Constitutional Law Review Week 3

Week 3
Monday, 5 October 2020 6:00 pm
V. Executive Department
The President
a. Qualifications of President
No person may be elected President unless he is a:
i. natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

ii. a registered voter,
iii. able to read and write,
iv. at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
v. and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election (Sec.
2, Art. VII)
b. Presidential succession
i. If there is vacancy BEFORE the beginning of the term
President-elect fails to VP-elect shall act as President until President-elect have qualified
qualify
President shall not have VP-elect shall act as President until President-elect have been
been chosen chosen
President-elect dies or VP shall become president

becomes permanently
disabled
No President or VP has Senate President, or House Speaker in case of former's inability,

been chosen or have shall act as President until a President or VP shall have been
qualified chosen and qualifies
Both President and VP Same as above

becomes permanently
disabled
NOTE: The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph (Sec. 7, Art. VII).
ii. If there is PERMANENT vacancy DURING the incumbency
Death, permanent disability, removal from VP to serve the unexpired term

office, or resignation of the President
Death, permanent disability, removal from SP or HS shall act as President until a

office, or resignation of the President and President or a VP shall have been chosen or
VP qualified
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent
disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers
and disqualifications as the Acting President (Sec 8, Art. VII).
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and disqualifications as the Acting President (Sec 8, Art. VII).
Petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
i. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit."
"Ayoko na" are words of resignation
ii. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned.
It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that
time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period.
iii. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon
as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if
he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense. (Estrada v. Disierto).
iii. If there is TEMPORARY vacancy DURING the incumbency
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office (Sec 11, Art. VII).
Prohibitions

Prohibitions
a. Rule on additional positions:
(1) Elective – No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure (Sec. 7, Art. IX-B)
(2) Appointive - Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries (Sec. 7, Art. IX-B).
(3) Elective (President and VP) and appointive (Cabinet Secretaries, Usecs. and Asecs.)
Sec. 13 Art. VII. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Sec. 16, Art. XI. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any
firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
1. Sec. 3, Art. VII. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and
term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment

requires no confirmation.
2. Sec. 8, Art. VII. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.
3. Sec. 9, Art. VII. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the
term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
4. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency - The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially
postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the
President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official
duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove
such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of
government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the

government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the
heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive;
and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of
practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to personally
perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
5. It being clear, as it was in fact one of its bestselling points, that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office (Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary).
6. The persons cited in the constitutional provisions are the 'members of the cabinet and their
assistants.' These terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring
to the heads and executive departments, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries.
Public officials given the rank equivalent to the aforementioned are not covered by this
prohibition. x x x Thus, it is clear that EO 284 is valid insofar as it authorizes 'other
appointive officials', other than members of the Cabinet, Undersecretaries and Asst.
Secretaries, to hold multiple positions in the government, but not to exceed 2 positions.
(Clarificatory en banc Resolution in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary and Anti-
Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform)
7. The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive
official to hold more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position." In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,12 this Court ruled that, "[t]here is no
legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing
the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility."
x x x
In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the
CPLC.
x x x
this Court already clarified the scope of the prohibition provided in Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. Citing the case of US v. Mouat16 , it specifically identified the
persons who are affected by this prohibition as secretaries, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries; and categorically excluded public officers who merely have the rank
of secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary.
x x x
It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of
them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may
have the same rank as the latter positions.
It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains covered by the general prohibition

