Module 5

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6019. March 25, 1911.]

JUAN N. ARAGON, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE  INSULAR  GOVERNMENT,  oppositor-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REALTY; ABANDONMENT OF PROPERTY; TIDE-WATER LANDS; OWNERSHIP. — Held, That the facts
proven and set out in the opinion do not establish the abandonment of possession of the land in controversy, under a
claim of ownership, nor its total deduction by the erosive action of the sea, so as to establish the loss of possession
thereof under the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code.

DECISION

CARSON, J  p:

This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of Land Registration adjudicating title to a small lot or parcel of
land in the city of Manila in favor of the appellees and ordering its registry in accordance with the provisions of "The
Land Registration Act."
The Government of the Philippine Islands , through its proper representatives, objected to the application for
registry on the ground that, as it alleges, the land in question is a part of the public domain, as defined in subsection 1,
article 339, of the Civil Code, which is as follows:
ART. 339. Property of public ownership is
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by
the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
and also as defined in article 1 of "The Law of Waters" (Ley de Aguas) of the 3d of August, 1886, which is as
follows:
The following belong to the national domain and are for the public use:
xxx   xxx   xxx
3. The shores. "Shore" is understood to be that space which is alternatively covered and uncovered by water
with the movement of the tides. Its interior or terrestial limit is marked by the lone reached by the highest tides and
equinoctials. Where the tides are not perceptible the shore begins at the line reached by the water during tempests
and ordinary storms.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, as alleged by the opponent, the land in question, at the
time when the trial was had in the court below, was so located that at high tide it was completely covered by the
waters of the Bay of Manila, though the receding waters left it completely bare at low tide. It can not be denied,
therefore, that if there were no other evidence of record, touching the physical status of this land or title thereto, the
contention of the Government would necessarily be sustained.
It appears, however, that in the year 1892 a possessory title to the land in question was duly registered in
favor of Inocencio Aragon, one of the predecessors in interest of these applicants; that for a long period of years, and
perhaps from a time beyond which the memory of man runneth not to the contrary , the applicant and their
predecessors in interest have been in possession of the parcel of land in question, under and undisputed claim of
ownership; that it is located toward the center of one of the most valuable residential sections of the city of Manila,
and that for many years a house stood upon this land, and was occupied by some of the predecessors in interest of
the applicants in these proceedings; that with some relatively small expenditure by way of a "fill" or a "retaining wall" it
would still be a valuable building lot for residential purposes; that the adjoining lots extend toward the bay to a line
 formed by the extension of the outer boundary line of the lot in question, and that these adjoining lots would be in
substantially the same physical condition, by relation to the ebb and flow of the tide, as lot in question, but for low
retaining walls which protect them against the incoming sea; that the water which spreads over the lot in question at
high tide is of but little depth, and would be wholly excluded by a very limited amount of "filling" materials or a low
retaining wall; that there are strong reasons to believe that the land in question was originally well above the ebb and
flow of the tide; and that only in later years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores of the Bay of
Manila at this point as to cover the land in question completely at high tide; though it does not definitely appear
whether this is due to changes in the current and flow of the waters in the bay, or to the gradual sinking of the land
along the coast.
We think that these facts conclusively establish the right of possession and ownership of the applicants.
Article 446 of the Civil Code is as follows:
"Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in the
laws of procedure."
Article 460 of that code is as follows:
"ART. 460. The possessor may lose his possession "
"1. By the abandonment of the thing.
"2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
"3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.
"4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year."
Under these provisions of the code it seems quite clear that if the Government is justified in disturbing the
possession of the applicants, it can only be on the ground that they have abandoned their property, or that it has been
totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by the erosive action of the sea. It is quite clear that
applicants have never abandoned their possession under a claim of ownership of this land. And we think the facts
above stated fully sustain a finding that there has been no such destructive or total loss of the property as would
justify a holding that the owners have lost possession. Doubtless the property has been injured by the erosive action
of the sea. Doubtless the owners in order to profitably enjoy the possession of this property will be compelled to make
some relatively small expenditures by way of a "fill" or a retaining wall. But the actual condition of the property as it
appears from the record makes a claim that it has been totally lost or destroyed preposterous and wholly untenable.
We need hardly add that if the applicants have not lost their right of possession, the Government's claim of ownership,
on the ground that this is a part of the playa (shore) of Manila Bay, necessarily falls to the ground.
We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by
the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become "property of public ownership," as defined in article 339
of the code, where it appears that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally
destroyed, so as to become a part of the "playa" (shore of the sea), "rada" (roadstead), or the like. Our ruling in this
case is merely that it affirmatively appears that the owners of the land in question have never in fact nor in intent
abandoned it, and that keeping in mind its location and actual condition it can not be said to have been totally
destroyed for the purposes for which it was held by them, so as to have become a part of the playa (shore) of the Bay
of Manila.
The decree entered by the lower court should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. It is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
 
|||  (Aragon v. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-6019, [March 25, 1911], 19 PHIL 223-227)
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 80294-95. March 23, 1990.]

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE,  petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO and JUAN VALDEZ,  respondents.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J p:

xxx
The relevant question that should now be asked is, considering the aforestated decision of the appellate court and guided
by the findings of facts therein, who is entitled to the possession of the lots in question? Who owns these lots?
CA-G.R. No. 38830-R was a land registration case where petitioner and private respondents were asking for
confirmation of their alleged imperfect titles to the lots in question under Section 49 (b) of the Public Land Act. 2
In the said decision, the appellate court found that the petitioner was not entitled to confirmation of its imperfect title to
Lots 2 and 3. In separate motions for reconsideration filed by private respondents Heirs  of Octaviano and Heirs of Juan
Valdez relating to the same decision, they also asked that said two lots be registered in their names. On August 12,
1977, the Court of Appeals denied both motions. Effectively, therefore, in the said decision the appellate court ruled that
neither the petitioner nor the private respondents are entitled to the confirmation of imperfect title over said two lots. That
is now res judicata.
What is the nature of these two lots? Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the two lots in question
remained part of the public lands. This is the only logical conclusion when the appellate court found that
neither the petitioner nor private respondents are entitled to confirmation of imperfect title over said lots. LLpr
Hence, the Court finds the contention of petitioner to be well-taken in that the trial court and the appellate court have no
lawful basis in ordering petitioner to return and surrender possession of said lots to private respondents. Said property
being a public land its disposition is subject to the provision of the Public Land Act, as amended. 3
The present actions that were instituted in the Regional Trial Court by private respondents are actions for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and not for recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria).
In the aforestated decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the following are among the findings of facts:
"9th. The totality of foregoing together with evidence of oppositors must convince this Court that as to
lots 2 and 3, it was oppositors who were possessors under bona fide claim of ownership thru their
predecessors since around 1906; and that appellee came in only in the concept of a borrower in
commodatum, but that appellee took it upon itself to claim and repudiate  the trust sometime in 1951,
and since from that time at least, possession of oppositors had been interrupted, neither can they claim
registration under Sec. 48, par. b of the Public Land Law, Com. Act 141, as amended by R.A. 1942; this
must be the final result, and there would be no more need to rule on the errors
impugning the personality of appellee to secure registration;" 4
From the foregoing, it appears that the petitioner was in possession of the said property as borrower in commodatum from
private respondents since 1906 but in 1951 petitioner repudiated the trust when it declared the property for tax purposes
under its name. When it filed its application for registration of the said property in 1962, petitioner had been in adverse
possession of the same for at least 11 years. prLL
Article 555 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing or because it goes out of commerce;
 (4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But  the real right of possession is not lost till after  the lapse  of  ten years.
(460a)" (Emphasis supplied.).
From the foregoing provision of the law, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, it is clear that the real
right of possession of private respondents over the property was lost or no longer exists after the lapse of 10 years that
petitioner had been in adverse possession thereof. Thus, the action for recovery of possession of said property filed by
private respondents against petitioner must fail.
The Court, therefore, finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents to be
entitled to the possession thereof. Much less can they pretend to be owners thereof. Said lots are part  of the public
domain. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and the decision of this Court dated September 21, 1988 is
hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting
aside the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148-49 dated August 31, 1987 and dismissing the complaints
for recovery of possession, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 80294-95 (Resolution), [March 23,
1990], 262 PHIL 698-702)
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198356. April 20, 2015].

ESPERANZA SUPAPO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, namely: ESPERANZA, REX
EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, all surnamed SUPAPO, and
SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN,  petitioners,  vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO and SUSAN DE
JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER
THEM, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J  p:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo and Romeo
Supapo 2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision 3 and August 25, 2011 resolution 4 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint 5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus
(Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively,
the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon
City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
28441 6 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (P39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax
declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. 7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made
sure to visit at least twice a year. 8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot.
The houses were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus
occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one. 9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing
the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably. 10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case 11 against the respondents for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. 12 The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
xxx
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. 14 While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing  Presidential Decree No. 772," which
resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case. 15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final. 16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability,
praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of
execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the
respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the
quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration. 17 The CA granted the petition and held that with
the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. 18 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the  Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now
have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners. 19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse
may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana. 20
After filing their Answer, 21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary
hearing 22 and argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint
for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by
prior judgment.
xxx
The Respondents' Case 33
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by
prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.
Issues
The issues for resolution are:
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Accion Publiciana and the Jurisdiction of the MeTC
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but
they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine
who between the parties has the right to possess the property. 35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. 36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only
do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court
has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
xxx
The cause of action has not prescribed
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after
the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7,
2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The
respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the
complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.
 Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property, and
assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover
possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten (10)
years after the certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible
since the subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo
acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. 46 Interestingly,  the respondents do not challenge the existence,
authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT. 47
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in actual, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The
respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot for
more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their possession. 48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the
land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 49 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 50 ]. 51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The
most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. — No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof. 52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of
ownership. 53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible. 54
In Bishop v. CA, 55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. 56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we still
rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-
registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado 57 in which we gave greater probative weight to the plaintiff's TCT vis-à-
vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the
respondents did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that
we uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely
recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land
registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that
the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public
confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that
land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. 58
With respect to the respondents' defense 59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in nature
and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. 60 In other words, the party alleging laches must
 adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue;
especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's
petition. 61 On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to
exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot,  viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate
Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the  accion publiciana. To our
mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession of the
subject lot is not barred by prescription.
xxx
Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between
the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the
issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
111674.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Supapo v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 198356, [April 20, 2015])
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 80298. April 26, 1990.]

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP.,  petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES LEONOR and

GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE
COURT OF APPEALS,  respondents.

DECISION

CRUZ, J  p:

The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the particular question of when a
person may be deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of movable property in the hands of another. The article runs
in full as follows:
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.
The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from the petitioner by an impostor who sold it to
the private respondents. Ownership of the books was recognized in the private respondents by the Municipal Trial
Court, 1 which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court, 2 which was in turn sustained by the Court of Appeals. 3 The
petitioner asks us to declare that all these courts have erred and should be reversed.
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed
an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the
purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent
Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check,
made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such
person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah
Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested
Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he
had ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. 8
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue, which forced
their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen
property. They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned
them over to the petitioner. 9
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return
was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally
surrendered the books to the private respondents. 10 As previously stated, the petitioner was successively rebuffed in the
three courts below and now hopes to secure relief from us.
To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner in taking the law into its own
hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the private respondents. The circumstance that it did so with the
assistance of the police, which should have been the first to uphold legal and peaceful processes, has compounded the
wrong even more deplorably. Questions like the one at bar are decided not by policemen but by judges and with the use
not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Now to the merits.
It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not established their ownership of the disputed
books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is unacceptable.
Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with further proof.
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good faith has been dismissed by the lower
courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership of the books from the EDCA invoice showing that
they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was selling them for a discount because he was in financial need. Private
respondents are in the business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to part
with their books at reduced prices. To Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many such sellers she was
accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for any one in the business of buying and selling books to buy them at a
discount and resell them for a profit.
But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by
the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has been unlawfully deprived of
personal property is entitled to its recovery except only where the property was purchased at a public sale, in which event
its return is subject to reimbursement of the purchase price. The petitioner is begging the question. It is putting the cart
before the horse. Unlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that EDCA has been
unlawfully deprived of the books.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he could have validly
transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack of funds, there was a
failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter
and the consideration. According to the Civil Code: cdll
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the
law governing the form of contracts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1477. The owner ship of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he
has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the
buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the
purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to
the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang, 11 the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang, who in turn sold them to
Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been paid by Ang, it sued for the recovery of the articles from Tan, who claimed he had
validly bought them from Ang, paying for the same in cash. Finding that there was no conspiracy between Tan and Ang to
deceive Asiatic, the Court of Appeals declared:
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 12 of the Civil Code providing, among other things that "one who
has been unlawfully deprived of personal property may recover it from any person possessing it." We
do not believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the cartons of Gloco Tonic within the
scope of this legal provision. It has voluntarily parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and
 sale. The circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did not render illegal a transaction
which was valid and legal at the beginning. LLjur
In Tagatac v. Jimenez, 13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to Jimenez. When the
payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff sued to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on the
ground that she had been unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Feist's deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the Court of
Appeals held:
The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has been unlawfully deprived of
her car. At first blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully deprived thereof, considering that she was
induced to part with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her by Warner L. Feist. Certainly,
swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-
appellant was "illegally deprived" of her car, for the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to part
with it is illegal and is punished by law. But does this "unlawful deprivation" come within the scope of
Article 559 of the New Civil Code?
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale as a voidable contract (Article
1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it is susceptible of either ratification or annulment. If the
contract is ratified, the action to annul it is extinguished (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the contract is
cleansed from all its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the contract is annulled, the contracting parties are
restored to their respective situations before the contract and mutual restitution follows as a
consequence (Article 1398, N.C.C.).
 
However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of annulment or of ratification,
the contract of sale remains valid and binding. When plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered
the car to Feist by virtue of said voidable contract of sale, the title to the car passed to Feist. Of course,
the title that Feist acquired was defective and voidable. Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to
Felix Sanchez, his title thereto had not been avoided and he therefore conferred a good title on the
latter, provided he bought the car in good faith, for value and without notice of the defect in Feist's title
(Article 1506, N.C.C.). There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad faith, it is safe to
assume that he acted in good faith.
The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as applied to the case before us.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly
transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him
and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner
suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from him would have to
surrender it to another person claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor.
The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing
bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz
before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been paid for
on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting — in dealing with the impostor. Although it
had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily
accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait
to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms
thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer. Cdpr
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered for
sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere
possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before
deciding to buy them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained by  EDCA as a result of its
own negligence. We cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and
with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the private respondents but
against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused all this trouble. The private respondents have themselves been
unduly inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind of business. It is they
and not EDCA who have a right to complain.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and  Medialdea, JJ., concur.
|||  (EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 80298, [April 26, 1990], 263 PHIL 560-568)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-20264. January 30, 1971.]

CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and
ANASTACIO GARCIA,  petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and
JUAN B. GUEVARA, respondents.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J p:

This petition for certiorari to review a decision of respondent Court of Appeals was given due course because
it was therein vigorously asserted that legal questions of gravity and of moment, there being allegations of an
unwarranted departure from and a patent misreading of applicable and controlling decisions, called for determination
by this Tribunal. The brief for petitioners-spouses, however, failed to substantiate such imputed
failings of respondent Court. The performance did not live up to the promise. On the basis of the facts as duly found
by respondent Court, which we are not at liberty to disregard, and the governing legal provisions, there is no basis for
reversal. We affirm.

The nature of the case presented before the lower court by private respondent Angelina D. Guevara, assisted
by her spouse, Juan B. Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals thus: "Plaintiff
seeks recovery of 'one (1) lady's diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire,
and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. total weight' which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc." 1 Then came a
summary of now respondent Guevara of her evidence: "Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that around October 11,
1953 plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña restaurant recognized her ring in the
finger of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant answered from her comadre. Plaintiff
explained that that ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Defendant handed the ring to plaintiff and it
fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of plaintiff, plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt.
Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed
the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the stock
card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to
defendant who despite a written request therefor failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff. Hence, this case. Later on when
the sheriff tried to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant refused to deliver the ring which had been examined
by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost." 2
How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the present petitioner before us, along with her husband
Anastacio Garcia, sought to meet plaintiff's claim was narrated thus: "On the other hand, defendant denied having
made any admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring (Exhibit 1)
was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner.
Aling Petring, who was hoarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring
plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond on
Exhibit 1 was before the trial never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57
cts." 3
Plaintiff lost in the lower court. She elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals with the
judgment of the lower court being reversed. It is this decision now under review.
These are the facts as found by respondent Court of Appeals: "That the ring brought by the parties for
examination by Rafael Rebullida on December 14, 1958 was the same ring purchased by plaintiff from B. Rebullida,
Inc. on October 27, 1947 and stolen in February, 1962 has been abundantly established by plaintiff's evidence. Before
plaintiff lost the ring, she had been wearing it for six years and became familiar with it. Thus, when she saw the
missing ring in the finger of defendant, she readily and definitely identified it. Her identification was confirmed by Mr.
Rafael Rebullida, whose candid testimony is entitled to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the
jewelry business and being a disinterested witness since both parties are his customers. Indeed, defendant made no
comment when in her presence Rebullida alter examining the ring and stock card told plaintiff that that was her ring,
nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand, . . . asserting ownership. Further confirmation may be found in the
extra-judicial admissions, contained in defendant's original and first amended answers . . ." 4
These further facts likewise appear therein: "The foregoing proof is not counter-balanced by the denial on the
part of defendant or the presentation of the ring, Exhibit I, which has a diamond-solitaire weighing 2.57 cts., or much
heavier than the lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts. only. It is noteworthy that defendant gave a rather dubious
source of her ring. Aling Petring from whom the ring supposedly came turned out to be a mysterious and ephemeral
figure. Miss Hinahon did not ever know her true and full name, nor her forwarding address. She appeared from
nowhere, boarded three months in the house of Miss Hinahon long enough to sell her diamond ring, disappearing
from the scene a week thereafter. Indeed, the case was terminated without any hearing the third-party and fourth-
party complaints, which would have shown up the falsity of defendant's theory. Moreover, Mrs. Baldomera Miranda,
third-party defendant, who tried to corroborate defendant on the latter's allege attempt to exchange the ring defendant
bought through is [belied] by her judicial admission in her Answer that appellee 'suggested that she would make
alterations to the mounting and structural design of the ring to hide the true identity and appearance of the original
one' (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 45 O.G. 3796). Finally, defendant is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions . . .
although made by defendant's counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such,
has the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose  of the
litigation. . . . Her proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is puerile because the liability to error as
to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value was rather remote." 5
It is in the light of the above facts as well as the finding that the discrepancy as to the weight between the
diamond-solitaire in Exhibit I and the lost diamond was due to defendant having "substituted a diamond-
solitaire of plaintiff with a heavier stone" that the decision was rendered, respondent Court reversing the
lower court and ordering defendant, now petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia, to return plaintiff's ring or fact
value of P1,000.00 and costs, as well as to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fee and P1,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Hence this appeal.
To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse respondent Court. It correctly applied the law to the facts as found.
1. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: "The possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable
lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been
unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo
S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition
in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price. As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, 6 the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof
that there was good faith in the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v.
Yapdiangco. 7 Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired
in good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that
where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the
party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and
a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction." 8
2. It is thus immediately apparent that there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error that
her possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases
demonstrate, even on that assumption the owner can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation.
Respondent Court of Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation is
such respondent. That is a factual determination to which we must pay heed. Instead of proving any alleged departure
from legal norms by respondent Court, petitioner would stress Article 541 of the Civil Code, which provides: 'A
possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it." She would accord to it a greater legal significance than that to which under the
controlling doctrines it is entitled. The brief for respondents did clearly point out why petitioner's assertion is lacking in
support not only from the cases but even from commentators. Thus: "Actually, even under the first clause, possession
in good faith does not really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of the Code provides for a
period of acquisitive prescription for movables through 'uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith' (Art.
1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a period of three years), so that many Spanish writers, including
 Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of the Spanish Code (Art.
559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the possessor in good faith is not that  of  ownership, but is merely a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., p. 258:
IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Español, 6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that the title established by the first
clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, that the clause
immediately following provides that 'one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L.
Reyes of this Court in Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: 'Article 559 in fact assumes that
possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire indefeasible title by,
let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former
owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it under any condition.'" 9
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure to prove the identity  of the diamond ring. Clearly
the question raised is one of fact. What the Court of Appeals found is conclusive. Again, petitioner could not
demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the Court of Appeals acted in an arbitrary manner. As made
mention of in the brief for respondents two disinterested witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Reynaldo
Cementina of the Pasay City Police Department, both of whom could not be accused of being biased in
favor of respondent Angelina D. Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the ring.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 6, 1962 is hereby affirmed. With costs.
|||  (De Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20264, [January 30, 1971], 147 PHIL 115-124)
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 86051. September 1, 1992.]

JAIME LEDESMA,  petitioner,  vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CITIWIDE

MOTORS, INC., respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; POSSESSION; REQUISITES TO MAKE POSSESSION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY EQUIVALENT TO

TITLE. — It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can
recover the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for
under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to
make possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner
voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of owner. (TOLENTINO, A.M.,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 ed., 275-276, citing 2-II Colin and Capitant 942; De Buen: Ibid., 1009, 2 Salvat
165; 4 Manresa 339). Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said
to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the exceptions found under the second
sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J  p:

Petitioner impugns the Decision of 22 September 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals 1 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.

05955 2 reversing the decision of then Branch XVIII-B (Quezon City) of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal in a replevin case, Civil Case No. Q-24200, the dispositive portion of which reads: cdll
"Accordingly, the Court orders the plaintiff to return the repossessed Isuzu Gemini, 1977 Model vehicle,
subject of this case to the defendant Ledesma. The incidental claim (sic) for damages professed by the
plaintiff are dismissed for lack of merit. On defendant's counterclaim, Court (sic) makes no
pronouncement as to any form of damages, particularly, moral, exemplary and nominal in view of the
fact that Citiwide has a perfect right to litigate its claim, albeit by this pronouncement, it did not
succeed." 3
which was supplemented by a Final Order dated 26 June 1980, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court grants defendant Ledesma the sum of P35,000.00 by
way of actual damages recoverable upon plaintiff's replevin bond. Plaintiff and its surety, the Rizal
Surety and Insurance Co., are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay defendant
Jaime Ledesma the sum of P10,000.00 as damages for the wrongful issue of the writ of seizure, in line
with Rule 57, Sec. 20, incorporated in Rule 60, Sec. 10.
In conformity with the rules adverted to, this final order shall form part of the judgment of this Court on
September 5, 1979.
 The motion for reconsideration of the judgment filed by the plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs at this instance." 4
The decision of the trial court is anchored on its findings that (a) the proof on record is not persuasive enough to show that
defendant, petitioner herein, knew that the vehicle in question was the object of a fraud and a swindle 5 and (b) that
plaintiff, private respondent herein, did not rebut or contradict Ledesma's evidence that valuable consideration was paid
for it.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the respondent Court of Appeals are as follows:
"On September 27, 1977, a person representing himself to be Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for
his father, a certain Rustico T. Consunji, two (2) brand new motor vehicles from plaintiff-appellant
Citiwide Motors, Inc., more particularly described as follows: llcd
a) One (1) 1977 Isuzu Gemini, 2-door Model PF 50ZIK, with Engine No. 751214 valued
at P42,200.00; and
b) One (1) 1977 Holden Premier Model 8V41X with Engine No. 198-1251493, valued at
P58,800.00.
Said purchases are evidenced by Invoices Nos. 3054 and 3055, respectively. (See Annexes A and B).
On September 28, 1977, plaintiff-appellant delivered the two-above described motor vehicles to the
person who represented himself as Jojo Consunji, allegedly the son of the purported buyers Rustico T.
Consunji, and said person in turn issued to plaintiff-appellant Manager's Check No. 066-110-0638 of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank dated September 28, 1977 for the amount of P101,000.00
as full payment of the value of the two (2) motor vehicles.
However, when plaintiff-appellant deposited the said check, it was dishonored by the bank on the
ground that it was tampered with, the correct amount of P101.00 having been raised to P101,000.00
per the bank's notice of dishonor (Annexes F and G).
On September 30, 1977, plaintiff-appellant reported to the Philippine Constabulary the criminal act
perpetrated by the person who misrepresented himself as Jojo Consunji and in the course of the
investigation, plaintiff-appellant learned that the real identity of the wrongdoer/impostor is Armando
Suarez who has a long line of criminal cases against him for estafa using this similar modus operandi.
On October 17, 1977, plaintiff-appellant was able to recover the Holden Premier vehicle which was
found abandoned somewhere in Quezon City.
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellant learned that the 1977 Isuzu Gemini was transferred by Armando
Suarez to third persons and was in the possession of one Jaime Ledesma at the time plaintiff-appellant
instituted this action for replevin on November 16, 1977.
In his defense, Jaime Ledesma claims that he purchases (sic) and paid for the subject vehicle in good
faith from its registered owner, one Pedro Neyra, as evidenced by the Land Transportation Commission
Registration Certificate No. RCO1427249. prLL
After posting the necessary bond in the amount double the value of the subject motor vehicle, plaintiff-
appellant was able to recover possession of the 1977 Isuzu Gemini as evidenced by the Sheriff's
Return dated January 23, 1978." 6
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the decision and subsequently issued the Final Order both earlier
adverted to, which plaintiff (private respondent herein) appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals; it submitted the
following assignment of errors:
"The trial court erred.
I
IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE CAR;
II
IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT IS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR
VALUE;
III
 IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD RETURN THE CAR TO DEFENDANT, DISMISSING ITS
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES, AND GRANTING DEFENDANT P35,000.00 DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
AGAINST THE REPLEVIN BOND AND P101,000.00 DAMAGES FOR ALLEGED WRONGFUL
SEIZURE;
IV
IN RENDERING THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1979 AND THE FINAL ORDER DATED
JUNE 26, 1980." 7
In support of its first and second assigned errors, private respondent cites Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ARTICLE 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it
in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor."
Without in any way reversing the findings of the trial court that herein petitioner was a buyer in good faith and for
valuable consideration, the respondent Court ruled that: cdll
"'Under Article 559, Civil Code, the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has
been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it not only from the finder, thief or robber, but
also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The
said article establishes two (2) exceptions to the general rule of irrevendicability (sic), to wit: when the
owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor
cannot retain the thing as against the owner who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except
when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.' (Aznar vs. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486).
Put differently, where the owner has lost the thing or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, the good
faith of the possessor is not a bar to recovery of the movable unless the possessor acquired it in a
public sale of which there is no pretense in this case. Contrary to the court's assumption, the issue is
not primarily the good faith of Ledesma for even if this were true, this may not be invoked as a valid
defense, if it be shown that Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of the vehicle.
In the case of Dizon vs. Suntay, 47 SCRA 160, the Supreme Court had occasion to define the phrase
unlawfully deprived, to wit:
'. . . it extends to all cases where there has been no valid transmission of ownership
including depositary or lessee who has sold the same. It is believed that the owner in such a
case is undoubtedly unlawfully deprived of his property and may recover the same from a
possessor in good faith.'
 
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the person who misrepresented himself to be the son of the purported buyer, Rustico
T. Consunji, paid for the two (2) vehicles using a check whose amount has been altered from P101.00
to P101,000.00. There is here a case of estafa. Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of the vehicle by false
pretenses executed simultaneously with the commission of fraud (Art. 315 2(a) R.P.C.). Clearly,
Citiwide would not have parted with the two (2) vehicles were it not for the false representation that the
check issued in payment thereupon (sic) is in the amount of P101,000.00, the actual value of the two
(2) vehicles." 8
In short, said buyer never acquired title to the property; hence, the Court rejected the claim of herein petitioner that at
least, Armando Suarez had a voidable title to the property.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied in the resolution of the respondent Court of 12 December
1988, 9 petitioner filed this petition alleging therein that: LLjur
"A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 559 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE TO THE INSTANT CASE DESPITE THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CITIWIDE
MOTORS, INC. WAS NOT UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVED OF THE SUBJECT CAR, AS IN FACT
 CITIWIDE VOLUNTARILY PARTED WITH THE TITLE AND POSSESSION OR (sic) THE SAME IN
FAVOR OF ITS IMMEDIATE TRANSFEREE.
B
THE FACTUAL MILIEU OF THE INSTANT CASE FALLS WITHIN THE OPERATIVE
EFFECTS OF ARTICLES 1505 AND 1506 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE CONSIDERING THAT THE
IMMEDIATE TRANSFEREE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CITIWIDE MOTORS, INC.,
ACQUIRED A VOIDABLE TITLE OVER THE CAR IN QUESTION WHICH TITLE WAS NOT
DECLARED VOID BY A COMPETENT COURT PRIOR TO THE ACQUISITION BY THE
PETITIONER OF THE SUBJECT CAR AND ALSO BECAUSE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, BY ITS OWN
CONDUCT, IS NOW PRECLUDED FROM ASSAILING THE TITLE AND POSSESSION BY THE
PETITIONER OF THE SAID CAR." 10
There is merit in the petition. The assailed decision must be reversed.
The petitioner successfully proved that he acquired the car in question from his vendor in good faith and for valuable
consideration. According to the trial court, the private respondent's evidence was not persuasive enough to establish that
petitioner had knowledge that the car was the object of a fraud and a swindle and that it did not rebut or contradict
petitioner's evidence of acquisition for valuable consideration. The respondent Court concedes to such findings but
postulates that the issue here is not whether petitioner acquired the vehicle in that concept but rather, whether private
respondent was unlawfully deprived of it so as to make Article 559 of the Civil Code apply.
It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the
same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the
first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make
possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner
voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of owner. 11
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily
parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the exceptions found under the second sentence  of Article
559 of the Civil Code.
The basic issue then in this case is whether private respondent was unlawfully deprived of the cars when it sold the same
to Rustico Consunji, through a person who claimed to be Jojo Consunji, allegedly the latter's son, but who nevertheless
turned out to be Armando Suarez, on the faith of a Manager's Check with a face value of P101,000.00, dishonored for
being altered, the correct amount being only P101.00. Cdpr
Under this factual milieu, the respondent Court was of the opinion, and thus held, that private respondent was unlawfully
deprived of the car by false pretenses.
We disagree. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private respondent and the original vendee.
The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee —
even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the
cars and the certificate of registration to the vendee's alleged representative. Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the
vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration
which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or
rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
the rule enunciated in EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp.  vs. Santos, 12 the facts of which do not materially and
substantially differ from those obtaining in the instant case. In said case, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose
Cruz, dean of the De la Salle College, placed an order by telephone with petitioner for 406 books, payable upon delivery.
Petitioner agreed, prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a
personal check covering the purchase price. Two (2) days later, Cruz sold 120 books to private respondent Leonor Santos
who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice the former had shown her, paid the purchase
price of P1,700.00. Petitioner became suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before his first check had
cleared, hence, it made inquiries with the De la Salle College. The latter informed the petitioner that Cruz was not in its
employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the bank against which he drew the
check. Petitioner sought the assistance of the police which then set a trap and arrested Cruz. Investigation disclosed his
real name, Tomas de la Peña, and his sale of 120 of the books to Leonor Santos. On the night of the arrest; the
policemen whose assistance the petitioner sought, forced their way into the store of Leonor and her husband, threatened
her with prosecution for the buying of stolen property, seized the 120 books without a warrant and thereafter turned said
books over to the petitioner. The Santoses then sued for recovery of the books in the Municipal Trial Court which decided
in their favor; this decision was subsequently affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review wherein it insists that it was unlawfully
deprived of the books because as the check bounced for lack of funds, there was failure of consideration that nullified the
contract of sale between it and the impostor who then acquired no title over the books. We rejected said claim in this wise:
"The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on
the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. prcd
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold
shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that
effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another." 13
In the early case of Chua Hai  vs. Hon. Kapunan, 14 one Roberto Soto purchased from the Youngstown Hardware, owned
by private respondent, corrugated galvanized iron sheets and round iron bars for P6,137.70, in payment thereof, he
issued a check drawn against the Security Bank and Trust Co. without informing Ong Shu that he (Soto) had no sufficient
funds in said bank to answer for the same. In the meantime, however, Soto sold the sheets to, among others, petitioner
Chua Hai. In the criminal case filed against Soto, upon motion of the offended party, the respondent Judge ordered
petitioner to return the sheets which were purchased from Soto. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he came to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction. In answer to the petition, it is
claimed that inter alia, even if the property was acquired in good faith, the owner who has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same unless the property was acquired in good faith at a
public sale. 15 Resolving this specific issue, this Court ruled that Ong Shu was not illegally deprived of the
possession of the property:
". . . It is not denied that Ong Shu delivered the sheets to Soto upon a perfected contract  of sale, and
such delivery transferred title or ownership to the purchaser. Says Art. 1496:
 
'Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment
it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the
vendee.' (C.C.)
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest in the
seller until and unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article
1191 of the new Civil Code. llcd
And, assuming that the consent of Ong Shu to the sale in favor of Soto was obtained by the latter
through fraud or deceit, the contract was not thereby rendered void ab initio, but only voidable by
reason of the fraud, and Article 1390 expressly provides that:
'ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
 These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They
are susceptible of ratification.'
Agreeably to this provision, Article 1506 prescribes:
'ARTICLE 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has
not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided
he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title.' (C.C.)
Hence, until the contract of Ong Shu with Soto is set aside by a competent court (assuming that the
fraud is established to its satisfaction), the validity of appellant's claim to the property in question can
not be disputed, and his right to the possession thereof should be respected." 16
It was therefore erroneous for the respondent Court to declare that the private respondent was illegally deprived of the car
simply because the check in payment therefor was subsequently dishonored; said Court also erred when it divested the
petitioner, a buyer in good faith who paid valuable consideration therefor, of his possession thereof. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 22 September 1988 and its
Resolution of 12 December 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 05955 are hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
trial court of 3 September 1979 and its Final Order of 26 June 1980 in Civil Case No. Q-24200 are hereby REINSTATED,
with costs against private respondent Citiwide Motors, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193426. September 29, 2014.]

SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., petitioner, vs. BERNARD C.

