Cases For Co-Ownership

G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011.
*
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, petitioner, vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., respondent.
Ownership; Co-Ownership; Partition; The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is
necessary in the resolution of an action for partition.—Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v.
Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989), is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the
existence of co-ownership is necessary in
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* THIRD DIVISION.
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8 REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.
the resolution of an action for partition. Thus: The first phase of a partition and/or accounting
suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of
all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may
end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. x x x The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by
the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Land Titles; Words and Phrases; What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title itself; Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.—Would a resolution on the
issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most
definitely, it would not. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register
of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more
often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of
title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used. 679
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Same; Same; Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed—the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.—Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean
that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the
latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties
may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Needless
to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
Co-Ownership; Partition; Evidence; Admissions; Requisites; Words and Phrases; An admission is
any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he
contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.—As to whether respondent’s assent to the initial
partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have
admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative. An admission
is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he
contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission against interest is governed by
Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. To be
admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite;
(c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would
be self-serving and inadmissible.
Waiver; Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.—A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
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determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful
spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver
is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
Estoppel; A party does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally
refused to sign.—Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after
seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on
the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Family Code; Co-Ownership; Co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the
acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint contribution of the
parties to acquire the same.—Any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered
common property if two (2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence showing that the properties
were acquired by the parties during their cohabitation; and second, there must be evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
Stated plainly, co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the acquisition of the property
during the cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same.
These two (2) conditions must concur.
Same; Same; Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof of
contribution, will not result in a co-ownership—proof of actual contribution must be established by clear
evidence showing that the party either used his or her own money or that he or she actually contributed
his or her own money to purchase the property.—On the contribution aspect of these elements, mere
cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof of
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contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof of actual contribution must be established by
clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her own money or that he or she actually
contributed his or her own money to purchase the property. Jurisprudence holds that this fact may be
proven by evidence in the form of bank account statements and bank transactions as well as testimonial
evidence proving the financial capacity of the party to purchase the property or contribute to the purchase
of a property.
Same; Same; Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot
automatically be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income referred to is
corporate income.—Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot
automatically be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income the petitioner
referred to is corporate income. The petitioner should have presented evidence showing that the income
she referred to actually accrued to her in the form of salaries, bonuses, commissions and/or dividends
from the manpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporation’s distinct legal personality
from its officers, stockholders and members applies. Unless otherwise shown, the source of the earnings
would be the corporation’s, not the petitioner’s.
Courts; Judgments; The phrase, “without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or
may file against him” in the last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is objectionable—for one,
no issue exists in this case between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties they
commonly or individually hold, and, additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the Court is
giving legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course of action to take against her husband.—
The phrase, “without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him” in the
last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is similarly objectionable. For one, no issue exists in
this case between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties they commonly or
individually hold. Additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the Court is giving legal advice to
the wife of the respondent on what course of action to take against her husband. This statement is beyond
what this Court should properly state in its Decision given the facts and issues posed, and is plainly
uncalled for.
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2 ANNOTATED
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Margarita C. Feliciano for petitioner.
Culvera & Waytan Law Offices for respondent.
Cesar B. Jimenea, Jr. collaborating counsel for respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against
respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent
as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978.
Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth
to respondent’s son on October 12, 1979.3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. 4 Five parcels of land were
also acquired during the said period and were registered in peti-
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1 Rollo, pp. 28-42. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring;
2 CA Rollo, pp. 35-39.
3 Records, p. 108.
4 Rollo, p. 29.
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tioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described
as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. “married to Betty
Lacbayan.”5
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of “Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty
Lacbayan.”6
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. “married to Betty
Lacbayan Samoy.”7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. “married to Betty L.
Samoy.”8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City
covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. “married to
Betty L. Samoy.”9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983,
petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4,
Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the
400-square meter property in Don Enrique Heights.10
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5 Records, pp. 7-8, 51-52.

6 Id., at pp. 9-10, 57-58.
7 Id., at pp. 11-12, 55-56.
8 Id., at pp. 13-14, 53-54.
9 Id., at pp. 15-16, 59-60.
10 Rollo, p. 31.
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4 ANNOTATED
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in
1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s
proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter,
while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent. 12 However, when
petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent
refused.13 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition 14 of the said
properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as
husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business
partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his
Answer,16 however, denied petitioner’s claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were
acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a
day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of
the morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from
the income of the company which she and respondent established.19
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11 Records, pp. 61-64.

12 Id., at p. 63.
13 Rollo, p. 32.
14 Records, pp. 2-6.
15 Id., at p. 2.
16 Id., at pp. 26-28.
17 Id., at p. 26.
18 TSN, Betty B. Lacbayan, October 20, 1999, pp. 52-54.
19 Id., at pp. 57-58.
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Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds,
salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.20 He countered that the said properties were
registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of
respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since
his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased the said
properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction
of a new building.22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to
petitioner’s own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds
but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33%
share.24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial court’s
decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to
law and jurisprudence. Peti-
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20 TSN, Bayani Samoy, Jr., December 10, 1999, pp. 22-23 and 27.
21 Id., at pp. 28-31.
22 Id., at pp. 29-32.
23 The dispositive portion of the February 10, 2000 RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the defendant
is hereby adjudged as the sole owner of the properties which are the subject matters of this case. Furthermore, the plaintiff
is hereby directed to pay the defendant the amount of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of this
suit.
SO ORDERED. (CA Rollo, p. 39.)
24 CA Rollo, pp. 37-39.
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6 ANNOTATED
tioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for
partition.25
Unimpressed with petitioner’s arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in
the following manner:
“Appellant’s harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to
say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the
appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the
subject realties—itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon
which appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule
on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that
availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said
principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the
selfsame realties in the parties’ name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellant’s imputation of reversible error against the trial court
for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action
involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property
against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition
may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second—assuming that the plaintiff
successfully hurdles the first—the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and
defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason
that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the
existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it
discounted the merit in appellant’s claim of co-ownership. 26
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25 Id., at p. 23.
26 Rollo, pp. 35-37.
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Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against
respondent’s interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating co-
ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in
dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by
respondent’s self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been
squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not
to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant
case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of
the Court’s jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. The issues may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the
action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
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27 Id., at pp. 17-18, 21-22.

688
8 ANNOTATED
Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that
the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action
for partition. Thus:
“The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting
of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition”
directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x” (Emphasis supplied.)
29
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on
the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-
owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore,
until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be pre-
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28 G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.

29 Id., at pp. 584-585.
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mature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not
even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over
the subject properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, 32 but that
rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document. 34 Petitioner apparently confuses title with the
certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title,
the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership
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30 See Fabrica v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47360, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 250, 255-256.
31 Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 534, 538.
32 Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, states in full:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.—A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
33 Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547.
34 Id.
35 Id., at p. 548.
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0 ANNOTATED
over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may
have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best
evidence thereof.
Finally, as to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an
admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-
ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to
the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by
him.38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
“Sec. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.”
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
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36 Id., at pp. 547-548.

37 Id., at p. 548.
38 Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II., 2004 edition, p. 715, citing 31 C.J.S. 1022.
39 Id.
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A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which
is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not
only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be
lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to
waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule
that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after
seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to
insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial court’s view that
respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with
respondent’s predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and
engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who
impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly,
respondent’s act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate
attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore,
has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing
of the complaint against him.
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40 Art. 6, CIVIL CODE.

692
2 ANNOTATED
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani
S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to
any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees in respondent’s favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., See Separate Opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
This case stemmed from a complaint for judicial partition of several properties based on the
petitioner’s assertion of co-ownership. As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the
party (the petitioner in this case) who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts the affirmative in the issue presented.1
Subject to my observations below, I find that the petitioner failed to discharge by clear
preponderant evidence her co-ownership of the subject properties to warrant their judicial
partition. I confine myself to this conclusion, however, as the issue before us is solely on
whether a judicial partition should be made. Specifically and as articulated in my observations
below, I cannot join the ponencia’s other rulings.
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1 Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
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Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to the property relationship in a cohabitation
situation, is clear on the conditions it imposes. The first sentence of this article states:
“In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions.” [underscoring supplied]
Thus, any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered common property
if two (2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence showing that the properties were
acquired by the parties during their cohabitation; and second, there must be evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry. Stated plainly, co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the
acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint contribution
of the parties to acquire the same. These two (2) conditions must concur.
On the contribution aspect of these elements, mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the
Family Code, without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof of actual
contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her
own money or that he or she actually contributed his or her own money to purchase the
property.2 Jurisprudence holds that this fact may be proven by evidence in the form of bank
account statements and bank transactions as well as testimonial evidence proving the financial
capacity of the party to purchase the property or contribute to the purchase of a property.3
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2 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439.
3 Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593.
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4 ANNOTATED
In this case, the presumption of co-ownership over the subject properties between the
petitioner and the respondent did not arise. While the first condition was duly proven by
evidence, the second condition was not.
The records sufficiently establish the first condition showing the acquisition of the subject
properties from 1978 to 1991 or during the cohabitation of the petitioner and the respondent. The
second condition is not similarly established since no evidence was adduced showing the
petitioner’s actual contributions in the acquisition of the subject properties.
Since the petition asserts an affirmative allegation (i.e., her co-ownership of the subject
properties to which she bases her action for judicial partition) she carries the burden of
substantiating her claim. She failed in this regard. The records show that she did not present any
evidence showing that the funds or a portion of the funds used to purchase the subject properties
came from her own earnings. On the contrary, the petitioner presented contradictory evidence
when she admitted that the funds used to purchase the subject properties did not come from her
own earnings but from the income of the manpower business which she managed. The Regional
Trial Court found that she only owned 3.33% of share in this corporation.
Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot automatically
be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income the petitioner
referred to is corporate income. The petitioner should have presented evidence showing that the
income she referred to actually accrued to her in the form of salaries, bonuses, commissions
and/or dividends from the manpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporation’s
distinct legal personality from its officers, stockholders and members applies. 4 Unless otherwise
shown, the source of the earnings would be the corporation’s, not the petitioner’s.
_______________
4 AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 633.
695
VOL. 645, MARCH 21, 2011 695
Iadditionally observe that except for one, all the subject properties name the respondent as the
exclusive registered owner. Although the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real properties covered thereby may be under
co-ownership with the petitioner and vice-versa, the fact remains that the subject properties are
registered in the respondent’s name. The rebuttable presumption is that these properties belong to
the respondent or to the conjugal partnership of the respondent, in line with Article 116 of the
Family Code and Article 160 of the Civil Code.5
In sum, the petitioner’s case for judicial partition of the subject properties has no legal basis
in the absence of a clear evidence of co-ownership proven under the
circumstances. Consequently, we must deny the petition for lack of merit without.
As final observations, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion declaring the respondent as
the sole owner of all the properties sought to be partitioned. Records show that the petitioner is a
registered co-owner of one of the five (5) properties cited in this case, i.e., the real estate under
TCT No. 23301 registered in the name of “Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan.” By
the tenor of its decision, the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily) introduced a cloud over the
petitioner’s interests in this commonly-owned property. I note, too, that the complaint underlying
this petition is an action for partition; the adjudication of this case should necessarily be limited
to resolving the propriety of the partition sought. Notably, the Majority itself recognizes that
registration in one’s name is without prejudice to an action seeking to establish co-ownership.
In light of the undisputed joint ownership of the property commonly registered under the
parties’ names, this Decision should be without prejudice to an action for partition to
_______________
5 Atienza v. De Castro, supra note 3, at p. 603.

696
6 ANNOTATED
divide up this property—a remedy we cannot now provide in the absence of any factual basis on
how the parties contributed in acquiring this property. Alternatively, the actual partition of this
commonly-owned property should be remanded to the trial court for determination of how
partition should be made.
The phrase, “without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against
him” in the last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is similarly objectionable. For one,
no issue exists in this case between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties
they commonly or individually hold. Additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the
Court is giving legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course of action to take against
her husband. This statement is beyond what this Court should properly state in its Decision given
the facts and issues posed, and is plainly uncalled for.
Subject to these observations, I concur with the opinion of the Majority.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Where payment was given to a person on the mistaken belief that it was a co-owner,
then such person has an obligation to return the same. (Valley Land Resources, Inc. vs. Valley
Golf Club, Inc., 369 SCRA 17 [2001])
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. (Vda. de Retuerto vs. Barz, 372 SCRA 712 [2001])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Catapang
G.R. No. 164110. February 12, 2008. *
LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, respondent.

Property; Co-Ownership; A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the
co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.—As
to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry
case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the
co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive
use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to
build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her
exclusive use.
Same; Same; Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will
injure the interest of the coownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance
with their rights.—Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other coowners from using it according to their rights. Giving
consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-
ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Same; Same; Alterations; Words and Phrases; .—Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows
that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
*
513
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 513
Cruz vs. Catapang
owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the
thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house
on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of
the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her
house on the co-owned property.
Same; Same; Actions; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant
the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder.—Consent of only one coowner
will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent
given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon
respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification “through strategy or stealth.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Entry into a land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of
the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth; The one-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land but when
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned
about it.—The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondent’s entry into the
property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We
cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into the property without the
permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner
Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth.
Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and
allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she
utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view,
514
Cruz vs. Catapang
was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring
an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned
about it. Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that
petitioner learned of it when she visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent
to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25,
1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the construction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Wilfredo M. Bolito for petitioner.
Eric P. Triste for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated September 16, 2003 and the
1
Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250. The Court of
2
Appeals reversed the Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
3
Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, which had earlier affirmed the Decision dated September 20, 1999 of
4
the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Taal, Batangas ordering respondent to vacate
and
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 53-59. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Romeo A.
Brawner and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
2
Id., at pp. 64-66.
3
Records, pp. 96-101. Penned by Executive Judge Benjamin P. Martinez.
4
Id., at pp. 67-72. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Pio M. Pasia.
515
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 515
Cruz vs. Catapang
deliver possession of a portion of the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of
land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal,
Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-owners,
5
respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of
land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property. 6
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property and was
surprised to see a part of respondent’s house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property.
She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to
vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused and
disregarded her demands. 7
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
8
before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that
consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendant’s construction of the
house and possession of the portion of the lot in question. The dispositive portion of the MCTC
9
decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant or any person acting in her behalf to
vacate and deliver the possession of the area illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant to
pay plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
_______________
Rollo, p. 53.
5
Id.
6
Id., at pp. 53-54.

7
Records, pp. 2-6.

8
Id., at p. 71.
9
516
Cruz vs. Catapang
SO ORDERED.” 10
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTC’s ruling in a Decision dated
October 22, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:
“Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.” 11
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision. The Court of Appeals
held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondent’s entry into
the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for
forcible entry. The Court of Appeals’ decision further held that petitioner’s remedy is not an
12
action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with the appropriate forum. The Court of
Appeals disposed, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Decision dated 22 October 2001 as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
of Taal, Batangas, Branch 86, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is
entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 71-T.
SO ORDERED.” 13
_______________
Id., at pp. 71-72.

10
Id., at p. 101.
11
Rollo, p. 58.
12
Id., at p. 59.
13
517
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 517
Cruz vs. Catapang
After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition.
Raised before us for consideration are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA

IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE
PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R]
CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE

OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO
THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER. 14
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE

PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY. 15
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of
land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a
forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person.
In her memorandum, petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma
16
Maligaya cannot defeat the

_______________
Id., at p. 101.
14
Id., at p. 110.
15
Id., at pp. 96-105.

16
518
Cruz vs. Catapang
action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual
co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters that the complaint for forcible
17
entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due
to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing
in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de
jure since it involves rights of coowners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one coowner will warrant the dismissal of a
forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to
construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote
common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a
18
co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which
is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
“Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the coownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even
_______________
Id., at pp. 108-112.