of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains covered by the general prohibition
under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply with the standard of
compatibility of officers laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby
pronounced in violation of the Constitution (Public Interest Center Inc. v. Magdangal B. Elma)
(4) Military - Sec. 5, Art. XVI. (4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any
time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
b. Rule on double compensation - petitioners knew fully well that they serve in Corregidor Foundation, Inc.
by reason of their office in the Philippine Tourism Authority. It is also undisputed that petitioners, as
officers and personnel of the Philippine Tourism Authority, already received honoraria and cash gifts.
Considering that this Court pronounced as early as 1991 in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
Secretary100 that an ex-officio position is "actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office,"101 receiving another set of honoraria and cash gift for rendering services to the Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. would be tantamount to payment of additional compensation proscribed in Article IX-B,
Section 8 of the Constitution. (Oriondo v. Commission on Audit).
Powers of the President
a. Executive power – Sec. 1, Art. VII. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Residual power
We hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that" [t]he prime duty of the Government is
to serve and protect the people" and that" [t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy."
x x x
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter,
The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of
powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief
powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order
and security (Marcos v. Manglapus).
b. Control power – Sec. 17, Art. VII. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
1. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
GENERAL RULE: under this doctrine, acts of secretaries of the Executive Departments

GENERAL RULE: under this doctrine, acts of secretaries of the Executive Departments
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are presumptively the acts
of the President (Villena v. Secretary of Interior).
Exceptions:
i. In cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the law to
act in persons
ii. The exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally.
2. The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor
may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President
Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and
the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the
incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into
by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate
(Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez).
3. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in
the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the President] to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is
said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive."
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency." As the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them
to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of
the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department (Power Sector Asset
and Liabilities Management Corporation [PSALM] v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
c. Power of general supervision
SECTION 4, Art. X. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units.
SECTION 16, Art. X. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
It is only proper that intra-governmental disputes be settled administratively since the opposing

It is only proper that intra-governmental disputes be settled administratively since the opposing
government offices, agencies and instrumentalities are all under the President's executive control
and supervision. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution states unequivocally that: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed." (Ganzon v. CA).
d. Power of appointment
SECTION 14, Art. VII. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked
by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
SECTION 15, Art. VII. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
SECTION 16, Art VII. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
i. Regular v. ad interim
Regular Ad Interim
One made while Congress is One made while Congress is in Recess

in Session
Takes effect only after Takes effect immediately

confirmation of the CA
If approved, continues until Ceases to be valid if disapproved by the CA or upon the next
the end of term adjournment of Congress
Permanent because appointment takes effect immediately and

cannot be withdrawn once appointee ha qualified into office
ii. Ad interim v. in an acting capacity
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at
the pleasure of the appointing power.31 A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any
security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including
the COMELEC (Matibag v. Benipayo).
iii. Steps in the appointing process
1. The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves
several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination
valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm
said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his

said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his
assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere
offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective
rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or
nomination. (Lacson v. Romero).
2. x x x The Government may call upon the people to defend the state and, in fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal,
military or civil service. (Sec. 4, Art. II).
➢ This does not require the acceptance of the persons called upon to render service.
iv. Presidential appointees:
1. Requires CA confirmation
i. the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution (Sec. 16, Art. VII)
ii. Regular members of the JBC (Sec. 8, Art. VIII)
iii. Chairman and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions (Sec. 1(2), Art. Art. IX-
B/C/D)
iv. Representatives composing the regional consultative commission, in case the Congress
enact an organic act for each autonomous region (Sec. 18, Art. X)
2. By the president alone
i. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.(Sec. 16, Art.
VII)
ii. Vice-president as member of the Cabinet (Sec. 3, Art. VII).
3. Requires JBC nomination
i. Members of the Supreme Court (from a list of at least 3 nominees preferred by the
JBC) (Sec. 9, Art. VIII)
ii. Ombudsman and his/her deputies (from a list of at least six nominees prepared by
the JBC) (Sec. 9, Art. XI).
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists
for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice,
consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the
six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if
embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three
nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement
under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at
least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the
JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All
the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence,
the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any

Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity (Aguinaldo v. President Aquino III).
v. Limitations on the appointing power of the president
1. Relatives - The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. x x x (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
2. Midnight appointment - Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety (Sec. 15, Art. 17)
a. Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. x x x The second type of
appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called "midnight"
appointments.
x x x
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998

(transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably
made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of
the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the
purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in
the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period
of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy
for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban (In Re:
Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta)
b. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an
appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper
by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by
his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
x x x
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very
evil which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of
acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in
the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the
entire appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint.
It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear that they
were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the
entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee (Velicaira-Garafil
v. Office of the President)
c. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done

to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court (De Castro v. JBC)
d. The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the
appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only
reason he cited to justify his action was that these were "midnight appointments"
that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the
CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective
officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing
mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments
were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations
governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was
that they were, to his personal belief, "midnight appointments" which the outgoing
mayor had no authority to make (De Rama v. CA).
3. Losing candidate - No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. (Sec. 6, Art. IX-B)
4. Military – No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. (Sec. 5(4), Art.
XVI).
5. Members of constitutional commissions - Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity. (Sec. 1[2], Art. IX B/C/D)
a. To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,

after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in
case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,

disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as
this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for
a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in
the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against

the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by
the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will
not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
The Court clarifies that "reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a
different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under
the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity (Funa v. COA Chair).
b. Unlike the constitutional commissions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the
Ombudsman and the deputies do not make a collegial body thus, making it implausible
to apply the regular rotation or cycle in its membership. The Ombudsman and the
deputies, in contrast to the constitutional commissions, do not decide by a majority
vote of all its members any case or matter brought before the Office of the
Ombudsman. To stress, the Ombudsman and the deputies have their respective
jurisdiction; hence, they could not have common responsibility relative to the discharge
of their separate and distinct functions
x x x
Nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to any

vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. This can only mean that it was the intent of the
framers that the appointment to the positions of the Ombudsman and the deputies,
whether it be for the expired or unexpired term of the predecessor, shall always be
for a full term of seven years (Ifurung v. Carpio Morales).
vi. Limitation on the appointments extended by an Acting President – Appointments extended by

an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within ninety
days from his assumption or reassumption of office. (Sec. 14, Art. VII).
e. Military Powers or the Commander-in-Chief Clause:
SECTION 18, Art. VII. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
1. Calling out power
a. Requisite?
b. the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond
the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. (David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo).
c. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may
not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be
discussed subsequently. (Kulayan v. Tan).
d. Subject to Judicial Review?
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This
is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The
Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate
the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of
this Court’s duty of "purposeful hesitation"32 before declaring an act of another branch
as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the President’s judgment (IBP v. Zamora).
2. Power to proclaim martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
a. Requisites for the proper exercise for both powers
i. Rebellion as Ground, Quantum of Proof?

i. Rebellion as Ground, Quantum of Proof?
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed.
x x x
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
follows:
l) actual rebellion or invasion;

2) public safety requires it; and
3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion
or invasion (Lagman v. Executive Secretary).
NOTE: the first two requirements must concur
b. Effects of the proclamation of martial law: Power added to the President
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police
power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President
exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place
of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a
locality, which remains under the control of the State.
x x x
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do
not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law.
This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither
does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the
guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such
instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such
suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with
invasion.
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil
liberties, the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a
state of martial law (Supra).
c. Effects of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
i. Suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to

a) Persons judicially charged with rebellion
b) Persons judicially charged with offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion (Sec. 18[5], Art. VII).
ii. Right to unreasonable search and seizures shall be inviolable (Sec. 22, Art. III)
iii. Search warrant or warrant of arrest shall only issue

a) Upon probable cause
b) Determine personally by the judge
c) After examination, under oath/affirmation, of the complainant and the
witnesses that may be produced
d) Place to be searched and persons/things to be seized particularly described
(Supra)

iv. Any person arrested SHALL be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be
released (Sec. 18[6], Art. VII).
v. Penalty shall be imposed upon failure to deliver any detained person to the proper
judicial authorities within
a) Within 12 hrs - light offenses
b) 18 hrs - correctional offenses or equivalent
c) 36 hrs - capital offenses or equivalent
vi. Right to bail shall not be impaired when the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
is suspended (Sec. 13, Art. III)
d. Limits to president’s exercise and safeguards to protect civil liberties
➢ Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension powers thus consists of:
First. The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension.
The review is "automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any
time after the proclamation or suspension is made."97 The Congress' decision to revoke the
proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the
President's initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion
persists and public safety requires it
x x x
Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
endeavored to institute a system of checks and balances to limit the President's exercise of
the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish safeguards to protect civil
liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
(a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege of the writ of
the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion and public
safety requires such declaration or suspension.
(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period not exceeding 60
days.
(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submit a
Report in person or in writing to Congress.
(d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members, can revoke the proclamation or suspension.
(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his proclamation or
suspension.
(f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or suspension. He should
ask the Congress' approval.
(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress, voting jointly and
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can extend the proclamation
or suspension for such period as it may determine.
(h) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be approved when the
invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
(i) The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension, or the extension thereof, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.
(j) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days from the filing of
the appropriate proceeding.
(k) (Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.

