Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

DOI 10.1007/s10743-010-9084-4

Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation

Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Dan Zahavi

Published online: 10 December 2010

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and
Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The
main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.

1 The Background

In his contribution, DeRoo states that he hopes that his attempt at clarification can
help to mediate the debate between myself on the one side and Brough and
Sokolowski on the other by providing a neutral vocabulary within which proponents
of each side can exchange their views (DeRoo 2011, p. 11). Earlier in the text,
DeRoo also writes, however, that the ‘‘Zahavi vs. Brough/Sokolowski’’ debate on
the three levels of consciousness identified in Zur Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins is to some extent not really a debate, since it by and large consists
of ‘‘Zahavi’s critiques of Brough and Sokolowski, followed by Zahavi’s elaboration
of what he takes to be a more accurate account of Husserl’s theory of
consciousness’’ (DeRoo 2011, p. 2). DeRoo then points to my discussion in
Self-awareness and Alterity (1999) as containing my most substantial contribution,

I completed the present text before having a chance to read John Brough’s contribution to this issue of
Husserl Studies. Instead, I mainly engaged with another recent article by Brough (2010). After having
finished my own contribution, I did, however, receive a copy of Brough’s new text, and as far as I can
judge the two new pieces by him neatly complement each other.

D. Zahavi (&)
Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication,
University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140–142, 2300 Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: dza@hum.ku.dk

123
14 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

while at the same acknowledging that I have discussed the issue of self-awareness in
other works, including some articles from 1998, 2000, and 2003.1
I welcome DeRoo’s reflections, but might just as well start by stating that I find
the outline just provided partly incorrect. There has been more of an exchange and
development in the debate since my 1999 publication, though these developments
have also remained somewhat unacknowledged. If nothing else, one aim of the
present discussion might precisely be to bring out some of the twists and turns of the
discussion, which remain unaddressed in DeRoo’s paper.
Brough and I have twice had a chance to discuss our respective interpretations in
public. The first occasion was during a book session on Self-awareness and Alterity
at the 31st Meeting of the Husserl Circle in Bloomington back in 2001, where
Brough commented on my book. The second occasion was during a book session on
my Husserl’s Phenomenology at the 43rd SPEP meeting in 2004, where Brough had
again kindly agreed to be one of the commentators. One of the outcomes of this
exchange, especially of the first meeting in 2001, was that I realized certain
ambiguities in my interpretation which I subsequently tried to clarify. To put it
differently, I came to realize that Brough took me to be defending a view which I
actually didn’t endorse. On the basis of our discussion, and on the basis of a
renewed reading of Husserl’s Bernau Manuscripts, I consequently sought to clarify
my position further, and this modified interpretation found a first form in my article
‘‘Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts’’ published in Husserl
Studies in 2004. It was subsequently taken up again in chapter 3 of my 2005
book Subjectivity and Selfhood, and in a recent 2010 article entitled ‘‘Inner
(time-)consciousness’’. Unfortunately, DeRoo doesn’t consider any of these latter
publications. This is unfortunate, not only because they represent a renewed attempt
to present my view, but also because they specifically seek to clear away some of
the misinterpretations that my 1999 book gave rise to; misinterpretations which I
explicitly distanced myself from at the Bloomington meeting in 2001, and which
DeRoo still ascribes to me.
Whereas I expressis verbis have criticized Sokolowski’s and Brough’s view in a
number of my own publications, and whereas a number of other Husserl scholars
(including Hart 2001; Kortooms 2002; Dodd 2005; Drummond 2006; Micali 2010;
Niel 2010) have commented on the debate, the other side has admittedly been more
reticent. To my knowledge, Sokolowski has never responded to the criticism.
Brough, however, has not merely acted as a commentator. In a new essay entitled
‘‘Notes on the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness’’ Brough offers a
thorough defense of his tripartite interpretation of Husserl’s theory of inner time-
consciousness. He only mentions my name a few times in the essay, but I still have
the distinct impression that the essay can be read as a rejoinder to my criticism. I
might be mistaken, but in his essay Brough does in any case address most of the
objections that I raised in my 1999 publication. Unfortunately, Brough also sticks to
that original publication, and doesn’t engage with my more recent work.
Nevertheless, his essay is a substantial contribution to the debate for the following

1
In fact, neither of the two latter publications engage in any detailed analysis of Husserl’s theory of inner
time-consciousness.

