring of 215, however, Cao Cao resumed his advance in the
west. Ma Chao had been driven away into Yi province, Han Sui had
been killed by his own subordinates or allies, and the remaining war-
lords and non-Chinese groups of the Wei valley and the Yellow River
had been largely dealt with by Xiahou Yuan, so it was now possible for
full attention to be given to Zhang Lu.34
The approach to Hanzhong was not easy. A number of roads led
through the Qin Ling ranges, but they were narrow and often wind-
ing, constructed in some places, by remarkable engineering, with tres-
tles along narrow gorges.35 The Ziwu “North-South” Road led almost
directly south from Chang’an: built by Wang Mang, it had been used
in the first century of Later Han, but it had steep ridges and joined the
Han well below Nanzheng, Zhang Lu’s capital. Further west the Baoye
Road went from Mei county in Youfufeng up the Ye tributary of the
Wei and across the watershed into the valley of the Bao, a northern
tributary of the Han. This was a more practical and popular route,
34
The conquest of Hanzhong is described by ZZTJ 67:2135 and 2138–40; deC,
Establish Peace, 483 and 490–493.
35
On the roads of this region, see Needham, Science and Civilisation IV.3, 19–22,
Figure 711 and Table 61 at 13, also deC, Establish Peace, 490, and Jupp et al., Plank
Roads Papers.
312 chapter seven
Map 17. The Hanzhong Region 215–219

but it too was easily defensible. Cao Cao therefore made a flanking
approach by the old Lianyun “Linked Cloud” Road which led through
the mountains of Wudu commandery west of Hanzhong, followed the
line of the modern Baoqi-Chengdu railway to the upper reaches of
the Han, then turned east at the Yangping Pass. As he entered Wudu
he was faced by resistance from the local Di people, first in isolated
groups blocking various passes, and then in more co-ordinated form
under their king Doumao. By the middle of summer, however, the
army had reached Hechi, near present-day Guixian in Gansu, and
the Di were slaughtered in pitched battle. In early autumn the army
came to the region of Yangping, south of present-day Lueyang in the
extreme southwest of Shenxi.
From present-day Lueyang there are two ways to approach Han-
zhong. The most direct is the modern motor-road, which runs southeast
to present-day Mian county and Nanzheng. Another route continues
further, then turns at the Yangping Pass to reach Mian from the south.
It was this longer and more indirect approach that Cao Cao adopted,
but he then found the advice he had been given was misleading:
Cao Cao had relied on reports from local officials of Liang province and
from men who had surrendered in Wudu, and they told him that “It is
easy to attack Zhang Lu. The ridges north and south of Yangping are a
long way apart, and the pass is indefensible.” Cao Cao believed them, but
when he got there it was quite different to the way they had said. “When
other people discuss plans,” he sighed, “they seldom see things the way
one does oneself.”36
Here, moreover, Zhang Lu’s younger brother Zhang Wei had con-
structed walls and picket lines to reinforce the natural barriers of the
mountains, and he had ten thousand men to defend them. A first attack
was driven back with heavy loss, and Cao Cao prepared to abandon
the field and seek a new approach.
At this point, however, he was favoured by a stroke of luck. Even as
he ordered Xiahou Dun and Xu Chu to call back their men from the
front, a group of them lost their way and came unexpectedly onto one
of Zhang Wei’s guard positions. Surprise was mutual, but it was the
enemy who fled, and when Xiahou Dun learned what had happened
he reported to Cao Cao and the whole army resumed the attack. The
36
314 chapter seven
defences broke in a night engagement, Zhang Wei was killed as he

fled, and the road into Hanzhong was open.
We are told that Zhang Lu had been prepared to surrender to Cao
Cao, and it was largely against his will that Zhang Wei had staged his
attempt at resistance. His adviser Yan Pu persuaded him, however,
that he would receive better terms if he made some show of reluctance,
so Zhang Lu withdrew south into the hill country of Ba command-
ery and established an alliance with Duhu and Fuhu, chieftains of the
non-Chinese Banshun people. As he left Nanzheng he insisted that the
treasury and grain-stores be left intact for the newcomers, and Cao
Cao, suitably impressed, sent messengers to reassure him. At the end
of autumn the tribal leaders offered homage and were rewarded with
titles and gifts, and in the eleventh month, at the turn of the Western
year, Zhang Lu himself came to surrender. Warmly welcomed, he was
given title as a general and, with other members of his family and his
adviser Yan Pu, received enfeoffment as a marquis.
The victory at the Yangping Pass occurred at the same time Liu Bei’s
army under Guan Yu was facing Sun Quan in Jing province, and Cao
Cao’s Registrar Sima Yi argued that he should immediately strike south.
Though Liu Bei had taken Yi province a year ago, the people were not
accustomed to his new regime, and the impetus of Cao Cao’s success,
combined with the distraction on the middle Yangzi, could demolish
his position. Cao Cao temporised, however, observing that “A man
who cannot be satisfied will get Long and look to Shu.”37 He did send
spies to the south, and though early reports were encouraging it soon
became clear that Liu Bei’s people were regaining their confidence and
control. Cao Cao therefore contented himself with Hanzhong and its
surrounding mountains.
The account of Sima Yi’s advice appears in his biography in Jin shu,38
and it surely did not escape the historian that Cao Cao’s failure to
seize the opportunity meant Sima Yi would spend many years as com-
mander of the armies of Wei contesting the Qin Ling frontier against
37
Long 隴 refers here to the mountain of that name on the border of Liang prov-
ince with Sili. Shu 蜀 is the region of present-day Sichuan, Han time Yi province;
the territory later gave its name to the common title of Liu Bei’s imperial state,
Shu-Han.
A similar expression was used in a comparable situation by Emperor Guangwu of
Later Han: HHS 17/7:660. It may well have been or become proverbial.
38
JS 1:2.
Shu-Han. The story is perhaps too good to be true, and a further ven-
ture into the heart of present-day Sichuan would indeed have been
fraught with danger: if Cao Cao did not gain swift success he and his
main army could have been entangled in the west, far from his base
and his other frontiers, and he would have had great difficulty in dis-
engaging and withdrawing without substantial loss. It is an interesting
might-have-been, but the example of the Red Cliffs showed what could
happen to an over-ambitious strategy, and failure in Yi province at this
time would have been a far worse disaster.
As it was, Cao Cao withdrew to the north, and by the second month
of 216 he had returned to Ye. Even as he did so, however, his advanced
positions proved untenable: before the end of 215 Liu Bei’s general
Huang Quan had defeated Fuhu, Duhu and the other non-Chinese
leaders who had joined Cao Cao as auxiliaries, and Zhang Fei caught
Cao Cao’s commander Zhang He by surprise in Ba commandery and
drove him back to Nanzheng. Though Cao Cao’s men were able to
maintain themselves in Hanzhong, Liu Bei had restored the frontier to
the line he had shared with Zhang Lu.
Settlement of such newly-acquired territory was complex and not

always easy. Besides the military command in Hanzhong under Xia-
hou Yuan, Cao Cao put his civil officer Du Xi in charge of adminis-
tration, and Du Xi arranged for some eighty thousand people to leave
the frontier and settle among depopulated areas about Luoyang and
Ye in central China: such farming colonists were a major resource of
the rival states.
On the other hand, men who had been compelled to surrender were
not necessarily reliable and were not always willing to be settled on
demand. The biography of Cao Cao’s officer Zhao Yen, at that time
Administrator of Youfufeng, tells of problems that he and the general
Yin Shu encountered as they sought to transfer men to the defence of
Hanzhong.
Cao Cao had given Yin Shu command of five thousand former
soldiers of Ma Chao, Han Sui and other chieftains of the northwest,
and he named Zhao Yan Protector of the Army. Twelve hundred of
the men were supposed to be transferred to reinforce Hanzhong, but
as they came to the Yegu Pass, at the beginning of the Baoye Road
through the Qin Ling ranges, they refused to go further, while the
troops under Zhao Yan’s command, fellow-countrymen of the recal-
citrants, also became agitated. Zhao Yan managed to prevent outright
316 chapter seven
mutiny, but he persuaded Cao Cao that the men were too unreliable to
be effective on the southern front. First dividing them up, then using
reinforcements of loyal troops to regain control, he transferred them
to the east where they were scattered among different units. In the
end more than twenty thousand people, including wives and children,
were shifted from the sensitive frontier and resettled in territory which
was more secure.39
Such complex dealings with reluctant and potentially disaffected
troops must have been common and typical in lands which had lately
been taken over by one warlord or another. Even after a formal sur-
render, men and their families had interests of their own, and could
not be treated merely as pawns.
In the autumn of 215, as Cao Cao was still in the northwest, Sun Quan
attempted once more to break the defences at Hefei. It is said that he
brought a hundred thousand men, while the garrison under Zhang
Liao, Li Dian and Yue Jin had a total force of only seven thousand.
Cao Cao, however, had left written instructions with the Protector Xue
Ti, to be opened in case of emergency, ordering that “If Sun Quan
comes, General Zhang and General Li go out to fight, General Yue
keeps guard; the Protector does not fight.”
After some debate, the local commanders followed the plan, and
with a group of eight hundred volunteers Zhang Liao broke the enemy
lines and challenged Sun Quan in the midst of his army. Although he
withdrew, the southerners were discouraged, and after ten days invest-
ment Sun Quan gave orders to retire. As the men of Wei came out in
pursuit, Sun Quan was twice trapped at a river crossing, saved only by
the devotion of his Companions.
In his translation of the Sunzi book of the Art of War, Griffith dis-
cusses this campaign and admires Cao Cao’s prescience. The story may
be exaggerated, however, and Sanguo zhi remarks that there was sick-
ness in the army of Wu, which would have contributed to the debacle.40
Be that as it may, Sun Quan and his men had been demoralised and
39
SGZ 23:668–69: ZZTJ 67:2143–44; deC, Establish Peace, 499–501. Cao Cao had
encountered similar problems on the Huai frontier with Sun Quan: see 303 above.
40
Griffith, Sun Tzu, 93–94. The victory is described in the biographies of Zhang
Liao and Li Dian, SGZ 17:518–19 and 18:534, also ZZTJ 67:2141–42; deC, Establish
Peace, 493–495, and Generals of the South, 377–382. The sickness in the army is men-
tioned by SGZ Wu 10:1295.
humiliated, and Sun Quan never again took personal command of a

major campaign. He was physically brave and had a good grasp of
strategy and politics, but unlike his rivals Cao Cao and Liu Bei he had
to rely upon others to do his fighting in the field.
In the summer of 216 Cao Cao took title as King of Wei, but in mili-
tary terms it was a quiet year. Some Wuhuan of Dai commandery in
the north caused trouble, but they were settled by Cao Cao’s agent
Pei Qian, and in the autumn the Southern Shanyu Huchuquan came
to court and was kept at Ye city, while government was left to his
subordinate Qubi, Worthy King of the West, with a Chinese Major
to supervise his regime. The Southern Xiongnu were now organised
into five divisions, extending from Beidi in the west across the Ordos
region to Dai commandery in the northeast, all the northern part of
present-day Shenxi and Shanxi. The capital of the puppet state was at
Pingyang in Hedong on the Fen River, and four divisions were spread
along that valley, with the Northern Division notionally responsible
for the rest.
In 213 Cao Cao had incorporated the territory of Bing province
into Ji, and in 215 he proclaimed the abolition of all its former com-
manderies, replacing them with a single unit, optimistically named
Xinxing “New Rising.” By doing so he recognised reality: since the
middle of the second century imperial control in this region had been
damaged and then destroyed by frequent rebellions of the non-Chi-
nese and steady out-migration to the south by Han settlers. Adminis-
trative districts had become little more than lines on a map, and the
settlement of the Xiongnu in 216 was a logical development. In prac-
tice, the inhabitants of the Northern Division were beyond the control
both of the Chinese and of their nominal over-lord the Shanyu, and
Huchuquan’s title was abolished at his death.41
At the end of the year, Cao Cao embarked on one more campaign
against Sun Quan. The army moved comparatively slowly, leaving Ye
city in the tenth month, passing Cao Cao’s home country of Qiao in
Pei during the eleventh month, and in the first month of 217 he came
41
On the settlement of the Xiongnu in the north, see deC, Northern Frontier, 352–
354, citing HHS 89/79:2965, SGZ 1:47 and JS 97:2548, also Uchida, “Five Tribes,” and
Boodberg, “Two Notes,” 292.
318 chapter seven
to Juchao in Lujiang, northeast of Huan city. Sun Quan took up a

defensive position about his fortress of Ruxu on the western bank of
the Yangzi, though he left immediate tactical command of his army
to Lü Meng and gave the fleet to Jiang Qin, an experienced officer
who had borne himself well in the rout before Hefei eighteen months
earlier.
In the second month Cao Cao moved to the attack. He gained little
from the fighting on land about Ruxu, and though the fleet of Wu
was severely damaged by a storm on the Yangzi he was unable to take
advantage of his enemy’s misfortune. Indeed the offensive lasted no
more than a few weeks, for in the third month Cao Cao led his main
army away.
This time, however, instead of withdrawing completely as he had
in the past, with a few garrisons at Hefei and other points on a line
of defence, Cao Cao left Xiahou Dun in command of twenty-six sub-
stantial army corps, under such fighting leaders as Cao Ren and Zhang
Liao, to face Sun Quan with a long-term threat. It was a new strategy,
made possible by the conquest of Liang province and the general set-
tlement of other regions on Cao Cao’s frontier, and it had immediate
effect upon Sun Quan. With command of the Yangzi and outposts
on the northern bank at Ruxu and in Huan city, Sun Quan had no
immediate fear of invasion from the north; but it would be difficult
to dislodge such a considerable force of the enemy, well established in
defensive positions. Their very presence, moreover, obliged Sun Quan
to keep on his guard, while his own freedom of action was severely
constrained: any major move to the west, for example, to the Poyang
region or into Jing province, would leave him vulnerable to raiding or
interception.
In these circumstances, Sun Quan sent an embassy to Cao Cao to
ask for terms. The move was evidently expected and welcomed, for we
are told the two sides swiftly agreed to restore friendly relations, and
swore to renew the marriage alliance which had been negotiated with
Sun Ce almost twenty years earlier. As sign of good faith, Cao Cao
withdrew his troops, and left only garrison defences as before.
In fact, the “submission” of Sun Quan was little more than a form
of words. It made no material change in the positions of the two sides,
and was in no way comparable to the very real surrender of Zhang
Lu. Far from attending Cao Cao’s court, Sun Quan did not even pro-
vide hostages—nor does it appear that he was asked to. He suffered
some loss of face, but he could claim that he was merely making his
peace with Cao Cao as representative of the emperor of Han. Notably,
moreover, he was endorsing Cao Cao’s new position as King of Wei,

so he could no longer claim to be defending the rights of the declining
dynasty against a usurper. This, however, was no longer a viable issue,
and formal alliance with Cao Cao could be useful in dealing with the
ambitious Liu Bei and his energetic general Guan Yu. Both Cao Cao
and Sun Quan had reason to be content with their new relationship.42
Cao Cao and the Art of War43
Early in his career, possibly during a period of forced but temporary

retirement after the family disgrace in the late 170s, Cao Cao prepared
two studies on military matters. One, Jieyao 接要 “Summary of the
Essentials,” was a general survey of literature in the field; the other was
a commentary to Sunzi Bingfa 孫子兵法 “The Art of War of Master
Sun,” generally known as Sunzi, which is ascribed to Sun Wu of the
Warring States period, and was well recognised as a major work. Cao
Cao’s commentary on Sunzi has been preserved to the present day,
but though the bibliographical chapters of Sui shu and Jiu Tang shu
list his Jieyao among the holdings of the imperial libraries, the work
has long been lost.44
42
On this brief campaign and the subsequent settlement, see ZZTJ 68:2148–49;
deC, Establish Peace, 508–509, citing the biographies of Cao Cao at SGZ 1:49, of Xia-
hou Dun at SGZ 9:268, and that of Sun Quan at SGZ Wu 2:1120. On the significance
of the submission of Sun Quan, see also deC, Generals of the South, 383–384, and
Establish Peace, 509 note 3.
43
In the discussion which follows, I have made particular use of Yates, “Ancient
Chinese Military Texts,” and “Chinese Literature on the Art of War” in Needham,
Science and Civilisation VI.6 [with Yates and Gawlikowski].
Major translations of Sunzi are those of Griffith, Ames, Sawyer [in Seven Military
Classics] and, most recent and valuable, Minford. The text history is discussed by these
scholars, and also by Gawlikowski and Loewe in Loewe [ed], Early Chinese Texts.
References are to the Sibu beiyao collection, which reproduces a text compiled by Ji
Tianbao 吉天保 of the Song dynasty, supplemented by the eighteenth century schol-
ars Sun Xingyan 孫星衍 and Wu Renji 吳人驥. Ji Tianbao gathered annotations from
ten commentators, starting with Cao Cao: his compilation is often referred to as Sunzi
shijia zhu 孫子十家注 or by a similar title. Good modern editions are those of Guo
Huaruo and Wei Ju-Lin.
Given the fact, as discussed below, that Cao Cao’s commentary is essentially techni-
cal, Western translators have rendered only a few passages. The Cao Cao ji published
by Zhonghua shuju, however, and Zhang Haiyu’s Cao Cao quanshu, have extracted
and collected the individual items.
44
SuiS 34:1012 records two editions of commentary to Sunzi by Emperor Wu of
Wei [i.e. Cao Cao], and at 1013–14 it lists a number of other works, including a Bing-
shu 兵書 jieyao in ten juan, a Bingfa jieyao in 3 juan, a Bingfa lueyao 略要 in 9 juan
and a Bingfa in 1 juan; these were presumably variant copies of the original Jieyao.
320 chapter seven
Cao Cao’s eulogy in the official Wei shu says that he also
composed a Xin shu 新書 “New Book” in more than a hundred thou-
sand characters, which served as a handbook for his generals. There
is no later bibliographical reference to this work, but it seems likely
it was a compendium of his writing in Jieyao and the commentary to
Sunzi.45 There is also one slightly unexpected reference to his proscrib-
ing books on the art of war—possibly to prevent too many theories
confusing his officers.46
It is difficult to judge what works Cao Cao may have discussed in his
Jieyao. At the beginning of his Treatise of Bibliography in Han shu,
Ban Gu explains that he based his list on the holdings of the imperial
libraries at the end of the first century BC,47 and in his discussion of
the collection of military materials he says that early in Former Han
Zhang Liang and Han Xin had been given responsibility for collating
works on such matters: they gathered 182 texts but reduced them to
35.48 There were disruptions during the course of the dynasty, notably
Similar titles are recorded by JTS 47:1039–40 and XTS 59:1549; including a Bingfa
yaolue ascribed, presumably mistakenly, to Emperor Wen of Wei, Cao Pi. There are,
however, no references in later catalogues to independent works by Cao Cao.
The Bu Hou Han shu yiwen zhi of Gu Xiangsan, at ESWSBB II, 2260, and the
Sanguo yiwen zhi of Yao Zhenzong at ESWSBB III, 3260–61, list some references pre-
served in other texts, and they are followed by the section Cao Cao zhuzuo kao “Study
of Cao Cao’s Writings,” in Cao Cao ji, 212–218.
Some scholars have expressed doubt whether the commentary ascribed to Cao Cao
has survived intact to the present day. In a personal communication, however, Profes-
sor John Minford, author of a major translation of Sunzi, advises me that it appears
to be complete.
45
On the eulogy, see Chapter Ten at 445.
One of the Seven Military Classics of the Song period [see note 52 below] was
the Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui 唐太宗李衛公問對 “Questions and Answers
between Emperor Taizong of Tang and Li Weigong.” Presented as a dialogue between
the emperor, Li Shimin 李世民, and his general Li Jing 李靖 and thus attributed to the
seventh century, it is, however, a later work, possibly from the Song: Needham, Science
and Civilisation V.6, 21. It is translated by Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 321–360.
Cao Cao’s Xin shu is referred to a number of times in the course of the dialogue, but
the quotations come from his commentary to Sunzi.
46
SGZ 23:660 PC presenting the biography of Ji Mao; and see note 54 to Chapter
Eight.
47
HS 30:1701, and see Loewe, QHX, 374–375 and 459.
48
HS 30:1762–63. Han Xin was a leading general of Emperor Gao, and a book in
his name appears in the catalogue at 1757; he has biographies in SJ 92 and at HS 34
[Loewe, QHX, 147–149]. The trusted minister Zhang Liang has biographies in SJ 55
and at HS 40 [QHX, 683–686]; his name is associated with the Huangshi gong sanlue,
on which see note 53 below.
in the time of the Empress-Dowager Lü, and towards the end of the
first century the government of Emperor Cheng instigated a search for
rare books and preparation of a catalogue. Though Liu Xiang was the
chief compiler, there were other scholars involved, and the section on
military works was prepared by Ren Hong, a colonel in the Northern
Army. After the death of Liu Xiang in 8 BC, his son Liu Xin presented
a final version of the catalogue to the throne of Emperor Ai, under the
title Qi lue “Seven Summaries.” One Summary lists “Books on Military
Matters” Bingshu lue 兵書略 and, allowing for some editorial inter-
vention by Liu Xiang and Liu Xin, this was the work of Ren Hong.49
“Books on Military Matters” contains 53 titles, divided into four cat-
egories. The first, Quanmou 權謀 “Power and Planning,” is explained
as the study of methods to guard the state by correct government
(正 zheng), but using troops in surprising ways (奇 qi); we may under-
stand it as the art of Grand Strategy, where warfare is considered as the
exercise of diplomacy by other means.50 The other three categories are
more specific: Xingshi 形勢 “Situations and their Potential” contains
works dealing with strategy and tactics in the field;51 Yinyang 陰陽
relates to the Five Powers and other supernatural forces, while books
listed under Jiqiao 技巧 “Skills and Techniques” dealt with physical
training and equipment, such as crossbows and archery, swordsman-
ship, hand-to-hand combat and other martial arts, including, perhaps
not inappropriately, football.
The works listed by Ren Hong, however, are not the only ones deal-
ing with warfare. Sima fa 司馬法 “The Marshal’s Treatise,” is cited
among Confucian classics of Li 禮 Ritual: its surviving content deals
49
On Ren Hong, see QHX, 459. Yates, “Ancient Chinese Military Texts” presents a
detailed discussion of the catalogue of Han and of texts which have been transmitted
to the present day or discovered by recent archaeological explorations.
50
HS 30:1758. The dichotomy between zheng “orthodox/regular” and qi “excep-
tional/unusual” is one of the central concepts of traditional Chinese strategy, and the
two terms are used with different meanings and value according to circumstances.
They are discussed further below at 329.
Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege I.24: „So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß
ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung
des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln.“
51
The terms xing 形 and shi 勢 form the titles of the fourth and fifth chapters of
Sunzi and, like zheng and qi above, are core concepts of the work’s argument. Min-
ford, Art of War, renders them as “Forms and Dispositions” and “Potential Energy,”
with notes at 148–149 and 161–162 discussing their various levels of significance.
Yates, “Ancient Chinese Military Texts,” 215, renders the two terms as “military form
and positional advantage.”
322 chapter seven
primarily with military organisation and discipline rather than opera-

tions on the battlefield, and its approach is Confucian, with empha-
sis on the good intentions and virtues of the ruler.52 Similarly, works
ascribed to the Ancient Duke (太公 Taigong) of Qi, Lü Shang, includ-
ing plans (謀 mou), sayings (言 yan) and weapons or warfare (兵
bing), were placed among those of the Taoist school 道家,53 which
also includes a Sunzi, possibly another version of the Sunzi Bingfa.54 In
addition, Mohists paid a great deal of attention to the defence of cities
and towns—so that the Mozi 墨子 book is an important source on tac-
tics and equipment;55 the School of Diplomacy (從橫家 Congheng jia)
52
HS 30:1710. The present-day text of Sima fa is translated by Sawyer, Seven Mili-
tary Classics, 111–143 and 410–420. The work has been attributed to Tian Rangju, a
general of the state of Qi in the sixth century BC, who was given the surname Sima
as an honorific; his biography is in SJ 64. It is generally considered, however, to be a
work of the fourth century.
In the eleventh century AD the government of Emperor Shenzong of Song (reg.
1078–1085) identified seven books as the canon of military texts (武經七書 Wujing
qishu). Six of these had been notionally extant during Han: Sunzi, Sima fa, Liu tao,
Wuzi bingfa, Wei Liaozi and Huangshi gong sanlue; they are discussed briefly in text
and notes following, but see further Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 20–21,
and Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, also Minford, Art of War, xli-xlii. The seventh
work was Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui, discussed above at note 45.
53
HS 30:1729. Lü Shang, legendary adviser to King Wu of Zhou at the time of
his conquest of Shang/Yin, was enfeoffed with the state of Qi. His biography is at
SJ 32:1477–81; Chavannes, MH IV, 34–40. When King Wu’s father, posthumously
entitled King Wen, first met Lü Shang, he observed that his own father, the Ancient
Duke, had hoped for such a counsellor. Lü Shang thus obtained the courtesy name
of Taigong wang 太公望 “Expected by the Ancient Duke,” later shortened to become
his own appellation.
At the present day there is a book Liu tao 六韜 “The Six Quivers.” Though the title
does not appear in HS 30, it has been thought to have been compiled from material
ascribed to the Ancient Duke in that catalogue. Part of the text was discovered in the
excavations at Yinqueshan, cited below, and though there has been much debate about
the work as a whole, fragments are now tentatively dated to the late fourth or early
third centuries BC: Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 21.
Huangshi gong sanlue 黃石公三略 “Three Strategies of the Lord of the Yellow
Stone,” is also attributed to the Ancient Duke and associated with Zhang Liang, a
leading assistant to the founding Emperor Gao of Han at the end of the third century:
SJ 55:2034–35; Watson, RGH I, 135–136, and HS 40:2024.. It is now believed to be a
post-Han forgery.
54
The Ji Tianbao compilation of Sunzi with ten commentators has also been
included in the Dao zang 道藏 canon of the Taoist school: Gawlikowski and Loewe,
450.
55
HS 30:1738. As Franke, “Siege and Defense of Towns,” remarks at 152, “The
highly technical character of the Mo-ti, chapters 51–71, is in striking contrast to the
more theoretical treatment of siegecraft and defense in military handbooks of antiq-
uity such as Sun-tzu or Wu-tzu . . .”
was naturally concerned with the possibilities of warfare;56 and though

the book of Lord Shang by Shang Yang appears among works of the
Legalist school, there is a Gongsun Yang in the Power and Planning
collection of military works—and Gongsun Yang was an alternative
name for Shang Yang.57 As with Sunzi, duplication may reflect vari-
ant editions and copies, or perhaps overlap between the compilers Liu
Xiang and Ren Hong.58
In 1972 a major archaeological find in a tomb of the second century
BC at Yinqueshan in Linyi county, Shandong, confirmed some texts
and revealed others which had long been lost.59 The survival rate over
two thousand years, however, is not good: Yates has estimated that 95%
of the military works listed by Han shu 30 have disappeared, and there
had already been the culling and losses of Former Han.60 Besides Sunzi,
material which has been preserved in one form or another includes
the Wuzi Bingfa 吳子兵法 of Wu Qi, probably from the fourth cen-
tury BC,61 the Wei Liaozi 尉繚子 of the third or second century,62 the
56
HS 30:1739 and [e.g.] SJ 34:1560; Chavannes, MH IV, 149.
57
HS 30:1735 [Shang jun in 29 juan] and HS 30:1757 [Gongsun Yang in 27 juan].
58
On other relevant works to be found outside the military section in HS 30, see
Yates, “Ancient Chinese Military Texts,” 214–215.
59
They include Sunzi with some additional chapters, and texts of Liu tao and Wei
Liaozi, together with the Sun Bin Bingfa [discussed in notes 53 above and 62 and 64
below respectively]. See, for example, Wu Jiulong, Yinqueshan Hanjian shiwen, Ames,
Sun-tzu, 13–16, and Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 18. Another discovery at
Shangsunjiazhai in Qinghai in 1978 revealed further fragments of Sunzi and other
military works: Wenwu 1981.2.
60
“Ancient Chinese Military Texts,” 215, and see above at 320.
61
There is a biography of Wu Qi in Shi ji 65, the same chapter that deals with Sun
Wu and his descendant Sun Bin. Wu Qi served as a general and minister of Lu, Wei/
Liang and Chu, until he was assassinated in 381. “The Art of War of Master Wu,”
which takes the form of discussions with Marquis Wen of Wei, may have been com-
piled by Wu Qi or by his disciples. The approach is more humane than that of Sun
Wu, but the two works have been associated since early times, and the Wuzi appears
to have been quite reliably transmitted to the present.
Wu Qi’s biography is translated by Nienhauser, GSR VII, 41–45, and by Sawyer,
Seven Military Classics, 193–196. Wuzi itself is translated by Griffith, Sun Tzu, 150–
168, and by Sawyer at 206–224. See also Needham, Science and Civilisation V.6, 20.
62
HS 30:1740 and 1758 mentions two works entitled Weiliao or Wei Liaozi: one
among the Miscellaneous Scholars 雜家, and the other in the military section. There
may have been two men of that name, for the present Wei Liaozi tells how Wei Liao
was interviewed by King Hui of the state of Wei/Liang, who ruled in the second half
of the fourth century, while SJ 6:230 [Chavannes, MH II, 114–115, Nienhauser, GSR
I, 131] identifies Wei Liao as a senior military adviser to the future First Emperor
some hundred years later, with title as Commandant 尉; this may be the source of
the man’s claimed surname. There is probably anachronism and confusion and, as
Yates remarks at 233, “we cannot really be certain that the text which has come down
324 chapter seven
Liu tao of uncertain authenticity,63 and the long-lost book of Sun Bin
孫臏, ‘Cripple Sun.’64 Historical details are uncertain, however, and it
is probable that many of these works comprised military aphorisms
associated to a notable figure, whether or not the eponymous author
even existed.65
Given the years of civil war at the beginning of Later Han, and the
subsequent achievements of men like Ma Yuan in the far south and
Ban Chao in central Asia, there are strangely few references to military
works compiled during Later Han.66 For Jieyao, therefore, it is prob-
able that Cao Cao relied upon established material, much of it from
the pre-Han period, and his parallel decision, to edit and prepare a
commentary for Sunzi, reflects that bias to classical military theory.
Though Sunzi was well known and circulated during Han, Cao Cao
appears to have been one of the first to prepare a commentary, a cir-
cumstance the more surprising as Later Han scholarship is notorious
for the number, length and prolixity of commentaries to the classics.
to us as the Wei Liao-tzu really should be considered as the same as that recorded in
the Han shu.”
63
See note 53 above.
64
The biography of Sun Bin in SJ 65 is translated by Nienhauser, GSR VII, 39–41.
Said to have been a distant descendant of Sun Wu, living some hundred years later in
the fourth century BC, Sun Bin initially served King Hui of Wei/Liang, but was slan-
dered by his rival Pang Xuan and was sentenced to have his feet cut off and his face
tattooed—bin refers to amputation of part of the leg; it was not his original personal
name. Sun Bin became the leading military adviser of the state of Qi, and he killed
Pang Xuan and destroyed the army of Wei.
The work ascribed to Sun Bin has had a chequered history. HS 30:1757 lists it under
the Power and Planning section of military books, but there is no record in the Sui or
Tang catalogues, and it appears to have been lost early. Excavations at Yinqueshan,
however, saw the discovery of sixteen chapters, and a translation has been published
by Professors Ames and Lau. It is uncertain when the original was lost: Ames suggests
that, since Cao Cao’s commentary to Sunzi makes no mention of it, the Sun Bin Bingfa
may have disappeared before the end of Later Han. Cao Cao, however, seldom cites
such parallel texts, and the argument ex silentio is not decisive.
65
Even the existence of Sun Wu may be doubted: his biography in SJ 65 is not
convincing, and there is no record of him in other histories of the time such as Zuo
zhuan. See, for example, Minford, Art of War, xix, and Ames, Sun-tzu, 20; also at 21:
“. . . works such as the Sun-tzu might have emerged more as a process than as a single
event, and those involved in its authorship might well have been several persons over
several generations.”
66
Gu Xiangsan, Bu Hou Han shu yiwen zhi at 2259–60, and Rao Zhenzong, Hou
Han yiwen zhi at 2388.
Most excesses of this genre, however, appear to have been applied to

Confucian texts.67
Two other commentaries to Sunzi were prepared about this time.
One was by Jia Xu, sometime adviser to Zhang Xiu and later a close
counsellor to Cao Cao; Sui shu lists him as a commentator to both
Sunzi and Wuzi Bingfa, but there is no further record of these works.
He was a few years older than Cao Cao, but may not have composed
his commentary until later in life. The other scholar was Shen You of
Wu, but he was younger than Cao Cao and his work is certainly later;
it too is now lost.68 During the early third century there was a com-
mentary by Wang Ling, a subject of Cao Cao’s state of Wei; it was well
respected for a time, but survives now only in fragments.69 A canonical
edition of Sunzi was prepared under Song: of the commentaries which
are included, only Cao Cao’s is earlier than the sixth century.70
A brief preface by Cao Cao indicates that he had edited the text, and
some believed his editing was so extensive as to create a new compila-
tion, to which he then added a commentary. The Yinqueshan discov-
eries make it clear, however, that Cao Cao used an existing text, albeit
in a variant version: his chief concern was commentary, not editing.71
Unfortunately, though it is interesting to have such a work by one
of the greatest military commanders of China, Cao Cao provides little
that is personal or reflects his own experience. For the most part this
is commentary in standard form, explaining terms or presenting para-
phrases, and it can be very cryptic. As the early translator Lionel Giles
complains,
67
On the detailed commentaries (zhangju 章句) of the time, see for example Tjan,
White Tiger Hall I, 147–149.
68
The biography of Jia Xu (147–223) is at SGZ 10:326–31, and that of Shen You
(175–204) is at SGZ Wu 2:1117. They are the only two commentators besides Cao
Cao who are listed in the modern bibliographies compiled by Gu Xiangsan and Rao
Zhenzong. There may have been others, but no trace of their work remains.
69
Wang Ling is sometimes cited as Wangzi 王子, “Master Wang.”
70
Besides the Ji Tianbao edition with ten commentaries [see note 43 above], there
is another with eleven, which incorporates the remarks of the Tang scholar Du You,
compiler of the encyclopaedic Tong dian: Loewe and Gawlikowski, 450–451.
71
HS 30 has Sunzi in 89 pian 篇, but Cao Cao’s preface refers to only 13 pian;
numbering varies among the bibliographic records, and the modern text is divided
into three juan 巻: Loewe and Gawlikowski, 447–448. Ames, Sun-tzu, 38–39, suggests
that the material discarded was supplementary “outer” or apocryphal chapters, and
that Cao Cao’s 13 pian were the core “inner” chapters of the work. Some of these outer
texts were found at Yinqueshan, and have been translated by Ames.
326 chapter seven
His commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue but does not

fully develop the meaning. His notes are models of brief austerity. Some-
times owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible, and
stand no less in need of commentary than the text itself.
Indeed Zhang Yu of the Song dynasty, one of the ten or eleven com-
mentators of the canon, explained and supplemented many of Cao
Cao’s notes. As Giles remarks further,
Without Zhang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Cao Cao’s commen-
tary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and therefore
valueless.72
There are just two places where Cao Cao’s commentary purports to
relate to his own experience, and one of those is very questionable:
In commentary to Sunzi 8, where the main text reads “There are towns
not to besiege,” Cao Cao remarks:
If a town is small but strong, and is well supplied, it should not be
attacked. It is for this reason that I left Hua and Fei and drove deep
into Xu province to take fourteen county cities.
This refers to his first attack on Tao Qian in 193, and it fits with other
records and with practical strategy. Hua and Fei were on the borders
of his territory with Tao Qian, and though they were evidently strong
enough to defend themselves, their garrisons were not so strong as to
threaten Cao Cao’s rear once he had passed. He was therefore able to
ignore them and strike into the heart of Tao Qian’s territory.73
In Sunzi 3, the main text reads, “If you have ten times the enemy’s
strength, surround him.”
The commentary says, “This is how I surrounded Xiapi and took Lü
Bu alive.”
The Annals/Biography of Cao Cao, however, and the biography of his
adviser Xun You, say that although Cao Cao laid siege to Xiapi in 198
and flooded its surrounds, the city did not fall until some of Lü Bu’s
men mutinied and went over to the enemy.74 Cao Cao certainly had
72
Giles, Sun Tzu, xxxvi and xl, cited by Minford, Art of War, xlix and li.
73
Sunzi 8:4b; Minford, Art of War, 217. See Chapter Two at 74 above. In discussing
the campaign, Diény, “Une Guerre de Cao Cao,” 325–326, notes also that Cao Cao
later preferred to encircle Tao Qian’s capital at Tan city rather than seek to besiege
or storm it directly.
74
Sunzi 3:11b; Minford, Art of War, 140. Minford, Sawyer and Griffith, however,
do not include this comment attributed to Cao Cao in their translations.
the greater number of troops, but it was by no means such a straight-

forward campaign as this item would indicate.
It is a pity that one of the only two references in Cao Cao’s com-
mentary which cite personal experience should be suspect in this way.
This second entry looks very like a later, false addition—and similar
doubt then attaches to the earlier, more plausible, anecdote. The refer-
ence to the attack on Xiapi in 198 could have provided a terminus post
quem for completion of the commentary, but in the circumstances we
have no means to tell when the work was done. It may be that Cao
Cao compiled it only during the 170s and 180s, before he began his
remarkable military career.
Despite the importance of his commentary in its own right, a simple
reading throws little light on his own practice of war.75
There is, however, another approach, and that is to consider the man-
ner in which Cao Cao engaged in war, and how the records of his
operations, successful or otherwise, relate to the doctrines of Sunzi.
To what extent, in other words, did Cao Cao apply and benefit from
his study of the work?
We must recognise that a good part of the classic deals with questions
of discipline in the army and the control of subordinates. Certainly
such matters were important and indeed essential, for the danger of a
ramshackle army disintegrating was ever-present. The problems have
been discussed in Chapter Four, but it appears that both by personal
contact and example, and by his record of success, Cao Cao was able
to maintain his very disparate following, both officers and men—in
some cases simply because they had no real alternative to the life of his
camp. Sunzi emphasised the need for discipline, and Cao Cao remarks
at one point that “the civil courtesies cannot be used to control an
army,”76 but he was also well aware of the importance of keeping his
men in good condition with adequate supplies, whether by providing
On the final campaign against Lü Bu, see Chapter Three at 109–110, and ZZTJ
62:2006; deC, Establish Peace, 235–236, based on SGZ 1:16 and 10:313.
75
Considering the impact of fire at the Red Cliffs in 208, one might expect Cao Cao
to have added some personal comment to the chapter of Sunzi which deals with that
topic; his notes, however, do not change from their academic style. Similarly, there
is no reference to the campaigns of Guandu in 200, White Wolf Mountain in 207, or
Huayin in 211, his three greatest triumphs.
76
Sunzi 3:18a; Minford, Art of War, 144, and see Chapter Four at 192–193.
328 chapter seven
his own or by plundering enemy territory.77 Chief attention is given

here, however, not so much to the problems of organising an army,
but rather to Cao Cao’s strategy and tactics: the way in which he used
his troops on campaign.
The first chapter of Sunzi is entitled Ji pian 計篇 “On Making Plans,”
and Cao Cao placed great emphasis on the matter. The first item of his
commentary says:
Planning means choosing generals, assessing the enemy, surveying the
terrain, counting troops, measuring distances, and knowing the lie of the
land: all this takes place in the ceremonial temple.78
With proper preparation, a campaign can be won even before the
troops are engaged:
Ultimate excellence lies
Not in winning every battle
But in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.79
Sunzi consistently emphasises the need to deceive and out-manoeuvre
the enemy, and a fragment ascribed to Cao Cao observes that “A good
general will seek for plans as if he were starving; which is why he will
be victorious in every battle and successful in every assault.”80
On one celebrated occasion in 215, Cao Cao left troops to guard
Hefei, with written orders which were only to be opened if Sun Quan
attacked. When Sun Quan did appear, Cao Cao’s men followed his
instructions, launched a pre-emptive attack on the enemy, and drove
the men of Wu in disorder from the field.81
77
E.g. Sunzi 2:7a; Minford, Art of War, 125.
78
Sunzi 1:1a; Minford, Art of War, 99, and Chapter Four at 191. At 117–118, ren-
dering Sunzi 1:25a, Minford suggests that this planning involved not only calculations,
but also preparatory war games.
79
Sunzi 3:2b; Minford, Art of War, 132.
80
良將思計如飢, 所以戰必勝, 攻必取也. Gu Xiangsan, Bu Hou Han shu yiwen
zhi, 2260b, cites this as from Cao Cao’s Bingfa jieyao, quoted in Tong dian. It does
not, however, appear in Tong dian, but rather in the sixth-century collection Beitang
shuchao at 115:4a, where the source is given as Sunzi bingfa biyao 孫子兵法祕要, with
no reference to the author. Though Gu Xiangsan is mistaken about the original refer-
ence, he may be correct in ascribing the text to Cao Cao’s Jieyao. It is equally possible,
however, that the Biyao “Secret Essence” is a separate, apocryphal and anonymous
work; the passage is not included in Cao Cao ji.
81
Above at 316–317. The story is retold by Griffith, Sun Tzu, 93–94. It is likely,
however, that Sun Quan’s men were seriously affected by sickness at the time.
Given the opportunity for planning, a central concept of Sunzi is the

relationship between the principles of zheng 正 and qi 奇, which may
loosely be rendered as the “regular” and the “exceptional.” In Chapter
5, Shi pian 勢篇 “On Situations,” Sunzi remarks:
In warfare
Engage directly [zheng]
Secure victory indirectly [qi].82
The permutations of the two are infinite, but may perhaps be sim-
plified to identify zheng with the normal and almost expected, and
qi with the exceptional and surprising. In battle, zheng may be the
main force or threat, fixing the enemy’s attention, while qi is the unex-
pected reserve, the ambush, flank, rear or surprise attack. The “indirect
approach” is well known and commonly used in modern times—it is
basic platoon tactics—but carrying out such manoeuvres on a grand
scale, with troops and leaders who were often awkward, and commu-
nications which were frequently difficult, required good planning, a
high degree of imagination, and swift action and effective leadership.
Cao Cao proved a master in this field.
At the battle of Guandu in 200, his army held the direct attack of
Yuan Shao, and then he himself led the raid behind enemy lines which
destroyed their supplies and drove them to defeat. In the campaign
against the Wuhuan in 207, Cao Cao first attempted a direct attack
along the coast, but then brought his army through the mountains
beyond the frontier to take the enemy positions in the flank at White
Wolf Mountain. And in his attack on the warlord alliance of the north-
west in 211, he fixed their attention on the Tong Pass, but then looped
to the north, crossing the Yellow River twice and the Wei River once,
to face them at Huayin. In classic style, he created uncertainty and
disruption among his opponents, and on the day of battle he used skir-
mishers to bring their attention to the front, then splintered their army
with a flank attack. These three campaigns could serve as a model for
any general.
On several occasions Cao Cao showed himself sensitive to the sig-
nificance of “death ground” (死地 sidi), where an army is forced onto
the defensive and cut off from either relief or retreat: as the men fight
82
Sunzi 5:4a; Minford, Art of War, 166; see also Minford’s comments on the two
terms at 164–165.
330 chapter seven
to save themselves, they become very dangerous opponents. Sunzi says

twice, “On death ground, fight.”83
In 198, as he was withdrawing from his second campaign against
Liu Biao’s officer Zhang Xiu, Cao Cao was caught by two hostile
armies. He made his escape by means of a pretended panic and an
ambush—both recommended by Sunzi—but he also remarked that he
had placed his men in a death place, ensuring that they would fight the
more fiercely. In similar fashion, when he attacked Lü Bu in Puyang in
194, he set fire to the gate behind him to show that he had no intention
of retreating, and to put pressure on his men; in this case, however,
the scheme did not work.
Again, when he was besieging Ye city in 204 and Yuan Shang brought
troops to the relief, some officers were concerned that Cao Cao’s ally
Yuan Tan was behind the enemy, so they would feel themselves in
death ground. Cao Cao remarked, however, that this would only be
true if Yuan Shang continued to approach from the east; if he moved
across to the northwest, he would have friendly territory behind him,
and his men would be easier to deal with. So indeed it proved.
There is a counter-story: as Cao Cao was besieging Huguan in 206,
he gave orders that when the city fell the defenders should be slain.
Predictably, resistance was fierce and Huguan held out for months,
until his cousin Cao Ren persuaded him to renounce the policy; the
place surrendered soon afterwards. Given Cao Cao’s concern not to
press an enemy too hard, however, this is a surprising incident, and
the tale may be doubted.84
The defeat at the Red Cliffs, of course, is Cao Cao’s great failure and,
regardless of its immediate effect, one of the major engagements at the
end of Han. The breathing-space afforded by their success, moreover,
allowed Sun Quan and Liu Bei the opportunity to establish a position
south of the Yangzi, and led to a centuries-long division between the
north and the south of China. Some have criticised Cao Cao for the
haste of his pursuit of Liu Bei, and cite Sunzi’s warning and his own
commentary against him:
Do not fight after marching thirty miles. Your commanders will all be
taken.
83
Sunzi 8:2a-b and 11:12b; Minford, Art of War, 215–216 and 277.
84
SGZ 9:275, the biography of Cao Ren, cited by Minford, Art of War, 212. Cf.
Chapter Five at 224.
I suspect, however, that Cao Cao was seeking to take advantage of

Liu Zong’s surrender and to follow up his victory over Liu Bei at the
Chang Slope—after the first stage of that successful pursuit, there is no
strong evidence that he was hurrying his men unduly in the manoeu-
vres which followed. And one may compare the somewhat contradic-
tory advice from Sunzi himself:
I have heard that in war
Haste can be folly;
But have never seen
Delay that was wise.85
Certainly there was a problem with the strange environment of the
marshlands on the middle Yangzi, and Cao Cao had not yet been able
to integrate his own experienced troops with the newly-acquired men
of Jing province, but the decision to press forward was not unrea-
sonable.86 Had he managed to force a bridgehead across the river, he
might well have disrupted his opponents, and it is very likely he was
negotiating for some such break. Sun Quan and Liu Bei had never
been in close contact, while the men of Jing province had no love for
the Sun family, their long-term enemies; there was reason to hope
that such uncertain allies might be divided.87 In the event, sickness in
his army and Huang Gai’s use of fireships—an unexpected qi device,
rendered perhaps the more convincing as Cao Cao was hoping for
85
The two texts are at Sunzi 7:5b; Minford, Art of War, 199–200, rendering Cao
Cao’s commentary at 200, and Sunzi 2:4b; Minford, Art of War, 123, rendering the
main text.
86
At Sunzi 7:6a [Minford at 200] the commentator Li Quan of Tang says that in
his pursuit of Liu Bei Cao Cao drove his men to cover three hundred li [some 150
kilometres/100 miles] in twenty-four hours. In doing so, he cites the statement of
Zhuge Liang to Sun Quan, with his comment that “The last flight of a strong cross-
bow cannot piece even thin silk from Lu:” SGZ Shu 5:915 and Chapter Six at 270
above.
However, though Cao Cao did hasten in pursuit of Liu Bei after he left Xiang-
yang, and achieved a considerable victory when he caught him at the Chang Slope,
his movements thereafter may have been less rapid. He went on to Jiangling to take
over the Yangzi fleet of Jing province, then came east to face Liu Bei and Sun Quan at
the Red Cliffs; and it is generally agreed that he established camp there. The need for
haste was over, and there is no particular reason to believe his men had been worn out
by these final stages of their approach. Zhuge Liang was correct to emphasise the fact
that the enemy were a long way from home, but the matter of the forced march was
irrelevant rhetoric for his debate at the court of Sun Quan. In this regard, the com-
ment of Li Quan may be inappropriate: Cao Cao’s swift pursuit had in fact brought
initial success.
87
E.g. Sunzi 3:4b; Minford, Art of War, 135.
332 chapter seven
defections—ruined his plans. The premise, however, was not neces-

sarily at fault.
The difficulty for a practicing general is that many items of Sunzi’s
advice, while individually sensible and correct, can appear contradic-
tory. Speed is important; but troops driven too fast will arrive exhausted
and disorganised. Boldness can gain decisive success; but it is a mis-
take to rush into a trap. Cities and strongholds may be bypassed, and
a drive deep into enemy territory may have demoralising effect, but
you need to be sure you can withdraw if you need to. And two sides,
after all, can play at deception.
Ultimately, Cao Cao’s achievement as a military commander came
from the care he applied to seeking information, making plans, and
then adapting to circumstances. Sunzi speaks several times of the need
for knowledge of the men involved and of the terrain; the latter to be
found from maps but also, importantly, from guides and spies.88 Cao
Cao endorsed these points, and he acted with flexibility, swift change
and surprise. The attack on Yuan Shao’s supplies; the flank attack on
the Wuhuan, and the northern loop against the warlords of the Wei
valley; all were planned on the spot, taking advantage of a developing
situation, but they were based on knowledge of the ground and of the
opposing forces. As he remarked to his officers at the end of the north-
western campaign, “There is no one way to deal with the changes of
war;”89 or, as Sunzi says, “War has no constant dynamic; Water no
constant form.”90
88
E.g. Sunzi 4:10b–11a; Minford, Art of War, 157–158, and 7:3a; Minford, Art of
War, 197–198, and 7:9a–b; Minford, 201, and 11:30a–b; Minford, 295–296. The local
knowledge of Tian Chou was essential to his strategy in the approach to White Wolf
Mountain in 207; though we may note his irritation when advice proved false on his
approach to Hanzhong through Yanping in 215.
89
SGZ 1:35; deC, Establish Peace, 427: 兵之變化固非一道也.
90
E.g. Sunzi 6:25b; Minford, Art of War, 193.
CHAPTER EIGHT
COURT AND CAPITAL
The elegance of Ye and the Masters of Jian’an

Cao Cao: poems and an Apologia
Style of government
Early in 208 Cao Cao established his position as Imperial Chancellor

and commenced a number of structural and administrative reforms,
and though the defeat at the Red Cliffs was a significant—and even-
tually critical—setback, he swiftly recovered his authority. From the
valley of the Huai to the frontier of the empire, his power was unchal-
lenged across the North China plain. Sun Quan, Liu Bei and Liu Zhang
retained their independence but presented no immediate threat, and
the warlords of the upper Wei valley and Liang province were dealt
with in 211.
The previous chapter has discussed the campaigns waged by Cao
Cao during these years. This one considers his court, his personal
poetry and proclamations, and aspects of his domestic policy as he
sought to rebuild an effective central power among the ruins of the
empire of Han.1
The elegance of Ye and the Masters of Jian’an
Soon after Cao Cao had captured Ye from the Yuan in 204, he adopted
the city as his chief residence. The emperor and his puppet court
remained at Xu, which continued to be recognised as the formal impe-
rial capital, and Cao Cao was frequently on campaign to the north,
south and west, but Ye city and the surrounding territory of Wei com-
mandery became the heart of his power. In 213 he was enfeoffed as
Duke of Wei, and it is from there that his dynasty, successor to Han,
acquired its name.2
1
The civil chronology of these years is presented at the head of Chapter Nine.
2
According to SJZ 10:352 (24b–25a), imperial Wei recognised five capitals: Xu
city, residence of the former Han emperor, renamed Xuchang by Cao Pi [note 12 to
334 chapter eight
During the Warring States period Ye had been a leading city of the
pre-Qin state of Wei, and it became the capital of a kingdom under
Former Han. During Later Han Wei was a middle-ranking command-
ery, and the headquarters of Ji province were in Changshan, so Ye city
had no major importance. In 190, however, at the time of the rising
against Dong Zhuo, the Governor Han Fu moved to Ye, and when
Yuan Shao took over from him in the following year he kept his resi-
dence there.
The walled city of Ye measured seven li from east to west and five
from north to south, approximately 2.3 by 1.6 kilometres, for an area
of 3.7 square kilometres. There were seven gates, three on the south,
two on the north, and one each on the east and west walls. We may
note in comparison that the walls of the imperial capital at Luoyang
contained just over ten square kilometres. The population of Luoyang,
however, estimated at half a million, spread into suburbs well beyond
the original walls, while the people of Ye under Han may not neces-
sarily have filled the space.3
At an early stage of occupation Cao Cao brought numbers of new
settlers to develop the region, in the same fashion as the agricultural
colonies which he had established at Xu city. Such conscripts pro-
vided the initial labour force for the embellishment of his new capital
with buildings and towers, parks and water-works, while the families
of his civilian staff, military commanders and their troops added to
their numbers. One may also assume that many other people came
voluntarily in hope of finding fortune at the new centre of power and
prosperity.4
Soon after his arrival Cao Cao began construction of the great Hall
of Civil Splendour, which became the heart of a palace complex occu-
pying much of the northern half of the city. While the surrounding
district became residential quarters for kinfolk, high officials and other
leaders of the state, the palace was provided with ceremonial gates
Chapter Four]; Luoyang, capital of Later Han, where Cao Cao died in 220; Chang’an,
capital of Former Han; Qiao, the homeland of the Cao family; and Ye, which became
known as the Northern Capital.
3
SJZ 10:351 (SJZS 23b–24b); on Luoyang, see Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 10–13 and
17–21.
4
Tian Chou, for example, following his accession to Cao Cao in 207, brought more
than three hundred households of family and followers to take up residence at Ye:
SGZ 11:343.
court and capital 335
and doorways, courtyards and apartments; and the splendour of his

work was later commemorated in Zuo Si’s “Rhapsody on the Capital
of Wei.”5
The world’s rarest materials
Are intricately imbricated in sundry sizes,
With purlins and rafters repeatedly joined,
Bearing blocks and brackets fitted layer upon layer.
Vermilion beams, like arching rainbows, stretch out one after another;
Scarlet girders, like a spreading forest, fork this way and that.
On ornate ceilings in serried array hang lotus stalks,
Their splendid double blossoms opening down.
Evenly placed are dragon-heads through which rainwater gushes;
At times they seem to resemble flowing pools.
Numerous columns are mightily arrayed,
Their luster reflected in the central eaves.
The finials are painted jet black;
Stairs and balustrades rise sheer and steep.
Cao Cao rearranged the local drainage, constructing a weir on the
Zhang River to feed the Changming “Long-lasting Brilliance” Canal
and send water under the western wall to flow through the centre
of the city, past the main entrance to the palace compound. Lined
with stone and crossed by stone bridges, the watercourse was divided
into two channels before leaving by the eastern wall to join the Huan
River.6
Further upstream on the Zhang, the new Sky Well Weir diverted
water to irrigate farmland for twenty li [ten kilometres] on the south
of the city, with twelve great drainage ditches each separated by three
5
The Weidu fu by Zuo Si of the late third century is in WH 6:1259–1482; Knechtges
I, 429–471. The translation below is taken from Knechtges’ admirable rendering of
WH 6:1316–18 at his pages 439–441, lines 181–194.
Miyakawa Hisayuki has a substantial essay on Ye city in his Rikuchō shi kenkyū,
seiji shakai hen, 537 ff.
6
SGZ 10:349 (SJZS 20a–b). SJZ has the name of the river as Huang 湟, but SJZS
notes that this is a miswriting for Huan 洹. As discussed in note 22 to Chapter Five
and note 2 to Chapter Six, the northern branch of the Huan River flowed along the
east of Ye city, then turned west to follow the northern wall, and finally joined the
Zhang River in the northeast corner. See immediately below, on the Dark Warrior
Pond and its park.
The commentary of Li Shan to Weidu fu says that the dam on the Zhang River
which created this canal was ten li [five kilometres] from the city. There must have
been a fall, slight but significant, to get the water from this point through the city to
the Huan, then back to the Zhang once more.
336 chapter eight
hundred bu paces [400 metres]: the area involved, known as the Yanpi
marshland, extended over forty-five square kilometres.7
Cao Cao also improved the communications of his new capital. The
White Canal, first constructed for the campaign against the Yuan in
204, gave access to Ye city from the south by way of the Huan River,
but in 213 the Licao “Profitable Transport” Canal was opened, some
seventy kilometres northeast of Ye, connecting the Zhang River with
the Qing, which itself received the waters of the White Canal. By this
route, supplementing the earlier waterway along the Huan, supplies
and equipment could be taken east to the centre of the plain, and then
carried north along the Qing River or south by the White Canal.8
Besides these practical concerns of construction, irrigation, drainage

and transport, Cao Cao created the Xuanwu “Dark Warrior” Park and
three great terraces along the western wall.
The Dark Warrior Pond was first formed in 208 at the junction of
the Huan River with the Zhang, northwest of Ye city, as a training area
for water-borne combat in preparation for the attack on Jing prov-
ince.9 Though they were defeated at the Red Cliffs soon afterwards,
Cao Cao and his men could now use the rivers and lakes of the Han
and the Huai for their exercises, so the Dark Warrior Pond became
the ornamental centre of a pleasure-ground, noted for its fine trees,
luxuriant vegetation and plentiful birds, beasts and fishes. Late in the
third century the park was celebrated by Zuo Si, but two hundred
years later Shuijing zhu recorded sadly that it had disappeared almost
without trace.10
7
SJZ 10:348–49 (18b); Knechtges I, 448 note to line 337 and see Chapter Four
at 179–180.
SJZ 10 says that the water flow was regulated by “hanging sluice gates” 懸水門
(xuan shimen). These were presumably “stop-log” gates as described by Needham,
Science and Civilisation IV.3, 347–349, formed by baulks of wood inserted one on top
of another within a framework; in contrast to “flash-lock” gates, which were used on
navigable waterways to enable the passage of vessels: op.cit. at 345–347.
As Knechtges observes, similar irrigation systems had been established centuries
before by the state of Wei during the fourth century BC: SJ 29:1408, HS 29:1677. SJZ
10:348 sees those works as predecessors to those of Cao Cao.
8
SGZ 1:42 and SGZJJ 1:100b, SJZ 9:326 (SJZS 55b) and SJZ 10:356 (SJZS 23a); the
last of these identifies the start of the canal about the Han-time county of Chizhang
in Julu, by present-day Quzhou in Hebei. The canal is marked in Zhongguo lishi ditu
ji III, 11–12 and 35–36.
9
Chapter Six at 241–242.
10
WH 6:1345–46; Knechtges I, 447–449, and SJZ 9:339 (SJZS 79b–80a).
court and capital
337
Map 18. Ye City 210–220

338 chapter eight
South of the Dark Warrior Park, close to the conduit which brought
the Canal of Long-lasting Brilliance into the city, stood three great ter-
races. The central and largest one was the Bronze Bird [Dongjue tai].
Linked by flying bridges to the western wall of the city, with soil pre-
sumably gained from the excavations which accompanied Cao Cao’s
hydraulic engineering, it rose to a height of ten zhang, one hundred
Chinese feet or twenty-three metres. Completed in 210 and later sup-
plemented by a garden of the same name, the Bronze Bird Terrace
was flanked on the north by the Ice Well [Bingjing] terrace and on the
south by the Metal Tiger [ Jinhu], slightly lower at eight zhang.11 The
upper levels of the terraces were covered by pavilions, each with more
than a hundred rooms, and Bronze Bird had a five-storey tower, no
doubt decorated with one or more suitable sculptures.12 Ice Well, as its
11
There are descriptions of the terraces in the Rhapsody of Zuo Si: WH 6:1332
[Knechtges I, 445], in the fragmentary Yezhong ji at 3a–4a, and at SJZ 10:350–51 (SJZS
21b–23b). All these, however, were composed or compiled at a later date, and the lat-
ter two sources reflect work carried out by Shi Hu, ruler of Later Zhao (reg. 333–349),
in the fourth century.
The texts are not entirely clear whether the terraces were inside or outside the city
wall, but the Rhapsody indicates that they were associated with the palace gardens
and orchards, while the Dark Warrior Park is described in a separate section [WH
6:1332; Knechtges I, 445, and 6:1345; Knechtges I, 447]. The commentary of Li Shan
to Wen xuan, moreover, says that the Bronze Bird Garden—presumably the site of the
terrace—lay to the west of the palace, and also that it was linked by a “screened way”
(閣道 gedao), while the Rhapsody refers to “soaring stairways” (飛陛 feibi). It seems
possible that the terraces and their surrounding garden were connected to the main
body of the palace by an overhead passageway across an intervening quarter of the
city, similar to the Covered Way (復道 fudao) which linked the Northern and South-
ern Palaces of Luoyang: e.g. Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 22, and deC, Establish Peace, 16.
The construction of the Bronze Bird Terrace in 210 is recorded by SGZ 1:32 (SGZJJ
78a–b) and that of the Metal Tiger in 213 by SGZ 1:42 (100b). SGZ 1 does not give
the date of the Ice Well Terrace; Yezhong ji 3a says that it too was built in 213, but
another tradition, cited by commentary to Wen xuan 6 at 1336, says that it was com-
pleted a year later.
SJZ 10 has the name Metal Tiger 金虎 as Metal Bird 金雀. Yezhong ji 3a says that
the name was changed to Metal Phoenix 金鳯 to avoid taboo on the personal name
of Shi Hu 石虎. The text of SJZ 10 may reflect this change, or may be affected by dit-
tography from the Bronze Bird.
The Qing dynasty scholar Pan Mei suggests that the Metal Tiger Terrace was given
its name to commemorate Cao Cao receiving a Tiger Tally at the time of the Nine
Distinctions: SJZJJ 1:110b.
12
Yezhong ji 3b. The text contains other details of the terraces, but they can be
difficult to interpret and it is not always clear how much had been reconstructed or
rearranged over the intervening century and a half.
The area as a whole has been heavily affected by frequent flooding of the Zhang
River, but modern observers identify two of the great terraces, Bronze Bird and Metal
Tiger/Phoenix, the latter being measured at 122 metres from north to south and 70
name implies, had tunnels to preserve winter ice through the summer,
and these also held reserves of grain and salt and a supply of “stone
ink,” a form of graphite mined from hills to the west.13
Those who described them compared the three vast platforms to
mountains, and the storied buildings at their top, with colourful pil-
lars, beams and tiles, must have presented a spectacular sight. There
was no matching construction elsewhere at this time, and it is not
surprising that Cao Cao composed a rhapsody in their honour, or that
he required a group of his sons to do the same.14
Even as he thus embellished his capital, Cao Cao established a court

to match the emperor’s at Xu city. Under the guidance of Du Kui,
who had formerly served Emperor Ling and later took refuge with Liu
Biao, he recovered much of the imperial music and enhanced his own
ceremonial with suitable compositions and players.15 He also brought
men of letters onto his staff, and many became widely celebrated. A
fine poet in his own right, Cao Cao appreciated the ability of others,
and although he was generally firm with men whom he saw as rivals
or opponents, he could show courtesy and tolerance.
One example was Chen Lin. Born in Guangling by the mouth of the
Yangzi, Chen Lin became a student of the great scholar Cai Yong, and
during the 180s he joined the staff of the General-in-Chief He Jin. He
warned against calling Dong Zhuo to the capital, and later joined Yuan
Shao in Ji province. A skilful propagandist, he composed the Call to
Arms with which Yuan Shao justified his attack on Cao Cao in 200,
and he wrote pamphlets against Cao Cao and his family: Cao Teng
from east to west, though it is now only 12 metres high. A survey of the area was
reported in Kaogu 1963.1, with a map and a description of the remains [appropriately
close to a village called Santai cun 三台村], illustrations have been published on the
Internet at http://gj.yuanlin.com/Html/Detail/2007–11/4692.html [31 Dec 2008], and
Huang Yongnian has presented a historical study of the vicissitudes of the site.
I am most grateful to Professor Huang Yijun of the History Department of Minzu
University, Beijing, for her assistance in this study.
13
On stone ink 石墨 shi mo as graphite, see Needham, Science and Civilisation
V.1, 239 and 242.
14
SJZ 10:349 (SJZS 20a–b) quotes a fragment from a “Rhapsody on Climbing the
Terrace” Dengtai fu by Cao Cao, celebrating the Canal of Long-lasting Brilliance which
led through Ye city. The work is not cited elsewhere, and is now lost. On the composi-
tions of his sons Cao Pi and Cao Zhi, see Chapter Nine at 408–409 and note 69.
15
The biography of Du Kui is at SGZ 29:806–07. He had previously refused to per-
form the imperial music for Liu Biao: note 59 to Chapter Six. We are not told whether
he abjured his principles for Cao Cao.
340 chapter eight
was grasping and greedy, Cao Song had begged to be adopted and
later paid for his high office, and Cao Cao himself was “the revolting
remnant from a line of castrates and parasites.”16
When Cao Cao destroyed Yuan Shang in 205 he captured Chen Lin
and taxed him with this abuse:
Since you were writing for Yuan Shao, I cannot complain that you
insulted me. I do resent it, however, that you attacked my father and
my grandfather.
Chen Lin was embarrassed, but defended himself, “An arrow in a bow
has no choice where it will be shot.”
Cao Cao took the point. He accepted Chen Lin’s apology and appointed
him as a personal secretary, working with the calligrapher Ruan Yu—
also a student of Cai Yong—to prepare official letters and orders. Chen
Lin was responsible for much of the written record of the emerging
state.17
In similar though more friendly fashion, Cao Cao also brought Wang
Can into his service.18 Born in 177, Wang Can was descended from a
leading official family of Shanyang: both his grandfather and his great-
grandfather had been Excellencies. In the late 180s Wang Can was
with his father Wang Qian at Luoyang, and he accompanied the court
to Chang’an in 190. Though still only in his mid-teens, he became the
favourite student of Cai Yong, who bequeathed him his vast library,
and he was invited to office by Dong Zhuo. In 192, however, when
Dong Zhuo was assassinated by Wang Yun and Lü Bu, Cai Yong was
executed as a collaborator of the fallen regime, and Wang Can fled
into Jing province. Despite his ability and reputation, he offended the
warlord Governor Liu Biao by his unprepossessing appearance and
unconventional conduct. His skill in composition gained him some
employment, and he drafted letters for Liu Biao to Yuan Tan and Yuan
Shang at the time of their quarrel, warning of the danger they faced
from Cao Cao.19 He held, however, no substantial position at court,
and spent several years in quasi-exile at Dangyang, by the present-day
16
On the Call to Arms, see Chapter Three at 129 [particularly note 62].
17
The biographies of Chen Lin (d.217) and of Ruan Yu (d.212; from Chenliu) are
at SGZ 21:599–602. On Ruan Yu, see also Holzman, Poetry and Politics, 2–5.
18
The biography of Wang Can (177–217) is at SGZ:597–99.
19
Versions of both letters appear in the Collected Works (集 ji) of Wang Can: HHS
74/64B:2414 PC; deC, Establish Peace, 319. See also Miao, Early Medieval Chinese
Poetry, 66–67, and Chapter Five at 213 and note 21.
city of that name in Hubei. Two works are well known from that time,
a Poem of Seven Sorrows (Qi’ai shi) and the “Rhapsody on Climbing
a Tower” (Denglou fu).
Several writers composed poems of Seven Sorrows, referring to the
emotions of grief, anger and despair which were felt as the Han state
fell into ruins.20 Wang Can wrote three by that title, of which the first
describes the flight from Chang’an:21
The Western Capital is ruined and in chaos,
Wolves and tigers roam amidst disaster.
Once more I quit the lands of central China
To look for refuge among the Jing barbarians.
My kinfolk mourn to see me go,
My friends together seek to hold me back;
Beyond the gate is nothing to be seen
But white bones scattered on the plain. . . . .
The second and third of Wang Can’s poems of Seven Sorrows lament
his exile, and the same theme inspired his “Rhapsody on Climbing a
Tower,” set precisely in Dangyang.22
I climb this tower to gaze in four directions
And take the occasion to smooth away my griefs.
I see those houses where I am staying
Stretched out and exposed, and few can match this height.
The city is bounded by streams of the clear River Zhang
And spreads along the banks of the winding River Ju;
Behind are the broad wide lands of embankments and the flats,
And in front the flowing streams of the rivers and the marshlands. . . . .
Flowers in bloom cover the wilderness
And millet crops flourish in the fields.
It is all very beautiful; but yet it is not my home,
And what have I here to wait for?
20
七哀詩: this explanation is presented by the commentator Lü Xiang of Tang.
The theme, however, was generic, and while Wang Can, Ruan Yu and others describe
miseries of the time, the Seven Sorrows poem by Cao Zhi refers to the more personal
separation of husband and wife; on this last, see Diény, “Les sept tristesses.”
21
The poem is translated and discussed by Miao, Early Medieval Chinese Poetry,
xiii–xiv and 126–132, by Frodsham, Anthology, 26–27, and by Watson, Chinese Lyri-
cism, 35–36. Diény, “Lecture de Wang Can,” a review article on the first of these,
discusses the poem at 289 and presents a translation and detailed analysis at 294–299.
The “wolves and tigers” of the second line describe the warlords ravaging the former
capital.
22
登樓賦: the whole composition is translated and discussed by Miao, Early Medi-
eval Chinese Poetry, 271–280, and by Knechtges II, 236–241.
342 chapter eight
Despite his comparative neglect by Liu Biao, in 208 Wang Can was
at the court of his son and successor Liu Zong, and was one of the
advisers who encouraged his surrender to Cao Cao. Recognising his
intervention and impressed by his reputation, Cao Cao granted him
title as a secondary marquisate (guannei hou)23 and appointed him a
senior clerk in his Chancellor’s office. Wang Can became the centre of
a group of scholars and writers, mostly in their thirties, who enhanced
Cao Cao’s reputation as a patron of the arts.
In later years Cao Cao’s son Cao Pi compiled Lun wen 論文 “An Essay
on Literature,” one of the first such critiques in China, and he hon-
oured seven men as the Masters of the Jian’an reign period.24 Besides
Wang Can, Chen Lin and Ruan Yu, they were Liu Zhen, Xu Gan,
Ying Chang and Kong Rong.25 Unlike the Seven Sages of the Bamboo
Grove, who rose to prominence in the middle of the third century and
included the poets Ruan Ji and Xi Kang,26 the Seven Masters were not
a distinctive coterie, and Cao Pi’s was a personal selection: it is said
that he was greatly impressed by the work of Kong Rong, and sought
energetically for anything by his hand, but Kong Rong, older than the
others, had been killed in 208, before the invasion of Jing province and
the recruitment of Wang Can.
Even if Kong Rong was gone, and the talented Ni Heng had been
sent away and died in the south before 200,27 the first years of the third
23
The phrase guannei 關內 in this context is generally interpreted as referring to
the Land Within the Passes, the imperial capital territory of Former Han. By tradition,
subjects should not hold fiefs in the region of their sovereign’s domain, so guannei
hou were not identified with any specific territory, and were not necessarily hereditary.
They ranked immediately below full marquises (侯 hou), who held identified territo-
rial fiefs.
The title guannei hou, which I thus interpret as “secondary marquis,” has been
variously rendered as Marquis Within the Imperial Domain [Dubs], Marquis Within
the Passes [Bielenstein], Nobility of the Interior [Loewe] and Lesser Marquisate
[CHOC].
24
Lun wen is a section of Cao Pi’s larger compilation Dian lun 典論, now in
QSGW 8.
25
The biographies of Liu Zhen (d.217; from Dongping), Xu Gan (170–217; from
Beihai) and Ying Chang (d.217; from Runan) are at SGZ 21:599–602; that of Kong
Rong (153–208; from Lu) is at HHS 70/60:2261–79. On the death of Kong Rong, see
Chapter Three at 117.
26
On the Sages of the Bamboo Grove, see, Balazs/White, “Nihilistic revolt,” 236–
242, and Holzman, “Les sept sages de la forêt des bambous,” La vie et la pensée de Hi
Kang, and Poetry and Politics.
27
Ni Heng has been discussed earlier, in Chapter Three at 117–118; he died about 199.
century saw an extraordinary flourishing of literary and scholarly tal-

ent. At the court in Ye city, beside the Masters there were Yang Xiu
and the two brothers Ding Yi and Ding I—though these three were
political opponents of Cao Pi and suffered at his hands28—while the
family tradition established by Cao Cao was maintained by his sons
Cao Pi and Cao Zhi, the latter still acknowledged as one of the greatest
composers in the Chinese language.29
28
The personal names of the brothers Ding were 儀 and 廙: both characters are
transcribed as yi in modern Mandarin; I refer to the younger as Ding I. Men of Pei,
and very likely connected by marriage to the Cao [Chapter One at 28], they died at the
orders of Cao Pi in 220. Their biographies are at SGZ 19:561–62, and that of Yang Xiu,
who came from Hongnong and was killed by Cao Cao in 219, is at SGZ 19:558–60.
See further in Chapter Nine at 413–416 and, on Yang Xiu, also Chapter Eleven at 475,
478, 486 and 503.
29
There was also the Lady Cai Yan, whose biography is at HHS 84/74:2800–03. The
daughter of Cai Yong, she had a remarkable career, and is remembered in legendary
fashion to the present day.
Well-read, eloquent, and skilled at music, about 194 the Lady fell into the hands
of Xiongnu exiles and was taken into the harem of one of its leaders. She was held
for twelve years and bore two sons, but about 206 Cao Cao paid a ransom for her
return. He married her to Dong Si, an officer in charge of agricultural colonies. Some
time later Dong Si was found guilty of a crime and sentenced to death, but the Lady
persuaded Cao Cao to rescind the order.
About this time, moreover, Cao Cao asked Cai Yan about her memory of her
father’s library, and she told him that Cai Yong had left more than four thousand
scrolls, but much had been destroyed, and she could recite the contents of just four
hundred items. At his request, she wrote out these works and they were placed in the
official library. Since Cai Yong had bequeathed the bulk of his library to Wang Can,
who presumably took them with him on his exile to the south and then on his return
to the north after 208, Cai Yan’s recollections were evidently a substantial supplement
to this larger collection.
It is also claimed that the Lady composed poems on her misfortunes, and three
have been preserved in her biography in the Chapter on Worthy Women of Hou
Han shu; the first two, under the general title Beifen shi 悲忿詩 “Poems of Lament
and Resentment,” became precursors for later writers on this theme. There has been
much debate, however, as to whether they are indeed by Cai Yan, and in a detailed
discussion Hans Frankel, in “Cai Yan and the Poems Attributed to Her,” argues that
none are genuine, but that they are imaginative impersonations—a genre which was
coming into fashion at this time. As he observes at 154, a rhapsody by Ding I, “The
Daughter of Cai Yong,” [Cai Bojie nü fu 蔡伯喈女賦: Yiwen leiju 30:26b] is presented
in part in the first person. Frankel concludes at 156 that:
Of the historical Cai Yan we know very little. Whether she had any literary tal-
ent is not known. Not a single line written by her, either in prose or verse, has
been transmitted.
Frodsham, Anthology, 9–13, translates the first of the poems, acknowledging in his
preface the debate about its authorship, but observing nonetheless that “What is cer-
tain is that here we have one of the most poignant pieces of verse in the history of
Chinese literature.”
On the relationship of Cao Cao and Cai Yan in later fiction, see Chapter Eleven
at 502.
344 chapter eight
Non-prose writing of this time at the end of Han took two forms.
Rhapsodies (賦 fu), sometimes understood as “prose-poems,” were
long pieces, varying in rhythm and rhyme, with wide and complex
vocabulary and allusions. The development of the genre was traced
back to Li sao, ascribed to the legendary Qu Yuan of the fourth cen-
tury BC and collected into the Chu ci anthology,30 and it was well
established by Former Han, notably in the compositions of Sima Xian-
gru of the second century BC.31 During Later Han, Ban Gu and Zhang
Heng wrote celebrated descriptions of the two dynastic capitals,32 and
the sophisticated style was maintained by Ni Heng, Wang Can and
many others.
In contrast, lyric poetry and ballads (詩 shi), came from a simpler
tradition, echoing Shi jing, the Confucian Classic of Poetry, dated to the
beginning of the first millennium BC. Whereas rhapsodies were com-
posed in high literary style, poetry claimed to express the concerns of
common people, vocabulary was simpler, and pieces were commonly
set to music—sometimes varying in line-length and rhyme-scheme
to fit the melody. According to Confucian ideals, the Office of Music
(樂府 Yuefu) of Former Han was expected to collect folksongs as a
means to inform the ruler about the feelings of his subjects; in practice
the office took a more substantial role at court, preparing songs in
popular form for the entertainment of the emperor and his compan-
ions.33 Diény has well observed how the prestige of the rhapsody fu
restricted the literary development of the shi, but the ornamented and
30
Hawkes, Ch’u Tz’u, discusses Qu Yuan at 10–19, and translates Li sao “Encoun-
tering Sorrow” at 22–34.
31
The biography of Sima Xiangru (197–117 BC), including several of his rhapso-
dies, is in Shi ji 117, translated by Hervouet, Le chapitre 117 du Che-ki; see also his
Un poéte de cour sous les Han.
32
The biography of Ban Gu (32–92), chief compiler of Han shu, is in HHS
40/30A–B. His Liangdu fu “Rhapsody on the Two Capitals” is translated by Knech-
tges I, 93–180.
The biography of Zhang Heng (78–139), noted scholar and scientist, is in HHS
59/49. His two compositions, Xidu fu “Rhapsody on the Western Metropolis” and
Dongdu fu “Rhapsody on the Eastern Metropolis,” are translated by Knechtges I, 181–
310. Further translations of Han rhapsodies are in Watson, Chinese Rhyme-Prose.
33
On the functions and influence of the Office of Music in the time of Former Han,
see particularly Diény, Origines de la poésie classique, and Birrell, Popular Songs and
Ballads. On the political circumstances of the Office, see Loewe, Crisis and Conflict,
193–210. The term yuefu was applied to many pieces, some indeed collected among
the people, others composed anonymously but evidently by members of the office, and
others again by later imitators. The designation, however, was not applied until later,
and the demarcation between yuefu and shi is often blurred.
complex fu then brought demand for a simpler, more accessible form

of verse; and this was filled by the compositions of the Office of Music
and other works in that tradition:
. . . les chansonniers de la cour avait forgé patiemment, depuis l’avènement
du Yue-fou, un nouveau language poétique dont la simplicité, la conci-
sion, la franchise naïve ou impudente devaient rafraîchir les esprits lassés
par la pompe du fou.34
During Later Han, moreover, another form of poetry emerged, whose
great exemplar is the collection of “Nineteen Old Songs” (古詩十
九首 Gushi shijiu shou). All have five-character lines, and though
they were surely composed by men of education and skill, they pres-
ent themes—particularly of separation and death—from the populist
yuefu tradition. Diény has argued that these Gushi represent a revo-
lutionary fashion, reaching back to Shi jing and Chu ci but opening
a new genre in both style and philosophical spirit,35 and it was upon
this basis that writers at the end of Later Han developed a personalised
poetry. Many of their compositions followed the five-character rhythm
and the regular rhyme scheme of the Nineteen Old Songs, but others,
echoing melodies and themes of the yuefu, had lines of four characters
or of varying length. Most notably, however, shi poetry came to match
the literary quality of the fu rhapsody and a writer such as Wang Can
could compose with equal effect in either form.
Some of this new writing was deeply personal, but many pieces,
albeit composed with emotion, do not necessarily describe direct expe-
rience. In his first poem of Seven Sorrows, Wang Can’s description of
his departure from Chang’an does not fit closely to the actual circum-
stances of his escape after the death of his mentor Cai Yong, and the
scene of desolation outside the gate of the city is rather symbolic than
real.36 Even his “Rhapsody on Climbing a Tower,” though it expresses
his sense of frustration and exile in Dangyang and describes the view
from the city, has elements of formula and allusion, and its achieve-
ment is as much literary as personal. As Diény points out, the belief
34
Diény, Origines de la poésie classique, 64–67 at 67.
35
Diény, Les dix-neuf poèmes anciennes, particularly 161–162.
36
Diény, “Lecture de Wang Can,” 297, notes that graves and tombs were com-
monly found outside a city gate [as may still be seen on the Appian Way of Rome],
and the haunting theme may be traced back to Shi jing and the yuefu. It appears with
effect in many works of this period, notably the Jieshi poem of Cao Cao, translated
at the end of Chapter Five, which was composed for the melody Buchu Xiamen xing
“Going out on foot by the Xia Gate.” See also his Poèmes de Cao Cao, 130 and ff.
346 chapter eight
that any poem or rhapsody can and should be related directly to the life
of the composer has held great influence in critical commentary, but
this illusion biographique (“the biographical fallacy”) may sometimes
conceal rather than illuminate the significance of a writer’s work.37
Indeed the poets at Cao Cao’s court composed many pieces with the
same nominal title. Sometimes they took inspiration from the themes
of common life in yuefu and the Nineteen Old Songs: the separation of
husband and wife or the miseries of an orphan. In Yin ma changcheng
ku xing “Watering my Horse at a Well by the Great Wall,” for exam-
ple, Chen Lin describes the bitter separation of husband and wife by
the demands of military conscription;38 in Shi si “Bedroom Long-
ing” and Qing shi “Lack-lustre,” Xu Gan expressed the thoughts of a
lonely wife;39 and in Jiachu beiguomen xing “I Drove Out my Carriage
through the North Gate of the Wall” Ruan Yu wrote of the misery
of an orphan.40 On other occasions they composed pieces on a com-
mon theme, exploring variant approaches and interpretations: Ruan
Yu, Wang Can and Cao Zhi all composed poems on the Three Gen-
tlemen who followed Duke Mu of Qin into his tomb.41 Expressions
and imagery were taken up from one writer to another, so that Wang
Can’s account of his departure from Chang’an, part-rendered above,
is echoed by Cao Zhi’s description of a return—probably fictional—to
Luoyang:
37
Diény, “Lecture de Wang Can,” 305; on Denglou fu itself, see his 293–294. Fran-
kel, “Fifteen Poems,” 2, with citations to Western critics, makes the same point with
reference to the “Intentional Fallacy:” the idea that a poem may serve in its own right,
without further supporting evidence, as the basis for judgement of the poet’s own
thoughts and feelings.
38
飮馬長城窟行: Birrell, New Songs, 48–49. The poem is written from the point
of view of a long-term corvée labourer on the Wall, while another of the same title is
in the persona of a woman whose husband is similarly far away: New Songs, 47–48,
and Frodsham, Anthology, 1–2 [Birrell suggests that this latter piece may have been
composed by Cai Yong; Frodsham has the author as anonymous]. By this time, the
Wall itself had long been neglected, but “Watering my Horse” had become a theme
for pieces on such separation.
39
室思 and 情詩; Birrell, New Songs, 49–50 and 51.
40
駕出北郭門行; Frodsham, Anthology, 32.
41
Diény, “Lecture de Wang Can,” 299 and ff, and Cutter, “Three Good Men.” The
sacrifice of the Three Gentlemen (三良 sanliang) is first recounted in the Huang niao
黃鳥 “Yellow Birds” Ode of Shi jing: Legge, Classics IV, 198–200, and see also note 36
to Chapter One. Cutter suggests that the poem was composed in 211/212, when Cao
Zhi and Ruan Yu accompanied Cao Cao’s campaign in the northwest: he cites at 8 the
preface to Cao Zhi’s Lisi fu 離思賦 “Rhapsody on Thoughts of Parting.”
On foot I climb the Beimang Slope