(k) (Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Bill of Rights187 remains effective under a state of martial law. Its
implementers must adhere to the principle that civilian authority is supreme over the
military and the armed forces is the protector of the people.188 They must also
abide by the State's policy to value the dignity of every human person and
guarantee full respect for human rights.
(l) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function.
(m) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
(n) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained should be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he should be
released (Lagman v. Pimentel III).
➢ In addition to the safeguards provided by the Constitution, adequate remedies in the

ordinary course of law against abuses and violations of human rights committed by erring
public officers are available including the following:
1. R.A. No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or
Under Custodial Investigation as Well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof);
2. R.A. No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007;
3. R.A. No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009; and
4. Writs of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) and Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); and
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
243522, February 19, 2019
e. Extension of proclamation or suspension
➢ The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative
of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum,
flaw or deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of times that the
Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only
limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or
suspension are that the extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be
grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety;
and that it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon
the petition of any citizen. (Lagman v. Pimentel III).
➢ This Court in the case of Lagman v. Medialdea explained the only limitations to the exercise
of congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension:
a) the extension should be upon the President's initiative;

b) it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands
of public safety; and
c) it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the
petition of any citizen (.Lagman v. Medialde).
f. Role of the Congress – Power to Revoke v. Judicial Power to Review
Congress' Power to Revoke Judicial Power to Review
May be activated by the Congress anytime Initiated by filing a petition in an

May be activated by the Congress anytime Initiated by filing a petition in an
after proclamation or suspension appropriate proceeding
May revoke by the Congress by majority rule Proclamation may be strike down on the
ground of lack of sufficient basis
May probe deeper and further; can delve into Court only considers date available to the
the accuracy of the facts presented before President prior such
it proclamation/suspension
➢ The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote
jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
x x x
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the relevant
provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only
required to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Padilla v. Congress).
g. Role of the Supreme Court:
i. Mode of review - It could not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a
Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The
standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be
emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers.
Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for
certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article
VII (Lagman v. Executive Secretary).
ii. Scope of SC’s Power of Review - In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to
the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our
review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the
bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and
at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Supra).
h. Ways to lift the Suspension
i. Revocation by the Congress

ii. Revocation by the President himself
iii. Nullification by the Court
iv. By operation of law (lapse of the 60-day period without extension).
3. Special topic: Command Responsibility
➢ The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all
litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility pertains
to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. The
doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this case
involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the actions
of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People).

of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People).
f. Delegated: Emergency powers
i. Conditions of granting emergency powers
a) In times of war or other national emergency,

b) the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to exercise emergency powers
c) for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe
d) Exercise is necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy (Sec. 23[2],
Art. VI)
NOTE: Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof.
ii. SECTION 17, Art. XII. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires,
the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
g. Executive clemencies
SECTION 19, Art. VII. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress.
(a) Limitations: No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the president without the favorable recommendation of
COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. IX-C).
i. Pardon v. Amnesty
Pardon Amnesty
Personal act of Public act which requires the concurrence of Senate

President
Given after conviction May be given before trial
Given to a single person Usually given to a class of person
Prospective Retroactive - it is as if the offender never committed any

crime and all effects of the crime is erased
Requires acceptance by No acceptance needed.

the grantee
▪ A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and
no satisfaction for it can be required." This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits (Monsanto v.
Factoran)