FERNANDEZ,  respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J  p:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the April 27, 2010 Decision 2 and August 24, 2010 Resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91758, entitled "Bernard C. Fernandez, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Subic Bay
Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc., Defendant Appellant," which affirmed in toto the May 17, 2006 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 237-0-97.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc., a duly organized and existing corporation operating under
Philippine laws, operates the Legenda Hotel and Casino (Legenda) located in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone in Zambales.
On the other hand, respondent Bernard C. Fernandez is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 237-0-97 prosecuted against
petitioner in Olongapo RTC.
As determined by the CA, the facts of the case are as follows:
At around eleven o'clock in the evening of 6 June 1997, the appellee's 5 brother[,] Ludwin
Fernandez[,] visited the Legenda Hotel and Casino . . . owned and operated by the appellant  6 and
located along the Waterfront Road, Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Legenda had strategically installed
several closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras as part of security measures required by its business.
The monitors revealed that Ludwin changed . . . $5,000.00 worth of chips into smaller denominations.
Legenda admitted in its brief that its surveillance staff paid close attention to Ludwin simply because it
was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar-denominated chips. After Ludwin won $200.00 in a
game of baccarat, he redeemed the value of chips worth $7,200.00. A review of the CCTV recordings
showed that the incident was not the first time Ludwin visited the Casino, as he had also been there on
5 June 1997.
 An operation was launched by Legenda to zero-in on Ludwin whose picture was furnished its
security section. Thus, unbeknownst to him, he was already closely watched on 13 June 1997 when he
went with another brother, Deoven[,] to the casino at around the same time or at 11:17 p.m. After
playing (and losing $100.00) only one round of baccarat, the siblings had their chips encashed at two
separate windows. Since the cashiers were apprised of a supposed irregularity, they "froze" the
transaction.
Shortly thereafter, Legenda's internal security officers accosted Ludwin and Deoven and
ordered them to return the cash and they complied without ado because they were being pulled away.
The two were eventually escorted to private rooms where they were separately interrogated about the
source of the chips they brought. They were held for about seven hours until the wee hours of the
morning, without food or sleep. The ultimatum was simple: they confess that the chips were given by a
certain employee, Michael Cabrera, or they would not be released from questioning. The same line of
questioning confronted them when they were later turned-over for blotter preparation to the Intelligence
and Investigation Office of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (IIO SBMA). Finally, the brothers
succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint statement implicating Cabrera as the illegal
source of the chips. Due to hunger pangs and fatigue, they did not disown the statement even when
they subscribed the same before the prosecutor in whose office they were [later] brought. On the other
hand, they signed for basically the same reason a document purporting to show that they were
"released to [their] brother's custody in good condition." At the time, Deoven was about 21 years old, in
his second year of engineering studies and was not familiar with the so-called "estafa" with which the
security personnel threatened to sue him for; although he was quite aware of the consequences of a
crime such as direct assault because he had previously been convicted thereof. About two weeks later,
Deoven executed a retraction in Baguio City where he took up his engineering course. 7 DTSaIc
On July 1, 1997, respondent filed Civil Case No. 237-0-97 for recovery of sum of money with damages against
petitioner, on the premise that on June 13, 1997, he went to Legenda with his brothers Ludwin and Deoven; that he
handed over Legenda casino chips worth US$6,000.00, which belonged to him, to his brothers for the latter to use at the
casino; that petitioner accosted his brothers and unduly and illegally confiscated his casino chips equivalent to
US$5,900.00; and that petitioner refused and continues to refuse to return the same to him despite demand. His
Complaint 8 prayed for the return of the casino chips and an award of P50,000.00 moral damages, P50,000.00 exemplary
damages, P30,000.00 attorney's fees, P20,000.00 litigation expenses, and costs.
Petitioner's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim 9 essentially alleged that right after Ludwin and Deoven's
transactions with the Legenda cashier were frozen on June 13, 1997, they voluntarily agreed to proceed to the Legenda
security office upon invitation, where Ludwin voluntarily informed security officers that it was a certain Michael Cabrera
(Cabrera) — a Legenda table inspector at the time — who gave him the casino chips for encashment, taught him how to
play baccarat and thereafter encash the chips, and rewarded him with P1,000.00 for every $1,000.00 he encashed; that
Ludwin pointed to a picture of Cabrera in a photo album of casino employees shown to him; that Ludwin and Deoven were
then brought to the IIO SBMA, where they reiterated their statements made at the Legenda security office; that they
volunteered to testify against Cabrera; that respondent himself admitted that it was Cabrera who gave him the casino
chips; that Ludwin and Deoven voluntarily executed a joint affidavit before the Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office, which
they subsequently recanted; that respondent had no cause of action since the confiscated casino chips worth
US$5,900.00 were stolen from it, and thus it has the right to retain them. By way of counterclaim, petitioner sought an
award of P1 million moral damages, P1 million exemplary damages, and P.5 million attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
Respondent filed his Answer 10 to petitioner's counterclaim.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After pre-trial and trial, the trial court rendered its May 17, 2006 Decision, which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of the plaintiff, judgment is
rendered against the defendant ordering it to:
1) Return to plaintiff casino chips worth USD$5,900.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at
the rate of P38.00 to USD$1 in 1997. DHIETc
2) Pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
3) [Pay] [c]ost of this suit.
SO DECIDED. 11
In arriving at the above conclusion, the trial court held:
 The primordial issue is whether or not plaintiff can be considered the lawful owner of the
USD$5,900 worth of casino chips that were confiscated.
There is no dispute that the subject chips were in the possession of the plaintiff. He claims he
got hold of them as payment for car services he rendered to a Chinese individual. Defendant however,
contends that said chips were stolen from the casino and it is the lawful owner of the same.
The onus fell on defendant to prove that the casino chips were stolen. The proof adduced
however, is wanting. The statements of Deoven and Ludwin C. Fernandez, confessing to the source of
the chips were recanted hence, have little probative value. The testimony of defendant's witnesses
narrated defendant's action responding to the suspicious movements of the Fernandez brothers based
on surveillance tapes. The tapes, however, do not show how these persons got hold of the chips. The
alleged source in the person of Mike Cabrera, a table inspector of the casino[,] was based on the
recanted declarations of the brothers. No criminal charge was shown to have been filed against him nor
the plaintiff and his brothers. Neither was there an explanation given as to how those chips came into
the possession of Mike Cabrera much less that he passed them on to the brothers for the purpose of
encashing and dividing the proceeds amongst themselves. All told therefore, there is no direct evidence
to prove the theory of the defendant and the circumstantial evidence present is, to the mind of the court,
not sufficient to rebut the legal presumption that a person in possession of personal property is the
lawful owner of the same (Art. 559, Civil Code of the Philippines). 12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the May 17, 2006 Decision of the trial court, arguing that Ludwin and Deoven's admission in
their joint affidavit before the Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office that it was Cabrera who gave them the casino chips
strongly indicates that the chips were stolen from Legenda; that the subsequent recantation by Ludwin and Deoven of
their joint affidavit should be looked upon with disfavor, given that recanted testimony is unreliable and recantations can
be easily secured from poor and ignorant witnesses and for monetary consideration or through intimidation; that
respondent's explanation that he gave the chips to his brothers Ludwin and Deoven for them to play in the casino is highly
doubtful; that the true purpose of Ludwin and Deoven was to encash the stolen chips; that no force or intimidation
attended the treatment accorded Ludwin and Deoven when they were accosted and asked to explain their possession of
the chips; and that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs for the filing of a baseless suit solely aimed at
unjustly enriching respondent at petitioner's expense.
On April 27, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the trial court's May 17, 2006 Decision.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was rebuffed as well. AEDISC
In deciding against petitioner, the CA held that, applying Article 559 of the Civil Code, 13 respondent had the legal
presumption of title to or ownership of the casino chips. This conclusion springs from respondent's admission during trial
that the chips represented payment by a Chinese customer for services he rendered to the latter in his car shop. The CA
added that since respondent became the owner of the chips, he could very well have given them to Ludwin and Deoven,
who likewise held them as "possessors in good faith and for value" and with "presumptive title" derived from the
respondent. On the other hand, petitioner failed to convincingly show that the chips were stolen; for one, it did not even
file a criminal case against the supposed mastermind, Cabrera — nor did it charge Ludwin or Deoven — for the alleged
theft or taking of its chips.
The CA likewise held that Ludwin's and Deoven's statements and admissions at the Legenda security office are
inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights: they were held in duress, denied the
right to counsel and the opportunity to contact respondent, and deprived of sleep, which is one of the "more
subtler [sic]  techniques of physical and psychological torture to coerce a confession." 14 It found that the actions and
methods of the Legenda security personnel in detaining and extracting confessions from Ludwin and Deoven were illegal
and in gross violation of Ludwin's and Deoven's constitutional rights. 15
Finally, the CA held that petitioner was guilty of bad faith in advancing its theory and claim against respondent by
unduly accusing him of dealing in stolen casino chips, which thus entitles respondent to the reduced award of attorney's
fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
a) The Honorable Court seriously erred in ruling that the recanted statements of Deoven
Fernandez and Ludwin C. Fernandez have [no] probative value;
b) The Honorable Court seriously erred in ruling that the circumstantial evidence present is not
sufficient to rebut the legal presumption that a person in possession of personal property is the lawful
owner of the same;
 c) The Honorable Court seriously erred in finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of
the herein respondent; [and]
d) The Honorable Court seriously erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs of suit in favor of
the respondent. 16
Petitioner's Arguments
In its Petition and Reply, 17 petitioner mainly argues that the assailed dispositions are grounded entirely on
speculation, and the inferences made are manifestly mistaken and based on a misappreciation of the facts and law; that
the CA failed to consider the testimonial and documentary evidence it presented to prove the fact that the casino chips
were missing and were stolen by Cabrera, who thereafter gave them to respondent's brothers, Ludwin and Deoven.
Petitioner maintains that the presumption of title under Article 559 cannot extend to respondent's brothers, who admitted
during the investigation at the Legenda security office and in their Joint Affidavit 18 that the chips came from Cabrera, and
not respondent; that the subsequent Sworn Statement 19 recanting the Joint Affidavit should not be given credence, as
affidavits of recantation can easily be secured — which thus makes them unreliable; and that no duress attended the
taking of the brothers' Joint Affidavit, which was prepared by Henry Marzo of the Intelligence and Investigation Office (IIO)
of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
Petitioner asserts that it is unbelievable that respondent would give US$6,000.00 worth of casino chips to his
brothers with which to play at the casino; that with the attending circumstances, the true intention of respondent's brothers
was to encash the stolen chips which Cabrera handed to them, and not to play at the casino. Petitioner thus concludes
that no coercion could have attended the investigation of Ludwin and Deoven; that their subsequent recantation should
not be given weight; and that for suing on a baseless claim, respondent is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs of
litigation.
Petitioner thus prays for the reversal of the assailed dispositions and the corresponding dismissal of Civil Case
No. 237-0-97.
Respondent's Arguments
In his Comment, 20 respondent generally echoes the pronouncement of the CA. He likewise notes that petitioner
has raised only questions of fact; that the Petition is being prosecuted to delay the proceedings; that the trial and appellate
courts are correct in finding that petitioner failed to prove its case and show that the casino chips were stolen; that
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that a person in possession of personal property is the lawful owner of the same,
pursuant to Article 559 of the Civil Code; and that the P30,000.00 award of attorney's fees should be increased to
P100,000.00.
Our Ruling
The Petition is denied.
Petitioner's underlying theory is that the subject casino chips were in fact stolen by its employee Cabrera, then
handed over to respondent's brothers, Ludwin and Deoven, for encashment at the casino; that Ludwin and Deoven played
at the casino only for show and to conceal their true intention, which is to encash the chips; that respondent's claim that
he owned the chips, as they were given to him in payment of services he rendered to a Chinese client, is false. These
arguments require the Court to examine in greater detail the facts involved. However, this may not be done because the
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented during trial; the
resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are
binding on the Court subject only to specific exceptions. 21 In turn, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals carry even
more weight when they are identical to those of the trial court's. 22
Besides, a question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 23
Moreover, if petitioner should stick to its theory that Cabrera stole the subject casino chips, then its failure to file a
criminal case against the latter — including Ludwin and Deoven for that matter — up to this point certainly does not help
to convince the Court of its position, especially considering that the supposed stolen chips represent a fairly large amount
of money. Indeed, for purposes of this proceeding, there appears to be no evidence on record — other than mere
allegations and suppositions — that Cabrera stole the casino chips in question; such conclusion came unilaterally from
petitioner, and for it to use the same as foundation to the claim that Ludwin, Deoven and respondent are dealing in stolen
chips is clearly irregular and unfair. HaECDI
Thus, there should be no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in Ludwin's and Deoven's possession were
stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the same without basis. Their Joint Affidavit — which was later recanted
— does not even bear such fact; it merely states that the chips came from Cabrera. If it cannot be proved, in the first
place, that Cabrera stole these chips, then there is no more reason to suppose that Ludwin and Deoven were dealing in or
possessed stolen goods; unless the independent fact that Cabrera stole the chips can be proved, it cannot be said that
they must be confiscated when found to be in Ludwin's and Deoven's possession.
It is not even necessary to resolve whether Ludwin's and Deoven's Joint Affidavit was obtained by duress or
otherwise; the document is irrelevant to petitioner's cause, as it does not suggest at all that Cabrera stole the subject
casino chips. At most, it only shows that Cabrera gave Ludwin and Deoven casino chips, if this fact is true at all — since
such statement has since been recanted.
The fact that Ludwin and Deoven appear to be indecisive as to who gave them the casino chips does not help
petitioner at all. It cannot lead to the conclusion that Cabrera stole the chips and then gave them to the two; as earlier
stated, petitioner had to prove this fact apart from Ludwin's and Deoven's claims, no matter how incredible they may
seem.
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, 24 there is no law which prohibits their use or trade outside of
the casino which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual — nor is it unlikely — that respondent could be paid by his
Chinese client at the former's car shop with the casino chips in question; said transaction, if not common, is nonetheless
not unlawful. These chips are paid for anyway; petitioner would not have parted with the same if their corresponding
representative equivalent — in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise — was not received by it in return or exchange. Given
this premise — that casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding representative value —
it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it
confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine
casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its
loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.
Finally, the Court sustains the award of attorney's fees. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, 25 attorney's fees
may be recovered when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid,
just and demandable claim, or in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. Petitioner's act of arbitrarily confiscating the casino chips and treating Ludwin
and Deoven the way it did, and in refusing to satisfy respondent's claim despite the fact that it had no basis to withhold the
chips, confirm its bad faith, and should entitle respondent to an award.
With the foregoing view of the case, a discussion of the other issues raised is deemed irrelevant and
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 27, 2010 Decision and August 24, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91758 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 193426, [September 29, 2014], 744 PHIL 354-
367)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-11977. April 29, 1959.]

LEONARDO AZARCON, MANUEL AZARCON and ESTEBAN ABOBO, petitioners, vs.

VICTOR  EUSEBIO, respondent.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J  p:

Appeal from an order of the Court of Appeals, Fourth Division, in CA-G. R. No. 15444-R, promulgated
September 5, 1956, finding Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon and Esteban Abobo guilty of contempt of court,
ordering each of them to pay a fine of P100, to remove certain improvements that they have constructed on the land
etc.
The record discloses that respondent Victor Eusebio and petitioners herein had a dispute over the possesion
of a certain parcel of public land in the year 1954. Victor Eusebio had filed a lease application, No. V-79, for a parcel
of land known as lot No. 3807, containing an area of about 349 hectares. A portion thereof was occupied by
petitioners herein, Leonardo L. Azarcon and his companions, under a homestead application. The conflict between
the lessee and the homesteaders was ordered to be investigated on May 25, 1955 by the Director of Lands and again
on August 3, 1955 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Before the dispute could be settled and on April 28, 1954, Victor Eusebio filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, alleging that he had acquired a big parcel of land, 349 hectares in area, by lease from the
Bureau of Lands (lease application No. V-79); that while he was in possession thereof defendants occupied a portion,
known as lot No. 2807, containing an area of six hectares more or less. He, therefore, prayed that defendants be
ordered to vacate the six hectares occupied by them and pay damages. Defendant Leonardo Azarcon answered the
complaint alleging that he is in actual possession of a portion of 24 hectares since 1941 by virtue of a homestead
application, No. V-42995; that the lease application of plaintiff is subsequent to said homestead application of
Leonardo Azarcon; that Azarcon had occupied the land since 1941 with interruptions during the war and again in 1950
up to the time of the filing of the action. He, therefore, prayed that the action be dismissed. The answer was filed on
June 2, 1954 and on motion of plaintiffs dated March 15, 1955, the defendants were declared in default. A motion to
set aside the default was denied, and a judgment by default was entered by the court on April 26, 1955. It ordered
defendants to restore possession of the land to plaintiff. Having failed to obtain a reconsideration of the above
decision, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, a writ for the execution of the judgment of the lower
court was issued on October 3, 1955. On October 8, 1955, defendants moved and the court on October 21 ordered
that the said writ of execution be stayed upon defendants' depositing of a supersedeas bond of P1,000. The writ of
execution was actually served on the defendants on October 7, 1955. Various petitions were submitted by the parties,
and among them was that of defendants-appellants asking for the lifting of the writ of execution. This petition, dated
October 14, 1955, was granted on November 1, 1955, and the court again fixed the supersedeas bond to stay
execution in the amount of P1,000 to be filed with and approved by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija as to its
sufficiency. In the same order of November 7, the Court of Appeals denied a petition of the plaintiff-appellee to file a
counter-supersedeas bond as well as plaintiff appellee's motion for injunction. In the meanwhile the defendants-
appellants had presented on November 21, 1955 the supersedeas bond required for the approval of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija and the said bond was filed and approved on November 21, 1955. This fact was certified to
by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija on November 14, 1955.
On December 2, 1955 the Court of Appeals on motion of plaintiff, reconsidered its order or resolution of
November 7, 1955 authorizing the stay of execution upon the filing of the bond by the defendants-appellants, on the
ground that the defendants-appellants have not filed any supersedeas bond as required. On January 19, 1956, the
Court of Appeals denied a petition of defendants-appellants to reconsider said order of December 2, 1955 on the
ground that the writ of execution issued on October 3, 1955 had already been executed.
The following appear to be clear: (a) the writ of execution dated October 3, 1955 was furnished the
defendants on October 7, 1955; (b) said order of execution was set aside in an order of October 21, 1955, which order
authorized the defendants-appellants to file a supersedeas bond in the amount of P1,000, the same to be approved
by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija; (c) said supersedeas bond was filed with the Court of First Instance on
November 21, 1955, but the certificate showing such filing of the bond was issued by the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija only on December 14, 1955; and the Court of Appeals, not having been notified of the fact
that the defendants have already secured the approval of their supersedeas bond, set aside the order to stay
execution on December 2, 1955.
The evidence shows that in spite of the receipt by the defendants of the notice of the writ of execution of
October 3, 1955, which writ of execution commanded defendants "to forthwith remove from said premises and that
plaintiff have restitution of the same," defendants-appellants nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was
then pending harvest. We gather further from the record that the rice found on the disputed land at the time of the
service of the order of execution had been planted by defendants-appellants, who appear to have been in possession
of the land from 1951. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the defendant-appellant to move out from the
premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon. Under the law a person who is in
possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest, has the
right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code.
"ART. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits,
the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest,
both in proportion to the time of the possession."
xxx xxx xxx
As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-appellants from gathering the pending
fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the defendants-
appellants committed an act which is a clear violation of the courts' order. Besides, the defendants-appellants had
presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set aside the said order of execution, and this motion to
stay execution was granted. Defendants furthermore presented a bond in accordance with the order of the court and
had it approved by the Court of First Instance. It was perhaps in expectation of this resolution of the court setting
aside the order of execution that defendants-appellants may have felt justified in entering the land and harvesting the
fruits existing thereon.
Again the order of the court setting aside its order to stay execution was issued in the belief that the
defendants-appellants had not presented their bond to stay execution (which they had actually presented before the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and which said court actually approved). Under the circumstances above
stated, we are not ready to conclude that the defendants-appellants can be held to have committed a clear defiance of
 the order of the court. Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but was not expressly
prohibited by the court's order, and was even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the execution. There
was, therefore, no open, clear and contumacious refusal to obey a definite order of the court such as would constitute
contempt. Furthermore, a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from
taking with him his own effects and possession, unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. No such
prohibition was contained in the order for the defendants to leave the land. There may have been a technical violation
of an order not to enter the premises, but not of one prohibiting them from removing anything therefrom. Such
technical violation of the order cannot be considered as one amounting to a defiance of the court's authority,
punishable as contempt.
For the foregoing considerations, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby, set aside, and the
defendants-appellants acquitted of the charge against them. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
 
|||  (Azarcon v. Eusebio, G.R. No. L-11977, [April 29, 1959], 105 PHIL 569-574)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-36789. July 25, 1983.]

FELIPA CORDERO (Deceased) MAURO OCAMPO, CASIMIRO OCAMPO and ELISEA

OCAMPO,  petitioners, vs. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, ALEJANDRO BERBOSO, DALMACIO
MONTAOS and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,  respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; SCOPE; ONLY QUESTIONS RAISED WITHIN THE ISSUES MADE BY THE
PARTIES IN THE PLEADINGS IN THE COURT BELOW; ENTERTAINED ON APPEAL. — It is a well-settled rule
that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court
below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings.
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT OF APPELLATE COURT BASED ON A GROUND NOT LITIGATED IN THE TRIAL
COURT; CASE AT BAR. — In this, case, the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered a decision based on a ground
which was not litigated in the trial court and which could not have been raised on appeal. The ground to be sure, is the
supposed oral contract of sale made to the predecessors of the defendants covering the disputed piece of land. The
supposed oral contract of sale was never an issue.
3. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; GOOD FAITH CEASES AND BAD FAITH BEGINS UPON
SERVICES OF SUMMONS. — The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land.
There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served
with summons to answer the complainant. (Art. 528, Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356 [1929]). As possessors
in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received . . ." (Art. 549, Civil Code)
DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

Petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals.

In Civil Case No. 2323 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Felipa Cordero and her children
Mauro, Casimiro and Elisea all surnamed Ocampo sued Victoria Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos in
a Complaint which reads as follows: LibLex
"1. That the plaintiffs are all of legal age, all residing and with postal address at Meycauayan,
Bulacan; Felipa Cordero is a widow while Elisea Ocampo is single; and the defendants are all of legal
age, Victoria P. Cabral is married but she is living apart and separate from her husband so the latter is
not included herein as party defendant, and all of them are residing and with postal address at
Meycauayan, Bulacan, where they may be served with summons;
2. That Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo of Meycauayan, Bulacan, husband of the plaintiff
Felipa Cordero and father of the other plaintiffs surnamed Ocampo, died on May 17, 1958, and that
said deceased left several properties, which were inherited by the plaintiffs, one of which is a parcel of
land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 5, plan Psu. 43302), with the improvements thereon, situated in the
barrio of Saluysoy, Municipality of Meycauayan. Bounded on the N. by Sapa and properties of Pedro
Dazo and Catalino Exaltacion; on the NE. by property of Trinidad Rodriguez & Mateo Mistica; on the
SE. by properties of Vicente Mistica, Antonio Rodriguez, Hermogenes Blanco, Lucio Sulbera and Pablo
Francia; on the SW. by properties of Concepcion Rodriguez and Alejandro de la Cruz; and on NW. by a
Sapa . . .; containing an area of Seventy-eight thousand one hundred and eighty-one square meters
(78,181), more or less. With TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 14513 in the name of Gregorio
Z. Ocampo and has Tax Declaration No. 2819 and is assessed at P4,290.00.
which parcel of land was originally registered in accordance with the Land Registration Act on
December 14, 1933, and was registered and/or transferred in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z.
Ocampo on July 31, 1934;
3. That after the death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo the plaintiffs herein took possession
of the properties left by him, among others is the afore-described parcel of land which is a riceland, but
they found out that the southern portion of the same with an area 4,303 square meters, more or less,
upon verification, was possessed by the defendants herein, Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and
Dalmacio Montaos; and that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion
while her co-defendants co-possessed the same as her tenants;
4. That the plaintiffs demanded of the defendants to surrender to the former possession of the
afore-mentioned portion of land and/or vacate it but they refused and failed to do so, and the defendant
Victoria P. Cabral continued claiming to be the owner of the same while her co-defendants continued
recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs had the afore-described
parcel of land (with T.C.T. No. 14513) relocated in the presence of the defendants' representatives and
it was found and/or determined that the afore-said portion of land with the area of 4,303 square meters,
more or less, was a part of the plaintiffs' land with T.C.T. No. 14513; that even after the said relocation
the defendant Victoria P. Cabral persisted and still persist in her claim of ownership over the said
portion and her co-defendants persisted and still persist in recognizing her as the owner thereof instead
of the plaintiffs; that the defendants continue in possession of the same; and that the defendants still
refuse and fail to surrender and/or vacate said portion of land inspite of demands made on them by the
plaintiffs;
5. That because of the defendants' occupancy of the afore-mentioned plaintiffs' portion of land
with the area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to the exclusion of the latter, the said plaintiffs failed
to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the
harvest-time of 1958 up to the present;
6. That because of the defendants' refusal to recognize plaintiffs' ownership over the afore-
mentioned portion of land and also because of their refusal and failure to surrender and/or vacate the
same the plaintiffs were forced to employ the services of the undersigned counsel to institute this action
at an agreed fees of P500.00.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiffs herein respectfully pray of this Hon. Court to
render judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants thus ordering them:
a) To recognize the ownership of the plaintiffs over the afore-mentioned portion of land with an
area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, and to surrender it to the plaintiffs or vacate the same;
b) To deliver, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs palay in the amount of ten (10) cavanes or
pay their market price at the rate of P10.00 per cavan per harvest-time beginning the year 1958 up to
the time of their delivery or payment.
c) To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs' lawyer's fees in the amount of P500.00; and
d) To pay the costs of this suit.
And to grant any remedy and relief just and equitable in the premises." (Record on Appeal, pp.
2-6.).
The Answer of the defendants contains the following allegations:
"I. That defendants have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
II. That defendants admit being in possession of the portion of land alleged in paragraph 3 of
the complaint, as said portion of land belongs to defendant Victoria P. Cabral;
III. That defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 4 of the complaint to the effect that the
said portion of 4,303 square meters, more or less, is a part of the plaintiffs' land;
IV. That defendants have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint;
V. That defendants likewise have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint;
And by way of SPECIAL DEFENSE, defendants allege: prcd
VI. That defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in interest before her are the real
owners, and have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession, of that portion of land
claimed by the plaintiffs in their complaint, which portion is more particularly described as Lot 5-B of
plan Psd-11496, duly approved by the Director of Lands on December 21, 1935;
VII. That the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and/or his heirs, the herein plaintiffs, have
admitted, acknowledged and recognized the defendant Cabral and her predecessors in said portion of
land, as the real owners thereof;
VIII. That the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and his predecessors in interest, as well as the
defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest, have always recognized as the boundary between
their respective properties, a barrio road which has existed since the Spanish regime and has continued
to exist up to the present time; and all the residents of the rural areas using said barrio road know for a
fact that, with respect to the respective properties of the parties hereto, said road is the boundary
between said properties;
IX. That the inclusion of that portion claimed by the plaintiffs in their complaint in the original
registration of their property was obtained thru error or fraud by the original applicant, but was never
possessed by him nor by his successors in interest, as they have always openly recognized the
ownership of said portion as belonging to defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest before her;
And by way of COUNTER CLAIM, defendants allege:
X. That all the foregoing paragraphs are pleaded herein and made parts hereof;
XI. That the defendant Victoria P. Cabral is the real owner of Lot No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496, with
an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, erroneously or fraudulently included in the property
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan,
registered in the name of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and now claimed by the herein plaintiffs;
XII. That defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest have been in possession of said
portion of land for more than fifty years, their possession being actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous, as owners thereof;
 XIII. That said deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and/or his heirs, and their predecessors in
interest have openly admitted, acknowledged and recognized the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her
predecessors in interest as the real owners of said portion of land, Lot 5-B plan Psd-11496, and said
Gregorio Z. Ocampo and/or his heirs and their predecessors in interest have never been in possession
of said portion of land;
XIV. That the plaintiffs, claiming to be the heirs of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo, are
therefore under obligation to execute a deed of transfer of said portion of land in favor of the true owner
thereof, the herein defendant Victoria P. Cabral, in accordance with law;
XV. That because of the present action filed by the plaintiffs, the defendants have suffered
damages in the amount of P1,000.00;
WHEREFORE:, defendants pray that judgment be rendered:
(a) dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs;
(b) declaring the defendant Victoria P. Cabral as the owner of Lot-5-B, plan Psd-11496, which
has been erroneously included in the property of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513, Bulacan, and ordering the herein plaintiffs to execute a deed of
transfer of said Lot No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496 in favor of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral; and
(c) ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the sum of P1,000.00.
Defendants further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which may be proper and just
under the premises." (R.A., pp. 8-13.)
The plaintiffs filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim as follows:
"1. That the plaintiffs deny the allegation in paragraph II of the Answer that the portion of land
now under litigation belongs to the defendant Victoria P. Cabral, and likewise deny the allegations in
paragraphs VI and XI of the same that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in
interest are the real owners of this portion (under litigation) with an area of 4,303 square meters, Lot 5-B
of plan Psd-11496 with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513 in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo,
because the truth is that the said Mr. Ocampo and his successors in interest, the plaintiffs herein, are
the real owners thereof; and that said portion is a part and is included in the plaintiffs' big parcel of land
known as Lot 5, Psu-43302, and covered by the afore-mentioned Certificate;
That the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in interest were never the owners
of the said portion of land and in fact none of them, much less Victoria P.  Cabral, has been in
possession or in possession of any title or any document either public or private, showing his or her
ownership, and not even a Tax Declaration for taxation purposes; the truth is that when the late Mr.
Antonio Rodriguez, original owner of the land with plan Psu-100536, adjacent to that of the plaintiffs,
sold said land to his successor Segunda Prodon he did not include in the said sale this portion, under
litigation, Lot 5-B, of plan Psd-11496 with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, knowing that it
did not belong to him; and because of Segunda Prodon has not acquired this portion of land with an
area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, it is clear, therefore, that she could not have transmitted it to
her successors including the herein defendant, Victoria P. Cabral;
2. That the plaintiffs deny the defendants' allegations in paragraphs VI and XII of their Answer
that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral and her predecessors in interest have been in actual, adverse,
peaceful and continuous possession of this portion of land for a period of more than 50 years because
the truth is that, if they were ever in possession of the same, their possession was 'not adverse' and 'not
continuous'. When Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo bought the parcel of land known as Lot 5, Psu-43302 with
an area of 78,181 square meters, more or less, in 1934, (wherein this portion under litigation is
included) the said Mr. Ocampo took possession of this whole land. In the year 1935 the adjoining owner
of the said property, the late Mr. Antonio Rodriguez and predecessor of the defendant Victoria
P. Cabral, requested Mr. Ocampo to sell to him a portion of said land with an area of 4,303 square
meters, more or less, to which Mr. Ocampo agreed. As there was already a meeting of the mind Mr.
Rodriguez requested Mr. Ocampo that he be allowed to possess the said portion as they were going to
make the formal deed of sale, to which proposition Mr. Ocampo likewise agreed. This proposed sale
never materialized so if Mr. Rodriguez ever possessed the said portion of land, now under litigation, he
did not possess it as owner but only as a 'prospective owner'. His possession cannot, therefore, be
termed 'adverse'. Such possession cannot also be termed 'continuous' for 50 years because Mr.
Ocampo was in possession of the same in 1934 before Mr. Rodriguez came in possession of the same,
first, with the consent and later by toleration of Mr. Ocampo.
 Granting but without admitting, that the defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest have
been in possession of this portion of land with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less for more
than 50 years, does she mean to imply now that she acquires ownership over the same by virtue of
'prescription'? She must remember that this property is titled under Act 496 and, therefore,
'imprescriptible',
3. That the plaintiffs deny the defendants' allegations in paragraphs VI and IX of their Answer
that the plaintiffs have admitted, acknowledged and recognized the defendant Cabral and her
predecessors in said land as the real owners thereof, because the truth is that the plaintiffs are the real
owners of the same, and that they have never admitted, acknowledged nor recognized the
defendant Cabral nor any of her predecessors in interest as the owners of said portion of land;
4. That the plaintiffs admit the allegation in paragraph VIII of the Answer that the defendant
Victoria P. Cabral owns an adjoining property which is described in her plan Psu-100536 but they deny
there is a 'barrio road' between her land and that of the plaintiffs which serves as the boundary and that
there has never been any road much less a barrio road between their properties.
That, if the defendants are referring to Lot 5-B, plan Psd-11496, and the rest of the land of the
plaintiffs Lot No. 5, Psu-43302, which said Lot 5-B is a part, the plaintiffs deny the existence of such
road much less a barrio road, and that there has never been a road therein. With the permission of the
Hon. Court the existence or non-existence of a road can be verified by an ocular inspection and if need
be with the aid of a licensed surveyor;
5. That the plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraphs IX and XIII of the Answer that Mr.
Gregorio Z. Ocampo and his successors in interest have never been in possession of this portion of
land now under litigation. Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo took possession of said property after he bought it in
1934 and if the predecessors in interest of the defendant Cabral happened to be in its possession it
was, first, with the consent of Mr. Ocampo and later by his toleration as we have already explained in
paragraph 2 of this Reply;
6. That the plaintiffs deny the allegation in paragraph IX of the Answer that the inclusion of this
portion of property under litigation was 'obtained thru error or fraud' by the original applicant, and they
likewise deny the allegation in paragraph XI of the Answer that this portion with an area of 4,303 square
meters, more or less, was erroneously and fraudulently included in the property described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14513 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan, because in truth and
in fact there was no such error or fraud. The title of this property was granted and obtained in a regular
proceeding. If there was any error or fraud the predecessor in interest of the defendant Victoria
P. Cabral would have filed a petition for review or would have sued for damages. Or the said defendant
or any of her predecessors in interest would have resorted to some legal remedy.
The fact is that the defendant Victoria P. Cabral or any of her predecessors in interest did not
sincerely and honestly believe that they were the owners of this portion of property. In fact they did not
have and do not have any kind of title or any kind of document, either public or private, over this
property and they did not even have this property declared in their names for taxation purposes. LibLex
Granting, but without admitting, that the title to this property was obtained either by error or
fraud yet the defendant Victoria P. Cabral can have no valid claim against the plaintiffs because she
has never been the owner of said property and also because the plaintiffs' predecessor, Mr. Gregorio Z.
Ocampo, acquired this property as 'an innocent purchaser, in good faith and for value.'
7. That the plaintiffs deny the allegation in paragraph XIV of the Answer that the plaintiffs are
under obligation to execute a deed of transfer of the portion of land in favor of the defendant Victoria
P. Cabral because, first, the title to this land was obtained in a regular proceeding where there was
neither error nor fraud; second, said defendant or her predecessors in interest are not the owners of
said land much less said defendant Cabral who has nothing at all in her possession to show any kind of
right over said portion of land, and third, Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the predecessor in interest of the
plaintiffs, acquire this property as an 'innocent purchaser, in good faith and for value', and
8. That the plaintiffs have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegation in paragraph XV of the defendants' Answer (Counterclaim).
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court to grant the plaintiffs' Petition in their
Complaint." (R.A., pp. 14-21.)
It can be seen that the thrust of the Complaint is that a piece of land covered by T.C.T. No. 14513 in the name
of Gregorio Z. Ocampo was illegally possessed by the defendants. Upon the other hand, the thrust of the Answer is
that "the defendant Victoria P. Cabral is the real owner of Lot No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496, with an area of 4,303 square
meters, more or less, erroneously or fraudulently included in the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14513 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan, registered in the name of the deceased Gregorio Z.
Ocampo and now claimed by the herein plaintiffs." (Answer, par. XI.)
The decision of the trial court is not clear as to whether or not the disputed lot is included in T.C.T. No. 14513.
However, the decision contains the following statement: "if it is included in their title, such title is void insofar as the
portion of the Pandayan road is concerned." (R.A., p. 30.). cdll
The trial court gave the following judgment:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiffs' complaint is hereby DISMISSED, without costs. For lack of proof that
plaintiffs were in bad faith in the filing of the present action, defendants' counter-claim is likewise
dismissed." (R.A., p. 30.)
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of errors:
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PANDAYAN ROAD IS LOCATED
INSIDE THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN T.C.T. NO. 14513 AND INCONSEQUENTLY HOLDING
THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE PROPERTIES OF
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND DEFENDANT-APPELLEE VICTORIA CABRAL.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT T.C.T. NO. 14513 IS 'VOID INSOFAR
AS THE PORTION FROM THE PANDAYAN ROAD IS CONCERNED', AND IN NOT HOLDING THAT
SAID T.C.T. IS INCONTROVERTIBLE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING IMPORTANCE TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES'
ALLEGED 'OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION' AND IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT." (Brief, pp. a-b.)
The Court of Appeals found as a fact: "That disputed portion Lot 5-a is admittedly part of the land originally
registered in the name of plaintiff's predecessor in interest, there should be no question that that title had become
imprescriptible and original registrant as well as his successors had the right to vindicate their ownership against any
body else." (Rollo, p. 54.) 06cdasia
But the Court of Appeals went further. Seizing a statement in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim filed by
the plaintiffs, it held that Gregorio Z. Ocampo had by an oral contract sold the disputed land to Antonio Rodriguez the
defendant's predecessor in interest. The Court of Appeals further said "that agreement oral albeit, became binding
upon Ocampo, it was even executed in part by the actual delivery of possession, it amounted to a supervening fact,
posterior to the title, and the fact that Ocampo's title was not afterwards cancelled can not at all mean that the title
could be used as a weapon to annul that posterior agreement by Ocampo voluntarily entered into and by reason of
which he had delivered possession unto defendant's predecessor; of course, no deed of sale was formalized for a
reason not clear in the evidence, but whether or not formalized, it was a binding personal agreement upon Ocampo."
(Rollo, pp. 56-57.)
The statement upon which the Court of Appeals built its decision is as follows:
"When Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo bought the parcel of land known as Lot 5, Psu-43302 with an
area of 78,181 square meters, more or less, in 1934, (wherein this portion under litigation is included),
the said Mr. Ocampo took possession of this whole land. In the year 1935 the adjoining owner of the
said property, the late Mr. Antonio Rodriguez and predecessor of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral,
requested Mr. Ocampo to sell to him a portion of said land with an area of 4,303 square meters, more
or less, to which Mr. Ocampo agreed. As there was already a meeting of the mind Mr. Rodriguez
requested Mr. Ocampo that he be allowed to possess the said portion as they were going to make the
formal deed of sale, to which proposition Mr. Ocampo likewise agreed. This proposed sale never
materialized so if Mr. Rodriguez ever possessed the said portion of land, now under litigation, he did not
possess it as owner but only as a 'prospective owner'. His possession cannot, therefore, be termed
'adverse'. Such possession cannot also be termed 'continuous' for 50 years because Mr. Ocampo was
in possession of the same in 1934 before Mr. Rodriguez came to possession of the same, first, with the
consent and later by toleration of Mr. Ocampo." (R.A. pp. 15-16.)
It passes understanding why the plaintiffs mentioned a non-consummated transaction between Gregorio Z.
Ocampo and Antonio Rodriguez when the defendants made no claim of such transaction nor was the name of
Antonio Rodriguez even mentioned in their Answer. Cdpr
Even as the Court of Appeals found that the disputed piece of land is registered in the name of the plaintiffs
but because of the supposed oral sale of the same to the predecessors of the defendants, it affirmed the judgment of
the trial court dismissing the complaint for the recovery of the land.
 The instant petition assails the Court of Appeals for rendering a decision based on a ground which was never
raised nor discussed whether in the trial court or before it by any of the parties. The ground to be sure, is the
supposed oral contract of sale made to the predecessors of the defendants covering the disputed piece of land.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless
it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (See cases cited
in II Moran, Rules of Court, pp. 504-505 [1970].)
In this case, the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered a decision based on a ground which was not
litigated in the trial court and which could not have been raised on appeal. That the supposed oral contract of sale was
never an issue is demonstrated by the following:
1. The pleadings of the parties have been purposely reproduced in full above. It can be seen therefrom that
no issue in respect of the supposed oral sale actually emerged.
2. The decision of the trial court is absolutely silent on the supposed oral contract of sale.
3. The plaintiffs who appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals did not make an
assignment of error in respect of the supposed oral sale.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the disputed piece of land is registered in the name of the plaintiffs'
predecessor.
The defendants claimed in their answer that they and their predecessors are the owners of the land in dispute
but that the plaintiffs' predecessor was able to register the same in his name through error or fraud.
However, the trial court made no categorical finding on this claim of the defendants otherwise it would have
granted the affirmative relief which they asked, namely: "(b) declaring the defendant Victoria P. Cabral as the owner of
Lot 5-B, plan Psd-11496, which has been erroneously included in the property of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513, Bulacan, and ordering the herein plaintiffs to execute a deed of
transfer of said Lot No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496 in favor of the defendant Victoria P. Cabral." The Court of Appeals did
not deal with this issue because there was no appeal made by the defendants. cdll
The following conclusions have to be made.
1. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. 14513 issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the predecessor of the
plaintiffs.
2. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated by error or fraud.
3. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Gregorio Z. Ocampo had orally sold the disputed land to the
predecessors of the defendants.
4. The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that
they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer
the complaint. (Art. 528, Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356 [1929].) As possessors in bad faith from the
service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have
received, . . ." (Art. 549, Civil Code.)
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and another one rendered in that the
defendants shall vacate and surrender the land in question to the plaintiffs; and the defendants shall also account for
the fruits thereof pursuant to Article 549 of the Civil Code from the service of the summons. Costs against the
defendants.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. L-36789, [July 25, 1983], 208 PHIL 452-468)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 28721. October 5, 1928.]