17
See De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 114, 127.
18
519
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 519
Cruz vs. Catapang
though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more
of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.”
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other coowners from using it according to their rights.
Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the
interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance
with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by
another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act
of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to
be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of
19
dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being
no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned
property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the
consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-
owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification “through strategy
or stealth.”
_______________
Gala v. Rodriguez, 70 Phil. 124 (1940).

19
520
Cruz vs. Catapang
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondent’s entry into the
property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-
owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into the
property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done
in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house.
Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be
categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of
20
one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed
house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-
owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year
period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made
through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about
it. Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that
21
petitioner learned of it when she visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on
respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the
complaint on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner
learned of the construction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 16, 2003 and the
Resolution dated June 11,
_______________
Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755, 768.
20
Bongato v. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002, 387 SCRA 327, 338; Elaine v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
21
80638, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 822.

521
VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 521
Manila International Airport Authority vs. Powergen, Inc.
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is
REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—As co-owners of the properties, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for
ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the
subject properties. (Celino vs. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, 435 SCRA 690 [2004])
Every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the co-owned property
and is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest except as to purely personal rights. (Cabal
vs. Cabal, 454 SCRA 555 [2005])
——o0o——

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003. *
LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as

Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Grounds; Where the issuance of the
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is
either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented.—Where
the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the
Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ
must be presented. However, this Court must be convinced thor-
_______________
EN BANC.
*
541
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 541
oughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65:
(a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules of Procedure; Liberal Construction; Litigations should, as much
as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.—The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the
cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere
technicalities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.—The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as
not to override substantial justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property
which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character, other elements should
be considered.— Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate
court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following:
(a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Attorneys; Duties; Negligence; There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally
notice to counsel is notice to parties.— There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally
notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked into and adopted,
according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the court’s desire to make a short-cut of the
proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It
would then be easy for one lawyer to sell one’s rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot
every pro-
542
cess of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should
not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Definition.—Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of
common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or
physically divided.” Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of the private right of ownership, which
instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised
by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.”
Same; Same; Characteristics; Co-ownership has the following characteristics.—The characteristics
of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision,
which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of
the co-owners.
Same; Same; Nature; In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute.—In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-
owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-
owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of
his co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to
create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust
and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Same; Same; Co-owners; Rights; He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party
independently of the other co-owners.—Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly
lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to
sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right
over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Noel S. Sorreda for petitioner.
543
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 543
Felizardo M. Mercado for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8
January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-
in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo
Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian
Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and
Felipe Sanchez. On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name
1
of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been
executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Petitioner claimed that she did
2 3
not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the
aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September
1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private respondent
declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as
the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda of
appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor even inform her of the
developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the RTC of Caloocan
City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.
_______________
Rollo, p. 19.
1
Id., at p. 21.
2
Id., at p. 23.
3
544
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor
of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later,
a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed
the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any
special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced
to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on
the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit
petitioner’s appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On 18 June 2001
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its
Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the acts of which for
some reason or other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be
presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it
gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction;
545
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 545
and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this petition as
there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. 4
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the
speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the
rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations
5
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. 6
Verily, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of petitioner

herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been unconscionably
irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client. Under the peculiar circumstances of
7
this case, it appears from the records that counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his
client’s interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals— 8
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation where the appellate
court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to appellant’s failure to perfect an appeal. Hence,
with more reason would this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most
mandatory charac-
_______________
4
See 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1, par. 6.
5
Herrera, Comments on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended (1st ed., 1997) at 22, citing Pacific Asia Overseas
Shipping Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 76595, 6 May 1988, 161 SCRA 122; International
Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69560, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 296.
6
Ibid.
7
Bayog v. Natino, G.R. No. 118691, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 378, 398.
8
G.R. No. 127596, 24 September 1998, 296 SCRA 38, 49, 51, 52.
546
ter in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable
number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court
reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as
to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do
in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and
again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the
Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of
the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following:
(a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 9
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantial justice requires
that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the present controversy that was brought about
by the absence of any partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject
lot in question. Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the dispute on
the property held in common.
In People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco we held: 10
_______________
Id., at p. 53 citing Paulino v. Court of Appeals, No. L-46723, 28 October 1977, 80 SCRA 257.

9
No. L-18891, 28 November 1964, 12 SCRA 471, 476.

10
547
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 547
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and
that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given
case, however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise,
in the court’s desire to make a shortcut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly,
dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell one’s rights
down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the court affecting his clients, because
he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer
is also a notice to his clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership. Throughout
the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership was not 11
sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in the interest of substantial
justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more
persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines
12
it as the “manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the
owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners
and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.” 13
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b)
unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially
divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal
shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners. 14
_______________
11
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, “[t]here is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the
provisions of this Title.”
12
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II (4th Ed., 1994) at 161
citing 3 Sanchez Roman 162.
13
Id., at p. 161 citing 3 Manresa 401.
14
Id., at p. 161 citing 1 Camus 377 and 2 Castan 194.
548
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in
character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners. 15
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create
an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust
and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. 16
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim
title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 17
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the
right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to
18
sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because
his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication. 19
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of
petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute
Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be
respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine
the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the
_______________
15
Id., at pp. 161-162.
16
Id., at p. 162 citing Sotto v. Teves, No. L-38018, 31 October 1978, 86 SCRA 154.
17
Id., at pp. 200-201 citing Oliveras v. Lopez, No. L-29727, 14 December 1988, 168 SCRA 431; See Civil Code, Art.
493.
Id., at p. 201 citing Vda. de Castro v. Atienza, No. L-25014, 17 October 1973, 53 SCRA 264.
18
Id., at p. 201 citing 2 Oyuelos 161 and cases.

19
549
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 549
rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly
TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot
are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to effect the
aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining to
petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED
insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., On official leave.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside. Partition ordered.
Note.—A co-owner has full ownership of his pro indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. (Del Campo vs. Court of
Appeals, 351 SCRA 1 [2001])
——o0o——
550

G.R. No. 200612. April 5, 2017.*

AFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE), petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Summary Procedure; Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
provides that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be deemed waived, except
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.—Rafael’s claim that the complaint below should have been
dismissed since Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of
prior barangay conciliation is untenable. Unlawful de-
_______________
** Designated acting member vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza per Raffle dated February 13, 2017.
* THIRD DIVISION.

383
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 383
Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez
tainer cases are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure provides that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be
deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Barangay Conciliation; Only individuals may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings
either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other
juridical entities may not be filed with, received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation.—There
was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for conciliation pursuant to
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. It bears stressing that only individuals may be parties
to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against
corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received or acted upon by
the barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity
that has a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy. Thus, there is no necessity to
bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer
with the MTCC.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties
should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial.
—It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on
appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial. However, before a party may be
barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the issue could have been
raised during the trial. What escaped the appellate court’s attention is that the sale of the one-half
undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only on December 29, 2005, more
than two years after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer on
July 18, 2003. Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi’s share in the subject
property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed with the MTCC.

384
Civil Law; Conjugal Partnership; Conjugal Properties; Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership;
Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the
death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one (1) year from the death of
the deceased spouse.—When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically
terminated. Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution
due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the
death of the deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property is void.
Same; Same; Same; Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are
co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership.—It bears stressing that under the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either
spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which
does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal
partnership. With respect, however, to the deceased spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership properties,
an implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
Same; Co-ownership; Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.—Upon Vipa’s death, one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. The other half, which is Vipa’s share, was transmitted to Vipa’s heirs — Grace Joy, Jill
Frances, and her husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. The ensuing
implied co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, which provides: Article 493. Each
co-owner shall

385
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 385
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis ours) Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal
partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can
claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Same; Same; A co-owner could sell his undivided share.—A co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi
of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-
owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. It
must be stressed that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).
Same; Interest Rates; In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 703 SCRA 439 (2013), the Supreme Court
(SC) pointed out that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board
(BSP-MB), the interest rate of loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation shall be six
percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July 1, 2013, the rate of interest on loans or
forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, is still twelve percent (12%).—In Nacar v. Gallery
Frames, et al., 703 SCRA 439 (2013), the Court pointed out that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board, the interest rate of loans or forbearance of money, in the
absence of stipulation shall be six percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July 1,
2013, the rate of interest on loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, is still 12%.
Accordingly, the amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals shall earn interest at

386
the rates of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013
and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
Rene C. Estocapio for petitioner.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy for respondent.
REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 26, 2010 and Resolution3 dated January 24,
2012 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04481.

Facts

Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay (Vipa) is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Lopez Jaena Street, Jaro, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26576
(subject property).4 Vipa and her husband, Levi Lahaylahay (Levi), have two children — Grace
Joy Somosierra (Grace Joy) and Jill Frances Lahaylahay (Jill Frances).5
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 14-41.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Eduardo B.
Peralta, Jr., concurring; id., at pp. 48-54.
3 Id., at pp. 45-46.
4 Id., at p. 134.
5 Id., at pp. 17-18.

387
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 387
Sometime in 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy (Rafael)
over the subject property and the improvements thereon, pursuant to which, Rafael bound
himself to pay Vipa, as consideration for the lease of the property, the amount of
P3,000.00 per month, with a provision for a 10% increase every year thereafter.6
On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever. Grace Joy became
the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. After Vipa’s death, Levi lived in Aklan.7
In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. 8 Consequently, on June 12, 2003, the
Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint 9 for unlawful detainer with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City against Rafael. It was alleged therein that, as of June
1998, Rafael was already bound to pay rent at the amount of P3,300.00 per month and that his
last payment was made in May 1998. Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the Complaint,
Rafael’s unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00.10 The Estate of Vipa claimed that despite
repeated demands, Rafael refused to pay the rents due.11
In his Answer,12 Rafael denied that he refused to pay the rent for the lease of the subject
property. He claimed that sometime in June 1998 Patria Fernandez-Cuenca (Patria), Vipa’s
sister, demanded for the payment of the rents, claiming that she is the rightful heir of
Vipa.13 Since he had no idea on who is entitled to receive the rent for the subject property, he
deposited the amount of P10,000.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City
_______________
6 Id., at p. 49.
7 Id., at p. 18.
8 Id., at p. 49.
9 Id., at pp. 131-132.
10 Id., at p. 131.
11 Id., at p. 132.
12 Id., at pp. 124-127.
13 Id., at p. 124.

388
on November 20, 1998 and that Grace Joy was informed of such consignation. 14 He claimed that
a case for the settlement of the Estate of Vipa was instituted by Patria with the RTC, which was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 6910. He averred that he is willing to pay the rent on the
leased property to the rightful heirs of Vipa and that he made another consignation with the RTC
in the amount of P6,000.00.15
On June 12, 2008, the MTCC rendered a Decision,16 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing ratiocination, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[Estate of Vipa] and against [Rafael], ordering the latter, to wit:
1. to vacate the premises subject of this case and covered by TCT No. T-26576 and to peacefully turn
over the possession of the same to the [Estate of Vipa];
2. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php271,150.00 as payment for the unpaid rentals with
12% interest per annum from the last demand on May 3, 2003 until the whole amount is paid;
3. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php3,000.00 per month with 12% interest per annum for
the use and occupancy of the premises computed from the date of the filing of this case on June 12,
2003 until fully paid;
4. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] attorney’s fees in the amount of Php20,000.00; [and]
5. to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 17
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 124-125.
15 Id., at p. 125.
16 Rendered by Presiding Judge Marie Yvette D. Go; id., at
pp. 115-123.
17 Id., at p. 123.

389
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 389
The MTCC found that after Vipa’s death in 1994 until 1998, Rafael was paying the rent for
the lease of the subject property to Grace Joy. 18 That the real reason why Patria claimed to be the
heir of Vipa is because she owed Rafael money which she could not pay. Patria then charged the
debt she owes to Rafael from the monthly rent of the subject property, an arrangement that
Rafael took advantage to avoid paying Grace Joy the monthly rents. The MTCC further opined
that the consignations made by Rafael in the total amount of P16,000.00 are not valid since there
was no prior tender of payment.19
On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision20 dated April 15, 2009, reversed the MTCC’s Decision
dated June 12, 2008 and, thus, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Estate
of Vipa. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
and the herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and further DISMISSING [Rafael’s]
counterclaim for failure to substantiate the same.
SO ORDERED. 21

The RTC opined that Grace Joy was actually the plaintiff in the case and not the Estate of
Vipa. It then pointed out that Grace Joy failed to bring the dispute to the barangay for
conciliation prior to filing the complaint for unlawful detainer.22
The RTC further held that the MTCC erred in including the entire subject property as part of
the Estate of Vipa. The
_______________
18 Id., at p. 119.
19 Id., at p. 120.
20 Rendered by Judge Antonio M. Natino; id., at pp. 101-114.
21 Id., at p. 114.
22 Id., at p. 107.

390
RTC explained that the subject property was acquired by Vipa during the subsistence of her
marriage with Levi and, as such, is part of their conjugal properties. That after Vipa’s death, the
conjugal partnership was terminated, entitling Levi to one-half of the property. 23 The RTC then
pointed out that Levi sold his share in the subject property to Rafael, as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale24 dated December 29, 2005.25 Accordingly, the RTC ruled that Rafael, as co-owner of the
subject property, having bought Levi’s one-half share thereof, had the right to possess the same.26
The Estate of Vipa sought a reconsideration 27 of the Decision dated April 15, 2009, but it was
denied by the RTC in its Order dated July 28, 2009.28
The Estate of Vipa then filed a Petition for Review29 with the CA. On November 26, 2010, the
CA rendered a Decision,30 which declared:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is GRANTED and the
April 15, 2009 Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 08-29842 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the June 12, 2008 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Iloilo City, in
Civil Case No. 03-208 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 31
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 112-113.

24 Id., at pp. 137-138.
25 Id., at p. 113.
26 Id., at p. 114.
27 Id., at pp. 95-100.
28 Id., at p. 51.
29 Id., at pp. 78-94.
30 Id., at pp. 48-54.
31 Id., at p. 54.

391
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 391
The CA held that there was no necessity to bring the dispute before the barangay for
conciliation since the Estate of Vipa, being a juridical person, cannot be impleaded to
a barangay conciliation proceeding. The CA likewise pointed out that any allegations against
Grace Joy’s authority to represent the Estate of Vipa had been laid to rest when she was
appointed as administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910 pending before
the RTC.32
Further, the CA held that Rafael raised the issue of ownership of the subject property, i.e.,
Levi’s sale of his one-half share in the subject property to Rafael, only for the first time in his
appeal with the RTC. Accordingly, it was error on the part of the RTC to have resolved the issue
of ownership of the subject property.33 Furthermore, the CA agreed with the MTCC that Rafael’s
consignation of the rent to the RTC is ineffective. It ruled that Rafael made the consignation only
twice and the amount consigned was patently insignificant compared to the amount of rent due.34
Rafael’s motion for reconsideration35 was denied by the CA in its Resolution 36 dated January
24, 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
Rafael maintains that Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and, when
she filed the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC, she did so in her personal capacity.
Thus, Rafael claims that the dispute should have been brought to the barangay for conciliation
before the complaint was filed in the MTCC.37 He further claims that the CA erred in reversing
the RTC’s ruling on the issue of ownership
_______________
32 Id., at p. 52.
33 Id., at p. 53.
34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 55-64.
36 Id., at pp. 45-46.
37 Id., at pp. 24-25.

392
of the subject property. He insists that he already purchased Levi’s one-half share in the subject
property.38
On the other hand, the Estate of Vipa, in its Comment, 39 avers that the supposed lack of
authority of Grace Joy to file the complaint for unlawful detainer and the ownership of the
subject property were never raised in the proceedings before the MTCC and, hence, could not be
passed upon by the RTC in the appellate proceedings. In any case, it pointed out that the RTC’s
Decision40 dated October 28, 2005 in Special Proceedings No. 6910, which appointed Grace Joy
as the administrator of the intestate estate of Vipa, recognized that the latter and Jill Frances are
legitimate children of Vipa and Levi.

