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Globalization and the Internet: Myths and Realities

Article  in  Trends in Communication · July 2003

DOI: 10.1207/S15427439TC1102_05

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 TRENDS IN COMMUNICATION 11(2), 137–153 (2003)
Copyright © 2003, Lawrence Erlbaum Asociates, Inc.

Globalization and the Internet:

Myths and Realities

Gholam Khiabany
Department of Applied Social Sciences
London Metropolitan University

Since McLuhan launched the idea of a global village to describe how media technolo-
gies were breaking down the barriers between different nations, communication tech-
nologies, perhaps more than at any time, have occupied a central place in debates
about culture, communications, commerce, and possible unity among nations and cul-
tures. The Internet is the latest technology, which is supposed to shoulder the burden
of realizing McLuhan’s “dream.” Intertwined ideologies of globalization and informa-
tion society are promising the evolution of the Internet into a global information infra-
structure. The Internet and globalization are invoked to signify sweeping social, cul-
tural, and institutional change, the end results of which sometimes are said to define
our age. In both cases of the Internet and globalization, the more myth makes of the
idea of sweeping social transformations arriving with the Internet, the more it sounds
plausible. By examining a number of well-established and publicized myths about
globalization and the Internet, this article argues that the typical hype about the global-
izing and democratizing impact of the Internet does not fit easily with the market logic.
By examining issues such as differential access within and between nations, diversity
of content, and the domination of media giants in the area of digital communication,
this article rejects “digital exceptionalism” as a theory and suggests the determining
factors are social relations and not the technologies involved.

Keywords: globalization, Internet, media technologies, digital divide,

media economics, media democracy

1. INTRODUCTION

Globalization has become a buzzword, a vague term used by academics,

policymakers, politicians, and journalists. Linked in particular to technological de-
velopments (and increasingly more so with global means of communication that
knows no boundaries), it has come to mean a number of things. Like many other
buzzwords there is no shared meaning and consensus among those who use the
term or those who have tried to define, explain, and describe this “process,” “pro-
ject,” “epoch,” or “ideology.” Since McLuhan launched the cliché of the global vil-

Requests for reprints should be sent to Gholam Khiabany, Department of Applied Social Sciences,
London Metropolitan University, Ladbroke House, 62–66 Highbury Grove, London N5 2AD, England.
E-mail: g.khiabany@londonmet.ac.uk
138 KHIABANY

lage some 30 years ago to describe how media technologies were breaking down
barriers between different nations; communication technologies, more than before,
have occupied a central place in debates about cultures, communications, com-
merce, and possible unity among nations and cultures, and hopefully peace. The
Internet is the latest technology, which is supposed to shoulder the burden of realiz-
ing McLuhan’s dream.
Vast numbers of scholars in all disciplines, and working under what Kessler
(2000) described as “the ever more exigent imperatives of political economy of ca-
reer survival and advancement in universities across the world” have produced
new journals acknowledging the term in their title as well as content, and thou-
sands of scholarly articles, books, reviews, reports, and conference papers seeking
to provide some explanations and answers to the question of globalization. Such
works, in themselves a global phenomenon, however, are written mostly by
Euro-American scholars and enthusiasts. Even the debates on the topic have the
mark of historical societies: the have and have not, winner and loser, rich and poor,
and so forth.
Academics, practitioners, news organizations, and NGOs, in a similar fashion,
have produced new journals, websites, supplements and reports that acknowledge
“information technologies” in their titles and contents. Issues relating to the break-
down of national boundaries, compression of time and space, real time communi-
cation between communities, and the emergence of a single global community
resurfaces in debate about the information revolution. The central question, and in
my view the most crucial one, remains whether technical innovations, possibilities
and the potential of new technologies, the Internet and in general what has been la-
beled as globalization represents a new era and epoch, or there is clear evidence of
continuities in our world. Can we call the changes we are witnessing a revolution (a
rather overused term in the absence of classical revolutions), or quite simply a
more evolutionary process? It is in this light that it is essential to examine the rela-
tionship between technologies and societies and assess whether the Internet will
realize the vision of a global village. This poses some central and crucial questions:
Who has access to this village; whether there are clear structures and hierarchies;
do all have equal access to resources, and finally what language(s) our villagers
speak? This article briefly examines some of the central concerns of globalization, it
then reviews the current issues and concerns over the digital divide, and assesses
whether globalization has rendered concerns over historical divisions between
North and South, have and have nots, obsolete.

