31. Appointments; Types; CA confirmation
Thus: x x x The
(Pimentel v. Ermita; Sarmiento v. Mison; Bautista v. Salonga)
PIMENTEL, JR. VS. ERMITA (G.R. NO. 164978. OCTOBER 13,
2005)
Constitutional Law; Appointments; Executive Department;
Congress; The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.—The
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive
power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to
appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to
an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office.
Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to
appoint any particular person to an office.
Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Even if the
Commission on Appointments is composed of members of
Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not
legislative.—Even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is
executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments
does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments.
Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution.
Although its membership is confined to members of Congress,
said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the
Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly
from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In
fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in
nature. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Considering the independence of the
Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for
petitioners to claim standing in the present case as
members of Congress.—Considering the independence of the
Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for
petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of
Congress. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments
while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress.
Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the
Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator
Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant
Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-
Estrada, and Senator Osmeñ a as members. Thus, on the
impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission
on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-
Estrada, and Osmeñ a have standing in the present petition. This
is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal,
who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives
as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present
petition.
Same; Same; Same; Congress, through a law, cannot impose
on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.—The essence of
an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is
a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on
the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and
confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego
should be.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch.”—The law
expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he
President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform
the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not
yet in the government service, as long as the President deems
that person competent.
Same; Same; Same; Ad interim appointments are extended
only during recess of Congress and are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection,
whereas appointments in an acting capacity may be
extended any time there is a vacancy and are not submitted
to the Commission on Appointments.—In distinguishing ad
interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a
noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad
interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments
in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance.
But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess
of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any
time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation
or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also
be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
SARMIENTO III VS. MISON (NO. L-79974. DECEMBER 17, 1987.)
1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of all presidential appointments, under
the 1973 constitution the president has absolute power of
appointment while under the 1987 Constitution, only the
first group of appointments requires confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.—In the 1935 Constitution,
almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, It is now a
sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution,
transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of
"horse-trading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the
1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
which it was molded and re-molded by successive amendments,
placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with
hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above
two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in
the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it,
struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in
the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group,
i.e., officers of lower rank.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent
of its framers is to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation on the Commission on Appointments except
appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16 Article VII.—In the 1987 Constitution, however, as
already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers
was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word
"President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power
to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the
second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII..
Commission on Appointments; Confirmation of the
appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by
the Commission on Appointments not required.—Coming
now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that
the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau
head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments
where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the
1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the
other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Same; Same; Appointment of respondent Savlador Mison as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting
his nomination to the Commission on Appointments is
within the constitutional authority of the President of the
Philippines.—Consequently, we rule that the President of the
Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power
in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the of fice
and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining
thereto. Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, No. L-79974
December 17, 1987
BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA G.R. NO. 86439. APRIL 13, 1989
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Appointing
Power of the President; Commission on Appointments;
Administrative Law; The appointment by the President of
the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is to be
made without the review and participation of the
Commission on Appointments.–––Since the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution, appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that
the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is
to be made without the review or participation of the
Commission on Appointments. To be more precise, the
appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested
by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights
pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is,
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
because they are among the officers of government “whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” And
Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes
the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. It provides: “(c) The Chairman
and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be
appointed by the President for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Appointments;
Acceptance of; Petitioner’s appointment on December 17,
1988 as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was
a completed act on the part of the President.–––The threshold
question that has really come to the fore is whether the
President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988, and after
petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had
been appointed, by taking the oath of office and actually
assuming and discharging the functions and duties thereof, could
extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14 January
1989, an “ad interim appointment” as termed by the respondent
Commission on Appointments or any other kind of appointment
to the same office of Chairman. Commission on Human Rights
that called for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. The Court, with all due respect to both the
Executive and Legislative Departments of government, and after
careful deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the
negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted
petitioner Bautista’s designation as Acting Chairman to a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised
Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such
appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance
of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject
or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the
appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming
immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista’s appointment
therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the
President. To paraphrase the great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall, in the celebrated case of Marbury vs. Madison. x x x
“The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The
appointment being the sole act of the president, must be
completely evidenced, when it is shown that he has done
everything to be performed by him. x x x Some point of time
must be taken when the power of the executive over an officer,
not removable at his will must cease. That point of time must be
when the constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act,
required from the person possessing the power, has been
performed. x x x But having once made the appointment, his (the
President’s) power over the office is terminated in all cases,
where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to
the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the
absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; No new or further appointment can be made to a
position already filled by a previously completed
appointment which had been accepted by the appointee
through a valid qualification and assumption of duty.–––It is
respondent Commission’s submission that the President, after
the appointment of 17 December 1988 extended to petitioner
Bautista, decided to extend another appointment (14 January
1989) to petitioner Bautista, this time, submitting such
appointment (more accurately, nomination) to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation. And yet, it seems obvious
enough, both in logic and in fact, that no new or further
appointment could be made to a position already filled by a
previously completed appointment which had been accepted by
the appointee, through a valid qualification and assumption of its
duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; Same; When the appointment is one that the
Constitution mandates is for the President to make without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the
Executive’s act of submitting such appointment to the
Commission on Appointments, and the latter’s act of
confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction.–––Respondent Commission vigorously
contends that granting that petitioner’s appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is one that under
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the
president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit such appointment
to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The
mischief in this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in the
suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing) may,
from time to time move power boundaries, in the Constitution
differently from where they are placed by the Constitution. The
Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance.
Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not
political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity.
Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission on
Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers
none. The evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and
delicate balance in the matter of appointments to public office,
between the President and Congress (the latter acting through
the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other
of the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other
words, to the extent that the Constitution has blocked off certain
appointments for the President to make with the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution
mandated that the President can confer no power of
participation in the Commission on Appointments over other
appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution.
The exercise of political options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained. Nor can the Commission on
Appointments by the actual exercise of its constitutionally
delimited power to review presidential appointments, create
power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone. Stated differently, when the
appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the
President to make without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments, the executive’s voluntary act of submitting
such appointment to the Commission on Appointments and the
latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the same are done without
or in excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Administrative Law; Appointments; Ad Interim
Appointments; Appointments that are for the President
solely to make, without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.–––
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new
appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad
interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design,
ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their
very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments
are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
can not be ad interim appointments.
Same; Same; Same; Tenure in Office as Distinguished from
Term of Office; As the term of office of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is 7 years, without
reappointment as provided by Exec. Order 163, the tenure
in office of said Chairman cannot be later made dependent
on the pleasure of the President, hence, E.O. 163-A providing
that the tenure of said Chairman and the members of the
CHR shall be at the pleasure of the President is
unconstitutional.–––Executive Order No. 163-A, 30 June 1987,
providing that the tenure of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights shall be at the pleasure of the
President is unconstitutional. x x x It is to be noted that, while the
earlier executive order (No. 163) speaks of a term of office of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights–––
which is seven (7) years without reappointment–––the later
executive order (163-A) speaks of the tenure in office of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights,
which is “at the pleasure of the President.” Tenure in office
should not be confused with term of office. As Mr. Justice (later,
Chief Justice) Concepcion in his concurring opinion in Alba vs.
Evangelista, stated: “The distinction between ‘term’ and ‘tenure’
is important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, ‘no officer or
employee in the Civil Service may be removed or suspended
except for cause, as provided by law’ (Art. XII, section 4), and this
fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could
legally make the tenure of some officials dependent upon the
pleasure of the President, by clothing the latter with blanket
authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his
term.” When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident
purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that
“the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the
Members of the Commission (on Human Rights) shall be
provided by law” (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). As the
term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the Commission
on Human Rights, is seven (7) years, without re-appointment, as
provided by Executive Order No. 163, and consistent with the
constitutional design to give the Commission the needed
independence to perform and accomplish its functions and
duties, the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members)
cannot be later made dependent on the pleasure of the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An independent office like
the CHR cannot truly function with independence and
effectiveness, if the tenure in office of its Chairman and its
members is made dependent on the pleasure of the
President.–––Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to
conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the
Constitution to be independent–––as the Commission on Human
Rights–––and vested with the delicate and vital functions of
investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing
responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial
measures therefor, can truly function with independence and
effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and
Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President.
