EMBIDO vs.

PE
A.C. No. 6732           October 22, 2013
By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:
Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya received two written communications from Mr.
Ballam Delaney Hunt. The letter requested a copy of the decision dated
February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the
records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084
wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files
revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,
Mr. Hunt sent a letter attaching a machine copy of the purported
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document
attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court
document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the
situation.
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to
communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the
investigation of the falsification.
Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit wherein
he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance
of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for
a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were
substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley
Quioyo.
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side but he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent.

ISSUE:
WON Pe should be disbarred.
HELD:
YES.

RATIO:
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty
of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the
decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given
the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar
that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the
confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity.
The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on
those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring
demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for
money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to their clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of
the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only
to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath
and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities.

DISPOSITION:
The Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N.
PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him.

Chua vs. Atty. De Castro Case Digest

Joseph C. Chua vs. Atty. Arturo M. De Castro
A.C. No. 10671. December 5, 2016

Facts
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by respondent Atty. Arturo M. De
Castro (Atty. De Castro) of the Court's Resolution dated November 25, 2015 which found him
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and was meted out the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

Chua alleged that his company, Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC) filed a collection case
against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel Atty. De Castro.
According to Chua, since the filing of the collection case on June 15, 2006, it took more than
five (5) years to present one witness of NCRC due to Atty. De Castro's propensity to seek
postponements of agreed hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. Atty. De Castro's flimsy
excuses would vary from simple absence without notice, to claims of alleged ailment unbacked
by any medical certificates, to claims of not being ready despite sufficient time given to
prepare, to the sending of a representative lawyer who would profess non-knowledge of the
case to seek continuance, to a plea for the postponement without providing any reason
therefore.

For his defense, Atty. De Castro countered that his pleas for continuance and resetting were
based on valid grounds. Also, he pointed out that most of the resetting were [sic] without the
objection of the counsel for NCRC, and that, certain resettings were even at the instance of the
latter.

On April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD. The Board of Governors modified
the penalty meted out to [Atty. De Castro] [by] reducing the period of suspension from six (6)
months to three (3) months.

On November 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors. The Court held that Atty. De Castro violated his oath of
office in his handling of the collection case filed against his client. Undaunted with the Court's
ruling, Atty. De Castro filed the present motion for reconsideration. He strongly disputes the
allegations of Chua averring that the long delay in the disposition of the collection case before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was due to the several postponements which were found
meritorious by the RTC.

Issue
Whether Atty. De Castro's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is proper.

Ruling
After a second hard look at the facts of the case, relevant laws, and jurisprudence, the Court
finds merit in the motion for reconsideration. A lawyer indubitably owes fidelity to the cause of
his clients, and is thus expected to serve the client with competence and utmost diligence. He is
enabled to utilize every honorable means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is
due the latter. Under the CPR, every lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Upon careful consideration of the circumstances, the Court finds that the delay in the
disposition of Civil Case No. 7939 was not solely attributable to Atty. De Castro. The trial court
itself, either at its own initiative or at the instance of Chua's counsel, allowed the delays.
Consequently, if not all of such delays were attributable to Atty: De Castro's doing, it would be
unfair to hold him solely responsible for the delays caused in the case. Moreover, it appears
that the trial court granted Atty. De Castro's several motions for resetting of the trial; and that
at no time did the trial court sanction or cite him for contempt of court for abuse on account of
such motions. Verily, if his explanations for whatever delays he might have caused were
accepted by the trial court without any reservations or conditions, there would be no legitimate
grievance to be justly raised against him on the matter.

While Atty. De Castro's repeated requests for resetting and postponement of the trial of the
case may be considered as contemptuous if there was a showing of abuse on his part, the
Court, however, finds that Chua failed to show that Atty. De Castro was indeed moved to cause
delays by malice, or dishonesty, or deceit, or grave misconduct as to warrant a finding of
administrative liability against him. The operative phrase for causing delay in any suit or
proceeding under Rule 1.03 is ''for any corrupt motive or interest." Considering that this matter
concerned Atty. De Castro's state of mind, it absolutely behooved Chua to present sufficient
evidence of the overt acts committed by Atty. De Castro that demonstrated his having
deliberately intended thereby to do wrong or to cause damage to him and his business. That
demonstration, however, was not made by Chua.