2. GLOBALIZATION: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGE

The diversity of definitions and explanations of the term globalization cannot cover
the level of agreement in academia. The supposedly growing interconnectedness
and interdependence of economies, cultures and politics is acknowledged, as is the
emergence of supranational power and order. Robertson (1992) for example, was
concerned about the ways in which the global and the local interact. Robertson ar-
gued that globalization as a process predates modernity and modern societies. Nev-
 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 139

ertheless, in Robertson’s “globalization stages,” modernity plays an important role

and it is in the final stage (uncertainty) in which all the barriers to globalization have
been eroded. For Robertson it was a concept, which referred “both to the compres-
sion of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”
(p. 8).
The creation of a “unified culture” will bring with itself the universalization of
the particular and particularization of the universal. This globalization is not a
melting pot but a process of contradictory movement and exchanges. Absent in
Robertson’s (1992) works, is any detailed examination of economic processes or
what is perhaps a more visible model of globalization: economic globalization. Na-
tion states are of course important as are cultures and consciousness, but these do
not operate in a vacuum. The so-called global media companies with their contents
and images, which link us to distant localities, do not exist out of the realm of com-
modities and economic interests.
In contrast to Robertson, Harvey (1990) saw the economy as the driving force of
human society. Therefore the key terms and central concerns in Harvey’s analysis
are not stages, but modes of production, relations of production, and labor processes.
Crises in the accumulation of capital are regarded as responsible for bursts of tech-
nological innovation that gives the impetus for processes of globalization to de-
velop and grow. In modernity the idea of time occupies a central place. No longer
can time have a genuinely local meaning and definition, rather the universalization
of time entails space being annihilated by time. Harvey suggested that time is fur-
ther compressed as capital flows more quickly through the newly rationalized sys-
tem. Communication technologies are crucial in this process of compression of
time and space.
Keen to combine the main approaches to globalization, Giddens’ (1990) work
appears as something of an amalgam of earlier sociological theories of globaliza-
tion. Certainly Giddens’ theory presents us with a number of controversial points.
Describing globalization as a consequence of modernity, Giddens recognized the
national and local disparities in access to material resources and yet he saw global-
ization as an equalizing process. For him it was a process of interdependence in
which states are increasingly interconnected and social relations are stretched
across national boundaries. With the aid of communication technologies local situ-
ations are transformed and global production and communications influences the
most intimate and personal aspects of lives, family structures, and traditions. His
theory is based on a tripartite division of human societies into late modern, early
modern, and traditional. Central to his argument is his description of high moder-
nity based on what he, and others, called reflexive modernization.
Although Giddens (1990) was undoubtedly right in pointing to the unprece-
dented rates of flow of information, images, and content, globalization is certainly
not an equalizing process, nor have the transnational nature of trade and economics
made either national states and regional blocs obsolete. The global flow is neither
new nor entirely global. Most economic and cultural exchanges are still confined be-
tween developed and industrialized states and control of the economies and com-
modities (tangible as well as intangible) are held by individual nation–states.
Internationalization should not be confused with globalization, and neither should
140 KHIABANY

global with universal (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1993). The fear of reverse coloniza-

tion is overly exaggerated and one of the greatest myths of globalization.
Ferguson (1992) argued that “in moving from prophesy to assumption about the
world, globalization is invoked to signify sweeping social, cultural and institu-
tional change, the end results of which sometimes are said to define our age” (p.
69). She suggested that this notion raises three major and problematic issues: the
problem of meaning, the problem of evidence, and finally the problem of evalua-
tion. In terms of meaning, globalization is a notion that denotes a journey as well as
destination, a process as well as the end result that is supposed to be a truly global
state. Evidence is equally problematic and a number studies (cf. Herman &
McChesney, 1997) have succinctly emphasized continuity and the very fact that it
is still and by large a North–North dialogue.
As for evaluation, although there is clear evidence of what Appadurai (1990)
labeled as the five dimensions (or scapes) of global cultural flow, the dominant
rhetoric among enthusiasts seems to be concerned with what should be rather
than what is (Ferguson, 1992, p. 73). The idea of globalization, therefore, is
loaded with a sense of historical inevitability, and it appears, much like technolo-
gies, as the engine of history and the process hailed as “a complex, overlapping,
disjunctive order, which cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing
center-periphery model” (Appadurai, 1990, p. 296). Even as a process it is not at
all an equal process. Exactly who and what is being globalized, who and what
are the agents of globalization, and who stands at each end of this process, and
will benefit or lose remain crucial issues.
Embedded in this project, journey, and destination are variations of the end and
the coming theses: the end of ideology and history and the coming of
postindustrial society and the third wave (Bell, 1960, 1973; Fukuyama, 1992;
Toffler, 1980). Information technologies and globalization are the new messiah.
Equally the idea of globalization as the dawn of peace, freedom, and prosperity, as
well as a unified and harmonious global community, crumbles before the realities
of the newest and the latest of the new world order as the tragedy of September 11
is turned upside-down and the “techno-libertarian myth of the end of a na-
tion-state has suddenly been cracked at the seams by the force of renewed patrio-
tism and state intervention” (Matterlart, 2002, p. 603). It is the borders of the North
that knows no boundaries and it is the sovereignty of the Southern states that is
subject to the globalizing project. The myth of the powerless state cannot be con-
cealed under the smoke of recent tragedies, especially when a number of states are
busily plotting the rewriting of their own history and pursuing the introduction of
modified historical texts for schools and universities to promote a greater sense of
pride and patriotism among their citizens.

