CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AMENDMENTS
On January 17, 1973, President Marcos issued
Presidentialn Proclamation No. 1102, declaring that
the new Constitution had been ratified by the Citizens
Assemblies, and “has thereby come into force and
effect”.
i) The validity of the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was challenged in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, and companion
cases (collectively known as the Ratification Cases).
The basic issues and the votes of the SC justices
were:
(1) Whether the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a
political or a justiciable question - Six justices said it is
justiciable, three said it is political, and one justice
qualified his vote.
(2) Whether the new Constitutionwas validly ratified
(with substantial if not strict compliance) with
the 1935 Constitution - Six justices said no, three
said there was substantialcompliance, and one
qualified his vote.
(3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new
Constitution (with or without valid ratification) - Four
justices said the people had already accepted the new
Constitution, two said that there can be no free
expression by the people qualified to vote of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed
Constitution under martial law, one said he is not
prepared to state that a new Constitution once
accepted by the people must be accorded recognition
independently of valid ratification, and three
expressed their lack of knowledge or competence to
rule on the question because under a regime of
martial law with the free expression of opinions
restricted, they have no means of knowing, to the
point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution.
(4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief -
Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions, while four
were for giving due course to the petitions.
(5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force -
Four said yes by virtue of the people’s acceptance of
the same, four said they could not with judicial
certainty whether or not the people had accepted the
Constitution, and two declared that the new
Constitution is not in force, “with the result that there
are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force”. The SC decision
concluded: “Accordingly, by virtue of of six votes
x x x. with four dissenting votes x x x all of the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect. ”
II. THE TWO VIEWS IN THE DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
a) Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative, as if it had not been
passed at all. See Art. 7, Civil Code of the
Philippines.
b) Modern view: Courts simply refuse to
recognize the law and determine the rights of
the parties as if the statute had no existence.
Under this view the Court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the constitution. It simply refuses
to recognize it and determine the rights of
the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. See: People vs Republic GR
No. 79732, Manila Motors v. Flores, 99 Phil.
738; Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB, 35
SCRA 429; Republic v. Henda, 119 SCRA
411. Certain legal effects of the statute prior
to its declaration of unconstitutionality may
be recognized. See: Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569. Thus, a public officer
who implemented an unconstitutional law
prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality
cannot be held liable [Ynot v. IAC, supra)
III. BROAD VIEW OF NATIONAL TERRITORY
IV. STATE IMMUNITY
State Immunity from Suit. “The State cannot be
sued without its consent” [Sec.3, Art. XVI].
1. Basis: There can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right
depends Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83],
However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether
express or implied. The doctrine is a lsoknown as the
Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
2. Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant
with the public international law principle of par in
parem non habet imperium. The Head of State, who
is deemed the personification of the State, is
inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity from suit.
1|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
a) The State’s diplomatic agents, including consuls to
a certain extent, are also exempt from the jurisdiction
of local courts and admiinistraive tribunals. [See
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, infra.].
i) A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending State. The cloak of
protection is removed the moment the foreign agent is
sued in his individual capacity, as when he is sought
to be made liable for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice
or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. In Minucherv. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 142396, February 11, 2003, it was sufficiently
established that respondent Arthur Scalzo an agent of
the US Drug Enforcement
Agency, was tasked to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug activities within the country, and
having ascertained the target, to inform the local law
enforcers who would then be expected to make the
arrest. In conducting this surveillance and later, acting
as the poseur- buyer during the buy-bust operation,
and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal
case against Minucher, Scalzo can hardly be said to
have acted beyond the scope of his official functions
or duties.
He should, therefore, be accorded diplomatic
immunity.
b) The United Nations, as well as its organs and
specialized agencies, are likewise beyond the
jurisdiction of local courts [Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations; Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations; World
Health Organization v. Aquino, supra.].
i) In Lasco v. UNRFNRE (United Nations Revolving
Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration), 241 SCRA 681, the
Supreme Court upheld the diplomatic immunity of
private respondent as established by the letter of the
Department of Foreign Affairs recognizing and
confirming such immunity in accordance with the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
UN of which the Philippines is a signatory.
c) Even other international organizations or
international agencies may
be immune from the jurisdiction of local courts and
local administrative tribunals. i)
In SEAFDEC (Southeast Asia Fisheries Development
Center) v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580, and SEAFDEC v.
Acosta, G.R. Nos. 97468-70. September 02, 1993, it
was held that SEAFDEC, as an international agency,
enjoys diplomatic immunity. It was established
through an international agreement to which the
Philippines became a signatory on January 16, 1968.
The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the
promotion of fisheries development in Southeast Asia
by mutual cooperation among the member
governments of the Center.
The invocation by private respondents of the doctrine
of estoppel is unavailing, because estoppel does not
confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over a
cause of action. The Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29, ruling cannot apply to parties which enjoy foreign
and diplomatic immunity [SEAFDEC-Aquaculture v.
NLRC, 206 SCRA 283].
ii) In Callado v. IRRI, 244 SCRA 210, the Court
upheld anew the constitutionality of Sec. 3, P.D. 1620,
which provides that the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) shall enjoy immunity from
any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly
waived by the Director General of the Institute or his
authorized representative.
Citing International Catholic Migration Commission v.
Calleja (and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa
IRRI v. Secretary of Labor), 190 SCRA 120, the Court
stated that the letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
constituted a categorical recognition by the Executive
Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, a
determination held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass
a political department of the government.
3. Test to determine if suit is against the State: On
the assumption that decision is rendered against the
public officer or agency impleaded, will the
enforcement thereof require an affirmative act from
the State, such as the appropriation of the needed
amount to satisfy the judgment? If so, then it is a suit
against the State. See: Sanders v. Veridiano, 162
SCRA 88; Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424.
a) In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302, the
Supreme Court said that State immunity from suit may
be invoked as long as the suit really affects the
property, rights or interests of the State and not
merely those of the officers nominally made party
defendants. In this case, the Court said that the
promotion of public welfare and the protection of the
inhabitants near the public forest are property rights
and interests of the State. In Veterans Manpower and
Protective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 214
SCRA 286, the suit for damages filed against the PC
Chief and the PC-SUSIA would require an affirmative
act of appropriation should damages be awarded, and
is, therefore, a suit against the State.
4. Suits against Government Agencies
a) Incorporated: If the charter provides that the
agency can sue and be sued, then suit will lie,
including one for tort. The provision in the charter
constitutes express consent on the part of the State to
be sued. See: PNB v. CIR, 81 SCRA
314; Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460; SSS v.
Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA
707.
i) Municipal corporations are agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions
and, therefore, should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. However, they are subject to suit even in
2|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
the performance of such functions because their
respective charters provide that they can sue and be
sued [Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
Judge Firme, 195 SCRA 692].
