Pure Immanence Essays on A Life Gilles Del with an introduction by John Rajchman{tm ie ny yy nag ‘Sc ncn rte. mie. ee, acre et at gee yn) nites us Capp oc nico moe fr rs pent ithe wen erm fa he Pa Ya ly pin gi negli © “gy aid me Pe eae a i ort, gid m SOCK SCIENCES | onion Srexconmaciarae escuivamc onet ‘en a Contents Introduction by John Rajchman 7 Inmanence A Life 28 ume 98 Nietache 2Introduction Jota Rajan Gills Deleure was an empinicis, logan. That was the source of his lightness, his humor his mvt hie practice of pilosophy "sort of at bet” —"I never broke with a kind of empiricism that procecds to 3 Aliect exposition of concepts” Rea shame to pre- sent him asa metaphysician and mater mytie. Even 4a ALN. Whitehead, he admired a “pluralist empiri am that he found in another say in Michel Fo ‘ault—an empiriciam of “multiplicities” that says"the sbstrat doesn't expan, but mst itself be explained” Indeed, it was through his logic and his empiricism that Deleuze found hie way out ofthe impasses ofthe two dottinant philosophical schools of his genera- tion, phenomenological and analy, and elaborated 4 now conception af sease, nelther hermeneutic nor Feegean. He tried to introduce empiricism into hisvery Image of thought, and saw the philosopher as an ‘experimentalist and diagnostic, not as judge, even ‘of amystieal aw. 1. We will speak ofa transcendental empeican tn contrast co everything that makes up the world of the subject and the object” he would hus reiterate in the esty tht opens this volume, Transcendental em irks had been Delewe's way out ofthe diiclies ‘neoduced by Kant and continued inthe phenome: tuslogiel search for an Urdoxa~ the difficulties of ranscndental-enpitical doubling” andthe “raps of rsciousness? Bat what does such ex withthe two Meas the ety’ fone together i ‘aay think of aie as an empiricist concept in rast what Jon Locke called "the sl" A ie front features than those Locke assoc the self consciousness, memors and pe Te unfolds according to another loge: 3 ersonal individuation rather than per lon, of singularities rather than uticularites. Kean never be completely specified. Ie somal individual fala nine a fe, eis only a irtaaity” in the ite te corresponding individ that ean some tines snore strange interval before deat, In tas thes, a is “ipesoal nd yet singulan” and so requires a “wilder” sont of em Melina —a eanacendental enapircien ‘rom the start Deleuze sought a conception ofem- icin hat depart rom the clas definition that ‘say that all our ideas canbe derived from atomistic sensation through a lgie of shetraction and gener ization, The real problem ofempircim is rather to bbe Found in a new conception of subjectivity that acquires is fll force in Hume, and goes beyond hie “asociationiam”—the problem ofa life. A life in- volves a diferent “synthesis of the sensible” than the ind that mae poate the coraious elf or person Sensation has a peculiar olen i, and Delewze talked ofa "being of sensation” quite nl individul sense data waiting tobe inserted into categorical or dicur- sive synthesis providing the unity oftheir manifold for fn" think” The being of senetion i what can only be seared, since there precisely pre-exite no categorical ‘unity, no sensu communi for Atonce mote material and les dvisibe chan sense data requires synthe sis of another,non-categorcal sort foundin artworks, for example. Indeed Deleuze camte to think that at works just ae sensations connected in material in sacha way as to fre ssh from the assmptions of the sort of“common sense" tat for Kant i supposed bythe " think” or the "I judge” Through affect andpereept, artworks hit upon something singular yet Impersonal in our bodies and brains, ereducble to Any pre-exstent “we The “coloring sensations” that, [Maurice Merle-Ponty sw in Ce ie ate examples of such a spataizing logic of sensation, no longer Aominated by clases! subject-object relations. But we must push the question of sensation beyond the phenomenological anchoring ofa subject in alan seape for example, in the way Deleuze thinks cinema introduces movement into image, allowing fra dis ‘inci colors in Jean-Luc Godard There i still Kind of scnsulist piety in Merleau-Ponty — what he ly the “thermometer ofa be ‘oing” given through “asymmetrical syatheses of ‘he sensible” that depart from good form or Gestalt Such syntheses then require an exercise of thought, ‘which, like dhe syaheses ofthe self or conscious tus, involve a sort of dissolution of the ego. Indeed ‘what Deleze isolates as “cinema” from ee fitful is- tory of filmmaking isin effet nothing other than 2 vultifaceted exploration ofthis other act of thinking, this other empiricism, In sch eaves, sensation is synthesized according to «specular ogl-~a logic of mahi that is either Aleta nor transcendental, por not simply to the worl {subject and abject, bot abo tothe logical connections of subject and predicate and the sets and functions that Gotlob Frege proposed to substite for them. Itt logicof an AND prior and ire to te IS of