3. NEW TECHNNOLOGIES: CONTINUTIES AND CHANGE

It is hoped that the Internet will evolve into a global information infrastructure. It
has been hailed as a new engine of history that will transform our sense of place,
time, and community and will give way to a new society, a society like never be-
 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 141

fore. New technologies in a variety of theories of information society and debates

about the new economy are accorded a significant place. Undoubtedly the
Internet will, (and has already), offer new possibilities and opportunities by re-
ducing costs, faster product developments, business transactions, delivery, and
much better global coordination.
Enthusiasts, however, praise the Internet not simply for its undeniable advan-
tages that it provides for businesses but for its ability to transcend national bound-
aries, for making space and distance irrelevant, and above all for sucking away
powers from political and economic elites, big businesses, and governments
(Dyson, 1998). Similarly Negroponte (1995) predicted the collapse of big media em-
pires: “Media barons of today will be grasping to hold on to their centralized em-
pires tomorrow” (p. 58). Another enthusiast of the ends project, in a book entitled
The Death of the Distance, Cairncross (1997) issued the warning that the size of com-
panies will no longer matter. Rheingold (1994) also argued that the latest technol-
ogy will decentralize traditional media and media channels, will allow for new
interpersonal and interactive communication, and above all, can and will revitalize
citizen-based, participatory democracy. Others have suggested, in a similar vein,
that it is very unlikely that the development of digital technology will mirror the
development of old technologies, for the Internet has the potential and capacity to
disseminate rather than centralize information.
These are not untypical accounts of the promises of the Internet that, we are in-
formed, is revolutionary in nature, revolutionary in its social impact as well as em-
powering and unprecedented in its rise, diffusion, and the end result.
In general and as the spectacular burst of dotcoms and the rapid decline of
values of digital companies since 2000 have shown us, no technology will make
capitalism immune from its inevitable crisis, and will not change its very basic
nature. Even the most enthusiastic advocates of the new economy question the
new part in the new economy and accept that the miracle of unproblematic
growth and more efficient allocation of resources is far fetched and as real as vir-
tual reality.
In arguments over the potential and impact of the Internet, there are, as in the
case of globalization, some elements of truth. Certainly the Internet, like previous
technologies, has provided some room for some disputes, disagreements, and
discussions. From Mexico, where we have a much celebrated example of effec-
tive use of technologies by rebels in Chiapas, Kosovo, Russia, Nigeria, East
Timor, Peru, Ecuador (Main, 2001) to Seattle, Prague, Geneva, London, and oth-
ers, where activists have used new technologies to organize dissent and events of
a global scale and significance, we do have a number of good examples of some
of the real potential of new technologies for empowering citizens and the possi-
bility of electronic civil disobedience. This, however, is not peculiar to the
Internet. Alternative uses of technologies are nothing new. An important aspect
of all new technologies is what Williams (1974) called “uncontrollable opportuni-
ties” and a set of interesting complications. He brilliantly demonstrated this with
the case of literacy: “For there was no way to teach a man to read the Bible which
did not also enable him to read the radical press. A controlled intention became
an uncontrollable effect” (p. 125).
142 KHIABANY

4. THE MYTH OF THE GLOBAL VILLAGE AND THE REALITIES

OF THE DIGITAL DIVIDE

Ever since 1994, Al Gore, former Vice President of the United States, announced his
plan for a global communication infrastructure and the possibility of a global hu-
man community. The issues of new economy and widespread access to information
technologies as the agents of this transformation have been top of the international
agenda. The digital divide became a metaphor to describe the existing disparities
and the disadvantages of those who either by choice or design were priced out of the
emerging digital economy and communities. There is a general consensus that ac-
cess to the Internet is far from universal, and all parties agree that this is an unfortu-
nate and undesirable situation. This sentiment was first expressed in a report by the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in a report
entitled, rather interestingly, “Falling Through the Net.”1

To be on the less fortunate side of the divide means that there is less opportunity to take
part in our new information-base economy, in which many more jobs will be related to
computers. It also means that there is less opportunity to take part in the education,
training, shopping, entertainment and communications opportunities that are avail-
able on line. Now that a large number of Americans regularly use the Internet to con-
duct daily activities, people who lack access to these tools are at a growing disadvan-
tage. Therefore, raising the level of digital access by increasing the number of
Americans using the technology tools of the digital age is a vitally important national
goal.

