Atlantic Council

EURASIA CENTER

KREMLIN’S
THE

TROJAN
HORSES

Alina Polyakova, Markos Kounalakis, Antonis Klapsis,

Luigi Sergio Germani, Jacopo Iacoboni,
Francisco de Borja Lasheras, and Nicolás de Pedro
 KREMLIN’S
THE

TROJAN
HORSES
Russian Influence in Greece,
Italy, and Spain

Alina Polyakova, Markos Kounalakis, Antonis Klapsis,

Luigi Sergio Germani, Jacopo Iacoboni,
Francisco de Borja Lasheras, and Nicolás de Pedro

Second edition

ISBN: 978-1-61977-387-5

Cover photo credits, from left to right: GUE/NGL, Niccolò Caranti, and matthew_tsimitak.

This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual
Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic
Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this
report’s conclusions.

November 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction: The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses 2.0

5 Greece: Still the EU’s Weak Link?

11 Italy: Is the Turn to Russia Reversible?

20 Spain: The Next Target for Russian Influence?

26 Policy Recommendations

29 About the Authors

 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

INTRODUCTION:
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0
Alina Polyakova

R
ussia’s interference in the US presidential
election in 2016 sent a signal to the West:
democratic societies are deeply vulnerable to
foreign influence. For decades, the Kremlin had been
testing and refining its influence operations in the new
democracies of Eastern Europe. Russian cyber attacks,
disinformation campaigns, and Kremlin supported
political allies are nothing new to Ukraine or Georgia,
which have been testing labs for Moscow since the
early 2000s. If US and European policy makers had
been paying attention to Russia’s activities in these
countries, then perhaps the West would have been
better prepared to respond when Russia targeted it.
Instead, the American public and policy makers were
taken by surprise in the fall of 2016.
In January 2017, the US intelligence community
published an assessment of Russian influence
operations in the US elections, which concluded
that “Moscow [would] apply lessons learned from its
Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential
election to future influence efforts worldwide, including
against US allies and their election processes.”1 Indeed,
since then, major elections took place across Western
Europe, and to varying degrees, the hand of the Kremlin
was visible in all of them: in France, the National Front’s
presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, was propped
up by Russian sponsored social media accounts
and media; in Germany, the far-right Alternative for
Germany (AfD) campaigned aggressively in districts
with a high concentration of Russian speakers while
Russian state media provided favorable coverage; and
in the Netherlands, fears of vote manipulation pushed
the Dutch parliament to return to a fully manual
paper ballot. Increased attention to the integrity
of democratic elections is a positive, if unintended,
consequence of the US experience. But Russian
influence operations go far beyond disparate elections.
In November 2016, shortly after the US presidential
elections and before the full extent of Russian
interference was coming into public focus, the Atlantic
Council published the first volume of The Kremlin’s
Trojan Horses that detailed the extent of Russian-linked
political networks in France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom.2 That report has since become a guide to
policy makers, journalists, and experts seeking to
understand how the Kremlin cultivates political allies
in Western European countries to achieve its goals of
undermining European consensus, sowing divisions
in societies, and engendering mistrust in democratic
institutions. US congressional members3 and European
Union (EU) parliamentarians4 have highlighted the
report’s conclusions as a call to action, and the links
the report pointed to between Russian interests and
the Brexit campaign have led to a new investigation by
the UK’s Electoral Commission into the funding behind
the referendum.5 Among its recommendations, the
report’s authors urged EU member states to establish
“counter-influence taskforces” to track, monitor, and
report on Russia’s influence activities. And indeed,
most EU member states, including the EU and NATO,
have established or reinvested in StratCom taskforces,
hybrid threat centers, or cyber threat centers whose
function is to do just that.
Following on the success of the first The Kremlin’s
Trojan Horses, volume two takes up the task of
tracing the extent of Russian political penetration in
Europe’s southern flank: Greece, Italy, and Spain. These
countries bore the brunt of Europe’s major crises in
the last decade: the 2008 economic crisis and the
2015 refugee crisis. In the aftermath of the economic
crisis, Greece, Italy, and Spain experienced double
digit unemployment and income drops coupled with
reductions to social safety nets. The EU’s response
for Europe’s large southern economies was to impose

1 “Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident
Attribution,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
2 Alina Polyakova et al., “The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” Atlantic Council,
November 15, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_Kremlins_Trojan_Horses_web_0228_third_edition.pdf.
3 Sheldon Whitehouse, “Transparency, Corruption, and Russian Meddling,” Sheldon Whitehouse United States Senator for Rhode Island,
June 14, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/speeches/transparency-corruption-and-russian-meddling-.
4 Kavitha Surana, “The EU Moves to Counter Russian Disinformation Campaign,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2016/11/23/the-eu-moves-to-counter-russian-disinformation-campaign-populism/.
5 Maïa de La Baume, “Arron Banks investigated over Brexit campaign funding,” Politico, November 1, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/
arron-banks-investigated-over-brexit-campaign-funding/.

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THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0
The Kremlin, seat of the Russian government in Moscow. Photo credit: Svetlana Tikhonova.
austerity measures. And while in the long run, these
policies helped shore up the economies (signs of
recovery emerged in 2016), in the short term, they bred
resentment among citizens against the EU, mainstream
parties, and the Western model of liberal democracy.
Then, Syrian refugees began arriving by the thousands
on the Italian and Greek shores. These already
struggling economies became the first entry point for
the millions that would arrive in 2015 and 2016, further
polarizing these societies and Europe as well.
As Markos Kounalakis and Antonis Klapsis write, it
is this “volatile socio-economic climate” that “has
proven to be fertile ground for Russian overtures” while
providing an opening for political parties oriented
toward the East rather than the West. The Kremlin has
actively stepped into this opening by providing political
and media support to pro-Russian forces, leveraging
historical, religious, and cultural ties, and cultivating
(either directly or through proxies) a network of pro-
Moscow civil society organizations to promote Russia’s
goal of weakening the EU and NATO.
In all three countries examined in this report, the
economic crisis is the watershed moment that facilitates
2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
doubt in the Western system and centrist parties
and thus primes citizens to look beyond mainstream
politics toward more radical political parties on the far
right or far left. At first blush, parties like the leftist
Spanish Podemos, the nationalist Northern League
and populist 5 Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, and the
governing Syriza party in Greece appear to have little
in common in terms of policy. Podemos and Syriza are
politically left while Northern League and M5S are on
the right. Northern League and Syriza are traditional
parties while M5S and Podemos style themselves as
movements. Despite significant differences in their
political visions, however, these parties share one
thing: they have all sought to align themselves with
Putin’s Russia. Some have made this intention more
explicit than others. Northern League, for example,
formalized its desire for closer relations with Russia by
signing a cooperation agreement with Putin’s United
Russia party in March 2017. As Luigi Sergio Germani
and Jacopo Iacoboni write, formal agreement or not,
these parties’ political leaders, their media entities,
and their foreign policy platforms “embrace and
spread Russian strategic narratives, support Moscow’s
foreign policy actions, and propose policies that
favor Russia’s geopolitical interests and that tend to
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

undermine the cohesion of the EU and NATO.” From
the Russian perspective, the ideological stances of
useful political allies are irrelevant: Communist or right-
wing nationalist, what matters is that these parties
advocate Russian interests, vote against common EU
foreign policies, and undermine establishment parties
to engender chaos and instability from within Europe.
For these reasons, the Kremlin has worked strategically
and actively to cultivate closer relations with Europe’s
emerging insurgent parties on the left and the right.
The case studies reveal that the extent of Russian
political influence and investment in forging political
relationships varies between countries. Italy is most

Map 1. Pro-Russian Political Parties in Western Europe

UKIP

The Left Party

Alternative for Germany

National Front

Northern League
5 Star Movement

Podemos

Golden Dawn
Syriza

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0
Western democracies can
build resilience
to Russian interference,
but they are only as strong
as their weakest link.
vulnerable to Russian influence. In the fall of 2017, M5S
was consistently polling as the most popular party
in Italy. The party’s documented pro-Kremlin stance
combined with its grassroots mobilization capacity
make it a particularly important ally for the Kremlin,
and thus a dangerous force against the EU, NATO,
and the transatlantic partnership. With Italy poised for
elections in early 2018, an M5S win could dramatically
shift Italian foreign policy away from EU cooperation,
support for common defense, and continuation of
economic sanctions against Russia. As the authors
warn, an “M5S-led government could lead to serious
domestic political and economic instability because
of the party’s lack of experience and capacity to
govern, undermining Italy’s credibility as a partner for
Washington and the Euro-Atlantic community.”
Greece’s long-standing historical and religious
connections to Russia through the Orthodox Church
serve as the conduit for the Kremlin’s desire to deepen
its foothold in Greek politics. But Russia’s activities
in Greece are not contained to diplomatic overtures.
Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin have
bought stakes in Greek media. Russia’s state-owned
gas giant, Gazprom, purchased large stakes in Greek
energy firms. And most notably, Putin has maintained
a close relationship with the Greek leadership. Despite
these ties, Moscow is only willing to go so far in
supporting its allies. In 2015, Greece was still reeling
from the fallout of the economic crisis, which almost
led the country to default on its debt. Alexis Tsipras,
newly elected as prime minister after Syriza’s win in
the elections, was locked in difficult negotiations with
the EU over additional bailout funds, which Greece
would need to avoid bankruptcy. Tsipras has become a
vocal critic of the EU’s sanctions policy against Russia.
That spring, Tsipras traveled to Moscow to meet with
Putin. While both countries denied that the purpose
of Tsipras’s visit was to request financial support, the
timing raised eyebrows in the EU. Tsipras walked away
empty-handed, nonetheless.
4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Tsipras’s experience with Putin in 2015 highlights an
important facet of the Kremlin’s strategy toward its
political influence operations: despite the political
connections, Russia has not invested economically in
the European countries it seeks to influence. There are
two reasons for this: first, Russia remains a struggling
natural resource driven economy that has few economic
resources at its disposal. Russia cannot match China,
for example, in investing in infrastructure projects or
buying up national debt. Russia is not a major foreign
investor in Western European countries. Second, as
a result of its economic limitations, the Kremlin is
constantly engaged in a cost-benefit game to assess
how to achieve its foreign policy goals with minimum
investment. For this reason, asymmetric measures—
disinformation, cyber attacks, cultivation of political
allies, and corruption—that are far less expensive than
economic investment or conventional military activities
but have great destabilizing potential, are the preferred
tools of choice for the Kremlin. Chaos is cheap.
Spain, unlike Italy and Greece, has not been a target
of Russian influence. “Still, Spain, as one of the largest
EU countries and hub of the Spanish-speaking world,
is relevant to Russian geopolitical interests,” write
Francisco de Borja Lasheras and Nicolás De Pedro. A
lack of engagement with Russia coupled with Russia’s
growing Spanish language media outlet— RT Spanish—
and Madrid’s desire to balance a pro-EU foreign policy
with multilateralism, along with an emerging pro-
Russian foreign policy in Podemos, could make Spain
the likely next target for the Kremlin. In this sense,
Spain is at an inflection point: if Spanish policy makers
take lessons from the experiences of other European
countries and the United States, they might be able
to get ahead of the Kremlin’s agenda. If not, then
Spain will likely face increasing Russian meddling in
its politics.
Western democracies can build resilience to Russian
interference, but they are only as strong as their
weakest link. Building societal resilience will require
policy makers, civil society, and the private sector
coming together to find short- and long-term solutions.
The first step in this process is identifying where our
societies are vulnerable. This report, and the 2016
volume on France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
is meant to alert policy makers across the Atlantic
to the depth and breadth of the Kremlin’s influence
operations and to the threats these activities pose to
transatlantic stability and security.
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

GREECE
STILL THE EU’S WEAK LINK?

Markos Kounalakis and Antonis Klapsis

R
ussia has always had a strong—and sometimes
reciprocated—interest in Greece. From the birth
of modern Greece during its 1821 revolution
against Ottoman Turkey to its contemporary relations
with Greece’s ruling leftist Syriza party and through
their mutual support of Orthodox Christian institu-
tions, Russia has found Greece open to a strategic
relationship rooted in historic, cultural, and religious
connections.
As president of Russia, Vladimir Putin has used these
historic foundations to pursue closer economic,
military, political, and cultural bonds between Athens
and Moscow. Putin works to further his project of
diminishing Euro-Atlantic institutions, of which Greece
is a member, by strengthening Greco-Russian relations
and attempting to tilt Greece’s political stance into
closer alignment with Russian interests. With Greek
support, the Kremlin could leverage Greece’s European
Union (EU) and NATO memberships to drive wedges
between members from within. In the short run, this
means weakening the EU’s common sanctions policy,
which must be approved by all member states. In the
long run, this means ultimately creating an alliance
between Athens and Moscow and undermining
Greece’s affiliation with Western liberal democratic
values and institutions.
POLITICAL CONTEXT
Greece in 2017 is economically and politically
vulnerable. The country is suffering its eighth year of
a modern great depression,6 and its populace feels
exploited and underserved by both NATO and the EU.
Greece’s economic condition—the result of predatory
lending practices and irresponsible Eurozone
borrowing in combination with a severe EU economic
austerity program—have left many Greeks embittered,
cynical, and seeking radical solutions while openly
challenging the status quo.7 As of September 2017,
a quarter of Greeks were still unemployed, including
50 percent of youths, and the debt to gross domestic
product (GDP) ratio was at an alarming high of 180
percent.8 In addition, Greece has received over one
million migrants and refugees from the Middle East and
North Africa since 2015,9 adding political and economic
burdens on local communities and exacerbating anti-
immigrant sentiments.
This volatile socio-economic climate has proven to
be fertile ground for Russian overtures. The ruling
coalition, led by Syriza—which is friendly to the
Russian government—along with its marginal but
important governing partner, Independent Greeks,
took advantage of the crisis that discredited much
of the old political establishment. Syriza, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, aimed to
mobilize disillusioned voters with a radical platform
opposed to the austerity policies imposed by the EU
after 2009. Syriza made quick gains, growing from 4.6
percent of the vote and fifth place in Greece’s 2009
general elections to 16.8 percent and second place in
May 2012. By 2015, Syriza was the ruling party with
over 35 percent of the vote.10
One of Tsipras’s first moves as prime minister was to
force a referendum on whether to accept the EU’s
bailout in exchange for more austerity measures or to
leave the Eurozone. The confusing snap referendum
was not literally a vote to leave the Eurozone, but did
create the conditions for an exit. The so-called “Grexit”
referendum failed to deliver by a small margin in the