Issue

Essentially, the issue set forth for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in reversing
the RTC’s Decision dated April 15, 2009.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.
Rafael’s claim that the complaint below should have been dismissed since Grace Joy has no
authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of prior barangay conciliation is
untenable. Unlawful detainer cases are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. 41 Section 5
of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 27-33.

39 Id., at pp. 143-145.
40 Id., at pp. 146-150.
41 The 1991 REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Section 1(A)(1).

393
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 393
deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rafael failed to plead in the answer he filed with the MTCC that Grace Joy has no authority
to represent the Estate of Vipa. Neither did he raise therein the lack of barangay conciliation
between the parties herein prior to the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer. Accordingly,
the foregoing defenses are already deemed waived.
In any case, the issue of the supposed lack of authority of Grace Joy to represent the Estate of
Vipa had already been rendered moot with the RTC’s appointment of Grace Joy as the
administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910.
Also, there was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for
conciliation pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.42 It bears stressing that only
individuals may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or
respondents. Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may
not be filed with, received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation.43 The Estate of Vipa,
which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate and
distinct from that of Grace Joy.44 Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to
the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTCC.
_______________
42 Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book III and Section 515, Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No.
7160 (The Local Government Code).
43 Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Heirs of Angel Teves, 438 Phil. 26, 41; 389 SCRA 316, 327
(2002), citing Section 1, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
44 See Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 (1948).

394
The CA, nevertheless, erred in hastily dismissing Rafael’s allegation as regards the ownership
of the subject property. In disregarding Rafael’s claim that he owns Levi’s one-half undivided
share in the subject property, the CA ruled that the said issue was raised for the first time on
appeal and should thus not have been considered by the RTC, viz.:
On the second issue, the records show that [Rafael] raised the issue of ownership only for the first
time on appeal; hence, the [RTC] erred in deciding the appeal before it on the findings that part of the
subject premises is owned by petitioners, allegedly having bought the same from [Levi], the husband of
[Vipa].
The Court is not unmindful that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the MTC may rule on
the issue [of] ownership in order to determine the issue of possession. However, the issue of ownership
must be raised by the defendant on the earliest opportunity; otherwise, it is already deemed waived.
Moreover, the instant case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which expressly provide
that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the [RTC] erred in resolving the issue of ownership for the first
time on appeal. (Citations omitted)
45

It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first
time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial. However, before a
party may be barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the
issue could have been raised during the trial. 46 What escaped the appellate court’s attention is that
the sale of the one-half
_______________
45 Rollo, p. 53.
46 See Sañado v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 669; 356 SCRA 546 (2001).

395
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 395
undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only on December 29, 2005,
more than two years after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful
detainer on July 18, 2003.47 Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi’s
share in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed with the MTCC.
Moreover, Rafael’s ownership of the one-half undivided share in the subject property would
necessarily affect the property relations between the parties herein. Thus, the CA should have
exerted efforts to resolve the said issue instead of dismissing the same on the flimsy ground that
it was not raised during the proceedings before the MTCC.
Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961 48 and in the absence of a marriage settlement,
the system of conjugal partnership of gains governs their property relations. 49 It is presumed that
the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi considering that the same
was acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no proof to the contrary.50
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically
terminated.51 Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its
dissolution due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void. Thus:
_______________
47 Rollo, p. 21.
48 Certificate of Marriage; id., at p. 133.
49 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 119.
50 Id., Article 160.
51 Id., Article 175(1).

396
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within six months from the death
of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations
of the subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)

Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of the Family Code pursuant to Article
105 thereof, viz.:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter
shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws as provided in Article 256. (Emphasis
ours)

397
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 397
Rafael bought Levi’s one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00
as evidenced by the Deed of Sale52 dated December 29, 2005. At that time, the conjugal
partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition,
notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not
necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife
are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership. 53 Thus, upon the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual
and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and
segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.54 With respect,
however, to the deceased spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.55
Thus, upon Vipa’s death, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor
of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is
Vipa’s share, was transmitted to Vipa’s heirs — Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her husband Levi,
who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. The ensuing implied co-ownership
is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
per-
_______________
52 Rollo, pp. 137-138.

53 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 143.
54 See Domingo v. Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016, 791 SCRA 47.
55 See Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 253 Phil. 516, 526; 171 SCRA 524, 532-533 (1989).

398
taining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis ours)

Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and
Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Before the
partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire land or thing.56
Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely
sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share
in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was
effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. It must be
stressed that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).57
However, Rafael became a co-owner of the subject property only on December 29, 2005 —
the time when Levi sold his one-half undivided share over the subject property to the former.
Thus, from December 29, 2005 Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to possess the subject
property as an incident of ownership. Otherwise stated, prior to his acquisition of Levi’s
_______________
56 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665, 676; 404 SCRA 540, 548 (2003).
57 See Lopez v. Cuaycong, et al., 74 Phil. 601 (1944).

399
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 399
one-half undivided share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus obliged to
pay the rent for his possession thereof.
Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject property since he is
already a co-owner thereof. Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid rentals from
June 1998 until April 2003 in the amount of P271,150.00. In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et
al.,58 the Court pointed out that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas-Monetary Board, the interest rate of loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of
stipulation shall be six percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July 1, 2013,
the rate of interest on loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, is still 12%.
Accordingly, the amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals shall earn interest at the
rates of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013 and
6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
Further, Rafael is likewise bound to pay reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the
subject property from May 2003 until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand, i.e., the filing of the
complaint with the MTCC on June 12, 2003, until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid.
The award of attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 is likewise proper. Attorney’s fees can be
awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically:
Article 2208. x x x
x x x x
(2) Where the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest[.]
_______________
58 716 Phil. 267; 703 SCRA 439 (2013).

400
Certainly, because of Rafael’s unjustified refusal to pay the rents due on the lease of the
subject property, the Estate of Vipa was put to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect its
interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In unlawful detainer cases, where
attorney’s fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed P20,000.00.59
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review
on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2010 and
Resolution dated January 24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04481
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rafael C. Uy is hereby directed to pay the
Estate of Vipa Fernandez the following:
1. The amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals, with interest at the rates of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30,
2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid;
2. Reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 2003 until
December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with interest at the rates of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from the date of the last demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint for unlawful
detainer on June 12, 2003, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid; and
3. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
_______________
59 1991 REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Section 1(A)(1).

401
VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 401
Petition partially granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement
reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal
court within ten (10) days from its date. (Catedrilla vs. Lauron, 696 SCRA 341 [2013])
Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the
Certification to File an Action, the Supreme Court (SC) notes that this irregularity is not a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC). (Sabay vs. People, 737 SCRA 423 [2014])

——o0o——

Acebedo vs. Abesamis
16
HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACE-BEDO, petitioners, vs. HON.
BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON
ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and
YU HWA PING, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Probate; Jurisdiction; It is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication.—In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out
in a separate action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
187
VOL. 217, JANUARY 18, 1993 187
estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.—The Court further elaborated that
although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate
court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent’s estate.—Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court. It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights
of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest or
participation he may have in the property under administration.—This Court had the occasion to rule that
there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property
under administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property even if the
same is under administration is based on the Civil Code.—The right of an heir to dispose of the
decedent’s property, even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating
that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from
the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however,
two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.—The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-
owner-ship, further qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and
188
benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging
his ideal share in the property held in common.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85.
Abesamis, J.
Herminio L. Ruiz for petitioners.
Vicente D. Millora for private respondents.
Romero A. Yu for respondent Yu Hua Ping.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
The lower court’s jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-
heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining
portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being
challenged in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in
Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million. Said
estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
1. a.P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;

2. b.P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
3. c.The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and
the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Ace-bedo; and
4. d.Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the
others are the private respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respon-
189
VOL. 217, JANUARY 18, 1993 189
dent Court for sixteen years, respondents-heirs filed a “Motion for Approval of Sale”, on October
4, 1989. The said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City, and form part of
the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they
already had a buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that respondents-heirs have already
received their proportionate share of the six (6) million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as
earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the unsettled
claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus
Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):
1. 1.to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;

2. 2.with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate; and
3. 3.to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an “Opposition to Approval

of Sale”, to wit:
1. “ 1.That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real estate
property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without the
knowledge of the herein administrator, without the approval of this Honorable
Court and of some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;
2. 2.That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the
approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even render the
proponents of the sale liable for punishment for contempt of this Honorable
Court;
3. 3.The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to
authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the Estate to generate
funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and with the approval of this
Honorable Court if warranted, to give the heirs some advances chargeable
against theirs (sic) respective shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein
Administrator, and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or
through a broker, to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject
always to
190
1. the approval of this Honorable Court.” 1
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days
within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than
P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners have
not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court, on February 8, 1990, for
an inextendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document
against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this
complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of
Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator’s signature was made to appear. He
also learned that after he confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter
revoked his notarial act on the same.
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by
the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner
Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several periods within which
to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-
administrator filed another “Opposi-tion to Approval of Sale”, dated May 10, 1990, maintaining
that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the coup d’etat attempts,
otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease
some of the Properties of the Estate”. To this Motion, respondents filed an Opposition on the
following grounds: that the motion is not proper because of the
____________________
1
Annex 2, Opposition to Approval of Sale, Rollo, pp. 121-122.
191
VOL. 217, JANUARY 18, 1993 191
pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties; that said conditional sale was initiated
by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money;
that the approval of the sale would mean Yu Hwa Ping’s assumption of payment of the realty
taxes; that the estate has no further debts and thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which,
stated, among others, to wit: 2
1. “b.the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying that the
new administrator be directed to sell the properties covered by TCT Nos.
155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied;
and
2. c.the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some properties of
the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to the approval of the Court.”
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a
conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the parties were unable to
arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually
agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price
already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a “Supplemental Opposition” to the approval of the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive portion
of which states, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted, reconsidered and set aside, and another
one is hereby issued as follows:
1. 1.Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed by the heirs-
movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City;
_________________
2
Rollo, p. 145-a.
192
1. 2.Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of the
said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale executed by
the herein heirs-movants;
2. 3.Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining balance of the
purchase price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
3. 4.The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of court,
resulting from his failure to submit the owner’s copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145
is hereby denied.” 3
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for the
properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of P6,500,000.00. Petitioners
herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days thereafter, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990.
To this, private respondents filed their Oppo-sition. 4
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by the
respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping
for the last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order dated March 29,
1991 in effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for
“lack of merit”.
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order dated
March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this Petition for Certio-
rari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction
of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional
Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court
_______________
Rollo, pp. 164-165.
3
Rollo, pp. 173-176.

4
193
VOL. 217, JANUARY 18, 1993 193
approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive.
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is within
5
the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the
sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding,
should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its
capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted
within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional
sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was made conditional,
the condition being that the same should first be approved by the probate court.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. It is settled 6
that court approval is necessary

___________________
5
163 SCRA 30 (1988).
6
“Section 7—Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate.—The court having
jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial,
under the following regulations:
1. a.The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the
deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of
the estate to be sold, mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale,
mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
2. b.The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the
nature of the petition, the
194
for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. However, reference to judicial
approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share
in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. X 7
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. 8
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary
9
property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death
of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. 10
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right. Although 11
it is mandated that each co-

________________________
reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such
further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper;
c. If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned
that such executor or administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance;
d. If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been complied with, the court, by order stating such
compliance, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate
as it deemed necessary, and in case of sale the court may authorize it to be public or private, as would be most beneficial to all parties
concerned. The executor or administrator shall be furnished with a certified copy of such order. x x x.
Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 270 (1987).
7
Vda. de Gil vs. Cancio, 14 SCRA 796 (1965).

8
Article 533.
9
Mendoza I vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 778 (1991); New Civil Code, Article 1078.
10
Article 493.
11
195
VOL. 217, JANUARY 18, 1993 195
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
12
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. X 13
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under
administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., it was said that the sale made
14
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no
wise, stands in the way of such administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the Old
Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 399 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493,
respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa:
“Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs ‘becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate
left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided’.”
Private respondents having secured the approval of the pro-bate court, a matter which is
unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents’ right to
alienate the decedent’s property subject of administration, this Petition should be dismissed for
lack of merit.
PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Regalado and No-con, JJ., concur.
___________________
Reyes vs. Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171 (1990).
12
PNB vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 (1980); Mercado vs. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472 (1962).
13
73 Phil. 628 (1942).

14
196
Donato vs. Court of Appeals
Petition dismissed.
Note.—A co-owner may sell, alienate or mortgage his ideal share in the property held in
common, but the alienation or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be alloted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership (Reyes vs. Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171).
——o0o——
VOL. 391, NOVEMBER 14, 2002
653
Fernandez vs. Tarun
G.R. No. 143868. November 14, 2002. X *
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, GIL C. FERNANDEZ and

