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Justice Magdangal de Leon Outline Updates in Civ Pro and Spec Pro
Justice Magdangal de Leon Outline Updates in Civ Pro and Spec Pro
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
- Outline -
Justice Magdangal M. de Leon
CIVIL PROCEDURE
a. Formal requirements
1) Verification
2) Certification of non-forum shopping
b. Manner of making allegations in pleadings
2. Complaint
a. Joinder of causes of action
1) Permissive
2) Compulsory
3. Filing and service of pleadings and other papers
V. JOINDER OF ISSUES
A. Plaintiff’s motions and pleadings
1. Motions
a. To dismiss complaint under Rule 17, Sec. 2
b. To amend or supplement complaint under Rule 17, Secs. 3 and 6
c. For judgment on the pleadings under Rule 34
e. For summary judgment under Rule 35
f. To set pre-trial
2. Pleadings
a. Reply
b. Answer to counterclaim
3. Others
a. Pre-trial brief
B. Defendant’s motion and pleading
1. Motion
a. Motion to dismiss complaint due to fault of plaintiff under Rule 17,
Sec. 3
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2. Pleading
a. Answer with or without counterclaim
3. Others
a. Pre-trial brief
VI. PRE-TRIAL
A. Plaintiff’s motions
1. To present evidence ex parte and render judgment
B. Defendant’s motion
1. Motion to dismiss
C. Common motions
1. To postpone
2. For consolidation or severance
3 For trial by commissioner
D. Joinder
1. Joinder of claims or causes of action
2. Joinder of parties
VIII. TRIAL
A. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation
of evidence under Rule 10, Sec. 5
X. JUDGMENT
b. Discretionary
B. Procedure for execution
1. In case of death of party
2. Of judgments for money
3. Of judgments for specific act
4. Of special judgments
C. Execution sales
1. Sales on execution
2. Conveyance of property sold on execution
3. Redemption of property sold on execution
E. Satisfaction of judgment
ACTIONS IN GENERAL
What are the requisites for joinder of causes of action? (Rule 2, Sec. 5)
1. Compliance with the rules on joinder of parties under Rule 3, Sec. 6.
2. A party cannot join in an ordinary action any of the special civil actions. –
Reason: special civil actions are governed by special rules.
3. Where the causes of action are between the SAME PARTIES but pertain to
DIFFERENT VENUES OR JURISDICTIONS, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC,
provided ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC
and the venue lies therein.
Exception: ejectment case may not be joined with an action within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as the same comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTC.
However, if a party invokes the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot thereafter
challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case. He is barred by estoppel from
doing so. (Hinog vs. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005)
N.B. As to joinder in the MTC, it must have jurisdiction over ALL THE CAUSES
OF ACTION and must have common venue.
4. Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, jurisdiction is determined by the AGGREGATE OR TOTAL AMOUNT
claimed (totality rule).
N.B. The totality rule applies only to the MTC – totality of claims cannot
exceed the jurisdictional amount of the MTC.
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There is no totality rule for the RTC because its jurisdictional amount is
without limit. Exc. In tax cases where the limit is below P1 million. Amounts of
P1 million or more fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA.
PARTIES
Lack of personality to sue – the fact that plaintiff is not the real party in
interest.
Plaintiff’s lack of personality to sue is a ground for a motion to dismiss based
on the fact that the complaint, on its face, states no cause of action (Rule 16,
Sec. 1 [g]) (Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744 [2005])
JOINDER OF PARTIES
VOID, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as
to those present (Uy vs. CA, 494 SCRA 535 [July 11, 2006]).
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3)
or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of
the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March
31, 2006).
SELECTION OF COURT
VENUE
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly
laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the
Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. The venue of real actions
affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the
SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the transactions involving said parcels of land.
Where said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is
in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated (United
Overseas Bank Phils. (formerly Westmont Bank) vs. Rosemoore Mining
& Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521, March 12, 2007).
PLEADINGS
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim
as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
The evidence of the petitioner on its claim in its complaint, and that of the
respondents on their counterclaims are thus different. There is, likewise, no
logical relation between the claim of the petitioner and the counterclaim of the
respondents. Hence, the counterclaim of the respondents is an initiatory
pleading, which requires the respondents to append thereto a certificate of non-
forum shopping. Their failure to do so results to the dismissal of their
counterclaim without prejudice. (Korea Exchange Bank vs. Hon. Gonzales,
etc., et. al., G.R. Nos. 142286-87, April 15, 2005)
the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since
the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground
(O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corp. vs. Macamir Realty
and CA, G.R. No. 135803, March 28, 2006).
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal
of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the
dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal
of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim. (Pinga vs. Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June
30, 2006).
A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
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judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without
need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default ( Martinez
vs. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006).
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 9, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting
the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s
discretion on whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The
same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief
that may be granted. In particular, the court’s judgment "shall not exceed the
amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages." (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, supra)
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that a judgment on the
pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who
is the party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to
obtain a declaratory relief. (Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 156304, October 23, 2006)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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For summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) there must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount
of damages; and (2) the moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
When, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment
is not proper. An issue is genuine if it requires the PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. The trial court’s
decision was merely denominated as summary judgment. But in essence, it is
actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary
judgment inapplicable in this case. (Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R. No. 159224,
January 20, 2006).