And see far off the Luoyang hills.
How silent and empty the city;
Palaces and houses burnt and gone.
Walls and buildings fallen asunder,
Thorns and brambles grow to touch the sky. . . . .
As I think of the place I lived in times of peace,
My spirit chokes within me and I cannot speak.42
Cao Zhi and his eldest brother Cao Pi, born in 192 and 187 respectively,
were ten or more years younger than Wang Can and his colleagues,
but their position as Cao Cao’s sons gave them special status, and their
literary skills earned them respect. Surviving letters and poems contain
references to friendly and convivial gatherings, banquets and outdoor
parties, when talented men would gather to celebrate their abilities and
to exchange ideas of philosophy and poetry.43
Though some of their poems survive, Chen Lin and Ruan Yu were
celebrated chiefly for compositions in prose—memorials, letters and
official documents—and though Cao Pi admired both the rhapsodies
and the poetry of Ying Chang, Liu Zhen and Xu Gan, little of them
remains.44 In addition, however, Ying Chang is known to have compiled
42
This well-known poem is the first of two dedicated to “Mr Ying” [Zeng Yingshi
贈應氏], probably Ying Chang or perhaps his brother Ying Qu. Many of Cao Zhi’s
early pieces have such designations, reflecting his close association with the literary
group at Ye city. The poem has been translated, among others, by Frankel, “Fifteen
Poems,” 8, and by Watson, Chinese Lyricism, 39–40.
As at note 41 immediately above, it has been suggested that this poem too can be
dated to 211/212, when Cao Zhi may have met the brothers at Luoyang. Cao Zhi
himself, however, cannot have been able to recall living at Luoyang during its days
as imperial capital, for it was abandoned by Dong Zhuo in 190, before he was born,
and though he may have written in sympathy with the Ying brothers, there is no need
for such identification to validate the poem. It is more significant that the concept of
a wanderer, climbing high to look across a desolate landscape and a ruined city, is
shared with Wang Can’s elegy for Chang’an.
43
See in particular Cutter, “Symposium Poems,” 3–6, quoting letters to Wu Zhi
from Cao Pi and Cao Zhi. The former writes:
Whenever the goblets and ladles were moving freely, and strings and bamboos
played together, we would become tipsy from the wine and would lift up our
heads to compose poems.
44
Two poems of Xu Gan are cited at 346 above, while banqueting poems composed
by Ying Chang and Liu Zhen are cited in Chapter Nine at 413. Frodsham, Anthology,
30–31, translates three other pieces by Liu Zhen, but remarks that, although he was
ranked second only to Cao Zhi, none of the fourteen poems which survive today are
especially impressive.
348 chapter eight
a treatise on the art of chess,45 and Xu Gan’s Zhong lun, “Discussions

of the Mean” or “Balanced Discourses,” a collection of philosophical
essays which emphasise the Confucian concept of matching names to
their reality, has survived to the present day.46
Besides these, about 206 the youthful philosopher Zhongchang Tong,
aged in his mid-twenties, was recommended to Cao Cao by his adviser
Xun Yu. He became a member of the Imperial Secretariat, served for
a time on Cao Cao’s headquarters staff, and later presented his work
Chang yan “Frank Discussions” or “Admirable Words.” Though he
came from a wealthy family, Zhongchang Tong argued that the pres-
sures of private property and the greed of great land-owners will even-
tually destabilize any state. With a sense of indignation, he described
the process of dynastic failure as a founder’s long-term successors
declined in ability and virtue, while he also urged limits on private
holdings to encourage essential farming and education—a program
which should be enforced by firm administration and increased taxa-
tion, with careful attention to the selection of officials. Like Xu Gan,
Zhongchang Tong was concerned with the relation between names
and reality, but his primary argument was the good order lost by the
weakness of Han could be restored only by forceful government. His
proposals reflected the difficulties of the time, and Holzman observes
that “his thought also marks the end of a long tradition of Confu-
cian political philosophy . . . according to which a virtuous ruler would
bring peace and prosperity to the world.” Cao Cao no doubt welcomed
his support of exceptional authority.47
45
Yishi 弈勢 “On Chess:” Rao Zhenzong, Hou Han yiwen zhi, 108b, citing TPYL
753:8b. Yi was another name for weiqi “surrounding chess” 圍棊, the modern Japa-
nese Go. The game was popular under Later Han and Cao Cao, as one might expect,
is said to have been an expert player: SGZ 1:54 PC quoting the Bowu zhi by Zhang
Hua of the late third century.
46
Makeham, Name and Actuality and Balanced Discourses. Two poems of Xu Gan
are cited above, and are translated by Birrell, New Songs: note 39.
47
Holzman, Landscape Appreciation, 70–74 at 71. The biography of Zhongchang
Tong (180–220; from Shanyang) is at HHS 49/39:1643–59. His theories are also dis-
cussed by Balazs, “Crise sociale et philosophie politique,” 116–131; “Political Philoso-
phy,” 213–225. A short essay by Zhongchang Tong on the pleasures of manorial life
is preserved in his biography at 1644; Ebrey, “Economic and Social History,” 624, also
rendered in the style of a rhapsody by Hightower, “Fu of T’ao Ch’ien,” 216–218. See
also ZZTJ 65:2067–68; deC, Establish Peace, 349–350.
Among other literary figures of the time, Xun Yue of Yingchuan is discussed at
374 below.
Poems and an Apologia
Such a galaxy of talent at Ye enhanced Cao Cao’s position in the eyes

of many gentlemen, and gave a show of civilised legitimacy to the
power which he had won by war. Cao Cao himself, moreover, was an
accomplished musician and a very fine poet, among the first to adapt
the forms of the yuefu and the Old Songs to express emotion in his
own name.48 Others, such as Kong Rong, could write in similarly per-
sonal fashion, but Cao Cao had a major influence in raising the liter-
ary standard and sophistication of the genre towards the level which
would be reached by younger contemporaries such as Wang Can, and
by his own brilliant son Cao Zhi.
The cycle of verses composed to the yuefu melody Buchu Xiamen
xing “Going out on foot by the Xia Gate,” often known as the Jieshi
poem, is translated at the end of Chapter Five, and the whole body of
Cao Cao’s poetry, including fragments, has been rendered and dis-
cussed by Jean-Pierre Diény under the thematic headings of “Politics,
Escape and Lyricism.”49 The six pieces which Diény classes as politi-
cal relate to the failure of government, the troubles of the times, or
the heroes and ideals of the past and the future; there are naturally
elements of propaganda, with sympathy and anger at the miseries of
civil war. At the end of the poem Haoli xing “Song of the Tomb,”
for example, after an account how the leaders who rose against Dong
Zhuo quarrelled and then fought amongst themselves, the last four
lines read, in the style of Wang Can and others:
48
In a eulogy for his father, Cao Zhi describes how he composed pieces and set
them to music for the jin 琴 lute and the se 瑟 zither: Cao Zhi quanping 168–170 at
169. And a similar passage from Cao Cao’s official eulogy in the state history Wei
shu tells how “If he climbed a height, he would compose a rhapsody, and when he
composed a new poem he would supplement it by wind and strings, composing music
on each occasion:” SGZ 1:54 PC; Chapter Ten at 446 below. Both texts are cited by
Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 198.
Climbing a height to compose a rhapsody was a cliché of that time, and the eulogy
may be over-blown, but Cao Cao’s interest in musical accompaniment for his poetry
appears well attested.
49
Politique, Evasion, Lyrisme in Poèmes de Cao Cao. Besides translations and
extensive notes, Diény provides Chinese text, with variations. Other translations of
Cao Cao’s verse include those of Balazs/White, “Two Songs,” von den Steinen, “Poems
of Ts’ao Ts’ao,” Frankel, in “Development of Han and Wei Yüeh-fu,” and Kroll,
“Portraits.”
350 chapter eight
White bones lie exposed in the fields,

For a thousand li there are no cocks to crow,
From a hundred of the people, just one remains alive;
To think of this cuts a man to the heart.50
In contrast, the seven poems dealing with escape reflect the tradition of
Qu Yuan’s Li sao and other writings in the Chu ci anthology describ-
ing supernatural journeys and encounters with spirits:
I harness my rainbow steeds
To ride a carriage of crimson clouds;
On Earth I climb the Nine Doubts peaks, and pass through the Gate of
Jade.
Flying across the Milky Way
I reach the Kunlun Mountain,
Attending the Queen Mother of the West and visiting the Lord of the
East.51
Besides magical meetings and feasts, such ventures could bring hope
of immortality, and Diény raises the question of the degree that Cao
Cao gave credit to such beliefs.52 While observing that there was a con-
siderable body of supernatural imagery to draw upon, he wonders why
50
蒿里行: Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 32–40, also translated by Kroll, “Portraits,”
68–69, and by Frodsham, Anthology, 28–29.
Gaoli Mountain 高里山 is a peak on the southern face of the Taishan massif,
believed to be an abode of the dead. The character gao appears in the variant form of
hao 蒿 artemesia, so the phrase haoli became the designation of a tomb, and the tune
and theme is that of a funerary dirge: Chavannes, T’ai chan, 104–107. The poem is
composed in five-character lines, with each second line rhyming.
51
From Moshang sang 陌上桑; Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 73–77, rendered also by
Kroll, “Portraits,” 77–78. The poem has lines of three, three and seven characters, but
the traditional yuefu of that name, “Mulberry by the Path,” had regular five-character
lines, and the theme is quite different: a young woman is accosted by the local magis-
trate, but laughs at his advances, claiming that her husband is far superior in rank or
quality: e.g. Birrell, Popular Songs and Ballads, 169–173, and New Songs, 33–34.
The most usual creature to draw a magical carriage is of course the dragon, but drag-
ons could take the form of rainbows: Kroll, “Portraits,” note 95 at 111, with citations.
Nine Doubts (九疑 Jiuyi) mountain is in the Nanling ranges of present-day southern
Hunan; the Gate of Jade 玉門 is the Yumen Pass leading to the Western Regions and
central Asia. The Milky Way is here identified by the phrase He-Han 河漢 “River of
Han:” Diény, Dix-neuf Poèmes, 27 and 105, and Loewe, Ways to Paradise, 111–115.
Kunlun Mountain 崑崙山 was believed to be the residence of the Queen Mother of
the West (Xiwang mu) one of the ancient deities of China, with power to confer
immortality. Her consort, the King Father of the East (Dongwang fu), here simply the
Lord of the East (Dong jun) sometimes travelled there to join her: e.g. Loewe, Ways
to Paradise, 111 and 121–123.
52
Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 68–72.
Cao Cao should want to write in such fashion. He also remarks that in
the last years of his life Cao Cao gave pensions and appointments to
a number of magicians and adepts such as Hao Mengjie, Gan Shi and
Zuo Ce, so it is possible that he was indeed interested in the longevity
which they claimed to achieve.53 At about the same time, however, Cao
Cao proscribed all books on these subjects, and also works on the art
of war—he may have wished to hold a monopoly of such knowledge,
but the contradictions appear insurmountable.54
Cao Cao’s son Cao Zhi claimed that his father patronised such
unorthodox teachers just to keep them under control and to restrict
their capacity for stirring trouble among the credulous, while he
and his family did not believe in their claimed abilities.55 Diény cites
another source in which Cao Zhi claims that Gan Shi and Zuo Ce
were tested by Cao Cao and proved successful, so father and son may
have changed opinion; there are questions, however, about this latter
text.56 It is possible Cao Cao’s scepticism was political, and that he was
privately a believer, but there is no good way to determine the matter.57
It may well be that Cao Cao’s writing in this genre did no more than
reflect the style of the times and that he enjoyed composing on these
53
HHS 82/72B:2750; Ngo, Divination, magie et politique, 142. The claim was
repeated by Zhang Hua, whose Bowu zhi “Record of a Myriad Things” is quoted by
SGZ 1:54 PC.
54
The proscription of works on “inner knowledge” (內學 neixue) and on warfare
is mentioned by SGZ 23:660 PC, which presents a biography of the scholar Ji Mao,
who narrowly escaped execution for suspected involvement in a plot of his kinsmen
in 217 [Chapter Ten at 424–425], but who was also in danger because he owned cop-
ies of such books.
55
Biandao lun 辯道論 “An Analysis of Taoism,” quoted in SGZ 29:805–06 PC; the
relevant passage is translated by Holzman, “Ts’ao Chih and the Immortals,” 19–21.
56
The essay entitled Shiyi lun 釋疑論 “Resolving Doubts,” appears in the Baopu zi
by Ge Hong of the fourth century, translated and discussed by Holzman, “Ts’ao Chih
and the Immortals,” 25–28.
It is not certain, however, that this text is indeed by Cao Zhi. Diény, Poèmes de Cao
Cao, 72, cites Holzman as saying [at 27] “The essay does not ring false and only shows
us that Ts’ao Chih mellowed when he became older,” but immediately afterwards [at
28] Holzman observes that “In fact, aside from this essay, Ts’ao Chih seems to have
been an unbeliever.” Cutter, “Incident at the Gate,” 240 note 51, likewise doubts the
validity of Shiyi lun.
57
In this regard, we may note the well-known method of developing vital force by
coupling with a number of women but withholding ejaculation. Bowi zhi, cited above,
says that Cao Cao was a devotee of this technique, but it appears that he fulfilled the
first part of the practice better than the second. He had dealings with a great many
women, and when he died at the age of sixty-five he had sired at least twenty-five sons
and seven daughters.
352 chapter eight
themes. Such literary artifice need have no relation to a man’s true

opinion or to his conduct in other circumstances.
In other poems, Cao Cao accepts the brevity of human life; but he
rejects despair and likewise the false appeal of short-lived pleasure. The
second of two “Songs of Qiu Hu” begins,
Let us voice our ambitions with song:
We seek to scale the sacred Mount Hua.
and finishes:
Why be concerned with sorrow and distress?
Our thoughts should go to pleasure and joy.
Strength and vigour, wisdom and knowledge
Surely will not return.
Striving ambition as days pass by;
What is the purpose in that?
But to drift along in idleness
Has equally no point.
Let us voice our ambitions with song;
Why be concerned with sorrow and distress?58
Here, as in other poems, one may hear the voice of the man of action,
authority and self-confidence.59
The six works which Diény classifies as lyrics include the four-part
Jieshi poem, evidently related to the period of operations in the north
against the Wuhuan and the remnant Yuan brothers in 207. Another
piece, Kuhan xing “Song of Bitter Cold,” is attributed to the campaign
against Gao Gan in 206:60
58
Qiu Hu xing 秋胡行 “Song of Qiu Hu” II; Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 97–103,
also in Balazs/White, “Two Songs,” 185–186, and Kroll, “Portraits,” 262–264.
The story of Qiu Hu tells how an official returned home after five years absence. As
he approached, he sought to seduce a woman gathering mulberries, but she rejected
his invitation. When he arrived, he found the woman was his wife; she felt so ashamed,
however, that she killed herself. Though the story has no direct connection to Cao
Cao’s poems of this title, Diény suggests that the sadness of the theme may have been
reflected in his composition.
59
Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 81.
60
苦寒行: Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 118–129, Kroll, “Portraits,” 59–66, and von
Zach, Chinesische Anthologie II, 479–480. The campaign against Gao Gan is described
in Chapter Five at 224.
The composition appears in two forms. One, preserved in Wen xuan and rendered
here, is in five-character lines, but a longer version inserts repetitive two- and then
five-character verses in the middle of each stanza. This second form may have fitted
North I climb the Taihang Mountains;

Difficult indeed, so majestic and tall.
Sheep-gut Slope is rugged and winding,
The wheels of our carts break on the track.
What is that lonely sighing in the trees?
The wind from the north is singing sorrow.
Bears come to sit before me,
Tigers and leopards roar by the sides of the road.
Few are the people who live in these valleys and gorges,
With sleet coming down so harsh and hard.
I turn my head forward and heave a long sigh,
And think of the things I cherish, far away.
My heart is troubled and anxious,
My thoughts and my wishes turn back to the east;
The waters run deep and the bridges are broken,
I halt in the road and stand undecided.
Bewildered and confused, we have left the old way,
We are tired, it grows dark, and there is no place to rest.
Onward and onward, though the sun has now gone,
And men and horses hunger together.
Bearing their sacks, men go to fetch firewood,
Chopping ice to get water for gruel.
Touched by recall of the ode “Eastern Hills,”
I am sad and uncertain and affected by grief.
Diény points out, however, that whereas in 206 Cao Cao led his army
west from Ye city to attack Gao Gan in Bing province, this poem refers
to a northern advance. In fact, the theme is deeper than a description
of hardship among the mountains, for the difficulties of the march
are used as symbols of his struggle to return the empire into order, of
the mental and emotional pressures which he was facing, and of his
sympathy for the men under his command. At the same time, while
the Eastern Hills ode of Shi jing describes the plight of soldiers on
a long campaign, it is said to have been composed by the Duke of
the work to a musical accompaniment; and Diény suggests that it was written origi-
nally as a song.
Kroll, “Portraits,” 61–62, observes that although there are some Han poems with
five-character lines, the standard length was four-characters. He notes that there are
several exclamatory characters; this may be for colloquial effect, but there is also “a
touch of technical uncertainty” and he suggests that “while formally using the longer
line, Ts’ao is still often composing his thoughts in the old four-word line.”
354 chapter eight
Zhou, guardian of the rightful ruler; and that is the role which Cao
Cao claimed to play.61
Probably the best-known of Cao Cao’s poems is the second com-
posed to the strain Duange xing “Brief Song.” This and Kuhan xing
above are the only two to have been chosen for the Wen xuan collec-
tion, but Duange xing also appears in Romance, when Cao Cao is said
to have chanted it before the battle at the Red Cliffs:62
The wine is poured and it is time to sing,
For how long is the life of a man?
We may compare it to the dew at dawn;
So many days are sadly now past.
A noble heart can brave such melancholy,
But it is hard to ignore anxious thoughts.
How shall we relieve our distress
Except with the wine of Du Kang?63
You, with your collar of blue,
My heart longs to greet you.64
It is just on your account
That I have sighed for so long.
61
The Dongshan 東山 Ode is rendered by Legge, Classics IV, 235–238. Each stanza
commences with the refrain:
We went to the hills of the east
And long were we there without returning.
When we came from the east,
Down came the rain drizzlingly.
Among other renderings, the poem is translated by Burton Watson in Mair [ed],
Traditional Literature, 456–457.
62
短歌行: WH 27:11b-12a; von Zach, Chinesische Anthologie II, 478–479, and
Romance Chapter 48; Brewitt-Taylor, 503. Su Shi quotes from Cao Cao’s poem in his
“First Rhapsody on the Red Cliffs,” so the idea of a connection with that campaign
had been established by the eleventh century: see note 73 to Chapter Six and Chapter
Eleven at 482–483.
Brewitt-Taylor does not provide a good rendering, but the poem is translated by
Diény, Poèmes de Cao Cao, 108–117, with considerable attention to commentaries and
critiques, and also by Kroll, “Portraits,” 87–92. The looser version here follows largely
upon Diény’s interpretations.
63
Du Kang 杜康 was a legendary wine-maker of the Zhou period, celebrated for
the quality of his brew; his name was often used to refer to the product itself.
64
These two lines are direct quotation from the Zi jin 子衿 Ode of Shi jing, referring
to a woman longing for her absent and indifferent lover: Legge, Classics IV, 144.
The deer may call to one another

As they graze the open ground.
Now I too have admirable guests;
Pluck the lutes and blow the pipes.65
How bright the moon is shining;
But how may one hope to hold it?
Cares rise from the depths of my being,
And continue without resolution.
Along the paths and over the tracks
You have come to me in courtesy.
In toil or time of pleasure
My heart will remember your kindness.
The moon is clear and the stars shine thin;
Crows and magpies fly to the south.
They have circled three times about that tree;
Which bough will they choose to rest on?66
Mountains are not troubled by their height;
The ocean is not concerned at its depth.
When the Duke of Zhou spat food from his mouth
All the world turned their hearts to him.67
Composed in four-character lines, with two substantial quotes from
Shi jing, the poem has a most traditional format, but varies in theme
and emotion. The first two stanzas are primarily carpe diem, with the
impermanence and melancholy of man overcome by wine and music.
Two stanzas then contrast the writer’s desire for a companion with the
contentment of the deer grazing together and the feast of the success-
ful ruler, and the fifth and sixth repeat the same theme with greater
intensity. Finally, as the solitary birds, like scholars and other men
of ability, search undecided for a place to settle, Cao Cao offers his
own generosity of spirit, modelling himself upon the Duke of Zhou in
search of talented men who may serve the state.68
65
This whole stanza is a direct quotation from the Lu ming 鹿鳴 Ode of Shi jing,
referring to a ruler entertaining worthy guests; Legge, Classics IV, 245.
66
This is a critical stanza, discussed further in note 69 below.
67
Hanshi waizhuan III.31, translated by Hightower at 114, tells how the Duke of
Zhou stopped eating and spat food from his mouth three times in a single meal rather
than miss any opportunity to meet a visitor who might prove to be a worthy official.
68
Another version of this poem in SongS at 21:610 omits the sixth and seventh
stanzas and reverses the order of the fourth and fifth, while Yiwen leiju 42:1a has only
the first, fifth, seventh and eighth stanzas. I accept Diény’s argument that the longer
356 chapter eight
In Romance the poem is presented as a celebration of power and

over-confidence on the eve of a humiliating defeat, and the absentees
may be identified as Liu Bei and Sun Quan, who are expected to come
in submission. Cao Cao’s officer Liu Fu is said to have objected that
the image of the bright moon, and of crows and magpies flying to the
south without a place to settle are signs of ill omen, and he is killed
for his pains. The incident is not historical, for Liu Fu had died ear-
lier, but the same lines are cited by Su Shi and lead him to a theme
on the insignificance of man in the face to time.69 There is no reason
to believe the poem was composed at the Red Cliffs, however, nor
that Liu Bei or any other particular person is indicated. It remains an
impressive expression of contrasting emotions and hopes.
In the winter at the end of 210, strictly on 1 January 211 by the Julian
calendar, Cao Cao issued a special proclamation, describing and seek-
ing to justify his rise to power and the position which he currently
held. At other times he used proclamations (ling) to announce policy
and regulations, but on this occasion he gave an account of his politi-
cal career. As Bauer has observed, this Apologia represents one of the
earliest forms of autobiography in China.70
piece, in Wen xuan, is most likely the original, and that the others are simplified rear-
rangements which have lost some of the effect.
69
This seventh stanza appears only in Wen xuan, not in Song shu. The image of
the bright moon and the pale stars may be interpreted as Cao Cao proudly com-
paring himself to his rivals, but the last line is perhaps even more significant. The
Wen xuan text, referring to the flight of the crows, reads 何枝可依 “Which bough
will they choose to rest on?” Romance, however, gives a variant reading: 無/无枝可
依 “They find no bough to rest on.” In the first version, Cao Cao recognises that
people may choose one leader or another; in the second, he implies that he is the
only possibility.
In Romance, Liu Fu objects to the apparent arrogance of the first line and, still more
significantly, to the concept of birds which can never find a resting place, presumably
implying endless uncertainty and war.
In his rhapsody, Su Shi cites only the moon and the birds flying south, and makes
no reference to their resting-place. Diény does not mention the Romance version or
its possible interpretation.
70
SGZ 1:32–34 PC quoting Wei-Wu gushi “Documents of Emperor Wu of Wei
[Cao Cao].” The text is discussed and translated by Kroll, “Portraits,” 9–15, and ren-
dered in part by Bauer, Anlitz Chinas, 131–133; it is summarised in ZZTJ 66:2100–01;
It is notable that throughout his Apologia Cao Cao refers to himself as gu 孤 “the
solitary man,” self-appellation of an independent ruler.
The events to which Cao Cao refers in the proclamation have been discussed in
previous chapters. Summary references are given where necessary, and dates are pro-
vided in brackets.
I was young when I was first nominated Filial and Incorrupt [in 174].
Recognising that I was not equipped by nature to make a name for
myself as a hermit among cliffs and caves, I was concerned lest the
world consider me simple and dull. For this reason I wanted to become
the Administrator of a commandery, to maintain good government
and teaching, and to establish a fine reputation among the gentlemen
of the time.
In Ji’nan [in 184], therefore, I began by driving out cruelty and
corruption, and my recommendations for office were made with an
unbiased mind, opposing the influence of the [eunuch] Regular Atten-
dants. For this, however, I was hated by powerful men. Concerned
their hostility might affect my family, I pleaded ill health and resigned
my position [in 187].
I was still young after I had thus left office, and I looked around
at men [who had been appointed] in the same year as me, but who
were fifty years old and had made no name for themselves. I thought
to myself that even if I waited twenty years until the empire had been
purified and reformed, I would still hold no higher rank. For the four
seasons of a year, therefore, I stayed in my home country, building a
comfortable house fifty li from Qiao; in summer and autumn I read
and wrote, and in winter and spring I went hunting and shooting.71 It
was my intention to bury myself away, isolated behind muddy streams,
with no expectation of visitors or passing guests.
This, however, was not to be, for soon afterwards I became a Com-
mandant, and was then transferred to be Colonel Who Arranges
the Army [in 188].72 As a result, my thoughts turned to establishing
merit by defeating the enemies of the state, and it was my hope to be
enfeoffed as a marquis and named General Who Subdues the West;
the inscription on my grave would read: “Tomb of the Marquis Cao,
71
The term 精舍 jingshe, used here by Cao Cao to describe his country residence,
is the same as that ascribed to the “spirit houses” of Gan Ji, a religious leader of the
southeast at this time. Gan Ji’s establishments, like those of other sects, were intended
as places for rest and/or purification [cf. note 13 to Chapter Five]; Cao Cao is empha-
sizing his intention of Taoist withdrawal from the world.
72
This was the fourth among the eight commanders of regiments in the Western
Garden corps established by Emperor Ling.
Cao Cao’s biography in SGZ 1:5 implies that he was appointed directly to the colo-
nelcy in the Western Garden corps, but he says here that he was first called to the
capital as a Commandant, possibly to the office of Commandant of Cavalry which he
had held at the time of the Yellow Turbans rebellion in 184.
358 chapter eight
formerly General Who Subdues the West under Han.” That was the
whole of my ambition.
But then came the troubles from Dong Zhuo, and I raised loyal
troops against him [in 190]. Though our allied forces were surely
greater in number, the leaders were always arguing and would not
combine against him. As a result, despite many men with fine inten-
tions, when we faced this powerful enemy we met with initial disaster.
Several thousand [died] in battle at the Bian River,73 and I went back to
Yang province to raise more men. Though I gained no more than three
thousand, this was as much as I had hoped for.74 Later, however, I took
charge of Yan province [in 192], where I defeated the Yellow Turbans
and compelled three hundred thousand to surrender [in 193].
Then Yuan Shu usurped the imperial title in Jiujiang [in 197], and
all his followers acknowledged themselves as subjects. He [had already]
named one of the gates of his capital as the Gate of Established Title,75
in all his clothing and raiment he was following the system of the
Son of Heaven, and his two wives were arguing which should be his
empress. Though his plans were settled, however, when someone
urged him to claim the position and announce it to the empire, he
replied that “It is impossible so long as Cao Cao is still there.”76 Later
[also in 197] I attacked and captured his four generals, and took over
his people, so that Yuan Shu was ruined and isolated. He became ill
and died [in 199].
Then Yuan Shao controlled the north of the Yellow River, his mili-
tary power was great, and it was my considered opinion that I had
no way to match him. I believed, however, that if I risked death for
the good of the state, and sacrificed myself for the sake of honour, it
would be enough to be remembered by posterity. By good fortune, I
73
This describes Cao Cao’s defeat at Rongyang: Chapter Two at 55. The Bian River
was the stretch of the Vast Canal at the junction of the Yellow River.
74
Cf. Chapter Two at 56–57.
75
Yuan Shu’s capital at this time was Shouchun in Jiujiang. There is no other
record of this gate.
Cao Cao makes no reference to his successful attack on Yuan Shu in 193: Chapter
Two at 70. Presumably this was because he sought to emphasise his efforts on behalf
of the dynasty, and that campaign had been no more than a conflict between rival
warlords.
76
Despite Cao Cao’s previous success, as in note 75 immediately above, there is
no other evidence for this anecdote, which is presumably designed to emphasise his
support for the dynasty of Han. In fact Yuan Shu did proclaim himself emperor, but
he gained no wide recognition and indeed became isolated.
did defeat Yuan Shao [in 200], and I displayed the heads of his two
sons [in 207].77
And then there was Liu Biao, who considered himself a member
of the imperial clan but had a mind to treason. Alternating between
aggression and withdrawal according to circumstances, he gained con-
trol of a province. Once again, I was able to deal with him [in 208],
and so I brought peace to the empire.
Now I am chief minister,78 the highest honour a subject can hold,
and far beyond anything I had imagined. I can, however, say this—and
I do not refrain even if it seems boastful, for I want others to discuss
the matter fully: If the state had not had me, who can tell how many
men might have claimed the imperial title, and how many more might
have styled themselves kings?79
On the other hand, some people see how my power has grown, and
realise that I have no natural trust in the favour of Heaven.80 They
are afraid I am concerned only for myself, and that I have ambitions
for the throne. In this they misjudge me, but it is a matter of deep
concern.
The reason Huan of Qi and Wen of Jin are remembered to the pres-
ent day is because although they held great military power, they con-
tinued to support and serve the house of Zhou.81 Lun yu tells how:
77
Yuan Shao had three sons: Yuan Tan, who died fighting Cao Cao in 205, and
Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi, who were eventually killed by Gongsun Kang in 207. Gong-
sun Kang sent the heads to Cao Cao, and it is presumably to this incident that Cao
Cao refers; it certainly meant the end of the Yuan clan.
78
Though never formally used by Han, the term zaixiang 宰相 indicated the chief
minister of the state.
79
Eventually, Liu Bei in Yi province and Sun Quan on the lower Yangzi took title
as king and then as emperor. At this time, however, in 210/211, despite the setback at
the Red Cliffs in 208, Cao Cao evidently expected to bring them under control; or at
least claimed so for the purposes of propaganda.
80
The whole passage presented in this paragraph of translation presents problems
of interpretation, primarily because of uncertainty about the subject in one clause or
another. Bauer and Kroll offer slight variations, but the thrust of Cao Cao’s argument
is clear enough. In his précis, Sima Guang conflates some of this text: ZZTJ 66:2101;
The phrase tianming 天命 is commonly understood as the Mandate of Heaven, the
mystical authority held by a successful dynasty, but here I suspect that it indicates the
more general concept of the will of Heaven: Cao Cao is saying that it is his belief that
Heaven helps those who seek to help themselves; one cannot rely upon good fortune
without making an effort to obtain it.
81
The two great models of hegemony were Duke Huan of Qi (reigned 685–643 BC)
and Duke Wen of Jin (635–628 BC). Each established dominance over central China,
notably through gathering assemblies of other feudal lords for formal declaration of
360 chapter eight
“King Wen [of Zhou] possessed two of the three parts of the empire,
and with those he served the Yin. That may be said to have been the
highest point of the virtue of the house of Zhou.” This is using the
large as a means to serve the lesser.82
In former times Yue Yi fled to Zhao. The king of Zhao wanted to
make plans with him against [his home state of] Yan, but Yue Yi knelt
in tears before him and replied, “I served King Zhao [of Yan], just as
I now serve your majesty. If I should offend you and flee to end my
days in another country, I could not bear to plan against any subject
of [your state of] Zhao; how much more is this true of the heir to my
former ruler!”83
When Huhai [Second Emperor of Qin] sent order of death to Meng
Tian, Meng Tian replied, “From my grandfather through his son to his
grandson, three generations of my family have shown fidelity to Qin.
Now I command three hundred thousand men, sufficient to raise a
rebellion. Despite this, I recognize that I must die if I am to maintain
my honour, for I dare not abandon the teachings of my ancestors, nor
can I forget his late majesty [the First Emperor].84
Whenever I read of these two men, I cannot restrain my tears of
sympathy.
[In my own family,] from my grandfather [Cao Teng] and my father
[Cao Song] to me, each generation has held an important position
allegiance to the weakened Eastern Zhou dynasty at Luoyang, for the adjudication of
disputes, and for the occasional organisation of an allied military campaign.
82
In Chinese tradition, the Shang dynasty, which later changed its name to Yin,
reigned in the second millennium BC. Towards the end of that time the lord of Zhou
周, posthumously titled King Wen, controlled the greater part of China, but he served
the dynasty of Yin so long as the king ruled with justice and virtue: Analects VIII.20;
Legge, Classics I, 215. Later, however, the wicked King Zhou 桀 of Yin ruled badly, and
King Wu of Zhou, son of King Wen, destroyed him and established a new dynasty.
83
Yue Yi was chief general to King Zhao 昭 of Yan 燕, but King Zhao’s successor
King Hui 惠 became suspicious of him and he was forced to take refuge in the rival
state of Zhao 趙. His biography is in SJ 80:2427–34; Nienhauser, GSR VII, 255–259,
and his loyalty to Yan is referred to at note 25 to 259.
At 2433; Nienhauser, 259 and note 25, Yue Yi explains to the ruler of Zhao that
even though he had been driven into exile he still considered himself bound in loyalty
to the state of Yan which he had served in the past. In the same fashion, should he be
obliged to leave the state of Zhao which had now given him refuge, he would never
take action against it.
84
In the late third century BC Meng Tian was chief general to the First Emperor of
Qin, but after that sovereign’s death his son and successor Huhai, the Second Emperor,
was persuaded by the eunuch Zhao Gao to send an order for Meng Tian to kill him-
self. The biography of Meng Tian is in SJ 88:2565–70; Nienhauser, GSR VII, 361–366.
Meng Tian indeed took poison, but he made an eloquent response to the unjust com-
mand: SJ 88:2569–70; GSR VII, 365–366. That text is drawn upon by Cao Cao.
close to the throne, and if we include Zihuan and his brothers, then
one may say that more than three generations have shown their loyal-
ty.85 I am speaking not only to you gentlemen,86 but I constantly give
instruction to my wives and concubines, that they too may appreciate
what I am saying. I tell them: “Thinking of the time after my death,
you should all marry again, but I want you to record and pass on
my true feelings, so that other men may know them.”87 Those are my
words, and they come from the bottom of my heart.
The reason I express myself in such sincere and earnest terms is that
I recall how the Duke of Zhou placed a document in the Metal-bound
Coffer as a means to explain his intentions—because he was concerned
other people did not believe him.88
On the other hand, if anyone proposes that I should simply give up
my army, hand over power and retire to my fief in Wuping,89 then that
is quite impossible. Why? because I am really afraid I should be killed
as soon as I leave the protection of my men. And if I should come
85
Cao Pi, eldest surviving son of Cao Cao, had the style Zihuan. In 206, at the age
of twenty, he had held formal command at Ye city during Cao Cao’s absence, and he
had since been consulted on some matters. In addition, Cao Cao’s eldest son Cao Ang,
half-brother to Cao Pi, had been killed in battle against Zhang Xiu in 197.
86
“You gentlemen” indicates the wider audience which Cao Cao was addressing
in his proclamation.
87
The phrase wannian zhi hou 萬年之後 presents difficulties: Kroll interprets it as
Cao Cao referring to his descendants far into the future: he is addressing his wives
and concubines because they are the mothers of his sons and responsible for their
upbringing. Bauer omits the passage. I follow the commentary of Lu Bi at SGZJJ 1:80b,
which interprets Cao Cao as contemplating his own death. The phrase wansui zhi
hou 萬歲之後 “after ten thousand years;” appears in HS 42:2096 in reference to the
impending death of Emperor Gao of Former Han; and as a sovereign is wished ten
thousand years of life [wansui; Japanese banzai], when he died it has been said that
ten thousand years have come to an end.
In using such an expression for himself, no matter how modest and loyal he claimed
to be, Cao Cao was surely presumptuous, in the same fashion as his use of the personal
pronoun gu: note 70 above. Lu Bi regards the passage as the words of a skilful but
deceitful scoundrel: 奸雄欺人之語.
88
Jinteng “The Metal-bound Coffer” is a chapter of Shu jing; Legge, Classics IV,
351–361. Cao Cao has slightly adapted the story.
Shu jing tells how, when King Wu of Zhou fell ill, his brother the Duke of Zhou
wrote a prayer that he might recover, and offered his own life in his stead. The tab-
lets were then placed in a metal-bound casket and the king indeed recovered. Later,
when the young King Cheng doubted the duke’s loyalty, the casket was opened and
the tablets were found. Unlike the Duke of Zhou, who had sought to keep his offer of
self-sacrifice secret, Cao Cao is advertising his loyalty.
89
Cao Cao had been enfeoffed with the county of Wuping in Chen in 196: SGZ
1:13. Kong Rong had similarly proposed that Cao Cao should be obliged to take up
residence at his fief: Chapter Three at 117.
362 chapter eight
to harm, it will not be only my sons and grandsons who suffer—the

whole realm will be in danger. In seeking a meaningless reputation, I
would guarantee myself a certain death; and I am not going to do this.
Some time ago, the court proposed to grant fiefs to three of my sons,
but I firmly refused the offer. This time I am accepting it, not because
of the honour, but in order that they may assist the long-term security
of the state.90 I have heard how Jie [Zhi]tui refused enfeoffment from
Jin, and how Shen [Bao]xu rejected any reward from Chu, and when-
ever I read of this I sigh with admiration. They are models for me to
judge myself by.91
To maintain the authority and majesty of the state, to carry a battle-
axe and command in war, to support the weak and control the strong,
to protect the small and restrain the great; these are my hopes. If my
heart holds firm to the principle of action which does not oppose the
nature of affairs, then why should I not be successful? And if I can
indeed pacify and settle the empire, without damage to the Mandate of
the true ruler, then let it not be said that success has come through the
power of man, but that Heaven itself has aided the House of Han.
At the same time, how can my virtues be so great as to justify
enfeoffment with four counties and a pension from thirty thousand
households?92 Since the Yangzi and the lakelands are not yet at peace,93
I cannot leave my position; but I can certainly relinquish towns and
fields. I therefore hand back the three counties of Yangxia, Zhe and
Ku, with twenty thousand households, and keep only the ten thousand
of Wuping as my source of revenue. By this means I may remove some
cause of criticism, and slightly reduce the complaints made against me.
90
A few weeks after this proclamation, three of Cao Cao’s sons, Cao Zhi, Cao Ju
and Cao Lin, were awarded marquisates, each with revenue from five thousand house-
holds: Chapter Nine at 382.
91
Zuo zhuan, Duke Xi 25th year; Legge, Classics V, 189 and 191–192, tells how in
the mid-seventh century Jie Zhitui followed the future Duke Wen of Jin during the
years of exile before he came to the throne, but then refused all reward and went into
hiding.
SJ 66:2177; Nienhauser, GSR VII, 54–55, and 79:2414; GSR VII, 242, tell how in the
late sixth century Shen Baoxu led a revival of the military fortunes of Chu against its
rival state of Wu, but refused to accept a fief for his services.
92
Since the original grant of Wuping, the value of Cao Cao’s nominal fief had
evidently been increased by the addition of revenue from neighbouring counties.
Yangxia, Zhe and Ku are listed below; all three, like Wuping, were in Chen.
93
This refers to Sun Quan on the lower Yangzi and to Liu Bei, currently occupying
the lakes and marshes of Jing province on the middle basin of that river.
Though Cao Cao is well prepared to make literary and historical

allusions—adapted to fit his argument—his prose, like his poetry, is
straightforward and direct when compared to some ornate composi-
tions of the time. His Apologia must first be considered as self-justi-
fication and a form of propaganda, but a great part is practical and
sensible. He is not in a position to abandon his military power, and
it would be absurd for him to do so. He appears genuine in his con-
cern to restore order to the Chinese world, and his modesty in seeking
offices, titles and wealth is in considerable contrast to men of similar
power in previous years: not only Dong Zhuo, but also great relatives
by marriage such as Liang Ji, Dou Wu and He Jin.94
The core question, particularly for those who retained a perhaps
romantic loyalty to the four-hundred-year tradition of Han, was Cao
Cao’s attitude towards the weak and crippled dynasty. His expressed
intention is clear: he seeks to restore the imperial state to its former
authority and splendour, and he has no wish to seize the throne for
himself: this is not Wang Mang, the usurper of Former Han. On the
contrary, he refers several times to men of the past who proved them-
selves loyal subjects and sought to restore or maintain the fortunes of
their rightful sovereigns, and—at least for the purposes of this publi-
cation—his ideal is that of the Duke of Zhou, admired by Confucius,
who acted as regent for the benefit of his nephew King Cheng, but
then handed over power and was celebrated by future generations for
his wisdom and sense of honour.95 Almost ten years later in 219, when
his ministers praised his recent successes and once more urged him
to take the imperial title, Cao Cao replied, “If the Mandate of Heaven
indeed rests with me, then let me act as King Wen of Zhou.”96 Though
he held great power, he had no wish to seize the place of the rightful
dynasty.97
94
On these men and their extravagances, see for example, deC, LH3K, sub voce.
95
See, for example, the chapter Luo gao “Proclamation at Luo” of Shu jing; Legge,
Classics IV, 435–452. Shaughnessy, “Western Zhou History,” presents a more aggres-
sive and power-seeking role for the Duke, but acknowledges that the legend of his
wisdom and self-abnegation became dominant in later centuries.
96
SGZ 1:52–53 PC quoting Wei lue; deC, Establish Peace, 555. On King Wen, who
held great power but never took the throne, see note 82 above. The passage appears
also in ZZTJ 68:2173, and it inspired one of Sima Guang’s most notable essays, “On
Teaching and Custom,” in praise of the legacy of Han: deC, Establish Peace, 555–
558.
97
Mansvelt Beck, “Fall of Han,” 354–355, discusses the debate at this time, and the
practical argument that there could be no question of a Mandate to take over from
364 chapter eight
In subsequent years Cao Cao did take extraordinary honours, and

had himself enfeoffed first as a duke and then as a king. Formally,
however, he remained a subject of Han, and one may perhaps per-
ceive his vision of the future in terms of the hegemon rulers of the
later Zhou period, or the Shogunate of Japan: a great feudatory who
controls the state but pays nominal service to the continuing imperial
authority. His son and successor Cao Pi, however, had a less delicate
sensitivity, and the dynasty of Han was maintained only a few months
after Cao Cao’s death in 220. That, however, is another story, and its
implications will be considered later.98
Character and style of government
In 197, after his humiliating defeat at the hands of Zhang Xiu in Nan-
yang, Cao Cao received a letter from Yuan Shao. We are told it was
couched in disparaging terms and that Cao Cao, already embarrassed,
was close to despair. His adviser Guo Jia, however, reminded him how
Emperor Gao, founder of Han, had defeated the mighty Xiang Yu, and
he encouraged him with a series of most favourable comparisons:
There are ten points where Yuan Shao is weak and you are his superior.
Though Yuan Shao may be powerful in military terms, he will never
gain success:
Yuan Shao esteems complex ritual and great ceremony; you show
consideration and act naturally. This is the first superiority: in moral
conduct.
Yuan Shao acts as a rebel; you serve and obey the Emperor and so
command the empire. This is the second superiority: in your sense of
honour.
During the last years of Han the government has lost power through
excessive leniency. Yuan Shao seeks to solve the problem with yet more
leniency, so he does not maintain firm control. You, however, are strict
with the people, and every man of every rank knows the rules. This is
the third superiority: in good government.
Outwardly Yuan Shao acts generously, but privately he is jealous. He
uses men but is suspicious of them, and he appoints only the sons and
Han so long as great parts of the empire remained independent: “Ts’ao Ts’ao, essen-
tially a practical man, concurred with [this] view.”
98
Chapter Ten at 399 below. The process by which Cao Pi acceded to the imperial
title is discussed in detail by Leban, “Managing Heaven’s Mandate,” and Goodman,
Ts’ao P’i Transcendent.
brothers of his own family or those connected by marriage. Outwardly

you are easy and plain, but within you are clever and shrewd. When you
appoint a man, you give him your confidence. It is only ability that mat-
ters, and you make no distinction between those who are close kin and
those who are not. This is the fourth superiority: liberality of mind.
Yuan Shao has many plans but seldom makes a decision; he lets things
slip and acts too late. When you make a plan you follow it swiftly, and
you are always ready to deal with any change in the situation. This is the
fifth superiority: in planning.
Yuan Shao comes from a family which has established its fortune over
many generations; he uses fine talk and formal courtesy to gain a good
reputation, and those gentlemen who love words and ornamental show
will turn to him. You treat men honestly, you act with full sincerity, and
you have no use for empty finery. You deal with your subordinates in
straight-forward fashion, and you do not try to cheat those who have
done well. So gentlemen with loyal hearts, who can see things clearly
and are sincere, will all want to serve you. This is the sixth superiority:
in virtue.
If Yuan Shao sees a man who is hungry or cold, his face shows pity
and sympathy, but he deals only with what he can see: this may be called
a woman’s compassion. You sometimes neglect small matters before
your eyes, but when it comes to great affairs concerning all the people
of the world, then you extend your grace and your providence is beyond
expectation. You comprehend even the things you cannot see, and noth-
ing is omitted. This is the seventh superiority: in human feeling.
Yuan Shao’s great officers contend for power, with accusations,
confusion and uncertainty. You treat subordinates fairly, and you pay
no attention to rumour or slander. This is the eighth superiority: in
understanding.
No-one knows what Yuan Shao considers right or wrong. You, how-
ever, bring forward with ceremony those who do right, and you use the
law to correct those who do wrong. This is the ninth superiority: in civil
administration.
Yuan Shao admires empty show, but has no appreciation for the
essentials of war. You, however, can defeat a host of men with only a
few, and you use soldiers like a spirit. The men of your army put their
trust in you and the masses of the enemy fear you. This is the tenth
superiority: in military skill.
We are told that Cao Cao laughed at the encomium, “How can I be
worthy of all this?” The speech is indeed an impressive piece of flat-
tery, and the conversation may never have taken place in such terms.
As Balazs observes, however, the “gem of rhetoric” would be no less
interesting if it were pure invention, for it presents character summa-
ries of the two great rivals, and of Cao Cao in particular, through the
eyes of men very close to the time: Guo Jia was on the spot, and Fu
366 chapter eight
Xuan, author of Fuzi, was writing in the middle of the third century
and was thus also a near-contemporary.99
In any event, the attributes ascribed to Cao Cao in this passage are
reflected in his writing and his conduct. Some, such as his military
skill and ability in planning, are personal, and the claim to act in the
emperor’s name was politically useful, but Cao Cao is recognised for
his insistence on strict maintenance of the law, for his direct dealings
99
The ten attributes ascribed to Cao Cao are: 道 dao, here rendered as “moral
conduct;” 義 yi “honour;” 治 zhi “good government;” 度 du “liberality of mind;” 謀
mou “planning;” 德 de “virtue;” 仁 ren “human feeling;” 明 ming “understanding;” 文
wen “civil administration” and 武 wu “military skill.”
SGZ 14:432 PC quoting Fuzi, translated by Balazs/White, “Nihilistic Revolt,” 227–
229. ZZTJ 62:1994–95 presents a slightly abridged version of the text; deC, Establish
Peace, 213–215. Sima Guang says that Xun Yu and Guo Jia were both involved in the
speech, but Xun Yu’s biography at SGZ 10:313 indicates that although he may have
been in the same conversation as Guo Jia, his response was slightly different, with
stronger emphasis on loyalty to the emperor: see further in Chapter Nine at 385.
It is unlikely Cao Cao would have expressed his anxiety in an open forum, so one
must assume Guo Jia and Xun Yu were speaking to him privately. It is possible, how-
ever, that some account was recorded, or recalled and published later. Cao Cao would
surely not have objected.
More generally, there are other places where Cao Cao is compared favourably to
Yuan Shao: similar remarks are ascribed to Yang Fu, officer of Wei Duan the Gover-
nor of Liang province in the northwest, in 199 [SGZ 25:700], and to Jia Xu, adviser
to Zhang Xiu, in 200 [SGZ 10:329]; both men persuaded their masters to ally with
Cao Cao.
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 282–285, fairly questions whether the differences between the
two were indeed so obvious, or whether some common source was later adapted and
ascribed to various advisers. It may well be that the pattern: “Cao Cao is better than
Yuan Shao at A, at B, at C . . . etc” was a model of propaganda published by his staff
and circulated by his agents. Similar comparisons of character, moreover, are noted
on other occasions and about other people. When Yuan Shao sought to take over Ji
province from Han Fu in 191, for example, his agent Xun Shen compelled Han Fu
to acknowledge three ways in which he was inferior: in generosity, in planning abil-
ity, and in the rank of his family: HHS 74/64A:2377–78 and SGZ 6:191 PC quoting
Hanmo yingxiong ji; deC, Establish Peace, 72.
Such rhetoric may be seen as a natural development of the descriptions of character,
the “pure judgements” (淸議 qingyi) which were popular towards the end of Later
Han. See, for example, the assessments of Cao Cao by Qiao Xuan, He Yong and Xu
Shao: Chapter One at 31 and note 58.
Finally, however, we should note the argument presented by Diény in “Littérature
chinoise et littérature gréco-latine,” where he suggests that many such debates, assess-
ments and comparisons are rather inventions of a historian than any real attempt to
record a particular conversation. As in the speeches allegedly recorded by Thucydides
or Tacitus—or even the soliloquies of Shakespeare—such passages are designed to
present an analysis of the situation by putting words into the mouths of the actors in
a historical drama; they are explanations and interpretations, not facts.
with his followers, and for his concern to employ men of ability with-
out regard for their background.
On this last, he took the slanderous Chen Lin into his service, and
was prepared to forgive the treachery of Wei Chong. Naturally enough,
he made considerable use of his cousins of the Xiahou clan, but he
accepted support and advice from anyone, without regard for previ-
ous allegiance. Xun Yu and Guo Jia had served Yuan Shao, but Cao
Cao had no hesitation in accepting their transfer of loyalty. Zhang Xiu
attacked Cao Cao by surprise, inflicted a heavy defeat upon him and
was responsible for the death of his son Cao Ang, but Cao Cao later
welcomed his accession to his cause, granting him high command and
alliance by marriage, while Zhang Xiu’s adviser Jia Xu became a most
influential counsellor.
Cao Cao’s policy on this question was presented very clearly in three
proclamations. The first is dated to the spring of 210, the same year as
he published his Apologia:100
Since ancient times, no ruler who has received the Mandate or secured
a revival of his dynasty has ever failed to obtain the services of worthy
men and true gentlemen to assist him in the government of the empire.
And to find such men, [the ruler] must surely go out into the streets;
how else may he encounter a great minister? For a man of high quality
does not seek for office.
As the empire is still not settled, this is a time to search with particular
urgency. [Confucius observed that] “Meng Gongchuo is well competent
to be chief officer of Zhao or Wei, but he cannot serve as a senior official
in Teng or Xue.”101 [On the other hand,] if a gentleman must be known
to be of pure virtue before he can be used in office, then how would
Duke Huan of Qi have become hegemon?102 Are there none in the world
100
SGZ 1:32, translated also by Kroll, “Portraits,” 17–18, with abbreviated text in
101
This comes from a remark of Confucius recorded in Analects XIV.12/11; Legge,
Classics I, 279. Commentary explains that the state of Jin was at that time controlled
by the three great clans of Zhao, Wei and Han, which later divided it between them-
selves. At this time, however, they were not full states, and Meng Gongchuo was com-
petent to manage the internal affairs of such a second-level polity.
On the other hand, though Teng and Xue were small and weak, their rulers held
their fiefs directly from the royal house of Zhou, so their chief officers had to deal
with the high-ranking states about them. Meng Gongchuo was not equal to that level
of ceremony and responsibility.
102
Guan Zhong, great minister of the state of Qi during the seventh century BC,
was wealthy and ostentatious, but Duke Huan gave him office without concern for
his private conduct, and Qi became the most powerful state under the Zhou dynasty.
For Confucius’ disapproval of Guan Zhong’s extravagance, see Analects III.22; Legge,
368 chapter eight
today who may fish on the banks of the Wei while holding a jade amulet
beneath their cloak?103 And are there none who may have committed
adultery with their sister-in-law, or taken bribes, but who have not yet
met their [Wei] Wuzhi?104
You must help me bring to light men who are unusual but unknown.
Please make recommendations simply on the basis of ability. When I
have such men, I can use them.
In a second proclamation published in the winter at the end of 214,
Cao Cao repeated his interest:105
Now a man of good conduct is not necessarily suitable for promotion,
and a man fit for promotion is not necessarily one of good conduct. . . . .
[Considering the examples of Chen Ping and Su Qin,]106 should every
man who has faults be rejected? If my senior officers consider this care-
fully, then [suitable] gentlemen will not be passed over or rejected, and
those in office will not be [mistakenly] dismissed.
And in the eighth month of 217 he returned to the theme one more
time. Again citing examples from the past, he argued that:
Some men who have been disgraced or who are an object of scorn to
others, even if they are neither generous nor filial they may yet have
Classics I, 162–163, but on his admiration for Guan Zhong’s achievement, see XIV.17
& 18 [also numbered as 16 & 17]; Legge, Classics I, 281–282.
Previously, moreover, Guan Zhong had fought against Duke Huan and wounded
him in battle: Rickett, Guanzi, 8–14, 289 and 320. The biography of Guan Zhong is in
SJ 62; Nienhauser, GSR VII, 9–14.
103
Lü Shang, a man of fine descent, was nonetheless in humble circumstances. He
was fishing on the banks of the Wei River 渭水 when he was discovered by the future
King Wen of Zhou, who made him his chief minister. He later served the conquering
King Wu, and was enfeoffed with the state of Qi. His biography, as Taigong [Grand
Duke] of Qi 齊太公, is at SJ 32:1477–81, while Chavannes, MH IV, 34–36, translates
the various accounts of his discovery and appointment: see also note 53 to Chapter 7.
There is no reference to the tablet of jade, but it is evidently a symbol of Lü Shang’s
future high rank.
104
Chen Ping had a chequered early career until he was introduced to Emperor
Gao of Han by Wei Wuzhi and took service with him. When he was first proposed
for substantial office, some advisers claimed that he had seduced his brother’s wife
and that when he was in office in a rival state he had accepted bribes to arrange good
appointments. Emperor Gao questioned Wei Wuzhi, who agreed that the charges
were true. He acknowledged that Chen Ping was not a worthy man 賢人, but claimed
that he was capable 能. Emperor Gao approved, and Chen Ping became a loyal and
effective Chancellor of Han. See SJ 56:2055, HS 40:2041, and Loewe, QHX, 35–37.
105
SGZ 1:44; Kroll, “Portraits,” 18. The Western date is 31 January 215.
106
On Chen Ping see note 104 above. During the Warring States period, the bril-
liant strategist Su Qin offered his services to many states, and was widely suspected of
double-dealing. He nonetheless served his masters well: SJ 69:2241–66; Nienhauser,
GSR VII, 97–111.
sufficient skill to share in government or hold command of troops. Let

each [of my officers] nominate any such man that he knows, so that
none are passed over.107
Such exhortations are in clear contrast to the ideals of the recent past.
Most candidates for commissioned office under Later Han had been
nominated as “Filial and Incorrupt,” or endowed with similar attributes,
and even if such claims had been no more than a matter of form, Cao
Cao’s approach was clearly different. Ability, skill and capacity were
the essential criteria, and his repeated requests for nominations of
competent people reflect the difficulty of finding men to serve a frag-
ile state emerging from but still beset by warfare. I have suggested that
the early form of the jiupin zhongzheng system, designed to provide a
supply of suitable officials, may be dated to about 208.108 The procla-
mation of 210 and those which followed were intended to encourage
responsible officials, whether in local or central government, to keep
an open mind about the background and previous experience of their
nominees. Since the supply of competent men was limited, it made no
sense to be unduly scrupulous.
Perhaps the most important statement is at the end of the first proc-
lamation: “When I have such men, I can use them.” Cao Cao was
confident he could bend his officers to his will, so that they served the
public good and not their personal interests, and he was prepared to
do so by his own authority and by formal structures of supervision.
One should not underestimate the difficulty faced by a warlord in
dealing with his subordinates, particularly those who held military
command. While such men were courageous—and they needed to
be—they were often flamboyant by nature, and the nature of leader-
ship required by conditions of civil war was liable to encourage their
potential lack of discipline.109 In the rival state of Wu, for example, Sun
Quan’s generals Gan Ning and He Qi were celebrated for ostentatious
display, and there were endemic rivalries and quarrels.110 Sun Quan
107
SGZ 1:49–50 PC quoting Wei shu; Kroll, “Portraits,” 19.
108
109
See Chapter Four at 186.
110
See, for example, the biographies of Gan Ning and He Qi, at SGZ Wu 10:1292–95
and 15:1380, discussed by deC, Generals of the South, 517–521.
370 chapter eight
kept a measure of control, Liu Bei had some lapses of discipline,111 but
Cao Cao’s regime appears to have been both stricter and more effec-
tive. Even as early as 200, when the situation was precarious and in a
state of flux, the unity of his staff was in evident contrast to the camp
of Yuan Shao, whose advisers and senior commanders formed factions
of varying alliance and opposition; and it was the defection of Xu You
after a quarrel with Shen Pei that gave Cao Cao his critical opportunity
at Guandu.
Though Guo Jia attributed Cao Cao’s sixth superiority to his straight-
forward dealing with subordinates, there was a limit to his tolerance
for undue familiarity or lack of respect. Some time after the victory at
Guandu, in 204 or 205, Xu You addressed him in a public assembly:
using Cao Cao’s childhood name, he observed that, “But for me, you
would never have taken Ji province.” Cao Cao laughed and agreed, but
he was privately angered by the claim to intimacy, and he had Xu You
killed soon afterwards.112
In somewhat similar fashion, apart from his niggling criticisms
from a conservative standpoint, Kong Rong made himself particularly
unpopular with Cao Cao through his superior knowledge of the clas-
sics. It is said that when Cao Pi took the Lady Zhen, wife of Yuan
Xi, for himself, Kong Rong claimed that the Classic of History told
how King Wu of Zhou gave the concubine of his defeated enemy the
king of Shang/Yin to his brother the Duke of Zhou. Because of Kong
Rong’s reputation for scholarship, Cao Cao initially believed him, but
later found that history and tradition held King Wu had killed the
woman. Kong Rong explained that he was simply reinterpreting the
past to match the present: the parallel was not complimentary.113 As
Kong Rong also ridiculed Cao Cao’s victory over the Wuhuan, criti-
111
Most notably, when Liu Bei captured Liu Zhang’s capital of Chengdu in 214, he
allowed his men free reign to plunder, and was then embarrassed by a lack of funds
in the treasury: SGZ 9:982 PC quoting Lingling xianxian zhuan, and ZZTJ 67:2130;
112
SGZ 12:373 PC quoting Wei lue. The text at this point has the characters Moujia
某甲 “So-and-so:” Yu Huan, author of Wei lue, evidently respected the taboo on Cao
Cao’s name and did not record it.
Cao Cao’s regular style was Mengde 孟德, but the anonymous Cao Man zhuan says
that his childhood name (xiaozi 小字) was A’man 阿瞞: SGZ 1, 1 PC and Chapter
One at 26.
113
On Cao Pi’s marriage to the Lady Zhen, see Chapter Five at 218. Kong Rong’s
joke was contained in a letter to Cao Cao: HHS 70/60:2271 and SGZ 12:372 PC quot-
ing Weishi chunqiu.
cized his sumptuary laws and argued that he should withdraw to his
fief, Cao Cao was eventually forced to conclude that the embarrass-
ment of his witticisms and his eloquent opposition outweighed the
contumely which might follow his execution. So Kong Rong died.114
As well as Xu You and Kong Rong, Sanguo zhi claims that Lou
Gui, likewise a friend of Cao Cao’s youth, was executed for presuming
upon their past relationship. A clever adviser, Lou Gui had encouraged
Cao Cao at the time of Liu Zong’s surrender in Jing province, and later
distinguished himself in the north-western campaign of 211. He was
well rewarded, but when an unguarded and apparently disrespectful
remark was reported to Cao Cao he too was killed.115
The essential point, constantly in Cao Cao’s mind and in the
thoughts of his more astute companions, was that while a reputation
for open dealing was desirable, it could not be gained by excessive
informality or loss of dignity. That way led to a failure of authority,
and a man in Cao Cao’s position could not afford to ignore any show
of disrespect or abuse of favour. There was a definite, albeit undrawn,
line, and those who crossed it were in dangerous territory.
Aside from personal control of his senior subordinates, Cao Cao estab-
lished a strict system of supervision, notably through his appointment
of Cui Yan and Mao Jie to supervise recommendations and promo-
tions.116 Mao Jie’s biography claims that:
The men they recommended for appointment were all gentlemen of
purity and honesty. There were many with fine reputations who lacked
personal integrity; they gained no advancement.
Furthermore,
Though a minister had honour and favour, he dared not possess a bet-
ter carriage or finer raiment than the regulations allowed. When senior
officials came back from their posts they had dirty faces, shabby clothing
and rode in wood-carts, and when commanders of the army visited the
114
For Kong Rong’s comments about the campaign against the Wuhuan and about
restrictions on alcohol, see HHS 70/60:2272 and 2273 commentary quoting his col-
lected writings.
115
SGZ 12:370 and 374 PC quoting Wei lue and Wu shu.
On Lou Gui in the advance into Jing province, see Chapter Six at 265. In 211 Lou
Gui found a means to fortify Cao Cao’s bridgehead against Ma Chao and his fellows
before Huayin: note 17 to Chapter Seven.
116
See Chapter Six at 245.
372 chapter eight
administrative offices they wore court dress [i.e civilian clothing] and
came on foot.
It is said that Cao Cao sighed with admiration, and observed that:
If officials are like this, then the people of the empire will govern them-
selves; what more need I do? 117
Some time later, however, the alternative view was presented by He
Xia, who joined Cao Cao’s staff after the takeover of Jing province. He
argued that it was a mistake to force all men into the same moral strait-
jacket, and that Mao Jie and Cui Yan were taking policy to extremes:
The way things are now, any official who wears new clothes and rides in
a fine carriage is immediately suspected of corruption, while those who
pay no attention to their appearance and wear worn-out clothing and
furs are considered upright and pure. It has reached a point where your
officials must dirty their clothes and hide their carriages and fine robes,
while the highest members of the court or government sometimes bring
their own food and drink to the office.
It is said that Cao Cao was impressed by the criticism.118 The restric-
tions may have been eased slightly, while repeated proclamations
of 210, 214/215 and 217, cited above, discounted the emphasis on
personal morality at the expense of ability.119 Mao Jie and Cui Yan
retained their authority, however, and the threat of their sanctions
kept a degree of control over Cao Cao’s officers.
Opposition to such censors was predictable, and in 216 Cui Yan
was slandered to Cao Cao by his enemies and suffered death, while his
colleague Mao Jie was also disgraced.120 In their place, however, about
this time Cao Cao instituted a system of Examiners, also with power
to investigate officials’ conduct. The first men appointed to this office,
Lu Hong and Zhao Ta, were accused of corruption by the legal officer
Gao Rou, and though Cao Cao initially supported them they were later
117
The first and third passages of quotation come from the biography of Mao Jie at
SGZ 12:374, the second from Xianxian xingzhuang, quoted by PC to that text; ZZTJ
65:2079; deC, Establish Peace, 371.
118
SGZ 23:655–56, the biography of He Xia; ZZTJ 65:2099; deC, Establish Peace,
408–409. Sima Guang adds that Cao Cao approved this argument, though SGZ 23
does not say so specifically: Establish Peace, 409 note 15.
119
See above at 367–369.
120
SGZ 12:369 and 376–77, combined in ZZTJ 67:2144–46; deC, Establish Peace,
502–504. See also Chapter Nine at 415.
found guilty and executed.121 The office was nonetheless maintained

until about 250.122
Generally, therefore, Cao Cao maintained a strict government, with
an occasional show of leniency but frequent punishment. Sumptu-
ary regulations applied not only to those holding office, but to the
general public and to members of his own family, while extravagant
conduct was never tolerated. The saddest case is that of the Lady Cui,
niece of Cui Yan and wife of Cao Cao’s son Cao Zhi. Though Cui Yan
was known for his strict conduct, the Lady evidently had a different
approach, for she defied restrictions with a robe of embroidered silk.
One day about 218, however, Cao Cao himself caught sight of her
from one of the towers of the residence at Ye: she was sent back to her
family and ordered to kill herself.123
Through the second century AD, as the government of Later Han

