Breaking the Cycle and Moving Forward

October 15, 2020

Same old approach and tools will doom us to failure

The current political institutions have been in power for the past five years. They are
universally condemned for total lack of vision, will, and capacity to act responsibly in the best
interest of the country. They had time, a mandate in the form of the Libyan Political Agreement
(LPA), UN resolutions, and continuous public pleas for change, peace, and prosperity. They
failed miserably at every turn and sat idly by while Libyans suffered political discord, war,
destruction, incompetence, and looting of the national treasury. This combined with the
hundreds of thousands of civilians and combatants killed, maimed, or displaced, left the social
fabric and national identity in tatters and despair set in.
The Boznika deal to impose a regional quota for the selection of sovereign position holders is
a case in point. It’s the latest manifestation of the current political institutions’ cynical disregard
of Libyans’ will and welfare. The deal is the antithesis of a “key point of consensus” emerging
from the consultation phase of the Libyan National Conference which stated, “The imposition
of regional, political and ethnic quotas undermines national unity, encouraging division and
jeopardizing effective governance.”

Three likely scenarios

If there is a will to take risks and undertake bold moves, The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum
(LPDF) can be saved from ending up as yet another wasted opportunity to transform the
conflict and give Libyans a fair shot at a better life. As it stands, Libyans are facing a stark
choice between cosmetic changes to the status que, with some meaningless promises thrown
in, or reinvigorating their much ignored and maligned hopes for democracy and prosperity.
Avoiding the morass of the status que requires a bold decision to do everything possible to let
Libyans decide anew whom they trust to lead at this critical juncture.
Within this context, the LPDF, aside from a possible scenario where no agreement is reached
at all, is in turn facing three other likely scenarios:
1. Maintain the status quo with change of personnel reflecting a decision by HoR,
HCS, and their backers locally, regionally, and internationally to freeze the conflict.
Publicly, advocates defend this position not only by anointing it as the only realistic and
practical solution, but also by a well-financed attack on its opponents as idealistic,
naïve, impractical, and outright spoilers and warmongers. In realty, such a solution
preserves the current balance of power and avoids change brought about by elections.
However, from the perspective of ordinary citizens, this scenario will mean the
continuation in power of the current discredited clique for another indefinite transitional
period marked by ineffective and fragmented governance structure based on regional
quotas and a country divided along foreign spheres of influence. It almost guarantees
that more of the same is in store.
These political institutions, which Ghassan Salame aptly described as “ineffective and
increasingly illegitimate authorities”, are wrapping themselves in the flag and
demanding another turn at the wheel. Their raison d'etre is the bogus claim that Libyan
have no alternative except the LPA. In return for accepting this claim, Libyans are
promised that, this time, great many good things will happen in a new transitional
period, they now call it “preparative period”, that will end “as soon as possible.” If they
succeed, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) will be turned into a bazaar with
attendees haggling over who gets what in terms of executive powers and thereby

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 control of resources. Adding insult to injury, the country will be divided into spheres of
influence reflecting the current alignment of the parties with major regional and
international powers.
2. Parliamentary elections to pump new blood and ideas into the system and give it a
fresh mandate. This is a logical scenario if an LPDF agreement is to be perceived as
a window of opportunity for meaningful societal change. Parliamentary elections have
a better chance of invigorating the current political system by bringing in a new group
of legislators with fresh mandate who are unencumbered by past failures, distrust,
animosity, and suspicions.
We all know that getting to parliamentary elections is encountering fierce resistance
from the entrenched politicians and those who believe that the easiest and quickest
path to power is to restrict discussion to the few and inside closed rooms. In a
November 2019 briefing to the Security Council, a frustrated Ghassan Salame
lamented the fact that "To both Houses [HoR/HCS], elections are a threat that must be
resisted at all costs..., to citizens, elections are a means of liberation from the
ineffective and increasingly illegitimate authorities..., 80% of Libyans insist on having
elections."
Aside from dismissing elections as idealistic, naïve, and impractical idea, opponents
of elections bring up three other excuses:
▪ It cannot be done because we lack a constitutional framework. This is a
disingenuous and self-serving claim raised by those who prefer the status quo
over progress. This is evident from the fact that these same people have
committed or ignored massive violations of the Constitutional Declaration of
2011 which, incongruously, they insist is good enough for them to manage
another transitional period of practically indefinite duration. As Karim Mizran
and Wolfgang Pusztai wrote for MENASource, “It is obvious that the idea of
holding the referendum [on draft constitution] is thrown around by those who
personally benefit, in some cases massively, from the status quo and do not
want to move forward.”
▪ We don’t have election laws. The national conference can adopt the GNC
election law (mix of parties & individuals), the HoR election law (individuals
only), or another one.
▪ The environment is not secure. The fact is that the security issue is not as
complicated for parliamentary elections as it could be for presidential elections.
The candidates, the voters, the polling stations workers, and those who are
going to provide security are all local and, in most cases, have family or tribal
relationships which minimize chances of violence. Virtually violence-free
municipal elections were carried out by the Central Commission of Municipal
Council Elections in 2019 and 2020 in the south and west and without outside
support are a good example.
3. A hybrid agreement where the primary purpose is the holding of parliamentary
elections but allowing for changes in the competencies and personnel of the current
executive setup for the sole purpose of conducting free, fair, and safe elections. The
mere inclusion of a date or time frame for elections is not enough. Been there, done
that. For this scenario to be credible, three conditions must be met.
3.1. Make the beginning of any discussion of a new executive power contingent upon
definitive settlement of all necessary constitutional, legal, timing, administrative,
financial, and other issues concerning new parliamentary elections;
3.2. The LPDF must mandate an established body or ad hoc body to support efforts to
translate the resulting agreement’s provisions regarding elections from paper to