123
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25 15

reason: Given his current formulations—and as I will come back to later, I think there
is an important difference between his original account, i.e., the one we find in his
classical 1972 article, which was also the target of my criticism, and his present
one—I think the difference between our respective views has dwindled considerably.
In fact, the difference is now so small that one might ask whether it still makes sense
to talk of two distinct interpretations.

2 Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

The discussion and interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-

consciousness that I presented in Self-awareness and Alterity was motivated, guided
and structured by the overarching theme of that book: The issue of self-awareness or
self-consciousness.2 It is, in other words, important to understand that my interest
did not really concern temporality per se, but rather what we might learn about the
nature of self-consciousness through a study of Husserl’s investigations of time-
consciousness. From the very start, I emphasized that it was possible to find textual
evidence in support of several different interpretations, and that my own preference
was for an interpretation of time-consciousness that, while textually grounded,
would at the same time provide us with the most plausible account of
self-consciousness. To put it differently, I was arguing that Husserl’s most profound
investigation of the latter was to be found in his analysis of the former, and that
bearing this in mind would allow for a new interpretation of his lectures and
manuscripts on time. In defending such a view, I was at the same time criticizing a
number of philosophers working on self-consciousness, whose depiction of Husserl
as a reflection theorist I rejected. This included authors such as Frank, Cramer, Gloy
and Henrich who were not normally discussed by scholars writing on Husserl’s
account of inner time-consciousness.
There was also another critical dimension to my interpretation. It was set up in
opposition to what I on different occasions have called the internal object
interpretation. On this interpretation, Husserl’s account involved a distinction
between three different levels or layers. Level one would be the region of
transcendent temporal objects such as trains, houses, and symphonies. Level two
would be the region of experiences (Erlebnisse), and would include the intentional
acts aimed at the objects on level one, and also the different immanent sensory
contents. Level three would be the experiencing (Erleben) of the unities on level
two. Just as we should distinguish between the constituted dimension in which
transcendent objects exist and the constituting dimension that permits them to
appear, we should distinguish between the constituted dimension in which the acts
exist and the constituting dimension that permits them to appear. The acts are
temporal objects existing in subjective or immanent time, but they are constituted by
a deeper dimension of subjectivity, namely, by the absolute flow of inner time-
consciousness. Thus, according to the internal object interpretation the absolute flow
makes us aware of the acts or Erlebnisse as temporal objects in immanent time. This

2
In the following, I will be using both terms interchangeably.

123
16 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

interpretation is one that has been defended by both Brough and Sokolowski. In his
classical contribution ‘‘The emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl’s
early writings on time-consciousness,’’ Brough repeatedly writes that we have to
distinguish ‘‘the level of constituted immanent objects and that of the absolute time-
constituting flow of consciousness’’ (Brough 1972, p. 315), and that we more
generally speaking have to respect the difference between the ‘‘self-appearance of
the flow’’ and the ‘‘marginal awareness of immanent objects’’ (Brough 1972,
p. 318). In Husserlian Meditations, Sokolowski gives voice to a similar view and
writes as follows:
In perceiving (a) something in the world, I also experience (b) my act of
perceiving and its ingredient sensations, which are constituted as inner objects;
my act of perceiving can give away to an act of reflection which focuses on the
act of perceiving or its sensations. The act of reflection is itself an inner object
and, like all inner objects, is experienced and constituted by (c) the absolute
flow of inner time-consciousness (Sokolowski 1974, p. 156).
I found and continue to find this way of accounting for time-consciousness
problematic. Already in my 1999 book, I did, however, acknowledge that there were
passages in Husserl that could be read in support of this interpretation. And in my
2004 article, I went even further and said that the validity of the internal object
interpretation did not merely depend on a number of ambiguous passages in
Husserl’s writings on time, but that on the contrary there were texts in the Bernau
Manuscripts that quite unequivocally supported the internal object interpretation.
To concede that the internal object interpretation is textually supported is not to
concede, however, that the theory it advocates is a correct theory, nor does it
exclude the possibility that Husserl elsewhere advocated quite different views. And
in fact my claim has always been twofold: (1) That Husserl also defended a different
account, namely one that took us to be aware of our own ongoing experiences in an
immediate, pre-reflective, and non-objectifying manner, i.e., not as internal objects,
and (2) that this account was systematically more convincing. In order to reject my
interpretation and in order to unconditionally endorse the internal object interpre-
tation, it is, in short, not sufficient simply to find textual evidence that unequivocally
supports it. It is also necessary to demonstrate (1) that Husserl did not advance any
serious alternative, and (2) that the internal object account is both cogent and
systematically convincing. In my view, neither of these two conditions has been
met.
What is wrong with the internal object interpretation? Why does it provide us
with a wrong understanding of the working of inner time-consciousness? I have
elaborated on this question at length elsewhere, so let me here just summarize the
main point.
It is relatively, but not completely, uncontroversial to concede that we, under
certain circumstances, are aware of our own experiences as immanent objects,
namely, whenever we reflect. If I reflect on my current perception of my Ipad and
reflectively try to discern and articulate the different structures of this perception, I
do seem to be confronted with a rather peculiar immanent object. In the Bernau
Manuscripts, Husserl called these objects of reflection ‘‘noetic objects’’ (Hua