Executive Order No. 163-A, being anti-thetical to the
constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on
Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Removal; Due Process; Petitioner can
certainly be removed from her office even before the
expiration of the seven-year term, but such removal must be
for cause and with her right to due process properly
safeguarded.–––To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner
Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as
such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance
thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office
before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly
can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her
right to due process properly safeguarded. In the case of NASECO
vs. NLRC, this Court held that before a rank-and-file employee of
the NASECO, a government-owned corporation, could be
dismissed, she was entitled to a hearing and due process. How
much more, in the case of the Chairman of a constitutionally
mandated INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on
Human Rights. If there are charges against Bautista for
misfeasance or malfeasance in office, charges may be filed
against her with the Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case
against her, the corresponding information or informations can
be filed with the Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her
suspension from office while the case or cases against her are
pending before said court. This is due process in action. This is
the way of a government of laws and not of men.
32. APPOINTMENTS MADE BY CONGRESS (FLORES V.
DRILON)
Constitutional Law; Local Government Code; Sec. 94 of the
LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13,
par.(d), of RA 7227 for no legislative act prevail over the
fundamental law of the land.—In the case before us, the
subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the
expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. It is argued
that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of a local elective official to another post if so
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the
contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not
determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of RA
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law
of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of
LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared
unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we
invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its
validity.
Same; Same; Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority; Meaning of
the phrase “shall be appointed”; The phrase shall be
appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City.—It is further argued that the SBMA
posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo
City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the prohibition
against the holding of any other office or employment by the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13,
Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional
duties and functions required by the primary functions of the
officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio
capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor. This argument is apparently based on a
wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the
subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been
the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio,
Congress would have, at least, avoided the word “appointed” and,
instead, “ex officio” would have been used.
Same; Appointing Power; The appointing power has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
—Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. According
to Woodbury, J., “the choice of a person to fill an office
constitutes the essence of his appointment,” and Mr. Justice
Malcolm adds that an “[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an
executive act involving the exercise of discretion.” In Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court we held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The
appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise
freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power x x x x”
Same; De Facto Officer; Respondent Gordon’s appointment
pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained. His acts as SBMA official
are not necessarily null and void, he may be considered a de
facto officer.—As incumbent elective official, respondent
Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are
not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto
officer, “one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as
they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where
the duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a
known election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being
unknown to the public x x x x [or] under color of an election, or
appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law,
before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38
Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec.,
213; Sheehan’s Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).” Flores
vs. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
33. POWER TO DISCIPLINE (JOSON V. TORRES)
Same; Same; Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary
actions against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating
Authority.—Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary
actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities:
the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is
explicit from A.O. No. 23. Pursuant to these provisions, the
Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines,
whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is
not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG
Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special
Investigating Committee.
Same; Same; Power of the President over administrative
disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived
from his power of general supervision over local
governments.—The power of the President over administrative
disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from
his power of general supervision over local governments. The
power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties.”
If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the
official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. The President’s power of
general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring
that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act
within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.
And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed must be construed to authorize the President to order
an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires.
Same; Same; Power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate.—The power to discipline evidently
includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority,
the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself
to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O.
No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG
or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by
the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary
to petitioner Joson’s claim. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not the power to discipline.
Same; Same; The power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.—
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative
complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency. Thus: “Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Same; Same; Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the
President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23.
—In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary
usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner
to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was
filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG
Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer. Strictly applying the
rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the
provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required
petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the
answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority
for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is
not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable
the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The
President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance
to warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the
President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if
they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the
business of government will not be prejudiced.—Petitioner
should know that the formal investigation of the case is required
by law to be finished within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the time of formal notice to the respondent. The extensions
petitioner requested consumed fifty-five (55) days of this period.
Petitioner, in fact, filed his answer nine (9) months after the first
notice. Indeed, this was more than sufficient time for petitioner
to comply with the order to file answer. The speedy disposition
of administrative complaints is required by public service. The
efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case
hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared
expeditiously if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so
that the business of government will not be prejudiced.
Same; Same; Suspension; Instances where preventive
suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority.—
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined;
(b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity
of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who
continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation denied him procedural due process.—The
rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied
him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides
that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority
shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a
formal investigation. This provision does not give the
Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a
formal investigation would be conducted. The records show that
petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation.
Same; Same; Same; An erring elective local official has rights
akin to the constitutional rights of an accused.—An erring
elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of
an accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due
process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and
defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to
compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules
Implementing the Local Government Code and in A.O. No. 23.
Well to note, petitioner formally claimed his right to a formal
investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been admitted by
Undersecretary Sanchez.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against
him was decided on the basis of position papers;
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
government officials are not exactly similar to those against
appointive officials.—Petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him
was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in
the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative
cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of
position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating
Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and
hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating
Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving
allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but
contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled
by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses.
Position papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of
lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of
truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order
denying petitioner’s motion for a formal investigation applies to
appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary
proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly
similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the
provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and
distinct from appointive government officers and employees.
This can be gleaned from the Local Government Code itself. Joson
vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279, G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998
34. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWERS (LAGMAN V.
MEDIALDEA)
Same; Presidency; The most important objective of Section
18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers
of the Commander-in-Chief.—The most important objective of
Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason
why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial
Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive
Department.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; The phrase “in an appropriate
proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the
purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers.—A
proceeding “[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which
actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of
intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding
them, of opposing judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the
phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated
by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency
powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
Same; Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Veto Powers;
The President’s extraordinary powers of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law
are subject to the veto powers of the Supreme Court (SC) and
Congress.—The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated
the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential
action. In particular, the President’s extraordinary powers of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court
and Congress.
Same; Same; Calling Out Power; The President may resort to
this extraordinary power (calling out power) whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion; the actual use to which the President
puts the armed forces is not subject to judicial review.—
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is
the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. “[T]he power to call is fully discretionary
to the President”; the only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, “the actual use to
which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to
judicial review.”
Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; The
extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be
exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion,
and public safety requires it.—The extraordinary powers of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual
invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987
Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these
powers: “(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible
revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible
nullification by the Supreme Court.” The framers of the 1987
Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase “imminent
danger thereof” as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. They
perceived the phrase “imminent danger” to be “fraught with
possibilities of abuse”; besides, the calling out power of the
President “is sufficient for handling imminent danger.”
Same; Same; The declaration of martial law serves as a
warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called
upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and
order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner
that will render it more difficult to restore order and
enforce the law.—The powers to declare martial law and to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve
curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual
freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning
to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the
military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while
the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest
and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their
exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and
review by the Court.
Same; Same; A state of martial law is peculiar because the
President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is
normally a function of the Legislature.—A state of martial law
is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police
power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In
particular, the President exercises police power, with the
military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of
government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope
with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control
of the State. In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA
160 (2006), the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s
(Justice Mendoza’s) Statement before the Senate Committee on
Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration
of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order
the “(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban
on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies
and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees
x x x.” Worthy to note, however, that the above cited acts that the
President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to
infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is
because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts
or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill
of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such
instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also
suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially
charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most
severe threat to civil liberties, the Constitution has safeguards
against the President’s prerogative to declare a state of martial
law.
Same; Same; Even the recommendation of, or consultation
with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-
ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President
to declare martial law.—Even the recommendation of, or
consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other
high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the
President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power
to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for
the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public
safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense
if the decision of the President is made dependent on the
recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on
the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is bestowed.
Same; Presidency; Calling Out Power; The President may
exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although,
of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future
exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.—The President
may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course,
it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter
powers, as in this case. Even so, the Court’s review of the
President’s declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted
for that particular purpose. As explained in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), the President’s
exercise of his power to call out the Armed Forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only be
examined by the Court as to whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Political Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; Under the “operative
fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as
an “operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.—
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in
the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant
thereto. Under the “operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional
statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared
unconstitutional.
Same; Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction; Under
the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers
of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the
prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the
Constitution.—Under the doctrine of contemporaneous
construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed
to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were
drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase “sufficiency of factual
basis” in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be
understood as the only test for judicial review of the President’s
power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the
President’s decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine
whether the President’s decision had sufficient factual bases.
Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; As Commander-
in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare
martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
review of the Supreme Court (SC).—As Commander-in-Chief,
the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this
Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is
sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based
only on facts or information known by or available to the
President at the time he made the declaration or suspension,
which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well
as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may
be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was
made or past events. As to how far the past events should be
from the present depends on the President. Past events may be
considered as justifications for the declaration and/or
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the
current situation existing at the time of the declaration.