prediatons, which Deleuze fis ids in David Hume: "Think wth AND instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking for 1: emplricitn has never had another secret" Ie is 3 constrictvis logic of unfin= shed series rather than a calculus of distinct, count- ale collections; andi i governed by conventions and problematizations, not anions and fixed rules of inference. ts sens is ineparable from play arti Fetion, a, for example inthe ease of Lewis Carell “intensive surfices fora world that has lost the con- ventions ofits Euclidean skin. Transcendental em Piricism may then be sid to be the experimental Telition we have to that element in senstion that pre ‘cedes the self a well ae any “we,” through which ataned, inthe materiality of living, the powers of Iie" Im Stole log, Delewe finds a predecessor for such 4 view, But af the end ofthe nineteenth centary ie Henn Bergson and Wills James who offer usa bet ter philosophical ide to than do ether Huser] or Frege. Indeed, at one point Deleuze remarks that the ery idea ofa “plane of mmanence” requires kind of “radical emplrian”—an empiric whose force*.scbegins fom the moment i defines the subject a Ibis, a habit, nothing more than habit in fel of immanence, the habit of ying I" Among the cas ‘a empieicists, itis Hume who poss such questions, Hume who redirects the problem of empiricism to ward the nev questions that would be elaborated by Bergson and Nietache. “That is the subject of Delevze's youth eno He soos Hume as connecting empiricim and subjec: iit in ame way, departing fom Locke on the ques ‘inn of personal identity. In Lacks’ conception, the set fenether what the French lle moto fe =the athe me® Rather ite defined by individ stp (ysl, yourself and sameness overtime (iden- it) ck thas introduces the problem af identity sul versity ito eur philosophical conception of ilves, What the young Deleuze found singel ia "has empiric is dhs the Hea tha this sel this rs this possession in fact not gen Indeed the ‘ell afietin or artifice in whic, through abit, sve cum to believe, a sort of incorrigible illusion of ining andi is as this artifice thatthe sel becomes fully pet of ature — ournatre, Hun thu opens op the question of other ways of composing sensations hn those ofthe habits of the sean the "haman nate that they supper. A eo peroneal dsm" becomes possible, one concerned with whats ‘Singular yetin-human”inthecompositon ofourscves. elewze would find tin Rerguon and Nietzsche, who Imagined ree dfference"in ving, n-conscious and na longer enclosed within a personal enti. ‘While Deleuze shared with his French contempor rats suspicion about a consticutng subject or con sciousness, in Hume he found new empiricist way ‘rged against phenomenclogy and its tendency to reintroduce a transcendental ego or a material a prior. Th real problesn dramatized in ‘Hume’s humorous pictre of the selfs incorigible illusion is how aur lives ever anqive dhe consetency ‘ofan enduring sel, given that itis born of... debi sum, chance, indierence™ and the question then i ‘ca we constrict an empiricist or experimental rela: tion tothe persistence af this zane or plane of pre- subjective delirium and pe-indvidul singularity in cour lives and in ou Tmmanence and sie thus suppose one another. For immanence x pare only when its not immanent ‘wa pir subject or object mind or mate, only when, neither innate nor acquired, itis alway yet “in the raking”; and "se" 3 potential or vitality sub- sisting in just such porely immanent plane. Unite thelie ofan individual, ies thus necesariy vague ut oft, whi lations with thers? "‘or indefinite, and this indfinitenes x real. Ii vague inthe Peitcan sense thatthe real isitselfindetermiate ‘or ancxact, beyond the limitations of our capacities tomeasure it. We thus each have the pre-prediative vagueness ofAdamin Paradis tht Leibniz envisaged in bis letters to Arnaud. We are always quelonque— ‘we are and remain “anybodies” before we become “somehodies” Underneath the enti of our bodies or organisms, we each hve what Deleaze calls body {emouth,astomach, etc). Wethushave the singularity ‘of what Spinoza already termed "a singular exten, and of what makes the Freudian unconscious slngula ‘ach of uspostesed ofa peculiar “complex” unfolding ‘through the time of our lives, How then can we make such pre-indvivalnguarites coincide in space and ‘imeandehatisthespaceand time thatincluds them? ‘We need a new conception of society in which what we have in common sour singularities and not ‘our individualites— where what i common is “m= persona” and whats “inpersonal™ is common. That is precisely what Charles Dickens's tale shows —only through «proces of in-personalization” inthe in terval between life and death does the hero become ‘ou “conon frend Its also what Deleuze brings ‘out iv Humes the new questions of empiricism and subjetivity discover thei fall force only ia Hume's soca thought. In the place ofthe dominant idea of a socal contract among already given selves or sub- jects, Home elaborates an