appeared increasingly weak and corrupt, many thinkers sought ways
to halt the social and political decline which they saw about them. In
his Qianfu lun “Comments of a Recluse,” published about the middle
of the century, Wang Fu called for honest application of the law, with-
out concern for status or the influence of bribery, and wrote angrily
about the leniency of amnesties which allowed wicked men to escape
their just deserts:
Unless you have strict and enlightened decrees and governance, you will
not be able to break off their wrongdoing.124
And about the same time the younger Cui Shi, author of Simin yueling,125
argued in his essay Zheng lun “On Government” that there had been
121
SGZ 24:684, and 377 below.
There is no way to tell whether the office of Examiners (校事 jiaoshi) was estab-
lished before or after the fall of Cui Yan and Mao Jie: the appointment of Lu Hong
and Zhao Ta (of whom nothing further is known) may have been designed to supple-
ment the work of the other two, or perhaps to replace them. It is probable, however,
that the office was part of the structure of Cao Cao’s own state of Wei, and was not
subordinate to the Imperial Chancellor of Han.
122
SGZ 14:429–31.
123
SGZ 12:369 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu. It is possible the Lady Cui suffered for her
uncle‘s alleged guilt, described above and Chapter Nine at 418. The story is nonethe-
less shocking.
124
Pearson, Wang Fu, 166, also 84, and see Balazs/White, “Political Philosophy,”
204–205. Qianfu lun survives in several editions, and there is a summary in Wang Fu’s
biography at HHS 49/39:1630–43.
125
See note 3 to Chapter One and note 40 to Chapter Four. A leading writer of
Han who died about 170, Cui Shi left a quantity of material including inscriptions,
374 chapter eight
a steady decline in public morality and that the laws, already severe,
should be made even stricter.126
Some forty years later, in 205 the librarian Xun Yue presented his
Shenjian 申監 “Extended Reflections” to the puppet Emperor Xian.
A distant kinsman of Cao Cao’s advisers Xun Yu and Xun You, Xun
Yue compiled a chronicle of Former Han, and Shen jian sought to
emphasise ideal Confucian reform while calling for the restoration of
tradition and a balanced government under the authority of Han. Such
a conservative approach, however, was less well received and influen-
tial. As Ch’en Ch’i-yün has observed, Xun Yue “tended to find fault
with reality as such,” so his prescriptions had small relevance to the
situation of the time.127
Zhongchang Tong, already mentioned as a proponent of authoritar-
ian government, called similarly for the restoration of the firm penal
code of the past, but with provision for proper administration of the
law, and restriction of the death penalty to the most heinous crimes:
murder, rebellion and incest.128 All these writers were concerned at
the political and social damage caused by weak and mistakenly lenient
governments, and they called for firm laws, strictly administered. Cao
Cao was prepared to answer their call, and it was this aspect of his
regime that inspired Guo Jia’s claim of his superiority in good govern-
ment over Yuan Shao.
One immediate change in policy as Cao Cao took control of the
imperial government was the ending of amnesties. Amnesties had
varied in frequency, but under Emperor Ling from about 170 they
occurred almost annually, and no less than three were issued in the
turbulent year of 189—with minimal real benefit to the government
or the people.129 From 196, however, when Emperor Xian came under
memorials and historical essays. His biography is at HHS 52/42:1725–31, and the text
of Zheng lun is at 1725–29.
126
Balazs/White, “Political Philosophy,” 207–210, Ch’en, “Confucian, Legalist, and
Taoist Thought,” 788–789.
127
“Confucian, Legalist, and Taoist Thought,” 804–806 at 806; and see also Profes-
sor Ch’en’s works on Xun Yue and his philosophy, 114.
128
Balazs/White, “Political Philosophy,” 213–225 at 221, and above at 348.
129
On amnesties (赦 she) in general, see Hulsewé, Records of Han Law, 225–250,
and McKnight, Quality of Mercy, 12–36, also de Crespigny, Huan and Ling, 265 note 2,
and Establish Peace, 2. Amnesties clearly provided some general remission of punish-
ment throughout the empire, probably reducing the heaviest sentences by one degree,
Cao Cao’s control, no further grants were made, and it is very likely
that other forms of remission, such as sacrifice of noble rank, were
also eliminated.
The legal code of Han was already fierce, both in its penalties and
in its capacity to involve kinfolk and associates in the punishment of a
wrongdoer, and a frightening variety of tortures and degradation was
available to investigate a crime or to enhance the penalty.130 Despite
the urgings of Cui Shi and Zhongchang Tong, it was hardly necessary
for Cao Cao to make the system more harsh: if the law was adminis-
tered without favour or remission, it should be adequate for its pur-
pose. There was some debate, however, as to the law itself.
During the 190s the senior official Chen Ji had been with Lü Bu
but served Cao Cao’s interests, and after the destruction of Lü Bu he
became Minister Herald at the imperial court under Cao Cao’s con-
trol. In that office, Chen Ji put forward a proposal for the restoration
of the mutilating punishments of Former Han. Military affairs were
too urgent for the matter to be considered at that time, and Chen Ji
died soon afterwards, but some fifteen years later Cao Cao returned
to the question and asked Chen Ji’s son Chen Qun, now head of the
Censorate, to explain his father’s reasoning.131
Chen Qun’s argument reflects that presented by Cui Shi in Zheng
lun.132 Though Emperor Wen of Former Han was praised for ending
the punishment of amputating a hand or a foot, this apparent benev-
olence had been counter-balanced by the imposition of additional
strokes of the bastinado. This increase in flogging, amounting to hun-
dreds of strokes, was often enough to kill the criminal: so loss of a limb
was replaced by a most painful death. On the other hand, argued Chen
Qun, there were cases where mutilation became purely symbolic; so
and perhaps giving full pardon to minor offences or sentences whose time had been
largely served. Some are distinguished in the texts by the designation “great” (大 da)
but, as Hulsewé observes, a reference in the history must be accepted as a shorthand
for an edict giving details of the crimes and criminals were affected, and to what
degree; it is impossible to identify the significance of any one proclamation.
130
See, for example, Hulsewé, Records of Han Law, 103, 112 and 341 [translating
HS 23:1104], and his “Ch’in and Han Law,” 531–533.
131
The biography of Chen Qun is at SGZ 22:632–38. Chen Ji’s career is described
in HHS 62/52:2067–68l; but see further deC, LH3K, 68–69, citing a stele.
The account of the debate on mutilating punishments (肉刑 rouxing) is at SGZ
22:634, followed by ZZTJ 66:2124; deC, Establish Peace, 458–461.
132
Balazs/White, “Political Philosophy,” 209, citing HHS 52/42:1729 and quoting
the comments of Sima Guang in ZZTJ 53:1725–26.
376 chapter eight
that a man who had crippled another might suffer no more than the
cutting of his hair and shaving of his beard. Proper application of the
penalty would have thieves and robbers lose their hands and feet as a
warning to others; and at the same time, by providing a degree of flex-
ibility, it would reduce the incidence of capital punishment.133
Chen Qun was endorsed by Cao Cao’s Grand Judge Zhong Yao,134
but received no wider support, and the question was again shelved on
grounds of the continuing military emergency. Later, at the end of 214,
Cao Cao established a Department of Justice in his office as Chancel-
lor, with responsibility for advice on legal policy, and particularly on
matters concerning the army. This was a new venture, not matched
in the former structure of Han, and the first head of the department,
Gao Rou, was soon called upon for an opinion on a case involving
desertion.135
A certain Song Jin, a musician in the garrison at Hefei facing Sun
Quan, had fled the army, leaving behind his wife, his mother and
two younger brothers. According to previous regulations, his wife
and children were liable for punishment, but other relatives were not
involved. Cao Cao, however, had extended the liability of relatives, and
the authorities at Hefei were prepared to execute all Song Jin’s kinfolk.
Gao Rou now argued that such severity could be counter-productive,
for the deserter’s comrades might fear that they too could be involved
and would also run away. On the contrary, he suggested that even
133
Though castration was applied for a time during Later Han as a substitute for
the death penalty, it was not one of the regular mutilating punishments, and it was
not revived at this time: note 18 to Chapter One.
On the severity and often fatal results of beatings, see Sanft, “Six of One, Two Dozen
of the Other,” especially 94–97.
134
Cao Cao had just lately established a system of ministries for his new state of
Wei: Chapter Nine at 394. The Grand Judge (大理 dali) of Wei was the equivalent of
the Minister of Justice (庭尉 tingwei) under Han.
135
The biography of Gao Rou is at SGZ 24:682–90. A proclamation by Cao Cao
establishing his office is quoted at 683–84, and SGZ 1:44 has a parallel entry, express-
ing particular concern at the quality of the legal administration in the army. The two
texts differ, but they are very likely taken from a single, longer document. The citation
in SGZ 1 is dated to the twelfth month of the Chinese year, strictly the beginning of
Western 215: this is close in time to another of Cao Cao’s proclamations on the selec-
tion of officers, and the two may have been issued on the same day: 368 above.
The new “Department of Justice” was called licao 理曹. During Later Han, each of
the Excellencies had been assisted by a facao 法曹, but we are told that those “Depart-
ments of the Laws” were chiefly concerned with the imperial posting service: HHS
114/24:3559; Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 13–17. Legal policy under Han was primar-
ily in the hands of the Minister of Justice (tingwei), as Chen Zhong in note 18 to
Chapter One.
the wife and children of a deserter should be spared, as this would

give the man reason to return. Cao Cao accepted this, at least insofar
as he spared the mother and brothers of the escapee, and though the
wife may still have suffered for her husband’s crime, the more lenient
policy saved many lives.136
Gao Rou was transferred to senior appointment as Administrator of
Yingchuan, but later returned to court as head of the Department of
Law, which was probably the Department of Justice under a new guise
and was evidently regarded as an important position.137 He attacked
the arbitrary authority and personal corruption of the newly-appointed
Examiners Lu Hong and Zhao Ta, and although Cao Cao initially sup-
ported his agents he was later compelled to recognise their wrongdo-
ing.138 Gao Rou went on to further legal and censorial appointments,
and became an Excellency in the imperial government of Wei.
In 203, as Cao Cao was still south of the Yellow River facing the sons
of Yuan Shao, and before he had established any strong position in
the north, he issued a proclamation deploring the breakdown of edu-
cation and good morality after fifteen years of civil war, and giving
orders for the establishment of schools. There should be one in each
district of five hundred households, with a scholar of suitable quality
to give instruction in the Confucian virtues.139 The matter is not men-
tioned specifically again, but it is probable that the policy was extended
over all the territories Cao Cao acquired. It cannot have been perfectly
effective, but it was useful propaganda, and such local education would
serve to encourage the loyalty of gentlemen of family and provide a
source of recruitment for administration in the future.
The destruction of Luoyang at the time of Dong Zhuo marked the
end of the Imperial University of Han, and the great imperial librar-
ies suffered a similar fate. Hou Han shu tells how Luoyang was plun-
dered as the capital was transferred to Chang’an in 190, and many
manuscripts written on silk were made into curtains or purses. The
minister Wang Yun rescued some more substantial works and sent
136
The case of Song Jin and his family is recorded at SGZ 24:684; it is summarised
by ZZTJ 67:2134; deC, Establish Peace, 482.
137
Under Later Han, the rank salary of a department head had been Equivalent to
300 shi, while that of a commandery Administrator was 2000 shi. Since there is no
suggestion that Gao Rou had fallen from favour, we may assume that his new office
and responsibilities were comparable.
138
See above at 373.
139
SGZ 1:24; Kroll, “Portraits,” 27, cited in Chapter Five at 212.
378 chapter eight
them to Chang’an in seventy wagons, but half again were abandoned

on the road and almost all those which arrived were burnt or lost in
the turmoil of the following years.140
The situation of the empire was far too precarious for any attempt to
restore the University—that was eventually done by Cao Pi in 224141—
but Cao Cao did begin a new collection of books. The largest library in
private hands had been that of the great scholar Cai Yong, who is said
to have possessed some four thousand volumes. Cai Yong bequeathed
his books to Wang Can, who presumably took a quantity with him to
refuge in Jing province and then back to the north under Cao Cao.
It is said that Cao Cao had been able to make copies of some books
through the recollection of the Lady Cai Yan, daughter of Cai Yong,142
and it is very probable that he had those in Wang Can’s possession
copied too. We have been told, moreover, that Liu Biao, a patron of
scholarship, arranged a “Later Edition” of the classics, with new and
authoritative commentaries,143 and we may assume that his collection
was taken over when Cao Cao occupied Jing province, while the fact
that the philosopher Xun Yue was appointed Custodian of the Private
Library at Xu city indicates that some works had been preserved or
resurrected in one form or another, and these would also have been
available for copying.144
A few years later, as Cao Pi took the imperial throne at the end of
220, he commissioned the vast project Huang lan “Imperial Readings,”
a comprehensive edition of the classics and their commentaries. The
work was carried out a group of scholars led by Wang Xiang and Wei
Dan, successive Custodians of the Private Library, and was probably
completed before Cao Pi died in 226: the final compendium amounted
to more than forty sections and eight million characters.145 While this
was not formally Cao Cao’s achievement, the reconstruction of classi-
cal scholarship which it represented was surely based upon his interest
and energy as a collector.
140
HHS 79/69A:2548; Kroll, 26.
141
SGZ 2:84 and 13:420–21.
142
See note 29 above.
143
SGZ 6:212; deC, “Scholars and Rulers,” 72, and Chapter Six at 261.
144
HHS 62/52:2058. It is said that for a time Emperor Xian used Xun Yue as a
source of independent advice and information, but Cao Cao ensured that he had no
practical effect.
145
On Huang lan, see SGZ 2:88 and deC, “Scholars and Rulers,” 73–74. Being a
collection and edition of other works, the encyclopaedic work was subject to constant
quotation without attribution; only a few fragments can now be identified.
One aspect of Cao Cao’s opinions in this regard is his approach

to calligraphy. Writing about the middle of the third century, and
perhaps with some tradition in his favour, the scholar official Zhang
Hua of Jin claimed that Cao Cao disliked all the great specialists in
the informal cao shu Grass Script at the end of Han: Zhang Zhi, his
brother Zhang Chang, and Cui Shi.146 This could be true. Zhong Yao,
however, known for his ability in the kai shu Standard Script, became
one of Cao Cao’s leading officials, Ruan Yu was a confidential clerk,
while Cao Cao also made his peace with Liang Gu; all were celebrated
calligraphers in more regular styles. It would appear, therefore, that
Cao Cao was not opposed to calligraphy per se, but he may have disap-
proved of the eccentric and unduly artistic style of writing which was
developing at this time.147
A long tradition of Han, which owed a good deal to the Confucian

ideal of the sage ruler, regarded the emperor as a patron of learning,
deeply involved with scholarship. The maintenance of the great impe-
rial libraries, the Imperial University, and the occasional academic
conference, such as the celebrated Discussions of the White Tiger Hall
arranged by Emperor Zhang, demonstrated this concern and added to
the legitimacy of the dynasty.148 In the circumstances of the time, there
was no question of Cao Cao arranging a major symposium, but the
authority of his regime benefited from the manner in which he was
able to attract scholars and philosophers to his court at Ye city.
As a poet in his own right, moreover, whose work surely received
wide circulation, Cao Cao himself could expect recognition and a
degree of respect from the gentlemen of the empire, and the later
146
SGZ 1:54 PC, quoting Bowu zhi “Record of a Myriad Things” by Zhang Hua.
Biographies of Zhang Zhi and Zhang Chang are at HHS 65/55:2144; the biography of
Cui Shi is at HHS 52/42:1725–31. Zhang Hua also mentions Cui Shi’s father Cui Yuan,
who was certainly an expert in Grass Script, but who died before Cao Cao was born;
his biography is at HHS 52/42: 1722–24.
147
On Zhong Yao, see Chapter Three at 106; on Ruan Yu see 340 above; on Liang
Gu, see note 60 to Chapter One.
During the 170s Emperor Ling established a School at the Gate of the Vast Capital,
with a syllabus emphasising calligraphy and the composition of fu rhapsodies. This
new venture offered a route into the commissioned civil service, but it was naturally
opposed by regular scholar-officials, and it disappeared at the death of its imperial
patron: deC, Huan and Ling, 137 and 145, “Scholars and Rulers,” 72, and “Recruitment
Revisited,” 38–39. Cao Cao’s attitude probably reflects the conservative opinion.
148
This matter is discussed generally by deC, “Scholars and Rulers” with the debates
in the White Tiger Hall at 63–64. For details, see Tjan, White Tiger Hall.
380 chapter eight
achievement of his sons, notably Cao Zhi, added to this. By the year
210, even as warfare continued on his frontiers, Cao Cao had already
established a brilliant court, and commenced a building program to
embellish Ye city. For the greatest man in China, this was appropri-
ate and expected, though his restrictions against extravagance were a
notable contrast to the great families which had formerly dominated
the court of Han.149 Such a combination of private restraint, public
display and intellectual energy was excellent politics; in Cao Cao’s case
it may have been genuine.
149
The extravagance and arrogance of great families such as the Dou in the time of
Emperor He and the Liang under Emperors Shun and Huan are a matter of legend,
supported by historical records. See, for example, deC, LH3K, sub Dou Xian, Liang Ji
and the Lady Sun Shou.
CHAPTER NINE
TENSIONS OF LOYALTY 210–217
Trappings of power
Imperial consorts
Women and children
A question of succession
217: the year of the plague
Chronology
210 winter: Cao Cao builds the Bronze Bird Terrace at Ye

1 Jan 211: Cao Cao publishes his Apologia
211 spring: Cao Pi is named Associate to Cao Cao as Chancellor; he
is left in charge at
Ye city as Cao Cao campaigns in the northwest
212 winter: Dong Zhao’s proposal, that Cao Cao be made a Duke
and receive the Nine Distinctions, is opposed by Xun Yu;
death of Xun Yu
213 spring: Cao Cao reorganises the provinces of Han
summer: Cao Cao is enfeoffed as Duke of Wei and receives the
Nine Distinctions
autumn: official altars and an ancestral temple are established
for the state of Wei; three of Cao Cao’s daughters enter the
imperial harem
winter: Ministries and a Secretariat are established for the state
of Wei
214 spring: Cao Cao is granted rank above the kings of Han
autumn: Cao Zhi is left in charge of Ye city as Cao Cao attacks
Sun Quan
winter: Cao Cao kills the Empress Fu and two imperial children
215 Cao Cao’s daughter the Lady Jie become Empress
216 summer: Cao Cao is enfeoffed as King of Wei
217 Cao Cao is granted banners, flags and imperial insignia
winter: Cao Pi is appointed Heir to the kingdom of Wei
In this year there is a great plague
382 chapter nine
Chapter Seven discusses the campaigns by which Cao Cao consoli-

dated his power in the north after the set-back at the Red Cliffs on
the middle Yangzi, while Chapter Eight considers the nature of his
government and the court which he established at his headquarters in
Ye city. Formally speaking, Cao Cao’s power came from his appoint-
ment as Imperial Chancellor of Han, the position which he took early
in 208; his Apologia, issued in 210, affirmed his loyalty and his concern
to act as a servant of the imperial house, restoring its lost authority
and bringing peace to the nation.
Almost inevitably, however, though Cao Cao renounced some fiefs,
his military success and his dominance of the government meant that
he was encouraged and expected to receive special recognition. Within
a few years he had taken titles for himself, not just as a marquis, but as
duke and then as king, and he received honours comparable to those
of the great usurper Wang Mang at the end of Former Han. By doing
so, as the Apologia had foreshadowed, he sought to confirm his posi-
tion and that of his family for the future; but he also raised questions
about his final ambitions, and he tested the faith of those followers
who still retained a sense of loyalty to Han.
The trappings of power
In his Apologia, published as a proclamation in the winter of 210/211,

Cao Cao argued that his ultimate aim was to restore the authority
of the Han dynasty throughout its fallen empire, and that he sought
only security for himself and his family. In a show of self-restraint, he
relinquished three of the four counties he had acquired as fiefs, with
two-thirds of his former revenue.
At the same time, however, even as he reduced his own benefits in
this way, Cao Cao arranged enfeoffment for three of his sons, and a
few weeks later Cao Zhi, Cao Ju and Cao Lin each received the income
from five thousand households, a combined amount almost as great as
that which Cao Cao had given up. The eldest son, Cao Pi, was granted
no fief, but he was appointed a General of the Household and named
as Cao Cao’s chief Associate: during the autumn of that year he held
formal power at Ye city as Cao Cao led his army against the warlords
of the northwest.
Early in 212, moreover, as Cao Cao returned in triumph from
his victory at Huayin and the conquest of the northwest, the puppet
tensions of loyalty 210–217 383
Emperor Xian awarded him the first in a series of special honours: the
right to enter court without announcing himself and without hasten-
ing step, and the right to wear shoes and carry a sword in the imperial
presence. Precedent for this were favours granted to Xiao He, chief
minister to the founding Emperor Gao of Former Han, and later to
the scholar Bao Xian, former tutor to Emperor Ming of Later Han.
Perhaps more significantly, similar privileges had been granted in 145
to the General-in-Chief Liang Ji, who dominated the imperial court,
and in 189 the usurper Dong Zhuo had taken them for himself.1
All these cases, particularly those of Xiao He and Bao Xian, related
to the conduct and status of a minister at court, and in that regard Cao
Cao was being treated as no more than an especially worthy subject of
Han. Towards the end of that year, however, a more substantial move
was proposed.
The initiator was Dong Zhao, who had earlier served as Cao Cao’s
agent at the imperial court as it returned to Luoyang in 196, and aided
him to bring the emperor under his control at Xu city. He had since
held a number of administrative positions, and he was rewarded with
enfeoffment for his work on the canals which brought supplies for the
northern campaign of 206/207. He was now a senior member of Cao
Cao’s staff as Imperial Chancellor.2
After his success in the northwest, Cao Cao planned to move against
Sun Quan across the Yangzi in the southeast, and in the winter of 212
he led his army from Ye city. He would naturally pass close to Xu, the
nominal imperial capital, and it was probably at this time that Dong
Zhao made two suggestions: that the noble ranks of the empire should
be changed to revive the title of Duke; and that Cao Cao should be
awarded the Nine Distinctions.
It was believed that in ancient times there had been five ranks of
nobility under the High King (wang). The first two of these were gong
“dukes” and hou “marquises,” followed by bo “earls,” zi “viscounts,”
1
On the award to Cao Cao, see SGZ 1:36. On Xiao He, see Loewe, QHX, 603–
605, and on his privileges SJ 53:2016 and HS 39:2009; Watson, Records I, 94. On the
awards to Bao Xian, Liang Ji and Dong Zhuo, see HHS 79/69:2570, 34/24:1183 and
72/62:2325.
2
Dong Zhao had been Libationer in Cao Cao’s office as Excellency of Works, and
was presumably transferred to an equivalent position when Cao Cao became Chancel-
lor early in 208. His biography is in SGZ 14.
384 chapter nine
and nan “barons.”3 The Han dynasty had allowed members of the
imperial house to hold title as king, but had otherwise used only the
title of marquis, except for the notional descendants of the ancient
dynasties of Shang and Zhou, who were honoured as dukes. Bo, zi and
nan were not used, while gong more commonly described the Three
Excellencies (san gong), heads of the imperial bureaucracy, whose
position was high but neither life-long nor hereditary.4
Dong Zhao’s chief purpose was not so much to restore the system of
a legendary past but rather to allow Cao Cao to claim an exceptional
rank within the nobility: lower than a king but higher than a marquis.
Strictly speaking, the Distinctions were a separate matter, but Dong
Zhao put the proposal forward at the same time, and he had the sup-
port of senior colleagues.5
The Nine Distinctions were augmentations of honour whose ori-
gins could be traced at least to the Zhou period. Their first appear-
ance under Han was in 5 AD, when the future usurper Wang Mang
had them awarded to himself.6 They had not been granted in full by
Later Han, but they were discussed and codified by the conference at
the White Tiger Hall in 79, whose conclusions are recorded by Bohu
tong.7 Details varied slightly from one list to the next, but each award
was notionally associated with some civil or military achievement, and
3
公 gong, 侯 hou, 伯 bo, 子 zi and 男 nan. It is questionable, however, whether the
ancient Chinese recognised such a hierarchy.
4
Dubs, followed by Bielenstein, renders the phrase san gong 三公 as “Three Dukes,”
but I have avoided that terminology in order to avoid confusion with the hereditary
title.
5
Dong Zhao’s proposal to restore the feudal title of a duke is at 439–440, and the
award of the Nine Distinctions is raised at 440 PC quoting Xiandu chunqiu; ZZTJ
66:2115–19. The debate which followed is discussed in deC, Establish Peace, 438–449,
and “Question of Loyalty.”
6
HS 99A:4072–75; Dubs, HFHD III, 202–210, discussed further below.
7
On the conference held at Luoyang under the auspices of Emperor Zhang, which
largely confirmed the orthodoxy of New Text Confucianism, see Tjan, White Tiger
Hall, and deC, “Scholars and Rulers,” 63–64. At II, 504–509, Tjan translates the
account of the Distinctions in Bohu tong 20:8a-10b, which refers to Liwei han wen
jia, an apocryphal book of Rites [mistakenly claiming it as the Confucian classic] and
lists the awards and the achievements which earned them: Liwei han wen jia is also
cited by HHS 9:387 TC.
At I, 37–39, Tjan discusses early references to the Nine Distinctions, citing the
Shangshu dazhuan attributed to the scholar Fu Sheng of the third and second centu-
ries BC [Loewe, QHX, 107, and Shaughnessy in Early Chinese Texts, 381 and 385] and
the Hanshi waizhuan of Han Ying of the second century BC [QHX, 151, Hightower
in Early Chinese Texts, 125–128, and Dubs, HFHD III, 211 note 23.3]. Tjan discusses
the Distinctions further at I, 25–29, and presents a translation of the edict award-
a special liquor was given to those of personal virtue and good con-
duct. Individual items could be granted separately, and in 196 Yuan
Shao had received axes, bows and arrows and special guards,8 while we
have seen above how a ruler could grant other privileges to a worthy
minister. Tradition, precedent and theory, however, grouped all Nine
Distinctions into a single splendid array.
Cao Cao evidently accepted this initiative of Dong Zhao, and it
is probable that he hoped to call at Xu city and receive the honours
before he embarked on the campaign against Sun Quan. Unexpectedly,
however, when Dong Zhao wrote to Xun Yu, Director of the Imperial
Secretariat, extolling Cao Cao’s achievements in support of Han, Xun
Yu raised objections. The full text of his letter has not been preserved,
but his biographies present summaries which echo Cao Cao’s Apologia
of two years earlier:
Lord Cao originally raised loyal troops to save the dynasty and give
peace to the nation. He has kept faith with loyalty and honesty, and has
maintained his honour by withdrawing and yielding.
A true gentleman shows his love for others by giving virtuous advice,
so I must speak out now: we should not act like this.9
As head of the Secretariat, Xun Yu could refuse to prepare the nec-
essary edict, though such obstruction was unlikely to be maintained
for long against Cao Cao’s control of the puppet court. More signifi-
cantly, however, he was one of Cao Cao’s oldest allies, who had shown
utmost loyalty at the time of crisis against Lü Bu in 194, and he had
been a reliable and effective adviser ever since. Opposition from such
a quarter was surely unexpected, and also highly embarrassing: though
we are told the correspondence was kept secret, we are also told that
Dong Zhao had canvassed support for the project among others of
Cao Cao’s officers, so Xun Yu’s intervention either became known or,
at the very least, caused an awkward hiatus in the program. When the
ing them to Cao Cao in 213. This text, and others dealing with the Distinctions, are
discussed below.
8
Chapter Two at 89, and above at 383.
9
Dong Zhao’s letter to Xun Yu is in SGZ 14:440 PC quoting Xiandi chunqiu. Xun
Yu’s biographies, at SGZ 10:317 and HHS 70/60:2290, vary slightly in the texts of the
summaries, but the argument is identical. Sima Guang follows the version of SGZ 10:
386 chapter nine
historians say that Cao Cao was upset, it is probably a mild description
of his feelings.10
Cao Cao’s response was swift. As he led his army towards the Huai,
he sent a request that Xun Yu attend his headquarters “to encourage
the army,” Xun Yu duly arrived at Qiao, the base for operations against
Sun Quan, and Cao Cao named him Palace Attendant and Household
Counsellor, bearing the Staff of Authority, and Adviser to the Army
of the Imperial Chancellor. The new appointments were announced in
most complimentary terms, and they were indeed fine positions in the
official system of Han: a Palace Attendant held the highest status, with
personal access to the emperor, Household Counsellors were his most
senior advisers, and the Staff of Authority gave broad authority for
independent action. They lacked, however, the special influence of the
head of the Secretariat, a post which was formally lower in rank but
which had developed into a central position in the government. The
fourth appointment, moreover, Adviser to the Army of the Chancel-
lor, removed Xun Yu from his former office and placed him directly
under Cao Cao’s control. Hereafter he had no independent standing.
Xun Yu accompanied the army to the southeast, but towards the
end of the year, at Shouchun on the Huai, he became seriously ill and
was left behind. Cao Cao’s troops advanced to the Yangzi, but failed to
gain a crossing, and in the spring of 213 they turned back. By the time
Cao Cao reached Shouchun once more, Xun Yu was dead.
Xun Yu was fifty years old, and he may have died of natural causes:
the damp air of the river lands in the southeast was not healthy even
in winter, and he was obviously under strain from the rift with Cao
Cao. There are also claims that he killed himself or even that he was
murdered. The Weishi chunqiu of Sun Sheng, a scholar-official of the
fourth century with moral principles, tells how Cao Cao refused Xun
Yu’s requests for a private conversation, but later came to his bed-
side with a dish of food; when the lid was lifted, however, the bowl
was empty, and Xun Yu, in despair, took poison.11 It was also claimed
that Cao Cao had ordered him to kill the Lady Fu Shou, Empress of
Emperor Xian, but Xun Yu could not bear to do it.12
10
SGZ 10 and HHS 70/60 say that Cao Cao 心不能平 “could not be easy in his
mind.” Summarising the position more directly, ZZTJ 66 has 不悦 “was not
pleased.”
11
SGZ 10:317 PC.
12
This tale was brought by a deserter to Sun Quan, who gave it wide publicity:
SGZ 10:319 PC quoting Xiandi chunqiu. DeC, “Question of Loyalty,” 46–47, discusses
The motives and true intentions of the two men are obscure and
remain uncertain. Later historians have debated whether Xun Yu suf-
fered for his loyalty to the idea of Han, and turned against Cao Cao
when he perceived the growth of his ambition—but had he acted as a
true gentleman or merely suffered from moral confusion?13 From Cao
Cao’s point of view, the whole affair was an unhappy one, and no mat-
ter his feelings it is doubtful he sought Xun Yu’s death. Certainly in
later years he praised Xun Yu and his cousin Xun You in the highest
terms, both for the quality and reliability of their advice and for the
steady determination with which they pressed their opinions.
When the emperor at Xu city learned of Xun Yu’s death he held
state ceremonies of mourning.14 One cannot be sure whether this was
courtesy to a long-serving officer or demonstrated a personal and
political alliance, but Xun Yu had been Director of the Secretariat for
more than fifteen years, and regardless of his connection to Cao Cao
it remained true that the court at Xu city, the imperial household,
and even the emperor himself, were potential sources of trouble and
opposition to Cao Cao’s government. If Xun Yu had become slightly
ambivalent in those surroundings, he was now replaced by Hua Xin, a
member of Cao Cao’s personal staff, who had no hesitation about his
loyalty and would very soon demonstrate it.15
Cao Cao remained in the southeast through much of the spring of

213, but then returned north and reached Ye city at the beginning
of summer. In the following month he visited the imperial capital,
and on 16 June he was enfeoffed as Duke of Wei and received the
Nine Distinctions. With Xun Yu gone, there was no opposition to the
grant, and after a lengthy and flowery preface, the edict firstly granted
him an extended fief covering ten commanderies in Ji province, then
another set of stories, which claim that Xun Yu concealed a plot by the empress against
Cao Cao; these last, however, appear anachronistic and most unlikely.
13
DeC, “Question of Loyalty,” 49–59, discusses the opinions of later historians and
commentators, including Chen Shou, Fan Ye and Pei Songzhi, compilers of the stan-
dard histories; Yuan Hong the fourth-century author of Hou Han ji; and Du Mu of the
ninth century, who composed a short essay on the question. Sima Guang, moreover,
included a special note in his Zizhi tongjian, comparing Xun Yu to the great minister
Guan Zhong, servant of the hegemon Duke Huan of Qi, who devoted himself not so
much to the reigning dynasty or to his own immediate master, but to the good of the
people of China as a whole: ZZTJ 66:2115–16; deC, Establish Peace, 440–442.
14
HHS 70/60:2290.
15
The biography of Hua Xin is at SGZ 13:401–06. On his dealings with the Empress
Fu, see 398 below.
388 chapter nine
confirmed his position as Imperial Chancellor, and then listed out his
rewards:16
Because you have regulated the rituals and the regulations, to guide the
people in carrying out their duties, so that each may fulfil his occupa-
tion in peace and none are uncertain or contumacious; for this reason
we award you a Great Carriage and a War Carriage, one of each, with
Two Black Stallions.
Because you have emphasised the basic concern [of agriculture], so
that farmers pay attention to their work, the supply of grain and silk
increases and our great heritage flourishes; for this reason we award you
a Robe and Cap of Honour, with Red Slippers to match.
Because you show respect for honesty and yielding, so that the people
attend to their conduct, young and old keeping proper ritual and high
and low maintaining harmony; for this reason we award you the Sus-
pended Musical Instruments and the Six Rows of Dancers.
Because you have extended good custom and reform, reaching to
every direction, so that people of distant regions are converted and the
people of China are flourishing; for this reason we award you the right
to [dwell behind] Vermilion Doors.
You have polished your intelligence and understanding and given
thought to our problems, you have given office to the talented and
employed worthy men, ensuring that only the best shall be promoted;
for this reason we award you the right to [ascend by] an Inner Staircase.
Because you have maintained balance in the state, restraining emotion
and holding to the middle way, so that even the slightest fault is rejected;
for this reason we award you three hundred guards Rapid as Tigers.
Because you have shown respect for the penal code endorsed by
Heaven, and have manifested it to evil-doers, so that every criminal or
person who offends the law receives his just punishment; for this reason
we award you one Ceremonial Axe and one Battleaxe.
Because you gaze across the eight directions with the stance of a
dragon and the ferocity of a tiger, taking and punishing those who rebel
against good order and driving them away; for this reason we award you
one Scarlet Bow with a hundred Scarlet Arrows, and ten Black Bows
with a thousand Black Arrows.
Because you have based your conduct upon grace and respectfulness,
with the virtues of filial piety and friendship, being intelligent and hon-
est, generous and honourable, fully in accordance with our wishes; for
this reason we award you one goblet of the Black-Millet Herb-Flavoured
Liquor, with a Libation Cup of Jade to accompany it.
16
The edict is preserved at SGZ 1:37–39; Tjan, White Tiger Hall I, 26–27. The pas-
sage listing the Nine Distinctions is summarised by ZZTJ 66:2119–20; deC, Establish
Peace, 449.
Despite centuries of scholarly attention during Han, and the award to

Wang Mang in 5 AD, no firm consensus had been reached on what
the Distinctions should be and the reasons they should be awarded;
the edict for Wang Mang, indeed, simply lists them out and makes
no attempt to justify them by virtue or achievement.17 The confer-
ence at the White Tiger Hall of 79 followed the list preserved by Han-
shi waizhuan from the second century BC, not that of Wang Mang,18
and some hundred years later the scholar-official Ying Shao prepared
another list of Distinctions:19 it varies from Hanshi waizhuan only in
the order of the items, but again fails to identify the relevant merits.
The only source to do this is Bohu tong, which adds a more detailed
passage after its initial list and summary of justifications, enlarging the
reference to the Black Millet Liquor to describe the accompanying Jade
Libation Cup; the two together demonstrate not only the virtue of the
recipient but also his spiritual power.
The edict of award to Cao Cao largely follows Bohu tong, including
the Jade Cup, though it is notable that whereas Bohu tong ascribes
the award of Vermilion Doors to the achievement of increasing the
population, Cao Cao’s edict praises him for extending the cultural
and moral influence of Chinese civilisation. In 221 Cao Cao’s son and
successor Cao Pi would award the Nine Distinctions to Sun Quan,
and the pattern naturally followed Cao Cao’s, with adaptation for Sun
Quan’s position in the southeast, and some slight variation in details
of the awards. In general terms, behind the rhetoric, there is a con-
nection between the various virtues and achievements and the grants
17
HS 99A:4072–75; Dubs, HFHD III, 202–210. In his note 23.3 Dubs cites Hanshi
waizhuan and Liwei han wen jia [see note 7 above] and derivative texts; those lists
basically agree, but Wang Mang’s is slightly different. In addition, commentary at HS
6:168 contains a quotation from the Shangshu dazhuan [also note 7 above], which
says that when an official made three successful recommendations for appointment,
he could be rewarded with carriages, robes, or bows and arrows.
The list of awards received by Wang Mang omits the Musical Instruments and
Dancers, but has instead Two Green Jade Tablets for the Nine Conferments 九命青
玉珪二, while there are also variations in terminology and some extras: the award of
guards Rapid as Tigers, for example, is accompanied by the right to establish a variety
of clan offices and household officials; the carriages have banners and special clothing;
and where other lists mention raiment in general terms, Wang Mang’s edict specifies
aprons and tunics, together with an ornamented scabbard, shoes and a hat.
18
Tjan, White Tiger Hall II, 504–509, and see note 7 above.
19
Ying Shao died about 200, and his list is preserved in commentary to the Annals
of Emperor Wu, HS 6:168. It does not appear in the present-day text of his Fengsu
tongyi.
390 chapter nine
which match them: peaceful government is rewarded by Carriages

and Horses; prosperous government by Robes of Honour; reform and
ceremony by Musical Instruments; the extension of moral civilisation
by Vermilion Doors; and the appointment of good officials by the
Inner Staircase. Thereafter, the sixth, seventh and eighth Distinctions
are granted for different aspects of military prowess; and finally per-
sonal virtue is rewarded with the Ceremonial Liquor and the Libation
Cup.20
As we have seen, the same edict which awarded Cao Cao the Nine Dis-
tinctions also enfeoffed him as Duke of Wei.21 This was part of Dong
Zhao’s original proposal, though there is no further mention of the
lower ranks bo, zi or nan. The fief territory, however, is extraordinary:
ten commanderies occupying the bulk of the North China plain; even
royal fiefs under Han had controlled no more than a single command-
ery unit, and that generally a small one.22
Even before this, through an edict issued in the spring of 213 Cao
Cao had re-arranged the provinces of the empire.23 You and Bing,
on the northern frontier, were incorporated into Ji province together
with the eastern part of Sili, former capital commandery of Han, while
Liang in the northwest was combined with the western part of Sili
to form a new Yong province.24 In the far south, Jiao province was
20
SGZ Wu 2:1122; deC, Generals of the South, 415–417.
21
The Annals of HHS 9:387, not unreasonably, say that Cao Cao took the ducal
position for himself. Immediately afterwards, the Annals record the inauspicious por-
tent of heavy rain and flooding. This pattern is followed by Sima Guang in ZZTJ
66:2119–20; deC, Establish Peace, 449.
Soon afterwards, moreover, at the time Cao Cao is given rank above the kings of
Han, ZZTJ 67:2126 records drought in the fourth month and floods in the fifth month:
in this case, the phenomena are recorded by HHS 9:387, but that text does not men-
tion Cao Cao’s promotion, which appears only in SGZ 1:43; the juxtaposition is Sima
Guang’s own. His indirect comment, however, does not accompany Cao Cao’s later
self-promotions.
22
The ten commanderies were Hedong, Henei, Wei, Zhao, Zhongshan, Changshan,
Julu, Anping, Ganling and Pingyuan.
23
HHS 9:387 and SGZ 1:37, also ZZTJ 66:2118; deC, Establish Peace, 446. In note
3 to that translation I argue that although the texts indicate the change was made in
the first month, Cao Cao was at that time engaged against Sun Quan on the Yangzi,
and it is more probable that the edict was issued in the third month, when he was
returning to Ye and would have passed by Xu city. For the allocation of commandery
units within the new arrangement, I follow the reconstruction of Wu Zengjin, Sanguo
junxian biao, with commentary by Yang Shoujing, supported by Wang Xianqian in
HHSJJ 109/19.
24
The administrative geography of the northwest at the end of Han is confusing.
The commanderies west of the Yellow River, along the present-day Gansu corridor
divided, and the two parts were attached to Jing and Yi provinces at
their immediate north; this last, however, cannot have been effective,
for the government of Cao Cao and his puppet court of Han had no
practical authority in that region.25
The text of Hou Han shu claims that the purpose of the reform was
to reduce the current fourteen provinces to the classical nine recorded
in the Yu gong “Tribute of Yu” chapter of Shi jing. Though the number
was the same, however, the new units did not fully match that clas-
sical tradition,26 and the chief effect of the arrangement was to vastly
increase the size of Ji province, centre of Cao Cao’s power. Not only
did it now cover the whole of the northern frontier, from the terri-
tory of the Gongsun warlords in Manchuria to the Ordos loop of the
Yellow River, but it also stretched south into Hedong and Henei and
occupied all the plain north of the Yellow River.
Duke of Wei, Imperial Chancellor, Governor of extended Ji province

and holder of the Nine Distinctions and other privileges; here is a con-
siderable change from the restrained and sensitive Apologia which Cao
Cao had published just three years earlier. He had certainly been suc-
cessful against the warlords of the northwest, but Sun Quan remained
well defended on the lower Yangzi, Liu Bei was in the process of
acquiring Yi province to add to his control of the middle Yangzi and
beyond modern Lanzhou, had been isolated by the troubles with Han Sui and other
rebels of the region, and in 194 they were separated from Liang province and identi-
fied as a new Yong province: HHS 9:376.
Cao Cao is now reuniting the territory of the former Liang province of Later Han,
but adds the western part of Sili, the capital province, and renames the whole as Yong
province.
In 220, moreover, Cao Cao’s son and successor Cao Pi divided the region once
more but reversed the earlier nomenclature, calling the western half [the Gansu cor-
ridor] Liang province and the eastern part Yong: SGZ 15:474.
On these changes and those at commandery level, see JS 14:432–34; Sanguo junx-
ian biao, 2888–2903, deC, Establish Peace, 136–137, and Northern Frontier, 498–499
note 58.
25
Some time after 200 Cao Cao had sought to gain a position in that region by
appointing Zhang Jin as Inspector, but Zhang Jin was killed by rebels, and after 208
control of the territory was divided between the local warlord Shi Xie, based on the
Red River in present-day Vietnam, and Sun Quan’s officer Bu Zhi in the Pearl River
delta: above at 275–276. Following the death of Shi Xie, Sun Quan acquired authority
over the whole territory; and from time to time he divided Jiao into two parts, east
and west of Hepu: e.g. deC, Generals of the South, 445.
26
Legge, Classics III, 92–128. Yu gong lists a Liang 梁 province, but the Liang 涼
province of Han is written with a different character, and in any case does not appear
here; while Yi 益 province, which was used by Han and is retained at this time, was
not a unit of the Yu gong system.
392 chapter nine
Map 19. The provinces arranged by Cao Cao 213

its southern basin, and even Zhang Lu in Hanzhong still had hope of
independence behind the barrier of the Qin Ling. Within his territory,
on the other hand, Cao Cao’s power was uncontested, so what was
the point of these additional signs of imperial favour? And when the
empire was not yet restored, how could he justify the elaborate praise
and claims of achievement which accompanied the award of the Nine
Distinctions? Who, indeed, was his audience? The ceremonies would
surely not impress his enemies, and one must suspect that many of
his followers shared the feelings of Xun Yu: that the timing was inap-
propriate, and the achievements of the past were rather marred than
enhanced by such grasping for superfluous insignia.
Cao Cao, however, was determined to build a state for himself and
his successors which would be strong enough to withstand even the
hostility of a future and more powerful ruler. Though little love was
lost between Emperor Xian and his mighty subject, Cao Cao had no
difficulty in coping with that from his position as Imperial Chancellor
and military commander. For the sake of his family, however, he now
sought to create a position within the empire which would depend not
merely upon his formal status, but which would survive in the longer
term. This was a very different program to what he had presented in
his Apologia, but once embarked upon the course of action he would
follow it through.
In all this, however, we need not assume that Cao Cao intended
to replace the dynasty of Han with his own. He continued to keep
the emperor under control, and would interfere even further into his
already humiliating position, but the prestige of Han was useful, the
authority of the dynasty served to justify any attack on his rivals, and
there was yet no good reason to make such a break—four hundred
years of tradition were not easily cast aside. In the months which fol-
lowed, however, he enhanced his status further. In the autumn he set
up an Altar to the Gods of the Soil and Grains at his capital, Ye city,
and also an Ancestral Temple for his new state of Wei. In the winter
he appointed ministers, a Secretariat and Palace Attendants, and in the
first month of the following year, 214, he carried out the ceremony of
Ploughing the Sacred Field.27 In the third month of that year it was
27
SGZ 1:42–43. On the altar and worship to the Gods of the Soils and Grain, see
Bodde, Festivals, 56, Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 54–56, and CHOC, Map 13 at 263. On the
imperial ancestral temples under Later Han, see Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 56. On Plough-
ing, see Festivals, 223–228, and Lo-yang, 56–57.
394 chapter nine
ordered that the Duke of Wei should bear a royal seal of gold and
ribbon of red, and take precedence above all the kings of the imperial
house.
The Ploughing and the sacrifices offered to the Gods of the Soil and
Grain, to encourage agriculture and seek good harvests, had tradition-
ally been carried out by the sovereign at the capital, while provincial
rulers performed equivalent rituals. Cao Cao’s ceremonies, however,
were intended to have more than local significance, and they reflected
the broad authority of his new state. In similar fashion, though there
was a tomb complex—now ruined—in the family homeland of Qiao in
Pei, the ancestral temple was a mark of independence, infringing once
more upon the prerogatives of the emperor.28
The establishment of ministries and a secretariat appears likewise
to have been rather symbolic than practical. Cao Cao’s chief of staff
Xun You, cousin of the late Xun Yu, hitherto styled Master of the
Army, was named Director of the Secretariat, and other advisers and
assistants such as Mao Jie and Cui Yan were appointed to that office,
while their critic He Xia, with Wang Can and Wei Ji, became Palace
Attendants. Among the ministries, Zhong Yao became Grand Judge,
equivalent to the Minister of Justice of Han, and Wang Xiu became
Minister of Finance. The worthy Yuan Huan, a man noted for his
restraint and sense of honour, became Prefect of the Gentleman of
the Palace, parallel to the Han Minister of the Household, and was also
Acting Counsellor, while Chen Qun was Palace Assistant Clerk: these
last two were heads of the Censorate for the new state.29
28
The Ancestral Temple of Wei was maintained at Ye city until the end of 229,
when Cao Cao’s grandson Cao Rui had the spirit tablets of the family transferred
to a new temple at Luoyang: SGZ 3:96–97. At that time the tablets were identified
as those of Cao Teng [posthumously honoured as High Emperor 高帝 Gaodi], Cao
Song [Grand Emperor 太帝 Taidi], Cao Cao [Martial Emperor 武帝 Wudi] and Cao
Pi [Civil Emperor 文帝 Wendi]. Cao Cao, therefore, had celebrated only his father
and his adoptive, eunuch, grand-father.
29
The appointments are listed in ZZTJ 66:2123–24, based upon SGZ 1:42 and
entries in biographies. Some complications and confusions are discussed in deC,
Establish Peace, 456–457: in particular, Chen Qun’s office was not a ministry in the
system of Han, so it must be assumed that besides Zhong Yao, Wang Xiu and Yuan
Huan, there were a further three ministers whose names are not recorded.
The titles yushi dafu and yushi zhongcheng under Han are normally rendered Impe-
rial Counsellor and Palace Assistant Imperial Clerk. Since they are not full members
of the dynastic service in this instance, however, but officers of the duchy and later
kingdom of Wei, I omit the imperial appellation. On their position as senior officers
On the other hand, Cao Cao established only six ministries at this
time, not the nine of Han, and three of the offices and their appointees
are unnamed. The anonymity is surely not because the men concerned
were unimportant, for those who are mentioned were senior associates
and trusted officers, but rather that the new offices were not essential
to government. The purpose of the arrangement was to entrench the
legitimacy of the new feudatory: whereas a regular king of the imperial
house had no direct control over his nominal fief, and a comparatively
small personal staff,30 Cao Cao was setting up the facade of an admin-
istration to shadow the system of Han. Though he gave fine titles to his
followers, we must doubt their duties had or were intended to possess
any constitutional significance. The true political structure remained
that of a military command with warlord power.
In 216, as Cao Cao returned from his successful campaign against
Zhang Lu in Hanzhong, aggrandisement reached a logical conclusion.
In the third month he again carried out the Ploughing ceremony, just
as he had before taking title as Duke, and a few weeks later, on 29 May,
he was advanced in rank to be King.31 In the autumn his Grand Judge
Zhong Yao was named Chancellor of the State of Wei, and three fur-
ther ministers were appointed, raising the total to the imperial nine.32
of the Censorate of Han, and presumably also that of Wei, see deC, “Inspection and
Surveillance Officials,” and LH3K, 1227.
30
On the administration of a royal fief under Later Han, see HHS 118/28:3627–29
and Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 107. In practice, the Chancellor of a kingdom had been
appointed by the central government and held the same authority as the Administra-
tor of a commandery; the king had no control over him. The royal court included a
Prefect of the Gentlemen of the Palace and a Coachman, ranked at 1000 shi, a secre-
tariat and various lesser officials, but these too were all appointed from the capital.
31
SGZ 1:48 PC preserves the text of the edict. Surprisingly, the entry for the enfeoff-
ment in the main text of SGZ 1:47 appears misdated: it says that the change was made
in the fifth month, and this is followed by ZZTJ 67:2144; the Annals of HHS 9:388,
however, give the date as the jiawu day of the fourth month, equivalent to 29 May in
the Julian calendar. There was no jiawu 甲午 day in the fifth month of this year and,
given its precision, HHS 9 is more likely to be correct.
32
Wei shu, quoted by SGZ 1:49 PC notes 4 and 1, says that an Upholder of Cer-
emonies [equivalent to the Minister of Ceremonies in Han] and a Minister of the
[Royal] Clan were established in 216—very likely at the same time as the appointment
of Zhong Yao—and a Minister of the Guards in the following year. By elimination,
therefore, the three unspecified ministries of Wei which had been established in 213,
as above, were a Minister Coachman, a Minister Herald, and a Minister Steward.
None of the incumbents are recorded by name, however, nor is the man who replaced
Zhong Yao as Grand Judge.
396 chapter nine
With this last promotion, and the appointment of his own Chancel-
lor, Cao Cao had confirmed his personal administration. As Imperial
Chancellor of Han, he held formal authority throughout the empire,
but his state of Wei now largely superseded the imperial government,
which was no more than a façade to provide a sense of legitimacy to
its mighty subject. During the following year 217, as final flourishes of
honour, King Cao of Wei was awarded the banners and flags normally
reserved to the Son of Heaven, and an imperial crown with twelve
pendants.33 All roads were to be cleared before him, and he was per-
mitted in ride in a Root of Gold carriage drawn by six horses, with
Chariots of the Five Seasons to serve as his escort.34 In style, as well as
practical power, he was emperor in all but name.
Yuan Huan, Counsellor to Cao Cao as Duke of Wei, presumably continued to serve
when the title changed, but he became ill and died soon afterwards. In the summer of
217 Cao Cao appointed Hua Xin as Royal Counsellor: SGZ 1:49. Again, however, the
name of Yuan Huan’s replacement as Prefect of the Gentleman of the Palace is not
recorded. [Hua Xin appears at 398 below in charge of the arrest of the Empress Fu,
but that incident took place before his promotion.]
33
SGZ 1:49, ZZTJ 68:2150: deC, Establish Peace, 510. The crown (冕 mian) resem-
bled a mortar-board, longer than it was wide, with the flat upper surface curved at the
back and straight at the front. Six pendants (旈 liu) of white jade beads hanging at the
front, and six at the back, were an imperial prerogative, first worn by Emperor Ming of
Later Han. High nobility and the Excellencies were permitted a total of seven strands
of green jade beads. See the Treatise of Carriages and Robes, HHS 120/30:3663; Mans-
velt Beck, Treatises, 251.
34
The Treatise of Carriages and Robes, HHS 120/30:3644, records the Root of Gold
(金根 jin gen) as one of the state carriages of Han, often used as the chief in a proces-
sion. It is discussed by Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 244–248, followed by deC, Establish
Peace, 510–511. The origin of the name is uncertain, as are details of the vehicle itself,
for there are number of contradictory descriptions:
A text by the contemporary scholar Dong Ba, preserved in the commentary of
Hu Sanxing to ZZTJ 68:2150, says that the carriage had vermilion wheels, side-
bars and a hand-bar decorated with dragons and tigers, and a golden crow on
the yoke. The canopy was covered with feathers, and the ribs ended in flowers.
It was drawn by six horses, and had a great banner of twelve streamers painted
with images of the sun, the moon and flying dragons.
Writing a few years later, however, Cai Yong says that the Root of Gold had
golden wheels, that the animals on the side-bars related to the four directions,
and that there was no banner.
The Treatise of Jin shu, JS 25:754, agrees that there was no banner, and explains
further at 759 that the Chariots of the Seasons were arrayed in pairs, each coloured
for one of the Five Powers.
Imperial consorts
Emperor Xian, now in his mid-thirties, could do nothing but accept

and endorse Cao Cao’s demands. He had attempted a conspiracy
with Dong Cheng fifteen years earlier, but that had failed, and he was
obliged to recognise his powerlessness.35 Xun Yu, Director of his Sec-
retariat, had advised Cao Cao to restraint—albeit without success—but
his Empress Fu Shou had had more energetic and mistaken plans.
The Lady Fu was a daughter of Fu Wan, member of a long-stand-
ing scholarly and official family who had married the Princess Liu
Hua, a daughter of Emperor Huan. Though Fu Shou had been born
to a concubine, the Lady Ying, and was thus only a step-daughter of
the princess, the imperial connection was strong enough to gain her
advancement. Joining the harem of Emperor Xian in 190, she became
an Honoured Lady and was chosen empress in 195, and she accompa-
nied the emperor in his travels from Chang’an to Xu city under Cao
Cao’s control in 196.
In 200, after Dong Cheng’s conspiracy was discovered, Cao Cao had
his daughter the Honoured Lady Dong killed, even though she was
pregnant at the time. Horrified, and concerned for her own life, the
Lady Fu urged her father to act against Cao Cao. One might have
expected that the example of the Lady Dong would serve as a warning,
but the empress was only twenty years old at the time, and not very
wise. Fu Wan, sensibly, took no action, and indeed refused high posi-
tion as a means to keep out of trouble. He died peacefully in 209.
35
HHS 10B:453, followed by ZZTJ 67:2133; deC, Establish Peace, 480:
There was an occasion that Cao Cao called upon the Emperor in his palace.
Unable to bear the anxiety, the Emperor said to him, “If you can assist me, it
would be generous. If you cannot, have pity and do not oppress me.” Cao Cao
appeared embarrassed, then asked permission to leave.
According to the old system, if one of the Excellencies had command of troops
and came to audience, Guards Rapid As Tigers were ordered to hold naked swords
against his side. When Cao Cao came out and rejoined his own people the sweat
was pouring down his back. From this time he went no more to audience.
The ostentatious precaution of naked swords was because of the exceptional combined
authority of an Excellency, leader in civil administration, with high military com-
mand; Cao Cao, of course, was in just such a powerful situation. On the other hand,
no matter what the traditions of Han, it seems strange that Cao Cao would allow
himself to be placed in such a dangerous and humiliating position before his puppet
ruler. One must doubt the truth of the story.
398 chapter nine
Five years later the empress’s proposal was found out; it is not
known by what means. Despite the lapse of time, it was hardly possible
for Cao Cao to ignore the matter. Mistaken leniency might inspire
others, while he could hope—despite the effect which the example of
the Lady Dong had had upon the empress—that a firm reaction would
discourage further ideas on this line. He compelled Emperor Xian to
order the Lady Fu’s dismissal, and sent his colleague Chi Lü the Impe-
rial Counsellor to have her removed. As Chi Lü was with the emperor
Hua Xin, Xun Yu’s successor as Director of the Secretariat, led troops
into the private apartments of the palace to arrest the Lady. She closed
the doors and tried to hide in one of the walls, but the soldiers dragged
her out and away. As they passed the pavilion where the emperor was
sitting the Lady Fu, weeping and dishevelled, appealed to her husband
for help.
“I do not know when my own turn will come,” he replied, then turned
to Chi Lü, “Under heaven, my lord Chi, how can this be?”
As the former empress died in the harem prison, two children she had
borne to the emperor were killed, while her mother the Lady Ying and
other kinfolk were sent into exile.36
The vacancy thus created was remarkably and almost suspiciously

convenient, for Cao Cao was ready with a replacement for the dis-
graced empress. In the previous year, 213, he had arranged for three
of his daughters, whose given names were Xian, Jie and Hua, to be
taken into the imperial harem, and early in 214 all three were named
as Honoured Ladies. In 215, less than two months after the fall of the
Lady Fu, the second of the three sisters, Cao Jie, was named as her
replacement.37
36
HHS 10B:453–54 and ZZTJ 67:2134; deC, Establish Peace, 480–481. Sima Biao,
in XHS 1:19a, says that the emperor himself found the Lady guilty of Impiety, but this
surely misreads the situation.
HHS 10B claims that a hundred members of the Fu clan were killed, but this is
probably an exaggeration based upon the hostile record of Cao Man zhuan in SGZ
1:44 PC [which anachronistically includes Fu Wan, now dead five years, among
those who were slain]. It is unlikely that Cao Cao would have found it necessary or
politic to execute so many; his exiling of the Lady Ying and her family seems more
appropriate.
37
HHS 9:388 records the date of the fall of the Empress Fu as the dingmao day of
the eleventh month, equivalent to 8 January 215, and has the new Empress Cao accede
We are not told the names of the mothers of the young women,
nor whether they were full or half-sisters; Cao Xian and Cao Hua are
not mentioned out of this context. Since the normal age for selection
was between thirteen and twenty, they were presumably in their teens,
though Cao Hua was too young in 213 and remained another year
with Cao Cao’s household. The betrothal present included 50,000 rolls
of silk, and the former general Wang Yi, now a minister at the court of
Han, was sent to Ye city to present them, together with jade bi-rings,
the insignia of rank.38
The new Empress must have been at least ten years younger than
her husband, who was now in his thirties, and the circumstances did
not augur well for a successful marriage. It appears, however, that she
acquired an interest in the fortunes of the dynasty, and certainly for
her own position within it. A few years later in 220, as her half-brother
Cao Pi compelled Emperor Xian to abdicate in order that he might
take the imperial title for himself, he sent one of his officials to collect
the empress’s seal and ribbon. The Lady Cao refused at first to hand
them over, but eventually threw them to the ground, weeping as she
did so and swearing that, “Heaven will never bless you!” As attendants
looked on in embarrassment, Cao Pi’s messenger was obliged to fish
out the insignia from behind a balustrade.39
to her position in the first month of the following year, on the jiazi day, first of a new
cycle, being 6 March 215.
XHS 1:19b says that it was Cao Xian who became empress, but this is not correct,
and the statement is contradicted by another fragment of the same work immediately
following.
Note 17 to Chapter One discusses the implication of the personal name of the
Lady Cao Jie for determining that of the father of Cao Teng, her adoptive great-great-
grandfather.
38
On the betrothal embassy see HHS 10B:455 and Xiandi qijuzhu “The Diary of
Activity and Repose of Emperor Xian,” quoted by SGZ 1:42 PC. The formal age of
selection is identified by HHS 10A:400; on Cao Hua see HHS 10B:455.
The Fuzi by Fu Xuan of the third century says that Cao Cao’s objections to luxury
and ostentation extended also to wedding ceremonies, so that when any of his daugh-
ters married she was adorned only in black [a fortunate colour], and was accompanied
by no more than ten maids in waiting: SGZ 1:54. The imperial connection may none-
theless have been celebrated in more style.
39
HHS 10B:455. In his Kaoyi commentary to ZZTJ 69:2182, however, Sima Guang
casts doubt on the story, which is remarkably similar to that told of the regent Grand
Empress-Dowager Wang, widow of Emperor Yuan of Former Han. As her nephew
Wang Mang was planning to take the throne, he sent to require the imperial Seal of
State from her, but the Dowager was furious and threw it to the ground: one of the
corners was chipped: HS 98:4032; deC, Generals of the South, 139–140, Goodman,
Ts’ao P’i Transcendent, 69.
400 chapter nine
The Lady Cao outlived her consort by more than twenty-five years
and died in 260, as the Wei dynasty was already being subverted by
the Sima clan. She was awarded posthumous title as Empress Mu, and
was buried with her husband the former emperor.40
Women and children
Besides the three mentioned above, Cao Cao had at least four other
daughters, though none of their personal names have been recorded.
The eldest was born to his senior concubine the Lady Liu about 178,
and was a full sister of his eldest son Cao Ang. Married to Xiahou
Mao, son of Cao Cao’s cousin Xiahou Dun, she became Princess of
Qinghe in Ganling, presumably after Cao Pi had taken the imperial
title in 220. About 230, objecting to her husband’s constant adulteries,
she accused him of treason and almost had him executed.41
A second daughter, whose mother is unknown, was probably born
about 190. She was married to Xun Yun, son of Xun Yu, and later
became Princess of Anyang.42 A third daughter, born to the Lady Du
about 200, became Princess of Gaocheng.43 And finally there was the
daughter of the Lady Yin: formerly consort of a son of the General-
in-Chief He Jin, the Lady Yin had borne him a son, He Yan; she later
became a concubine of Cao Cao and was the mother of Cao Ju and of
a daughter. Cao Cao had this daughter marry her own half-brother He
Yan; she became Princess of Jinxiang.
It seems certain that Cao Cao had more than the seven daughters listed
above,44 for he acknowledged twenty-five sons by two formal wives
and thirteen concubines; and he had a number of other liaisons.
40
SGZ 4:147. Just three days earlier Sima Yan had been appointed Imperial Chan-
cellor, enfeoffed as Duke of Jin with a territory of ten commanderies, and received the
Nine Distinctions. He took the imperial title in 265/6.
41
SGZ 9:268–69; see also Chapter One at 22–23.
42
SGZ 10:316. It is difficult to calculate the date of the marriage, but it may have
taken place about 207, and the Lady Cao could have been in her late teens at that
time.
43
The Lady Du, former concubine of Qin Yilu, did not come into Cao Cao’s hands
until 198: see below and SGZJJ 20:1a-b.
44
SGZ 12:388 mentions a Princess of Linfen about 227, while SGZ 22:632 refers to a
Princess of Shengqian Village about the same time. They may have been daughters of
Cao Cao, but there are no further details; and it is likely that at least the lady enfeoffed
with a village was a grand-daughter rather than a direct daughter.
His first formal wife was the Lady Ding, whom he probably married
about 175.45 She was unable to have children, but his senior concubine
the Lady Liu bore two sons and a daughter, the future Princess of
Qinghe. When the Lady Liu died about 179, possibly in child-birth, her
children were fostered by the Lady Ding, who became particularly fond
of the elder son Cao Ang. After he was killed in battle against Zhang
Xiu in 197, the Lady Ding mourned him bitterly—and there may have
been extra bitterness from the fact that Zhang Xiu had launched his
surprise attack because Cao Cao had taken another casual concubine.46
In mourning, the Lady reproached Cao Cao and rejected him, and Wei
lue has a sad account of the end of their relationship:
After Cao Zixiu [Cao Ang] fell at Rang, the Lady Ding said repeatedly,
“You took my son and killed him, and you never think of him any
more.” And she would weep uncontrollably.
Maddened by this, Cao Cao sent the Lady back to her family in the
hope that she might have a change of heart. He later went to see her
there. She was weaving at the time, and when someone announced that
“His Lordship has arrived,” she continued to kneel at the loom.
Cao Cao came in and stroked her back, saying, “Turn round and look
at me, and let us ride home together,” but she did not respond to him.
He left her, but then stood at the door and said again, “Can’t we manage
something?” There was still no reply.
“So this is really goodbye,” he said; and he broke off with her.
Wei lue adds that Cao Cao wanted the Lady’s family to marry her
off to someone else, but they would not do it. The couple remained
estranged, but it is said that Cao Cao regretted his treatment of her,
and felt ashamed at the reproaches Cao Ang might offer him in the
after-life.47
It seems likely that the final rift with the Lady Ding took place about
200, and the Lady Bian, whom Cao Cao had taken as a concubine
twenty years earlier, became the senior member of his harem. It is
uncertain whether at this time she had formal status as chief wife,48
45
Wei lue, quoted at SGZ 5:156–57 PC, describes the Lady Ding as 嫡 di.
46
On the circumstances of this fighting, and the death of Cao Ang, see Chapter
Three at 105–106.
47
SGZ 5:156–57 PC; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 91–92.
48
The biography of the Lady Bian is at SGZ 5:156–58; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses
and Consorts, 90–95. Both SGZ 5 and Wei lue describe her as 繼室 jishi, which may
be understood rather as “second wife” than as full replacement of the first. Bohu tong
debates whether a gentleman can marry a second time [e.g. 9:5a–6a; Tjan, White Tiger
Hall I, 252 at c, et al.], and remarks [Tjan at 253] that “a concubine, however worthy,
402 chapter nine
but she was the mother of Cao Pi, Cao Cao’s eldest surviving son,49
and she was also given charge of caring for a number of his children
whose mothers had died. It is said that when the Lady Ding was chief
wife, she had treated the Lady Bian with small respect, but the Lady
Bian held no grudge: she invited the Lady Ding on several occasions
and showed her the utmost courtesy, always yielding her the place of
honour. When the Lady Ding died a few years later the Lady Bian
persuaded Cao Cao to grant her formal burial near Xu city, the impe-
rial capital.50
The Lady Bian maintained her leading position in Cao Cao’s house-
hold, but it was not until 219, last year of his life, that he arranged for
her to share his rank and be formally named Queen (王后 wanghou)
of Wei. When Cao Pi took the imperial title in the following year
he gave his mother title as Empress-Dowager (皇太后 huang taihou),
and his son and successor Cao Rui, Emperor Ming, named her Grand
Empress-Dowager (太皇太后 tai huang taihou). The Lady died in 230,
at the age of seventy.
The introduction to SGZ 5, the Biographies of Empresses and Con-
sorts, describes how Cao Cao established a hierarchy within the harem
of his royal state of Wei, with the Queen at the top, followed by Senior
Concubines (夫人 furen), then Brilliant Companions (昭儀 zhaoyi)
and another three ranks below, each equated to a level of the male
bureaucracy.51 Since the Lady Bian was not appointed as queen until
219, however, three years after Cao Cao had taken the royal title, one
may doubt the women were ever so well organised: at the beginning
of SGZ 20, the Biographies of the Sons of Cao Cao and Cao Pi, the
names of several women who bore him sons are recorded, but some
are described only as Junior Concubines (ji 姬). The information may
be summarised as follows:
will never become a principal wife.” The marriage described, however, is that of a great
feudal lord taking nine wives at once, and we know in any case that Cao Cao had a
relaxed attitude to such matters.
49
Cao Ang had a younger full brother Cao Shuo, born of the Lady Liu about 179,
but he does not seem to have been so favoured by his father. He sired two sons, but
probably died before 200: SGZ 20:579 and 404 below.
50
Cao Cao’s own tomb, however, was at Gaoling west of Ye city, and the Lady Bian
would later be buried at that site: Chapter Ten at 445.
51
SGZ 5:155; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 89 and 137.
Cao Cao’s first formal wife, the Lady Ding, had no children;
his Senior Concubine [ furen] the Lady Liu had two sons, Cao Ang and
Cao Shuo, and one daughter, the later Princess of Qinghe;
his later wife the Lady Bian had four sons, Cao Pi, Cao Zhang, Cao Zhi
and Cao Xiong;
his Senior Concubine the Lady Huan had three sons, Cao Chong, Cao
Ju and Cao Yü;52
his Senior Concubine the Lady Du had two sons, Cao Lin [or Bao] and
Cao Gun, and one daughter, the later Princess of Gaocheng;
his Senior Concubine the Lady Qin had two sons, Cao Xuan and Cao
Jun;
his Senior Concubine the Lady Yin had one son, Cao Jü,53 and one
daughter, the later Princess of Jinxiang;
his Concubine [qie 妾 (rank unspecified)] the Lady Chen had one son,
Cao Gan [or Lang];54
his Junior Concubine [ ji] the Lady Sun had three sons, Cao Zishang,55
Cao Biao and Cao Ziqin;
his Junior Concubine the Lady Li had three sons, Cao Zicheng, Cao
Zizheng [or Zheng] and Cao Zijing;
his Junior Concubine the Lady Zhou had one son, Cao Jün;56
his Junior Concubine the Lady Liu had one son, Cao Ziji;
his Junior Concubine the Lady Song had one son, Cao Hui;
his Junior Concubine the Lady Zhao had one son, Cao Mao.
In many cases it is difficult to ascertain when a woman served as com-
panion to Cao Cao, but several of them died well before the formal
establishment of the state of Wei. The accounts of his first wife the
Lady Ding, of his concubine the Lady Liu, and of his later queen the
Lady Bian are comparatively clear, but others are known by little more
than their name and those of their sons.
52
This personal name is transcribed with an umlaut to distinguish it from that of
Cao Cao’s brother Cao Yu: Chapter One at 27 and Table 1.
53
Cao Ju, son of the Lady Huan above.
54
See further at note 62 below.
55
Here and following, the prefix zi 子 would indicate that these sons of Cao Cao
were known by their styles, and their personal names are not recorded. Confusingly,
however, the character zi is omitted in some texts, so that, for example, Cao Zishang
may be referred to as Cao Shang, which could be a personal name.
56
Cao Jun, son of the Lady Qin above.
404 chapter nine
In similar fashion, the dates of birth of the children are confused

and uncertain.57 Cao Pi, born to the Lady Bian in 187, is described in
his biography as taizi “eldest son,” but he was certainly younger than
Cao Ang, born about 177 to the Lady Liu. Moreover, since the Lady
Liu is said to have had two more children before her death just a few
years later, Cao Pi was probably also junior to her son Cao Shuo, who
was presumably born about 179. There may have been a hiatus during
the early to middle 180s—possibly filled by daughters—but the birth of
Cao Pi was followed by that of his full brothers Cao Zhang (the second
brother), Cao Zhi (born in 192) and Cao Xiong, who may have been
older than Cao Zhi, but in any case died young.
Besides Cao Shuo and Cao Xiong, another eight of Cao Cao’s sons
are said to have died young: Chong, Jü, Xuan, Zicheng, Ziji, Zijing,
Ziqin and Zishang; a two-fifths mortality.58 The phrase zao hong “died
young,” however, was not applied only to small children, for Cao Shuo
sired two sons and probably died in his late teens sometime in the
190s, and Cao Xiong left one son.59 On the other hand, a further two
of Cao Cao’s sons died before he did, Cao Zheng in 218, and Cao Jün
in 219.
The sons of the Lady Bian are reasonably well attested, as are the
children of the senior Lady Liu, who must have been born by about
180. For the others, dates of birth are difficult to assess. Cao Jün was
married to a daughter of Zhang Xiu in 199, which might indicate he
was born in the 180s, and Cao Zheng married a daughter of Yuan Tan
in 203; but since we also know that Cao Zhang was promised in mar-
riage to a daughter of the Sun clan in 198, when he was barely eight
years old, such calculations cannot be relied upon. As in medieval and
early modern Europe, marriage alliances were often made for diplo-
57
The Annals/Biography of Cao Pi, Emperor Wen of Wei, are in SGZ 2, the biog-
raphies of his brothers Zhang, Zhi and Xiong are in SGZ 19. Cao Cao’s other sons
have biographies in SGZ 20.
58
All these sons later received posthumous enfeoffment: Shuo, Zicheng, Ziji, Zijing,
Ziqin and Zishang, each with the appellation Shang 殤 “Young” [SGZ 20:579, 588
and 586], while Xiong and Xuan were styled Huai 懷 “Cherished” [SGZ 19:577 and
20:584], and Cao Jü had the posthumous title Min 閔 “Mourned” [SGZ 20:585]. Cao
Chong, discussed further below, was styled Ai 哀 “Lamented” [SGZ 20:580].
59
SGZ 19:577 and 20:579. It is possible that 早薨 zao hong indicates that the young
man had not formally come of age and taken the cap of manhood, an event which
could be celebrated between the ages of twelve and twenty by Chinese reckoning: see
deC, LH3K sub Cao Bao.
matic or dynastic reasons, with small concern for personal interest or

practicality.60
It is clear that the mother of Cao Jün, the Lady Zhou, was a mem-
ber of Cao Cao’s harem about 190, as was the mother of Cao Zheng,
the Lady Li, and we may assume that the Lady Li’s other sons, Cao
Zicheng and Cao Zijing, were also born in the 190s. The biography of
Cao Chong, moreover, says that he died in 208 at the age of thirteen
sui, so he was born in 196; his full brothers by the Lady Huan, Cao Ju
and Cao Yü, were presumably a few years younger. Again, Cao Biao
died in 251 at the age of fifty-seven sui,61 so he was born in 195; his
mother the Lady Sun had two other sons: Cao Zishang was older than
Cao Biao and Cao Ziqin was younger. This would indicate that dur-
ing the 190s, even in the fiercest years of civil war and during his late
thirties and early forties, Cao Cao took at least six women as regular
companions and fathered some thirteen children. Towards the end of
that period, moreover, in 198, he acquired the Lady Du, former wife
of Lü Bu’s officer Qin Yilu, and her children Cao Lin [also known as
Bao], Cao Gun and the later Princess of Gaocheng, would have been
born about 200.
There are no such clues by which we might date Cao Cao’s dealings
with the Ladies Qin, Yin, Liu, Song and Zhao, and the birth of their
children. It appears, however, that he maintained an active sexual life
into his sixties, and his youngest son, Cao Gan or Lang, was born
about 215.62
60
On the marriage of Cao Jün, see Chapter Three at 127; and on that of Cao Zheng,
Chapter Five at 214. On the alliance of cross-marriages between Cao Cao and the
young warlord Sun Ce, see SGZ Wu 1:1104 [which has the personal name Zhang 彰
mistakenly as 章]; deC, Generals of the South, 197.
61
SGZ 29:809. Cao Biao was close to his elder half-brothers Cao Zhang and Cao
Zhi, sons of the Lady Bian. When Cao Zhang died in 223 all three were at the capi-
tal, and Cao Biao and Cao Zhi planned to travel back to their fiefs together. Cao Pi
forbade them, and in sorrow Cao Zhi composed the poem Zeng Poma wang Biao “To
Biao the King of Boma,” which later became celebrated.
62
The introductory section of SGZ 20:579 says that Cao Gan’s mother was the Bril-
liant Companion Wang, but an extract from Wei lue attached to his biography at SGZ
20:586 PC says that his natural mother was the Lady Chen; she died when the boy
was aged three sui, and the Lady Wang took over his care. [Wei lue also says that Cao
Gan had the alternative personal name of Lang.] Though she had no children herself,
the Lady Wang had influence with Cao Cao, and she encouraged him to appoint Cao
Pi as his successor. [The main text of the biography at 585 ascribes this influence to
the boy’s mother. I believe, however, that Chen Shou, following his statement at 579,
is referring to the foster-mother Lady Wang and ignores the relationship to the Lady
Chen.] When Cao Cao was seriously ill, moreover, he expressed pity for the boy who
406 chapter nine
Many of Cao Cao’s women and children are mentioned by little more
than their names, and we have few details about his feeling for them.
Cao Mao is said to have been arrogant and rude, and to have offended
his father, so he received no substantial fief and was made a king only
in 227, after the death of Cao Pi.63
Cao Cao’s favourite was Cao Chong, son of the Lady Huan. Born
in 196, he showed precocious intelligence and mature good sense. We
are told that when he was five years old Sun Quan sent an elephant to
Cao Cao’s court. Cao Cao thought to weigh it, but no-one could work
out how to do this until Cao Chong advised putting the animal on a
boat, measuring its depth in the water, and then adding weights to the
empty boat until it sank back to the same level.64 It is also said that
Cao Chong was generous and sympathetic to anyone threatened with
punishment, and frequently persuaded his father to leniency:
On one occasion, some saddles in Cao Cao’s arsenal were chewed by
rats, and the officer in charge was afraid he would be executed.
Cao Chong took a knife and cut his own clothing so it looked as if
rats had been at it, then pretended to be terrified. Cao Cao asked what
was wrong, and Cao Chong explained, “It is said that when rats chew
clothing they bring bad luck to the owner. My clothing has been chewed
and I am frightened of what may happen.”
had lost his mother at the age of three and now, at the age of five, was likely to lose
his father. He commended Cao Gan to Cao Pi, and Cao Pi indeed treated him with
special consideration.
The dating of Cao Gan’s early life is uncertain. He was enfeoffed as a junior marquis
in 215, possibly about the time of his birth; in which case his mother the Lady Chen
could have died of the plague which affected China in 217, and Cao Cao’s illness
shortly preceded his death in early 220. It may be, however, that the boy was born a
year or two earlier, and that the illness of Cao Cao was not his last. Certainly Cao Gan
was a child of his father’s old age, and he received special favour from Cao Pi. He was
made a duke in 221 and a king in 222.
63
The biography of Cao Mao is at SGZ 20:589–90.
64
The biography of Cao Chong is at SGZ 20:580. The story about weighing the
elephant is discussed by Needham, Science and Civilisation IV.1, 39–40, who observes,
however, that the principle of measuring by displacement may have already been well
known in Han.
SGZJJ 20:2b quotes the eighteenth century commentator Shao Jinhan, who cites an
extract from the Former Han work Fuzi 符子, preserved in the Nenggai zhaiman lu by
Wu Zeng of Song: the technique of measurement by displacement is there ascribed to
the ruler of the state of Yan 燕 at the beginning of the Zhou period. He Chuo of early
Qing has made the same point, and also comments on the fact that this incident is said
to have taken place about 200: although Sun Quan was at that time in a loose alliance
with Cao Cao, it is unlikely he would have had access to an elephant before his agent
Bu Zhi had gained a position in the far south about 210: Chapter Six at 276.
“That is nonsense,” replied Cao Cao. “Nothing will happen.”

