Module 4- Qualification and Disqualification (pero if congress wants to add that as qualification for local electives, pwede yan

kasi their qualifications are not imposed by the constitution.

Candidate- any person aspiring for or seeking an elective office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy by himself ,or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
Qualifications of Candidates for Local Elective Offices.
Qualifications of Candidates for National Elective Offices. Position Gov. and Vice Mayor (HUC) Mayor and SP and SB
Position President and VP Senate HR Gov. VM (City)
Basis Sec2, Article VII, Section 3, Article
Section 6, Article Basis Section 39, Section 39, Section 39,
Section 39,
Constitution VI, Constitution
VI, Constitution. R.A 7160, LGC R.A 7160, LGC R.A 7160, LGC R.A 7160,
Citizenship Natural Born Natural BornNatural Born of 1991 of 1991 of 1991 LGC of 1991
Age At least 40 years At least 35 years
At least 25 years Citizenship Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen
old on the day of old on the day of
old on the day of Age At least 23 At least 21 At least 18 At least 18
the election the electionthe election years old on years old on years old on years old on
Literacy Able to read and Able to read and
Able to read and the day of the the day of the the day of the the day of
Write Write Write election election election the election
Voter Registration Registered voter Registered voter
Registered voter Literacy Able to read Able to read Able to read Able to read
in the district in and Write and Write and Write
and Write
which he shall be Filipino or Filipino or Filipino or
Filipino or
elected. other local other local other local
other local
Residence Resident of Resident of Resident of language language language language
Philippines at Philippines not Philippines not Voter Registered Registered Registered Registered
least 10 years less than 2 yrs. less than 1 yr. Registration voter voter voter voter in the
immediately immediately immediately district in
preceding preceding preceding election which he
election election shall be
Notes: elected.
Residence Resident of Resident of Resident of Resident of
Qualifications for National elective officers are exclusive, kasi these are expressed the Province the City at the City at the District at
under the constitution. But nuisance candidate-allowed yan kasi consti din nag at least 1 year least 1 year least 1 year least 1 year
impose nyan, (article 2, on political dynasty. ) immediately immediately immediately immediately
preceding preceding preceding preceding
In the case of SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board, R.A 9165, (g) All candidates for public election election election election
office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.=was declared unconstitutional. The Congress Resident of Resident of Resident of Resident of
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it Philippines Philippines Philippines Philippines
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter not less than not less than not less than not less than
or enlarge the Constitution. 2 yrs. 2 yrs. 2 yrs. 2 yrs.
immediately immediately immediately immediately
preceding preceding preceding preceding
 election election election election
Citizenship requirement
Labo v. Comelec, 1989
These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the
citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
[*Australian na sya before filing COC]
Frivaldo v. Comelec, 1996
[In this case, when he was won the election, he was still an alien]
The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application
on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions
to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or
when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
***The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the
requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior
to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it
would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification.
Note: R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied
retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a
foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2
and 3 of the law would readily reveal that only those falling under the second
paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who became naturalized
citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be considered
as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Romualdez-Marcos, v. Comelec, 1995
Domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts
and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in
a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends.
A person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. (otherwise, defeats the
essence of representation)
Aquino v comelec 1995
[lease agreement of condominium unit in the area.]
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote
or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other
residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a
resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in
Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City."
The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of
domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances
under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of
residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of
Makati.
Mitra v. Comelec, 2010
The law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or
residence, but imposes only the condition that residence at the new place should at
least be for a year. Of course, as a continuing requirement or qualification, the
elected official must remain a resident there for the rest of his term.
1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
Svetlana Jalosjos v. Comelec, 2013
[A temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence.]
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of
all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted,
for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the
date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be
established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same
standard of evidence.
Petitioner’s stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand,
was only a temporary and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It
was never the intention of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed
there at times when she was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed.
Her temporary stay in Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in
Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yap’s house. Except for
the declarations of her witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in
the resort was being built, she presented no other evidence to show any basis of
her right to stay in that particular house as a resident.

Rommel Jalosjos v. Comelec, 2012

[staying in brother’s house=resident]

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Disqualification under Omnibus
Election Code B.P 881
Declared Incompetent or insane by
competent authority
Conviction for Subversion,
Insurrection, rebellion
Sentenced by final judgement of an
offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than
18 months
Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude
Permanent resident of or immigrant to
a foreign country, unless said person
has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.
Addtl notes:
 Conviction= disqualified, unless
given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
Disqualification under Sec 40, RA
7160- applicable to local elective
office only
The insane or feeble-minded.
Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
Those sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude
Or
for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
same
Permanent residents in a foreign
country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code;
Those removed from office as a result
of an administrative case;
Those with dual citizenship;
Fugitives from justice in criminal or
 disqualifications are deemed non-political cases here or abroad;
removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five
years from his service of
sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes
disqualified.
Moral Turpitude
An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statue.
 Violation of Anti Fencing Law is a crime involving moral turpitude- Dela
Torre v. Comelec. 1996
 Violation of B.P22 – Villaber v. Comelec, 2001
The Court, on the other hand, has also had the occasion to categorically rule that
certain crimes do not involve moral turpitude, namely:
1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)
2. Illegal recruitment63
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of
firearms)
4. Indirect Contempt. penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether
the convict serves his jail sentence or not.
CONVICTION
Risos-Vidal v. Comelec, 2015
Moreno v. Comelec, 2006
[Convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
[2 years qualifies BOTH those convicted by moral turpitude or penalty of 1 year]
disqualification to hold public office]
[PROBATION=not disqualified]
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment.