original picture of conven: ion that allows for an “attunement” ofthe passions prior tothe identities of reasons only in this way can wwe escape the volence toward others inher formation of our social identities o the problem of ‘our *patialiiea” Hume thus prepares the way for view of society not a contact but as experiment — experiment with what in life is prior to both poses: sive individuals and traditional social wholes, Prop. erty, for example, bocomes nothing more than an volving jurisridensil convention, There i in short, an element in experience that comes before the determination of subject and sense, Shown through a "diagram" that one constrict 10 ‘move about more freely rather thin a space defined by ana prior “scheme” into which one inserts one self icinvolves temporality satis always starting up again inthe midst, and relations with others based notin identification o recognition, but encounter and new compositions In Difeence and Repetition, Deleuze tries to show that what characterizes the modern work" isnot slfreference but prciely the tempt to introduce such difference into the very ‘ea of sensation, discovering syrtheses prior to theIdentities of figure and perception —a sort of great Inboratory for ahigher empiricism. OF thisexperence ‘or experiment, Nietzsche's Ariadne Figures a the dra rmitic hereine o concept] personas". (Ariadne Jas hung herself. The work fart leaves the domain of representation to become “experience? transeen ental empiriciom or science ofthe sensible..." But to assume this role Arladae must herselfun ergo a ransformtion, “becoming” She must hang herself with the famous thread her father gave her tw help the hero Thescus escape from the labyrinth. Fo tied up with the thread she remains a “cold ere: ture of resentment.” Sach iser mystery —the key to Deleuze’ subtle view of Nietzsche. The force of her {conininty i thus unlike cht of Antigone, who pe- serves er identification with her dead father, On ps through a defian “pare negation” that can no Tonger be reabsorbed in Creon’s city. Ariadne be cams the heroine who say “yee” rather than “n yes to what is “outside” our given determinations or entities, She becomes a heroine not of mourning but ofthe breath and plasticity of life, of dance and Tightness—of the light Earth of which Zarathustra says that it must be approached in many way, since the way does not exist, She this points to an emp cat way ot ofthe impases of ein. For the problem with Theseus becoming a Get al-too-German hero is that even If God is dead, ‘one sil believes in “the subject” “the individual,” " ture” Abandoned by Theseus, approaching Dionysus, Ariadne introduces instead belie inthe world ain the potentials of aif We thus aeive at 1m original view ofthe problem of nism in Niet sche a that partially phystlogial condition in which sch belie inthe work! is lost. n fat ites problem that goes back to Hume, For its Hume who eube tutes forthe Cartesian problem of certainty and doube, the new questions of belief and probable inference. ‘To think snot to be certain, but, on the contrary 0 believe where we canmot know for sute In his Dia- agus on Notaral Religion (which Deleuze counts a8 the only genuine dialogue inthe history of philoso phy), Hume suggests that God as well asthe self te regarded a fiction requited by our nature, The problem of religion is then no longer whether God feasts, but whether we need the idea of Godin order toexist, or, in the terms of Pascal's wager, who has the better mode of existence, the bellever oF the non: bier fis hete that Deere thinks Nietzsche goes beyond Hume, who, in connecting bell and proba bility, ound the ides of chance tobe quite meaning les.” By contrast, Nietsehe introduces a conceptionof chance ax distinct from probability into the very ‘experience of thought and the way the "game of thought” is played (seule, its players is ams). He asks what it means to think thatthe world is always ‘making itself while God is calculating, such that his calculations never come out right and so he extends the question ofbelief othe plane of “delirium, chance, ‘ndilerence” out of which the habits of self are formed an from which the potentials of fe take off. Niil= fam is then the state in which the Bele nthe poten tials of life and so of chance and dspaity inthe hasbeen lst. Conversely, as Ariadne becomes light what she fim stat to think snot eo be er ‘a nor yet to calculate probabilities It is to ay ye (crwhat ix singular yet impersonal i living: and for As oe must believe inthe world and not inthe i ‘ions of God oF the self that Hume thought derived fon it [Deleuze cals this way out of iis an “emp st conversion," and in his lst writing, gains a peculiar urgency. Yes, the problem has changed” he Alclares in What is Philosophy? “It may be that to Iie inthis world, i hi if, has become our most sical task, the task of mode of existence to be roe today" Ale tlh the thre easays inthis volume exc fake up eon our plane of imma ‘his question, they in fact come fom different