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Safety Climate in Organizations
Article · April 2016

DOI: 10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062414
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Mark A. Griffin1 and Matteo Curcuruto2

Annu. Rev. Organ. Psychol. Organ. Behav. 2016.3:191-212. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
1
School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Perth 6009, Australia;
email: mark.griffin@uwa.edu.au
2
School of Social, Psychological and Communication Sciences, Leeds Beckett University,
Leeds LS1 3HE, United Kingdom; email: matteo.curcuruto@leedsbeckett.ac.uk
Access provided by 144.136.237.123 on 04/23/16. For personal use only.
Annu. Rev. Organ. Psychol. Organ. Behav. 2016. Keywords

3:191–212
safety climate, safety behavior, work motivation, accident prevention,
First published online as a Review in Advance on
February 24, 2016 injury, well-being
The Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Abstract
Organizational Behavior is online at
orgpsych.annualreviews.org Safety climate is a collective construct derived from individuals’ shared per-
This article’s doi: ceptions of the various ways that safety is valued in the workplace. Research
10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062414 over the past 35 years shows that safety climate is an important predictor of
Copyright c 2016 by Annual Reviews. safety behavior and safety outcomes such as accidents and injury. We first
All rights reserved review the conceptual foundations of safety climate and explore how the
construct can be applied to different levels of analysis. We then review ways
that safety climate influences individual processes of sense making, moti-
vation, and work behavior. Next, we explore the impact of safety climate
on organization-level outcomes related to both safety and productivity. We
conclude with suggestions for future research and practice to support the
overall safety of people and organizations.
191
1. INTRODUCTION
The organizational context is a critical and pervasive influence on safety outcomes such as accidents
and injuries. Reviews of major accidents consistently identify the attributes of organizational
management that contribute either directly or indirectly to incidents. In this article, we review
safety climate as a critically important aspect of the organizational context that influences myriad
safety outcomes. Safety climate is widely defined as the “shared perceptions with regard to safety
policies, procedures and practices” in an organization (e.g., Zohar 2011, p. 143). Meta-analyses
show that safety climate influences the motivation to work safely, the type of safe or unsafe
behaviors that are enacted, and safety outcomes such as accident and injury (e.g., Nahrgang et al.
2011).
Shared perceptions about the value and meaning of safety have been shown to influence safety
across a range of industries that deal with individual and environmental hazards. Substantial re-
search has shown that safety climate improves safety outcomes in healthcare, manufacturing,
mining, transport, and energy production. We explore the implications of conceptualizing cli-
mate in terms of shared perceptions and develop an expanded view of the nature and impact of
safety climate in organizations. We review safety climate in terms of a perceptual, collective and
multidimensional phenomena in organizations that exercise a subjective-normative influence on
individual and group behaviors through sensemaking processes. Ultimately, this process influences
organizational outcomes of safety as well as other aspects of organizational functioning such as
productivity.
The review is divided into four main sections. The first section reviews the nature of safety
climate as an entity in organizations, and we outline how shared perceptions across multiple
dimensions of the organization constitute safety climate. We also review safety climate as an
entity at different levels of analysis including team, organization, industry, and national levels. The
second section reviews how safety climate influences individual processes in terms of cognitive
sensemaking, motivation, and behavior. The third section reviews the impact of safety climate
on outcomes at the individual and aggregate level of analysis as well as interventions that might
improve safety climate. The final section identifies future directions for research and practice.
Throughout these four sections, we review existing research and theory and identify practical
implications for the management of safety at both the individual and organization level.
Since Zohar (1980) published his study of safety climate 35 years ago, both theory and research
have advanced but a comprehensive theory and a unanimously preferred measurement approach to
safety climate are still lacking (Guldenmund 2000, Wu et al. 2007). Figure 1 outlines the content
of the core theoretical and empirical constructs that we review in the following sections.
2. FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY CLIMATE

Safety climate is a multidimensional and multilevel construct: Perceptions about many aspects of
the work environment can be shared across teams, organizations, and other collectives. In this
section, we review the key attributes of safety climate and develop an integrative definition of
the construct. We first review the features of safety climate that define a distinct organizational
entity and research topic in the fields of organizational behavior and industrial and organizational
psychology. We then review the multiple dimensions that might constitute climate and conclude
with a review of safety climate across various levels of analysis. We pay particular attention to the
national and cultural levels of analysis as an increasingly important but little understood aspect of
the safety climate.
192 Griffin · Curcuruto

Safety climate Individual processes Outcomes

Shared perceptions Sensemaking Safety and health
• Values • Accidents
Motivation and knowledge
• Practices • Injury
• Expectancy
Multiple levels • Well-being
• Empowerment
• Team • Self-determination Performance
• Organization • Social exchange • Productivity
• Industry • Innovation
Behavior
• Nation
• Compliance
• Participation
• Affiliation
• Proactivity
Figure 1
Overview of safety climate, individual processes, and organizational outcomes.
2.1. Developing the Construct of Safety Climate

More than 35 years ago, Zohar (1980, p. 101) described safety climate as “the molar and unified set
of cognitions [held by workers] regarding the safety aspects of their organization.” This influential
statement positioned safety climate as a specific form of organizational climate based on individuals’
evaluation of their experiences of safety in the work environment. Divergent views about the
meaning of safety climate (Litwin & Stringer 1968) and its level of analysis ( James et al. 1990) and
causal role in organizational success were coalescing over this period. A general view emerged of
organizational climate as a collective phenomenon defined by shared perceptions of the procedures,
practices and kinds of behaviors that get rewarded and supported with regard to a specific strategic
focus (Schneider et al. 2013).
As a more consistent view of general climate emerged, the importance of Zohar’s (1980) study
became increasingly apparent to safety researchers. During the 1990s and early 2000s, numerous
key studies on safety climate were published, and various definitions were used that had in common
the way groups of people perceived safety-related features of the work context. For example, Ostroff
et al. (2003, p. 566) described safety climate as an “experientially based description of what people
see and report happening in the real organizational situation.”
We highlight two key features of the perceptions that constitute safety climate. First, percep-
tions are shared across individuals. This sharedness means that climate is a collective property
of groups. The shared nature of this perception is critical for distinguishing safety climate from
other safety constructs such as personal attitudes toward safety, even though both are based on
individual perceptions. Whereas psychological climate refers to individual perceptions of the work
environment, safety climate emerges only when these perceptions are shared by individuals within
a work group or organization. The content of shared perceptions typically concerns the safety
policies, procedures, and practices in the organization (Griffin & Neal 2000). These perceptions
serve as a collective frame of reference for employees that provides cues about expected behavior
and outcome contingencies related to safety (Zohar 2010).
Second, safety climate perceptions are characterized as being intrinsically descriptive and cog-
nitive in their nature with reference to observable features of organizational safety as they are
experienced by employees in their daily interactions (Guldenmund 2000, Zohar & Luria 2005).
www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 193

