Battle of Malaya

Background
By 1941 the Japanese had been engaged for four years in trying to subjugate China. They were heavily reliant
on imported materials for their military, particularly oil from America. From 1940 to 1941 embargoes on
supplying oil and war materials to the Japanaese were introduced by America, Britain, and the Dutch. The
object of the embargoes was to assist the Chinese and encourage the Japanese to halt military action in China.
The Japanese considered that pulling out of China would result in loss of face and decided instead to take
military action against American, British and Dutch territories in South East Asia.
Planning for this offensive was undertaken by the Japanese Military Affairs Bureau's Unit 82 based in Taiwan.
Intelligence on Malaya was gathered through a network of agents which included Japanese embassy staff;
disaffected Malayans (particularly members of the Japanese established Tortoise Society); and Japanese,
Korean, and Taiwanese business people and tourists. Japanese spies, which included a British intelligence
officer, Captain Patrick Stanley Vaughan Heenan, also provided intelligence and assistance. Through these
networks and prior to the invasion the Japanese knew where the Commonwealth forces were based and their
unit strengths, had good maps of Malaya, and had local guides available to provide them with directions.

The Japanese forces for the invasion were assembled in 1941 at Hainan Island and in French Indo-China. This
troop build-up was noticed by the Allies and, when asked, the Japanese advised that it related to its operations
in China.

When the Japanese invaded, they had over 200 tanks, consisting of the Type 95 Ha-Go, Type 97 Chi-Ha, Type
89  I-Go and Type 97  Te-Ke. In addition they had over 500 combat aircraft available. Commonwealth troops
were equipped with the Lanchester 6x4 Armoured Car, Marmon-Herrington Armoured Car, Universal
Carrier and only 23 obsolete light tanks, none of which were sufficiently armed for armoured warfare. They
had just over 200 combat aircraft, but half of these were destroyed inside the first few days of combat.

Commonwealth
Between the wars, the United Kingdom's military strategy in the Far East was undermined by a lack of
attention and funding. In 1937, Major-General William Dobbie, Officer Commanding Malaya (1935–1939),
looked at Malaya's defences and reported that during the monsoon season, from October to March, landings
could be made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in Siam (Thailand). He predicted
that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Siam, and Kota Bharu in Malaya. He recommended
large reinforcements to be sent immediately. His predictions turned out to be correct, but his recommendations
were ignored. The British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at
the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility, in order to defend both Britain's Far Eastern
possessions and the route to Australia. A strong naval presence was also thought to act as a deterrent against
possible aggressors.
By 1940, however, the army commander in Malaya, Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, conceded that a
successful defence of Singapore demanded the defence of the whole peninsula, and that the naval base alone
would not be sufficient to deter a Japanese invasion.  Military planners concluded that the desired Malayan air
force strength would be 300–500 aircraft, but this was never reached because of the higher priorities in the
allocation of men and material for Britain and the Middle East.
The defence strategy for Malaya rested on two basic assumptions: first, that there would be sufficient early
warning of an attack to allow for reinforcement of British troops, and second, that American help was at hand
in case of attack. By late 1941, it became clear that neither of these assumptions had any real substance.  In
addition, Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that in the event of war breaking out in the east, priority would
be given to finishing the war in the west. The east, until that time, would be a secondary priority. Containment
was considered the primary strategy in the east.
In November 1941 the British became aware of the large scale build up of Japanese troops in French Indo-
China. Thailand was seen to be under threat from this build-up as well as Malaya. British strategists had
foreseen the possibility of Thailand's Kra peninsula being used by the Japanese to invade Malaya. To
counteract this plans for a pre-emptive invasion of southern Thailand, named Operation Matador, had been
drawn up. By the time the invasion became highly likely the British decided not to use them for political
reasons.