This national goal, later adopted by other nations sparked an unprecedented in-
ternational debate since the outcry of developing countries for what was dubbed
the New World Information and Communication Order in the 1970s. This wide-
spread concern is based on a technologically determinist assumption that access to
the Internet will kick start the long awaited digital revolution. Politicians for rather
obvious reasons, including scoring political points with rivals and increasing their
popularity and their chance of securing more votes, put their weight behind the de-
bate and offered possible solutions for easier and widespread access to the Internet.
Technologies by themselves, however, neither can solve political, social, cul-
tural, or economic discrepancies within societies, nor can they be regarded as the
engine of history. They do not teach literacy; are not education in themselves; and
cannot conceal the lack of clean water, electricity, and food. Technologies are born
in historical society and as such have all the marks of history painted on them: in
their shape, design, function, and the very fact that are sold in the market place as
commodities. The debate about the digital divide, therefore, raises some basic, but
nevertheless interesting set of questions: What exactly is a digital divide? Is there
only one? Who is excluded and by what/whom? To what extent is this divide dis-
tinctly digital?
For most commentators the digital divide is primarily about differential access
to the Internet. There is clear evidence presented in a number of studies of a direct
correlation between Internet access and income, occupation, race, gender, and edu-

1http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/contents.html
 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 143
Table 1
Internet Access in the United States by Households, Income, and Ethnic Background

Lower Incomea Higher Incomeb

Ethnic Background Two Parents Single Parent Two Parents Single Parent

White 22.6 17.3 53.1 38.0

Black 8.0 3.6 30.7 16.6
Other 21.0 11.3 55.0 36.8
Hispanic 5.3 5.1 30.8 15.5

Note. Households with children in 1998. Source: http://som.csudh.edu/cis/lpress/netstate/

selected/divide/kids%20and%20income.htm.
aLess than $35,000. bGreater than $35,000.

cation (see Table 1; Norris, 2001; Wilhelm, 2000). The aforementioned report by
NTIA (2000) showed that of U.S. households with an annual income of less than
$15,000 only around 12% have access to the Internet. This figure increases to 34%
access in households with an annual income of between $25,000 to $34,999 and to
77.7% in households with an annual income of more than $70,000. The disparities
within nations are also clearly visible in terms of other social groups. The propor-
tion of Internet access, according to a survey by the U.S. Commerce Department,
varies depending on race, income, education, and families.
Similar problem and disparities can be seen at an international level. According
to figures released by the Nua Website,2 the number of Internet users has increased
from 16 million in 1995, (0.39% of the world population), to over 580 million in May
2002, (9.58% of world population). An impressive increase in some respects and
faster than many previous media technologies (although not television that in Brit-
ain increased from nothing in 1950 to 50% of households by the end of the decade).
The pace of diffusion is one thing and the national rate of access to the Internet is
something else. It is exactly here where the hype about the global village and the
creation of a global community through the Internet can be examined. The net-
works that sustain communication between geographic locations are necessarily
based in a physical, tangible space. So for this very reason the differences in terms
of availability of such networks in different countries, let us say Ghana and the
United States, is crucial. There are a variety of sources that provide information
about the number of users in each continent and countries. Among such sources is
the Irish Internet consultancy that relies on various sources and provides details of
distribution of Internet across the world. The latest figure can be seen in Table 2.3
Even though the above table conceals the huge disparity between nations in the
above continents, for example in Asia/Pacific where Japan (44%, June 2002), Hong
Kong (59.58%, April 2002), and Australia (54.38%, February 2002) are together with
the likes of Bangladesh (with 150,00 users in December 2001) and Cambodia (with
10,000 users in December 2001), it is not difficult to see where the main Internet us-
ers are based. The majority of users clearly come from Europe and North America.

2http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/world.html
3http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/index.html
144 KHIABANY

Table 2
Distribution of Internet Users

Location Amounta

World total 605.60

Africa 6.31
Asia/Pacific 187.24
Europe 190.91
Middle East 5.12
Canada and United States 182.67
Latin America 33.35

aGiven in millons.

We will get a much clearer picture of global access to the Internet if we compare a
selective number of countries across the world (see Table 3).4
Various reports have confirmed what the more critical observers and academics
have predicted that the Internet, although it has the potential to bridge the gap, will
in the current political and economic climate widen the gap and marginalize the
majority of countries. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1999)
suggested that more than 90% of Internet users are based in OECD countries, the 29
richest countries that only represent a mere 19% of the world population. Another
document (World Bank, 2000) stated that nearly two thirds of the Internet popula-
tion live in the United States and Canada, while half of the world’s population has
never made a phone call. Big cities such as New York or Tokyo have more tele-
phone lines than all African countries combined. Telecommunications infrastruc-
tures, needless to say, are an absolute necessity for Internet access. A UNESCO
report (2000) painted a similarly grim picture. In the developed world for every
10,000 inhabitants there are 1,822 mobile phones whereas the figure for developing
countries is only 163; there are 1,989 PCs in developed countries in contrast to a
mere 113 in developing countries. Southeast Asia, which represents 23% of the
world’s population is home to only 1% of Internet users; out of 280 million people
in the Middle East, a little over 5 million have access to the Internet, and more than
a third of those live in Israel. Moreover, more than 97% of all Internet hosts are in
developed countries, home to only 16% of world’s population (Main, 2001).
If these figures are not enough, consider the cost of Internet access, which as
Matterlart (2002) argued, is linked to the density of a country’s Internet population.
“Whereas the average cost of 20 hours of Internet connection in the United States is
$30, it jumps to well over $100 in countries with few Net Users” (p. 607). This has to do
with poor telecommunication infrastructures in the developing world where it acts
as a major barrier to Internet access. Cost of access to international telecommunica-
tion bandwidth varies. The politics of bandwidth is intertwined with a three-way po-
litical struggle between states, firms, and consumers (Herrera, 2002). According to
Main (2001) Internet Service Providers based in Ghana pay $2500 for a half-circuit,
whereas due to extra charges levied by public telecom operators Kenyan ISPs have to
pay $8000 for the same use of half-circuit. Location within a country also plays a role