In contrast, safety attitudes such as feeling personal responsibility for safety and skepticism can be
characterized as more evaluative and affective in their nature (Mearns et al. 1998).
Differences between the constructs of organizational climate and culture have been the impetus
for much debate over decades. Logically, these issues also apply to safety climate, and much could
be written about the way safety climate differs from safety culture. However, we address this
point only briefly because, in many cases, both research and practice conflate the meaning of
the two constructs. For example, numerous studies of safety culture use survey instruments that
are more accurately described as measures of safety climate. A fine-grained distinction between
climate and culture in specific domains is feasible (Day et al. 2014). Safety culture refers to the
underlying assumptions and values that guide behavior in organizations rather than the direct
perceptions of individuals. A key difference, therefore, is the greater accessibility of safety climate
to conscious evaluation compared to the more implicit processes of safety culture. In this way,
safety climate might be regarded as the surface features of the safety culture discerned from the
workforce’s attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time (Flin et al. 2000). Safety climate
measures provide a snapshot of the state of safety providing an indicator of the underlying safety
culture of a work group, plant, or organization.

Despite these differences, both constructs emphasize the way safety is valued and help to explain
the processes through which the meaning attached to safety in an organization influences safety
outcomes. Therefore, our review focuses on safety climate as defined above; however, much of
the research in safety climate overlaps with safety culture research and shares substantially similar
goals.
2.2. The Multidimensional Nature of Safety Climate

A major conceptual and practical challenge has been reaching consensus about constituent ele-
ments of safety (Christian et al. 2009, Zohar 2010). The range of factors that might be included
is wide, encompassing perceptions of formal practices such as training as well as more informal
processes such as group relationships (Christian et al. 2009). As noted above, one must differ-
entiate the content of safety climate perceptions from other individual perceptions such as risk
appraisal and attitudes toward safety (Huang et al. 2006). Clarke’s (2006) meta-analysis examining
22 empirical studies identified conceptual confusion in measures of safety climate, leading to a
variety of models that conflated perceptions and attitudes. In addition, various studies included
constructs such as dispositions, beliefs, risk perceptions, and work stressors as elements of safety
climate. It was difficult to ascertain a clear link between safety climate and safety outcomes because
key relationships were obscured by aggregation across diverse psychological constructs, and by
overlap among safety and non-safety variables (Wallace et al. 2006). Clarke’s (2006) meta-analysis
showed that more clearly defined perceptual approaches to safety climate tended to increase the
predictive power for outcomes such as occupational accidents.
Previous literature reviews have identified more than 50 different variables or conceptual
themes that have been included in safety climate questionnaires (Flin et al. 2000, Guldenmund
2000). Griffin & Neal (2000) identified three general domains of safety management in the organi-
zation: general policies, formal procedure systems, and work practices relating to safety promotion
in the workplace. Examples of specific practices include safety communication, safety training, and
safety management systems. Through the experiences of employees as relate to these aspects of
the organization during daily interactions, employees develop a unified perception of the priority
of safety overall in the workplace (Zohar 2008).
Much of the scientific research on safety climate has focused on assessing empirical models
rather than developing theoretical frameworks about the content and effects of safety climate.

Empirical issues include the dimensionality of safety climate such as the factor structure of mea-
surement scales and their predictive validity for a variety of safety outcomes (Clarke 2006).
Despite the diversity of dimensions described in the literature, the various definitions and mea-
sures show some commonality across core conceptual themes. Key themes include the perceptions
of managerial commitment for safety, safety systems and procedures, and training and competence
systems related to working safely.
2.3. The Multilevel Nature of Safety Climate

As a collective construct, safety climate can be applied to a variety of aggregate entities (Kozlowski
& Klein 2000). This section reviews different levels of analysis at which safety climate might
operate. Although safety climate has traditionally been conceptualized and operationalized at the
organization level (e.g., Zohar 1980), there is growing evidence for the informative and predictive
nature of safety climate at various levels of aggregation.
We briefly review the organization level and then show how team and group climates relate to
the broader organization level. We then consider the level of the industry and the nation. These
two levels of aggregation are considered less frequently in the literature but raise increasingly
important issues for organizations operating in hazardous environments. We consider the issue of
national culture at some length because this is an important area for future development in safety
climate research.
2.3.1. Organization-level safety climate and variation within organizations. Safety climate
is most commonly viewed as an organization-level construct. Even when safety climate is studied
empirically at other levels, such as the group, the theorizing around the nature of climate is often
oriented toward the organization level. A Scopus database search showed that more than 1,000
studies featuring safety climate have been published since 1980. More than half of these studies
focused on the organization as a relatively autonomous and self-defining entity with well-defined
borders (Zohar 2010).
The prominence of the organization level for conceptualizing safety climate is consistent with
a focus on policies, procedures, and practices that are developed primarily at this level. As noted
in the previous section, reviews consistently describe perceptions of organizational variables such
as the safety actions of senior managers, the quality of the safety management systems, and the
adequacy of safety training and safety competence systems (Flin et al. 2000, Zohar & Luria 2005).
However, team supervisors play a key role in implementing organizational policies and pro-
cedures and translate organizational processes into more locally specific practices (Zohar 2000).
This fundamental process gives rise to two important extensions of safety climate constructs.
First, it suggests a process through which local safety climates emerge within teams and businesses
(Zohar & Luria 2010). We explore this development in terms of team safety climate in the next
section.
Second, group-level processes are a source of variation within organizations that is increasingly
recognized as an intrinsic feature of organizational safety climate (Brondino et al. 2012). From
this perspective, researchers have investigated additional features of organizational safety climate,
particularly the variability of climate perceptions across subunits of an organization and across
individuals in different roles within an organization (Beus et al. 2010). The construct of climate
strength has been used to describe the extent of agreement among individuals and groups in their
perceptions of safety climate features. A stronger climate is characterized by higher agreement
and is expected to exert a more powerful effect on motivational and behavioral processes (Zohar
& Luria 2005).