123
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25 17

XXXIII, p. 449). The crucial question, however, is whether our experiences are also
given as objects in inner time-consciousness prior to reflection. Is their primary
givenness a form of object-manifestation? This is what the internal object account
claims, but is it true? Not only do I think it is wrong from a purely descriptive point
of view—in my everyday life, I am absorbed by and preoccupied with projects and
objects in the world, I am not aware of my own stream of consciousness as a
succession of immanent objects—but I also find the view theoretically misleading.
To say that the acts are originally given as objects for an inner consciousness, to
interpret their primary givenness as an object-manifestation, that is, as the result of a
process of objectification, leads us back into a version of the reflection theory, and is
therefore also vulnerable to the standard arguments raised against this kind of
theory. In fact a frequent criticism of Husserl (by Heidegger, by the Heidelberg
school, by Tugendhat etc.) has been precisely that he did defend a reflection-
theoretical account of self-consciousness, and that this constitutes a major flaw in
his theory. I take it that one of the virtues of my interpretation is that it presented us
with a reading of Husserl that would immunize him against this criticism.
Brough emphasizes that Husserl frequently speaks of acts as temporal objects
(Brough 2010, p. 34). In fact, Husserl does this so frequently that it cannot simply
have been a question of an occasional slip of the pen. I agree. In fact I have no
problem accepting that acts are occasionally given as temporal objects. The problem
is when they are given in such manner. Are they already given so pre-reflectively, or
are they only given so reflectively?3 Much depends on what precisely we mean
when we speak of something being an object.4 For Husserl, for something to be an
object is for that something to consciously appear in a specific manner. More
specifically, for x to be considered an object is for x to appear as transcending the
subjective consciousness that takes it as an object. It is to appear as something that
stands in opposition to, or over against, the subjective experience of it (cf. the
German term Gegen-stand). Given these considerations, I don’t think it makes much
sense to insist that our experiences are given as objects when we are absorbed by or
immersed in our daily projects and simply live through the experiences. They are
not something we observe from a distance and they do not stand opposite us. This,

3
In the following, I will focus on reflection, but we shouldn’t forget that memory can also exemplify a
form of reflection. When I remember a past episode, I am usually concerned with the episode, i.e., with
how the world was, and not with my past experience of it. But I always have the opportunity to reflect. I
can reflect upon my current recollection of the past promenade, but I can also reflect upon my past
experience of the promenade. As Husserl writes, ‘‘Die von der geraden Erinnerung, etwa eines Hauses,
abbiegende Selbsterinnerung enthüllt nicht das gegenwärtige Ich, das der aktuellen Wahrnehmungen
(darunter der jetzigen Wiedererinnerung selbst als Gegenwartserleben), sondern das vergangene Ich, das
zu dem eigenen intentionalen Wesen des erinnerten Hauses gehört, als das, für das es da war, und da war
in den und den subjektiven Bewußtseinsmodis. Erinnerung ist ihrem Wesen nach nicht nur In-Geltung-
haben eines Vergangenen, sondern dieses Vergangenen als eines von mir Wahrgenommenen und eines
sonstwie Bewußtgewesenen; und eben dieses in gerader Erinnerung anonyme vergangene Ich und
Bewußtsein kommt in einer Reflexion (Reflexion nicht auf das jetzige Erinnern, sondern ‘in’ ihm) zur
Enthüllung’’ (Hua VII, p. 264).
4
An interesting illustration of this can be found in Galen Strawson’s work on self. Strawson vigorously
defends the claim that the self is an object. From a phenomenological perspective this claim will sound
quite problematic. However, it is worth noticing the specific definition of object provided by Strawson. As
he writes ‘‘to be an object (if objects exist) is simply to be a ‘strong unity’’’ (Strawson 2009, p. 298).