MARTIN MENDOZA and NATALIO ENRIQUEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MANUEL  DE GUZMAN, defendant-appellant. MAX. B. SOLIS, intervenor-appellant.

DECISION

MALCOLM,  J p:

This case calls for the application of articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code to the proven facts.
On November 6, 1916, Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas against Martin Mendoza for the recovery of a certain piece of land. Judgment was rendered in
that case absolving Mendoza from the complaint, and this judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme
Court. 1 When the case was remanded to the court of origin, the trial judge issued an order requiring the provincial
sheriff immediately to dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and to put Mendoza in the possession of the land. By
virtue of this order, Mendoza was in fact put in possession of the property.
In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of Sariaya, Tayabas, the piece of land above-mentioned was
identified as lot No. 687. In the decision rendered in the cadastral case, this lot was adjudicated in favor of
Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso  subject to the right of retention on the part of
Manuel de Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. By virtue of this
judgment, De Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot No. 687 in his favor
which was granted on June 25, 1924. From the time Leandra Solis and Bernardo Solis, as well as
Manuel de Guzman who was working on the land, were ejected therefrom, Martin Mendoza possessed it until June
25, 1924, when De Guzman obtained the writ of possession abovementioned. Since then De Guzman has had
dominion over the land.
Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed for the improvements made
on the land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an action requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the
necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements; (b) require the
defendant to render an accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the
payment of the necessary and useful expenses; and (c) decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. To
the complaint, the defendant filed an answer in the form of a general denial with special defenses and appended a
counterclaim and crosscomplaint, in which a total of P6,000 was asked. During the pendency of the case, Bernardo
Solis, or Max. B. Solis, one of the persons who was ejected from the land, asked leave to intervene, alleging, among
other things, that De Guzman, in consideration of the sum of P5,000, had transferred all his rights in the
improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of two hundred coconut trees. This petition was granted by the
trial court.
When the case was called for trial, the parties entered into the following stipulation:
"1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and proprietors of the land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint.
"2. That a decree of registration has been issued on said land in the terms set forth in
paragraph 3 of the complaint.
"3. That the defendant Manuel de Guzman is the one who has been in possession and
enjoyment of the land from June 25, 1924, up to the present time by virtue of a writ of possession
obtained by him from the Court of Land Registration.
"4. That the defendant has made improvements on said land by planting coconut trees thereon.
"5. That the plaintiff Martin Mendoza is the one who has been in possession and enjoyment of
said property and its improvements since December 16, 1916, by virtue of a writ of possession in civil
case No. 356 until said possession was transferred to the defendant Manuel de Guzman.
"6. That from March 20, 1920, the plaintiff Natalio Enriquez has been in possession and
enjoyment of a portion of the land, the subject matter of the complaint herein, by virtue of a deed of sale
executed in his favor by Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who, in turn, acquired it from the other plaintiff
Martin Mendoza, until June 25, 1924.
"The parties desire to submit, as they do submit, under this stipulation of facts the following
questions:
"(a) The amount of the indemnity to be paid to the defendant for the improvements made by
him on said lot and the basis upon which said amount shall be fixed.
"(b) Whether or not the defendant is obliged to render an account of the fruits received by him
from June 25, 1924, until the improvements are delivered after same have been paid for.
"(c) Whether the value of said fruits and products received by the defendant shall be applied to
the indemnity to which he is entitled, or whether said defendant is obliged to deliver to the plaintiffs the
remainder in case of excess.
"(d) Whether or not the defendant has the right to be paid by the plaintiffs in whole or in part for
the value of the fruits received by Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez from the respective dates that
they were in possession and enjoyment of the land until June 25, 1924.
"The parties at the same time that they submit to the court for decision the questions presented
in the above stipulation reserve to themselves, whatever said decision may be, the right to present later
their evidence in support of their respective views with respect to the amount of the indemnity.
"After the preliminary questions have been decided, the parties request that commissioners be
appointed to receive said evidence with respect to the amount of the indemnity in accordance with the
views of both parties."
The trial court resolved the questions presented by holding (1) that in accordance with the provisions of
articles 453 and 454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the "indemnizacion" to be paid to the
defendant should be fixed according to the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las
plantaciones en cuestion"; (2) that the plaintiffs as the owner of the property have the right to make their own "las
plantaciones hechas por el demandado" upon payment in the form indicated in No. 1, the defendant having the right
to retain the land until the expenditures have been refunded; (3) that the defendant is obliged to render a detailed and
just account of the fruits and other profits received by him from the property for their due application; and (4) that the
value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be applied to the payment of the "indemnizacion," and in case
 that it exceeds the value of the "indemnizacion," the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs With respect to the last
question as to whether or not the plaintiffs are obliged to return to the defendant the value of the fruits received by
them before the defendant took possession of the land, the trial court abstained from making any pronouncement for
the reason that the circumstances under which the plaintiffs acquired possession and the defendant again acquired it
were not before him, the parties needing to submit their evidence with respect to this point.
At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties, two commissioners were appointed with
instructions to inspect the land and to count the number of coconut trees planted thereon, determining the number of
fruitbearing trees and those that are not fruit-bearing as well as the condition of the same. After trial, Judge of First
Instance Gloria rendered judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor Bernardo
Solis have the right to collect from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as
compensation for the necessary and useful expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and
80 per cent for Bernardo Solis; and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25, 1924, one-fifth of this amount to be paid by Manuel  de Guzman and the
other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. As on the date when this judgment was rendered, that is on September 23, 1927,
the amount that the plaintiffs were required to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that the latter
were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor were ordered to deliver the land and its improvements as soon
as the plaintiffs have paid the difference, without special pronouncement as to costs.
The appeal of the defendant and intervenor is based on fourteen assigned errors relating to both questions of
fact and of law. The question of fact mainly concerns the amount to be paid as "indemnizacion" in the form of
necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. The question of law mainly concerns the interpretation
of articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code. Counsel for the appellants has presented a learned brief divided into
three chapters. Counsel for the appellees has countered with an equally helpful brief in which the fourteen assigned
errors are reduced for purposes of argument to four fundamental questions. It would not be profitable and it is not
necessary to follow opposing counsel into all of their refinements of fact and law.
As to the facts, the findings of the trial judge should be given effect. An examination of the evidence shows
that these findings are fully substantiated. Our only doubt has been as to the just value for each coconut tree now
found on the land. However, everything considered, we have at last determined that we would not be justified in
changing the value per tree of P2 as fixed in the trial court. With respect to the fruits received by the defendant while
the land was in his possession, the finding in the trial court is correct.
With the facts as above indicated, little time need be taken to discuss the points of law. Article 361 of the Civil
Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion." However one may speculate as to the true meaning
of the term "indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity," the amount of the
"indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the
present case is the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses
have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing (4
Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 258); as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost
(Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo  Civil, p. 408); as those that augment the income of the things upon which they are
expended (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scævola's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 416).
Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. (4
Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo  Civil, p. 257). Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced
on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant.
Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a possessor in good faith within the meaning of the law, seeks to be
reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the owners of the
estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.
In brief, therefore, and with special reference to the decision appealed from, the errors assigned on appeal,
and the argument of counsel as addressed to the decision in the lower court and the assignment of errors, we may
say that we are content to make the findings of fact and law of Judge Gloria in the lower court the findings of fact and
law in the appellate court.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez,and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
|||  (Mendoza v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 28721, [October 5, 1928], 52 PHIL 164-171)
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16736 December 22, 1921

EVARISTA ROBLES and her husband ENRIQUE MARTIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LIZARRAGA

HERMANOS Defendants-Appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Owing to the character of the facts in the three above entitled cases and the intimate connection existing between them,
they were, by agreement of the parties, tried together in the court below, and on appeal this court was requested to try
them at the same time, which was done, and these three cases are jointly adjudged in the present
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The following facts are undisputed: law library

Anastasia de la Rama died on the 17th of October, 1916, leaving six children, to wit, Magdalena, Jose, Evarista, Zacarias,
Felix, and Purificacion, surnamed Robles, and some properties, among which is house No. 4 on Iznart Street in the city of
Iloilo, concerning which a controversy arose which developed into the three cases now under
consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and
settlement of their accounts, by virtue of which the competent court awarded to said partnership the properties left by the
deceased, including the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Evarista Robles, one of the aforesaid heirs, since before the death of her mother Anastasia de la Rama, has been with
her husband occupying the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street, at the beginning, by permission of her mother, later on
by the consent of her coheirs, and lastly by agreement with the partnership, Lizarraga Hermanos, to whom it had been
awarded, having made some improvements on the house, the value of which is fixed at four thousand five hundred pesos
(P4,500), and paying to said partnership forty pesos (P40) monthly as rent of the upper
story.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 18, 1918, Lizarraga Hermanos notified Evarista Robles (Exhibit J) that beginning April next the rent of the upper
story of the house would be raised to sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she did not agree to the new rate of rent, she
might vacate the house. Evarista Robles refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house, and Lizarraga
Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment. Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos afterwards to recover the
value of the improvements, and demanded, in another action, that said value be noted on the certificate of title as an
encumbrance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Evarista Robles contends that the understanding with Lizarraga Hermanos by virtue of which she continued to occupy the
house and made the improvements, was a contract whereby it was agreed to sell her the said building on Iznart Street,
the deed of sale to be executed as soon as the title deeds of the property were transferred to the name of said
partnership; that by virtue of this contract she remained in the occupation of the building and made the improvements;
that, as one of the stipulations in the contract of sale of the estate, Evarista Robles assumed the liability of an
encumbrance of fourteen thousand pesos (P14,000)on the estate and another one in favor of the Agricultural Bank and its
successor, the National Bank, paying the interest thereon as well as the land tax and the premiums of the five insurance,
all of which payments were made through the same firm of Lizarraga Hermanos who, as a result of the liquidation of
accounts, held funds in their possession belonging to Exhibit A, B, C, F, H, and I. It should here be noted that Evarista
Robles does not seek the execution of the proper instrument of evidence this contract of sale, nor the performance
thereof. She only claims the cost of the improvements made at her expense and that this be recorded in the
corresponding certificate of title.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While the firm of Lizarraga Hermanos does not question that fact that said improvements have been made and that their
value amounts to four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500), it denies, however, having entered into any agreement with
Evarista Robles for the sale of the building in question. In deciding the case No. 16736 of this court, the court a quo found
such a verbal contract of sale to have been proven not only by Exhibit A, which leads to such a conclusion, but by the oral
evidence, which, in its opinion, had a preponderance in favor thereof, and by the corroborative evidence consisting in the
fact of Lizarraga Hermanos having executed the deed of sale of the warehouse mentioned in the said Exhibit A. This firm
questions the right of Evarista Robles to the improvements under consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles
virtual law library

The fundamental questions upon which hinges the controversy in these three cases are: First, whether Evarista Robles is
the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand payment of their value (case No. 16736); second,
whether she has any right to retain the building until the said value is paid to her (case No. 16661); and third, whether a
note for the four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500), the value of the above-mentioned improvements, as an
encumbrance on this estate (case No. 16662), should be made on the title deeds
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Regarding the controversy in the case No. 16736, attention is called to article 453 of the Civil Code which reads:

Necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until they are repaid to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right to retention, the person who has
defeated him in his possession having the opinion of refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the
increase in value which the thing has acquired by reason thereof.

This provision of law is in force and applies to personal as well as real property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles
virtual law library

The expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have
continued to stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the house better serves the purpose for which it
was intended, being used as a residence, and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen,
closet, and bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it
is beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the building. One of the chiefs of the firm of Lizarraga Hermanos,
on the occasion of a luncheon in the house, on noting the improvements, could not refrain from expressing that such
improvements added much to the value of the building (folio 25, stenographic
notes).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now then, was Evarista Robles a possessor in good faith when she made those improvements? Article 434 provides that
"good faith is always presumed and the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the person
alleging it." Lizarraga Hermanos did not allege, nor prove in the first instance the bad faith characterizing Evarista Robles'
possession, who, as shown in the records and heretofore stated, began to occupy the house by permission of the former
owner, her mother Anastasia de la Rama, and continued later in the occupation by the consent of her coheirs, and
afterwards by considering herself the future owner of the building by virtue of the contract with the present owner,
Lizarraga Hermanos. The evidence shows that said improvements were begun about the end of December, 1916, after
the agreement with Lizarraga Hermanos for the sale thereof to Evarista Robles. (Folios 23, 24, 25, stenographic
notes.)chanrobles virtual law library

We find that in the court below the presumption of good faith in favor of Evarista Robles' possession at the time she made
the improvements on the property was neither disputed nor discussed, but on the contrary, there is positive evidence
sufficient to support the conclusion that when she made the improvements on the aforesaid building she was possessing
it in good faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If the improvements are useful and Evarista Robles' possession was in good faith, the conclusion set out in article 453 of
the Civil Code, supra, is inevitable; Evarista Robles is the owner of such improvements, and entitled to reimbursement
therefor, and to retain the building until the same is made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

One of the proofs establishing the fact that Evarista Robles' possession was in good faith is found in Exhibit A, which
textually is as follows:xxx

Severiano Lizarraga acknowledged having drawn this document and admitted it to be in his own hand-writing (folios 6-8,
transcript of stenographic notes taken in case No. 16661 at the trial held December 6, 1919). Taking into consideration
the explanation he gives of the contents of this exhibit, there is the inevitable conclusion which is obviously inferred from
the phrases "Value of house - of warehouse - For Evarista P16,500 - Evarista pays them in this way," that Evarista Robles
was to become the owner of the house (which is the one question) and the warehouse for sixteen thousand five hundred
pesos (P16,500), which sum she was to pay by assuming the liability of all the amounts enumerated in the said
memorandum all the way through.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But the admissibility of this document as evidence is disputed by reference to section 335, case No. 5, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which in the English text, which is clearer on this point, reads:

SEC. 335. Agreements invalid unless made in writing. - In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall
be unenforceable (Emphasis ours) by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or secondary evidence of its contents:chanrobles virtual law library

No. 5. An agreement for . . . the sale of real property, etc.

It should be noted, first of all, that this rule of evidence does not go to the extent of rendering invalid any verbal contract
for the sale of real property (Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil., 387), but declares inadmissible any evidence of
such a contract other than the document itself of the sale or some memorandum signed by the party charged, in so far as
the object of the action instituted is to enforce performance of said contract of sale. But we are not dealing with that phase
in any of the cases now before us. This document was introduced only to reinforce the proofs relative to the good faith
characterizing the possession of Evarista Robles when she made the improvements in question, to the effect that if she
made then, it was because she entertained the well-founded, may certain belief that she was making them on a building
that was to become her property by virtue of the verbal contract of sale.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles virtual law
library

In the action wherein Evarista Robles and her husband ask that they be adjudged owners of these improvements and that
their value be paid to them, Lizarraga Hermanos filed a general denied and a counterclaim and cross-complaint for
nineteen thousand pesos (P19,000) as compensation for damages alleged to have been sustained by them on account of
their inability to sell the house and the warehouse, due to the fact that the buyer imposed the condition that the house
should be vacated, which the plaintiffs refused to do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is a fact that the value of the improvements in question has not as yet been paid by Lizarraga Hermanos. Wherefore, if
Evarista Robles and her husband are entitled to retain the building until the value of such improvements is paid them,
Lizarraga Hermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the building, nor, therefore, to be indemnified for any
damages caused by the refusal of the plaintiffs found on their legitimate rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In regard to the ejectment sought in the case No. 16661, the suit was brought by Lizarraga Hermanos in the justice of the
peace court of Iloilo on May 6, 1918, based on the failure of Evarista Robles and her husband to pay the rent of the upper
story of the house in question for the month of April of that year, amounting to sixty pesos (P60), and on the refusal of said
spouses to quit the building. These spouses in their answer alleged as special defense that they had never been the
tenants of Lizarraga Hermanos until November, 1917, when they became so "under the special circumstances" under
which the plaintiff partnership sold the building, whereon they later made, with the latter's consent, improvements
amounting to four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500), setting out the other stipulations and conditions hereinabove
stated, which were incorporated into the contract of sale, and prayed, under their counterclaim, that Lizarraga Hermanos
be sentenced to pay the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500), the value of the improvements referred to,
and under their cross-complaint, that said partnership be ordered to pay then thousand pesos (P10,000) as compensation
for damages alleged to have been sustained by the aforesaid spouses due to the aforesaid partnership's act, praying
lastly, in view of the questions raised, that the case be regarded not as one of unlawful detainer, but for the recovery of
title to real property, and that the court of the justice of the peace abstain from taking cognizance thereof for want of
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The case having been appealed to the Court of First Instance, these allegations were
reproduced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the Court of First Instance Lizarraga Hermanos demurred to this counterclaim and cross-complaint, and the demurrer
was sustained by the court in its decision on the merits of the case, whereby the defendants are sentenced to return to
Lizarraga Hermanos the possession of the building, to pay the rents thereof due from April, 1918, until they vacate the
house, at the rate of sixty pesos (P60) per month, and the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

From this judgment Evarista Robles and her husband have appealed, assigning as errors of the court a quo in finding the
Lizarraga Hermanos were entitled to bring action for unlawful detainer, and ordering them to return the possession of the
building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If Evarista Robles and her husband were mere lessees of this building, the plaintiff's action for unlawful detainer is obvious
and must prosper. But, were Evarista Robles and her husband mere lessees?chanrobles virtual law library

As above stated, we hold that there existed a contract of sale of this building executed by Lizarraga Hermanos in favor of
Evarista Robles about November, 1916, the performance of which is not, however, sought to be enforced, nor would it be
enforceable if the evidence offered in the action instituted for the purpose be not the document itself of the sale, or a
memorandum thereof, signed by the party bound by the contract and required in the action to fulfill it, and objection be
made to said evidence, as was done here.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The possession of these spouses was in no way begun by virtue of any lease whatever, since it is not disputed, and is a
proven fact, that they came to occupy the building by permission of the mother of Evarista Robles. Upon said mother's
death, the continued to occupy the property by the consent of the coheirs. After the assignment of the property of
Lizarraga Hermanos was concluded, but before the title deeds were transferred to the name of this partnership, an
agreement was made for the sale of the building to Evarista Robles and her husband, the latter agreeing in the meantime
to pay to Lizarraga Hermanos a certain sum per month - forty pesos (P40) - by way of compensation for the occupation of
the building until the execution of the deed of sale in favor of the occupants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles virtual
law library

Considering abstractly the naked fact that these spouses occupied the house by paying a certain sum for its occupation, it
would seem that this is indeed a case of lease. But such was not the contract. It was simply the sense of justice of the
parties that led them to make the stipulation that, while the conveyance of the building was being carried into effect in due
form, the future owners should pay a certain sum for its possession. This peculiar situation continued for all the time in
which the said spouses made and completed the improvements in question until Lizarraga Hermanos changed their
resolution to sell the building to Evarista Robles and her husband. But then all the improvements in question had already
been made, and when these spouses were requested to vacate the building, they answered and gave it to understand,
that they would do so as soon as the value of the improvements was paid to them. Up to that time they were not lessees
strictly speaking. Did they become so afterwards? Neither; for since that moment they have been as are at present, in
possession of the building by virtue of the right that they had, and do have, to retain it until the value of the improvements
is paid to them. And it was after these spouses had manifested their intention not to leave the building until they were
reimbursed for the improvements made thereon that this action for unlawful detainer was
instituted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Before these improvements were made, or before these spouses demanded payment of their value, that is, while the
possession was partly based on the stipulation with color of lease, an action for unlawful detainer might have, in a sense,
been justifiable, though not entirely maintainable, owing to the fact that such possession was based primarily on the well-
founded belief of the occupants that they were to become the owners of the house in their possession, that the monthly
payment being a provisional arrangement, an incidental and peremptory stipulation, while the solemn formalities of the
conveyance were being complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But after the improvements had been made and Lizarraga Hermanos had manifested their resolution to rescind the
contract of sale and not to pay for them, then the possession of the aforesaid spouses lost all color of lease, and turns out
to be possession based only upon the latter's right to retain the building. And these were all the attending circumstances
of said possession when the action for unlawful detainer was commenced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

We are, therefore, of opinion, and so hold, that Lizarraga Hermanos were not, and are not, entitled to maintain any action
for unlawful detainer so long as they do not pay the value of the improvements in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We will now take up the case No. 16662 wherein Evarista Robles and her husband ask that these improvements be noted
on the proper certificate of title as an encumbrance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

These spouses pray in their complaint for the cancellation of the said certificate of title, which is the transfer certificate No.
526, a substitute of the original No. 32 of the office of the register of deeds of Iloilo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

If the object of these spouses is, as it cannot be otherwise, to have such an encumbrance noted, the cancellation is not
necessary, and, of course, not justifiable. At any rate, the fraud alleged in this last action to have been committed
precisely to secure such a transfer certificate cannot be held proven.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

But it having been decided that these spouses are entitled to demand payment of the value of the improvements and to
retain the building until such value is paid them, it only remains for us to determine whether this right of retention has the
character of a real right to be regarded as one of the encumbrances referred to in section 70 and the following sections of
the Land Registration Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It being a burden on the building to the extent of being inseparably attached to the possession thereof, this right of
retention must necessarily be a real one. If so, as we regard, and find, it to be, it is but just that such an encumbrance
should be noted on the transfer certificate No. 526 issued by the register of deeds of Iloilo in favor of Lizarraga Hermanos,
or on any substitute thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As a consequence of all the foregoing, we affirm the judgments appealed from in the three cases in so far as they are in
harmony with the conclusions herein set out, and reverse them in so far as they are in conflict therewith, and it is hereby
adjudged and decreed:chanrobles virtual law library

First. That Lizarraga Hermanos pay to the spouses Evarista Robles and Enrique Martin the sum of four thousand five
hundred pesos (P4,500), the value of the improvements referred to in these cases, with right on the part of said spouses
to retain the building in question until the payment hereby ordered is made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles virtual
law library

Second. That said spouses Evarista Robles and Enrique Martin vacate the aforesaid building immediately after the
receipt, or the legal tender, of the payment hereby decreed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Third. That the said spouses Evarista Robles and Enrique Martin pay to Lizarraga Hermanos a compensation for the
occupation of the building at the rate of forty pesos (P40) a month, beginning with the month of April, 1918, until they
vacate the aforesaid building as it is ordered herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Fourth. That upon payment of his lawful fees, the register of deeds note said right of retention on the back of the transfer
certificate No. 526 issued in favor of Lizarraga Hermanos, or of any other certificate standing in lieu thereof, concerning
the said building, which note will remain in force until the payment of the aforesaid improvements is made as above
ordered. Without pronouncement as to the costs in this instance, so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns,  JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-54526. August 25, 1986.]

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS 
and THE CITY OF DAGUPAN, respondents.

DECISION

FERIA,J  p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the

decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The lower court had declared respondent City of Dagupan
the lawful owner of the Dagupan Waterworks System and held that the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority,
now petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, was a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled
to indemnity for the useful improvements it had introduced.
Before proceeding further, it may be necessary to invite attention to the common error of joining the court (be
it a Regional Trial Court, the Intermediate Appellate Court, or the Sandiganbayan) as a party respondent in an appeal
by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The only parties in an appeal by certiorari are the
appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. (Cf. Elks Club vs. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272) The court which
rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action  of certiorari under
Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or
respondent. The joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan as party respondent in an appeal
by certiorari is necessary in cases where the petitioner-appellant claims that said court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. An example of this is a case where the petitioner-appellant
claims that the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in making its
findings of fact, thus justifying the review by this court of said findings of fact. (See the exceptions to the
rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan in the
case of Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 66497-98, July 10, 1986.) In such a case, the petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the
joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan becomes necessary. (Cf. Lianga Lumber
Company vs. Lianga Timber Co.,Inc.,March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 197).
The City of Dagupan (hereinafter referred to as the CITY) filed a complaint against the former
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (hereinafter referred to as the NAWASA), now
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (hereinafter referred to as MWSS), for recovery of the ownership
and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A.
1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the
Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and
useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the
basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to
the reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA appealed to the then Court of Appeals and argued in its lone
assignment of error that the CITY should have been held liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured
by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court and ruled as follows:
"However, as already found above, these useful expenses were made in utter bad faith for they
were instituted after the complaint was filed and after numerous Supreme Court decisions were
promulgated declaring unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA of the
patrimonial waterworks systems of cities, municipalities and provinces without just compensation.
"Under Article 546 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellant, it is clear that a builder or a
possessor in bad faith is not entitled to indemnity for any useful improvement on the premises.
(Santos vs. Mojica, L-25450, Jan. 31, 1969). In fact, he is not entitled to any right regarding the useful
expenses (II Paras (1971) 387). He shall not have any right whatsoever. Consequently, the owner shall
be entitled to all of the useful improvements without any obligation on his part (Jurado, Civil Law
Reviewer (1974) 223)."
Petitioner-Appellant MWSS, successor-in-interest of the NAWASA, appealed to this Court raising the sole
issue of whether or not it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the
Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith. In
support of its claim for removal of said useful improvements, MWSS argues that the pertinent laws on the subject,
particularly Articles 546, 547 and 549 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, do not definitely settle the
question of whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements. To bolster its claim MWSS
further cites the decisions in the cases of Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap (13 SCRA 190) and
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals (69 SCRA 99).
The CITY in its brief questions the raising of the issue of the removal of useful improvements for the first time
in this Court, inasmuch as it was not raised in the trial court, much less assigned as an error before the
then Court of Appeals. The CITY further argues that petitioner, as a possessor in bad faith, has absolutely no right to
the useful improvements; that the rulings in the cases cited by petitioner are not applicable to the case at bar; that
even assuming that petitioner has the right to remove the useful improvements, such improvements were not actually
identified, and hence a rehearing would be required which is improper at this stage of the proceedings; and finally,
that such improvements, even if they could be identified, could not be separated without causing substantial injury or
damage to the Dagupan Waterworks System.
xxx
 However, We shall overlook this procedural defect and rule on the main issue raised in this appeal, to wit:
Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful improvements? The answer is clearly in the negative.
Recognized authorities on the subject are agreed on this point. **
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost
whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity (Santos vs. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA
703).
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful
expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith
may remove useful improvements if the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor
in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the
thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have
at the time he enters into possession (Article 549, Id.).
The decision in the case of Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap (13 SCRA 190) cited by petitioner does not
support its stand. On the contrary, this Court ruled in said case that "if the defendant constructed a new building, as
he alleges, he cannot recover its value because the construction was done after the filing of the action for annulment,
thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of reimbursement." What this Court allowed
appellant Yap to remove were the equipment, books, furniture and fixtures brought in by him, because they were
outside of the scope of the judgment and may be retained by him.
Neither may the decision in the case of Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals (69 SCRA 99), also cited by petitioner,
be invoked to modify the clear provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines that a possessor in bad faith is not
entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses or to removal of useful improvements.
In said case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondents Infantes were possessors in
good faith. On appeal, the First Division of this Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared
petitioner Carbonell to have the superior right to the land in question. On the question of whether or not respondents
Infantes were possessors in good faith, four Members ruled that they were not, but as a matter  of equity allowed them
to remove the useful improvements they had introduced on the land. Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice)
concurred on the same premise as the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma that both the conflicting
buyers of the real property in question, namely petitioner Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as the
second buyer, may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their purchase. Justice Muñoz
Palma dissented on the ground that since both purchasers were undoubtedly in good faith, respondents Infantes' prior
registration of the sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the land. Inasmuch as only four Members
concurred in ruling that respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled that they were
possessors in good faith, said decision does not establish a precedent. Moreover, the equitable consideration present
in said case are not present in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-54526, [August 25, 1986], 227 PHIL
585-593)

Module 6

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-2659. October 12, 1950.]

In the matter of the testate estate of Emil Maurice Bachrach, deceased. MARY

MCDONALD BACHRACH, petitioner-appellee, vs. SOPHIE  SEIFERT and
ELISA ELIANOFF, oppositors-appellants.