One of the corporate powers of local government
units, as enumerated in Sec. 22,
Local Government Code, is the power to sue and be
sued.
ii) In National Irrigation Administration v. Court of
Appeals, 214
SCRA 35, the Supreme Court reiterated that NIAis a
corporate body performing
proprietary functions, whose charter, P.D. 552,
provides that it may sue and be sued.
iii) In Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,
217 SCRA 401, it was held that although the charter
of PNR is silent on whether it may sue or be sued, it
had already been ruled in Malong v. PNR, 185 SCRA
63, that the PNR “is not performing any governmental
function” and may, therefore, be sued.
b) Unincorporated: Inquire into principal functions of
the agency:
i) If governmental: NO suit without consent [Sanders
v. Veridiano, supra.;
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees
Association, 1 SCRA 340]. In the Veterans Manpower
case, the Court said that the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
are instrumentalities of the national government
exercising primarily governmental functions
(regulating the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen or security guard agencies), and
thus may not be sued without consent. In Farolan v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298, the Supreme
Court said that the Bureau of Customs, being an
unincorporated agency without a separate juridical
personality, enjoys immunity from suit. It is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely the
power of taxation; it performs governmental functions.
In Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs Arrastre
Service, 18 SCRA 1120, it was held that the Customs
Arrastre Service is merely an adjunct of the Bureau of
Customs. A suit against it is, therefore, a suit against
the Bureau of Customs, an unincorporated agency
performing primarily governmental functions. [NOTE:
Even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental
to its primarily governmental functions, an
unincorporated agency still cannot be sued without its
consent.]
ia) But in Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227
SCRA 693, because of the express consent contained
in Act No. 3038 (where the Philippine
Government “consents and submits to be sued upon
any money Constitutional Law claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties”), the Department of Agriculture could be sued
on the contract for security services entered into by it
(subject to prior filing of the claim with the
Commission on Audit), despite it being an
unincorporated agency performing primarily
governmental functions.
ii) If proprietary: suit will lie^ because when the State
engages in principally proprietary functions, then it
descends to the level of a private individual, and may,
therefore, be vulnerable to suit. See: National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 207; Civil
Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals, 167
SCRA 28.
5. Suit against Public Officers. The doctrine of State
immunity also applies to complaints filed against
officials of the State for acts performed by them in the
discharge of their duties within the scope of their
authority. Thus, in the Veterans
Manpower case, the suit against the PC Chief and
PC-SUSIA was dismissed for being a suit against the
state, since it was a suit against public officers in the
discharge of official functions which are governmental
in character. Likewise, in
Larkins v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 598, it was noted that the
private respondents were dismissed from their
employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in
behalf of the US government which, by right of
sovereign power, operated and maintained the
dormitories at the Clark Air Base for USAF members.
a) In Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88, the
Supreme Court spoke of a number of well-recognized
exceptions when a public officer may be sued without
the prior consent of the State, viz: (1) to compel him to
do an act required by law;
(2) to restrain him from enforcing an act claimed to be
unconstitutional; (3) to compel the payment of
damages from an already appropriated assurance
fund or to refund tax over-payments from a fund
already available for the purpose; (4) to secure a
judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by
himself without the State having to do a positive act to
assist him; and (5) where the government itself has
violated its own laws, because the doctrine of state
immunity “cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice”.
b) The unauthorized acts of government officials
are not acts of state; thus, the public officer may be
sued and held personally liable in damages for such
acts [Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713],
Where a public officer has committed an ultra vires
act, or where there is a showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence, the officer can be held personally
accountable, even if such acts are claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties
[Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357]. Thus, the PCGG or
any of its members, may be held civilly liable (for the
sale of an aircraft to Fuller Aircraft, which was void) if
they did not act with good faith and within the scope of
their authority in the performance of official duties
[Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 142476, March 20, 2001]. Likewise, in U.S. v.
Reyes, 219 SCRA 192, petitioner Bradford, Activity
Exchange Manager at JUSMAG Headquarters, was
held personally liable, inasmuch as the search of
respondent Montoya at the JUSMAG parking lot
(which subjected respondent to embarrassment) was
3|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
held to be beyond the scope and even beyond the
Manager’s official functions. Similarly, in Republic v.
Hon. Edilberto Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, even as the
Supreme Court dismissed the suit against the
Republic of the Philippines, the action for damages
against the military personnel and the policemen
responsible for the 1989 Mendiola massacre was
upheld, inasmuch as the initial findings of the
DavideCommission (tasked by President Aquino to
investigate the incident) showed that there was, at
least, negligence on their part when they fired their
guns.
c) Where the public official is sued in his personal
capacity, the doctrine of state immunity will not apply,
even if the acts complained of were committed while
the public official was occupying a'public position. In
Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667,
February 23, 2000, the petitioner was sued for
allegedly “personal motives” in ordering the ejectment
of the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) from
the Rizal Park; thus, the case was not deemed a suit
against the State.
6. Need for consent. In order that suit may lie against
the state, there must be consent, either express or
implied. Where no consent is shown, state immunity
from suit may be invoked as a defense by the courts
sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings, because
waiver of immunity, being in derogation of
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly and must be
construed in strictissimi juris. Accordingly, the
complaint (or counterclaim) against the State must
allege the existence of such consent (and where the
same is found), otherwise, the complaint may be
dismissed [Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424].
a) Express consent. Express consent can be given
only by an act of the legislative body [Republic v.
Feliciano, supra.], in a general or a special law. i)
i) General Law. An example of a general law granting
consent is CA327, as amended by PD 1445, which
requires that all money claims against the government
must first be filed with the Commission on Audit
before suit is instituted in court. See: Sayson v.
Singzon, 54 SCRA 282. The Department of
Agriculture may be sued for money claims based on a
contract entered into in its governmental capacity,
because of the express consent contained in Act No.
3038, provided that the claim be first brought to the
Commission on Audit in accordance with CA 327, as
amended [Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227
SCRA 693].
ia) But in Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, an
action for the recovery of the value of the property
taken by the government and converted into a public
street without payment of just compensation was
allowed, despite the failure of the property owner to
file his claim with the Auditor General. Invoking
Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, the
Supreme Court said that suit may lie because the
doctrine of State immunity cannot be used to
perpetrate an injustice. This ruling was reiterated in
De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223
SCRA 11,where it was held that the “public
respondents’ belief that the property is public, even if
buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no
reason for the unjust taking of petitioner’s property”;
after all, the TCT was in the name of the petitioner.
See also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212.
ib) In EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar, G.R. No.