6 “Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis,” New York Times, June 17, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/
greece-debt-crisis-euro.html.
7 Markos Kounalakis, “Greece’s High-Stakes Gamble,” Sacramento Bee, July 10, 2015, http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/markos-
kounalakis/article26905798.html.
8 “Greece Government Debt to GDP | 1980-2017,” Trading Economics, 2017, tradingeconomics.com/greece/government-debt-to-gdp.
9 John Clayton, “More than one million refugees travel to Greece since 2015,” UNHCR, March 16, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/
latest/2016/3/56e9821b6/million-refugees-travel-greece-since-2015.html.
10 Antonis Klapsis, “In the Shadow of Grexit: A Short Story of Long (and Failed) Negotiations, January-July 2015,” Romanian Journal of
European Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 14, 29-31.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in Moscow, Russia, April 8, 2015.
Photo credit: Press Service of the President of Russia.

summer of 2015, but it signaled Greece’s potential MAJOR PLAYERS

to be a disruptive force in the EU. While Russia’s
desire to develop a deeper foothold in Greek politics
serves the Kremlin’s interests of weakening the EU
and undermining the Western liberal project, for now,
Russian economic investments, cultural connections,
and political overtures fan the flames of discontent but
do not ignite them.
Russia’s successful actions in Greece—such as providing
discounted energy, intervention in media ownership,
and ethno-cultural seduction of the Orthodox
hierarchy—have already weakened EU resolve toward
confronting Russia’s more egregious acts, neutralized
Greece’s previous intent for expansion of defense ties
within NATO, and rebuilt the foundation of a strong and
lasting alignment with Greece’s people and interests.11
Russian President Vladimir Putin himself is active in the
direct overtures to Greece. He has made it a personal
project to engage Orthodox religious institutions,
meet with the Greek political leadership, and pursue
any availing business opportunities in the country. As
Putin made clear in his May 2016 visit to Greece, the
new receptivity of a Syriza-led government provides
a strategic opening for the two countries to increase
their cooperation and collaboration. Tsipras told Putin
that improving Greco-Russian relations was “a strategic
choice.” Putin asserted that “it is not a coincidence that
an opportunity for this has arisen in Greece—a country
with which we have deep and historic ties.”12
A host of other individuals and institutions support
the Kremlin’s strategy toward Greece, but it is Putin
who provides the leadership, vision, and symbolism
for the renewed and rapidly evolving Greco-Russian
relationship. The improving Greco-Russian twenty-first

11 Markos Kounalakis, “Greece Is a Good Insurance Policy for the West,” Sacramento Bee, September 21, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/
opinion/op-ed/article2610377.html.
12 “Putin and Tsipras Seeking to Profit from Historic Ties,” Kathimerini, May 27, 2016, http://www.ekathimerini.com/209084/article/
ekathimerini/news/putin-and-tsipras-seeking-to-profit-from-historic-ties.

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

century relationship has not relied on leftist Greek
governments alone, however. Greece’s conservative
New Democracy government of Prime Minister
Kostas Karamanlis (2004–09) provided a strong and
symbolic boost to building economic ties with Russia
in the energy sector. In March 2007, the Karamanlis
government signed an agreement with Bulgaria
and Russia for the construction of the Burghas-
Alexandroupolis pipeline—a key strategic partnership—
but a project that was never implemented.13
Unlike the Karamanlis administration, Tsipras’s
government made better relations with Russia a top
priority and part of its anti-EU platform. In January
2015, Tsipras expressed “discontent” with an EU
statement that Russia was responsible for a rocket
attack on Mariupol, Ukraine.14 Countering the prevailing
EU sentiment and action for economic sanctions
on Moscow following its annexation of Crimea and
incursion into Ukraine’s Donbas in 2014, Tsipras made
his first official foreign policy statement a criticism of
those sanctions and an affirmation of solidarity with
the Russian people.15
The Tsipras government’s opposition to the EU’s Russia
policy did not go unnoticed (or even unmanaged) by
Russia. Putin sent an immediate positive message:
Putin, via his ambassador to Greece, was the first to
personally congratulate Tsipras on his initial January
25, 2015 victory.16 This marked the beginning of Russia’s
public charm offensive with the Greek leadership and
people.
Putin’s first trip to an EU country after the imposition
of sanctions against Russia was to Athens to meet
Tsipras.17 Importantly, on this two-day visit in May 2016,
Putin made a personal pilgrimage to the Orthodox
spiritual center of Mount Athos along with Patriarch
Kirill of Moscow. Putin first went to Mt. Athos in 2005,
the only Russian leader ever to do so and, on this visit,
he received a warm welcome from monks and priests
expressing adulation for his global leadership and
moral rectitude. One monk, Father Efraim, exclaimed,
“Putin is the only true world leader.”18 Putin made
sure to solidify this perception by taking a seat on
what appeared to be the Protaton Throne, the throne
of past Byzantine emperors. In fact, this was widely
misreported (instead he sat in an ornate bishop’s chair
in the Protaton church), but the story was propagated
and popularly accepted as Putin symbolically taking his
rightful place in Byzantium’s resurrection, with his role
presumably as its emperor. The photos of Putin at Mt.
Athos were widespread and impressive, and conveyed
to both Russians and Greeks the historic relationship
of the two fraternal Orthodox nations.19
Putin’s personal touch is visible with his regular and
close communications with the Greek leadership, in
particular Prime Minister Tsipras.20 Tsipras and Putin
have spoken by phone and met in both bilateral and
multilateral settings, such as the May 2017 Beijing “Belt
and Road Forum.”21 Defense Minister Panos Kammenos,
a member of the governing coalition and leader of the
far-right Independent Greeks party, also has moved to
deepen professional relations with Russia, including
signing a memorandum of understanding with the
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI)—a think
tank known to have connections to the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service. Both Kammenos and RISI’s
leader, Leonid Reshetnikov, are devout defenders and
aggressive promoters of Orthodox religious clergy and
institutions, with Kammenos depending on the church
and its fervent adherents as a reliably solid part of his
power base.22 Reshetnikov is but one of the frontline
individuals bridging institutional relations with Greece.
Putin’s proxies are also able to develop these warm
ties further and maintain personal, business, and media
relationships with Greece. First among those playing

13 “Greece, Russia, Bulgaria Sign Pipeline Deal,” Kathimerini, March 16, 2007, http://www.ekathimerini.com/47756/article/ekathimerini/
news/greece-russia-bulgaria-sign-pipeline-deal.
14 Andrew Rettman, “Greece Says No to EU Statement on Russia,” EUobserver, January 27, 2015, https://euobserver.com/foreign/127393.
15 Nick Squires, “Greece Objects to EU Call for More Russia Sanctions,” Telegraph, January 27, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/greece/11373136/Greece-objects-to-EU-call-for-more-Russia-sanctions.html.
16 Bernard-Henri Levy, “Admired by Le Pen, Friends with Putin, Tsipras Spells Trouble,” Daily Beast, February 4, 2015, http://www.
thedailybeast.com/admired-by-le-pen-friends-with-putin-tsipras-spells-trouble.
17 Derek Gatopoulos, “Putin Blasts West on First Trip to EU Country This Year,” US News and World Report, May 27, 2016, https://www.
usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-05-27/putin-heads-to-greece-for-business-orthodox-christian-site.
18 Giorgos Christides, “Putin Auf Athos: Hier Bin Ich Mönch, Hier Darf Ichs Sein,” trans. Markos Kounalakis, Spiegel Online, May 28, 2016,
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin-auf-athos-hier-bin-ich-moench-hier-darf-ich-sein-a-1094681.html.
19 “Putin on Athos: The Protaton Throne,” Athos - Agion Oros, June 1, 2016, https://athosweblog.com/2016/06/01/1823-putin-and-the-
protaton-throne/.
20 Dalibor Rohac, “Putin’s Best EU Friends,” Politico, June 16, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article/putin-friends-renzi-tsipras/.
21 “Tsipras, Putin Underlined Need of Strengthening Greek, Russian Relations,” National Herald, May 14, 2017, https://www.
thenationalherald.com/161975/tsipras-putin-underlined-need-strengthening-greece-russia-relations/.
22 John R. Schindler, “Is Putin Playing Puppetmaster in Greece?” Daily Beast, July 8, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2015/07/08/is-putin-playing-puppetmaster-in-greece.

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THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

a significant role is Ivan Savvidis, a Georgian-born
Russian Greek, one of Russia’s richest men, member of
Putin’s United Russia party, a member of the Russian
parliament (Duma), and a resident of Thessaloniki,
Greece.23 Savvidis is actively investing in strategic
industries and advocating against the New Democracy
opposition party and its pro-Western leader Kyriakos
Mitsotakis.24 Savvidis bought Thessaloniki’s PAOK
professional soccer team, northern Greece’s cigarette
manufacturer SEKAP, Thessaloniki’s best-known hotel,
the Grand Pallas, and, most troubling to the Greek
political opposition, a controlling interest in one of the
more popular television networks, MEGA.25 In late July
2017, he also purchased three historic newspapers.26
In addition to Putin and Savvidis, there are second-
tier players who dabble in real estate and business
engagements, seeking opportunities to strengthen
Greco-Russian ties where available. For example, three
Russian companies, including Gazprom, pursued large
stakes in the Greek gas companies DEPA and DEFSA.27
Wealthy Russian individuals, such as Ekaterina
Rybolovleva, also make headlines for their wealth,
influence, and interest in Greece. Rybolovleva made a
symbolic splash when she purchased the private island
once owned by Aristotle Onassis—the island where he
married former US first lady Jacqueline Kennedy.28
PRO-RUSSIAN LEANINGS
AND GREEK POLITICS
Russian attempts to influence Greek politics have
a long history, starting with the early days of Greek
independence in the nineteenth century, when
Russia funded and fought together with Greek naval
revolutionary forces and commissioned the famous
female revolutionary leader, Laskarina Bouboulina, as
an admiral in the Russian Imperial Navy.29 But today,
Russian efforts to influence Greek politics are part of a
broader effort to undermine Western institutions, and
they have never found such fertile ground in Greece
as the Syriza government and its Independent Greeks
coalition.
For the leftist and anti-liberal Syriza, closer cooperation
with Russia seems to be the key to Greece’s gradual
disengagement from the West. Tsipras and many of
his closest associates are former communists who
base their political thinking on a loathing of capitalism
and many of the Western values that go along with
it. From this perspective, Russia appears as Greece’s
geopolitical alternative to the EU and NATO. Members
of the populist right Independent Greeks view Moscow
favorably in light of the common religious background
between the two countries.
Ardent supporters of the move to establish much
closer Greco-Russian relations are found across almost
the whole political spectrum in Greece, from the
extreme right to the communist left. A striking example
of this pro-Russian attitude was the vote of the Greek
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in
September 2014, on the ratification of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement. Out of the 21 Greek MEPs, 12
voted against the agreement, 8 voted in favor, and 1
abstained. Not surprisingly, the votes against were
cast by MEPs from Syriza (6); the Independent Greeks
(1); neo-Nazi Golden Dawn (3); and Communist Party
of Greece (2). The votes in favor were cast by MEPs
belonging to the three major pro-Western Greek
political parties, namely New Democracy (4), PASOK
(2), and the River (2).30 What is even more impressive
is the fact that the Greek MEPs were the only national
group in the European Parliament that voted in
majority against the ratification of the agreement.31
As in the case of many other far-right European
parties, Golden Dawn openly favors a pro-Russian turn
in Greece’s foreign policy.32 Golden Dawn officials have
repeatedly referred to the religious bonds that unite

23 Giorgos Christides, “Greece Gets Investment from Russia with Love,” BBC News, October 26, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-20031296.
24 “Greek-Russian Tycoon Intervenes in Politics,” Kathimerini, May 2, 2017, http://www.ekathimerini.com/218081/article/ekathimerini/news/
greek-russian-tycoon-intervenes-in-politics.
25 “Russian-Greek Investor Savvidis Buys 20% Stake of Troubled Nationwide TV Channel,” Naftemporiki, May 22, 2017, http://www.
naftemporiki.gr/story/1238160/russian-greek-investor-savvidis-buys-20-stake-of-troubled-nationwide-tv-channel.
26 Tasos Kokkinidis, “Greek-Russian Businessman Ivan Savvidis Buys 3 Historic Newspapers,” Greek Reporter, July 26, 2017, http://greece.
greekreporter.com/2017/07/26/greek-russian-businessman-ivan-savvidis-buys-3-historic-newspapers/.
27 Georgi Gotev, “Privatisation of Greek Gas Grid Operator DESFA Fails,” Euractiv.com, December 1, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/
section/energy/news/privatisation-of-greek-gas-grid-operator-desfa-fails/.
28 Julie Zeveloff, “24-Year-Old Russian Billionaire Heiress Is the Buyer of Greece’s Most Famous Private Island,” Business Insider, April 19,
2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/ekaterina-rybolovleva-bought-skorpios-2013-4.
29 Callum Rae, “Laskarina Bouboulina,” Female Soldier, September 27, 2015, http://thefemalesoldier.com/blog/laskarina-bouboulina.
30 The Greek MEP that abstained belongs to New Democracy as well.
31 “EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, with the Exception of the Treatment of Third Country Nationals Legally Employed as Workers
in the Territory of the Other Part,” Votewatch, last updated September 16, 2014, http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-eu-ukraine-
association-agreement-with-the-exception-of-thetreatment-of-third-country-nationals-lega.html.
32 For a detailed account of the forging of bonds between Moscow and far-right parties across the EU see Antonis Klapsis, An Unholy