2.3.2. Team- and unit-level safety climate. Supervisory roles entail a certain amount of dis-
cretion, which means that members of different teams and departments have different perceptions
of safety policies, procedures, and practices (Zohar 2000). This variability stems from several
causes. For example, procedures rarely cover all situations and there can be substantial discretion
in how broad plans are implemented at a local level. Leader–member exchanges involve interper-
sonal dynamics that are only partially governed by formal procedures, and individual beliefs and
attributions influence supervisory interpretation and implementation of formal procedures.
Between-team differences in implementing company policies and procedures are, therefore,
to be expected in a single organization, creating the potential for distinct organization-level and
group-level safety climate perceptions Employees may form complementary, coexisting percep-
tions concerning focal role facets at two levels of analysis, after adjusting the sources or referents
of climate perceptions (Zohar & Luria 2005, 2010). That is, enacted policies and procedures
constitute the primary target or referent of organization-level perceptions, whereas supervisory
practices constitute the primary target of reference of team-level perceptions.
2.3.3. Industry level. As noted by Zohar (2014), there have been two primary approaches to the
measurement of safety climate. A first approach involved the development of universal or general
measures of organizational safety climate for use regardless of the specific organizational context
(e.g., Griffin & Neal 2000). A second approach has been to develop industry- and sometimes
organization-specific measures of safety climate adapted to the unique features of the industrial
context (Dedobbeleer & Beland 1991, Singer et al. 2007). Although the former approach neces-
sitates the development and validation of climate measures in each new context, the latter offers
the possibility of accumulating knowledge regarding the antecedents and consequences of safety
climate across multiple contexts, languages, and cultures (Mearns et al. 2001). To do so, however,
there must first be evidence that the meaning and measurement of safety climate is equivalent
across these disparate contexts (Zohar 2014).
The continuing occurrence of catastrophes in high-risk industries, such as oil and gas, nuclear
power generation, aviation, railways, and medicine, indicates a continuing need for concepts, meth-
ods, and tools to better manage risk and safety (Grote 2009). Over the years, various industries have
initiated ways to improve safety management within their own contexts, with other industries fol-
lowing and often reinventing practices that were well established elsewhere (Mearns & Yule 2009).
Generalizability of safety climate models and approaches across industries remains an impor-
tant issue for research and practice. Many factors might influence the nature of safety climate across
different industries, including the coexistence of different professional subcultures in risk man-
agement, department interactions, investigation systems, sociotechnical-based risk assessment,
and organizational and regulatory structures (Grote 2007). Therefore, further research on safety
climate needs to address how the interplay between industry-specific features, managerial orien-
tations, and operational safety systems might interact to eventually determine the ways in which
safety climate develops over time (Zohar 2014).
2.3.4. National culture and safety climate. Cultural differences in perceptions of risk as well as
broad social and economic conditions provide a basis for exploring national differences in safety
culture. The management of organizational safety in international and culturally diverse organi-
zations is a continuing and growing concern for many high-risk industries (Reader et al. 2015).
Although there is evidence that safety climate may generalize across organizations (e.g., Mearns
et al. 2001) and industries (e.g., Hahn & Murphy 2008), there has been limited attention given to
generalization across national cultures (Zohar 2014). Most published studies have been conducted
on Western countries and especially in Anglo, English-speaking countries such the United States,

United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (Barbaranelli et al. 2015). Notable exceptions such as the
study by Bahrami et al. (2014) also highlight the limited information about safety climate in dif-
ferent national contexts. Therefore, comparative studies are needed to better understand how the
meanings of safety climate might transfer to different national and cultural contexts (Zohar 2014).
Beyond the issue of internal validity in different national and cultural contexts (Hsu et al. 2008),
there is a need to understand how well the assumptions and measures of safety climate apply across
global organizations. As argued by Reader et al. (2015), there are at least three distinct macrofactors
that highlight a need for researchers and practitioners to further investigate and understand safety
climate from a more global perspective.
First, the number and reach of multinational corporations in the current economy means that
many large organizations have operations that span multiple countries and continents, including
both highly industrialized and developing countries (Mearns & Yule 2009). The need to under-
stand personal and process safety from a global perspective is therefore increasingly important.
For example, cross-national differences might be especially salient for organizations who appoint
managers from Western backgrounds to positions in non-Western environments. Implications
for well-established safety climate dimensions such as safety managerial commitment and safety
leadership (Flin et al. 2000, Griffin & Talati 2014) across varied multinational contexts are not
well understood. In addition, Mearns & Yule (2009) suggested that relationships between per-
ceived management commitment to safety and compliance versus risk-taking behaviors might
vary across cultures. Future research should investigate whether differences in cultural values be-
tween the workforce and management have an impact on how safety management and supervision
behaviors are construed and their influence on employee safety performance in high-risk domains.
Second, national cultures can vary greatly in their support for legislation and regulation systems
that preserve, maintain, and improve safety in work and organizational settings. Existing research
indicates that variations in national safety regulation practices have an impact on safety outcomes
(Mearns & Yule 2009). Differences in regulation can be reflected in job stability, access to safety
training, and the nature of safety procedures (Vincent 2011). For example, globalized industries and
organizations operate across different regulatory environments and must manage different stan-
dards for managing and learning from risk (Colakoglu et al. 2006). A single organization can be re-
quired to work to different safety standards depending on the location of operations, which poten-
tially creates confusion and uncertainty around practices such as safety inspections (Harzing 2006).
Third, safety-critical work is often performed by multicultural and colocated teams (Manzey &
Marold 2009). Although this diversity can be positive by bringing together different perspectives
on safety (Reader et al. 2015), it also presents a challenge for safety management (Kouabenan 2009).
Different cultural values, beliefs, and social representations (Cavazza & Serpe 2009) about the way
individuals contribute to safety may also strongly affect the influence of safety climate on more
discretional forms of safety behaviors. For example, structured forms of workforce participation
and involvement in safety management systems might be more easily accepted and used within a
low power-distance culture (low hierarchy and equal power distribution), but be perceived as less
appropriate in a high power-distance culture (strong hierarchy and unequal power distribution)
(Hofstede 1996). Moreover, some national cultural traits such as a preference for challenging
authority might influence safety-related beliefs of team members. For example, the acceptability
of highlighting a supervisor’s mistake or the appropriateness of giving and receiving feedback for
safety might vary depending on cultural expectations (Reader et al. 2015).
Overall, a stronger focus on the cross-cultural implications of safety climate will help to explain
how key elements such as managerial safety commitment might vary across national contexts. It
will also provide insights into the way national systems such as legislations frameworks and cultural
systems such as values might moderate the link between safety climate and outcomes.

2.4. Developing Climate Through Sensemaking Processes

Perceptions that constitute safety climate become shared over time as individuals interact with
each other and their work environment. Sensemaking is a key process through which individual
experiences aggregate into a collective phenomenon (Gonzalez-Roma et al. 2002). In general,
organizational sensemaking refers to ongoing interpretative processes in which individuals who are
facing complex and ambiguous work situations engage in social interactions to better understand
their environment and reduce uncertainty related to organizational goals, norms, and priorities
(Weick 1995). Through repeated social interactions, individuals infer organizational priorities and
the corresponding behaviors that are rewarded or sanctioned. Sensemaking is a primary means
through which organizational events and social information are transformed into a collective
experience of safety climate (Ostroff et al. 2003).