Same; Same; Same; In determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the
Supreme Court (SC) should look into the full complement or
totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually.—In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not
piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect
absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and
in the written Report as the President could not be expected to
verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due
to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the
President’s appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a
requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on
the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted
to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining
would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not
only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very
purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to
borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504 (2012), to “immediately put an
end to the root cause of the emergency.” Possibly, by the time the
President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his
possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or
rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if
not impossible, to curtail.
Same; Same; Same; Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some
of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written
report are not enough reasons for the Supreme Court (SC) to
invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as
there are other facts in the proclamation and the written
Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration and/or suspension.—The Court’s review is
confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at
hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do
not have any bearing insofar as the Court’s review is concerned.
In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the
martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may
choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is
made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of
the declaration. Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or
inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to
invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are
other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that
support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or
suspension.
Same; Same; Same; Section 18, Article VII itself sets the
parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
“namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public
safety requires the exercise of such power.”—Section 18,
Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, “namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public
safety requires the exercise of such power.” Without the
concurrence of the two conditions, the President’s declaration of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down.
Same; Same; Presidency; The Constitution grants to the
President the discretion to determine the territorial
coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.—Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution states that “[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law.” Clearly, the Constitution
grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial
coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only
a part thereof under martial law.
Same; Same; Presidency; The President’s duty to maintain
peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas
where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
—The President’s duty to maintain peace and public safety is not
limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it
extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in
danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the
escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid
enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from
different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation
and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion
would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it
will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
Same; Same; Same; As a crime without predetermined
bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that
the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the
circumstances.—There were also intelligence reports from the
military about offensives committed by the ASG and other local
rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has
already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao. Moreover,
considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the
linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising
that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined
only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the
events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the
Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the
countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and
Basilan, among others. The Court cannot simply take the battle of
Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds,
the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration
of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most
necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
35. Pardon and Amnesty (Monsanto v. Factoran)
Criminal Law; Pardon, Effects of; Administrative Law; Public
Officers; Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon
to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by
reason of such conviction.—Pardon granted after conviction
frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly
grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the
true character and purpose of the privilege. Thus,
notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the
Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon
to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of
the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his
eligibility for appointment to that office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The pardon granted to
petitioner resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment, but to regain her former post,
she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.—For petitioner Monsanto, this is the
bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from
public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when
her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this
particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth,
petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was
forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once
again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability, Extinction Of; The pardon
granted to herein petitioner did not extinguish the civil
liability arising from the crime she has been convicted of.—
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court
cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by
the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability
may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
Same; Same; Same; Acceptance of Pardon; Petitioner is
deemed to have abandoned her appeal when she accepted
the pardon granted to her.—The 1981 amendments had
deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only
upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given
even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s unconditional pardon
was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It
is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the
former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as
it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material
when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having
accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned
her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
36. Foreign Loans
37. Treaties; the President as the Sole Organ of Foreign
Relations (Vinuya v. Romulo)
Constitutional Law; Foreign Relations; The Constitution has
entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines; The Supreme Court
(SC) cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.—
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not
to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is
left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the
wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct
our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
38. Administrative Supervision by the SC over Courts
(Maceda v. Vasquez)
Administrative Law; Judge; Criminal Law; Falsification of
Certificate of Service; A judge who falsifies his certificate of
service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.—
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over said case despite this Court’s ruling in Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge’s
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment
into the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty of supervision over
all inferior courts. The Court disagrees with the first part of
petitioner’s basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in
Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Separation of
Powers; It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul by the doctrine of separation of powers.—However, We
agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative
action taken against him by this Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the
1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of
petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for
such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate
of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary. Maceda vs.
Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 102781 April 22, 1993
39. Career and Non-career positions; Power to Discipline;
Security of Tenure (CSC v. Salas; Gloria v. CA)
(Civil Service Commission vs. Salas, G.R. No. 123708. June 19,
1997.*)
Constitutional Law; Civil Service Commission;
Appointments; Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts
PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law
and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed
by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987).—In reversing the decision of
the CSC, the Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be
applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have
been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point,
we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC
to the effect that “Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts
PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and
Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the
1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987).”
Same; Same; Same; The power to declare a position as
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical has subsequently been codified and incorporated
in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292.—
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last
portion of Section 16 which provides that “all employees of the
casino and related services shall be classified as ‘confidential’
appointees.” While such executive declaration emanated merely
from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the implementing
rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a
position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical as defined therein has subsequently been codified and
incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292
or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later enactment only
serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Be that as it may,
such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.
Same; Same; Same; Two recognized instances when a
position may be considered primarily confidential.—Prior to
the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there
were two recognized instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when the President,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has
declared the position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly,
in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the
functions of the office there exists “close intimacy” between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings
of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Same; Same; Same; Executive pronouncements, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict.—
Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil
Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical. And the Court in the aforecited
case explicitly decreed that executive pronouncements, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must
be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief
Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection
of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the
Constitution. In other words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent application without
compromising the constitutionally protected right of an
employee to security of tenure.
Same; Same; Same; The primary purpose of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a
position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical is to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining merit
and fitness.—It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether
apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is
to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a
means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed
further that these positions are covered by security of tenure,
although they are considered non-competitive only in the sense
that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive
examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness.
Same; Same; Same; The submission that PAGCOR employees
have been declared confidential appointees by operation of
law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830
must be rejected.—In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as
may be gleaned from its questioned resolution wherein it stated
that “the declaration of a position as primarily confidential if at
all, merely exempts the position from the civil service eligibility
requirement.” Accordingly, the Piñ ero doctrine continues to be
applicable up to the present and is hereby maintained. Such
being the case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have
been declared confidential appointees by operation of law under
the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830 must be
rejected.
Same; Same; Same; In holding that private respondent is not
a confidential employee, respondent Court of Appeals
correctly applied the “proximity rule.”—We likewise find that
in holding that herein private respondent is not a confidential
employee, respondent Court of Appeals correctly applied the
“proximity rule” enunciated in the early but still authoritative
case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, et al.
Same; Same; Same; Where the position occupied is remote
from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant.—It can thus be
safely determined therefrom that the occupant of a particular
position could be considered a confidential employee if the
predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing
authority was, to repeat, the latter’s belief that he can share a
close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures
freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or
misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential
matters of state. Withal, where the position occupied is remote
from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant.
Same; Same; Same; Position of private respondent does not
involve “such close intimacy” between him and the appointing
authority.—Based on the nature of such functions of herein
private respondent and as found by respondent Court of Appeals,
while it may be said that honesty and integrity are primary
considerations in his appointment as a member of the ISS, his
position does not involve “such close intimacy” between him and
the appointing authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, as
would insure “freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust.”
Same; Same; Same; As the lowest in the chain of command,
private respondent does not enjoy that “primarily close
intimacy” which characterizes a confidential employee.—
Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do not
directly report to the Office of the Chairman in the performance
of their official duties. An ISS member is subject to the control
and supervision of an Area Supervisor who, in turn, only
implements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer.
The latter is himself answerable to the Chairman and the Board
of Directors. Obviously, as the lowest in the chain of command,
private respondent does not enjoy that “primarily close
intimacy” which characterizes a confidential employee. Civil
Service Commission vs. Salas, 274 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 123708
June 19, 1997
(Gloria vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000*)
Judicial Review; Prohibition; Presidency; Separation of
Powers; Presidential Immunity from Suit; The doctrine of
presidential immunity has no application where the petition
for prohibition is directed not against the President himself
but against his subordinates; Presidential decisions may be
questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.—Petitioners theorize that the present petition for
prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity
from suit. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple
reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not
against the President. The questioned acts are those of
petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is
grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Where an administrative
department acts with grave abuse of discretion, which is
equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set
aside the administrative determination thus reached.—
Petitioners’ submission that the petition of private respondent
with the Court of Appeals is improper for failing to show that
petitioners constituted themselves into a “court” conducting a
“proceeding” and for failing to show that any of the petitioners
acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or
ministerial functions, is barren of merit. Private respondent has
clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of
jurisdiction in reassigning the private respondent in a way that
infringed upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves
admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty,
such that they could be subject to charges of insubordination if
they did not comply with the presidential order. What is more,
where an administrative department acts with grave abuge of
discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner, there is a justification for the
courts to set aside the administrative determination thus
reached.