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the Greeks and the Russians. Being anti-European

and anti-American, Golden Dawn sees Russia as
Greece’s “natural ally.” According to the party’s leader,
Nikos Michaloliakos, Athens and Moscow share broad
common interests in the Balkans and the Eastern
Mediterranean; therefore, Greece should disassociate
itself from the West (i.e., from the EU, NATO, and the
United States) and offer Russia an exit “to the warm
seas” in return for a Russian guarantee of Greek
national security. Golden Dawn’s official program
clearly states that a turn to Russia in the fields of
investment and energy is absolutely essential, since
a trade and defense agreement with the Russians
would disentangle Greece “from the fatal embrace of
the US and its allies.” 33 Not surprisingly, Golden Dawn
warmly welcomed the creation of the Russian-fostered
Eurasian Economic Union in May 2014, expressing the
hope that it would become a successful rival to both
the EU and the United States.34
The prospect of closer cooperation between Athens
and Moscow, especially in the economic sector, has
been warmly welcomed by the Tsipras-led coalition
government, especially just after the government
came to power in January 2015. In early 2015, Tsipras’s
government supported the expansion of the Turkish
Stream gas pipeline to Greece and negotiations
between Athens and Moscow on the project went
on for several months.35 However, the scheme was
never implemented. Had it been constructed, the new
pipeline would have increased Greece’s dependence on
Russian gas. In one of his recent interviews, Panagiotis
Lafazanis, minister of productive reconstruction,
environment, and energy in the first Tsipras cabinet
and supporter of Greece’s exit from the Eurozone,
revealed that when he was in government, he made an
agreement with Moscow that Russia would provide a
“down payment” for a gas pipeline and that this money
would be used to supplement the Greek budget, if
Greece left the Eurozone. “The pipeline we agreed
on would have changed the economic and foreign
policy conditions for Greece if the deal had been
implemented,” he claimed. 36
The prospect of closer
cooperation between Athens
and Moscow, especially in
the economic sector, has
been warmly welcomed by
the Tsipras-led coalition
government. . .
Tsipras himself publicly referred to his plan of
deepening Greco-Russian bonds in June 2015, at a time
when the Greek government’s negotiations with the
country’s creditors were going from bad to worse. In
2015, Greece was on the verge of bankruptcy. Grexit, or
a Greek exit from the Eurozone, was a real possibility
ahead of a July 2015 referendum pushed through by
Tsipras. During this tumultuous time, Tsipras took
part in the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. Tsipras
described Russia as one of “Greece’s most important
partners.” He lambasted the EU for imposing sanctions
on Russia over the annexation of Crimea, attacked the
“delusions” of Europe, and openly hinted that Athens
would form a strong alliance with Moscow if Greece
had to leave the Eurozone. “We are at the centre of a
storm, of a whirlpool,” Tsipras added. “But you know
we live near the sea—we are not afraid of storms, we
are not scared of open seas, of going into new seas.
We are ready to go into new seas to reach new safe
ports.”37 After the so-called Grexit referendum failed,
Tsipras had to make a quick U-turn and abandon these
plans. However, the desire for closer relations with
Russia remains among policy makers in Greece, some
of whom are members of the current government. For
example, in May 2016, Defense Minister Kammenos
publicly announced his intention to sign an agreement
with Moscow for the manufacture of Kalashnikov
assault rifles in Greece as soon as the European Union
ended its trade embargo with Russia.38 Kammenos was
also the only Western politician to attend the Fourth

Alliance. The European Far Right and Putin’s Russia (Brussels: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2015).
33 Klapsis, An Unholy Alliance, 19.
34 Klapsis, An Unholy Alliance, 28.
35 “Greece Says Financing Agreed to Extend Russian Gas Pipeline,” Euractiv.com, June 2, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/
news/greece-says-financing-agreed-to-extend-russian-gas-pipeline/.
36 “Lafazanis Claims Russian Cash Could Have Helped with Grexit,” Kathimerini, July 22, 2017, http://www.ekathimerini.com/220304/
article/ekathimerini/news/lafazanis-claims-russian-cash-could-have-helped-with-grexit.
37 Ben Chu, “Greece’s Crisis: Alexis Tsipras Woos Vladimir Putin as Greeks Rush for their Savings,” Independent, June 19, 2015, http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greece-crisis-alexis-tsipras-woos-vladimir-putin-as-greeks-rush-for-their-savings-10333104.
html.
38 “Greek Defense Minister Eyes Kalashnikov Project,” Kathimerini, May 31, 2016, http://www.ekathimerini.com/209185/article/ekathimerini/
news/greek-defense-minister-eyes-kalashnikov-project.

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International Security Conference held in Moscow in
April 2016.39
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
What is clearly felt in the post-Grexit debate
environment is a palpable shift and a political and
popular Greek reorientation away from the US and
European institutions and affiliations built, enhanced,
and solidified following World War II and toward a
reexamining and renewal of relations with Russia.
The harsh economic consequences of austerity,40
Eurozone exigencies, NATO expectations and costs, the
failure of previous Greek governments oriented toward
the West, historic grievances over active US support
for the twentieth century Greek Junta—in addition
to the Kosovo war and Belgrade bombing, relations
with Turkey, and the ongoing dispute in Cyprus—are
all contributing factors to contemporary Greece’s
susceptibility to Putin and its increasing preference for
a culturally aligned and fraternally seductive Russia.
Despite this current trend, Greece’s foreign policy
turn toward Russia might shift as domestic political
disenchantment with Syriza grows over its economic
and taxation policies. With this political shift, European
leaders look toward the rising centrist New Democracy
(ND) party and its US-educated and business-oriented
leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis with some hope. Despite
the relentless domestic press attacks on Mitsotakis
by the Savvidis news organizations and historic
disillusionment with ND among the public, current polls
favor Mitsotakis’s party. The mainstream EU leadership
seems to believe an ND victory in the next general
elections could reverse Greece’s growing disposition
toward Moscow. Polling in early 2017 showed a strong
likelihood that Syriza would be turned out and New
Democracy would become the number one vote-getter
with a significant lead.41 The next general elections will
take place no later than September 2019, but an exact
date is uncertain. Greek elections regularly take place
earlier than expected.
The Greek government’s attitude toward Russia also
has ramifications for European and US security policies.
In particular, Souda Bay is a key US naval support base
on the Greek island of Crete and used by NATO for
operations. Upgrading its role and facilities relies on
reaching a longer-term agreement between Greece and
the United States—an arrangement opposed behind
the scenes by Russia. The current Greek government
continues to negotiate this deal, but there is a clear lack
of enthusiasm on Syriza’s part, despite the economic
and security benefits of such an agreement.42
The European Union conducts its foreign policy on
the basis of full consensus by its member states. As
long as this is the case, the EU will be a weak foreign
policy actor. It can only be as strong as its weakest
link, and Greece, along with countries such as Hungary,
is already practicing the pocket veto prerogative on
EU policy making vis-à-vis Russia. Growing frustration
with the evolving Greek reorientation has even led
analysts to consider the possibility of cutting Greece
loose in a “grand bargain” approach.43 Such loose
European talk and limited options create the potential
for a conceivable concurrence of an opportunistic
Russia offering a financial lifeline amidst a Eurozone
renegotiation.44
In essence, transatlantic relations are on the verge of
being further undermined by the Greek Syriza coalition
government that is neither oriented toward improving
relations with the United States—exacerbated of late by
the Trump presidency—nor positively inclined toward a
Europe it perceives as strangling Greece economically
and forcing it into impoverished subservience.

39 Con Coughlin, “NATO’s United Front Under Threat after Greece Signs Arms Deal with Russia,” Telegraph, July 8, 2016, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/0/natos-united-front-under-threat-after-greece-signs-arms-deal-wit/.
40 Markos Kounalakis, “European Confederacy Slowly Dies,” Sacramento Bee, June 27, 2015, http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/
article25534822.html.
41 Philip Chrysopoulos, “New Poll Shows New Democracy 17.5% Ahead of Syriza,” Greek Reporter, April 11, 2017, http://greece.
greekreporter.com/2017/04/11/new-poll-shows-new-democracy-17-5-ahead-of-Syriza/.
42 Alexis Papahelas, “Agreement Needed on Souda Bay,” Kathimerini, May 10, 2017, http://www.ekathimerini.com/218283/opinion/
ekathimerini/comment/agreement-needed-on-souda-bay.
43 Stefan Wagstyl, “Germany’s Wolfgang Schäuble puts Grexit back on the agenda,” Financial Times, July 16, 2015, https://www.ft.com/
content/4bb34e4e-2bcf-11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7?mhq5j=e7.
44 “Signal: Acelaland, the United States of Europe and the New Hanseatic League,” Eurasia Group, June 29, 2017, http://mailchi.mp/
eurasiagroup/signal-acelaland-the-united-states-of-europe-and-the-new-hanseatic-league-1shlqkhtd0?e=e0c1842e88. In an interview
with Eurasia Group, Karthik Sankaran made a flippant, if telling statement: “I was joking that the Russians should just pay Greece $100
billion, at least in perpetuity, for the Sergey Gorshkov Memorial Base for the Russian Mediterranean fleet. You’d accomplish a few
different things. You’d make Greece sustainable. You would make Greece, which historically at least, has been a country that has had
an element to the left and seen a great deal in common with their kind of coreligionists in Russia. The great enemy of Greece is their
neighboring NATO member ‘ally,’ Turkey.”

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ITALY
IS THE TURN TO RUSSIA REVERSIBLE?

Luigi Sergio Germani and Jacopo Iacoboni

T
he rise of pro-Russian political parties in Italy is
intimately linked to the populist and anti-estab-
lishment surge that, in the past four years, has
fundamentally transformed the Italian political sys-
tem. A key factor in this surge was the economic crisis,
which hit the country hard beginning in 2011, provoking
a sharp decline in living standards and economic se-
curity for vast sectors of society, especially the middle
class. Growing frustration and anger with the Italian
establishment was fueled not only by socio-economic
stress, but also by fear of uncontrolled immigration,
widespread corruption in the country’s political elite,
and ties between politics and organized crime, as well
as the political system’s failure to respond effective-
ly to the economic crisis or to carry out long-awaited
structural reforms.
In 2011-2012, Mario Monti’s technocratic government,
under pressure from the European Union (EU),
implemented harsh austerity measures that saved
the country from financial collapse but provoked
widespread social discontent and exacerbated the
populist surge. In Italy’s 2013 general elections, the
anti-establishment 5 Star Movement (M5S) won more
than 25 percent of the vote and over one hundred
parliamentary seats.45 The M5S styled itself as an anti-
austerity, anti-EU, and anti-bank force that was fighting
to regain Italy’s economic and political sovereignty,
which it claimed had been usurped by the EU and by
other international centers of power and “globalist
elites.”
A remarkable phenomenon that accompanied the
recent phase of the populist surge, especially in the
past three years, is the increasing popularity among
the Italian public of Vladimir Putin,46 who is widely
perceived as a strong and effective leader, the only
leader capable of saving Europe from the threats of
Islamist terrorism and mass illegal immigration. In Italy,
Putin has also become a cult figure on social media:
there are dozens of Facebook (FB) pages of Putin fan
clubs as well as numerous “alternative news” FB pages
that disseminate a highly favorable image of Putin to a
vast audience in the country.47
Within Italy’s anti-establishment movements, Putin
became a powerful symbol of “sovereigntism” in its
battle with globalism. This perception may also have
been influenced by Kremlin propaganda efforts, which
for several years had been emphasizing Putin’s role
as a great leader who restored Russia’s sovereignty
against foreign efforts to weaken and destabilize it.48
The Russian president was also seen by many in the
rising Italian populist forces as an adversary of the
EU and of the West’s “globalist elites” and therefore a
potential ally in Italy’s efforts to regain its sovereignty.
The widespread perception among Italy’s anti-
establishment parties of Putin as a model and ally (and
perhaps even a vote-getter, given his popularity) was
one of the key factors that explains why these forces
embraced a pro-Russian stance.

45 “Elezioni Politiche 2013 - Liste e risultati per circoscrizione,” Repubblica.it, accessed October 17, 2017, http://www.repubblica.it/static/
speciale/2013/elezioni/camera/riepilogo_nazionale.html.
46 According to an SWG opinion poll conducted in August 2017, thirty-three percent of Italians expressed appreciation for Putin, who
is liked by a higher proportion of Italians than are other world leaders such as Trump, Merkel, Macron, May, and Xi Jinping. In a SWG
November 2015 poll, forty-nine percent viewed Putin’s policies against ISIS as effective, while thirty-two percent viewed Obama’s anti-
ISIS policies as effective. “Sondaggi politici SWG: chi sono I leader mondiali più amati dagli italiani?” Termometro Politico, accessed
October 17, 2017, http://www.termometropolitico.it/1264328_sondaggi-politici-leader-mondiali.html.
47 One example of a Facebook page that frequently disseminates an idealized image of the Russian president is “Silenzi e falsità della
stampa italiana,” a widely followed Facebook page within the pro-M5S FB network.
48 Russia has invested considerable resources in Italy to shape geopolitical perceptions favorable to Russia among the political elite and
public opinion. See: Gustav Gressel, “Fellow travellers: Russia, anti-Westernism, and Europe’s political parties,” European Foreign Policy
Council Policy Brief, July 14, 2017; Massimiliano Di Pasquale, “Perché la propaganda russa trova terreno fertile in Italia,” Strade, May-
June, 2017.