Through sensemaking mechanisms, safety climate provides a shared interpretation framework
that affects the motivations and behaviors of individuals (Beus et al. 2012). This process is important
for safety where interactions can be embedded in a complex net of competing organizational goals
(speed/productivity versus safety), time frames, (short- versus long-term goals), and contradictory
messages (enacted versus declared policies) (Zohar 2002a). For example, efforts toward short-
term maximization of production can result in an ongoing dilemma for managers and supervisors,
leading employees to cope with a multitude of potentially inconsistent policies and practices (Zohar
2008). From this perspective, managers’ and supervisors’ daily actions and informal interactions
provide the most reliable information concerning goals and priorities in the workplace (Luria
et al. 2008). For example, Luria & Rafaeli (2008) showed that team members could interpret
the meaning of safety signs in different ways such as an indication of management concern for
employee welfare or as a need to comply with legal requirements. Supervisory behaviors were
found to be important for creating a common perception of the alternative meanings associated
with safety signs.
3. INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL PROCESSES

So far, we have emphasized the collective properties of safety climate that emerge through a shared
sensemaking process. We next focus on the individual level of analysis and explore how safety cli-
mate shapes individual motivational and behavioral processes. Our initial definition indicates that
safety climate exerts a subjective-normative influence on individual and group behavior through
motivational mechanisms (Zohar 2010). In other words, employees perceive and interpret the
organization context and act according to their interpretations (Carr et al. 2003). We first re-
view various theoretical perspectives applied to safety motivation. We then review the variety of
motivated safety behaviors that contribute to overall safety in organizations.
3.1. Motivation
Internal psychological states are typically proposed as precursors to individual effort and behavior.
Understanding what motivates employees to work safely is crucial for reducing levels of unsafe
behavior and increasing employees’ participation in safety activities at work (Conchie 2013). Safety
motivation reflects “an individual’s willingness to exert effort to enact safety behaviors and the
valence associated with those behaviors” (Neal & Griffin 2006, p. 947). As a psychological process
that directs, energizes, and sustains action (Latham & Pinder 2005, Scott et al. 2014), safety
motivation has been conceptualized as a key determinant of safe behavior in the workplace across
a range of industrial and organizational contexts.
Griffin & Neal (2000) proposed that safety motivation is a proximal determinant of employee
safety behaviors, and that distal factors such as safety climate have an indirect effect on safety

behaviors by influencing employees’ safety motivation. Subsequent research has consistently sup-
ported these conceptual assumptions (Christian et al. 2009, Clarke 2010, Neal & Griffin 2006).
However, a variety of theoretical perspectives underpin the concept of motivation in safety re-
search (Scott et al. 2014). Below, we review the theoretical foundations and empirical bases for
different approaches to motivation as an outcome of safety climate and a determinant of safety
behavior.
3.1.1. Safety motivation and normative influence of safety climate. The subjective meaning
of safety is thought to underlie safety motivation (Conchie 2013, Curcuruto et al. 2013, Scott et al.
2014), and this meaning is partly derived through mechanisms of normative influence (Tesluk &
Quigley 2003). As a shared perception of enacted managerial priorities in the organization, safety
climate informs employees about the normative value of safety in relation to other aspects of
the organization (Cavazza & Serpe 2009). A positive and consistent organizational safety climate
reinforces expectancy-value perceptions of safety behaviors (Parker et al. 2010). Individuals enact
safety behaviors that are perceived to be rewarded and valued in the organization (Zohar 2010).
3.1.2. Safety motivation and self-determination perspectives. In recent years, an expanded

view of safety motivation has been developed through the principles of self-determination theory
(SDT) (Scott et al. 2014). This theory builds on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic types
of motivation at work (Deci & Ryan 2002). According to SDT, extrinsic motivation explains work
behavior in terms of its expected instrumental value for obtaining tangible rewards or avoiding
undesired outcomes (Gagné & Deci 2005). In contrast, intrinsic motivation involves engaging in
a work behavior because it is personally rewarding—performing an activity for its own sake rather
than a desire for an external reward.
In safety climate research, it can be argued that because the target of climate perceptions
concerns rewarded role behavior, it follows that the main safety climate-behavior relationship
should be explained in terms of motivation for safety externally directed (Zohar et al. 2015).
However, the distinction between the two types of motivation adds a further dimension to this
argument. Many safety events (e.g., near-misses or accidents) have a low likelihood of occurring
with delayed and unsure negative outcomes. Individuals might choose an unsafe behavior such as
working faster if the subjective expected utility of unsafe behavior exceeds that of safe behavior,
resulting in greater extrinsic motivation for engaging in safety shortcuts or workarounds (Zohar &
Erev 2007). Safety climate, as a contextual signal that safety behavior will lead to positive outcomes
(e.g., supervisory recognition and/or approval), therefore constitutes a key antecedent for extrinsic
safety motivation. In a highly positive safety climate, the level of such motivation can be expected
to exceed that associated with safety’s competing demands.
SDT suggests, however, an increasing internalization of externally regulated behavior. There-
fore, it might be argued that safety climate endangers identification- or integration-based extrinsic
motivation (Ryan & Deci 2001, Zohar et al. 2015). A further consideration is that many safety
behaviors involve rule compliance, offering limited potential for autonomy or interest (Parker
et al. 2001). We discuss the motivational implications of different forms of safety behavior in more
detail below.
3.1.3. Safety motivation and psychological empowerment. Safety climate might also motivate
safety behavior through feelings of empowerment, psychological ownership, personal engagement,
and passion for meeting challenging work goals (Curcuruto et al. 2015, Parker et al. 2003, Zohar
2008). For example, highly engaged employees experience a sense of personal significance and
pride (Schaufeli et al. 2006). Consequently, they are more intrinsically motivated to protect their

work from harm (Greenglass 2002). In other words, when work is psychologically meaningful,
safety behavior becomes an intrinsically motivated investment in self-protection, particularly when
performing high-risk work (Zohar et al. 2014).
Given this line of argument, it follows that work environments that promote employee engage-
ment in conjunction with exposure to routine physical risks can offer an opportunity to stimulate in-
trinsic motivation of safety behavior. Literature reviews of job design (e.g., Parker 2014) have iden-
tified numerous work-related attributes promoting such engagement (Macey & Schneider 2008).
These attributes include task autonomy, challenge and variety (Gagné & Deci 2005), task meaning-
fulness (Kahn 1990), job control (Parker et al. 2006), and employee empowerment (Carless 2004).
3.1.4. Safety motivation and social-exchange theories. Another complementary approach