DECISION
OZAETA,  J p:

Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or part of the corpus of
the estate, which pertains to the remainderman? That is the question raised in this appeal.
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last
will and testament made varius legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate as follows:
"Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise to my beloved wife Mary
McDonald Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all my estate after payment of
the legacies, bequests, and gifts provided for above; and she may enjoy said usufruct and use or spend
such fruits as she may in any manner wish."
The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of all his estate "shall be
divided share and share alike by and between my legal heirs, to the exclusion of my brothers."
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc.,
received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June
10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize
the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M.  Bachrach, to transfer to her the said
54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that
said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary
or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that
the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman. And they have appealed from the order granting the petition and overruling
their objection.
While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but
merely represents an addition to the invested capital. The so-called Massachusetts rule, which prevails in certain
jurisdictions in the United States, supports appellants' contention. It regards cash dividends, however large, as
income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital. (Minot vs. Paine, 99 Mass., 101; 96 Am. Dec., 705.) It holds
that a stock dividend is not in any true sense any dividend at all since it involves no division or severance from the
corporate assets of the subject of the dividend; that it does not distribute property but simply dilutes the shares as
they existed before; and that it takes nothing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of
the shareholders.
On the other hand, the so-called Pennsylvania rule, which prevails in various other jurisdictions in the United
States, supports appellee's contention. This rule declares that all earnings of the corporation made prior to the death
of the testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the estate, and that all earnings, when declared as dividends in
whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant are income and belong to the usufructuary or
life tenant. (Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa., 368.)
". . . It is clear that testator intended the remaindermen should have only the corpus of the
estate he left in trust, and that all dividends should go to the life tenants. It is true that profits realized
are not dividends until declared by the proper officials of the corporation, but distribution of profits,
however made, is dividends, and the form of the distribution is immaterial." (In re Thompson's Estate,
262 Pa., 278; 105 Atl. 273, 274.)
In Hite vs. Hite (93 Ky., 257; 20 S. W., 778, 780), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, speaking thru its Chief
Justice, said:
". . . Where a dividend, although declared in stock, is based upon the earnings of the company,
it is in reality, whether called by one name or another, the income of the capital invested in it. It is but a
mode of distributing the profit. If it be not income, what is it? If it is, then it is rightfully and equitably the
property of the life tenant. If it be really profit, then he should have it, whether paid in stock or money. A
stock dividend proper is the issue of new shares paid for by the transfer of a sum equal to their par
value from the profit and loss account to that representing capital stock; and really a corporation has no
right to declare a dividend, either in cash or stock, except from its earnings; and a singular state of case
— it seems to us, an unreasonable one — is presented if the company, although it rests with it whether
it will declare a dividend, can bind the courts as to the proper ownership of it, and by the mode of
payment substitute its will for that of the testator, and favor the life tenants or the remainder-men, as it
may desire. It cannot, in reason, be considered that the testator contemplated such a result. The law
regards substance, and not form, and such a rule might result not only in a violation of the testator's
intention, but it would give the power to the corporation to beggar the life tenants, who, in this case, are
the wife and children of the testator, for the benefit of the ramainder-men, who may perhaps be
unknown to the testator, being unborn when the will was executed. We are unwilling to adopt a rule
which to us seems so arbitrary, and devoid of reason and justice. If the dividend be in fact a profit,
 although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. It has been so held in Pennsylvania and
many other states, and we think it the correct rule. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Cook, Stocks & S.
sec. 554. . . ."
We think the Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule. Under
section 16 of our Corporation Law, no corporation may make or declare any dividend except from the surplus profits
arising from its business. Any dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits. Article 471 of the
Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct. And articles 474 and 475 provide as follows:
"ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the usufructuary in
proportion to the time the usufruct may last.
"ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or periodical revenue,
either in money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each matured
payment shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right.
"When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an industrial or
commercial enterprise, the profits of which are not distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall have
the same consideration.
"In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in accordance with
the rules prescribed by the next preceding article."
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil
fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said
dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares ,
just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother.
The order appealed from, being in accordance with the above-quoted provisions of the Civil Code, is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
|||  (Bachrach v. Seifert, G.R. No. L-2659, [October 12, 1950], 87 PHIL 483-487)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107132. October 8, 1999.]

MAXIMA HEMEDES,  petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE  COURT  OF APPEALS, DOMINIUM REALTY

AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D.  HEMEDES, and R & B INSURANCE
CORPORATION,  respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J  p:
 Assailed in these petitions for review on certiorari is the decision 1 of the eleventh
division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22010 promulgated on September 11, 1992 affirming in toto the
decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna in Civil Case No. B-1766 dated February 22, 1989, 2 and the
resolution dated December 29, 1992 denying petitioner R & B Insurance Corporation's (R & B Insurance) motion for
reconsideration. As the factual antecedents and issues are the same, we shall decide the petitions jointly.
The instant controversy involves a question of ownership over an unregistered parcel of land, identified as Lot No.
6, plan Psu-111331, with an area of 21,773 square meters, situated in Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was originally owned by
the late Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. On March 22, 1947
Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" 3 whereby he conveyed
ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the
following resolutory conditions:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the
children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the
property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage contained
in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal
heirs of the DONOR in common.
Pursuant to the first condition abovementioned, Justa Kausapin executed on September 27, 1960 a
"Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" 4 conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property
under the following terms —
That the said parcel of land was donated unto me by the said Jose Hemedes, my deceased
husband, in a deed of "DONATION INTER VIVOS WITH RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS" executed by
the donor in my favor, and duly accepted by me on March 22, 1947, before Notary Public Luis Bella in
Cabuyao, Laguna;
That the donation is subject to the resolutory conditions appearing in the said
deed of "DONATION INTER VIVOS WITH RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS," as follows:
"(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall
xxx
That, wherefore, in virtue of the deed of donation above mentioned and in the exercise of my
right and privilege under the terms of the first resolutory condition therein contained and hereinabove
reproduced, and for and in consideration of my love and affection, I do hereby by these presents
convey, transfer, and deed unto my designee, MAXIMA HEMEDES, of legal age, married to RAUL
RODRIGUEZ, Filipino and resident of No. 15 Acacia Road, Quezon City, who is one of the children and
heirs of my donor, JOSE HEMEDES, the ownership of, and title to the property hereinabove described,
and all rights and interests therein by reversion under the first resolutory condition in the above
deed of donation; Except the possession and enjoyment of the said property which shall remain vested
in me during my lifetime, or widowhood and which upon my death or remarriage shall also automatically
revert to, and be transferred to my designee, Maxima Hemedes.
Maxima Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over the
subject unregistered land. Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (0-941) 0-198 5 was issued in the
name of Maxima Hemedes married to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna on June 8, 1962, with the
annotation that "Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over the parcel of land herein described during her
lifetime or widowhood."
It is claimed by R & B Insurance that on June 2, 1964, Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez
constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject property in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained
in the amount of P6,000.00. On February 22, 1968, R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since
Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even after it became due on August 2, 1964. The land was sold at a public
auction on May 3, 1968 with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate  of sale was issued by the sheriff in its
favor. Since Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, R & B Insurance executed an
Affidavit of Consolidation dated March 29, 1974 and on May 21, 1975 the Register of Deeds of Laguna cancelled OCT
No. (0-941) 0-198 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41985 in the name of R & B Insurance. The
annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title. 6
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a
"Kasunduan" on May 27, 1971 whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D.  Hemedes, pursuant to
the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique
D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property — in 1972, and again, in 1974, when the assessed value of the
property was raised. Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed
the property to him in 1971 until 1979. In the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna conducted from September 8, 1974 to
October 10, 1974, the property was assigned Cadastral No. 2990, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, in the
name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.
On February 28, 1979, Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation
(Dominium). On April 10, 1981, Justa Kausapin executed an affidavit affirming the conveyance of the subject property in
favor of Enrique D. Hemedes as embodied in the "Kasunduan" dated May 27, 1971, and at the same time denying the
conveyance made to Maxima Hemedes.
On May 14, 1981, Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who,
even before the signing of the contract of lease, constructed two warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about
P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia Brewery's constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a
letter on March 16, 1981 informing the former of its ownership of the property as evidenced by TCT No. 41985 issued in
its favor and of its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder in bad faith. On March 27, 1981, a
conference was held between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
On May 8, 1981, Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery wherein she asserted that she
is the rightful owner of the subject property by virtue of OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 and that, as such, she has the right to
appropriate Asia Brewery's constructions, to demand its demolition, or to compel Asia Brewery to purchase the land. In
another letter of the same date addressed to R & B Insurance, Maxima Hemedes denied the execution of any real estate
mortgage in favor of the latter.
On August 27, 1981, Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint 7 with the Court of First
Instance of Binan, Laguna for the annulment of TCT No. 41985 issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the
reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Dominium was the absolute
owner of the subject property by virtue of the February 28, 1979 deed of sale executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in
turn obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan" dated May 27, 1971. The
plaintiffs asserted that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D. Hemedes had
no knowledge of the registration proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.
After considering the merits of the case, the trial court rendered judgment on February 22, 1989 in
favor of plaintiffs Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes, the dispositive portion of which states —
xxx
Both R & B Insurance and Maxima Hemedes appealed from the trial court's decision. On September 11, 1992
the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision in toto and on December 29, 1992, it denied R & B Insurance's motion
for reconsideration. Thus, Maxima Hemedes and R & B Insurance filed their respective petitions for review with
this Court on November 3, 1992 and February 22, 1993, respectively.
xxx
The primary issue to be resolved in these consolidated petitions is which of the two conveyances by Justa
Kausapin, the first in favor of Maxima Hemedes and the second in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes, effectively transferred
ownership over the subject land.
xxx
We come now to the question of whether or not R & B Insurance should be considered an innocent
purchaser of the land in question. At the outset, we note that both the trial court and appellate court found that
Maxima Hemedes did in fact execute a mortgage over the subject property in favor of R & B Insurance. xxx
xxx
We sustain petitioner R & B Insurance's claim that it is entitled to the protection of a mortgagee in good faith.
It is a well-established principle that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
the condition of the property. 36 An innocent purchaser for value 37 is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person. 38
The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes' OCT does not impose
upon R & B Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor's title. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. 39 The usufructuary is entitled to all the
natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property 40 and may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or
alienate his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall
terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct. 41
Clearly, only the  jus utendi and  jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. 42 The
owner of the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the
same. 43 This right is embodied in the Civil Code, which provides that the owner of property the usufruct of which is held
by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter the property's form or substance, or do anything which may be
prejudicial to the usufructuary. 44
There is no doubt that the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and the law provides
that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, and should the immovable be
attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter
may lose by reason thereof. 45
Based on the foregoing, the annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin is not sufficient cause to
require R & B Insurance to investigate Maxima Hemedes' title, contrary to public respondent's ruling, for the reason that
Maxima Hemedes' ownership over the property remained unimpaired despite such encumbrance. R & B Insurance had a
right to rely on the certificate of title and was not in bad faith in accepting the property as a security for the loan it extended
to Maxima Hemedes.
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that R & B Insurance was obligated to look beyond the certificate of title and
investigate the title of its mortgagor, still, it would not have discovered any better rights in favor  of private respondents.
Enrique D. Hemedes and Dominium base their claims to the property upon the "Kasunduan" allegedly executed by Justa
Kausapin in favor of Enrique Hemedes. As we have already stated earlier, such contract is a nullity as its subject matter
was inexistent. Also, the land was mortgaged to R & B Insurance as early as 1964, while the "Kasunduan" was executed
only in 1971 and the affidavit of Justa Kausapin affirming the conveyance in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes was executed
in 1981. Thus, even if R & B Insurance investigated the title of Maxima Hemedes, it would not have discovered any
adverse claim to the land in derogation of its mortgagor's title. We reiterate that at no point in time could private
respondents establish any rights or maintain any claim over the land.
It is a well-settled principle that where innocent third persons rely upon the correctness of a certificate of title and
acquire rights over the property, the court cannot just disregard such rights. Otherwise, public confidence in the
certificate of title, and ultimately, the Torrens system, would be impaired for everyone dealing with registered property
would still have to inquire at every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. 46 Being an innocent
mortgagee for value, R & B Insurance validly acquired ownership over the property, subject only to the usufructuary
rights of Justa Kausapin thereto, as this encumbrance was properly annotated upon its certificate of title.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of public respondent and its resolution dated February 22, 1989 are
REVERSED. We uphold petitioner R & B Insurance's assertion of ownership over the property in dispute, as evidenced by
TCT No. 41985, subject to the usufructuary rights of Justa Kausapin, which encumbrance has been properly annotated
upon the said certificate of title. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-123. December 12, 1945.]

JOSEFA FABIA,  petitioner, vs. JOSE  GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of Manila, NGO
BOO SOO and JUAN GREY, respondents.

DECISION

OZAETA,  J p:
 The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo
Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased
Rosario Fabie y Grey, which textually reads as follows:
xxx
The owner of the Santo Cristo property above mentioned is the respondent Juan Grey, while those of the
Ongpin property are other persons not concerned herein. Previous to September 1944 litigation arose between
Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owners of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving
the administration of the houses mentioned in clause 9 of the will above quoted (civil case No. 1659 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila). That suit was decided by the court on September 2, 1944, upon a stipulation in writing
submitted by the parties to and approved by the court. The pertinent portions of said stipulation read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"(4) Heretofore, the rents of said properties have been collected at times by the respective
owners of the properties, at other times by the usufructuary, and lastly by the defendant Juan Grey as
agent under a written agreement dated March 31, 1942, between the owners of both properties and the
usufructuary.
"(5) When the rents were collected by the owners, the net amounts thereof were duly paid to
the usufructuary after the expenses for real estate taxes, repairs and insurance premiums, including the
documentary stamps, on the properties and the expenses of collecting the rents had been deducted,
and a certain amount set aside as a reserve for contingent liabilities. When the rents were collected by
the usufructuary, she herself paid the expenses aforesaid. When the rents were collected by the
defendant Juan Grey under the agreement of March 31, 1942, the net amounts thereof were duly paid
to the usufructuary, after deducting and setting aside the items aforesaid, monthly, until the month of
October 1943, when the usufructuary refused to continue with the agreement of March 31, 1942.
xxx xxx xxx
"II. The parties hereto jointly petition the Court to render judgment adopting the foregoing as
finding of facts and disposing that:
"(8) Beginning with the month of September 1944, the usufructuary shall collect all the rents of
both the Sto. Cristo and the Ongpin properties.
"(9) The usufructuary shall, at her won cost and expense, pay all the real estate taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums, including the documentary stamps, and make all the necessary
repairs on each of the properties, promptly when due or, in the case of repairs, when necessary, giving
immediate, written notice to the owner or owners of the property concerned after making such payment
or repairs. In case of default on the part of the usufructuary, the respective owners of the properties
shall have the right to make the necessary payment, including penalties and interest, if any, on the
taxes and special assessments, and the repairs, and in that event the owner or owners shall be entitled
to collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid by him or them and the
expenses of collection are fully covered thereby, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the
rents in accordance herewith.
"(10) The foregoing shall be in effect during the term of the usufruct and shall be binding on the
successors and assigns of each of the parties.
"(11) Nothing herein shall be understood as affecting any right which the respective, owners of
the properties have or may have as such and which is not specifically the subject of this stipulation."
In June 1945 Josefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against the herein respondent Ngo Boo
Soo (who says that his correct name is Ngo Soo), alleging in her amended complaint that the defendant is occupying
the premises located at 372-376 Santo Cristo on a month-to-month rental payable in advance not later than the 5th of
each month; that she is the administratrix and usufructuary of said premises; "that the defendant offered to pay P300
monthly rent payable in advance not later than the 5th of every month, beginning the month of April 1945, for the said
premises including the one door which said defendant, without plaintiff's consent and contrary to their agreement, had
subleased to another Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based on the fact that the herein plaintiff very badly needs the
said house to live in, as her house was burned by the Japanese on the occasion of the entry of the American
liberators in the City and which was located then at No. 38 Flores, Dominga, Pasay; that defendant was duly notified
on March 24 of April 14, 1945, to leave the said premises, but he refused"; and she prayed for judgment of eviction
and or unpaid rentals.
xxx
Juan Grey intervened in the unlawful detainer suit, alleging in his complaint in intervention that he is the sole
and absolute owner of the premises in question; that the plaintiff Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of
said premises; that the defendant Ngo Soo is the tenant of said premises by virtue of a contract between him and the
intervenor which will expire on December 31, 1945, with the option to renew it for another period of five years from
and after said date; that under the agreement between the intervenor and the plaintiff Josefa Fabie in civil case No.
1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was approved by the court and incorporated in its decision of
September 2, 1944, the only right recognized in favor of Josefa Fabie as usufructuary of the income of said premises
is to receive the rents therefrom when due; and that as usufructuary she has no right nor authority to administer the
said premises nor to lease them nor to evict tenants, which right and authority are vested in the intervenor as owner of
the premises.
The municipal court (Judge Mariano Nable presiding found that under paragraph 9 of the stipulation
incorporated in the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 1659, the plaintiff usufructuary is
the administratrix of the premises in question, and that the plaintiff had proved her cause. Judgment was accordingly
rendered ordering the defendant Ngo Soo to vacate the premises and to pay the rents at the rate of P137.50 a month
beginning April 1, 1945. The complaint in intervention as dismissed.
Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila the latter (thru Judge Arsenio P. Dizon) dismissed the
case for the following reason: "The main issue . . . is not a mere question of possession but precisely who is entitled to
administer the property subject matter of this case and who should be the tenant, and the conditions of the lease.
These issues were beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court. This being the case, this Court, as appellate court, is
likewise without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present case." A motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff
was denied by Judge Jose Gutierrez David, who sustained the opinion of Judge Dizon.
The present original action was instituted in this Court by Josefa Fabie to annul the order of dismissal and to
require the Court of First Instance to try and decide the case on the merits. The petitioner further prays that the appeal
of the intervenor Juan Grey be declared out of time on the ground that he received copy of the decision on August 3
but did not file his notice of appeal until August 25, 1945.
xxx
It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of the property in
question and that the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is likewise admitted that by virtue of a final
judgment entered in civil case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between the usufructuary and the
owner, the former has the right to collect all the rents of said property for herself with the obligation on her part to pay
all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums, and make all the necessary repairs thereon,
and in case of default on her part the owner shall have the right to do all those things, in which event he shall be
entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid by him and the expenses of
collection are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There is therefore no dispute as
to the title to or the respective interests of the parties in the property in question. The naked title to the property is
admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes and
insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in usufructuary, the petitioner
Josefa Fabie, during her lifetime. The only question between the plaintiff and the intervenor is, Who has the right to
manage or administer the property — to select the tenant and to fix the amount of the rent? Whoever has that right
has the right to the control and possession of the property in question, regardless of the title thereto. Therefore, the
action is purely possessory and not one in any way involving the title to the property. Indeed, the averments and the
prayer of the complaint filed in the municipal court so indicate, and as a matter of fact the defendant Ngo Soo does
not pretend to be the owner of the property but on the contrary admits to be a mere tenant thereof. We have
repeatedly held that in determining whether an action of this kind is within the original jurisdiction of the municipal
court or of the Court of First Instance, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
primarily to be consulted; that the defendant in such an action cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
or municipal court by setting up title in himself; and that the factor which defeats the jurisdiction of said court is the
necessity to adjudicate the question of title.
xxx For the guidance of that court and to obviate such confusion in its disposal of the case on the merits, we
deem it necessary and proper to construe the judgment entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case
No. 1659, entitled "Josefa Fabie and Jose Carandang, plaintiffs, vs. Juan Grey, defendant, and Nieves G. Vda. de
Grey, et al., intervenors-defendants," which judgment was pleaded by the herein respondents Juan Grey and Ngo
Soo in the municipal court. According to the decision, copy of which was submitted to this Court as Appendix F of the
petition and as Annex 1 of the answer, there was an agreement dated March 31, 1942, between the usufructuary
Josefa Fabie and the owner Juan Grey whereby the latter as agent collected the rents of the property in question and
delivered the same to the usufructuary after deducting the expenses for taxes, repairs, insurance premiums, and the
expenses of collection; that in the month of October 1943 the usufructuary refused to continue with the said
agreement of March 31, 1942, and thereafter the said case arose between the parties, which by stipulation approved
by the court was settled among them in the following manner:
Beginning with the month of September 1944 the usufructuary shall collect all the rents of the property in
question; shall, at her own cost and expense, pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and insurance
 premiums, including the documentary stamps, and make all the necessary repairs on the property; and in case of
default on her part the owner shall have the right to de any or all of those things, in which event he shall be entitled to
collect all subsequent rents until the amounts paid by him are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again
collect the rents. It was further stipulated by the parties and decreed by the court that "the foregoing shall be in effect
during the term of the usufruct and shall be binding on the successors and assigns of each of the parties."
Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario  Fabie y Grey,
which was quoted in the decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made the usufructuary during her lifetime of the
income of the property in question, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to administer the property in
question. All the acts of administration — to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all
necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon — were by said
judgment vested in the usufructuary. The pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he is the administrator of the
property with the right to choose the tenants and to dictate the conditions of the lease is contrary to both the letter and
the spirit of the said clause of the will, the stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage
or administer the property after all the acts of management or administration have been vested by the court, with his
consent, in the usufructuary. He admitted that before said judgment he had been collecting the rents as agent of the
usufructuary under an agreement with the latter. What legal justification or valid excuse could he have to claim the
right to choose the tenant and fix the amount of the rent when under the will, the stipulation of the parties, and the final
judgment of the court it is not he but the usufructuary who is entitled to said rents? As long as the property is properly
conserved and insured he can have no cause for complaint, and his right in that regard is fully protected by the terms
of the stipulation and the judgment of the court above mentioned. To permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to
choose the tenant, to dictate the conditions of the lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith, would
be to place the usufructuary entirely at his mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation of having a certain
indisputable right without the power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it.
One more details needs clarification: In her complaint for desahucio Josefa Fabie alleges that she needs the
premises in question to live in, as her former residence was burned. Has she the right under the will and the judgment
in question to occupy said premises herself? We think that, as a corollary said premises herself? We think that, as a
corollary to her right to all the rent, to choose the tenant, and to fix the amount of the rent, she necessarily has the
right to choose herself as the tenant thereof, if she wishes to; and, as long as she fulfills her obligation to pay the
taxes and insure and conserve the property properly, the owner has no litigate cause to complain. As Judge Nable of
the municipal court said in his decision, "the pretension that the plaintiff, being a mere usufructuary of the rents,
cannot occupy the property, is illogical if it be taken into account that could not have been the intention of the
testatrix."
We find that upon the pleadings, the undisputed facts, and the law the action instituted in the municipal court
by the petitioner Josefa Fabie against the respondent Ngo Soo is one of unlawful detainer, within the original
jurisdiction of said court, and that therefore Judges Dizon and Gutierrez David of the Court First Instance erred in
holding otherwise and in quashing the case upon appeal.
xxx
xxx
The orders of dismissal of the respondent Court of First Instance, dated September 22 and October 31, 1945,
in the desahucio case (No. 71149) are set aside and that court is directed to try and decide the said case on the
merits: with the costs hereof against the respondent Ngo Soo.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Jaranilla, Feria De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
|||  (Fabia v. David, G.R. No. L-123, [December 12, 1945], 75 PHIL 536-548)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-56249. May 29, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS,
RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO
 B. ARANAS, ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B.
MANTA,  respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J  p:

This is a petition for certiorari xxx

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had executed on
June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and
Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother
Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents.
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother
Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents.
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and
serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the
expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal
repose of the testator's soul. Said pertinent provision 1 reads as follows:
"Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be converged and
placed under a 'special administrator.' The special administrator of these lands, for his office, should
receive one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration,
and the other half of the produce should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be
spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew,
should be the first special administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he
should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can
hold the said office of special administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my brother
Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office, but upon the
death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have power to select the one among
themselves. The special administration is perpetual."
The lower court in its Order 2 dated November 17, 1977 ruled, upon petitioners' (in Sp. Proc. No. 303)
"Motion for the Declaration of Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for his
Permission to Resign, and appointment of His Successor" that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of the
portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, administered by Vicente Aranas, is null and void after twenty
years from January 19, 1954 . . ." and declared in the same order the heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro  Aranas. It also
declared that "the removal of Vicente Aranas will, therefore, not serve the ends of justice and for the best interest of
all the heirs, particularly with respect to the portion of the estate taken by the heirs of Aniceto  Aranas, represented by
the petitioners herein and the rest of the heirs of Carmelo, represented by the intervenors, co-heirs of Administrator
Vicente Aranas." 3
However, the abovesaid Order was subsequently set aside upon the "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
to Declare Testate and Intestate Heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas," filed by the administrator Vicente Aranas on
the allegation that said order was violative of due process and without legal and factual basis because only the issue
for the removal of the administrator was heard and not the matter of the declaration of heirs. Thus, the lower court
declared in its Order. 4 dated July 16, 1980 that the Order dated November 17, 1977 is "set aside and in the interest
of justice, reopened in order that other heirs, successors-in-interest of Felino Aranas, 5 could likewise assert their
claims, as in the case of the heirs of Aniceto Aranas and Carmelo Aranas." 6
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the lower court in its order dated September 23,
1980, petitioners now come before Us by certiorari raising the issue that the lower court erred in setting aside its order
dated November 17, 1977 and in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of the New Civil Code with respect to the
properties referred to as Group "C" in the Last Will and Testament. prLL
The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties (Group "C") is subject to the
following:
 "1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after
deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his lifetime and shall continue
an administrator of the estate, and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be
succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas, if still
alive or one selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the Will. (Article 562, 563, 564
and 603 of the New Civil Code).
"2. Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, particularly the Archbishop diocese of
Cagayan de Oro City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop Patrick H. Cronin over one-half of the
proceeds of the properties under Group "C." (Article 603, New Civil Code) and to last for a period of
Fifty years from the effective date of the legacy, Article 605, New Civil Code)." (Annex "L-14," p. 87,
Rollo)
Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine laid down in Art. 870 of the New
Civil Code to wit:
"Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more
than twenty years are void."
A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament shows that it was the sincere
intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by
allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal
to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo  Aranas among his
sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one among themselves.
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which
result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the designated
time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties
is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his
designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run
counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to
dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the
properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership
without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente  Aranas as usufructuary
and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and
unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be
respected and be given effect until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted
usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject to the limitations
provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution, said Article says:
"A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted
with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall
be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at
the time of the death of the testator."
It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated November 17, 1977 was already
final and not subject to correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only regarding the determination of
additional heirs. Such contention is not worthy of credence. Respondents in their Memorandum allege and it is not
disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17, 1977 has not yet become final because it was received only on
January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and the Motion for Reconsideration and to declare
testamentary and intestate heirs dated January 17, 1978 was filed by the said respondent within the reglementary
period. Besides the validity or invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions would affect the determination of heirs. cdll
As to petitioners' allegation that the order of July 16, 1980 is without basis, the record shows that during the
hearing of the urgent motion for reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs, it was proven
conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that he was instituted as a remunerative legatee per mandate
of the Last Will and Testament by way of usufructuary. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic Church as the other
usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from the date of the
effectivity of said legacy, was also established. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. SO
ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 51333. February 19, 1991.]

RAMONA R. LOCSIN, accompanied by her husband RENATO L. LOCSIN; TERESITA R.

GUANZON, accompanied by her husband ROMEO R. GUANZON; CELINA R. SIBUG
accompanied by her husband CARLOS V. SIBUG; MA. LUISA R. PEREZ, accompanied by her
husband JOSE V. PEREZ; EDITHA R. YLANAN, accompanied by her husband CARLOS W.
YLANAN; and ANA MARIE R. BENEDICTO, accompanied by her husband JOSE LUIS U.
BENEDICTO,  petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch III and SPOUSES JOSEPH SCHON and HELEN
BENNETT SCHON,  respondents.

DECISION

FELICIANO,J  p:

There are two (2) petitions for review before us:

The facts relevant for resolution of the remaining substantive aspects of the CFI case and the CAR case, may
be summarized from the Court's Resolution of 18 May 1989 —
"Petitioner Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita Guanzon, Celia R. Sibug, Maria Rosa R. Perez, Editha Ylanan
and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as 'Hacienda
Villa Regalado' located in Barrio Panubigan, Canlaon City, Negros Occidental. The tract of land was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-494 and there more particularly described in the following
terms:
 
'TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-494
A parcel of land ...containing an area of THREE MILLION THIRTY—THREE
THOUSAND AND FORTY-EIGHT (3,033,048) square meters, more or less.' (Rollo, of G.R. No.
52289, p. 31.)
A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was
subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated
by the following lessees-tenants who customarily delivered the rentals to Helen Schon:
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, of G.R. No. 51333, p. 4.)
On 22 October 1972, after the onset of the martial law administration of former President
Marcos, Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated, decreeing the 'Emancipation of Tenants.' The
tract of land owned in common by petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's
usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the 'Operation Land Transfer'. In consequence, staff
members of the Department of Agrarian Relations advised the tenants-tillers of said land, and the
necessary parcellary map sketch was made and submitted to the Bureau of Land Office in Dumaguete
City. (Rollo, of G.R. No. 51333, Annex 'A' of Petition, pp. 19-20) Petitioners through counsel sought the
opinion of the DAR as to who (petitioners or respondent Helen Schon) should be entitled to receive the
rental payments which continued to be made by the respondent tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR
District Officer rendered an opinion on 13 May 1977 that the rental payments as of 22 October 1972
were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain to the
landowners and not to the usufructuary. (Id., p. 5)
1. Civil Case No. 13828, Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental.
On 22 May 1978, petitioners filed against spouses Joseph and Helen Schon Civil Case No. 13828 . . .,
for collection of rentals plus damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. There petitioners claimed
that since the land subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights was among the parcels of land which
collectively had been declared by the DAR as a land reform area pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27, the rental payments which the respondent spouses had been collecting from the tenants really
 pertained and should be delivered to the petitioners, beginning from 21 October 1972, as constituting or
forming part of the amortization payments for the land to be made by the tenants. Petitioners sought in
that case to recover from the Schons all such rentals or the money value thereof, and prayed for
injunction to prevent respondents from collecting any further rental payments from the tenants of the
land involved.
Upon the other hand, in the Answer filed on 12 July 1978, the respondents Schon contended that
...,upon the assumption arguendo that the Court of First Instance did have jurisdiction, Article 609 of the
Civil Code must in any case be applied by that court in resolving the case.
2. CAR Case No. 76, Court of Agrarian Relations
Approximately five (5) months after filing their complaint before the Negros Occidental Court of First
Instance, petitioners filed a second complaint on 13 October 1978, this time with the Court of Agrarian
Relations, 11th Judicial District, San Carlos City. In this complaint before the Agrarian Court, petitioners
impleaded as co-respondents of the spouses Schon the tenants who were cultivating the land burdened
with the usufruct of Helen Schon. Petitioners prayed that the respondent tenants be required to pay to
petitioners (rather than to the spouses Schon) all future rentals beginning with the crop year of 1978
and every year thereafter, until full payment of the amortization payment computed by the DAR. In their
Answer, the respondents Schon once again asserted lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, this time on the part of the Court of Agrarian Relations. ....
The respondent tenants, for their part, agreed with the Schons that there was no tenancy relationship
existing in respect of the land cultivated by them, since such land had already been brought within the
ambit of 'Operation Land Transfer',and prayed that the petitioners and the usufructuary be required to
litigate among themselves their respective rights before the proper court." 2
As noted earlier, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision dismissing petitioners' complaint in CAR Case No.
76, declaring itself as bereft of jurisdiction to decide that case.
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals ruled that since the only issue presented in the appeal was
whether or not the CAR had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, the appeal raised "a pure question of law" and
certified the case to this Court for disposition.
On 16 March 1979, the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed petitioners' complaint upon the ground that
jurisdiction to hear and decide that case was vested in the CAR. This order was brought directly to this Court by
petitioners.
In our Resolution dated 18 May 1989, the Court, after declaring that jurisdiction over the two (2) cases was
lodged in the appropriate Regional Trial Court by virtue of the provisions of Section 19 (7) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, required the petitioners and private respondents in G.R. Nos. 51333 and 52289 to file simultaneous memoranda
on the remaining non-jurisdiction issues. At the same time, the Court directed the Solicitor General to file a motion for
intervention on behalf of the Government and to submit a memorandum on the same issues. Both parties and the
Solicitor-General complied.
The substantive issues to be resolved here are the following:
(1) As between the naked owners and the usufructuary, who should be entitled to the amounts paid by
the tenants beginning 21 October 1972? and
(2) What is the legal character of the payments made by the tenants beginning 21 October 1972 —
payments on the price of the land itself or civil fruits of the land?
The two (2) above issues are obviously interrelated and the Court will discuss them together.
Petitioners insist that the payments made by private respondent tenants to private respondent Helen Schon
beginning on 21 October 1972 should be considered as amortization payments for the price of the land and as such
should belong to the landowners and not to the usufructuary. Upon the other hand, private respondent Helen Schon
urges that those amounts should pertain to her considering that her rights as usufructuary persist during her lifetime
and have not been extinguished by operation of the Land Reform Law. She further argues that assuming her
usufructuary rights had been extinguished, the provisions of Article 609 of the Civil Code should be applied, and that
thereunder she would be entitled either to replacement of the land burdened with her usufruct (the fruits of which
would then be payable to her) or payment of legal interest on the amount of the purchase price of the land. LLjur
xxx
Reading the foregoing provisions together, we observe that under Presidential Decree No. 27, the basic
statute, the tenant-farmer became owner of a family-size farm of five (5) hectares or, if the land was irrigated, three (3)
hectares, and that the tenant-owner had to pay for the cost of the land within fifteen (15) years by paying fifteen (15)
equal annual amortization payments. Thus, it appears clear that ownership over lands (like Lot No. 2-C-A-3) subjected
to Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants (the new
landowners). The fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be paid by the tenants-owners were intended to replace the
landholdings which the old landowners gave up in favor of the new landowners, the tenants-owners. 3 It follows that in
respect of land subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the tenants-farmers became owners of the land they tilled as of
the effective date of Presidential Decree No. 27, i.e.,21 October 1972.Pending full payment of the cost of the land to
the old landowner by the Land Bank of the Philippines, the leasehold system was "provisionally maintained" but the
"lease rentals" paid by the tenants-farmers prior to such full payment by the Land Bank to the old landowner, would be
credited no longer as rentals but rather as "amortization payments" of the price of the land, the un-amortized portion
being payable by the Land Bank. In respect of lands brought within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the
leasehold system was legally and effectively terminated immediately on 21 October 1972 (notwithstanding the curious
statement in Department Circular No. 8 that it was "provisionally maintained").It was in respect of lands not yet
subjected to the terms and effects of Operation Land Transfer that the leasehold system did continue to govern the
relationship between the "landowner and his tenant-tillers". llcd
The exemption of the old landowner from the capital gains tax on the amortization payments made to him by
the tenants-purchasers, under Presidential Decree No. 57 (supra),underscores the fact, referred to above, that
ownership or dominion over the land moved immediately from landowner to tenant-farmer, rather than upon
completion of payment of the price of the land. In general, capital gains are realized only when the owner disposes of
his property.
We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform area and subjected
to Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21 October 1972 by the private respondent tenants-
farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were required to pay under  Presidential
Decree No. 27. These payments, therefore, legally pertain to petitioners, the former landowners as part of the
compensation for the dominion over land of which they were deprived by operation of  Presidential Decree No. 27.
Those payments can not be characterized as rentals like those which had been paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary
prior to the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 and prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer. LLjur
We turn to the question of what rights, if any, were retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary, after the
effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 27. We believe that the usufruct which had therefore existed as a  jus in re
aliena  in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by Presidential Decree No. 27. To hold, as private
respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed
upon the land passing on to the new owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform
statute. Presidential Decree No. 27 was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving
to tenants-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption that they would work harder
to improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen
Schon as entitled to continue enjoying, as usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of Lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be to set at
naught the major purpose projected by Presidential Decree No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order No. 228. llcd
This is not to say that respondent Helen Schon lost any and all rights upon the promulgation of Presidential
Decree No. 27. In a legal, technical sense, it may be difficult to hold that Presidential Decree No. 27 resulted in the
lands brought within the scope of Operation Land Transfer being "expropriated for public use", as this term is used
in Article 609 of the Civil Code, which reads thus:
"Art. 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged either
to replace it with another thing of the same value and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary
the legal interest on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct. If the owner
chooses the latter alternative, he shall give security for the payment of the interest."
For it was not the Government or any of its agencies which took over ownership of the land nor was such land
devoted subsequently to "public use", since ownership was transferred directly from former landowner to the tenant-
tiller as new landowner, for the use and benefit exclusively of the new landowner. While, however, Article 609 of the
Civil Code may not be strictly applicable, we believe that the situation contemplated in Article 609 is sufficiently close
to that which resulted from application of Presidential Decree No. 27 to the land here involved. Bearing in mind
that refusal to decide an otherwise unavoidable issue upon the ground of non liquet ("it is not clear") is not a
permissible response by a court where there is no provision of law clearly and specifically applicable to the facts at
hand, 4 we believe that Article 609 should be applied to the present set of facts by analogy. LLphil
It follows that respondent Helen Schon, so long as her rights as usufructuary persist under the instrument
which gave birth to such rights, would be entitled to a replacement reasonably equivalent to the land previously
burdened with her usufructuary right, or to legal interest on the amount of the indemnity or cost of the land paid by
private respondent tenants-farmers and the Land Bank. While the option or choice belongs to petitioners, considering
that Helen Schon had already received part of the purchase price of the land previously owned by petitioners from
 private respondent tenants-farmers, and in the interest of expeditious justice, we consider it the second alternative
that should be given effect. Thus, from the monies that she actually received from private respondent tenants-farmers
on and after 21 October 1972, respondent Helen Schon is entitled to retain an amount equivalent to the legal interest
on said amounts for every year that the usufruct would by its own terms have continued to exist had it not been
extinguished by operation of Presidential Decree No. 27; the balance of such amounts received by her shall be turned
over to petitioners. She is also entitled to the same right in respect of the balance of the price of the land petitioners
presumably received from the Land Bank. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, private respondent spouses Joseph and Helen Schon are hereby
DIRECTED to deliver to petitioners the amounts paid to them by private respondent tenants-farmers beginning on 21
October 1972, after deducting therefrom an amount equivalent to simple legal interest thereon computed at six (6%)
percent per annum on the amount received each year. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Locsin v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 51333, 52289, [February 19, 1991], 272 PHIL 15-30)
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-39187. January 30, 1982.]