123
18 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

however, is precisely what can happen when we reflect. In reflection, we can place
ourselves in contrast to a part of our own experiential life. We can distance
ourselves from an experience and seize it as an object. But whereas we in reflection
are confronted with a situation involving two experiences, where one (the reflected
upon) can appear as an object for the other (the reflecting), we are on the pre-
reflective level only dealing with a single experience, and one experience cannot
appear as an object to itself, cannot stand opposed to itself, in the requisite way.
In his recent contribution, Brough suggests that it might be better to avoid talking
of experiences in terms of internal objects, and now proposes to talk of them as units
instead (Brough 2010, p. 37). Indeed, in contrast to the preferred terminology in his
1972 paper, Brough now argues that it is reflection that makes experiences into
objects, whereas prior to reflection we enjoy a non-objectifying awareness of the
experiences. As he points out, experiencing (another term for the absolute time-
constituting flow of consciousness) is not an act with an intentional object, it is not
an experience alongside others, but a primal, implicit, non-objectifying form of self-
awareness (Brough 2010, pp. 27, 36). I obviously agree with this (cf. Zahavi 1999,
p. 72), and it does highlight an important issue. If our experiences are only given as
demarcated objects through the process of reflection, how are they then given pre-
reflectively? As a kind of homogeneous porridge, or rather as possessing some form
of pre-objective discreteness? In short, are experiences already given as distinct
from one another pre-reflectively? Brough favors the latter option, and as he rightly
points out: ‘‘If experiences were not thus distinct from one another prereflectively,
reflection’s ability to pick out its objects would be mysterious indeed. In the absence
of prominences, of peaks and valleys in prereflective experience, there would be
nothing to guide reflection in making its objectifying cuts’’ (Brough 2010, p. 39).
In my 1999 book, I quoted a passage from a manuscript where Husserl compares
the intentional experiences to waves. As he writes, ‘‘Consciousness is a unity. An
act is nothing independent, it is a wave in the stream of consciousness’’ (Ms. L I 15
2b).5 Brough now picks up on this and argues that the distinction between the flow
(or stream) and the wave is a helpful metaphor, since it allows us to better
understand the discreteness of the experienced acts. Waves may not be things, but
they are still demarcated from one another, they can become prominent and stand
out, enjoying a fleeting individuality (Brough 2010, pp. 39–40).
I agree with this, and I think that a brief Bergsonian digression might be
informative here. According to Bergson, we ordinarily think of our stream of
consciousness as consisting of a temporal sequence of conscious states, ranged
alongside one another so as to form a discrete multiplicity, a bit in analogy with
spatial objects, which might also be perceived as distinct, isolated entities,
externally related to one another. But time understood in such a fashion is for
Bergson something utterly distinct from and alien to the lived time that is unique to
and distinctive of consciousness, and which he terms true or pure duration (Bergson
1910, p. 91). Indeed, time conceived as a homogenous medium in which our
conscious states are spread out so as to form a series composed of separate and
distinct elements that stand in external relations to one another, like wagons in a

5
‘‘Bewußtsein ist eine Einheit. Ein Akt ist nichts für sich, er ist Welle im Bewußtseinsstrom.’’