131544,
March 16, 2001, the ruling in Ministerio was invoked
when the respondent DPWH
Secretary denied the money claims of petitioners
even after the DPWH Auditor interposed no objection
to the payment and the DBM had ordered the release
of the amount under a corresponding Advise of
Allotment it issued. Where in Ministerio, the Court said
that the doctrine cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen, in this case the
Supreme Court declared that it is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on
the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained.
ic) In Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294, an action
for the revocation of a donation because of the failure
of the defendant to comply with stipulated conditions
was allowed, inasmuch as the action did not involve a
money claim.
ri) Special Law. See: Merritt v. Government of the
Philippines Islands, 34 Phil. 311. This form of consent
must be embodied in a statute and cannot be given by
a mere counsel [Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470].
iia) By virtue of P.D. 1620, the grant of immunity to
IRRI is clear and unequivocal, and an express waiver
by its Director General is the only way by which it may
relinquish or abandon this immunity [Callado v. IRRI,
supra.].
b) Implied Consent
i) When the State commences litigation, it becomes
vulnerable to
a counterclaim [See: Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping,
G.R. No. L-6060, Sept. 30,
1950]. Intervention by the State would constitute
commencement of litigation, except when the State
intervenes not for the purpose of asking for any
affirmative relief, but only for the purpose of resisting
the claim precisely because of immunity from suit [Lim
v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345],
ii) When the State enters into a business contract.
See: U.S. v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487, where the
Supreme Court distinguished between contracts
entered into by the State in jure imperii (sovereign
acts) and in jure gestionis (commercial or proprietary
acts). Where the contract is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, there is no waiver of immunity, and no implied
consent may be derived
therefrom.
iia) In U. S. v. Ruiz, it was held that the contract for
the repair of wharves was a contract in jus imperii,
because the wharves were to be used in national
4|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
defense, a governmental function. In JUSMAG Phil. v.
NLRC, 239 SCRA
224, the engagement of the services of private
respondent was held to be performance of a
governmental function by JUSMAG, on behalf of the
United States. Accordingly, JUSMAG may not be
sued under such a contract. In Republic of Indonesia
v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003, it was
held that contracts entered into by a sovereign state in
connection with the establishment of a diplomatic
mission, including contracts for the upkeep or
maintenance of air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor
pumps of the embassy and the Ambassador’s
residence, are contracts in jure imperii. The fact that
the contract contains a provision that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according
to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court
of the Philippines does not necessarily mean a waiver
of the state’s sovereign immunity from suit.
iib) Conversely, in U.S. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, the
contract bidded out for barbershop facilities in the
Clark Field US Air Force Base was deemed
commercial. Similarly, in a companion case, U.S. v.
Rodrigo, a contract for restaurant services within the
Camp John Hay Air Station was likewise held
commercial in character.
iic) Note, however, that in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
204 SCRA 212, the Court held that even if, in
exercising the power of eminent domain, the State
exercises a power jus imperii, as distinguished
from its proprietary right
of jus gestionis, where property has been taken
without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit cannot be set up in an action for
payment by the owner. See Amigable v. Cuenca, 43
SCRA 360.
iid) In Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
129406, March 6, 2006, 227 shares in Negros
Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI)
owned and registered in the name of private
respondent Benedicto were sequestered and taken
over by PCGG fiscal agents. In a suit for payment of
dues of the sequestered shares, PCGG raised,
among others, the defense of immunity from suit. The
Supreme Court held that by entering into a
Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the Republic
stripped itself of its immunity and placed itself in the
same level as its adversary. When the State enters
into a contract through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and
pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accruse and
rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may
be sued even without its express consent, precisely
because by entering into a contract, the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen.
7. Scope of Consent. Consent to be sued does not
include consent to the execution of judgment against
it.
a) Such execution will require another waiver,
because the power of the court ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law
[Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84; Department of
Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693]. Thus, in Larkins
v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 598, considering that the
employer of private respondents was not Lt. Col.
Frankhauser or the petitioner but the U.S.
Government which, by right of sovereign power,
operated and maintained the dormitories at the Clark
Air Base for USAF members, the awards (of monetary
claims to the private respondents) will have to be
satisfied by the U.S. Government.
Without its consent the properties of the U.S.
Government may not be subject to execution.
b) But funds belonging to government corporations
(whose charters provide that they can sue and be
sued) that are deposited with a bank are not exempt
from garnishment [Philippine National Bank v.
Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595;
Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49].
In National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Quivelondo,
G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003, it was held that if
the funds belong to a public corporation or a
government- owned or controlled corporation which is
clothed with a personality of its own, then the funds
are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to
be treated like any other corporation. NHA is one such
corporation; thus, its funds are not exempt from
garnishment or execution.
i) However, in Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v.
Fernandez, 130 SCRA 56, it was held that funds of a
municipality (although it is an incorporated agency
whose charter provides that it can sue and be sued)
are public in character and may not be garnished
unless there is a corresponding appropriation
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan.
Thus, in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, G.R. No. 107271,
September 10, 2003, the rule was reiterated that all
government funds deposited with any official
depositary bank of the Philippine Government by any
of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by
general or special deposit, remain government funds
and may not be subject to garnishment or levy in the
absence of a corresponding appropriation as required
by law. In this case, the City of Caloocan had already
approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992, allocating the amount of P439.377.14 for
respondent Santiago’s back salaries plus interest.
Thus, this case fell squarely within the exception, and
the amount may therefore be garnished.
ia) Be that as it may, in Municipality of Makati v. Court
of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206, it was held that where the
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason,
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
5|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance
and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds to satisfy the money judgment.
c) In Pacific Products v. Ong, 181 SCRA 536, the
Supreme Court said that by the process of
garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee
for a debt due from the defendant. The debtor-
stranger becomes a forced intervenor; when served
with the writ of attachment, he becomes a party to the
action.
Money in the hands of government agency (engaged
in governmental functions), even if due to a third
party, is not liable to creditors of the third party
through garnishment.
To allow this would be to allow a suit against
the State without the latter’s consent.
8. Suability not equated with outright liability. Liability
will have to be determined by the Court on the basis
of the evidence and the applicable law.
a) In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands,
supra., while consent to be sued was granted through
a special law, the government was held not liable for
damages, because under the attendant
circumstances the government was not acting through
a special agent.
. b) In Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486, the
Supreme Court said that the
National Irrigation Administration is a government
agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government; it is a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Thus, the NIA may
be held liable for damages caused by the negligent
act of its driver who was not a special agent. This was
reiterated in National Irrigation Administration v. Court
of Appeals, 214
SCRA 35.
V. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Sec. 6. Art. II: “The separation of Church
and State shall be inviolable."]