ANULINA L. VDA. DE BOGACKI, petitioner, vs. HON. SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Presiding Judge,

Branch I, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, The Provincial Sheriff of ILOILO, and MA. EMMA
LUZ BOGACKI, respondents.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J  p:

The private respondent, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki, is the owner of four parcels of land situated in Iloilo City,
and more particularly known as Lots 72-B, 591, 73, and 72-A of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo over which her mother,
herein petitioner Anulina Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki has a usufruct, covering one-third (1/3) of one-half (1/2) each of
the said parcels of land or equivalent to one-sixth (1/6) of the share pertaining to the deceased Cesar Bogacki, Jr.
Due to a misunderstanding, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki left the home of her mother and the latter took possession of all
these properties exclusively for herself, without sharing with Maria Emma Luz the rentals she obtained from the said
properties. As a consequence, Maria Emma Luz filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
against her mother Anulina "to define the portions over which the defendant may exercise her usufructuary rights over
the four parcels of land, Lots 72-B, 591, 73 and 72-A." After appropriate proceedings, judgment was rendered therein,
as follows: prcd
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby orders the defendant to limit her right of
usufruct to one-sixth (1/6) each of all these portions of the land described in the complaint and which is
now subject of litigation, including Lot 72-A which is included in the amended complaint already
admitted by this Court.
"It is to be regretted that the several attempts of the Court as well as the attorney for the parties
and the willingness on the part of the plaintiff to assign to the defendant a definite portion of some of
these lots to correspond to the usufructuary right of the mother, she has adamantly refused to accede to
any approach at an amicable settlement thereby making manifest the necessity of defining the same for
her compliance. Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to order the mother, the defendant,
to get only one-sixth (1/6) of whatever collection may be obtain from the lots in question and orders her
to turn over to the plaintiff 5/6 of all that she had previously collected from the lots not beyond ten years
before this date and conservatively appraised at P50.00 a month from 1959 until the filing of this case
and an equivalent of said amount from date of judgment, without pronouncement as to other damages
or costs." 2
No appeal was taken from said decision and a writ of execution was issued on March 3, 1971. But, since no
tangible assets or properties were available to satisfy the money judgment, the plaintiff therein asked the Court that a
levy be made on the usufructuary rights of the defendant. 3 The defendant opposed the motion upon the ground that
her usufructuary right is one created by law as a surviving spouse and hence, exempt from execution for family
reasons. 4 The motion was denied on March 25, 1971, 5 and thereafter, the respondent Sheriff set the sale of the
usufruct at public auction. 6 The defendant filed an urgent motion to stop said public auction sale, 7 but the motion
was denied on June 24, 1971. 8 The usufructuary rights were subsequently sold to the judgment creditor, Maria
Emma Luz Bogacki, as the highest bidder thereof, for P6,300.00. 9 On July 26, 1971, the defendant Anulina Ledesma
Vda. de Bogacki filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of June 24, 1971, stating a new grounds therefor,
that the usufructuary right is exempt from execution under Sec. 12(a) of Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court; and that the
usufruct cannot be levied upon, much less sold at public auction which, in effect, would extinguish it in a manner not
according to the modes for extinguishing a usufruct as provided for under Art. 603 of the Civil Code. 10 Her motion
was denied on July 31, 1971. 11 On October 24, 1972, the plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, to which the defendant filed an opposition, but the said motion was withdrawn before the court could act on
it, and the plaintiff, instead, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, 12 which was granted by the
respondent Judge on August 5, 1974. 13
Hence, the instant recourse for the annulment of the order of August 5, 1974, as well as the levy on execution
and the sale at public auction of the petitioner's usufructuary rights, and to restrain the respondents from
dispossessing her of the said usufruct.
 The only issue to be resolved, considering the facts, is whether or not there was abuse of discretion in the
levy and sale on execution of the petitioner's usufructuary rights and the issuance of the writ of possession.
The petitioner claimed that her usufructuary rights are exempt from execution for the reasons that: (1) a
usufruct of a surviving spouse cannot be alienated for family reasons pursuant to Art. 321 of the Civil Code; (2) her
usufruct, already confined to a single area equivalent to 1/6 of the total area of the lots on which she has a usufruct
and where she had built a residential house, is a homestead within the purview of Sec. 12(a) of Rule 39, Rules of
Court; and (3) her usufructuary rights partake of the nature and character of such personal relations as in the right to
receive legal support, government pension and gratuity, as provided for under Sec. 12(1) of Rule 39. The petitioner
further claimed that her usufruct cannot be levied on execution, much less sold at public auction, which, in effect,
would extinguish it in a manner not according to the modes for extinguishing a usufruct provided for under Art. 603 of
the Civil Code.
The petition is without merit. This Court had ruled that the usufruct of a widow may be transferred, assigned
or otherwise disposed of by her as she may please, like any other hereditary property, 14 and hence, an interest in
real property which can be sold upon execution. 15
Besides, the grounds relied upon by the petitioner in resisting the levy and sale on execution of her
usufructuary rights are devoid of merit. Thus, the petitioner claimed that her usufruct cannot be alienated for family
reasons pursuant to Article 321 of the Civil Code. This Article of the Civil Code, however, cannot be invoked by the
petitioner because the usufructuary rights mentioned in this Article are those enjoyed by parents over the property of
their unemancipated children under their custody, and not those enjoyed by the petitioner which are those of a widow,
constituted on the property of her late husband as her share in the estate of the latter. Said Article provides: LexLib
"Art. 321. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his
work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father
or mother under whom he is under parental authority and in whose company he lives; but if the child,
with the parent's consent, should live independently from them, he shall be considered as emancipated
for all purposes relative to said property, and he shall have over it dominion, usufruct and
administration."
The usufruct herein granted cannot be alienated or transferred to third persons because it arises from parental
authority and is necessary to enable the parents to carry out their obligations to the incompetents under their
authority. But, upon emancipation of the child or loss of parental authority, as in the case of the private respondent
who has already attained the age of majority, is married, and living independently of the petitioner, the usufruct is
extinguished.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued is lifted and set aside. Cost against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Vda. de Bogacki v. Inserto, G.R. No. L-39187, [January 30, 1982])
Module 7

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-37409. May 23, 1988.]
NICOLAS VALISNO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIPE ADRIANO, defendant-appellee.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J  p:

On June 20, 1960, the plaintiff-appellant file against the defendant-appellee an action for damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 3472 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the
absolute owner and actual possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of land in La Fuente, Santa Rosa, Nueva
Ecija, and more particularly described in his Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-16281. The plaintiff-
appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendant-appellee's sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6, 1959.
(Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. "A".) The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other
vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had
been inherited by Honorata Adriano Francisco and her brother, Felipe Adriano, from their father, Eladio Adriano. At
the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal
about seventy (70) meters long, traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the appellant was
deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water
rights. A decision was rendered on March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal, "otherwise
judicial action shall be taken against him under the provisions of Section 47 of Act 2152 (the Irrigation Act), as
amended." Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau
of Public Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was granted. LLphil
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for water to
irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.
On June 20, 1960, he filed a complaint for damages in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 3472) claiming that he suffered damages amounting to P8,000 when he failed to plant
his fields that year (1960) for lack of irrigation water, P800 to reconstruct the canal on defendant  Adriano's land, and
P1,500 for attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
On October 25, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by
issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which
had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-
use of the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence
the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Valisno, as
vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father's estate did not acquire any water rights with the land
purchased.
xxx
In a decision dated April 21, 1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass through the
defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law,
controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty days.
The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there
was nothing in the plaintiff's evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim.
xxx
The plaintiff-appellant argues that while the trial court correctly held that the Secretary of Public Works may
legally decide who between the parties is entitled to apply for water rights under the  Irrigation Act, it erred in ruling that
the Secretary has authority to hear and decide the plaintiff's claim for damages for the defendant's violation of his
(plaintiff's) right to continue to enjoy the easement of aqueduct or water through the defendant's land under Articles
642, 643, and 646 of the Civil Code, which provide:
"Article 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he can
dispose shall have the right to make it flow through the intervening estates, with the obligation to
indemnify their owners, as well as the owners of the lower estates upon which the waters may filter or
descend.

"Article 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:
"(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is
intended;
"(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to
third persons;
"(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and
regulations.
"Article 646. For legal purposes, the easement of aqueduct shall be considered as continuous
and apparent, even though the flow of the water may not be continuous, or its use depends upon the
needs of the dominant estate, or upon a schedule of alternate days or hours."
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code:
"Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established
or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered should either of them be alienated, as a title in
order that the easement may continue actively and passively unless at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply
in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons" (Civil Code)
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: prcd
"Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a
single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more
owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an
easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any compensation
therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance." (Art. 122, Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866.)
xxx
As indicated in the decision dated March 22, 1960 of the Bureau of Works "the principal issue involved in this
case falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are governed by Article 648 of the new Civil Code and the
suppletory laws mentioned in the cases of Lunod vs. Meneses (11 Phil. 128) and Osmeña vs. Camara (C.A. 380
62773) which are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, specifically Article 122 thereof.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor
Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and
participations over the parcel of land above-described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G"
suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe
with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the
property subject of this sale. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase
of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the
water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371, 19 C.J. 868-897). The fact that an easement by
grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as property right,
which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145). cdll
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside, and a new one is entered ordering the appellee to grant
the appellant continued and unimpeded use of the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to obtain water from the
Pampanga River to irrigate appellant's land. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court  a quo for the
reception of evidence on the appellant's claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.|  (Valisno v. Adriano, G.R. No. L-37409, [May 23, 1988], 244 PHIL 419-425)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-10619. February 28, 1958.]

LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL.,  plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of

VICENTE ROCO  Y DOMINGUEZ,  ET AL.,  defendants-appellees.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J  p:

The facts and the issue involved in the appeal are well and correctly stated in the appealed order, the
pertinent portion of which we are reproducing and making our own:
"The amended and supplemental complaint alleges that the plaintiffs have been in the
continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants
and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from
their residential land and back, for more than 20 years; that the defendants and the tenants of
Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the said defendants have long recognized and respected
the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs; that on May 12, 1953, the defendants
Jose Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and
with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the property of the late
Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way construction actually
impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right
of way; that on July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the
approval of the defendant, Jose Roco and with the help of their men and laborers, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and
closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of way in question against their protests and
opposition, thereby preventing them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and
the public market of the City of Naga.
"It is very clear from the allegations of the plaintiffs in their amended and supplemental
complaint, that they claim to have acquired the easement of right of way over the land of the defendants
and the latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and
uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road in going to
Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City, from their residential land or houses, and return.
"The only question therefore to be determined in this case, is whether an easement of right of
way can be acquired thru prescription."
The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though it may be apparent is,
nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue
of a title. Under the Old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be Continuous or discontinuous (intermittent),
apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts
of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil
Codes, respectively).
Xxx
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the articles thereof aforecited, it would
therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the
 Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the
exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way.
(Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857, 867).
xxx
However, in the case of Municipality of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil., 545, this same Tribunal held
that the continued use by the public of a path over land adjoining the Catholic church in going to and from said church
through its side door, has given the church the right to such use by prescription, and that because of said use by the
public, an easement of right of way over said land has been acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also
by the public, which without objection or protest on the part of the owner of said land, had continually availed itself of
the easement.
The minority of which the writer of this opinion is a part, believes that the easement of right of way may now
be acquired through prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription
through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction
as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the
writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for
ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, Cannot give said
party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.
"The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse
possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise
of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)"
Even under the case of Cuaycong vs. Benedicto (supra), this Tribunal insinuated that the rule that no
discontinuous easement, like an easement of right of way, may, under Article 539 of the Old Civil Code, be acquired,
might possibly have been changed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to prescription.
. . . "Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been changed by the provisions of the
present Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since its enactment discontinuous
easement may be acquired by prescription, it is clear that this would not avail plaintiffs. The Code of
Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of rights
in real estate is fixed by the Code (section 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911
before the expiration of the term of ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the
defendants interrupted the use of the road by plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll gate on it
and collecting toll from persons making use of it with carts and continued to do so until they were
enjoined by the granting of the preliminary injunction by the trial court in December 1912." . . .
(Cuayong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781,796).
Professor Tolentino in his Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 340, would appear to
be of the opinion that under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to prescription, even discontinuous
easements, like the easement of right of way, may be acquired through prescription:
. . . "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription,
provided it can be shown that the servitude was 'actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right and adverse to all other claimants'." However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held
that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is
changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.
 
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Félix, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.
|||  (Ronquillo v. Roco, G.R. No. L-10619, [February 28, 1958], 103 PHIL 84-92)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988

EDUARDO C. TAÑEDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XXI, Cebu
City; Spouses ROMEO SIM and PACITA S. SIM; and Spouses ANTONIO CARDENAS and MAE LINDA
CARDENAS, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The facts, in brief, are as follows:

The private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated in Cebu City which
he had inherited from Lourdes Cardenas and more particularly known as Lot 7501-A, with an area of 140 square meters
and Lot 7501-B, with an area of 612 square meters. On Lot 7501-A is constructed an apartment building, while the
improvements on Lot 7501-B consist of one four-door apartment of concrete and strong materials; one two-storey house
of strong materials; a bodega of strong materials; and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A
and 7501-B. A small portion of the apartment building on Lot 7501-A also stands on Lot 7501-B.

On 5 February 1982, said Antonio Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo. 1

Antonio Cardenas, on that same day, also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to said Eduardo C. Tañedo as a security for the
payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00. 2

Antonio Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to Eduardo Tañedo in case he should decide to sell it,
as the septic tank in Lot 7501-B services Lot 7501-A and the apartment building on Lot 7501-A has a part standing on Lot
7501-B. This was confirmed in a letter, dated 26 February 1982, wherein Antonio Cardenas asked Tañedo not to deduct
the mortgage loan of P10,000.00 from the purchase price of Lot 7501-A "because as we have previously agreed, I will sell
to you Lot 7501-B."3

Antonio Cardenas, however, sold Lot 7501-B to the herein respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.  4 Upon learning
of the sale, Eduardo Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim. But the latter refused. Instead, Romeo Sim
blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B.
He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. As a result, Eduardo Tañedo,
invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an action for legal redemption and damages, with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. CEB-994, against the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim, Antonio Cardenas and his wife Mae Linda Cardenas, the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City, and Banco Cebuano, Cebu City Development Bank. 5

Answering, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim claimed that they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that
Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is
much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo. 6
Antonio Cardenas, upon the other hand, admitted that he had agreed to sell Lot 7501-B to Eduardo Tañedo and claimed
by way of cross-claim against the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed in favor of said
spouses was only intended as an equitable mortgage, to secure the payment of amounts received by him from said
spouses as petty loans . 7

In answer to the cross-claim, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim insisted that the sale executed by Antonio Cardenas of
Lot 7501-B in their favor was an absolute one. 8

xxx

Hence, the present recourse by petitioner Tanedo.

The Court finds merit in the petition. xxx

In the instant case, it cannot be denied that petitioner Tanedo cannot redeem the entire Lot 7501-B from the spouses
Romeo and Pacita Sim pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1622 Romeo and Pacita Sim, since the lot sought to be
redeemed, has an area of 612 square meters which is much bigger, area-wise, than the lot owned by petitioner Tañedo.
However, the petitioner seeks to purchase only that small portion of Lot 7501-B occupied by his apartment building,
because the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim had told him to remove that portion of his building which enroaches upon
Lot 7501-B. Whether or not this is possible should have been determined at the pre-trial stage or trial on the merits.

xxx

Considering this admission of defendant Cardenas, and that his promise to sell Lot 7501-B to Eduardo Tañedo appears to
be for a valuable consideration, a trial is necessary to determine, at the very least, the amount of damages suffered by the
plaintiff Eduardo Tafiedo by reason of such breach of promise to sell, if indeed there is such a breach.

Moreover, the finding of the trial court that petitioner Tañedo's right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot
7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the same
interest,16 also appears to be contrary to law. Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment
of an easement. Said article provides:

Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:

(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By non-user for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed
from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day
on which an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it
shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless
when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the
provisions of the preceding number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the conditions, if the easement is temporary or
conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates.

As can be seen from the above provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not
one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained
by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division
of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale
of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the
occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B),
cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude. 17

WHEREFORE, the Orders complained of are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent judge or another one
designated in his place is directed to proceed with the trial of this case on the merits. With costs against private
respondents. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 80511. January 25, 1991.]

COSTABELLA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO.,

INC., AURORA BUSTOS LOPEZ, MANUEL S. SATORRE, JR., JOSEFA C. REVILLES, FELIX
TIUKINHOY, JR., PERFECTA L. CHUANGCO, and CESAR T. ESPINA, respondents.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J  p:

The principal issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 dated May 30,
1986 of the Court of Appeals, 2 which modified the decision 3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City in
Cebu, is whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way, in the form of a passageway,
on the petitioner's property.
It is admitted that the petitioner owns the real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon
Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private
respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and
5123-C of the Opon Cadastre.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In
1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless
opened another route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass.
Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the
petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from
traversing any part of it.
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner by the
private respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. 4 In their complaint, the
private respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of the original passageway which they (private respondents) claimed
to be an "ancient road right of way" that had been existing before World War II and since then had been used by them, the
community, and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu
City and other parts of the country. The private respondents averred that by closing the alleged road right of way in
question, the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused them damages. prLL
In the same complaint, the private respondents likewise alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach
fronting the latter's property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen,
and trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed that the debris and flotsam that had accumulated
prevented them from using their properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them. The complaint this prayed
for the trial court to order the re-opening of the original passageway across the petitioner's property as well as the
destruction of the dike. 5
In its answer, 6 the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and counter-averred, among
others, that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage
through, its property by the private respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighborliness. It
justified the walling in of its property in view of the need to insure the safety and security of its hotel and beach resort, and
for the protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel patrons and guests. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the
private respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway as they (private respondents) had another
existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties. With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed,
the petitioner stated that what it built was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a dike as
claimed by the private respondents. Moreover, contrary to the private respondents' accusation, the said construction had
benefited the community especially the fishermen who used the same as mooring for their boats during low tide. The
quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed on the private respondents' beach front on the other hand were but the
natural and unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the waves of the sea. The
petitioner's answer then assailed the private respondents' complaint for its failure to implead as defendants the
owners of the other properties supposedly traversed by the alleged ancient road right way, indispensable parties without
whom no final adjudication of the controversy could be rendered. 7
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had acquired a
vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment not
only by the private respondents, but also by the community at large. The petitioner in so closing the said passageway, had
accordingly violated the private respondents' vested right. Thus, the trial court ordered the petitioner: xxx
xxx
Now before us, the petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and not in
accord with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter.
The petition is meritorious.
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous 15 and as such can
not be acquired by prescription. 16 xxx
It is provided under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code that:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity. 
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four requisites, to wit:
(1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) after payment of the proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate. 17
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites
mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public
highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court,
"there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road." 18 Thus, the
respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." 19 Yet, it ordered the re-
opening of the old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff."
20 On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate
has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. 21 To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the
legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is
entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it." 22
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case that
they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be established over its property. Neither have the
private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their
predecessors-in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence,
that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the
petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard  of security within
its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised. That
indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great importance that the claimed right of way over the
petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its business.
Hence, the private respondents' properties can not be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory easement is
demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as a controversy for a compulsory
right of way, this Court is constrained to hold that it was in error. LexLib
Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept, which date back to the iter, actus, and via of the Romans. 23 They are
demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to make full use of their properties, which
lack of access to public roads has denied them. 24 Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory and hence,
legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the concurrence of the other conditions above-referred to.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for the dominant estate.
Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dominant" estate can not demand a
right of way, although the same may not be convenient. Of course, the question of when a particular passage may be said
to be "adequate" depends on the circumstances of each case. Manresa, however, says: "In truth, not only the estate
which absolutely does not possess it should be considered in this condition, but also that which does not have one
sufficiently safe or serviceable; an estate bordering a public road through an inaccessible slope or precipice, is in fact
isolated for all the effects of the easement requested by its owner. On the other hand, an estate which for any reason has
necessarily lost its access to a public road during certain periods of the year is in the same condition. . . . There are some
who propound the query as to whether the fact that a river flows between the estate and the public road should be
considered as having the effect of isolating the estate . . . If the river may be crossed conveniently at all times without the
least danger, it cannot be said that the estate is isolated; in any other case, the answer is in the affirmative." 25
The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner, and the estate itself
need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not a right of way is necessary to fill a
reasonable need therefor by the owner. 2 6 Thus, as Manresa had pointed out, if the passageway consists of an
"inaccessible slope or precipice," 27 it is as if there is no passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant
owner's necessities, although by the existence of that passageway the property can not be truly said that the property is
isolated. So also, while an existing right of way may have proved adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need may
have changed since then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width. 28
But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on
arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria:
(1) at the point least prejudical to the servient state; and
(2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest.
According, however, to one commentator, "least prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance." 29 Yet, each case must be
weighed according to its individual merits, and judged according to the sound discretion of the court. "The court," says
Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the
interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline." 30
 
It is based on these settled principles that we have resolved this case. prLL
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 30, 1986, and the resolution dated October 27, 1987, of the
respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and the private respondents' complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, [January 25, 1991], 271 PHIL 350-362)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 77628. March 11, 1991.]

TOMAS ENCARNACION,  petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN AND THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE SAGUN, * respondents.

DECISION

FERNAN, C.J p:

The facts are undisputed.

Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the
owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas ** Petitioner owns the dominant estate which has an
area of 2,590 square meters and bounded on the North by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino, on the south by
Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienso and on the West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-own the 405-
square-meter servient estate which is bounded on the North by the National Highway (Laurel Talisay Highway), on the
South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the
servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway
just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence
around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide
access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter
portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and none was given for the
portions constituting the pathway. 1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his abode. He
would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for
petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In
January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However,
that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun
and Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to
be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was
turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6 (Tanauan) to seek the
issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns'
405-square-meter parcel of land. 2
xxx
After evaluating the evidence presented in the case, the Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for
an additional easement of right of way, contrary to the conclusions of the courts a quo.
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate.
Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when,
even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the
level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is
impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all. 
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right  of easement over adjacent servient estates as a
matter of law. 4
With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route to the highway, we transfer our attention to the
existing pathway which straddles the adjoining properties of the De Sagun heirs and Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against petitioner his candid admission in open court that he needed a wider pathway for the
convenience of his business and family. (TSN, August 2, 1985, pp. 24-26). We cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting that
which is convenient. But certainly that should not detract from the more pressing consideration that there is a real and
compelling need for such servitude in his favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under
the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs
may vary from time to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make
do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the
use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have
become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to
the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer
pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (11/2) meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient
estate to only about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent
portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the
offer of petitioner seriously. 5 But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify
the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute
the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and
permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code which states in part:
"Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
"Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
xxx xxx xxx"
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
28, 1987 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion is hereby declared entitled to an additional
easement of right of way of twenty-five (25) meters long by one and one-half (11/2) meters wide over the servient estate
or a total area of 62.5 square meters after payment of the proper indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77628, [March 11, 1991], 272-A PHIL 27-33)
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 5044. December 1, 1909.]

EDWIN CASE,  petitioner-appellant, vs. THE  HEIRS  OF TUASON Y SANTIBAÑEZ, opponents-

appellees.

DECISION

TORRES, J  p:

On the 7th of December, 1906, the attorneys for Edwin Case filed a petition with the Court of Land
Registration requesting that the property owned by the applicant, described in the petition, be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. After a written opposition was presented by Felipe R.
Caballero on the 6th of June, 1907, on behalf of the heirs of the late Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez, counsel
for the applicant, Case, on August 2, 1907, amended the original petition and set forth: that said property, situated in
Calle Escolta, district of Binondo, consists of a parcel of land and the building erected thereon bearing Nos. 142 and
152; it is bounded on the northwest, approximately, by the estero of Santa Cruz and the property of Carmen de Ayala
de Roxas; on the southeast by the River Pasig; on the southwest by the property  of the heirs of Tuason and
Santibañez; and on the northwest by Calle Escolta and the aforesaid property of Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; that the
total area is 3,251.84 square meters, its description and boundaries being detailed in the plan attached to the petition;
that according to the last assessment made for the purposes of taxation the land was valued at P170,231 and the
buildings thereon at P30,000; that the property is free from all incumbrance, and no one has any interest therein or
right thereto; that on the northeast side the property had in its favor the right of easement over some 234.20 square
meters of land owned by the said Ayala de Roxas, and that the applicant acquired the property by succession from
Doña Clotilde Romree.

In the written opposition above alluded to, counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez
alleged that the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner on
the southwest; that the latter, in making the plan attached to his petition, extended his southwest boundary line to a
potion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibañez in the form indicated by the red line in the annexed plan;
that the true dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is the walls indicated in black
ink on the accompanying plan; that said walls belong to the opponents, and that about two years ago, when the
applicant made alterations in the buildings erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion  of them to rest on the
wall owned by the parties whom he represents, at points 12, 13, and 14 of said plan; for which reason the opponent
prayed the court to direct the applicant to amend the line marked in his plan with the letters Y, X, U, T, S, and R, so
that it may agree with the wall indicated by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 on the plan
which accompanist the written opposition, reducing the are to whatever it may be after the amendment has been
made; that the applicant be compelled to remove the supports that he placed for his buildings on the wall  of the
representatives of the petitioner, and that he be sentenced to pay the costs.
The case was brought to trial, both parties adduced evidence, and their exhibits were made of record. The
court, assisted by the interested parties and their respective experts, made an inspection of the two properties, in
view of which it entered judgment on the 31st of July, 1908, sustaining the opposition offered by the
representative of the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez, and after declaring a general default granted
the registration of the property described in the application filed by Edwin Case, with the exclusion of the wall claimed
by the opponents and shown on their plan by the lines numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14; and in
view of the fact that lines drawn on the plan offered in evidence by the applicant under letter G. are not correctly
drawn, once this decision shall have become final, let the dividing line of both properties be fixed by common accord
between the two parties and their experts, taking as a base for the same the amended line  of walls drawn on the
plan of the opponents, but should they not reach an agreement a surveyor of the Court of Land Registration shall be
detailed to fix the same at the expense of the parties; the court also ordered the cancellation of the registration shall
be detailed to fix the same at the expense of the parties; the court also ordered the cancellation of the registration
entries of the property entered in the name of Clotilde Romree, principal of the petitioner, at page 142 and those
following of volume 15, section of Binondo and 52 of the register, property No. 828, first entry.
On the 12th of August, 1908, the petitioner moved for the new trial on the ground that the evidence was not
sufficient to justify the decision of the court in excluding the wall claimed by the opponents; that said decision was
contrary to the law, in so far as it excludes the said decision was contrary to the law, in so far as it excludes the said
wall, and that the conclusions of fact therein are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence in so far
as they referred to the exclusion of said wall. The said motion was overruled on the 15th of the same month, to which
overruling the applicant excepted and announced his intention to perfect the corresponding bill of exceptions which
was filed, approved, and submitted to this court together with the proper assignment of errors.
It the appeal interposed by the applicant against the decision of the Court of Land Registration, now before
this court, the questions set up are merely of fact.
 The question is whether the wall that with slight interruption runs from Calle Escolta to the River Pasig, and
which divides the adjoining properties of the applicant, Edwin Case, and of the opponents, belongs to the former, as
he claimed in the first instance, or is a dividing wall as affirmed in his brief in this second instance, or is the
property of the said opponents, the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez.
The trial court after considering the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, found that the wall in
controversy belongs to the opponents for the reason, among others that in the public document by which one  of their
original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed by them, it appears that the
property was then already inclosed by a stone wall. This document, which was offered in evidence by the opponents,
has not been impugned by the applicant. On the contrary, it was acknowledged as the title deed  of the property
adjoining that of the applicant by the witness Juan B. Tuason, who knows the one and the other.
It is fully proven that two walls extend from Calle Escolta to the interior  of both properties, the one backing the
other, and which respectively support the edifices of the petitioner and of the opponents from points 36, 35, 34, 33,
32, 31, and 30 on the plan of the petitioner corresponding to points 1 to 6 on that of the opponents.
This section of the wall of the opponents embraced within the points mentioned in the plans offered in
evidence by the parties, for the very reason that it supports only the property of the opponents and not that of the
petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length would belong to the adjoining building
owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected thereon
disproves the pretension of the petitioner.
It should, however, be noted that portion of the wall between the numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 on the plan  of the
opponents, which corresponds to numbers 33, 32, 31, and 30 of that of the petitioner, and which constitutes the
cesspool on the property of the latter, belongs to him, and it has so been admitted by counsel for the opponents, for
the reason that the petitioner had acquired it by prescription, the opponents having lost control over the area of land
covered by the said cesspool together with the walls that inclose it.
Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior
sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the common
point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article  of the code,
and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary appear from the little of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is to
say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where there is no exterior sign to
destroy such presumption and support a presumption against the party wall. (Art. 573, Civil Code.)
The intermediate portion of the wall in question, lying between numbers 6 and 13 on the defendants' plan,
equivalent to a little more than numbers 30 to 25 on the plan of the petitioner, is the portion against which no other
wall appears to have been erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this it can not be presumed that the
aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the latter
have proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their ancestors
and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building was erected; it
must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by which the land was inclosed was
necessarily included.
 
 The above documentary evidence has not been overcome by any other presented by the petitioner, by apart
from the record discloses the existence of certain unquestionable signs. These consist of constructions made by the
petitioner himself on his own property which entirely destroy any presumption that it is a party wall, and indeed gives
rise to a presumption against it.
Three openings have been made in the wall, undoubtedly to allow the passage of air and light. Two of them
are beveled on the side toward the land of the objectors, and the third had recently imbedded in the wall on the
side of the property of the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs and were recorded as the
result of personal inspection by the trial court in company with the experts of both parties. These signs positively and
conclusively prove that the said wall is not a party wall, but the exclusive property  of the defendant. This is further
confirmed by the testimony of the witnesses at the trial.
The fact that the petitioner built a wall and backed it against the one in question to support the edifice he had
constructed between points 21 and 13 of the corrected plan is a further indication that the neighboring wall is not a
party one. He knew perfectly well that he had no right to rest his building on the latter. That he built a terrace about
four years previously over the wall between points 30, 29, 28, and 27 does not prove that the whole of the wall, from
the Escolta to the Rive Pasig, is a party wall, but it does show that he usurped a portion thereof to the prejudice  of the
real owner.
Neither can it be presumed that part of the wall bordering on the River Pasig comprised between points 13
and 14 is a party wall. It was shown in the proceedings as resulting from the above-mentioned ocular inspection that
at the side of the said wall, which is rather a low one, there is another, a higher one erected on the petitioner's land
and backed against the one in question. The first one, as has been said, forms part  of that which has surrounded the
property from the date of its acquisition, more than a century ago, until the present date. It is absolutely
independent of the built by the petitioner, and that it is the exclusive property of the objectors and is not a party wall
can not be denied.
It therefore appears from the proceedings that, with the exception of the small portion of the wall in question
occupied by the latrine on the property of the petitioner, and which the opponents admit that he had acquired by
prescription, the whole of said wall from the Escolta to the River Pasig can not be presumed to be a party wall; the
evidence to the contrary conclusively proves that it belonged exclusively to the defendants, and it has been further
shown in the case that at one time an old building belonging to the opponents used to rest on a portion of the wall
near the river.
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law and
the merits of the case, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed in full, as we do hereby affirm it, with the
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
|||  (Case v. Heirs of Tuason y Santibañez, G.R. No. 5044, [December 1, 1909], 14 PHIL 521-528)
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 6076. December 29, 1911.]

SEVERINA and FLORA CHOCO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ISIDRO SANTAMARIA,  defendant-

appellant.