123
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25 19

train, is for Bergson a spurious conception, one due to the transposition of the idea
of space onto the field of consciousness (Bergson 1910, pp. 98–99). To think of time
as a line presupposes a view from above, a view that, so to speak, takes it in all at
once; but this merely reveals that simultaneity and thereby spatiality pervades such
a conception of time. In fact, for Bergson, this conception of time basically betrays
what is essential to time in favor of space (Bergson 1910, pp. 91, 98).
If through vigorous effort we manage to intuit the true character of conscious-
ness, we will, according to Bergson, soon realize that true duration has nothing in
common with space (Bergson 1910, pp. 90–91). It is not quantifiable, and the
moment we treat it as such and try to measure it, we will do violence to it (Bergson
1910, p. 106). Indeed, in pure duration, conscious states are not distinct but united.
They are characterized by a dynamical self-organization, where they melt into and
permeate one another without precise outlines. In fact, on this level, there is no real
difference between the persistence of one state and the transition to another state.
They intermingle in such a way that we cannot tell whether they are one or several.
We cannot examine or approach them from this point of view at all without altering
and distorting them (Bergson 1910, p. 137). To isolate one conscious state is
consequently not like detaching one independent element from another, but rather
like tearing off a fragment of material from a whole that is thereby left in tatters.
In reality, consciousness is nothing jointed; it simply flows. Rather than being a
quantitative succession of separate bits, the stream of consciousness is a qualitative
continuity without distinctions, where the different states are characterized by
mutual penetration and interconnection (Bergson 1910, pp. 105, 107). However,
unwittingly we will start to introduce spatial notions and categories into our
understanding of experiential life. Distinctions we find among objects in the
external world will be transposed and introjected into subjectivity, but thereby its
character will be altered dramatically (Bergson 1910, p. 90). Indeed, for Bergson,
we are dealing with structures so unique that they cannot be grasped by means of
language or through any form of intellectual cognition. Reason can isolate,
immobilize, and spatialize the flow of lived experiences and thereby make them
accessible to verbal description and analytic reflection. But the true life of
consciousness cannot be caught in our conceptual network. It will always overflow
our artificial demarcations and distinctions.
Is this a model we should endorse? I think there are various problems with
Bergson’s proposal (cf. Zahavi 2010b). It might be right to say that experiences
cannot be separated as neatly from one another as coaches on a train. A coach has a
clearly demarcated unity, it is easy to say when it starts and when it ends, and it
doesn’t stop being a coach if it is separated from the rest of the train. But is it also
true that there are no distinct conscious states in lived time, but that they rather
intermingle to such an extent that we cannot tell whether they are one or several?
Consider the following situation. You are sitting and enjoying a glass of wine.
Suddenly your reveries are interrupted by the phone. It is your mother asking
whether you have remembered to buy a wedding gift for your nephew. You
embarrassingly confess that you have forgotten all about it. Now, whereas it would
be quite right to stress the qualitative continuity of the temporal phases of an
experience—say, the auditory experience of your mother’s voice—it is just not right

123
20 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

to divide that experience up into separate and externally related time-slices; more
arguments need to be put on the table to make the case that the experience of wine-
tasting and the experience of embarrassment are not two different experiences. On
the face of it, a denial of their distinctness just seems wrong.6
But back to Brough. In considering the merits of the wave metaphor, Brough also
remarks that one advantage of this metaphor is that it emphasizes the inseparability
of flow and acts: ‘‘The flow could not exist or present itself independently of the
experiences it constitutes, for it simply is the experiencing of experiences and would
be nothing without them. By the same token, experiences are what they are only as
experienced’’ (Brough 2010, p. 40). I agree completely.7 One page later, however,
Brough dwells on what he terms the ‘‘question of unwarranted complexity.’’ He
refers to my alleged argument against the idea that there are two levels within
consciousness (Brough 2010, p. 49), and briefly considers what he calls a simpler
account, that is an account that only operates with the level of the flow of
experiences. On such an account, my pre-reflective experiencing of acts as
immanent temporal unities would occur through the acts themselves. Each act
would be intrinsically self-aware, and the consciousness of acts as coexisting or
succeeding one another would come about, not through a distinct absolute flow, but
through acts being aware of other acts. No distinct absolute flow would be required
(Brough 2010, p. 41).
This model, which Brough presumably ascribes to me, is one that he rejects. As
he points out, it is ‘‘difficult to understand how any one act or even several acts
could account for the abiding awareness I have of my conscious life as an ongoing
flow of successive and coexistent experiences’’ (Brough 2010, p. 42). Rather, it
‘‘would seem, then, that acts are not originally constituted by themselves or by other
6
Tye has recently defended a view somewhat similar to Bergson’s. Tye considers the problem of how a
sequence of experiences is unified to be a pseudo-problem, since on his account we are never aware of our
experiences as unified or as continuing through time or as succeeding one another. If I have an experience
of a red flash followed by a green flash, I experience two colored flashes as occurring one after the other. I
do not experience my experience of a green flash as succeeding my experience of a red flash any more
than I experience my experience of a red flash as red. Continuity, change and succession are features of
the items experienced and not features of the experiences (Tye 2003, pp. 96–97).
7
It is, however, also important not to overlook a certain ambiguity inherent to the metaphor. The relation
between the stream (of consciousness) and the waves (the experiences) is not identical to the relation
between the experiencing and the experiences. The latter relation has nothing to do with the former
relation, which is a relation between a whole and its moments. In the following quotation it is obviously
the latter that Husserl has in mind: ‘‘Unser Weltbewußtseinsleben ist ein kontinuierlicher Strom des
‘Erlebens’, verlaufend in mannigfaltigen Sondererlebnissen als unselbständigen Momenten, als Wellen
gleichsam dieses Stromes. Ein jedes ist nicht nur ‘Welle des Stromes’, also Teil eines Ganzen, des
Lebensganzen, sondern in jedem ist etwas erlebt’’ (Hua XXIX, p. 194). That this notion of ‘‘Erlebens’’
should not be confused with the experiencing of the absolute time-constituting flow is clear from the
following passage: ‘‘Diese strömend lebendige Gegenwart ist nicht das, was wir sonst auch schon
transzendental-phänomenologisch als Bewusstseinsstrom oder Erlebnisstrom bezeichneten. Es ist
überhaupt kein ‘Strom’ gemäß dem Bild, also ein eigentlich zeitliches (oder gar zeiträumliches) Ganzes,
das in der Einheit einer zeitlichen Extension ein kontinuierlich sukzessives individuelles Dasein hat (in
seinen unterscheidbaren Strecken und Phasen durch diese Zeitformen individuiert). Die strömend
lebendige Gegenwart ist ‘kontinuierlich’ strömendes Sein und doch nicht in einem Außereinandersein,
nicht in raumzeitlicher (welträumlicher), nicht in ‘immanent-zeitlicher’ Extension Sein (also in keinem
Außereinander, das Nacheinander heißt, Nacheinander in dem Sinne eines Stellenauseinander in einer
eigentlich so zu nennenden Zeit)’’ (Hua XXXIV, p. 187).