4Extracted from various tables, http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online

 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 145
Table 3
Internet Access in Selected Countries

Country Date No. of Usersa % of Population

Albania December 2000 .012 0.34

Algeria March 2001 .18 0.57
Australia February 2002 10.63 54.38
Bangladesh December 2001 .15 0.11
Brazil September 2002 13.98 7.77
Chad December 2001 .004 0.04
Columbia December 2001 1.15 2.81
Denmark July 2002 3.37 62.73
Georgia December 2001 .025 0.5
Germany August 2002 32.1 38.91
India December 2001 7 0.67
New Zealand August 2002 2.06 52.7
South Africa December 2001 3.068 7.03
Ukraine June 2001 .750 1.54
United States April 2002 165.75 59.1

aGiven in millons.

in the actual cost of Internet access and all these costs are passed to users. Therefore
whereas in the United States 40 hr of Internet access costs $20 a month including tele-
phony, in Europe the same amount of access costs $45. Africans pay even more than
Europeans in this respect and the average cost of 5 hr Internet access in Africa a
month is $60 and this does not include telephone line rental.
Similar problems exist with the actual costs of computers and hardware. In rela-
tive terms personal computers are at least 50% more expensive in Africa than in the
United States. Main (2001) suggested that the

cost of a computer in Zimbabwe is about 10 times the Zimbabwean per capita GDP
whereas in the USA it is about 1/10 of the per capita GDP. In Zambia the cost of a com-
puter is typically six years wages and in Tanzania a computer costs three times an aver-
age professional’s monthly salary. (p. 94)

Developing countries pay huge sums of money to U.S. firms for the limited access
that they have. No wonder U.S. firms are pushing so hard for further liberalization
of international markets and encourage deregulation at the global level. One of the
key issues is the fact that 98% of Internet protocol bandwidth globally connects to
and from North America.

The USA operates as the hub of Internet traffic and countries must make payments for
traffic exchange and connectivity to US telecommunication carriers. Not only does this
require foreign exchange payments in prohibitively high US dollars which developing
countries can barely afford, it reverses the accounting system for telephone traffic
where the cash flow is from the developed to the developing world. (Cullen, 2001, p.
317)

One can easily see, especially if you look at the diffusion of media technologies
in an historical context, that there is nothing uniquely digital about the digital di-
146 KHIABANY

vide. Differences between rich and poor countries are as visible in Internet penetra-
tion as it is for postal services, newspapers and books, radio and TV sets, and
telephones and computers. Diffusion of the infrastructure of the Internet has a very
close correlation with the wealth of a country. The optimism of the early years
when advocates of the trickle-down model of diffusion (Wilhelm, 2000) where pre-
dicting, or rather hoping, that with aid, subsidy, and support of governments and
telecommunication firms the Internet for everyone will be a real option has faded
and even the U.S. Department of Commerce, under the new administration has
changed its tune. “Falling Through the Net” has now officially been replaced by “A
Nation Online.”5
The optimistic predictions of the early years were based on the “S”- curve model
of diffusion theory that showed the take up of an innovation within a community in-
creased over time in the shape of an S curve (Rogers, 1995). Rogers was concerned
with the diffusion of hybrid seed corn among Iowa farmers, but other studies of dif-
fusion of new products and media technologies found similar patterns of take off and
widespread diffusion after sometime. This, however, has not happened in the case of
the Internet for some obvious reasons that I will explain later. However, it is impor-
tant to realize that not all technologies and innovations diffuse. There are a number of
examples of failed technologies (Winston, 1998). Also we have to remember that not
all diffusion follows a recognizable S curve, not even within the whole population of
a country. Although mini-disc has certainly diffused in Britain to a certain extent, it
has not been diffused among the general population of Britain. That is true of many
innovations that might be of particular interest to a particular group. The classic
studies of S-curve diffusion assume an invariant population and an invariant tech-
nology. The major factor, however, is the very fact that the Internet unlike other tech-
nologies, such as terrestrial television and radio, is not a one-off purchase. Free to air
TV only requires consumers to make a one-off payment and have unlimited access to
programs over a number of years. Unlike television, the Internet requires more than
electricity and needs additional expenditure on telecommunication connections and
regular update for faster access and better capacity. This is perhaps the only digital
aspect of the digital divide.