Then Cao Chong mentioned the arsenal officer and the damaged sad-
dles. Cao Cao laughed and said, “You had your clothes with you, and
they got chewed. What can one do about saddles in storage?” And he
took the matter no further.
Many other men liable to the death penalty also asked Cao Chong’s
help, and dozens were saved by his efforts.65
In 208, however, at the age of thirteen, Cao Chong became ill, and
though Cao Cao prayed for his life he died. Cao Cao mourned him
deeply: he arranged for Cao Chong’s posthumous marriage to a dead
girl of the Zhen family, and later had Cao Cong, a son of Cao Chong’s
full brother Cao Ju, adopted to maintain his lineage.66
When Cao Chong died Cao Pi came to offer condolences. Cao Cao
had said publicly that he planned to make Cao Chong his heir, and
now, utterly distraught, he told Cao Pi, “It is my loss, but your good
fortune.” Years later, even after Cao Pi had taken the imperial title,
he would remark that if Cao Chong had lived he would himself never
have obtained the empire. In 221 he had Cao Chong’s grave trans-
ferred to the vicinity of Cao Cao’s tomb, and awarded him posthu-
mous title as a duke.67
A question of succession
With the death of Cao Chong, as Cao Cao remarked, the natural can-
didate to succeed him was Cao Pi, eldest son by his principal consort
the Lady Bian. Cao Cao, however, was in no hurry to make a decision:
in 208 he was only in his early fifties, he was evidently in good health
65
SGZ 20:580 and 581 PC note 1 quoting Wei lue, also Chapter Ten at 445.
66
This marriage of dead children is discussed also in Chapter One at 24.
Since Cao Chong died at the age of twelve by Western reckoning, and since Cao Ju
was his younger brother, the transfer of lineage must have taken place several years
later.
Among other stories, it is also said that Zhou Buyi, born in 193 and recognised as
a talented writer, was a companion of Cao Chong. Cao Cao offered Zhou Buyi one
of his daughters in marriage, but he declined the honour. After Cao Chong died, Cao
Cao recalled the rejection with resentment, and in 209, despite the protests of his son
Cao Pi, he had Zhou Buyi killed: SGZ 6:216 PC quoting Lingling xianxian zhuan.
Since Zhou Buyi would have been about sixteen years old at that time, and was barely
thirteen when Cao Chong died, this all seems somewhat precocious.
67
SGZ 20:580 and 581 PC note 3 quoting Wei shu and Wei lue.
408 chapter nine
and, like many in a similar situation, he was not anxious to encourage

too much anticipation of his departure.
He was in any case interested in and impressed by Cao Zhi, his third
son of the Lady Bian and younger full brother of Cao Pi.68 Even in his
teens, Cao Zhi was well-read in the Confucian classics and in poetry,
and was a competent composer. On one occasion Cao Cao asked him,
“Did you have someone else write this for you?” Cao Zhi replied, “The
words come out in literary form, and when I set down my brush I have
completed the piece. You may test me face-to-face; how can I borrow
from someone else?”
In the winter of 210 Cao Cao completed the Bronze Bird Terrace,
first of the three by which he enhanced his capital at Ye city. He and
his sons climbed to the top of the new construction, and Cao Cao had
each of them compose a rhapsody for the occasion. We do not know
what the others wrote, but Cao Zhi’s work, “Rhapsody on Climbing
the Terrace,” was recorded by Wei ji and is preserved in the commen-
tary to SGZ 19:69
On a pleasure tour with the brilliant ruler, we climb the storied terrace
with feelings of delight;
We see all the city stretched out below, and we gaze on the works of
wisdom and virtue.
He has built tall gates like rugged hills, he has floated twin turrets into
the clouds;
68
The biography of Cao Zhi is at SGZ 19:557–77.
69
SGZ 19:557 and 558 PC. The rhapsody is translated by Cutter, “Symposium
Poems,” 1–2 [following a text slightly different to that of SGZ 19], and also by Dunn,
Cao Zhi, 19–21.
The context of SGZ 19 indicates that the visit to the newly-built terrace and the
composition of the rhapsody took place in the winter of 210, possibly early 211. This
dating is supported by Yezhong ji 3a, and the text of SGZ 19 is cited also by the ency-
clopaedia Yiwen leiju at 56:9a. In “Cao Zhi and his Poetry,” 507–508, however, Cutter
notes that Yiwen leiju at 62:7a-b contains the texts of two rhapsodies on Climbing
the Terrace: the one by Cao Zhi as above; and another ascribed to Cao Pi under his
posthumous title as Emperor Wen of Wei. Furthermore, Cao Pi’s work has a preface
which says that it was written in the spring of 212, when Cao Cao took his sons to
visit the park and required them to compose.
If Cao Cao was uncertain whether Cao Zhi was creating his own works, however,
he would surely have put him to the test before he arranged his enfeoffment, and that
event is clearly dated to early 211 and is foreshadowed in the Apologia of the previous
year. Cao Pi’s preface, as transmitted, may have the wrong date—the spring of 212
instead of the spring of 211—or perhaps such literary excursions took place on more
than one occasion.
As noted in note 14 to Chapter Eight, a fragment of Cao Cao’s own “Rhapsody on
Climbing the Terrace” is quoted by SJZ 10.
He has raised splendid pavilions to reach the heavens, and linked flying
galleries to the western wall.
We look down to the long thread of the River Zhang; we look out to the
flourishing growth of the orchards;
We lift our heads to the gentle majesty of the spring breeze, and hear the
mournful cries of a hundred birds.
The heavenly work is firm as a wall; the dreams of our house are brought
to fulfilment;
Good influence extends to all the world, while every respect and rever-
ence is paid to the capital. . . . .
The next and final lines heap increasing praise upon Cao Cao, likening
him to the loyal hegemons of the past, celebrating his military achieve-
ment, and comparing him to the sun and the moon. It is grossly
exaggerated, and even the first passage, rendered above, is somewhat
derivative.70 As an apparently extempore composition, however, the
work was impressive and it served its purpose: Cao Cao was confirmed
in his favourable opinion.
A few weeks later, early in the new Chinese year on 11 February
211, three of Cao Cao’s sons were enfeoffed as marquises, each with
revenue from five thousand households: Cao Zhi received the county
of Pingyuan in the commandery of that name; Cao Ju, second son
by the Lady Huan, was given Fanyang in Zhuo; and Cao Lin, eldest
son by the Lady Du, acquired Raoyang in Anping.71 Cao Ju was the
younger brother of Cao Cao’s late favourite Cao Chong, and may have
been chosen for that reason; and though little is known of Cao Lin
there was presumably some reason he was selected for the honour.
Notably, while Cao Zhi was granted enfeoffment, his elder brother
Cao Zhang, second son by the Lady Bian, was not.
Cao Pi likewise received no fief at this time, but in the same month,
possibly on the same day, he was given title as General of the House-
hold for All Purposes, with a clerical staff, and was named Associate
to Cao Cao as Chancellor.72 In the autumn he was given formal charge
70
Compare, for example, Wang Can’s “Rhapsody on Climbing a Tower:” Chapter
Eight at 341.
71
Wei shu quoted in SGZ 1:34 PC. That text refers to the new marquis of Raoyang
as Cao Bao, a name which does not appear among the sons of Cao Cao recorded by
SGZ 19 or 20. The biography of Cao Lin at SGZ 20:583, however, says that he was
enfeoffed as Marquis of Raoyang at this time, so it appears that Bao was his alternate
personal name.
72
Under the Han dynasty, General of the Household (zhonglang jiang), with high
rank/salary Equivalent to 2000 shi, was in charge of one of the five corps of gentlemen
410 chapter nine
of Ye city as Cao Cao went on campaign against the warlords of the

northwest, though Cao Cao left his experienced officer Cheng Yu as
Adviser to the Army to keep an eye on him, while Xu Xuan and Guo
Yuan dealt with military and civil matters respectively.
During that time there was a rebellion in Hejian to the northeast.
Cao Pi wanted to attack the rebels himself, but his Officer of Merit
Chang Lin argued that the disturbance did not justify such a commit-
ment, and it was more important to maintain a strong position at Ye
city. So the general Jia Xin was sent, and indeed he swiftly restored
order.
There followed debate whether captured rebels should be executed.
Cao Cao had previously ordered that those who surrendered only after
they were surrounded should receive no mercy, but Cheng Yu claimed
this had been a temporary policy in time of real trouble, and should
not be maintained now that the region was largely under control.
Cao Pi was persuaded to refer the matter to Cao Cao, and Cao Cao
indeed authorised pardons. When he returned to Ye at the beginning
of 212 he congratulated Cheng Yu on the advice he had given; and it
is implied that Cao Pi’s instincts had been too energetic and zealous.
We are not told who, if anyone, was left in charge at Ye as Cao
Cao went to attack Sun Quan in the winter of 212—the situation
was confused by the crisis of the Nine Distinctions and the death of
Xun Yu73—but Cao Pi may have continued in that command. In the
autumn of 214, however, when another campaign was launched to
the southeast, it was not Cao Pi but his brother Cao Zhi who received
the appointment. Cao Zhi was now twenty-three by Chinese reckon-
ing, and Cao Cao encouraged him, saying,
cadets on probation for commission in the imperial service. More recently, the title
had been used for the commander of troops in the field [as Zhu Jun in 184 and Wang
Zhong in 199], and for a senior official in charge of agricultural colonies [as Ren Jun
about 196].
This appointment of Cao Pi followed Han tradition: the Corps for All Purposes had
been the senior of the three civilian groups of cadets. We may doubt, however, that
Cao Pi had any such supervisory responsibilities, for the former system of local nomi-
nation and probation was now largely subsumed by the appointment of Rectifiers in
each commandery: Chapter Six at 248. The real significance of Cao Pi’s position was
his designation as Associate 副 fu to the Chancellor, and the right to an administrative
office to assist him in carrying out his duties.
SGZ 1:34 dates Cao Pi’s appointment to the first month; it appears also, without
date, at SGZ 2:57. His command at Ye city, as below, is recorded at SGZ 14:429 PC
quoting Wei shu.
73
Pages 385–386 above.
When I became magistrate of Dunqiu, I was just twenty-three. If I reflect

on my conduct at that time, there is nothing I regret. You too are now
twenty-three; you must exert yourself to the utmost.
In Chinese terms, Cao Cao was now sixty years old. Some men of the
time lived to be eighty, but it was surely appropriate to consider his
succession, and Cao Zhi had become a strong candidate. His biogra-
phy says that his father was several times on the point of naming him
Heir to the throne of Wei, and Cao Cao himself observed later that he
had regarded Cao Zhi as the most likely to achieve the grand design
of unifying the empire.74 For another three years, however, he made
no firm decision, and one proclamation of this period publicised his
hesitation, explaining that he would like to have one or other of his
sons take command at Shouchun, at Chang’an and in Hanzhong, but
that he cannot be certain they will follow his instructions. The ultimate
choice, he remarks, must depend not on personal affection but on the
public good of the state.75
The uncertainty must have been difficult for everyone.
There was a tradition that a man’s eldest son by his principal wife
should be his heir, but in reality Cao Cao could select any of his sons
by any of his women. Furthermore, though the Lady Bian is described
at that time as his senior wife or concubine, she was not yet recognised
as his full consort; and we know that he had earlier planned to appoint
Cao Chong, son of the Lady Huan. By 215, however, the competition
had been narrowed down to Cao Pi and Cao Zhi, both sons of the
Lady Bian.
Their full brother Zhang, younger than Pi but older than Zhi, was
not in contention. He had not been enfeoffed in 211, nor given any
other mark of favour at that time. Expert in the military arts, Cao
Zhang did receive a fief in 216, and he later held senior command,76
but Cao Cao was attracted rather by the literary ability and imagina-
tion of Cao Zhi than by the practical skills of Cao Zhang—which may
tell us something of his own self-image.
There may have been two other candidates: Cao Ju, son of the Lady
Huan and full brother to Cao Cao’s favourite Cao Chong; and Cao
74
SGZ 19:557 and 558 PC quoting Wei-Wu gushi. The latter citation is presented
in the context of the Incident at the Gate, as at 417 and note 91 below.
75
TPYL 429:9a; repeated in Cao Cao ji, 47, with the title Zhu’er ling 諸兒令 “On
My Sons.”
76
The biography of Cao Zhang is at SGZ 19:555–57.
412 chapter nine
Lin, born to the Lady Du. Both had been enfeoffed in 211, at the same
time as Cao Zhi, and Cao Cong, a son of Cao Ju, was later transferred
by adoption to maintain the lineage of Cao Chong. By 217, however,
these two young men had moved out of contention; they or their
mothers may have lost favour, but there was likely some pressure on
Cao Cao to choose a son by his senior wife, the Lady Bian.77
So Cao Pi and Cao Zhi were now the leading competitors for their
father’s approval, with a high prize for the winner. The contest and its
associated intrigue, however, had to be kept below the surface. Not
only was it unfilial for a son to look forward to his father’s death, but
any political activity which smacked of partisanship was regarded as
disruptive and dangerous.
We are told that Cao Cao had taken care in choosing men to guide
and supervise his sons, and both Cao Pi and Cao Zhi attracted friends
and companions with literary skills. Despite their rivalry, the two
households ate and drank together, made excursions among the plea-
sure grounds of Ye city and its palace, composed poems and rhapsodies
with dedications, and engaged in active correspondence. In a letter to
Wu Zhi, for example, transferred to be a magistrate in Henei, Cao Pi
recalled how they had ridden to picnics in carriages and on horseback,
played chess and other board games, listened to music and discussed
the classics and philosophers.78 And in a poem entitled “On a Visit to
the Dark Warrior Embankment,” he describes such an excursion:
With my brothers I travel for pleasure,
Riding in carriages through the western wall.
Farmlands have spread across the wilderness,
Rivers and waterways flow one to the other. . . . .
and after a few lines describing the flourishing crops, the trees and the
songs of birds, he concludes with the wish:
May the affection between us last for a thousand years.79
77
Biographies of Cao Ju and Cao Lin are at SGZ 20:581–82 and 582. After Cao Pi
succeeded his father and then proclaimed himself Emperor of the new Wei dynasty,
he named Cao Ju and Cao Lin as dukes and then as kings. When the puppet ruler
Cao Fang was deposed by Sima Shi in 254, Cao Ju was briefly proposed as his suc-
cessor: SGZ 4:130.
78
Cutter, “Symposium Poems,” 3–4.
79
Cao Pi, Yu Xuanwu bei zuo 於玄武陂作, in Liu Yisheng and Zhao Futan, Cao-
Wei fuzi shu xuan, 39. The Dark Warrior embankment was no doubt the dyke which
formed the artificial lake in the Xuanwu “Dark Warrior” Park.
With its praise for the development of the country about Ye city, the
poem is reminiscent of Cao Zhi’s Rhapsody on Climbing the Terrace,
and it may well have been composed on a similar occasion. The refer-
ence to brotherly love would surely have pleased the princes’ father,
but other pieces indicate a real tolerance and even affection between
the rivals. Wen xuan contains a group of poems classified as “The
Lord’s Feast” genre, three of them by Cao Zhi, Liu Zhen and Ying
Chang. It is believed that they were all composed on the occasion of a
banquet given by Cao Pi, while the host celebrated the occasion with
a matching piece, “Written at the Lotus Pond.”80
This was an elegant life, led by talented young men. Besides Liu
Zhen and Ying Chang, four of the other “Masters of Jian’an” later
identified by Cao Pi were among the coterie: Wang Can, Chen Lin,
Xu Gan and Ruan Yu; and the group also included Yang Xiu and the
brothers Ding, equally admired for their literary talents.
Ding Yi and Ding I were sons of Ding Chong, an old friend of Cao
Cao—very likely a kinsman of his first wife the Lady Ding—who had
escorted the emperor on his escape from Chang’an in 195 and helped
to arrange the transfer to Xu city in 196. He died soon afterwards,
but Cao Cao treated his sons with favour, and at one time intended
to marry Ding Yi to one his daughters. Ding Yi, however, had only
one eye, and when Cao Pi spoke against the match on that ground his
father accepted his advice. He did appoint Ding Yi as a clerk in his
Chancellor’s office, and he admired his ability, so that it is said he later
regretted having taken his son’s advice. Naturally enough, however,
the brothers were opposed to Cao Pi and supported the candidacy of
Cao Zhi.81
80
Cutter, “Symposium Poems,” 7–8, citing and discussing Wen xuan 20. The poems
by Cao Zhi and Liu Zhen are both entitled “The Lord’s Feast” (公宴 Gong yan) and
the one by Ying Chang is specific: “In Attendance at the Jianzhang Terrace Gathering
of the General of the Household for All Purposes” (侍五官中郎將建章臺集詩 Shi
wuguan zhonglang jiang Jianzhang tai ji shi). Cao Pi’s poem is called “Written at the
Lotus Pond” (芙蓉池作 Furong chi zuo).
There is no other reference to a Jianzhang “Establish Splendour” Terrace in the
texts. Emperor Wu of Former Han built a Jianzhang Palace outside the western wall
of the city of Chang’an (e.g. Knechtges I, 128 note to line 253), but it is most unlikely
that this was the scene of a courtly party at this time. More probably, a terrace of that
name had been constructed in the vicinity of Ye city: Cutter, loc. cit. note 36.
81
The personal names of the brothers were 儀 and 廙: both characters are tran-
scribed as yi in modern Mandarin, the first in the second tone, and the second in the
fourth tone. For convenience I refer to the younger as Ding I. The biography of Ding
414 chapter nine
Though he had no such reason to dislike Cao Pi, Yang Xiu was
also an ally of Cao Zhi. A son of the former Excellency Yang Biao by
his wife the Lady Yuan, a sister of Yuan Shu, he could claim a dis-
tinguished lineage, even if it had been compromised by Yuan Shu’s
failed usurpation of the imperial title. Yang Xiu became Registrar in
the Chancellor’s office, with close contact to Cao Cao and influence
throughout the government.82
It was most probably in 214, when Cao Cao left him in charge at Ye
city, that Cao Zhi came closest to receiving his father’s endorsement,
and Cao Pi was certainly uneasy at the competition from his talented
and charming younger brother; he is said to have consulted a physi-
ognomist in hope of reassurance. He had friends and supporters of
his own, however, and he could dissimulate on occasion. There was
one time that Cao Cao was departing on campaign, perhaps indeed
in 214, and Cao Zhi made a splendid speech, full of praise for his
father’s achievements and virtues. Everyone admired him, and Cao Pi
felt quite at a loss, but his friend Wu Zhi whispered, “As the king is
about to leave, weep,” Cao Pi followed his advice, shedding tears as he
bowed in farewell, and all in attendance wept in sympathy. Some now
felt that though Cao Zhi was a fine orator, he lacked true feeling.83
When Cao Cao canvassed opinion about his two sons, the consen-
sus among his senior advisers favoured Cao Pi. The senior clerk Xing
Yong had at one time been the head of Cao Zhi’s household, but dis-
approved of his frivolous conduct and argued that the claim of the
elder brother should take priority.84 Mao Jie and Cui Yan, Cao Cao’s
strict supervisors of official conduct, both argued that Cao Pi was the
rightful heir and fully worthy of appointment; it would be a serious
error to dispossess him. Mao Jie drew the parallel with the Yuan clan,
which had been brought to ruin by Yuan Shao’s preference for Yuan
Yi from Wei lue was preserved by SGZ 19:561–62 PC; that of Ding I is in SGZ 19:562
PC quoting Wenshi zhuan.
Wei lue says that Ding Chong’s son Ding Yi came from Pei. It is likely that Cao
Cao’s mother and his first wife, both of the Ding surname, were also from that region:
Chapter One at 28.
82
Biographies of Yang Biao are at HHS 54/44:1789–90 and SGZ 19:558–60 PC
quoting Wei lue.
83
SGZ 21:609 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu, and ZZTJ 68:2151; deC, Establish Peace,
513.
84
Xing Yong’s earlier appointment and his comments at this time are recorded by
SGZ 12:383; also ZZTJ 67:2133 and 67:2151; deC, Establish Peace, 478 and 512.
Shang at the expense of the elder Yuan Tan,85 while Cui Yan’s com-
ments were enhanced by the fact that one of his nieces was the wife
of Cao Zhi, so he might have been expected to favour his kinsman by
marriage.86
Yang Xiu and Ding Yi, however, sought to discredit Cao Zhi’s crit-
ics. In 215 or 216 Yang Xun, a protégé of Cui Yan, was criticised for an
over-effusive praise of Cao Cao, and when Cui Yan attempted to reas-
sure him he made the mistake of using the term “changes.” He meant
only that people would alter their opinion, but Ding Yi claimed he
was using the term in its political sense, implying hostility to Cao Cao
and hope for a new regime. Cui Yan was arrested on suspicion of trea-
son, and it was then alleged further that he displayed resentment and
aggression; he was put to death. When his colleague Mao Jie showed
sympathy, he too was sent to prison, and though other senior officials
pleaded for him, Cao Cao refused to listen. Mao Jie was eventually
released, but he was expelled from office and died soon afterwards.87 It
was clear that Ding Yi and Yang Xiu had considerable influence, and
members of the court became very cautious in dealing with them.88
About 215, after Wu Zhi had gone to his post in Henei, Cao Pi
turned to him again for support and advice, and Wu Zhi returned to
see him at Ye city, hidden in a basket in a cart. This was quite against
regulations, and Yang Xiu found out and reported the offence to Cao
Cao. Though Cao Cao did not investigate immediately, Cao Pi was
seriously worried. Wu Zhi reassured him, however, and on the follow-
ing day he had another load sent in, this time with a basket of silk. The
85
SGZ 12:375 and ZZTJ 67:2151; deC, Establish Peace, 512.
86
SGZ 12:368–69 and ZZTJ 67:2151; deC, Establish Peace, 512. Cui Yan also cited
the Gongyang commentary to Chunqiu [Legge, Classics V, prolegomena 54–55]:
When setting up an heir from the sons of a true wife, take the eldest and do not
make comparison of their virtue. When choosing between sons, take the children
of the true wife and make no comparison of their age.
By this calculation, Cao Pi, eldest son by Lady Bian the senior wife, was the only
rightful choice.
On the Lady Cui, wife of Cao Zhi, and her later sad fate, see Chapter Eight at 373
and also note 93 below.
87
The account of this incident is presented by ZZTJ 67:2144–45: deC, Establish
Peace, 502–504, quoting SGZ 12:369, 12:376, and 23:656–57. The contentious word
was bian 變 “changes.”
88
ZZTJ 67:2145–46; deC, Establish Peace, 504–505, based on SGZ 12:377, 22:632
and 12:381 PC quoting Wei shu.
416 chapter nine
guards inspected it but found nothing untoward, so Cao Pi was cleared

and Cao Cao began to have doubts about Yang Xiu.89
Despite the efforts of his supporters, Cao Zhi gradually lost favour
with his father. His biography says that he often acted upon impulse
and paid little attention to his conduct, adding that he drank wine
without restraint, while Cao Pi was cautious and controlled. In any
case, there had to be a strong reason for Cao Cao to override the gen-
eral expectation and appoint a younger son, and a discussion with the
elder statesman Jia Xu reinforced the comments of Xing Yong, Cui
Yan and Mao Jie:
Cao Cao dismissed his other attendants and asked Jia Xu about the
succession. Jia Xu remained silent and did not answer him.
“I spoke to you,” said Cao Cao, “but you did not reply. Why not?”
“I was thinking of something,” said Jia Xu, “so I did not respond imme-
diately.”
“What were you thinking about?” asked Cao Cao.
“I was thinking,” replied Jia Xu, “of Yuan Benchu [Yuan Shao] and Liu
Jingsheng [Liu Biao], the fathers and their sons.” Cao Cao gave a great
laugh.90
Though the conversation is said to have been private, Jia Xu may have
told the story later, and the political argument was strong: the last
thing that such a new state needed was a succession quarrel between
the factions of two rival princes. In the winter at the end of 217 Cao
Pi was formally proclaimed Heir to the kingdom of Wei.
Cao Cao was now sixty-three by Chinese reckoning, and would die
two years later, so the decision was timely, and even overdue. Cao Pi,
however, was just over thirty when he was appointed, and Cao Cao
had sired only two older sons: Cao Ang, who had been killed in 197
aged about twenty; and Cao Shuo, who had died perhaps a year of so
later. It was fortunate for his dynasty that Cao Cao lived to see other
sons grow to manhood. Ten years earlier the succession could have
been very insecure.
89
SGZ 19:19:560–61 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu, also ZZTJ 68:2162; deC, Establish
Peace, 536. The letter of Cao Pi to Wu Zhi, written early in 218 and cited at 420 below,
refers to the fact that they have not seen one another for three years.
90
SGZ 10:330, the biography of Jia Xu. Sima Guang gives considerable weight to
the story: ZZTJ 68:2151; deC, Establish Peace, 513.
When the decision was announced, Cao Pi was naturally delighted:

“Can you imagine how happy I am, Mr Xin?” he exclaimed, embrac-
ing the Consultant Xin Pi. Told of this, Xin Pi’s daughter remarked
with moral foreboding, “To take the ruler’s place is a serious duty; to
be master of a state is a fearful task. He should be sober and anxious,
but instead he rejoices. . . . . Here lies the ruin of Wei.”
More charitably, one might believe Cao Pi was glad to know that his
father thought well of him.
In contrast, Cao Pi’s mother the Lady Bian was a model of pro-
priety and restraint. Congratulated by her attendants, and urged to
celebrate with extravagant gifts, the Lady replied that she was only
concerned to have produced a worthy son—there was no cause to offer
presents. Her sentiments were reported to Cao Cao, who commented,
“In anger, not to change expression; in happiness, not to lose control:
these are the truly difficult things.” And Sima Guang commented on
the contrast between the mother and her son: the wisdom of women
is greater than that of men.
As some compensation for his decision, Cao Cao had Cao Zhi’s fief
increased by the revenue of five thousand households, added to his
original ten thousand. Though surely disappointed, however, Cao Zhi
appears to have been determined to prove his father’s decision correct.
Soon afterwards, without authority he rode a carriage to a Major’s
Gate of the palace, compelled the guards to let him through, then trav-
elled from the city on the speedway. The speedway (馳道 chidao) was
the central track of a highway, formally reserved for the emperor or
a king, and used by others only with special permission. The Major’s
Gate was the outermost of a palace, and all those entering or leav-
ing were required to dismount as they passed through. Cao Cao was
furious, for Cao Zhi had shown contempt for protocol and usurped
his royal prerogative. In a series of proclamations he denounced his
conduct and observed that he now felt obliged to keep close watch on
all his family.91
91
SGZ 557–58 and 558 PC quoting Wei-Wu gushi, which cites Cao Cao’s three
proclamations.
This whole affair has been discussed in detail by Cutter, “The Incident at the Gate,”
and I largely follow his conclusions: deC, Establish Peace, 514–515. Though SJZ 16:544
relates this incident to a gate at Luoyang, it most probably took place at Ye city.
418 chapter nine
Very possibly as a consequence of this new surveillance, Cao Cao

discovered that Cao Zhi’s wife the Lady Cui had disobeyed the sump-
tuary laws by wearing embroidered silk. It is said that Cao Cao himself
saw her when he was on a tower, but in any case she was sent back
to her family and ordered to kill herself.92 The blow to Cao Zhi can
barely be imagined.
Not long afterwards his friend and ally Yang Xiu suffered a similar
fate. Taking advantage of his close involvement in Cao Cao’s coun-
cils, Yang Xiu had kept Cao Zhi informed of matters coming up for
discussion so that he could prepare appropriate advice. It appears this
arrangement continued even after Cao Pi had been chosen as Heir, but
eventually Cao Cao became suspicious and the trick was discovered.
Yang Xiu was known for his opposition to Cao Pi—there was the ear-
lier accusation against Wu Zhi—and Cao Cao now recalled that his
mother was a sister of the former usurper and enemy Yuan Shu. Cao
Cao had great respect for Yang Xiu’s ability, but equally great concern
for the trouble he might cause Cao Pi. The former favourite was there-
fore accused of communicating unlawfully with a feudal lord, Cao Zhi,
and was executed.93
92
SGZ 12:389 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu; also Chapter Eight at 373.
93
SGZ 19:561 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu, and ZZTJ 68:2162; deC, Establish Peace,
536. In “Incident at the Gate,” 234–238, Cutter discusses the death of Yang Xiu, with
various other reasons and circumstances given by different texts. He questions whether
Yang Xiu’s fate was indeed closely linked to the Incident at the Gate, pointing out that
several sources and commentators give the date of his death as 219.
On this last point, however, I note that Cao Pi was named Heir of Wei in the winter
at the end of 217, and it is likely that the Incident at the Gate took place in the fol-
lowing year, 218. Furthermore, though Wei lue at SGZ 19:560 PC says that Yang Xiu
was executed in the autumn of Jian’an 24 [219], the main text of SGZ 19:558 mentions
it before Jian’an 24.
Pace Cutter, therefore, I suspect that the Incident at the Gate and the disgrace and
death of Yang Xiu, as well as the death of the Lady Cui, all took place in the early
months of 218.
There are two quasi-fictional incidents associated with the death of Yang Xiu. The
first, from Wenshi zhuan, quoted in the commentary of Liu Jun to SSXY XI:1 [Quick
Perception] and translated by Mather, Tales of the World, 292, tells how Yang Xiu had
prepared replies to Cao Cao’s likely questions, but his papers were disturbed by the
wind; Cao Zhi, however, is not mentioned.
Furthermore, the sixth-century collection of Xiaoshuo compiled by Yin Yun claims
that after the execution of Yang Xiu Cao Cao wrote to his father Yang Biao and Cao
Cao’s wife the Lady Bian wrote to his mother, the Lady Yuan. The letters are remark-
able: Cao Cao offers apologies and presents, for example, but Yang Biao replies that,
though his son was surely at fault—what else could he say?—the gifts only add to his
sorrow and his fear. The text is at GXSGC 91–92, and is translated by Kroll, “Por-
The final blow to Cao Zhi’s position came in the autumn of 219.
Liu Bei’s general Guan Yu had attacked Cao Ren in the north of Jing
province, driven in his defences and laid siege to the key city of Fan.94
Cao Cao proposed to appoint Cao Zhi as General of the Household
of the South, with acting command as a full general to lead a relief
expedition. When he was called in, however, Cao Zhi had been drink-
ing, and was incapable of receiving his instructions. Cao Cao sent him
away and cancelled the appointment.95
Though the years of uncertainty had confused the issue, it does not
appear that Cao Cao ever regretted his decision of 217. There has been
speculation whether Cao Zhi might yet have gained the succession at
the expense of Cao Pi, but the record of his conduct makes it most
unlikely. It has also been suggested that his erratic behaviour was delib-
erate: a policy of self-abnegation to remove himself from contention
and ensure that Cao Cao’s inheritance was maintained without contest
in favour of Cao Pi. Both theories, however, are surely mistaken: Cao
Zhi was a brilliant young man and a remarkable poet, but he was also
unconventional, thoughtless, irresponsible and frequently intoxicated.96
His artistic temperament was attractive, both to the people of his own
time and to later scholars, and was not inappropriate for one of the
great literary figures of China—but it did not qualify Cao Zhi to suc-
ceed his father as ruler of the new-found state of Wei. When the time
came, Cao Pi would surely provide a safer pair of hands.
traits,” 288–289, but no earlier source has been preserved, and one must doubt the
historicity of the exchange.
The complex relationship between Cao Cao and Yang Xiu, whom he admired but
later came to distrust, became a theme of later fiction: for examples, Chapter Eleven
at 475, 486 and 503.
94
This campaign is discussed in Chapter Ten at x.
95
SGZ 19:558. SGZ 19:561 PC quotes Wei-shi chunqiu, which claims that Cao
Pi tricked his brother into getting drunk. This, however, is probably no more than
another of the calumnies published by Sun Sheng, the author of this and other works
dealing with the period. While Cao Zhi was presumably with the army at Luoyang,
it is almost certain that Cao Pi was in Ye city at this time: he put down a potential
rebellion there in the ninth month of 219 [SGZ 1:52 PC quoting Wei-Jin shiyu; deC,
Establish Peace, 535–536] and he was at Ye when his father died at the beginning of
the following year [SGZ 15:481; Fang, Chronicle I, 18].
Cao Zhi was not entirely unused to responsibility and military affairs: besides his
nominal command at Ye city in 214 he had accompanied his father on the north-
western campaign in 211.
96
Cutter, “Incident at the Gate,” 261, particularly quoting the modern scholar
Deng Yongkang.
420 chapter nine
217: the year of the plague
Though the Annals/Biography of Cao Cao in Sanguo zhi have no men-

tion of the matter, the Annals of Emperor Xian in Hou Han shu say
that in 217 there was a great plague.97 This was the first such record
since the time of Emperor Ling in 185, a generation earlier, but the
effect appears to have been devastating. In a letter to Wu Zhi dated
to 18 March 218, Cao Pi tells how “In last year’s epidemic many of
our family and friends met with disaster. Xu [Gan], Chen [Lin], Ying
[Chang] and Liu [Zhen] all died at that time.”98 These were four of the
men whom Cao Pi would later list as his Seven Masters; Kong Rong
and Ruan Yu had died in 208 and 212. The remaining Master, Wang
Can, also died in 217, on campaign with Cao Cao against Sun Quan, as
did Sima Lang, who was also admired by Cao Pi.99 Though we have no
further information, it seems reasonable to believe that such high mor-
tality among a comparatively young and certainly privileged group of
courtiers and composers was reflected in the general population.
As for previous outbreaks, there is no good way to tell the nature of
the disease. It could have been a revival of the Antonine plague from
a generation earlier, made more virulent by the interval; or possibly a
new incursion such as measles, which is also believed to have begun to
affect humans at this time. There was a further attack in the autumn of
223, and another in the summer of 234, while the Roman empire was
ravaged once more in the middle of the century.100
The plague of 217 affected Cao Cao’s army as well as his court: Wang
Can and Sima Lang died on the campaign to the southwest early that
year, and Sima Lang’s biography refers specifically to sickness in the
97
HHS 9:389; cf. SGZ 1:49–50. The term used, dayi 大疫, is the same as for earlier
outbreaks.
98
The letter is quoted by Wei lue in SGZ 21:608 PC, and is dated to Jian’an 23.
Another version in WH 42:6a-7a gives the day: Cutter, “Symposium Poems,” 4–5,
whose translation I largely follow.
99
Wang Can and Zhong Yao had written that good government could be achieved
only by a sage, but Sima Lang sent in an essay arguing that if there were enough men
of high quality, even if they were not sages, they could achieve success. His essay was
admired by Cao Pi, and when he became Emperor of Wei he had a copy placed in the
imperial library: SGZ 15:468 and PC quoting Wei shu.
100
SGZ 2:82 and 3:101, McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 103–104 and 260 citing
Zhongguo lidai tianzai renhuo biao 中國歷代天災人禍表 compiled by Chen Gaoyong
陳高佣 and first published in Shanghai in 1940. On the epidemics which affected
China in the latter part of the second century, and which I have suggested were related
to the Antonine plague of the contemporary Roman empire, see Chapter One at 36.
camp. Cao Cao was nonetheless able to force Sun Quan’s formal sur-
render, and later in the year Liu Bei led an army against Xiahou Yuan
in Hanzhong.101 It does not appear that either campaign was affected
by the new epidemic.
101
On the campaign against Sun Quan, see Chapter Seven at 318; on the campaign
of Liu Bei, see Chapter Ten at 426.
CHAPTER TEN
THE LAST YEARS 218–220
Liu Bei in Hanzhong 218–219

Guan Yu and Lü Meng 219
Posthumous emperor 220
The later history of Cao Wei
Chronology 218–2201
218 spring: short-lived rebellion at Xu city

Liu Bei sends an army into Hanzhong; driven back by Cao Hong
summer: Wuhuan rebellion put down by Cao Cao’s son Zhang;
Kebineng of the Xianbi surrenders
winter: rebellion in Nanyang
219 spring: Nanyang rebellion put down by Cao Ren
Liu Bei defeats Xiahou Yuan at Dingjun Mountain
summer: Cao Cao withdraws from Hanzhong; Liu Bei presses
east down the Han
autumn: Liu Bei proclaims himself King of Hanzhong; Guan Yu
attacks north in Jing province, besieges Cao Ren in Fan city
rebellion of Wei Feng at Ye city
winter: Guan Yu defeated at Fan; Lü Meng seizes Jing province
for Sun Quan and destroys Guan Yu
220 spring [15 March]: Cao Cao dies at Luoyang; Cao Pi succeeds
him as King of Wei
winter [11 December]: Cao Pi takes the imperial title; Cao Cao
is given posthumous honour as Martial Emperor of Wei [Wei
Wudi]
*****
1
The major source for Cao Cao’s activities from 218 to 220 is SGZ 1:50–53. They
are presented in chronicle order by ZZTJ 68:2154–74 and 69:2175; deC, Establish
Peace, 508–560.
424 chapter ten
Chronology from 220
222 Lu Xun defeats the revenge attack of Liu Bei against Sun Quan
226 death of Cao Pi, succeeded by his son Cao Rui
238 death of Cao Rui, succeeded by Cao Fang under the regency of
Cao Shuang
249 Sima Yi destroys Cao Shuang and seizes power in the state of
Wei for his family
254 Sima Shi deposes Cao Fang, replacing him with Cao Mao
255 Sima Shi succeeded by Sima Zhao
260 Cao Mao killed in a coup d’état; replaced by Cao Huan
264 conquest of Shu-Han
266 Sima Yan takes title as Emperor of Jin
280 conquest of Wu by Jin
Liu Bei in Hanzhong 218–219
Even while Cao Cao steadily developed his position with honours,
titles and insignia, he continued to proclaim his loyalty to Han and
to represent himself as a servant—albeit a most successful and distin-
guished one—of the established dynasty. To many people, however, his
protestations sounded hollow, and a few daring souls were prepared
to risk their lives in hope of overthrowing the usurper and restoring
the sovereign to his rightful place at the head of the government. In
217, concerned at the possibility that Cao Cao would take formal title
as emperor, a group of officials planned to seize power at Xu city and
invite Liu Bei’s general Guan Yu to come north to support them.
The leader of the plot was a certain Jin Yi of Jingzhao, member of an
old family of Han loyalists,2 and he was joined by the Minister Steward
Geng Ji, of similar background, by the censorial official Wei Huang,
and by the Court Physician Ji Ben with his two sons Miao and Mu. Jin
Yi had been a friend of Wang Bi, a long-time servant of Cao Cao who
2
SGZ 1:50 PC quotes the commentary to Sanfu juelu by Zhi Yu of Jin, which has
a detailed account of the incident, and explains that Jin Yi was a descendant of Jin
Midi of the early first century BC, who was born a Xiongnu but became a loyal servant
of Emperor Wu and foiled an assassination plot in 88: Loewe, QHX, 196–197. Jin Yi
sought to emulate his achievement in the service of Han.
Geng Ji belonged to a clan which had close connection to the house of Liu, some-
times by marriage, during Later Han: HHS 19/9:718.
the last years 218–220 425
was now his garrison commander at Xu city, so there was an element

of surprise, while the conspirators evidently hoped that the approach
of Guan Yu would gain them time to hold the city against the forces
loyal to Cao Cao. Guan Yu was a notable military commander, and
his army presented a continuing threat to Cao Cao’s position in Jing
province, but his nearest troops were three hundred kilometres to the
south, and it would not have been easy for him to reach Xu city in
time to support the rising. One must wonder who devised the plan,
and why this comparatively unimpressive group of civilians thought it
had any real chance.
In the event, the attempt was quite unsuccessful. Ji Miao led a mixed
body of followers and household retainers in a night attack on Wang
Bi’s headquarters, but though they burnt down the gate and Wang Bi
was badly wounded, he was able to escape and rallied support in the
city. When day broke the rebels were in confusion, and troops from
the local military colonies came to aid Wang Bi. The insurgents were
quickly captured and killed, but Wang Bi died of his injuries a few
days later.
It is not surprising that there was a steady level of opposition to
Cao Cao’s pretensions from romantic supporters of the tradition of
Han, though it seldom came to such a head. There had earlier been the
sad case of the Empress Fu, and in the following year there would be
the rising of Wei Feng at Ye city, while other malcontents may have
been sufficiently intimidated by the prospects of detection that they
took no action. Cao Cao could generally trust his military men, but
he could never be completely sure of his officials, particularly those
who related their position to the empire of Han, and there was always
potential for trouble. The risk, however, was comparatively low, and
the greater threat came from outside enemies, particularly Liu Bei and
his comrade Guan Yu.
Cao Cao had defeated Zhang Lu and received his surrender of Han-
zhong in the last months of 215, but he left the commandery soon
afterwards. He spent much of 216 at Ye city, no doubt engaged in its
massive building program, and he also received title as King of Wei
from the imperial court at Xu. At the end of the year he embarked on
the offensive to the southeast which brought the nominal surrender of
Sun Quan, and after his return to Ye he was occupied with the choice
of his successor. Isolated and a considerable distance from his centre
of operations, Hanzhong had not been a high priority.
426 chapter ten
Immediately after the submission of Zhang Lu, Cao Cao made some
attempt to gain a foothold in the north of Ba commandery, across
the watershed between the Han River and the Sichuan basin, but his
non-Chinese allies in the region were defeated and his general Zhang
He was driven back by Liu Bei’s comrade Zhang Fei, so the two sides
remained separated by the natural boundary. In his absence Cao Cao
entrusted overall command of operations in the area to Xiahou Yuan,
and attempted to reinforce him with transfers from the Wei valley;
these moves, however, had not been very successful. There followed
a period of consolidation on both sides, but at the end of 217, as Cao
Cao was still occupied in the east Liu Bei resolved to test Xiahou
Yuan’s position.3
In the longer term, Hanzhong was critical to Liu Bei’s control of
Yi province: a hostile army in the valley of the Han would present a
constant threat of invasion down the Jialing Jiang or across the moun-
tains; but if he held it himself he would have a highly defensible fron-
tier among the high ridges and narrow roadways of the main Qin Ling
range. As early as 211, the possibility that Cao Cao might take the
territory from Zhang Lu had been the reason Liu Zhang sought Liu
Bei’s support—with unfortunate consequences for himself—and now
Liu Bei had taken over he was faced with the reality of that threat.
His natural line of approach was upstream along the Jialing Jiang,
then through the Yangping Pass eastwards into the valley of the Han;
a similar route from the north had been followed by Cao Cao in 215.
In the winter or spring at the turn of 217–218, therefore, Liu Bei sent
Zhang Fei and Ma Chao on a first expedition. Cao Cao’s cousin Cao
Hong held a detached command at Xiabian, capital of Wudu com-
mandery on the left flank of the advance, and the generals Wu Lan and
Lei Tong were sent to guard that direction. They were heavily defeated
by Cao Hong, however, and their troops were then attacked by the Di
people. Both commanders were killed, and while Zhang Fei and Ma
Chao withdrew in haste a local chieftain sent the head of Wu Lan to
Cao Cao as a token of good will.4
3
At SGZ Shu 7:961 the biography of Liu Bei’s adviser Fa Zheng ascribes the pro-
posal to him, but Liu Bei could probably have thought of it for himself.
The campaign is described in some detail by SGZ Shu 2:884, which indicates that
operations commenced in 218. SGZ 1:50 dates it to 217, presumably late in the year.
4
SGZ 1:51, Shu 12:1020.
After a pause to regroup his disconcerted troops, Liu Bei returned

to the offensive, this time taking personal command. He reached the
entrance to the Yangping Pass without difficulty, but was then held in
stalemate for several months. He sent a detachment to cut the Baoye
Road, chief supply and communications route for the Wei troops
through the mountains to the north, but it was driven back by Cao
Cao’s general Xu Huang, while the Yangping Pass was firmly held by
Zhang He. Increasingly concerned, in the summer of 218 Liu Bei sent
orders back to Chengdu that all men available should be mobilised for
the offensive.
Recognising Liu Bei’s ambitions, in the autumn of 218 Cao Cao
returned to the west, and in the ninth month he set headquarters at
Chang’an. He was still, however, somewhat distracted. Early in the
summer there had been a rising among the Wuhuan people of Dai
and Shanggu commanderies in the far north, and though it was suc-
cessfully dealt with by his son Cao Zhang—in his first military com-
mand—such potential problems made it difficult to commit himself to
a long-distance campaign. Soon after he arrived at Chang’an, more-
over, there was a mutiny in Nanyang, where the garrison commander
at Wan city took the Administrator captive. As in the conspiracy at
Xu earlier in the year, there was a possibility Guan Yu might come to
aid the insurgents, and Wan city was closer than Xu and in a more
vulnerable position. Cao Ren, commander of the frontier against Guan
Yu, was ordered to deal with the problem, but the city was not retaken
until three months later, at the beginning of the following year. Here
again was reason for Cao Cao to remain at Chang’an, not committing
himself too strongly across the Qin Ling ranges.
The delay, however, had serious consequences, for in the spring of
219, very soon after Cao Ren had captured Wan city, Liu Bei obtained
a decisive victory.5 From his position on the Jialing Jiang facing the
Yangping Pass, he moved east through the hill country, emerging to
set camp at Dingjun Mountain, on the southern bank of the Han and
forty kilometres from Nanzheng, capital of the commandery.6 By this
5
The battle is mentioned at several places in Sanguo zhi, but many references
relate rather to individual achievements, as recorded in a man’s biography, than to
the action as a whole. The story is thus somewhat confused. ZZTJ 68:2157–58 presents
a summary narrative, but is not entirely satisfactory: deC, Establish Peace, 524–527.
I attempt a reconstruction here.
6
Dingjun Mountain is opposite the present-day city of Mianxian.
428 chapter ten
unexpected approach he broke into the heartland of Hanzhong, and

as Xiahou Yuan came out from Nanzheng, Zhang He, now outflanked
at Yangping, returned to give support. Liu Bei, however, attacked the
two camps by night, and set fire to their protective abatis.7 As Zhang
He came under increasing pressure, Xiahou Yuan detached some of
his own men to assist him, but at that point the enemy recognised an
opportunity: Liu Bei’s officer Huang Zhong charged from the heights
and broke Xiahou Yuan’s army. Xiahou Yuan was killed, and the
forces of Wei were driven from the field.
Zhang He managed to rally the defeated troops, but he could not
regain the advantage and was restricted to the hills, guarding the
entrance to the Baoye and other roads to the north while Liu Bei occu-
pied the open ground. When Cao Cao at last arrived a few weeks later,
he could find no good way to restore the situation, for Liu Bei had
firm control over the valley of the Han. Cao Cao faced him for a time,
looking for some weakness, but there was nothing to be done. In the
middle of summer he abandoned the territory and withdrew his men
across the Qin Ling divide, while he also arranged the transfer and
migration of several thousand Di people from Wudu north into the
valley of the Wei River.
Confirming his triumph and displaying his further ambition, in the

early autumn Liu Bei took title as King of Hanzhong. He published a
memorial to the imperial throne announcing the self-promotion, and
he sent back the seals of a general and marquis which he had received
under Cao Cao’s aegis. Since the emperor remained under Cao Cao’s
control, the return of the insignia may not actually have taken place,
for a messenger to Xu city would not have been well received. The cer-
emony and proclamation were nonetheless fine pieces of propaganda,
supplementing Liu Bei’s success in the field by a claim to equal rank
with Cao Cao, while the choice of his nominal fief reflected the origins
of the Han dynasty itself: the founding Emperor Gao of Former Han
7
An abatis [Chinese lujue 鹿角, “deer horns”] is a line of brushwood and tree
branches, their points facing outwards, which acts like barbed wire: the obstacle
impedes an enemy attack, while the defenders can shoot or throw missiles through
the spaces.
had first been enfeoffed as King of Han in 206 BC, with the territory
of Ba, Shu and Hanzhong, all now held by Liu Bei.8
Liu Bei swiftly followed his military success with an aggressive cam-
paign eastwards against Cao Cao’s positions in Jing province. In 208
Cao Cao had established a frontier commandery at Fangling, a county
which had belonged to Hanzhong under Later Han, and whose city
was on a southern tributary of the Han River. Liu Bei now sent orders
for his officer Meng Da, who was stationed on the Yangzi near the
mouth of the Gorges, to move north into Fangling.9 Meng Da had to
travel a hundred kilometres north along the western flank of the army
of Wei commanded by Cao Ren, but Cao Ren was under threat from
Guan Yu on the lower valley of the Han and could spare no troops to
relieve Fangling. The territory was taken and Cao Cao’s Administrator
was killed.
At the same time, moreover, Liu Bei sent his adopted son Liu Feng
downstream from Hanzhong to take over command from Meng Da.10
The local warlord Shen Dan, who had been a nominal ally of Zhang
Lu and had then submitted to Cao Cao, changed allegiance once again
and was named Administrator of Shangyong, while his brother Shen
Yi was given charge of Xicheng. The Shen family were fair-weather
allies of no more than local importance, but Liu Feng’s control of Fan-
gling threatened the west of Cao Ren’s position in Nanyang and Nan
commanderies, and more immediate danger arrived very quickly.
8
E.g. HS 1:28; Dubs, HFHD I, 66. Liu Bei’s proclamation is recorded in SGZ Shu
2:884–85, though strangely no date is given in that text. The Annals of HHS 9:389
record the self-enfeoffment, and date it to the gengzi 庚子 day of the seventh month;
that month, however, had no gengzi day. It is possible that gengzi has been miswritten
for gengwu 庚午: the gengwu day of the seventh month of that year was 18 August
219.
9
Meng Da held title as Administrator of Yidu commandery, with his headquarters
at Zigui city, on the same site as present-day Zigui in Hubei. Depending upon require-
ments, many such small commanderies were set up during these years. Cao Cao’s
Fangling was another, as were Shangyong and Xicheng below; none were necessarily
long-term establishments.
10
Born in 192, Liu Feng was a son of the Kou family of Changsha, which was
related by marriage to the Liu clan of that commandery. When Liu Bei came into
Jing province in 201 he had no heir, so he adopted Liu Feng as his son and putative
successor. Liu Feng showed some enterprise and ability at the time of the seizure of
Yi province from Liu Zhang, but his position as heir had been eliminated by the birth
of Liu Bei’s own son Liu Shan in 207.
Brown and deC, “Adoption,” 245, discuss the case of Liu Feng as an example of
adoption from a different surname.
430 chapter ten
Guan Yu and Lü Meng in Jing province 219
The attack on Fangling took place at the end of summer, and in the
early autumn Liu Bei proclaimed his royal title, naming his son Liu
Shan as Heir. He then returned to Chengdu, where he set up the
formalities of a court, with offices and rewards for his followers. In
the eighth month Liu Bei’s commander in Jing province, Guan Yu,
launched a major offensive to the north. Leaving his Administrator of
Nan commandery Mi Fang to guard Jiangling, and the general Shi Ren
in charge at Gong’an,11 he led his main army and fleet up the Han to
attack Cao Ren in Nanyang.12
Cao Ren had his headquarters at Fan city, which lay on the northern
bank of the Han opposite Xiangyang the former capital of Liu Biao; it
is now part of the Xiangfan metropolis. His defences were supported
on the outside by seven large camps, each commanded by an officer of
general rank. Strategically it was a strong position, for below Xiangyang
and Fan the river runs through a comparatively narrow pass between
high ground on the east and west. Unfortunately, however, the open
ground about the twin cities receives water not only from the Han but
also from a great number of tributaries which flow south across the
open country of Nanyang, and the narrows of the Han can slow its
escape. Just as Guan Yu was approaching, the autumn rains brought
massive flooding onto Cao Ren’s positions, and his supporting camps
were overwhelmed by metres of water.13
The men of Wei sought refuge on causeways and patches of high
ground, but Guan Yu sent his ships to attack them, and one by one
the isolated groups were compelled to surrender. Their overall com-
mander Yu Jin was taken prisoner, and though his associate Pang De
11
One source has the surname of Shi Ren as Fushi, but the character fu is probably
a mistaken addition.
12
Lewis, China Between Empires, 35–36, says that Guan Yu attacked down the
Han River. This, however, is a confusion. As above, Liu Bei indeed pressed against
Fangling, in the border country between Hanzhong and Nanyang, but Guan Yu’s
offensive was launched from the middle Yangzi, and he was moving up the Han River.
Details of the campaign are in deC, Generals of the South, 393–407.
13
The flooding is recorded by the Treatise of the Five Powers, HHS 105/15:3312.
The Hou Han shu of Yuan Shansong related it to the abdication of Han to the new
dynasty of Wei at the end of the following year, but it had more practical significance
for the armies at Xiangyang.
held out for longer and refused to submit, the result was the same.14
With his support destroyed, Cao Ren was isolated in Fan city, sur-
rounded by a triumphant water-borne enemy.
The fortifications of a traditional Chinese city gave some protec-
tion against flood-waters as well as against a land-based attack, but
the tamped-earth barriers of Fan were only a few feet above the water-
level and were in danger of washing away. Guan Yu’s ships could sail
direct to the walls, could use hooks and grapnels to break them down,
and could shoot or launch boarding raids against their defenders. As
the city of Xiangyang was surrounded, attacked and fell, Cao Ren was
urged to make his escape from Fan, but he resolved to hold out, and
he drowned a white horse as sacrifice and covenant to confirm the
decision.
Despite the damp and the danger, there was good reason to main-
tain the position as long as possible. Cao Ren still had several thousand
men under his immediate command, and horses for his cavalry, and
he might hope that the flood-waters would go down as swiftly as they
had appeared. So long as he and his division were there, moreover,
they were a threat to any further advance by Guan Yu, while if they
should surrender the invader would have little to halt him south of the
Yellow River. Even as he surrounded Cao Ren, Guan Yu was sending
probing parties towards Xu city, and some local leaders were prepared
to act as allies. Should he take his army north there was every possibil-
ity of unrest and uprising in favour of the charismatic Liu Bei and his
claim of loyalty to his imperial kinsman.15
Further north in Ye city, possibly related to Guan Yu’s success but
perhaps only coincidental, there was a conspiracy led by the clerical
officer Wei Feng and a few senior officials, including Chen Yi, who
was commandant of the guards at the residence of the Lady Bian,
lately proclaimed Queen of Wei. This was very close to home, but then
Chen Yi became frightened and confessed. Cao Pi, who held charge
14
While Yu Jin surrendered, Pang De held out to the last man and the last arrow,
and when he was captured he defied Guan Yu and was killed. Cao Cao commented
that he had never expected Yu Jin to show himself inferior to the courage of Pang De:
SGZ 17:524 and 18:546; deC, Establish Peace, 533–34.
15
The strategic position is presented in the form of advice from Man Chong,
Administrator of Runan, who had brought assistance to Cao Ren at the time of Guan
Yu’s first approach: SGZ 26:722; deC, Establish Peace, 534.
432 chapter ten
of Ye city, arrested and killed several dozen of those who had been
implicated, and the trouble was ended.16
It is difficult to assess the seriousness of the situation, but there was
certainly cause for concern. Guan Yu had destroyed or captured a con-
siderable number of Cao Cao’s men, and Cao Ren was isolated in Fan
city. Liu Bei had an army further up the Han, to press against Nanyang
from the west, while there was unrest in Hongnong and, more impor-
tantly, in the region about Xu city. It may have been an exaggeration
to suggest, as Man Chong is said to have done, that the fall of Fan
would bring the loss of everything south of the Yellow River, but Nan-
yang commandery was certainly vulnerable, and it is said that Cao Cao
considered shifting the emperor north from Xu city to some place of
greater security, presumably his own capital at Ye.17 In the mean time
he returned from the failed campaign in Hanzhong, and in the tenth
month he reached Luoyang and set his headquarters there.
At first news of the attack, Cao Cao sent his experienced commander
Xu Huang from Hanzhong with a detachment to support Cao Ren,
but by the time he arrived the floods had overwhelmed Yu Jin and
Cao Ren was surrounded in Fan city. Xu Huang had too few troops
to effect his relief, but with the advice of Zhao Yan, who had been
appointed to his staff, he brought his men forward to threaten Guan
Yu’s lines from the outside, and shot arrows with messages of support
and encouragement to the besieged.
As the main body of Cao Cao’s field army gradually came to join
him at Luoyang, he was able to commit increasing numbers of troops
to the struggle against Guan Yu. He himself came forward to the Mo
Slope some seventy-five kilometres north of Wan, but he did not take
16
Sadly, two of the executed conspirators were the sons of the great scholar and
composer Wang Can, who had died two years earlier. Wang Can’s possessions,
including the great library of which part had been inherited from Cai Yong, came
to his nephew Wang Ye and later to Wang Ye’s son Wang Bi, precocious scholar of
Daode jing.
17
This statement appears in the biographies of Sima Yi at JS 1:3 and of Jiang Ji at
SGZ 14:450–51, followed by ZZTJ 68:2164–65; deC, Establish Peace, 538. Both texts
continue by recording how the protagonists argued that the loss of Yu Jin and his men
through the floods did not indicate a failure of the state itself and did not call for such
a show of anxiety, and how they proposed that Cao Cao should encourage Sun Quan
to attack Guan Yu from behind. As discussed below, this last appears unlikely, and
both accounts may have been designed simply to enhance the prescience of the two
advisers. Cao Cao would, however, have been well aware of the exposed position of
Xu city, and might indeed have been prepared to move the court.
direct control of operations: he was persuaded that by holding back he

showed both the strength of his resources and his confidence in Cao
Ren and the other commanders in the field.18 The demonstration of
reserve power was impressive, but it is also possible that Cao Cao was
feeling the effects of his recent exertions—he was now sixty-five, and
he had only a few months to live.
In any case, even without his immediate oversight Xu Huang and
his reinforced army were managing very well. Guan Yu had set his
headquarters at the chief point of the siege lines, with four lesser camps
about him. Xu Huang first threatened the main position, spreading
rumours that this was his target, but then made a series of raids against
the outlying posts, and attacked Guan Yu when he went to support
them. Following up the success, he broke the enemy lines and com-
pelled Guan Yu to end the siege. Cao Ren was relieved and the Wei
troops were reunited.
Guan Yu was still a threat, for his fleet controlled the river and his
army held the city of Xiangyang on the southern bank. At this point,
however, Sun Quan’s general Lü Meng entered the fray, engineering
one of the most dramatic coups—in some eyes one of the greatest
betrayals—of Chinese history.
Since the time of their first alliance against Cao Cao and the victory
at the Red Cliffs in 208, relations between Sun Quan and Liu Bei had
been uneasy and unsatisfactory. In 210 Liu Bei had vetoed Zhou Yu’s
proposal to attack Liu Zhang in Yi province, but in 214 he took the
territory for himself. After a brief confrontation in 215, Sun Quan
obtained some compensation east of the Xiang River, but Guan Yu still
controlled the bulk of Jing province and Sun Quan’s local commander
Lu Su, a diplomat rather than a fighting man, was primarily concerned
to keep the peace. When Lu Su died in 217, he was succeeded by Lü
Meng, who continued the rapprochement with Guan Yu.
Forty years old, Lü Meng had been in the service of the Sun family
since the time of Sun Ce, and had shown enterprise on several occa-
sions. At the time of the dispute in 215, while Lu Su held Guan Yu at
bay, it was Lü Meng who swept south to seize the Xiang valley. He was
18
The Mo Slope was a ridge of the present Funiu Hills, on the watershed between
the basin of the Han River and the streams which flow north into the Yellow River.
SGZ 22:632 says that it was Cao Cao’s attendant Huan Jie who persuaded him to hold
back; deC, Establish Peace, 545.
434 chapter ten
obviously more energetic than Lu Su, but the threat from Cao Cao was
sufficient to render any breach dangerous to both parties, and after his
appointment Lü Meng gave special attention to reassuring Guan Yu
that he had no cause for concern.
Guan Yu was in any case confident of his own military prowess, and
he does not appear to have held any great respect for Lu Su and his
peace policy, nor for Lü Meng as his successor. He may well have been
encouraged in this attitude by the unimpressive record of Sun Quan’s
forces on the lower Yangzi. The debacle at Hefei in 215 had been fol-
lowed by the surrender of 217, and though this latter agreement meant
that Sun Quan formally owed allegiance to Cao Cao, Guan Yu had no
reason to believe it would have any significance in his own dealings
with the men of Wu. It is said that Sun Quan had suggested one of
his sons as husband for a daughter of Guan Yu, but Guan Yu rejected
the alliance. He was nonetheless confident that his eastern neighbour
would not dare move directly against him, and in a further fit of arro-
gance, after the surrender of Yu Jin and his men Guan Yu seized the
stores held by Sun Quan at Xiangguan, to feed and supply these new
prisoners and potential recruits.19
While the plundering of Xiangguan could be made to appear as a
casus belli, Sun Quan and Lü Meng had already discussed the possibil-
ity of attacking Guan Yu as he was engaged with Cao Ren. Plans and
preparations had to be made in secret, but deception was aided by the
fact that Lü Meng was ill: even as he was called back to Sun Quan’s
capital at Jianye, present-day Nanjing, troops and ships were prepared
for an attack.
Some sources claim that Cao Cao urged Sun Quan to the offensive
and promised him rewards,20 others that Sun Quan advised Cao Cao
of his intentions. Both scenarios are unlikely: whatever Cao Cao may
have hoped for or expected, it would have been an extraordinary error
for Sun Quan to reveal his plans to anyone who might spread the
news more widely. It is further claimed that when Sun Quan wrote
to Cao Cao, the news was swiftly passed on to Xu Huang, who in
turn announced it to Guan Yu, but Guan Yu refused to give it credit.
Though the record of evidence appears strong, it seems incredible that
19
Xiangguan “Pass on the Xiang” was evidently a fortified crossing of the Xiang
River which formed the frontier of the two warlord states.
20
At note 17 above, we have observed how Sima Yi and Jiang Ji suggested that Cao
Cao should encourage Sun Quan to make such a move.
Sun Quan should have taken such a risk—he did not need Cao Cao’s
approval, there was no good way to arrange a joint offensive, and it is
far more probable that he made the utmost attempt to keep his inten-
tions secret. It is nonetheless possible that Xu Huang sent an invented
message to Guan Yu as a means to discourage him from the offensive,
and though Guan Yu discounted it in the belief that Sun Quan would
never dare such a move, the false threat proved to be true.21
In the intercalary tenth month, December 219, Lü Meng launched
his attack, with thirty thousand men carried in a disguised fleet of
apparent merchant ships.22 Leaving a blocking force to hold the mouth
of the Han, he moved up the Yangzi to Gong’an and Jiangling. Guan
Yu had drawn heavily upon his reserves for the offensive against Cao
Ren, and it is said that he had quarrelled with and threatened the gar-
rison commanders Mi Fang and Shi Ren. In any case, both men were
swiftly persuaded to surrender,23 and Lü Meng’s forces advanced to the
mouth of the Gorges. By the time Guan Yu heard of the attack and
sought to turn back, he had been cut off from Liu Bei in Yi province
while his troops, learning that Lü Meng was treating their families
well, steadily abandoned him. For a few weeks Guan Yu sought refuge
at one place after another in the hill country of western Nan com-
mandery, but in the twelfth month he was taken and killed. Early in
the new year Sun Quan sent his head to Cao Cao.
The massive defeat had swift effect upon Liu Bei’s position in the
east of Hanzhong. Though Guan Yu sent several requests for assistance
to Liu Feng and Meng Da in Fangling, neither had felt secure enough
in their territories to send him aid. Then he was destroyed, and both
men felt uneasy and quarrelled, while the Shen family turned to Cao
21
The story of Sun Quan’s message to Cao Cao appears, with slight variations, in
SGZ 14:440, the biography of Dong Zhao, and even in the Annals/Biography of Cao
Cao at SGZ 1:52 and that of Sun Quan at SGZ Wu 2:1120. See the translation and
discussion at deC, Establish Peace, 544–545.
Lewis, China Between Empires, 36, says that Sun Quan “abandoned his former ally
and united with Cao Cao.” As we have seen, however, the relationship between Sun
Quan and Liu Bei/Guan Yu was not particularly friendly, and it is probably too strong
to say that he united with Cao Cao: he had his own agenda.
22
Lü Meng’s campaign is described in ZZTJ 68:2168–70, quoting chiefly from his
biography at SGZ Wu 9:1278–79 and that of Guan Yu at SGZ Shu 6:941, with com-
mentaries to those texts: deC, Establish Peace, 546–550. It is discussed in more detail
by deC, Generals of the South, 400–403.
23
Mi Fang had been Chancellor of Pengcheng under Cao Cao before throwing
in his lot with Liu Bei. Since he later held office under Sun Quan in Wu, he had the
remarkable record of serving each of the rival Three Kingdoms.
436
chapter ten
Map 20. The Campaigns of 219