123
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25 21

acts, though I am aware of them in nonobjectivating experiencing. If this

experiencing does not originate in the experienced act, then it is plausible to locate
its source in the absolute flow’’ (Brough 2010, p. 42).
This criticism brings us to another contentious issue, and to what I believe is a
recurrent misreading of my own interpretation of Husserl. The question to ask is
basically, how the interpretation I offer stands in regard to the distinction between
three different layers or levels of temporality: The objective time of the appearing
objects, the subjective, immanent or pre-empirical time of the acts and experiences,
and finally the absolute pre-phenomenal flow of inner time-constituting conscious-
ness (Hua X, pp. 73, 76, 358). Contrary to a claim that has been reiterated by
Brough, and which is also picked up and repeated by DeRoo, the interpretation I
favor does not reject the tripartition. It is quite true that I do claim that Husserl’s
investigation of the absolute flow of experiencing is an investigation of the
pre-reflective self-manifestation of our experiences and not an analysis of some
further, additional, self-appearance. But I am not, and have never been, denying that
there is a crucial difference between analyzing consciousness in terms of different
intentional acts—such as acts of perception, judgment, imagination, etc.—and
analyzing consciousness in terms of the structure of inner time-consciousness. To
insist that the very flow of inner time-consciousness is the pre-reflective
self-manifestation of the experiences is, in short, not to deny the distinction
between our transitory experiences and the abiding dimension of experiencing, i.e.,
between die Erlebnisse and das Erleben (Hua XXIII, p. 326; cf. Hua XIV, p. 46). If
we take three different experiences—say, a visual perception of a bird, an
anticipation of a forthcoming holiday, and a rejection of the claim that Earth is the
largest planet in our solar system—these three experiences obviously have different
intentional structures. But the very experiencing of the three experiences does not
have a different structure in each case. On the contrary, we are faced with the same
basic structure of inner time-consciousness. If that is the case, however, we do need
to distinguish the experience and its self-manifestation. Whereas we live through a
number of different experiences that arise, endure, and become past, the structure of
protention-primal impression-retention might be considered an invariant field of
presencing, or even better a field of presencing and absencing. Simply to collapse
these different levels into one involves an oversimplification that is detrimental to a
correct understanding of consciousness. In other words (and to repeat), it is highly
appropriate to distinguish the singularity of the lebendige Gegenwart from the
plurality of changing experiences.
But to claim that the experiencing must be distinguished from the experience is
not to claim that they are distinct and independent. We are not dealing with a pure or
empty field of presencing–absencing upon which the concrete experiences
subsequently make their entry.
It is now time to reassess the disagreement. Two issues are at stake.8 The first
question is whether or not our experiences are pre-reflectively given as internal

8
A third disagreement concerns Brough’s understanding of Querintentionalität (cf. Zahavi 1999,
pp. 74–75). But since this criticism has never been picked up by or commented on by Brough or any other
Husserl scholar for that matter, I will leave it at that.