5. MYTH OF DIVERSITY

The issue of course is not simply connection and access to the Internet, which as we
have seen is far from real, but access to information and communications. The inter-
active and searchable nature of the Internet of course offers a wide range of oppor-
tunities. And it is this aspect that has been hailed by enthusiasts who have identified
the Internet as a perfect tool to break down centralized powers, big businesses, and
to empower citizens across the world beyond imagination and what has so far been
offered by older media. Concerns with divide are not and should not be limited to
physical access by social processes and usage. As Mansell (2002) suggested we have
no reason to believe that once connected all citizens will be empowered and will

5U.S. Department of Commerce (2002), A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of
Internet (www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf).
 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 147

conduct and organize their social lives in meaningful ways. To my knowledge and
following Garnham (1997) was the second academic to borrow the notion of entitle-
ment from Sen and applied it to mass media. She called for a policy intervention to
encourage citizens to acquire the capabilities necessary for a democratic dialogue.
Entitlement to such capabilities is a fundamental human right. This perhaps will fi-
nally pave the way for a truly global public sphere. Although certainly there is some
evidence of alternative use of the Internet, the overwhelming majority of evidence is
not promising.
The most crucial issue in this instance is not one of simple adoption to techno-
logical changes but trends in cultural production. Although the predictions of ho-
mogenization and globalization of culture have been immensely exaggerated, it
remains an undeniable fact that within the market place of media products and cul-
tural production, diversity and pluralism is far from secured. The same applies to
the Internet. All major media firms have significant activities and due to their size,
recognizable brand name, and access to massive amounts of premium content are
in driving positions. Yahoo, America Online (AOL), Microsoft, and so forth, have
become as recognizable as the older giants and these giants to a large degree deter-
mine the online experiences of many of Internet users.
AOL as a powerful ISP has, in constrast to its name, or perhaps because of it, a
major global operation that provides emails, chat rooms, news, and various other
services to a an increasingly world wide audience. In 1998 it accounted for 40% of
all online traffic and 60% of home use, and 80% of its users never venture beyond
AOL’s site (McChesney, 2000). Microsoft operations and interests are also well
known. Its Internet Explorer, like other portals and search engines, offers high-
lighted channels and plum positions belong to the major media giants and brands.
It has an already saved favorites for users and in the media folder of favorites all the
major news and entertainment companies are duly listed.
Major search engines are actively excluding the lesser known websites from
their list. According to Introna & Nissenbaum (2000), the base success rate for any
submitted pages being listed with Yahoo is around 25%. Because most search en-
gines only display the 10 most relevant sites on the first page the struggle for rank-
ing is intense. Many companies try to buy the highest possible rank, although
search engines deny that search positions are for sale. Nevertheless, many compa-
nies have comprehensive arrangements with search engines, for example Amazon
with Yahoo and Barnes & Noble with Lycos that allows them to have their banner
posted across a computer screen where the user has searched a term with book in it.
Introna & Nissenbaum predicted that

information seekers on the web, whose experiences are mediated through search en-
gines, are most likely to find popular, large sites whose designers have enough techni-
cal savvy to succeed in ranking game, and especially those sites whose proprietors are
able to pay various means of improving their site’s positioning. (p.175)

They argued, by looking at evidence from www.hot100.com, that there is little won-
der that out of the top 100 websites only 6 are not dotcom commercial sites. Search
engines have turned into huge supermarkets where mostly the best-known brands
are stocked.
148 KHIABANY

Online news is another problematic area. Surely if the potential of the Internet is
to be realized, it has to cater for a wide variety of point of views, analysis, and alter-
native perspectives. Although, as in the case of older media there is evidence of al-
ternative news, major news organizations and well-known brands are also
dominating the web. This aspect is rather crucial because more news consumers
are turning to the Internet for international and national news. Although the tech-
nology is different, it seems that news provided by major websites is barely differ-
ent from what is available through other mainstream media. According to
Patterson (1999, pp. 4–5), AOL provides unedited Associated Press and Reuter’s
stories for international and national news respectively. Yahoo provides only
Reuters news; GO offers mostly unedited news from Reuters mixed with some
ABC news that tends to come from AP and Reuters; Microsoft links news seekers
directly to MSNBC owned jointly with Microsoft and General Electric; and both
Lycos and Excite offer only Reuters international stories. There is nothing specifi-
cally electronic about e-journalism and as Patterson concluded it is neither interac-
tive, diverse, original, nor more relevant than traditional media.
Another area of concern is the language of the Internet and the fact that Ameri-
can English has been promoted to the status of an international language. Miege
(2000) cited a 1998 Euromarketing study, according to which more than every two
Internet users (58%) use English. Other languages including Spanish (8.7%), Ger-
man (8.6%) Japanese (7.9%) and French (3.7%) are much less commonly used. A
more recent report6 also indicated that English is the dominant language 68.4% of
web content is in English despite the fact that only 35.6% of web users speak Eng-
lish as their first language. More than 10% of web users speak Chinese but only
3.9% of online content is in Chinese. The same disparity can be seen across all lan-
guages and populations. The figure becomes more interesting if we remember that
many web users in the United States, Canada, and other countries with higher rates
of Internet penetration do not speak English. Many of the limited number of online
newspapers in Africa are in colonial languages (Sparks, 2000). Automatic transla-
tion systems offered by some sites are inadequate, and will not promote either
multilingualism or better cross-cultural understanding and cannot in any way re-
place the lack of suitable local materials. The language of the elites in developing
countries might, as has been the case historically, created a closer link among simi-
lar social group (business class) but that hardly qualifies as a “global public
sphere” (Sparks, 1998). Issues of language are significant, but as Main (2001) inter-
estingly asked if there is more local content in local languages, how global will the
Internet remain?