linking safety climate to safety motivation involves social-exchange theory and social reciprocation
principles (Mearns & Reader 2008). Social-exchange theory proposes that when individuals (or
other social agents including organizations) provide valued services, others typically respond with
a certain level of obligation in response to and in exchange for these services. The social-exchange
perspective suggests the perception of employer support and investment generates an implied
obligation in employees that results in positive reciprocity favoring the organization (DeJoy 2005).
Thus, when organizations provide services that are perceived as discretionary, reciprocating
behavior can sometimes ensue in the form of employee compliance with organizational policies,
rules, and expectations.
A strong positive safety climate, in which employees perceive safety to be a priority and that
managers are committed to their safety, is likely to increase employees’ feelings of commitment
and satisfaction with the organization, and as such influence their behavior—an effect that has been
described as a positive spillover (Morrow & Crum 1998, p. 130). Similarly, Hofmann & Morgeson
(1999) argued that individuals who perceive that their organizations are supportive of their health
and safety may feel obligated to reciprocate this support with more active involvement in safety.
Therefore, perceptions of managerial commitment and organizational investment in programs
promoting health and safety of the workforce might be reciprocated by employees through an
active commitment to safety compliance and participation in discretional activities that support
safety in the organization.
Similarly, other authors have extended this focus on social exchange and reciprocity to include
the influence of organizational support for safety by supervisors, coworkers, and management
(Tucker et al. 2008). In other words, various social agents such as managers, supervisors, and
colleagues reflect the general support and care by the organization for the quality and well-being of
the work experience (Brondino et al. 2012). For example, studies have highlighted how supportive
and participative managerial styles in organizations and workgroups are linked to a greater safety
commitment by employees (Curcuruto et al. 2013, DeJoy et al. 2010, Tucker et al. 2008).
3.2. Safety Behaviors

We next review the link between safety climate and specific safety behaviors such as compliance
with procedures and making suggestions to improve safety and proactivity. Employee safety be-
haviors play an important role in maintaining a safe work environment and have been shown to
predict workplace injuries (Christian et al. 2009, Clarke 2006, Neal & Griffin 2006).
Safety behaviors by individuals are frequently conceptualized as central safety outcome as they
constitute a measurable outcome, which is more proximally related to psychological factors than
accidents or injuries (Christian et al. 2009). Moreover, safety performance behaviors tend to be

predicted with greater accuracy than more distal outcomes, which often have a low base rate and
skewed distributions (Zohar 2000). Similar to job performance in general, safety performance
behaviors can be scaled by the frequency with which employees engage in the behaviors and are
distinguishable in terms of their antecedents and covariation with safety outcomes (Burke et al.
2002). A recent meta-analysis of 32 studies by Clarke (2013) showed that a higher level of safety
behavior is associated with fewer occupational injuries (average corrected rs with occupational
injuries = −0.21).
3.2.1. The distinction between compliance and participation. Several conceptual models
of safety behavior have been advanced. A model of safety performance outlined by Burke et al.
(2002, p. 432)—defined as “actions or behaviors that individuals exhibit in almost all jobs to
promote the health and safety of workers, clients, the public, and the environment”—includes
four factors: (a) using personal protective equipment, (b) engaging in work practice to reduce risk,
(c) communicating hazards and accidents, and (d ) exercising employee rights and responsibilities.
However, since the beginning of the 2000s, further conceptual distinctions emerged between
safety “compliance” and safety “participation,” referring to, respectively, “generally mandated”
safety behaviors and safety behaviors that are “frequently voluntary” (Neal et al. 2000, p. 101).
This distinction is similar to that between task and contextual performance in the job performance
literature (e.g., Borman & Motowidlo 1993). From this perspective, safety compliance behaviors
are the core of safety activities that are required by the formal work procedures to maintain
a minimum level of safety. Examples of safety compliance behaviors include following safety
rules and procedures and complying with occupational safety regulations. Alternatively, safety
participation describes behaviors that might not directly contribute to an individual’s personal
safety but that do help to develop an environment that supports safety (Neal & Griffin 2006). These
behaviors include activities such as participating in voluntary safety activities, helping coworkers
with safety-related issues, and attending safety meetings.
3.2.2. Expanding the concept of participation: affiliation and proactivity. In the safety lit-
erature, the concept of safety participation is frequently used interchangeably with the notion of
organizational safety citizenship (Conchie 2013, Zohar et al. 2015). A broad range of behaviors
are associated with safety citizenship. Some behaviors describe affiliative-oriented actions such as
helping and stewardship behaviors (Curcuruto et al. 2015), civic virtue (Hofmann et al. 2003), and
caring for safety (Geller et al. 1996). Other citizenship behaviors involve more change-oriented
and proactive behaviors such as initiating safety-related changes (Simard & Marchand 1995) and
safety voice behaviors including raising safety related concerns and providing suggestions for im-
provement (Curcuruto et al. 2013, Tucker et al. 2008). Future research should provide a more
fine-grained conceptualization and measurement of the different kinds of behaviors that are mo-
tivated by safety climate.
4. ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES
The importance of safety for people and organizations has encouraged research on the practical
consequences of safety climate, with a strong focus on safety performance and safety outcome
indicators. In the next sections, we first briefly review the most relevant individual and aggregate
indicators of safety outcomes. We then discuss the meaning of safety climate as both leading
and lagging indicators of safety performance. Finally, we examine intervention studies focused on
safety climate as a key tool for improving safety outcomes in teams and organizations.

4.1. Safety Outcomes: Individual and Aggregate Indicators

In this section we review the principal outcomes investigated in safety climate research. At the
individual level, researchers have mainly focused on the relationship between safety behavior
and critical events, so we extend the above discussion and incorporate safety behavior as a key
safety indicator for organizations. More recently, aspects of individual health and well-being have
been incorporated into studies of safety climate. We then review the link between safety climate
organization outcomes such as accident rates and productivity.
4.1.1. Individual indicators: safety performance, critical events, health and well-being.
Recent meta-analyses show that safety climate predicts a range of safety criteria across industries
and countries (Christian et al. 2009, Nahrgang et al. 2011). Below, we review a range of individual
and aggregated outcomes that have been linked to safety climate.
Three types of safety indicators are frequently associated with safety climate at the individual
level: safety behaviors, prevention of critical events and individual health and well-being. It is
common for both to be assessed with self-report questionnaires (Clarke 2006), and we review
these different types of outcome next.
4.1.1.1. Employees’ safety behaviors and prevention of critical events. Research consistently
concludes that a positive safety climate is associated with higher levels of safety compliance and
participation behaviors, which in turn are associated with a reduction in negative safety outcomes
such as injuries and accidents (Christian et al. 2009, Neal & Griffin 2006, Sinclair et al. 2010,
Vinodkumar & Bhasi 2010, Zohar 2002a). Although other possible psychological mechanisms
have been proposed to explain the relationship between perceived safety climate and occupational
accidents, the main assumption is that employees’ perceptions of the safety climate influence their
behavior, which in turn affects their accidents and injuries.
Meta-analyses show that safety climate is more strongly associated with discretional safety be-
haviors such as safety participation rather than compliance, although most safety climate research
has focused on compliance (Christian et al. 2009, Wallace & Chen 2006). In line with this focus,
considerable evidence shows that greater individual safety compliance is associated with fewer
adverse events, accidents, and injuries (Nahrgang et al. 2011, Zohar 2002a).
More recently, scholars have identified broader safety behaviors beyond compliance that are
increasingly important to prevent accidents and injuries in an organizational context. For example,
different clusters of safety citizenship behaviors can influence safety outcomes in a complementary
way. Curcuruto et al. (2015) found affiliative safety citizenship was associated with minor incidents
such as property damage and microinjuries, whereas challenging or proactive safety citizenship
was positively related with near-miss reporting and negatively with injuries (Kongsvik et al. 2012).
Distinct forms of safety participation or citizenship may play a complementary role for safety
compliance in determining safety outcomes.
4.1.1.2. Employee health and well-being. Employee health and well-being is a second type of
individual outcome that can be linked to safety climate. Well-being has been investigated in
two different ways (Clarke 2010). Some studies have focused on how safety climate and safety
performance assessed at the individual level relate to reduced levels of self-reported involvement
in adverse events, with health and safety implications such as injury and disease (Nahrgang et al.
2011, Tucker & Turner 2015). Research addressing this type of indicator is usually focused on
understanding how safety performance behaviors mediate the effects of a perceived positive safety
climate on negative outcomes for individuals.