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IDENTIFYING MAJOR PLAYERS: KEY
PRO-RUSSIAN PARTIES AND FIGURES
Italian political parties can be subdivided into three
categories according to their Russia policy:
1. The mainstream camp includes the present
Gentiloni coalition government parties: the center-
left Democratic Party (PD), the center-right
Popular Alternative (AP), and other minor parties.
This camp follows Italy’s traditional foreign policy
approach: Atlanticism and Europeanism are the
pillars of Italy’s foreign and security policy, but
Rome should, nonetheless, always strive to engage
with Russia and position itself as Russia’s best
friend in the Euro-Atlantic community in order to
safeguard Italian energy and economic interests.
2. The “ambiguous” camp comprises Berlusconi’s
Forza Italia (FI), a center-right party that is
currently in the opposition. FI’s foreign policy
looks both toward the West and toward Russia.
It cannot be considered a pro-Russian party,
although some of its members of parliament (MPs)
express a Kremlin-friendly line. It maintains good
contacts in the Kremlin thanks to Berlusconi’s
personal relationship with Putin and the Moscow
connections of some FI politicians (Valentino
Valentini, for example).
3. The pro-Russian camp is made up of the anti-
establishment parties that are riding the populist
wave: the far-right Northern League (Lega Nord
or LN—now renamed Lega dei Popoli); the 5 Star
Movement (M5S), which does not easily fit into
“left-right” categories; the far-right Fratelli d’Italia
(FDI); the extreme neo-fascist right, which includes
Casapound and Forza Nuova; and some parties of
the extreme left (such as the Communist Party
headed by Marco Rizzo).
The parties in the third group are labelled pro-Russian
because they conduct the following activities: a) they
embrace and spread Russian strategic narratives,
including anti-Western and anti-American ones; b)
they consistently support Moscow’s foreign policy
actions; and c) they propose policies that favor Russia’s
geopolitical interests and that tend to undermine the
cohesion of the EU and NATO.
In 2012-2013, the Kremlin began to actively engage
the emerging anti-establishment forces in Italy,
encouraging them to embrace a pro-Russian stance,
and using them to exert influence on Italian political
debates.49 This strategy became more aggressive
after the Ukraine crisis, as Moscow sought to support
populist and sovereigntist forces across Europe to
weaken the unity of the EU and NATO, foment tensions
among Euro-Atlantic states, encourage domestic
political instability, and undermine public confidence
in liberal democracy.50
Italy’s pro-Russian parties—especially LN and M5S, but
also to some extent the extreme neo-fascist right51—
receive political support from Moscow, as evidenced by
meetings between representatives of these parties and
senior Russian government and United Russia officials
(LN and United Russia even signed a cooperation
agreement in March 2017). These parties and their
leaders also receive media support, primarily in the
form of visibility in Kremlin-controlled international
media as well as Russian media campaigns hostile to
the Italian government; however, there is no publicly
available evidence that Moscow has provided overt or
covert financial support to these parties.
There is considerable evidence of the pro-Russian
activities of LN and M5S, the two major anti-
establishment parties, as will be detailed below. First it
is useful to provide some background information on
these two parties.
The Northern League (LN). Matteo Salvini, when
he was elected leader of LN in December 2013,
inherited a party in deep crisis. LN’s image was
seriously compromised by corruption scandals, and
in the February 2013 national elections, its vote had
plummeted to 4 percent.52 Salvini and his team then
embarked upon a major rebranding of the party,
transforming LN from a northern-Italy focused

49 Anton Shekhovtsov, “Ul’trapravyy front aktivnykh meropriyatiy: Rossiya i yevropeyskiye krayne pravyye,” Anton Shekhovtsov’s Blog,
July 6, 2017, http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.it/2017/07/blog-post.html.
50 Mark Galeotti, “Controlling Chaos: How Russia manages its political war in Europe,” European Council of Foreign Relations Policy Brief,
September 1, 2017.
51 The relations between neo-fascists—such as Forza Nuova—and the Kremlin are handled by the Russian nationalist party “Rodina.” Forza
Nuova’s leader Roberto Fiore was invited by Rodina to participate in the March 2015 International Russian Conservative Forum, held
in St. Petersburg, that hosted representatives of right-wing extremist (including neo-nazi) movements from many countries. Andrea
Ferrario, “Il cuore dei neofascisti batte per la Russia,” Comedonchisciotte.org, March 26, 2015, https://comedonchisciotte.org/forum/
index.php?p=/discussion/79923/il-cuore-dei-neofascisti-batte-per-la-russia.
52 Giulia Parravicini, “Italy’s Far-Right Jolts Back from Dead,” Politico, March 2, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-
salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-effettosalvini/.

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 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

Beppe Grillo, a former comedian, is the founder of the 5 Star Movement (M5S), which espouses a pro-Russian
foreign policy. Photo credit: Niccolò Caranti.

separatist party into a right-wing nationalist, populist,
sovereigntist force, similar to Marine Le Pen’s National
Front.53
Under Salvini, the LN adopted a strong and visible
pro-Russian orientation. The party also formed closer
connections to other European parties of the far-
right.54 The party aimed at appealing to anti-system
voters, who were increasingly frustrated and enraged
with Italy’s political establishment, both in northern
and in central-southern Italy.
up by Gianroberto Casaleggio, has played a strategic
role in M5S since its beginning; it is now run by Davide
Casaleggio (Gianroberto’s son).55 The latter’s shadowy
role as the party’s “de-facto leader” and the conflict of
interest between his company and M5S have aroused
considerable concern.56
The party managed to capture a growing share of
the protest vote using aggressive anti-establishment
rhetoric and building up a powerful Internet-based
propaganda machine,57 which includes:

5 Star Movement (M5S). M5S was founded in 2009 by
former comedian Beppe Grillo and the late Gianroberto
Casaleggio, a visionary Internet entrepreneur; both
founders realized that the Internet could be used to
launch a new political movement. Casaleggio Associati,
a consulting company specializing in web strategies set
• The party’s own official blogs and social media
accounts, especially the founder’s blog, directly
run by Casaleggio Associati, which has millions of
followers.

53 Matteo Luca Andriola, “Populismo e Liberismo: la ‘rivoluzione’ di Salvini in camicia nero-verde,” Paginauno (February-March 2015).
54 Andriola, “Populismo e Liberismo.”
55 Margherita Movarelli, “From Dreams to Reality: The Challenges of Italy’s Five Star Movement,” European View (2016).
56 James Politi and Hannah Roberts, “Five Star Movement: The Unanswered Questions about Italy’s Populist Movement,” Financial Times,
September 17, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/546be098-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b.
57 Alessandro Dal Lago, Populismo Digitale (Milan: Raffaelo Cortina Editore, 2017).

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 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

• Many supposedly independent news outlets that Dugin, who became an influential figure in the Italian
are in fact close to the pro-M5S universe (although extreme right milieu,60 but was little-known in Italy
unofficially).58 outside these fringe groups.

• More loosely affiliated sites, such as those of the
fan clubs of M5S members of parliament (MPs).
• Anonymous sites sympathetic to the party.59
M5S’s ideology is a mix of technological utopianism
(especially the idea that the Internet enables web-
based direct democracy); hostility toward the Italian
establishment, depicted by the party as totally corrupt;
populism; environmentalism; anti-capitalism; anti-
globalism; and sovereigntism.
Many Italian radical right and
neo-fascist intellectuals
LN established a connection to Dugin, who in the past
was himself a fringe figure in Russia but in recent years,
has entered the mainstream of the Russian political
scene.61 The party—together with some extreme
right-wing think tanks—sought to make Dugin’s ideas
known to a wider audience, frequently inviting him to
LN-sponsored conferences.62 In 2013-14, LN also began
to forge ties with senior Russian figures close to the
orthodox ultranationalist oligarch Konstantin Malofeev,
particularly with Aleksey Komov, World Congress of
Families Regional Representative for Russia and the
CIS and head of international projects at Malofeev’s St.
Basil the Great Foundation,63 and with Andrey Klimov,
who at the time was responsible for United Russia’s
foreign relations.64

have been in contact In February 2014, LN set up the Lombardy-Russia

with Russian ultranationalists
since the early 1990s. . .
BUILDING NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE:
EVIDENCE OF THE PRO-RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES OF KEY ACTORS
The Northern League (LN)
Under Salvini, LN initiated dialogue with extreme right-
wing intellectuals and think tanks aimed at developing
a new sovereigntist identity for the party, drawing from
Russian Eurasianist and National Bolshevik critiques
of the perceived moral and spiritual degradation of
modern Western societies produced by liberalism’s
erosion of tradition, the family, religion, and patriotism.
Many Italian radical right and neo-fascist intellectuals
have been in contact with Russian ultranationalists
since the early 1990s, in particular with Aleksandr
Cultural Association (ACRL) in order to support the
development of its political contacts in Russia, relay
Russian strategic narratives to the Italian public, and
facilitate business relationships between the Lombardy
business community and Russian entrepreneurs.
Gianluca Savoini, a journalist and longtime Russia
expert for LN, became the president of ACRL, while
the above-mentioned Aleksey Komov was chosen as
honorary president. As Savoini explained in an interview,
ACRL was established in order to make the Italian
public aware that “it is absurd and counterproductive
for the EU to view Russia as an enemy and not as a
fundamental geopolitical, military, as well as economic
ally.”65
Three influential LN figures were active in developing
and managing the party’s relations with Moscow:
Gianluca Savoini (mentioned above); Claudio D’Amico,
a former LN MP, and Lorenzo Fontana, member of the
European Parliament (MEP) for LN and responsible for
LN’s relations with other European far-right parties. In

58 Nicola Biondo and Marco Canestrari, Supernova (Nicola Biondo and Marco Canestrari, 2017), p. 24-25, www.supernova5stelle.it.
59 Jacopo Iacoboni, “L’abbraccio dei Cinquestelle con I due emissari di Putin,” La Stampa, November 5 2016, http://www.lastampa.
it/2016/11/05/italia/politica/labbraccio-dei-cinquestelle-con-i-due-emissari-di-putin-l7G0E54oaCbpgn9gUqrjtN/pagina.html.
60 Giovanni Savino, “From Evola to Dugin: The Neo-Eurasian Connection in Italy,” in Eurasianism and the European Far Right: The Future
Europe-Russia Relationship, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015).
61 Anton Shekhovtsov, “Russia and the Western Far-Right,” Institute for Human Sciences, January 25, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UM_LkVLdwCw#action=share.
62 Matteo Andriola, “Dugin: il filosofo antiliberale che ha stregato la Lega,” Lettera 43, December 6, 2015.
63 Komov participated in the 2013 LN congress in Turin that elected Salvini as party leader, along with United Russia deputy Viktor
Zubarev.
64 Anton Shekhovtsov, “The Italian Far-Right Lega Nord Builds Closer Ties with Moscow,” Anton Shekhovtsov’s Blog, March 6, 2017, http://
anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.it/2017/03/the-italian-far-right-lega-nord-builds.html.
65 Alessandro Catto, “Associazione Lombardia – Russia, uno sguardo geopolitico per una nuova amicizia con Mosca,” Blog.ilgiornale.it,
December 2, 2015, http://blog.ilgiornale.it/catto/2015/12/02/associazione-lombardia-russia-uno-sguardo-geopolitico-per-una-nuova-
amicizia-con-mosca/ .

14 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

March 2014, D’Amico and Fontana traveled to Crimea
as “observers” of the referendum organized by Moscow
to legitimate its annexation of the Ukrainian province
by force.
Beginning in the fall of 2014, LN significantly increased
its pro-Russian activities, as Salvini and other LN
compatriots began to meet frequently with Russian
officials.
• October 13, 2014: Salvini leads an LN delegation to
Russian-annexed Crimea and Moscow. They meet
with Crimea’s “Prime Minister” Sergey Aksyonov,
Sergey Naryshkin (chairman of the State Duma),
Vladimir Vasiliev (deputy chairman of the State
Duma), and Aleksey Pushkov (chairman of the
Duma Foreign Affairs Committee).66
• October 17, 2014: Salvini meets with Putin on the
sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit to discuss
“the absurd sanctions against Russia” imposed by
the EU.67
• October 18, 2014: LN organizes a mass anti-illegal
immigration demonstration in Milan called “stop
invasion.” Many demonstrators held posters hailing
Putin and his tough anti-immigration policies.
Salvini, in his speech to the crowd, praised Putin
as a great and far-sighted statesman, stressed
that Russia should be a fundamental ally against
Islamist terrorism, and attacked the EU’s sanctions
policy.68
• December 8, 2014: Salvini travels to Moscow to
meet Pushkov and other Russian officials. The LN
leader stressed LN’s uncompromising opposition
to sanctions in various media appearances,69 and
claimed that the Italian economy had suffered a
loss of five billion euros because of lost exports to
Russia.
• February 14, 2015: Salvini returns to Moscow to
meet Russian officials.
• December 18, 2015: An LN delegation led by Salvini
meets Klimov and Pushkov to discuss an LN-United
Russia cooperation agreement. The Russians were
apparently not yet ready to agree to it, because
LN’s popularity was not yet sufficient (at the time
it had 10-12 percent support in nationwide polls,
with some polls pegging support as high as 15
percent).70
• May 18, 2016: The LN-dominated Venice regional
parliament passes a resolution calling for lifting
anti-Russian sanctions and recognizing the 2014
Crimea referendum. LN pushed for other regional
parliaments in the country to pass the same
resolution.
• October 14, 2016: LN begins to adopt more
aggressive anti-NATO rhetoric and denounces the
Italian government’s decision to send 140 Italian
troops to Latvia to participate in a NATO Enhanced
Forward Presence battle group in support of
reassurance measures in Central and Eastern
Europe as an “act of war” against Russia.71 At the
time, Kremlin-controlled media were warning that
Italy’s participation in the battle group was “putting
Italy on a collision course with Russia.”72
• October 18, 2016: Salvini, in a television interview
states, “NATO is playing a very dangerous game
by moving 4000 troops, with tanks and aircraft,
toward Russia’s borders.” He described NATO’s
Latvia mission, and Italy’s participation in it, as
“crazy,” and stated that Italy should reconsider its
membership in NATO.73
• November 18, 2016 (about two weeks before the
critical referendum on then Prime Minister Matteo
Renzi’s constitutional reforms): Salvini and other
LN officials are again in Moscow to meet Sergey
Zheleznyak (deputy chairman of the Duma and
deputy secretary of the General Council of United

66 Shekhovtsov, “The Italian far right Lega Nord builds closer ties with Moscow.”
67 Eliseo Bertolasi, “Sanzioni alla Russia fanno interessi solo delle lobby» – Intervista a Matteo Salvini e Gianluca Savoini,” Lombardiarussia.
org, November 3, 2014, http://www.lombardiarussia.org/index.php/component/content/article/57-categoria-home-/392-lsanzioni-alla-
russia-fanno-interessi-solo-delle-lobbyr-intervista-a-matteo-salvini-e-gianluca-savoini.
68 Matteo Salvini, “Stop Invasione - Intervento di Matteo Salvini,” YouTube.com, October 18, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=v2pfZajgeaA.
69 Tatiana Santi, “Salvini torna a Mosca per dire “no” alle sanzioni,” Sputnik News, December 9, 2014, https://it.sputniknews.com/italian.
ruvr.ru/2014_12_09/Salvini-torna-a-Mosca-per-dire-no-alle-sanzioni-Parte-1-7922/.
70 Shekhovtsov, “The Italian far right Lega Nord builds closer ties with Moscow.”
71 Ugo Giano, “Nato, Divina (Ln): Soldati Alleanza Atlantica a confine russo è atto di Guerra,” Agenparl.com, October 14, 2016, http://www.
agenparl.com/nato-divina-ln-soldati-alleanza-atlantica-confine-russo-atto-guerra/.
72 “NATO’s Bidding Puts Italy on a Collision Course with Russia,” Sputnik News, October 19, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/
europe/201610191046484173-italy-russia-troops/.
73 Matteo Salvini, “Matteo Salvini intervistato da Myrta Merlino,” YouTube.com, October 18, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2nJZb6OREm4.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 15
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

Alexander Gauland, head of the Alternative für Deutschland. Photo credit: Metropolico.org/Flickr.