Japan invades
The Battle of Malaya began when the 25th Army invaded Malaya on 8 December 1941. Japanese troops
launched an amphibious assault on the northern coast of Malaya at Kota Bharu and started advancing down the
eastern coast of Malaya.This was made in conjunction with landings at Pattani and Songkhla in Thailand,
where they then proceeded south overland across the Thailand-Malayan border to attack the western portion of
Malaya.
The Japanese were allied with the Axis collaborators, the Vichy French, and had been given access to naval
facilities and supplies in French Indochina where they massed their forces for the invasion. They then coerced
the Thai government into letting them use Thai military bases to launch attacks into Malaya, after having
fought Thai troops for eight hours early in the morning. At 04:00, 17 Imperial Japanese
Navy bombers attacked Singapore, the first ever air raid aimed at the colony. It became evident Japanese
aircraft bombers operating in Saigon were now in range of Singapore.
The Japanese were initially resisted by III Corps of the Indian Army and several British Army battalions. The
Japanese quickly isolated individual Indian units defending the coastline, before concentrating their forces to
surround the defenders and forcing their surrender.
The Japanese forces held a slight advantage in numbers on the ground in northern Malaya, and were
significantly superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics and experience, with the Japanese
units having fought in China. The Allies had no tanks, which had put them at a severe disadvantage. The
Japanese also used bicycle infantry and light tanks, which allowed swift movement of their forces overland
through terrain covered with thick tropical rainforest, albeit criss-crossed by native paths. Although the
Japanese had not brought bicycles with them (in order to speed the disembarkation process), they knew from
their intelligence that suitable machines were plentiful in Malaya and quickly confiscated what they needed
from civilians and retailers.
A replacement for Operation Matador, named Operation Krohcol, was implemented on 8 December, but the
Indian troops were easily defeated by the Japanese 5th Division, which had already landed in Pattani Province,
Thailand.
The naval Force Z—consisting of the battleship HMS  Prince of Wales, battlecruiser HMS Repulse, and
four destroyers, under the command of Admiral Tom Phillips—had arrived right before the outbreak of
hostilities. However, Japanese air superiority led to the sinking of the capital ships on 10 December, leaving
the east coast of Malaya exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their landings

Air war

The Allied fighter squadrons in Malaya—equipped with Brewster Buffaloes—were beset with numerous

problems, including poorly-built and ill-equipped planes; inadequate supplies of spare parts; inadequate
numbers of support staff; airfields that were difficult to defend against air attack; lack of a clear and coherent
command structure;[  antagonism between RAF and Royal Australian Air Force squadrons and personnel;[
and inexperienced pilots lacking appropriate training.
Commonwealth fighters were swept off the sky by the Nakajima Ki-43 Oscar of Sentai (groups) 59 & 64, and
the Nakajima Ki-27 Nate of other three Sentai. Despite being slower, undergunned, underpowered in
comparison (Ki-27's even had fixed main landing gear) as well as having absolutely no protection for pilot,
engine or fuel tanks, Japanese fighters managed to get absolute air superiority in Malaya thanks to their
superior agility and training. Because of this, allied air forces suffered severe losses in the first week of the
campaign, resulting in the ongoing merger of squadrons and their gradual evacuation to the Dutch East Indies.
One pilot—Sergeant Malcolm Neville Read of 453 Squadron RAAF—sacrificed himself by ramming his
Buffalo into a Nakajima Ki-43 Oscar of 64th Sentai over Kuala Lumpur on 22 December.
One squadron of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force (ML-KNIL) — 2-VLG-V — was
deployed to Singapore, contributing to the Allied cause before being recalled to Java on 18 January. Several
Dutch pilots—including Jacob van Helsdingen and August Deibel—responded to a number of air raids over
Singapore while stationed at Kallang Airport. They claimed a total of six aircraft, particularly the Nakajima
Ki-27 Nate, which fared poorly in Malaya. Their involvement in Malaya, however, did little to weaken the
Japanese air force.
The remaining offensive aircraft—the Bristol Blenheim, Lockheed Hudson light bombers and very specially
the Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bombers—were considered obsolete for the European theater of operations.
Most were quickly destroyed by Japanese aircraft and played an insignificant part in the campaign. One
Blenheim pilot—Squadron Leader Arthur Scarf—was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for an attack
on 9 December.
In addition, the Japanese military intelligence service had managed to recruit a British officer, Captain Patrick
Heenan, an Air Liaison Officer with the Indian Army. While the effects of Heenan's actions are disputed, the
Japanese were able to destroy almost every Allied aircraft in northern Malaya within three days. Heenan was
arrested on 10 December and sent to Singapore. However, the Japanese had already achieved air superiority.