1. Reinforced by:
a) Sec. 5, Art. Ill (Freedom of religion clause).
b) Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-C (religious sect cannot be
registered as political party).
c) Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from
the religious sector).
d) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against
appropriation for sectarian benefit)
2. Exceptions:
» were money derived from the sale of the stamps given
a) Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI: (Churches, parsonages, etc.,
actually, directly and exclusively used for religious
purposes shall be exempt from taxation).
b) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI: (Prohibition against
appropriation for sectarian benefit, except when
priest, etc., is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution or government orphanage or
leprosarium).
c) Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV: (Optional religious instruction
for public elementary and high school students).
d) Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIV: (Filipino ownership requirement
for educational institutions, except those established
by religious groups and mission boards).
3. See discussion on FREEDOM OF RELIGION, infra.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ 64 PHIL 201
FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme
Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in
the City of Manila of the Thirty- third
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage for printing
ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of separation of
church and state?
HELD:
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent
Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. Act No. 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous
to the
Government" does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation,
use or application of public money or property for the
use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In thepresent case, however, the issuance of the
postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts
and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold
for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the
letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint,
that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned
merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the
6|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that
the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead
of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as
follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not
the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital
of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is
obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government.
We are of the opinion that the Government should not
be embarrassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character,
if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.
The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
There is no violation of the principle of
separation of church and state. The issuance and sale
of the stamps in question maybe said to be separably
linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
government (to promote tourism).
AUSTRIA VS NLRC G.R. 124382 (1999)
ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the
services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
and as such, involves the separation of state.
RULING: No. The matter at hand relates to the
church and its religious minister but what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer
and the minister as an employee, which is purely
secular because it has no relationship with practice of
faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for
petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of
Labor Code.
VI. VITAL ROLE OF COMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION IN NATION BUILDING: POLICY OF
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
While the final text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Package Agreement (JPEPA) may not be
kept perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged by
the parties during negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality” would
govern the same. Disclosing these offers could
impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations
[AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16,
2008].
Honest public service and full public
disclosure
Sec. 27. Art. II: “The State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption. ”
Sec. 28. Art. II: “Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. ”]
Read also Sec. 7, Art. Ill; Secs 12 & 20, Art. VI; Sec.
20, Art. VII; Sec. 4, Art. IX-D; Secs. 4-15
& 17, Art. XI; and Secs. 12 &21, Art. XII.
SeeLegaspiv. Civil Service Commission,
150 SCRA 530; Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA
256; Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374;
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515.
Honesty and integrity in public service [Sec. 27]
Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in
the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.
VII. D. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
powers into the legislative, the executive and the
judicial [Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No.
45081. July 15, 1936].
Separation of powers is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution. But it obtains from actual division
[found in Sec. 1 of Articles VI, VII, and VIII]. Each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra]
Separation of powers is founded on the belief that,
by establishing equilibrium among the three
power holders, harmony will result, power will not
be concentrated and thus tyranny will be avoided
[Bernas].
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. Any system that is
violative of this principle is unconstitutional and void.
[See Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, Nov. 19,
2013, on the unconstitutionality of the PDAF]
The Pork Barrel System violates the separation of
powers because it is a form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget.
(1) By giving individual legislators the (a) power to
determine projects after the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) is passed, and, (b) through congressional
committees, authority in the areas of fund release and
7|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
realignment, the system encroaches on the
Executive’s power to implement the law.
(2) Furthermore, identification of a project by a
legislator being a mandatory requirement before his
PDAF can be tapped as a source of funds, his act
becomes indispensable in the entire budget execution
process. [Belgica, supra]
OPLE v. TORRES
G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998; Puno, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Blas Ople prays that the SC invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds: one,
it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether AO 308 violates the constitutionally
mandated right to privacy
HELD. Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308
need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
alone."
The SC prescinds from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST and that it is
NARROWLY DRAWN .
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. BUT WHAT IS
NOT ARGUABLE IS THE BROADNESS, THE
VAGUENESS, THE OVERBREADTH OF A.O. NO.
308 WHICH IF IMPLEMENTED WILL PUT OUR
PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through the use
of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application
designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our
antennas for a further look will show that it does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact,
the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development
planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not
be used solely for identification but the generation of
other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness
of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered
under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order,
an individual must present his PRN every time he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic
services and security.
His transactions with the government agency will
necessarily be recorded
— whether it be in the computer or in the
documentary file of the agency.
The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the
PRN, the better the chance of building a huge
formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for
gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation
that may be too great for some of our authorities to
resist. It does not provide who shall control and
access the data, under what circumstances and for
what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information. THERE ARE ALSO NO CONTROLS
TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF
INFORMATION. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken,
an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can
make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the data stored within the system.
It is plain and the SC held that A.O. No. 308 falls short
of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons
to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities
and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
8|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual
lacks control over what can be read or placed on his
ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill
of Rights seeks to prevent.
The SC rejected the argument of the Solicitor General
that an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
the National ID and the use of biometrics technology
as it stands on quicksand.
THE REASONABLENESS OF A PERSON'S
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
DEPENDS ON A TWO-PART TEST :
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether
this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case
determine the reasonableness of the expectation .
However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity,
may serve to create or diminish this expectation. The
use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O.
No. 308 does not assure the individual of a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Next, the Solicitor General urges the SC to validate
A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by
using THE RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TEST . He
stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308
are:
(1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of
basic government services,
(2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services,
and (3) generate population data for development
planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the
incursions into the right to privacy for the means are
rationally related to the end. The SC was not
impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the SC
upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police
power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report
disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of
income and expenses, did not infringe on the
individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to
promote morality in public administration by curtailing
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service.
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is
sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices
were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly
drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No.
308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose,
but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not
narrowly drawn. They must satisfactorily show the
presence of compelling state interests and that the
law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude
abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987
Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect
human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case
of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the
stance that will not put in danger the rights protected
by the Constitutions.
In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing
A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only
the indifferent fail to perceivethe danger that A.O. No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
Thus, the petition was GRANTED.
Administrative functions are those that involve
regulation of conduct of individuals or promulgation of
rules to carry out legislative policy. Judges should
render assistance to a provincial committee of justice
(which is under DOJ supervision) only when it is
reasonably incidental to their duties. [In Re Manzano,
A.M. No. 8-7-1861-RTC, Oct. 5, 1988]
SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN RE: MANZANO
166 SCRA 246, 1988
FACTS:
Judge Manzano was designated member of the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Committee on Justice by the
Provincial Governor. The function of the Committee is
to receive complaints and make recommendations
towards the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those who are poor.
ISSUE: May the Judge accept the designation?
HELD:
No. The committee performs administrative functions,
that is, functions which “involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devoted upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
Court and other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12,
Art. VIII,
Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge
Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will
be in violation of the Constitution. This declaration
does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an
9|Page
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming
indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice.