Cao. In the following year Meng Da went over to Wei, returning with
an army to take over as Administrator of Xincheng, notionally com-
bining Fangling, Shangyong and Xicheng in a new commandery based
at Fangling city, and securing that frontier on the Han. Liu Feng was
withdrawn in disgrace to Chengdu, and was soon afterwards ordered
to kill himself so that he would not confuse the succession to his adop-
tive father’s new kingdom.
Further to the south, Lü Meng’s forces appear to have had little
difficulty in taking over the whole of the territory formerly held by
Guan Yu. Lü Meng himself insisted on strict discipline, and made
ostentatious examples of looters, but the manner in which local lead-
ers accepted the new regime indicates that there was limited loyalty
for Liu Bei—now long gone to the west beyond the Gorges—and it
is very likely that the arrogance with which Guan Yu had treated Mi
Fang and Shi Ren had rendered him comparably unpopular with the
civilian population. Lü Meng died just a few days after his victory, but
he was succeeded by his close associate Lu Xun. A few attempts at
uprising were swiftly put down, and for the next sixty years the lower
Han and middle Yangzi remained under the control of Sun Quan’s
state of Wu.
The border in this region between Wei and Wu remained largely
where it had been when Guan Yu held control: on the Han River it
was close to present-day Yicheng in Hubei, some hundred kilome-
tres south of Xiangyang; to the west it followed ridges of high ground
north of the Yangzi;24 and in the southeast the loyal Wen Ping, Cao
Cao’s Administrator of Jiangxia, continued to hold his position north
of the lakes and marshes below present-day Wuhan.
In effect, the two great campaigns of 219—Liu Bei’s victory in Han-
zhong and Guan Yu’s defeat in Jing province—determined the frontiers
of the rival states for the next generation. Wu controlled the lower and
middle Yangzi and the far south, Shu-Han the Sichuan basin, while
the state of Wei extended across north China, some seven-tenths of
the old empire of Han. This would be Cao Cao’s legacy, for he died at
Luoyang in the first month of 220.
24
SGZ Wu 13:1345 says that, during the campaign against Guan Yu, Lu Xun
attacked and defeated Liu Bei’s Administrator of Fangling. This, however, was evi-
dently a side-show, and it is clear that Fangling came under the control of Wei.
438 chapter ten
Posthumous emperor 220
With Guan Yu defeated and the threat to Jing province ended, Cao
Cao brought his army back from Nanyang, arriving at Luoyang early
in the new year, twenty-fifth of the Jian’an period of Han. Soon after-
wards, on the gengzi day, twenty-third of the first month, he died at
the former capital aged sixty-six sui. The date by the Julian calendar of
the West was 15 March 220—the same Ides of March as had seen the
death of Julius Caesar two and a half centuries earlier.
The cause of death is not known. Cao Cao had at one time suffered
from headaches and summoned the celebrated physician Hua Tuo to
be in constant attendance. Hua Tuo cured him with acupuncture, but
later sought to leave the court and was arrested and executed.25 We
are told, however, that this was before Cao Cao’s favourite son Cao
Chong became fatally ill in 208, and though the headaches are said
to have returned there is no necessary reason they should have been
directly associated—as with a brain tumour—to his own death many
years later. The official history Wei shu says that there was some form
of epidemic at this time, and this may have been the cause.26
It appears that Cao Cao’s death was unexpected. His Heir Cao Pi
was at Ye city, and he would surely have come to Luoyang if there had
been any warning. As it was, some wanted to conceal the event, but
the news leaked out and had then to be announced formally, with a
proclamation of official mourning. Not surprisingly there was unrest
in the army, and the Qingzhou Troops in particular broke out of their
barracks and beat their drums in a demonstration.27 The disturbance
was settled when the men were given authority to obtain provisions.
This seems like a licence to plunder, but the concession appears to
have mollified the trouble-makers, and discipline was soon restored.
The dominant figure at Luoyang at this time proved to be Jia Kui,
a long-time servant of Cao Cao who had served as a commandery
Administrator but was currently a member of Cao Cao’s Chancellor’s
office with title as Counsellor Remonstrant. With rank/salary at 600
25
HHS 82/72B:2738; Ngo, Divination, magie et politique, 121.
26
Quoted by SGZ 15:481 PC.
27
The Qingzhou Troops had been formed from Yellow Turbans who were defeated
in 192/193 and then incorporated into Cao Cao’s army: Chapter Two at 66–67. They
had not been recorded since the 190s, but it appears that they retained their identity as
a special unit; the men of 220 were presumably descendants of the original recruits.
shi, this was not high, but Jia Kui had senior experience and was able
to influence the transitional government. Not only did he settle the
potential mutiny, but when Cao Zhang, second brother of Cao Pi and
currently holding senior rank as a general, enquired after the seal of
state, Jia Kui faced him down: “The Heir is at Ye and everything is
under control. The seal of the late King is not something your lordship
needs to know about.”28
Cao Zhang had come to Luoyang from his position at Chang’an, but
Cao Pi remained at Ye, and it was there that he proclaimed his royal
title and ascended the throne. He acted formally under the sponsor-
ship of his mother the Lady Bian, dowager Queen of Wei, and con-
firmed his authority by issuing an amnesty. Neither the Annals of Hou
Han shu, nor any text in Sanguo zhi, give a precise date for Cao Pi’s
accession to the throne, but the ceremony was evidently carried out
within a few days of Cao Cao’s death on 15 March: the next entry in
the Annals of Han records an eclipse of the sun on the first day of the
second month, 22 March.29
There is nothing exceptional about such speed. Leaving aside the
need to confirm the succession as swiftly as possible, it was traditional
in Han that a new emperor should be installed as soon as his prede-
cessor was dead, and the ceremony was regularly held in the presence
of the newly coffined corpse.30 For Cao Pi, this last was not practica-
ble—taking time for a journey to Luoyang could have allowed others
to develop different plans. His actions were swift enough to establish
his inheritance without argument, however, and the imperial edict of
endorsement arrived soon afterwards.
As Cao Pi thus took his position, Cao Cao was awarded posthu-
mous title as King Wu [the Martial] of Wei,31 and when Cao Pi took
the imperial title for himself in the winter of that same year 220 he
raised his father’s rank from King to Emperor Wu of the new dynasty.
28
SGZ 15:481, the biography of Jia Kui; Fang, Chronicle I, 2.
29
HHS 9:390.
30
HHS 96/6:3141–43; Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 75–77.
31
The text of the edict is preserved in SGZ 2:57–58 PC quoting the Hou Han ji of
Yuan Hong.
JS 37:1082; Fang, Chronicle I, 3, claims that Cao Pi was at first so upset that he
could take no action, but his attendant Sima Fu, brother of Sima Lang and Sima
Yi, persuaded him to attend to his responsibilities without delay. SGZ 22:644; Fang,
Chronicle I, 3, tells how the secretarial official Chen Qiao urged Cao Pi to arrange
the enthronement swiftly, without waiting for endorsement from the Han court at
Xu city.
440 chapter ten
In 237 Cao Cao’s grandson Cao Rui awarded him the temple name
Grand Ancestor, Taizu.32
On the day dingmao of the second month, 11 April 220, Cao Cao was
buried at Gaoling “the High Mound,” a tomb which had been prepared
for him to the west of Ye city. An early item of his sumptuary laws,
published in 205 and reflecting the difficulties of the time, forbade
excessive display at funerals,33 and in his testamentary proclamation,
observing that the empire was not yet at peace and that he had failed
to match the great unifiers of the past, he ordered that his shroud be
made of ordinary cloth, suitable to the season,34 and no valuables, gold
or jade were to be placed in this tomb. The mourning period should
end once burial was completed: all officials were thereafter to attend
to their regular duties, and soldiers and colonists should remain in
their camps.35
In keeping with this lack of ceremony, the tomb complex was sim-
ple. Another proclamation, issued in 218, praised the customs of the
ancient worthies, who had tombs constructed on land of no use for
agriculture, often dug into a slope, and had no mound above them nor
any trees planted. Funerals had become more elaborate during Han,
with grave goods, stele and substantial buildings, but Cao Cao called
for the simpler tradition of the past to be restored. His wishes were
32
SGZ 2:76 and 3:109; Fang, Chronicle I, 10–11 and 516–517.
33
SGZ 1:27, discussed in Chapter Five at 221.
34
Since it was spring, Cao Cao was presumably buried in a shroud made of green
cloth.
35
It was customary for an emperor of Han to leave a testamentary edict (遺詔
yizhao), and Cao Cao followed this example in the form of a proclamation (遺令
yiling); see also note 5 to Chapter Five. SGZ 1:53 contains a short text, translated by
Kroll, “Portraits,” 35, but this is only part of the full document. Further fragments are
identified and presented in SGZJJ 1:126a–127a.
When Emperor Wen of Former Han died in 157 BC, his testamentary edict ordered
that mourning dress should be worn for just thirty-six days after the coffin had been
placed in the tomb, and this became standard practice for the dynasty: HS 4:132 and
133–34 note 16 quoting Yan Shigu; Dubs, HFHD I, 270. Dubs, however, goes on to
cite the Qing scholar Yan Ruoju 閻若璩, cited by HSBZ at 20b, who remarks that
Cao Cao set a new precedent: Emperor Wen restricted mourning after burial, but Cao
Cao eliminated it altogether; it was now observed only for the few weeks between the
ruler’s death and the placement of his body in the tomb.
Yan Ruoju observes that the extended mourning was later restored, though it is not
known when this happened. Cao Cao’s restrictions were presumably maintained by
his immediate successors, though one must note that he had not taken the imperial
title for himself, and his post-mortem restraint may have reflected his formal sense of
failure and his lower rank.
surely followed for his own resting-place, with chambers under the
earth approached by a descending ramp. We are also told that seventy-
two false tombs were constructed as a means to hinder robbers.36
The site at Gaoling did have buildings above ground, including a
memorial hall. The biography of Yu Jin tells how, after his surrender to
Guan Yu, he came into the hands of Sun Quan and was eventually sent
back to the north. Cao Pi sent him to pay respects to Cao Cao’s tomb,
but had pictures of his surrender and of Pang De’s heroism painted
on the walls of the mausoleum. Yu Jin killed himself for shame, and
Sima Guang and other commentators have criticised Cao Pi for poor
taste and vindictiveness.37
In 222 Cao Pi issued an edict on the preparations for his own tomb,
to be set in the Shouyang hills east of Luoyang. Remarking that a rich
tomb merely invited thieves, so it was a mark of filial respect to keep it
plain and simple, he gave instructions that the site should be in waste
ground and should be marked by no stele, spirit way of sculptures, or
any other monument. There was to be no means by which it might be
known to future generations.38 He also ordered that the mausoleum
and other structures at Gaoling be destroyed, and that sacrifices hith-
erto carried out at his father’s tomb should henceforth be maintained
at the ancestral temple of the new dynasty.39 The emperors of Later
Han had honoured their ancestors and predecessors at temples both in
Loyang and at the relevant tombs—with occasional excursions to the
Former tumuli about Chang’an.40 Since Cao Pi was arranging for his
tomb to be set in a quite different region to that of his father, however,
36
SGZ 1:51: 不封不樹 bufeng bushu. See also Howard et al., Chinese Sculpture, 160.
On the seventy-two false tombs, see SGZJJ 1:127a, quoting various sources. Seventy-
two was a mystical number and if they were indeed constructed we may assume that
they consisted of a façade and some form of trap within, or an alarm system which
might alert guards. No sign of them, however, has yet been discovered in the course
of the recent excavations of Cao Cao’s alleged tomb, discussed below.
37
SGZ 17:524, ZZTJ 69:2192–93; Fang, Chronicle I, 54.
38
SGZ 2:80–81, part-translated by Fang, Chronicle I, 129–130, and discussed by
Dien, Six Dynasties Civilization, 164.
39
JS 20:634, cited by Dien, 166. The Ancestral Temple of Wei was maintained at
Ye city until 229, when Cao Rui, son and successor of Cao Pi, had it transferred to
Luoyang: SGZ 3:96–97 and note 28 to Chapter Nine.
40
On the imperial temples and tombs of Later Han, see Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 54–56
and 83–87.
442 chapter ten
it made sense for the major dynastic worship of Wei to be held at a

single ancestral temple.41
This was a substantial change in ritual and reinforced Cao Cao’s
previous strictures. The official attitude of Han called for simple funer-
als and tombs, and some scholars sought to put it into practice, but the
great majority of families ignored such strictures, and the latter half of
the second century had seen heavy expenditure on private tombs—as
for example those of the Cao family itself at Qiao in Pei42—and wide-
spread erection of stele and shrines to honour individual achievements
or public works.43 Cao Cao’s proclamation of 205, however, forbade
such extravagance, both for graves and for stele in general.44 His poli-
cies may be seen as a means to control powerful clans and individuals,
but they also reduced expenditure and waste in a society which had
suffered severely in the course of civil war; and we may well accept that
there was a strong sense of morality and simple distaste for the excesses
which had brought the collapse of the empire and the disasters of civil
war.45 The warlords of the time, moreover, had been responsible for
the plunder of many tombs in search of means to pay and reward
41
There was one attempt to revive the custom of visiting the tomb. In 249 Cao Fang
and the regent Cao Shuang were on their way to Gaopingling, the burial place of Cao
Rui south of Luoyang, when they were ambushed and captured by Sima Yi: SGZ 4:123;
Fang, Chronicle II, 31. JS 20:634, however, notes that this was the first time such an
excursion had been undertaken, and the venture was never repeated.
42
On the Cao family tombs, see Chapter One at 18–19. As Poo, “Death and Burial,”
has observed at 47–62, thrifty burials were widely supported in principle by intellectu-
als of Later Han, but the practice was different.
43
Of more than three hundred inscriptions of the Han period recorded or pre-
served in one form or another, the vast majority are dated to the second century AD,
and it has been argued that this reflects the increasing prosperity of local families and
their growing independence from the central government of the empire.
Among many studies of stele, see, for example, Ebrey, “Later Han Stone Inscrip-
tions,” Wong, Chinese Steles, 25–41, and deC, LH3K, xii–xiii. On tombs and memorial
shrines, see Powers, Art and Political Expression, and Wu Hung, Monumentality.
44
See also Dien, loc. cit. Wu Hung, Monumentality, 121, notes that a number of
third-century tombs contain stele slabs from Later Han which have been used simply
as building materials, and cites this as evidence of a “nationwide iconoclastic move-
ment.”
The results may also be seen in archaeological and epigraphic records. The two great
collections of inscriptions, Li shi and Li xu, compiled by Hong Kuo of Song, contain
almost two hundred items from Later Han, but barely half a dozen from Wei, while
the modern index of Yang Dianxun has twenty-three two-column pages listing stele
of the Later Han and only three columns for those of Wei.
45
Zhongchang Tong, a noted thinker of this time, was among those offended by
and resentful of the extravagance of the past, and called for strict control of wealth
and its display: Chapter Eight at 348.
their armies, and would not have been surprising if Cao Cao sought to
avoid such desecration and indignity.46
The new policy, confirmed and enhanced by Cao Pi, was maintained
through Wei and repeated by Sima Yan, founding Emperor Wu of
Jin in 287.47 Later generations gradually resumed the use of stele, but
it was a long time before tombs and shrines regained their former
extravagance, and it may be argued that no subsequent period has
matched the energy and splendour of Later Han. Cao Cao’s successors
would be criticised for their building works, but they were palaces and
pleasure grounds, not monuments for the dead, and for almost two
thousand years Cao Cao’s last resting place received the secrecy he
had sought.
Though the general area was known, Cao Cao’s grave long remained
unidentified, and many believed that the changing course of the River
Zhang had covered or destroyed it. In 2006, however, near the village
of Xigaoxue in the city region of Anyang, some fifteen kilometres west
of the ruins of Ye city of the Han period, workmen digging clay for
bricks came across a tomb. The discovery was not at first reported,
and several items were taken, but in 2008 a team from the Henan
Provincial Institute of Cultural Relics and Archaeology began a rescue
operation, and the tomb has now been identified as Cao Cao’s.48 The
assertion has been challenged, but members of the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences took part in the work, the Academy gave tentative
endorsement to the claim in December 2009, and officers of the Insti-
tute of Archaeology presented further confirmation at a conference in
January 2010.
At the date of writing, June 2010, excavations are still in progress and
no formal report has been published. Information, therefore, must be
obtained primarily from newspapers, journals and television reports,
46
The Call to Arms of Yuan Shao in 200 claimed Cao Cao robbed tombs and even
appointed officers to organize the plunder. Given the hostile nature of this piece of
writing, details of the accusation may be false, but we know that Dong Zhuo plun-
dered the imperial tombs about Luoyang in 190, and such depositaries would provide
any warlord with useful resources. Whether for the use of an army, or simply as pri-
vate enterprise, the custom must have been widespread.
47
SongS 15:407, and Dien, Six Dynasties Civilization, 189–190.
48
The name of the village is composed of the three characters xi 西 “west,”
gao 高 “high” and xue “a cave or hollow.” Given the fact that Cao Cao’s tomb was
called Gaoling, and the site is west of ancient Ye city, it is notable that the village is
effectively called “The cave ‘Gao’ in the west.”
444 chapter ten
many of which are on the Internet.49 The descriptions and illustra-

tions show two vaulted chambers front and rear, linked by arches
to four side rooms. A roughly rectangular area of some 750 square
metres, now fifteen metres underground, the tomb was approached by
a sloping tunnel thirty-five metres long and a little under ten metres
wide. The floor is paved with slabs, the walls were unpainted, but the
doorways were originally sealed by gates of finely carved and painted
stone.
Many objects were found within the tomb, but others appear to
have been obtained from robbers who traded them later. Provenance,
therefore, is not always certain. Beside ornaments of gold, silver,
ceramic and jade, there are stone tablets with inscriptions listing the
grave-goods. Professor Wang has stated that the attribution of the
tomb to Cao Cao is based upon the standard system which considers
its style, size, level, age and relics, especially inscribed objects; most
significant at this stage are eight tablets which refer to weapons “often
used by [the late] King Wu of Wei” 魏武王常用.50
Parts of three skulls have been found, one of them that of a man in
his 60s, which matches Cao Cao’s age. Though the burial place of his
son Cao Zhi has been identified, including a number of bones, after
such an elapse of time and deterioration it is doubtful DNA testing
is practicable.51 The other two skulls were women’s, one in her fifties
and the other in her twenties: there is no obvious means to suggest an
49
For example, The People’s Daily Online at http://english.people.com.cn/90002/
98669/99315/6856137.html and China Today at http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/cteng
lish/se/txt/2010–03/16/content_255090.htm.
50
The posthumous title King Wu is correct for the time of Cao Cao’s burial; as we
have seen, he was not honoured as an emperor until the end of the year. There is, of
course, always the possibility of forgery and even of “salting” the tomb with suitable
objects; and there is naturally a great deal of local interest in having such a monument
to display. As for the town of Chibi on the Yangzi, such a discovery should be very
good for tourism: cf. note 73 to Chapter Six.
51
Cao Zhi’s tomb was discovered in 1951 at Dong’a in Shandong: with two chambers
built into the foot of a hill, it follows the new and simpler style. See Dien, Six Dynasties
Civilization, 165, citing Huaxia kaogu 華夏考古 “Huaxia Archeology” (Library of the
National Taiwan University of Arts 國立台灣藝術大學圖書館) 1999.1. The Internet
has illustrations at http://www.cultural-china.com/chinaWH/html/en/35History2040.
html [10 March 2010]. The site was “renovated” in 1981 and again in 1985.
One substantial mausoleum was constructed at this time. After Cao Rui came to the
throne he wished to honour his late mother the Lady Zhen, former concubine of Cao
Pi. A tumulus and shrine were raised for her, presumably in the grounds of Cao Pi’s
tomb complex east of Luoyang, but in 230 it was decided that the mound was too low
and she was re-interred under a larger one: SGZ 5:162; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses
and Consorts, 100–101, and Fang, Chronicle I, 320. One must assume that Cao Rui was
concerned to enhance his mother’s status, even at the risk of robbery.
identity for them: they may have been members of Cao Cao’s harem,
daughters, or servants.52 We are told that Cao Cao’s widow the Lady
Bian was buried with him, but she was seventy years old when she died
in 230 and it was common for a wife to have a separate tomb to her
husband, albeit in the same complex.53 Han custom also made provi-
sion for the burials of favourites and other associates near the tomb
of a ruler, and we know that Cao Cao’s favourite son Cao Chong was
buried at Gaoling; there may well have been others.54 There is report
of at least one more tomb nearby, and there is so far no sign of the
seventy-two false tombs which are said to have been created. Excava-
tion continues.
The commentary of Pei Songzhi to Sanguo zhi preserves the eulogy
to Cao Cao in Wei shu.55
The Grand Ancestor took control of the empire, destroying all his
opponents. Commanding his armies on military campaigns, he gener-
ally followed the principles of Sun [Wu] and Wu [Qi]. He created an
exceptional response to each situation, he achieved success by deceiving
the enemy, and he was flexible and adaptable like a spirit. He person-
ally compiled a work of more than a hundred thousand characters, and
We may also note that in May 2010 the tomb of Cao Xiu, who died in 228, was
reported as having been discovered at the end of 2009: see http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/photo/2010-05/18/content_9863318.htm. This tomb is also in a simple style. On
Cao Xiu, see also 458 below.
52
One must assume the women died about the same time as Cao Cao, whether by
natural causes or by their own hand. There may also be echoes of the “marriage of
the dead,” as in Cao Cao’s own search for a partner for his favourite son Cao Chong:
Chapter One at 24 and Chapter Nine at 407.
There is, however, no reason to believe that the women were killed in order to
provide grave attendants for the dead ruler. Such a custom was generally attributed
to the semi-barbarous state of Qin and is attested by a number of pre-Han sources.
The practice, however, had been banned by Former Han: HS 53:2421–22. In Cao Cao’s
time the “Yellow Birds” Ode was the theme of three poems composed by Wang Can,
Ruan Yu and Cao Zhi, and none of them endorsed the idea: Chapter Eight at 346.
Such slaughter would thus have been very surprising, and would certainly have given
material to enemies of Wei; the absence of criticism on this ground—when so much
was written against Cao Cao—is a strong argument ex silentio.
There is one case recorded at the time of the Three Kingdoms: we are told that
when Sun Quan’s officer Chen Wu died in 215, Sun Quan arranged for his favourite
concubine to be buried with him. The commentator Sun Sheng is predictably scathing,
but the story may not be reliable: SGZ Wu 10:1289 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan
and Sun Sheng; discussed in deC, Generals of the South, 380, and LH3K, 79.
53
E.g. Guo, “Tomb Architecture,” 11. On the Lady Bian, see SGZ 5:158: Cutter &
Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 94.
54
SGZ 20:581 PC note 3 quoting Wei shu.
55
SGZ 1:54 PC. The text has also been translated by Fang, Chronicle I, 15–17, and
by Kroll, “Portraits,” 119–120.
446 chapter ten
when his generals went on campaign they followed the prescriptions of

this Xinshu “New Book.” On each occasion, moreover, he gave detailed
instructions: those who followed his orders were successful; those who
did not were invariably defeated.56
Facing the enemy in line of battle, he would seem quite calm, as if he
had no thought of fighting, but when a critical opportunity appeared he
would seize it with utmost enthusiasm. For this reason he was successful
in every engagement, and his success owed nothing to chance.
His judgement of men was excellent, and it was extremely difficult to
deceive him by superficial display. He picked Yu Jin and Yue Jin from
the ranks of common soldiery, he found Zhang Liao and Xu Huang
among enemies who had surrendered; all became successful assistants
and celebrated generals. And there were a host of men whom he selected
from low-ranking clerical offices and who later rose to be governors of
provinces and administrators of commanderies. It was by these means
that he created his great work, exercising skills both military and civil.
During thirty years of warfare, he never left his books aside. By day
he would attend to planning for war, but at night he contemplated the
classics and the histories. Whenever he climbed high, he would compose
a rhapsody,57 and he also wrote new poems, setting them to pipes and
strings so they could be sung.
Stronger and more skilful than other men, he could shoot birds on
the wing and capture fierce animals. On one occasion at Nanpi he shot
sixty-three pheasants in a single day.58
He also constructed palaces and buildings and repaired engines and
machines. He always gave detailed instructions and the results were
invariably excellent.
By nature he was elegant but restrained, rejecting florid adornment.
The women of his harem had no embroidered garments, and those who
attended him wore plain shoes.59 If his tent or the curtains of his carriage
were damaged, he simply had them patched, and his bedding served
only to keep him warm; it had no decorative fringes.
Any fine or beautiful things which he obtained as plunder from cap-
tured cities or towns he would distribute to those of his followers who
had done well, and to reward good service he had no hesitation in grant-
56
See the section Cao Cao and the Art of War in Chapter Seven.
57
The phrase 登高必賦 was regarded as one of the attributes of a great man: HS
30:1955 [HSBZ at 58b] quoting the Mao commentary to the Ding zhi fang zhong 定之
方中 Ode [Legge, Classics IV, 81–82], discussed by Wilhelm, “Scholar’s Frustration,”
312 and 399 notes 8 and 9, also note 48 to Chapter Eight.
58
The only time that Cao Cao is specifically recorded at Nanpi was during his final
campaign against Yuan Tan in 205. He was probably too busy for hunting at that time,
and it is more likely that his skill was displayed on another occasion, perhaps in 207,
when he was on the way to or returning from the campaign against the Wuhuan.
59
On embroidered garments, there is the sad case of the Cao Cao’s daughter-in-law
the Lady Cui, The second part of this sentence is a cliché.
ing a thousand pieces of gold. Those who sought favour without reason,
however, received not a single cash. Gifts and tribute came from all parts
of the empire, but these too he would share with his officers.
He always considered the funerary system of the time, and the display
which accompanied it, to be unduly complex and pointless, and its cus-
tomary conduct quite excessive. For this reason he ordered there be no
more than four baskets of clothing placed in his tomb.
Composed for the official history of Wei, this passage is predictably
complimentary. It is followed by three shorter texts, two from the Fuzi
of Fu Xuan, and one from the Bowu zhi “Record of a Myriad Things,”
compiled by the scholar and statesman Zhang Hua and completed
about 280. Both men present straightforward accounts of aspects of
Cao Cao’s character. Zhang Hua mentions his skill at chess, his disap-
proval of Grass Script calligraphy and his interest in magic: all matters
discussed elsewhere.60 He also claims that Cao Cao ate quantities of the
poisonous yege plant, gelsemium elegans, and drank poisoned wine, no
doubt to inoculate himself against attacks by such means.61
The extracts from Fuzi refer to Cao Cao’s dislike of unnecessary
luxury and ornamentation. The first tells how he disapproved of the
elaborate wedding ceremonies common at the time, and arranged that
when his own daughters married they did so in the most austere fash-
ion—though he may have allowed an exception when three of them
entered the imperial harem in 213, and one became empress in 215.
The second passage tells how Yuan Shao and other leaders dressed
themselves for war in silk brocade, but Cao Cao took account of the
poverty of the time and wore a plain leather cap of ancient style, with
just a coloured panel to show his rank; suitable for the army rather
than for a court.
In the same note, however, Pei Songzhi offers a counter-comment
from Cao Man zhuan, compiled by a subject of the rival state of Wu,
which presents Cao Cao’s choice of headwear not as a symbol of
60
See Chapter Eight: on chess, note 45 at 348; on calligraphy, 379; on magic, 350–
352.
61
On the yege 野葛 plant, also known as gouwen 鉤吻, see SGZJJ 1:129a, Stuart,
Vegetable Kingdom, 185, Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 171, and Needham, Science and
Civilisation VI.1, 487–488.
Mithridates VI of Pontus, great enemy of Rome in the first century BC, is also said
to have protected himself in this way, and a number of twentieth-century detective-
story writers have noted that the steady ingestion of arsenic eventually gives immu-
nity. Most rulers who felt so threatened, however, preferred to employ a taster.
448 chapter ten
restraint, but as evidence that he lacked proper dignity and a sense of

position. The attack gathers strength thereafter:62
The Grand Ancestor was frivolous and changeable, with no true weight
of authority. Fond of music, he kept actors and singing girls with him day
and night. He would dress in light silk, with a sash and a satchel at the
waist containing a hand-cloth and other small items, and he sometimes
wore a plain leather cap, so that he looked like a humble retainer.
In conversation, he could speak lightly and playfully, appearing to
keep nothing back and laughing with every sign of good humour. He
would even get drunk at banquets and spill food and wine on his cloth-
ing. Such was his careless conduct.
In application of the law, however, he was relentless and cruel. Should
one of his generals present a plan better than his own, he would find
cause to execute him,63 while no-one who had angered him in the past
could ever escape.64 When he sentenced a man to death, he would weep
before him and lament his fate, but none were spared.
When Yuan Zhong was Chancellor of Pei he wanted to punish Cao
Cao in accordance with the law, while Huan Shao, a man of that state,
also thought little of him. When Cao Cao was in Yan province, Bian
Rang of Chenliu spoke disrespectfully of him, so Cao Cao killed Bian
Rang and destroyed his family. Yuan Zhong and Huan Shao took refuge
from the troubles in Jiao province, but Cao Cao sent messengers to the
Administrator Shi Xie, that he should kill both of them with their fami-
lies. Huan Shao managed to escape, and he came to present himself and
make his apologies at Cao Cao’s court. Cao Cao said to him, “You may
kneel, but why should that save your life?” And he killed him.65
62
SGZ 1:54–55 PC. On Cao Man zhuan, see also note 27 to Chapter One. A small
part of this text is translated by Fang, Chronicle I, 17, and the whole is rendered by
Kroll, “Portraits,” 122–124.
Though Cao Cao is referred to throughout this passage as “Grand Ancestor,” his
imperial temple name under Wei, we may doubt the original used such a complimen-
tary appellation.
63
This accusation may reflect the unease with which any warlord regarded his for-
mal subordinates, and the dominant position which he must seek to maintain. Only
one officer is recorded as having been killed by Cao Cao in any such circumstances,
and that was Xu You, whose real fault was a mistaken appearance of familiarity.
64
As above, this appears exaggerated. Cao Cao could certainly be vindictive, but the
example of Yuan Zhong below is uncertain, while it is recorded that he forgave Liang
Gu [note 60 to Chapter One] and showed great tolerance to Wei Chong [Chapter
Three at 127].
65
On Bian Rang, see Chapter Two at 77.
HHS 45/35:1526 tells how Yuan Zhong held office in Pei, Cao Cao’s home country,
during the early 190s. He was well thought of, but later left his post and took refuge in
Kuaiji. Driven from there by Sun Ce in 196, he fled again to the far south. HHS 45/35
goes on to say that after the emperor had been settled under Cao Cao’s control of Xu
On one occasion he was with his army, the route lay through wheat-
fields. Cao Cao issued an order: “No officer or soldier shall injure the
crop. Anyone who disobeys shall die.” The cavalrymen all got down from
their horses, and parted the grain-stalks so as to make their way without
harming them. But then Cao Cao’s horse took fright and broke into
the wheat. Cao Cao summoned his Registrar and ordered him to make
judgement. The Registrar replied that according to the principles of the
Chunqiu, the most senior officer was not liable to punishment. “There is
a point of law, and I have offended it,” observed Cao Cao. “Why should
the penalty apply only to lesser ranks? Nonetheless, as commander of the
army I cannot execute myself. I must inflict my own punishment.” So he
drew his sword, cut off his hair, and set it on the ground.66
Again, when one of his favourite concubines came to share his bed
during the daytime, he rested his head on her as a pillow, saying, “Wake
me in a little while.” When she saw he was sleeping peacefully, she did
not disturb him; but then he woke of his own accord, and had her cud-
gelled to death [for failing to obey his order].67
At another time, as he was attacking an enemy the food for his army
began to run short. Speaking secretly to his quartermaster, he asked,
“What are we to do.”
“If we use a smaller measure to issue the grain,” the man replied, “it
will last longer.”
“Excellent,” said Cao Cao.
Later, however, the soldiers complained that Cao Cao was cheating
them. Cao Cao summoned the officer again and said to him, “In these
special circumstances, I must use your death to settle the army. There is
unfortunately no alternative.” So he had his head cut off and announced
city, Yuan Zhong was invited back north to become a minister at court, but died on
the journey. This account of his fate is different.
Huan Shao is known only from this story.
66
Shaving the head was a recognised form of supplementary punishment: e.g.
Hulsewé, “Ch’in and Han Law,” 533. It appears here as a substitute for beheading.
There was a custom of binding the hair into a knot on the top of the head, and Kroll
plausibly suggests that this was what Cao Cao cut away.
There is no specific reference in Chunqiu itself to the exemption of the commander
from the effect of military law, though Li ji 禮記 1:35 says that punishment does not
apply to a great man: 刑不上大夫. Cao Cao and his clerk, however, were primarily
concerned to make the point that discipline applied to all, even if the commander
might, under special circumstances, escape its full force.
A slightly longer account of this—very doubtful—incident appears in Romance
Chapter 17, translated by Brewitt-Taylor and quoted by Minford, Art of War, 109. It
also appears in the drama Zhan Wancheng “Fighting at Wan City:” Chapter Eleven
at 499.
67
As SGZJJ 1:130b observes, a somewhat similar story appears in SSXY XXVII:4,
where Cao Cao kills an innocent attendant as a means to show that no-one should
attempt to take him by surprise when he appeared to be asleep; Mather, Tales of the
World, 442 [Guile and Chicanery]. See further in Chapter Eleven at 476 and note 39.
450 chapter ten
that “The man who issued short measure and stole the official grain sup-
plies has been beheaded at the gate of the camp.”68
Cao Cao’s trickery and cruelty all followed this pattern.
Many such anecdotes, some justified by the records but others no
more than hostile propaganda, had gathered about Cao Cao during
his lifetime, and they multiplied in the years that followed. Grist to
the mills of later writers, they became an alternative biography, and the
legend of Cao Cao would enhance and shadow the real figure of the
man. This long post-history will be discussed in the next chapter.
The later history of Cao Wei69
In the winter at the end of 220, on 11 December by Western reckon-

ing, Cao Cao’s son and successor Cao Pi received the abdication of
the last emperor of Han and proclaimed his new imperial dynasty of
Wei.70 Cao Cao had resisted the temptation to take such a step, and
in many respects the decision by Cao Pi was dangerous: his authority
could not yet match that of his father, and his new-found state was
vulnerable to comparison with the long-lived glory of Han.
In the short term, however, Cao Pi’s proclamation of sovereignty,
supported by philosophical and mystical argument on how the virtue
of the previous dynasty had been exhausted and the power of Yellow
should succeed the Red, served to entrench his position as successor
68
This last anecdote is quoted by Liu Jun in commentary to SSXY XXVII:3 as
above; Mather, Tales of the World, 442. An enlarged version appears in Romance 27,
translated by Brewitt-Taylor and quoted by Minford, Art of War, 121–122. For added
verisimilitude, Romance identifies the occasion as the siege of Yuan Shu’s capital,
Shouchun, and gives the name of the unfortunate officer as Wang Hou. In fact Cao
Cao never attacked Yuan Shu in Shouchun, and the name of Wang Hou does not
appear in any historical text. The technique is similar to that which gives a name to
Dong Zhuo’s concubine, seduced by Lü Bu: note 44 to Chapter Two.
69
The general history of this time is covered by Fang, Chronicle, deC, “Three
Kingdoms and Western Jin” and Lewis, China Between Empires.
70
The formal processes by which Cao Pi justified his claim to the Mandate and
arranged his accession are discussed by Goodman, Ts’ao P’i Transcendent, and Leban,
“Managing Heaven’s Mandate.” A summary of this and the later history is provided
by Mansvelt Beck, “Fall of Han,” 355–356 ff.
Some authorities give the date of abdication as 25 November: e.g. CHOC, xli. This
is the date upon which Emperor Xian issued an edict calling upon Cao Pi to take the
throne, but the ceremonial transfer of sovereignty was carried out two weeks later.
The former emperor was given courtesy title as Duke of Shanyang. He died at that
fief in 234.
to his father within the state of Wei.71 As Goodman has observed, for
Cao Pi and his supporters, “Becoming emperor was not a legislative
or strictly patrimonial process, nor was it only about military domi-
nation. It was the attainment of a solemn and mysterious status . . . by
unclear means—by one’s own luck and in fact daring.”72 On the other
hand, the fact was that Wei did not control the Chinese world, and by
eliminating the authority of Han Cao Pi abandoned the claims of loy-
alty and restoration which had justified his father’s power. Six months
later Liu Bei in Yi province put forward a rival claim as emperor of the
continuing house of Han, and in 229, with no pretence of continuity
and no justification but the accumulation of omens and a statement of
virtue, Sun Quan too would take the imperial title.73
Sun Quan at first maintained his nominal submission, recognising
Cao Pi’s new honour and accepting enfeoffment as King of Wu under
Wei. His immediate concern was to ensure Cao Pi’s neutrality as he
faced attack from Liu Bei, seeking to avenge the destruction of Guan
Yu and to regain the territory he had lost in Jing province. In this
he was successful, for Cao Pi could not afford to turn too ostenta-
tiously against his own feudatory. In the summer of 222, however, Sun
Quan’s general Lu Xun destroyed the invading army and confirmed
Wu’s control of the middle Yangzi.74 Thereafter Sun Quan refused to
send hostages to the court of Cao Pi and, in a remarkable reversal
of policy he arranged an alliance of mutual support with his former
enemies of Shu-Han.
71
An effective summary of the metaphysical authority of Han, and its ultimate
decline, is given by Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” 357–362. We may note that
when he took the imperial title, Cao Pi proclaimed the new reign period of Huangchu
黃初 “Yellow Beginning.” Two years later, when Sun Quan declared his independence,
he announced his own reign title Huangwu 黃武 “Yellow Warfare.”
72
Ts’ao P’i Transcendent, 224.
73
On Liu Bei’s response to Cao Pi’s proclamation, and his assumption of the impe-
rial title, see SGZ Shu 2:887–90. On Sun Quan, see SGZ Wu 2:1134–36, discussed by
deC, Generals of the South, 448–455.
In a celebrated essay at ZZTJ 69:2185–88, translated by Fang, Chronicle I, 45–48,
Sima Guang discusses the rival claims of continuity and legitimacy for Cao Pi and
Liu Bei, and concluded that the requirements of chronology must take precedence
over theories of righteousness. His position has long been criticised, however, nota-
bly by Zhu Xi and the Neo-Confucianists of Song. See further in Chapter Eleven at
468–469.
74
The biography of Lu Xun is in SGZ Wu 13. An account of his triumph over Liu
Bei is at 1346–48 and in ZZTJ 69:2202–05; Fang, Chronicle I, 100–104. It is discussed
by deC, Generals of the South, 418–425.
452 chapter ten
The division of the empire of Han between three rival states contin-
ued for the next forty years. There were individual warlords and rulers
on the perimeters of the Chinese world, but the essential boundaries
had been drawn. In the west, the victory of Liu Bei in Hanzhong in
219 had brought the upper Han valley under his control and set the
lines of battle in that area along the Qin Ling divide, south of the val-
ley of the Wei. On the middle Yangzi, as Shu-Han was restricted to
the west of the Gorges, Wei and Wu shared a hostile but largely static
frontier about the lower Han River. In the southeast, Cao Cao’s mili-
tary agricultural colonies confirmed the hold of Wei along the Huai,
and Sun Quan achieved no success against the key cities of Hefei and
Shouchun. His naval power on the Yangzi, however, was never seri-
ously threatened, and a desolate no-man’s land defined the spheres of
the two states.
In military terms, this tripartite division was not inevitable. Had
Wei kept hold of Hanzhong, it is doubtful whether the small state
of Shu-Han could have survived the destruction of Guan Yu and the
loss of the middle Yangzi, and it would in any case have remained
desperately vulnerable to attack from the upper Han valley. In turn,
had Liu Bei been eliminated, it is most unlikely that Sun Quan could
have survived the pressure of Wei on two fronts in Jing province and
across the lower Yangzi. In that regard the defeat of Xiahou Yuan by
Liu Bei at Dingjun Mountain in 219, not the Red Cliffs battle of 208,
was the decisive engagement of the period.75
Regardless of such grand strategy, however, the restoration of a united

Chinese world, whether under Han or Wei, was always going to be dif-
ficult. Previous interludes of civil war, after the end of Qin about 200
BC and after the fall of Wang Mang in 23 AD, had been followed by
a restoration of government over the whole of China, and though the
latter years of Later Han saw much discussion concerning the Mandate
of Heaven, it was generally assumed that the dynasty would be revived
or replaced, not that the empire would be divided. By the end of the
second century AD, however, two major changes had taken place.
75
The eventual conquest of Wu in 280 followed the defeat of Shu fifteen years
earlier, and was achieved by an attack through the Gorges combined with offensives
down the Han and across the Huai.
Firstly, the breakdown of imperial government had been far more

serious than at the time of the fall of Wang Mang. Full civil war had
lasted only fifteen years, from the rebellion against Wang Mang in 22
to Emperor Guangwu’s defeat of his last major enemy, Gongsun Shu
in 36, and though the Red Eyebrows brought widespread devastation,
much of the formal structure of commanderies and counties remained
intact.76 Even after Cao Cao confirmed his control of the North China
plain in 207, however, the northwest and the far northeast remained
beyond his reach, while the empire had been torn apart by almost
twenty years of war, and traditional forms of government had largely
disappeared among the rivalries of warlords and other local groups.
The second great difference was that control of central China no
longer guaranteed command of the periphery. Once Guangwu gained
control of the lands about the Yellow River, he met comparatively little
difficulty in dealing with the regions of the middle and lower Yangzi,
while Gongsun Shu had depended largely upon the natural defences
of the Yangzi Gorges and the Qin Ling mountains—he was never in
a good position to challenge the central power. During the course of
Later Han, however, there had been a strong shift of population from
the north of the empire to the south beyond the Yangzi.
Chapters 28A and 28B of Han shu preserve the figures of a census
carried out in 2 AD, when the population of the empire was almost fif-
ty-eight million, and Chapters 19 to 23B of Hou Han shu give similar
details for the early 140s, when the total recorded was fifty million.77
Households and individuals are listed under their provincial and com-
mandery units, allowing for an assessment of the spread of Chinese
settlement from one period to the next.
Some of the difference between Former and Later Han may be
attributed to the fact that figures for three commanderies of Later Han
are missing; had they been available, the total could have been one or
one and a half million more. The major cause of decline, however, was
the reduction in settlement across the north: in the northeast imperial
control had withdrawn from the Chengde basin;78 in the northwest
76
The civil war at that time is described by Bielenstein, RHD I and II.
77
The discussion which follows is based upon Bielenstein, “The Census of China,”
139–145 and Plates II and III, followed by deC, “Prefectures and Population.” The dat-
ing of the figures from Later Han is discussed by Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 187–189.
78
On the withdrawal from the region of present-day Chengde, see Chapter Five
at 234.
454 chapter ten
non-Chinese Qiang and Xiongnu had occupied land within the nomi-
nal boundaries of the empire; and overall the frontier was so troubled
by warfare, rebellion and cross-border raiding that Chinese citizens
had no wish to remain. The Xiongnu had divided into rival states in
the middle of the first century and the Southern Shanyu became a vas-
sal of Han, but the destruction of the Northern Xiongnu forty years
later left a power vacuum in the steppe which was filled by the erratic
and unruly Xianbi, while the Southern state proved incapable of rul-
ing its own people and those who had surrendered. By the end of the
second century, the time of Cao Cao, the Ordos region was largely out
of control and beyond the reach of the imperial government. And in
the further northwest two great rebellions of the Qiang, one lasting
from 107 to 118, and the other in the early 140s, likewise removed
large areas from Chinese sway and left opportunity for the mutinies
and rebellions of Liang province in 184.
In 211 Cao Cao defeated the warlords of the northwest, and in 216
he made a formal settlement of the remnant Xiongnu state in the
Ordos region. Though he regained control of the Wei valley, however,
the country north of the Fen River was outside his effective reach,
and the loss of population was already considerable by the middle of
the second century. The turmoil since that time had done nothing
to improve the situation: the northern frontier had been ravaged by
the Xianbi, and though Cao Cao’s victory over the Wuhuan in 207
brought some stability, the damage had been done and much of the
region was empty.
By contrast, the lands south of the middle and lower Yangzi had
shown a marked increase. On the lower Yangzi, heartland of the Sun
family, the population under Former Han had been 1.75 million, but
doubled to 3.5 million by 140 AD, with a sixfold increase in Yuzhang
commandery. On the middle Yangzi, seized by Sun Quan in 219, the
population rose from just over a million in 2 AD to more than 3.5
million in the 140s. Given the natural defences provided by the river
and its marshlands, the state of Wu had the human resources to resist
the power of Cao Cao and his successors.79
79
DeC, Generals of the South. Map 41 of Zhongguo shi gao ditu ji has an impres-
sive representation of population changes in the southern commanderies between 2
AD and the 140s.
Furthermore, though the armies of the south never achieved any

breakthrough north up the Han into Nanyang, and were likewise held
on the line of the Huai in the east, the government of Wu had early
embarked on an energetic program of conquest and colonisation,
extending control over present-day Zhejiang and Fujian and gaining
conscripts for defence on the north.80 At the same time on the far
south coast, Sun Quan’s officer Bu Zhi established a relationship with
the local chieftain Shi Xie, and after Shi Xie’s death in 226 Bu Zhi’s
successor Lü Dai seized control from his family.81 The trading wealth
of that region supported the demographic factors which allowed Sun
Quan to defy the greater military power of the north.
Further west, the claimant empire of Shu-Han in present-day Sichuan

had been badly weakened by the loss of Guan Yu’s position on the
middle Yangzi in 219 and the defeat of Liu Bei’s attempt at revenge
and reconquest in 222. Liu Bei died in the aftermath of that campaign,
and was succeeded by his son Liu Shan, then seventeen sui. Liu Shan,
however, was not a young man of great competence or promise, and
Liu Bei entrusted Zhuge Liang with full power of regency.
In 224 and 225 Zhuge Liang undertook a celebrated series of cam-
paigns to the south, which brought at least nominal submission from
the greater part of present-day Yunnan. The native chieftains were
granted seals and other insignia, and became formal subjects of Shu-
Han, but though the tribespeople were largely kept under control,
there were later rebellions. Here was no such energetic program of
colonisation as in Wu under Sun Quan, and the region as a whole
added little to the resources of the state.
On the north and west, the forces of Shu-Han made several attempts
to break through the barrier of the Qin Ling or to advance down the
Han into Jing province, but they achieved only limited success. Zhuge
Liang did occupy Wudu commandery, and in 233 he established a
foothold in the valley of the Wei, but he was held there by the Wei
general Sima Yi, and his death in the following year put an end to the
major threat in that region.
In general, though the rulers of Wei and Wu made some attempt
to establish a form of government which might echo the traditions
80
Generals of the South, 328–340.
81
Chapter Six at 276, note 25 to Chapter Nine, and deC, Generals of the South,
442–446.
456 chapter ten
of Han, Shu-Han did not develop into more than a warlord regime,
with emphasis on the recruitment and supply of troops and on the
personal interests of the chieftain. It is notable that the majority of the
leaders came originally from other parts of China, and though there
were administrative and clerical offices it was not a government for
long-term planning and development.
For Cao Cao’s successors, however, the existence of two such ene-
mies in notional alliance, with capacity to threaten defences in the Wei
valley, in the middle Yangzi basin, and across the lower Yangzi and
the Huai, meant that the state was always on a war footing, whether in
hope of a breakthrough or fear of a significant reverse in any of those
regions. This was not a recipe for peaceful prosperity under a civilian
government.
Despite concerns to the south, however, the empire of Wei gained

considerable success elsewhere. Cao Pi received embassies from cen-
tral Asia and re-established a form of protectorate, the Qiang were held
under control, and though the government had effectively abandoned
the lands north of the Ordos and the Sanggan River, neither the Xion-
gnu nor the Xianbi of the steppe were well enough organised to offer a
major threat. In 238 the separatist state of the Gongsun family in the
northeast was destroyed by Sima Yi, and a further series of campaigns
in 244–245 broke the power of the non-Chinese state of Koguryŏ: the
Chinese military position in that region was now the strongest it had
been since the time of Emperor Wu of Former Han.
In that regard at least, the Cao dynasty had restored the authority
of China in east Asia. The achievements, however, were owed in great
part to the energy of the general Sima Yi. As he and his family rose
to a dominant position in the new state, the structure at the centre of
Wei became increasingly uncertain.
Sima Yi was a man of gentry family from Henei, whose members had
held senior official rank for several generations.82 His father Sima Fang
had at one time a reputation as a hermit, but later held office in com-
mandery and provincial governments and at the capital. After Dong
Zhuo seized power, Sima Fang was obliged to accompany the court to
82
On the family, see SGZ 15:466 PC quoting the Preface 序傳 of Sima Biao to his
Xu Han shu [see SGZJJ 1:116b-117a], and JS 1:1. On Sima Fang and Sima Lang as
below, see also deC, LH3K, sub voce.
Chang’an, but he ordered his eldest son Lang to take the household
back to their home country. Sima Lang then took service with Cao
Cao, and Sima Fang was eventually able to join him. On account of
his age he held only a supernumerary position, but in 175 he had been
Prefect of Luoyang and thus the direct superior of Cao Cao as county
commandant. Years later, when Cao Cao became King of Wei in 216,
Sima Fang joked with him about their change of circumstance—at least
on this occasion Cao Cao took no offence, and he may have respected
the old connection.
Sima Fang had eight sons, whom he brought up on strict Confucian
principles. Sima Lang, the eldest, became Inspector of Yan province
and held influence at court, but died on the campaign against Sun
Quan in 217. His brother Sima Yi, second son of Sima Fang, had to be
firmly persuaded to enter Cao Cao’s service, but eventually did so in
208.83 Appointed to Cao Cao’s staff, he became Registrar in his office
as Imperial Chancellor, and in 217 he was made a member of the suite
of Cao Pi the Heir of Wei. Though eight years the elder, he became a
close friend and companion.
When Guan Yu attacked in Jing province at the end of 219, Sima Yi
was again in Cao Cao’s company, and after Cao Cao died at Luoyang
he assisted the succession of Cao Pi, then accompanied the funeral
cortège to Ye city. He played a leading role in the debate which justi-
fied Cao Pi’s taking the imperial title,84 was rewarded with enfeoffment
and received steadily higher appointments. When Cao Pi led an army
against Wu in 224 and 225 he left Sima Yi in charge of affairs at the
capital with plenipotentiary powers.
In the summer of 226 Cao Pi was taken seriously ill. The Lady Zhen,
former wife of Yuan Xi, had born him a daughter and a son, Cao
Rui, but lost favour on account of her jealousy, and in 221 Cao Pi
ordered her to commit suicide.85 Cao Rui was nonetheless the eldest
83
See Chapter Six at 246. The biography of Sima Yi, posthumously entitled Emperor
Xuan of Jin, is in JS 1.
84
See, for example, SGZ 2:66; Goodman, Ts’ao P’i Transcendent, 111.
85
Cao Rui was born in 206 or 207, after the Lady Zhen had entered the harem of
Cao Pi but while her former husband Yuan Xi was still alive.
The Lady’s suicide is recorded by SGZ 5:160; Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and Con-
sorts, 97. Since she was the mother of the future Emperor, this was embarrassing, and
at SGZ 5:161, PC quotes the official history Wei shu, which claims instead that Cao
Pi wanted to name the Lady Zhen as his empress, but that she repeatedly refused the
honour and died of natural causes before he could persuade her. Pei Songzhi, how-
ever, notes the falsehood.
458 chapter ten
son, and as Cao Pi was on his deathbed he named him his Heir and
successor.86
Some twenty years old when he came to the throne, Cao Rui was
formally of full age, but his father appointed a council of regency for
him, comprising the senior official Chen Qun, the generals Cao Zhen
and Cao Xiu, and Sima Yi. Neither Cao Zhen nor Cao Xiu were close
kinsmen of the imperial family: Cao Xiu came from a cadet branch
and Cao Zhen was a son of Qin Shao, who was connected to the Caos
by a female lineage; he had been adopted by Cao Cao. Both men had
been youthful companions of Cao Pi.87
Cao Pi had excluded his brothers from any role in government.
Given the initial uncertainty and rivalry with Cao Zhi for appointment
as their father’s successor, and the potential interest of Cao Zhang,
this was not an unreasonable decision, and it followed the tradition of
Han which kept members of the imperial house exiled on distant fiefs.
With many protestations of loyalty, Cao Zhi asked several times for an
opportunity to assist his brother, and his frustration was surely shared,
perhaps to an even greater degree, by Cao Zhang, who had achieved
military success while their father was alive. Though Cao Zhang died
in 223, Cao Pi remained adamant against his close kin, shifting their
fiefs from one place to another lest they establish local support, and
insisting on keeping them apart even when they journeyed to court.88
86
According to the annals of SGZ 2:86, Cao Pi was taken ill on the bingchen day
of the fifth month of 226, equivalent to 28 June. He had barely time to name Cao
Rui as his Heir and arrange a regency, for he died on the following day, dingsi: Fang,
Chronicle I, 201 and 213.
87
Biographies of Cao Zhen and Cao Xiu are at SGZ 9:280–82 and 279–80. On
Chen Qun, see Chapter Six at 249 and Chapter Eight at 375–376. His biography is at
SGZ 22:633–37.
88
On the control of the imperial family, see for example SGZ 19:576 and 20:591;
Fang, Chronicle I, 357–358.
In a celebrated poem composed after the death of Cao Zhang, Cao Zhi mourned
the loss and expressed cautious resentment that he and his half-brother Cao Biao were
prevented from travelling together as they returned from the capital to their estates.
The poem is preserved in SGZ 19:564–65 PC quoting Weishi chunqiu; it appears also
in WH 24:3b-5a under the title Zeng Boma wang Biao “To Cao Biao, King of Boma,”
and is translated by von Zach, Chinesische Anthologie I, 384–387.
About the same time Cao Zhi presented a most humble memorial to Cao Pi, seek-
ing his favour and possible employment and adding two poems in similar vein: SGZ
19:562–64; Dunn, Cao Zhi, 63–70, also WH 20:2a-5b; von Zach, Chinesische Antholo-
gie I, 280–285.
In 228 Cao Zhi wrote to the new ruler, his nephew Cao Rui, likewise seeking
employment, and in 231 he sent two more memorials in the same vein; they too,
In similar fashion, and mindful of the problems faced by the Later

Han dynasty, he also ordered that his mother the Dowager Lady Bian
should have no involvement in government, and that no member of
the clan of an imperial consort should hold position as a regent.
Justified though his concerns may have been, Cao Pi’s policy had
dangers for the dynasty. While it was true that close kinsmen could
offer a threat to the ruler, they could also support the family, and the
appointment of a council of regency for Cao Rui not only limited his
authority but allowed more distant relatives and outsiders to share in
power. Cao Xiu died in 228 and Cao Zhen in 231, and while Chen
Qun remained active until his death in 236 it was the fourth regent,
Sima Yi, who became the leading general of Wei.
Sima Yi had not held major military command under Cao Pi, but
he proved to be an energetic and competent general, achieving suc-
cess against Wu in the defence of Nanyang and later, despite setbacks,
holding the forces of Shu-Han from the Wei valley. With the death of
Zhuge Liang in 234 the situation eased, and in 238 Sima Yi destroyed
the Gongsun state in the northeast.
In the following year Cao Rui died, aged in his late thirties, leaving
no son of his own. The parentage of his adopted successor Cao Fang is
not known, and he was only seven years old. Cao Rui had considered
involving members of the imperial family in the government, but was
finally persuaded to nominate only two men: Cao Shuang, son of the
former regent Cao Zhen, and Sima Yi.89
By this time the prestige and authority of the dynasty itself had
come under question, for not only was Cao Fang of uncertain birth,
but the imperial family compared badly with a clan such as the Sima.
Some of the problem came from the tradition of marriage initiated by
Cao Cao. His wife the Lady Bian, mother of Cao Pi, had been a sing-
song girl; the Lady Guo, Empress of Cao Pi, came of minor gentry
stock and had at one time been a servant; the Lady Zhen, mother of
Cao Rui, had been taken into bigamy by Cao Pi; and the father of Cao
Rui’s first empress the Lady Mao had been a wainwright.90 Cao Rui
however, had little success: SGZ 19:565–68 and 569–74. The memorials of 231 are
translated by Fang, Chronicle I, 339–348; that of 228 and the first of 231 are also in
WH 37:4a-10b; von Zach, Chinesische Anthologie II, 667–676.
89
SGZ 3:113–14 and other texts: see by Fang, Chronicle I, 582–584 and 610–616.
90
On the Lady Bian, see Chapter One at 34–35, and Cutter & Crowell, Empresses
and Consorts, 90–93. On the Lady Guo, see Cutter & Crowell, 95–100. On the Lady
460 chapter ten
later replaced her with the Lady Guo, a woman of respectable family,
but the Lady Yu, a concubine of Cao Rui who had been an unsuc-
cessful contender as his consort, is said to have remarked bitterly and
tactlessly to the Lady Bian that “The Caos have always preferred people
of inferior quality. They have never managed to make appointments
on the basis of good character.”91
There is a yet more damaging story in Shishuo xinyu, which tells
how Cao Pi took over his father’s harem after Cao Cao’s death, quite
against custom, propriety and filial respect. It is said that the Lady Bian
his mother found out about it only when her son was on his death-
bed, and was so offended that she refused to visit him and held only
the minimum of mourning.92 Like an anecdote from Cao Man zhuan,
this may be no more than a slanderous tale published by a rival state,
but the fact that such stories could be circulated, with some possibility
of credit, was surely damaging.
During the first years of Cao Fang’s reign, power at court was held by
Cao Shuang while Sima Yi concentrated upon military affairs. Unlike
his father and grandfather, Cao Rui had taken no part in such mat-
ters, and Cao Shuang had made one unsuccessful campaign against
Shu-Han.93 Sima Yi, however, was now a distinguished commander,
with wide support in the army and among men of quality outside the
circle of the court.
Cao Shuang’s regency during the 240s was a time of intellectual
excitement, when the Confucian tradition, almost exhausted by the
sterilities of Han, was revived under the influence of Taoism and par-
ticularly by association with Xuanxue, “The Study of the Mysteries.”
Among the leaders of this intellectual trend were He Yan, a close asso-
ciate of Cao Shuang, and his friend Wang Bi, imaginative interpreter
of the Yi jing Book of Changes. With their contemporaries Ruan Ji,
Xi Kang and other Sages of the Bamboo Grove, these men of good
Zhen, see Chapter Five at 218, note 85 above, and Cutter & Crowell, 106–110. On
the empresses of Cao Rui, see Cutter & Crowell, 111–114. The humble origins of
Mao Jia, and his later pretensions to grandeur, are described by SGZ 5:168; Cutter &
Crowell, 112.
91
SGZ 5:167; Cutter & Crowell, 111–112.
92
SSXY XIX:4; Mather, Tales of the World, 342 [Worthy Beauties].
It is possible that this story is a reflection of the manner in which Cao Pi took
the Lady Zhen as his consort when she was still formally the wife of Yuan Xi. SSXY
XXXV:1; Mather, Tales of the World, 484 [Blind Infatuations], says that Cao Cao had
wanted the Lady for himself; see also Chapter Eleven at 474.
93
The biography of Cao Shuang is at SGZ 9:282–88.
background and great talent sought to avoid pointless formality and

deliberately opposed tradition.
The social attitudes and personal conduct of this group of intellec-
tuals and scholars, however, though fitting the freedom of their phi-
losophy, did not win wide approval or respect. He Yan in particular,
whose mother became a concubine of Cao Cao and who married his
own half-sister, was elegant and arrogant, brilliant in the repartee and
dialectic of Pure Conversation. He was a member of the imperial sec-
retariat and had influence on appointments, but he was also known as
a libertine, and he and his associates were devotees of ecstatic drugs.94
He Yan appears to have been the only member of his group who
was interested in substantial office, but Cao Shuang and all the court
were affected by his reputation. In the early years of Wei under Cao
Cao and Cao Pi, the literary life of the capital had added lustre and
authority to the new regime. In contrast now, the excesses attributed
to He Yan and his clique became an embarrassment, and Sima Yi
could present himself as the representative for men of good family
who sought traditional morality and restraint in politics and society.
After various political intrigues, in 249 Sima Yi ran a coup d’état at
Luoyang, slaughtered Cao Shuang and his party, and seized power in
the state of Wei. Though he died two years later, his eldest son Sima
Shi took over his position, and when Cao Fang attempted a coun-
ter-coup in 254 he was deposed and replaced by a cousin, Cao Mao.
Sima Shi died in the following year, but was succeeded by his younger
brother Sima Zhao, and Cao Mao was killed as he attempted a further
conspiracy in 260. In 264 Sima Zhao achieved the conquest of Shu-
Han, and though he died soon afterwards his eldest son Sima Yan
completed the process which his grandfather had begun. At the end
of the following year, on 8 February 266, in form reminiscent of Cao
Pi’s accession years before, he received the abdication of Cao Huan,
last puppet ruler of Wei, and took title for himself as Emperor of the
Jin dynasty. In 280 Sima Yan received the surrender of Wu and China
was once more—at least for a time—ruled by one dynasty.
The government of Wei had restored authority in the north but it was
the Jin dynasty of the Sima that reunited the Chinese world, and apart
94
On He Yan’s connection with the Cao family, see Chapter Nine at 400; he was a
grandson of the late General-in-Chief He Jin. His biography is at SGZ 9:292–93, that
of Wang Bi is at SGZ 28:795–96 PC, and those of Ruan Ji and Xi Kang are at SGZ
21:605–07 and in JS 49.
462 chapter ten
from arguments of loyalty and legitimacy this was not inappropriate.

Cao Cao and Cao Pi had maintained their power by a combination of
military ability and a splendid state, but Cao Rui had not taken firm
command of the army. For a marginal lineage still close to its military
origins, this was a risk, and the isolation of the ruler from his close
kinsmen, the policy established by Cao Pi, meant that the dynasty had
no solid base for its rule. In the end, suspicious of the threats they
perceived to their authority, local Confucian gentry and leaders of the
political community were prepared to support Sima Yi and his clan,
men of achievement who identified with their own background and
interests, against an imperial family perceived as being of poor char-
acter and lineage, lacking in true prestige.
In considering the foundation and the ultimate failure of Cao Cao’s
state of Wei, however, one very human factor must be borne in mind:
Cao Cao lived to be sixty-five years old, but his son Cao Pi was dead
by the age of forty, and his grandson Cao Rui was no more than thirty-
five. Comparably short spans had been at least in part responsible for
the weakness of the Later Han dynasty, where no ruler after the sec-
ond, Emperor Ming, reached the age of forty, and the great major-
ity came to the throne as minors. Such accidents of mortality would
weaken any dynasty, particularly one which had only lately claimed
sovereign power. In comparison, the state of Wu gained stability from
the long reign of Sun Quan, who died in 252 at the age of seventy—
though his inheritance was badly affected by mistaken favouritisms
of his old age.95 Had Cao Pi lived longer—and his final, fatal illness
appears to have been sudden and unexpected—he could have estab-
lished a long-lasting state.
In this regard, we may consider one last “might-have-been:” had
Cao Cao died at the same age as his son Cao Pi, he would have met
his end in 195, when he was still engaged with Lü Bu in the strug-
gle to recapture Yan province, and before he had brought Emperor
Xian under his control. Guandu, White Wolf Mountain, the Red Cliffs
and the kingdom of Wei were still ahead of him, as were his civil
reforms and much of his poetry: he would have been remembered, if
at all, as a minor warlord in a ruinous time. There is much to be said
for longevity.
95
DeC, Generals of the South, 483–485.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
ANOTHER LIFE: HISTORY, ANECDOTE AND FICTION
Pei Songzhi, Fan Ye and Shishuo xinyu

Story-tellers, poets, playwrights and Pinghua
Revisionist history, Romance and the Peking opera
Marxist debate and the modern actor
Why Cao Cao?
For most men and women, little remains after death but the memory
and record of their deeds and their work: facts may be discussed, but
the book is largely closed.
For Cao Cao, however, the conflicts and controversy of life were
followed by centuries of debate and reinvention. The complexity of his
personal character and the imperfect nature of his achievement meant
that he and his career became symbols for the future, and judgement
over the years has been greatly affected by political circumstance and
popular opinion. It is naturally not possible here to present a detailed
account of this afterlife—there is already a vast literature in Chinese
and other languages on all aspects of historical writing and fiction
relating to the period of the Three Kingdoms—but the essay which
follows offers a summary of Cao Cao’s changing reputation in the
eighteen hundred years since his time.
Pei Songzhi, Fan Ye and Shishuo xinyu
Predictably and as we have seen, stories gathered about Cao Cao even
in his lifetime, some in his favour but many composed and circulated
by rivals and enemies. Two major sources are Yuan Shao’s Call to
Arms on the eve of the Guandu campaign in 200 and the Cao Man
zhuan composed in the state of Wu.1
1
On the Call to Arms, see Chapter Three at 128 ff. On Cao Man zhuan, see note 27
to Chapter One; and on its negative eulogy of Cao Cao, Chapter Ten at 448.
464 chapter eleven
Apart from criticism of Cao Cao’s family background, and general

accusations of cruelty and usurpation of power, Yuan Shao charged
him with the killing of Bian Rang and Zhao Yan, and the torture of
Yang Biao, claiming also that he robbed the tombs of the dead and
established officers to supervise the plunder. Cao Man zhuan told of
jealousy and deception, with no concern for others, combined with
a false bonhomie, a misleading simplicity of carriage and dress, and
an underlying viciousness. Both sources affected to despise Cao Cao’s
military ability—Yuan Shao would suffer for the underestimate—but
the essential pattern was that of a man who was clever but treacherous,
never to be trusted by friend or foe.
Such hostile propaganda would be circulated against any notable
political figure, and varying forms of abuse and denigration were
exchanged between all contenders in such a civil conflict; echoes may
be found in texts surviving from the time of the restoration of Han
under Emperor Guangwu in the early second century.2 Naturally
enough, few tales directed against the eventual victor of a civil war
were likely to survive, but the fact that Cao Cao’s state of Wei failed to
unify the empire meant unfavourable stories were not suppressed, but
rather spread by its enemies, while politics and historiography com-
bined to produce debate on the nature of the dynasty and the founder
of its fortunes. As Wei and then Shu-Han were taken over by the Sima
family of Jin, the question of legitimacy became important, and the
argument would continue for centuries.
Chen Shou (233–297), author of the now canonical Sanguo zhi, was
born a subject of Shu-Han and worked in the records office of that
state.3 He was in his early thirties when Shu-Han was conquered by
Jin, and he took service again under the government of his new mas-
ters. It is said that he was favoured by the great minister Zhang Hua,
and that after the conquest of Wu in 280 he drew upon the archives
of the three rival governments to compile their history. There were
other works available at the time, though in the absence of printing
2
Bielenstein, RHD II, 232–248, discusses various forms of propaganda during that
time of civil war. Much was made of omens and portentous sayings, but there were
also songs and ditties which denigrated various contenders.
3
There are biographies of Chen Shou in HYGZ 11:189–190 and in JS 82:2137–38,
the first being more favourable. Both accounts are presented at the end of the modern
Beijing edition of SGZ, at 1475–76 [HYGZ] and 1477–78 [ JS].
another life: history, anecdote and fiction 465
one cannot be confident that they were widely circulated, nor can one
judge which ones Chen Shou had available to him. There were, how-
ever, official histories of Wei and Wu, compiled respectively by Wang
Shen (d.266) and by Wei Zhao (204–273) and others, and two impor-
tant works by the private scholar Yu Huan, Dian lue “An Authoritative
Account of Events” and Wei lue “An Account of Wei,” together with a
large number of “secondary biographies” (biezhuan) of leading figures,
records of great families, and many other texts whose very names have
been forgotten.4
It was appropriate that the bulk of Chen Shou’s compilation, thirty
chapters out of a total of sixty-five, was devoted to Wei, greatest of
the three states, with twenty allocated to Wu, which outlasted both
the others. Dealing with Shu-Han was made more difficult by the fact
that although archives were kept—and Chen Shou had served in a
relevant office—there had been no formal organisation nor any offi-
cial history project such as Wei shu and Wu shu.5 Chen Shou him-
self, however, had edited the Collected Works of Zhuge Liang, and he
was also involved in the compilation of Yibu qijiu zhuan “Accounts
of Venerable Men and Ancient Affairs of Yi Division,” a collection of
biographies relating to Yi province, one of many in the genre of local
histories common at the time. It would nonetheless have been mis-
taken and even dangerous to place undue emphasis upon that region.
As the former subject of a defeated enemy, Chen Shou had to be care-
ful what he wrote.
On the other hand, Chen Shou did treat the three states inde-
pendently, so that each has its own section, sometimes appearing
separately.6 All three sections consist solely of biographies, with no
4
Chen Shou and his sources are discussed by deC, Records of the Three Kingdoms,
Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 1–44, and the Prolegomenon of Cutter & Crowell, Empresses
and Consorts, 61–81. Chapter 9 of deC, Generals of the South, has a survey of the
texts with particular emphasis on sources for the history of Wu, and an account of
the historiography of Wu shu at 550–557.
5
SGZ Shu 3:902; Leban, “Ts’ao Ts’ao,” 12, and Cutter & Crowell, Empresses and
Consorts, 65 and 186 note 35.
6
The bibliographical treatise (經籍志 Jingji zhi) of Sui shu has the Sanguo zhi of
Chen Shou, with commentary by Pei Songzhi, as a single item in the category of stand-
ard histories (正史 zhengshi): SuiS 33:955. The Jingji zhi of Jiu Tang shu, however,
lists the Weiguo zhi 魏國志 by Chen Shou, with commentary, among the standard
histories (zhengshi), but Shuguo zhi and Wuguo zhi are placed among the chronicles
(編年 biannian): JTS 46:1989 and 1992. The Yiwen zhi 藝文志 of Xin Tang shu has
Weiguo zhi, Shuguo zhi and Wuguo zhi, each by Chen Shou with commentary by Pei
Songzhi, among the standard histories: XTS 58:1455.
466 chapter eleven
treatises or tables, but the lives of the founders and rulers are pre-
sented in similar fashion to the traditional annals of Han shu and
Hou Han shu. Within their respective sections Cao Pi and his suc-
cessors are identified as emperors (帝 di), and Liu Bei and Liu Shan
are described as First and Second Sovereigns (先主 xianzhu and 後主
houzhu), while Sun Quan and the other chieftains of Wu are referred
to only by name. Cao Cao himself appears initially by his posthumous
title Taizu 太祖, but from 196, when he became an Excellency, he is
referred to as gong 公, reflecting that status. The authority of each state
is accepted within its own borders, so that pejorative terms for bandits
(賊 ze), rebels (逆 ni) and their pacification (平 ping) are applied to
internal opponents, while external military action is expressed by the
neutral terms of “attack” (攻 gong), “going out” (岀 chu) or “striking
at” (擊 ji). Though Chen Shou’s format thus accepted the primacy of
Wei, the accounts of Shu and Wu were not subordinated in the man-
ner of Zaiji “parallel annals” of Jin shu, and each state was given its
own history largely in its own terms.7 Considering the pressures that
he faced in terms of the past conflict between the states and the poli-
tics of his own day, it is generally agreed that Chen Shou achieved a
remarkable balance.
The Jin dynasty of the Sima, however, could not be wholly sympa-
thetic to the cause of Wei, for Sima Yi, Sima Zhao and their kinsmen
had subverted the regime established by Cao Cao and Cao Pi. It was
therefore in the interests of the rulers of the new state to emphasise
the failings of the family which they had supplanted. Any faults which
might be attributed to the founders of Wei could be used to weaken
the authority of their successors, and so justify the seizure of power.
Early in the fourth century, moreover, after the devastating civil
conflict known as the War of the Eight Princes, the government of
Jin was driven from north China by a Xiongnu state whose founder
Liu Yuan had proclaimed a new dynasty of Han.8 In 311 Liu Yuan’s
son and successor Liu Cong captured Luoyang, and in 316 he took
the last northern stronghold at Chang’an. A remnant of the defeated
regime took refuge among the lands of the Yangzi, regaining there a
7
Cf. JS 101–130, being the chapters identified as 載記, and Gardiner, “Standard
Histories,” 46.
8
On the fall of Western Jin see, for example, deC, “Three Kingdoms and Western
Jin” II, 160, and Dreyer, “Eight Princes,” particularly 135–136 and 141–142. Liu Yuan,
often referred to by his style as Liu Yuanhai, claimed descent from the lineage of the
Shanyu of the Xiongnu on one side and from a princess of Han on the other.
measure of authority and maintaining itself for another hundred years.

Now known as Eastern Jin, it was less the heir to the state of Wei than
an echo of exiled Shu-Han: holding territory outside the heartland,
but nonetheless claiming legitimacy against the false, barbarian rul-
ers of the north. In that regard again, there was reason for men of
the south to identify with Liu Bei, Zhuge Liang and other leaders
of Shu-Han, and to idealise their struggle against the usurping power
of Cao Cao.9
One aspect of this approach was the question of the true succession
(正統 zhengtong) to the Mandate of Heaven, and hence the legitimacy
of Wei and Jin. Having taken over from Wei, the rulers of Jin were ini-
tially bound to accept the rights of their predecessors, but in the fourth
century the historian and theorist Xi Zuochi of Eastern Jin argued that
the true lineage ran from Former and Later Han through Shu-Han to
Jin, by right of the conquest in the middle 260s.
The biography of Xi Zuochi in Jin shu is largely devoted to the essay
in which he argues that the state founded by Liu Bei had maintained
a dynastic inheritance from Han, and to confirm this chronology he
composed a Han-Jin chunqiu “Chronicle of Han and Jin,” covering the
period from Emperor Guangwu of Later Han to Emperor Min the last
ruler of Western Jin.10 As a natural consequence, of course, the East-
ern Jin, though forced into exile in the south, remained the legitimate
sovereign of China.
It was really a matter of chance that Wei and Shu-Han could be set
in such calendrical competition. After the death of Cao Cao early in
220, Cao Pi had the reign-title of Han changed from Jian’an to Yan-
kang; but when he took the imperial position at the end of that year he
published his own new reign-period of Huangchu “Yellow Beginning.”
Then, in the following summer, Liu Bei announced his own claim to
the empire, with the reign-title Zhangwu. As a result, the chronology
9
On Eastern Jin, see Holcombe, In the Shadow of Han, and on attitudes towards
Cao Cao and Wei, see Kroll, “Portraits,” 128 and 203–204 note 31. Shen, “Inventing
the Romantic Kingdom,” 36, points to the importance of Shu-Han as a means for the
southern regime to justify its status as a true, ethnic Chinese government.
Though the capital was set at present-day Nanjing, former home of Sun Quan, there
does not appear to have been any sense of succession to the self-proclaimed empire
of Wu. Wu had been primarily a regional state, and there was also the problem that
Wu had been the last opponent of Western Jin. On calendrical continuity, see also
below.
10
Xi Zuochi’s biography is at JS 82:2152–58; his essay on the succession of dynas-
ties is at 2154–58.
468 chapter eleven
of Wei describes the Chinese year which extended from Western