MAPA, J  p:

The judgment rendered in this case in first instance is in part as follows:

"From the evidence presented at the trial, I find that the defendant is in possession of a parcel
of land on the corner of Calles Pescadores and P. Rada, in the district of Tondo, city of Manila, and that
he has erected a house thereon flush with the boundary line of the adjacent property; that the plaintiffs
are the owners of the land on both sides of defendant's house, erected as stated, both on Calle
Pescadores and Calle P. Rada; that the defendant in the building of his house has made several
openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking the property of the plaintiffs'
that at the time the defendant was building his house, and the windows and openings were being made,
the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the
defendant, and the defendant received the written protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from the
evidence, appears to have suggested an amicable adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was not
made, and this action was brought.
"It is likewise established that the entrance to the defendant's house is in Calle Pescadores,
and taking it as the front of his house he has put a large window in its upper story, on the balcony of
said house, marked 1 on Exhibit A, overlooking Calle P. Rada; and that this window and its balcony do
not face directly toward the house of the plaintiffs.
"There have also been constructed two windows in the rear wall of the house of the defendant,
in the first story of the house, which are marked 8 and 9 on Exhibit A, and these windows are each 50
by 80 centimeters, and are placed immediately under the ceiling of the first story, and each of these
windows is equally divided into four panes.
"On the right hand side of the house, entering from Calle Pescadores, there is a window or
opening in the wall of the house in the second story, which is about 25 by 35 centimeters, and is located
a little more than half way from the floor of the ceiling of the second story and this is subdivided into
smaller panes; and on the same side there are three windows which are marked 2, 3, and 4 on Exhibit
A, located immediately under the ceiling of the first story, and each of the three is 25 by 25 centimeters.
"There are two other windows on the same side located immediately under the ceiling, which
are marked 5 and 6 on Exhibit A and also on Exhibit C, and one of these windows is about 35 by 67
centimeters, and the other about 75 by 90 centimeters.
"It also appears that there is wire screening over all these openings or windows.
 "The law provides that the owner of a wall which is not a party wall, adjoining another's estate,
may make in it windows or openings to admit light at the height of the ceiling joists, or immediately
under the ceiling, thirty centimeters square, with an iron grate embedded in the walland a wire screen.
"In this case the windows are in a wall not a party wall adjoining plaintiff's estate, and the
windows marked 2, 3, and 4, as appears on Exhibit A, are less than thirty centimeters square and have
a wire screen, but there does not appear to be the iron grate embedded in the wall.
"The windows marked 5 and 6, as indicated on Exhibit A, have a wire screen but are more than
thirty centimeters square, and have not the iron grate embedded in the wall.
"The window marked 7 on Exhibit A has a wire screen, but is more than 30 centimeters square
and has not the iron grate embedded in the wall.
"The windows 8 and 9, as indicated on Exhibit A, have a wire screen but no iron grate
embedded in the wall, and are of a greater dimension than thirty centimeters square.
"The window marked One on Exhibit A is located in a balcony which overlooks the street, and,
while the premises of the plaintiff may be seen from it, it is not adjoining their estate.
"The court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for closing all the windows or
openings in the walls of the defendant's house, as hereinbefore described, which directly overlook the
premises of the plaintiffs, or that in some other way the provisions of the law be complied with so that
they may remain open.
"All these openings and windows can be made to comply with the law, with the exception of
that marked 7, which is not immediately under the ceiling (techo).
"Let judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora Choco, and against the
defendant, Isidro Santamaria, forever prohibiting the opening of the window marked No. 7, as
hereinbefore stated, which must be closed, and forever prohibiting the opening of the windows and
openings marked, as hereinbefore stated, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, which must be closed or made to
conform to the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate embedded in the wall,
with the costs of the action.''
The plaintiffs appealed from that judgment and allege in their appeal in this instance:
1. That the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final and perpetual closing of the large
window opened in the balcony of the back part of the appellee's house and marked No. 1 in the photographic Exhibits
A and D, on the ground that the said window is in the balcony which overlooks Calle Padre Rada and that, though the
appellants' lot can be seen from this window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property.
2. That the trial court also erred in ordering in his judgment that the openings and windows, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
8, and 9, might continue open if they were fixed so as to comply with the requirements of the law as regards their
dimensions and the placing of iron grates embedded in the wall.
3. That the lower court also erred in denying the appellants' petition for a rehearing.
It appears obvious to us, from the evidence, that the window No. 1, referred to in the first assignment of
errors, is next to the appellants' lot. To judge from the photographic views, Exhibits A and D, it opens on the boundary
line between the said lot and that of the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs
to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said
photographs, in so far as he said that "a part of the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property, and a
person approaching the window may clearly see the said lot." And certainly if it is in front of this lot, it is
unquestionable that it directly overlooks the same; but even though it did not and only a side or oblique view of the lot
could be obtained from it, it could not be kept open, since between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not
intervene the distance required by law — that of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second. In
reality, there is no distance at all between the said window and the plaintiffs' lot, because, as we have said, this
window is perpendicular to the boundary line of the said lot; therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the
provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
"Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over the estate of
the neighbor, can not be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the wall in which
they are built and said estate.
"Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property, unless there is a distance of
60 centimeters."
Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question must be closed, and
consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense, as regards this window. With respect to
the second assignment of error, the question raised by the appellants concerns the proper interpretation of article 581
of the Civil Code which prescribes as follows:
"The owner of a wall which is not a party-wall, adjoining another's estate, may make in it
windows or openings to admit light, at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately under the ceiling, of
the dimensions of 30 centimeters square and, in any case, with an iron grate embedded in the wall and
a wire screen."
The windows mentioned in this part of the appeal are those indicated by Nos. 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 8, and 9, in the
defendant's Exhibit A. They are all situated immediately under the ceiling of the first floor and are provided with wire
screens; some of them measure more and others less than 30 centimeters square and none of them have iron grates
embedded in the wall. Owing to this last circumstance, none of them fully comply with the conditions required by law;
moreover, those numbered 5, 6, 8, and 9, have the additional defect of being greater than 30 centimeters square. The
trial judge therefore ordered, in the judgment, that all the aforementioned windows be closed or that they be made to
conform to the law with respect to their dimensions and the placing of iron grates embedded in the wall. The
appellants maintain that these windows should have been ordered closed absolutely and finally, and, consequently,
that the option allowed the defendant to keep them open, provided that he brought them within the terms of the law, is
contrary to the same and, therefore, illegal.
It is alleged as a ground for such averment that none of the windows referred to are at the height of the ceiling
joists, which is the first condition required by law.
"We understand by ceiling joists — say the appellants — in a building composed of any given number of
stories, the long pieces to which are nailed the boards that form the ceiling of the last story of the building, counting
the stories from below; and this interpretation which we give to the words ceiling joists must be that most in harmony
with the spirit of article 581 of the code, the subject of our examination, since immediately after them in the same
article, in explanation, are found the words or immediately under 'los techos,' in order to indicate, without the least
doubt, the sole place or height where openings or windows may be made in conformity with the law. It is needless to
say that a building, though composed of several stories, can have but one techo. . . ."
This last assertion is incorrect. By techo is understood that part of a construction which covers the rooms
under it and certainly forms one of the essential parts of every story. A story is composed of earth, pavement and
ceiling, the latter, that is, the ceiling, being that part of the story that is visible to the observer situated below in the
room covered by it. (Hispano-American Encyclopedic Dictionary, by Montaner and Simon.) Consequently, every story
has a ceiling, and not, as the appellants maintain, the upper one alone.
Nor is their definition exact of the word joists, as it is employed in article 581 of the Code. According to the
dictionary of the Spanish Academy, these are, in architecture, understood to be a kind of beam laid horizontally and
serving in buildings to support others or for bracing and connecting the parts of the structure. Mucius Scaevola says in
his Civil Code, volume 10, page 448:
"The horizontal timbers that are placed upon the tops of the uprights, that is, what are
commonly called beams, intended to serve for connection and main support of the timbers of the
different floors that separate the stories of the building, are called joists."
According to these definitions each floor necessarily has joists, that is, beams, since, in the last analysis they
are what support and secure the structure of the story immediately above; therefore it is not true that there may be
joists only in the top story, as the appellants claim by saying that they understand to be such the long timbers to which
are fastened the boards of the ceiling at the top story of the building. On the contrary, carefully considered, it is
precisely the top story that does not need joists since it does not have to support any other higher portion of the
building. It has only to support the weight of the roof, which is undoubtedly much less than that of a whole story. So
that, according to Mucius Scaevola (work cited, vol. 10, p. 487), it can not be said that the top story has joists. And
because it certainly does not have them, is the reason why the code in said article 581 employs the phrase
or immediately under "los techos" in referring to the top story.
The author's words in expounding this theory in his commentary on article 581 of the Civil Code are as
follows:
"We said elsewere that these (the joists) were the horizontal timbers that rest upon the tops of
the uprights; they form, then, the upper limit of the different stories of a house; and therefore, in
referring to the top story, which can not be said to have joists, article 581 makes use of the phrase
or immediately under 'los techos.'"
This does not mean that the italicized phrase refers solely and exclusively to the top story, since the lower
stories also have techos, as above set forth. In our opinion what the author cited means is that in speaking of the top
story, which has no joists, the words of article 581 of the code, at the height of the ceiling joists, fail to apply, the
phrase or immediately under "los tecllos" alone being thereto applicable, in distinction from the lower stories, with
regard to which both phrases are applicable as they have at the same time joists and techo. In referring to the lower
 stories either phrase may, in connection with the other, determine the place, which surely can not be more than one,
where it is permissible to open the windows called regulation windows, whenever in them the joists are actually joined
to or placed next to the techo which forms the top of each of said stories. Both phrases therefore express the same
idea with reference to the lower stories.
Aside from what has been said here, the object of the law in authorizing the opening of the windows in
question in all the stories of a building, without any exception, is clear. Their purpose is, as article 581 itself says, to
furnish light to the rooms, and it is evident at a glance that the rooms of the lower stories have as much need for light
as those of the top story. No good reason exists for having one story in better condition than another, whichever it
may be, in connection with this provision of law.
The defendant is ordered to close finally and forever the window marked No. 1 in Exhibit A, the judgment
appealed from in so far as it refers to said window being thus modified, but affirmed in all other respects; without
special finding as to costs in this instance.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson and Calson, JJ., concur.
|||  (Choco v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 6076, [December 29, 1911], 21 PHIL 132-140)
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 90596. April 8, 1991.]

SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF

APPEALS, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP AND ITS MODIFICATIONS; EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES; NATURE,
CONSTRUED. — Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated from the tenement,
or mortgaged separately.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; A LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT OF THE OWNER TO USE. — An easement operates as a limitation on the
title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use ( jus utendi).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT; MERGER, DEFINED. — A merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of
both estates.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL SERVITUDE; CONSTRUED. — A personal servitude, is one constituted not in favor of a
particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public. In a personal servitude, there is
therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant
estate, in this case, the public at large.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; SUMMARY JUDGMENT; WHEN PROPER. — Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the
Rules of Court are proper where there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts appear
undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of the ritual of a trial where, from
existing records, the facts have been established, and trial would be futile.
7. ID.; ID.; LAW OF THE CASE; CONSTRUED. — "Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. (21 C.J.S. 330)
8. ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING. — There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect
to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J  p:

This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals 1 erred in reversing the trial court which had
rendered summary judgment; and (2) whether or not it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by
merger.
We rule for the petitioner on both counts.
It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name
of the private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an
easement of way:
. . . a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had
been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at
the back of the covering Transfer Certificate of Title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer
of Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been
expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the
Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record). 2
As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as follows:
Entry No. 7712/T-5000 — CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY — It is hereby made of record that a
construction of private alley has been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street
to the interior of the aforesaid property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City
Engineer subject to the following conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least three (3)
meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be closed so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic);
(3) That the alley shall be open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private alley has
been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide same with concrete canals as per
specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at the
expense of the registered owner; (6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions
whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been
constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and
drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall
impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other conditions
set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa, Not. Pub. of Manila. 3
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above
private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private
respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates
removed and to allow full access to the easement. prLL
The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the
latter moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger
in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the
petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not
shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a "temporary writ of preliminary injunction to
continue up to the final termination of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff"  4 (the
petitioner herein).
Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above defenses.
On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the court a quo ruled on the same as follows:
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the merit (sic) and hereby
resolve (sic) to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. (pp. 15-107, Record). 5
On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private respondent, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the temporary mandatory injunction,
that had been issued against the defendant, and for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this
suit.
The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit. (Summary
Judgment, p. 6). 6
The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition for the cancellation of the
annotation in question. The court granted cancellation, for which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the
respondent Court of Appeals which ordered the restoration of the annotation "without prejudice [to] the final outcome of" 7
the private respondent's own appeal (subject of this petition).
In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals
held that the summary judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up by the
private respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an easement
is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private
respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale executed between the
private respondent and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the
intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale. LLpr
As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition.
There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the
seller, had been constituted on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as follows: "(6) That the alley shall
remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which
the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and
drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof . . . " 8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel
gates across the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude
of way.
 
The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in denying injunctive relief on appeal, the
respondent Appellate Court committed an error of judgment and law.
It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent is the owner of the portion on which the
right-of-way had been established and that an easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the
easement or any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the private respondent respect the
easement already existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that the private respondent has ownership, but that
nonetheless, it has failed to observe the limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same.
There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or not an easement exists on the property, and
as we indicated, we are convinced that an easement exists.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale
"excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. 9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. 10 Although they are possessed of a
separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated 12
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat
the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the
servient estate, specifically, his right to use (  jus utendi).
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring
NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of
the neighboring estates . . ." 13 and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a
discount on account of the easement, thus:
WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto agreed to adjust the purchase price
from THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS
(P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY
PESOS (P3,503,240.00) 14
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property—including the disputed
alley — as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen,
requires full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one
constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. 16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to
persons without a dominant estate, 17 in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that
relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public — if that is possible
— no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. prLL
For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of
Appeals held that it (the trial court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error.
Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where there is no genuine issue as to the existence
of a material fact, and the facts appear undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of
record. 18 In one case, this Court upheld a decision of the trial court rendered by summary judgment on a claim for money
to which the defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed to produce receipts. 19 We held that under the
circumstances, the defense was not genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In another case,
we rejected the claim of acquisitive prescription over registered property and found it likewise to be sham, and sustained
consequently, a summary judgment rendered because the title challenged was covered by a Torrens Certificate and
under the law, Torrens titles are imprescriptible. 20
We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary judgment rendered thereon, on the ground that from
the records, the plaintiffs were clearly guilty of laches having failed to act until after twenty-seven years.  21 We likewise
allowed summary judgment and rejected contentions of economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding payment under a
contract for the reason that the contract imposed liability under any and all conditions. 22
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger
is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does
not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and can not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of
action.
As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of the ritual of a trial where, from existing
records, 23 the facts have been established, and trial would be futile.
What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent — and consequently, the challenged holding of the
respondent Court of Appeals as well — is the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in its CA-G.R.
No. 13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at
the back of the private respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case No. 273. As the petitioner
now in fact insists, the Court of Appeals' judgment, which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated December 14,
1988, in G.R. No. 83540, is at least, the law of the case between the parties, as "law of the case" is known in law, e.g.:
xxx xxx xxx
"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330).
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding
appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points,
or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not
be considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267).
In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the
court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than
those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the
 compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case
whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to
seek a rehearing." (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the
case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the
court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received
due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87). 24
CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to determine the rights of the parties regarding
the easement, subject of the controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation" it may have, at
a glance, suggested a different cause of action.
And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CA-G.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case, after
all, it was the one that initiated the cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that precipitated
that appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to preempt the
injunction decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping,
as we have described the term:
xxx xxx xxx
 
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while
an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and
in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so,
as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. 25
to which contempt is a penalty. 26
As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private respondent found an unfriendly court and it can not be
made to profit from its act of malpractice by permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its applicability as the law of the
case.
As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the will of the owner.
In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar  Co., Inc.  v. Hidalgo, 27 this Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto,
declared that a personal servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere "act"  28 of the landowner,
and is not "contractual in the nature," 29 and a third party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality to
claim its benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained that a personal or voluntary servitude
does require a contract and that "[t]he act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute an
offer .." 30 and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence no contract." 31
The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal titans (they would contend even more
spiritedly in the "larger" world of politics) to whom present scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who, because of the
paths they have taken, have shaped history itself; after all, and coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed that an
easement has been constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case. Rather, the question is whether it is still
existing or whether it has been extinguished. As we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the
private respondent can not bar the public, by erecting an obstruction on the alley, from its use.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why
they should not be punished for contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum
shopping.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
|||  (Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 90596, [April 8, 1991], 273 PHIL 115-128)
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 75723. June 2, 1995.]

SIMEON FLORO,  petitioner, vs. ORLANDO A. LLENADO (Deceased), substituted by his wife

WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her own behalf as Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando
A. Llenado and as Legal Guardian of Minors Ma. Bexina, Avelino and Antonio, all
surnamed Llenado, and the COURT OF APPEALS,  respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI; ORDINARILY

CONFINED TO REVIEWING ERRORS OF LAW COMMITTED; EXCEPTIONS. — In a petition to review a decision of
the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction of the Court is ordinarily confined to
reviewing errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals, its findings of fact being conclusive on the Court. There
are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to review the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, summarized in Remalante  v. Tibe (G.R. No. 59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138, 145) and
subsequent cases as follows: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (10) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised in the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record.
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY; ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT AS TO THE
CONSIDERATION DOES NOT CREATE A VALID CONTRACT THEREOF. — It is not disputed that sometime in
February 1983, Floro granted the Llenados verbal permission to pass through the Floro Park Subdivision in going to
and from the MacArthur Highway. Whether such permission, as claimed by Floro, was the month of March only,
without compensation and as a neighborly gesture for the purpose merely of enabling the Llenados to install stone
monuments (mojones) on their land, or was in relation to the easement of right of way granted in their favor, as
insisted by the Llenados, the fact remains that no such contract of easement of right of way was actually perfected
between Floro and Llenado. Both Orlando and Wenifreda Llenado testified that the conditions of the easement of right
of way were still to be drawn up by Floro's lawyer. Thus, no compensation was agreed upon, and none was paid, for
the passage through Floro's property during the month of March. However, when Wenifreda saw Floro in the evening
of April 7, 1983 to negotiate for the reopening of Road Lot 5 and Floro laid down his conditions for the requested
reopening and presumably for the requested easement of right of way, Orlando rejected said conditions for being
onerous. The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados during the month of March was by mere tolerance
of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. This is evident from the testimony of
Wenifreda that "they said to us to go on while they are preparing for the papers" and that "We can use that for a while,
while they were making for the papers." Although such use was in anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of way,
no such contract was validly entered into by reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms and conditions.
Thus, private respondents Llenados cannot claim entitlement to a right of way through the Floro Park Subdivision on
the basis of a voluntary easement.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY SERVITUDE OF RIGHT OF WAY; PRECONDITIONS TO BE
ESTABLISHED. — To be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the preconditions
provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after
payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a
compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO ADEQUATE OUTLET TO A PUBLIC HIGHWAY AS A CONDITION; NOT MET IN
CASE AT BAR. — Significantly, when Orlando Llenado filed the complaint for legal easement under Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code, he focused his argument on the absence of any road, other than the closed road of
the Floro Park Subdivision, as his means of ingress and egress to and from his property. However, he omitted to state
that there is a proposed access road through the Ipapo property. There being an existing right of way over the Ipapo
property, the first requirement for a grant of a compulsory easement of right of way over the  Floro Park Subdivision
has not been met.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRE-PAYMENT OF REQUIRED INDEMNITY; DEFINED. — In Talisay-Silay Milling
Co. v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, (42 SCRA 584) the Court explained what is meant by payment or
prepayment of the required indemnity under Article 649 of the Civil Code, as follows: ". . . Prepayment, as we used the
term means the delivery of the proper indemnity required by law for the damage that might be incurred by the servient
estate in the event the legal easement upon the extent of compensation cannot be reached by the parties involved, is
not an impediment to the establishment of such easement. Precisely, the action of the dominant estate against the
servient estate should include a prayer for the fixing of the amount which may be due from the former to the latter." In
the case at bench, no proof was presented by private respondent Llenado that he complied with this requirement. The
complaint for easement of right of way filed by him in the lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing of the
amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of way be constituted. Thus, the existence of
the second requisite has likewise not been established.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ISOLATION WAS NOT DUE TO ACTS OF THE PROPRIETOR OF THE DOMINANT
ESTATE; NOT SATISFIED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — There can be no denying that the isolation of
the Llenado Homes Subdivision is the doing of its owner/developer/applicant. It appears that the access road
indicated in the Plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision and the Llenado Homes Subdivision for which a right of
way over the Ipapo property was procured, was merely for the sake of securing an approval of the proposed
development plan. There were no proofs of actual work having been done to construct a road, even just a dirty road,
over the right of way that would connect road Lot 3 of the Llenado Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur Highway.
Private respondents Llenado admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated and there was already a
fence made of adobe wall constructed on it. Indication are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. There
was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it
would cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REAL, NOT A FICTITIOUS OR ARTIFICIAL NECESSITY REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY THE
IMPOSITION THEREOF. — In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not
a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the
basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
servitude, the same should not be imposed. This easement can also be established for the benefit of a tenement with
an inadequate outlet, but not when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person had already established an
easement of this nature in favor of his tenement, he cannot demand another, even if the first passage has defects
which make passage impossible, if those defects can be eliminated by proper repairs.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION THEREOF, NOT PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — Worthy of mention is the
trial court's reason for the denial of the easement of right of way, thus: ". . . While it is true that the conversion of said
salable (sic) Lot 14, Block 6 into a Road Lot has been approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission,
such approval, however, does not ipso facto connect Road Lot 5 and 4 (Exh. C-1) of the Floro Park Subdivision in the
absence of consent and/or approval of the owner of said Floro Park Subdivision. . . . It should be emphasized that the
end of Road Lot 3 of Llenado Homes Subdivision facing MacArthur Highway as per approved subdivision plan,
subject of the proposed amendment, has been designated/specified as an access road directly leading to the
MacArthur Highway. It is the shortest route and the road alignment is direct and in a straight line perpendicular to the
MacArthur Highway. The disapproval, therefore, of the closure and consequent conversion of both ends of Road Lot 3
into residential lots, in effect, maintains Road Lot 3 as an access road of Llenado Homes Subdivision to the main
highway. There appears a semblance of deception if the provision for (the) proposed access road in the approved
subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, now Llenado Homes Subdivision, would not be implemented as it
would appear that the same was indicated in the plans merely for purposes of approval of the subdivision but not
actually to develop and avail of the same was originally intended." It is also worthwhile to observe that on November
29, 1985 the then Minister of Public Works and Highways found the construction of the concrete culvert across
Palanas Creek illegal in contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 296, Letters of Instructions No. 19 and Presidential
Decree No. 1067 and ordered private respondent herein to remove or demolish the same, to be carried out by the
Chief Civil Engineer, Bulacan Engineering District, at the expense of private respondent. Failing to establish the
existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private respondent  Llenado's bid for a
compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
  

DECISION

ROMERO, J  p:

The instant petition for review on certiorari presents two (2) issues for resolution, namely: (1) whether or not a
valid contract of easement of right of way exists when the owner of one estate voluntarily allows the owner of an
adjacent estate passage through his property for a limited time, without compensation; and, (2) whether or not an
owner/developer of a subdivision can demand a compulsory easement of right of way over the existing roads of an
adjacent subdivision instead of developing his subdivision's purposed access road as provided in his duly approved
subdivision plan.
Simeon Floro is the owner of a piece of land known as the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Barangay
Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. 1 The subdivision has its own egress and ingress to and from the MacArthur
Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing.
Orlando A. Llenado, 2 on the other hand, was the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land, with the total
area of 34, 573 sq. meters, more or less,3 known as the Llenado Homes Subdivision ("Llenado Homes," for brevity).
Prior to its purchase by Llenado from the owner Francisco de Castro, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega.  4 Bounded on the
South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek,  5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west
by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and Guevarra, the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road
or passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo
has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by
the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board). 6
Sometime in February, 1983, the Llenados sought, and were granted, permission by the Floros to use Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as the passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. On April 7, 1983,
however, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its
use by the Llenados.
Their request for the reopening of Road Lot 5 having been denied, Orlando Llenado instituted on April 13,
1983, a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, against Simeon Floro for Easement of
Right of Way with the Prayer of the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages. The
complaint was docketed as the Civil Case No. 6834-M and raffled off to Branch XIX, presided over by Hon. Judge
Camilio Montesa.
After hearing and ocular inspection, the trial court, in an Order dated July 15, 1983,7 granted the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon the filing of a bond by Llenado in the amount of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). Floro was ordered:
"1. To open the road by removing the rocks and wooden posts and/or to remove the barricade
on the subject road of the Floro Park Subdivision and enjoining him and any person or persons under
him from doing or performing any acts which will prevent (LLENADO) or his agents or any person acting
under (LLENADO's) instruction from passing through the subject subdivision road to get into and to get
out of the aforementioned properties of (LLENADO) until further order from this Court."
Floro moved for reconsideration but was denied the relief sought. 8 He then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with petition for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order, but later on,
moved to withdraw his petition. His motion for withdrawal was granted by the appellate court in its Resolution dated
March 30, 1984 which declared the case closed and terminated. 9
In the meantime, Orlando Llenado died and was substituted by his wife Wenifreda T. Llenado as
administratrix of his estate and as legal guardian of their four (4) minor children. 10 Trial on the merits of the case
which was suspended pending resolution of the petition before the Court of Appeals, resumed.
On October 16, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction previously issued. The dispositive portion of the decision 11 reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit,
and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in favor of the plaintiff is hereby ordered
dissolved and/or lifted. On the counterclaim posed by defendant, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay
defendant the following amounts:
 a. P30,000.00 as actual damages suffered by defendant;
b. P77,500.00 as a compensation for the use of defendant's property;
c.  P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
d.  To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED."
On the appeal by Llenado, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court in a
decision 12 promulgated on February 11, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one entered:
(1) Granting the establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right of way passing
through Road Lots 4 and 5 of defendant's Floro Park Subdivision in favor of plaintiff's Llenado Homes
Subdivision;
(2) Ordering defendant to remove immediately all of the obstructions, such as walls, rocks and
posts with which he had barricaded Road Lot 5 for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from using
defendant's subdivision as passage way to the MacArthur Highway;
(3) Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff, upon finality of this decision, the following:
(a)  P60,000.00 — temperate or moderate damages
(b) P100,000.00 — moral damages; and
(c) P30,000.00 — attorney's fees;
(4) Ordering plaintiff to pay to defendant the amount of P60,000.00 within ten (10) days from
the date of finality of this decision as indemnity for the right of way pursuant to the mandate of Article
649 of the Civil Code; and
(5) Ordering defendant to pay the costs.
The liability of the defendant under No. (3) (supra) shall be legally compensated by the liability
of the plaintiff under No. (4) (supra) automatically to the extent that the amount of one is covered by the
amount of the other.
SO ORDERED."
On August 14, 1986, the appellate court in separate resolutions denied Floro's motion for reconsideration and
supplementary motion 13 and granted Llenado's motion for partial execution pending appeal. 14 The latter resolution
provided in its dispositive portion, thus:
"WHEREFORE, upon the posting by plaintiff appellant of a bond in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) approved by this Court, let a writ of partial execution
pending appeal be issued ordering the defendant-appellee to remove immediately all of the
obstructions, including all walls, rocks, posts, and other materials with which he has barricaded Road
Lot 5, for the purpose of preventing plaintiff-appellant from using defendant's subdivision as passage
way to the MacArthur Highway. Said Order shall include Road Lot 4 so that plaintiff-appellant will have
free access to MacArthur Highway.
SO ORDERED."
The writ of partial execution pending appeal was issued on October 2, 1986 after the instant Petition had
been filed and after the Court had resolved on September 15, 1986 to require Llenado to comment thereon. On
motion of Floro, the Court issued a restraining order on October 29, 1986, 15 enjoining the appellate court from
carrying out its writ of partial execution pending appeal. Subsequently, the instant petition was given due course. 16
In a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction
of the Court is ordinarily confined to reviewing errors of law committed by the court of Appeals, its findings of fact
being conclusive on the Court. 17 There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to
review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, summarized in Remalante v. Tibe 18 and subsequent cases 19 as
follows: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of a specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (10) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, being contrary to the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, the instant case falls within the exception. Thus, the Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to
bring to light the real facts of the case. 20
It is not disputed that sometime in February 1983, Floro granted the Llenados verbal permission to pass
through the Floro Park Subdivision in going to and from the MacArthur Highway. Whether such permission, as
claimed by Floro, was the month of March only, without compensation and as a neighborly gesture for the purpose
merely of enabling the Llenados to install stone monuments (mojones) on their land, 21 or was in relation to the
easement of right of way granted in their favor, as insisted by the Llenados, 22 the fact remains that no such contract
of easement of right of way was actually perfected between Floro and Llenado. Both Orlando 23 and
Wenifreda Llenado 24 testified the conditions of the easement of right of way were still to be drawn up by Floro's
lawyer. Thus, no compensation was agreed upon, and none was paid, for the passage through Floro's property during
the month of March. 25
However, when Wenifreda saw Floro in the evening of April 7, 1983 to negotiate for the reopening of Road
Lot 5 and Floro laid down his conditions 26 for the requested reopening and presumably for the requested easement
of right of way, Orlando rejected said conditions for being onerous. 27
In Dionisio v. Ortiz, 28 where therein private respondents claimed to have every right to use Howmart Road
as passageway to EDSA by reason of a standing oral contract of easement of right of way with therein petitioner, so
that the latter did not have the right to put a barricade in front of private respondent's gate and to stop them from using
said gate as a passageway to Howmart Road, the Court said:
"There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over
Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December 1988. The
continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEA including the private respondents is by the mere
tolerance of the owner pending the renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way. . . .
Absent an agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of
right of way has been validly entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus the private respondent's
claim of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis."
As in the Dionisio case, the use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados during the month of March was by
mere tolerance of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. This is evident from
the testimony of Wenifreda that "they said to us to go on while they are preparing for the papers" and that "We can
use that for a while, while they were making for the papers." 29 Although such use was in anticipation of a voluntary
easement of right of way, no such contract was validly entered into by reason of the failure of the parties to agree on
its terms and conditions. Thus, private respondents Llenados cannot claim entitlement to a right of way through
the Floro Park Subdivision on the basis of a voluntary easement.
Having ruled that no voluntary easement of right of way had been established in favor of private respondents
Llenados, we now determine whether or not they are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way.
For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the
preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are: (1) that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). 30
The burden of providing the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on
the owner of the dominant estate. 31 We find that private respondents have failed in this regard.
Significantly, when Orlando Llenado filed the complaint for legal easement under Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code, he focused his argument on the absence of any road, other than the closed road of the  Floro Park
Subdivision, as his means of ingress and egress to and from his property. However, he omitted to state that there is a
proposed access road through the Ipapo property.
Danilo Ravello, an engineer employed as Project Officer of the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) since 1981, testified that his duties consisted in evaluating and processing subdivision plans and making the
proper recommendation for their approval or disapproval. The application of Soledad Ortega for the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision, 32 appearing on page 120 of the records of the HSRC, had the following attachments: (1) Sketch
Plan of the property containing an area of 34,973 sq. m.; 33 (2) Waterline Layout Plan; 34 (3) Vicinity Plan; 35 (4)
Road Plan Layout; 36 and (5) Consolidation Subdivision Plan. 37 According to Ravello, as per Plan Exhs. "10-A" and
"10-C", Road Lot 3 of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision starts and ends with adjacent properties; on one end, the
property owned by Mariano Monadero and at the other, the property owned by a certain Ventura Tan Mariano. As per
Plans, the access road to the subdivision should have come from the MacArthur Highway through the Ipapo
property. 38 Having found on ocular inspection that the access road indicated in the Plan did not actually exist, the
HSRC required applicant Soledad Ortega to submit a written right of way clearance from Ipapo, which she did and on
the basis of which, her application on behalf of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision was approved. 39
When Orlando Llenado acquired the subject property, he adopted the subdivision plans of Emmanuel Homes
and renamed it as the Llenado Homes Subdivision. Accordingly, he applied for the issuance of a new Development
Permit and License to Sell in his name as the new owner of the subdivision. Subsequently, the corresponding license
to sell and development permit were issued. As shown by the Consolidation Subdivision Plan 40 submitted by
Orlando Llenado, the names Soledad Ortega/Emmanuel Homes Subdivision were merely crossed out and, in lieu
thereof, the names Orlando Llenado/Llenado Homes Subdivision were written. In said subdivision plan which was
duly approved by the HSRC, the Ipapo Access Road was retained.
On July 1, 1983, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 6834-M, Orlando Llenado filed with the HSRC an
application for the amendment of the original Consolidation Subdivision Plan of the Llenado Homes
Subdivision. 41 The proposed amendments, as indicated in Exh. "11-A", 42 were: (1) the conversion of Lot 14 of
Block 6 into a road lot, designed to connect with Road Lot 5 of the Floro Homes Subdivision; and, (2) the closing of
both ends of Road Lot 3, the portion leading to the Ventura Tan Mariano property and the portion leading to the Ipapo
right of way (Adriano Monadero property), to be converted into saleable residential lots. The first proposed alteration,
the conversion of Lot 14, Block 6 into a road lot was approved on March 20, 1984.  43 The access road
of Llenado Homes Subdivision, however, remained in the Subdivision Plan to be through the Ipapo property, as
approved by the HSRC.
When asked by the court as to the policy of the HSRC regarding the approval of a subdivision plan in
connection with the right of way issue, Engr. Ravello responded that as a prerequisite for approval, the subdivision
must have an access road. It was not necessary that the access road be a paved road. A dirt road was sufficient
provided that the owner of the lot used as access road gives his consent and the owner/developer/applicant of the
proposed subdivision develops the proposed access road, 44 as approved by the HSRC in compliance with Section
29 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which states:
"SEC. 29 Right of Way to Public Road — The owner or developer of a subdivision without
access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and
such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government
authorities concerned."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents Llenado submitted a letter of Marcial Ipapo dated July
3, 1985 addressed to the HSRC, 45 informing the latter that he did not give a road right of way over his property in
favor of Soledad Ortega, the developer of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This letter seems to be an aftermath of the
testimony of Engr. Ravello that the notarized affidavit of Ipapo submitted by Soledad Ortega to the HSRC could not be
located in the records of the Commission. 46 This new matter, however, is inadmissible in evidence, not having been
authenticated in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of the Court. It was, therefore, erroneous on the
part of the Court of Appeals to consider this piece of evidence in its Resolution For the Motion For Reconsideration
dated August 124, 1986. 47
There being an existing right of way over the Ipapo property, the first requirement for a grant of a compulsory
easement of right of way over the Floro Park Subdivision has not been met.
In Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 48 the Court explained what is
meant by payment or prepayment of the required indemnity under Article 649 of the Civil Code, as follows:
". . . Prepayment, as we used the term means the delivery of the proper indemnity required by
law for the damage that might be incurred by the servient estate in the event the legal easement is
constituted. The fact that a voluntary agreement upon the extent of compensation cannot be reached by
the parties involved, is not an impediment to the establishment of such easement. Precisely, the action
of the dominant estate against the servient estate should include a prayer for the fixing of the amount
which may be due from the former to the latter."
In the case at bench, no proof was presented by private respondent Llenado that he complied with this
requirement. The complaint for easement of right of way filed by him in the lower court did not contain a prayer for the
fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of way be constituted. Thus, the
existence of the second requisite has likewise not been established.
 There can be no denying that the isolation of the Llenado Homes Subdivision is the doing of its
owner/developer/applicant. It appears that the access road indicated in the Plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision
and the Llenado Homes Subdivision for which a right of way over the Ipapo property was procured, was merely for the
sake of securing an approval of the proposed development plan. There were no proofs of actual work having been
done to construct a road, even just a dirty road, over the right of way that would connect road Lot 3 of
the Llenado Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur Highway. Private respondent llenado admitted that the Ipapo
riceland was no longer being cultivated and there was already a fence made of adobe wall constructed on
it. 49 Indication are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. There was no reason for private respondent's
failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third requisite
has not been met.
If the servitude requested by private respondent Llenado is allowed, other subdivision developers/owners
would be encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions for access roads merely for
registration purposes. Thereafter, said developers could abandon their duly approved plans and, for whatever reason,
open up another way through another property under the pretext that they have inadequate outlets to a public road or
highway. Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957 was
enacted, that is to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers who renege on their
duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved subdivision plans, would be defeated.
The Court takes cognizance of the fact that, instead of developing the proposed access road, private
respondent Llenado applied for the conversion of Lot 14 of Block 6 into a road lot to connect it with Road Lot 5 of
the Floro Park Subdivision, citing as reason therefor, that the amendment sought would create a "more adequate and
practical passage" from Llenado Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur National Highway and vise-versa. The
"convenience" of using Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision will not suffice, however, to justify the
easement in favor of private respondent.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same
should not be imposed. 50 This easement can also be established for the benefit of a tenement with an inadequate
outlet, but nit when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person has already established an easement of
this nature in favor of his tenement, he cannot demand another, even if those first passage has defects which make
passage impossible, if those defects can be eliminated by proper repairs. 51
In the case of Ramos  v. Gatchalian, 52 the Court denied access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in
view of the fact that petitioner had a road right of way provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision
indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots, notwithstanding that said lot was still
undeveloped and inconvenient to petitioner. Even if Ramos, the petitioner therein, had "to pass through other lots
belonging to other owners, which are grassy and cogonal, as temporary ingress/egress with great inconvenience
particularly due to flood and mud," the Court did not allow the easement because it would run counter to existing
jurisprudence that mere convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis for the servitude. This
ruling was reiterated in Rivera v. Intermediate Appellate Court 53 and Constabella Corporation v. Court of
Appeals. 54
As borne out by the records of this case, despite the closure of the subject road, construction work
at Llenado Homes Subdivision continued. The alternative route taken by private respondent is admittedly inconvenient
because he has to transverse several ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that
said passage, as found by the trial court, is impassable during the rainy season. However, private respondent has no
one to blame but himself for not developing the proposed access road through the Ipapo property.
Worthy of mention is the trial court's reason 55 for the denial of the easement of right of way, thus:
". . . While it is true that the conversion of said salable (sic) Lot 14, Block 6 into a Road Lot has
been approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission, such approval, however, does not
ipso facto connect Road Lot 5 and 4 (Exh. C-1) of the Floro Park Subdivision in the absence of consent
and/or approval of the owner of said Floro Park Subdivision. . . . It should be emphasized that the end
of Road Lot 3 of Llenado Homes Subdivision facing MacArthur Highway as per approved subdivision
plan, subject of the proposed amendment, has been designated/specified as an access road directly
leading to the MacArthur Highway. It is the shortest route and the road alignment is direct and in a
straight line perpendicular to the MacArthur Highway. The disapproval, therefore, of the closure and
consequent conversion of both ends of Road Lot 3 into residential lots, in effect, maintains Road Lot 3
as an access road of Llenado Homes Subdivision to the main highway. There appears a semblance of
deception if the provision for (the) proposed access road in the approved subdivision plan of Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision, now Llenado Homes Subdivision, would not be implemented as it would appear
that the same was indicated in the plans merely for purposes of approval of the subdivision but not
actually to develop and avail of the same was originally intended."
 It is also worthwhile to observe that on November 29, 1985 the then Minister of Public Works and Highways
found the construction of the concrete culvert across Palanas Creek illegal in contemplation of Presidential Decree
No. 296, Letters of Instructions No. 19 and Presidential Decree No. 1067 and ordered private respondent herein to
remove or demolish the same, to be carried out by the Chief Civil Engineer, Bulacan Engineering District, at the
expense of private respondent. 56
Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private
respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the  Floro Park
Subdivision must fail.
It appears from the records that during the period from March 1983 until the closure of the subject roads on
April 7, 1983, private respondent was allowed to pass thru petitioner's subdivision without any agreement or
compensation. During the same period, the subject roads (Road Lots 4 and 5) were damaged due to trucks and
heavy equipment passing thereon. Justice and equity demand that petitioner be compensated for the said damage.
Hence, the lower court's decision awarding to petitioner Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual and
compensatory damages should be affirmed.
Petitioner should likewise be indemnified for the use of his property from July 15, 1983 (upon the reopening of
the subject road pursuant to the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) until October 16, 1986 (when
the writ was lifted). In the absence of a specific provision applicable in the case at bench as to the amount of proper
indemnity, the award of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as temperate or moderate damages pursuant to Articles
2224 and 2225 of the Civil Code 57 is considered proper and reasonable. 58
As regards the claim for attorney's fees, considering that the petitioner was compelled to file a petition for
review on certiorari before this Court, the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) is just reasonable. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial
court, as herein modified, is REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, [June 2, 1995], 314 PHIL 715-741)
DE JESUS ET AL VS HOWMART ET AL 12 CA REP 831

FACTS:

Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo,Manila. They brought an action for damages
against Homart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing Corporation, owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff on the
same street where a sixty storey concrete building was constructed. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe
the necessary care and precautions to protect the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support,thereby causing it to sink in some parts; its walls, ceilings, and floorings to crack in some places; and by
the careless manner of handling the cement used the roofing’s of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the
accumulated debris piled thereon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing the building in question so as to
prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff.