As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the
structure of government. Their integrity and
performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to
the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they
are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the landable purposes
for which they exist, but only when such assistance
may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their
judicial duties.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
SANIDAD V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976
FACTS:
Pablito Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of
“Overview,” a weekly newspaper circulating in Baguio
and the Cordilleras, assailed the
Constitutionality of Sec 19 of the Comelec Resolution
2167 which provides that during the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio
or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issue. Petitioner contends that it violates the
freedom of expression and of the press. Hence,
constitutes as a prior restraint in his constitutional
right. Solicitor General contends that it does not
violate the Constitution for it is a valid implementation
of the power of Comelec to supervise and regulate
media during election or plebiscite period and can
express his news through the Comelec space &
airtime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec is granted the power
to regulate mass media during election or plebiscite
period under Article 9C of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
It is given that what was granted to Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits, or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities, media communication or information to
the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and
the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefore, for public information campaign
and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil
sought to be prevented is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 6646 can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their
right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Comelec
Resolution No 2167 has no statutory basis.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
DAZA VS. SINGSON
180 SCRA 496, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the Commission on
Appointments representing the Liberal Party. With the
organization of the LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino), some congressional members belonging to
the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the
LDP.
When the Commission on Appointments were
reorganized, petitioner was replaced by an LDP
representative.
Petitioner contends that the organization of the LDP
cannot affect the composition of the Commission on
Appointments because LDP is not a registered party
and has not yet shown the stability of a party.
ISSUE: Does the situation present a “political
question”?
HELD:
The question is justiciable. The issue is one of legality
not of wisdom. The ascertainment of the manner of
forming the Commission on Appointments is distinct
from the discretion of the parties to designate there
representatives. And even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come under the
expanded power of review in Article VIII
VIII. LIMITATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Limitations:
i) In aid of legislation.
ia) In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767, the inquiry was held
not to be in aid of legislation. The Supreme Court
declared that the speech of Senator Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to
look into possible violation of Sec. 5, RA 3019.
There appears to be no intended legislation
involved.
Further, the issue to be investigated is one
over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan; the issue had thus been
preempted by that Court.
To allow the Committee to investigate
would only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments, but if the Committee’s judgment is
reached before the Sandiganbayan’s, the
10 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
possibility that its influence may be made to bear
on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan
cannot be discounted. The SBRC’s probe and
inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would
be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
ib) However, the mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting
a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely,
the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate
to a criminal or an administrative investigation
[Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, G.R. No. 167173,
December 27, 2007].
ii) In accordance with duly published rules of
procedure.
iia) In Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No.
180843, March 25, 2008, by a majority vote, the
Supreme Court declared that the conduct of the
investigations by the Senate Committees did not
comply with the Constitution, for failure to
publish the rules of procedure on logislative
inquiries.
iii) Rights of persons appearing in, or affected
by such, inquiry shall be respected.
iiia) In Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks, supra., it was held that the
legislative inquiry does not violate the petitioners’
right to privacy. In Miguel v. Gordon, supra., the
Court said that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to the privacy of ordinary
financial transactions. Employing the rational basis
relationship test laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, the
Court said that there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclose information is for a valid purpose; in this
case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities.
iiia) Neither does the inquiry violate the petitioners’
right against self-incrimination, because the officers
of Standard Chartered Bank are not being indicted
as accused in a criminal proceeding; they are
merely summoned as resource persons, or as
witnesses. Likewise, they will not be subjected to
any penalty by reason of their testimony [Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
supra.].
c) Power to punish contempt. Punishment of
contumacious witness may include imprisonment,
for the duration of the session. The Senate, being a
continuing body, may order imprisonment for an
indefinite period, but principles of due process and
equal protection will have to be considered. See
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29; Arnault v.
Balagtas, 97 Phil 358.
i) In Miguel v. Gordon, supra., the Supreme Court
underscored the indispensability and usefulness of
the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry. Sec.
21, Art. VI, grants the power of inquiry not only to
the Senate and the House of Representatives, but
also to their respective committees. Clearly, there
is a direct conferral of the power to the committees.
A reasonable conclusion is that the conferral of the
legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress must carry with it all powers necessary
and proper for its effective discharge.
5. Question hour. The heads of departments may
upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as
the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session. [Sec. 22, Art. VI],
a) A distinction has to be made between the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, and the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function [Senate
v. Ermita, supra.]. . i)
i) When Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, the
deparment heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Art. VI, Sec. 22, in keeping with the doctrine of
separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request the appearance of department heads,
who may appear with the consent of the President.
ii) However, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation”
under Sec. 21, the appearance is mandatory.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the
only way for department heads to exempt
themselves there from is by a valid claim of
executive privilege. They are not exempt by the
11 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one executive official may be exempted from
this power — the President — on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment.
iii) Thus, the requirement for Cabinet Members to
secure
Presidential consent under Sec. 1 of E.O. 464,
which is limited only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. It cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of deparment
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect
the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made either by the President herself
or by the Executive Secretary, acting for the
President. [Senate v. Ermita, supra.]
“The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines...”
In Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August
15, 2006, the Senate Committee on National
Defense invited several senior AFP officers to
testify on matters related to the conduct of the
2004 elections. AFP Chief of Staff
General Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of
the Senate Committee, that “no approval has been
granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear” at the Senate hearing. This
notwithstanding, General Gudani and Col. Balutan
attended and both testified atthe hearing. On
recommendation of the Office of the Provost
Marshal General, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were charged with violation of Articles of War 65,
on will fully disobeying a superior officer, in relation
to Articles of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to
good order and military discipline. Gudani and
Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
asking that the order of PGMA preventing
petitioners from testifying be declared
unconstitutional, the charges for violation of the
Articles of War be quashed, and the respondents
be permanently enjoined from proceeding against
the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition.
ia) The ability of the President to require a military
official to secure prior consent before appearing in
Congress pertains to a wholly different and
independent specie of presidential authority — the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. By
tradition and jurisprudence, these commander- in
chief powers are not encumbered by the same
degree of restriction as that which may attach to
executive privilege or executive control.
ib) The vitality, of the tenet that the President is the
commander in- chief of the AFP is most crucial to
the democratic way of life, to civil supremacy over
the military, and to the general stability of our
representative system of government. The Court
quoted Kapunan v. De Villa: “The Court is of the
view that such is justified by the requirements of
military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain
liberties of persons in the military service, including
the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by
rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain
degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because
the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties
under the law depends to a large extent on the
maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence,
lawful orders must be followed without question
and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the
matter.”
READ Garcillano vs HRep. GR. 17033
Romero Vs Estrada GR. 174105
RESIDUAL POWER AND EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE OF THE PRESIDENT
Right to return to one's country, a distinct right
under international law, is independent from
although related to the right to travel.