22 February 220 to 9 February 221 as the first year of Huangchu, but
for Han loyalists and sympathisers of Shu the year is the first of Yan-
kang, followed by the first of Zhangwu.11
Forty years later, in 263, Liu Bei’s son Liu Shan surrendered to Wei,
but Shu-Han was not entirely conquered until the following year,
which would have been counted as the second of the Yanxing “Bril-
liant Prosperity” period. And on 8 February 266, at the very end of the
Chinese year after that, Sima Yan took the throne from the house of
Wei and renamed the whole year from 3 February 265 as the first of
Taishi “Grand Beginning.” So the chronology of Wei from 263 to 266
would be represented by Jingyuan 4 and Xianxi 1 of Wei, followed by
the Taishi period of Jin. For those who sought to link Shu-Han to Jin,
however, it was Yanxing 1 and 2 of Shu, then the Taishi period of Jin.
No such continuity could be claimed for Wu: Sun Quan acknowledged
the suzerainty of Cao Pi and accepted his reign-title of Huangchu until
he proclaimed independence and his own calendar in 223; and there
was a fifteen-year overlap between the formal foundation of Jin and
its conquest of Wu.
It has been said that “The controversy is not one in which modern
historians are likely to take much interest,”12 but it certainly concerned
the statesmen and scholars of Eastern Jin, and the debate was raised
on a number of occasions in the centuries which followed. The histo-
riographer Liu Zhiji of Tang left the question somewhat open,13 but
Ouyang Xiu of Northern Song was clear that the Mandate had trans-
ferred from Han to Wei to Jin,14 and when his contemporary Sima
11
Most reign-titles were little more than hopeful slogans, and while characters
change, the meaning often remains much the same. Note 52 to Chapter Two dis-
cusses Jian’an 建安 as “Establishing Peace,” while Yankang 延康 may be understood
as “Long-lasting Peace” and Zhangwu 章武 as “Splendid Warfare.” Similarly, of the
titles mentioned below, Yanxing 炎興 can be rendered as “Brilliant Prosperity,” Taishi
泰始 as “Grand Beginning,” Jingyuan 景元 as “Luminous Beginning” and Xianxi 咸煕
as “United Prosperity.”
The first reign-periods of Wei and Wu, however, Huangchu 黃初 “Yellow Begin-
ning” and Huangwu 黃武 “Yellow Warfare,” have special significance. Various omens
and sayings had foretold that Han ruled through the force of Red and would be suc-
ceeded by the power of Yellow, and the Yellow Turban rebels of 184 had taken their
name and their badge from this inspiration. Wei and then Wu followed the same
principle; Liu Bei, of course, could do no such thing.
12
Glenn W. Baxter, in his Editor’s Preface to Fang, Chronicle I, xiii.
13
E.g. Shitong 7:28b–29a.
14
Wei lun 魏論, in Wenzhong ji 59:14b–15b.
Guang had to choose a chronology for Zizhi tongjian, he opted for

the same sequence. In a careful essay, however, while noting the dis-
tance and doubt of Liu Bei’s claim to be descended from the imperial
house of Former Han, Sima Guang claimed nonetheless that “we are
not honouring one or treating the other with contempt, nor making
the distinction of the orthodox and intercalary positions.”15 Northern
Song was in any case less concerned politically by the problems of
exiled legitimacy.
A hundred years later the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi took
issue with Sima Guang, arguing that Shu-Han and Liu Bei were the
true heirs of Han, and he arranged the chronology of his Zizhi tongjian
gangmu to reflect that assessment.16 Zhu Xi was rather a moralist than
a historian, and sought to allocate praise and blame like a second
Confucius. The summary is convenient to use, however, Zhu Xi was a
most important thinker, and the concept of a legitimate government
maintaining itself in semi-exile was popular in his dynasty of Southern
Song, just as it had been during Eastern Jin. Zhu Xi’s approach became
the main stream of Chinese and later of Western interpretation.
The status of Cao Cao’s dynasty of Wei, and the relationship to Liu
Bei and his rival empire of Shu-Han, had thus long been a matter of
controversy. In 420 the general Liu Yu seized power from the last ruler
of Eastern Jin, and the publication of three major works a few years
later served to enhance the discussion. In 429 Pei Songzhi presented
his commentary to Chen Shou’s Sanguo zhi, and in 430 there appeared
the Shishuo xinyu, collected by a group sponsored by the prince Liu
Yiqing. A few years earlier, in the winter of 424, the official Fan Ye had
been disgraced for being drunk at an imperial funeral; exiled to the
provinces he began to work seriously on Hou Han shu, which would
become the standard history of Later Han.17
15
ZZTJ 69:2185–88 at 2188; Fang, Chronicle I, 45–48 at 47.
16
Though Zizhi tongjian gangmu is attributed to Zhu Xi, it was published by his
students after his death in 1200, and some commentators have questioned whether it
truly reflected his opinion: Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s Sense of History,” 200 and note
34. It was nonetheless accepted as his work, and acquired enormous influence.
17
On Pei Songzhi (372–451) and his commentary to Sanguo zhi, see the sources
cited in note 4 above. The biography of Pei Songzhi in Song shu 64 is reprinted at the
end of the modern Beijing edition of SGZ at 1479–81.
On Liu Yiqing (403–444) and the compilation of Shishuo xinyu, see the Introduc-
tion to Mather, Tales of the World, xxvii.
Fan Ye and Hou Han shu are discussed in more detail below.
470 chapter eleven
An associate of Liu Yu, Pei Songzhi had held high position under the
new regime and was recognised for his scholarship. He had evidently
been working on his commentary for some time before he received the
formal commission in 428, for he completed it very promptly, and the
imperial endorsement meant that Sanguo zhi, with its commentary,
ranked with Shi ji and Han shu. In his memorial of presentation, Pei
Songzhi remarked that:
The argument and design of Chen Shou’s work are admirable, and in
most matters it is well judged; indeed it is a garden of knowledge and the
finest historical work of recent times. It is, however, rather too summary
and there are a number of omissions.
Having received the imperial command to search into detail and to
devote my efforts to discover every source, I have looked out old tradi-
tions and recovered records which had been neglected.18
Pei Songzhi, however, not only used alternative and supplementary
texts to enlarge the scope of Chen Shou’s work, but in one remarkable
fashion he distinguishes himself from the generality of Chinese his-
torical writing. Whereas most traditional compilers before and since
his time have absorbed previous accounts into their own narrative
without attribution, Pei Songzhi identified his sources by name, he
had no hesitation in presenting accounts which differed from Chen
Shou’s, and he frequently cites one text against another. As he remarks
further in his memorial:
If there is something Chen Shou did not mention, and it is something
that should be remembered, then I collect records to fill in the gaps.
Sometimes there are agreed accounts of an affair, but there are errors or
confusion in the text, sometimes an incident is described in two quite
different ways and I do not feel competent to decide between them. In
all such cases I include the alternative version to show the different tra-
ditions. If one account is clearly wrong and what it says is not logically
sound, then I note which is correct in order to right the mistake. On
occasion I argue with Chen Shou in his judgement of events or on minor
matters of fact.19
Despite these ambitions, not all the sources that Pei Songzhi cited were
reliable. Some were propaganda, others were folk tales, legends and
superstitions. The eighteenth-century editors of Siku quanshu com-
18
The memorial is printed at the end of the modern Beijing edition of SGZ at
1471–72.
19
SGZ at 1471.
plained that Pei Songzhi was unduly fond of strange stories,20 and it is
true that the Shenxian zhuan “Biographies of Spirits and Immortals”
of Ge Hong and the Soushen ji “Record of Enquiry about the Spirits”
by Gan Bao, both of which appear several times in the commentary,
are primarily concerned with the supernatural.
The editors of Siku quanshu also criticised Pei Songzhi for includ-
ing irrelevant material and for haphazard arrangement, but although
these are fair comments and Pei Songzhi does not always carry out his
fine intentions, he does account for his sources and he is prepared to
discuss them. As a result, his commentary provides a survey of mate-
rial which survived two hundred years after Cao Cao, with variant
accounts and interpretations, and opportunity for later scholars to
judge the history for themselves.
In compiling his Hou Han shu, Fan Ye could make use of sources
called upon by Chen Shou and Pei Songzhi, and there is obvious
overlap: both histories contain biographies of Dong Zhuo, Yuan Shao,
Yuan Shu, Liu Biao and others, and some passages are identical. The
range and perspective, however, are very different. Hou Han shu deals
with a period of two hundred years, twice as long as Sanguo zhi, and
its arrangement of annals and biographies, with treatises added later
from earlier work by Sima Biao, follows closely upon the models of
Han shu and Shi ji. Bielenstein has observed that Fan Ye drew heavily
upon Dongguan Han ji “Han Records of the Eastern Lodge,” a con-
tinuing history compiled at intervals through the dynasty itself, but he
had access to other texts dealing with the period, and copied also from
these, rearranging the material as he did so.21
Based thus strongly upon the archives of Han, Hou Han shu natu-
rally reflects the outlook of that dynasty, and one obvious effect is the
20
The discussion of Sanguo zhi by Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao is printed at the end
of the modern Beijing edition of SGZ at 1473–74.
21
On Fan Ye (398–446) and Hou Han shu, see Bielenstein, RHD I, 14–18. At 15–16
Bielenstein discusses Fan Ye’s treatment of his sources, and at 13 he presents a table of
twenty-two histories which dealt with all or part of the two centuries of Later Han.
As Fan Ye had left only the annals and biographies of his projected work, the sixth-
century scholar Liu Zhao added the treatises from the Xu Han shu of Sima Biao of the
third century, with his own commentary. In the seventh century Li Xian (651–684),
who was Heir to the throne of Tang but was later disgraced and dismissed, sponsored
the compilation of a commentary to Fan Ye’s work. The present-day full version of
Hou Han shu, with annals, biographies and treatises and the commentaries of Li Xian
and Liu Zhao, was published under imperial auspices for the first time in 1022.
472 chapter eleven
treatment of Cao Cao. It is not surprising that Fan Ye did not give him
a biography, for the work of Chen Shou was already comprehensive,
but as Kroll remarks, the terms in which he is described are very dif-
ferent to those of Sanguo zhi and Wei shu. When Sanguo zhi says that
Cao Cao received a title or position, Hou Han shu indicates that he
took it for himself (自 zi), and whereas Sanguo zhi describes his death
by the term 崩 peng, used for an emperor, Hou Han shu has 薧 hong,
referring to a minister or feudal lord.22
Elsewhere Kroll notes further that many stages of Cao Cao’s rise
to power were accompanied or swiftly followed by mention in Hou
Han shu of ominous portents such as eclipses and comets, or terres-
trial disasters like drought and flood.23 He attributes this to the hostil-
ity of historians favourable to Han, but his argument is not strong.
The Annals of Hou Han shu offer no interpretations of portents, and
though the Treatise of the Five Powers from Xu Han shu sometimes
does, and the commentary of Liu Chao may cite other interpretations,
Mansvelt Beck has shown that the portents recorded in the body of
Sima Biao’s Treatise were chosen by their third-century compiler to
illustrate his opinion of the course of Later Han history, and the Trea-
tise as a whole provides his “ex post facto criticism of specific court
policies;” it cannot be taken as a reflection of opinion at that time.24
Manipulation, moreover, was best carried out on unusual phenom-
ena in the human and animal world; reports of eclipses, for example,
were real.25 There is no reason to believe that other events were delib-
erate fabrications: portents had been used by ministers of Han to offer
22
Kroll, “Portraits,” 127. Bielenstein, RHD I, 47–48, however, argues that events
“appear dressed in different stereotype formulas only because they are described
from the view of two different dynasties. No personal judgement of the authors is
involved.”
23
Kroll, “Portraits,” 34–35 note 37.
24
Treatises, 170–171. At 156 Mansvelt Beck points out that the abdication of
Emperor Xian in 220 is mentioned once by the Treatise of Astronomy, related to
comets in 204 and 206 [HHS 102/12:3261], and only twice by the Treatise of the Five
Powers: a dead dragon in 164 and a boy changing into a girl in 202 [HHS 3349]. Sima
Biao’s major concern was for the usurpation of power by imperial consort families.
25
Kroll mentions three: in 208, 212 and 216. All have been calculated by von
Oppolzer and are mapped by Stephenson and Houlden. See deC, Establish Peace, 386,
436 and 505, discussing the records of HHS 9 at 385, 386 and 388, quoted by ZZTJ
65:2087, 66:2113 and 67:2146.
One may observe, incidentally, that if any interpretation was to be put upon the
eclipse of the tenth month of 208, it could as well be related to the battle of the Red
Cliffs as to Cao Cao’s appointment as Imperial Chancellor a few months before.
criticism and warning, but such remonstrance would have little effect
upon Cao Cao when he was engaged in full-scale war, and it would
have been extremely dangerous to invent anything. It seems more
plausible to accept that the Annals of Later Han preserve the major
observations of the Bureau of Astronomy, that these were presented
without great prejudice, and that the juxtapositions are rather acciden-
tal than deliberately related to Cao Cao’s cursus honorum.
In sum, given its perspective, Hou Han shu was not particularly hos-
tile to Cao Cao, certainly far less so than many of the more informal
histories and collections of stories which gathered about him in his
own time and in the two centuries after his death.
Contemporary with Hou Han shu and with Pei Songzhi’s commentary
to Sanguo zhi, Shishuo xinyu is a work of a different style.26 While
Pei Songzhi collected some stories of doubtful authenticity, and Fan
Ye was prepared to include tales of ghosts and spirits among his
biographies,27 the collection gathered by Liu Yiqing and his associ-
ates presents a series of anecdotes of varied historical reliability. Many
of the protagonists were concerned with religion, philosophy and
mysticism, and though the stories largely reflect the real world, their
authenticity is questionable. As Mather observes in his Introduction,
even if the background to a tale may be factual, it is no guarantee that
what actually happened or was said is reported correctly.
A certain amount of local colour and fictionalization was more or less
expected even in the standard histories . . . . . . Yet the writing of history
seems not to have been the intention of the author of the Tales of the
World.28
The bibliographical treatises of Sui shu and the Tang histories classify
Shishuo xinyu as Xiaoshuo 小說 “Minor Tales:” a source of entertain-
ment rather than a true account of events. Similar collections already
existed, such as the Yulin “Forest of Sayings” compiled by Pei Qi of the
26
For Shishuo xinyu, I largely follow the commentary and translation of Mather,
Tales of the World.
27
On criticisms of Pei Songzhi’s fondness for the supernatural by the editors of
Siku quanshu, see above. For examples of Fan Ye’s supernatural and ghost stories, see
his biographies of Wang Chun 王忳 in HHS 8171:2680–81, and of Xu Deng 徐豋 and
Zhao Bing 趙炳 in HHS 82/72B:2741–42; deC, LH3K sub voce.
28
Mather, Tales of the World, xiv.
474 chapter eleven
fourth century, and Liu Yiqing drew upon them, but Yulin and other
compilations survive now only in fragments.29
The vast majority of stories in Shishuo xunyu relate to the Jin period
in the third and fourth centuries; a few deal with Qin and Former
Han, but the earliest otherwise concern people of the second cen-
tury AD.30 Liu Bei appears just once; Zhuge Liang four times; Sun
Ce and Sun Quan of Wu are mentioned twice and once respectively.
Cao Cao is in nineteen of the tales, far more than any other figure of
his time.31
For the compilers of Shishuo xinyu, Cao Cao made good copy: cel-
ebrated, intelligent and tricky, whether the tales were true or not he
was an excellent source of entertainment. The story of Yuan Shao and
the assaulted bride may be better taken as an analogy for the fate of
the empire rather than a real event at Luoyang,32 and it is something
of a joke that when he captured Ye city in 204 he planned to abduct
the Lady Zhen, wife of Yuan Xi, only to find that his son Cao Pi had
got to her first: “So all my success this year went simply to benefit that
young fellow!”33
29
SSXY XXVI:24; Mather, 437–438 and xiv, tells us that Peizi yulin “The Forest
of Sayings of Master Pei” was extremely popular when it first appeared in 362, but
soon fell from favour because it contained material critical of contemporary figures
and apparently false. Remnants are collected in Lu Xun/Zhou Shuren’s Gu xiaoshuo
gouchen [GXSGC] at 5–36.
30
A later work, part restored in GXSGC, 71–102, is the Xiaoshuo “Minor Tales”
compiled by Yin Yun of the sixth century. In contrast to Shishuo xinyu, many anec-
dotes from Xiaoshuo concern men of Later Han.
31
Most anecdotes relating to Cao Cao are discussed below; others are at XXVI:11;
Mather, 433, and XXVII:2; Mather, 442, with two passing references at X:18; Mather,
286, and XIII:4; Mather, 302, the last to his Jieshi poem.
In the section on “Precocious Intelligence” SSXY XII:2, Mather, 297, tells how Cao
Cao’s step-son He Yan rejected his plan to formally adopt him. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, however, there is no mention of Cao Cao’s brilliant young son Cao Chong nor
of the great poet Cao Zhi.
32
SSXY XXVII:1; Mather, 441, and Chapter One at 474.
In the same section, SSXY XXVII:5; Mather, 443, tells how Yuan Shao sent a man
to kill Cao Cao as he lay in bed. The assassin thrust a sword through the bed-curtains,
but it went a little too low. Cao Cao guessed that the next one would be higher, so he
lay down flat and the weapon indeed missed him once more. The story is repeated in
the Xiaoshuo collection of Yin Yun of the sixth century, also following close upon the
bride incident: GXSGC, 76. Deprived of a dénouement, however—what about a third
attempt?—it appears mildly pointless, and the commentator Liu Jun dismisses it.
33
SSXY XXXV:1; Mather, 484, and Chapter Five at 218. As discussed in Chapter
Ten at note 92, however, this tale is possibly connected to the story of Cao Pi’s taking
over his father’s harem: SSXY XIX:4; Mather, 312. Both may be untrue.
Three stories in the collection of “Quick Perception” describe word-

games with Yang Xiu. In one of these, as the army was on the march,
Cao Cao took longer to find the answer to a riddle than did Yang Xiu;
and he acknowledged with a sigh that “My wit is thirty li slower than
yours.”34 A fourth in the series tells how both men thought of ways to
use a surplus of bamboo writing strips to make shields for the army.
Word-games based upon fractured characters could be attributed to
anyone, but there was perhaps a certain frisson in the historical fact
that Yang Xiu was admired and trusted by Cao Cao, but was later
executed for betraying that trust.35 Again, Shishuo xinyu tells how Cao
Cao disapproved of Ni Heng and forced him to become a drummer,
but Ni Heng played brilliantly and Kong Rong persuaded Cao Cao to
pardon him. Commentary quotes further from Wenshi zhuan, which
tells how Ni Heng undressed in the middle of the assembly; Cao Cao
is generous enough to remark that “Though I wanted to humiliate
Ni Heng, it is he who has embarrassed me.” He did, however, send
him away.36
Wenshi zhuan says that Cao Cao told Kong Rong he would have
killed Ni Heng for his impertinence, but refrained from doing so lest
people think he was intolerant. It was, as we have discussed, a fine
balance, and Kong Rong eventually went also too far. On the other
hand, in the section on “The Square and Proper,” Shishuo xinyu tells
how the moralist Zong Cheng of Nanyang refused to accept the young
Cao Cao and continued to reject his overtures even after Cao Cao had
gained power. Cao Cao never gave him high office, but he ordered his
son Cao Pi to respect Zong Cheng as a teacher.37 So he was prepared
to put up with rejection and—from the example of Yang Xiu and the
word-game—could acknowledge another’s superiority, but he would
not accept presumption or threats to his dignity.
34
SSXY XI:3; Mather, 293. This anecdote appears in slightly different form in Peizi
yulin at GXSGC, 8, and another version is in the Xiaoshuo collection of Yin Yun,
where the successful puzzle-solver is identified as Ni Heng: GXSGC, 91. The other
stories are in SSXY XI:1 to XI:4, Mather, 292–294.
35
Chapter Nine at x.
36
SSXY II:8; Mather, 30–31. The passage from Wenshi zhuan is cited by SGZ 10:312
PC; deC, Establish Peace, 209–210. On Ni Heng, see also Chapter Three at 118, which
likewise discusses the fate of Kong Rong as below.
37
SSXY V:2; Mather, 146–147, with Liu Jun’s commentary quoting the Chuguo
xianxian zhuan “Accounts of Worthy Men of the Past of the Country of Chu” by
Zhang Fang of the third century.
476 chapter eleven
Shishuo xinyu does contain anecdotes portraying Cao Cao as decep-

tive, and some add cruelty or callousness to his deceit. The section on
“Appearance and Behaviour” says that when a Xiongnu envoy came
to the royal court of Wei Cao Cao chose one of his most physically
impressive courtiers to receive the guest while he himself stood by.
As he left, however, the envoy remarked that though the king had a
fine presence, his attendant had the mark of a true hero. Concerned
that such an excellent judge of men should be in the service of another
and might present a danger, Cao Cao, had him murdered on the
road home.38
Still more brutal is the tale how Cao Cao killed an attendant who
sought only to cover him with a blanket as he lay in bed. This may be a
development from Cao Man zhuan’s account of the unfortunate con-
cubine who failed to wake him on time, and variations on the theme
appear in other texts: Cao Cao appears to sleep, then kills an innocent
man who approaches him. The trick surely dissuaded any potential
assassin, but it came at a cost of humanity.39
Under the rubric of “Anger and Irascibility,” Shishuo xinyu tells
how Cao Cao had a singing girl with a splendid voice but a violent,
vicious temper. Rather than killing her for this fault, or letting her go
to someone else, he collected a hundred others and had them trained
until one was found to match the first. Now equipped with a suit-
able under-study, he proceeded to kill the original. For patient cyni-
cism, this is hard to beat, but no earlier authority is known, and one
38
SSXY XIV:1; Mather, 308, and Kroll, “Portraits,” 129. The same story appears in
Peizi yulin at GXSGC, 8, while this and others are repeated in the Xiaoshuo collection
of Yin Yun: GXSGC, 75–76. The texts say that Cao Cao held a dao 刀; translators
disagree whether it was a sword (Mather) or a stylus, mark of a scribe (Kroll).
Kroll suggests this tale may have been inspired by Cao Man zhuan’s accusation that
Cao Cao would arrange the death of any of his officers who presented a better plan
than his own: Chapter Ten at 448. See also note 55 to Chapter One.
39
On the concubine, see Chapter Ten at 449 and note 67; on the attendant, SSXY
XXVII:4, Mather, 442. The tale of the attendant appears also in Peizi yulin at GXSGC,
8; Kroll, “Portraits,” 282.
The story immediately before this, at XXVII:3, Mather, 441, tells how Cao Cao per-
suaded one of his close attendants to conceal a dagger and attempt to approach him;
he would of course be prepared and have the man arrested, but would then let him go
and reward him for his co-operation. The man believed him, but was in fact executed.
This version is followed by the Xiaoshuo of Yin Yun: GXSGC, 76; Kroll, 287.
Commentary of Liu Jun to XXVII:3 repeats the story from Cao Man zhuan about
the unfortunate quartermaster, encouraged to issue short rations but then executed
to placate the troops: Chapter Ten at 449–450. All these are variations on the same
theme: never trust Cao Cao.
may doubt he ever had the time or inclination for such a sophisticated
solution.40
Unlike Cao Cao, the leaders of Shu-Han hardly appear in Shishuo
xinyu. Liu Bei is referred to just once, and that in dismissive fashion:
were he in central China, he might raise a rebellion but could never
build a proper government; should he take refuge in a frontier ter-
ritory with good natural defences, however, he might survive as the
ruler of a small state.41 His heroic companions Guan Yu and Zhang
Fei are mentioned not at all, and though there are four items concern-
ing Zhuge Liang, the first tells how one of his stratagems was foiled
by the prescience of Xin Pi, while the other three mention him only
in passing.42
In sum, the portrait of Cao Cao presented by Shishuo xinyu is that
of a fast-thinking trickster. He certainly killed people, but his actions
were calculated, and even the story of the ill-tempered singer is amus-
ing at one level.43 If Shishuo xinyu reflects his image at the time, then
two centuries after his death Cao Cao was regarded with a degree of
admiration, and tales about him refer not merely to his cruelty but
also to his tolerance and occasional humility. There is small sign of
conventional morality, and it would not prove difficult to turn such
a character into a fascinating villain, but there is no sign here of Cao
40
SSXY XXXI:1; Mather, 465, Kroll, 131.
41
SSXY VII:2; Mather, 196–197. The judgement is attributed to Pei Qian, who was
in Jing province with Liu Bei but joined Cao Cao in 208; his biography is at SGZ
23:671–73.
The same section of “Insight and Judgement” repeats the story of the young Cao
Cao’s meeting with the Excellency Qiao Xuan. Forecasting the coming disorder, Qiao
Xuan remarked that he himself would not live to see such days, but he trusted his
family to Cao Cao’s care for the future: SSXY VII:1; Mather, 196. The original story is
in SGZ 1:2 PC quoting Wei shu; cf. note 58 to Chapter One.
42
SSXY V:5, Mather, 149. The other citations are at VIII:99; Mather, 235, at IX:4;
Mather, 250, and at XXV:44; Mather, 418.
43
For a truly brutal story, I recommend SSXY XXX:1; Mather, 458, which tells
how the general Wang Dun of Western Jin was invited to a banquet given by the
wealthy and ostentatious Shi Chong. Shi Chong had beautiful women serve the wine,
but made it a rule that if one of his guests refused a cup, the bearer was immediately
beheaded.
Wang Dun’s cousin, the Chancellor Wang Dao, had never been able to drink wine,
but forced himself to do so. Wang Dun, however, refused three times, and remained
unperturbed as three women died. When Wang Dao remonstrated with him, Wang
Dun simply replied, “If our host wants to kill some people, why should it concern
you?”
478 chapter eleven
Cao the wicked enemy, nor any idealistic vision of Liu Bei and his
comrades of Shu-Han.44 That would be a different development.
We may also consider here how both the historical Cao Cao, and the
one presented by early quasi-fictional anecdotes, are noted for their
laughter and a sense of humour. Cao Man zhuan remarked scathingly
of his apparent frivolity, and although the author used this as a means
to show how unworthy he was of a high position, there are a num-
ber of citations which indicate that he was prepared to joke, even at
his own expense. When his attempt to force the transfer of people
from the region of the Huai resulted in a mass exodus to the south
instead, he acknowledged his error with a laugh, but awarded Jiang
Ji, who had warned him against the project, with the perhaps deri-
sory title of Administrator of Danyang.45 And when his advisers com-
pared him point by point to Yuan Shao, he laughed at such splendid
exaggeration.46
Again, he laughingly accepted Cao Chong’s defence of the store-
keeper in the arsenal,47 and when he was considering granting the
succession to his younger son Cao Zhi, he accepted the oblique
remonstrance of Jia Xu.48 It is also recorded that he teased the atten-
dants of Han Sui before the battle of Huayin in 211,49 and that he
joked with Sima Fang about their change of fortune. Shishuo xinyu,
as above, records that he jested with Yang Xiu, that he recognised the
manner in which Ni Heng had turned the tables on him, and that he
joked about the fact that Cao Pi had pre-empted him with the Lady
Zhen when they captured Ye city.50 The one thing he could not accept,
however, was lese-majesty—and Xu You paid the penalty.51
44
This conclusion is opposed to that of Kroll, expressed in “Portraits,” 131 ff, who
identifies the character as “evil” and claims that “There can be no doubt of the evalua-
tion of Ts’ao made and intended by Liu I-ch’ing.” Though Kroll’s discussion is detailed
and sophisticated, I believe that he misinterprets the balance of the evidence.
45
Note 23 to Chapter Seven.
46
Chapter Eight at 365.
47
Chapter Nine at 406.
48
Chapter Nine at 416.
49
Chapter Seven at 299.
50
Above at 474 and 475.
51
Chapter Eight at 370.
So one may understand the criticism of Cai Man zhuan: Cao Cao
could laugh and joke, and he could treat his associates with remark-
able intimacy; but he was no less dangerous for that.52
Story-tellers, poets, playwrights and Pinghua
The comparatively favourable picture of Cao Cao presented by Shishuo

xinyu may be a sample of opinion in the first half of the fifth century;
the sample, however, is limited. Shishuo xinyu is upper-class enter-
tainment, suitable to those seeking ideas for elegant repartee and the
flights of Pure Conversation; as Mather observes, “The world of these
tales is . . . a very narrow one indeed: of emperors and princes, court-
iers, officials, generals, genteel hermits, and urbane monks.”53
Though historians of the southern dynasties may have preferred the
interpretation of Xi Zuochi and Han-Jin chunqiu, giving legitimacy to
Liu Bei and Shu-Han rather than Cao Cao’s state of Wei, Cao Cao was
well regarded by the leaders of society under the unified empires of
Tang and Northern Song. An essay attributed to Li Shimin, Emperor
Taizong of Tang, “Examining the Writings of Emperor Taizu of Wei,”
praises the wisdom and skill by which he brought order and peace
to the people after the disruption and turmoil at the end of Han.54
This, of course, is the opinion of a monarch who claimed comparable
52
I am grateful to Professor Christoph Harbsmeier of the University of Oslo for
raising this question with me. Wenxin diaolong 15:104 records that Cao Pi compiled
a selection of humorous pieces into a Xiaoshu 笑書 “Book of Laughter,” which is now
lost: Shih, Literary Mind, 80. This, however, is most likely one facet of his concern for
collecting literary material—as in his Huang lan: Chapter Eight at 378—and does not
of itself reflect his father’s nature.
Li Xie, author of Wenxin diaolong, was somewhat disapproving of such frivolity:
“These jokes, though effective in producing merriment during a feast, serve no practi-
cal purposes.” Jests and word-games, however, were an important part of a diplomat’s
repertoire, and skill in repartee, particularly with literary allusions, could do much
to enhance the status of the envoy’s state and his position at the court to which he
was accredited: see, for example, deC, Generals of the South, 471–472. “Taunting and
Teasing” [Paitiao 排調] and other sections of Shishuo xinyu, moreover, attest to the
popularity of such wit and humour among the literati: Mather, Tales of the World,
400 ff, and see x below.
53
Mather, Tales of the World, xvi.
54
祭魏太祖文; for example in Chuxue ji 9:31b. For this and other references I am
indebted to Professor Anne McLaren of the University of Melbourne, who drew my
attention to the essay Cao Cao zai shemmo shihou chengwei jianchen 曹操在什么时
候成为奸臣 “When did Cao Cao come to be regarded as a disloyal minister?” by Qiu
Zhensheng, in his Sanguo yanyi zongheng tan at 56–59.
480 chapter eleven
and even greater achievement by ending centuries of division, but a

hundred years later the poet Du Fu likewise composed a piece in his
memory.55
Similarly, about 1020 Zhao Dechang, Emperor Zhenzong of North-
ern Song, ordered the repair and restoration of Cao Cao’s temple at
his homeland. An essay by the litterateur Mu Xiu commemorated the
work, arguing that Cao Cao deserved the same honours as the found-
ing emperors Gaozu of Former Han and Guangwu of Later Han,56 and
some fifty years later the poet Zhang Lei wrote “On the Temple of
Emperor Wu of Wei to the east of Qiao;”57 a structure was still identi-
fied there in the time of the Ming dynasty.58
Other temples were to be found along the Yangzi: one at Wuwei, in
the ancient border-land with Sun Quan south of the Huai;59 another by
present-day Yichang in Hubei,60 and one more at present-day Luzhou,
upstream from Chongqing in southern Sichuan. This last is most sur-
prising, for the territory is deep in the hinterland of former Shu-Han,
55
Danqing yin—zeng Cao jiangjun ba 丹青引—贈曹将軍霸 in [for example] Yud-
ing quan Tang shi 御定全唐詩 220:13b-15a. Emperor Taizong of Tang reigned from
626 to 649, Du Fu lived 712–770.
56
Mu Xiu, Bozhou Wei Wudi miao ji 亳州魏武帝廟記, in Henan Mugong ji
3:1a–3b at 1b–2a. The Han county of Qiao had been renamed as Bozhou [present-day
Bo county]. Mu Xiu’s essay is dated to 1023, the year after Zhenzong’s death.
57
題譙東魏武帝廟 in Keshan ji 柯山集 15:11a–b.
58
The Ming gazetteer Yitong zhi 7:20a records a Temple of Emperor Wu of Wei
魏武帝廟 east of Bo in Anhui.
59
In a poem written on a journey in the autumn of 824, Liu Yuxi 劉禹錫 of Tang
records that there was a Shrine to Cao Cao 曹操祠 near Ruxu, and that the Ruxu
Fortress could still be identified: Liu Binke wenji 劉賓客文集 Supplementary [外]
8:14a–b, and Yuding Quan Tang shi 363:7b–10a at 8a. On the Ruxu Fortress of Sun
Quan, see Chapter Six at 285–286.
As observed in note 22 to Chapter Seven, there was a tradition that Cao Cao estab-
lished a fortress at present-day Wuwei, south of the Chao Lake. This could indeed
have been an appropriate place for a commemorative shrine, and Wang Shizhen of
Qing says that there was a Temple to Cao Cao 曹操廟 at Wuwei: Juyi lu 32:15a.
In these and other references, it appears that the terms for temple 廟 miao and
shrine 祠 ci were interchangeable, while Cao Cao could be identified either by his
name or by one of his imperial titles.
Beside the Temple to Cao Cao, however, Wang Shizhen also cites Liu Yuxi as evi-
dence for a Shrine to Emperor Wu of Wei 魏武祠 near He 和 in Anhui, on the
Yangzi east of the Chao Lake, some seventy kilometres northeast of Wuwei. In fact
Liu Yuxi mentions only one such construction in the region, being the Shrine to Cao
Cao near Ruxu, and this is surely the one at Wuwei, identified by Wang Shizhen as
a Temple. There may have been dittography, for it is unlikely there would have been
two such constructions in the area, and no other evidence supports Wang Shizhen’s
second statement.
60
On the temple at Yichang, see below at 489.
and Cao Cao himself was never closer than five hundred kilometres of
the region. The Ming gazetteer Yitong zhi, however, notes that during
a campaign against the local non-Chinese people in 1080–81, Emperor
Shenzong ordered prayers to be made at the temple, seeking an end to
a period of rain, while we are also told that there was an inscription by
Emperor Taizong of Tang.61
At the same time, however, many scholars and writers were attracted
to the men of Shu-Han. Apart from the negative view of Cao Cao and
his state of Wei, as presented by Xi Zuochi and reflecting the justifi-
cation of the exiled dynasties in the south, Liu Bei and his comrades
offered an ideal picture of the relationship between a sovereign and his
ministers. Guan Yu and Zhang Fei were treated as brothers, and Zhuge
Liang was a model for any man of political ambition: a wise counsellor
in civil mode, well capable of fine writing, who transformed himself
into a most competent military commander, saving the nascent state
after Liu Bei’s defeat and death. There were temples and inscriptions
to Liu Bei, to Zhang Fei and to Zhuge Liang, while Guan Yu appears
to have been adopted as a deity by a Buddhist sect as early as the Sui
dynasty, Even during Northern Song, at the turn of the twelfth cen-
tury, it was Guan Yu—not Cao Cao—who became identified as an
official god of war, and that status was confirmed by the Yongzheng
Emperor of Qing in the early eighteenth century.62
For ordinary people, moreover, such endorsement had less signifi-

cance than the robust accounts of common-men’s heroes. Story-telling
is one of the oldest professions, and though there are no references to
tales of the Three Kingdoms period before the sixth or seventh cen-
turies, it is hard to believe such a reservoir of plot and incident had
not been called upon before that time. The citations of Pei Songzhi
indicate how many anecdotes were available, well suited to public and
dramatic presentation in market-places and other common ground,
61
Yitong zhi 72:19a; the campaign is recorded in Song shi 16:302–306. The inscrip-
tion composed by Emperor Taizong of Tang (though 太宗 is miswritten as Yuanzong
元宗) is recorded by Cao Xuequan of Ming in his Shuzhong guangji 16:6a.
62
K’ung Ling-ching, Hsiao-shuo shih liao, 41–42, citing the Qing scholar Tai Yan-
nian, and Shen, “Inventing the Romantic Kingdom,” 37.
482 chapter eleven
and these provided popular competition for the sophisticated vignettes

of Shishuo xinyu.63
The locus classicus on this theme is a couplet from the poem Jiao er
shi “Boasting of my Son” by Li Shangyin in the middle of the ninth
century, where he tells how the boy makes fun of visitors, one for
being “barbarous like Zhang Fei,” another for “stammering like Deng
Ai:”64 we may gather that stories of the Three Kingdoms were well
established in the repertoire of story-tellers—using posture and ges-
ture to emphasise their words—or performers in street theatre. Two
hundred years later, in the time of Northern Song, the great poet Su
Shi [commonly known by his literary name as Su Dongpo] mentions
how a friend, Wang Peng, described small boys sent off with a few
cash to hear a story-teller:
When they hear of Liu Xuande being defeated, they frown and even cry;
but when Cao Cao loses, they shout for joy. One can see from this that
the effect of a true gentleman or that of a mean fellow may be felt for a
hundred generations without interruption.65
One may also see that gentlemen such as Su Shi and his friend were
numbered among the supporters of Liu Bei.
In his poetic works, two rhapsodies and a ci poem entitled “Medita-
tions on the Red Cliffs,” Su Shi adorns the site with a sense of mysti-
cism and heroic legend. In the poem, he tells how:
I think of Zhou Yu in those days,
Newly married to the young Qiao girl—
His fine appearance, majestic and spirited,
Holding a feather fan and wearing a silk kerchief.
63
On early, often tenuous, evidence in written sources for popular performances
of Three Kingdoms material, see Kroll, “Portraits,” 139. More recently, the pseudony-
mous Yisu has presented evidence of the circulation of such tales during the Tang
period. See also deC, Generals of the South, 578–579.
64
The poem is translated by James J. Y. Liu in Mair [ed], Traditional Literature,
237–239. Zhang Fei is described as hu 胡, interpreted by Liu as indicating dark fea-
tures: in modern opera his mask is marked in black, symbol of brutal ferocity. Another
interpretation suggests that it refers to a large jaw and/or a beard [Hsia, Classic Chi-
nese Novel, 328], or it may be simply his clumsy behaviour.
Deng Ai, whose biography is in SGZ 28:775–83, served Cao Cao when he was young,
and later became a general under Sima Yi, commanding one of the armies which con-
quered Shu-Han in 263. There is a tradition that he suffered from a stammer.
65
Dongpo zhilin 1:7; Plaks, Masterworks, 368 and note. Xuande was the style of
Liu Bei.
Amidst talk and laughter

He reduced his enemy to flying ashes and smouldering smoke.66
In writing of Zhou Yu, general of Wu, not of the crafty Zhuge Liang,
Su Shi echoes the historical tradition, but it is clear from Wang Peng’s
report that popular feeling favoured the men of Shu-Han.
A hundred years later, with the publication of Zhu Xi’s Zizhi tongjian
gangmu, the legitimacy of Shu-Han was accepted even by philosophers
and scholars; and we have observed how the situation of Southern
Song, seeking to maintain an imperial tradition while the heartland of
China was occupied by aliens, gave a natural sympathy for the cause of
Liu Bei. Such a view of the Three Kingdoms became dominant thereaf-
ter, even when China was reunited under the native Ming dynasty, and
it is reflected in plays and in the great romance of Sanguo yanyi. This
development among the elite, however, came a good deal later than it
had among the tellers of popular stories and their audience, who had
early established a prejudice for the cause of Liu Bei and his fellows.
If we consider the nature of public story-telling, such bias is not
surprising. Shishuo xinyu and other collections were prepared for
members of the gentry; they had little to say about those of inferior
status and learning, and equally little to offer them. Word-games based
upon the analysis of written characters might entertain a literate per-
son, but they were incomprehensible to the uneducated, and stories of
quick wit and repartee, even those of moral attitudes and Confucian
conduct, would not attract poor people in search of momentary enter-
tainment. What they wanted was action, energy, heroism and strong
characterisation; just like the little boys cheering or weeping about Cao
Cao and Liu Bei.
For such a purpose, there were many reasons that a story-teller
would choose to deal with the Three Kingdoms and, in doing so, to
66
Chibi fu and Chibi huaigu. The rhapsodies are translated by A. C. Graham in
Birch [ed], Anthology, 385–388, and by Richard Strassberg in Mair [ed], Traditional
Literature, 439–442. The lines from the ci poem follow the translation by Liu Wu-chi
in his Introduction to Chinese Literature, 110.
Zhou Yu had been a close friend of Sun Ce, and in 199 the two young men married
sisters of the Qiao family of Lujiang: SGZ Wu 9:1260. Both women were celebrated
for their beauty; but in 208 Zhou Yu could hardly have been described as “newly mar-
ried.” On Su Shi’s apparent misplacement of the site of the battle, at least in his first
rhapsody, see note 73 to Chapter Six.
484 chapter eleven
emphasise the role of Shu-Han. The concept of legitimacy and the

propaganda of true and rightful lineage—regardless how distant the
imperial descent—allowed Liu Bei the romantic image of a long-lost
heir, while he could also be presented as a man of the people: he
had worked as sandal-maker before he emerged from obscurity. His
celebrated comrades then enhanced the picture: Guan Yu the noble
knight; Zhang Fei the bullying bravo; and Zhuge Liang the wise and
skilful counsellor who became a great general. Other heroes offered
less: Sun Ce and Zhou Yu were remarkable men with great military
records, but both died young and did not lend themselves to a long-
lasting saga—the best way to ensure the audience would return for
another episode—while Sun Quan, though personally brave, had few
military achievements. It was he and his general Lü Meng, moreover,
who destroyed Guan Yu with the “stab in the back” to seize Jing prov-
ince, and the reputation of Wu would suffer for that act of treachery.
Cao Cao could certainly have been given a positive role, but he fit-
ted better into that of a powerful anti-hero and villain. He was a mem-
ber of the gentry and connected to the eunuchs—factors which limited
his appeal to a more humble audience—and although he made his
mark as a fighting man his cleverness and trickery, accompanied by
ruthlessness, also set him apart. Far better a man like Liu Bei, a true
warrior with powerful companions, who also gained the services of the
brilliant Zhuge Liang: such a romantic combination was more than a
match for Cao Cao.
With these factors in play, the pattern was set, and it is probable that
such treatment of the Three Kingdoms began very early. Though the
oral tradition may have been strong, however, the theme does not
appear to have attracted many playwrights. There is reference to pup-
pet plays during the short-lived Sui, but no strong evidence of per-
formance on the human stage during Tang.67 Even in the time of
67
Taiping guangji 226:3a tells of plays presented before Emperor Yang of Sui.
Among the themes were a meeting of Sun Quan of Wu with an immortal, and Liu
Bei’s escape from Liu Biao, when he leaped his horse across the Tan River. Sun Kaidi,
Cangzhou ji, 224, quotes a Tang text which says that the wooden puppets were two
feet tall, splendidly dressed, and their lifelike movements were controlled by water.
Liu Bei’s feat of horsemanship is described by the Wei-Jin shiyu of Guo Ban at SGZ
Shu 2:877 PC. Though the commentator Sun Sheng rejected the story, it became an
accepted theme and was incorporated into the Xu Hou Han shu of Hao Jing: see below
and McLaren, “History Repackaged,” 306. It is told also in Chapter 34 of Romance.
Further references are given by Kroll, “Portraits,” 139 and 206.
Song, from a total of almost a thousand plays whose titles have been
recorded, only four, from the non-Chinese northern state of Jin, are
clearly relevant: “To Kill Dong Zhuo” (Ci Dong Zhuo), “Cursing Lü Bu
(Ma Lü Bu), “Meeting at Xiangyang” (Xiangyang hui) and “Slaughter
at the Red Cliffs” (Chibi aoping). On the other hand it is recorded
that early in the twelfth century, during the last years of Northern
Song, a story-teller named Huo Sijiu was known for his tales of the
Three Kingdoms,68 and by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the
development of zaju “variety plays” under Yuan and early Ming saw a
substantial repertoire on that theme.69
The structure of the zaju provides for one principal, who has the
only singing part. There were other role-types, somewhat on the lines
of the Italian commedia dell’arte, but the principal actor had to be one
with which the audience could sympathise. Since fictional tradition
had established the men of Shu-Han as true loyalists, Liu Bei and his
comrades appear in almost all the Three Kingdoms repertoire, and
Cao Cao in barely half of them. Sometimes he is allied with Liu Bei,
and his part is a minor one, but the more substantial roles present him
as a great opponent: ambitious and arrogant, treacherous and crafty,
but destined for humiliation and defeat; though he never has the lead-
ing role, he did have a distinctive costume.70
In Bowang shaotun “Burning the Camp at Bowang,” for example,
set at the time of the take-over of Jing province in 208, Cao Cao has
his general Xiahou Dun attack Liu Bei’s troops under the command
of Zhuge Liang, and later sends an agent to entice Zhuge Liang into
his service. Both attempts are unsuccessful, and Xiahou Dun, whose
role is that of a comic villain, is repeatedly defeated and embarrassed.71
68
Dongjing menghua lu 5:3a and Shuofu 68A:8b: 霍四究說三分.
69
Following Yuanqu xuan, Yuanqu xuan waibian and Guben Yuan-Ming zaju,
Kroll, “Portraits,” 221–222, identifies twenty-one plays, eleven with Cao Cao as a char-
acter. The Three Kingdoms plays are also listed by Plaks, Four Masterpieces, 371–372
note 35.
70
At 226–235, Kroll provides a fuller discussion of the plays, summarised below,
and the nature of Cao Cao’s stage characterizations. The leading parts, male or female
(正末 zhengmo or 正旦 zhengdan), could be played by the same actor; Cao Cao’s role
is sometimes the “secondary lead” (沖末 chongmo) or simply an extra (外 wai); his
officers such as Xiahou Dun are frequently comic villains (淨 jing).
71
A detailed study of two versions of this play is given by Kimberley Besio, “Zhuge
Liang and Zhang Fei: Bowang shao tun and Competing Masculine Ideals within the
Development of the Three Kingdoms Story Cycle,” in Besio and Tung, Three King-
doms, 73–86. The incident appears in Romance Chapter 41; it is a fictional attempt
to restore some credit to Liu Bei’s arms from what was in fact a disastrous flight and
defeat at the Chang Slope: Chapter Six at 266–267.
486 chapter eleven
In Qianli duxing “A Lone Journey of a Thousand li” Cao Cao wants

to keep Guan Yu from returning to Liu Bei: he arranges for him to
be presented with a fine cloak, and plans to have him seized when
he dismounts to accept it. Guan Yu, however, takes the cloak on the
tip of his sword and rides on his way, while none of Cao Cao’s men
dare move against him.72 And in Shiliu yuan “The Pomegranate Gar-
den” Cao Cao invites Liu Bei to a meal, planning to make him drunk
and take him prisoner. The plot is foiled, however, by Yang Xiu, who
arranges that Cao Cao is affected by the wine instead, then warns Liu
Bei. As Zhang Fei and Guan Yu come to the rescue, Cao Cao has to
beg for mercy and is saved only on Liu Bei’s orders.
The image of Cao Cao in these plays suffers from the fact that his
character never holds the leading role—which would allow greater
development—and from the requirement that each play should have
a happy ending. So there is limited room for a sensitive approach,
and many events are exaggerated, distorted or invented to please an
unsophisticated audience. Given his history, and the stories in Shishuo
xinyu and other such texts, it is interesting that Yang Xiu is still known
for his ambiguity, but Cao Cao’s other followers, not only Xiahou
Dun but also the intelligent Zhang Liao and the courageous Xu Chu,
become little more than lay figures to be out-witted or intimidated by
Liu Bei, Guan Yu or Zhuge Liang. As Kroll remarks in a summary:
There is no question of or concern for historical accuracy here, nor any
regret at the lack of it. The ruling principles are the demands of the stage,
not of history, and from that perspective the entertaining and satisfying
ingredients portrayed here were, we imagine, sure of winning the audi-
ence’s applause.73
About the same time as the zaju dramas were being prepared and per-
formed, in the early 1320s a Sanguo zhi pinghua “Popular Account of
the Three Kingdoms History” was produced by the Yu family of pres-
ent-day Fujian, a leading publishing house of the time. Finely printed,
72
Kroll, “Portraits,” 234–243, discusses the play and provides a translation of the
third act. The original incident took place in 200, on the eve of the Guandu campaign;
Chapter Three at 140. Romance Chapter 27 records the same incident, but indicates
that Cao Cao reluctantly accepted Guan Yu’s decision, for he had given his word to let
him go. Furthermore, while the play has Cao Cao’s bodyguard Xu Chu too frightened
of Guan Yu to act against him, Romance says that he wants to attack, but is forbidden
to do so by Cao Cao.
73
Kroll, “Portraits,” 244.
each page with a pictorial head-piece, it was one of series: other items
dealt with the conquest of the tyrant Zhou of Shang/Yin by King Wu
of Zhou, with heroes of the Zhou period, with the First Emperor of
Qin, and with the history of Former Han.74 Composed in a mixture of
classical and vernacular language, interspersed with poetry, pinghua
were designed to be read, and though the style of writing and the suc-
cession of incidents can be erratic and sometimes discontinuous, they
present a strong theme. They may have owed something to the prompt
books of story-tellers and other vernacular literature, but they depart
from the traditional cycles of the oral tradition.75
Sanguo zhi pinghua is based upon the idea of karmic retribution.
At the beginning of Former Han, the founding Emperor Gao destroys
three of his great assistants, Han Xin, Peng Yue and Ying Bu; four
hundred years later these men, wrongfully killed, return to life as Cao
Cao, Liu Bei and Sun Quan, wreaking vengeance on the unfortunate
Liu Xie, Emperor Xian, who has reincarnated the spirit of Emperor
Gao. Such a concept was as popular in Chinese fiction as in that of the
West,76 and the pinghua makes it the basis for an imaginative survey
of the period from the time of Emperor Ling to the fall of Western Jin
and the destruction of Luoyang by the Xiongnu state self-styled as Han
in the early fourth century.77
Leaving aside the supernatural aspect, much of the writing is clumsy,
and many incidents are historically false: Cao Cao, for example, is
said to have compelled Emperor Xian to abdicate in favour of Cao Pi,
74
Five items of the original printing are held by the Cabinet Library (Naikaku
bunko 內閣文庫) in Tokyo. Each is described as Zhizhi xinkan quanxiang 至治新刊
全相 “Newly published in the Zhizhi period [1321–1323], Fully Illustrated,” and they
are identified as the production of the Yu family of Jian’an, now Jian’ou in northern
Fujian. Facsimiles were published at Beijing in 1956, and texts are also on the Internet.
The books are discussed by Idema, Vernacular Fiction, particularly at 73, 92–93 and
102 ff.
75
Idema, Vernacular Fiction, 97:
No evidence exists for the conclusion of an exclusive link between story-telling
and the p’ing-hua in whatever form. The p’ing-hua would rather appear as texts,
compiled from a great variety of sources, meant from the outset to be read, . . . per-
haps originating from the Mongol court, and in the editions known at present
probably intended for the wealthy and limitedly literate classes of society.
76
Among many examples in Chinese literature, characters from Jin Ping Mei 金瓶
梅 appear as reincarnations in the sequel Gelian huaying 隔帘花影 “Flower Shadows
Behind the Curtain.”
77
Sanguo zhi pinghua [SGZPH] is discussed by Idema, Vernacular Fiction, at 87–88,
and in detail by Kroll, “Portraits,” 141–152.
488 chapter eleven
whereas the transfer of dynasty took place after his death. On the other
hand, the first of the three chapters presents him as the patron of Liu
Bei in the struggle against Lü Bu, and tells how he praises the courage
and skill of Zhang Fei, who in most other sources is over-shadowed
by Guan Yu. In the second chapter, which concludes with his defeat
at the Red Cliffs, Cao Cao reverts to his traditional role as the wicked
enemy, but the emphasis is again slightly different: Sun Quan and his
general Zhou Yu play a larger role than is common in other works of
fiction, and Zhou Yu is given credit for the celebrated incident of col-
lecting ten thousand arrows:
As Zhou Yu sailed in a covered ship, Cao Cao sent volleys of arrows
against him, which hit on his left hand side. Zhou Yu had the steersman
turn about, so that the arrows came from the right, and after a short
time the ship was fully laden. Zhou Yu went back, and counted tens of
thousands of arrows. Very pleased, he shouted, “Thank you, Chancel-
lor!” Cao Cao heard of this and was extremely angry.78
Soon afterwards he remarks in some frustration that, “Sun Quan has
Zhou Yu, and Liu Bei has Zhuge Liang; I have only myself.”
Drawing upon and elaborating a number of legends and anecdotes
of the day, both in written and oral form, Sanguo zhi pinghua has the
same general attitude to the character of Cao Cao, albeit with a slightly
different balance between his enemies of Wu and Shu. Overall lies the
theme of retribution: Cao Cao and his rivals are destined by the gods
to destroy the house which betrayed their avatars, but they will be
overthrown in their turn79—and it is significant that the pinghua ends
with the defeat of Jin, successor to Wei, and the restoration of a new
Han state. No matter how tenuous the relationship may have been to
his nominal predecessors, the last entry tells how, after the capture of
Chang’an in 316, Liu Cong paid his respects at temples of Emperor
Wu of Former Han, Guangwu of Later Han, and Liu Bei and Liu Shan
78
Adapted from SGZPH. In Romance Chapter 46, and in the modern drama Cao-
chuan jiejian “Borrowing Arrows with Straw Boats,” it is Zhuge Liang who is chal-
lenged by Zhou Yu to produce the arrows, and fulfils it by sending out a flotilla of
boats laden with straw. Compare, however, what is probably the original version of
this story, ascribed to Sun Quan: Chapter Six at 284–285 and note 99.
79
In a touching scene, SGZPH extends the life of Liu Xie, deposed Emperor Xian
of Han, who actually died in 237, until 266. Then, when at last he heard that Wei had
been overthrown by Jin, “he smiled, and died” 笑而死.
of Shu-Han.80 For the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty, the idea that
a non-Chinese could maintain and restore the traditions of the past
had obvious attractions.
One mark of Cao Cao’s loss of reputation under the Yuan is the fate of
a temple which had been set up in his honour at Yiling, near present-
day Yichang on the Yangzi in Hubei. It is uncertain why he should
have had a temple there, for the territory lay outside the borders of
Wei, but we have seen how a similar shrine had been established in
the south of present-day Sichuan, even further from his sphere of
influence.81 In any event, in 1316 the inspection official Shentu Jiong
became indignant that Cao Cao had received such spiritual honour
while the district had no temple to Confucius. He therefore had the
complex rededicated to the sage: Cao Cao’s portrait was removed, the
inscriptions were altered, and a school was established there.82
This so-called “destruction” of Cao Cao’s temple became the sub-
ject of a remarkable number of poems, rhapsodies and essays by well-
thinking gentlemen. In 1356, for example, the poet Cheng Tinggui
composed a rhapsody to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the
démarche, remarking as he did so that many others before him had
composed works in its praise.83 Later writers followed his example,
celebrating the righteous conduct of Shentu Jiong and denigrating Cao
Cao,84 and the affair was still remembered in early Qing, more than
three hundred years later.85
80
Indeed, according to JS 101:2649, when Liu Cong’s father Liu Yuan founded his
claimant state of Han in 304, he issued a proclamation ordering sacrificial ceremonies
for emperors of Former and Later Han, and also for Liu Bei and Liu Shan.
81
Above at 480.
82
Shentu Jiong, whose style was Zidi, has no biography of his own. He is men-
tioned in passing by Yuan shi 170:3990 as a son of the official Shentu Zhiyuan, but is
otherwise known only for this rearrangement.
83
Juzhu xuan shiji “Collected Poems of the Resting Bamboo Pavilion” 1:10b–11a;
also in Yuan shi xuan A 13:9b–10a. Among the compositions of that time were a
preface by Wu Cheng 吳澄毁曹操廟詩序, in his Wu Wenzheng ji 21:8a–b, cited by
Wang Shizhen in Juyu lu 33:18b, and a poem by Chen Lü (d. c.1355), at Yuan shi
xuan A 37:27a.
84
In an “Essay on the Destruction of Cao Cao’s Temple by Shentu Zidi” 申屠子迪
毁曹操廟文, for example, Tang Su notes that although Cao Cao was unworthy of the
honour of a temple, and people knew it, neither the locals nor any official had previ-
ously ventured to do anything about it: Mingwen heng 明文衡 52:9a-10a, also cited by
Wang Shizhen, Juyi lu 33:18b. And in his Chengyi bowen ji 7:47b-48b, Liu Ji observes
that Cao Cao kidnapped the emperor and killed good men and their families.
85
Song Wan in his Anya tang ji 2:24b–25a.
490 chapter eleven
Revisionist history, Romance and the Peking opera
Sanguo zhi and the other official histories were printed under North-
ern Song during the eleventh century, and by Southern Song there was
a quantity of material available to a wide readership. When Sanguo zhi
pinghua was published in the early fourteenth century, printing was
well established on a commercial basis.
Many in this broad audience, concerned that the Chinese Song had
been driven from the heartland of China by the alien Jin, welcomed
the arrangement of Zizhi tongjian gangmu and Zhu Xi’s moral opposi-
tion to Sima Guang’s pragmatic approach on the question of dating
and dynastic succession. Even before this, however, scholars had taken
exception to Chen Shou’s emphasis on the state of Wei, and in 1167
Zhang Shi, a strong proponent of revanchist war to recover the north,
published Jingshi jinian “Annals of Statecraft,” arguing that Shu was
the true successor of Han. Later historians then amended the three-
part arrangement of Chen Shou to present a single structure with
Shu-Han as the legitimate government and Wei and Wu in secondary
positions. Two major works of this genre, both titled Xu Hou Han shu
“Sequel to the History of Later Han” but of very different purpose and
nature, were compiled first by Xiao Chang of Southern Song and later
by Hao Jing, a subject of the Yuan.86
Xiao Chang’s Xu Hou Han shu appeared in 1204 with high-level
endorsement, for the preface was composed by the senior official Zhou
Bida and the work was taken into the imperial collection. The straight-
forward intention was to express the interest of Southern Song and
establish Liu Bei as the legitimate heir of Later Han. Highly favour-
able, it consistently interprets his conduct in most honourable terms,
particularly his loyalty to the Han and his reluctance to take advantage
of Liu Zhang in order to seize Yi province. Both these are questionable
interpretations, and Xiao Zhang was not above amending the textual
evidence to support his thesis.
Cao Cao’s reputation suffers by contrast, for Xiao Chang is con-
cerned to show that he took power by force, so that the state of Wei
loses its claim to legitimacy. Concerned to present a bloodthirsty quest
86
On this historiographical development, see McLaren, “History Repackaged”
and “Challenging Official History.” I am also most grateful to Professor McLaren for
advice in personal communications.
for power, he includes the story of Lü Boshe, emphasises the slaughter

in Xu province and the execution of Dong Cheng, Kong Rong and
their families, describes how he took appointments without authority,
and concludes with the claim that it was Cao Cao who had Cao Pi take
the throne. So he and his successors held power in name, but they did
so without justification and without truth.87
Though the theme was the same, the Xu Hou Han shu of Hao Jing
was composed for quite a different purpose. A distinguished Neo-
Confucian scholar and poet, Hao Jing had been sent as an envoy
from Kubilai Khan to the court of Southern Song in 1260, but was
kept in prison until freed by the Mongol invasion of 1275. It does not
appear that he knew of Xiao Chang’s work, but his own history was
designed to justify the unification of China by a righteous ruler. Hao
Jing accordingly paid chief attention to Liu Bei as the model of a Con-
fucian monarch, aided by the genius of Zhuge Liang and supported by
Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. Cao Cao appears once more as the usurper
and oppressor, while Emperor Xian appeals for help through Dong
Cheng and the loyal, chivalrous Liu Bei responds as best he can. The
whole work is a plea for unification, under the benevolent rule of the
ostensibly sinicised Kubilai Khan.
Like that of Xiao Chang, Hao Jing’s Xu Hou Han shu was presented
to an imperial court. There were other books on the same line, though
they were generally regarded as less successful,88 while during Song and
Yuan there was discussion whether one of the reinterpretations might
not be authorised to replace or balance the compilation of Chen Shou
and Pei Songzhi. As any reader of Sanguo zhi has found, the mixture
of a main text with a commentary quoting alternate sources, combined
with the tripartite division, can make some events difficult to follow.
Even in Northern Song, the great minister Wang Anshi had wanted a
revised version, while Xin Tang shu and the Wudai shi of Ouyang Xiu
provided precedents for a new history of the Three Kingdoms which
might be adopted into the canon.89
87
McLaren, “Challenging Official History.”
88
McLaren, “History Repackaged,” 296–297, lists eight such works; and “Chal-
lenging Official History” quotes the fourteenth-century court historian Su Tianjue
蘇天爵.
89
Ouyang Xiu was a major compiler of Xin Tang shu and the author of Xin Wudai
shi, also known as Wudai shiji. Jiu Tang shu and Jiu Wudai shi were both removed
from the canon, and were restored only in the eighteenth century; Jiu Wudai shi
was in fact lost and had to be reconstructed: see Wang Gungwu, “Later Standard
492 chapter eleven
In the end, however, though both versions of Xu Hou Han shu

were held in the imperial library, and were included in the great Siku
quanshu collection of the eighteenth century, they never received full
endorsement. Composed so much later, they lacked the authority of
the original work, and it was difficult to make a convincing case for the
importance of Shu-Han, isolated in the west, against the dominance of
Wei over central China. Any attempt to do so must result in distortion
or corruption of the information which had been handed down and,
as McLaren points out, the revisionists were getting closer to literature
than to history.90 If Chen Shou’s perceived imbalance of morality and
power was to be overthrown, it would best be done by a fully literary
approach, rather than by playing with the received text.
In 1366, even before he came to full power, Zhu Yuanzhang the first
emperor of Ming had ordered the publication of historical works,
with strong moral indications, for the benefit of members of his own
and other leading families. They were to be presented in plain lan-
guage: as he remarked, though the gentlemen were well able to read
they could not follow abstruse arguments. This is not surprising in an
emerging state at war, and throughout his reign the emperor contin-
ued to be concerned about the problem of communication: his first
legal code, published in 1368, was accompanied by a plain language
commentary.91
As McLaren observes, by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there
had developed a general demand for historical writing which would
be accessible to the ordinary reader and might also provide models
of good and bad conduct. From this point of view, the novel Sanguo
yanyi “Romance of the Three Kingdoms,” composed by Luo Guan-
zhong in the second half of the fourteenth century under the reign of
Zhu Yuanzhang, fitted admirably with the wishes of that monarch and
with the temper of the times.92
Little is known of Luo Guanzhong, but it is generally accepted that
he lived from about 1315 to about 1385, that he also wrote yanyi on
Histories,” 54–58, and articles by Tu Lien-che on Shen Ping-ch’en and Shao Chin-han
in Hummel [ed], Eminent Chinese, 644–645 and 636–637.
90
McLaren, “History Repackaged,” 311.
91
McLaren, “History Repackaged,” 299, and Langlois, “The Hung-wu Reign,”134.
92
The term yanyi may be rendered as “elaboration of the meaning:” Plaks, Four
Masterpieces, 372. The novel also appears under the title Sanguo zhi [志] yanyi: e.g.
note 94 below. I refer to it as the Romance.
the fall of Sui and the rise of Tang and on the Five Dynasties, and
that he composed an early version of the bandit novel Shuihu zhuan
“Water Margin.”93 Though his composition on the Three Kingdoms
marked the beginning of the history of the Romance, the novel devel-
oped over a long period, both in manuscript copy and in printed
editions, and can be traced through two streams of transmission: a
simpler, illustrated zhizhuan style, and the more complex yanyi form,
written in finer language and relying more strongly on historical than
on mythical material. Eventually, in the mid-seventeenth century,
the early years of the Qing dynasty, the material was revised by Mao
Zonggang, who added a critical essay of his own and set the work into
120 chapters. His edition has become the accepted form of the present
text and Plaks argues that, although it is commonly identified as the
work of Luo Guanzhong,
San-kuo chih yen-yi, as we know it from the 1522 text and later edi-
tions, [is] an example of the sixteenth-century literati novel, one that
was either newly created during the second Ming century or was sub-
stantially altered by that time.94
The eighteenth-century scholar Zhang Xuecheng remarked that the
Romance is seven parts fact and three parts fiction, and in some ways
that is a fair assessment, for it tells the history of the Three Kingdoms
from the time of Emperor Ling until the surrender of Wu, and it does
so in clear language and well-presented imagery. It is a lively account
which, like Xu Hou Han shu and other scholarly works of Song and
Yuan, accepts the priority and entitlement of Liu Bei and his state
of Shu-Han, and the vast majority of readers have found it far more
accessible than the complex arrangement of the official Sanguo zhi and
its commentary.
93
See, for example, Lu Xun, Chinese Fiction, 157–158, Hsia, Classic Chinese Novel,
35–38, 77 and 341–342, Liu Wu-chi, Chinese Literature, 197–203, and Liu Ts’un-yan,
“Lo Kuan-chung and his Historical Romances.” He is also said to have been the author
of a play on how the founder of the Song dynasty recruited his generals.
94
Plaks, Four Masterworks, 363–364. Recent scholarship on the transmission of
Romance is summarised by McLaren, “Textual History,” 265–286, and there is detailed
analysis in the 1993 doctoral dissertation of Andrew West at Princeton University,
revised and published in China in 1996.
Mao Zonggang’s edition had the title Sanguo zhi yanyi, but the character zhi is
frequently omitted. Kroll, “Portraits,” 157–167 and ff, discusses Mao’s treatment of
the work.
494 chapter eleven
The fiction, however, grossly distorts the history, and though major
events such as the Guandu and Red Cliffs campaigns, or the seizure
of Jing province by Lü Meng, are cited in order, their description is
frequently overwhelmed by exaggeration of the prowess of Liu Bei and
Guan Yu, or the magical wisdom of Zhuge Liang, often at the expense
of their allies such as Sun Quan and Zhou Yu. The account is also
riddled with falsehood and anachronism: the story of Cao Cao and Lü
Boshe is taken to the extreme in order to show Cao Cao’s ruthless-
ness; but soon afterwards the alliance against Dong Zhuo is said to
have been built on his initiative, so that Yuan Shao swears allegiance
to him; this last an extraordinary reversal of reality.95 Much later, on
the eve of the Red Cliffs battle, Cao Cao slays Liu Fu, who ventured
to criticise him; but Liu Fu, who had established defences in the val-
ley of the Huai, had died in that region several months earlier.96 And
we have seen elsewhere how the story of collecting arrows with a boat
and the Empty City stratagem are taken to the credit of Zhuge Liang.97
Many such changes are minor, but they occur so often that within the
broad sweep of historical narrative no single detail or characterization
can be trusted.
The Romance, therefore, cannot be taken as a source of information
on the period of the Three Kingdoms or as a meaningful aid to its
interpretation. Such a mistake is frequently made, however, and those
who make it not only fail to understand the history—they may also
fail to appreciate the complexity and sensitivity of the novel.98 Though
the story-tellers and playwrights of Song, Yuan and early Ming, the
revisionist historians of Xu Hou Han shu, and the authors of Sanguo
zhi pinghua and Romance drew upon a common tradition and shared
an approach which favoured the enemies of Cao Cao, they did not
always follow the same themes, and the selection may be significant.
Importantly, Plaks presents a strong argument that Romance should
95
Romance Chapters 4 and 5; cf. Chapter One above at 48–49, and Chapter Two
at 54.
96
Romance Chapter 48 says that Liu Fu complained of inauspicious lines in Cao
Cao’s song on the eve of the battle. The piece concerned, Duange xing, is discussed in
97
Romance Chapter 46 and Romance Chapter 95; cf. note 78 above and note 4 to
Chapter Seven.
98
Hsia, Classic Chinese Novel, 41, discussing the criticisms of Hu Shih: “For most
Chinese, of course, it is very easy to misread the novel since they have been condi-
tioned by the popular theatre and the storytellers to accept unquestioningly the benev-
olence of Liu Pei, the wizardry of Chu-ke Liang, and the prowess of Kuan Yü.”
be seen not merely as a populist narrative, but as “a serious, often

ironic revision of its various sources.”99
On the face of it, Romance tells an almost clichéd story of the hon-
ourable Liu Bei, the marvellous Zhuge Liang, and the heroic Guan
Yu, while Cao Cao is selfish, ambitious and cruel. Many themes are
repeated so frequently, however, that they lose their impact or even
acquire an aura of parody, while the qualities of the heroes of Shu-
Han are so exaggerated that they become self-defeating. Guan Yu is
skilled and courageous, but his excessive self-confidence causes him
firstly to allow Cao Cao to escape from ambush at Huarong during his
retreat from the Red Cliffs in 208, and later to underestimate the threat
from Lü Meng as he attacked northwards in Jing province in 219.100
Zhang Fei’s energy leads him into such violence and brutality that he
becomes more of a liability than an asset to his sworn brother Liu Bei,
and his own troops eventually mutiny and kill him.101
Even Zhuge Liang, brilliant as he is, may lose the reader’s sympathy
for the way he uses subordinates and allies as no more than tools to
his cause, and enjoyment of his wit and trickery must be tempered
by a sense of embarrassment at his unfeeling taunting of Zhou Yu
and the harshness he can show to opponents and rivals. Despite set-
backs, the Wei commander Sima Yi eventually gains his measure, and
Zhuge Liang’s campaign to break into the valley of the Wei ends in
exhaustion and death. In similar fashion, the characters of Guan Yu
and Zhang Fei are flawed, as exceptional ability leads to arrogance
and hubris. Indeed, as Plaks points out, their exploits should not be
taken simply at face value, for the novel presents a deliberate account
of how the very qualities which distinguish them carry the seeds of
their ultimate failure.102
When opposed to such an array of heroes carrying virtue to excess,
Cao Cao appears more human: certainly cruel and crafty, and ready
99
Plaks, Four Masterpieces, 375 and ff.
100
Romance Chapters 50 and 75. Huarong was indeed on Cao Cao’s line of retreat
from the Red Cliffs, but there is no historical evidence for his interception by Guan
Yu: Chapter Six at note 83, but cf. below at 498, citing a play on that subject.
Hsia, Classic Chinese Novel, 41, cites the complaint of the great scholar Hu Shih
that the character of Guan Yu has been “reduced to an arrogant and stupid warrior.”
He observes himself, however, that “Lo Kuan-chung has adopted, not inadvertently
or perfunctorily but deliberately, Ch’en Shou’s view of the hero as a haughty warrior
deficient in generalship.”
101
Romance Chapter 81, and Plaks, Four Masterworks, 416.
102
Plaks, Four Masterworks, 446–452.
496 chapter eleven
enough to kill, but capable of generosity and even humour, and

above all aware of his own nature. In this regard he can be favour-
ably compared to Liu Bei, who sees himself as a man of chivalry
and honour, but is ever prepared to seek his own advantage. Even
the sad story of Lü Boshe and his family, with Cao Cao’s comment
“I would rather betray others than have them betray me,” shows a
cynical honesty more attractive than the flummery with which Liu Bei
seeks to justify his treachery towards Liu Zhang, notional kinsman and
host, whom he first claims to assist but from whom he plans to seize
power.103 Even as he accepts the invitation into Yi province, with all
that implies, Liu Bei insists upon his own virtues:
My opposite is Ts’ao Ts’ao. He is impetuous and I am long-suffering; he
is cruel and I am humane; he feigns, while I am true . . . . .
His adviser Pang Tong, however, persuades him that:
To adhere too obstinately to the idea of abstract rectitude is to do noth-
ing . . . . . . If after the settlement you reward with righteousness and
make of the land a great country, will you be guilty of a breach of trust?
Remember, if you do not take it now another will.
Liu Bei is suitably impressed: “These words are as jewels; they should
be engraven on my very heart.” And he gives orders for the move to
the west.104
With self-righteous Liu Bei for an ally, one might well prefer Cao
Cao; at least you knew where you were. Lü Bu would surely have
agreed.105
103
On Lü Boshe, see Chapter One at 48–49 and Romance Chapter 4. On Liu Bei’s
attack on Liu Zhang, see Chapter Seven at 308 and Romance Chapter 60.
104
Romance Chapter 60 at 634 [Brewitt-Taylor]. The incident is discussed by Plaks,
Four Masterpieces, 428–429, who notes that the vast majority of historians have criti-
cised Liu Bei for his breach of faith. Kroll, “Portraits,” 189–193, also translates this
passage, remarking:
The fact that most readers do not seem to have been bothered by this scene and
that no critic . . . has ever doubted Liu Pei’s full integrity despite it, is a measure of
Lo Kuan-chung’s skill in manipulating his characters. However, to a perceptive
and open-minded reader the scene cannot but darken somewhat his impression
of Liu Pei, just as it relatively lightens that of Ts’ao Ts’ao.
105
Chapter Three at 110, and Romance Chapter 19. One may recall that on an ear-
lier occasion Lü Bu had come to the rescue of Liu Bei when he faced a powerful attack
from Yuan Shu: Chapter Three at 101. Though Guan Yu spared Cao Cao at Huarong
on account of his former good treatment, Liu Bei showed no such scruples when Lü
Bu was captured at Xiapi.
Though Cao Cao has the villain’s part, he is recognised for his abil-
ity to choose loyal and competent officers and for his skill as a military
commander. In contrast, Zhuge Liang does not choose his servants
well, and Liu Bei is repeatedly defeated in battle. On his last campaign,
seeking to avenge the death of Guan Yu and the loss of Jing province,
he is humiliated by the youthful Lu Xun of Wu.106 While it is true that
Cao Cao’s disaster at the Red Cliffs forms the centrepiece of the novel,
and we are told how he and the armies of Wei suffer massive casualties
again and again, these occasions of misfortune serve to demonstrate
his resilience and even his physical courage. Though a true loyalist
might object, the anti-hero Cao Cao is in many ways a more attractive
and interesting character than either the magical but arrogant Zhuge
Liang or the hypocritical Liu Bei. Finally, as Mao Zonggang himself
observed, Cao Cao held great power but never took the imperial title;
for all his protestations of loyalty, Liu Bei did.107
The chuanqi Southern dramas which came to dominate Chinese the-

atre during Ming and early Qing were concerned rather with tales of
romantic love than with historical or warlike subjects, but the Peking
school of opera which developed in the late eighteenth century returned
to such themes, and many pieces of that genre, popular at every level
of society, present scenes from the Three Kingdoms.108
Among well-known incidents are Cao Cao’s flight from Luoyang in
190 [Zhuo fang Cao “Capture and Release of Cao Cao”], his defeat by
Zhang Xiu in 197 [Zhan Wancheng “Fighting at Wan City”] and Ni
Heng’s abusive conduct at court [ Jigu ma Cao “Beating a Drum and
Cursing Cao Cao”],109 but the Red Cliffs campaign of 208 has natu-
rally attracted greatest attention. Changban po “The Battle of Chang-
ban Slope” again ascribes imaginary victory to Liu Bei and his heroic
generals Zhang Fei and Zhao Yun as they retreat before Cao Cao’s
106
Romance Chapter 84, and Chapter Ten at 451 above.
107
Quoted by Plaks, Four Masterpieces, 469.
108
Tao Junqi lists some 120 plays dealing with events of the Three Kingdoms up to
the death of Cao Cao; Cao Cao has a major role in 45 of them, and his army and his
generals appear in several more: Jingju jumu chutan 7:68–101.
109
Zhuo fang Cao, which includes the slaughter of Lü Boshe and his family, is
translated by Arlington and Acton, Famous Chinese Plays, 132–151; the story is told
also in Romance Chapter 4, and see Chapter One at 48–49. Jigu ma Cao is translated
by Arlington and Acton, 39–52; Romance Chapter 23 and see Chapter Three at 118.
Zhan Wancheng is discussed below.
498 chapter eleven
advance,110 while the works collected under the general title Qunying
hui “Meeting of Many Heroes” present the major historical and leg-
endary episodes. Titles vary, but they include Caochuan jie jian “Bor-
rowing Arrows with Straw Boats,” Jiang Gan tao shu “Jiang Gan Steals
a Letter,” Pang Tong xian lianhuan ji “Pang Tong Proposes Chain-
ing Ships Together,” Da Huang Gai “Beating Huang Gai,” Jie dong-
feng “Obtaining an East Wind,” Huoshao zhanchuan “Burning the
Armada,” and Huarong dao “Incident on the Huarong Road.”111
The themes of Caochuan jie jian and Huarong dao have been dis-
cussed above. Others in the series describe how Cao Cao sent his agent
Jiang Gan, a skilled debater, to attract Zhou Yu into his service. Zhou
Yu refuses, but leaves a forged letter, apparently from two of Cao
Cao’s officers, where Jiang Gan can see it. Jiang Gan takes the docu-
ment, and as a result Cao Cao is tricked into ordering the execution
of his two most experienced naval commanders. Then Pang Tong, in
Liu Bei’s service, pretends to change sides and persuades Cao Cao to
render his ships immobile in hope of making them more secure. With
the scene thus set, Zhou Yu’s officer Huang Gai has himself flogged so
that he may more effectively pretend to surrender, and Zhuge Liang
uses magical incantations to summon a favourable wind. Cao Cao’s
fleet and camps are destroyed, and Guan Yu traps him as he flees past
Huarong, then lets him go.
Those dramas follow Chapters 45 to 50 of Romance, but Cao Cao
plays a lesser role, for major interest lies in the rivalry between Zhou Yu
and Zhuge Liang.112 Zhan Wancheng “Fighting at Wan City” presents
a broader picture of Cao Cao in both strength and weakness. Based
upon the first encounter with Zhang Xiu in 197, the drama shows Cao
Cao receive his surrender, but then become entranced by the Lady
Zou, widow of Zhang Xiu’s kinsman and patron Zhang Ji. Already
110
Changban po is translated by Arlington and Acton, 25–38; and see note 71 above.
111
Arlington and Acton, 201–210, contains summaries and translations from the
cycle of plays.
112
The plot of the opera Huanghe lou “Yellow Crane Tower” is similar to that of
the earlier zaju Shiliu yuan “The Pomegranate Garden,” outlined above. Where Shiliu
yuan has Liu Bei threatened by Cao Cao, however, Huanghe lou tells how he is trapped
by Zhou Yu in an attempt to force him to return “borrowed” Jing province to Sun
Quan. In Shiliu yuan he is warned by Yang Xiu and then rescued by Zhang Fei and
Guan Yu; in Huanghe lou he owes his escape to the wiles of Zhuge Liang. See Arling-
ton and Acton, Famous Chinese Plays, 230–251; as they observe at 251, in many such
incidents Liu Bei appears a lay figure, timid and perplexed.
uneasy, Zhang Xiu turns against Cao Cao and defeats him in a surprise
attack. Dian Wei, loyal commander of Cao Cao’s bodyguard, is killed,
together with Cao Cao’s son and a nephew. As Cao Cao makes his
escape, he abandons the Lady Zou and she is killed by Zhang Xiu.113
At the beginning of the play there appears the incident from Cao
Man zhuan, when Cao Cao’s horse tramples in a wheat-field and Cao
Cao cuts off his hair in atonement; he also kills the horse.114 Thereafter
the plot follows the Romance account quite closely, though it adds a
secondary affair between Cao Cao’s nephew Anmin and the maid-
servant of the Lady Zou, and Romance has no reference to Zhang Xiu
killing the lady. Unlike the original story in Fuzi, there is no attempt
to suborn Zhang Xiu’s follower Hu Che’er, but Hu Che’er disguises
himself as a groom and steals Dian Wei’s double halberd, making him
vulnerable. Zhang Xiu’s wise adviser Jia Xu has a comparatively small
part, and the core of the story is Cao Cao’s lust and callous selfishness
towards the unfortunate Lady Zou. No matter what one may think of
the sophistry involved in the case of the horse and the wheat-field, Cao
Cao comes badly out of the whole affair. The mask his character wears,
white with streaks of black, is well suited to such a powerful, cunning
and remorseless villain.
Marxist debate and the modern actor
The image of Cao Cao thus portrayed by Romance and confirmed

by the Peking opera was generally accepted in the twentieth century
and continues to hold sway in the Republic of China on Taiwan: the
analogy of a legitimate government in provincial exile opposed to the
113
Zhan Wancheng is translated by Arlington and Acton, 1–24; the incident is par-
alleled in Romance Chapter 16; the original account is in SGZ 8:262 and 263 PC quot-
ing Fuzi; Chapter Three at 105–106.
SGZ 8 does not mention the maiden surname of the widow of Zhang Ji. Romance
and the drama say that she is Zhang Xiu’s aunt (嬸 shen), for Zhang Ji had been his
uncle. In reality, though they were certainly kin, the connection was probably not so
close.
The Lady Zou describes herself as lonely for male companionship, and her eventual
murder by Zhang Xiu is in some respects reminiscent of Golden Lotus and the brutal-
ity of Wu Song in Jin Ping Mei. It may not be entirely coincidental that the Lady Zou’s
maidservant—also killed by Zhang Xiu—and the maid and confidant of Golden Lotus
in the later novel have the same name, Chunmei “Plum Blossom.”
114
See Chapter Ten at 449. The incident appears separately in Romance, in Chapter
17, and only in the opera is there an account of killing the horse.
500 chapter eleven
powerful usurper who has seized the heartland is dear to old idealists
of the Nationalist Kuomintang. After the People’s Republic was estab-
lished on the mainland, however, Cao Cao’s role in history and his
consequent reputation were reassessed in the light of Marxist theory
and progressive ideology. Guo Moruo, President of the Chinese Acad-
emy of the Social Sciences and a leading intellectual of the new regime,
was the first major figure to raise the question, with an article entitled
Ti Cao Cao fan’an “Let us reopen the case of Cao Cao,” first published
in Renmin ribao “The People’s Daily” on 23 March 1959.115
Up to that time, historical study under the Communist regime had
been bedevilled by the problem of fitting Chinese experience into the
expected Marxist sequence of slave societies, followed by feudalism,
bourgeois capitalism and true socialism. Not only had the Communist
triumph of 1949 been based upon a peasant rather than an industrial
proletarian revolution, but two thousand years of a centralised impe-
rial state, from Qin and Han to the Manchu Qing, fits badly into any
model of feudalism. Political emphasis on the struggles of working
people, moreover, with concomitant downplay of individuals, meant
that much of the debate was couched in abstract terms of periodisa-
tion and mass movements; as Feuerwerker claimed, it could be both
sterile and meaningless. Discussion of Cao Cao, however, allowed this
well-known figure to serve as focus for the study of a critical period in
the past, while scholars were urged to judge historical figures in terms
of their contribution to the development of the nation and its people,
not merely by the ideals of the present day.116
Though many at first opposed Guo Moruo’s revisionist opinion, his
scholarly authority and political influence eventually swung the debate,
and Cao Cao was praised as a progressive force in history. Several con-
tributions were published in Cao Cao lunji “Collected Essays on Cao
Cao,” edited by Guo Moruo and Jian Bozan, the latter a professor of
history at Beijing University and a senior member of the Academy.
At the core of the argument lay three points in Cao Cao’s career: his
fighting against the Yellow Turbans, his destruction of the Wuhuan in
115
提曹操翻案 in 人民日报. The article was reprinted in Xinhua banyue kan 新华
半月刊 “New China Semi-Monthly” 1959.8, 104–108, and appears in Cao Cao lun ji,
47–63. The debate which followed is summarised by Feuerwerker, “History in Marx-
ian Dress,” 349–350.
116
Kahn and Feuerwerker, “Ideology of Scholarship,” 2.
207, and his establishment of agricultural colonies. The last of these

may easily be interpreted as a benefit to the people in a world rav-
aged by war, and elements might even be related to the system of
communes which were then being established. On the other hand,
the Wuhuan campaign could be presented as brutal aggression, and
opposition to the Yellow Turbans implied that Cao Cao had set him-
self against one of the great peasant rebellions, fore-runners of the
new order.117 Opponents of Cao Cao, moreover, emphasised his fond-
ness of killing, with particular attention to the tale of Lü Boshe—as
enhanced by Romance—and the massacres in Xu province, and the
view is still widely held: could Cao Cao have been charged with war
crimes? It was also claimed that, rather than being an opponent of the
land-owning classes, he was in fact their representative.118
It was eventually agreed, however, that the religious fanaticism of
the Yellow Turbans and their poor organisation meant they would
never have improved the lot of the common people, while the fact that
many of the rebels later joined Cao Cao’s service was a strong point
in his favour. The historical role of the Yellow Turbans was to weaken
the grasp of imperial power and create opportunity for men like Cao
Cao to advance the cause for the future. As to the Wuhuan, Cao Cao’s
offensive should be regarded not as cruelty to a weaker people, but as
defence of China against unruly and uncivilised aliens. This argument
gained greatly from the words of Chairman Mao, for on a visit to
the resort town of Beidaihe in 1954, near the legendary cliff of Jieshi,
he had composed a poem echoing Cao Cao’s commemoration of that
campaign:
A storm of rain covers these northern lands,
White waves dash to the sky.
The fishing boats off Qinhuangdao
Are all lost to sight.
Where have they gone?
A thousand years ago and more
Wu of Wei cracked his whip.
117
On the establishment of agricultural colonies tuntian, see Chapter Two at 89–91.
On the Wuhuan campaign of 206–207, culminating in the victory at White Wolf
Mountain, see Chapter Five at 203–235.
118
The survey article by Lin Yanshu, cited by Harrison, “Interpretations of Chinese
Peasant Wars,” 194, presents a variety of opinions from a number of younger scholars
opposed to those of Guo Moruo.
502 chapter eleven
“Eastward to Jieshi;” his poem survives,