HELD:

No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides “No property shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any
adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent support”. A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an
adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It
does not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his
land. Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about
eight inches. The sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and
to the weight of the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as the excavation made necessarily
disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiff’s land. Defendants having failed to provide the plaintiff’s land and house with
sufficient lateral and subjacent support are liable for damages.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996.]

ANASTACIA QUIMEN,  petitioner, vs.  COURT  OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q.

OLIVEROS, respondents.

Benedicto L. Nanca for petitioner.

Armando A. San Antonio for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSING THE

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, UPHELD ON APPEAL. — But we find no cogent reason to disturb the
ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as
between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it
concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private
respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or
an easement by necessity constituted by law. The trial court found that Yolanda's property was situated at the back of her
father's property and held that there existed an available space of about nineteen (19) meters long which could
conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda's father; that the vacant space
ended at the left back of Sotero's store which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda requested a
detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her
right of way to the public highway. But notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court concluded, although
erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property since a detour through it would not
make the line straight and would not be the route shortest to the public highway. In applying Art. 650  of the New Civil
Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared
to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda' s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari
store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in
the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer
will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main
function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite
calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the situation. In sum, this Court finds that
the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence.
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP AND ITS MODIFICATIONS; EASEMENT, DEFINED. — As defined,
an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner  of the latter must refrain
from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or
tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A
right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass
over another's property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the
public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he
indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
 3. ID.; ID.; EASEMENTS; RIGHT OF WAY; CONDITIONS FOR GRANT THEREOF. — The conditions sine qua
non  for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CRITERION OF LEAST PREJUDICE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE, CONSTRUED. —
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private respondent
is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion  of least
prejudice  to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance  may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent
structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and
the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on
any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO,  J p:

IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice
shall be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way where damage will be
least shall be used even if not the shortest route. 1 This is so because least prejudice prevails over shortest distance.
This means that the court is not bound to establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to
avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round
about way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance  would place the way
on a dangerous decline.
Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero,
Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the
municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B-1. It is bounded on
the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot No. 1448-B-2. Adjoining Sotero's property on the right are Lots Nos.
1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain
Catalina Santos. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated
as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each
with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacia's Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-
B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who
was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was
hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance
that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway
Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her
property. 2
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore  between their house, extending about
nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store  of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence.
The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and
nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The
municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass
through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.
 On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia's property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of the presiding judge was conducted by the branch
clerk of court. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing
the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her
property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store  of Sotero in order to reach the municipal
road 3 and the way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle. 4
But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that
the right of way through Sotero's property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacia's
property would no longer make the path straight. Hence the trial court concluded that it was more practical to extend
the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest
route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacia's property. 5
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she was
entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage
and detriment to the servient estate. 6 The appellate court however did not award damages to private respondent as
petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent Court of Appeals: (a) in disregarding the
agreement of the parties; (b) in considering petitioner's property as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not
abut or adjoin the property of private respondent; and, (c) in holding that the one-meter by five-meter passage way
proposed by private respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest distance to the public road.
Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a right of way. She claims that her agreement
with private respondent was to provide the latter with a right of way on the other lot of Antonio Quimen under her
administration when it was not yet sold to private respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through the
property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down
the avocado tree standing thereon.
Petitioner further argues that when Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-B in 1986 the easement of right of way
she provided her (petitioner) was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the
servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a
right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose. Petitioner strongly maintains that the proposed
right of way is not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer
the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and
considering that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it. 7
But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right of way to
private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda
their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination  of the principal issue herein
presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is
inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law. 8
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the
owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property,
for the benefit of another person or tenement. 9 It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless
extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted
by law 10 to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when his tenement is surrounded by realties
belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a
right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use  of his
property. 11
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to
pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way
being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. 12
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of way 13 readily shows that —
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff was reluctant to purchase the
same for they are enclosed with permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and have
(sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the assurance of the defendant that plaintiff will be
provided one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square
meter to be taken from Anastacia's lot at the side of a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her father's
land, plaintiff was induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land . . . That the aforesaid right of way is the
shortest, most convenient and the least onerous leading to the road and being used by the plaintiff's
predecessors-in-interest from the very inception . . . .
 The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other
persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed
between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate. 14 These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court,
more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by
plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need
for an easement of right of way to the public highway." 15
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private
respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion  of least
prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance  although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance  may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent
structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and
the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on
any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. 16 This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted —
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan, kindly go over this and please point to us
in what portion of this plan is the house or store of the father of the (plaintiff)?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the proposed right of way).
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you will agree with me . . . that this portion is the front portion of the lot owned by the
father of the plaintiff and which was (sic) occupied by a store made up of strong materials?
A. It is not true, sir.
Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff made of?
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in question, what right of way does (sic)
he use in reaching the public road, kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in reaching
the public road?
A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me . . . the main reason why your brother is (sic) using this property is
because there was a store located near this portion?
A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other way than this, sir. 17
The trial court found that Yolanda's property was situated at the back of her father's property and held that
there existed an available space of about nineteen (19) meters long which could conveniently serve as a right of way
between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda's father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Sotero's
store which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia
and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.
But notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not
entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property since a detour through it would not make the line straight and would
not be the route shortest to the public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed
right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner's property,
will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property  of Yolanda's
father which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings
and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts
them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over
again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and
the probabilities of the situation. 18 In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly
backed up by law and the evidence.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is
DENIED and the decision subject of review is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Quimen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112331, [May 29, 1996], 326 PHIL 969-981)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997.]

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC.,  petitioner, vs.  COURT  OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC.,

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL, EMDEN
ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIÑO, JR., DOMINGO REYES, PEDRO C. MERCADO, MARIO
AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU, JR., and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf
and in behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS,  INC., PHASES I AND II, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was part of a land owned by the Tuasons which was sold to
Philippine Building Corporation by virtue of a Deed  of  Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed provides that ".
. .the boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining property  of  the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen
(15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from
the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS." The land was later sold to Ateneo de Manila University with the
consent of the Tuasons. The Tuasons later developed its 7.5 meter share of the Mangyan road, while Ateneo erected an
adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide roadway which was later
removed due to an amicable settlement. Ateneo sold 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan road to Solid Homes, Inc.
and the deed of sale provided among others that the vendor passes unto the vendee the privileges of such right-of-way.
Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc. developed the Loyola Grand Villas. La Vista, a residential village developed by the
Tuasons, prohibited the agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc. and residents of Loyola from traversing the Mangyan
Road. Solid Homes Inc. then instituted an action, and prayed that LA VISTA be enjoined from preventing and obstructing
the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction in
favor of Solid Homes, Inc. which was nullified and set aside by the Appellate Court. In a petition for review
on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, Solid Homes, Inc. assailed the nullification and setting aside of the preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a decision on the merits affirming and recognizing
the easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc. LA VISTA appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The Supreme Court held that the opinion and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ preliminary injunction
are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is terminated. Being an ancillary remedy, the
proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the
merits of the main case for injunction. The merits of the main case having been already determined in favor of the
applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.
It is very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. The
opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements
like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement  of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; ORDER ISSUING WRIT,

INTERLOCUTORY. — A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
opinion and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made
even before the trial on the merits is terminated. Consequently there may be vital facts subsequently presented during the
trial which were not obtaining when the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Hence, to equate the basis for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction with that for the issuance of a final injunctive writ is erroneous. And it does not
necessarily mean that when a writ of preliminary injunction issues a final injunction follows. We thus repeat what we said
in Solid Homes,  Inc., v.  La Vista which respondent  Court  of  Appeals  quoted in its assailed Decision — Being an
ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently  of  the
decision rendered on the merits  of  the main case for injunction. The merits  of  the main case having been already
determined in favor  of  the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and
effect.
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP AND ITS MODIFICATION; EASEMENT; LEGAL EASEMENT
DISTINGUISHED FROM VOLUNTARY EASEMENT. — A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by
law for public use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the
owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four (4)
requisites, namely: (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
(b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (d) the right-of-
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. A voluntary easement on the other hand is
constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EASEMENT IN CASE AT BAR A VOLUNTARY ONE. — From the facts  of the instant case it is
very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-
way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a)
the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par. 3  of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that
the "boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen
(15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from
the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors"; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the
assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in
1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal
easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original
width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the middle of the 15 meter wide roadway;
(d) LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A.
Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one half of which is taken from your property and the other
half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our
favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor";
(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the
contractual right of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University
and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus
become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and, (f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997, acknowledged that "'one-half of the whole
length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in
equal portions". These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADEQUATE OUTLET TO A HIGHWAY CANNOT EXTINGUISH VOLUNTARY EASEMENT. —
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to
say the least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the
necessity.
5. ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PARTIES MAY STIPULATE TO OBSERVE
PROVISIONS OF CONTRACT BY ALL WHO IN THE FUTURE MAY SUCCEED THEM. — That there is no contract
between LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc. and thus the court could not have declared the existence of an easement
created by the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid
Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building Corporation transferred its rights and
obligations to ATENEO the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile, the Tuasons themselves
developed their property into what is now known as LA VISTA. On the other hand, ATENEO sold the hillside portions of its
property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the right over the easement of right-of-way. In sum, when the easement in this
case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all who in the future
might succeed them in dominion.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; ORDINARILY NOT ALLOWED AFTER TRIAL; ALLOWED ON
APPEAL FOR THOROUGH DISPOSITION OF CASE. — Finally petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA
residents at a time when the case was already on appeal, and submits that intervention is no longer permissible after trial
has been concluded. Suffice it to say that in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 238, 245-246), we said — It
is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial
has already been concluded, a judgment thereon had been promulgated in favor of private respondent and on appeal by
the losing party . . . the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said
judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under . . . Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court (now Sec. 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). But
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose
and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. The denial of the motion for intervention arising from the strict
application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will lead
the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-interests and to all purchasers for value and
in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claims be proven
to be true. After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay the proceedings. On the contrary, it
seems to have expedited the resolution of the case as the incidents brought forth by the intervention, which could have
been raised in another case, were resolved together with the issues herein resulting in a more thorough disposal  of this
case.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO,  J p:

MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west,
traversing the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll (now
Miriam) College on the south. Mangyan Road serves as the boundary between LA VISTA on one side and ATENEO and
MARYKNOLL on the other. It bends towards the east and ends at the gate of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision. The road
has been the subject of an endless dispute, the disagreements always stemming from this unresolved issue: Is there an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road? llcd
In resolving this controversy, the Court would wish to write  finis to this seemingly interminable debate which has
dragged on for more than twenty years.
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons
in Quezon City and Marikina. On 1 July 1949 the Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion  of their
landholdings amounting to 1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed  of  Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the
deed provides that ". . . the boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining property  of  the VENDORS
shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half  of  which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE
and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS."
On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was then acting for and in behalf  of Ateneo de
Manila University (ATENEO) in buying the properties from the Tuasons, sold, assigned and formally transferred in
a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to
ATENEO which assumed the mortgage. The deed of assignment states —
The ASSIGNEE hereby agrees and assumes to pay the mortgage obligation on the above-
described land in favor of the MORTGAGOR and to perform any and all terms and conditions as set
forth in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated July 1, 1949, hereinabove referred to, which said
document is incorporated herein and made an integral part of this contract by reference . . .
 On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building
Corporation into a residential village known as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the boundary between LA VISTA and the
portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road.
On 6 June 1952 ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western portion of the land adjacent to Mangyan Road.
MARYKNOLL then constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway making one-half of Mangyan Road
part of its school campus. The Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
for the demolition of the wall. Subsequently, in an amicable settlement, MARYKNOLL agreed to remove the wall and
restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters.
Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide boundary. ATENEO deferred
improvement on its share and erected instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to
the 15-meter wide roadway.
On 30 January 1976 ATENEO informed LA VISTA of the former's intention to develop some 16 hectares of its
property along Mangyan Road into a subdivision. In response, LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain
aspects with regard to the use of Mangyan Road. Thus —
. . . The Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from your
property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on
your 7 ½ m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on
our 7 ½ portion of the road in your favor (paragraph 3 of the Deed of Sale between the Tuasons and the
Philippine Building Corporation and Ateneo de Manila dated 1 July 1949 . . .
On 28 April 1976 LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.
J., offered to buy under specified conditions the property ATENEO was intending to develop. One  of the conditions
stipulated by the LA VISTA President was that "[i]t is the essence  of  the offer that the mutual right  of  way between the
Ateneo de Manila University and  La Vista Homeowners'  Association  will be extinguished." The offer of LA VISTA to buy
was not accepted by ATENEO. Instead, on 10 May 1976 ATENEO offered to sell the property to the public subject to the
condition that the right to use the 15-meter roadway will be transferred to the vendee who will negotiate with the legally
involved parties regarding the use of such right as well as the development costs for improving the access road.
LA VISTA became one of the bidders. However it lost to Solid Homes, Inc., in the bidding. Thus on 29 October
1976 ATENEO executed a Deed  of  Sale in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., over parcels of land covering a total
area of 124,424 square meters subject, among others, to the condition that —
7. The VENDOR hereby passes unto the VENDEE, its assigns and successors-in-interest the
privileges of such right of way which the VENDOR acquired, and still has, by virtue of the Deeds
mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph hereof; provided, that the VENDOR shall
nonetheless continue to enjoy said right of way privileges with the VENDEE, which right of way in
favor of the VENDOR shall be annotated on the pertinent road lot titles. However it is hereby agreed
that the implementation of such right of way shall be for the VENDEE's sole responsibility and liability,
and likewise any development of such right of way shall be for the full account of the VENDEE. In the
future, if needed, the VENDOR is therefore free to make use of the aforesaid right of way, and/or
Mangyan Road access, but in such a case the VENDOR shall contribute a pro-rata share in the
maintenance of the area.
Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision now known as Loyola Grand Villas and together they
now claim to have an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they could have access to Katipunan
Avenue.
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid Homes, Inc., that LA VISTA could not recognize
the right-of-way over Mangyan Road because, first, Philippine Building Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never
complied with their obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5-meter portion of the road and,
second, since the property was purchased for commercial purposes, Solid Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the right-
of-way as Mangyan Road was established exclusively for ATENEO in whose favor the right-of-way was originally
constituted. LA VISTA, after instructing its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from
traversing Mangyan Road, then constructed one-meter high cylindrical concrete posts chained together at the
middle of and along the entire length of Mangyan Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from passing through.
Solid Homes, Inc., complained to LA VISTA but the concrete posts were not removed. To gain access to LOYOLA
through Mangyan Road an opening through the adobe wall of ATENEO was made and some six (6) cylindrical concrete
posts of LA VISTA were destroyed. LA VISTA then stationed security guards in the area to prevent entry to LOYOLA
through Mangyan Road.
 On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc., instituted the instant case, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-22450, before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal and prayed that LA VISTA be enjoined from preventing and
obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. LA VISTA in turn filed a third-party
complaint against ATENEO. On 14 September 1983 the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. (affirming an earlier order of 22 November 1977), directing LA VISTA to desist from blocking and preventing
the use of Mangyan Road. The injunction order of 14 September 1983 was however nullified and set aside on 31 May
1985 by the then Intermediate Appellate Court 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 02534. Thus in a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 71150, Solid Homes, Inc., assailed the nullification and setting aside of the preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, on 20 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a decision on the merits 2 in
Civil Case No. Q-22450 affirming and recognizing the easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc., and ordering LA VISTA to pay damages thus —
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that an easement of a right-of-way
exists in favor of the plaintiff over Mangyan Road, and, consequently, the injunction prayed for by the
plaintiff is granted, enjoining thereby the defendant, its successors-in-interest, its/their agents and all
persons acting for and on its/their behalf, from closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to
the plaintiff, its successors-in-interest, its/their agents and all persons acting for and on its/their behalf,
and to the public in general, the unobstructed ingress and egress on Mangyan Road, which is the
boundary road between the La Vista Subdivision on one hand, and the Ateneo de Manila University,
Quezon City, and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, Marikina, Metro Manila, on the other; and, in
addition the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees in the
amount of P30,000.00. The defendant-third-party plaintiff is also ordered to pay the third-party
defendant reasonable attorney's fees for another amount of P15,000.00. The counter-claim of the
defendant against the plaintiff is dismissed for lack of merit. With costs against the defendant.
Quite expectedly, LA VISTA appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19929. On 20 April
1988 this Court, taking into consideration the 20 November 1987 Decision of the trial court, dismissed the petition
docketed as G.R. No. 71150 wherein Solid Homes, Inc., sought reversal of the 31 May 1985 Decision in AC-G.R. SP No.
02534 which nullified and set aside the 14 September 1983 injunction order of the trial court. There we said —
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may be granted at any
time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff
is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs (Section
3(a), Rule 58) and it appearing that the trial court had already granted the issuance of a final injunction
in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered after trial on the merits (Sections 7 & 10, Rule 58,
Rules of Court), the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered moot and
academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to
the plaintiff's right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been decided on the merits, the
trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is proper, notwithstanding the fact that the
decision rendered is not yet final (II Moran, pp. 81-82, 1980 ed.) Being an ancillary remedy, the
proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision
rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already
determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have
any force and effect. 3
On the other hand, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, several incidents were presented for resolution: two (2) motions
filed by Solid Homes, Inc., to cite certain officers of LA VISTA for contempt for alleged violation of the injunction ordaining
free access to and egress from Mangyan Road, to which LA VISTA responded with its own motion to cite Solid
Homes, Inc., for contempt; a motion for leave to intervene and to re-open Mangyan Road filed by residents  of LOYOLA;
and, a petition praying for the issuance of a restraining order to enjoin the closing of Mangyan Road. On 21 September
1989 the incidents were resolved by the Court of Appeals 4 thus —
1. Defendant-appellant La Vista Association, Inc., its Board of Directors and other officials and
all persons acting under their orders and in their behalf are ordered to allow all residents of Phase I and
II of Loyola Grand Villas unobstructed right-of-way or passage through the Mangyan Road which is the
boundary between the La Vista Subdivision and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision;
2. The motion to intervene as plaintiffs filed by the residents of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision
is GRANTED; and
3. The motions for contempt filed by both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant are
DENIED.
 This resolution is immediately executory. 5
On 15 December 1989 both motions for reconsideration of Solid Homes, Inc., and LA VISTA were denied. In
separate petitions, both elevated the 21 September 1989 and 15 December 1989 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals to
this Court. The petition of Solid Homes, Inc., docketed as G.R. No. 91433, prayed for an order directing the
appellate court to take cognizance of and hear the motions for contempt, while that of LA VISTA in G.R. No. 91502 sought
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to order Solid Homes, Inc., ATENEO and LOYOLA residents to desist from
intruding into Mangyan Road.
On 22 May 1990, pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 91433 and 91502, the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals 6 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929 affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q-22450. On 6 September 1990 the motions for reconsideration and/or re-raffle and to set the case for oral argument
were denied. In view of the affirmance of the Decision by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929
this Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 91502 for being moot as its main concern was merely the validity  of a
provisional or preliminary injunction earlier issued. We also denied the petition in G.R. No. 91433 in the absence  of a
discernible grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the appellate court that it could not entertain the motions to cite the
parties for contempt "because a charge of contempt committed against a superior court may be filed only before
the court against whom the contempt has been committed" (Sec. 4, Rule 71, Rules of Court). 7
Consequently we are left with the instant case where petitioner LA VISTA assails the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in toto  the Decision of the trial court which rendered a judgment on the
merits and recognized an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road, permanently enjoining LA VISTA from closing
to Solid Homes, Inc., and its successors-in-interest the ingress and egress on Mangyan Road.
In its first assigned error, petitioner LA VISTA argues that respondent appellate court erred in disregarding the
decisions in (a) La Vista Association,  Inc., v.  Hon.  Ortiz, 8 affirmed by
this Court in Tecson  v. Court of Appeals;  9  (b)  La Vista Association,  Inc., v.  Hon.  Leviste, 10 affirmed by
this Court in Rivera  v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate  Court;  11 and, (c) La  Vista  v. Hon. Mendoza, 12 and in holding that
an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road exists. 13
We do not agree with petitioner. The reliance of petitioner on the cited cases is out of place as they involve the
issuance of a preliminary injunction pending resolution of a case on the merits. In the instant case, however, the
subject of inquiry is not merely the issuance of a preliminary injunction but the final injunctive writ which was issued after
trial on the merits. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The opinion
and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even
before the trial on the merits is terminated. Consequently there may be vital facts subsequently presented during the trial
which were not obtaining when the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Hence, to equate the basis for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction with that for the issuance of a final injunctive writ is erroneous. And it does not
necessarily mean that when a writ of preliminary injunction issues a final injunction follows. Accordingly,
respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision rightly held that —
We are unswayed by appellant's theory that the cases cited by them in their Brief (pages 17
and 32) and in their motion for early resolution (page 11, Rollo) to buttress the first assigned error, are
final judgments on the merits of, and therefore res judicata to the instant query. It is quite strange that
appellant was extremely cautious in not mentioning this doctrine but the vague disquisition nevertheless
points to this same tenet, which upon closer examination negates the very proposition. Generally, it is
axiomatic that res judicata will attach in favor of La Vista if and when the case under review was
disposed of on the merits and with finality (Manila Electric Co.  vs. Artiaga, 50 Phil. 144;
147; S  . Diego vs.  Carmona, 70 Phil. 281; 283; cited in Comments on the Rules of Court, by Moran,
Volume II, 1970 edition, page 365; Roman Catholic Archbishop vs.  Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 339;
350-351, cited in Remedial Law Compendium, by Regalado, Volume 1, 1986 Fourth Revised Edition,
page 40). Appellants suffer from the mistaken notion that the "merits" of the certiorari petitions
impugning the preliminary injunction in the cases cited by it are tantamount to the merits of the main
case, subject of the instant appeal. Quite the contrary, the so-called "final judgments'' adverted to dealt
only with the propriety of the issuance or non-issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, unlike the
present recourse which is directed against a final injunctive writ under Section 10, Rule 58. Thus the
invocation of the disputed matter herein is misplaced. 14
We thus repeat what we said in Solid Homes, Inc.,  v. La  Vista  15 which respondent Court of Appeals quoted in
its assailed Decision  16 —
Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately
or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merits of the main case for injunction. The
merits of the main case having been already determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary
determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.
 Petitioner LA VISTA in its lengthy Memorandum also quotes our ruling in Ramos, Sr., v.  Gatchalian
Realty,  Inc., 17  no less than five (5) times 18  —
To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right-
of-way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows
petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely
ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a
right-of-way, that 'mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To
justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it'
(See Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 371)
Again this is misplaced. Ramos, Sr.,  v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,  19 concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-
of-way —
Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right-of-way
by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the
respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is
whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right-of-way —
which should be distinguished from a voluntary easement. A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted
by law for public use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the
owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four (4)
requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and, (d)
the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. 20 A voluntary easement on
the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest
intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and
servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in
par. 3 of their Deed  of  Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining
property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property
herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors;" (b) the Tuasons in
1951 expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights and
obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form
part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for
breach of contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL
set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the
middle of the 15-meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a
letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half  of  which is
taken from your property and the other half from the  La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your
7 ½ m.  portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7½
m. portion of the road in your favor;" (e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976,
acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the
Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent
ATENEO property and would thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March
1997, acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to  La Vista Assn., Inc.  The other
half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Thus respondent Court of Appeals did not commit a
reversible error when it ruled that —
Concerning the pivotal question posed herein on the existence of an easement, we are of the
belief, and thus hereby hold that a right-of-way was properly appreciated along the entire
route of Mangyan Road. Incidentally, the pretense that the court a quo erred in holding that Mangyan
Road is the boundary road between La Vista and Ateneo (page 31, Appellant's Brief) does not raise any
critical eyebrow since the same is wholly irrelevant to the existence of a servitude thereon from their
express admission to the contrary (paragraph 1, Answer).
One's attention should rather be focused on the contractual stipulations in the deed of sale
between the Tuason Family and the Philippine Building Corporation (paragraph 3, thereof) which
 were incorporated in the deed of assignment with assumption of mortgage by the Philippine Building
Corporation in favor of Ateneo (first paragraph, page 4 of the deed) as well as in the deed of sale dated
October 24, 1976 when the property was ultimately transferred by Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee. Like any
other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary rescission of the
contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots
(Chuanico  vs. Ibañez, 7 CA Reports, 2nd Series, 1965 edition, pages 582; 589, cited in Civil Law
Annotated, by Padilla, Volume II, 1972 Edition, pages 602-603), more so when the easement was
implicitly recognized by the letters of the La Vista President to Ateneo dated February 11 and April 28,
1976 (page 22, Decision; 19 Ruling Case Law 745).
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement between
Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with
the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same so much so that —
When the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works impairing
the use of the servitude, the owner of the dominant tenement may ask for the
destruction of such works and the restoration of the things to their condition before the
impairment was committed, with indemnity for damages suffered (3 Sanchez Roman 609). An
injunction may also be obtained in order to restrain the owner of the servient tenement from
obstructing or impairing in any manner the lawful use of the servitude (Resolme v. Lazo, 27
Phil. 416; 417; 418)." (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
by Tolentino, Volume 2, 1963 edition, page 320). 21
Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be
used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant case, the  court merely declares the
existence of an easement created by the parties. Respondent court could not have said it any better —
It must be emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement along Mangyan
Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by the manifest will of the parties herein in
recognition of autonomy of contracts (Articles 1306 and 619, New Civil Code; Tolentino, supra, page
308; Civil Code of the Philippines, by Paras, Volume II, 1984 edition, page 549). 22
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise
meritless, to say the least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified
as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity. 23
That there is no contract between LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court could not have declared
the existence of an easement created by the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-
interest of both LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively,
clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building Corporation
transferred its rights and obligations to ATENEO the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile, the
Tuasons themselves developed their property into what is now known as LA VISTA. On the other hand, ATENEO sold the
hillside portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the right over the easement of right-of-way. In sum, when
the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all
who in the future might succeed them in dominion. cdtai
The contractual easement of right-of-way having been confirmed, we find no reason to delve on the issue
concerning P.D. No. 957 which supposedly grants free access to any subdivision street to government or public offices
within the subdivision. In the instant case, the rights under the law have already been superseded by the voluntary
easement of right-of-way.
Finally, petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA residents at a time when the case was already on
appeal, and submits that intervention is no longer permissible after trial has been concluded. Suffice it to say that
in Director  of  Lands  v. Court of Appeals,  24 we said —
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial has already been concluded, a judgment thereon had been
promulgated in favor of private respondent and on appeal by the losing party . . . the same was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under . . . Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court (now Sec. 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
 But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a
rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to
obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of the Rule due to
alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to
commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value
and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors' claims be proven to be true.
After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay the proceedings. On the contrary, it seems
to have expedited the resolution of the case as the incidents brought forth by the intervention, which could have been
raised in another case, were resolved together with the issues herein resulting in a more thorough disposal of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 22 May 1990 and its Resolution dated 6
September 1990, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, dated 20 November 1987, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95252, [September 5, 1997], 344 PHIL 30-51)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136996. December 14, 2001.]

EDILBERTO ALCANTARA, FLORENCIO VILLARMIA, POLICARPIO OBREGON, + RICARDO

ROBLE, ESCOLASTICA ONDONG, ESTEBAN RALLOS, HENRY SESBINO, SERGIO SESBINO,
MANUEL CENTENO, + RENATO CRUZ, MARCELINO CENEZA, BUENAVENTURA ONDONG, and
BENJAMIN HALASAN,  petitioners,vs.CORNELIO B. RETA, JR.,  respondent.

Pedro F. Alcantara,  Jr. for petitioners.

Garcia Iñigo De Guzman Sarsaba Heje & Associates for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase subject property in
accordance with Section 3(g) of P.D. No. 1517, claiming they are the legitimate tenants or lessees thereof. Both the trial
court and the CA dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held: that P.D. No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Act,"
pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones; that subject land is beyond the ambit of P.D. No. 1517 since it
has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law is BP Blg. 25 for failure of petitioners to
pay rentals; and that petitioners are not the legitimate tenants contemplated by PD No. 1517, who can exercise the right
of first refusal. aECSHI

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LEASE; THE URBAN LAND REFORM ACT (P.D. NO. 1517); PERTAINS TO AREAS
PROCLAIMED AS URBAN LAND REFORM ZONES; CASE AT BAR. — Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known
as "The Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones. Consequently, petitioners
cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.
 2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL MAY BE AVAILED OF ONLY BY LEGITIMATE TENANT OF THE
LAND; CASE AT BAR. — To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree,
one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by
contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do not fall within the said
category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the
property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.
Respondent Reta denies that he has lease agreements with petitioners Edilberto Alcantara and Ricardo Roble.
Edilberto Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present proof of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court that
he bought the house that he is occupying from his father-in-law. Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use
sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba.This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and
not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance,
unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the
land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article
614 of the Civil Code.Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the
agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined
by Presidential Decree No. 1517. As to the other petitioners, respondent Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements
with them. This notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants contemplated by  Presidential Decree No. 1517,
who can exercise the right of first refusal.