123
22 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

objects. If I understand Brough correctly, he now also thinks it is best to avoid this
way of talking, and that it is preferably to say that we are pre-reflectively aware of
the experiences as discrete units. If this is his claim, I don’t think there is any longer
any substantial disagreement. The other issue concerns whether, in addition to the
non-objectifying pre-reflective self-manifestation of the experiences, there is an
additional and distinct self-appearance of the absolute flow. I would deny this. What
is Brough’s view? I detect a certain hesitancy in his account. On the one hand, he
admittedly writes that there is no consciousness of the flow in separation from the
consciousness of the experiences. After all, the former is precisely nothing but the
experiencing of the latter (Brough 2010, p. 40). On the other hand, right after having
made that claim, he also criticizes the so-called simpler account for failing to
recognize the existence of a distinct absolute flow (Brough 2010, p. 41).
Presumably Brough’s argument is that unless we appeal to such a distinct flow—
one that so to speak overflows the singular experience, rather than being limited to
and contained in it—we will have no way of accounting for the diachronic unity of
consciousness. If the pre-reflective self-manifestation of the experience is internal or
intrinsic to that experience, then the self-manifestation of one experience will be
replaced and superseded by the self-manifestation of another experience—like a
series of self-luminous pearls—and we will have no satisfactory way of accounting
for the abiding awareness of our ongoing conscious life. There is a lot to say on that
topic,9 but let me here just restate what I wrote a moment ago, namely that a
sequence of changing experiences, on my view, does have something in common,
even if the experiences differ in regard to their type and their object. They all remain
characterized by the same fundamental first-personal character; they all share the
same first-personal presence. But doesn’t this commit me to endorse Brough’s
tripartition? Well, if Brough is merely insisting on the difference between the
experience and the experiencing, then I am (and always have been) in complete
agreement. If Brough wants to claim that the experiencing (the absolute flow) is
distinct from, i.e., independent of, the experiences, and that it possesses its own self-
appearance, in addition to and on top of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of the
experiences, then I continue to disagree.
Drummond has argued that a resolution of the dispute between Brough and
myself calls for an account that ascribes a certain internal complexity or
differentiation to consciousness. Drummond’s own suggestion is that we accept a
distinction between the absolute time-constituting form of consciousness and the
concrete flow of subjective life itself and that we should operate with two
irreducible aspects of one single self-awareness (Drummond 2006, pp. 216–218; cf.
Hart 2001, p. 345). I can accept that suggestion, and if Brough can as well, I don’t
think it any longer makes sense to speak of two significantly distinct interpretations
(cf. Zahavi 1999, p. 234).

9
For a number of contributions discussing the merits and weaknesses of such an account, see Siderits
et al. (2010).

123
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25 23

3 Passivity and Activity

Let me now finally return to DeRoo, who must be credited for having triggered this
new exchange. The main focus of DeRoo’s paper is on the stratification of
consciousness into passive and active levels. More specifically, through a close
study of Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, DeRoo suggests that we should accept a
three-fold distinction between active synthesis, passive association and internal
time-consciousness, and that this tripartition supports Brough’s interpretation.
I have already remarked on the fact that DeRoo doesn’t consider any of my more
recent contributions to the debate, but by and large sticks to the 1999 book. His
basic objection is that I allegedly propose a two-fold distinction between self-
manifestation and hetero-manifestation and that this doesn’t square with Husserl’s
distinction between the three just mentioned levels of consciousness (DeRoo 2011,
pp. 4–5).
In reply, let me first say that I have never seen my own interpretation of Husserl’s
theory of inner time-consciousness as mainly consisting in the claim that there are
two levels of consciousness (a self- and a hetero-manifesting), and that I have never
disputed the tripartite distinction that DeRoo is arguing for (cf. Zahavi 1999,
pp. 115–127). But I must then also add that it is quite unclear to me what DeRoo’s
tripartition has to do with the issues at stake. To put it differently, DeRoo’s criticism
reminds me a bit of an objection raised by Heffernan during the 2001 meeting in
Bloomington. Like Brough, Heffernan thought that my account entailed a rejection
of a tripartite account in favor of a binary model, and he objected to this by
reminding us of the fact that Husserl’s theory of intentionality involves a tripartite
distinction between ego, cogito and cogitatum. My reply back then was that this is
quite correct, but that I failed to see its relevance to the topic at hand.
The only way I can relate DeRoo’s distinctions to the Zahavi/Brough/Sokolowski
debate is as follows: Perhaps DeRoo’s main point is that the level of passive
synthesis involves the constitution of certain units, involves a certain discreteness,
which although not yet amounting to the fully constituted objects of active
synthesis, is still something differentiated. But I have already granted that point
above, and as I already wrote back in 1999: One ‘‘should not confuse the fluctuating
unity of our lived experiences with a formlessness or lack of structure. On the
contrary, our lived experiences possess an organic or morphological structure and
internal differentiation, and it is ultimately this that makes them accessible to
reflection and conceptual articulation’’ (Zahavi 1999, p. 186). I would, however,
challenge DeRoo’s suggestion that it might on this level be preferable to talk of
objectivities rather than of objects, and that our pre-reflective acts might have a
degree of objectivity although they are not objects. I don’t think this proposal works,
at least not if we want to stay within a Husserlian framework. The reason for this is
obviously that Husserl’s discussion of objectivity primarily focuses on the extent to
which it is intrinsically and constitutionally related to intersubjectivity (cf. Zahavi
1996), and I don’t think it would be advisable to introduce that kind of complexity
into the topic currently under discussion.