Administrative Law; Civil Service; Security of Tenure; Transfers
and Reassignments; A reassignment with no definite period or
duration is definitely violative of the security of tenure of a
government employee.—The Court upholds the finding of the
respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST
“appears to be indefinite.” The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to
the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will “best
fit his qualifications and experience” being “an expert in
vocational and technical education.” It can thus be gleaned that
subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private
respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job,
being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said
Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of
the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security
of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain: “Security
of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends
not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases
of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court
of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002;
Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138). While a temporary
transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without
the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the
transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme
to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to
indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil
Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109
Phil. 116).” Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 5, G.R. No.
119903 August 15, 2000
Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012. April 21, 1999.
Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; Public Officers;
Preventive Suspension; Two Kinds.—There are thus two kinds
of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1)
preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by
the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, the respondent is exonerated (§47[4]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty—it is a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any
way influencing witnesses against him.—Preventive suspension
pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any
way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not
finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the
suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically
be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent
of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The
amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a
statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the
meaning of the statute.—The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2260) provided for the payment of such salaries in case of
exoneration. However, the law was revised in 1975 and the
provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was
deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. 807) read: * * *
This provision was reproduced in §52 of the present Civil Service
Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.
6770) categorically provides that preventive suspension shall be
“without pay.” It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to
disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension.
This conclusion is in accord with the rule of statutory
construction that—As a rule, the amendment by deletion of
certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the
legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the
presumption is that the legislature would not have made the
deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its
meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be given a
construction different from that previous to its amendment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An officer who has been lawfully
suspended from his office pending investigation is not
entitled to compensation for the period during which he was
so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined
that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient.
—The principle governing entitlement to salary during
suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechem’s A Treatise on
the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows: §864. Officer
not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office.—An officer
who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled
to compensation for the period during which he was so
suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the
cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason
given is “that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or
implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could
not lawfully perform such ser-vices.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not enough that an employee
is exonerated of the charges against him—his suspension
must be unjustified.—It is not enough that an employee is
exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his
suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court
of Appeals itself similarly states that “payment of salaries
corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the
charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the
suspension is unjustified.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The preventive suspension of civil
service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the
Civil Service Law, and cannot, therefore, be considered
“unjustified” as it is one of those sacrifices which holding a
public office requires for the public good.— The preventive
suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized
by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered
“unjustified,” even if later the charges are dismissed so as to
justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is
one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for
the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days
unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to
the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee
shall be automatically reinstated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The possibility of abuse is not an
argument against the recognition of the existence of power,
but if and when such abuse occurs, that would be the time
for the courts to exercise their nay-saying function.—Third, it
is argued in the separate opinion that to deny employees salaries
on the “frivolous” ground that the law does not provide for their
payment would be to provide a “tool for the oppression of civil
servants who though innocent, may be falsely charged of grave
or less grave administrative offenses.” Indeed, the possibility of
abuse is not an argument against the recognition of the existence
of power. As Justice Story aptly put it, “It is always a doubtful
course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the
possibility of its abuse . . . . [For] from the very nature of things,
the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest
somewhere—wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of
abuse.” It may be added that if and when such abuse occurs, that
would be the time for the courts to exercise their nay-saying
function. Until taken, however, the public interest in an upright
civil service must be upheld.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Employees who are considered
preventively suspended pending appeal are entitled to
payment of their salaries if they are subsequently found
innocent.—But although we hold that employees who are
preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to
the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do
not agree with the government that they are not entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal
if eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension
pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but
only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in
effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is
exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent
“shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand,
if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the
period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
suspension or dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Though an employee is considered
under preventive suspension during the pendency of his
appeal, in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified
because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension
for a period not exceeding 90 days—beyond that period the
suspension is illegal.—Nothing in what has thus far been said is
inconsistent with the reason for denying salaries for the period
of preventive suspension. We have said that an employee who is
exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salaries because
his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot be unjustified.
To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only
be found innocent of the charges but his suspension must
likewise be unjustified. But though an employee is considered
under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal
in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified because what
the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not
exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal.
Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstatement with
full pay. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not
exceed the equivalent of five years pay at the rate last received
before the suspension was imposed.
40. Power of the COMELEC over interparty issues (Atienza v.
COMELEC)
Election Law; Political Parties; Intra-Party Disputes; Parties;
Where no wrong had been imputed to a political party nor
had some affirmative relief been sought from it, then such
political party is not an indispensable party.—But petitioners
Atienza, et al.’s causes of action in this case consist in
respondents Roxas, et al.’s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al.
from the election of party leaders and in the illegal election of
Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly
excluded from the elections by a series of “despotic acts” of
Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among these acts
are Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from
the NECO, and respondent Drilon’s “railroading” of election
proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and
prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al. Since no wrong had been imputed
to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the
LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.’s
prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.’s acts and the
reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where individual members of a
political party who want to take part in another election
would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court’s
decision in the instant case, they have legal standing to
pursue the present petition.—But, as the Court held in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006) legal standing in suits
is governed by the “real parties-in-interest” rule under Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that “every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.” And “real party-in-interest” is one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff’s
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising
petitioners Atienza, et al.’s lack of standing as a threshold issue,
respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically
assume the truth of the allegations in the petition. Here, it is
precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.’s allegations that respondents
Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by
summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing
them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all
who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If
Atienza, et al.’s allegations were correct, they would have been
irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers,
void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as members
of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers
using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore,
Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another election would
stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court’s decision in this
case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this
petition.
Same; Same; Same; The amended Liberal Party (LP)
Constitution did not intend the National Executive Council
(NECO) membership to be permanent.—Nothing in the
Court’s resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO
membership should be pegged to the party’s 60th Anniversary
Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such a
position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO
membership to be permanent. Its Section 27 provides that the
NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the
House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP
members in good standing for at least six months. It follows from
this that with the national and local elections taking place in May
2007, the number and composition of the NECO would have to
yield to changes brought about by the elections. Former NECO
members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership
had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege
because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore, former
NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or
went on leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO
that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In
addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly
authorized the party president to nominate “persons of national
stature” to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot
validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated
by respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this
move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.’s way of
ensuring their election as party officers, there was certainly
nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; A political party could very well remove
an officer for cause as it sees fit.—Petitioner Atienza claims
that the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases recognized his
right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that
would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his
ouster from that position violated the Court’s resolution. But the
Court’s resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party
from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29 and 46 of the
amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him
or any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; Under the
circumstances of the present case, the validity or invalidity
of the expulsion of a political party’s officers is purely a
membership issue that has to be settled within the party—it
is an internal party matter over which the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) has no jurisdiction.—While petitioners
Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to
their faction, they did not specify who these members were and
how their numbers could possibly affect the composition of the
NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et
al. has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the
NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al.