Supporters of the Northern League (LN), a far-right political party with close ties to Russian leadership, rally against
immigration in Turin, Italy, October 12, 2013. Photo credit: Fabio Visconti.

Russia), Viktor Zubarev (United Russia), and
Crimea’s “Deputy Prime Minister” Georgy Muradov.
• March 6, 2017: Salvini travels to Moscow to sign the
United Russia-LN cooperation agreement.74
The 5 Star Movement (M5S)
M5S shifted toward a pro-Russian foreign policy in the
spring of 2015. It appears that a key role in the decision
to make this shift was played by Davide Casaleggio.
Previously, the party was not pro-Russian but was, in
fact, often critical of Putin’s authoritarian regime and of
systematic violations of fundamental rights in Russia.
In contrast to LN, which openly declares its pro-Russian
stance and publicizes its contacts with the Kremlin,
M5S denies that it has such an attitude toward Russia
and generally strives to keep its contacts and meetings
with Russian officials confidential and out of the public
view.
Three leading M5S MPs appear to have been assigned
a key role in managing the party’s cooperation with
Moscow: Alessandro Di Battista (deputy chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of
Deputies), Manlio Di Stefano (M5S group leader at
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of
Deputies, often described as a possible foreign minister
in a future M5S government), and Vito Petrocelli (M5S
group leader at the Senate). Davide Casaleggio is
believed to have closely followed the development of
the M5S-Russia relationship.
One of the first indicators of Moscow’s support of M5S
was the party’s growing visibility in Kremlin-controlled
international media such as RT, Sputnik, and other
outlets. This trend began in April 2015, when RT
broadcast an interview with Beppe Grillo in which the
latter described Italy as a country “in dire straits” and
on the verge of breakdown and an authoritarian coup
d’etat, while RT—during Grillo’s interview—showed
images of unrest and violent anti-government protests

74 Matteo Carnieletto and Elena Barlozzari, “Ecco l’accordo tra Lega Nord e Russia Unita,” Ilgiornale.it, July 13, 2017, http://www.ilgiornale.
it/news/politica/ecco-laccordo-lega-nord-e-russia-unita-1419611.html.

16 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

in Italian cities.75 The depiction of Italy as a country
in constant revolt against the government and on the
verge of chaos became a recurring theme of Kremlin
propaganda that was echoed by M5S’s extensive
network of websites and social media accounts.76
In June and July 2015, the party launched a campaign
against anti-Russian sanctions,77 and top M5S
politicians began to express pro-Moscow views and
to embrace Kremlin strategic narratives. On June 8,
2015, for example, Manlio di Stefano, in a statement
posted on Grillo’s blog, accused the West of having
staged a coup d’etat in Ukraine and installed a pro-US
government in Kiev. He argued that the West is now
preparing to turn Ukraine into a NATO base in order to
launch “a final assault on Russia.”78
On July 29, 2015, Di Stefano argued, in a post on Grillo’s
website, that the EU is subservient to US interests and
that “Europe is being dragged by Washington into a
dangerous crusade against Russia.”79
It became increasingly evident in 2016 that
Russian strategic narratives (sometimes including
disinformation and conspiracy theories) were
systematically spread in Italy by the vast network of
pro-M5S websites and social media accounts.80 Items
on these websites were frequently sourced to Kremlin-
controlled media.
For example, Sputnik became one of the preferred
sources of stories published by Tze Tze (controlled by
Casaleggio Associati), one of the major news websites
of the pro-M5S network with 1.2 million followers.
L’Antidiplomatico, a website that publicizes M5S’s
foreign policy positions but is not officially affiliated
with the party, constantly published articles that
relayed Kremlin propaganda themes. The site’s director,
Alessandro Bianchi, is one of Alessandro Di Battista’s
closest aides.81
In 2016, top M5S politicians began to visit Moscow
to meet senior Russian politicians while the party
intensified its pro-Russian activities.
• March 25, 2016: The United Russia website
announces that on March 26, 2016, an M5S
delegation, guided by Di Battista, is to meet Sergey
Zheleznyak, deputy secretary of United Russia’s
General Council, and Robert Shlegel, chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Presidium of
United Russia’s General Council.82
• June 26, 2016: Di Stefano is the only Italian
politician to speak at the United Russia congress
in Moscow. In his speech, Di Stefano calls Ukraine’s
Maidan revolution a “Western-backed coup”
aimed at bringing NATO to Russia’s borders. He
calls for sanctions to be lifted immediately, and for
closer Italian-Russian intelligence cooperation on
counterterrorism. He also stresses Italy’s national
interests require that Moscow be a key player in
the solution of security crises in the Middle East
and North Africa.83
• August 3, 2016: As terrorist attacks in Europe
increased, Di Battista, in a foreign policy speech to
the Italian Parliament, emphasizes Italian-Russian
intelligence cooperation as the key to countering
the growing threat of Islamist terrorism.84
• August 4, 2016: M5S presents a legislative proposal
to the Italian parliament that would require Italy’s
participation in NATO to be ratified by parliament
every two years and would also subject NATO’s

75 “Beppe Grillo alla televisione russa RT: ‘’Sono a favore dell’Europa ma contro l’euro’’ #fuoridalleuro,” Beppegrillo.it, April 10, 2015, http://
www.beppegrillo.it/2015/04/beppe_grillo_alla_televisione_russa_rt_sono_a_favore_delleuropa_ma_contro_leuro_fuoridalleuro.html.
76 Jacopo Iacoboni, “L’abbraccio dei Cinquestelle con i due emissari di Putin,” La Stampa, May 11, 2016, http://www.lastampa.it/2016/11/05/
italia/politica/labbraccio-dei-cinquestelle-con-i-due-emissari-di-putin-l7G0E54oaCbpgn9gUqrjtN/pagina.html.
77 “Revocare sanzioni a Russia, Italia ha perso più di 1mld in un anno,” Movimento5stelle.it, June 11, 2016, http://www.movimento5stelle.it/
parlamento/esteri/2015/06/revocare-sanzioni-a-russia-italia-ha-perso-piu-di-1mld-in-un-anno.html.
78 “Putin circondato,” Beppegrillo.it, June 8, 2015, http://www.beppegrillo.it/2015/06/putin_circondato.html.
79 Manlio Di Stefano, “Una delegazione di pace M5S in Russia e Crimea,” Beppegrillo.it, July 29, 2015. http://www.beppegrillo.it/2015/07/
una_delegazione_di_pace_m5s_in_russia_e_crimea.html.
80 Alberto Nardelli and Craig Silverman, “Italy’s Most Popular Political Party is Leading Europe in Fake News and Kremlin Propaganda,”
Buzzfeed, November 29, 2016, https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/italys-most-popular-political-party-is-leading-europe-in-
fak?utm_term=.bj1qk2Pay#.sxBw2J8jQ.
81 Jacopo Iacoboni, “L’Antidiplomatico, così un sito divulga la linea filo-russa del M5S,” La Stampa, November 8, 2016, http://www.
lastampa.it/2016/11/08/italia/politica/lantidiplomatico-cos-un-sito-divulga-la-linea-filorussa-del-ms-wcy1I06N9alcHSE8nUGwsL/pagina.
html.
82 “V Moskve sostoyatsya rossiysko-ital’yanskiye mezhpartiynyye konsul’tatsii «Yedinaya Rossiya» - «Dvizheniye pyat’ zvezd»,” United
Russia website, March 25, 2016, http://er.ru/news/140645/.
83 Manlio Di Stefano, “Manlio Di Stefano in Russia: Una politica estera differente è possibile,” Ilblogdellestelle.it, June 28, 2016, http://www.
ilblogdellestelle.it/manlio_di_stefano_in_russia_una_politica_estera_differente_e_possibile.html.
84 Manlio Di Stefano, “Non Era Mai Successo...Prima del M5S,” Facebook, August 4, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/ManlioDiStefano/
videos/1198714733519984/?video_source=pages_finch_main_video.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 17
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

use of military bases in Italy to parliamentary propaganda,” and for those that seek to counter
approval.85 “fake news.”88

• October 14, 2016: After the announcement that
140 Italian troops would participate in a NATO
Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Latvia,
M5S intensifies both its hostile rhetoric against
NATO and its warnings that a nuclear war could
break out because of the West’s “aggressive and
provocative” moves against Russia. These warnings
echoed a recurrent theme of Kremlin propaganda
campaigns aimed at reinforcing fear and anxiety in
Western public opinion that tensions with Russia
could escalate into nuclear war. Di Stefano called
on the government to immediately re-discuss
Italy’s membership in NATO, “an ‘alliance’ that is
trapping us in a scenario of war and its ultimately
apocalyptic consequence: a thermonuclear war
with Russia.”86
• In October 2016, some of Russia’s international
media outlets initiated a campaign to undermine
the pro-Yes (pro-Renzi) vote for the December
2016 referendum on constitutional reform.
• October 30, 2016: RT in English and its websites
falsely present images of a pro-Yes public
demonstration of thousands of people in Rome as
an anti-government protest supporting a no vote
at the referendum, and the fake news is spread
quickly by a number of pro-M5S websites and
social media accounts. Rome lodged a protest
with Moscow over the incident through diplomatic
channels.87
• November 14, 2016: An M5S delegation headed by
MP Vito Petrocelli travels to Moscow to wrap up
M5S’s campaign for a no vote at the referendum,
and holds a press conference at the Kremlin-
controlled Rossiya Segodnya’s media center.
• March 23, 2017: M5S issues the Five Stars Citizen
Handbook for Europe, a foreign policy document
that calls for the immediate removal of sanctions
against Russia, and the cancellation of funding
for EU strategic communications programs that
spread “anti-Russian propaganda” and “pro-Euro
• April 5, 2017: Registered members of M5S’s
“Rousseau” online voting platform vote on the
party’s foreign policy program, which calls for a
strategic partnership with Russia, while repeating
the Russian strategic narrative that US and Western
“interventionism” and democracy-promotion
programs are entirely to blame for generating
chaos, terrorism, and destabilization in the Middle
East and in other regions of the world, as well as
uncontrolled immigration from such crisis-stricken
areas. “Western unilateralism,” the program states,
“has destroyed countries such as Iraq, Somalia, the
Former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine and
Syria.” 89
Consequences and Implications for Transatlantic
Relations
Italy is set to hold national elections in the first half of
2018. If M5S or LN enter into national government or
significantly increase their influence on policy making,
then the transatlantic partnership—a key pillar of Italy’s
foreign and security policy—could be weakened.
1. M5S and LN, if they accede to power, may push
to change Italy’s traditional Atlanticist and
Europeanist foreign policy and attempt to forge
some kind of strategic alliance with Moscow. This
would weaken mutual trust between Europe and
the United States, with negative consequences for
transatlantic dialogue and cooperation.
2. These parties have proclaimed policies that weaken
Italy’s commitment to NATO and create obstacles
for the country’s participation in NATO missions
and for NATO’s use of military bases in the country,
thus undermining the Alliance’s cohesion.
3. M5S and LN will probably continue to spread
the Kremlin’s anti-Western and anti-US strategic
narratives among the Italian public, which has
traditionally been pro-American. These propaganda
efforts, if left unchallenged, may generate a
significant increase in anti-American sentiments in

85 Manlio Di Stefano, “Non Era Mai Successo...Prima del M5S.”

86 Manlio Di Stefano, “Manlio Di Stefano (M5S): «Quando governeremo, la Nato non potra’ trattarci come sudditi. Mai piu’»,”
Lantidiplomatico.it, October 14, 2016, http://www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-manlio_di_stefano_m5s_quando_governeremo_la_nato_
non_potra_trattarci_come_sudditi_mai_piu/82_17478/.
87 Jacopo Iacoboni, “La propaganda russa all’offensiva antirenzi e il web grillino rilancia,” La Stampa, November 2, 2016, http://www.
lastampa.it/2016/11/02/italia/politica/la-propaganda-russa-alloffensiva-antirenzi-e-il-web-grillino-rilancia-4Nr21Ymkcw9clKLm6HtuFK/
pagina.html.
88 “Libro a 5 Stelle Dei Cittadini Per L’Europa,” Movimento5stelle.it, http://www.movimento5stelle.it/parlamentoeuropeo/libro-5-stelle-dei-
cittadini-per-europa.pdf.
89 “Programma Esteri Movimento 5 Stelle,” Programma parziale, April 13, 2017.

18 ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Italy, undermining public support for the country’s
transatlantic partnership.
4. An M5S-led government could lead to serious
domestic political and economic instability because
of the party’s lack of experience and capacity to
govern, undermining Italy’s credibility as a partner
for Washington and the Euro-Atlantic community.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0
Italy’s political system has been transformed by the
pro-Russian camp in Italian politics, which has emerged
and grown as a result of the populist surge that began
in 2013. In the absence of a strategic response by Italy’s
establishment that addresses the deeper causes of
the populist surge, Russian influence in Italy is bound
to increase, progressively undermining the country’s
Western-oriented foreign policy as well as the strength
and stability of its democratic system.
19
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

SPAIN
THE NEXT TARGET FOR RUSSIAN INFLUENCE?