ARMANDO C. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. Spouses CARLOS
and NARCISA TARUN, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Sales; Redemption; The right of redemption may be availed of by a co-owner, only
when the shares of the other owners are sold to a third person; There is no legal redemption, either in
case of a mere lease and if the purchaser is also a tenant.—In Basa v. Aguilar, this Court has
unequivocally ruled that the right of redemption may be availed of by a co-owner, only when the shares
of the other owners are sold to a third person. “Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by
law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to
afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or [an] inconvenient association into which he has
been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.) It is intended to minimize coownership. The law grants a co-
owner the exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the other owners are sold to a ‘third
person.’ ” There is no legal redemption, either in case of a mere lease and if the purchaser is also a tenant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Code merely provides that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit that a written notice has been given to all
possible redemptioners; It does not state that, by reason of such lack of notice, the sale shall become void.
—Equally unavailing is petitioners’ contention that the sale was void, because the vendor had not sent
any notice in writing to the other co-owners as required under Article 1625 of the Code. Indeed, the Code
merely provides that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit that a written notice has been given to all possible redemptioners. However, it does not
state that, by reason of such lack of notice, the sale shall become void.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject of
varying interpretations.—Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject of
varying interpretations. Conejero v. Court of Appeals held that a written notice was still required, even if
the redemptioner had actual prior knowledge of the sale. However, in Distrito v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
654
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fernandez vs. Tarun
written notice was not necessary, if the co-owner was actually aware of the sale. While the law requires
that the notice must be in writing, it does not prescribe any particular form, so long as the reasons for a
written notice are satisfied otherwise. Thus, in a civil case for collection of a share in the rentals by an
alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the receipt of a summons by a co-owner has been held to constitute
actual knowledge of the sale. On that basis, the co-owner may exercise the right of redemption within 30
days from the finality of the decision.
Same; Same; Same; Mortgage; Circumstances where a document is considered a contract of equitable
mortgage; For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, one must first satisfy the requirement
that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale, and that their intention was to
secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.—On its face, a document is considered a contract of
equitable mortgage when the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code are manifest, as
follows: (a) when the price of the sale with the right to repurchase is unusually inadequate, and (b) when
the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise. Although it is undisputed that Angel Fernandez
was in actual possession of the property, it is important to note that he did not sell it to respondents. The
sellers were his co-owners—Antonio and Demetria Fernandez—who, however, are not claiming that the
sale between them was an equitable mortgage. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, one
must first satisfy the requirement that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale,
and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless the price is grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience, a sale
is not set aside.—Furthermore, mere alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily void a contract
of sale, although the inadequacy may indicate that there was a defect in the consent, or that the parties
really intended a donation, mortgage, or some other act or contract. Finally, unless the price is grossly
inadequate or shocking to the conscience, a sale is not set aside.
The facts are stated in the Opinion of the Court.
Oscar C. Fernandez for petitioners.
Fernando P. Cabrera for private respondents.
655
655
Fernandez vs. Tarun
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of redemption may be exercised by a co-owner, only when part of the community
property is sold to a stranger. When the portion is sold to a co-owner, the right does not arise
because a new participant is not added to the co-ownership.
The Case
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenges the July 7, 2000 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55264, which reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
1
Dagupan City (Branch 44) in Civil Case No. D-3815. The assailed Decision disposed as
2
follows:X
“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and a NEW ONE is entered:
“1. Ordering the partition of Lot 2991 in the proportion stated in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24440,
that is: Angel Fernandez, married to Corazon Cabal—7,114.46 sqm; spouses Carlos Tarun and Narcisa
Zareno—1094.54 sqm.
“The costs of the subdivision shall be equitably shared by plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-appellees.
“2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to issue a separate transfer certificate of title each to
plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-appellees corresponding to their respective shares upon completion
of the partition. X
3
The Facts
The antecedent facts of the case are narrated in the assailed CA Decision as follows:
“An 8,209-square meter fishpond situated at Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City is disputed by [Respondents]
Carlos Tarun and Narcisa Zareno,
_______________
1
Fifteenth Division. Penned by Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Division chairman) and concurred in by Justices Candido V. Rivera and
Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (members).
2
Written by Judge Crispin C. Laron; Records, pp. 298-305.
3
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
656
656
Fernandez vs. Tarun
and [Petitioners] Corazon Cabal vda. de Fernandez and her children Oscar, Gil and Armando, all
surnamed Fernandez.
“The property is known as Lot No. 2991 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan. It was originally covered
by OCT No. 43099, subsequently cancelled by TCT No. 24440. The brothers Antonio, Santiago,
Demetria and Angel Fernandez, together with their uncle Armando, co-owned this property to the extent
of 1/6 thereof. It was subsequently increased to 1/5 on account of the 1/6 share of Armando, who died
4
single and without issue, which accrued in favor of the five remaining co-owners. X
“On June 4, 1967, Antonio Fernandez sold his share of about 547.27 square meters to [the Spouses]
Tarun (Exh. “I”). On June 18, 1967, Demetria Fernandez, also sold her share on the same fishpond
5
consisting of 547.27 square meters to [respondents]. Thus, the total area sold to [respondents] is 1094.54
6
square meters, more or less. The two sales were registered and annotated on OCT No. 43099. X
“On November 14, 1969, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and another fishpond covered by TCT
No. 10944 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of two parcels of registered land with exchange of
shares. Among the parties to the deed are Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel, all surnamed
Fernandez.
“It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale of a portion of Lot 2991
consisting of 1094.54 square meters previously sold by Antonio and Demetria Fernandez in favor of
[respondents]. This portion was excluded in the partition.
“Likewise, by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Angel B. Fernandez exchanged his share on
the other fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 to the shares of his co-owners on the remaining portion of
[L]ot No. 2991 covered by TCT No. 10945, making Angel B. Fernandez and [respondents] as co-owners
of Lot No. 2991.
“By virtue of the terms and conditions set forth in the Deed, TCT No. 24440 of the Registry of Deed[s] of
Dagupan City, (Exh. ‘A’) was issued in favor of Angel B. Fernandez and [respondents]. From the time
the latter bought the 1094.54 square meter portion of the fishpond, they had been paying the realty taxes
thereon. However, it was Angel B. Fernandez and
_______________
4
Actually, the property was co-owned by Jose, Amando (not Armando), Miguel, Paz, Angel and Aurelio Fernandez (Records, pp.
13-14). Antonio, Demetria and Santiago are the children of Aurelio Fernandez, while petitioners are the children of Angel
Fernandez.
5
Records, p. 132.
6
Id., p. 131.
657
657
Fernandez vs. Tarun
later on his heirs, [petitioners], who remained in possession of the entire fishpond.
“When Angel B. Fernandez was still alive, [respondents] sought the partition of the property and their
share of its income. Angel Fernandez refused to heed their demand. After the death of Angel Fernandez,
[respondents] wrote [petitioners] of their desire for partition but this was rejected by [petitioners]. Hence,
this suit for partition and damages.” X 7
Ruling of the RTC

On August 1, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, ruling that, under
Articles 1620 and 1621 of the Civil Code, they were entitled to redeem the property that they had
sold to respondents. It further held that the sale was highly iniquitous and void for respondent’s
failure to comply with Article 1623 of the same code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that petitioners were not entitled to redeem the controversial
property for several reasons. First, it was Angel Fernandez who was its co-owner at the time of
the sale; hence, he was the one entitled to receive notice and to redeem the property, but he did
not choose to exercise that right. Second, the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was
a substantial compliance with the notice requirement under the law. Finally, it was too late in the
day to declare the exchange highly iniquitous, when Angel Fernandez had not complained about
it. As his successors-in-interest, petitioners were bound by the terms of the agreement.
Hence, this Petition. X 8
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues.X
9
_______________
CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 20-22.
7
The case was deemed submitted for decision on November 14, 2001, upon this Court’s receipt of respondents’
8
Memorandum signed by Atty. Fernando P. Cabrera.

Signed by Atty. Oscar C. Fernandez and received by this Court on October 15, 2001.
9
658
658
Fernandez vs. Tarun
1. “1.Whether or not petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of legal

redemption.
2. “2.Whether or not the transaction is one of equitable mortgage.
3. “3.Whether or not the deed of extra-judicial partition is void and inefficacious.
4. “4.Whether or not petitioners are entitled to damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
5. “5.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it substituted its surmises, conjectures
and guesswork in place of the trial court’s findings of fact borne by the evidence
on record.” 10
This Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Entitlement to Legal Redemption
Petitioners aver that the sale to respondents is void, because it did not comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code. According to them, they were not notified of the sale, but
learned about it only when they received the summons for the partition case. They claim their
right to redeem the property under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
“Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
“Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.”
“Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural
land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any
rural land.
_______________
Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 85-86.
10
659
659
Fernandez vs. Tarun
“The right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by brooks, drains, ravines, roads and
other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other estates.
“If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at the same time, the owner of
the adjoining land of smaller area shall be preferred; and should both lands have the same area, the one
who first requested the redemption.
x x x x x x x x x
“Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
“The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.”
We disagree with petitioners. True, the right to redeem is granted not only to the original co-
owners, but also to all those who subsequently acquire their respective shares while the
community subsists. However, it must be stressed that this right of redemption is available only
11
when part of the co-owned property is sold to a third person. Otherwise put, the right to redeem
referred to in Article 1620 applies only when a portion is sold to a non-co-owner.X
In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners’ coowners. The sale of the contested
property to Spouses Tarun had long been consummated before petitioners succeeded their
predecessor, Angel Fernandez. By the time petitioners entered into the co-ownership,
respondents were no longer “third persons,” but had already become co-owners of the whole
property. A third person, within the meaning of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a coowner. X 12
In Basa v. Aguilar, this Court has unequivocally ruled that the right of redemption may be
13
availed of by a co-owner, only when theX

_______________
Viola v. Tecson, 49 Phil. 808, 810, December 24, 1926.
11
Francisco P. Boiser, 332 SCRA 792, May 31, 2000; Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 566, 576, December 4,
12
1995.
117 SCRA 128, September 30, 1982.
13
660
660
Fernandez vs. Tarun
shares of the other owners are sold to a third person. “Legal redemption is in the nature of a
privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and
convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or [an]
inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.) It is
intended to minimize co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of
redemption when the shares of the other owners are sold to a ‘third person.’” There is no legal
14
redemption, either in case of a mere lease and if the purchaser is also a tenant. X
15 16
Equally unavailing is petitioners’ contention that the sale was void, because the vendor had not
sent any notice in writing to the other co-owners as required under Article 1625 of the Code.
Indeed, the Code merely provides that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit that a written notice has been given to all possible
redemptioners. However, it does not state that, by reason of such lack of notice, the sale shall
become void.
Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject of varying
interpretations. Conejero v. Court of Appeals held that a written notice was still required, even if
17
the redemptioner had actual prior knowledge of the sale. However, in Distrito v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that written notice was not necessary, if the co-owner was actually
18
aware of the sale. While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it does not prescribe
any particular form, so long as the reasons for a written notice are satisfied otherwise. Thus, in a
19
civil case for collection of a share in the rentals by an alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the
receipt of a summons by a co-owner has been held to constitute actual knowledge of the sale. On
that basis, the co-ownerX
_______________
Id., pp. 130-131, per Vasquez, J.
14
De la Cruz v. Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709, 712, October 12, 1949.

15
Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31, December 24, 1915.

16
16 SCRA 775, 779-780, April 29, 1966.

17
197 SCRA 606, 610, May 28, 1991.

18
Hermoso v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 516, 538, December 29, 1998.

19
661
661
Fernandez vs. Tarun
may exercise the right of redemption within 30 days from the finality of the decision. X 20
Applying the presently prevailing principles discussed above, petitioners’ predecessor—Angel

Fernandez—is deemed to have been given notice of the sale to respondents by the execution and
signing of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange of Shares. As correctly held by the
CA, the law does not require any specific form of written notice to the redemptioner. From such
21
time, he had 30 days within which to redeem the property sold under Article 1623. The Deed
was executed November 4, 1969; hence, the period to redeem expired on December 4, 1969.
Consequently, the right to redeem was deemed waived, and petitioners are bound by such
inaction of their predecessor. The former cannot now be allowed to exercise the right and adopt a
stance contrary to that taken by the latter. Otherwise stated, the right to redeem had long expired
during the lifetime of the predecessor and may no longer be exercised by petitioners who are his
successors-in-interest.X
Second Issue:
Sale or Equitable Mortgage?
Petitioners contend that the sale was only an equitable mortgage because (1) the price was
grossly inadequate, and (2) the vendors remained in possession of the land and enjoyed its fruits.
Since the property is situated primely within the city proper, the price of P7,662 for 1,094.54
square meters is supposedly unconscionable. Moreover, since June 4, 1967 up to the present, the
vendees (or herein respondents) have allegedly never been in actual possession of the land.
The contention is untenable. On its face, a document is considered a contract of equitable
mortgage when the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code are manifest, as
follows: (a) when the price of the sale with the right to repurchase is
_______________
Francisco v. Boiser, supra, p. 801.
20
CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 27, citing Cabrera v. Villanueva, 160 SCRA 672, 678, April 15, 1988.
21
662
662
Fernandez vs. Tarun
unusually inadequate, and (b) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
22
otherwise. Although it is undisputed that Angel Fernandez was in actual possession of the
23
property, it is important to note that he did not sell it to respondents. The sellers were his co-
owners—Antonio and Demetria Fernandez—who, however, are not claiming that the sale
between them was an equitable mortgage. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise,
one must first satisfy the requirement that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
contract of sale, and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. X 24
Furthermore, mere alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily void a contract of sale,
although the inadequacy may indicate that there was a defect in the consent, or that the parties
really intended a donation, mortgage, or some other act or contract. Finally, unless the price is
25
grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience, a sale is not set aside. In this case, petitioners
26
failed to establish the fair market value of the property when it was sold in 1967. Hence, there is
no basis to conclude that the price was grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience.X
Third Issue:
Validity of the Extrajudicial Partition
Petitioners also assail the partition as lopsided and iniquitous. They argue that their predecessor
stood to lose 5,498.14 square meters under the extrajudicial partition.
We are not convinced. It is a long-established doctrine that the law will not relieve parties from
the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous agreement they entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what they were doing. Courts have no power to relieve
them from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be
disastrous
_______________
Art. 1602, par (1), Civil Code.
22
Id., par. (2), Code.

23
Lustan v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663, 671-672, January 27, 1997; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA 97, 104,
24
August 25, 2000.

Art. 1470, Civil Code.
25
Abapo v. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 180, 187, March 2, 2000.

26
663
663
Fernandez vs. Tarun
deals or unwise investments. Neither the law nor the courts will extricate them from an unwise
27
or undesirable contract which they entered into with all the required formalities and with full
knowledge of its consequences. On the other hand, petitioners herein are bound by the
28
extrajudicial partition, because contracts not only take effect between the parties, but also extend
to their assigns and heirs. X 29
Moreover, if petitioners intended to annul the extrajudicial partition for being “lopsided and
iniquitous,” then they should have argued this in a proper action and forum. They should have
filed an action to annul the extrajudicial partition and claimed their rightful share in the estate,
impleading therein the other signatories to the Deed and not just herein respondents.
In any event, a perusal of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Exchange of Shares reveals
that the partition of Lot Nos. 2991 and 2924 was done equally and fairly. Indeed, 1,641.80
square meters of Lot No. 2991 and 10,971.80 square meters of Lot No. 2924-B were originally
30 31
given to all the co-owners—except Antonio, Demetria and Santiago Fernandez, who had already
sold parts of their share to third persons. However, Angel Fernandez agreed and stipulated in the
same Deed that he had traded his share in Lot No. 2924-B for the entire Lot No. 2991, except the
portion already sold to respondents. X 32
Taking these stipulations into consideration, we are inclined to believe that the swapping of
shares by the heirs was more favorable to the late Angel Fernandez, because his ownership
became
_______________
Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 380, 393, February 3, 1997; Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647, 683-
27
684, September 29, 1997; Heirs of Joaquin Teves v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 632, 649, October 13, 1999.
Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385, 396, July 30, 1998.
28
Art. 1311, Civil Code; Smith, Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530, 538-539, February 6,
29
1997; Bangayan v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 379, 385, August 29, 1997.

Annex “B,” Records, p. 16.
30
Ibid.
31
Id., p. 17.
32
664
664
Fernandez vs. Tarun
contiguous and compact in only one fishpond, instead of being merely shared with the other co-
heirs in two different fishponds. X 33
Fourth Issue:
Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Petitioners’ claim that they are entitled to P50,000 as attorney’s fees and damages deserves scant
consideration. It has been clearly established that respondents are co-owners of the subject
property. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common. Hence, respondents’ action for partition was not an
unfounded suit. Verily, it was founded on a right given by law.
Fifth Issue:
Factual Findings of the CA
Petitioners insist that the CA made some factual findings that were neither in conformity with
those of the RTC nor borne by the evidence on record. They assert that the appellate court erred
in ruling that the extrajudicial partition had been freely and willfully entered into when, in fact,
Angel B. Fernandez had been shortchanged by 5,498.14 square meters. They also contend that
the registration of the two Deeds of Sale in favor of respondents was not valid, because it was
not accompanied by an affidavit that written notice had been served to all possible
redemptioners.
We are not persuaded. We do not find any factual or legal basis to conclude that the extrajudicial
partition was iniquitous, and that the sale of Antonio and Demetria’s share in Lot No. 2991 is
void. Factual findings of the CA supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and
binding, unless they fall under the exceptions in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals and similar
34 35
cases.X
_______________
Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 108.
33
Bañas v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259, 271, February 10, 2000; Maxi v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 475, 480-481,
34
May 31, 2000; Heirs of Tan Eng Kee v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 740, 748, October 3, 2000.
268 SCRA 703, 708-709, February 26, 1997.
35
665
665
Re: Habitual Tardiness First Semester 2002
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Note.—In case of doubt a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase should be
considered an equitable mortgage. (Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 762 [1999])
——o0o——

188
Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998. X *
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Family Code; Marriages; Circumstances which would constitute competent evidence to
prove the fact of marriage.—Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has
been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact
of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the
birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.
Same; Same; Paternity and Filiation; A baptismal certificate though not a conclusive proof of filiation,
is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to show pedigree.—
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive
________________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
189
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
189
proof of filiation, it is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to
show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: “What both the trial court and the
respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by ‘any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,’ according to the Civil
Code, or ‘by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,’ according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Property; Prescription; Co-ownership; No prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.—Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or
her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners.—Otherwise
stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148
SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen
to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).”
190
190
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
Liberato R. Ibadlit for private respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be
proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of
Appeals Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994 and Resolution promulgated on February
1 2
8, 1995 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
3
petitioner’s action for partition and damages.X

On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages
4
against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of
First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not
5
substituted as a party. X 6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of the petitioner, in
7
which it ruled: X 8
_______________
1
Fifteenth Division composed of J. Bernardo P. Pardo, ponente; and JJ. Justo P. Torres, Jr., (now a retired associate
justice of this Court) and Antonio P. Solano, concurring.
2
Rollo, pp. 114-117.
3
Rollo, p. 141.
4
Records, p. 1.
5
The case was later transferred to Branch VI, presided by Judge Jaime D. Discaya, and then to Branch VIII, presided by
Judge Emma C. Labayen.
6
Records, p. 68; TSN, July 17, 1984, p. 2.
7
Penned by Judge Labayen.
8
Rollo, p. 90; Regional Trial Court’s decision, p. 20.
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VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
191
“Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes
Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4
parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving
[his] share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what
year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.”
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other
and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed: X 9
“WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision. In lieu thereof, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the [petitioner’s] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.”
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: X 10
“The Court DENIES defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for
lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of
the decision.”
Hence, this petition. X 11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows: X 12
________________
Rollo, p. 90.
9
Rollo, p. 141.
10
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by this Court of the private respondents’ two-page
11
Memorandum on August 15, 1997.