▪ The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his
reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that
petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to
his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency (Garcia v. Chariman).
NOTE: The difference of the Monsanto and Garcia cases is that: in the former, Monsanto
was found guilty of estafa while in the latter he was later found to be innocent.
▪ Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive
author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to
reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the
subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to
interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been
our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach
of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to
effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the
exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely loaded in his office (In Re: Wilfredo
Sumulong Torres).
(b) The diplomatic / treaty-making power – No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. (Will be thoroughly
discussed in Public International Law)
(c) Power of impoundment
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the
President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by
Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.
Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners
herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist
from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when
through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such
a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law
(PHILCONSA v. Enriquez).
j. Power of augmentation
SECTION 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations (Sec. 25[5], Art. VI).
➢ The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of

the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices (Araullo v. Aquino)
NOTE: Augmentation is the power of the President to fill-in a shortage. The only prohibition is
"cross-border" transfer or augmentations from saving.
k. Power with regard to the utilization of natural resources – Art. XII, Sec 2, (pars. 4 and 5)
SECTION 2, Art. XII. x x x The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
i. Congressional power with regard to small-scale utilization Art. XII, Sec 2, (par. 3)
SECTION 2. x x x The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural

resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. x x x
ii. Requirements:
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4,

with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The
following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are
these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will
set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain
a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted
several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any (Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec.
Reyes).
VI. Judicial Department
Concept
a. Judicial power, traditional and expanded meaning

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)
1) Political Question Doctrine
It is evident from this long line of cases that the Court can no longer refuse to adjudicate cases
on the basis of the "political question doctrine." Whenever issues of a political nature are raised
before it, it is the duty of the Court to meet the questions head-on for as long as grave abuse
of discretion or constitutionality is seriously involved. (Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez).
b. Requisites for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review
i. Actual case or controversy
➢ An actual case or controversy is present when the issues raised are ripe for adjudication
or the challenged statute has a direct, adverse effect on the party that raised its
constitutionality. Absent an actual case or controversy, this Court's decision would be a
mere advisory opinion that "is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator
and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law.
x x x
There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the
Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as
the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and
convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or
threatened injury and they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining
direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending,
petitioners are languishing in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal
confinement or detention in the meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued
incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice
demands that they be released soonest, if not on time (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v.
Secretary De Lima).
➢ It is well-established in this jurisdiction that ". . . for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . . [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging." The
controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the
other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts (In the Matter of: Save the SC Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy)

(JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy)
2. Advisory opinion
International Court of Justice – Article 96, Chapter XIV of the UN Charter
3. Moot and academic
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because

the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is
likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as
the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Nevertheless, case law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
are involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, jurisprudence
recognizes these four instances as exceptions to the mootness principle (International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia (Philippines) v. Court of Appeals).
ii. Proper party (“locus standi” or legal standing)
1. General Rule: “direct injury test”
The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement11 has been
satisfied in the instant case. The broad subject of the prohibited importation is "all types
of used motor vehicles." Respondents would definitely suffer a direct injury from the
implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration and tax exemption
authorize them to trade and/or import new and used motor vehicles and spare parts,
except "used cars."12 Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents
and not falling within the category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the
prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail the
validity of EO 156 (Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. v. Southwing Heavy Industries).
2. Exceptions:
i. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm
and harmony of nature" (Oposa v. Factoran).
ii. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by
this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators (David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo).
iii. As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest.[34] In cases involving such issues, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence (Ocampo v. Enriquez).
iv. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member
of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (Umali v.
JBC); We have held that legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and
are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives as legislators (Osmena v. PSALM); We have ruled that
legislators have legal standing to ensure that the constitutional prerogatives,
powers, and privileges of the Members of the Congress remain inviolate.54 Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action - or in these cases,
inaction - which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators (Padilla
v. Congress).
v. In a legislators' suit, those Members of Congress who are challenging the official act
have standing only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on their right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution of which they are
members. Legislators have the standing "to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to
sue to question the validity of any official action, which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators." As legislators, they must clearly show that there was a
direct injury to their persons or the institution to which they belong. x x x A
taxpayer's suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.125 Here, those
challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. (Saguisag v. Ochoa).
vi. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws (Resident
Marine Mammals v. Sec. Angelo Reyes).
vii. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation (West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine
Industrial Corporation).
viii. However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the

represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the
writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is
only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission
(Segovia v. The Climate Change Commission).
ix. Over the years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal
standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which
provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for
standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen.
He need not even be a taxpayer (Lagman v. Executive Secretary); Contra IBP v.
Zamora
3. Prohibition against third-party standing - “As applied” and Facial Challenges
➢ The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of
penal statutes."
x x x
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
x x x
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert
the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council)
➢ In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right
can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of
ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits
one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the
rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under
the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness
of the statute (Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice).
➢ In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing (Imbong v. Ochoa).
➢ The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to
some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to

applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad
statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove
that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties (Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City)
iii. Earliest opportunity - Exceptions?
1) In criminal cases, it may be brought at any stage of the proceeding subject to the
discretion of the judge
2) In civil cases, it may be brought anytime if resolution of the constitutional issue is inevitable
in the resolving the main issue.
3) When the jurisdiction of the lower court is in question, except when there is estoppel.
iv. The “lis mota” of the case / necessity of deciding constitutional question
Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a
case,25 this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the
case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the
statute or general law (Lalican v. Vergara).
Doctrine of Purposeful Hesitation
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the
measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only
when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in
the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
(Drilon v. Lim).
Doctrine of Operative Fact
There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a

statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not
been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have
existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts
be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict
with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for
ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no

ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no
judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a
precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute
from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The
parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.
x x x
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the
effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration (Republic v.
CA).

Constitutional Law Review Week 3

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Constitutional Law Review Week 3

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Week 3

Monday, 5 October 2020 6:00 pm

No person may be elected President unless he is a:

i. natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

i. If there is vacancy BEFORE the beginning of the term

President-elect dies or VP shall become president

No President or VP has Senate President, or House Speaker in case of former's inability,

Both President and VP Same as above

ii. If there is PERMANENT vacancy DURING the incumbency

Death, permanent disability, removal from VP to serve the unexpired term

Death, permanent disability, removal from SP or HS shall act as President until a

Constitutional Law Review Page 1

iii. If there is TEMPORARY vacancy DURING the incumbency

Constitutional Law Review Page 2

a. Rule on additional positions:

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment

Constitutional Law Review Page 3

Constitutional Law Review Page 4

Powers of the President

1. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Constitutional Law Review Page 5

c. Power of general supervision

Constitutional Law Review Page 6

One made while Congress is One made while Congress is in Recess

Takes effect only after Takes effect immediately

Permanent because appointment takes effect immediately and

ii. Ad interim v. in an acting capacity

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

iii. Steps in the appointing process

Constitutional Law Review Page 7

iv. Presidential appointees:

2. By the president alone

3. Requires JBC nomination

Constitutional Law Review Page 8

v. Limitations on the appointing power of the president

The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998

Constitutional Law Review Page 9

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,

Constitutional Law Review Page 10

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a

Nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to any

vi. Limitation on the appointments extended by an Acting President – Appointments extended by

e. Military Powers or the Commander-in-Chief Clause:

Constitutional Law Review Page 11

1. Calling out power

d. Subject to Judicial Review?

a. Requisites for the proper exercise for both powers

i. Rebellion as Ground, Quantum of Proof?

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l) actual rebellion or invasion;

NOTE: the first two requirements must concur

b. Effects of the proclamation of martial law: Power added to the President

c. Effects of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

i. Suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to

iii. Search warrant or warrant of arrest shall only issue

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d. Limits to president’s exercise and safeguards to protect civil liberties

Constitutional Law Review Page 14

➢ In addition to the safeguards provided by the Constitution, adequate remedies in the

e. Extension of proclamation or suspension

a) the extension should be upon the President's initiative;

f. Role of the Congress – Power to Revoke v. Judicial Power to Review