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 realty. This body must be a separate mechanism, independently financed and
administered, internationally supported, and unconstrained by the need for further
action by HoR, HCS, or whatever new executive power is agreed.
3.3. The agreement must contain sanctions to deter potential violations of the election
provisions. Such sanction must stipulate from the outset consequences for non-
compliance. Learning from previous experience within the Libyan context means
that we must stipulate that the failure to honour the elections’ provisions will
automatically trigger the dissolution of the LPDF established body entrusted with
the election as well as HoR, HCS, and the executive bodies and turning the entire
matter to another body, such as the High Council of the Judiciary, UNSMIL,
OECD, or a combination for the express purpose of conducting elections for a new
parliament.
Agreement provisions and implementation
It is widely accepted that both the specific provisions of an agreement and preventing the
parties to the agreement from reneging on its provisions are crucial to its chances of success.
Unfortunately, that wasn’t a primary concern to the LPA parties or to UNSMIL in Skhirat.
Perhaps more crucially and specifically, our greatest failure in Skirt was our lack of focus on
the obstacles to its successful implementation. Leveraging all that experience requires
addressing several significant vulnerabilities:
1. Absence of implementation guarantors. With Russia’s opposition and US, EU, and
NATO reluctance, there is very little chance a peacekeeping or peace enforcement
mission will be established. This means that Libyans will have to rely on their own
commitments to making the agreement work. While research has proven that such a
task for weak states lacking government capacity is extremely difficult, it will be
impossible for such a commitment to materialize without a truly inclusive peace
process;
2. Lack of government capacity to deliver on effectiveness, accountability, or even
the simplest of task. Gaddafi left us state institutions that were “hollow, ineffective,
and preoccupied with trading public employment and financial bribes for loyalty.” The
situation has not changed over the past nine years. Unfortunately, this deficit cannot
be overcome if, as things are headed now, insist on allowing what Salame called
“ineffective and increasingly illegitimate authorities” to monopolize the process and
form a government whose membership has divided loyalties based on tribal, political
or regional affiliations;
3. Ambiguity about the root causes of the conflict. If this occurs, as is most likely to
happen in the rush to divvy up new executive positions, issues of constitution, resource
distribution, state’s monopoly of force-security sector reform, and elections which are
critical issues for a permanent and sustainable peace, will be deadlocked later. As a
result, we will be stuck in an untenable transitional period for an undetermined period
or, as our experience with the LPA shows, we could go to war again.
4. Absence of effective mechanisms to prevent the parties from reneging on their
commitments. While it’s very important to reach an equitable agreement, it’s equally
crucial that we avoid a rerun of what followed the LPA signing by focusing also on how
to prevent the parties from reneging on their commitments.

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Recommendations
The 10 Oct 2020 UNSMIL statement on the resumption of intra-Libyan political and military
talks declared that the objective of These talks is “to restore Libya’s sovereignty and the
democratic legitimacy of Libyan institutions.” For that to become reality, certain steps must
be taken.
1. Make the purpose of the upcoming conference crystal clear. It must not be designed,
conducted, or perceived by others as another round of dividing executive power for
another transitional period with ambiguous promises regarding the core issues of the
conflict.
2. Prioritize and schedule the settlement of new parliamentary elections’ constitutional, legal,
timing, and implementation issues before talks on new executive bodies or positions. The
talks must not leave any of the requirement for holding those elections for a later date or
their initiation hostage to action by HoR, HCS or any other body.
3. As stated earlier, the agreement must contain sanctions to deter possible reneging on its
provisions. Over the past nine years and without any doubt we learned that setting
deadlines alone is absolutely useless in making parties honour their commitments. There
must be self-enforcing real sanctions for non-compliance. Stipulating that the failure to
honour the agreement’s provisions will automatically trigger the transfer of power to
another body such as the High Council of the Judiciary, UNSMIL, OECD, or a combination
for the express purpose of conducting elections for a new parliament.
4. In addition to the requirement that participants in the LPDF “recuse themselves from
political and sovereign positions in any new executive arrangement”, there should be a
requirement that those selected for political and sovereign positions in any new executive
arrangement shall not contest for any elective office during the following election.
5. As was the case with the LPA over the past five years, lack of state capacity was the
agreement’s Achilles heel which led to failure in implementing its provisions and loss of
legitimacy for the associated institutions. Today, lack of state capacity has reached
unprecedented levels making international involvement in supporting and guaranteeing
the implementation of any agreement reached a prerequisite for any chance of success.
6. To help stabilize the situation, a new parliament should have a four-year mandate and
should be charged with four main tasks:
6.1. Select a prime minister and give her/him enough latitude to form a cohesive and
competent government of technocrats;
6.2. Develop an economic agreement to equitably share resources. Libyan experts have
a draft agreement already and with the help of relevant international institutions, this
will address a major cause of the conflict;
6.3. Initiate a SSR program and ensure the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
NATO, OECD, or EU have programs and tools to help in this endeavour. The
Netherlands is well place to help due to its historic role in the birth of independent
Libya and the progress made by the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector
Development (SSD) programme;
6.4. Undertake a complete review of the constitutional question. This can be done through
the formation of an expert panel assisted by relevant international organizations. They
may decide to put the current draft as-is to a referendum or after amending it, adopt
the Kingdom’s constitution, or do something else.

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