6. MYTH OF THE END OF THE MEDIA GIANTS

Undoubtedly digital technologies and the so-called information revolution raise a

number of significant areas for investigation in media studies. As in the case of the
economy in general, the central question remains whether it will change the nature
of the way that businesses, including media economics, work? Embedded in tech-

6http://global-reach.biz/globstats/refs.php3
 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 149

nologies, are not wires, plastics, electricity, and design (although even these and
contrary to digital revolutionaries claims do have the mark of historical society on
them); but concrete sets of social relations.
The more cautious of technological determinists accept this. Their argument is
not based on the total rejection of these social relations and specially the patterns of
ownership and concentration of ownership. Rather they argue that digital technol-
ogy and in particular the Internet will change the very basic nature of social rela-
tions. This time and in a digital age, we are informed, “things are different.” This
theory of “digital exceptionalism” can be criticized for a number of good reasons.
Taking issue with Negroponte, Bill Gates and other enthusiasts, Herman &
McChesney (1997) argued that instead of undermining the development of the
global communications oligopoly, the Internet will become an integral part of it.
They stated that digital communications will not challenge the power of media gi-
ants and big brands. However, it is more likely that “the global media firms will be
able to incorporate the Internet and related computer networks into their empires,
while the egalitarian potential of the technology is minimized” (p. 107).
Contrary to what Cairncross (1997) argued the digital revolution has not made
the size of companies irrelevant. The big media companies do have distinct advan-
tages in web activities. Five such advantages are listed by McChesney (2000, pp.
26–27). In the first place they already have massive resources of content that they
can plug into the web at very little cost. Second, as established and recognizable
brands they have an army of already existing audience and can and do promote
their digital offering on their traditional outlets. Third, due to well established links
with advertisers and advertising agencies they are seizing most of the advertising
revenues and stand to gain more as companies are becoming keener to promote
their products on the Internet. Smaller firms cannot offer major companies promi-
nent display positions on the web. Fourth, as owners and operators of the hottest
and most recognizable brands they are in a perfect position to get premier locations
on the web. The politics of search engines, as we have already discussed, provide
little evidence to suggest otherwise. And finally due to their massive operation and
financial resources, they can aggressively invest and promote their online ven-
tures.
There are without doubt new companies and brands, AOL, Yahoo, Amazon,
and so forth. All new innovations will pave the way for newly developed
companies, and IT and the telecommunications sector is no exception. However,
many of the newly established digital companies have based their business plan on
existing scenarios, hoping to off load their assets to bigger and richer players. For
every success story such as Yahoo and Microsoft there are hundreds of spectacular
failures. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the new industry will not go
through similar shakes-outs as electrical goods and car manufacturing did. In the
late 19th century mergers between electrical firms led to consolidation of industrial
monopolies of General Electric and Westinghouse from the field of 21 mergers.
Similar trends can be seen in car manufacturing that has led to five major compa-
nies replacing the hundreds of manufacturers in the early 20th century and consoli-
dating five major international players (Harris, 2001).
The issue of size and economies of scale is even more crucial for media prod-
ucts due to specific characteristics of cultural commodities. High costs of first
150 KHIABANY

copy of media products and low costs of reproduction means it is imperative for
media companies to spread the cost of production and to produce the most at-
tractive products and attract the widest possible audience. This combined with
the novel nature of cultural products implies risk as producers are not exactly
sure what products will be a success in the market place and what will fail. Risk
avoidance strategies imply size and the bigger the company the better, as they
can provide a wide range of media catalogues that smaller producers cannot af-
ford (Goodwin, 1998). New technologies will not diminish these tendencies. It is
not the technology, but the mechanism of the culture industries that is the deter-
mining factor.