Rollo, pp. 114-115.
12
192
192
“On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of
the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3)
children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the
land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but
the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before
plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of
land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and
that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4)
parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the
marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned
into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but
defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby
reproduces pertinent portions of the trial court’s decision: X 13
_______________
Rollo, pp. 74-85.
13
193
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
193
“EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who
is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being
elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a
member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That
she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She
knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were
already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff
was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the
plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiff’s parents[’] house and she
used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That
both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the
father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also
knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad
who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That
she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and
mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad
because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war]
and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the
land was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the
picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as
Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of
the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad
pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the
defendants in this case, witness answered yes.
194
194
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the
woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which
witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when x x x the picture [was]
taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness
answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of
baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2.
The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also
identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass
by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by
it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B,
witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can
identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister,
Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified
having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes
are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she
knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married
in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows
Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and]
she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season. That she
knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and
usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes,
Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of
the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one
possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up
195
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
195
to the present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for
him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio
was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by Lourdes
Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father’s share
but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes
and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents
of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father,
Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father
having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism
which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War
2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother
was already dead. Plaintiff’s mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided
for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the
defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by
the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that
he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he presented a
picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff’s daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another
family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff’s son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were
living with the defendants. That a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them
vacate the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for
[a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an
upland.
196
196
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts
every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are: East-Federico Inocencio;
West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove;
also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico
Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and SouthGregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of
the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years
[sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and
North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square
meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference
to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the
cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by
Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel
3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of
Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share
in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is
Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan,
by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal
197
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
197
judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet born at
that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was
wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived
with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his
mother receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix
Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner’s] highest educational
attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of
Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They
being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his
father are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes
and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his
death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of
Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, “Nanay Taya,” referring to Anastacia Briones who
is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of
the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and
with his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited
with anybody before his death, he answered, “That I do not know,” neither does he kn[o]w a person by
the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes
Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife,
witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That
after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always
visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after
the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be
a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: “I do not know about that.”
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to
reside in Nalook, Ka-
198
198
libo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4
parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he does not
know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at
the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes
Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead
before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when
he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land because the Japanese forces were
roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the
plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked
as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A
is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not
know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is
75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already
dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941.
According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15
days before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had
married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When
asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because
Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she
knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, ‘Yes,’ but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with
them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his
grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When
asked by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days,
witness answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house,
witness also said, ‘He did not.’
199
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
199
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia
Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix
Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died
without a wife and children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has
[no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in
their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of
Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that
Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941
was still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A
which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; ‘Yes.’ And the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad.
According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will
be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a
party, she answered; ‘Maybe there was.’ When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the
picture carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the
child to the church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the
latter’s child was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet.
She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix.
When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff,
witness answered she does not know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to
identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her brother, Felix, and who
was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot
identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding
another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that
the one who took this picture was the son of Am-
200
200
brosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does
not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio
Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants,
Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that
a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola’s house whose name was
Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in
Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That
according to her, about 1 1/2 months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also
testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes
Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was born
in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember
that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she
[was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo
was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of
Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that x x x she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents]
in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that
according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that
Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from
her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because
he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano
Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was
in good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics
but that according to her, their marriage was
201
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
201
solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during the marriage of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a
marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one
Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting
to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.”
Respondent Court’s Ruling

In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad,
Respondent Court ruled: X 14
“We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in
the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that
he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes
Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept.
6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes’
acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-owner-
_______________
14
Rollo, pp. 115-116; Decision; pp. 2-3.
202
202
ship (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the
defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their
father died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority,
still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by
acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).”
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: X 15
1. “1.Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant

evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. 2.Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence
to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private
respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. 3.Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision
of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the
Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. 4.Whether or not petitioner’s status as a legitimate child can be attacked
collaterally by the private respondents.
5. 5.Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired
ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.”
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. 1.Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and of his
filiation?
2. 3.
4. 2.Was petitioner’s status as a legitimate child

subject to collateral attack in the action for
partition?
_______________
The 51-page petition was signed by Attys. Al A. Castro, Florecita V. Bilbes and Teresita S. de Guzman of the Public
15
Attorney’s Office; rollo, pp. 21-22.

203
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
203
1. 3.Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Court’s Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties requires
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as
16
a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This
Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of
the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.X
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on

Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court’s assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in
the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not
apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this
case. X
17
Petitioner’s first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly
married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to
Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has
18
been contracted arisesX

_______________
De Mesa vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 773, 779-780, April 25, 1994, per Regalado, J.
16
Quebral vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 364, January 25, 1996; Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA
17
344, 350; November 13, 1989; and Pacmac, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 555, 560, May 29, 1987.
4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.
18
204
204
in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage,
the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the
birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents. X 19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of
20
Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner’s case.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of
relevant evidence may take its place. X 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who
testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in
New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves
as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon
and former board member of the local parent-teachers’ association, used to visit Inocentes and
Felicidad’s house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943,
22
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes’ house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended
petitioner’s baptismal party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of
23
common repu-X
_______________
Ibid.
19
Exh. I, Folder of Exhibits.

20
Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 259, 266-267, March 7, 1997; Lim Tanbu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425, 469,
21
August 29, 1975.

TSN, July 30, 1981, p. 6.
22
Ibid., pp. 1-17; TSN, October 30, 1981, pp. 18-26; TSN, March 5, 1982, pp. 27-36.
23
205
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
205
tation respecting marriage. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a
24
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and
25
Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother. X 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:

“ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by
the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.” X 27
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that records relative to his birth were either
28
destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on
June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardo’s testimony.X
_______________
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
24
Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules; and Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, revised ed., 1993, p. 131,
25
citing Rivera vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 322; De Labuca vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 77 SCRA 31; and Alvado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230.
Exhs. C-1 and C-2, Folder of Exhibits.
26
Now Arts. 170 & 171 of the Family Code; and Vitug, supra, pp. 223-224.
27
Exh. D, Folder of Exhibits.

28
206
206
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter
and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying
petitioner’s first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture
showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner’s first child (Exhibit B-2). These
pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove
petitioner’s filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private
respondents as Inocentes’ legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes’ denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B
shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner’s daughter, she demurred that she did so only
because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. When shown Exhibit A,
29
she recognized her late brother—but not petitioner, his wife and the couple’s children—slyly
explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. X 30
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of “the
other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to show pedigree, as this Court
ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: X 31
“What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by ‘any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws,’ according to the Civil Code, or ‘by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,’
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissi-
_______________
29
TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 6.
30
Ibid., p. 8.
31
201 SCRA 675, 684, September 24, 1991, per Cruz, J.; and Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684, 689, October 26,
1989.
207
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
207
ble under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Phil., 1988 ed., p. 246]”
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either
consanguinity or affinity, her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding
32
pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioner’s legitimacy.X

Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private
respondents’ self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents’ thesis is that Inocentes died
unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents’ witness, Pedro Briones, testified
that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was
willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese
forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for
only three months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive: X 33
“Q:
At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or
not?
A:
Not married.
Q:
In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A:
I was staying with them.
Q:
When you said ‘them,’ to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A:
My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.

x x x x x x x x x
Q:
Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia
Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A:
For only three months.
_______________
Sec. 40, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence.
32
TSN, August 29, 1986, pp. 4-6.

33
208
208
Q:
Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he
had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A:
[T]hat I do not know.
Q:
You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody
with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A:
I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q:
After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia
at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A:
Every Sunday.

x x x x x x x x x
Q:
You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A:
I do not know him.
Q:
After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has
stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A:
I do not know about that.”
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese occupied
Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick.
Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without
issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad
Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to
Inocentes. X34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing
of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in March
1941. The Japanese forces occupied Manila only onX
35
________________
TSN, March 17, 1988, pp. 2-5.
34
RTC Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 86.

35
209
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
209
January 2, 1942; thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only
36
then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of
the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. X 37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes’ surname (Trinidad) without objection from
private respondents—a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes’ legitimate child. X 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that
of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial
39
court, Respondent Court’s holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to
Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court
may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest
or want thereof, and their personal credibility. Applying this rule, the trial court significantly
40
and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner’s favor. It declared:X
“x x x [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being
their nephew x x x before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he
_______________
36
Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, Vol. II, revised ed., 1957, p. 341.
37
Rollo, p. 86.
38
Mendoza vs. CA, supra, pp. 683-684.
39
Summa Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, 185, February 5, 1996; New Testament Church of God vs. Court
of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, 269, July 14, 1995; Sapu-an vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, 706, October 19, 1992; Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.
40
Ibid.; and Francisco, Basic Evidence, 1991 ed., p. 491.
210
210
started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived
with the defendants x x x is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures
were taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father’s share. x x x x His
demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned
him as their nephew. x x x x In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken
when plaintiff demanded for the partition x x x as he was already having a family of his own. x x x x.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff
[petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the
testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at
the time she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and
the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the
witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the
case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.” X 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. Rather than rely on this axiom,
42
petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents’ marriage. Hence, there is
no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioner’s cause.X
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested
parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-
________________
Rollo, pp. 89-90.
41
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321, January 23, 1992; Rosales vs. Castillo Rosales, 132 SCRA 132, 141-142;
42
September 28, 1984; and Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990
ed., pp. 535-536.
211
VOL. 289, APRIL 20, 1998
211
ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession—in the concept of owners—
of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these
parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in
question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-
owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a
43
co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.X
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the
concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the
land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was
beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of
petitioner’s father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in
their father’s name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940
and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,
they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court held: X44
“x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not
lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano
vs.
_______________
Art. 494, Civil Code.
43
205 SCRA 337, 345-346, January 24, 1992, per Bidin, J.

44
212
212
De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible
and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]. On the other hand, an
action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs.
IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).”
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that
petitioner’s claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court’s decision dated July 4, 1989 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, decision and resolution reversed and set aside. Decision of court a quo
reinstated.
Note.—A co-owner is entitled to a written notice from selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as well as its efficacy and status. (Verdad
vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 593 [1996])
——o0o——
213
G.R. No. 157954. March 24, 2006. *
PAZ GALVEZ, CARLOS TAM, and TYCOON PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and PORFIRIO GALVEZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-Ownership; Prescription; It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
ownership.—This case is governed by the rules on co-ownership since both Paz Galvez and Porfirio
Galvez are obviously co-owners of the disputed property having inherited the same from a common
ancestor. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that “[a] prescription shall not run in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.” It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
_______________
FIRST DIVISION.
*
347
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 347
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and the latter has been categorically
advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question.—For title to prescribe in favor of
a co-owner there must be a clear showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and the
latter has been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question. The
rule requires a clear repudiation of the co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. It is only
when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of prescription will begin to run against the
other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it.
Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair
price before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same property.—A
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims
and interest of another person in the same property. So it is that the “honesty of intention” which
constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person
on inquiry.

Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Offices for petitioner Tycoon Properties, Inc.
Tan & Venturanza Law Offices for petitioner Carlos Tam.
Stephen L. David for respondent Galvez.
348
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The factual antecedents of this case reveal that Timotea F. Galvez died intestate on 28 April
1965. She left behind her children Ulpiano and Paz Galvez. Ulpiano, who died on 24 July
1
1959, predeceased Timotea and was survived by his son, Porfirio Galvez. Timotea left a parcel
2
of land situated at Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, covered by Tax Declaration No.
39645 and more particularly described as follows:
3
“A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated at Brgy. Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union under Tax
Declaration No. 39645, series of 1957, with an area of 4,304.5 square meters, more or less bounded on
the North by Valentin and Isidoro Sobrepeña; on the East by Nicolas Ducusin; on the South by Victor
Ducusin; and on the West by the National Highway.” 4
Considering that all the other compulsory heirs of Timotea already received their respective
shares, the property passed by succession, both to Timotea’s daughter, Paz Galvez, and to the
5
former’s grandson, Porfirio, the latter succeeding by right of representation as the son of
Ulpiano.
Porfirio Galvez was surprised to discover that on 4 May 1970, Paz Galvez executed an6
affidavit of adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful owner of the said property. Tax
Declarations No. 15749 and No. 12342 were then issued in the name of Paz Galvez. On 22 June
7 8
1992, without the knowledge and consent of Porfirio Galvez, Paz Galvez sold the property to
Carlos Tam for a consideration of Ten Thousand
_______________
Exhibits for the plaintiff, Exhibit “C,” p. 3.

1
Id., Exhibit “D,” p. 4.

2
Id., Exhibit “A,” p. 1.

3
Rollo, p. 67.
4
Amended Complaint, p. 3; Records, p. 43.

5
Annex “A,” Records, p. 7.

6
Exhibits for the plaintiff, Exhibit “F,” p. 6.

7
Id., Exhibit “G,” p. 7.

8
349
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 349
Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Carlos Tam thereafter filed an
9
application for registration of said parcel of land under Land Registration Case No. 2278 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union. On 21 January 1994, Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-2602 of the Registry of Deeds of San Fernando, La Union, was issued
in the name of Carlos Tam. Subsequently, on 27 September 1994, Carlos Tam sold the property
10
to Tycoon Properties, Inc. through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the former in favor of
the latter. As a result, the title of Carlos Tam over the property was cancelled and a new one,
11
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40390 was issued in favor of Tycoon Properties, Inc.
12
On 12 May 1994, Porfirio Galvez filed Civil Case No. 4895 before the RTC, Branch 26, of
San Fernando, La Union, for Legal Redemption with Damages and Cancellation of
Documents against Paz Galvez and Carlos Tam. The Complaint was later amended to implead
13
as additional defendant, Tycoon Properties, Inc. When Tycoon Properties, Inc. filed its Answer,
14
it also filed a cross-claim against Carlos Tam. In a decision dated 15 December 1999, the trial
15
court held:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. 1.declaring null and void the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by defendant PAZ
GALVEZ dated May 4, 1970;
2. 2.declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property originally covered
by Tax Declaration No. 39645 executed by PAZ GALVEZ in favor of CARLOS TAM;
_______________
9
Id., Exhibit “H,” p. 8.
10
Id., Exhibit “J,” p. 10.
11
Exhibits for the defendant, Exhibit “2,” p. 3.
12
Exhibits for the plaintiff, Exhibit “K,” p. 12.
13
Records, pp. 1-6.
14
Records, pp. 115-121.
Penned by Judge Alfredo A. Cajigal.
15
350
1. 3.the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2602, in the name of CARLOS TAM be
considered cancelled;
2. 4.The Deed of Sale between CARLOS TAM and TYCOON PROPERTIES, Inc. is
hereby ordered cancelled with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40390, being null and
void;
3. 5.That CARLOS TAM shall receive from the Clerk of Court, San Fernando City, La
Union the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, as redemption of the property
pursuant to law;
4. 6.That the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40390, be reconveyed
(whole property) to PORFIRIO GALVEZ, he having redeemed one-half (½) of the
property from CARLOS TAM and other half of the property belongs to him as co-heir
of TIMOTEA FLORES GALVEZ.
5. 7.Defendant PAZ GALVEZ and CARLOS TAM shall be liable solidarily for the actual
damages of the plaintiff in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as well as
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, together with
attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos acceptance fee and
Five Hundred (P500.00) per appearance fee.” 16
Petitioners Paz Galvez, Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc. appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 August 2002, the ap-pellate
17 18
court resolved to affirm the decision of the trial court. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 14 April 2003. 19
Not contented with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners are now before this
Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
_______________
Rollo, pp. 45-46.