The President has the power (residual/implied) to
impair the right to return when such return poses
threats to the government. [Marcos v. Manglapus
(1989)]
vib) The first and safest criterion to determine
whether a given power has been validly exercised
by a particular department is whether or not the
power has been constitutionally conferred
upon the department claiming its exercise —
since the conferment is usually done expressly.
However, even in the absence of express
conferment, the exercise of the power may be
justified under the doctrine of necessary
implication, i.e. that the grant of an express
power carries with it all other powers that may
be reasonably inferred from it. Note also that
there are powers which although not expressly
conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or
incidental, e.g., the President’s power to deport
undesirable aliens which may be exercised
independently of constitutional or statutory
authority, because it is an “act of State”. See also:
Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760, where the
Supreme Court justified the action of President
Aquino in banning the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines on the basis of the President’s residual
powers.
12 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
Kinds of Executive Privilege in Neri v. Senate
(2008)
(1) Presidential Communications Privilege
(President): communications are presumptively
privileged; president must be
given freedom to explore alternatives in policy-
making.
(2) Deliberative Process Privilege (Executive
Officials): refer to materials that comprise part of a
process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated. This includes diplomatic
processes. [See Akbayan v. Aquino (2008)]
Varieties of Executive Privilege (US):
(1) State secrets privilege - invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the
ground that the information is of such nature that
its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives.
(2) Informer’s privilege - the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
(3) Generic privilege for internal deliberations -
has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated. [Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 163783, Jun. 22, 2004]
Scope: This jurisdiction recognizes the common
law holding that there is a "governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters." Closed-door Cabinet
meetings are also a recognized limitation on the
right to information.
Note: Executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information
and not to categories of persons—it attaches to
the information and not the person. Only the [1]
President (and the [2] Executive Secretary, by
order of the President) can invoke the privilege.
(Senate v. Ermita, supra).
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFGUARD
Constitutional Safeguards to insure of the
Judciiary.
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it
may not be abolished by the legislature.
2. The members of the Supreme Court are
removable only by impeachment.
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its
minimum original and appellate jurisdiction;
appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without
its advice and concurrence.
4. The Supreme Court has administrative
supervision over all inferior courts and personnel.
5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to
discipline judges/ justices of inferior courts.
6. The members of the Judiciary have security of
tenure.
7. The members of the Judiciary may not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions.
8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the
Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.
a) In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the
Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-up
of the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No. 01- 1-
04-SCPhilja, 481 SCRA 1, the Supreme Court said
that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility
to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government
and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions. In
downgrading the positions and salary grades of
two positions in the Philippine
Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its
authority and encroached upon the fiscal autonomy
of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision
over court personnel, as enshrined in the
Constitution. 9
9. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and
promulgate the Rules of
Court.
10. The Supreme Court, alone, may order
temporary detail of judges.
11. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and
employees of the Judiciary.
BENGZON VS DRILON
(GR NO 103524, APRIL 15,1992)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least
20 years service either in the Judiciary or in any
other branch of the Government or in both, having
attained the age of 70 years or who resign by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
office.
13 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
The retired Justice shall receive during the residue
of his natural life the salary which he was receiving
at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the
members of the Constitutional Commissions under
RA. 1568, as amended by RA 3595. Subsequently,
President Marcos signed PD 578 which extended
similar retirement benefits to the members of the
Armed Forces giving them also the automatic
readjustment features of RA 1797 and RA 3595.
However, PD 644 was issued, repealing Section 3-
A of RA 1797 and RA 3595 (amending RA 1568
and PD 578) which authorized the adjustment of
the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members
of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers
and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under PD 1638 the automatic
readjustment of the retirement pension of officers
and enlisted men was subsequently restored by
President Marcos. A later decree PD 1909 was
also issued providing for the automatic
readjustment of the pensions of members of the
Armed Forces who have retired prior to September
10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for
members of the Armed Forces who number in the
tens of thousands was restored, that of the retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals who are only a handful and fairly
advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination
against the members of the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in
1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed
provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress
was under the impression that PD 644 became law
after it was published in the Official Gazette on
April 7, 1977.
In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297
and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the
need to reenact RA 1797 and 3595 to restore said
retirement pensions and privileges of the retired
Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Constitutional Commissions adequate old age
pensions even during the time when the
purchasing power of the peso has been diminished
substantially by worldwide recession or inflation.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No.
16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that
according to her "it would erode the very
foundation of the Government's collective effort to
adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on
standardization of compensation as articulated in
RA 6758 known as Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989." She further said that
"the Government should not grant distinct
privileges to select group of officials whose
retirement benefits under existing laws already
enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast
majority of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court
of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P.
Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R.
Lood filed a letter/petition asking this Court far a
readjustment of their monthly pensions in
accordance with RA. 1797. They reasoned out that
PD 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not
become law as there was no valid publication. PD
644 appeared for the first time only in the
supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74,
No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but
published only on September 5, 1983. Since PD
644 has no binding force and effect of law, it
therefore did not repeal RA 1797.
The Court acted favorably on the request. Pursuant
to the above resolution, Congress included in the
General Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the
Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted
pension rates due the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attempt of the
President to use the veto power to set aside a
Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of
benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches
upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to
the Judiciary.
HELD:
YES. The Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence end flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the interest of
comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders.
We now agree with the petitioners that this
grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision.
14 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
In the case at bar, the veto of these
specific provisions in the General Appropriations
Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how
its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
The freedom of the Chief Justice to make
adjustments in the utilization of the funds
appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular
item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of
the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to
it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities
just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is
needed.
READ CHAVEZ VS. JBC GR. 202242
Appointment to the Judiciary.
1. Qualifications: Of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence [Sec. 7 (3), Art. VIII]. In
addition:
a) Supreme Court: Natural born citizen of
the Philippines, at least 40 years of age,.for 15
years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines [Sec. 7 (1),
Art. VIII]..
b) Lower Collegiate Courts: Natural born
citizen of the Philippines, member of the Philippine
Bar, but Congress may prescribe other
qualifications [Sec. 7 (1) and (2), Art. VIII].
c) Lower Courts: Citizen of the Philippines,
member of the Philippine
Bar, but Congress may prescribe other
qualifications [Sec. 7 (1) and (2), Art. VIII]..
2. Procedure for Appointment.
a) Appointed by the President of the
Philippines from among a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy; the appointment shall need no
confirmation [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]..
b) Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall
be filled within ninety (90) days from the
occurrence thereof [Sec. 4 (1). Art. VIII],
c) For lower courts, the President shall
issue the appointment within
ninety (90) days from the submission by the JBC of
such list [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]. i)
i) Relate this to the constitutional prohibition
against midnight appointments [Sec. 15, Art.