Francisco de Borja Lasheras and Nicolás de Pedro

U
ntil recently, Russia has not been a tradition-
al foreign policy priority or a “hot” topic that
can easily mobilize domestic constituencies in
Spain. Nonetheless, Russian aggression against Ukraine
in 2014 produced heated public debates. As in other
Western countries, the Russia question, especially
when paired with broader European security issues,
international order, and Western democracy, could be
a polarizing topic, especially against a backdrop of dis-
content, economic insecurity, and populism.
Spain has not been a priority target for hybrid activities
from Moscow, unlike Germany, Italy, or some Central
European countries. Still, Spain, as one of the largest
European Union (EU) countries and hub of the Spanish-
speaking world, is relevant to Russian geopolitical
interests. And because political and strategic thinking
on Russia remains hollow and often driven by
stereotypes, public opinion outlets and some policy
makers are malleable, which makes Spain potentially
vulnerable to Russian influence operations.
Overall, the Spanish government’s position on Russia
reflects established patterns in Spanish diplomacy,
such as a preference for multilateralism, a penchant for
caution, and a self-perception of Spain as predictable
and as a neutral broker. It also reflects an uneasy
equilibrium between competing strategic drivers. This
is why Madrid’s position may be framed as a balancing
act among three positions: 1. a pro-European and
pro-Western position, which sees a pro-EU Spain
adhering to sanctions and supporting NATO positions
in the Baltics and in Europe’s East, while generally
refraining from open overtures to Moscow; 2. a
pro-engagement with Russia position, that furthers
bilateral relations, is cautious with measures that
Madrid perceives as escalating tensions with Russia,
and underscores the need to engage with Russia;
and 3. a geo-economic position, which dominates
the current minority government of the Popular Party
(conservative), is focused on economic growth, and
sees diplomacy as a tool for business promotion
abroad.90
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s government is
generally keen to avoid tensions with Russia. Madrid’s
initial stance on Ukraine was ambiguous,91 but the
government gradually escalated its critical rhetoric,
closely following Berlin and Paris. After Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, Rajoy’s government slowed its
pursuit of better bilateral relations, but, following this
brief hiatus, interests in seeking closer economic links
with Russia and a return to so-called normalization
seem to be the driving force right now. Spanish officials
have resumed visits to Moscow,92 coupled with some
calls to eventually revisit sanctions, though within the
EU-specified constraints that link sanctions relief to
the fulfillment of the Minsk agreements. And while
Madrid insists on engagement, it has set in motion, and
endorsed at the highest political levels,93 a substantial

90 According to official statistics provided by ICEX, current bilateral figures of investment are modest (109 million euros in 2016). Total
bilateral trade turnover is more significant (it reached five billion euros in 2016), though limited compared to Spain’s total international
trade (583 billion euros in 2015). Russia is a key partner in tourism and real estate, with promising opportunities in infrastructure
development and civil engineering. See: Antonio Sánchez Andrés and Nicolás De Pedro, “Spain and the European Union-Russia
Conflict: the Impact of the Sanctions,” Notes Internacionals, CIDOB 108 (2015), accessed October 18, 2017, https://www.cidob.org/en/
publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/n1_108/spain_and_the_european_union_russia_conflict_the_impact_of_the_
sanctions.
91 Previous Spanish Foreign Minister Manuel García-Margallo raised eyebrows with his friendly meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov, in Madrid, on March 5, 2014, at the peak of the Crimean crisis. Margallo did ask Russia to respect international law, though
expressing a wish that there would not be a need to slash sanctions. This is consistent with his policy throughout his term as finance
minister.
92 Foreign Minister Alfonso Dastis, and also Spain’s Minister for Industry, Energy and Digital Agenda, Álvaro Nadal, visited Moscow in
spring 2017, with a strong economic component. See: Xavier Colás, “España, al rescate de las infraestructuras rusas,” El Mundo, May 29,
2017, http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2017/05/29/592c7af7e2704ecd058b45b1.html.
93 Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy made a strong endorsement of the mission during his visit to the Spanish troops in Adazi (Latvia) in
July 2017 and even supported the possibility of Spain leading the multinational battlegroup. See: Ángel Collado, “Rajoy anuncia en

20 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

increase in its contributions to NATO deployments in public positioning, as it permeates politically active
the Baltics,94—an area not seen as vital interest. and ideological segments of society with or without
public responsibilities.
THE SPANISH RUSSLANDVERSTEHERS
Thus, while Spain may not yet have high-profile Trojan
Spain and Russia have generally had limited political,
Horses, it has many Russlandverstehers: individuals
social, and economic relations and have weak
and entities who sympathize with, subscribe to, or
historical and structural links.95 As a result, Spanish-
promote core elements of the Kremlin’s worldview
Russian relations remain hollow in strategic terms,
and narrative.98 These individuals are active in political
and public discourse is often rife with stereotypes and
settings, including government bodies, policy circles,
misconceptions. Since the war in Ukraine, this may
and across social media, from different positions
be changing. Though specific polls on the topic are
of influence. They are a heterogeneous group that
infrequent,96 most Spaniards seem to find Putin and
includes scholars, civil servants, politicians of almost
Russia, which they view as a blend of authoritarianism
all stripes, and pundits who mainly emphasize the
with homophobic, militaristic, and macho posturing, as
need to “understand” Russia’s actions in Syria,
abhorrent. This suggests a gap between some sectors
Ukraine, or elsewhere as inevitable or justifiable, over
of the establishment, political groups and scholars, and
other considerations such as human rights, pluralistic
a plurality of citizens when it comes to Putin’s Russia,
democracies, or liberal values. Pragmatists amongst
though it is still not a topic that mobilizes the public.97
them understand that Russia behaves as a hostile
In general, mainstream media editorials endorse a
power and thus that some form of containment
harsher position on Russia than that advocated by the
is necessary; however, they frequently stress that
Spanish government.
open-ended confrontation over Ukraine is pointless
There is, nonetheless, an entrenched “Russophilia” in the wider scheme of international affairs. A smaller
that seems to result from a deeply rooted blend of subgroup of “true believers” sees Russia’s actions as
ideology as well as idealistic characterization and justified, one way or the other, or that despite them,
clichés of Russia or the Soviet Union. This Russophilia Russia is a European country and remains a potential
often goes hand in hand with equally strong, though partner and ally facing common threats, such as
negative perceptions of the West, the role of the terrorism.
United States and NATO in European security (or
Most Spanish Russlandverstehers refrain from stances
even Spanish history—e.g., US support for Francisco
openly supportive of Putin himself, but they do prioritize
Franco) or ideology—especially, but not only, on the
notions of partnership and a common European space.
left of the political spectrum where anti-Americanism is
At times, some such voices promote the need for a
still rampant. Such Spanish Russophilia is inchoate, not
nonaligned, Russia-friendly Southern Caucasus.99 They
grounded in any substantial understanding of modern
reject the “pro-Russian” label and seem to perceive
Russia and is devoid of strategic depth. Nevertheless,
themselves as objective and balanced, as opposed to
it does play a role in shaping policy preferences and
mainstream Spanish public figures in media or policy

Letonia una mayor implicación de España con la OTAN,” El Confidencial, July 18, 2017, https://www.elconfidencial.com/
espana/2017-07-18/rajoy-letonia-implicacion-espna-otan-baltico_1417133/.
94 Spain has deployed 300 troops in Latvia as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence multinational battlegroups in the Baltic
countries and Poland. It has contributed for years to the NATO Policing mission in the Baltics with several Eurofighter jets. Spain
is deploying a mechanized infantry Company in armored fighting vehicles, including Leopard tanks, together with cyber security
experts in Estonia. See: “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Practices,” NATO, May 2017, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf.
95 For instance, in terms of energy, Russia was the fifth largest supplier of oil to Spain in 2016 (7.9 percent of the total). The supply sources
of crude oil are highly diversified. At the same time, Russian gas is not consumed in the Iberian Peninsula. Official figures are provided
by the Corporación de Reservas de Productos Petrolíferos (CORES).
96 For instance, according to a Pew Research poll published in August 2017, Spaniards are among the least confident in President Putin
worldwide. In the EU, Spain is ranked only behind Poland with eighty-eight per cent exhibiting lack of confidence in Putin’s global
leadership (above the global median of sixty percent). This is consistent with similar results in previous years. See: Margaret Vice,
“Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia,” Pew Research Center, August 16, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/16/
publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/.
97 There are exceptions. For instance, on April 21, 2017, hundreds gathered in front of the Russian embassy in Madrid to protest
against the alleged concentration camps for homosexuals in Chechnya. See: “Cientos de personas protestan por la persecución de
homosexuales en Chechenia,” Eldiario.es, April 21, 2017, http://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Cientos-protestan-persecucion-homosexuales-
Chechenia_0_635537548.html.
98 Francisco de Borja Lasheras, “Spain’s balancing act with Russia”, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 26, 2016, http://www.ecfr.
eu/article/commentary_spains_balancing_act_with_russia.
99 Discussions with authors, Madrid, 2014-2017.

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THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

Thousands of people participate in the “March of Change,” organized by Podemos, a leftist political party supportive
of lifting sanctions on Russia, in Madrid, Spain, January 31, 2015. Photo credit: Barcex.

circles, whom they criticize as “anti-Russian” (or “pro- claims that it is better to engage with Russia and Putin
Ukrainian” or “pro-Syrian opposition”). in order to avoid greater conflict.

The Spanish Russlandverstehers, like their peers in other
Western countries, whether left or right, subscribe
to a rather conservative view of international affairs
that uncritically accepts power-based international
affairs and geopolitics. These Iberian Henry Kissingers
are skeptical about democracy promotion and
revolutionary uprisings like Ukraine’s Maidan or the
Arab Spring—especially when the West and United
States are perceived to be involved. They are mostly
concerned with stability and readily accept the notion
of spheres of influence.
Hence, such support in Spain for Russian views of
the international order is generally less an open
admiration of the model and more an acceptance
and legitimization of Russia’s geo-strategic agenda,
regardless of the Kremlin’s actual behavior. In fact, in
their view, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy bolsters
Nonetheless, Russia’s allure to Europhobic far
right groups and its actions in recent years, from
Ukraine to Syria to interference and meddling in
Western democracies could contribute to a certain
reassessment of positions at both government and
broader political levels. This shift is far from coherent
yet, and the jury is still out on whether it will produce
a strategic repositioning of the country as a whole.
But the Kremlin’s undeniably destabilizing actions
have certainly hampered notions of partnership with
Russia. Madrid does not officially see Putin’s Russia as
a threat, but there is an awareness of the challenges it
presents to European security and stability—and that
these could eventually affect Spain.100 Such factors
mitigate and restrain the Russlandverstehers, but they
have further entrenched opinions regarding Russia,
both within the political class and in policy and media

100 Take the concerns of Madrid’s authorities regarding the presence of Russian mafia elements in the Spanish coast and their potential
links to the Kremlin. See: Jesus Duva, “Un fiscal español vincula a la mafia rusa con el Kremlin,” El Pais, December 1, 2010, https://elpais.
com/internacional/2010/12/01/actualidad/1291158037_850215.html.

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circles, even if the topic is not mainstream yet.101 Still,
as a pacifist country, Spanish political discourse shies
away from positions labelled as too hawkish on Russia.
IDENTIFYING THE MAJOR PLAYERS: KEY
PRO-RUSSIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND
FIGURES
Overall, the main Spanish parties tend to adhere to
common EU and NATO positions, and some, such
as the social democrats (PSOE) are, at times, quite
vocal on human rights and democracy questions with
respect to Russia and the post-Soviet space.
On the right, the pro-Russian grouping is composed
of fringe parties and far right movements, such
as Movimiento Social Republicano (MSR) and the
xenophobic Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), in
addition to individual figures in or close to mainstream
conservatism. Russia-promoted narratives are
attracting growing attention from some outlets and
emerging rightist parties, such as Vox, which does not
have parliamentary representation yet. These actors
see Putin as tough on terrorism or as a supporter of
territorial integrity, and they view Russia as a stalwart
defender of Christianity against Islam.

Spain does not yet have the equivalent of Italy’s
Northern League and its leader Matteo Salvini
or Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder, each vying for
Kremlin attention apparently out of financial interest,
ideological conviction, or a mix of both. Political
figures that are openly pro-Russian are mostly fringe
characters of the right and far right, along with some
groups and figures from the far left. They all defend
and/or support Russia, though for different reasons and
agendas, and out of disparate preconceptions of what
Russia or Putin fundamentally are. Their motivations
and inspirations resemble those of their bedfellows
in the West and Russia: to the left (including far left),
Russia is seen through the prism of Soviet ideological
nostalgia and as a bulwark against Western imperialism
and the US-backed NATO alliance; meanwhile, rightists
admire Russia and even Putin out of an imperialistic
nostalgia, and they appreciate Putin’s brand of social
conservatism. As a result, when it comes to policy
toward Russia, far-right and far-left forces often find
themselves on the same side of the fence.
On the left, Podemos, which is further to the left
politically than PSOE,102 deserves a separate, nuanced
analysis. Russia (and foreign policy) is not a core policy
platform of this force. Instead, Podemos mostly looks
at the Russian model as an embodiment of a counter-
Western narrative that puts on the table, in their view,
the hypocrisy and abuses of the liberal order. The party
does take pains in public not to be associated with
Putin himself, a leader seen as at odds with the party’s
pro-empowerment, anti-oligarchic, and pro-social
rights stance. Though the party rejects the label of
“pro-Russian,” it is the only main Spanish party calling
for an immediate, unconditional lifting of sanctions
on Russia.103 Some Podemos leaders make arguments
tantamount to spheres of influence,104 akin to a Monroe
doctrine for Eastern Europe—even if the rejection
of the eponymous US doctrine in Latin America is,
ironically, one of their ideological bases.105
There are some differences of opinion, and specific
Podemos leaders have occasionally condemned
Moscow.106 Still, and overall, the party thus far stands

101 Francisco de Borja Lasheras, “Four Spanish factions on Russia and Ukraine,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 24, 2014,
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_spain_on_russia_and_ukraine_the_understanders_the_equidistan274.
102 Unlike their German colleagues, today’s PSOE lacks any figures perceived as Russia friendly or with interests in that country, and the
party has actually shifted towards a more demanding position, though it is not a core party policy.
103 In a survey by the Elcano Royal Institute ahead of Spain’s general election in December 2015, Podemos supported a quick lifting of sanctions on
Russia and the launch of a dialogue process to (re)incorporate Russia to an inclusive wider Europe security architecture. See: “La intervención
de Rusia en Ucrania,” Real Instituto Elcano, 2016, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/especiales/elecciones2016/pregunta/16.php.
104 Podemos’ foreign policy chief, Pablo Bustinduy, often argues that NATO’s expansion is to blame for the war in Ukraine, seen as
“meddling into what Russia sees as a geo-strategic area vital for its interests,” while stating that the sanctions’ policy has been an “utter
failure.” An especially prominent role in this discourse is also played by Javier Couso, MEP from IU, part of the Podemos coalition. Mr
Couso, at the European Parliament and at media appearances (including regularly on RT), tends to put the blame on NATO and the
EU, and calls for an unconditional lifting of sanctions on Russia, endorsing the narrative of the “Kyiv junta.” Mr. Couso invited Alexey
Pushkov to address the European Parliament in February 2015. See: Podemos Congreso, “Pablo Bustinduy en la Comisión de Asuntos
Exteriores el 19 de Abril,” YouTube video, April 19, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odebFkYw_cI); IzquierdaUnida, “Couso
celebra que “por fin” Rusia pueda hablar sobre el conflicto en Ucrania en la Eurocámara,” YouTube video, February 10, 2015, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUiBXW7LyDo.
105 Jorge Galindo, “Pablo Bustinduy: «El amor a tu patria es un afecto político poderosísimo y noble en esencia»,” Jotdown, http://www.
jotdown.es/2016/06/pablo-bustinduy/.
106 In an interview, Pablo Iglesias, Podemos’ main leader, labeled Putin as a “resentful KGB agent” and “a nationalist”, adding that “in
Russia Podemos would be imprisoned.” Additionally, in the 2015 European Parliament resolution condemning the killing of Boris
Nemtsov, Podemos split with Mr. Iglesias voting in favor and other MEPs of Podemos voting against. See: John Carlin, “Pablo Iglesias:
“Catalans, stay with us and let’s all kick out Rajoy together,” El Pais, September 24, 2015, https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/09/24/
inenglish/1443088078_061646.html; “Murder of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and the state of democracy in Russia,”
Vote Watch Europe, http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-murder-of-the-russian-opposition-leader-boris-nemtsov-and-the-state-of-
democracy-in-russia-joint-mot.html.