And the autumn wind still sighs today.
But we have changed the world.119
With such endorsement, Cao Cao’s rehabilitation was assured, and
the wave of revision extended to embrace the First Emperor of Qin,
Emperor Wu of Former Han, Taizong of Tang, and even the wicked
King Zhou, last ruler of Shang/Yin.120 Cao Cao, however, may have
gained most from the movement.
Besides his scholarship, Guo Moruo was a distinguished playwright,
and at the same time as he was arguing for Cao Cao’s rehabilitation he
was composing a play, Cai Wenji, in modern style. First performed in
May 1959 at the Beijing People’s Art Theatre, it tells how Cao Cao paid
ransom for the return of the Lady Cai Yan from the court of the bar-
barian Xiongnu. The work emphasises Cao Cao’s admiration for talent
and the love of both characters for the motherland: Cao Cao’s appeal
to the Xiongnu chieftain is that he needs the Lady Cai to work on the
national history in succession to her father Cai Yong; and the Lady
Cai leaves her husband and children in order to answer the call. Cai
Wenji became a major item in the theatrical repertoire, and formed
the theme of a thirty-two-part television serial first shown in 2003.121
In 1973 the disgrace of Lin Biao, former comrade in arms of Chair-
man Mao but now lost and vilified as a traitor, saw the beginning of
the political campaign Pi-Lin Pi-Kong “Criticise Lin Biao and Con-
fucius.” At the core of the argument was the ancient conflict between
Confucianist and Legalist attitudes towards society, and chief attention
was given to an attack on Confucius’ reputation and the rehabilitation
of the First Emperor of Qin. Later Han was not a focus of attention,
but Cao Cao was presented as a Legalist and once more praised as a
force for progress. There was some debate about his attitude to the
Yellow Turbans, but it was then officially agreed that he had always
119
Beidaihe; on Cao Cao’s Jieshi poem, see Chapter Five at 236–239.
120
Early in his career Guo Moruo was a scholar of early China and published a
major study of bronze inscriptions of the Zhou period. His article Dui Yin Zhou-
wang di yizhong kanfa 对殷纣王的一种看法 “One way of viewing King Zhou of Yin”
appeared in the journal Xin jianshe 新建設 of 7 April 1959, 6–7, soon after the essay
on Cao Cao.
121
Wenji was the style of the Lady Cai Yan. On her return from the north about
206, see note 29 to Chapter Eight. Guo Moruo is said to have claimed an affinity for
the Lady Cai’s abandonment of her family, for he had left a wife and children in Japan
when he returned to China in 1937.
been a reformist, opposed to the great landlord families, and that his
policies had aided economic and national development. Posthumously,
this may be pleasant for Cao Cao, and some writing on the subject had
scholarly value, but the debate was strained and artificial, of little more
than marginal value to the study of history.122 After the death of Mao
Zedong and the overthrow of the Gang of Four in 1976, the intensity
of the Cultural Revolution faded away and Cao Cao lost much of his
political significance.
In 1988 the Shanghai Peking Opera Troupe presented a new opera,

Cao Cao and Yang Xiu. Based upon the relationship described in
Romance, the theme of the drama was the tension between the two
characters: Cao Cao genuinely seeking good men to serve him, but
unable to fully appreciate and trust the intellectual and honourable
Yang Xiu. Here Cao Cao is neither the parody figure of the traditional
opera, nor the ideal character envisaged by Guo Moruo in Cai Wenji;
he is a great man with limitations.
In more popular mode, an eighty-part television serial of the
Romance of the Three Kingdoms appeared in 1995, keeping closely to
the plot of the novel, and several series were produced in Japan dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s; many of these have been distributed in the
West. The period and the theme naturally lend themselves to the mar-
tial arts genre, with historical accuracy comparable to Dumas’ Three
Musketeers, The most recent spectacular is the two-part epic Chi pi
“Red Cliff ” of John Woo, screened in 2008 and 2009,123 but there
are also more factual television programs, including news reports and
documentaries inspired by the recently reported discovery of Cao Cao’s
tomb at Anyang,124 and popular lectures by Professor Yi Zhongtian of
Xianmen University. And in the open world of the Internet, many
games are based on Three Kingdoms history, accompanied by websites
122
Kandel, “New Interpretations,” presents a summary, and at 110–113 she dis-
cusses Cao Cao. See also Lishi yanjiu 1 (1974).
123
Another film of 2008, produced jointly in Korea and China with the title Saam
gwok dzi gin lung se gap 三国之见龙卸甲 [English as “Three Kingdoms: Resurrection
of the Dragon”] is based on the career of Liu Bei’s general Zhao Yun. After a confu-
sion of bloodthirsty but unlikely battles, the hero eventually meets his end through
the agency of a daughter of Cao Cao, who has succeeded to the command of her
father’s troops.
124
Chapter Ten at 443–444.
504 chapter eleven
of varying quality. In one manifestation or another, after almost two

thousand years Cao Cao, his comrades and his rivals have a long life
still to come.125
Why Cao Cao?
After more than two thousand years of well-told history, with pow-
erful emperors and great heroes and scholars, it may seem strange
that so much attention should be given to a single warlord, who never
achieved full suzerainty over the empire and whose dynasty lasted less
than fifty years. Even the period of the Three Kingdoms, tumultuous
and tragic as it may have been, was just one of such occasions in the
Chinese past. The long period of division which followed the expulsion
of Jin from the north, the founding struggles of each dynasty which
came afterwards, and the national wars of Song and Ming against the
encroachment of non-Chinese northerners; all provided men and deeds
worthy of record and duly admired. None, however, have received the
interest awarded to Cao Cao, and even those commentators who dis-
like and despise him are compelled to pay him respect.
Such popularity surely reflects the medley of emotions that his
memory arouses, and this in turn is a result of his own self-expression.
Others have gone to war, composed poetry and left documents and
testaments, but Cao Cao did all three. His fighting skills were consid-
erable: he not only displayed some brilliant generalship but took part
also in hand-to-hand combat. His poetry is among the earliest to break
from the traditional, semi-impersonal style of Han lyrics and yuefu
and make use of the genre to express personal feelings. And through
his various proclamations the people of his own time and those who
came after have received something very close to a personal style of
communication from a man with important things to say and ideas
to express.
There is no question that Cao Cao could be clever and cruel, and
many of his actions were harsh and unjust. He was, however, an excep-
tional man in a dangerous time, and both his words and his actions are
125
One may also record that in the present day an American actor, Jonathan Kos-
Read, has achieved considerable success on Chinese television under the stage-name
of Cao Cao.
remarkable. It is, in fact, the combination of his brilliant ability and

his personal failings that render Cao Cao a fascinating character to
study and a continuing source of fantasy and imagination over centu-
ries since his death. Above all, he must be remembered as a man who
sought, with energy and skill, to control his own destiny.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Early Sources: Standard Histories
HHS Hou Han shu 後漢書:

Annals 本纪 and liezhuan 列傳 [biographies and accounts] by Fan Ye 范曄
(396–446),
with commentary compiled under the auspices of Li Xian 李賢, Heir of Tang
章懷太子 (651–684) [TC];
Treatises 志 incorporated from the Xu Han shu 續漢書 of Sima Biao 司馬彪
(third century) [see also Other Texts below],
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Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 [ZHSJ], Beijing 1965;
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the Commercial Press, Shanghai
citation by chapter numbers within sections of the work:
HHS 1A = HHS annals 1A
HHS 11/1 = HHS liezhuan 1 [chapter 11 of the whole work]
HHS 101/11 = HHS treatises 11 [chapter 101 of the whole work]
HS Han shu 漢書 by Ban Gu 班固 (32–92) and others, with commentary by Yan
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Changsha 1900; in the facsimile edition by Yiwen 藝文 Publishers, Taipei
JTS Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書 compiled by Liu Xu 劉昫 (887–946) and others; ZHSJ,
Beijing 1975
JS Jin shu 晉書 by Fang Xuanling 房玄齡 (578–648) and others; ZHSJ, Beijing
1974
SGZ Sanguo zhi 三國志 by Chen Shou 陳壽 (233–297), with official commentary
compiled by Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (372–451) [PC], presented to Liu Yu 劉裕,
founding Emperor Wu 武 of the Song 宋 dynasty, in 429; ZHSJ, Beijing
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also SGZ jijie 集解 [SGZJJ] compiled by Lu Bi 盧弼, Mianyang 1936; facsimile
edition by Yiwen 藝文 Publishers, Taipei;
citation by chapter numbers within sections of the work:
SGZ 1 = Wei shu 魏書 1
SGZ Shu 1 = Shu shu 蜀書 1 [chapter 31 of SGZ]
SGZ Wu 1 = Wu shu 吳書 1 [chapter 46 of SGZ]
SJ Shi ji 史記 by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (146–c.86 BC), ZHSJ, Beijing 1959
Song shi 宋史 compiled by Tuotuo [Toktaga] 脱脱 (1314–1355) and others, ZHSJ,
Beijing 1977
SongS Song shu 宋書 compiled by Shen Yue 沈約 (441–513), ZHSJ, Beijing 1974
SuiS Sui shu 隋書 compiled by Wei Zheng 魏徴 (580–643), Yan Shigu and others,
ZHSJ, Beijing 1973
XTS Xin Tang shu 新唐書 compiled by Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007–1072) and
others, ZHSJ, Beijing 1975
Yuan shi 元史 compiled by Song Lian 宋濂 (1310–1381), ZHSJ, Beijing 1976
508 bibliography
Early Sources: Works by Cao Cao
Cao Cao ji 曹操集 [Collected Works of Cao Cao], ZHSJ, Beijing 1959: [the collec-
tion is based on Han-Wei liuchao mingjia ji 漢魏六朝名家集本 compiled by Ding
Fubao 丁福保; which in turn followed Quan Shanggu Sandai Qin Han Sanguo
Liuchao wen 全上古三代秦漢三國六朝文 compiled by Yan Kejun 嚴可均 and
first published at Guangzhou in 1893]; this compilation includes Cao Cao’s com-
mentary to Sunzi Bingfa 孫子兵法; supplementary material includes Wudi ji 武
帝紀 “Annals of Emperor Wu;” Cao Cao nianbiao 曹操年表 “Chronology of Cao
Cao” compiled by Jiang Ou [see below]; and Cao Cao zhuzuo kao 曹操著作考
“Study of Cao Cao’s Writings” with Wenji fuyi 文集補遺 “Additional fragments”
based on the work of Yao Zhenzong q.v. below.
Cao Cao ji yizhu 曹操集譯注 [Collected Works of Cao Cao, with commentary and
translation], compiled by scholars of Bo county in Anhui 安徽亳县《曹操集》译
注小组, Beijing 1979: [text from Cao Cao ji as above, with Nianbiao by Jiang Ou
Cao Cao ji zhuzi suoyin 曹操集逐字索引 “A Concordance to the Works of Cao Cao,”
compiled by Liu Dianjue [Lau, D C (Dim Cheuk)] 劉殿爵, Chen Fangzheng 陳方
正 and He Zhihua 何志華, Collected Works No. 7 of the ICS [Institute of Chinese
Studies] Concordances to Works of Wei-Jin and the Northern and Southern Dynas-
ties 魏晉南北朝古籍逐字索引叢刊, Chinese University of Hong Kong 2000
Cao Cao quanshu: wenbai duizhao quanyi 曹操全书: 文白对照全译 [Complete
Works of Cao Cao, translated into Baihua], by Zhang Haiyu 张海雨, Beijing 1995
Cao Cao shiwen xuandu 曹操詩文選讀 [Selected Readings of the poetry and other
writings of Cao Cao], Beijing University Department of Chinese Literature, Beijing
1974
Wei Wudi Wei Wendi shi zhu, 魏武帝魏文帝詩注 [The Poems of Emperor Wu of
Wei (Cao Cao) and of Emperor Wen of Wei (Cao Pi), with commentary], compiled
by Huang Jie 黃節, Beijing 1958
See also Sunzi Bingfa 孫子兵法 below
Early Sources: Other Texts
Anya tang ji 安雅堂集 by Song Wan 宋琬 (1614–1673), in SKQS

Beitang shuchao 北堂書鈔 compiled by Yu Shinan 虞世南 (558–638), in SKQS
Bohu tong 白虎通 compiled by Ban Gu 班固, in Baojing tang congshu 抱經堂叢書
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Hall
Chengyi bowen ji 誠意伯文集 by Liu Ji 劉基 (1311–1375), in SKQS
Chunqiu 春秋 Spring and Autumn Annals, see Legge, Classics V below
Chuxue ji 初學記 compiled by Xu Jian 徐堅 of Tang, in SKQS
Dong Han huiyao 東漢會要 by Xu Tianlin 徐天麟 of Song, ZHSJ, Beijing 1955
Dongjing menghua lu 東京夢華錄 by Meng Yuanlao 孟元老 (twelfth century), in
SKQS and Shuofu
Dongpo zhilin 東坡志林 by Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101), ZHSJ, Beijing 1981
Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 風俗通義 by Ying Shao 應劭 (second century AD), ZHSJ,
Beijing 1981
Guben Yuan Ming zaju 孤本元明襍劇 compiled by Wang Jilie 王季烈, Beijing 1958
GXSGC: Gu xiaoshuo gouchen 古小說鉤沈 compiled by Lu Xun 魯迅/Zhou Shuren
周樹人 (twentieth century) [first published in 1909–11], Renmin wenxue chuban-
she 人民文學出版社, Beijing 1953
Henan Mugong ji 河南穆公集 by Mu Xiu 穆脩 (979–1032), in SBCK
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文庫 edition of the Commercial Press, Shanghai
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others, in Guoxue jiben congshu 國學基本叢書, Taiwan Commercial Press 1968
Juyi lu 居易錄 by Wang Shizhen 王士禎 (1634–1711), in SKQS
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1957 and see sub Mather
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Shuofu 説郛 compiled by Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀 (Yuan), in SKQS
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jiao 校 edition by Wang Guowei 王國維 and others, Shanghai 1985; also Shuijing
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Beijing 1957
SSXY: Shishuo xinyu 世說新語 by Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 (403–444), with commentary by
Liu Jun 劉峻 (462–521), Beijing 1956
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INDEX
Abdications: armour, double 兩鎧 (liang kai), 173,

by Emperor Xian of Han, 6, 88, 158, 281
399, 430, 450, 461, 472, 487 armour, jade 玉匣 ( yuxia) or 玉衣
by Cao Huan of Wei, 461 ( yuyi) [funerary regalia], 18, 99
Abundant Talent 秀才 nomination, 244, armoured horses 鎧馬 (kaima), 171
247 Assistant 丞 of a county, 158
Adjutant of the Northern Army Associate to the Imperial Chancellor 副
北軍中候 (beijun zhonghou) [Captain 丞相 (fu chengxiang), 381, 409–10
of the Centre], 259 Attendant Gentleman of the Household
Administrator 太守 of a commandery, 從事中郎 (congshi zhonglang), 131
91, 357, 377, 395, 438; and see Attendant Officer 別駕從事 (biejia
commanderies by name congshi) in a province, 63, 78, 192
adoption, 2, 15–17, 19–26, 30, 54, 60, Authority, see Staff of Authority
82, 85, 129, 208, 220, 340, 394, 399,
407, 412, 429, 437, 458, 459, 474 Ba 巴 commandery in Yi province,
Adviser to the Army 参軍事 (can 293, 314–5, 426, Map 17, Map 21;
junshi), 188, 386, 410 Administrator, 112, 292
Agincourt [battle 1415], 184, 194–5 Baling 霸陵 in Jingzhao, Map 7
agricultural colonies, military 屯田 Ban Chao 班超, 11, 187, 324
(tuntian), 3, 52, 78, 89–92, 123, Ban Gu 班固, 320, 344
164–7, 189, 195, 206, 243, 250–1, 255, Banshun 板楯 people of Ba
258, 277, 334, 343, 410, 452, 501 commandery, 314, Map 17
Ancestral Temple/s 宗廟 Bao River 褒水, Map 17
of Han, 86, 88 Bao 保 in Jiangxia, Map 14
of Wei, 381, 393–4, 441–2 Bao Xian 鮑咸, 383
Anding 安定 commandery in Liang Bao Xin 鮑信, 63–4
province, 299, 304, Map 1, Map 15, Baopu zi 抱朴子 by Ge Hong 葛洪, 351
Map 21 Baoqiu River 鮑丘水, Map 3, Map 12
Anping 安平 commandery/kingdom Baoye Road 褒斜道, 311, 315, 427,
in Ji province, 219, 390, 409, Map 3, Map 17
Map 10, Map 21 Baron 男 [noble title], see nan
Anyang 安陽 in Runan, Princess, 400 Bazhen 八陳 “Eight Formations,” 190
Anyang 安陽 in present-day Henan, Bearer of the Mace 執金吾 (zhi jinwu),
214, 443, 503 76, 127
Anyi 安邑 in Hedong, 52, 82–6, 224, Beauty 美人 [imperial concubine], 92
Map 1, Map 7, Map 15 Beidaihe 北戴河 poem by Mao Zedong
Anzhong 安衆 in Nanyang, 97, 107–8, 毛泽东, 237
174, 180, Map 13 Beidi 北地 commandery in Liang
Ao Granary 敖倉 in Henan, 133, Map 2 province, 223, 265, 317, Map 15,
Archers Who Shoot at a Sound 射聲 Map 21
regiment, 153 Beifen shi 悲忿詩 “Poem/s of Lament
Area Commander 都督 (dudu), 123–4, and Resentment” by Cai Yan 蔡琰,
188; and see Chief Controller 343
armour 鎧 (kai) also as 甲 (jia), 131, Beihai 北海 commandery in Qing
168–171, 282 province, 116–7, 128, 199, 231, 342,
“dark armour” 玄鎧 (xuankai), 168 Map 6, Map 21
“shining black” 黑光 (heiguang), 168 Bi 費 in Taishan, see Fei
“shining bright” 明光 (mingguang), 168 Bi village, marquis 費亭侯, 18, 20, 71, 85
526 index
Bi 比 [Xiongnu], 11 Bowu zhi 博物志 “Record of a Myriad

Bi Chen 畢諶, 78 Things” by Zhang Hua 張華, 351,
Bian River/Canal 卞河/水, 124, 133, 379, 447
142, 358, Map 1, Map 2, Map 9, Brilliant Companion 昭儀 (zhaoyi)
Map 10; and see Vast Canal [concubine], 405
Bian 卞, the Lady, concubine and later Bronze Bird Terrace 銅雀/爵臺 and
wife of Cao Cao, 9, 21, 24, 28, 34–5, Garden 園 at Ye city, 338, 381, 408,
40, 48, 103, 401–12, 415–8, 431, 439, Map 18
445, 459–60 Bu Zhi 步騭, 276, 310, 391, 406, 455
Bian Rang 邊讓, 77, 130, 448, 464 Buchu Xiamen xing 步岀夏門行 “Going
Biandao lun 辯道論 “An Analysis of out on foot by the Xia Gate” poem by
Taoism” by Cao Zhi 曹植, 351 Cao Cao, 237, 345, 349; and see Jieshi
Bibliography Treatise of Han shu, see poem
Yiwen zhi 藝文志 buqu 部曲, 166; and see hereditary
Bing province 并州, 42, 84, 123, 133, military service
140, 149, 167, 203, 205, 211, 216–9, burial ceremonies, see tombs
222, 225–6, 230, 288, 305, 317, 353,
Map 1, Map 3, Map 7, Map 8, Map 9, Cai 蔡, the Lady, wife of Liu Biao, 263
Map 10, Map 21; Governor, 46, 149; Cai Mao 蔡瑁, 264
Inspector, 205, 211, 218 Cai Wenji 蔡文姬 [modern play by Guo
Bing Yuan 邴原, 24 Moruo 郭沫若], 502–3
Bingfa 兵法 “The Art of War” by Sun Cai Yan 蔡琰 (style Wenji 文姬),
Wu 孫武, see Sunzi daughter of Cai Yong, 343, 378, 502;
Bingfa 兵法 “The Art of War” by Wu and see Cai Wenji
Qi, see Wuzi Bingfa 吳子兵法 Cai Yong 蔡邕, 171, 339–40, 343, 345,
Black Mountain 黑山 bandits, 42, 51, 346, 378, 396, 432, 502
61–3, 70, 80, 123, 127, 133, 159, Call to Arms 檄 (xi) of Yuan Shao, 45,
161, 223, 300, Map 1, Map 3, Map 4, 97, 126, 128–35, 339–40, 443, 463
Map 8, Map 10 calligraphy, 32, 379, 447
Blue Heaven 蒼天 (zangtian), 37 Grass Script 草書 cao shu, 379
bo 伯 [noble title] “Earl,” 383–4, 390 Standard Script 楷書 kai shu, 107, 379
Bo 亳 in present-day Anhui, 480 Cangting Crossing 蒼亭津 of the Yellow
Bo Canal 白溝, see White Canal 白溝 River, 78, 203, Map 4, Map 10
Bo Rao 白繞, 61, 62 Cangwu 蒼梧 commandery in Jiaozhi/
Bobo 白波 bandits/rebels, 160–3 Jiao province, 269, 276, Map 13,
Bohai 勃海 commandery/kingdom in Map 21; Administrator, 269
Ji province, 62, 93, 121, 213, 219–20, Cannae [battle 216 BC], 193
227, 231, Map 3, Map 10, Map 21 Cao 曹 family of Pei, 18–22, 25, 71, 205,
King, 93 334; and see tombs
Bolang River 白狼水, 234–5, Map 12 Cao A’man 曹阿瞞, 26, 370; and see
Bolang shan 白狼山, see White Wolf Cao Cao
Mountain Cao Ang 曹昂 (style Zixiu 子脩), 9, 21,
Boling 博陵 commandery, 218, Map 3, 34, 106, 361, 367, 400–4, 416
Map 10, Map 21 Cao Anmin 曹安民, 21, 27
Boma 白馬 in Dong commandery, Cao Bao 曹褒, brother of Cao Teng,
98, 137, 139–40, 143, 171, 405, 458, 21, 220
Map 9 Cao Bao 曹豹, officer in Xu province,
King [Cao Biao, dedicatee of the poem 76, 100
Zeng Boma wang Biao 贈白馬王 Cao Bao 曹豹, son of Cao Cao, see Cao
彪 by Cao Zhi 曹植], 405, 458; and Lin 曹林
see Cao Biao Cao Biao 曹彪, 403, 405, 458; and see
Book of Changes 易經 Yi jing, 261, 460 King of Boma
Botan 白壇 region, 234, Map 12 Cao Bin 曹彬, 21, 26–7
Bowang shao tun 博望燒屯 “Burning Cao Boxing 曹伯興, 20
the Camp at Bowang” [play], 485, Cao Can 曹參, see Cao Shen
index 527
Cao Cao 曹操 (style Mengde 孟德; Cao Jun 曹峻, son of Cao Cao by the
secondary personal name Jili 吉利; Lady Qin, 403
childhood name A’man 阿瞞); Cao Jün 曹均, son of Cao Cao by the
posthumous title (shi 諡) King and Lady Zhou, 127, 403–5
then Emperor Wu of Wei 魏武帝/王; Cao Lang 曹良, see Cao Gan
temple name (廟號 miaohao) Grand Cao Lin 曹林 [or Cao Bao 豹], 362, 382,
Ancestor 太祖 Taizu, passim 403–5, 409, 412
character and reputation, 1, 3–4, Cao Man zhuan 曹瞞傳 “Biography of
24–5, 29–35, 40, 48–50, 75, 105, Cao Man,” 20, 22–3, 26, 30, 33, 74–5,
117, 129–35, 201, 218, 236–7, 329, 144–6, 197, 236, 243, 298, 370, 398,
339–40, 349–71, 377, 380, 386–7, 447–8, 460, 463–4, 476, 478, 499
393, 401, 445–50, 463–505 Cao Mao 曹茂, 403, 406, 424
military abilities, 1, 3, 30, 32, 55–6, Cao Mao 曹髦 [third century], 461
81–2, 147–52, 201, 319–32, 445–50 Cao Meng 曹萌, 17, 20–1, 25; and see
wives and concubines, 4, 9, 21, 23–8, Cao Jie
34, 48, 111, 361, 400–5, 411–2, 445, Cao Pi 曹丕 (style Zihuan 子桓),
449, 459–60, 476; and see Lady Bian Emperor Wen 文帝 of Wei, saepe;
Apologia, 4, 16, 40, 43, 57, 66, 356–63, wives and concubines, 24, 218, 370,
382, 385, 391, 393, 408 444, 459–60, 474, 478
other proclamations (令 ling), 4, 23, literary works, 342–3, 347, 378, 408,
35, 205–6, 212, 218–9, 221, 250, 411–3, 461, 479
251, 301, 376, 377, 440, 442 appointment as Heir to Cao Cao,
poetry, 1, 3–4, 32, 236–9, 333, 339, 413–6
349–56, 379, 446, 462 takes title as Emperor of Wei, 1, 6,
tomb [Gaoling 高陵], 402, 440, 441, 158, 364, 399, 450–1
443, 445 restrictions on relatives, 405, 458, 462
temples 廟 and shrines 祠, 394, 442, death and burial, 441–4, 457–8, 462
443, 480, 489 Cao Quan 曹全, 16
Cao Cao biezhuan 曹操别傳 “Secondary Cao Ren 曹仁, 20–1, 127, 141–2, 144,
Biography of Cao Cao,” 57, 290, 465 151, 220, 241–2, 275, 277, 288–9, 295,
Cao Chi 曹熾, 20–1, 220, 245 301, 304, 306, 311, 318, 330, 419, 423,
Cao Chong 曹沖, 21, 24, 403–12, 438, 427, 429–35
445, 474, 478 Cao Rui 曹叡, Emperor Ming 明帝 of
Cao Chun 曹純, 20–1, 220 Wei, 24, 218, 256–7, 289, 394, 402,
Cao Cong 曹琮, 407, 412 424, 440–4, 457–460, 462
Cao De 曹德, 21, 27, 70–1 tomb [Gaopingling 高平陵], 442
Cao Fang 曹芳 [third century], 412, Cao Shen 曹參, 16, 21
424, 442, 459, 461 Cao Shuang 曹爽, 424, 442, 459–61
Cao Gan 曹幹 or Cao Lang, 403–6 Cao Shuo 曹鑠, 34, 402–4, 416
Cao Gun 曹袞, 403, 405 Cao Shuxing 曹叔興, 20
Cao Hong 曹洪, 20–1, 55, 86, 106–7, Cao Song 曹嵩, 2, 16, 20–30, 34–5, 42,
115, 145–6, 423, 426 51, 70–4, 85, 129, 205, 220, 255, 340,
Cao Hua 曹華, the Lady, 399 360, 394
Cao Huan 曹奐 [third century], 424, 461 Cao Teng 曹騰, 2, 16–22, 25–6, 30, 45,
Cao Hui 曹徽, 403 85, 129, 220, 339, 360, 394, 399
Cao Jie 曹節 [i.e. Cao Meng?], father of Cao Xian 曹憲, the Lady, 399
Cao Song, 17, 20–1, 25, 399 Cao Xiong 曹熊, 21, 403–4
Cao Jie 曹節, the Lady, Empress Mu 穆 Cao Xiu 曹休, 458–9; tomb, 444
of Emperor Xian of Han, 21, 398–400 Cao Xuan 曹玹, 403
Cao Jili 曹吉利, 20, 26, 246 Cao Yu 曹玉, brother of Cao Cao, 21,
Cao Ju 曹據, son of Cao Cao by the 27
Lady Huan, 362, 382, 400, 403, 405, Cao Yü 曹宇, son of Cao Cao, 403, 405
407, 409, 411, 412 Cao Zhang 曹彰, 21, 103, 403–5, 409,
Cao Jü 曹矩, son of Cao Cao by the 411, 427, 439, 458
Lady Yin, 403, 404 Cao Zhen 曹真, 458–9
528 index
Cao Zheng 曹整 or Zizheng 子整, 214, 310, 429, Map 13, Map 14, Map 16,
219, 404–5 Map 21; Administrator, 126, 159, 259
Cao Zhi 曹植, 3, 21, 28, 33, 104, 168, Changshan 常山 kingdom/commandery
339–51, 362, 373, 380–2, 403–4 in Ji province, 149, 161, 334, 390,
wife, 415, 418, 446 Map 3, Map 10, Map 21
tomb, 444 Changyan 昌言 “Frank Discussions” or
Cao Zicheng 曹子乘, 403, 405 “Admirable Words” by Zhongchang
Cao Ziji 曹子棘, 403 Tong 仲長統, 348
Cao Zijing 曹子京, 403, 405 Chao Lake 巢湖, 276, 286, 301, 303,
Cao Ziqin 曹子勤, 403, 405 480, Map 16
Cao Zishang 曹子上, 403, 405 Chao Cuo 鼂錯 [Former Han], 252
Cao Zizheng 曹整, see Cao Zheng Chariots and carriages
曹子整 Root of Gold ( jin’gen che) 金根車,
Cao Zhongxing 曹仲興, 20 396
Caochuan jiejian 草船借箭 “Borrowing Five Seasons (wushi che) 五時車, 396
Arrows with Straw Boats” [drama], see also sub Nine Distinctions
285, 488, 498 Chen 陳 kingdom in Yu province,
castration, 17, 22, 376; and see mutilat- 361–2, Map 16, Map 21; Chancellor, 85
ing punishments sub laws King, 85
Cen Peng 岑彭 [first century], 282 Chen 陳, the Lady, concubine of Cao
censors and censorship, 24, 26, 87, 131, Cao, 403–6
244, 372, 375, 377, 394–5, 424 Chen Deng 陳登, 104, 109, 111, 189
Chaisang 柴桑 in Yuzhang, 269, Map 16 Chen Gong 陳宮, 52, 63, 76–9, 109, 111,
Chancellor, Imperial 丞相 of Han, 6, 16, 166
241, 244–6, 256, 333, 368, 373, 382, Chen Gui 陳珪, 103–4, 111, 189
388, 391, 393, 395, 396, 457, 472 Chen Gui 陳規 [Song], 176
Chancellor, Imperial 丞相 to Yuan Chen Ji 陳紀, 375
Shu, 85 Chen Jiao 陳矯, 19, 23–4
Chancellor 相 of a kingdom, 16, 18; and Chen Lin 陳琳, 128–9, 168, 197, 339–40,
see kingdoms by name 342, 346–7, 367, 413
Chancellor of the state/empire 相國/ Chen Lü 陳旅 [Yuan], 489
丞相 of Wei, 395–6, 400 Chen Ping 陳平 [Former Han], 368
Chang River 長水 regiment, 153–4, 165, Chen Qian 陳騫, 24
170, 228 Chen Qun 陳羣, 249, 375–6, 394, 458–9
Chang Slope 長阪 in Nan commandery, Chen Rong 陳容, 80
226, 268, 269, 331, 485, Map 14 Chen Shou 陳壽 [third century], 1, 20,
Chang Lin 常林, 410 22, 29–30, 40, 72, 387, 405, 464–6,
Chang Nu 萇奴, 26, 86 470, 471–2, 490–1
Chang Xi 昌豨, 204–5, 231, 304 Chen Wen 陳溫, 56, 62, 70, 159
Chang‘an 長安 in Jingzhao, 6, 51–2, Chen Wu 陳武, 445
55, 67–8, 77, 81–2, 87, 94, 106, 110, Chen Yi 陳禕, 431
112–3, 127, 157, 161, 177–8, 211, 223, Chen Yu 陳瑀, 104
244, 253, 256, 265, 291, 298–9, 303, Chen Zhong 陳忠, 17, 376
340, 345, 377–9, 411, 413, 488, Map 1, Chencang 陳倉 in Youfufeng, Map 1,
Map 7, Map 8, Map 15, Map 17, Map 15, Map 17
Map 20 Cheng Pu 程普, 183, 270, 272, 289
Changban po 長板坡 “The Battle of Cheng Tinggui 成廷珪 [Yuan], 489
Changban Slope” [drama], 497–8 Cheng Yu 程昱, 78–9, 86, 137, 295, 410
Changming “Long-lasting Brilliance” Chengdu 成都 in Shu commandery,
Canal 長明渠 at Ye city, 335, 338–9, 291, 308–9, 313, 370, 427, 430, 437,
Map 18 Map 8, Map 20
Changsha 長沙 commandery in Jing Chenggao 成臯, 48, in Henan, Map 1,
province, 126, 159, 261, 268, 275, 289, Map 2
index 529
Chengyang 城陽 kingdom, 39, 129 Colonel Who Arranges the Army 典軍

Chenliu 陳留 commandery in Yan 校尉, 43, 357
province, 49, 52, 70, 77–9, 85, 161, Colonel Who Seeks for Gold 摸金校尉,
179, 340, 448, Map 1, Map 2, Map 4, 132
Map 21; Administrator, 304 colonisation, see agricultural colonies
chess, i.e. weiqi 圍棊 “surrounding and population
chess,” 348, 412, 447 Commandant of a commandery
Chi Lü 郗慮 [also transcribed as Xi Lü], 都尉/尉, 141, 243,
117, 245, 398 Commandant of a county 尉, 158, 224,
Chibi 赤壁; see Red Cliffs and sub 457
Puqi Commandant of the Northern Division
Chibi aobing 赤壁鏖兵 “Slaughter at the of Luoyang 洛陽北部尉, 9, 32, 39
Red Cliffs” [play], 485 Commandant in Charge of Agriculture
Chibi fu 赤壁賦 “Rhapsodies on the Red 宜禾都尉, 91
Cliffs” by Su Shi 蘇軾, 272, 482–3 Commandant of Cavalry 騎都尉, 9, 39,
Chibi huaigu 赤壁懷古 “Meditations on 43, 104, 357
the Red Cliffs” ci 詞 poem by Su Shi Commandant Liao 尉繚, 322–3; and see
蘇軾, 482 Wei Liaozi 尉繚子
Chief Clerk 長史, 125 Commissioner for Agriculture 典濃中
Chief Clerk in Command of Troops 郎將, 91
將兵長史, 187 Commissioner for Opening Tombs 發丘
Chief Controller 都督 (dudu), 139, 中郎將, 132
187–8; and see Area Commander Companions 親近 (qinjin), 172–3, 316;
Chong Ji 种輯, 119 and see Tiger Warriors
Chong’er 重耳 [ancient prince], 264; concubines of the court of Han
and see Duke Wen of Jin Beauty 美人 (meiren), 92
Chu 楚 [ancient state], 239, 367 Honoured Lady貴人 (guiren), 86,
Chu ci 楚辭, 344–5, 350 119–20, 397
chuanqi 傳奇 [dramas], 497 concubines of the court of Wei:
Chuge 屠各 tribe of the Xiongnu, 133 Brilliant Companion 昭儀 (zhaoyi),
Chuguo xianxian zhuan 楚國先賢傳 402, 405
“Accounts of Worthy Men of the Past Senior Concubine 夫人 ( furen), 403
of the Country of Chu” by Zhang Junior Concubine 姬 ( ji), 403
Fang 張方, 475 [unspecified rank] 妾 (qie), 403
Chunmei 春梅 “Plum Blossom” and see wives and concubines sub
[fictional characters], 499 Cao Cao and Cao Pi
Chunqiu 春秋 “Spring and Autumn conscription, 154–8, 279, 346; and see
Annals,” 24, 35, 130–1, 264, 324, 362; desertion and hereditary military
and see Zuo zhuan service
Guliang 穀粱 commentary to Consultant 議郎, 9, 35, 40, 86, 116, 417
Chunqiu, 35 Contemplating the Concealed, Method
Chunyu Qiong 淳于瓊, 84, 98, 136, 139, 緬匿法, 292; and see Luo Yao
144–5, 151, 188, 197 Copper Bird Terrace 銅雀/爵臺, see
Ci Dong Zhuo 刺董卓 “To Kill Dong Bronze Bird Terrace
Zhuo” [play], 485 Counsellor, Imperial 御史大夫 ( yushi
Classic of History 書經, see Shu jing dafu) of Han, 244–5, 394, 398
Classic of Poetry 詩經, see Shi jing Counsellor [Royal] 御史大夫 ( yushi
Coachman 僕 (pu) in a kingdom dafu) of Wei, 394–6
under Han, 395; and see Minister Counsellor Remonstrant 諫議大夫
Coachman ( jianyi dafu), 438
Colonel in Charge of Agriculture 典濃 Cui 崔, the Lady, wife of Cao Zhi, 415,
校尉, 90–1 418, 446
Colonel of Resolute Cavalry 驍騎校尉, 48 Cui Shi 崔寔, 10, 373–5, 379
530 index
Cui Yan 崔琰, 218, 245–7, 371–3, 394, Ding 丁 family of Pei, 28
414–6 Ding 丁, the Lady, mother of Cao Cao,
Cui Yuan 崔瑗, 379 21, 25, 71
currency and coinage, 13, 55, 255–7 Ding 丁, the Lady, wife of Cao Cao, 21,
Custodian of the Private Library 28, 34, 304, 401–3
祕書監, 114, 378 Ding Chong 丁沖, 28, 413
Ding Fei 定斐, 298
Da Huang Gai 打黃蓋 “Beating Huang Ding I 丁廙, younger brother of Ding
Gai” [drama], 498 Yi, 28, 343, 413–4
Dai 代 commandery in You province, Ding Yi 丁儀, 28, 343, 413–5
236, 317, 427, Map 3, Map 10, Map 21 Ding Yuan 丁原 (style Jianyang 建陽),
Dangtu 當塗 in Jiujiang, 102, 276, 76, 110, 205
Map 16 Dingjun Mountain 定軍山 in
Dangyang 當陽 in Nan commandery, Hanzhong, 7, 181, 432, 427, 452,
266, 340–1, 345, Map 13 Map 17, Map 20
Danyang 丹陽 commandery in Yang Director of Retainers 司隸校尉, 26, 87,
province, 19, 56, 99–100, 159, 303, 106, 126, 211, 258, 291; and see Sili
Map 16, Map 21; Administrator, 56, the capital province
303, 478 Discussions in the Shiqu Pavilion/Hall of
Dark Warrior [Xuanwu] Pond 玄武池 the Stone Conduit 石渠[閣]禮論, 19
and Park 苑 at Ye city, 216, 241, 273, Discussions in the White Tiger Hall
335, 336–8, 412, Map 18 白虎通 Bohu tong, 19, 23, 325, 379,
Daye Marsh 大野澤, Map 4, Map 9, 384, 388–9, 401
Map 10 Dong 東 commandery in Yan province,
demography, see population 9, 33, 38–9, 51, 61, 63, 77–8, 80, 99,
Deng Ai 鄧艾, 482 107, 127, 133, 137, 161, 204, Map 4,
Deng 鄧, Empress and Dowager of Map 10, Map 21; Administrator, 6, 40,
Emperor He, 13–4, 17–8 51, 58, 80, 130, 137, 159
Denglou fu 登樓賦 “Rhapsody on Dong 董, [titular] Empress-Dowager,
Climbing the Tower” by Wang Can mother of Emperor Ling, 44
王粲, 341, 345, 409 Dong 董, Honoured Lady of Emperor
Dengtai fu 豋臺賦 “Rhapsody on Xian, 119–20, 397
Climbing the Terrace” by Cao Cao, Dong Ba 董巴, 396
339, 408 Dong Cheng 董承, 86–7, 95, 98, 119–21,
Dengtai fu 豋臺賦 “Rhapsody on 397, 491
Climbing the Terrace” by Cao Zhi, Dong Si 董祀, 343; and see the Lady
408, 413 Cai Yan
Department of the East 東曹, 245 Dong Xi 董襲, 281, 285
Department of Justice 理曹, 376–7 Dong Zhao 董昭, 67–8, 86–7, 120, 231,
Department of the Laws 法曹, 376 383–5, 435
Department of the West 西曹, 245 Dong Zhong 董重, 44
deserters and desertion, 159, 166, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 [Former Han],
191, 228, 376; and see sub laws and 248
penalties Dong Zhuo 董卓, 2, 6, 9, 44–60, 67,
Di 氐 people of Wudu commandery, 76–7, 82–6, 93–5, 105, 110, 113–6,
313, 426–8, Map 17 119–20, 127, 130, 153, 157, 159,
Dian lue 典略 “An Authoritative 164–5, 169, 177, 191, 201, 205, 256,
Account of Events” by Yu Huan 259, 300, 334, 339–40, 347, 349, 358,
魚豢, 36, 465 363, 377, 383, 443, 456, 471, 494
Dian lun 典論 “Authoritative Dong’a 東阿 in Dong commandery,
Discussions” by Cao Pi 曹丕, 342 77–8, 91, 444, Map 4
Dian Wei 典韋, 106, 172–3, 499 Dongdu fu 東都賦 “Rhapsody on the
Diaochan, the Lady 貂蟬 “Sable Cicada” Eastern Metropolis” by Zhang Heng
[fictional character], 76 張衡, 344
index 531
Dongguan Hanji 東觀漢記, 115 Emperor An 安帝 of Later Han, 13–4,

Donghai 東海 kingdom/commandery 17–8, 44
in Xu province, 70–1, 74–6, 204, 304, Emperor Cheng 成帝of Later Han, 321
Map 4, Map 6, Map 21 Emperor Gao 高帝 of Former Han, 16,
Donglai 東來 commandery in Qing 29, 39, 189, 320, 322, 361, 364, 368,
province, 231, Map 6, Map 21; 383, 428–9, 487
Administrator, 221 Emperor Guangwu 光武帝 of Later
Dongping 東平 commandery in Yan Han, 11, 16, 66, 154, 164, 228, 234,
province, 203, 342, Map 4, Map 21 244, 252, 295, 314, 453, 464, 467,
Dongshan 東山 “Eastern Hills” poem of 480, 488
Shi jing, 353 Emperor He 和帝 of Later Han, 11,
Dongting Lake 洞庭湖, 266, 275, 14–5, 18, 380
Map 13 Emperor Huan 桓帝 of Later Han, 2,
Dongwuyang 東武陽 in Dong 14, 18–9, 35–6, 39, 44, 93, 112, 155,
commandery, 61–2, 80, 180, Map 4, 397
Map 10 Emperor Jing 景帝 of Former Han,
Dou 竇, Empress and Dowager of 29, 98
Emperor Zhang, 14 Emperor Ling 靈帝 of Later Han, 2, 9,
Dou 竇, Empress and Dowager of 15, 18, 26, 33, 35–6, 40–4, 57, 84, 88,
Emperor Huan, 14 92–4, 113, 130, 229, 259, 292, 339,
Dou Xian 竇憲, 11, 13, 155, 380 357, 374, 379, 420, 487, 493
Dou Wu 竇武, 15, 363 Emperor Min 愍帝 of Jin, 467
doujian 鬬艦 or zhanjian 戰艦 Emperor Ming 明帝 of Later Han, 383,
“Fighting Junks,” 280, 284; and see 396
mengchong Emperor Ming 明帝 of Wei, see Cao Rui
Doumao 竇茂 [Di], 313 Emperor Shenzong 宋神宗 of Song,
Du 杜, the Lady, concubine of Cao Cao, 322, 481
111, 400, 403, 405, 409, 412 Emperor Shun 順帝 of Later Han, 14–5,
Du Fu 杜甫 [Tang], 480 17, 19, 37
Du Ji 杜畿, 223–6, 231, 258, 285, 291, 299 Emperor Taizong of Tang 唐太宗 [Li
Du Kui 杜夔, 262, 339 Shimin], 320, 322, 479–81, 502
Du Mu 杜牧 [Tang], 387 Emperor Wen 文帝 of Former Han,
Du Xi 杜襲, 315 129, 132, 375, 440
Duan Jiong 段熲, 12, 155 Emperor Wen 文帝 of Wei, see Cao Pi
Duan Wei 段煨, 95 Emperor Wu 武帝 [Former Han], 170,
Duange xing 短歌行 “Brief Song” poem 248, 413, 424, 456, 488, 502
by Cao Cao, 354, 494 Emperor Wu 武帝 of Wei, see Cao Cao
Duhu 杜濩 [Banshun], 314–5 Emperor Wu 武帝 of Jin, see Sima Yan
Duke 公 gong [noble title], 383–4; and Emperor Xian 獻帝 of Later Han, 2–3,
see Excellency, also individual fiefs/ 6–7, 16, 28–9, 31, 46, 52, 55, 57,
states sub voce 63, 68, 72, 81–8, 92, 103, 105, 107,
Dunhuang 敦煋 commandery in Liang 111–20, 129, 134, 136, 157–63, 201,
province, 154, Map 21 218, 223, 241, 245, 258, 277, 333,
Dunqiu 頓丘 in Dong commandery, 9, 374–5, 378, 383, 386–7, 393, 397–9,
33, 62, 411, Map 4 400, 413, 428, 432, 450, 462, 472,
dynastic succession and legitimacy, 487–91; and see Liu Xie and Duke of
467–9, 483–4 Shanyang
Emperor Xuan 宣帝 of Jin, see Sima Yi
Earl 伯 [noble title], see bo Emperor, the Young 少帝 of Later Han,
“east of the mountains” 山東 troops, 48 45–6; and see Liu Bian
“Eight Formations” 八陳 (Bazhen), 190 Emperor Yuan 元帝 of Former Han, 399
Elite Cavalry 越騎 regiment, 153 Emperor Zhang 章帝 of Later Han, 14,
Emperor Ai 哀帝 of Former Han, 244, 379, 384
321 Emperor Zhao 昭帝 of Former Han, 252
532 index
Emperor Zhenzong of Song 宋眞宗 Fei River 肥水, 289

[Zhao Dechang], 480 Fei River 肥水 [battle 383], 274
Empress 皇后 Fei 費 in Taishan, 18, 71, 74, 326, 477,
Empress Cao 曹 of Emperor Xian, see Map 4, Map 6
the Lady Cao Jie Fen River 汾水, 211, 317, 454, Map 1,
Empress Fu 伏 of Emperor Xian, Map 15
94–5, 120, 381, 386–7, 396–8, 425 Fengqiu 封丘 in Chenliu, Map 5
Empress He 何 of Emperor Ling, 35, Filial and Incorrupt 孝廉 nomination, 9,
43, 92–3 29, 127, 247, 357, 369
Empress Song 宋 of Emperor Ling, 33 First Sovereign 先主 (Xianzhu) of
Empress-Dowager 皇太后 Shu-Han, see Liu Bei
Empress-Dowager Deng 鄧, 17 Five Dou of Rice sect 五斗米道 (Wudou
Empress-Dowager Dong 董, mother mi dao), see Rice Sect
of Emperor Ling, 44, 46 Five Powers 五行, see Wuxing
Empress-Dowager Dou 竇, 11, 14 Footsoldiers 步兵 regiment, 153
Empress-Dowager Liang 梁, 14, 17 fu 賦 [literary genre], see rhapsodies
Empress-Dowager Lü 呂 [Former Fu Sheng 伏生/勝 [Qin/Former Han], 384
Han], 321 Fu Shou 伏壽, the Lady, see Empress Fu
Empress-Dowager Wang 王 [Former of Emperor Xian
Han], 399 Fu Xuan 傅選, 265
Empress-Dowager Yan 閻, 14 Fu Wan 伏完, 120, 397, 398
Grand Empress-Dowager 太皇太后 Fuhan 枹罕 in Longxi, 306
[Wei], 402 Fuhu 朴胡 [Banshun], 314–5
Empress-Dowager as regent, 11, 14, 17, funerary customs, see tombs
93, 244 Furong chi zuo 芙蓉池作 “Written at
Empty City Stratagem 空城計, 289, 494 the Lotus Pond” poem by Cao Pi, 413
Enclosure on the Left 左校 Zuoxiao Fushi Ren 傅士仁, see Shi Ren
[bandit leader], 133 Fuzi 符子 [Former Han book], 118, 366,
“Establishing Peace” reign period, see 399, 406, 412
Jian’an 建安, 84, 468 Fuzi 傅子 by Fu Xuan 傅玄 [third
eunuchs, 2, 6, 9, 11, 14, 18–9, 22, 37, 40, century], 105, 249, 447, 499
41–6, 92–3, 113, 115–6, 130, 259, 484
Examiners (校事 jiaoshi), 372–3, 377 Gan 甘, the Lady, concubine of Liu Bei,
Excellency/ies 公 of Han, 27–8, 31, 54, 199–200, 268
60, 70, 76, 112, 113, 115, 119, 132, Gan Bao 干寳 [fourth century], 278, 471
244, 340, 376, 384, 396, 397, 414, 477; Gan Ji 干吉 [also as Yu Ji 于吉], 278,
and see Grand Commandant 294, 357
Excellency over the Masses 司徒, 112, Gan Ning 甘寧, 178, 369
244, 245 Gan Shi 甘世, 351
Excellency of Works 司空, 52, 89, 112, Ganling 甘陵 kingdom/commandery,
115, 129, 188, 204, 244, 245, 383 51, 61, 219, 390, 400, Map 3, Map 10,
Excellency/ies of Wei, 115, 188, 377 Map 21
Gao Gan 高幹, 114, 123, 149, 203, 211,
Fa Zheng 法正, 307, 308, 426 217–8, 222–5, 352, 353
Fan 范 in Dong commandery, Map 4 Gao Lan 高覽, 98, 145–6, 151
Fan 樊 in Nanyang, 78, 423, 430–2, Gao Rou 高柔, 372, 376–7
Map 13, Map 14 Gao Shun 高順, 111, 173
Fan Xian 范先, 223–4 Gaocheng 高城 in Bohai, Princess, 400,
Fangling 房陵 in Hanzhong [county/ 403, 405
commandery], 295, 429–30, 435, Gaoling 高陵 tomb of Cao Cao, see sub
Map 13, Map 17; Administrator, 437 Cao Cao
Fankou 樊口 in Jiangxia, 268, Map 14 Gaopingling 高平陵 tomb, see sub Cao Rui
Fanyang 范陽 in Zhuo, Marquis, 409 Garrison Cavalry 屯騎 regiment, 153
index 533
Gate of Established Title 建號門 at Gongsun Zan 公孫瓚, 51, 60–4, 67–8,
Shouchun, 358 74–5, 80–1, 87, 89–90, 98–9, 106,
Ge Hong 葛洪 [fourth century], 36, 351, 109, 121–4, 126, 131–3, 140, 149–51,
471 161–2, 171, 174–5, 178, 181, 193, 196,
General-in-Chief 大將軍, 43–4, 88–9, 208, 229, 231
112, 119, 244, 259, 339, 383, 461 government monopolies, 13, 126, 253,
General of Chariots and Cavalry 255; and see currency and taxation
車騎將軍, 54, 89, 119, 209 Governor 牧, 63, 64, 446; and see under
General of the Guards 衞將軍, 86, 119 provinces
General of the Household 中郎將, 91–2, Grand Ancestor 太祖 Taizu [post-
125, 158, 223, 294, 382, 409, 413, 419 humous temple name (廟號
General of the Household for Agricul- miao-hao) of Cao Cao], 440, 445, 448
ture 典濃中郎將, see Commissioner Grand Commandant 太尉 of Han, 26,
for Agriculture 42, 88, 89, 112, 244, 255
General of the Household for All Grand Commandant 太尉 of Wei, 127
Purposes 五官中郎將, 409, 413 Grand Judge 大理 of Wei [cf. Minister
General of the Household for of Justice of Han], 376, 394–5
Opening Tombs 發丘中郎將, see Grand Marshal 太司馬, 244
Commissioner for Opening Tombs Grand Master 太師, 110
General of the Household of the South Great Peace, Way 太平道, see sub
南中郎將, 419 Zhang Jue and Taiping
General on the Left 左將軍, 104 Gu River 泒水, 231, Map 12
General on the Liao 度遼將軍 Guan Cheng 管承, 231
[Trans-Liao command], 12, 137, 140, Guan Tong 管統, 199, 221
154 Guan Yu 關羽, 7, 99, 125–6, 139–40,
General of the Rear 後將軍, 54 171, 197, 266–8, 271, 274, 280, 304,
General on the Right 右將軍, 119 307–11, 314, 319, 419, 423–38, 441,
General Supreme 無上將軍, 43 451–2, 457, 477, 481, 484, 486, 488,
General Who Displays Firmness 491, 494–8
奮武將軍, 51, 54 Guan Zhong 管仲 or Guanzi 管子
General Who Establishes Virtue 建徳 [ancient statesman], 367–8, 387
將軍, 85 Guandu 官度 in Henan, 3, 6, 97–160,
General Who Maintains the East in 169–71, 176, 179–85, 191, 192–4,
Peace 鎮東將軍, 85 197, 198, 203, 206, 208, 254, 258, 262,
General Who Subdues the West 272–5, 291, 300, 304, 327, 329, 370,
征西將軍, 357–8 462–3, 468, 494, Map 8, Map 9
Geng Ji 耿紀, 424 Guang ya 廣雅 “Enlargement of Er ya
Gentlemen [cadets] 郎, 29, 410 爾雅” by Zhang Yi 張揖, 282
公 gong [noble title], see Duke; and see Guanghan 廣漢 commandery in Yi
also Excellency province, 308, Map 17, Map 21
Gong yan 公宴 “The Lord’s Feast” poem Guangling 廣陵 commandery in Xu
by Cao Zhi, 413 province, 100, 109, 339, Map 6, Map 16,
Gong yan 公宴 “The Lord’s Feast” poem Map 21; Administrator, 104, 111
by Liu Zhen, 413 Guannei hou 關內侯 “secondary
Gong Du 龔/共都, 204 marquisate” [noble title/rank], 342
Gongqi Chou 公綦稠, 229 Guangyang 廣陽 commandery in You
Gongsun Du 公孫度, 121, 227, 261 province, 27, 121, 221, 228, Map 3,
Gongsun Kang 公孫康, 203, 227, 235, 359 Map 21
Gongsun Shu 公孫述 [first century], Guiyang 桂陽 commandery in Jing
282, 295, 453 province, 268, 275, 289, 310, Map 13,
Gongsun Yang 公孫鞅 [book], 323; and Map 21
see Shang Yang Guo 郭, the Lady, Empress of Cao Pi,
Gongsun Yue 公孫越, 60 459–60
534 index
Guo 郭, the Lady, Empress of Cao Rui, Champions at the End of Han” by
460 Wang Can 王粲, 174
Guo Jia 郭嘉, 102, 106, 109, 114–5, 120, Hanning 漢寜 commandery under
188, 201, 212–3, 220, 230, 234, 364–7, Zhang Lu; Administrator, 294
370 Hanshi waizhuan 韓氏外傳 by Han
Guo Moruo 郭沫若 [twentieth century], Ying 韓嬰, 355, 384, 389
500–3 Hanshou village, Marquis, 139; and see
Guo Si 郭汜, 51, 60, 67–8, 76, 82–6, Guan Yu
94–5, 105, 112, 115, 119, 211, 258 Hanyang 漢陽 commandery in Liang
Guo Tu 郭圖, 84–5, 136, 139, 145–6, province, 304–5, Map 15, Map 17,
188, 208, 220 Map 21
Guo Yuan 國淵, officer of Cao Cao, Hanzhong 漢中 commandery in Yi
194, 410 province, 6–7, 29, 36, 126, 160, 181,
Guo Yuan 郭援, officer of Yuan Shang, 243, 287–95, 305, 307, 310–5, 332,
211 393–5, 411, 421–32, 435–7, 452,
Gushi 故市 city in Henan, 142–4, 185, Map 1, Map 13, Map 17, Map 21;
Map 9 Administrator, 292
Gushi shijiu shou 古詩十九首, see King [Liu Bei], 7, 29, 423, 428
Nineteen Old Songs Hao Jing 郝經 [Yuan], 484, 490–1
Hao Mengjie 郝孟節, 351
haihu 海鵃 ships: “Sea Hawks,” 280–1 Haoli xing 高/蒿里行 “Song of the
Haiyang 海陽 in Liaoxi, Map 12; Tomb” poem by Cao Cao, 349
Lamented Marquis 哀侯, 27 He 何, the Lady, wife of Sun He 孫和,
Hall of Civil Splendour/Literary 44, 166
Splendour 文昌殿 (Wenchang dian) He Jin 何進, 43–8, 93, 119, 130, 259,
at Ye city, 334 339, 363, 400, 461
Han 漢 dynasty, 129, 158–9, 382, 384, He Kui 何夔, 117, 247–9, 254
409, 428, 459 He Xia 和洽, 372, 394
Han River 漢水 [also known as Mian He Yan 何晏, 25, 400, 460–1, 474
River and Xia River], 242, 261–71, He Yong 何顒, 31, 366
281, 289, 293, 311, 426, 429–30, 433, Headquarters Officer 治中從事
437, 452, Map 13, Map 17 (zhizhong congshi) in a province, 63
Han Fu 韓馥, 58, 113, 151, 334, 366 Hechi 河池 in Wudu, 313, Map 17
Han Hao 韓浩, 78, 91 Hedong 河東 commandery in Sili, 46,
Han Meng 韓猛, 144; and see Han Xun 52, 82, 95, 99, 150, 160–1, 211–2,
Han Rong 韓融, 56 222–6, 291, 296, 300, 317, 390–1,
Han Sui 韓遂, 107, 191, 198, 258, 298–9, Map 1, Map 7, Map 15, Map 21;
304, 311, 315, 391, 478 Administrator, 211, 223, 258, 299
Han Xian 韓暹, 86–8, 95, 103, 161, 163 Hefei 合肥 in Jiujiang, 166, 171, 191–2,
Han Xin 韓信 [Former Han], 320, 487 196, 241, 276–7, 287–9, 301–3, 316–8,
Han Xun 韓荀, 142–4, 147, 151, 385; 328, 376, 434, 452, Map 16, Map 20
and see Han Meng Marquis, 40–1
Han Ying 韓嬰 [Former Han], 384 Heir 太子 of Han, 14, 17, 44, 93
Handan 邯鄲 in Zhao, Map 10, Map 11 Heir of Shu-Han, 430
Hanguan yi 漢官儀 “Ceremonial of Han Heir of Wei, 24, 381, 411, 416–8,
Offices” by Ying Shao 應劭, 279 438–9, 458
Han-Jin chunqiu 漢晉春秋 “Chronicle Heir of Wu, 166
of Han and Jin” by Xi Zuochi 習鑿齒, Hejian 河間 kingdom/commandery in
210, 467, 479 Ji province, 41, 81, 121, 178, 194, 219,
Hanji 漢紀 by Xun Yue 荀悅, 114, 374 410, 455, Map 3, Map 10, Map 21
Hankou 漢口 [present-day city], 263; Henan 河南 commandery in Sili, 38,
and see Xiakou 42, 48, 51, 55, 58, 86, 124–6, 141,
Hanmo yingxiong ji 漢末英雄記 144, 259, 443, Map 1, Map 2, Map 7,
“Records of the Heroes and Map 13, Map 21
index 535
Henei 河內 commandery in Sili, 42, 52, Huang She 黃射, 118

67, 77, 84–6, 98, 127, 197, 222, 246, Huang Zhong 黃忠, 428
390–1, 412, 415, 456, Map 1, Map 2, Huang Zu 黃祖, 118, 125–6, 150, 241,
Map 4, Map 7, Map 10, Map 21; 261–4, 269, 281–3
Administrator, 84, 127 Huangchu 黃初 “Yellow Beginning”
hereditary military service, 165–8, reign period, 451, 467–8
219, 376; and see conscription and Huangfu Gui 皇甫規, 12
desertion Huangfu Mi 皇甫謐, 31, 305
High King 王 (wang) [supreme ruler in Huangfu Song 皇甫嵩, 36, 39
early China], 383 Huanghe lou 黃鶴樓 “Yellow Crane
hills people 山民 of south China, 163 Tower” [drama], 498
Hongnong 弘農 commandery in Sili, Huangshi gong sanlue 黃石公三略
22, 28, 82, 95, 105, 223, 226, 291, “Three Strategies of the Lord of the
296, 343, 432, Map 1, Map 2, Map 7, Yellow Stone,” 322
Map 15, Map 21 Huangwu 黃武 “Yellow Warfare” reign
hostages, 82, 94, 107, 126, 133, 198–200, period, 451, 468
226, 258, 276, 298, 304–5, 309, 318, 451 Huanyuan Pass 轘轅關, 88, Map 2,
hou 侯 [noble rank/title], see Marquis Map 7
Hou Cheng 侯成, 109, 110, 175 Huarong 華容 in Nan commandery,
Hou chushi biao 後出師表, see Second 272–4, 495–8, Map 13
Memorial at the Beginning of a Huarong dao 華容道 “Incident on the
Campaign Huarong Road” [drama], 274, 498
Hou Han ji 後漢紀 by Yuan Hong Huayang guo zhi 華陽國志 “Record of
袁宏, 387, 439 the Countries to the South of Mount
Hou Lan 侯覽, 15 Hua” by Chang Qu 常璩, 120
Household Counsellor 光祿大夫 Huayin 華陰 in Hongnong, 6, 95, 191,
(guanglu dafu), 386 287, 297, 298–300, 304, 307, 327–9,
Hu Pass 壼關, 222, 224, Map 10; see 371, 382, 478, Map 7, Map 15
also Huguan Huchuquan 呼廚泉 [Xiongnu], 211–2,
Hu Che’er 胡車兒 or Hu Chi’er 胡赤兒, 224–5, 317
105, 499 Huguan 壼關 in Shangdang, 224, 330,
Hua 華 in Taishan, 70, 71, 74, Map 4, Map 1; see also Hu Pass
Map 6 Huhai 胡亥, Second Emperor of Qin, 360
Hua Xin 華歆, 188 387, 396, 398 Humu Ban 胡母班, 56
Huai River 淮水, 41, 100, 102, 288, Huo Nu 霍奴, 222
Map 5, Map 6, Map 16 Huoshao zhanchuan 火燒戰船 “Burning
Huan River 洹水, 180, 336, Map 11, the Armada” [drama], 498
Map 20 Hutuo River 呼沱河, 231, Map 12
Northern Branch, 214–6, 242, 335,
Map 11, Map 20 Ice Well Terrace 冰井臺 at Ye city, 338,
Southern Branch, 214, Map 11 Map 18
Huan 皖 in Lujiang, 177–8, 278, 287, Imperial Chancellor 丞相 (chengxiang),
303, 310, 318, Map 16 see Chancellor, Imperial
Huan 環, the Lady, concubine of Cao Imperial Counsellor 御史大夫 ( yushi
Cao, 21, 403, 405–6, 409, 411 dafu), see Counsellor, Imperial
Huan Shao 桓邵, 448–9 inheritance, 43, 85, 208, 263–4, 411, 415
Huang River 湟水, see Xining River Inspector 刺史, 10, 41, 63–4, 243; and
西寧河 see under provinces/regions
Huang lan 皇覽 “Imperial Readings” Internuncio 謁者 yezhe, 131
project of Cao Pi 曹丕, 378
Huang-Lao 黄老, 35–7 Ji River 濟河, 124, 144, Map 1, Map 2,
Huang niao 黃鳥 “Yellow Birds” poem Map 4, Map 9, Map 10
of Shi jing, 24, 346, 445 Ji province 冀州, 40, 51, 58, 64, 68,
Huang Quan 黃權, 315 113, 121–3, 131, 134, 147–51, 161,
536 index
186, 212, 217, 219–22, 251, 254, 339, Jiao province 交州, 269, 275–6, 390,
366, 370, 387, Map 1, Map 3, Map 4, 448, Map 13, Map 21; and see Jiaozhi
Map 8, Map 9, Map 10, Map 21; region; Governor, 275–6; Inspector,
Governor, 58, 64, 218, 334; Inspector, 275–6
40, 68 Jiao Chu 焦觸, 221–2
Ji province enlarged, 390–1, Map 19; Jiao er shi 驕兒詩 “Boasting of my Son”
Governor, 391 poem by Li Shangyin 李商隱, 482
Ji 薊 in Guangyang, 121, Map 3, Map 12 Jiaozhi 交趾 region, 276, 310, Map 21;
Respectful Duke 恭公, 27 and see Jiao province; Inspector, 28
Ji 冀 in Hanyang, 305, Map 17 Jiaozhi 交趾 commandery in Jiaozhi/
Ji Ben 吉本, 424 Jiao province, 275–6, Map 21;
Ji Ling 紀靈, 101, 103 Administrator, 276, 448
Ji Mao 吉茂, 249, 320, 351 jiazi 甲子 day, 37, 399
Ji Miao 吉邈, 424–5 Jibei 濟北 kingdom in Yan province,
Ji Mu 吉穆, 424 66, 133, 160, Map 4, Map 21;
Jia Kui 賈逵, 438–9 Chancellor, 63
Jia Xin 賈信, 209, 410 Jie Bridge 界橋 in Ganling, 61, 174–5,
Jia Xu 賈詡, 108, 127, 189, 201, 325, Map 3, Map 10
366–7, 416, 478, 499 Jie dongfeng 借東風 “Obtaining an East
Jiachu beiguomen xing 駕出北郭門行 Wind” [drama], 498
“I Drove Out my Carriage through Jie Zhitui 介之推 [ancient worthy], 362
the North Gate of the Wall” poem by Jieshi 碣石 “Towering Rock” cliff,
Ruan Yu 阮瑀, 346 237–8, Map 12
Jiameng 葭萌 in Guanghan, 308, Jieshi 碣石 poem by Cao Cao, 236,
Map 17 345, 349, 474, 501–2; and see Buchu
Jian Shi 蹇碩, 33, 43–4 Xiamen xing
Jian’an 建安 “Establishing Peace” reign Jieyao 接要 “A Summary of the
period, 77, 84, 333, 342, 418, 420, 438, Essentials” by Cao Cao, 32, 319, 365
467–8 Jigu ma Cao 擊鼓駡曹 “Beating a Drum
Seven Masters of Jian’an 七子, 342, and Cursing Cao Cao” [drama], 497
420 Jin 晉 [ancient state], 264, 359
Jiang Gan 蔣幹, 498 Duke Wen 文公 [personal name
Jiang Gan tao shu 蔣幹盗書 “Jiang Gan Chong’er 重耳], 264, 359, 362
Steals a Letter” [drama], 498–9 Jin 晉 dynasty [post-Han], 67, 166, 443,
Jiang Ji 蔣濟, 192, 303, 316, 432, 434, 461, 466–7
478 Jin Midi 金日磾 [Former Han], 424
Jiang Ou 江耦 [modern scholar], 35 Jin Shang 金尚, 67
Jiang Qin 蔣欽, 318 Jin yangqiu 晉陽秋 “Chronicle of Jin”
Jiang Xu 姜敘, 305 by Sun Sheng 孫盛, 30
Jiangbiao zhuan 江表傳 “Account of the Jin Yi 金褘, 424
Lands Beyond the Yangzi” by Yu Pu Jin Yun 靳允, 78
虞溥, 158, 286 Ji’nan 濟南 kingdom in Qing province,
Jiangling 江陵 in Nan commandery, 39–40, 160, 357, Map 6, Map 21;
241, 263, 266, 268, 271–9, 286–90, Chancellor, 6, 9, 39, 43, 61
295, 306–7, 331, 430, 435, Map 13, Jing province 荆州, 6, 32, 86, 114, 118,
Map 20 133–4, 141, 150, 153, 160, 163, 172,
Jiangxia 江夏 commandery in Jing 183, 186, 189, 193, 199–200, 203–4,
province, 262–4, 268, 271–5, 289–90, 213, 223, 224, 226, 230, 241–3,
Map 13, Map 14, Map 16, Map 21; 258–64, 268–71, 275–80, 287–90,
Administrator, 289, 437 295, 306–11, 314, 318, 331, 336,
Jianzhang 建章 “Establish Splendour” 341–2, 362, 371–2, 378, 419, 423, 425,
Terrace at Ye, 413 429–30, 433, 437–8, 451–2, 455, 457,
Jianye 建業 in Danyang, 434, Map 16, 477, 484–5, 494–5, 497, 498, Map 1,
Map 20 Map 7, Map 8, Map 13, Map 14,
index 537
Map 16, Map 19, Map 20, Map 21; kings under Wei, 405–6, 451, 458
Governor, 60, 70, 105, 126, 261, 340; King Father of the East 東王父君
Inspector, 259, 275, 290 (Dongwang fu) or Lord of the East
Jingshi jinian 經世紀年 “Annals of 東君 (Dong jun), 350
Statecraft” by Zhang Shi 張栻, 490 Kong Rong 孔融, 89, 114–8, 199, 241,
Jingzhao 京北 commandery in Sili, 223, 245, 342, 349, 361, 370–1, 420, 475,
224, 258, 299, 424, Map 1, Map 7, 491
Map 15, Map 17, Map 21 Kong Zhou 孔伷, 52–4
Jingzhao, Intendant 尹, 299 Koguryǒ [Gaogouli] 高句驪 people,
Jinteng 金縢 “The Metal-bound Coffer” 227, 456
chapter of Shu jing, 361 Kou 寇 family of Changsha, 429
Jinxiang 金鄉 in Shanyang, Princess, Ku 苦 in Chen, fief of Cao Cao, 362
400, 403 Kuai Yue 蒯越, 261, 265
Jiujiang 九江 commandery in Yang Kuaiji 會稽 commandery in Yang
province, 70, 77, 98, 100, 102, 104, province, 50, 56, 103, 157, 158, 448,
120, 124, 237, 276, 358, Map 6, Map 16, Map 21; Administrator, 103,
Map 16, Map 21; Administrator, 130 279
jiupin zhongzheng 九品中正 system, Kuaiji dianlu 會稽典錄 “Authoritative
247–9, 369; and see Nine Ranks and Record of Kuaiji” by Yu Yu 虞預,
Rectifier 50, 56
Jiuzhou chunqiu 九州春秋 “Chronicle Kuhan xing 苦寒行 “Song of Bitter
of the Nine Provinces” ascribed to Cold” poem by Cao Cao, 352
Sima Biao 司馬彪, 172 kunji 昆雞 bird, 238
Jiyin 濟陰 commandery in Yan Kunlun Mountain 崑崙山, 350
province, 52, 68, 77, 79, 163, Map 4,
Map 21 labour service (corvée), 62, 90, 180, 254
Ju Shou 沮授, 84–5, 136, 139, 142, 147, Langling in Liaoxi, Lamented Marquis
188, 197, 208 朗陵哀侯, 27
Juancheng 甄城 in Jiyin, 77–9, 107, 137, Langye 琅邪 commandery in Xu
Map 4, Map 5, Map 9, Map 10 province, 34, 70, 76, 128, 263, Map 4,
Juchao 居巢 in Lujiang, 318, Map 16 Map 6, Map 21 Administrator, 111
Julu 鉅鹿 commandery in Ji province, Laozi 老子, 35, 292; and see Huang-Lao
86, 336, 390, Map 3, Map 10, Map 21 laws and penalties,
Juyan 居延 in Zhangye, 90, 154, 252, 255 amnesties, 84, 86, 373–4
execution, passim
Kaiyang 開陽 in Langye, 34, Map 6 involvement of family members,
Kebineng 軻比能 [Xianbi], 423 375–6
King 王 [noble title] under Han, 16, laws against desertion, 166, 376
160, 294, 359, 382, 384, 390, 394–5, mutilating punishments, 17, 117,
444, 476; and see under names of 373–6; and see castration
kingdoms sumptuary laws, 221, 373, 418, 440
King of Hanzhong 漢中, 7, 29, 359, Le’an 樂安 commandery in Qing
423, 428; and see Liu Bei province, 221, Map 6, Map 10, Map 21
King of Wei 魏, 6, 30, 317, 319, 364, Lei Tong 雷銅, 426
381–2, 395–6, 414, 417, 423, 425, Lei Xu 雷緒, 304
439, 444, 457, 476; and see Cao Li 李, the Lady, concubine of Cao Cao,
Cao and Cao Pi 403, 405
King of Wu 吳, 451; and see Sun Quan Li Dian 李典, 166–7, 231, 289, 316
king, pre-Han, see under names of states Li Fu 李孚, 188, 220
king, non-Chinese, 229, 313, 317; and see Li Jin 李進, 79
Shanyu and Worthy King of the West Li Jue 李傕, 51, 60, 67–8, 76, 82–6,
King of the Sources of the River 94–5, 105, 112, 114–5, 119, 127, 177,
Who Will Pacify Han 河首平漢王 211, 258, 261
(Heshou ping-Han wang), 306 Li Quan 李筌 [Tang], 280–1, 331
538 index
Li sao 離騷 ascribed to Qu Yuan, 344, Literary Scholarship, Senior Clerk 文學