W//which states that two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or acting President
shall not make appointments except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. In Re: Mateo
Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-
SC, November 9, 1998, it was held that during this
period (when appointments are prohibited), the
President is not required to make appointments to
the courts, nor allowed to do so. While the filling up
of vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the issuance of the
appointment during the period of the ban.
3. The Judicial and Bar Council.
a) Composition [Sec. 8 (1), Art. VIII]:
i) Ex-officio members: Chief Justice, as Chairman;
the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of Congress.
ii) Regular members: A representative of the
Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, a professor of law, a retired justice of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
iii) Secretary ex-officio: The Clerk of the Supreme
Court.
b) Appointment: The regular members
shall be appointed by the President for
a term of four [4] years, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
They shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court
[Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII].
c) Powers/Functions: Principal function of
recommending appointees to
the Judiciary. May exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it [Sec. 8 (5), Art. VIII].
XI. POLICE POWER
Definition
It is the inherent and plenary power of the state
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. [Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. v. Mayor of Manila (1967)]
Scope and Limitations
General Coverage
"The police power of the State […] is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is [aptly]
termed the 'law of overruling necessity.'” [Rubi v.
Provincial Board (1919)]
“The state, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons may
15 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim
of our Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated.” [Ortigas and Co., Limited
Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co. (1979)]
“Police power […] has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent, and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs.” [Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of
Manila (1967)]
“Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to
meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant.” [White Light Corporation v. City of
Manila (2009)]
Police Power cannot be bargained away through
treaty or contract. [Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at
the time of its execution may be legally modified or
even completely invalidated by a subsequent law.
If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it
will prevail over the contract. [PNB v. Office of the
President (1996)]
Taxation, Eminent Domain as Implements of Police
Power
Taxation may be used as an implement of police
power. [Lutz v. Araneta (1955)]
Eminent domain may be used as an implement to
attain the police objective. [Association of Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(1989)]
Specific Coverage
(1) Public Health
(2) Public Morals
(3) Public Safety
(4) Public Welfare
Test of Reasonability
(1) Lawful subject: The interests of the public,
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference;
(2) Lawful means: The means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. [Planters Products v. Fertiphil Corp.
(2008)]
The limit to police power is reasonability. The Court
looks at the test of reasonability to
UP LAW BOC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
POLITICAL LAW
99
decide whether it encroaches on the right of an
individual. So long as legitimate means can
reasonably lead to create that end, it is reasonable.
[Morfe v. Mutuc (1968)]
Legislature’s determination “as to what is a proper
exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.” [US v. Toribio (1910)]
However, courts cannot delimit beforehand the
extent or scope of the police power, since they
cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare. “So it is that Constitutions do
not define the scope or extent of the police power
of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof. The most important of these are
the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.” [Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
The SC upheld the validity of Administrative Orders
(issued by the DENR Sec.) which converted
existing mine leases and other mining agreements
into production-sharing agreements within one year
from effectivity. The subject sought to be governed
by the AOs are germane to the object and purpose
of E.O. 279 (passed under the Freedom
Constitution) and that mining leases or agreements
granted by the State are subject to alterations
through a reasonable exercise of police power of
the State. [Miners Association of the Philippines v.
Factoran (1995)]
Illustrations on the Exercise of Police Power
General Welfare v Property rights – RA 9257,
the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003, is a
legitimate exercise of police power. Administrative
Order No. 177 issued by the Department of Health,
providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior
citizens shall not be limited to the purchase of
unbranded generic medicine but shall extend to
both prescription and non-prescription medicine,
whether branded or generic, is valid. [Carlos
Superdrug Corporation v. DSWC et al. (2007)]
National Security v Property Rights – SC upheld
the constitutionality of RA 1180 (An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business) which sought to nationalize
the retail trade business by prohibiting aliens in
general from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade. The law was to “remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail business;
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by which
it protects its own personality and insures its
security and future.” [Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
Public Safety – Police power is a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from being precisely
defined; the principle is the Constitution did not
intend to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to unreasonably obstruct the enactment of
measures calculated to communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare. A heavy burden lies in the
16 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
hands of a petitioner who questions the state’s
police power if it was clearly intended to promote
public safety. [Agustin v. Edu, (1979), on an LOI
requiring early warning devices for all motor vehicle
owners]
Police Power, Property Rights v Fundamental
Rights - Hotel and motel operators’ association
assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No.
4760 (regulating motels through fees, restrictions
on minors, open inspection, logbooks, etc.). Court
held: The mantle of protection associated with the
due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.
This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance.
Where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider. [Ermita-Malate Motel
and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor of Manila
(1967)]
However, when legitimate sexual behavior, which
is constitutionally protected [by the right to privacy],
and other legitimate activities, most of which are
grounded on the convenience of having a place to
stay during the short intervals between travels [in
motels], will be unduly curtailed by the ordinance,
the same ordinance is invalid. [See White Light
Corp. v. City of Manila (2009)]
Limitations when police power is delegated:
(1) Express grant by law [e.g. Secs. 16, 391, 447,
458 and 468, R.A. 7160, for LGUs]
(2) Limited within its territorial jurisdiction [for local
government units]
(3) Must not be contrary to law
XII. DUE PROCESS
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[Art. III, Sec. 1]
The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments. [Art. XIII, Sec. 1]
In General
Due process of law simply states that “[i]t is part of
the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side"
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made
by those who sit in judgment.” [Ynot v. IAC (1987)]
It covers any governmental action which
constitutes a deprivation of some person's life,
liberty, or property.
Definition
Due process furnishes a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. xxx It is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively pit, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided. xxx Correctly it
has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness.
It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair
play. [Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
A law hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
[Darthmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton
518]
Life is also the right to a good life. [Bernas] It
includes the right of an individual to his body in its
completeness, free from dismemberment, and
extends to the use of God-given faculties which
make life enjoyable. [Malcolm]
Liberty “includes the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude. [It] includes the right of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways[.]” [Rubi
v. Provincial Board]
Property is anything that can come under the right
of ownership and be the subject of contract. It
represents more than the things a person owns; it
includes the right to secure, use and dispose of
them. [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 US 197]
Scope and limitations
Universal in application to all persons without
regard to any difference in race, color or
nationality.
Artificial persons are covered by the protection but
only insofar as their property is concerned [Smith
Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163]
The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the
means of livelihood. [Villegas v. HiuChiong, 86
SCRA 275]
The due process clause has to do with the
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police
power. xxx The guaranty of due process, as has
often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the
17 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
UP LAW BOC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
POLITICAL LAW
108
subject sought to be attained. [Ichong v.
Hernandez (1957)]
Noted exceptions to due process
(1) The conclusive presumption, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or
there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed there
from.