present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then
assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were
totally unsupported by evidence. Consequently, petitioners
Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party
impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of
respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for
the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances,
the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was purely a
membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an
internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The Commission on
Elections’ (COMELEC’s) jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes is limited—the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may intervene in disputes internal to a party
only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions, such as in resolving an intra-party leadership
dispute as an incident of its power to register political
parties.—What is more, some of petitioner Atienza’s allies
raised objections before the NECO assembly regarding the status
of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with
the election, implying that its membership, whose composition
has been upheld, voted out those objections. The COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have
blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving
political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct
their activities without interference from the state. The
COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only
when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes
has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw
v. Commission on Elections, that the COMELEC’s powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
“include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party
and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the
persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political
parties.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The requirements of
administrative due process do not apply to the internal
affairs of political parties.—Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue
that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party
membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim
that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned
them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the
party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and
are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid
down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635
(1940). But the requirements of administrative due process do
not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due
process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative
bodies created by the state and through which certain
governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative
agency or instrumentality “contemplates an authority to which
the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function.” The constitutional limitations that generally
apply to the exercise of the state’s powers thus, apply too, to
administrative bodies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to due process is meant to
protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action,
but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities.—
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s
powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of
life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is
generally a limitation on the state’s powers in relation to the
rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not
from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the
latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such
private acts apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental
rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private
controversies involving private parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The discipline of members by a
political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause; Even
when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will
ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary
matters within a political party.—Although political parties
play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private
organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members
by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause. An
individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted
or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if
any, that party members may have, in relation to other party
members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed
upon among themselves through their charter, which is a
contract among the party members. Members whose rights
under their charter may have been violated have recourse to
courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due
process issue against the government or any of its agencies. But
even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will
ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters
within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to
free association. In Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266 (1999) the
Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves
the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate
without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state
policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve,
according to the free choice of the people.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the
question of party leadership has implications on the
Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) performance of its
functions under the Constitution, the same cannot be said of
an expulsion which, for the moment, is an issue of party
membership and discipline.—The COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas’ election as LP
president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.’s
expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership
has implications on the COMELEC’s performance of its functions
under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot
be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from
the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party
membership anddiscipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political
parties. Atienza, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 612 SCRA 761,
G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010
41. Automatic release of IRA (Pimentel v. Aguirre)
Presidency; Administrative Law; Municipal Corporations;
Local Governments; Power of Control and Supervision; In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties;
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body—it does not
include any restraining authority over such body.—This
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President’s
power of supervision over local government officials with that of
his power of control over executive officials of the national
government. It was emphasized that the two terms—supervision
and control—differed in meaning and extent. The Court
distinguished them as follows: “x x x In administrative law,
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” In
Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive
wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. “Supervisory power, when contrasted
with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
body; it does not include any restraining authority over such
body,” we said.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; By constitutional fiat, the
heads of political subdivisions are subject to the President’s
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers, and
by the same token, the President may not withhold or alter
any authority or power given them by the Constitution and
the law.—Under our present system of government, executive
power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet
and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will
and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their
sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are
directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to
the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts
are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the
same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Municipal Corporations; Local Autonomy; Decentralization;
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national
administration, not power, to local governments.—
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national
administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials
remain accountable to the central government as the law may
provide. The difference between decentralization of
administration and that of power was explained in detail in
Limbona v. Mangelin as follows: “Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments ‘more responsive
and accountable,’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress.’ At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over
them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According
to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.”
Same; Same; The withholding of 10% of the LGUs’ IRA
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee, pursuant to Section 4 of AO
372, although temporary, is equivalent to a holdback, which
means “something held back or withheld, often
temporarily,” and contravenes the Constitution.—Section 4
of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1,
1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation” in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means
“something held back or withheld, often temporarily.” Hence, the
“temporary” nature of the retention by the national government
does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
Same; Same; Rule of Law; Although the President was well-
intentioned in issuing AO 372 withholding the LGUs’ IRA, the
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and
the law.—While Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an
advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has
no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his
Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires that
even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
Judicial Review; By the mere enactment of the questioned
law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without
any other overt act—indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.—This is a rather novel theory—that people should await
the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question
acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that
the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are
violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc
case Tañ ada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this
Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
Same; When an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a co-equal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws,
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility
of the courts.—By the same token, when an act of the President,
who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws,
as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.
Same; Due Process; Considerations of due process prevents the
use of an issue against a party that has not given sufficient notice
of its presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity
to refute it.—The issue that the Petition is premature has not
been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed waived.
Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a
party that has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation,
and thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.
42. Initiation of Impeachment Proceedings (Gutierrez v.
HOR)
Impeachment; Judicial Review; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; The
Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether
public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its
functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or
excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court.—Francisco characterizes the power
of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court reflects, includes the power to
“determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” In the
present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari
jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within
its power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in
the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate
as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting
its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of
the sovereign will.
Same; Same; Same; An aspect of the “case-or-controversy”
requirement is the requisite of ripeness; There is no doubt
that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as
a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation; The unusual act of
simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to
invoke judicial power.—Respondents do not seriously contest
all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as
they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe
for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings
before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when
petitioner filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it
had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form
and substance of the two complaints. An aspect of the “case-or-
controversy” requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The
question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct,
adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. In the
present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia,
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints
and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call
for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously
referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints
presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner
cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she
took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Same; Due Process; Bias and Partiality; Mere suspicion of
partiality does not suffice to prove bias; The act of the head
of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire
body itself.—The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and
vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication
thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. The act of
the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the
entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications
Phils., 271 SCRA 790 (1997), teaches: First. We hereby declare
that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of
the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the
chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote
coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at
least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put,
Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC.
The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. In the present case,
Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and
merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.
Same; Same; Same; An abbreviated pace in the conduct of
proceedings is not per se an indication of bias.—Petitioner
contends that the “indecent and precipitate haste” of public
respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and
substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it
only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. An
abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an
indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of
Justice, 543 SCRA 70 (2008), holds: Speed in the conduct of
proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se
be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue
haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the
paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of
the circumstances peculiar to each case. The presumption of
regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was
incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence
other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the
Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or
shady without discounting the presumably regular performance
of not just one but five state prosecutors. (italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Same; Same; The respondent’s initial participation in the
impeachment proceedings—the opportunity to file an
Answer—starts after the Committee on Justice finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance.—Rule III(A) of
the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the
impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly
Section 5 which denotes that petitioner’s initial participation in
the impeachment  proceedings—the opportunity to file an
Answer—starts after the Committee on Justice finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee
refused to accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its
finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is
apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Same; Same; The determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of
the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of
the House of Representatives which committed such
determinative function to public Committee on Justice.—The
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed suchm, determinative
function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and
in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an
impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the
Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do
not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are
clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing
that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution,” and that
the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee.” Notatu dignum is the fact that it is
only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint
is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution
basically merely requires a “hearing.” In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint
is vital “to effectively carry out” the impeachment process, hence,
such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Same; Same; Publication; Words and Phrases; While
“promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,”
there is a statutory difference in their usage.—Black’s Law
Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as To publish; to
announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory.
The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An
administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or
regulation to become known or obligatory. (emphasis supplied)
While “promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,”
there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution
notably uses the word “promulgate” 12 times. A number of those
instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and
issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. To appreciate
the statutory difference in the usage of the terms “promulgate”
and “publish,” the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these
rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, promulgation means “the delivery of the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.” Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision
directing Congress to “promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates” in the presidential and vice presidential
elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules
for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, it did
not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather,
Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, “promulgation” and
“publication” likewise take on different meanings as they are
part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in
one case, the publication of implementing rules occurs after their
promulgation or adoption.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Promulgation
must be used in the context in which it is generally
understood—that is, to make known; Since the
Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation”
to “publication,” the former should be understood to have
been used in its general sense; It is not for this Court to tell a
co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of
promulgation.—Promulgation must thus be used in the context
in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known.
Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally
spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted
sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must
prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense
was to be used. Since the Constitutional Commission did not
restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to
deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has
not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in
no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the
dictates of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; Publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue
for Congress to make known its rules; Had the Constitution
intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have
stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries; Other than “promulgate,” there
is no other single formal term in the English language to
appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being
published.—Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make
known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that x x x in
the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is
not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is
of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well
as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. (italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted) Had the Constitution intended to have the
Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in
legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than “promulgate,” there is
no other single formal term in the English language to
appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being
published.
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming arguendo that
publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the
proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the
relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution; The
provisional adoption of the previous Congress’
Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the avowed purpose.—Even assuming arguendo that
publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings
taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which
faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of
the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated
periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would
already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the
15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate
the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints
pending the completion of the publication requirement. Given
that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the
rules on impeachment is aimed at “effectively carry[ing] out the
purpose” of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to
provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th
Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing
and in keeping with the “effective” implementation of the
“purpose” of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment
Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
Same; Same; Same; The rules on impeachment, as
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid
or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment, and,
being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive
application to pending actions.—Moreover, the rules on
impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. “It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that,
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.” In the present case, petitioner fails to allege
any impairment of vested rights. It bears stressing that, unlike
the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of
witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender.
Same; One-Year Bar Rule; Words and Phrases; The initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving, i.e.,
Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint which is its
referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.—
Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco states that the
term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which
must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint
moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.