jc: tures in Delewze's journey. The esays on Hume and Nietsche are from a first phase, after World War I, when Deleuze tied to extract anew image of thought from the many differnt stata of the philosophical tration, and so rethink the relation of thought to life; the image of a “superior empiricism” accompa nis all these attempts. The first or lead essay, how ver, was Deleuze’ st comtes from a at phase of “dine” exay, in which Deleuze takes up again the many paths and trajectories composing hi work, some leading to “impasses closed of by illness" Wi often humorous, thes essays are shor, brupt in the transitions and ending. They have something of Franz Kaflas parables orthe aphorisms Nictsche likened to shouting from one Alpine peakto another ~ one mist ‘condense and distil onc’ message, as with Adorno's image, invoked by Deleuze ofa bot thrown into the ‘sea of communication. Fort isin the dea of commnu- nication tht Deleuze came to think philosophy con: fronts anew and most insolent val. Indeed tha just. ‘why the problem has changed, aling for fresh em Piricit conversion” nda Kunsewllen or "becoming st" of the sort he imagined the at of cinema had offered usin the rather different circumstances of un- ‘certainty following World Wa I.‘Written ina surange interval before his own death, “Immanence..a lie” has ben regarded asa kind of testament. What i clear stat Deleuze tok ts “ast message” to occur atime of renewed dificlty and possiblity for philosophy. As with Bergson, one need cto again introduce movement into thought eather than tying to find universal of information oF con ‘munication —in particular into the very image ofthe brain and contemporary neuroscience. Inthe place of artifical intelligence, one needed to construct new picture of the brain asa “relatively undfferen- iste mater” ito which thinking al at might in Aroduce new connections that didn't preexst chem ssi were, the brain ar materiality of "a ife™ yo Inc invented, prior and iereducble to consclousness ss well at machines, In his I writing, “Immanence 4 life” we sense not only this new problem and Us new urgency, but ako the force ofthe Tong in srolible voyage in which Deleuze kept alive thesia ular ong of thought which has dhe maveté and the strength to believe that “plilorophy brings about a ‘ot deviation of widom ~ it pute ii the service of 4 pore immanence” 1. ewpran Pri Ml, 1990p 122, 2, Daag (New Yorks Corbis Univerity Pras 1987 lowing se dcraton hae aye fla Lam i, ata plrt”| Chae Imbert examines why and how an empiric, Pilospher, eles certaely mos came all the more Inertia ge (Unpblod MSer Pore te dela ia (as PUP, 198) may bern as an trp gine wats Mato ool ight ke Fm hi peal epi che pin of out hs xpd er rer work Pre log ng formas Pr PU, 192) which she ‘lel exis the internal ski the pommel ‘al anya ell oth te Mere Posy od ‘Wiese. ths ember oles more promising ouch tothe robe af the lato of Dewan np tosetheory than does Akin Balin i tempt st ie aang tact es 4. cel ae «eae cae for Locke eter {han Devas he oer ofthe pope concept of soca ad th ee intact John Lick, od dif a Seu, 198. 5. Se Image maton (Pr Mint 1983) 7p 88h for Deka’ cant of why Bein fre ena” oof he rin phology the nineteenth etary hat ‘outs with Hae a the sbeue® fc on pighencmenology In i Serpent of Prapton (Cambridge, (MA: MIT Pres, 199), Jonathan Crary gos ont sha how hina may be ened pang, the ate CHa, he finds move Heroin eaten ye unaraliblet2 Manet Sarat. oeeence fly ete eeuarand temper dpesl ements which inte ‘ling togeter he contents ofthe persed worl she to enter lt i cence mavens of detablation”(p 2, 6 Digs 9.52 27 Oyen se ul phil (Pe Mina, 197), 1. Pu Paton antes ee and ema of wich ue ‘on thong Diflecesod Reto, 0 “the Fad "the ‘Ss seing however, the lf fest eh, sod 1. lene Balai ft comer into pio French ack vento rie fo sro the lop rokoan of wach erinoogialdfrnce In hit etry e/a or Foca cropien de plone Sea 200) Heses he rte fhe he Me eden fiom Kasianrectig of Deere cpio, wile te Lack mes nd Bap, 9 pint mje (Pre PU, 1959) 94, 10. So Lay dens (Pe: Mia, 1969) pp. 8. The rtm rage ai Sn pat in hee ter * the oe etn tha ac pt Kat nt anys gong anyone, br ke Fe a sie of Aum fom sings. of pest seven lp -42, fires piton (ac PU, 1968, 9.73 12, On he cont between tue and both Pic nd Nhe on his score lan Hacking, The Taming of hance {New Yrs Cambie University Pre, 19, Haring’ a tan” chance an othe "nomali”chancetha eee di ‘oe fr example a fence, pp 36 ners fk aeration of he pe of ong 18. ore queer pp 72-73 1. Cg ng Pari Mit, 193) 9.10 18, Seed gen Paris Mit, 985) p22. Only ett in te word can reconnet mint wate ses nes to give a buck el inthe world~ ouch the pone of 1. ene ee plop 46Cartes Ove Immanence: A Life ‘Whats 2 transcendental field It can be dstingvished from experience in that it doesnt refer to an object cor belong toa sabject(empirial representation) I appears therfore asa pure stream of a-subjective consciousness, a pre-rfleive impersonal conscious nest a qualitative duration of consciousness