350 掾 (wenxue yuan), 246
Li Shangyin 李商隱 [Tang], 482 Liu 劉 surname, 19, 23, 99, 208
Li Shimin 李世民, see Emperor Taizong Liu 劉, the Lady, Senior Concubine of
of Tang Cao Cao, 9, 21, 34, 400–4
Li Tong 李通, 141, 243, 254 Liu 劉, the Lady, Junior Concubine of
Liang province 涼州 of Han, 9, 12, Cao Cao 403–4
42–3, 46, 58, 155, 159, 228, 287, Liu 劉, the Lady, second wife of Yuan
298–9, 305–6, 310, 313–4, 318, 333, Shao, 218
366, 391, 454, Map 1, Map 7, Map 8, Liu Ba 劉巴, 268, 275
Map 20, Map 21; Governor, 258, 366; Liu Bao 劉保, see Emperor Shun of
Inspector, 258, 305 Later Han
Liang 梁 province [ancient territory], Liu Bei 劉備 (style Xuande 玄德), First
391 Sovereign 先主 of Shu-Han, passim;
Liang 梁 kingdom in Yu province, character and reputation, 98–100,
Map 4, Map 21 110, 200, 230, 264–5, 483–6, 490–6
Liang/Wei 梁/魏 [ancient state], see at the Red Cliffs, 6, 271–7
Wei/Liang takes Yi province, 6, 29, 287, 307–10,
Liang 梁, Empress and Dowager of 370
Emperor Shun, 14, 17 takes title as King of Hanzhong, 7, 29,
Liang Gu 梁鵠, 32, 197, 379, 448 423, 428–30
Liang Ji 梁冀, 17–8, 363, 380, 383 wives and concubines, 199–200, 268,
Liang Xi 梁習, 167, 219, 225–6 290, 309
Liangdu fu 兩都賦 “Rhapsody on the Liu Bian 劉辯, the Young Emperor,
Two Capitals” by Ban Gu 班固, 344 43–6, 93
Lianyun “Linked Cloud” Road 運雲道, Liu Biao 劉表 (style Jingsheng 景升),
313, Map 17 32, 51, 60, 70, 81, 84, 86, 97, 105–8,
Liaodong 遼東 commandery in You 118, 126, 133–5, 141, 150, 172, 175,
province, 137, 140, 154, 229, 233–4, 183, 186, 203–4, 210–4, 224, 226, 230,
280, 284, Map 21 241–3, 258–69, 275–7, 279, 289–90,
Liaodong Dependent State 遼東屬國 in 303, 330, 339–42, 359, 378, 416, 430,
You province, 233, Map 21 471, 474
Liaoxi 遼西 commandery in You Liu Cong 劉聰 [fourth century], 342,
province, 27, 140, 203, 221, 228–9, 466, 488
233–4, 235, Map 3, Map 21 Liu Chong 劉寵, King of Chen, 85
Libationer to the Army of the Excellency Liu Dai 劉岱, Inspector of Yan
of Works 司空軍祭酒, 115, 188, 383 province, 54, 58, 63–4, 67, 125
Libationers 祭酒 under Zhang Lu, 294 Liu Dai 劉岱, officer of Cao Cao, 125
libraries and book collections, 114, Liu Fang 劉放, 222
320–4, 343, 351, 377–9, 420, and see Liu Feng 劉封, 429, 435–7
Huang lan and Yiwen zhi Liu Fu 劉輔, King of Pei, 16
Licao “Profitable Transport” Canal Liu Fu 劉馥, Inspector of Yang province,
利漕渠, 366, Map 11 243, 258, 276, 289, 353, 356, 494
Lin Biao 林彪 [modern soldier/ Liu Hong 劉弘, see Emperor Ling of
politician], 502 Later Han
Linfen 臨汾 in Hedong, Princess, 400 Liu Hong 劉弘, 99
Ling Tong 淩統, 281 Liu Ji 劉基 [Ming], 489
Lingling 零陵 commandery in Jing Liu Kui 劉悝, King of Bohai, 93
province, 181, 268, 275, 289, 310, Liu Qi 劉琦, 263–71, 275, 290
Map 13, Map 21; Administrator, 181 Liu Shan 劉禪, son of Liu Bei and
Lingling xianxian zhuan 零陵先賢傳 Second Sovereign 後主 of Shu-Han,
ascribed to Sima Biao 司馬彪, 261, 200, 263, 268, 290, 309, 429–30, 455,
268, 272, 370, 407 466, 468, 488–9
Linzheng 臨蒸 in Changsha, 275, Map 13 Liu Sheng 劉勝, 98–9
index 539
Liu Song 劉頌, 23–4, 405 Lord Shi 史侯, 93; and see Liu Bian
Liu tao 太公六韜 “The Six Quivers,” 322 Lord Teacher 師君 (shijun), 293; and
Liu Xi 劉熙 [second century], 281 see Zhang Lu
Liu Xian 劉先, 261 Lord of Xu province 徐伯, 70; and see
Liu Xiang 劉向 [Former Han], 321–3 Yuan Shu
Liu Xie 劉協, 29, 43–8, 57, 93–6, 487–8; Lou Gui 婁圭, 265, 298, 371
and see Emperor Xian of Later Han Louban 樓班 [Wuhuan], 229, 235
Liu Xin 劉歆 [Former Han], 321 louchuan 樓船官 “Towered Ships,”
Liu Xiong 劉雄, 99 279–80, and see Towered Warships,
Liu Xiu 劉秀, see Emperor Guangwu of Office
Later Han “loyal rebels” 義兵, 3, 6, 9, 48, 51–2, 57
Liu Xun 劉勳, 125 Lu 魯 kingdom in Yu province, Map 4,
Liu Yan 劉延, Administrator of Dong Map 6, Map 21; Chancellor, 78
commandery, 137 Lu Bi 盧弼 [modern scholar], 24, 50, 86,
Liu Yan 劉焉, Governor of Yi province, 209, 361
293 Lu Su 魯肅 (style Zijing 子敬), 183, 200,
Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 [fifth century], 469, 269–70, 278, 290, 307, 310–1, 433–4
473–4 Lu Xun 陸遜, 181, 424, 437, 451, 474,
Liu You 劉友, 24 493, 497
Liu Yu 劉虞, 57, 68, 121–3, 162, 181, Lu Hong 盧洪, 372–3, 377
229, 469–70 Luan River灤河 [ancient Ru River
Liu of Yu province 劉豫州, 100; and see 濡水], 231, 234, Map 12
Liu Bei Lujiang 廬江 commandery in Yang
Liu Yuan 劉淵 (style Yuanhai 元海) province, 50, 100, 104, 125, 177,
[fourth century ruler], 466, 489 262, 279, 287, 289, 303–4, 310,
Liu Zhang 劉章, King of Chengyang 318, 483, Map 13, Map 16, Map 21;
under Former Han, 39 129 Administrator, 125
Liu Zhang 劉璋, Governor of Yi lujue 鹿角 “deer-horns”/abatis, 181, 428
province, 126, 129, 192–3, 230, 261, Lulong 盧龍 Pass, 234, Map 12
287, 293, 305–9, 333, 426, 429, 433, Lun wen 論文 “An Essay on Literature”
490, 496 by Cao Pi 曹丕, 342
Liu Zhen 劉貞, 99, 342, 347, 413 Luo gao 洛誥 “Proclamation at Luo”
Liu Zhi 劉志, Emperor Huan of Later chapter of Shu jing, 363
Han, 2, 14, 18–9, 35–6, 39, 44, 93, Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中 [Ming], 492–3
112, 155, 397 Luo Jun 駱俊, 85
Liu Zong 劉琮, 241, 263–6, 269–72, 342 Luo Yao 駱矅, 292
Liu Zuan 劉纘, Emperor Zhi of Later Luoyang 洛陽 city/county; imperial
Han, 18 capital of Later Han, passim, Map 1,
Liucheng 柳城 in Liaoxi, 234–5, Map 12 Map 2, Map 5, Map 7, Map 8, Map 9,
Liwei han wen jia 禮緯含文嘉 Map 20; Prefect, 32, 457; and see
[apocryphal book], 384, 389 Commandant of the Northern Division
Liyang 黎陽 in Wei commandery, Luyang 魯陽, Map 2, Map 5
98, 137, 143, 147, 185, 209–10, 214, Lü 呂 clan of the Empress-Dowager of
Map 2, Map 4, Map 9, Map 11 Emperor Gao of Former Han, 39, 129
Long Mountain 隴山, 305, Map 1, Lü Boshe 呂伯奢, 48–9, 491, 494, 496–7,
Map 15, Map 17 501
Longxi 隴西 commandery in Liang Lü Bu 呂布, 6, 23, 52, 58, 76–82, 91–2,
province, 46, 304, 306, Map 17, 97–111, 113, 127–8, 131, 134, 149,
Map 21 163–6, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 180,
Lord of the East 東君, see King Father 186, 189, 192, 194, 196, 199, 204–5,
of the East 296, 300, 326–7, 330, 340, 375, 385,
Lord Dong 董侯 [Liu Xie], 93; and see 450, 462, 488, 496
Emperor Xian of Later Han Lü Fan 呂範 (style Ziheng 子衡), 187–8
540 index
Lü Meng 呂蒙, 7, 168, 173, 177–8, 278, Meng Mingshi 孟明視 [ancient general],
280, 285–6, 310, 318, 423, 430, 433–7, 130
484, 494–5 Meng Tian 蒙恬 [ancient general], 360
Lü Shang 呂尚 [ancient statesman], 322, mengchong 蒙衝 ships: “Armoured
368; and see Taigong [wang] 太公望 Breakers,” 280–4 ; and see doujian
Lü Xiang 呂向 [Tang], 341 Mi Fang 麋芳, 430, 435–7
Mian River 沔水, see Han River
Ma Chao 馬超, 298–9, 304–6, 309, 311, Miankou 沔口, see Xiakou
315, 371, 426 military agricultural colonies 屯田
Ma Lü Bu 罵呂布 “Cursing Ma Lü Bu” (tuntian), see agricultural colonies
[play], 485 Milky Way 河漢 “River of Han,” 238,
Ma Teng 馬騰, 107, 198, 211, 224, 258, 350
291, 304 Minister of Ceremonies 太常 (taichang)
Ma Yuan 馬援, 164, 324 of Han, 395; and see Upholder of
major 司馬, 158, 168, 317 Ceremonies of Wei
Man Chong 滿寵, 115, 128, 150, 163, Minister of the [Ducal/Royal] Clan 宗正
289, 431–2 (zongzheng) of Wei, 395
marriage, 22–4, 166, 218, 399–401, Minister Coachman 太僕 (taipu) of
413, 447, 482–3; and see wives and Wei, 395; and see Coachman
concubines Minister of Finance 大司農 (da sinong),
consanguinity and incest, 22–24, 400, 26, 255–7, 394
461 Minister of the Guards 衛尉 (weiwei) of
marriage alliance, political, 23, 27, Han, 304
103–4, 109, 127, 214, 219, 229, 290, Minister of the Guards 衛尉 (weiwei) of
318, 367, 404–5 Wei, 395
marriage connection of families, 19, Minister Herald 大鴻臚 (da honglu) of
21, 23–4, 28, 304, 343 Han, 26, 375
marriage of the dead, 24–25, 407, 445 Minister Herald 大鴻臚 (da honglu) of
relatives by marriage, imperial, under Wei, 395
Han, 2, 14, 92, 363, 397, 424; under Minister of the Household 光祿勳
Wei, 459 (guangluxun) of Han, 28–9, 394
Mao 毛, the Lady, Empress of Cao Rui, 459 Minister of Justice 廷尉 (tingwei) of
Mao Jia 毛嘉, 460 Han, 17, 376, 394; and see Grand
Mao Jie 毛玠, 245–7, 371–3, 394, 414–6 Judge of Wei
Mao Zedong 毛泽东 [twentieth Minister Steward 少府 (shaofu) of Wei,
century], 503 395, 424
Mao Zonggang 毛宗岡 [Qing], 493, 497 Mo Slope 摩陂 in Nanyang, 432–3,
maotu 冒突 ships, 282 Map 13
Marquis 侯 hou [noble title], 15, 18, 99, Mo 麻 in Jiangxia, Map 14
103, 106, 127, 222, 264, 265, 276, 289, Modun 冒頓 [Xiongnu], 227
314, 323, 342, 357, 362, 382, 383–4, Moshang sang 陌上桑 “Mulberry by the
406, 428; and see under names of fiefs Path” poem by Cao Cao, 350
secondary marquis, see guannei hou Mozi 墨子 book by Mo Di 墨翟, 176, 322
Master of the Army 軍師, 114, 188, 394 “Mr Ying” 應氏 [probably Ying Chang
Master of Writing 尚書, 32, 114; and 應瑒] dedicatee of the poem Zeng
see Secretariat Yingshi 贈應氏 by Cao Zhi 曹植, 347
medical treatment, 194–5; and see Mu Xiu 穆脩 [Song], 480
sickness and wounds Music, Office of 樂府; 344–5, and see
Mei 郿 in Youfufeng, 24, Map 1, Map 7, yuefu
Map 15, Map 17
Metal Tiger Terrace 金虎臺 at Ye city, Nan 南 commandery in Jing province,
338, Map 18 263, 277, 287, 290, 307, 309,
Meng Da 孟達, 429, 435, 437 435, Map 13, Map 14, Map 21;
Meng Gongchuo 孟公綽 [ancient Administrator, 430
official], 367 nan 男 [noble title] “Baron,” 384, 390
index 541
Nanhai 南海 commandery in Jiaozhi/ Palace Assistant Clerk 御侍中丞 ( yushi

Jiao province, 276, 310, Map 21 zhongcheng) of Wei, 394
Nanjing [present-day city], 279, 434, 467 Palace Attendant 侍中, 113, 119, 386
Nanlou 難樓 [Wuhuan], 229, 236 Pan Mei 潘眉 [Qing], 24, 338
Nanpi 南皮 in Bohai, 213, 219–21, 446, Pang De 龐 /德, 211–2, 430–1
Map 10 Pang Ji 逢紀, 199, 208–9, 213
Nanyang 南陽 commandery in Jing Pang Lin 龐林, 200
province, 6, 27, 38–9, 52, 67, 70, Pang Tong 龐統, 307, 496, 498
97–8, 102, 105–6, 108, 126, 133, 150, Pang Tong xian lianhuan ji 龐統獻運
158–60, 165, 177, 201, 211, 213, 243, 環計 “Pang Tong Proposes Chaining
258, 259–61, 265–6, 277, 300, 304, Ships Together” [drama], 498
311, 364, 423, 427, 429–32, 438, 455, Pang Xuan 龐煖 [ancient general], 324
459, 475, Map 1, Map 2, Map 13, pao 砲 trebuchet, 175
Map 14, Map 21 Peach Garden, Oath 桃園結義, 99
Nanzheng 南鄭 in Hanzhong, 295, Pei 沛 kingdom in Yu province, 9, 16,
311–5, 427–8, Map 17 26, 28–9, 34, 40, 49–50, 57, 70–1, 97–8,
Neihuang 內黃 in Wei commandery, 101–3, 109, 125, 149, 163–4, 205–6,
62, 214–6, Map 4, Map 10 288, 291–2, 317, 343, 394, 414, Map 4,
Nenggai zhaiman lu 能改齌漫錄 by Wu Map 6, Map 21; Chancellor, 29, 448
Zeng 吳曾, 406 King, 16
New River, see Xinhe 新河 Pei 沛 in Pei kingdom, city also known
Ni Heng 禰衡, 117–8, 342, 344, 475, 478 as Xiao-Pei 小沛, 100, 109, Map 6
Nine Distinctions 九錫 ( jiu xi) [i.e. Pei Qian 裴潛, 317, 477
Great Carriage 大輅 and War Peizi yulin 裴子語林 “The Forest of
Carriage 戎輅 with Black Stallions Sayings of Master Pei” compiled by
玄牡; Robe and Cap of Honour 袞冕 Pei Qi 裴 , 47, 474
with Red Slippers 赤舃; Suspended Peng Yue 彭越 [Former Han], 487
Musical Instruments 軒縣之樂 and Pengcheng 彭城 kingdom in Xu
Six Rows of Dancers 六佾之舞; province, 74–5, 109, Map 6, Map 21;
Vermilion Doors 朱戶; Inner Chancellor, 435
Staircase 納陛; Guards Rapid as Pengcheng 彭城 in Pengcheng, 74, 109,
Tigers 虎賁; Ceremonial Axe 鈇 and Map 6
Battleaxe 鉞; Scarlet Bow and Arrows Pengli 彭蠡 lake and marshland, 262,
彤弓矢 and Black Bow and Arrows 269, Map 13, Map 14, Map 16
玈弓矢; Black-Millet Herb-Flavoured Pi-Lin Pi-Kong 批林批孔 “Criticise
Liquor 秬鬯 and Jade Libation Cup Lin Biao and Confucius” political
珪瓚; Green Jade Tablets for the Nine campaign, 502
Conferments 九命靑玉珪], 89, 338, Pinggang 平剛, 234–5, Map 12
381–393, 400, 410 Pinglu “Pacify the Caitiffs” Trench/
Nine Doubts Mountain 九疑山 (Jiuyi Canal 平虜渠, 231, Map 12
shan), 350 Pingyang 平陽 in Hedong, 211, 225,
Nine Ranks 九品 ( jiupin), 248–250 317, Map 1
Nineteen Old Songs 古詩十九首 (Gushi Pingyuan 平原 commandery/kingdom
shijiu shou), 345–6 in Qing province, 68, 216, 219, 224,
Ningling 寧陵 in Liang, Map 5 390, 409, Map 3, Map 6, Map 10,
Northern Army 北軍, 39, 43, 153–7, Map 21; Chancellor, 76, 99
170, 228, 259, 274, 321 Pingyuan 平原 in Pingyuan, 213–4,
Map 10
Officer of Merit 功曹 (gongcao), 249, 410 Marquis, 409
Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 [Song], 468, 491 plague, see sickness
Ploughing the Sacred Field 耕藉田, 393
Palace Assistant Imperial Clerk poetry, 1, 3, 4, 272, 341–56, 379, 405,
御侍中丞 ( yushi zhongcheng) of Han, 408, 412–3, 419–20, 445–6, 448; and
394; and see censors see sub Cao Cao
542 index
Poison Yu 于毒 [bandit], 62 Qiao Mao 橋瑁, 58

population and demography, 3, 10, 13, Qiao Xuan 橋玄, 31, 205, 366, 477
29, 61, 149, 154–5, 182, 250, 315, 334, Qin 秦 [ancient state/dynasty], 178, 474,
389, 420, 453–5 500
Poyang Marshland 鄱陽澤 in Yuzhang, Duke Mu 穆公, 24, 130, 346
262, 263, 279, 282, 318, Map 13, First Emperor 始皇帝, 25, 168, 237,
Map 14, Map 16 487, 502
Poyang 鄱陽 in Yuzhang [later a Second Emperor 二皇帝, see Huhai
commandery], Map 16 Qin 秦, the Lady, concubine of Cao
Prefect of the Gentleman of the Palace Cao, 403, 405
郎中令 (langzhong ling) of Wei, 395 Qin Yilu 秦宜祿, 24, 111, 400, 405
Prefect of the Yellow Gates 黃門令, 17 Qing River 淸河, 61, 214, 336, Map 2,
Princess 公主 (gongzhu), 93, 397, 466; Map 3, Map 9, Map 10, Map 11
and see by fief Qing province 靑州, 39, 51, 61–2, 66–8,
Private Library, Custodian 祕書監, 114, 73–5, 89, 121, 128, 133, 149–51,
378 159–60, 163–5, 181–2, 192, 213,
Protector of the Army 護軍, 91, 315 219–21, 304, Map 3, Map 4, Map 6,
Protector of the Wuhuan 護烏桓校尉, Map 8, Map 10, Map 19, Map 21;
140, 228 Inspector, 68, 75, 89, 116, 149, 208,
Pu River 濮水, Map 4, Map 9, Map 10 213, 265
Puban Crossing 蒲阪津 of the Yellow Qingzhou troops 靑州兵, 51, 66–7, 78,
River, 296–8, 300, Map 15 106, 148, 165, 438
Pufulu 普富廬 [Wuhuan], 236 Qing shi 情詩 “Lack-lustre” poem by Xu
Puqi 蒲圻 [present-day city renamed Gan 徐幹, 346
Chibi 赤壁 (Red Cliffs)], 272, 444 Qinghe 凊河 in Ganling, Princess,
Putian Marsh 圃田澤, 124, 142, Map 9 400–1, 403
Puyang 濮陽 in Dong commandery, 52, Qingtan 淸談 “Pure Conversation,” 54,
61, 67, 78, 163, 173, 194, 330, Map 4 461, 479
Qiu Hu xing 秋胡行 “Song of Qiu Hu”
Qi Mountain 祁山 in Hanyang, 305, poem/s by Cao Cao, 4, 352
Map 17 Qiuliju 丘力居 [Wuhuan], 229
Qi River 淇水, 180, 214–6, Map 2, Qu Yi 麴義, 80, 89, 121, 174
Map 9, Map 10, Map 11 Qu Yuan 屈厡 [ancient writer], 344
Qi 齊 kingdom in Qing province, 34, 128, Quanzhou in Yuyang 泉州, 231, Map 12
324, Map 6, Map 21; Chancellor, 113 Quanzhou Trench/Canal 泉州渠, 231,
Qi 齊 [ancient state], 322 Map 12
Duke Huan 桓公, 359, 367, 387 Qubi 去卑 [Xiongnu], 95, 317
Taigong “the Ancient Duke” 太公, Que Xuan 闕宣 also as Yan Xuan
368 閻宣, 72
Qi lue七略 “Seven Summaries” by Liu Quebei Lake 芍陂, see Shaobei
Xin 劉歆, 321 Queen 王后 of Wei, see the Lady Bian
Qi’ai shi 七哀詩 “poem/s of Seven Queen Mother of the West 西王母
Sorrows” by Wang Can 王粲 and (Xiwang mu), 350
others, 341, 345 Qunying hui 羣英會 “Meeting of Many
Qianfu lun 潛夫論 “Comments of a Heroes” [drama cycle], 498
Recluse” by Wang Fu 王服, 373, 519
Qianli duxing 千里獨行 “A Lone Rang 穰 in Nanyang, 106–7, 401
Journey for a Thousand li” [play], 486 ransom, 197–8, 343, 502
Qiang 羌 people, 12, 43, 90, 155, 185, Raoyang 饒陽 in Anping, Map 12;
223, 225, 228, 304–6, 454, 456 Marquis, 409
Qiao 譙 in Pei [later a commandery], Red Cliff [films], 503
16, 18, 28, 34, 40, 43, 70–1, 205–6, Red Cliffs campaign and battle, 3, 6, 50,
288–9, 317, 334, 357, 386, 394, 442, 135, 181, 192, 193, 196, 241, 262–77,
480, Map 4, Map 16 280, 283, 285, 286, 288, 290, 296, 300,
Qiao 橋, the Ladies, 483 306, 315, 327, 330–1, 333, 336, 354–6,
index 543
359, 392, 433, 452, 462, 472, 488, secondary marquisate (關內侯 guannei
494–5, 497, Map 13, Map 14 hou), 342
rhapsodies 賦 (fu), 93, 118, 168, 242, Secretariat, Imperial of Han 尚書 [or
272, 335, 338, 339, 341, 343, 344–9, Master/s of Writing], 32, 45, 87,
354, 408–9, 412–3, 446, 482–3, 489 112–4, 131–2, 188, 348
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, see authority over the affairs of the
Sanguo [zhi] yanyi Secretariat, 錄尚書事, 87
Romance of the Three Kingdoms Director of the Secretariat 尚書令 [or
[television series], 503 Prefect of the Masters of Writing],
Ruan Ji 阮籍 [third century], 342, 460–1 112, 188, 385–7, 397–8
Ruan Yu 阮瑀, 340–2, 346–7, 379, 413, Secretariat of Wei 尚書, 381, 385–6,
420, 445 393–5, 397–8, 461
Runan 汝南 commandery in Yu Seven Masters of Jian’an 建安七子, 342,
province, 98, 128, 135, 141, 149, 420
150–1, 158, 160, 163, 192, 204, 211, Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove 竹林
213, 243, 342, Map 13, Map 16, 七賢 [third century], 342, 460
Map 21; Administrator, 114, 431 Shan Jing 單經, 68
Ruxu 濡須 in Lujiang, 301, 318, 480, Shang 上 commandery in Bing
Map 16 province, Map 1, Map 15, Map 21
Shang 商 [ancient dynasty] also known
Sable Cicada 貂蟬 [the Lady Diaochan; as Yin 殷 q.v., 322, 370, 487, 502
fictional character], 76 Shang jun 商君 “Book of Lord Shang”
Salamis [battle 480 BC], 286 by Shang Yang, 323
Sanfu juelu 三輔決錄 by Zhao Qi Shang Yang 商鞅 [ancient philosopher],
趙岐; commentary by Zhi Yu 摯虞, 323
424 Shangdang 上黨 commandery in Bing
Sanguo zhi 三國志 by Chen Shou 陳壽, province, 222, 224–6, Map 1, Map 2,
1, 16, 20, 22, 32, 34, 40, 71, 91, 157, Map 21; Administrator, 222
164, 205, 209, 225, 227, 272, 300, 303, Shanggu 上谷 commandery in You
316, 371, 420, 427, 439, 445, 464–5, province, 229, 236, 427, Map 3,
469, 470–3, 487, 490–1, 493 Map 21
Sanguo zhi pinghua 三國志平話 Shangshu dazhuan 尚書大傳 by Fu
“Popular Account of the Three Sheng 伏生/勝, 384, 389
Kingdoms History,” 486–8, 494 Shangyong 上庸 in Hanzhong [county/
Sanguo [zhi] yanyi 三國志演義 “The commandery], 295, 437, Map 13,
Romance of the Three Kingdoms” Map 17; Administrator, 429
[cited as Romance], 49, 76, 98–9, 101, Shanyang 山陽 commandery in Yan
105, 108, 120, 189, 274, 285, 289, 307, province, 52, 79, 115, 167, 196,
354, 356, 449–50, 463, 484–6, 488, 259, 274, 340, 348, Map 4, Map 21;
490–9, 501, 503 Administrator, 223
yanyi 演義 stream of transmission, 1, Duke of Shanyang [honorary title of
146, 493 the former Emperor Xian of Han],
zhizhuan 志傳 stream of 196
transmission, 493 Shanyang gong zaiji 山陽公戴記
scholarship and education, 113–4, 246, “Parallel Annals of the Duke of
261–2, 324, 348, 370, 378–9; and see Shanyang” by Yue Zi 樂資, 196
schools, libraries and University Shangsunjiazhai 上孫家寨 in Qinghai
schools, 116, 162, 206, 212, 377 [archeological site], 323
Seal of State [Imperial/Great] 傳國璽 Shanyu 單于 [Xiongnu title], 227, 466
(chuan’guo xi), 58, 102, 124, 399, 439 Shanyu, Northern, 11–2, 228, 444
Second Memorial at the Beginning of a Shanyu, Southern, 11–2, 62, 211, 224,
Campaign 後出師表 Hou chushi biao 225, 228, 317, 444
by Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮, 210 Shanyu 單于 [non-Xiongnu title], 229,
secondary biographies (別傳 biezhuan), 236
465 Shao Jinhan 邵晉涵 [Qing], 406
544 index
Shaobei [or Quebei] Lake 芍陂, 289, Shouyang Hills 首陽山, 441
Map 16 Shu 蜀 commandery in Yi province,
She 葉 [also as Ye] in Nanyang, 106–7, 314, 488, Map 17, Map 21;
133 Administrator, 114
Shen Baoxu 申包胥, 362 Shu jing 書經 [Classic of History], 361,
Shen Dan 申耽, 295, 429 363, 370
Shen Pei 審配, 136, 179, 198–9, 208–9, Shu-Han 蜀漢 state of the Three
216–7, 251, 370 Kingdoms, 2, 16, 29, 98, 167, 189–90,
Shen You 沈友, 325 210, 263, 314–5, 424, 437, 451–2,
Shen Yi 申儀, 429 455–6, 459–61, 464–9, 477–85,
Shenjian 申監 “Extended Reflections” 488–90, 492–3, 495
by Xun Yue 荀悅, 114, 374 First Sovereign 先主, see Liu Bei
Shengqian Village 升遷亭, Princess, Second Sovereign 先主, see Liu Shan
400 Shun 舞 [mythical sovereign], 16
Shentu Jiong 申屠駉 (style Zidi 子迪) Shuowen jiezi 說文解字 dictionary by
[Yuan], 489 Xu Shen 許愼, 168
Shentu Zhiyuan 申屠致遠 [Yuan], 489 Si River 泗水, 74–5, 109, Map 6
Shi Hu 石虎 [fourth century ruler], 338 sickness and plague:
Shi Huan 史渙, 127, 144 general epidemics, 36, 196, 292, 381,
shi 詩 [literary genre: lyric poetry and 420, 438
ballads], 344; and see poetry medical treatment, 194–5
Shi jing 詩經 [Classic of Poetry], 25, 35, religion and faith-healing, 36, 160, 294
344–6, 353–5, 391 sickness in armies, 184, 196, 273, 316,
Shi ming 釋名 dictionary compiled by 328, 331, 420–1; and see wounds
Liu Xi 劉熙, 281 Sili 司隸 [the capital province], 42,
Shi Ren 士仁, 430, 435–7 314, 390–1, Map 1, Map 3, Map 4,
Shi si 室思 “Bedroom Longing” poem Map 5, Map 7, Map 8, Map 9, Map 10,
by Xu Gan 徐幹, 346 Map 13, Map 20, Map 21
Shi wuguan zhonglangjiang Jianzhang Sima 司馬 family of the Jin 晉 dynasty,
tai ji shi 侍五官中郎將建章臺集詩 29, 464
“In Attendance at Gathering of the Sima fa 司馬法 [book] “The Marshal’s
General of the Household for All Treatise” attributed to Tian/Sima
Purposes at the Jianzhang Terrace” Rangju, 321–2
poem by Ying Chang, 413 Sima Fu 司馬孚, 439
Shi Xie 士燮, 275–6, 310, 391, 448, 455 Sima Guang 司馬光 [Song], 10, 72, 85,
Shi Zimiao 史子眇, 93 359, 366, 372, 375, 385, 387, 390, 399,
Shishuo xinyu 世說新語 “A New 416–7, 441, 451, 468–9
Account of Tales of the World” by Sima Lang 司馬朗, 246, 257, 420, 439,
Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 and others, 31, 456, 457
460, 463, 469, 473–9, 482–3, 486 Sima Rangju 司馬穰苴, see Tian Rangju
Shiliu yuan 石榴園 “The Pomegranate 田穰苴
Garden” [play], 486, 498 Sima Shi 司馬師 [third century], 246,
Shiyi lun 釋疑論 “Resolving Doubts” by 412, 424, 461
Ge Hong 葛洪, 351 Sima Xiangru 司馬相如 [Former Han],
Shock Troops 陷陳營 (xianchen ying), 344
146, 171, 173 Sima Yan 司馬炎 [third century;
Shogun 將軍 [Japanese title], 130, 364 Emperor Wu 武 of Jin], 246–7, 400,
Shoucheng lu 守城錄 “Guide to the 424, 443, 461, 468
Defence of Cities” by Chen Gui 陳規 takes the imperial title, 461
and others, 176, 322 Sima Yi 司馬懿, 246–7, 257, 314, 424,
Shouchun 壽春 in Jiujiang, 100, 103, 432, 434, 439, 442, 455–62, 466, 482,
124, 192, 289, 301, 358, 386, 411, 450, 495
452, Map 5, Map 6, Map 8, Map 16, Sima Zhao 司馬昭 [third century], 67,
Map 20 246, 424, 461, 466
index 545
Simin yueling 四民月令 “Monthly 189–92, 196, 200, 241, 259, 262–5,
Ordinances for the Four Peoples” by 279–90, 301, 303, 306–19, 328, 330–3,
Cui Shi 崔寔, 10, 372 356, 359, 362, 369, 376, 381–91, 406,
Siti shu shi xu 四體書勢序 [Preface to a 410, 420–5, 432–5, 441, 445, 451–7,
study of calligraphy], 32 462, 466–8, 474, 480, 484, 487–8, 494,
Sky Well Weir 天井堰 at Ye city, 335, 498
Map 18 and the Red Cliffs campaign, 269–78
Sluys [battle 1340], 286 claims title as Emperor of Wu, 451
Soil and Grain 社稷, altars to the Gods, Sun Shao 孫韶, 166
393–4 Sun Sheng 孫盛 [fourth century], 19, 23,
Song 宋, the Lady, concubine of Cao 30, 49, 386, 419, 445, 484
Cao, 403 Sun Shou, the Lady 孫壽, 380
Song Jian 宋建, 306 Sun Wu 孫武 [ancient general], 32,
Song Qi 宋奇, 33 191–2, 319, 323–4
Song Wan 宋琬 [Yuan], 489 Sunzi 孫子 [book] by Sun Wu [also as
Sou shen ji 搜神記 “Record of Enquiry Sunzi bingfa]; 3, 32, 110, 152, 177,
about the Spirits” by Gan Bao 干寶, 278 190–3, 316, 319–332
Sovereign on High 上帝, 84, 86, 142 Supuwan 速僕丸, see Supuyan
Spanish Armada [campaign 1588], 285 Supuyan 蘇僕延 [Wuhuan also as
Staff of Authority 節 ( jie) [Bearing the Sufuwan and Supuwan], 229, 235–6
Staff of Authority 持節 (zhijie)], 386
stele, 16, 29, 221, 222, 375, 440–3; and Ta River 漯水, 133
see sumptuary laws and tombs Tadun 蹋頓 [Wuhuan], 227, 229–30,
Su Qin 蘇秦 [ancient minister], 368 233, 235–6
Su Shi 蘇軾/Su Dongpo 蘇東坡 [Song] Tai Lake 太湖, Map 16
272, 354, 356, 482–3 Tai Yannian 戴延年 [Qing], 481
Su You 蘇由/游, 216 Taibo yin jing 太白陰經 “Secret Classic
Suanzao 酸棗 in Chenliu, 51–2, 55–6, of the Great White Planet” by Li
58, Map 2 Quan 李筌, 280
Sufuwan 速附丸, see Supuyan Taigong [wang] 太公望, 322, 368
Sui Gu 眭固, 127 Taigong Liu tao 太公六韜, see Liu tao
Suiyang Trench/Canal 睢陽渠, 205 Taiping dao 太平道 Way of Great
sumptuary laws, 221, 371, 373, 418, 440 Peace, 36
Sun 孫, the Lady, concubine of Cao Taiping jing 太平經 “The Classic of
Cao, 403, 405 Great Peace,” 37
Sun 孫, the Lady, sister of Sun Quan Taishan 太山 commandery in Yan
and short-term wife of Liu Bei, 290, province, 56–7, 62, 67, 70–4, 78,
309 111, 350, Map 4, Map 6, Map 21;
Sun Bin 孫臏 [ancient general], 190, Administrator, 70
323–4 Taishi Ci 太史慈, 171
Sun Ce 孫策, 23, 27, 97, 100, 103–4, Taishou 太壽 in Chenliu/Liang, 179
125–6, 150, 157, 163, 165, 168, 171, Taiyuan 太厡 commandery in Bing
187–9, 262, 278–9, 318, 405, 433, 448, province, 30, 160, 225–6, 304, Map 1,
474, 483–4 Map 21
Sun He 孫河, general of Sun Quan, 19, Tan River 檀溪, 484
25, 166 Tan 郯 in Donghai, 74–6, 204, 326,
Sun He 孫和, son of Sun Quan, 166 Map 4, Map 6
Sun Jian 孫堅, 51, 58–60, 70, 81, 100, Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui
102–3, 124, 157–9, 165, 177, 188, 191, 唐太宗李衛公問對 “Questions and
259–62, 290 Answers between Emperor Taizong of
Sun Kaidi 孫楷第 [modern scholar], 484 Tang and Li Weigong,” 320
Sun Kuang 孫匡, 27, 103, 104 Tanshihuai 檀石槐 [Xianbi], 12, 228
Sun Quan 孫權, 6–7, 16, 23, 71, 117, Tao Qian 陶謙, 27, 51–2, 62, 67–80, 90,
150, 157, 163–73, 177–8, 183–4, 97–100, 130, 204, 326
546 index
taxation; 10–11, 13, 62, 89, 155, Vast/Grand Canal 鴻溝 system, 55,
167, 218–9, 250–7, 358; and see 124, 133, 144, 186, 205, 231, 233, 358,
government monopolies and labour Map 1, Map 9; and see Bian River
service (corvée) Viscount 子 [noble title], see zi
household tax 戶調 (hutiao), 253–4,
256–7 Wan 宛 in Nanyang, 38, 105–7, 133,
gengfu 更賦 [scutage], 155, 254 159, 177, 266, 427, 432, 449, 497–8,
land tax, 251–3, 256–7 Map 1, Map 2, Map 13
poll tax 算賦 (suanfu), 253–4 Wang, Beauty 王美人, concubine of
property tax 算訾 (suanzu), 253 Emperor Ling, 92
Teng Yan 滕延, 15 Wang 王, the Lady, concubine of Cao
Three Gentlemen (san liang 三良) Cao, 405
[ancient worthies], 346 Wang Anshi 王安石 [Song], 491
The Three Musketeers (Les Trois Wang Bao 王裦 [Former Han], 196
Mousquetaires) novel by Alexandre Wang Bi 王必, 67, 424–5, 432, 460
Dumas the elder, 503 Wang Bi 王弼 [third century], 67,
Tian 田 clan of Puyang in Dong 424–5, 432, 460–1
commandery, 78, 163 Wang Can 王粲, 213, 340–7, 349, 378,
Tian Chou 田疇, 162, 164, 191, 233–5, 394, 413, 420, 432, 445
332, 334 Wang Fen 王芬, 9, 40–1
Tian Feng 田豐, 107, 136, 147 Wang Fu 王服, 119, 373
Tian Kai 田楷, 75–6, 89, 98–9, 121, 149 Wang Gong 王肱, 58, 61
Tian Rangju 田穰苴 [ancient general], 322 Wang Gui 王瓖, 56
Tiger Warriors 虎士 [bodyguard of Cao Wang Hou 王垕 [fictional character],
Cao], 173, 296 450
Tiger Cavalry 虎騎, 299 Wang Ji 王基, 24
tombs and burial, 10–11, 98, 168–9, 171, Wang Jun 王儁, 31
205, 218, 221, 237, 266, 323, 345–6, Wang Kuang 王匡, 52–4, 56–7, 66, 81,
349–50, 394 159
burial of living with the dead, 24, 346, Wang Ling 王凌 [third century], 325
445 Wang Mang 王莽 [first centuries BC
tomb robbery, 55, 94, 132, 441–3, and AD], 66, 159, 182, 216, 227–8,
445, 464; and see Commissioner for 244, 255–6, 311, 363, 382, 384, 389,
Opening Tombs 399, 452–3
tombs of the Cao family, 18–22, 37, Wang Niansun 王念孫 [Qing], 282
205, 394, 442 Wang Peng 王彭 [Song], 482
tombs of Cao Cao [Gaoling 高陵], Wang Qian 王謙, 340
402, 407, 440–5, 447, 503 Wang Rui 王叡, 259
tombs of Cao Pi, 444 Wang Shen 王沈 [third century], 465
tombs of Cao Xiu, 445 Wang Song 王松, 221, 222, 226
tombs of Cao Zhi, 444 Wang Wei 王威, 265
Tong Pass 潼關 in Hongnong, 296–8, Wang Xiang 王象, 378
300, 329, Map 15 Wang Xiu 王脩, 221, 394
Towered Warships, Office 樓船官 Wang Yun 王允, 58, 76, 114, 177, 340,
(louchuan guan), 279 377
Towering Rock see Jieshi Wang Zhong 王忠, 125, 410
Trafalgar [battle 1805], 285 Waterloo [battle 1815], 189
tuntian 屯田 military agricultural Way of Great Peace, see Taiping dao
colonies, see agricultural colonies weapons and military equipment, 10–1,
169–73, 175–6, 181, 193, 278, 284–5,
University, Imperial 太學, 28, 32, 99, 377–9 321–2, 444
Upholder of Ceremonies 奉常 Wei River 渭河 in Sili and Liang
(fengchang) of Wei; cf. Minister of province, Map 1, Map 7, Map 15
Ceremonies of Han, 395 Wei River 衛河 in present-day Hebei,
index 547
Wei 魏 commandery in Ji province, 58, Wei Zhen 衛臻, 50

61–2, 87, 98, 106, 137, 161, 210, 246, Wei Zi 衛玆, 49–50, 55
333, Map 1, Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Wen Chou 文醜, 139
Map 10, Map 21 Wen Ping 文聘, 289, 437
Wei 魏 [Three Kingdoms state] Wenshi zhuan 文士傳 “Biographies
Duke 公 of Wei, see Cao Cao of Literary Gentlemen” by Zhang
Emperor Wen 文帝 of Wei, see Cao Pi Yin 張隱, Zhang Zhi 張騭 and/or
Emperor Wu 武帝 of Wei, see Cao possibly Zhang Heng 張衡, 118
Cao Western Garden 西園 at Luoyang, 42
King 王 of Wei, see Cao Cao and Western Garden Corps, 6, 9, 43–4,
Cao Pi 357
Queen 王后 of Wei, see the Lady Bian White Wolf Mountain 白狼山 (Bolang
Wei/Liang 魏/梁 [ancient state] shan), 6, 165, 203, 230, 234–6, 300,
King Hui 惠王, 323–4 327, 329, 332, 462, 501, Map 12
Marquis Wen 文侯, 323 wives and concubines, 19, 60, 76, 81,
Wei Ao 隗囂 [first century], 295 117, 166, 180, 199, 200, 204, 221,
Wei Chong 魏种, 98, 127–8, 197, 222, 246–7, 259, 263, 376–7, 445, 502; and
367, 448 see sub Cao Cao, Cao Pi, Cao Zhi,
Wei Dan 韋誕, 378 Liu Bei
Wei Duan 韋端, 258, 366 Woo, John [modern film director], 503
Wei Feng 魏諷, 423, 425, 431 Worthy King of the West 西賢王
Wei Gu 衛固, 223–4 [Xiongnu title], 317
Wei Heng 衛恒, 32 Worthy Women 列女傳 chapter in Hou
Wei Huang 韋晃, 424 Han shu, 343
Wei Ji 衛覬, 126, 394 wounds and injuries, 134, 194–5, 425;
Wei ji 魏紀 “Annals of Wei” by Yin and see sickness
Dan 陰澹, 408 Wu 吳 commandery in Yang province,
Wei-Jin shiyu 魏晉世語 “Tales of the Map 16, Map 21 Administrator, 104
Generations of Wei and Jin” by Guo Wu 吳 [ancient state], 362
Ban 郭頒, 20, 27, 484 Wu 吳 [Three Kingdoms state], 71, 437,
Wei Liaozi 尉繚子 [book], 322–3 447, 454, 462; and see Sun Quan
Wei lue 魏略 “An Account of Wei” by Wu Cheng 吳澄 [Yuan], 489
Yu Huan 魚豢, 34, 167, 188, 212, 220, Wu Lan 吳蘭, 426
224, 249, 285, 363, 370–1, 401, 405, Wu li 吳暦 “Calendar of Wu” by Hu
407, 414, 418, 420, 465 Chong 胡沖, 303
Weimo zhuan 魏末傳 “The Story of the Wu Lan 吳蘭, 426
Last Years of Wei,” 25 Wu lu 吳錄 “Record of Wu” by Zhang
weiqi 圍棊 “surrounding chess,” 348 Bo 張勃, 50
Weishi chunqiu 魏氏春秋 “Chronicle Wu Qi 吳起 [ancient statesman], 322–3,
of the House of Wei” by Sun Sheng 325; and see Wuzi Bingfa
孫盛, 19, 23–4, 30, 45, 111, 129, 134, Wu shu 書 by Wei Zhao 韋昭 and
370, 386, 458 others, 71–2, 157, 178, 371, 465
Wei shu 魏書 “The [Official] History of Wu Xiu 吳脩, 56
Wei” by Wang Shen 王沈 and others, Wu Zeng 吳曾 [Song], 406
4, 31, 34–5, 40, 48, 66, 82, 91–2, 166, Wu Zhi 吳質, 347, 412, 414–6, 418, 420
212, 219, 227, 251, 320, 349, 369, 395, Wuchao 烏巢 marsh, 142, 144–5, 151,
407, 409–10, 415, 420, 438, 445, 457, 185, 197, Map 9
465, 472, 477 Wudai shi 五代史 “History of the Five
Wei Wuzhi 魏無知 [Former Han], 368 Dynasties”
Wei-Wu gushi 魏武古事 “Documents “Old” [Jiu 舊 Wudai shi] compiled by
of Emperor Wu of Wei [Cao Cao]”, Li Fang 李昉 and others, 491
40, 92, 356, 411, 417 “New” [Xin 新 Wudai shi or Wudai
Wei Zhao 韋昭 [third century], 390, shiji 五代史記] compiled by
465 Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修, 491
548 index
Wudou mi dao 五斗米道 [Five Dou of Xiakou 夏口 in Jiangxia, 263, 266–8,

Rice Sect], see Rice Sect and Zhang Lu 272, 283, Map 13, Map 14, Map 16
Wudu 武都 commandery in Liang Xianbi 鮮卑 people, 12, 43, 68, 80, 140,
province, 305, 313, 426, 428, 455, 155–6, 170, 227–8, 230, 423, 454, 456,
Map 15, Map 17, Map 21 Map 21
Wuhuan 烏桓/Wuwan 烏丸 people, Xiandi chunqiu 獻帝春秋 “Chronicle of
227–36, 242, 258, 277–8, 317, 329, Emperor Xian” by Yuan Ye 袁曄, 95
332, 352, 370–1, 423, 427, 446, 454, Xiandi ji 獻帝傳 “The Annals of
500–1, Map 3, Map 12, Map 21 Emperor Xian” by Liu Ai 劉艾, 85
Wujing zongyao 武經總要 “Collection Xiandi qijuzhu 獻帝起居注 “The Diary
of the Most Important Military of Activity and Repose of Emperor
Techniques” compiled by Zeng Xian,” 146, 399
Gongliang 曾公亮 and others [Song], Xiandi zhuan 獻帝傳 “The Account of
176 Emperor Xian,” see Xiandi ji
Wuku fu 武庫賦 “Rhapsody on the Xiang River 湘水, 310, 433–4, Map 13
Arsenal” by Chen Lin 陳琳, 168 Xiang Yu 項羽 [third century BC], 364
Wulin 烏林 in Nan commandery, 272, Xiangguan 湘關 in Jiangxia, 434
Map 13 Xiangyang 襄陽 in Nan commandery,
Wuling 武陵 commandery in Jing 259–64, 266, 277, 279, 289, 304, 331,
province, 263, 268, 275, 289, Map 13, 430–1, 433, 437, 485, Map 8, Map 13,
Map 14, Map 21 Map 14, Map 20
Wuping 武平 in Chen, marquisate, Xiangyang hui 襄陽會 “Meeting at
361–2 Xiangyang” [play], 485
wushu 五鑄 coins, 55; and see currency Xianxian xingzhuang 先賢行狀
wuxing 五行 [Five Powers (often as “Conduct and Character of Worthy
“Five Elements”)], 37 Men of the Past,” 90
Wuwan 烏丸 people, see Wuhuan 烏桓 Xiangyi 襄邑 in Chenliu, Map 5
Wuwei 武威 commandery in Liang Xianyu Fu 鮮于輔, 123–4, 140, 149, 164,
province, 127, 154, 165, 171, 211, 188, 221–2, 226
Map 21 Xiao Chang 蕭常 [Song], 490–1
Wuwei 無爲 in Jiujiang, 303, 480 Xiao He 蕭何 [Former Han], 383
Wuyan 烏延 [Wuhuan], 229, 235 Xiao-Pei 小沛, i.e. Pei 沛 q.v.
Wuzhong 無終 in Youbeiping, 234, Xiaoshuo 小說 “Minor Tales” [library
Map 12 classification], 473–4
Wuzi Bingfa 吳子兵法 by Wu Qi 吳起, Xiaoshuo 小說 “Stories” compiled by
322–3, 325 Yin Yun 殷芸 [sixth century], 31,
418, 474–6
Xi Lü 郗慮, see Chi Lü 郗慮 Xiapi 下邳 commandery/kingdom in Xu
Xi Kang 嵇康 [third century], 342, 460, province, 72, 74–5, 100, 103, 109, 269,
461 Map 6, Map 21; Chancellor, 100, 186
Xi Zhicai 戲志才, 114 Xiapi 下邳 city in Xiapi, 74–5, 97, 103,
Xi Zuochi 習鑿齒 [fourth century], 210, 109–11, 125, 175, 180, 326–7, Map 6
467, 479, 481 Xidu fu 西都賦 “Rhapsody on the
Xia River 夏水, 263; and see Han River Western Metropolis” by Zhang Heng
xia 俠 “knight-errant,” 29, 157 張衡, 344
Xiabian 下辯 in Wudu, 426 Xigaoxue Village 西高穴村 by
Xiahou 夏侯 family of Pei, 19, 23–8, 304 present-day Anyang in Henan, 443
Xiahou Dun 夏侯惇, 20–5, 28, 35, Xihe 西河 commandery in Bing
56–7, 78, 109, 126, 211, 223, 304, 313, province, 42, 160, 225–6, Map 1,
318–9, 400, 485–6 Map 21
Xiahou Heng 夏侯衡, 27 Xincheng 新城 commandery,
Xiahou Mao 夏侯楙, 22–4, 400 Administrator, 437
Xiahou Yuan 夏侯淵, 7, 27–8, 181, 204, Xin Pi 辛毗, 213–4, 217, 417, 477
287, 296, 299, 303–6, 311, 315, 421, daughter, 417
423, 426, 428, 452 Xin Ping 辛評, 208, 213, 217
index 549
Xin shu 新書 “New Book” by Cao Cao, Xuanxue 玄學淸談 “Study of the
320, 445 Mysteries,” 460
Xinhe 新河 or New River canal, 231–3, Xuchang 許昌 city, see Xu city and Xu
Map 12 Chang
Xining River 西寧河 or Huang River Xue 薛 [ancient state], 367
湟水, 90, 223, 304, 306 Xue Ti 薛悌, 316
Xinxing 新興 commandery, 317 Xun Kun 荀緄, 113
Xinye 新野 in Nanyang, 265–6, Map 13 Xun Shen 荀諶, 113, 366
Xiongnu 匈奴 people, 133, 140, 155–6, Xun Shu 荀淑, 113
161, 170, 182, 211, 224–5, 227–8, 288, Xun Shuang 荀爽, 113
304, 317, 343, 424, 454, 456, 466, 476, Xun Yan 荀衍, 114
487, 502, Map 21 Xun You 荀攸, 108–9, 114–5, 119, 137,
Northern, 11, 155, 228, 454 144–6, 188, 326, 374, 387, 394
Southern, 12, 155, 211, 317 Xun Yu 荀彧, 23, 75, 78–9, 86, 106–8,
Xiping 西平 commandery, 223; 112–5, 120, 143, 188, 192, 201, 223,
Administrator, 223 245, 254, 348, 366–7, 374, 381, 385–7,
Xu province 徐州, 6, 27, 42, 51–2, 62, 393–4, 397, 400
67, 70, 74–80, 97–104, 116, 120, 127, Xun Yue 荀悅, 114, 348, 374, 378
130, 141, 149, 192, 199, 204, 300, Xunyang 尋陽 in Lujiang, 279, Map 16
326, 491, 501, Map 4, Map 5, Map 6,
Map 8, Map 16, Map 19, Map 20, Yan Crossing 延津 of the Yellow River,
Map 21; Governor, 51–2, 71, 80, 97, 98, 125–6, 137–41, 171–2, 175, Map 9,
100, 104; Inspector, 62 Map 10, Map 11
Xu 許 in Yingchuan, 6, 51–2, 81, 86–92, Yan province 兗州, 3, 6, 51–2, 57,
95–6, 100, 103–7, 109, 112, 114–6, 61–71, 74–81, 84, 92, 100, 113, 115,
119–20, 123–5, 131, 141–3, 149, 151, 127, 130–2, 148–9, 159, 192, 218, 300,
157–8, 164, 188–9, 198, 204–6, 209, 358, 448, 462, Map 1, Map 3, Map 5,
212, 223, 236, 243, 245, 257–8, 276–7, Map 6, Map 7, Map 8, Map 9, Map 19,
288, 291, 303, 333–4, 339, 378, 383, Map 21; Governor, 52, 63–4, 68, 71,
385, 387, 389, 397, 402, 413, 423–5, 77, 81, 84, 88, 218; Inspector, 57–8,
428, 431–2, 439, Map 7, Map 8, 63–4, 67–8, 130, 149, 457
Map 9, Map 13, Map 20; Prefect, 115, Yan 燕 [ancient state], 360, 406
128 King Hui 惠王, 360
Xu Chang 許昌, 158 King Zhao 昭王, 360
Xu Chu 許褚, 121, 164, 296, 298–9, 313, Yan 閻, Empress and Dowager of
486 Emperor An, 14
Xu Gan 徐幹, 342, 346–8, 413 Yan Fu 閻甫, see Yan Pu 閻圃
Xu Hou Han shu 續後漢書 “Sequel to Yan Hui 顏回, disciple of Confucius, 117
the History of Later Han” by Hao Yan Liang 顏良, 137–40
Jing 郝經, 484, 490–1 Yan Pu 閻圃 also as Yan Fu 閻甫, 294,
Xu Hou Han shu 續後漢書 “Sequel to 314
the History of Later Han” by Xiao Yan Rou 閻柔, 140, 149, 164, 226
Chang 蕭常, 490, 492, 494 Yan Xuan 閻宣, see Que Xuan 闕宣
Xu Huang 徐璜, eunuch, 129 Yang province 揚州, 51, 56, 70, 100–2,
Xu Huang 徐晃, general of Cao Cao, 158–9, 192, 243, 279, 309–11, 358,
144, 296, 300, 427, 432–5, 446 Map 4, Map 5, Map 6, Map 8, Map 13,
Xu Rong 徐榮, 55, 157, 194 Map 14, Map 16, Map 19, Map 20,
Xu Shao 許劭, 31, 366 Map 21; Inspector, 56, 158–9, 192,
Xu Shu 徐庶, 200 243, 276
Xu You 許攸, 142, 144–5, 191, 197, Yang 楊 family of Hongnong, 115
370–1, 448, 478 Yang Biao 楊彪, 112, 115–6, 132, 414,
Xu Xuan 徐宣, 410 418, 464
Xuanping Gate 宣平門 of Chang’an, 94 Yang Ding 楊定, 95
Xuanwu Pond/Park 玄武池/苑, see Yang Feng 楊鳳, sometime Black
Dark Warrior Pond and Park Mountain bandit, 86–8, 95, 103
550 index
Yang Feng 楊奉, sometime Bobo bandit, Map 21; Governor, 126, 293, 305–6,
161 309–10; Inspector, 292
Yang Fu 楊阜, 201, 305, 366 Yi 易 in Hejian, 81, 89–90, 123, 131,
Yang Xiu 楊脩, 343, 413–6, 418–9, 475, 161, 178, 196, 231, Map 3, Map 10
478, 486, 498, 503 Yibu qijiu zhuan 益部耆舊傳 “Accounts
Yang Xuan 楊琁/璇, 181 of Venerable Men and Ancient Affairs
Yang‘an 陽安 in Yingchuan [county/ of Yi Division” by Chen Shou, 465
commandery], 141, 243, Map 13; Yin 殷 [ancient dynasty] also known as
Administrator, 254 Shang 商, 322, 370, 487, 502
Yangping 陽平 region and Pass 關 in King Zhou 桀, 360, 502
Hanzhong, 313–4, 426–8, Map 17 Yin ma changcheng ku xing 飮馬長城
Yangwu 陽武 in Henan, 141, Map 9 窟行 “Watering my Horse at a Well
Yangxia 陽夏 in Chen, fief of Cao Cao, by the Great Wall” poem by Chen Lin
362 陳琳, 346
Yanmen 鴈門 commandery in Bing Yin 尹, the Lady, concubine of Cao Cao,
province, 205, 225–6, Map 21 400, 403
Yanpi Marshland 晏陂澤 by Ye city, Yin Shu 殷署, 315
180, 216, 332, 336, Map 18 Yin Xiu 陰脩, 56
Yao Fan 姚範, 24 Yin’an 陰安 in Wei commandery, 210,
yaoze 妖賊 “religious rebels,” 36, 292 Map 10
Ye River 斜水, 311 Ying River 潁水, Map 5, Map 9
Ye 葉 in Nanyang, see She Ying 盈, the Lady, mother of the
Ye 鄴 in Wei commandery, 3, 58, 88, Empress Fu of Emperor Xian, 397–8
106, 114, 161, 167, 179–80, 188, 203, Ying Bu 英布 [Former Han], 487
206–10, 212–20, 222, 224–6, 236, Ying Chang 應瑒, 342, 347, 413
241–2, 251, 257, 273, 277, 287–8, 295, Ying Qu 應璩, 347
299, 303, 315, 317, 330–9, 343, 347, Ying Shao 應劭, 19, 62–3, 67, 70–2, 155,
349, 353, 361, 373, 379–83, 387, 390, 206, 279, 389
393–4, 399, 402, 408–10, 412–9, 423, Yingchuan 潁川 commandery in
425, 431–2, 438–43, 457, 474, 478, Yu province, 52, 77–8, 85–6, 106,
Map 1, Map 2, Map 8, Map 9, Map 10, 113–4, 141, 148–9, 158, 160, 204,
Map 11, Map 18; Palace at Ye, 337, 348, Map 1, Map 2, Map 13, Map 21;
380, 412, Map 18; and see under other Administrator, 77, 304, 377
buildings Yingwu fu 鸚鵡賦 “Parrot Rhapsody”
Marquis, 88 by Ni Heng 禰衡, 118
Yegu Pass 斜谷關, 315, Map 17 Yingxiong ji 英雄記, see Hanmo
Yellow Emperor 黃帝; and see yingxiong ji
Huang-Lao, 16, 36, 37 Yinping 陰平 in Donghai, 70–1, 74, Map 6
Yellow River 河, passim, Map 1, Map 2, Yinqueshan 银雀山 in Linyi 臨沂,
Map 3, Map 4, Map 5, Map 6, Map 7, Shandong [archeological site], 322–5
Map 10, Map 11, Map 15 Yishi 弈勢 “On Chess” by Ying Chang
Yellow Turban/s 黃巾 rebels, 2, 6, 9, 應瑒, 348, 447
15, 38–43, 46, 51, 54, 58, 62–8, 74, Yishi zhuan 逸士傳 “Biographies
82, 85, 99, 106, 113, 116, 130, 141, of Gentlemen in Retirement” by
148, 158–61, 163–5, 177, 181–2, 192, Huangfu Mi 皇甫謐, 31
196, 205, 222, 228, 259, 292, 294, 300, Yitong ping 異同評 “Comparisons and
304, 357–8, 438, 468, 500–2; and see Criticisms” by Sun Sheng 孫盛, see
Qingzhou Troops Yitong zayu
Yi River 昜河, 231, Map 3, Map 10 Yitong zayu 異同雜語 “Comparisons
Yi province 益州, 6, 29, 42, 160, 230, and Comments” by Sun Sheng
243, 261, 276, 287, 290, 291–3, 295, 孫盛, 30
305–15, 359, 391, 426, 429, 433, 435, Yiwen zhi 藝文志 [Treatise of
451, 465, 490, 496, Map 1, Map 7, Bibliography of Han shu], 320–4
Map 8, Map 13, Map 19, Map 20, Yong province 雍州, 390–1, Map 19
index 551
Yongqiu 雍丘 in Chenliu, 79–81, Map 4 Yuan Shu 袁術, 19, 23, 31, 48, 51–2, 54,
You province 幽州, 81, 121, 123, 140, 56–60, 67–70, 76–7, 79, 81, 84–6, 88,
149, 159, 218, 221, 226–31, Map 3, 92, 97–8, 100–5, 107, 109–11, 115,
Map 8, Map 10, Map 21; Governor, 117, 120, 125, 149, 159, 160–1, 163,
57, 68, 121, 162, 229; Inspector, 208, 165, 179, 191, 251, 259–62, 300, 358,
221–2, 225 414, 418, 450, 471, 496
Youbeiping 右北平 commandery in Yuan Si 袁嗣, 85
You province, 162, 228–9, 233–5, Yuan Tan 袁譚, 23, 89, 116, 121, 123,
Map 3, Map 21 146, 149, 151, 199, 203, 208–10,
Youfufeng 右扶風 commandery in Sili, 213–7, 219–21, 236, 262, 264, 330,
311, Map 1, Map 7, Map 15, Map 17, 340, 359, 404, 415, 446
Map 21; Administrator, 315 Yuan Xi 袁熙, 24, 203, 208, 218–9, 221,
youting 遊艇 “Patrol Boats,” 280–1 227, 230, 235, 359, 370, 457, 460, 474
Yu province 豫州, 85, 102, 105, 107, Yuan Wei 袁隗, 54
132, 134–5, 149, 192, Map 1, Map 4, Yuan Zhong 袁忠, 448–9
Map 5, Map 6, Map 7, Map 8, Map 9, Yuan Zhun 袁準 [third century], 23
Map 13, Map 14, Map 16, Map 19, Yue Jin 樂進, 231, 289, 316, 446
Map 20, Map 21; Governor, 102; Yue ling 月令 “The Ordinances of the
Inspector, 52, 98–101, 129 Months,” 294
Yu 俞 family of Wu commandery, 19 Yue Yi 樂毅 [ancient general], 360
Yu 虞 family of Jian’an 建安 [fourteenth yuefu 樂府 [literary genre], 237, 344–6,
century], 486–7 349–50, 504; and see Music, Office of,
Yu 虞, the Lady, concubine of Cao Rui, and poetry
460 Yufuluo 於夫羅 [Xiongnu], 62, 70, 161,
Yu gong 禹貢 “Tribute of Yu” chapter 211
of Shi jing, 391 Yulin 鬱林 commandery in Jiaozhi/Jiao
Yu Huan 魚豢, 36, 208, 291, 370, 465 province, Map 13, Map 21
Yu Jin 于禁, 106, 125–6, 211, 231, 304, Yumen Pass 玉門關 (Gate of Jade), 350
430–2, 434, 441, 446 Yuyang 漁陽 commandery in You
Yu Xuanwu bei zuo 於玄武陂作 province, 123, 221, 231, 234, Map 3,
“On a Visit to the Dark Warrior Map 21
Embankment” poem by Cao Pi, 412 Yuzhang 豫章 commandery in Yang
Yuan 袁 family of Runan, 22, 128, 135, province, 188, 262, 454, Map 13,
141, 207, 211, 218, 242, 251, 259, Map 16, Map 21
265
Yuan Cheng 袁成, 208 Zaji 雜記 “Miscellany” by Sun Sheng
Yuan Feng 袁逢, 19, 60 孫盛, see Yitong zayu
Yuan Hong 袁宏 [fourth century], 387, zaju 雜劇 [“variety plays”], 485–6, 498
439, 508 Zang Ba 臧霸, 97, 111, 128, 149, 150
Yuan Huan 袁渙/煥, 394, 396 Zang Hong 臧洪, 80, 180
Yuan Ji 袁基, 54 zangtian 蒼天, see Blue Heaven
Yuan Shang 袁尚, 199, 203, 208–11, Zao Zhi 棗祗, 78, 91
213–7, 219–22, 227, 230, 235–6, 251, Zhan lue 戰略 “An Account of the
262, 264, 330, 340, 359 War” by Sima Biao 司馬彪, 212
Yuan Shao 袁紹 (style Benchu 本初), 3, 6, Zhan Wancheng 戰宛城 “Fighting at
19, 25, 31, 43–8, 51–61, 63–70, 72– 77, Wan City” [drama], 105, 497, 498,
79–81, 84–5, 87–9, 98–100, 104, 106–8, 499
111–4, 116, 119–152, 153, 159, 161, Zhang River 漳水, 179, 180, 214,
169, 171, 174–5, 179–180, 182–3, 185, 216, 335, 336, 338, Map 2, Map 10,
188, 193, 197–201, 203–4, 206–9, 213, Map 11, Map 18
218, 220, 226, 229, 236, 244, 251, 254, Zhang 張, the Lady, mother of Zhang
261–2, 272–3, 300, 304, 329, 334, 339, Lu, 246, 247, 293
340, 358–9, 364–7, 370, 374, 377, 385, Zhang Chang 張昶, 379
416, 443, 447, 464, 471, 474, 478, 494 Zhang Chao 張超, 54, 79
552 index
Zhang Cheng 張晟 alias White Rider Zhang Xuecheng 張學誠 [Qing] 493
白騎, 222, 224 Zhang Yan 張燕 or Zhang Feiyan 飛燕,
Zhang Chun 張純, 228 42, 82, 179, 161, 165, 216, 220, 223–4
Zhang Chunhua, the Lady 張春華, 246 Zhang Yan 張琰, of Hongnong, 223
Zhang Daoling 張道陵, see Zhang Ling Zhang Yang 張楊, 67, 77, 84, 86–7, 127
張陵 Zhang Yi 張揖 [fourth century], 282
Zhang Fei 張飛, 99–100, 268, 290, 309, Zhang Yin 張隱 [third/fourth century],
315, 426, 477, 481–2, 484–6, 488, 491, 118
495, 497–8 Zhang Yu 張預 [Song], 326
Zhang Feiyan 張飛燕, see Zhang Yan Zhang Yun 張允, 264
Zhang He 張郃, 98, 145–6, 151, 305, Zhang Zhao 張昭, 80, 189, 270, 276, 288
307, 315, 426–8 Zhang Zhi 張芝, 404
Zhang Heng 張衡, 118, 293, 344 Zhang Zhi 張騭 [third/fourth century],
Zhang Hong 張纮, 157 118, 379
Zhang Hua 張華 [third century], 348, zhanjian 戰艦 “Fighting Junks,” see
351, 379, 447, 464 doujian 鬬艦
Zhang Huan 張奐, 12 Zhangye 張掖 commandery in Liang
Zhang Ji 張既, officer of Cao Cao, 105, province, Map 21
211, 224, 258, 299, 303, 498–9 Zhao 趙 kingdom/commandery in Ji
Zhang Ji 張濟, sometime officer of province, Map 3, Map 10, Map 21
Dong Zhuo, 165, 211 Zhao 趙 [ancient state], 360, 367
Zhang Jia 張嘉, see sub Zhang Xi Zhao, Later 後趙 [medieval state], 338
Zhang Jian 張儉, 50 Zhao 趙, the Lady, concubine of Cao
Zhang Ju 張舉, 228 Cao, 403, 405
Zhang Jue 張角, 36–8, 42, 160–1, 292, Zhao Ang 趙昂, 199, 305
294 Zhao Dechang 趙德昌, Emperor
Zhang Kai 張闓, 71–2, 74 Zhenzong of Northern Song, 480
Zhang Lei 張耒 [Song], 480 Zhao Du 趙犢, 222
Zhang Liang 張良 [Former Han], 320, Zhao Gao 趙高, 129, 360
322 Zhao Qi 趙岐
Zhang Liao 張遼, 111, 137, 204–5, 235, Zhao Ta 趙達, 372–3, 377
242, 289, 316, 318, 446, 486 Zhao Wen 趙溫, 112, 244–5
Zhang Ling 張陵 or Zhang Daoling Zhao Yan 趙彥, executed by Cao Cao,
道陵, 291–3 116, 132, 141, 464
Zhang Lu 張魯, 6, 36–7, 126, 160, 287, Zhao Yan 趙儼, officer of Cao Cao, 186,
291–5, 304–9, 311, 313–5, 318, 393, 254, 315, 432
395, 425–6, 429 Zhao Yiqing 趙一淸 [Qing], 23, 86
Zhang Lu, mother of, 293 Zhao Yue 趙月, 199
Zhang Miao 張邈, 52, 54–5, 68, 76–9, 127 Zhao Yun 趙雲, 200, 268, 289, 290, 309,
Zhang Rang 張讓, 30 479, 503
Zhang Shi 張栻 [Song], 490 Zhao Yun biezhuan 趙雲别傳
Zhang Song 張松, 308 “Secondary Biography of Zhao Yun”,
Zhang Wei 張衞, 313–4 290
Zhang, White Rider 張白騎, see Zhang Zhe 柘 in Chen, fief of Cao Cao, 362
Cheng 張晟 Zhen 甄, the Lady, posthumous bride of
Zhang Xi 張喜 or Zhang Jia 嘉, Cao Chong, 407
Excellency at Chang’an, 112 Zhen 甄, the Lady, wife of Yuan Xi,
Zhang Xi 張喜, general of Cao Cao, 192 later concubine of Cao Pi, 24, 218,
Zhang Xian 張羨, 126, 150, 261, 275 370, 444, 457, 459–60, 474
Zhang Xiu 張脩, sect leader of Yi Zheng lun 政論 “On Government” by
province, 292–4 Cui Shi 崔寔, 373–5
Zhang Xiu 張繡, military man, 6, 27, Zheng lun 正論 “On Proper Conduct”
97–9, 105–8, 126–7, 133–5, 141, 150, by Yuan Zhun 袁準, 23
164–5, 173, 175, 189, 194, 201, 258, Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, 245
262, 300, 366–7, 401, 404, 497, 499 Zheng Zhong 鄭眾, 15
index 553
Zhong lun 中論 “Discussions of the Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, the Hongwu

Mean” or “Balanced Discourses” by 洪武 Emperor of Ming, 492
Xu Gan 徐幹, 348 Zhu Zhi 朱治, 19, 25
Zhong Yao 鍾繇, 68, 106–7, 126, 211–2, Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (style Kongming
223, 226, 231, 258, 291, 295–6, 376, 孔明), 189–90, 200, 210, 263–4,
379, 394–5, 420 269–70, 275, 277, 285, 289, 307, 309,
Zhongchang Tong 仲長統, 252–3, 348, 331, 455, 459, 465, 467, 474, 477, 481,
374–5, 442 483–6, 488, 491, 494–5, 497–8
Zhongshan 中山 kingdom/commandery Collected Works 諸葛亮集 compiled
in Ji province, 98, 217, 219, 390, by Chen Shou, 465
Map 3, Map 10, Map 21 Zhuo 涿 commandery in You province,
Zhongmou 中牟 in Henan, 124, Map 2, 36, 99, 160, 219, 222, Map 3, Map 10,
Map 9 Map 21
Zhou 周 [ancient dynasty], 355, 361, Zhuo fang Cao 捉放曹 “Capture and
363, 370 Release of Cao Cao” [drama], 49, 497
Duke of Zhou 周公, 355, 361, 363, zi 子 [noble title] “Viscount,” 383–4,
370 390
King Cheng 成王, 361, 363 Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 by Sima Guang
King Wen 文王, 322, 360, 363, 368 司馬光, 10, 387, 468–9, 483, 490
King Wu 武王, 322, 487, 502 Zizhi tongjian gangmu 資治通鑑綱目
Zhou 紏, ancient King of Shang/Yin, by Zhu Xi 朱熹, 469, 483, 490
322, 370, 487, 502 Zong Cheng 宗承, 475
Zhou 周, the Lady, concubine of Cao Zou, the Lady 鄒氏 [fictional character],
Cao, 127, 403, 405 498–9
Zhou Bo 周勃 [Former Han], 129 zouge 走舸 ships: “Flying Barques,”
Zhou Buyi 周不疑, 407 280–1
Zhou Jing 周旌, 40 Zuo Ce 左慈, 351
Zhou Xin 周昕, 50, 56, 159 Zuo Guan 左悺/悹, 129
Zhou Yu 周喁 of Kuaiji, 49–50, 56–7, 60 Zuo Si 左思 [third century], 242, 335–6,
Zhou Yu 周瑜 (style Gongjin 公瑾), of 338
Lujiang, general of Sun Quan, 50, 183, Zuo zhuan 左傳, 24, 35, 130–1, 264,
196, 241, 263, 269–78, 287, 289–90, 324, 362; and see Chunqiu
306–7, 433, 482–4, 488, 494–5, 498 Zuopingyi 左馮翊 commandery in Sili,
Zhu Jun 朱儁, 39, 157–8, 410 211, 296, 300, Map 1, Map 7, Map 15,
Zhu Ling 朱靈, 296, 300 Map 21
Zhu Xi 朱熹 [Song], 451, 469 Zuoxiao 左校, see Enclosure on the Left
Map 21. The Empire of Han in 189 AD
This map shows the provinces, commanderies, kingdoms and
dependent states [DS] about 189, the time of the death of
Emperor Ling of Later Han. For the generality of the empire,
commandery units are shown with their boundaries, but on the
North China plain they are indicated by the sites of their capi-
tals, with abbreviated names as listed below:
Ji province Qing province

AP Anping BH Beihai
BH Bohai DL Donglai
BL Boling JN Ji’nan
CS Changshan LA Le’an
GL Ganling PY Pingyuan
HJ Hejian Q Qi
JL Julu
W Wei Xu province
Z Zhao DH Donghai
ZS Zhongshan GL Guangling
LY Langye
Yan province PC Pengcheng
CL Chenliu XP Xiapi
D Dong commandery
DP Dongping Yu province
JB Jibei C Chen
JY Jiyin L Liang
RC Rencheng Lu Lu
SY Shanyang P Pei
TS Taishan RN Runan
YC Yingchuan
NOTES
When Liu Hong 劉宏, Emperor Ling, came to the throne in
169, the name of Hongnong 弘農 commandery was changed to
Hengnong 恆農 to accord with the taboo on his personal name.
The variant form, however, seldom appears in the records.
The administrative headquarters of Anding, Beidi, Shang,
Shuofang and Xihe had been withdrawn from those frontier
regions during the disturbances of the Xiongnu in the early
140s. Though the commanderies were formally maintained on
the map, Chinese imperial authority in the Ordos region was
now very slight.
Apart from these and a few lesser changes of name and
boundaries, the official geography of China at the death of
Emperor Ling was essentially the same as at the time of the
census during the reign of Emperor Shun about 140 AD. In the
years of rebellion and civil war, however, a multitude of new
units were set up. The regional maps which accompany this
work reflect local changes where appropriate.

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Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

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List of Maps and Tables .................................................................... xi

Chapter One Grandson of a Eunuch 155–189 ........................... 9

Chapter Two To Guard the Emperor 190–196 .......................... 51

Chapter Three To Battle at Guandu 197–200 ............................ 97

Chapter Four The Conduct of Civil War .................................... 153

Chapter Five Conquest of the North 201–207 ........................... 203

Chapter Six Red Cliffs 208 ............................................................. 241

Chapter Seven Military Matters 209–217 .................................... 287

Chapter Eight Court and Capital .................................................. 333

Chapter Nine Tensions of Loyalty 210–217 ............................... 381

Chapter Ten The Last Years 218–220 .......................................... 423

Chapter Eleven Another Life: History, Anecdote

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 507

Index ..................................................................................................... 525

Table 1. The Cao, Xiaohou and Ding families ............................. 21

Map 1. Sili Province: the capital region ........................................ 47

less. Once he gained the opportunity to command, he sought men of

Some Technical Matters

All dates are given as AD unless otherwise specified. While recognis-

A Summary Chronology of Cao Cao

155 birth of Cao Cao

GRANDSON OF A EUNUCH 155–189

The problems of Later Han

155 birth of Cao Cao

The problems of Later Han1

power extended from the Korean peninsula to the coast of Vietnam,

These matters, however, were of no great concern to the impe-

offer meaningful assistance in time of famine or other misfortune, and

The financial problems of the regime were compounded by the politi-

The eunuch connection12

Much of the information from the tomb complex is fragmentary,

Table 1 A Summary of the Alleged Connections Between

Cao Meng/Jie marriage connection? Xiahou

Cao Bao Cao Ding Cao ? Cao Teng [eunuch]

Cao Cao (155–220) Cao Bin Cao Yu Cao De Xiahou Dun

second marriage one son [Cao Anmin (d.197)] + two daughters

many other concubines

Cao Chong nineteen other the Lady Cao Jie other

Young man about town

name of Mengde 孟德 “Great Virtue.” The character cao 操 sounded

mous title as Respectful Duke of Ji, a county in Guangyang. [Confusingly, there

of Confucian classics to be inscribed on stele, as a means to prevent forgery by Acad-

subverted the Wei. He had therefore no reason to protect Cao Cao’s

Another anecdote, preserved in the anthology Shishuo xinyu, tells

Regardless of conduct, Cao Cao gained a good education. He became

man barely twenty to be granted such responsibility, and though the

that of a Japanese geisha or an ancient Greek hetaera, an entertainer

identified such trouble-makers as yaoze 妖賊 “religious rebels,” but the

Like the worship of Huang-Lao, the concept of a utopian age of

Zhang Jue, however, was determined on rebellion. He had disciples

Though there was at this time no alternative to the current imperial

ably an extension and some form of revival of the defeated cause.83

Liu Xie.86 In the summer of 189, however, before he had announced

Map 1. Sili Province: the capital region

TO GUARD THE EMPEROR

To govern Yan province 190–192

194 spring: Cao Cao withdraws from Xu province