Notwithstanding the absence of malice, dishonesty, or ill motive, it is good to remind Atty. De
Castro that as a member of the Bar, he is expected to exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and to be more circumspect
whenever seeking the postponements of cases.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Atty.

Arturo M. De Castro is hereby GRANTED. The Court's Resolution dated November 25, 2015
is SET ASIDE. Atty. Arturo M. De Castro is ADMONISHED to exercise the necessary prudence
required in the practice of his legal profession in his representation of the defendant in Civil
Case No. 7939 in the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City.

ETHICS DIGEST

MALONZO VS. PRINCIPE 447 SCRA 1

(A.C. No. 6289, December 16, 2004)

(447 SCRA 1)
RESPONDENT:
COMPLAINANT:
FACTS:
In expropriation proceedings by the NAPOCOR against several lot owners in Bulacan,
the president of an organization of the lot owners entered into a contract for legal services with
Atty. Pete Principe. Complainant Julian Malonso, a member of the same organization,
appointed on the other hand a certain Danilo Elfa as his attorney-in-fact on the matter of
negotiation with NPC. Thereafter, there was an amicable settlement between NAPOCOR and
the lot owners. More than two years after the expropriation cases were instituted; Atty.
Principe filed his motion to separate legal fees and filed his “Notice of Entry of Appearance”
claiming that he is the legal counsel of the lot owners. The other lot owners including Malonso
wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Sandama’s President
to hire the services of Atty. Principe’s law firm to represent them. Atty. Principe filed several
motions to ensure his claim to the 40% of the selling price of the properties being expropriated.
An investigation conducted by the IBP recommended Atty. Principe’s suspension from the
practice of law.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said
member executed a special power of attorney[6] in favor of Elfa, which served as the latter's
authority to act in behalf of Malonso.
In his Reply, Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf,
considering that while the Contract of Legal Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was
dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later date, 27
November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf
since he already had his own lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by
SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of
the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a
member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organization's commitments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Prinsipe be suspended from the practice of law.
HELD:
 YES. Atty. Principe had violated among others HELD: Rule 12.04 which says that “a
lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.”
In its Resolution, the IBP Board ordained his suspension from the practice of law. The SC
however found that formal requisites of the investigation and resolution had not been
complied
with and dismissed the case requiring the IBP to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule
139-B in all cases involving disbarment and discipline of attorneys.

SC ruled that “The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%)
contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per
se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the
amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case.[38] Nevertheless, when it
is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the
attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly
excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party”

URBAYAN vs. CALTEX PHILS, INC.

L-15379; August 31, 1962

Facts:

The case originated in the municipal court of the City of Tacloban, where appellant
Teodoro L. Urbayan filed a complaint against Caltex (Philippines), Inc. and appellee John Gray
for recovery of damages for breach of contract. John Gray filed an answer with a counterclaim
for damages in the sum of P2,000.00 and attorney's fees of P300.00. Caltex on its part, moved
to dismiss. Its motion was granted by the municipal court in an order dated September 7, 1954.
The case was set for trial with respect to Gray on the following September 17.
On the said date, the case was dismissed because appellant failed to appear against
Gray (nonsuit). Within two hours after this case had been dismissed with respect to defendant
John Gray for failure of the plaintiff to appear before this Court and plaintiff declared in default
on counterclaim against him; and after the said defendant presented his evidence in support of
his counterclaim plaintiff with his counsel Atty. Filomeno Montejo appeared before the Court
and orally asked that the order of dismissal of the complaint and default on counterclaim be
lifted. The petition being in accordance with the Rules of Court it was granted.

Nevertheless, instead of asking for a re-trial or a new trial plaintiff announced that he is
not going to present evidence and manifested his intention to appeal against the decision of
this Court to the Court of First Instance.