without self It my seem curios that the transcendental be defined by such inumediate givens: we wil speak ofa transcendental empiri in contrat to everything that makes up the world ofthe subject andthe objet. “Thete is something will and powerful in thie tan scendental empiricist thit i af course not the ele ment of sosation (simple empiricism), for sensation is only a break witha the flow of bole conseious- ness. Is rather, however clase two senstions may he the passage from one to the other as hecoming, as increase o dereat in power (virtual quantity) Mustsve then define the transcendental fel by a pure i: mediate consciousness with neither object nor sel, tsa moveatent that neither begins nor ends? (Even Spinova's conception ofthis passage or quantity of power stil appeals to consciousness) atthe relation of the transcendental eld 0 com sciousnesis only a conceptual one. Consciousness becomes fact only when a subject is produced a the samme tate a its object, both Being outside the field and appearing a transcendent,” Conversely, Jong ws consciousness traverses the tanscendental Held at an infnite speed everywhere difsed, nothing is {o tose i! Is expresed im fc, only when iis lected on asubject that refers it to objects. That i ‘oy the transcendental field eannot be defined by the ‘sciousness that x coextensive witht, but remoed hom any revelation The transcendent is notthe transcendental, Wereit not for consciousness, the transcendental eld would Ine defined as pure pane af immanence, because it ules all transcendence ofthe subject and of the tbject Absolute immanence iin isl: i notin something, co somethings it does not depend on an bjt or belong to a subject. to Spinoza immanence ‘sat iosancnce to substance: rather, substance and in immanent. When the subject or the objet filing outside the plane ofmmanence taken 6 universal subjct ora any objec o which na rence is atributd, the transcendental is entirely de- ature, fori then simply redoubls the empirical (as ith Kant), and immanence is distorted, fort then finds itself enclosed in the transcendent. Immanence {snot related to Some Thing tunity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of thing its only when immanence is no longer fmmanence to anything oter than itself hat ‘we an speak of apne of immanence. No more than the transcendental field is defined by consciousness fan the plane of immanence be defined by a subject fran object that is able to contain it ‘We wl sy of pure immanence that itis ALIFE, and nothing eke. It is not mmanence to fe, bat the Inmmanent tha isin nothing i itelfa fe A if is the Jmmanence of mmanence, absolute imaanence: i complete power, complete bls. Its tothe degree that he goes beyond the aporas of the subject and the abject that Johann Fihte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental field so li, no longer dependent ona Being or submitted toan Act ~itisan sbsclute immediate consciousness whose very activity to longer refers to being bt is ceatclesly posed in 4 life The transcendental field then becomes a gen-tine plane of mmanence that reintroduce Spinal Ino the bear of the philosophical process, Did Mine de iran not go through sntething sea in bis “ast philosophy” (the one he was too tired to bring to fruition) when he discovered, beneath the trance ence of effort, an absolute immanent life? The tan scondental Feld ie defined bya plane of immanence, snd the plane of immanence by life. ‘Whatisimmanence? Alife... Noonehas described what lifes better than Charles Dicken, if we take he indefinite arte asa index ofthe tr ‘1, disreputable man, a rogue, held in contempt by seryone, i found ashe lies dying, Suddenly, those scene “king care ofhim manifest an eagerness, respect, even low for bis lightest sia of ie. Everybody bustles st to save him, co the poiat where, in his depest ra, this wicked man hitel seneessmmething sft ‘sweet penetrating him. fut to the degree that he mes back to lie i saviors tun colder, and he be ‘umes once agsn mean and crude. Hetween his life snd his death, dere ita moment that sony that of «life playing with death. The life of the individ ves way to an impersonal and yet singular fe dat Feleascea pure event fred fom the accidents of inter sland external fe, thai from the sabjecivity and happens: a “Homo tantum” with tiv of wh ‘whom everyone empathizes and who attains a ort of beatitde, It isa haeccity no longer of individuation but of singularzation: ie of pute immanence, neu teal, beyond good and ei, foe i was oly the subject that incarnated i inthe midst of hag tht made it good or bad, The life of such nivale fades aay in favor of the singular life immanent toa man who rn longer has 2 name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular esence, life But we shouldn't enclose life in the single mo ment when individual ie confronts unives death, A lifes everyshere inal the moments tht given living subject goes through and that are measured by given ied object: an immanent life carrying with ic the events