123
24 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25

References

Bergson, H. (1910). Time and free will. An essay on the immediate data of consciousness. Montana:
Kessinger Publishing Company.
Brough, J. B. (1972). The emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl’s early writings on time-
consciousness. Man and World, 5, 298–326.
Brough, J. B. (2010). Notes on the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness. In D. Lohmar &
I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), On time—new contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time
(pp. 21–49). Phaenomenologica 197. Springer: Dordrecht.
DeRoo, N. (2011). Mediating the debate between Zahavi and Brough-Sokolowski on the levels of
consciousness in Husserl. Husserl Studies, 27(1), 1–12.
Dodd, J. (2005). Reading Husserl’s time-diagrams from 1917/18. Husserl Studies, 21, 111–137.
Drummond, J. (2006). The case(s) of (self-)awareness. In U. Kriegel & K. Williford (Eds.), Self-
representational approaches to consciousness (pp. 199–220). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hart, J. G. (2001). I-ness and otherness: A review of Dan Zahavi’s Self-awareness and alterity.
Continental Philosophy Review, 34, 339–351.
Hua VII (1956). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil. Kritische Ideengeschichte. R. Boehm (Ed.).
Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua X (1966). Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893–1917). R. Boehm (Ed.). Den
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua XIV (1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II. I. Kern (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus
Nijhoff.
Hua XXIII (1980). Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung. E. Marbach (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Hua XXIX (1993). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenol-
ogie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937. R. N. Smid (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Hua XXXIII (2001). Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917–18). R. Bernet &
D. Lohmar (Eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hua XXXIV (2002). Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935). S. Luft
(Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. Ms. L I 15 2b
Kortooms, T. (2002). Phenomenology of time. Edmund Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Micali, S. (2010). The temporalizations of the absolute flow of time-consciousness. In D. Lohmar &
I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), On time—new contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time
(pp. 169–185). Phaenomenologica 197. Dordrecht: Springer.
Niel, L. (2010). Temporality, stream of consciousness and the I in the Bernau manuscripts. In D. Lohmar
& I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), On time—new contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time
(pp. 213–230). Phaenomenologica 197. Dordrecht: Springer.
Siderits, M., Thompson, E., & Zahavi, D. (Eds.). (2010). Self, no self? Perspectives from analytical,
phenomenological, and Indian traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sokolowski, R. (1974). Husserlian meditations. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Strawson, G. (2009). Selves. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons: Unity and identity. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zahavi, D. (1996). Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachprag-
matische Kritik. Phaenomenologica 135. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zahavi, D. (1998). The fracture in self-awareness. In D. Zahavi (Ed.), Self-awareness, temporality and
alterity (pp. 21–40). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity. A phenomenological investigation. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2000). Self and consciousness. In D. Zahavi (Ed.), Exploring the self (pp. 55–74). Advances
in Consciousness Research 23. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Zahavi, D. (2003). Phenomenology of self. In T. Kircher & A. David (Eds.), The self in neuroscience and
psychiatry (pp. 56–75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2004). Time and consciousness in the Bernau manuscripts. Husserl Studies, 20(2), 99–118.

123
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:13–25 25

Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
Zahavi, D. (2010a). Inner (time-)consciousness. In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), On time—new
contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time (pp. 319–339). Phaenomenologica 197.
Springer: Dordrecht.
Zahavi, D. (2010b). Life, thinking and phenomenology in the early Bergson. In M. Kelly (Ed.), Bergson
and phenomenology (pp. 118–133). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

123