16
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66786.

17
Rollo, pp. 45-54, penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C.
18
Garcia and Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, concurring.

Rollo, p. 140.
19
351
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 351
Petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc. separately filed their Memorandum but 20
raised the same issues to wit:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO HOLD THAT

RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, WHICH IS BASED ON AN IMPLIED
TRUST, HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED BECAUSE THE ACTION WAS FILED 24 YEARS AFER
PETITIONER REPUDIATED THE SAID TRUST.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT
RESPONDENT’S CLAIM IS ALREADY BARRED BY LACHES BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
ASSERT HIS ALLEGED RIGHT FOR ALMOST TWENTY FOUR (24) YEARS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONERS

[CARLOS TAM AND] TYCOON PROPERTIES ARE BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE
AND HAS THE RIGHT TO RELY ON THE FACE OF THE TITLE. 21
In assailing the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, petitioners cite Article 1451 of the 22
Civil Code and claim that an implied or constructive trust which prescribes in ten years,
_______________
In view of the Certification by the Office of the Civil Registrar of San Fernando La Union of the death of Paz Galvez
20
on 5 May 2002, this Court, in a resolution dated 28 September 2005 (Rollo, p. 388) noted and considered as satisfactory
the compliance filed by counsel for Tycoon properties regarding its failure to enter a substitute on behalf of Paz Galvez.
Memorandum of Tycoon Properties, Rollo, pp. 323-324; Memorandum of Carlos Tam, Rollo, pp. 350-351.
21
Art. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
22
another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
352
was established between Paz Galvez and Porfirio Galvez. It is petitioners’ unflinching stand that
the implied trust was repudiated when Paz Galvez executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication on
4 May 1970, registered the same before the Register of Deeds of La Union on 4 June 1970 and
secured a new tax declaration in her name. From 4 May 1970 to the time the complaint was filed
on 12 May 1994, 24 years have passed, hence, the action is clearly barred both by prescription
and laches.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Ostensibly, this case is governed by the rules on co-ownership since both Paz Galvez and
23
Porfirio Galvez are obviously co-owners of the disputed property having inherited the same from
a common ancestor. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that “[a] prescription shall not run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In Santos v. Santos, citing
24 25
the earlier case of Adille v. Court of Appeals, this Court found occasion to rule that:
26
“Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by

repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a
co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the
other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by
law.”
_______________
Mariano v. De Vega, G.R. No. L-59974, 9 March 1987, 148 SCRA 342, 345.

23
Robles v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 635, 649; 328 SCRA 97, 110 (2000).
24
396 Phil. 928, 947; 342 SCRA 753, 770 (2000).

25
G.R. No. L-44546, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 455, 461.

26
353
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 353
For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner there must be a clear showing that he has repudiated
the claims of the other co-owners and the latter has been categorically advised of the exclusive
claim he is making to the property in question. The rule requires a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. It is only when such unequivocal notice
27
has been given that the period of prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and
ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it. 28
To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was originally a
joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or
should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged
prescriptive period began to run. 29
In Salvador v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a
30
trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owner but in fact beneficial to all of
them.
The case of Huang v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the creation of trust relationships.
31
“Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable duties
imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. A person
who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the
benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose
_______________
27
Mariano v. De Vega, supra note 23, p. 346.
28
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39299, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 375, 382.
29
Cortes v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480, 484 (1916).
30
313 Phil. 36, 56-57; 243 SCRA 239, 251 (1995).
31
G.R. No. 108525, 13 September 1994, 236 SCRA 420, 428-429.
354
benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary or cestui que trust. Trust is either
express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trust
comes into being by operation of law. The latter kind is either constructive or resulting trust. A
constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.
The duty to convey the property arises because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or
mistake, or through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another’s property.
On the other hand, a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of
property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend that the person taking or
holding the property should have the beneficial interest in the property. It is founded on the presumed
intention of the parties, and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be reasonably
presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the
time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established.”
Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-
owners are concerned. Thus, Salvador v. Court of Appeals reiterated what acts constitute proof
of exclusive ownership amounting to repudiation, emphasizing that the act must be borne out of
clear and convincing evidence of acts of possession which unequivocably amounts to an ouster
or deprivation of the right of the other co-owner. The case of Pangan v. Court of
Appeals enumerated the following as constituting acts of repudiation:
32
“Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or for recovery of
ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute an act of repudiation of the trust
reposed on him by the latter.
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust, and
the lapse of more than 20
_______________
Supra note 28, pp. 382-383.

32
355
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 355
years, open and adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription.
An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes within 10
years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for
purposes of the statute of limitation is counted.
The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated the trust relation in
1955 upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession against private respondents so that the
counterclaim of the private respondents contained in their amended answer wherein they asserted absolute
ownership of the disputed realty by reason of the continuous and adverse possession of the same is well
within the 10-year prescriptive period.
There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of property causes
the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of
title in his own name.
It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in question, executed a deed of
partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor
and the issuance of a new one wherein they appear as the new owners of a definite area each, thereby in
effect denying or repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged share in the entire lot,
that the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder.”
In this case, we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-
ownership. The execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication does not constitute such sufficient
act of repudiation as contemplated under the law as to effectively exclude Porfirio Galvez from
the property. This Court has repeatedly expressed its disapproval over the obvious bad faith of a
co-heir feigning sole ownership of the property to the exclusion of the other heirs essentially
stating that one who acts in bad faith should not be permitted to profit
356
from it to the detriment of others. In the cases of Adille and Pangan where, as in this case, a co-
33 34
heir was excluded from his legal share by the other co-heir who represented himself as the only
heir, this Court held that the act of exclusion does not constitute repudiation.
On the issue of prescription, while admittedly prescription operates as a bar to recovery of
property, the ten-year period commenced to run from date of registration. In this case, Carlos
Tam obtained his title to the property on 21 January 1994. Since the complaint of Porfirio Galvez
was filed on 12 May 1994, the same was well within the ten-year period to file the action.
On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or
perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful
35
owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of
another. The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this case.
36
Finally, petitioners claim that if the sale would be nullified, the nullification should extend
only to the one-half share of Porfirio Galvez but not to the share of Paz Galvez, who, by her
37
overt act of selling the property, manifested her intention to dispose of her part.
Notably, Porfirio Galvez’s complaint was captioned “legal redemption with damages,
cancellation of documents and
_______________
Adille v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26.

33
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28.

34
Jimenez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 46364, 6 April 1990, 184 SCRA 190, 197, cited in Cometa v. Court of
35
Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 06 February 2001, 351 SCRA 294, 310.

Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 379; 403 SCRA 291, 300 (2003).
36
Rollo, pp. 357-358.

37
357
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 357
reconveyance of share.” In his prayer, he sought for the reconveyance of his one-half share in
38
the property and at the same time be subrogated to the other half pertaining to Paz Galvez and
sold to Carlos Tam after reimbursement of the amount which the latter paid for the property.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on legal redemption are as follows:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipulated
in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
In the case of Hermoso v. Court of Appeals, this Court, in interpreting the provision of the law
39
on legal redemption, held:

The purpose of Article 1067 (of the old Civil Code, now Article 1088 of the present Civil Code) is to
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be
undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold ( De Jesus
vs. Manlapus, 81 Phil. 144). While there should be no question that an heir may dispose his right before
partition (Rivero vs. Serrano [CA] 46 O.G. 642; Wenceslao vs. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906; Hernaez vs.
Hernaez, 32 Phil. 214), a co-heir would have had to pay only the price for which the vendee acquired it
(Hernaez vs. Hernaez, Ibid.).
_______________
Records, pp. 1-6, 115-121.

38
360 Phil. 703, 721; 300 SCRA 516, 533-534 (1998).

39
358
It is a one-way street. It is always in favor of the redemptioner since he can compel the vendee to sell to
him but he cannot be compelled by the vendee to buy the alienated property.
In another case, this Court reiterated that:
40
“Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and
partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a
disagreeable or [an] inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th Ed., 317.) It
is intended to minimize co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of
redemption when the shares of the other owners are sold to a “third person.” ”
The rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property and
the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat him in the exercise of his right of redemption. 41
Thus, petitioners cannot be accommodated in this respect and we agree with the trial court
when it held:
“The provision of Art. 1088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is very clear on the matter.
Art. 1088, provides: “Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one (1) month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.”
There was no written notice sent to Porfirio Galvez by Paz Galvez when she sold her share over the
land to Carlos Tam. Porfirio Galvez only discovered on May 12, 1994 that the land was sold to Carlos
Tam. Art. 1620, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides:
_______________
Fernandez v. Sps. Tarun, 440 Phil. 334, 344; 391 SCRA 653, 660 (2002).
40
Ysmael v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 323, 334; 318 SCRA 215, 226 (1999).
41
359
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 359
Art. 1620. “A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the share of all the other co-owners
or any of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.”
No written notice of the sale was given by Paz Galvez (vendor) to Porfirio Galvez, the co-owner as
required under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The written notice is mandatory. Hence, the right to redeem
commenced when plaintiff sought to exercise it by instituting the complaint in the instant case on June 12,
1994. The complaint of legal redemption may be filed even several years after the consummation of sale
(Zosima Verdad vs. Court of Appeals, et al.; G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996, 256 SCRA 593).” 42
As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc.’s claim that they are buyers in good
faith, same fails to persuade.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice
of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same property. So it is that the
“honesty of intention” which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. 43
Suffice it to state that both the trial and appellate courts found otherwise as “Tam did not
exert efforts to determine the previous ownership of the property in question” and relied only on44
the tax declarations in the name of Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam received a
45
copy of the summons and the complaint on 22 September 1994. This notwithstanding, he sold
the property to Tycoon Properties,
_______________
Rollo, pp. 90-91.

42
Occeña v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, 4 June 2004, 431 SCRA 116, 124.

43
CA decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 52.

44
RTC decision, p. 16; Id., p. 82.

45
360
Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly, Carlos Tam is also an owner of Tycoon Properties,
Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry of
46
Deeds of the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T- 40390. Despite the inscription,
47
Tycoon Properties, Inc. mortgaged the land to Far East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of
P11,172,600. All these attendant circumstances negate petitioners’ claim of good faith.
48
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 August
2002 and its Resolution dated 14 April 2003 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was
in the adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. (Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. vs.
Uy, 344 SCRA 238 [2000])
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who
asserts that status. (Rayos vs. Reyes, 398 SCRA 24 [2003])
A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
abstract. (De Guia vs. Court of Appeals, 413 SCRA 114 [2003])
——o0o——
_______________
RTC decision, p. 26; Records, p. 342.

46
Exhibits for the plaintiff, Exhibit “K,” p. 12.

47
Id., Exhibit “K-1,” p. 12.

48
361
VOL. 485, MARCH 24, 2006 361
Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Venus, Jr.

Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 61584.November 25, 1992. *
DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO FANESA,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN,
ABELINO PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA
PAULMITAN and ANITO PAULMITAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; In every inheritance the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones.—Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that “[t]he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent,” the right of ownership, not
only of Donato but also of Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and
by operation of law vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of
Donato and Pascual did not yet have any right over the inheritance since “[i]n every inheritance the
relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.” Donato and Pascual excluded their children as
to the right to inherit from Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
Same; Property; Co-ownership; Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.—This
Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil.
320 (1923)].
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.—This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned
in common.
Remedial Law; Appeal; The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review; Generally, findings of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclu-
________________
THIRD DIVISION.
*
867
VOL.215,NOVEMBER25,1992 867
sive and cannot be reviewed on appeal.—Petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of the land.
According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only. This assigned error,
however, raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal.
PETITION for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ROMERO,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of 1
Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled “Alicio Paulmitan, et al. v.
Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al.” which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance
2
(now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case
No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left the two following parcels of
3
land located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area of 1,946 square
meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with
an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by OCT No. RO-11653. From her marriage with
Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely:
Pascual Paulmitan, who also
________________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Crisolito Pascual with the concurrence of Associate Justices Guillermo P. Villasor and
Vicente V. Mendoza.
Penned by Judge Oscar R. Victoriano.
2
Petition, page 3; Rollo, page 15.

3
868
died in 1953, apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is
4
one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato’s daughter while the third
petitioner, Rodolfo Fanesa, is Juliana’s husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona
Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are his children, namely: Alicio, Elena, Abelino,
Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to the
two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on August 11, 1963,
petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially
adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of
Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental who,
on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in Donato’s name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in
favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
5
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited
and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the
buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of
the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. 6
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial Government
of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on
January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against
petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
________________
Record on Appeal, pages 63, 65.

4
Record on Appeal, pp. 21-24.

5
Record on Appeal, page, 72.

6
Record on Appeal, page 92.

7
869
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an affirmative
defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years after the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as a consequence of the registration
with the Register of Deeds, of Donato’s affidavit extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot
No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the
Complaint that she acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale
executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption
from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners’ affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757, the
trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to the said property
upon finding merit in petitioners’ affirmative defense. This order, which is not the object of the
present petition, has become final after respondents’ failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial
court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial court, the
respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot
No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to his daughter, petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa of the
land from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive
ownership over the entire land but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid
to redeem the property. The trial court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners
Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts representing
the latter’s share in the fruits of the land. On the other hand, respondents were directed to pay
P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause of action pleaded in the complaint as
follows:
870
1. “1.The deed of sale (Exh. ‘F’) dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as the one-
half undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership over said
half portion in favor of defendant Juliana Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo
Fanesa, while the remaining half shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-indiviso;
2. “2.Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros Occidental,
now covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered partitioned. The parties
must proceed to an actual partition by property instrument of partition,
submitting the corresponding subdivision within sixty (60) days from finality of
this decision, and should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be
appointed by the Court;
3. “3.Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653 (N.A.) covering
Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue in lieu thereof of a new certificate of
title in the name of plaintiffs and defendants, one-half portion each, pro-indiviso,
as indicated in paragraph 1 above;
4. “4.Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant Juliana Fanesa
the amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal rate from May 28, 1974 until
paid;
5. “5.Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan Fanesa are
ordered to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and severally, the value
of the produce from Lot 1091 representing plaintiffs’ share in the amount of
P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up to the time of actual partition of the property,
and to pay them the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees as well as the costs of
the suit.”
***
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well to
review, initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan. When
Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A few months
later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven children, the private respondents. On the other
hand, Donato’s sole offspring was petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It is, thus, tempting
to apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation
871
as regards respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did not predecease his
mother, thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil Code on the right of
8
representation with respect to his children, the respondents. When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan
9
died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-
settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that “[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent,” the right of ownership, not only of
10
Donato but also of Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and
by operation of law vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the
children of Donato and Pascual did not yet have any right over the inheritance since “[i]n every
inheritance the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.” Donato and Pascual 11
excluded their children as to the right to inherit from Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of
her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code
provides: “Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the
deceased.” Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their
12
mother as no partition was ever made.