or singularities that are merely actalized in subjects and objects. This indefinite life doesnot itself have moments, close as they may be one to an- ‘othe, but only between-times, Between-moments it doesn't just come about or come alter but offers the Jmmensity of an empty’ time where one ses the event yet co come and already happened, in the absolute of| an immediate consciousness. In his novels, Alexaider Lemet-Holenis places the event in an in-between time that could engulf entire armies. The singularities aud che events that constitute a fe coexist with the accidents ofthe ie that corresponds to it, but theyareneither grouped nor divided inthe same way. They ‘connect with one another ia. a manner entirely dilfer- ‘nt from how individuals connect. It ven sets that 4 singular life might do without any individuality, ‘without any other concomitant that individuaizes it For example, very small children all resemble one other and have hardy any individuality, but they Ihave singularities a smile, a gestae, a Fanny face — ‘not subjective qualities. Smal children, through all ‘heir sfferings and weaknesses, ae infsed with an immanent life that is pute power and even bliss, The indefinite agpects in life lose all indtermination to the degre that dey fill outa plane of immanence or, ‘whatamountstothe same thing, tothe degree that they ‘constitute the elements ofa transcendental eld (in- Aida life, on the other hand, remains inseparable from empirical determinations. Theindefiniteassuch isthe mark not of an empirical indetermination but ‘fa determination by inmanence ora transcendental ‘leterminabity. The infinite article i the indetr: tmination of the person only because ii deter ‘ion ofthe singular, The One snot the transcendent ‘Hot might contain immanence but the lmmanent con tained within a ranscendental field, One ie always vex of 4 multiphcty: an even, a singularity, li... Alhgh is aways posible to woke a tan seendent that fils outside the pane of immanence, or that attributes immanence to itself, all eranscen ence i constituted soely inthe flow of immanent conscioumess tat belongs t this lane. Transcen ence is alas a product of immanence, Alife contains ony virus, fs nade up of vit alts, events, singularities. What we cll vietulis not something tat licks reality but something tha is engaged in a process of actuslizaton following the plane that gives its particularity, The immanent ‘events actualized in a tate of things an of the Lied that make itappen. The plane of iamanence is itself actulzed in an object and a subject to which tate butes itself. But however inseparable an object and a subject may be from their actualiation, te plane of Jmmanence is itself virtual, so long asthe events that populate tare vrtaies, Events or singularities give to the plane all their virtuality, just athe plane of lenmanence gives virtual event thei ful realy. The vent considered as non-actualized (indefinite is lack Ing in nothing. It salfices to pt i relation to its concomitant: a anscendental field, plane off ences if, singularities. A wound i incarnated ‘or actualized in a state of things or of lifes but its itll a pure vitality on the ple of imsmanence that Jeads us into ae My wound existe before me: notaranscendence ofthe wound as higher actuality but fas immanence apa virtuality always within a mii {plane or field) There isa bigdiference between the virtuale that define the immanence of the transce ‘ental flan he possible forms that actalze them an transform them ato something transcendent Ths though we fed ack to tin he gt which oncates rom anh twit pose wpe, truld never ve bones (Hee Berson, Mater end “Men [New Yor: ae Boks, 188,738) 2 CL ara Stew posts a tancendent eld iho jes that res enaclusen that imper on abate nant wthrepect i eset che jee ae “ramsndente (Lo mcendone de Ee [Pr i, 96) 9p. 74-8), On mes ee Dv Lago’ sine Hn nes de concen ces Wali Joes” P phe 6 ne 1995 Aen in he second intron o LD de sien “The ton of pte scy which icing ied gress ot ag, bate" (Ors es dle pipe rem [Ps Ven 1964p 274). Om th concept of Tecoding to ihe te Ito 3 i Berke (Pi: otic 1948), and Mar Gal commay f. 9 4 Dicks, Or alan (New Yrs Onn ie sy Pes 199), 9.3, 5. Bren Ediund Hanser ads his "The Big ofthe orl ecu ascent cae een wih ergy einen ein ces Wnsendont "ut ths don ange the ft hata mene eo ated sly inthe iff mentale a Me." (anos ns ae Vin, ET 52. This willbe te ring point of Si exe jt toe Cpa Ce 1955), ™Cuarren Two Hume The Meaning of Empiriciem “The history of philosophy has more o les absorbed, or less digested, empiric. Ie has defined em Piricism as the reverse of rationalism Is there ot is there not in ideas something that snot i the senses ‘or the sensible? thas made of empiticism a erie of fanatenes, of the a rie. But empiric has al- ways harbored other secrets, And itis they that David Hume pases the farthest and lly illuminates in his extremely dificult and subtle work, Hume's position therefore quite pecala. His empiricism x ‘sort of sciencecfctln universe