The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common Removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
sense, means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the
Reyes v. Comelec, 1996
period adjudged by the court.
although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated
administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he
with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically
brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it
provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
reelection.
The probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because
*petition for certiorari is an independent action which cannot toll or interrupt the
the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the
running of the reglementary period.
duration of the probation.
* That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
Jalosjos, Jr. V. Comelec, 2012.
proclaimed in case winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The second
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus either a majority or plurality of voters. =rule on succession.
Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Grego v. Comelec, 1997.
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or [Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?]
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately
once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory
No. statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as
to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly
and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.
Dual Citizenship
Mercado v. Manzano, 1999
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
Lopez v. Comelec. 2008
[Unlike in Mercado v. Manzano where the candidate was a dual citizen by birth, In
contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen
by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.]
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law
explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Sobejana-condon v. Comelec , 2012
the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point,
she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section
5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on
the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant
is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
Note* Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath=even if retention lang.
Maquiling v. Comelec, 2013
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged.
When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided
and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply.
Agustin v. Comelec, 2015 (*** when asked about the doctrine of rejection of
second placer, apply this case, this is in the syllabus, don’t apply reyes and
macquiling case)
Section 6 of the RA 6646 Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The
first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the
situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in
the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way
before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat's
favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Palileng's proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate,
second to none.
If the disqualified was before the election= second placer
If after= votes are not stray= doctrine of rejection of second placer.
***This is magulo ha so I’m not entirely sure, wala din kasi sa syllabus, pero
based on current jurisprudence,* The doctrine of rejection of second placer is
now abandoned, There was even a case na nag sabi na that doctrine was only an
obiter dicta. NOTE!!! THE CASES BELOW ARE NOT INCLUDED IN SYLLABUS, SO I
AM NOT SURE. JUST APPLY AGUSTIN V COMELEC.
-Diambrang v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 201809, [October 11,
2016])
Clearly, the prevailing ruling is that if the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, the candidate is not considered a candidate from the very beginning
even if his certificate of candidacy was cancelled after the elections.
-Dimapilis v Comelec, 2017,
A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a
candidate at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.The
cancellation of the CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as
stray votes, and are not considered in determining the winner of an
election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the
qualified candidate receiving the highest number of votes to the position.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot
apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de
jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a
permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There
 is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the
elections, has the legal right to assume the position.
FUGITIVE
Rodriguez v. Comelec, 1996
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification
or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof
that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed,
at the time of flight.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be
denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
Caasi v. CA, 1990
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he
is a permanent resident of the United States.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective
office."
Violation of Sec.80(campaign period), Sec 83, destruction of lawful election
propaganda, and sec 86, regulation of propaganda through mass media,
Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, 2002
Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered campaigning.
The term campaigning should not be made to apply to any and every act which may
influence a person to vote for a candidate, for that would be stretching too far the
meaning of the term. Examining the definition and enumeration of election
campaign and partisan political activity found in COMELEC Resolution 3636, the
Commission is convinced that only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit
votes will be covered by the definition and enumeration.
In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly
soliciting votes. Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks
imposed upon her by law, which duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor
of the Province of Laguna.
Spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law
Ejercito v. Comelec, 2014
the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not
just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit of the
former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase “those incurred
or caused to be incurred by the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover those
expenses which are contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of
the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written
conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as
“any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer.” Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguere debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.)
There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
Remedied for questioning the qualifications of candidate
Before election= BP 881
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Loong v Comelec, 1992
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the
petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by
respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative
powers. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which
is a legislative enactment.
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates;
Sections 12 and 68 of the Code are the following:
SEC. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public official performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election compaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election law.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate
fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless
as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results
of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the
Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the
election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto
with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed
within ten (10)days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called
"procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribed what the law does not provide, its
function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these
petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide
and remedy.
We are aware that in Frivaldo vs. Comelec, this Court held that a petition to
disqualify an elective official, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, may be
file at anytime, even beyond the period prescribed by law, and office and in fact
had long been discharging the duties of said office. But we disagree with
respondent Commission that the Frivaldo ruling applied to the case at bar in all its
connotations and implications. For one, the ground for which disqualification is
sought in the present case is misrepresentation as to the required age of the
candidate, whereas, in Frivaldo the ground for disqualification was lack of
Philippine citizenship. This is an overriding and fundamental desideratum matched
perhaps only by disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
**Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material
representation", the Court concluded that this refers to qualifications for elective
office. Citing previous cases in which the Court interpreted this phrase, we held that
Section 78 contemplates statements regarding age,residence and citizenship or Cayat v. Comelec, 2007
non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. Furthermore, aside from the
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an
requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate
election cannot be voted for, and votes case for him shall not be counted. This is a
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
mandatory provision under sec 6 of ra 6646, the electoral reforms law of 1987.
candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one’s qualification for public office. Thus, the votes were deemed stray and not counted, and the doctrine of rejection
of second placer was not applied. * connect with the agustin case.
After election

Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.

Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or
municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.

Gonzales v. Comelec 2011

under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to

office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the house of rep. the comelec’s jurisdiction over election, returns,
and qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. We declared that
the court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private
respondent who was already a member of the house at the time of the filing of the
petition for certiorari.

Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives.

EFFECT OF A DISQUALIFICATION