When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him
in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan’s right of ownership over an
undivided portion of the property passed on to his
________________
8
The records of the case do not indicate the exact date when Agatona Sagario Paulmitan and her son Pascual died in
1953 but all parties, including petitioners, do not dispute that Agatona died ahead of her son (See Petition, p. 3; Rollo p.
15.)
9
See Articles 970-977, 981 of the Civil Code.
10
Jimenez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 46364, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 190; Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100 (1943).
11
Article 962, Civil Code.
12
See also Mendoza I v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 44664, July 31, 1991, 199 SCRA 778.
872
children, who, from the time of Pascual’s death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over
the disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and (b) her
redemption of the land from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental after it was
forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P.
Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion
which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice
13
the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from
their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the
seller’s pro-indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the
14
land until it is partitioned. In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, The Court, through Justice
15
Irene R. Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the co-
owners, thus:
“The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.
Thus:
Art.493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Italics supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale
will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
________________
13
Article 493, Civil Code; Reyes v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 56550, October 1, 1990, 190 SCRA 171.
14
Abad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84908, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 817.
15
G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 744-745.
873
[Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision,
the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil.
528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid
with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of
land as correctly held by the lower court since the sale produced the effect of substituting the buyers in
the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.”
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to
his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land
but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the
co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the fact
that when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it was forfeited
for non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her
title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue raised by
petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, resolved the same with the following
16
pronouncements:
“The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property
held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners’ contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him
upon the failure of his co-heirs to
________________
G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 455, 459-460.

16
874
join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions Article 1515 of
the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand
redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone (CIVIL
CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. (1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In
other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt
that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
ART.488.Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter
may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the
co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, “may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,” the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over
it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property
and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the
redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.”
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to be reimbursed for half of the
redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her
co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due
her.17
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which

________________
Guinto v. Lim Bonfing, 48 Phil. 884 (1926).

17
875
the Court of Appeals affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966
until the partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of
the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only. This
assigned error, however, raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact made by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
Petition denied; decision affirmed.
Note.—Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent
(Jimenez vs. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190).
——o0o——
_______________
Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89880, February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA 603; De Ocsio v. Court of
18
Appeals, G.R. No. 44237, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 729.

876

Mariano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 101522. May 28, 1993. *
LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO, MERCEDES SAN

PEDRO, DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T. AQUINO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division), GRACE GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband CHARLIE
GUILLEN; EMMA GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband GERMAN GALCOS; ESTER
GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband AMADOR BITONA; FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO,
JR., NORMA GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY ROSE GUENO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; Sale of property owned in common; Right of redemption;
Notice required to be given to the co-owners of the sale to a stranger must be in writing.—Respondents
have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors,
the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Redemption by a co-owner inures to the benefit of all the other
co-owners.—“Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership
existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of
the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to
the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not put an end to the existing state of co-ownership.
Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Consignation; It is not necessary when tender of payment was
made to enforce or exercise a right and not to discharge an obligation.—It has been previously held that
consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of payment is enough if
made on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a retro to resell the property; no subsequent
consignation was necessary to entitle private respondents to such reconveyance.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
*
737
VOL. 222, MAY 28, 1993 737
The Barristers Law Office for petitioners.
Simeon T. Agustin for private respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review of the decision dated May 13, 1991 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 13122, entitled Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. v. Leonardo Mariano v. Amparo
Gosiengfiao raising as issue the distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 of the Civil
1 2 3
Code.X
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
“It appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot
located at Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly described as follows, to wit:
‘The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao Cadastre, and after its segregation now designated as Lot 1351-A,
Plan PSD-67391, with an area of 1,346 square meters.’
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416 recorded in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
“The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as
Mortgagee bank, for brevity) on several occasions before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and January
29, 1958.
“On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate sur-
_______________
1
Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., ponente, Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring.
2
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
3
Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
738
vived by his heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants: wife Antonia and Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino
and herein plaintiffs-appellants Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by daughter
Pinky Rose), and Jacinto.
“The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank and in the
foreclosure sale held on December 27, 1963, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the highest
bidder.
“On February 7, 1964, third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the property by
paying the amount of P1,347.89 and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the
mortgagee bank.
“On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and that of her minor children Emma,
Lina, Norma together with Carlos and Severino executed a ‘Deed of Assignment of the Right of
Redemption’ in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial register of Pedro (Laggui) as Doc.
No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No. 8, Series of 1965.
“On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property to defendant Leonardo Mariano
who subsequently established residence on the lot subject of this controversy. It appears in the Deed of
Sale dated August 15, 1966 that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos and Severino were signatories thereto.
“Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of the sale of said property by the
third-party defendants. She went to the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with defendants
Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to the said property.
“On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached by the parties, the Barangay Captain
issued a certificate to file action.
“On December 8, 1982, defendant Leonardo Mariano sold the same property to his children Lazaro F.
Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino as evidenced by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as
Doc. No. 143, Page No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.
“On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a complaint for ‘recovery of
possession and legal redemption with damages’ against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano.
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the
right to recover their respective shares in the said property as they did not sell the same, and the right of
redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners sold to the defendants.
“Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has (sic) no cause of action against them as the
money used to redeem the lot in question was solely from the personal funds of third-party defendant
Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became the sole owner of the said property and thus
validly sold the entire property to the
739
VOL. 222, MAY 28, 1993 739
defendants, and the fact that defendants had already sold the said property to their children, Lazaro
Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting that the plaintiffs are co-
owners with the third-party defendants, their right of redemption had already been barred by the Statute of
Limitations under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches.” 4
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, rendered a decision
dated September 16, 1986, dismissing the complaint and stating that respondents have no right of
ownership or possession over the lot in question. The trial court further said that when the
subject property was foreclosed and sold at public auction, the rights of the heirs were reduced to
a mere right of redemption. And when Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank
on her own behalf and with her own money she became the sole owner of the property.
Respondents’ having failed to redeem the property from the bank or from Amparo G. Ibarra, lost
whatever rights they might have on the property. X 5
The Court of Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial
court and declared herein respondents as co-owners of the property in the question. The Court of
Appeals said:
“The whole controversy in the case at bar revolves on the question of ‘whether or not a co-owner who
redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and
terminates the existing state of co-ownership.’
“Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed
among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the
whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the
benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not put an end to the existing state of co-ownership.
Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
x x x
“In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by records, that third-party defendant Amparo G.
Ibarra redeemed the property in
_______________
4
Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 71-73.
5
Rollo, pp. 67-68.
740
dispute within the one year redemption period. Her redemption of the property, even granting that the
money used was from her own personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner of the mortgaged
property owned in common but inured to the benefit of all co-owners. It would have been otherwise if
third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra purchased the said property from the mortgagee bank (highest
bidder in the foreclosure sale) after the redemption period had already expired and after the mortgagee
bank had consolidated it title in which case there would no longer be any co-ownership to speak of.”
6
The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long line of case law which states that a
redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law inures to the benefit of all the
other co-owners. X 7
The main argument of petitioners in the case at bar is that the Court of Appeals incorrectly
applied Article 1620 of the Civil Code, instead of Article 1088 of the same code which governs
legal redemption by co-heirs since the lot in question, which forms part of the intestate estate of
the late Francisco Gosiengfiao, was never the subject of partition or distribution among the heirs,
thus, private respondents and third-party defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
On that premise, petitioners further contend that the right of legal redemption was not timely
exercised by the private respondents, since Article 1088 prescribes that the same must be done
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is that
when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property or properties of the inheritance,
the right of redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that recognized in Article
1620. On the other hand, if the sale is the hereditary right itself, fully or in part, in the abstract
sense, without specifying any particular object, the right recognized in Article 1088 exists. 8
_______________
Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 74-75.
6
Annie Tan v. C.A., G.R. No. 79899, 172 SCRA 660 (1989); Adille v. C.A., G.R. No. 44546, 157 SCRA
7
455 (1988); De Guzman v. C.A., G.R. No. 47378, 148 SCRA 75 (1987).

Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
8
741
VOL. 222, MAY 28, 1993 741
Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case, respondents failed to
exercise their right of legal redemption during the period provided by law, citing as authority the
case of Conejero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. wherein the Court adopted the principle that
9
the giving of a copy of a deed is equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption.X
We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. However, the facts in the said
case are not four square with the facts of the present case. In Conejero, redemptioner Enrique
Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed of sale of the subject property. The Court in
that case stated that the furnishing of a copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written
notice required by law. 10
The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale being given
whatsoever to private respondents. Although, petitioners allege that sometime on October 31,
1982 private respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the questioned deed of sale and
shown a copy of the document at the Office of the Barangay Captain sometime November 18,
1982, this was not supported by the evidence presented. On the contrary, respondent, Grace
Gosiengfiao, in her testimony, declared as follows:
Q When you went back to the residence of Atty. Pedro
Laggui were you able to see him?
A Yes, I did.
Q When you saw him, what did you tell?
A I asked him about the Deed of Sale which Mrs. Aquino had
told me and he also showed me a Deed of Sale. I went over
the Deed of Sale and I asked Atty. Laggui about this and he
mentioned here about the names of the legal heirs. I asked
why my name is not included and I was never informed in
writing because I would like to claim and he told me to
better consult my own attorney.
A And did you go?
_______________
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, pp. 607-608, citing Manresa at p. 777.
16 SCRA 775 (1966).
9
Id., pp. 779-780.

10
742
2
A Yes, I did.
Q What kind of copy or document is that?
A It is a deed of sale signed by my mother, sister Amparo
and my brothers.
Q If shown to you the copy of the Deed of Sale will you be
able to identify it?
A Yes, sir. 11
Thereafter, Grace Gosiengfiao explicitly stated that she was never given a copy of the said Deed
of Sale.
Q Where did Don Mariano, Dr. Mariano and you see each
other?
A In the house of Brgy. Captain Antonio Bassig.
Q What transpired in the house of the Brgy. Captain when
you saw each other there?
A Brgy. Captain Bassig informed my intention of claiming
the lot and I also informed him about the Deed of Sale that
was not signed by me since it is mine it is already sold and
I was never informed in writing about it. I am a legal heir
and I have also the right to claim.
Q And what was the reply of Don Mariano and Dr. Mariano
to the information given to them by Brgy. Captain Bassig
regarding your claim?
A He insisted that the lot is already his because of the Deed
of Sale. I asked for the exact copy so that I could show to
him that I did not sign and he said he does not have a
copy. 12
The above testimony was never refuted by Dr. Mariano who was present before Brgy. Captain
Bassig.
The requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case of Castillo v.
Samonte, where this Court quoted the ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32 Phil., 214, thus:
13
“ ‘Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the
notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by
registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any
_______________
11
TSN, October 9, 1984, pp. 11-12.
12
Id., at pp. 14-15.
13
106 Phil. 1023 (1960).
743
VOL. 222, MAY 28, 1993 743
other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said notice be made in
writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient’ ”
14
Moreover, petitioners themselves adopted in their argument respondents’ allegation in their

complaint that sometime on October, 1982 they sought the redemption of the property from
spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue, by tendering the repurchase money of
P12,000.00, which the spouses rejected. Consequently, private respondents exercised their right
15
of redemption at the first opportunity they have by tendering the repurchase price to petitioners.
The complaint they filed before the Barangay Captain and then to the Regional Trial Court was
necessary to assert their rights. As we learned in the case of Castillo, supra:X
“It would seem clear from the above that the reimbursement to the purchaser within the period of one
month from the notice in writing is a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal
redemption; the bringing of an action in court is the remedy to enforce that right in case the purchaser
refuses the redemption. The first must be done within the month-period; the second within the
prescriptive period provided in the Statute of Limitation.” X 16
The ruling in Castillo v. Samonte, supra, was reiterated in the case of Garcia v.

Calaliman, where We also discussed the reason for the requirement of the written notice. We
said:
“Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New
Civil Code) this Court has stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale
acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written
notice, as exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notifications re-
_______________
14
Id., at 1028.
15
Amended Complaint; par. 15-16, Rollo, p. 34.
16
Ibid, at 1029.
744
mains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16
SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
75069, April 15, 1988).” (Italics, ours)
17
We likewise do not find merit in petitioners’ position that private respondents could not have
validly effected redemption due to their failure to consign in court the full redemption price after
the tender thereof was rejected by the petitioners. Consignation is not necessary, because the
tender of payment was not made to discharge an obligation, but to enforce or exercise a right. It
has been previously held that consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a
mere tender of payment is enough if made on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a
retro to resell the property; no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle private
respondents to such reconveyance. X 18
Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a
written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed.
Note.—Reconveyance being real action over immovable prescribes after thirty (30) years
(Lindain vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 425).
——o0o——
_______________
Garcia v. Calaliman, G.R. No. 26855, 172 SCRA 201 (1989).
17
Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 192 SCRA 388 (1991).

18
745
VOL. 298, OCTOBER 30, 1998 313

Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs. Tamayo
G.R. No. 110644. October 30, 1998.
*
THE HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, represented by Lucio Salamat and Danilo
Salamat, VALENTA DIZON GARCIA, represented by Raymundo D. Garcia, Jr. as Attorney-in-
Fact, THE HEIRS OF ANSELMA REYES DIZON, represented by Catalina Dizon Espinosa,
petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD DIZON TAMAYO, THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO DIZON,
represented by Angela R. Dizon, THE HEIRS OF GAUDEN-CIO DIZON, represented by Maria
Dizon Jocson, respondents.
Land Titles; Donations; A transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take effect
as a donation unless embodied in a public document.—It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real
property from one person to another cannot take effect as a donation unless embodied in a public
document.
Evidence; Ancient Document Rule; Words and Phrases; An ancient document refers to a private
document which is more than thirty (30) years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine, and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion.—The document
relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly satisfy the requirements of the rule on ancient
documents on account of unexplained alterations. An ancient document refers to a private document
which is more than thirty (30) years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion.
Ownership; Possession; Donations; Prescription; While it is true that a void donation may be the
basis of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.—In any case,
assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim
ownership over the property. While it is true that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which
may ripen into title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to constitute the founda-
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
314
tion of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Same; Same; Co-Ownership; Trusts; A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner being a
trustee for each other and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owners
but in fact is beneficial to them.—Respondent was never in adverse and continuous possession of the
property. It is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of
the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner being a trustee for
each other and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owners but in fact is
beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession
was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements in Order that a Co-Owner’s Possession may be Deemed
Adverse to the Cestui Que Trust or the Co-Owner.—The elements in order that a co-owner’s possession
may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive
acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Tax Declarations; It is well settled that tax declarations or realty
tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership.—The fact that the subject property is declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No.
14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Tabaquero, Rotairo, Evangelista and Associates for petitioners.
315
VOL. 298, OCTOBER 30, 1998 315
Carmelito M. Santoyo for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children Eduardo,
Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the properties left by the
decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an area of 2,188
square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384. 1
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3,000 to his sister
Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document bearing the signatures of
his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses. 2
On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum of P4,000 to his
sister Salud. The sale was evidenced by a notarized document which bore the signature of
Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as witnesses. Gaudencio died on May 30, 1951
3
leaving his daughters Pris-cila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson as heirs.

Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial partition of real
properties registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of
Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted by the refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon
Tamayo to agree to the formal distribution of the properties of deceased Agustin Dizon among
his heirs. Respondent’s refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of land
covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides, claiming
________________
The Original certificate of Title is presently registered in the name of the Heirs of Agustin Dizon, Exh. C.
1
Exhibit E.
2
Exh. F.
3
316
that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the conformity of the other heirs. The
subject property is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 10376 in the
name of respondent.
The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by the deceased
Agustin Dizon to herein respondent partook of the nature of a donation which required the
observance of certain formalities set by law. Nevertheless, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding that the partition of the estate of Agustin Dizon is in order, let a project of
partition be drawn pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 69, Rules of Court assigning to each heir the specific share to
which he is entitled taking into consideration the disposition made in favor of Salud Dizon Salamat and
the adjudication of Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D owned by Natividad Dizon Tamayo, together with
the improvements thereon, in her favor and the house owned by Valenta Dizon Garcia, executing, if
necessary, proper instruments of conveyance for confirmation and approval by the Court.
Parties are enjoined to draw the project of partition as equitably and equally as possible with the least
inconvenience and disruption of those in possession or in actual occupation of the property. Should the
parties fail to come up with an acceptable project of partition, the Court will appoint commissioners as
authorized by Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court, who will be guided by the dispositive portion hereof.
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the partition are to be shared equally by the parties.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and covered by OCT 10384 in the name
of the heirs of Agustin Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while respondent claims that her father
donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the consent of her co-heirs. In support of her claim,
respondent Natividad presented a private document of conformity which was
317
VOL. 298, OCTOBER 30, 1998 317
allegedly signed and executed by her elder brother, Eduardo, in 1936.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it is marred by
unexplained erasures and alterations.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the RTC, stated that notwithstanding the
unexplained erasures and alterations, a cursory reading of the signed statement of Eduardo
Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed that there was an oral donation of the litigated
land from Agustin Dizon to Natividad Dizon Tamayo in 1936.
4
The Court of Appeals further stated that the attestation by Eduardo, of the oral donation of the
subject land made by his father to respondent Natividad, in 1936, coupled with the tax
declaration and payment of taxes in respondent’s name would show that the trial court did not err
in ruling that the subject land should pertain to Natividad Tamayo as inheritance from her
parents.
We reverse.
Art. 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, unless it
is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take
effect as a donation unless embodied in a public document.
_______________
4
Exh. 1.
318
The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed in a public document.
Moreover, the document which was presented by respondent in support of her claim that her
father donated the subject parcel of land to her was a mere private document of conformity
which was executed by her elder brother, Eduardo in 1956. It may not be amiss to point out that
5
the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had already ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner
Salud Dizon Salamat even before 1950.X
The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the said document and made the
dubious observation that “x x x a cursory reading of the signed statement of Eduardo Dizon,
which execution is undisputed, shows that there was an oral donation x x x.”
Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly satisfy the
requirements of the rule on ancient documents on account of unexplained alterations.
An ancient document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30) years old,
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by
alterations or circumstances of suspicion. 6
To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by Eduardo was marred by
unexplained erasures and alterations. While the document was originally penned in black ink, the
number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on the number fifty-six (56) to make it
appear that the document was executed in 1936 instead of in 1956. Moreover, a signature was
blotted out with a black pentel pen and the three other signatures of the alleged witnesses to the
7
execution of the document at the lower portion of the document were dated June 1, 1951. This
could only mean that the witnesses attested to the veracity of the document 5 years earlier, if the
_______________
Respondent however claims it was executed in 1936.
5
Sec. 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

6
Signatories were Valenta D. Garcia, Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson.

7
319
VOL. 298, OCTOBER 30, 1998 319
document was executed in 1956 or 15 years later, if we are to give credence to respondent’s
claim, that the document was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of the signatories, namely,
Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson signed the document as witnesses two days after the
death of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned, had already sold his hereditary rights
to his sister Salud in 1949.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent, albeit orally,
respondent cannot still claim ownership over the property. While it is true that a void donation
may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription, it is well settled that
8
possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim
of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continuous possession of the property. It is undeniable
that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left
by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner being a trustee for each
other and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owners but in
9
fact is beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that
the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property.
In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to state that a mere silent
10
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of
buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon and the payment of land taxes, cannot
serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that
he exercised acts of possession which unequivo-
_______________
Pensador v. Pensador, 47 Phil. 959 [1924]; Vda. de Lima v. Tio, 32 SCRA 516 [1970]; Consato v. Fruto, 129 US
8
182 [1889]; Solis vs. CA, 176 SCRA 678 [1968].

Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 155 [1978].
9
243 SCRA 239 (1995).

10
320
cably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
The elements in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que
trust or the co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing. 11
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at bar. There are two houses
standing on the subject property. One is the house where respondent presently resides while the
other is a house built by respondent’s sister Valenta. Records show that the house on Lot 227
where the respondent lives is actually the ancestral house of the Dizons although respondent has
remodelled it, constructed a piggery and has planted trees thereon. Respondent herself testified:
12
“x x x x x x x x x
Q Now who is in possession of this particular residential
: land in Bo. San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan?
A I am in possession of that land, Sir.
:
Q Do you have your residential house there?
:
A Yes, sir.
:
Q Now, you said that you have your residential house there,
: since when have you stayed there?
A I was born there, Sir.
:
Q And you are staying there up to the present?”
:
A Yes, sir.
:
x x x x x x x x x.” 13
It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never made unequivocal acts of
repudiation, she cannot acquire
_______________
Ibid.
11
TSN, June 21, 1990, p. 5; TSN, September 19, 1989, p. 5; Rollo, p. 60.
12
TSN, October 26, 1989, pp. 7-8.

13
321
VOL. 298, OCTOBER 30, 1998 321
ownership over said property through acquisitive prescription. The testimony of her son that she
merely allowed her sister Valenta to build a house on the lot is pure hearsay as respondent
14
herself could have testified on the matter but chose not to.X
Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It
is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. 15
As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned lot, the parties
should be guided by Article 500 of the Civil Code which states that: “Upon partition, there shall
be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made. x x x”
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. Lot 2557,
Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384 is hereby declared
to belong to the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.
Notes.—Only the donor or his heirs have the personality to question the violation of any
restriction in the deed of donation. (Garrido vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 450 [1994])
_______________
14
Mr. Florentino Tamayo testified “According to my mother, when this Valenta Garcia got married, my mother offered
her to stay or erect her home there.” TSN, June 21, 1990, p. 17.
15
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 218 (1995); Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 224 SCRA
285 (1993); Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339 (1993).
322
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
A party cannot claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own
unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which it had slept for so long.
(Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181 [1996])
A person who is not principally or subsidiarily bound has no legal capacity to challenge the
validity of a contract of donation—he must first have an interest in it, meaning a material
interest, an interest to be affected by the deed, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest.
(Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 357 [1998])
——o0o——
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 731

Heirs of Flores Restar vs. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon
G.R. No. 161720. November 22, 2005. *
HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR namely: ESMENIA R. RESTAR, BERNARDITA R. RENTINO,

LUCIA RESTAR, RODOLFO RESTAR, JANET R. RELOJERO, LORNA R. RAMOS,
MANUEL RESTAR, NENITA R. BELLEZA, MIRASOL R. DELA CRUZ, ROSELLE R.
MATORRE, POLICARPIO RESTAR and ADOLFO RESTAR, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
DOLORES R. CICHON, namely: RUDY R. CICHON, NORMA C. LACHICA, NILDA C.
JUMAYAO, LYDIA C. SANTOS, and NELSON R. CICHON; HEIRS OF PERPETUA R. STA.
MARIA, namely GEORGE STA. MARIA, LILIA M. MANIAGO, DERLY M. CONCEPCION,
GERVY STA. MARIA, DORY M. INDULO; HEIRS OF MARIA R. ROSE, namely: TERESITA
R. MALOCO, ROLANDO ROSE, EDELYN R. PALACIO and MINERVA R. PASTRANA,
DOMINICA RESTAR-RELOJERO and PACIENCIA RESTAR MANARES, respondents.
_______________
THIRD DIVISION.
*
732
Property; Co-ownership; Partition; Prescription; While the action to demand partition of a co-
owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where
there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership.—While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not
prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
Actions; Appeals; While the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the
appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, the Supreme Court may, in the interest of justice,
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.—Resolving
the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription, the
appellate court held in the negative. While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the
appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence
in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record. Contrary to the findings of the
appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners’ claim that the requirements for
extraordinary prescription had been duly met.
Property; Co-ownership; Prescription; Tax Declarations; The statutory period of prescription
commences when a person who has neither title nor good faith, secures a tax declaration in his name and
may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed the ownership of the lot.—When Restar died in 1935,
his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never
possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed
the complaint for partition subject of the present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot
after Restar’s death and exercised acts of dominion thereon—tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and
733
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 733
enjoying the produce thereof. The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935
but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and
may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also
deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim. Flores’ possession thus ripened
into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the
earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Possession; While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be a basis of claim of ownership through
prescription.—While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not
prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of
great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.

Allan B. Gepty for petitioners.
Diomedes T. Resurreccion for respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory heirs,
namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-
Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
In 1960, Restar’s eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit he 1
executed with one Helen Restar,

_______________
Records at p. 8.
1
734
caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 6696 in Restar’s name covering a 5,918 square
2 3
meter parcel of land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was
among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.
On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restar’s Tax
Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.
4
On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores’ sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and
Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores’ surviving sisters Dominica
Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a Complaint against Flores’ heirs for
5
“partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and
preliminary injunction” before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.
Flores’ brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being
unwilling co-plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores, they
were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to 1991; after Flores’
death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance
the education of her children, to which they (the plaintiffs) agreed on the condition that after the
children had finished their education, it would be divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon
their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Heirs of Flores
_______________
Id., at p. 7.
2
As eventually determined by court appointed Commissioner Crispulo M. Vega, Id., at pp. 100-102.
3
Id., at p. 9.
4
Id., at pp. 1-6.

5
735
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 735
refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from
Flores.
By Answer filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores claimed
6
that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years
and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with
the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores’ death in 1989, Esmenia requested the
plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her children’s education, they contending that by
1977, the children had already finished their respective courses. 7
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the “new
Tax Declaration in 1945,” Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands situated in Carugdog,
Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Restar; and an 8
extrajudicial partition was subsequently executed on September 28, 1973 by Restar’s heirs,
which was notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among themselves
four (4) parcels of land. 9
The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer, alleged that the complaint did not state a
10
cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to the partition of the lot among the
heirs of Restar.
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer acknowledged Flores as
11
the owner of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was sold to him as
shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14,
_______________
Id., at pp. 31-36.

6
Id., at pp. 32-33.

7
Ibid.
8
Exhibits Folder – Exhibit “20.”

9
Records at pp. 19-21.

10
Id., at p. 128.
11
736
1981. He thus prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition of the lot among
12
Restar’s heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores. 13
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores’ share in Restar’s estate
was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the trial court, holding
that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-
ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription. 14
Respecting the defendant Policarpio’s claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him, the trial
court discredited the same upon noting that Flores’ signature in the purported Deed of Sale
differed from those appearing in other documents submitted by the parties; in 1981, when the
said Deed of Sale was alleged to have been executed, Flores was admittedly paralyzed and
bedridden and could not have written his name in a “straight” manner, as in fact his signature
appearing in at least two documents dated 1980 was “crooked,” and there existed discrepancies
in the spelling of Flores’ wife’s signature which read “Esmeña” in the deed, and not as
“Esmenia.” 15
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999. 16
On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate court, by
Decision of October 29, 2002. reversed the decision of the trial court, it finding that the
17
_______________
Exhibit “1”—Policarpio Restar, vide Records at pp. 131-132 (the List of Exhibits prepared by the RTC Clerk of
12
Court identifies the deed as such Exhibit “1” but the deed on pages 131-132 bears no such marking.
Records at p. 129.
13
RTC Decision, Records at pp. 161-171.

14
Records at p. 170. The records disclose, however, that Esmenia Restar signed as “Esmenia” in the deed of sale
15
whereas she always signed as “Esmeña.”

16
CA Rollo at pp. 158-165.

17
737
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 737
defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-
owners or that they derived title to it from a separate conveyance to them by Restar.
The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-
heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical
assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs’
claim of ownership. 18
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately take
legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest brother who had
asked them to continue cultivating the lot to support his children’s education. 19
Respecting the defendant Policarpio’s claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by
Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial court’s rejection thereof.
Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED in so far as plaintiffs-
appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant
Policarpio Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, dated June 30,
1999 is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership
by adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis in the original)
The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants Heirs of
Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:
1. A.THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE

RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
_______________
Id., at p. 163.
18
Ibid.
19
738
1. PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED

OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
2. B.THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN
QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION HAS
BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF
PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND
THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS. 20
The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
“ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
xxx
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may
acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-
21
ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. 22
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for
a period of ten years. Without good faith and just
_______________
Rollo at p. 17.
20
Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 868 (1920).

21
Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601, 608 (1997).

22
739
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 739
title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
“ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.”
Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary
prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the
facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to
arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record. 23
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support
petitioners’ claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly met.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by
intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their
claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the
present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts of
dominion thereon—tilling and
_______________
Ferrer v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 302, 305 (1993).

23
740
cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when
Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may,
therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also
deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim. 24
Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse
of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Court’s approval.
“The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in
question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen
Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name. It was
admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax
Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in the
name of Flores Restar (Exhibit “10”). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the
co-ownership over the land in question. x x x
“Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo,
Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and
Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (Exhibit “20”). If they were able to demand the partition,
why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the
inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the
eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?
_______________
De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 307, 321 (1993).

24
741
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 741
“Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances ( sic) to file a case
against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed
the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores’ death.
“From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the
time when the tax declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started
to run from this date. Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership,
laches and prescription of the action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his
heirs.” 25
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove
title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of
great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.
26 27
As for respondents’ claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of the land,
it was correctly discredited by the trial court.
“[P]laintiffs’ claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce
cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay
produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after
excluding expenses for cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share
of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan.”28
_______________

25
Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601, 606 (1997).

26
Cequeña v. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216, 226-227 (2000).

27
Records at p. 170.
28
742
Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial court’s findings of facts which
must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect, they must remain.
Respondents have not, however, proffered any reason warranting the disturbance of the trial
court’s findings of facts.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation
of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the
execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion
of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever
contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the
exclusion of respondents. And Flores’ adverse possession was continued by his heirs.
The appellate court’s crediting of respondents’ justification for failing to immediately take
legal action to protect their rights—forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be
allowed to cultivate the land to support their children’s education—does not impress. For
assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores’ continuous
possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?
The trial court’s finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years
possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner—which
length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents,
being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot
by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex
sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
743
VOL. 475, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 743
Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro vs.
Heirs of Alberto Cruz
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.,On Leave.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. That of the trial court reinstated.
Notes.—A co-ownership or co-possession is not an indicium of the existence of a partnership.
The essence of a partnership is that the partners share in the profits and losses. (Heirs of Tan Eng
Kee vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 740 [2000])
There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. (Si vs.
Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 653 [2000]
——o0o——

Cases For Co-Ownership

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G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011.

5 Records, pp. 7-8, 51-52.

11 Records, pp. 61-64.

27 Id., at pp. 17-18, 21-22.

28 G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.

36 Id., at pp. 547-548.

40 Art. 6, CIVIL CODE.

5 Atienza v. De Castro, supra note 3, at p. 603.

LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, respondent.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Id., at pp. 53-54.

Records, pp. 2-6.

Id., at pp. 71-72.

WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE

. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE

Maligaya cannot defeat the

Id., at pp. 96-105.

Id., at pp. 108-112.

Gala v. Rodriguez, 70 Phil. 124 (1940).

80638, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 822.

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Verily, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of petitioner

Id., at p. 53 citing Paulino v. Court of Appeals, No. L-46723, 28 October 1977, 80 SCRA 257.

No. L-18891, 28 November 1964, 12 SCRA 471, 476.

Id., at p. 201 citing 2 Oyuelos 161 and cases.

G.R. No. 200612. April 5, 2017.*

1 Rollo, pp. 14-41.

23 Id., at pp. 112-113.

38 Id., at pp. 27-33.

52 Rollo, pp. 137-138.

58 716 Phil. 267; 703 SCRA 439 (2013).

59 1991 REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Section 1(A)(1).

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. a.P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;

1. 1.to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;

To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an “Opposition to Approval

1. the approval of this Honorable Court.” 1

Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for

Rollo, pp. 173-176.

that court approval is necessary

it is mandated that each co-

Vda. de Gil vs. Cancio, 14 SCRA 796 (1965).

mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. X 13

73 Phil. 628 (1942).

OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, GIL C. FERNANDEZ and

Ruling of the RTC

Memorandum signed by Atty. Fernando P. Cabrera.

1. “1.Whether or not petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of legal

This Court’s Ruling

availed of by a co-owner, only when theX

De la Cruz v. Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709, 712, October 12, 1949.

Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31, December 24, 1915.

16 SCRA 775, 779-780, April 29, 1966.

197 SCRA 606, 610, May 28, 1991.

Hermoso v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 516, 538, December 29, 1998.

Applying the presently prevailing principles discussed above, petitioners’ predecessor—Angel

Id., par. (2), Code.

August 25, 2000.