avant Ja Jere, At fn acience Hetion, one hat the impression of a fe tive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, bu also the preseatisient that cis word is already oars, nd hove creatures, ourselves, A parallel conversion of seiener oF theory Fallows: theory becomes an ngity{the origin ofthis conception isin Francis Bacon; Tnmmaniel Kant will rc ¢ while wansforming and toalsing it when he conceives of theory as court ‘or eribunal) Science or theory an inguey, which i to saya prctice: a practice ofthe seemingly fictive ‘world that empiricism describes a study ofthe con tions of legliacy of practices inthis empirical world that is infact our own, The result i a great conver sion of theory to prctce. The mantle ofthe history ‘ot philosophy misunderstand what they call “sso~ ‘dstonisa” when they see it a8 a theory in the ond say sense ofthe term and a a averted ational Tame raises unexpected questions that seem never ‘les familiar To establish posession ofan aban- Aone ety, does Javelin theown against the door sullics, oF must the door be touched by a Ringer? To tvhat extent can we be owners ofthe sea? Why ithe ground more important than the surface i juridical ‘stem, whereas in plating, the paitis more impor- tant than the canvas? Is ny then that ee prem of the association of ideas discovers ite meaning, What i clled the theory of astocation finds ts di rection ats ruth ina casuistry of relation, a prac tice f li, of politics, of economics, that completly snges the ature of philosophical reflection. 6 The Nature of Relations iame's orginaity—or one of Hume's onginalties— comes from the force wit which he asserts chat rela tions ae external other terms, We can understand sucha thesis only in contrast tothe entire endeavor of Philosophy as rationalism and its attempt to reduce ‘the paradox of relations: either by finding a way of| making relations internal to their own term or by finding a deeper and more comprehensive term to ‘which the relation would itself be internal. "Peter is smaller thas Pal”: How ean we make ofthis elation something internal to Peter or to Paul, oto their concept, oF tothe whole they form, orto the ia in ‘which they participate? How can we overcome the lnreduable exteriorty of relations? Empiricism had always fought forthe exteriorty of relations, But in certain way, its position on this emsined obscured by the problem of the origin of knowledge o of teas, according to which everything ins its origin inthe sensible and inthe operations ofthe mind upon the sensible iam fects an inversion tha would take emp dam toa higher power ideas contain nothing ther and nothing more than what Is contained in sensory Ipessions, it precisely because relations ate eX ternal and terogeneous to thelr terms—impressonsor Sas, Ths the dference isnt Between ideas ond impressions but between two sorts af impressions oF ideas impressions or ideas of terms and impressions tor ideas of relations, The real empiricist world is thereby lad out for the ist tne tothe filles: iti world of exterioity, «world in which thought itell lst in fundamental relationship with che Outside, 2 world in which terms are veritable atoms and rel: tons veritable extemal passages: a world which the conjunction “and” dethrones the ineririty ofthe vert “ia harlequin world of multicolored pattems ane non-ttaliable fragments where communication takes place through external relations. Hume's thought ‘built up ina double way through the atom that shows how ideas or sensory impressions refer to punc= ‘val minima producing time and space; and through the asocivonin that shows how relations are estab lished between these terms, abvays external t them, and dependent on other principles. On the one hand, 4 physics of the mind om the other, logic of el ‘ons, 1s thus Hume who frst break with the con- straining form of predictive judginent and makes possible an autonomous logic of relations, discovering conjunctive world of atoms and relations, ater de veloped by Bertrand Russell and modern logic, for relations re the conjunctions thermtlvr. ” Human Nature What isa relation? Its what makes ws pas from 3 ven impression ot kes tothe idea of sounething th [snot presently given, For example, | think of some- ‘hing “simile”... When I see a picture of Peter, 1 think of Peter, who isnt there. One would lookin vain inthe given tem forthe reason for this passage “The relation is itself the effect of so-called principes of asociaton, contiguity, resemblance, and causality all of which constitute, precisely, «human nature Human nature means that what is universal of con stant in the human mind is never one tea or anther 2s term but only the ways of passing fom one par tela idea to another Hume, in thi sense, wll d- vote himself to a concerted destruction af the three {reat terminal ideas of metaphysics: the Self, the World, and God. And yet at First Hume's thesis seems disappointing wha is the advantage of explaining relations by principles of human nature, which are principles of