The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the
referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The petitioner’s
reliance on the singular tense of the word “complaint” to
denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against
the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers
its enlarged and plural sense.—Contrary to petitioner’s
emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution
mentions is impeachment “proceedings.” Her reliance on the
singular tense of the word “complaint” to denote the limit
prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of
statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural
sense. The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of
an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles
the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an
impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick.
Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the
candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee
ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous
referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important
is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent
matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Same; Same; The question as to who should administer or
pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been
initiated rests also on the body that administers the
proceedings prior to the impeachment trial; It is the House
of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the
power to set its own chamber into special operation by
referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the
initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting
a patently unconstitutional complaint.—The question as to
who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment
proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that
administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As
gathered from Commissioner Bernas’ disquisition in Francisco, a
proceeding which “takes place not in the Senate but in the
House” precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the
Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control
of the House of Representatives. Conscious of the legal import of
each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings,
must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding,
subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the
Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or
members or any private individual, should own up to its
processes. The Constitution did not place the power of the “final
say” on the lips of the House Secretary General who would
otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any
impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper
committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which
explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business
of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary
session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special
operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard
against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by
rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
Same; Same; It becomes clear that the consideration behind
the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and
not the number of complaints—the impeachable officer
should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding,
so that he will not be precluded from performing his official
functions and duties, while, similarly, Congress should run
only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with
little time to attend to its main work of law-making.—The
Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only
one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly
cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that concurred
with the Francisco ruling. Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose
of the one-year bar is two-fold: “to prevent undue or too frequent
harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal
task [of] legislation,” with main reference to the records of the
Constitutional Commission, that reads: MR. ROMULO. Yes, the
intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public
officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from
harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work
which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time.
And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same
individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but
that. (underscoring supplied) It becomes clear that the
consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the
element of time, and not the number of complaints. The
impeachable officer should defend himself in only one
impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from
performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress
should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave
it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The
doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and
referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional
provision.
Same; Same; What the Constitution assures an impeachable
officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself;
In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the
Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for
them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave
issues—the measure of protection afforded by the
Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it
just once; Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate
itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once.—Petitioner’s
claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy
and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of
complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution
assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous
effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative
assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the
quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the
side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not
promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the
charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the
Constitution did not concern themselves with the media
tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer
when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of
official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the
Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo
such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once.
Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle,
it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year.
This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-
year bar rule.
Same; Criminal Procedure; The Constitution allows the
indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled
in one set known as the “Articles of Impeachment”—it,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not
allege only one impeachable offense.—Without going into the
effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional
provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on
Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the
application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial
determination of which must be made by the House which has
yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s
invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not
lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment
for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge
representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
known as the “Articles of Impeachment.” It, therefore, follows
that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Impeachment; The fact that the acts complained of are
enumerated in the impeachment complaints, coupled with
the fact that they were verified and endorsed, is enough to
determine whether the complaints were sufficient in form.
—Section 4 is not vague as petitioner asserts. The Rules of
Procedure provides that “[t]he Rules of Criminal Procedure
under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to
impeachment proceedings before the House.” Section 7, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
complaint or information is sufficient if it states, among other
things, the name of the accused and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. Following Section 16
of the Rules of Procedure, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure suppletorily applies to the Rules of
Procedure to determine whether the impeachment complaints
are sufficient in form. The fact that the acts complained of are
enumerated in the impeachment complaints, coupled with the
fact that they were verified and endorsed, is enough to
determine whether the complaints were sufficient in form.
Same; The impeachment procedure is analogous to a criminal
trial but is not a criminal prosecution per se.—The impeachment
procedure is analogous to a criminal trial but is not a criminal
prosecution per se. While the Rules of Procedure provide for the
suppletory application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in an
impeachment proceedings, a strict application of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not required in impeachment proceedings,
as can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Same; The impeachment complaint is not the same as the
Articles of Impeachment—the impeachment complaint is
analogous to the affidavit-complaint of the private
complainant filed before the prosecutor for purposes of the
preliminary investigation, which affidavit-complaint may
allege several offenses; The only requirement in preparing
the Articles of Impeachment is that there is only one specific
charge for each article.—The impeachment complaint is not
the same as the Articles of Impeachment. The impeachment
complaint is analogous to the affidavit-complaint of the private
complainant filed before the prosecutor for purposes of the
preliminary investigation. Such affidavit-complaint, prepared by
the complainant, may allege several offenses. On the other hand,
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
refers to the formal complaint or information prepared by the
prosecutor and filed before the court after the preliminary
investigation. Such formal complaint or information must charge
only one offense against an accused. The Articles of
Impeachment is prepared by the Committee after it votes to
recommend to the House Plenary the filing of impeachment
charges. The only requirement in preparing the Articles of
Impeachment is that there is only one specific charge for each
article. The Articles of Impeachment, as its name imply, may have
several articles, each charging one specific offense. The
proceedings before the Committee on Justice is like a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case where there is no complaint or
information yet.
Same; Separation of Powers; The Court cannot review the
sufficiency of the substance of the impeachment complaints
—the sufficiency of the substance will delve into the merits of the
impeachment complaints over which the Court has no
jurisdiction.—The Court cannot review the sufficiency of the
substance of the impeachment complaints. The sufficiency of the
substance will delve into the merits of the impeachment
complaints over which this Court has no jurisdiction. The Court
can only rule on whether there is a gross violation of the
Constitution in filing the impeachment complaint, in particular,
whether the complaint was filed in violation of the one-year ban.
The Court cannot review the decision of the Committee on
Justice to impeach. The Court ruled in Francisco: The first issue
goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any
discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such
a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
43. Ancestral Land v. Domain (Cruz v. Sec. DENR)
PUNO, J.,Separate Opinion:
National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; Natural Resources;
Public Lands; The “Regalian Doctrine” or jura regalia is a
Western legal concept that was first introduced by the
Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas.—The capacity of the State to own or
acquire property is the state’s power of dominium. This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal
theory of jura regalia. The “Regalian Doctrine” or jura regalia is a
Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The Public
Land Act (Act No. 926) operated on the assumption that title
to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government, and that the government’s title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States; The term
“public land” referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded
the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.—Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling,
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the “issuance of patents to certain native settlers
upon public lands,” for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants
in the Islands.” In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the government’s title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term “public land” referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Enacted by the
Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private
lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.—Grants
of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens
system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903.
Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public
and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.
The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachusetts Land Registration Act of 1898, which, in turn,
followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of
registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it
after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens
system requires that the government issue an official certificate
of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of
the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.
The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said
certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and
negotiation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The delegates to the 1935
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept
of State ownership of land and natural resources was
introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans, so
to remove all doubts, the Convention approved the
provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.—The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935
Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the
1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was
an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of
State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by
the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts,
the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution
affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Same; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (RA. No. 8371);
Ancestral Domains: Ancestral Lands; Customary Laws; The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) grants the indigenous
cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains, and the ownership given is the indigenous concept
of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.—Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled “An Act to
Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” It is simply known as “The Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997” or the IPRA. The IPRA recognizes the existence of
the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these
lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which traces its
origin to native title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Indigenous
Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of
people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as
an organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory.—Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial.
They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and
other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of
conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may
have been displaced from their traditional territories or who
may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The abrogation of the Filipinos’
ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept
of public domain were the most immediate fundamental
results of Spanish colonial theory and law.—All lands lost by
the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well
as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now
declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the
Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were
made to non-Filipinos. The abrogation of the Filipinos’ ancestral
rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public
domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish
colonial theory and law. The concept that the Spanish king was
the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their
ancestral rights to land.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State, by recognizing the right
of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral lands and domains, has
effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly
their own.—The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6)
provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve
their way of life. This Constitution goes further than the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal
Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the
State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture
distinctly their own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Land titles do not
exist in the indigenous peoples’ economic and social system
—the concept of individual land ownership under the civil
law is alien to them.—Land titles do not exist in the indigenous
peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual
land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental
policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was to address the centuries-old
neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress passed and approved the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997.—It was to address the centuries-old
neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and
approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills—Senate
Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Ancestral
Domains,” Explained.—Ancestral domains are all areas
belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied
or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings with government and/or private individuals or
corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources. They also include lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which
they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Ancestral Lands,”
Explained.—Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs
under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that
these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These
lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Customary Laws; The
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) issues a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of
the community concerned, leaving the allocation of lands
within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous
corporate (family or clan) claimants to the ICCs/IPs
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions while with respect to ancestral lands outside the
ancestral domains, the NICP issues a Certificate of Ancestral
Land Title (CALT).—Upon due application and compliance with
the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the
NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the
community concerned. The allocation of lands within the
ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate
(family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
decide in accordance with customs and traditions. With respect
to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). CADTs and CALTs
issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The IPRA categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as
never to have been public land—domains and lands held
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to
have never been public lands and are private.—Native title
refers to ICCs/IPs’ preconquest rights to lands and domains held
under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory
reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue
of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT),
which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the
territories identified and delineated. Like a Torrens title, a CADT
is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native
title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted
to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands
held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to
have never been public lands andare private.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The concept of native title
first upheld in Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935
(1909), 212 US. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594, and enshrined in the IPRA
grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the
ICCs/IPs.—In the Philippines, the concept of native title first
upheld in Cariñ o and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership,
albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariñ o is
the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native
title. The long line of cases citing Cariñ o did not touch on native
title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands.