A smaller but growing research stream focuses on the relationship between safety climate
and the maintenance of positive conditions of health and well-being (Mearns et al. 2010). From
this perspective, Clarke & Cooper (2004) argued that employees’ general health and well-being
can influence involvement in accidents and injuries (Nahrgang et al. 2011). Consistent with an
occupational stress process, it is expected that negative perceptions of safety climate lead to the
experience of stress and reduced psychological well-being. Therefore, a negative safety climate
could increase vulnerability to accidents and injury through reduced physical and psychological
well-being (Clarke 2010). Cognitive processes, such as distraction, inattention, and fatigue, are
potential explanatory mechanisms for this process (Reason 1997).
4.1.2. Aggregate indicators: data archives, underreporting, productivity, and innovation.

Safety climate research has been hampered by the lack of objective outcome data, especially at the
individual level of analysis. In the following sections, we review more objective indicators that are
usually obtained from an aggregate level of analysis, most commonly the organization or team
level. First, we review aggregates of accident-related indicators such as microinjuries and near-
misses. We then consider aggregates of more positive outcomes that support the maintenance of
safety climate, including productivity and innovation.
4.1.2.1. Aggregate data-archives. Given the difficulties of obtaining objective data, past studies
have often used self-reports of behavioral safety, self-reports of accident occurrences, experts’
ratings of safety level, or retrospective accident data. To address the difficulties of obtaining
objective data, studies have included microaccidents or minor injuries requiring medical attention
but without lost work days (Turner et al. 2015, Zohar 2000).
Microaccidents have three methodological advantages for investigating the effects of safety
climate (Zohar 2002a). They are correlated with lost days from accidents but occur much more
frequently, resulting in a more homogeneous distribution over time compared to the highly skewed
distribution characteristic of typical accident data in a single organization. They also provide an
objective measure of behavioral safety compared to self-reports and are less influenced by sources
of bias associated with self-report or other forms of rating.
Near-misses provide another aggregate indicator in safety climate research (Kongsvik et al.
2012). A near-miss is an unplanned event that did not result in injury, illness, or damage, but
had the potential to do so (Curcuruto et al. 2015); that is, only a fortunate break in the chain of
events prevented an injury, fatality, or damage. Near-miss reporting is usually considered a cue
for proactive management of safety in organizations, rather than a reactive lagging indicator of
safety performance such as microinjuries (Reason 2008).
A high number of near-misses can be positive, so long as the number is within the organization’s
ability to respond and investigate. Recognizing and reporting near-miss incidents can make a
major difference in the safety of workers within organizations (Kongsvik et al. 2012) and provide
considerable opportunity for employees’ safety participation (Griffin & Neal 2000).
A concern for studies using these types of indicators is the potential for underreporting, that
is, the tendency to avoid recording that an incident has occurred (Probst 2015), and underesti-
mating the true prevalence of accidents and injuries (Probst et al. 2008). These reporting levels
have implications for understanding the impact of safety climate on safety outcomes. For example,
Jiang & Probst (2015) found that safety–production conflict and a high-productivity climate were
negatively related to accident-reporting attitudes. As expected, among employees in workgroups
exhibiting a positive safety climate, this negative effect was attenuated. Furthermore, researchers
found also significant cross-level effects on underreporting. Probst (2015) recently investigated
the effects of supervisors’ safety enforcement behaviors and organizational-level safety climate on

employee accident underreporting. The negative effects of supervisor enforcement on underre-

porting were attenuated in organizations with a positive safety climate.
These findings caution against assuming a causal link between safety climate and safety out-
comes, without considering the interaction of safety climate with other types of contextual vari-
ables such as risk management in the organization. From a practical perspective, these findings
may benefit human resources and safety professionals by highlighting methods for increasing the
accuracy of accident reporting through interventions aimed to improve safety climate at team and
organization levels.
4.1.2.2. Organizational productivity and innovation. Ongoing changes in economic, social, and
environmental conditions require change, adaptation and innovation in hazardous industries that
have theoretical implications for existing safety climate models (Griffin et al. 2015). Rapid changes
in technology and global markets, together with increasing social and environmental risks, create
new levels of uncertainty and complexity that influence risks and the management of safety.
Although cost-benefit analyses demonstrate that safer systems provide long-term savings (e.g.,
lower insurance premiums), there is almost no systematic information or evaluation of the way
safer systems generate productivity and innovation. In short, safety climate and safe organizational
systems are valued for their preventive role more than their generative contribution to change and
growth. A preventive focus in safety climate research is clearly important. Substantial advances
have been achieved to reduce the negative consequences of poor safety. However, the benefits of
preventive methods seem to be approaching a limit.
The susceptibility of reliable operations to external disruption has generated efforts to cre-
ate more adaptive safety capabilities through which organizations continually adapt to changing
conditions in the external context. This kind of adaptive change is being addressed through ap-
proaches such as resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al. 2011) and high-reliability organizations
(Weick & Sutcliffe 2007). These approaches focus their attention on how successful organizations
maintain reliability while adapting to unexpected change and unplanned events (e.g., Hollnagel
2009, Roberts 1990). Usually, distinct types of change are reflected in the response to major dis-
aster compared to the continuous improvement of high-reliability organizations described above.
First, disasters and other major events generate efforts for fundamental and far-reaching change to
achieve optimal levels of safety and reliability. By their nature, these changes are typically reactive.
Currently, there is no systematic framework for describing organizational drivers of change
in safety systems (Griffin et al. 2014). Without an adequate framework, important aspects of
innovation and safety-related changes might not be effectively integrated with existing safety
climate models. Changes to highly reliable systems involve more proactive and forward looking
changes that tend to be more incremental in nature. The concept of dynamic safety capability helps
explain the nature of this capability and the nature of the proactive organizational change that is
involved. This concept is defined as an organization’s capacity to generate, reconfigure, and adapt
operational routines to sustain high levels of safety performance in environments characterized
by change and uncertainty (Griffin et al. 2015).
Although safety capability and climate constructs have different theoretical heritages, they both
identify an organizational capacity for safety improvement. Both ideas are linked to a managerial
orientation by organizations that are strong determinants of both safety and innovation in orga-
nizations (Grote 2007, Hulsheger et al. 2009, Nahrgang et al. 2011). Future research on safety
capability might help to improve our knowledge about how safety climate could potentially work
as a generative driver for innovation and productivity. Both safety and innovation are important
sources of productivity improvement, and the ability to adapt to change is a defining feature of
modern organizations, particularly high-risk environments industries.