After filing for appeal, John Gray filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the same had been taken only from the order dismissing the complaint with respect to Caltex
but not from the decision on his counterclaim against appellant. On December 1, 1954 the
Court of First Instance granted the motion and dismissed the appeal as against Gray, but
remanded the case to the court below for further proceedings in so far as defendant Caltex was
concerned. It this order dismissing the appeal with respect to Gray that is now before us for
review.

Issue: W/o the appeal was correctly dismissed.

Held:

The question as to whether or not the appeal was correctly dismissed depends upon
how the notice of appeal filed by appellant on September 17, 1954 should be construed. The
reference made therein is to the order of the municipal court "dismissing the complaint against
defendant Caltex (Philippines), Inc. and against the other defendant John Gray." At first blush it
would seem that the appeal was ineffective as against Gray, because on one hand the order of
dismissal on the ground of non-suit had been set aside and the complaint reinstated by the
municipal court with respect to him, and on the other hand appellant had not yet received a
copy of the decision. However, appellant's intention may be clearly inferred from the court's
order lifting the declaration of non-suit. It is there stated that the defendant waived
presentation of his evidence and announced instead that he would appeal from the decision,
anticipating, with reason, that the decision would be adverse to him. He must have been
prompted to make the waiver because after all the effect of his appeal would be to vacate the
judgment and to have the case tried de novo in the Court of First Instance.

The circumstance that a copy of the decision was actually received by appellant only on
September 28 does not necessarily militate against his announced intention to appeal
therefrom on September 17, as he was then already certain that any decision the court might
render would be adverse to him inasmuch as only the defendant Gray had presented evidence.
The decisive fact is that appellant intended to appeal and did so by filing the corresponding
notice of appeal, and that the same could have been from no other action of the court than its
decision. Technicalities, such as the inaccurate reference in the notice of appeal to a non-
existent order of dismissal of the complaint as against defendant Gray, should give way to the
realities of the situation.1äwphï1.ñët

In connection with appellant's contention, subject of the first error assigned by him in his brief,
that the municipal court of Tacloban should have been declared as without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of appellee's counterclaim in view of the amount involved, it appears that the same
was not submitted either to the said court or to the Court of First Instance for resolution.
Hence, the assignment of such error in the present appeal is premature.

Saa vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Legal Ethics
Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 12

SAA vs. IBP

G.R. No. 132826

FACTS:

Atty. Freddie Venida, herein private respondent, filed criminal and administrative cases
against petitioner Saa containing the same facts and allegations – violation of Sec 3, RA 3019.
Saa filed a disbarment complaint against Venida in the Supreme Court on Dec 27, 1991 stating
that Venida’s act of filing two cases against him was oppressive and constituted unethical
practice.

In a Resolution dated February 17, 1992, Venida was required to comment on the complaint
within 10 days. However, Venida did not comply and just submitted a partial comment January
26, 1993. Supreme Court issued another Resolution on June 14, 1995 requiring Venida to show
costs why he should not be dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the
February 17, 1992 resolution. It was not until September 4, 1995, almost 3 years late, when
Venida filed his full comment which is just a reiteration of his partial comment.

Supreme Court referred the matter to the IBP. In a report dated August 17, 1997 which the IBP
Board adopted, Commisioner Briones the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit since it
found no evidence of unethical practice and that it was not oppressive. Saa filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Venida guilty of violation the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

Supreme Court upholds the decision of the IBP that there was no grave abuse of
discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical
behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated
by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.

However, the Supreme Court strongly disapproves Atty. Venida’s refusal to comply with the
directives of the court. As a lawyer, he has the responsibility to follow all legal orders and
processes. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three
years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear
violation of Canon 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But tried
to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a heavy
workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a strong typhoon for
the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment). His excuses tax the
imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly
unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to evade
accountability for his omissions.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Petition is granted in part. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against

respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyer’s oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately from
receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
1. .PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and E. C. GARCIA,  vs. ATTY. A. E. REVILLA, JR., A.C. No. 7056    
September 13, 2006
FACTS:
Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. Plus Builders Inc. filed
before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite
(PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.],
and against [tenants/farmers]. Tenants/farmers filed several verified pleadings as part of the
records of DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG
NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject properties, acknowledging the rights of the
registered owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were transferred to
Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion
for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due course to the
same. another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who
represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is
representing TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona fide' members of the
[Kalayaan Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27,
2000 stating that they received the Decision on March 14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is
 against the law and jurisprudence. On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing
that there was a monetary judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to
Tenants/Farmers, filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and
Amendment of Judgment' After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary
gain from the PARAD judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages
dated July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City,
notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another lawyer.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of
his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," in order to secure a
temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the
execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999.
Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the
unlawful practice of law was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter.
The failure of respondent to do so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.

HELD:
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as
vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are
expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in
court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:
"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. 'Rule
9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.'"

CANON 12

PNB V UY TENG PIAO

VICKERS; 1932
(romy ramirez)

NATURE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations at the CFI
of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum
of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered
the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the court within three
months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the mortgage properties should be
sold at auction in accordance with law and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the
judgment.
- The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties were auctioned by
the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer.
- On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latter’s right to redeem
one of the properties described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano
Santos for P8,600.
- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was credited to the
account of Uy. The total amount generated with the resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300.
- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of the balance of the
judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven percent per annum.
- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to redeem the first property
resold by PNB, the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment.
- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through one of its officer,
a certain Mr. Pecson.
- Hence this appeal

ISSUES
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case

HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the defendant, that
the bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to
the condonation, there is not evidence presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank
through its board of directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the
agreement.
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and witness in a trial is
not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer in this
case can appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they are to testify as required by
the case, they should withdraw from the active management of the case. This is embodied in
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics.
Disposition The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the
sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per annum to be
reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant.

En Banc
 NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. SANCHEZ

GR No. 75209 – September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY V. NLRC

GR No. 78791 – September 30, 1987

Per Curiam

SUBJECT: Canon 13 – Influencing or Giving appearance of Influencing Court

FACTS:

The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10,
1987 outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building. Since June 17, 1981

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to
withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to
appear before the Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was
further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
with an assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an
unregistered loosed alliance of about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either
the UFE or KILU.
ISSUE: WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively
dealt with.

HELD:

Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate
petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrator of justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.” (In re Stolen).

The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but
equally a violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the citizenry at large to
have their causes tried fairly.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts
to an abuse thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However,
being non-lawyers, the duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon
the shoulders of their counsel of record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal
profession as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice.

The contempt charges were dismissed.

CRUZ vs SALVA

FACTS:
 A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio,
Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial.
Castelo was again found guilty.
Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people
and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new
confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of
investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions.
Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was
implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz’ counsel
questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation
because the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow him to
appear at the investigation. SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim
investigation.

ISSUES

Whether or not Salva conducted the investigation property?

RULING:

No. the members of the Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a
criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but
when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and the Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put
an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary
measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, 
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.

Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.

City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V.
Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him
from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in
connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City.
To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from
the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved
and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and
others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the
case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial
which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of
sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the
case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence
agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the
investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would
appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the
trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained
by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred
with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the
Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine
Constabulary and Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial
with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of
those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar
Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal,
action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on
the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal
Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the
motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation
designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and
Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to
testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and
place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary
investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would
attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement,
Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas
appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly
respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same
case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same
day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted
by respondent Salva.

The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to
Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated
petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel
Monroy.

The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case
of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before
us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be
obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of
the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither
had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was
because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation
with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence
therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the
contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the
investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to
appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had
been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel
Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by
Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even
desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said
witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions,
either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication,
addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957,
be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no
opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear
at the investigation.

As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though
nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the
Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried
and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and
actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by
the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said
fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in
the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al.,
one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason
that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial
against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and
the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The
trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an
early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the
prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the
same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the
new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine
Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an
investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the
killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo
and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly
and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.