DECISION

PARDO,  J p:

The Case
In this petition for review, 1 petitioners seek to review the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14, dismissing petitioners' complaint for the exercise of the right
of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of
amicable settlement. cdaisa
The Facts
Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio Obregon, Ricardo Roble, Escolastica Ondong, Esteban Rallos,
Henry Sesbino, Sergio Sesbino, Manuel Centeno, Renato Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza, Buenaventura Ondong and Benjamin
Halasan, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14, a complaint 4 against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the
exercise of the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorney's
fees and nullity of amicable settlement.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta; that the land has been converted by Reta into a
commercial center; and that Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first
refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate
tenants or lessees thereof.
They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio for
being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has
not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg.25 for failure of the
plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the use of the land; and that the amicable settlement between him and Ricardo Roble was
translated to the latter and fully explained in his own dialect. aTEScI
On March 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to
pay Reta certain sums representing rentals that had remained unpaid. 5
On April 6, 1994, plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 6
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 7 affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court.
Hence, this appeal. 8
The Issue
 The issue is whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a
petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that the land they were occupying be declared as an ULRZ. On
May 27, 1986, the request was referred to Mr. Jose L. Atienza, General Manager, National Housing Authority, for
appropriate action. 9 The request was further referred to acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd
Indorsement dated July 1, 1986. 10 Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary
if the property was an ULRZ.
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as
Urban Land Reform Zones. 11 Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved
is not an ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1) a
legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has
resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category cannot be
considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the
owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. 12
Respondent Reta denies that he has lease agreements with petitioners Edilberto Alcantara and Ricardo
Roble. 13 Edilberto Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present proof of a lease agreement other than his testimony in
court that he bought the house that he is occupying from his father-in-law. 14
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he
gathered tuba.This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides. 15
Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering
of tuba.This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.16
Whether the amicable settlement 17 is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement
was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by Presidential Decree
No. 1517.
As to the other petitioners, respondent Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with them. This
notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants contemplated by Presidential Decree No. 1517, who can exercise
the right of first refusal.
A contract has been defined as "a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.'' 18
Clearly, from the moment respondent Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease
agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly, 19 ceased to exist as there was termination
of the lease. ACTaDH
Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.
Another factor which militates against petitioners' claim is the fact that there is no intention on the part of
respondent Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would
allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land, has not happened. P.D. No. 1517 applies
where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party. 20
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals  21 and
the resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Alcantara v. Reta, Jr., G.R. No. 136996, [December 14, 2001], 423 PHIL 623-629)
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114170. January 15, 1999.]

PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC.,  petitioner, vs.  COURT  OF APPEALS and

METROPOLITAN FABRICS,  INC., respondents.

Gonzales Batiller Bilog and Associates for petitioner.

Ceferino Padua Law Office for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On November 7, 1991, petitioner filed an injunctive suit in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner
alleged that in violation of the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, private respondent refused to allow petitioner to
make excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of water pipes; that it banned entry of petitioner's
truck and those of its tenants between 11:30 AM to 1:00 PM and 10:00 PM to 7:00 AM; and that it subjected the vehicles
to unnecessary searches. Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction requiring private respondent to
allow to proceed with the MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow petitioner's and its tenant's
delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without undergoing unnecessary searches, and to
otherwise recognize petitioner's right of way over said lot. After trial on the merits, the court a quo granted petitioner's
prayer of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved by the decision, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals to annul the order of the Regional Trial Court. On November 26, 1994, the
appellate court granted the petition and set aside the questioned orders after finding that the trial court had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing them. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the petition for
review on certiorari. TaDSCA
The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the right of the complainant to justify
the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction must be clear and unmistakable because it requires the
performance of a particular act or acts and thus tends to do more than maintain the status quo. In this case,
the Court found that the word "passage" stated in the memorandum does not clearly and unmistakably convey a meaning
that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner
proposes requires the consideration of evidence showing the parties' intention in using the word which can only be done
during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner cannot claim to have a clear and unmistakable right justifying the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution and
denied petitioner's application for the preliminary writ. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
26, 1993 and its resolution dated February 28, 1994 were affirmed. THESAD

SYLLABUS

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY MANDATORY

INJUNCTION; JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE THEREOF; THE PARTY SEEKING THE
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION MUST HAVE A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE
RIGHT. — As held in Pelejo v.  Court  of  Appeals  (117 SCRA 665 [1982]), to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction the following must be shown: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has
been violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (3) that there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. The right of the complainant must be clear and unmistakable because, unlike an ordinary
preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act or acts and
thus tends to do more than maintain the status quo. In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged right to the
preliminary mandatory injunction on the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, which provides that:
[T]he above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever
kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-in-interest. There is no
question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give petitioner the right to use the private road as a
means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side of the compound. The question concerns the
meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right
to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word "passage" does
not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road.
The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Webster's Dictionary, is that it is "the act or action of passing: movement
or transference from one place or point to another." Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Black's Law
Dictionary, the "act of passing; transit; transition." To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes requires
the consideration of evidence showing the parties' intention in using the word which can only be done during trial on the
merits. Until such time, petitioner cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right justifying the issuance  of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution and denied
petitioner's application for the preliminary writ. TDAHCS

DECISION

MENDOZA, J  p:

For review in this case is a decision 1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. 28684-SP dated
November 26, 1993 setting aside a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 95). cdasia
On August 3, 1984, petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. gave a loan to private respondent Metropolitan
Fabrics, Inc. 2 To secure the payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged to petitioner seven parcels of land
located at 685 Tandang Sora Avenue, Bo. Banlat, Quezon City. 3 The lots comprise a commercial compound with
Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road.
By October 27, 1987, private respondent's loan amounted to P10.5 million. 4 As private respondent defaulted in
the payment of the loan, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage and, in the ensuing public bidding, became the highest bidder
and purchaser of the seven (7) lots subject of the mortgage.
Later, private respondent negotiated with petitioner for the redemption of three lots covered by TCT Nos. 317705,
317706, and 317707, 5 all located on the southern and middle portions of the compound. As the reacquisition of these
three lots by private respondent would leave the remaining four lots on the northwestern side without access to Tandang
Sora Avenue, petitioner acceded to private respondent's request on the condition that petitioner be given a right of way on
the existing private road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by private respondent. The parties' agreement was
embodied in a Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, the full text of which reads: 6
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERTAKING
KNOW ALL MEN THESE PRESENTS:
 That METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC. is the registered owner of that certain land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 317709, more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 11 (Existing Road) of the consolidation-subdn. plan (LRC) Pcs-27706,
approved as a non-subdn. project, being a portion of the consolidation of Lots 373-E, (LRC)
Psd-16383; 377-B, Fls-2163-D; 377-C-1, 2, 3, & 4 (LRC) Psd-5025; 377-C-5-A, & B, (LRC)
Psd-9474; 384-A & 387-B-1, (LRC) Psd-254813; 388-A & C, Psd-30663; 388-B-1, 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Psd-54827; 389-A-1, 2 & 3, 389-B-1 (LRC) Psd-10087; and 389-B-2-C, (LRC) Psd-18842; LRC
(GLRO) Rec. No. 5975) situated in the Bo. of Banlat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Is. of Luzon . .
. containing of an area of FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (5,367)
SQUARE METERS, more or less.
That the above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and
egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its
successors-in-interest, the mortgagee of Lots 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the consolidation-subdivision plan,
Pcs-27706 of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703, 317704, 317705, 317706 &
317707, respectively, in the name of METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC.
DONE this Sep. 18, 1987 in the city of Manila.
On November 7, 1991, petitioner filed an injunctive suit in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95).
Petitioner alleged that, in violation of the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, private respondent refused to allow
petitioner to make excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of water pipes; that it banned
entry of petitioner's trucks and those of its tenants between 11:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M.; and that
it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary searches. Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction requiring private respondent "to allow [petitioner] to proceed with the MWSS installation project over the road lot
in question, to allow [petitioner's] and [its] tenants' delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and
without undergoing unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize [petitioner's] right of way over the said
lot." 7 Petitioner prayed that, after trial, the writ be made final.
On December 21, 1991, private respondent filed an answer with counterclaim, alleging that petitioner's right to
undertake excavations on the access road was not provided for in the Memorandum of Undertaking. 8 As counterclaim,
private respondent alleged that it was petitioner which caused damage to private respondent's tenants by undertaking,
without its consent, construction works on the access road which raised its level to about a meter and caused serious
flooding of the nearby buildings whenever it rained; 9 and that, as a result, its tenants demanded compensation for
damage to their merchandise and equipment occasioned by the flooding. Private respondent prayed for P2.1 million as
counterclaim. 10
The trial court required the parties to submit position papers in connection with petitioner's prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction. 11 After the parties had done so, the trial court granted, on February 14, 1992, petitioner's prayer
for a preliminary writ, conditioned upon the filing by petitioner of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. The trial court said
in part:
. . . [T]he court finds that to deny plaintiff's application for a preliminary mandatory injunction
writ would be to disregard its right of way in respect of the road lot in question, a right clearly set forth in
defendant's memorandum of undertaking of September 18, 1987; indeed, no cogent reason appears to
warrant treating the terms "for whatever kind of passage" contained therein as nothing more than a
useless, meaningless redundancy . . .
ACCORDINGLY, plaintiff's subject application is hereby granted and the Court hereby directs
that upon the filing and approval of the corresponding injunction bond in the sum of P500,000.00, . . . let
corresponding preliminary mandatory injunction writ be issued directing defendant to allow plaintiff to
proceed with its MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow plaintiff's and its
tenant's delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without undergoing
unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize plaintiff's right of way over the said road lot, pending
the termination of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court . . . 12
On March 2, 1992, the trial court issued the writ upon filing of the required bond by petitioner. 13 Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders granting injunction which the trial court denied. 14 However, it
increased the injunction bond to P2.1 million. 15
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to annul the aforesaid
orders, dated February 14, 1992 and March 2, 1992, of the trial court. On November 26, 1994, the appellate court granted
the petition and set aside the questioned orders after finding that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing them. 16 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 28, 1994, petitioner filed the present
petition for review on certiorari alleging that: 17
 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
EXERCISED CERTIORARI POWERS TO REVERSE AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, UPON FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT "MISUNDERSTOOD"
THE RIGHT OF HEREIN PETITIONER PROSPERITY OVER THE ROAD LOT IN QUESTION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE DOCTRINE
ENUNCIATED IN  RIVAS V. SEC  (190 SCRA 295) DESPITE THE DIVERSITY IN FACTUAL
SETTING OF THE INSTANT CASE VIS-A-VIS THAT OBTAINING IN THE CITED CASE. LLjur
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THE MERITS OF THE
MAIN CASE IN A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING PRACTICALLY RENDERING ACADEMIC THE
HEARING PROPER YET TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT MADE FINDINGS OF FACTS ON
THE BASIS OF THE REPRESENTATION AND RECITAL OF FACTS MADE IN THE MFI PETITION
AND PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERTAKING WITHOUT
CONSIDERING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ITS EXECUTION WHICH WERE
YET TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A FULL BLOWN TRIAL.
The assignment of errors raises a single question: whether, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake excavations along the access road for the
purpose of installing water pipes, the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion.
As held in Pelejo  v. Court of Appeals,  18 to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
the following must be shown: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has been violated and the
invasion is material and substantial; and (3) that there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
The right of the complainant must be clear and unmistakable because, unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction,
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act or acts 19 and thus tends to do
more than maintain the status quo. 20 In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged right to the preliminary mandatory
injunction on the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, which provides that:
[T]he above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for
whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-
in-interest.
There is no question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give petitioner the right to use
the private road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side of the compound. The
question concerns the meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial court read this phrase to mean that
petitioner had the right to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The
word "passage" does not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install water
pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Webster's Dictionary, is that it is "the act or
action of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to another." 21 Its legal meaning is not different. It
means, according to Black's Law Dictionary, the "act of passing; transit; transition." 22 To achieve a meaning such as that
which petitioner proposes requires the consideration of evidence showing the parties' intention in using the word which
can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable"
right justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have
observed caution and denied petitioner's application for the preliminary writ.
Petitioner contends that resort should be made to facts surrounding the execution of the
Memorandum of Undertaking which, according to it, shows the intention of the parties to give petitioner the right to install
water pipes along the side of the access road. 23 It cites Rule 130 §11 24 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 11. Interpretation according to circumstances. — For the proper construction of an
instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof
and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose
language he is to interpret.
That is precisely what we are saying. The recourse petitioner proposes must await the presentation  of the parties'
evidence during trial and the determination of their intention must be made by the trial court, not by this Court. Petitioner
cannot circumvent the process by asking this Court to determine the facts surrounding the execution of their agreement.
Indeed, for us to undertake such inquiry would be to expand the scope of the present review and intrude into the
domain of the trial court. Petitioner will have ample opportunity to substantiate its allegations on this point during the
trial of the case. Rule 130 §11, which petitioner invokes, is actually a rule for interpretation of documentary evidence
formally offered at the trial. It does not apply to preliminary proceedings concerning the issuance of ancillary remedies.
 Anent petitioner's contention that the writ of certiorari does not lie because the error sought to be corrected is an
error of judgment, suffice it to say that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction despite the doubt on petitioner's right to it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 26, 1993, and its resolution, dated
February 28, 1994, are hereby AFFIRMED. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114170, [January 15, 1999], 361 PHIL 30-39)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130845. November 27, 2000.]

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA,  petitioner,vs.HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and
SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.

The Law Firm of Chan Robles & Associates for petitioner.

Pedro I. Rodriguez for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of land previously owned by spouses Gabriel.
When Villanueva bought the land, there was a small house on the southeastern portion, occupying one meter of the two-
meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private
respondent. Unknown to Villanueva, even before he bought the land, there was already a final and executory decision
enforcing the right to easement where the small house encroaching the same was ordered demolished by Judge Velasco.
The easement in the case at bar is both voluntary and legal easement. The settled rule is that the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Hence, petitioner ought to demolish the small house on the
easement obstructing the entry of private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. And even if the easement was
not annotated in the title of the land and the notice of lis pendens  was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, in legal
easement, the servient estate is bound to provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to the public highway.
Further, the decision enforcing the right of easement against the previous owner, is conclusive and binding upon the
successor-in-interest.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; EASEMENTS; KINDS; LEGAL EASEMENT; ELUCIDATED. — [A] legal easement is
one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a
compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the  Civil
Code.The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity. has been paid; (3) the isolation was not
due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. DAESTI
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;THE NEEDS OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE DETERMINE THE WIDTH OF THE EASEMENT. —
[T]he small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents'
cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the
needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish
whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents' estate.
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;LEGAL EASEMENT BINDING EVEN IF NOT ANNOTATED IN THE TITLE AND NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS OF CASE ENFORCING THE SAME NOT RECORDED. — Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not
bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of  lis pendens  of the
complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious ...it is in the
nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private
respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS; DECISION IN A CASE BINDING TO THE
PARTIES AND SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST AFTER CASE COMMENCED. — Petitioner's last argument that he was not
a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he had not been given his day: in court, is also without merit [in view of] Rule
39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules of Court. . . . [A] decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said
case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this
case, private respondents. . . initiated; Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8,1991, against the original owners. . . . Title in
the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the
bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For,
although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in
court.

DECISION

QUISUMBING,  J p:

This petition for certiorari assails (1) the decision 1 dated December 27, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39166, dismissing petitioner's petition for review under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a cease and desist
order and/or temporary restraining order, and (2) the resolution 2 dated August 14, 1997 denying the subsequent motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of
said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19,
1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one
meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. The pertinent portion of the contract dated
November 28, 1979, states:
...in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their houses are
constructed and to have an outlet to Tandang Sora Ave. which is the nearest public road and the least
burdensome to the servient estate and to third persons, it would be necessary for them to pass through
spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA CAPUNO's land and for this purpose, a path or
passageway of not less than two (2) meters wide of said spouses' property is necessary for the use of
ROMEO, RODOLFO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and for all their needs in entering their
property.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that the property of the ESPINOLA had been bought by them
from MAXIMO CAPUNO, father of MAXIMO GABRIEL, spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA
CAPUNO hereby agree and permit RODOLFO, ROMEO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and their
families to have a permanent easement of right of way over the aforementioned property of said
spouses limited to not more than two meters wide, throughout the whole length of the southeast side of
 said property and as specifically indicated in the attached plan which is made an integral part of this
Contract as Annex "A";
This Agreement shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs, successors, assigns,
without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the circumstances. 3
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small
house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio
Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. 4 As successors-in-interest,
Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house
encroaching on the easement. On August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied.
Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On March 26, 1992, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTC's
issuances. The decision became final and executory on July 31, 1992. 5
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 88, issued an Alias Writ of
Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third
Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his
property since he was not a party to the civil case. His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was
denied for lack of merit on August 16, 1995. 6 The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995 were denied on October 19, 1995. 7
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
39166, asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a
party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas
could not be enforced against him. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied the
reconsideration, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed by this court for lack of merit.
No costs considering the failure of private respondents to file their comment, despite notice. 8
Hence, this instant petition.
Petitioner now avers that the appellate court erred in declaring,
(1) THAT FOLLOWING THE ESSENCE OF INHERENCE AND INTRANSMISSIBILITY OF AN
EASEMENT, A RIGHT OF WAY CAN EXIST EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT EXPRESSLY STATED OR
ANNOTATED ON THE TORRENS TITLE;
(2) THAT PETITIONER, AS PROSPECTIVE BUYER, SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
ORDINARY PRUDENCE BY TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO DETERMINE THAT AN EASEMENT HAS
BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE PROPERTY HE INTENDS TO BUY; AND,
(3) THAT IN AS MUCH AS THE HEREIN PETITIONER IS NOT A PARTY TO CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-91-8703, HE CANNOT BE BOUND BY ANY JUDGMENT OR ORDER RENDERED THEREIN. 9
Primarily, the issue is whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
Petitioner argues it could not be enforced against him. First, he says that a right of way cannot exist when it is not
expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title. According to him, even if an easement is inherent and inseparable from
the estate to which it actively belongs as provided in Art. 617 of the Civil Code, 10 the same is extinguished when the
servient estate is registered and the easement was not annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the Land
Registration Law. Second, petitioner points out that the trial court erred when it faulted him for relying solely on the clean
title of the property he bought, as it is well-settled that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go beyond
what is recorded in the title. He adds that it is private respondents who should have made sure their right of way was
safeguarded by having the same annotated on the title with the Register of Deeds. He adds that  Section 76 of P.D. No.
1529 11 also requires that when a case is commenced involving any right to registered land under the  Land Registration
Law (now the Property Registration Decree), any decision on it will only be effectual between or among the parties
thereto, unless a notice of lis pendens of such action is filed and registered in the registry office where the land is
recorded. There was no such annotation in the title of the disputed land, according to petitioner.  Lastly, since he was not a
party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, petitioner argues that he cannot be bound by the writ of demolition and be forcibly
divested of a portion of his land without having his day in court. STcADa
Private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla, for their part, adopted the disquisition of the appellate court as their
Comment and asked for the dismissal of the petition and P100,000.00 in damages. In its decision the appellate court,
citing the decision of the lower court, stressed that unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a
right of way can exist even if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because
servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover, Villanueva was bound
by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by
law, and continues to exists unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is
removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 12 in accordance with Article 617 13 of
the Civil Code.
At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant
petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement.
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing
property right. 14 As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said
Article 617 of the Civil Code.The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. 15 The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the
existence of said easement (right of way).This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on this Court, 16 hence we
see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter
wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for
the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement. 17 Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the
needs of private respondents' estate.
Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not
annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient
estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and
egress to the public highway.
Petitioner's last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he had not been given his
day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship
of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be   prima
facie  evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases,  the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Italics
supplied).
Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are
their successor-in-interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court.  18 In this case, private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991,  19 against the
original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of
Deeds 20 on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence,
the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Villanueva v. Velasco, G.R. No. 130845, [November 27, 2000], 399 PHIL 664-674)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114348. September 20, 2000.]

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,  petitioner, vs.  COURT  OF APPEALS and DICK

MANGLAPUS, respondents.

The Solicitor General  for petitioner.

Atty. Simeon T. Agustin for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in barrio Baybayog, Municipality of Alcala, Province of
Cagayan, was issued in the name of respondent's predecessor-in-interest Vicente Manglapus. The land grant provided,
among others, a condition that the land shall be subject to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized
and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of  Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended. Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.
Sometime in 1982, the NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction. Under the contract, the NIA
was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. The NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land
and made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint
for damages against the NIA. Manglapus alleged that the NIA's diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his
land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Manglapus ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P150,600.00) and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition by the NIA.
 The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the trial court awarding Manglapus just
compensation. According to the Court, the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original Certificate of Title covering the
subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over the land covered therein. The
transfer certificate of title, on which both the trial court and Court of Appeals relied, contained such a reservation, and said
reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting
condition.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; EASEMENT OF A RIGHT OF WAY; THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF
THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND CONTAINED RESERVATION GRANTING THE GOVERNMENT A RIGHT OF WAY
OVER THE LAND COVERED THEREIN. — We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original
Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over
the land covered therein. The transfer certificate of title, on which both the trial court and Court of Appeals relied, contains
such a reservation. It states that title to the land shall be: ". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and
the Public Land Act, as well as those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions
contained in the original title as may be subsisting." Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and
condition that the land is subject to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by
law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114,  Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended."
This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a
subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent, "shall further be
subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways, railroads, irrigation  ditches, aqueducts,
telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprises,
including mining or forest concessionaires may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only." We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well within the
limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain. TAIEcS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY EXISTS IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT IN CASE
AT BAR. — Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a
legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to
respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which
case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.
Neither can Manglapus argue that he was a transferee or buyer in good faith. Under the Torrens system, for one to be a
buyer in good faith and for value, the vendee must see the transfer certificate of title and rely upon the same. Here, the
annotation on the transfer certificate of title imposed on Manglapus the duty to refer to the conditions annotated on the
back of the original certificate of title. This, he did not do. The law cannot protect him. Manglapus is a transferee with
notice of the liens annotated in the title.

DECISION

PARDO,  J p:

This case is an appeal 1 from the decision of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 04, Tuguegarao, Cagayan 3 ruling in favor of private respondent Dick Manglapus (hereinafter referred
to as "Manglapus"), and ordering petitioner National Irrigation Administration (hereinafter referred to as "NIA") to pay
Manglapus one hundred fifty thousand six hundred pesos (P150,600.00), and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), as
compensatory damages, five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), as attorney's fees, and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), as
litigation expenses and costs.
First, the relevant facts.
On June 28, 1963, a free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in barrio Baybayog, municipality of
Alcala, province of Cagayan was issued in the name of respondent's predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manglapus, and
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-24814, in his name. The land was granted to Vicente
Manglapus, 4 subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title: 5
 "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said tract of land, with the appurtenances thereunto of right
belonging unto the said VICENTE MANGLAPUS and to his heirs and assigns forever, subject to the
provisions of Sections 113, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act. No. 141, as amended which
provide that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, the land
hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of five (5)
years from the date of this patent, and shall not be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior
to the expiration of that period; that it shall not be encumbered, alienated, or transferred to any person,
corporation, association or partnership not qualified to acquire lands of the public domain under
said Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended; and that it shall not be subject to any encumbrance
whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association or partnership except with the consent of the
grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for
educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions
and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in
Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141  as amended, and the right of
the Government to administer and protect the timber found thereon for a term of five (5) years from the
date of this patent, provided, however, that the grantee or heirs may cut and utilize such timber for his
or their personal use (emphasis ours)." ACDTcE
Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.
On July 18, 1974, the land was registered in Dick Manglapus' name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
26658 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan. 6 The land is particularly described as follows: 7
"Lot No. 3559, Pls-497, with an area of 30,438 square meters, and covered by TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-26658, and Tax Declaration No. 11985."
Sometime in 1982, NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction. Under the contract, NIA
was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and
made diggings and fillings thereon. 8
The portion of Manglapus' land entered into by NIA is described as follows: 9
"In a sketch prepared by NIA's employee labeled as NIA canal "Lateral "D", with an area of
7,880 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 3559, Pls-497."
On March 14, 1991, Manglapus filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for
damages against NIA. 10 Manglapus alleged that NIA's diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land and
that no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking. 11
Despite service of notice of the pre-trial conference, 12 NIA did not appear at the pre-trial conference. 13
On December 3, 1991, the trial court declared NIA in default and received Manglapus' evidence ex parte. 14
On December 23, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Manglapus, thus: 15
"WHEREFORE, and in consideration of the foregoing, the Court finds preponderance of
evidence in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant:
"1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P150,600.00) and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages;
"2) Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as
attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as litigation expenses; and
"3) To pay the cost of the suit.
"SO ORDERED."
On January 27, 1992, NIA filed a motion to lift the order of default dated December 3, 1991, and to set aside the
afore-quoted decision of December 23, 1991. 16
On June 3, 1992, the trial court issued a resolution denying the motion for lack of merit. 17
On July 17, 1992, NIA filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. 18
On July 27, 1992, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmission of the original
records to the Court of Appeals. 19
On July 30, 1992, Manglapus filed a motion for execution of judgment with the trial court. 20
 On August 7, 1992, the NIA through the Solicitor General filed an opposition to the motion for execution. 21
On August 17, 1992, the trial court declared that since the notice of appeal of NIA was given due course, the
motion for execution was "moot and academic." 22
On March 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 23
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, this appeal. 24
The sole issue is whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his
property for use as easement of a right of way.
We find that NIA is under no such obligation. We sustain the appeal.
We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title 25 and the Original Certificate of Title 26 covering the
subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over the land covered therein. 27
The transfer certificate of title, on which both the trial court and Court of Appeals relied, contains such a
reservation. It states that title to the land shall be: 28
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as
those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions contained in the
original title as may be subsisting (emphasis ours)." AHcaDC
Under the Original Certificate of Title, 29 there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to "to all
conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections
109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This reservation, unlike the
other provisos 30 imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railroads, irrigation  ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works as
the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprises, including mining or forest
concessionaires may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only (emphasis ours)."
We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well within the limit provided
by law. 31 Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners.
The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a legal
easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to
respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which
case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way. 32
Neither can Manglapus argue that he was a transferee or buyer in good faith. Under the Torrens system, for one
to be a buyer in good faith and for value, the vendee must see the transfer certificate of title and rely upon the
same. 33 Here, the annotation on the transfer certificate of title imposed on Manglapus the duty to refer to the conditions
annotated on the back of the original certificate of title. This, he did not do. The law cannot protect him. Manglapus is a
transferee with notice of the liens annotated in the title.
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system is charged with notice of burdens and claims
that are annotated on the title. 34
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSES the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38835.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in Civil Case No. 4266, and DISMISSES the complaint.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114348, [September 20, 2000], 395 PHIL 48-57)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198774. April 4, 2016.]

TEOFILO ALOLINO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO FLORES and ANASTACIA
MARIE FLORES,  respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J  p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed from the July 8, 2011 decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R. CV No. 94524. 1 The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) decision 2 in Civil
Case No. 69320 3 and dismissed petitioner Teofilo Alolino's complaint against the respondents for the removal of
their illegally constructed structure.
Antecedents
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated at No. 47 Gen. Luna Street,
Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 784 and 976. TCT No. 784 was
issued on August 30, 1976 covering an area of 26 square meters; while TCT No. 976 was issued on August 29, 1977,
with an area of 95 square meters.
Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the
structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors.
There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the
second floor.
 In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari
sari  store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. Since
they were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only
about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The
respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his
ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused. Thus, he
complained about the illegal construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig. He also filed a complaint
with the Barangay of Tuktukan.
Acting on Alolino's complaint, the Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal Construction against the
respondents on February 15, 1995, directing them to immediately stop further construction. 4
Sometime in 2001 or 2002, the respondents began constructing a second floor to their structure, again
without securing a building permit. This floor was to serve as residence for their daughter, Maria Teresa Sison. The
construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with the Building Official of Taguig.
The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal Construction against the respondents on May 6, 2002,
directing the respondents to desist from their illegal construction. 5
On May 17, 2002, the Office of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan issued a certification that no settlement was
reached between the parties relative to Alolino's 1994 complaint. 6
The respondents did not comply with the directive from the building official. This prompted  Alolino to send
them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the removal of their illegally constructed structure.
Despite receipt of the demand letter, the respondents refused to comply. Thus, on February 14,
2003, Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC praying for: (1) the removal of the encroaching
structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and (3) the payment of
damages. Alolino claimed that the respondents' encroaching structure deprived him of his light and view and
obstructed the air ventilation inside his house. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 69320. cSEDTC
In their answer, 7 the respondent spouses denied that Alolino had a cause of action against them. They
alleged that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased
his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to
the very boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their
house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no window.
The respondents also admitted to them that they did not secure a building permit because the property was
constructed on a municipal/barrio road. They claimed, however, that on March 1, 2004, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Taguig (the Sanggunian) reclassified the property as a residential lot from its prior classification as a  barrio/municipal
road. 8
During the trial, both parties moved for an ocular inspection of the premises. Consequently, on November 19,
2007, the RTC ordered the branch clerk of court, the deputy sheriff, and the stenographer to conduct the inspection.
The ocular inspection was conducted on December 6, 2007.
In their report dated January 30, 2008, 9 the inspection team confirmed that the respondents' property
blocked the entry of light and air to Alolino's house.
On April 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to remove their illegal structure
obstructing Alolino's right to light and view.
The RTC found that Alolino had already previously acquired an easement of light and view and that the
respondents subsequently blocked this easement with their construction. It held that the respondents' illegal
construction was a private nuisance with respect to Alolino because it prevented him from using the back portion of
his property and obstructed his free passage to the barrio/municipal road. The court further held that the respondents'
house was a public nuisance, having been illegally constructed on a barrio road — a government property — without
a building permit.
The respondents appealed the decision to the CA and was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 94524.
On July 8, 2011, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The CA held (1) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view because he never gave a formal
prohibition against the respondents pursuant to Article 668 10 of the Civil Code; (2) that Alolino was also at fault,
having built his house up to the edge of the property line in violation of the National Building Code; 11 (3)
that Alolino had not acquired an easement of right of way to the barrio Road; and (4) that the respondents' house was
not a public nuisance because it did not endanger the safety of its immediate surroundings.
 The CA concluded that the Government had already abandoned the  barrio road pursuant to the 2004
Sanggunian resolution. It further held that the respondents' property could not be demolished, citing Section 28 of
the Urban Development and Housing Act. 12
Alolino moved for reconsideration on July 28, 2011.
On September 28, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration and maintained that  Alolino had not
acquired an easement of light and view.
Thus, on November 15, 2011, Alolino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
Alolino insists (1) that he acquired an easement of light and view by virtue of a title because the respondents
constructed their house on a barrio road; (2) that the provision of Sec. 708 of the National Building Code and Article
670 of the Civil Code prescribing the setbacks is inapplicable because the property is adjacent to a  barrio road; (3)
that he has a right of way over the lot occupied by the respondents because it is a barrio road; and (4) that the
respondents' house/sari sari store is a nuisance per se.
In its comment, the respondent counters (1) that Alolino has not acquired an easement of light and view or an
easement of right of way, by either prescription or title; (2) that Alolino is at fault for constructing his house up to the
edge of his property line without observing the setbacks required in Article 670 of the Civil Code and Section 702 of
the National Building Code; and (3) that their house/sari sari store is not a nuisance because it is not a serious threat
to public safety and the Sanggunian has already reclassified the lot as residential. SDAaTC
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on government property. Properties of
Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or patrimonial property. 13 Article 424
of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two classifications:
Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of
the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. 14 (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public dominion devoted to
public use.
We find no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local Government of Taguig had already withdrawn
the subject  barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a residential lot. The Local Government
Code 15 (LGC) authorizes an LGU to withdraw a local road from public use under the following conditions:
Section 21.  Closure and Opening of Roads. —
(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction; Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the Sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate
substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for
the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from
public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed. . . .
To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved
by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The difference
between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution is only a
declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body. 16
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the
absolute control of Congress. 17 Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these properties unless
specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC. 18 In exercising this authority, the
LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian's failure to
comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the  barrio road.
As a  barrio  road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the
commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; 19 (2) it is not subject to registration
under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; 20 (3) it is not susceptible to
prescription; 21 (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; 22 (5) it is not subject to
attachment and execution; 23 and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements. 24
An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging
to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate
does not belong. 25 Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of
ten years. 26 Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones can only be acquired
by virtue of a title. 27 Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical justification for the acquisition of a right. It may refer
to a law, a will, a donation, or a contract.
We must distinguish between the respondents' house and the land it is built on. The land itself is public
property devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and cannot be burdened with voluntary easements.
On the other hand, the respondents' house is private property, albeit illegally constructed on public property. It can be
the object of prescription and can be burdened with voluntary easements. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the
respondents have not voluntarily burdened their property with an easement in favor of Alolino. acEHCD
An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription. 28 On the other
hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the owner of
the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the
dominant estate. 29
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to
their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through prescription. Thus,
only easements created by law can burden the respondents' property.
The provisions on legal easements are found in Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the  Civil Code whose specific
coverage we list and recite below for clarity and convenience.
Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right of way. Article 649 creates a legal easement in
favor of an owner or any person entitled to use any immovable, which is landlocked by other immovables pertaining to
other persons without an adequate access to a public highway. Article 652 creates a legal easement in favor of an
isolated piece of land acquired by sale, exchange, partition, or donation when it is surrounded by other estates of the
vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor. Article 653 grants the same right of way in favor of the vendor, exchanger,
co-owner, or donor when his property is the one that becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an estate,
after payment of indemnity, a right of way to carry materials through the estate of another when it is indispensable for
the construction or repair of a building in his estate. Finally, Article 657 governs right of way easements for the
passage of livestock.
None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the barrio road where the
respondents' house stands on. EcTCAD
On the other hand, Section 5 of Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code (Articles 667-673)
governs legal easements of light and view. These seven provisions are:
SECTION 5
Easement of Light and View
Article 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the party wall any
window or aperture of any kind.
Article 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be
counted: (1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or (2) From the
time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the window is
through a wall on the dominant estate.
Article 669. When the distances in article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall which is not
party wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another, can make in it openings to
admit light at the height of the ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty
centimeters square, and, in every case, with an iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a wire
screen.
 Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the openings are
made can close them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the
contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall thereon
contiguous to that having such openings, unless an easement of light has been acquired.
Article 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two meters
between the wall in which they are made and such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there
be a distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription.
Article 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct
views from the outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the latter
when they do, and, in cases of oblique view, from the dividing line between the two properties.
Article 672. The provisions of article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated by a public way or
alley, which is not less than three meters wide, subject to special regulations and local ordinances.
Article 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views, balconies or
belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at
less than a distance of three meters to be measured in the manner provided in article 671. Any
stipulation permitting distances less than those prescribed in article 670 is void.
However, none of these provisions actually create a legal easement of light and view which can only be acquired
through prescription or a by virtue of a voluntary title.
From the foregoing, we agree with the respondents that Alolino does not have an easement of light and view
or an easement of right of way over the respondents' property or the  barrio road it stands on. This does not mean,
however, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and blocking the rear of Alolino's
house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing
nuisance. 30 Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents' house is evidently a nuisance:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. (emphasis supplied)
A barrio road is designated for the use of the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed
passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed house, are
injurious to public welfare and convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to
public use constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se. 31
The CA clearly erred when it invoked Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act as a ground to
deny the demolition of respondents' illegal structure. The invoked provision reads: HSAcaE
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks,
and playgrounds;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. . . . (emphasis supplied)
The invoked provision itself allows the demolition of illegal structures on public roads and sidewalks because
these nuisances are injurious to public welfare. Evidently, the respondents have no right to maintain their occupation
 and permanent obstruction of the  barrio road. The interests of the few do not outweigh the greater interest of public
health, public safety, good order, and general welfare.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
94524 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 153 in Civil
Case No. 69320 is REINSTATED.
The respondents, and all persons claiming rights under them, are ORDERED to remove and demolish their
illegal structure. The respondents are also ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as attorney's fees. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Alolino v. Flores, G.R. No. 198774, [April 4, 2016])