4.2. Safety Climate Dynamics: Leading or Lagging Indicator?

Zohar (2011) notes that safety climate should both predict and be predicted by safety-related
incidents in the organization. The former effect is consistent with the broader literature about
organizational climate and specific studies of safety climate. The latter perspective—that safety
climate should be predicted by safety-related incidents—has more recently drawn the attention
of researchers (Bergman et al. 2014). In this process, safety climate should be affected by safety-
related incidents, because they provide information about the status of safety in the organization
(Zohar 2011).
Consistent with engineering and socio-economic literature (Hopkins 2009), these two causal
dynamics can be described in terms of leading and lagging indicators. Generally, leading indicators
refer to events prior to a safety outcome, whereas lagging indicators reflect subsequent conditions
(Mearns 2009). Leading indicators usually require prospective research studies, whereas lagging
indicators are frequently associated with retrospective-oriented research designs (Payne et al.
2010).
Leading indicators provide a positive opportunity for organizations to predict, potentially im-
prove, readjust, and correct their negative trends before they result in outcomes that affect the
life and health of people (Zohar 2010). Lagging indicators, however, are more readily collected,
assessed, and recorded by organizations, remaining easily available for retrospective studies. Al-
though there is more practical interest in safety climate as a leading indicator than as a lagging
indicator, both are important to our understanding of the relationship between safety climate and
accidents/injuries (Payne et al. 2010).
Safety climate and safety incidents are clearly ongoing and interdependent (Zohar 2003). How-
ever, few studies have examined safety climate as both a leading and lagging indicator, and retro-
spective studies greatly outnumber prospective studies (Payne et al. 2009).
Beus et al. (2010) analyzed the two causal directions separately, at both the individual and the
group level. They found that the relationship between safety climate and injuries was attenuated
over time. The strongest association was between safety climate and injuries, which occurred within
a six-month period following the original assessment of safety climate. This research suggests that
safety climate can be an important lead indicator over time periods less than one year, but many
questions remain about the optimal time lags for measurement and aggregation.
4.3. Safety Climate Interventions to Improve Outcomes

Correlational and longitudinal studies support the importance of safety climate as a determinant of
many relevant outcomes. However, as DeJoy (2005) noted in relation to safety culture, systematic
studies employing randomized control trials are few in number. Without evidence from systematic
and controlled interventions, cause and effect inferences about safety climate remain somewhat
uncertain. There is a clear need for experimental and quasi-experimental studies that evaluate the
impact of interventions to improve safety climate. Below, we summarize findings from the small
number of studies that have employed an experimental design on safety climate interventions.
In a series of studies, Zohar and colleagues (Luria et al. 2008, Zohar 2002b, Zohar & Polachek
2014) implemented safety climate interventions designed primarily to improve supervisor actions
to support safety. The studies used either random or quasi-random assignment to experimental
and control conditions, with experimental groups receiving feedback and leadership training on
their safety-related interactions with line workers. Results indicated that lagging indicators such as
microaccidents decreased, whereas lead indicators such as the use of personal protective equipment
increased across time for the experimental conditions.

There was one exception for the control condition in Zohar & Polachek (2014), where a signif-
icant increase in safety behavior was demonstrated for both conditions. This result was attributed
to the knowledge of workers that an intervention was taking place within the organization and
the structured interviews conducted with line workers regarding supervisory performance driving
behavior change.
Luria et al. (2008) demonstrated that the physical environment of the workplace can attenuate
the relationship between supervisory-based interventions and safety performance. Results from
this study demonstrated that after a training intervention, safety-related interactions increased and
the number of unsafe behaviors decreased in workplaces with high visibility between supervisors
and line workers. Supporting these findings, a study by Naveh & Katz-Navon (2015) found that
supervisory-targeted interventions increased driving-related safety climate and safety behavior.
In contrast, Hoffmann et al. (2014) found no significant differences between experimental and
control conditions in safety performance factors following a safety climate intervention aimed at
the work group level. Although no differences were found for outcomes, this study was targeted at
the team level rather than leader or management level. Feedback and recognition from supervisors
act as one of the biggest reinforcers of behavior in the workplace, providing a concrete example
to employees of the real priorities within the workplace (Luria et al. 2008). Further intervention
studies will greatly enhance the capacity of organizations and researchers to design and implement
organizational changes that improve safety climate.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Our review explored definitions, determinants, and processes of safety climate as well as con-
sequences for people, teams, and organizations. We conclude by pointing to future directions
for research and practice. We consider future directions within each of the topic areas plus
broader implications based on the changing nature of work, environmental concerns, and economic
development.
5.1. New Challenges for the Transformation of Organizations

The first section of our review aimed at summarizing the existing approaches in the definition of
safety climate nature and contents, integrating complementary approaches over the past 35 years
of research. A broad consensus defines safety climate as a perceptual, collective, multidimensional,
and multilevel organizational phenomenon. Studies have also investigated how team and organi-
zation levels of analyses interact (Zohar & Luria 2005, 2010) and how this cross-level interaction
might generate emergent phenomena (Probst 2015), affecting safety outcomes for organizations
and teams.
The changing nature of work and organizations over the past two decades raises questions
about the generalizability of current theoretical assumptions about safety climate. The mod-
ern economy is characterized by multinational corporations, organizations with weaker external
boundaries, more complex jobs, cross-national locations, and more heterogeneous workforce de-
mographics and cultures. These changes in the external and internal environment of organizations
have implications that are yet to be investigated in relation to safety climate. Meta-analyses show
that safety climate has a stronger effect on discretional safety participation than compliance, and
those managers and supervisors are consistent sources of safety climate across different types of
industries and organizations. However, working conditions characterized by higher levels of inter-
dependence and constrictions in agency and autonomy might modify the impact of safety climate
in unpredictable ways. For example, complex multiteam structures, where individuals respond to

more than one supervisor on various projects, might influence the way the organizational climate
for safety is perceived. Future research should address the impact of these changes to understand
how safety climate dynamics may interact with new organization, team, and work structures.
5.2. New Insights from Motivation Theories

Our review of safety climate and motivation has focused on the shared interpretation of organiza-
tional values in daily work activities, group dynamics, and social interactions phenomena (Zohar
2010). We have also seen that a well-established corpus of empiric evidence has been cumulated in
the past 15 years about the role of individual motivation as privileged mediation construct through
which safety climate affects individuals’ safety behaviors, with a special focus on discretionary safety
participation (Griffin & Neal 2000).