association that seem jas another way of sesigating relations? But thi disappointment derives from a misunderstanding of the problem, forthe problem isnot of cause but ofthe way elation func tion as effets of those causes and the practi condi ions of this fncioning, ‘Let us coder in thi reatd avery special relation:causality Its special because it doesn simply go froma given term to the idea of something that isn't presently given, Causility requires that Igo from something that is given to me tothe idea of some ‘thing that has never been given to me, tat nt even iveable in experienc. For example, based on some signs in book, Ibeieve that Caesar lived. When I see the sun rise, Tsay that twill be tomorrow: having seen water bul a 10 degrees, ay thatit necessarily boils at 100 degrees. Yet expessons such as “tomor- row.” “always” “necessarily” convey something that aot be given in experience: tomorrow it given wvithout becoming td, without ceasing to be to ‘row, and al experience is experience ofa cont emt particular. In other words, causality i relation secording to which I go beyond dhe given: Tsay more than what i given or piveable—in short, fe and 7 alive, Venpect that... This, Hume's fist displace rent is racial for i pts belie at dhe Basis nd the trgin of knowledge. The fanetoning of casa re tions can then be expe a follows: ae similar cases ave observed (all the times Ihave seen that o follows ‘or accompanies), they fuse in the imagination, while remaining distinct and separate fom each other in four understanding. This property of fasion in the Jamagination constigutes habit (J expect...) atthe ” same time a distnetion in the understanding eilors belief to the alelus of observed cases prubablity a calculus of degrees of belief). The principle of habit 1s fasion of similar cases inthe imagination and the Principle of experience as observation of distinct, cases inthe understanding thus combine to produce both the elation and the inference that follows from the relation (belief), through which causality fame Fett Fiction and Nature ate aranged ina particular way ia the empiricist world. Let to itself, the mind has the apaity to more fom one idea to apother but i does sot random, ia delirium that rane throughout the univers, creating fie dragons, winged horses, and monstrous plants. The principles of hia nator, on ‘he other band, impose constant rules on this deli ‘ums laws of page, of transition, of inference, which arein accordance with Nature isl. Butthenastange battle takes phae, for str thatthe principles of association shape the mind, by imposing om it a nature that dicplines the delriam orth ftions of ‘he imagination, conversely, the imagination uses these same principles to make it itions or its fantasies aeceptahle and to gve them a warrant they wouldn'thave om their own. In this ease, it belongs to ftion to feign these relations, to induce itive ones, and to make us belive in our follies. We se this not ony in the git fantasy has of doubling any present relation with other relations tht mt exist ina given eas, But especially inthe case of causality, fantasy forges Fieve causal chain, legitimate rules, simulacra of hele, either by conflating the accidental and the sential or byssing the properties of language going beyond experince) to substitute forthe repetition of similar eases actually observed simple verbal rept tion that ony simulates ts effect thas thatthe lar believes in his es by dint of expeating them: ed cation, superstition, eloquence, anid poetry also work inthis way. One no longer goes beyond experience in 2 scientific way that will be confirmed by Nature itself and by a cosresponding ealeulus: one goes be yond tinal the directions of deriv that forms a ounter-Nature, allowing forthe fasion of anything a all Fantay uses the principles of avocaton to tur them round, giving them an legitimate exten son. Hume thereby elects a second great displace tment in philosophy; which consists in substituting for the traditional concep of error a concept of dl ‘or illsion, according to which there ar beliefs chat ae not fale hut llegtinate~ illegitimate exercises ‘of faculties, illegitimate Functioning of relations. this aw Kant owes something esentl to Hume: wearenotthreatenedby eroratherand much worse, webathe i dels. ‘ut his would stil be nothing along asthe e- tons of fantanytarn the principles of human nature against themselves in conditions that can always be cortected, a, for example, inthe ease of enusality ‘where a strict calulus of probabilities cas denounce delirious extrapolations oF feigned relations. ut the illusion is considerably worse when it belongs to ‘man nature, in other words, when the illegitimate exercise or belie is incorigble, inseparable from legltimate beliefs, and indispensable to their organi= zation. In this cae, the fanciful usage of the principles of hum nature itself becomes a principe, Fiction and delirium shift over tothe side of human nature That i what Hume wil show in hit most subtle, most,