7. MYTH OF THE END OF GEOGRAPHY

Globalization has also come to mean “time-space distanciation” (Giddens, 1990),

“compression of time and space (Harvey, 1990), and new technologies has even
prompted some to declare the “death of distance” (Cairncross, 1997). The myth
about the death of distance assumes the consequences of new information technolo-
gies to be of rendering time and space. Appadurai’s (1990) five “scapes” and the
movement of people, technologies, ideologies, images, and capital do not make
time and space irrelevant. Technologies undoubtedly have the potential to bring
people close together, as in the case of rail networks and air travel, and undoubtedly
as Ferguson (1992) pointed out for the uprooted the business of living life in three or
four different time zones requires new skills.
Such hyperbole, however, overlooks the major problem of differential access at
national and international levels as well as the increased efforts of the champions of
the global market and global humanities to erect new barriers for the movements of
people and images, if not capital. Walls and new legislation erected, national secu-
rities and cultures of the North are declared vulnerable and plans are made and im-
plemented to protect Western civilization. Technologies have brought people
closer in peace and have helped in the formation of “imagined communities” (An-
derson, 1991) and a sense of belonging. However, they also, as we have learned to
our great regret, brought us closer in wars. Computer technologies not only have
paved the way for the computer assisted surgery and so-called “precision journal-
ism” (Meyer, 1979) but also for “surgical strikes” and “precision bombings.”
As Mosco (2000) pointed out location is crucial in the market place. Although
certainly the new technologies allow for real time communication, there are some
good reasons why major media companies have preferred to stay in expensive lo-
cations of Silicon Valley and Silicon Ally instead of much cheaper and less de-
manded locations. Distance should not be equated with geography and geography
should not be reduced to a mere physical space. Although undoubtedly it takes less
time to get from Khartoum to New York or Delhi to London, the faster mode of
transport does not make the place irrelevant. Geographies are not merely physical
space, but symbolic, social, political, and cultural constructions. Instant recogni-
tion of the White House and Hollywood across the globe does not mean leveling
and homogenization of our sense of place. In our greatly divided and polarized
world, places, social relations within and between places and the internal and ex-
 GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNET 151

ternal divisions across class, gender, and race does matter, and perhaps even more
than before as the flow of images makes the comparisons a much easer task.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Current debates about the impact of the Internet at the global level need to be put in
a wider historical context. The assumptions about globalization, despite a degree of
relevance, are not based in realities. The claims over imminent entering of the world
into a distinctly new epoch where economies of scale, the size of media companies,
time and space will become less important are not well founded. Similar claims
about the impact of information technologies for prosperity, well being, and de-
mocracy for developing countries should be treated with a good level of skepticism.
The idea that information technologies and technological advancements will help
the developing countries leapfrog many stages of development and catch up with
the North and global information society is equally a big myth (Nulens & Van
Audenhove, 1999). In the current climate where the emphasis is on liberalization
and further deregulation (or to be precise reregulation in favor of big companies)
developing countries are at a clear disadvantage where unlike in many European
countries there is no tradition of universal service (Van Audenhove, Burgelman,
Nulens, & Cammaerts, 1999). Fair and full competition as we have seen is a myth,
and the idea of a global village for all humanities of all persuasions, classes, genders,
and races is far fetched.
Differential access is a major issue that reveals nothing but the digital reproduc-
tion of centuries old disparities and divisions. In addition it is a mistake to believe
that access to technologies equals economic, social, and political developments. Al-
though such debates are wrapped and packaged in a rather more attractive way
and presented with new eloquent language, what they offer is nothing more that
what the advocates of modernization did a few decades ago. The modernization
school pointed at what opportunities existed, rather than what opportunities
ought to exist. In modernization theory, as Golding (1974, p. 50) pointed out, the
mass media were assumed to be forces of good since development was good. And
in the process the whole question of power, ownership, access, and political partici-
pation and the content of messages were ignored. They saw the communicative re-
lations between developed and developing countries as an essentially neutral, or
even benign, process.
Globalization has become the gospel of the free market, and technology the re-
deemer. In this narrative of social development, histories of social relations, human
developments, and disparities are brushed aside to make way for the further ex-
pansion of global capital. There is no doubt that changes are taking place, there is
no question of a certain technological impact, but whether either globalization or
information society theories adequately capture the essence of such changes and
explain the multi-layered complex transformation is still open to question. In the
post-modern condition examining media institutions, structures, and patterns of
ownership are not fashionable. Tomlinson (1991) suggested the reason for this is
that nobody disputes the dominant presence of media giants in the world. The situ-
ation as we have seen, however, is far more complex and the issue cannot be so eas-
152 KHIABANY

ily summarized as such. The idea that the Internet is a democratic medium at
national and international level is a myth. To say that a technology has a demo-
cratic or a global potential should not be confused with the reality. Potential means
nothing if it cannot be realized. A market driven communication, digital or other
wise is as likely to widen the gaps and disparities as it is to narrow them. No
amount of diffusion will change the basic nature of media economics. What needs
to be diffused are social relations and not the technology.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank David Ward for his patience, support, and editorial assistance.

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