In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as
suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and
secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
 We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any
form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United
States, theprosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor —
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69
United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarezvs. Platon,
69 Phil., 556)

With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him
at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present
at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and
implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and
testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary
investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there
implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as
claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be
present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and
even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be
compelled to do so.

Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If,
as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and
evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme
Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the
investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission
of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed
day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the
question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to
abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the
witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to
understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the
offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on
the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took
place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of
Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and
which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined
in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a
criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but
when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put
an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary
measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored
the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have
finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason
the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved;
that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent
may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by
respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied
in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby
publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism
that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and
find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same
would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

MAGSALANG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the court in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His
counsel, Atty. Castellano, filed for apetition for certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-
compliance with the requirements, the court dismissed the petition and a motion for
reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the President where he
accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly
rendering unjust judgments. He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for
being Marcos appointees, and robbing the Filipinopeople genuine justice and democracy. He
also said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge who was impleaded in the petition and
for money reasons. He alleges further that the court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary
men. The court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. When asked to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the complaint was
constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices
of the justices concerned. He also said that the justices have no jurisdiction over his act and that
they should just answer the complaint. The SC found him guilty of contempt and improper
conduct and ordered to pay P1, 000 or imprisonment of 15 days, and to suffer six months
suspension. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Castellano’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 

HELD: Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and contumacious. He went beyond the
bounds of constructive criticism. What he said are not relevant to the cause of his client.
They castaspersion on the Court’s integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable
controversies before it. 

The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing of the petition for certiorari did not
render his negligence excusable. It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged
injustices Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court, but his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. 

As an officer of the court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity
of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. 

Also, with the complaint he filed, the most basic tenet of the system of government –
separation of power - has been lost. He should know that not even the President of the
Philippines can pass judgment on any of the Court’s acts. 

MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 543 August 21, 1974

AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNATION OF MUNICIPAL JUDGES AND LAWYERS IN ANY BRANCH OF

THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO ACT AS COUNSEL DE OFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED WHO ARE
INDIGENT IN PLACES WHERE THERE ARE NO AVAILABLE PRACTICING ATTORNEYS

WHEREAS, under existing law, Municipal Judges and other lawyers in the government service
are prohibited from practicing law;

WHEREAS, there are some places where there are no available legal practitioners, as a result of
which the trial of cases in court is delayed to the prejudice particularly of detention prisoners;

WHEREAS, for the protection of the rights of the accused who cannot afford to hire lawyers
from other places and to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is necessary that they be provided
with counsel;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution as commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General
Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, as amended, do hereby order and decree as follows:

Section 1. Designation of Municipal Judges and lawyers in any branch of the government
service, as counsel de oficio. In places where there are no available practicing lawyers, the
District Judge or Circuit Criminal Court Judge shall designate a municipal judge or a lawyer
employed in any branch, subdivision or instrumentality of the government within the province,
as counsel de oficio for an indigent person who is facing a criminal charge before his court, and
the services of such counsel de oficio shall be duly compensated by the Government in
accordance with Section thirty-two, Rule One Hundred Thirty Eight of the Rules of Court.

If the criminal case wherein the services of a counsel de oficio are needed is pending before a
City or municipal court, the city or municipal judge concerned shall immediately recommend to
the nearest District Judge the appointment of a counsel de oficio, and the District Judge shall
forthwith appoint one in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

For purposes of this Decree an indigent person is anyone who has no visible means of support
or whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose income even in excess of P300 is
insufficient for the subsistence of his family, which fact shall be determined by the Judge in
whose court the case is pending, taking into account the number of the members of his family
dependent upon him for subsistence.

Section 2. Repealing Clause. All laws and decrees inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed.

Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 21st day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-four.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6034

AN ACT PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER ALLOWANCES FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS.

Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, any indigent litigant
may, upon motion, ask the Court for adequate travel allowance to enable him and his indigent
witnesses to attendant the hearing of a criminal case commenced by his complaint or filed
against him. The allowance shall cover actual transportation expenses by the cheapest means
from his place of residence to the court and back. When the hearing of the case requires the
presence of the indigent litigant and/or his indigent witnesses in court the whole day or for two
or more consecutive days, allowances may, in the discretion of the Court, also cover reasonable
expenses for meal and lodging.