(2) There are instances when the need for
expeditious action will justify omission of these
requisites—e.g. in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose,
which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives
of the people.
(3) Pornographic materials, contaminated meat
and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and
may be summarily destroyed.
(4) The passport of a person sought for a criminal
offense may be cancelled without hearing, to
compel his return to the country he has fled.
(5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked
in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. [Ynot v. IAC
(1987)]
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be
omitted without violation of due process in view of:
1) the nature of the property involved; or 2) the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
from a clear and present danger.
A. RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS
The concept of due process is flexible for not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure. [Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion (2000)]
Consideration of what procedures due process
may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well
as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.” [Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy (1961)]
To say that the concept of due process is flexible
does not mean that judges are at large to apply it
to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its
scope once it has been determined that some
process is due; it is a recognition that not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure. [Morrissey v. Brewer
(1972)]
B. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
B.1 SCOPE
Procedural Due Process – that aspect of due
process which serves as a restriction on actions of
judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the
government. It refers to the method or manner by
which a law is enforced.
Concerned with government action on established
process when it makes intrusion into the private
sphere.
B.2 SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person’s life, liberty, or property. [City
of Manila v. Laguio (2005)]
In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government’s action.
Substantive due process is an aspect of due
process which serves as a restriction on the law-
making and rule-making power of the government.
The law itself, not merely the procedures by which
the law would be enforced, should be fair,
reasonable, and just.
It guarantees against the arbitrary power even
when exercised according to proper forms and
procedure.
Requisites:
Due process of law means simply that
(a) There shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government;
(b) This law shall be reasonable in its
operation;
(c) It shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
(d) It shall be applicable alike to all the
citizens of the state or to all of a class. [Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)]
B.3 PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In Civil Proceedings
Requisites:
(a) An impartial court of tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
(b) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
over the person of the defendant and over the
property subject matter of the proceeding [Banco
Español v. Palanca (1918)]
18 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)
Note: Notice is an essential element of due
process, otherwise the Court will not acquire
jurisdiction and its judgment will not bind the
defendant.
To be meaningful, it must be both as to time and
place.
Service of summons is not only required to give the
court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
but also to afford the latter the opportunity to be
heard on the claim made against him. Thus,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much an issue of due process as of
jurisdiction. [Sarmiento v. Raon (2002)]
(c) The defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee. [Bautista v.
Court of Appeals (2004)]
The SC reiterated that the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. [Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753]
(d) Judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing and must clearly explain its factual
and legal bases. [Sec. 14, Art. VIII; Banco
Español-Filipino v. Palanca (1918)]
Note: The allowance or denial of motions for
extension rests principally on the sound discretion
of the court to which it is addressed, but such
discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently,
with a view to substantial justice. Poverty is
recognized as a sufficient ground for extending
existing period for filing. The right to appeal is part
of due process of law. [Reyes v. CA (1977)]
In Administrative Proceedings
The Ang Tibay Rules:
(1) Right to a hearing to present own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) Decision rendered must have support.
(4) Evidence which supports the finding or
conclusion is substantial (such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion).
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or any of its judges, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The tribunal should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. [Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940)]
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is to explain one’s side. An actual hearing
is not always an indispensable aspect of due
process as long as the party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course.
[Lumiqued v. Estrada (1997)]
In Criminal Proceedings
See Rights of the Accused, Topic 1 Criminal Due
Process
In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, it
cannot be said that the State has been denied due
process unless there is an indication that the
special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to
present available evidence or that other evidence
could be secured. [People v. Sandiganbayan
(2012)]
In Academic Disciplinary Proceedings
Requisites:
(a) The students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(b) They shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
(c) They shall be informed of the evidence against
them;
(d) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf;
(e) The evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case
[Non v. Dames (1990)]
In Labor Cases
The Labor Code requires twin requirements of
notice and hearing for a valid dismissal.
However, the Court in Serrano v. NLRC clarified
that this “procedural due process” requirement is
not constitutional but merely statutory, hence, a
violation of such requirement does not render the
dismissal void.
There are three reasons why violation by the
employer of the notice requirement cannot be
considered a denial of due process resulting in the
nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff:
(1) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is
a limitation on governmental powers. It does not
apply to the exercise of private power, such as the
termination of employment under the Labor Code.
(2) Notice and hearing are required under the Due
Process Clause before the power of organized
society are brought to bear upon the individual.
19 | P a g e
 CONSTIREV (DEAN JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON PLS 2019)

This is obviously not the case of termination of Basis: Labor Code

employment under Art. 283. Requirements:
(1) Procedural (the manner of dismissal, i.e. after
(3) The employer cannot really be expected to be LC requirements are satisfied)
entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. (2) Substantive (valid and authorized causes of
[Serrano v. NLRC (2000)] employment termination)
Purpose: Protects employees from being unjustly
C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS terminated without just cause after notice and
Laws which interfere with life, liberty or property hearing.
satisfy substantive due process when there is: Effect of breach: Does not void action; the law
(a) Lawful object i.e. the interests of the public in provides for other remedies (e.g. damages,
general (as distinguished from those of a particular reinstatement).
class) require the intervention of the State, and Constitutional due process protects the individual
(b) Lawful means i.e. means employed are from the government and assures him of his right
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings;
the purpose and not unduly oppressive on while statutory due process found in the Labor
individuals. [US v. Toribio (1910)] Code and Implementing rules protects employees
Publication of laws is part of substantive due from being unjustly terminated without just cause
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may and hearing. [Agabon v. NLRC (2004)]
be bound by law, he must be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. For the
publication requirement, “laws” refer to all statutes,
including those of local application and private
laws. This does not cover internal regulations
issued by administrative agencies, which are
governed by the Local Government Code.
Publication must be full, or there is none at all.
[Tañada v. Tuvera (1986)]
Governmental functions are classified into:
(1) Constituent – constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature (i.e. public
order, administration of justice and foreign
relations)
(2) Ministrant – undertaken only by way of
advancing the general interests of society, and are
merely optional on the part of the State (i.e. public
education, public charity and regulations of trade
and industry) [Concurring Opinion of Justice
Fernando in ACCFA v. CUGCO (1969)]

D. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE

PROCESS

D.1 CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS

[Agabon v. NLRC (2004)]
Basis: Constitution
Requirements: Procedural and Substantive
Purpose:
(1) Protects individual against government; and
(2) Assures him of his rights in criminal, civil and
administrative proceedings
Effect of breach: government action void

D.2. STATUTORY DUE PROCESS

Basis: Statute. Cases where due process is
statutory notably include (1) labor termination
cases, and (2) the right to appeal, .e.g. Statutory
Due Process in Labor Cases.

20 | P a g e