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out as the clearest advocate of positions resonating crisis in Catalonia has heightened concerns with Russian
with the Kremlin narrative in Spain—even if, in fairness, disinformation. In addition to the pro-independence
these positions resemble those held by individual campaign of Julian Assange,109 Edward Snowden,
members of other parties, too. and similar public figures, Russia-affiliated bots and
outlets, chiefly Sputnik, have ramped up stories on a
post-Francoism at work, in tones at times reminiscent
These groups further the of the inflammatory narrative of the “Kyiv junta.”110 At
this stage, this propaganda effort is far from consistent
Kremlin’s goal of fostering and a nuanced assessment is necessary. The Russian
alternative political realities government at this point seems keen on sticking to its
position of not alienating Madrid, officially reiterating
and undermining democracy, its official adherence to Spain’s territorial integrity and

as their alternative “truths” categorizing Catalonia as an internal Spanish affair.

and echo chambers appeal to
individuals disenchanted with
established institutions and
mainstream parties.
BUILDING NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE
As elsewhere, Russia has launched information
operations aimed at undermining European unity
and polarizing opinion in Spain as well. The Russian
government-funded news outlet, RT, launched its
Spanish service in 2009. While exact viewership
numbers are unknown, RT Spanish targets a huge
potential global audience of more than 550 million
Spanish speakers, including roughly 40 million in
the United States.107 The channel is well established
and easily accessible in Latin America. The editorial
line shifts and occasionally represents a balanced
perspective, but RT Spanish often seems to nurture
mostly anti-US and anti-Western constituencies. Given
its current presence and availability, its real impact and
leverage in Spain seems limited, especially within a
pluralistic media space. RT Spanish has, however, been
part of disinformation operations, especially when it
comes to shaping the narrative regarding Ukraine or
European and Western democracies.108 The ongoing
Putin weighed in on the situation in Catalonia as well,
criticizing the EU’s “double standard” in recognizing
some separatist regions, like Kosovo, but not others,
all of which lead to instability.111
Moreover, there is a pro-Russian underworld that
encompasses the blogosphere, activist platforms, and
quasi-civil society groups. They serve as a mobilizing
influence among fringe groups on the far left and right,
and occasionally have a disruptive impact on Spanish
politics. It is unclear whether their funding comes
directly from the Kremlin or from sectors associated
with it, but indications of Kremlin-directed efforts to
establish some sort of friendly experts’ platforms are
increasing. These groups further the Kremlin’s goal of
fostering alternative political realities and undermining
democracy, as their alternative “truths” and echo
chambers appeal to individuals disenchanted with
established institutions and mainstream parties. As
such, these shady groups and platforms, together with
more established politicians and actors, are of interest
to Russia, and can be useful levers for public opinion
and to influence Spanish politics.
As an example, since the outbreak of the war in Eastern
Ukraine, there was activism in favor of “Novorossiya”
and the “anti-fascist fight” (antifa) in the Donbas
coming from minority extreme-left circles (e.g. squat
movement protests and students’ associations),

107 According to the Instituto Cervantes, 472 million people have Spanish as their mother tongue. If those with a limited competence and
those learning it are included then the number increases to 567 million, including forty-two million native speakers in the US and fifteen
million with some limited competence. See: “El español: una lengua viva: Informe 2016,” Instituto Cervantes, https://cvc.cervantes.es/
lengua/espanol_lengua_viva/pdf/espanol_lengua_viva_2016.pdf.
108 Carl Schreck, “‘That Awkward Moment’: Putin Cited Debunked MH17 Claims In Oliver Stone Interview,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
September 1, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-debunked-spanish-air-traffic-controller-claims-oliver-stone-interview/28709936.html.
109 The sudden support from Julian Assange of Wikileaks to the Catalan pro-independence movement added to the intense coverage by
Russian media outlets. See: Marcos Lamelas, “Puigdemont, dos congresistas y un ‘lobby’: el triángulo que explica los tuits de Assange,”
El Confidencial, September 14, 2017, https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/cataluna/2017-09-14/rusia-cataluna-cuna-merkel-romper-
europa_1443052/.
110 Pilar Bonet, “Russia uses Catalan referendum in fight against Brussels,” El Pais, October 1, 2017, https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/01/
inenglish/1506863180_074507.html; Mark Scott and Diego Torres, “Catalan referendum stokes fears of Russian influence,” Politico,
September 29, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/russia-catalonia-referendum-fake-news-misinformation/.
111 Xavier Colas, “Putin a la UE sobre Cataluña: «Haber pensado mejor el respaldo a Kosovo»,” El Mundo, http://www.elmundo.es/
espana/2017/10/19/59e8c3c046163f1c2e8b463a.html.

24 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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particularly across social media platforms, such as
Twitter and Facebook. Small committees in support of
the “rebels” and the “antifa fight” in Donbas appeared
across Spanish cities, sometimes with connections
to Spanish “volunteers” fighting in the “republics”
supported by Moscow. This garnered occasional media
attention, especially from Russian mainstream and
Spanish far-left media and websites, even though the
number of such volunteers is small.
Within the broad spectrum of Spanish rightists, other
platforms have popped up recently that adhere
to a social conservative agenda that is cynically
spearheaded by the Kremlin. For instance, there have
been some reports of links between, “Hazte Oír”—a
Spanish ultra-conservative lobby, which is currently
very active on issues related to education, abortion,
and LGBT rights—and certain Russian figures with
Kremlin connections.112 The abovementioned far-right
fringe parties like MSR or xenophobic platforms like
PxC align with Moscow and contribute to spreading
the work of the Russian nationalist Aleksandr Dugin.113
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
In general, Spain plays both good cop and bad cop,
trying, so to speak, to get along with everyone; yet, it
is tempted by great power politics. For the time being,
and provided the political landscape in Madrid does
not change fundamentally, it will remain a country that
mixes friendly messages toward Russia with increases
to its military contributions in Eastern Europe and legal
crackdowns on local mafia networks with ties to the
Kremlin. Madrid should beware, nonetheless, of two
things: the periodic compliments it gets from Moscow
on its “balanced” position, which hardly signifies a
badge of honor these days; and the fact that Russia
will always see Spain as a NATO country that engages
in hostile actions against it, in spite of overtures and
friendly reassurances.
Much will depend on a combination of a range of
factors: the future constellation of political forces
in Spain and the polarization of their viewpoints
(especially in view of the ongoing Catalan crisis’
potential upending of Spanish democracy);114 the
future of the European order (as well as the position
of core countries such as Germany and France); the
United States—with the conflicting messages coming
from the Trump administration and the US influence
on Spain’s security policy choices; and also perhaps
on Russia itself and its domestic and foreign policy
choices. A developing Spanish policy incorporating
different vectors seems likely for the time being,
though a hypothetical Podemos-backed government
might be pressured toward a nonaligned policy and
more demonstrative overtures to Russia.

112 Jordi Pérez Colomé, “La conexión rusa de Hazte Oír”, El País, September 5, 2017, https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/03/
actualidad/1501774274_152047.html. https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/08/03/actualidad/1501774274_152047.html
113 In October 2016, one of Dugin’s books was presented in Barcelona at Casa Rusia, an institution devoted to public diplomacy that
functions under the umbrella of the Russkyi Mir foundation. Some of these individuals are regular contributors to Katehon website and
occasionally to RT.
114 Javi Lopez et al., “Spanish democracy faces its biggest challenge in decades”, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 29,
2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_spanish_democracy_faces_its_biggest_challenge_in_decades_7233.

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
WHAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DO
TO COUNTER RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN
SOUTHERN EUROPE
• The US Department of State should reach out
to Greek Orthodox communities abroad. US
embassies could engage diaspora Greek and
Cypriot communities, especially in Canada,
Australia, Britain, Germany, and other EU
countries, to encourage dialogue, investment, and
exchange with Greece. Silicon Valley in particular
captures the imagination of Greek youth and their
aspirations. Leveraging, marketing, and publicizing
Greek and Greek-American technology leaders and
successes both in Greece and via cultural exchange
and internship programs to California would add
to the appeal of—and preference for—Western
commercial and educational institutions and their
global primacy.
• The United States should take a leading role in
starting immediate and assertive multilateral
negotiations (following unsuccessful efforts)115
focused on a non-Russian solution to the Cyprus
crisis. The United States must not cede negotiation
leadership in this dispute to a regionally re-
assertive Russia and should be the main party
helping to push for the reopening of negotiations.
• To counter Russian disinformation efforts, US
public diplomacy should support independent
nongovernmental organizations and media
in Greece, including helping to finance media
professionalization and training programs. For their
part, civil society groups and media organizations
should build relationships with Greek organizations
to exchange best practices and establish open
dialogue. The more Western news organizations
bring their professional and ethical traditions to
the Greek media environment, the more they will
reinforce the values of open, free, and independent
media. The relationship between the New York
Times and Kathimerini116 is a good example of how
free and independent media collaboration can
counter Russian media involvement.
• Italy is an important partner to the United States
in managing the spread of terrorist groups,
such as ISIS, in Libya and elsewhere in northern
Africa. The US administration should reaffirm
and strengthen the American commitment to the
US-Italian bilateral partnership through increased
diplomatic efforts while working to increase
military cooperation via the EU and NATO.
• The United States should rebuild its public
diplomacy and strategic communications capacity
in Europe while devoting particular attention to
conducting pro-Western and pro-American soft
power activities in European nations, such as Italy,
that are particularly vulnerable to Russian influence.
The US Congress should continue to allocate and
appropriate additional funds for such activities as
part of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) and other legislative mechanisms.
• The US Department of State should prioritize and
develop its capabilities for tracking, monitoring, and
disseminating information about Russian influence
operations. To that end, the Global Engagement
Center (GEC) should receive congressionally
allocated funding via the Department of Defense
to carry out such activities.
• The US Congress could consider new legislation
to establish an independent advisory council to
serve as a bridge between policy makers and social
media firms. The advisory council would provide
guidance to establishing a voluntary code of
conduct for social media firms in the United States.
• The United States should seek more engagement
with Spain and the EU, including closer intelligence
cooperation, information sharing on cybersecurity
best practices, and regular exchanges of
information on Russian activities.
• The United States should seek to strengthen the
bilateral relationship with Spain through increased
official diplomatic visits by high-level officials,
including congressional members and Spanish
parliamentarians. A dialogue on Russian hybrid

115 Tom Miles, “Cyprus reunification talks collapse, U.N. chief ‘very sorry’,” Reuters, July 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-
conflict/cyprus-reunification-talks-collapse-u-n-chief-very-sorry-idUSKBN19S02I.
116 “Company Profile,” Kathimerini, accessed October 31, 2017, http://www.ekathimerini.com/aboutus.