The trial court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on
an action is in order. Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending
party or the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke the rule on summary
judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party must be notified of the motion
for summary judgment and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions before hearing is conducted. More importantly, a summary
judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Pineda vs.
Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007).
TRIAL
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and
that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single
proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to
situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is
presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the
pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party. (Swagman Hotels
& Travel, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005).
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant
loses the right to present his evidence and the appellate court shall then
proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence. The
rule, however, imposes the condition that if his demurrer is granted by the trial
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court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right
to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected
to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the
appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render
judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence (Republic vs. Tuvera,
G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007).
The Supreme Court may review factual findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals
The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are factual. Under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, for the simple reason
that the Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of the trial court as affirmed by
the CA are conclusive on this Court, absent proof of any of the recognized
exceptional circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are
beyond the issues of the case; and (11) the findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties. (Asian Construction & Dev’t. Corp. vs. Tulabut,
G.R. No. 161904, April 26, 2005)
We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for
recovery of ownership or accion reivindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case
brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over
the subject matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the instant
case, the MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for
lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered
a decision based on the findings of the MTC. (Provost vs. CA, G.R. No. 160406,
June 26, 2006).
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on
the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case
on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented
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in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings
and additional evidence in the interest of justice. (Encarnacion vs. Amigo,
G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006).
Under Rule 40, full payment of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional. Otherwise, the appeal is
deemed not perfected and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes
final and executory. (Republic vs. Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007).
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the
RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42 and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider
this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration
on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the
appellee’s brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective
Notice of Appeal. (Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132197,
August 16, 2005)
Per Sec. 3, Rule 38, "The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party
acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings” and not from the
date he actually read the same (Escueta vs. Lim, G.R. No. 137162, January
24, 2007).
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
EXECUTION
Although the RTC has the authority to annul final judgments, such authority
pertains only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-
judicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior courts. Given that
DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the
DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC’s
control (Springfield Development Corp. vs. Presiding Judge of RTC of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 40, G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007).
The writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
National Government Administration Committee was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for
prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
instant prohibition should be dismissed outright. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. (Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Defensor, G.R. No.
163980, August 3, 2006).
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EXPROPRIATION
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just
compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
the Government. Rep. Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from
previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of the Local
Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code merely provided
that the Government deposit the initial amounts antecedent to acquiring
possession of the property with, respectively, an authorized Government
depositary or the proper court. In both cases, the private owner does not
receive compensation prior to the deprivation of property. Under the new
modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immediate
monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her
property. (Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005)
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
(1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after
the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. (PNB vs. Sanao
Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005)
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent an extrajudicial
foreclosure, only upon a clear showing of a violation of the mortgagor’s
unmistakable right. Unsubstantiated allegations of denial of due process and
prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagee’s unmistakable
right to an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Selegna Management and
Development Corporation vs. UCPB, G.R. No. 165662, May 31, 2006)
In forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that the
only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the
damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered
but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. (Dumo vs.
Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006)
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the
property subject thereof. (Barangay Piapi vs. Talip, 469 SCRA 409 [2005]).
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available
to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion
publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the
instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner. (Santos vs. Sps. Ayon, G.R. No. 137013, May 6,
2005)
Where the period of the lease has expired and several demands were
sent to the lessee to vacate, when should the one year period to file
unlawful detainer be reckoned? From the date of the original demand or
from the date of the last demand?
From the date of the original demand if the subsequent demands are merely
in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand.
Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the action
is based on the expiration of the lease. Any notice given would only negate any
inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. The law
requires notice to be served only when the action is due to the lessee’s failure to
pay or the failure to comply with the conditions of the lease. The one-year
period is thus counted from the date of first dispossession. To reiterate, the
allegation that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to
saying that the lease expired every month. Since the lease already expired mid-
year in 1995, as communicated in petitioners’ letter dated July 1, 1995, it was at
that time that respondent’s occupancy became unlawful. (Racaza vs. Gozum,
490 SCRA 313 [June 8, 2006])
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RULE 73
RULE 74
Respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person
dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.
(Portugal vs. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005)
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could
not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to
the estate. (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Delgado, G.R. No.
155733, January 27, 2006)
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RULE 76
RULE 77
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that
such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the
trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms
of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the
case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
(Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006)
RULE 78
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.
An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
(San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007)
RULE 86
SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. – When the action is for
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but
shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in
the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person. (21a)
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. – All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants…
Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of respondents
must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel. (Gabriel vs.
Bilon, G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007)
RULE 102
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In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court
is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must produce
the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a
ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by
the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual
hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
(In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Alejano vs. Cabuay,
G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005)
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
extends to “all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.” The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal,
the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by
the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued
by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary
detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial
court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129,
3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4
above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has
been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that
“once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” (In the
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Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Kunting, G.R. No. 167193,
April 19, 2006)
RULE 108
The petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn,
alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is properly
considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ceruilas did not comply with the requirements of Rule 108. Under Sec. 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, not only the civil registrar but also all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be
made parties thereto. As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same
shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of
Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date
of birth are at stake.
The lack of summons on Rosilyn was not cured by the publication of the
order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation. Summons must still be served, not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process. (Ceruila vs. Delantar, G.R. No.
140305, December 9, 2005)