Cariñ o was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept
of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a
different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land
sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When
the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act
are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. The
land ceases to be part of the public domain, ipso jure, and is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
the prescribed statutory period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain; they are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.—Thus,
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.
Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of
the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into
four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral
lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII
mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not
classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify
them as public lands under any one of the four classes will
render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in
the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is
loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer
survival of the ICCs/IPs. The 1987 Constitution mandates the
State to “protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands” and that “Congress provide for the
applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.” It is the recognition
of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral
domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional
mandate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of ownership and
possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under the indigenous concept of ownership which maintains
the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property.—The right of ownership and possession
of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the
view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of
the public domain. But its private character ends there. The
ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not
by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas
within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are
presumed to be communally held. These communal rights,
however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under
the Civil Code. Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to
demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code
expressly provides that “[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership.” Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is
concerned. To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of
the very community itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rights granted by the
IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at
the same time, a priority in their large-scale development
and exploitation.—The rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in
their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does
not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the
ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its
discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is
nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources
within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such
endeavour always under State supervision or control. This
indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over
the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of
the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual
occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have
traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and
survival.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ecology and Environment;
Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of
today’s priorities for the international agenda.—Presently,
there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the
international scene. This came as a result of the increased
publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous
human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples’
environment, together with the national governments’ inability
to deal with the situation. Indigenous rights came as a result of
both human rights and environmental protection, and have
become a part of today’s priorities for the international agenda.
44. Public Utilities (Roy v. Herbosa)
Corporation Law; Public Utility Corporation; As defined in
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC-IRR), beneficial owner or beneficial
ownership means any person who, directly or indirectly,
through any contract, arrangement, understanding,
relationship or otherwise, has or shares voting power
and/or investment returns or power.—As defined in the SRC-
IRR, “[b]eneficial owner or beneficial ownership means any
person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract,
arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise, has or
shares voting power (which includes the power to vote or direct
the voting of such security) and/or investment returns or power
(which includes the power to dispose of, or direct the disposition
of such security).”
Same; Same; The term “full beneficial ownership” found in
the Foreign Investment Act-Implementing Rules and
Regulations (FIA-IRR) is to be understood in the context of
the entire paragraph defining the term “Philippine
national.” Mere legal title is not enough to meet the required
Filipino equity, which means that it is not sufficient that a
share is registered in the name of a Filipino citizen or
national, i.e., he should also have full beneficial ownership of
the share.—The term “full beneficial ownership” found in the
FIA-IRR is to be understood in the context of the entire
paragraph defining the term “Philippine national.” Mere legal
title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity, which
means that it is not sufficient that a share is registered in the
name of a Filipino citizen or national, i.e., he should also have full
beneficial ownership of the share. If the voting right of a share
held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is assigned or
transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the
determination of the required Filipino equity. In the same vein, if
the dividends and other fruits and accessions of the share do not
accrue to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is also to
be excluded or not counted.
Corporation Law; Public Utility Corporation; View that the
number and the par value of the permutation of shares
definitely affect the issue of the stockholding of a
corporation.—The number and the par value of the
permutation of shares definitely affect the issue of the
stockholding of a corporation. As illustrated by Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, preferred shares having higher par values and higher
dividend declarations result in higher earnings than those of
common shares. In his example, even if Filipinos own 120 shares
(100 common, 20 preferred), which outnumber the 80 preferred
shares of foreigners, it is possible that the latter would have
higher earnings.
Corporation Law; Public Utility Corporation; View that sixty
percent (60%) of the outstanding capital stock (whether or
not entitled to vote in the election of directors), coupled
with 60% of the voting rights, must rest in the hands of
Filipinos.—The objective of the Court in defining the term
capital as used in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution was
to ensure that both controlling interest and beneficial ownership
were vested in Filipinos. The decision of June 28, 2011
pronounced that capital refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors (controlling interest) and owned
by Filipinos (beneficial ownership). Put differently, 60 percent of
the outstanding capital stock (whether or not entitled to vote in
the election of directors), coupled with 60 percent of the voting
rights, must rest in the hands of Filipinos.
45. Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings (ADMU
v. Capulong)
Schools and Colleges; Minimum standards to be observed by
schools before imposing disciplinary sanctions.—“(1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel,
if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.”
Same; Ateneo de Manila University complied with the
minimum standards required in expelling respondent
students from that school.—It cannot seriously be asserted
that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean
of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondents
students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, the records show
that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the charges. While some of the
students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly
submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus,
the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991
to file their statements.
Same; Respondent students were assisted by counsel.—The
requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start
of the investigations before the Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog
and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf
of respondent students.
Same; Due Process; Administrative Law; Administrative
proceedings made by a school against students charged with
fatal hazing need not be similar to a judicial proceeding.—
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they
were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of petitioners’
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted investigate students’
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the
March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the
investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals
that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
Same; Same; Argument that students’ rights were violated as
the word “hazing” is not explicitly defined in the Ateneo Law
School Catalogue not an acceptable contention for law
students to advance.—With regard to the charge of hazing,
respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining
the word “hazing” and allege that there is no proof that they
were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School
Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not
worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge filed before the
Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee
and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements
of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the
specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to
declare in previous cases of a similar nature, due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. Accordingly, disciplinary charges
against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a
criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to
the students involved that “hazing” which is not defined in the
School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill
No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina,
petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this
sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
Same; Same; Hazing is a valid ground for student expulsion
from school.—Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to
the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d’ etre in the
increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the
neophytes by their insensate masters.” Assuredly, it passes the
test of reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the
school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d’
corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of
those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Academic freedom” defined.—At
this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms
subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurther in the term “academic
freedom” cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1)
who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
Same; Right to continue studying in a school subject to
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by one’s
school.—Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have
consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the
same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a
right “to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,”
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
Same; Same.—Such rules are “incident to the very object of
incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those
governing student discipline.” Going a step further, the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be
regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
46. Amendments to the Constitution (Lambino v. COMELEC)
Lambino vs. Commission on Elections
Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the
Constitution; People’s Initiative; The essence of
amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people—first, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal, and, second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition;
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment.—The essence of
amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must
be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present
only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that
every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before signing.
Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution directly
borrowed the concept of people’s initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause; A signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not
first seen what it is that he or she is signing.—The framers of
the Constitution directly borrowed the concept of people’s
initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States
which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is
that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the
people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. The rationale for this
requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions
of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, declared: [A] signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition
to a potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for
example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting,
portions of the petition that might not be to the signer’s liking.
This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the
person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who
obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite
signatures to qualify for the ballot.
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of
the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers
of the Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to
adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s
initiative.— Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on
people’s initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act
that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the
people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”
Same; Same; Same; There is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures—the proponents bear the burden
of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures, i.e., that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.—The proponents of the
initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents
secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus,
there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures—
that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.