Developments in the study of motivation in organizations suggest some new directions for safety
climate research. For example, safety climate research has generally assumed that organizational
values enhance the subjective value of safety for individuals. However, self-determination theory
and models of psychological empowerment suggest a more proactive role for individual motivation
(Zohar 2008). Future research might explore how complementary motivational mechanisms such
as psychological ownership and self-efficacy might interact with safety climate to influence a
broader range of safety behaviors.
5.3. Conclusion
The evidence for the complex causal processes associated with safety climate has grown markedly
over the past decades. Safety climate has been demonstrated to have a positive and pervasive
influence on a range of safety outcomes at individual and aggregate levels. Nevertheless, much
remains to be understood about the impact of safety climate and its development. For example,
it is clear that a positive safety climate helps to reduce accidents and injury in the workplace,
but it is less clear how safety climate links to other organizational outcomes such as productivity,
organizational change, and innovation. The process of improving safety climate through targeted
interventions and strategic change also needs better understanding. The research reviewed in this
article highlights how the positive developments to date can guide further insights and practical
improvements.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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24

OP03-FrontMatter ARI 4 March 2016 14:16
Annual Review
of Organizational
Psychology and
Organizational
Behavior
Contents Volume 3, 2016

Stumbling Toward a Social Psychology of Organizations: An

Autobiographical Look at the Direction of Organizational Research

Barry M. Staw p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Team-Centric Leadership: An Integrative Review
Steve W.J. Kozlowski, Stanton Mak, and Georgia T. Chao p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p21
Mindfulness in Organizations: A Cross-Level Review
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Timothy J. Vogus, and Erik Dane p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p55
Themes in Expatriate and Repatriate Research over Four Decades:
What Do We Know and What Do We Still Need to Learn?
Maria Kraimer, Mark Bolino, and Brandon Mead p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p83
Identity Under Construction: How Individuals Come to Define
Themselves in Organizations
Blake E. Ashforth and Beth S. Schinoff p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 111
Dyadic Relationships
Robert C. Liden, Smriti Anand, and Prajya Vidyarthi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 139
Genetics and Organizational Behavior
Richard D. Arvey, Wen-Dong Li, and Nan Wang p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 167
Mark A. Griffin and Matteo Curcuruto p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 191
To Seek or Not to Seek: Is That the Only Question? Recent
Developments in Feedback-Seeking Literature
Susan J. Ashford, Katleen De Stobbeleir, and Mrudula Nujella p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 213
Dynamic Modeling
Mo Wang, Le Zhou, and Zhen Zhang p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 241
Learner Control and e-Learning: Taking Stock and Moving Forward
Kenneth G. Brown, Garett Howardson, and Sandra L. Fisher p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 267
vii
OP03-FrontMatter ARI 4 March 2016 14:16
Charisma: An Ill-Defined and Ill-Measured Gift

John Antonakis, Nicolas Bastardoz, Philippe Jacquart, and Boas Shamir p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 293
The Nonconscious at Work
Michael G. Pratt and Eliana Crosina p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 321
How Technology Is Changing Work and Organizations
Wayne F. Cascio and Ramiro Montealegre p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 349
Impression Management in Organizations: Critical Questions,
Answers, and Areas for Future Research
Mark Bolino, David Long, and William Turnley p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 377
Employer Image and Employer Branding: What We Know and What

We Need to Know
Filip Lievens and Jerel E. Slaughter p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 407
The Social Context of Decisions

Richard P. Larrick p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 441
Adaptive Measurement and Assessment
Matt Barney and William P. Fisher Jr. p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 469
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and

Organizational Behavior articles may be found at http://www.annualreviews.org/
errata/orgpsych
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Safety Climate in Organizations

Article · April 2016

Mark Griffin Matteo Curcuruto

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Mark A. Griffin1 and Matteo Curcuruto2

Annu. Rev. Organ. Psychol. Organ. Behav. 2016. Keywords

2. FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY CLIMATE

192 Griffin · Curcuruto

Safety climate Individual processes Outcomes

Overview of safety climate, individual processes, and organizational outcomes.

2.1. Developing the Construct of Safety Climate

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 193

culture of a work group, plant, or organization.

2.2. The Multidimensional Nature of Safety Climate

194 Griffin · Curcuruto

2.3. The Multilevel Nature of Safety Climate

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 195

196 Griffin · Curcuruto

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 197

2.4. Developing Climate Through Sensemaking Processes

experience of safety climate (Ostroff et al. 2003).

3. INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL PROCESSES

198 Griffin · Curcuruto

3.1.2. Safety motivation and self-determination perspectives. In recent years, an expanded

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 199

3.1.4. Safety motivation and social-exchange theories. Another complementary approach

3.2. Safety Behaviors

200 Griffin · Curcuruto

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 201

4.1. Safety Outcomes: Individual and Aggregate Indicators

202 Griffin · Curcuruto

4.1.2. Aggregate indicators: data archives, underreporting, productivity, and innovation.

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 203

employee accident underreporting. The negative effects of supervisor enforcement on underre-

204 Griffin · Curcuruto

4.2. Safety Climate Dynamics: Leading or Lagging Indicator?

4.3. Safety Climate Interventions to Improve Outcomes

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 205

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

5.1. New Challenges for the Transformation of Organizations

206 Griffin · Curcuruto

5.2. New Insights from Motivation Theories

participation (Griffin & Neal 2000).

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 207

208 Griffin · Curcuruto

of uncertainty. Saf. Sci. 45(6):637–52

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 209

210 Griffin · Curcuruto

naire: a cross-national study. Educ. Psychol. Meas. 66(4):701–16

www.annualreviews.org • Safety Climate in Organizations 211

weighting of routine risks. Int. J. Risk Assess. Manag. 7(2):122–36

212 Griffin · Curcuruto

Contents Volume 3, 2016

Stumbling Toward a Social Psychology of Organizations: An

Autobiographical Look at the Direction of Organizational Research

Charisma: An Ill-Defined and Ill-Measured Gift

Employer Image and Employer Branding: What We Know and What

The Social Context of Decisions

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and