For the purpose of this Act, indigent litigants shall include anyone who has no visible means of
income or whose income is insufficient for his family as determined by the Court under Section
2, hereof.

Section 2. If the court determines that the petition for transportation allowance is meritorious,
said court shall immediately issue an order directing the provincial, city or municipal treasurer
to pay the indigent litigant the travel allowance out of any funds in his possession and proceed
without delay to the trial of the case. The provincial, city or municipal treasurer shall hold any
such payments as cash items until reimbursed by the national government.

Section 3. All payments of travel allowances made by provincial, city and municipal treasurer
under this Act as of October 31 each year, shall be transmitted to the Commissioner of the
Budget not later than November 30 each year for inclusion in the annual General
Appropriations Act. The necessary sum is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of the
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 4, 1969.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6035

AN ACT REQUIRING STENOGRAPHERS TO GIVE FREE TRANSCRIPT OF NOTES TO INDIGENT

AND LOW INCOME LITIGANTS AND PROVIDING A PENALTY FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.

Section 1. A stenographer who has attended a hearing before an investigating fiscal or trial
judge or hearing commissioner of any quasi-judicial body or administrative tribunal and has
officially taken notes of the proceeding thereof shall, upon written request of an indigent or low
income litigant, his counsel or duly authorized representative in the case concerned, give within
a reasonable period to be determined by the fiscal, judge, commissioner or tribunal hearing the
case, a free certified transcript of notes take by him on the case.

Section 2. A litigant who desires to avail himself of the privilege granted under Section one
hereof shall, at the investigation, hearing, or trial, establish his status as an indigent or low
income litigant and the investigating fiscal or judge or commissioner or tribunal hearing the
case shall resolve the same in the same proceeding.
For the purpose of this Act, an "indigent or low income litigant" shall include anyone who has
no visible means of support or whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose
income even in excess of P300 per month is insufficient for the subsistence of his family, which
fact shall be determined by the investigating fiscal or trial judge or commissioner or tribunal
hearing the case taking into account the number of the members of his family dependent upon
him for subsistence.

Section 3. Any stenographer who, after due hearing in accordance with the pertinent provisions
of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, has been found to have violated the provisions of
Section one of this Act or has unreasonable delayed the giving of a free certified transcript of
notes to an indigent or low income litigant shall be subject to the following disciplinary actions:

(a) suspension from office for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days upon finding of
guilt for the first time;

(b) suspension from office for not less than thirty (30) days and not more than sixty (60)
days upon finding of guilt for the second time; and

(c) removal from office upon finding of guilt for the third time.

Section 4. This Act shall apply to all indigent or low income litigants who, at the time of its
approval, have pending cases in any fiscal office, court, or quasi-judicial body or administrative
tribunal.

Section 5. The Department of Justice shall prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, and the Department Head concerned shall
provide the necessary supplies and authorize the use of government equipment by the
stenographers concerned.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 4, 1969.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6036

AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BAIL SHALL NOT, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, BE REQUIRED IN
CASES OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES AND IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES
WHEN THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR SUCH OFFENSES IS NOT HIGHER THAN ARRESTO
MAYOR AND/OR A FINE OF TWO THOUSAND PESOS OR BOTH.
Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be
required of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony
and/or a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six months
imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both, where said person has established
to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is
unable to post the required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:

(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagranti;

(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later
repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted
through force or intimidation;

(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or jumped bail;

(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;

(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously

convicted for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty;

(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and

(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor for
violation of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.

Section 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Section 1
hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the
community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to
the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its
discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under
the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be
willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a
statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so
appointed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of the
accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons
including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this
sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the
amount forthwith fixed by the Court.

Section 3. This Act shall apply to all person who, at the time of its approval, are under
temporary detention for inability to post bail for charges contemplated by Section 1 above.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 4, 1969