26 ATLANTIC COUNCIL

warfare against the West should be a strong
component of bilateral communication.
WHAT EUROPE SHOULD DO TO
COUNTER RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
• To address Greece’s economic woes, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU
must work together to better support Greece’s
recovery from the economic crisis. Greece has
embarked on a massive privatization to raise
funds from international donors—an effort that is
bearing fruit. But the third EU-IMF bailout package
is set to expire in the summer of 2018. To ensure
that Greece stays the course of market-based
economic measures, the EU and IMF should also
consider instituting broader-based professional
training programs aimed at Greece’s well-educated
populace and youth, who remain most vulnerable
to economic decline.
• To better understand the nature and impact
of Russian information warfare in Greece, the
European External Action Service (EEAS) should
expand the scope, capabilities, and capacities
of the East StratCom Task Force by allocating
additional resources to it. The European Parliament
should establish and appropriate a funding stream
marked for the EEAS’s StratCom activities rather
than asking the EEAS to reallocate budgeted funds
from other activities.
• To better prepare for hybrid threats in Europe’s
southern flank, NATO could consider establishing
a cyber-defense center of excellence in Athens,
akin to the NATO Cooperative Defense Center of
Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia. The center would be
a hub for monitoring, tracking, and alerting NATO
members in instances of potential cyber attacks.
The Center could also support better collaboration
between the EU, NATO, and European Common
Security and Defense initiatives on cyber defense.
• Italy’s mainstream parties should engage in a
serious debate on the divisive economic and
cultural issues that are facilitating the growth of
populism, including immigration policy, economic
liberalization and restructuring, and social welfare
programs. The Democratic Party (PD) and Prime
Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s government, should
make it a priority to debunk false narratives about
refugee and immigration inflows that link refugees
and asylum seekers to increased unemployment
and high government spending. In the short term,
the immigration policy pursued by Interior Minister
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THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0
Marco Minniti that seeks to block migration flows
may shore up public opinion, but a more effective
long-term policy would aim to regulate, rather than
block, migration.
• The Italian parliament should prioritize the fight
against elite corruption and against the penetration
of organized crime in the political system. It should
pass legislation aimed at increasing transparency
and accountability in real estate law to compel
clarity of land ownership. In addition, a major
campaign finance reform effort should require full
funding disclosure for both political parties while
officials should be obliged to produce full financial
disclosures to the public.
• Italy’s Ministry of Defense should allocate significant
resources to strengthening national cyber defense
systems while simultaneously prioritizing training
for public sector employees in data protection
practices and responsibilities.
• Italy’s government should follow the example of
the EU’s EEAS and other national governments in
establishing a counter-disinformation task force
that would coordinate intragovernmental efforts
to monitor and respond to disinformation attacks
while liaising with similar units in NATO, the EU, and
other member states.
• The Italian parliament should direct Italy’s
intelligence services to report on suspicious and
covert foreign meddling in Italian politics. The
intelligence services should prepare classified
and unclassified versions of such a report on a
regular basis to raise public awareness of foreign
interference and provide evidence to policy makers.
• Spanish political parties should work toward an
enhanced domestic accountability of Spain’s
policy toward Russia. In particular, there is a need
for greater attention to and public awareness of
parliamentarians’ voting records on Russia in the
Spanish and EU parliaments.
• There is a need within Spain for a more granular
understanding of Russia, Ukraine, and the
post-Soviet space that needs to go beyond
intergovernmental platforms and bilateral Spain-
Russia meetings. This more nuanced approach
should include a stronger political and social
dialogue with Eastern European countries, which
could include expanding university exchange
programs between Spanish and Eastern European
universities, including in Ukraine and Russia, civil
society networks, and independent media dialogue.
27
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0
• The Spanish parliament, government, and the
security agencies should work closer to scrutinize
the activities of platforms and outlets with ties
to Russia, and their impact on information in
deliberative democracies, as well as investigating
Russian organized crime networks. Additionally,
a public information campaign should work to
provide the Spanish population with greater
awareness of Russia’s actions within the country.
For a start, a parliamentary report could discuss the
lessons learned in the information war conducted
28
over the crisis in Catalonia and exchange lessons
learned with MPs, governments, and civil society
from other EU countries subject to disinformation
campaigns, such as Germany.
• Journalists’ associations should take the lead in
investigating the implementation of European
practices regarding journalistic standards, drawing
on lessons learned from the coverage of Ukraine
and Russia and raising awareness of disinformation
campaigns.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

DR. ALINA POLYAKOVA
David M. Rubenstein Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe,
Brookings Institution

Alina Polyakova, PhD, is the David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program’s
Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. She is the editor
and co-author of The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom. Dr. Polyakova specializes in European politics, far-right populism
and nationalism, and Russian foreign policy. Polyakova’s recent book, The Dark Side of
European Integration (ibidem-Verlag and Columbia University Press, 2015) examines
the rise of far-right political parties in Western and Eastern Europe. She has also written
extensively on Russian political warfare, Ukraine, and Transatlantic relations.

Prior to joining Brookings, she served as director of research and senior fellow for
Europe and Eurasia at the Atlantic Council. She is a term member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and a Swiss National Science Foundation senior research fellow.
Polyakova’s writings have appeared in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Policy, the American Interest, as well as a number of academic journals
and media outlets. She has also been a fellow at the Fulbright Foundation, Eurasia
Foundation, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, National Science
Foundation, Social Science Research Council, International Research and Exchanges
Board (IREX), and a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Bern.

Polyakova holds a doctorate and master’s in sociology from the University of California,
Berkeley, and a bachelor’s in economics and sociology with highest honors from Emory
University. She speaks Russian and German.

DR. MARKOS KOUNALAKIS

Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Senior Fellow, Center for Media,
Data, and Society, Central European University

Markos Kounalakis, PhD, is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford

University and a senior fellow at the Center for Media, Data, and Society at Central
European University in Budapest, Hungary. He is president and publisher emeritus of
the Washington Monthly and writes a syndicated foreign affairs column for McClatchy
newspapers. Dr. Kounalakis is a veteran print and network broadcast journalist and
author who has covered wars and revolutions, both civil and technological. In the
1980s and 1990s, he reported on the overthrow of communism for Newsweek in East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and on the outbreak of
ethnic strife and war in Yugoslavia. He was based in Rome and Vienna, and ran the
magazine’s Prague bureau. After this, he worked in the Soviet Union as the NBC Radio
and Mutual News Moscow correspondent covering the fall of the Soviet Union and
the war in Afghanistan. Dr. Kounalakis has written for Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles
Times Magazine, International Herald-Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle, Dallas Morning
News, and many other regional and international newspapers and magazines. He has
written three books: Defying Gravity: The Making of Newton (Beyond Words Publishing,
1993); Beyond Spin: The Power of Strategic Corporate Journalism (coauthor, Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1999); and Hope is a Tattered Flag: Voices of Reason and Change for
the Post-Bush Era (PoliPointPress, 2008). His upcoming book is on the geopolitics of
global news networks.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 29
THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

DR. ANTONIS KLAPSIS

Academic Coordinator, Centre of International and European Political Economy and
Governance, University of Peloponnese

Antonis Klapsis, PhD, is an adjunct lecturer at the Hellenic Open University, the Open
University of Cyprus, and Neapolis University Pafos. He is the academic coordinator
of the Centre of International and European Political Economy and Governance of the
University of Peloponnese. In 2014, he was a visiting fellow at the Wilfried Martens
Centre of European Studies. He is the author of five books and the co-author of another.
He has published numerous papers in distinguished peer-reviewed international
academic journals, contributed volumes, and conferences’ proceedings. His latest book,
An Unholy Alliance: The European Far Right and Putin’s Russia, was released in English
in May 2015.

PROF. LUIGI SERGIO GERMANI

Director, Gino Germani Institute of Social Sciences and Strategic Studies

Luigi Sergio Germani is director of the Gino Germani Institute of Social Sciences and
Strategic Studies, a non-profit educational and research think tank in Rome, Italy that
was established in 1981. Prof. Germani’s areas of specialization include Russian and post-
Soviet politics and security issues, European and Italian security policies, the role of
intelligence in national security policymaking, transnational organized crime, terrorism,
disinformation, and information warfare. He has published many analytical papers
and studies on these subjects, and has edited or co-edited several books, including:
L’Intelligence nel XXI Secolo (2001); New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis (2005);
Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency (2005); Le nuove minacce provenienti da
cyberspazio alla sicurezza nazionale italiana (2011); La sfida della cyber-intelligence al
sistema-Italia (2012); I fondamentalismi religiosi nel mondo contemporaneo (2014); and
Disinformazione e manipolazione delle percezioni: una nuova minaccia al sistema-paese
(2017). Prof. Germani was previously academic director of the Master’s Program on
Intelligence and Security Studies at Link Campus University, and currently coordinates
conferences and courses on national security issues in Rome. He holds degrees
in political science from the University of Bologna and in social sciences from the
Gregorian University in Rome, and studied international relations at the Johns Hopkins
Bologna Center.

MR. JACOPO IACOBONI

Political Analyst, La Stampa

Jacopo Iacoboni has been a journalist at La Stampa, one of the oldest newspapers in
Italy, since 2000. He currently covers populism and cyber networks in Italian politics.
He has reported on every Italian election since 2001, as well as the US presidential
election in 2008. Past subjects of his investigative journalism include former prime
minister Silvio Berlusconi, Former President Giorgio Napolitano, and current politician
Beppe Grillo. In 2005, he won the Ischia International Journalism Award for excellence
in journalism and communication. Mr. Iacoboni has published several books on various
Italian political developments. His next book, L’Esperimento: L’Italia del Movimento 5
stelle, will track the rise of the 5 Star Movement political party in Italy.

30 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES 2.0

MR. FRANCISCO DE BORJA LASHERAS

Director, Madrid Office, European Council on Foreign Relations

Francisco de Borja Lasheras is the director of the Madrid Office and policy fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Between 2007 and 2009 he worked
for the Fundación Alternativas’ Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex),  and
taught comparative European politics at the George Washington University in Madrid.
After serving at the Spanish Permanent Representation to the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Mr. Lasheras spent several years in the Western
Balkans: in Bosnia and Herzegovina as seconded national expert to the OSCE, in the
field as human rights officer, and in Albania with the head of mission. Mr. Lasheras
graduated  summa cum laude  from Deusto University’s Faculty of Law and holds an
MD from Harvard University, where he studied international relations and politics. He
has published works on the Western Balkans,  enlargement, security policy, Ukraine,
strategy and Spanish politics, and is a regular voice at El Mundo, Letras Libres, radio,
and international media.

MR. NICOLÁS DE PEDRO

Research Fellow, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

Nicolás de Pedro is a research fellow at CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International

Affairs) where he is in charge of the Russia and Eurasia Program. Mr. de Pedro has
participated in international Electoral Observation Missions of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Russia (2011), Kyrgyzstan (2009, 2010), Tajikistan
(2010), and Ukraine (2010, 2014). Furthermore, he has carried out fieldwork and
traveled extensively throughout the Central Asian region and Xinjiang (China), including
a twenty-four-month stay in Kazakhstan (2005-07) funded by a grant from the Spanish
Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) of the Spanish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. He has worked as a consultant on Russian and Eurasian issues for the
European Parliament, the Institute for Statecraft (UK), the Open Society Initiative for
Europe (OSIFE), the Club of Madrid, and the European Union-Central Asia Monitoring
(EUCAM) Project. He is an associate professor of international relations at Blanquerna
(Universitat Ramon Llull) and at the Institut Barcelona de d’Estudis Internacionals
(IBEI). In 2014 he was a visiting professor at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University
(Almaty). He can be followed on Twitter: @nicolasdepedro.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 31
 Atlantic Council Board of Directors

INTERIM CHAIRMAN R. Nicholas Burns Joia M. Johnson Thomas J. Ridge

*James L. Jones, Jr. *Richard R. Burt Stephen R. Kappes Charles O. Rossotti
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, Michael Calvey *Maria Pica Karp Robert O. Rowland
INTERNATIONAL James E. Cartwright Andre Kelleners Harry Sachinis
ADVISORY BOARD John E. Chapoton *Zalmay M. Khalilzad Rajiv Shah
Brent Scowcroft Ahmed Charai Robert M. Kimmitt Stephen Shapiro
Melanie Chen Henry A. Kissinger Kris Singh
CHAIRMAN,
INTERNATIONAL Michael Chertoff Franklin D. Kramer James G. Stavridis
ADVISORY BOARD George Chopivsky Richard L. Lawson Richard J.A. Steele
David McCormick Wesley K. Clark *Jan M. Lodal Paula Stern
David W. Craig *Jane Holl Lute Robert J. Stevens
PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. William J. Lynn Robert L. Stout, Jr.
*Frederick Kempe
Nelson W. Cunningham Wendy W. Makins *Ellen O. Tauscher
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS Ivo H. Daalder Zaza Mamulaishvili Nathan D. Tibbits
*Adrienne Arsht Ankit N. Desai Mian M. Mansha Frances M. Townsend
*Stephen J. Hadley *Paula J. Dobriansky Gerardo Mato Clyde C. Tuggle
VICE CHAIRS Christopher J. Dodd William E. Mayer Melanne Verveer
*Robert J. Abernethy Conrado Dornier T. Allan McArtor Charles F. Wald
*Richard W. Edelman Thomas J. Egan, Jr. John M. McHugh Michael F. Walsh
*C. Boyden Gray *Stuart E. Eizenstat Eric D.K. Melby Maciej Witucki
*George Lund Thomas R. Eldridge Franklin C. Miller Neal S. Wolin
*Virginia A. Mulberger Julie Finley James N. Miller Mary C. Yates
*W. DeVier Pierson Lawrence P. Fisher, II Judith A. Miller Dov S. Zakheim
*John J. Studzinski *Alan H. Fleischmann *Alexander V. Mirtchev
HONORARY DIRECTORS
*Ronald M. Freeman Susan Molinari
TREASURER David C. Acheson
Laurie S. Fulton Michael J. Morell Madeleine K. Albright
*Brian C. McK. Henderson
Courtney Geduldig Richard Morningstar James A. Baker, III
SECRETARY *Robert S. Gelbard Georgette Mosbacher Harold Brown
*Walter B. Slocombe Gianni Di Giovanni Edward J. Newberry Frank C. Carlucci, III
DIRECTORS Thomas H. Glocer Thomas R. Nides Ashton B. Carter
Stéphane Abrial Murathan Gunal Victoria J. Nuland Robert M. Gates
Odeh Aburdene Sherri W. Goodman Franco Nuschese Michael G. Mullen
*Peter Ackerman Ian Hague Joseph S. Nye Leon E. Panetta
Timothy D. Adams Amir A. Handjani Hilda Ochoa- William J. Perry
John D. Harris, II Brillembourg
Bertrand-Marc Allen Colin L. Powell
Frank Haun Sean C. O’Keefe
*Michael Andersson Condoleezza Rice
Michael V. Hayden Ahmet M. Oren
David D. Aufhauser Edward L. Rowny
Annette Heuser Sally A. Painter
Matthew C. Bernstein George P. Shultz
Ed Holland *Ana I. Palacio
*Rafic A. Bizri Horst Teltschik
*Karl V. Hopkins Carlos Pascual
Dennis C. Blair John W. Warner
Robert D. Hormats Alan Pellegrini
*Thomas L. Blair William H. Webster
Miroslav Hornak David H. Petraeus
Philip M. Breedlove
*Mary L. Howell Thomas R. Pickering *Executive Committee Members
Reuben E. Brigety II
Wolfgang F. Ischinger Daniel B. Poneman
Myron Brilliant
Deborah Lee James Arnold L. Punaro List as of November 3, 2017
*Esther Brimmer
Reuben Jeffery, III Robert Rangel
Reza Bundy
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affairs based on the central role of
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