Same; Same; Same; It is basic in American jurisprudence that
the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people; The
Lambino Group’s citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the
rug from under their feet.—The Lambino Group cites as
authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that “a signer who did
not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand
the nature of the act.” The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by
the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires that the proposed change must be attached to the
petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
the people to sign on the petition itself. Indeed, it is basic in
American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be
incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed
by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
the signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s citation of Corpus
Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and “Revision,”
Distinguished; Words and Phrases; The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution.—
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution
intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment”
and “revision” of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that a people’s initiative may propose only amendments
to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Same; Same; Same; A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.—
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a
people’s initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A
popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures,
cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in
the Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; Revision broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-
and-balances, and there is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution;
Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
or deletes without altering the basic principle involved;
Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.—Courts have long
recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that
recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference
in this manner: [T]he very term “constitution” implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as
well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term “amendment” implies such an addition
or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect
an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed. (Emphasis supplied) Revision broadly implies a change
that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other
hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
Same; Same; Same; The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution
by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions”—the court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of change; The
qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution—the main inquiry is
whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.”—In California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions.” The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The
qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.” Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches.” A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan
also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.”

Same; Same; Same; Under both the quantitative and
qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision
and not merely an amendment; A change in the structure of
government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution is reduced into two; A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution—
merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of the government.—Under both the
quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative
is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles—
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive—
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic
plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the
structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as
when the three great co-equal branches of government in the
present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative
and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
Same; Same; Same; By any legal test and under any
jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of
the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber
of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.— The abolition alone of the Office of the President
as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any
jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On
the face alone of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The express intent of the framers and
the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group’s theory—any theory advocating that a
proposed change involving a radical structural change in
government does not constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.—The express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s
theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate
from such categorical intent and language. Any theory espousing
a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves
scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in
the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential
mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group’s position. Any
theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a revision
justly deserves rejection.
Same; Same; Same; Where the proposed change applies only
to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting
any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision.—We can
visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end
green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions.
Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties
arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision.
The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the
red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks
a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among
the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution. Where the proposed change applies only to a
specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an
amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing
the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and
not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of
mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college
degree as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no fixed rule on whether a
change is an amendment or a revision—a change in a single
word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision
and not an amendment.—There can be no fixed rule on
whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision
and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1,
Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of
the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be
examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government,
the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the
underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Since a revision of a constitution affects
basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a
deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited
to undertake a revision.—Since a revision of a constitution
affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a
deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only
several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed
and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The basic rule in
statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails.—In the
present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions states: Section 2. Upon the expiration of
the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and
24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The basic rule in
statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule
also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the
Lambino Group’s draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case
of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision “shall
be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government.” The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable
provisions until the earlier one “shall be amended,” which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Same; Same; Same; A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
Constitution; Revision of the Constitution through a people’s
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution.— Now, what “unicameral parliamentary form of
government” do the Lambino Group’s proposed changes refer to
—the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models,
which are among the few countries with unicameral
parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to
the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of
government—the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all
bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature
sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government? This drives home the point that the people’s
initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only
for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing
several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision
of the Constitution through a people’s initiative will only result in
gross absurdities in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No.
6735); Judicial Review; There is no need to revisit the
Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270
SCRA 106 (1997), declaring R.A. No. 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution—an
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition; The Court must avoid
revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute
if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other
grounds.—The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative
to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments
to the Constitution. This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling
involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is
a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will
not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires
that the people must sign the petition as signatories.—Even
then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735
which requires that the “petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories.” Section 5(b) of
RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as
signatories.” The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition
of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006
filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes
B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for “Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners.” In the COMELEC the Lambino Group,
claiming to act “together with” the 6.3 million signatories, merely
attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended
petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA
6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lambino Group’s logrolling
initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, “No
petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x.”—The Lambino Group’s
logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735
stating, “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall
be submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The proposed Section 4(4)
of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament
to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution,
is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one
subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative
petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group’s initiative will still fail.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the
Constitution; People’s Initiative; Initiative and Referendum
Act (R.A. No. 6735); Certiorari; Commission on Elections;
Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a
very difficult and unsettled question of law, the Supreme
Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
poll body with respect to that action.—The Comelec did not
violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence. Neither
can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to
the Commission. Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this
Court’s jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming
arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and
unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Until and unless
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997),
is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings
of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the
Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements.—Until and unless Santiago
is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of
the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec
cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court’s
pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion,
under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of
this Court. The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino
Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would
appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would
have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely
been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and “Revision,”
Distinguished; Words and Phrases; The words “simple” and
“substantial” are not subject to any accurate quantitative or
qualitative test; We stand on unsafe ground if we use simple
arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are
“simple” or “substantial.”—The words “simple” and
“substantial” are not subject to any accurate quantitative or
qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test,
oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in
some one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the
same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners seek to
change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of
the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department)
and Article VII (Executive Department), together with the
complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a
presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral
structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be
affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration
of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV
(Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX
(Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI
(Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National Economy and
Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV
(Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports),
XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII
(Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground
if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed
changes are “simple” or “substantial.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Our Constitutions carried
the traditional distinction between “amendment” and
“revision,” i.e., “amendment” means change, including
complex changes while “revision” means complete change,
including the adoption of an entirely new covenant.—Our
Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to
determine whether an “amendment” is “simple” or “substantial.”
Nor did they provide that “substantial” amendments are beyond
the power of the people to propose to change the Constitution.
Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction
between “amendment” and “revision,” i.e., “amendment” means
change, including complex changes while “revision” means
complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new
covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional
difference between “amendment” and “revision.” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “amendment” as “[a] formal revision or
addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading,
order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by
addition, deletion, or correction.” Black’s also refers to
“amendment” as “the process of making such a revision.”
Revision, on the other hand, is defined as “[a] reexamination or
careful review for correction or improvement.” In parliamentary
law, it is described as “[a] general and thorough rewriting of a
governing document, in which the entire document is open to
amendment.” Similarly, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines
“amendment”—as “[a] correction or revision of a writing to
correct errors or better to state its intended purpose” and
“amendment of constitution” as “[a] process of proposing,
passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution.” In
contrast, “revision,” when applied to a statute (or constitution),
“contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter
contained in the statute (or constitution), and the substitution of
a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is
familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional
convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very
limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an
unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the
constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from
the action of the convention but from the powers (of the
people) who have ratified and adopted it.— The oppositors-
intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely on the
opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the
debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that
opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive
of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful
phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people)
since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not
from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the
people) who have ratified and adopted it. “Debates in the
constitutional convention ‘are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law.’” Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of
the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the
conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional
distinction between “amendment” and “revision.” For during the
debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring
opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, that stressed the traditional distinction
between amendment and revision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is arguable that
when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word
“revision,” they had in mind the “rewriting of the whole
Constitution,” or the “total overhaul of the Constitution”—
anything less is an “amendment” or just “a change of specific
provisions only.”—It is arguable that when the framers of the
1987 Constitution used the word “revision,” they had in mind the
“rewriting of the whole Constitution,” or the “total overhaul of
the Constitution.” Anything less is an “amendment” or just “a
change of specific provisions only,” the intention being “not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of
specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the
times.” Under this view, “substantial” amendments are still
“amendments” and thus can be proposed by the people via an
initiative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitution does
not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but
from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is
that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have
looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words
employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the
sense most obvious to the common understanding, and
ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense
designed to be conveyed; A constitution is not to be
interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally
and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its
establishment and carry out the great principles of
government—not to defeat them.—As we cannot be guided
with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the Commissioners
on the difference between “simple” and “substantial”
amendments or whether “substantial” amendments amounting
to revision are covered by people’s initiative, it behooves us to
follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e.,
construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who
adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz.:
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the
convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it,
the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be
supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse
meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have
accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that
was the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings
therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the
instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper
construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of
the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring
to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussion and
deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling
of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions
and issues before the people at the time of the election of the
delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory
as anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the
convention. Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on
narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general
lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out
the great principles of government—not to defeat them. One of
these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that
the people through initiative cannot propose substantial
amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty
on its head.—The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution which expressed the right of the sovereign
people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated power
of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to be
adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: “The
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.” Prescinding from
these baseline premises, the argument that the people through
initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the
Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the
submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of
the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the
sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the
power to propose “simple” but not “substantial” amendments to
the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty
should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was
originally developed in law. Legal sovereignty, he explained, is
“the possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is
the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party
endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not
subject to law ‘for it is the author and source of law.’ Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence.”