Advance down the Malayan Peninsulaedit 

The defeat of Allied troops at Jitra by Japanese forces, supported by tanks moving south from Thailand on 11
December 1941 and the rapid advance of the Japanese inland from their Kota Bharu beachhead on the north-
east coast of Malaya overwhelmed the northern defences. Without any real naval presence, the British were
unable to challenge Japanese naval operations off the Malayan coast, operations which proved invaluable to
the invading army. With virtually no remaining Allied planes, the Japanese also had mastery of the skies,
leaving the Allied ground troops and civilian population exposed to air attack.
The Malayan island of Penang was bombed daily by the Japanese from 8 December and abandoned on 17
December. Arms, boats, supplies and a working radio station were left in haste to the Japanese. The evacuation
of Europeans from Penang, with local inhabitants being left to the mercy of the Japanese, caused much
embarrassment for the British and alienated them from the local population. Historians judge that "the moral
collapse of British rule in Southeast Asia came not at Singapore, but at Penang" 
On 23 December, Major-General David Murray-Lyon of the Indian 11th Infantry Division was removed from
command to little effect. By the end of the first week in January, the entire northern region of Malaya had been
lost to the Japanese. At the same time, Thailand officially signed a Treaty of Friendship with Imperial Japan,
which completed the formation of their loose military alliance. Thailand was then allowed by the Japanese to
resume sovereignty over several sultanates in northern Malaya, thus consolidating their occupation. It did not
take long for the Japanese army's next objective, the city of Kuala Lumpur, to fall. The Japanese entered and
occupied the city unopposed on 11 January 1942. Singapore Island was now less than 200 mi (320 km) away
for the invading Japanese army.
The 11th Indian Division managed to delay the Japanese advance at Kampar for a few days, in which the
Japanese suffered severe casualties in terrain that did not allow them to use their tanks or their air superiority to
defeat the British. The 11th Indian Division was forced to retreat when the Japanese landed troops by sea south
of the Kampar position. The British retreated to prepared positions at Slim River.
At the disastrous Slim River battle, in which two Indian brigades were practically annihilated, the Japanese
used surprise and tanks to devastating effect in a risky night attack. The success of this attack forced Percival
into replacing the 11th Indian Division with the 8th Australian Division.

Defence of Johor

By mid-January, the Japanese had reached the southern Malayan state of Johore where, on 14 January, they
encountered troops from the Australian 8th Division, commanded by Major-General Gordon Bennett, for the
first time in the campaign. During engagements with the Australians, the Japanese experienced their first major
tactical setback, due to the stubborn resistance put up by the Australians at Gemas. The battle—centred around
the Gemencheh Bridge—proved costly for the Japanese, who suffered up to 600 casualties but the bridge itself
—which had been demolished during the fighting—was repaired within six hours. [24]
As the Japanese attempted to outflank the Australians to the west of Gemas, one of the bloodiest battles of the
campaign began on 15 January on the peninsula's West coast near the Muar River. Bennett allocated the 45th
Indian Brigade—a new and half-trained formation—to defend the river's South bank but the unit was
outflanked by Japanese units landing from the sea and the Brigade was effectively destroyed with its
commander, Brigadier H. C. Duncan, and all three of his battalion commanders killed. Two Australian infantry
battalions—which had been sent to support the 45th Brigade—were also outflanked and their retreat cut off,
with one of the Australian battalion commanders killed in the fighting around the town of Bakri, south-east of
Muar. During the fighting at Bakri Australian anti-tank gunners had destroyed nine Japanese tanks, slowing the
Japanese advance long enough for the surviving elements of the five battalions to attempt an escape from the
Muar area.
Led by Australian Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Anderson, the surviving Indian and Australian troops formed
the "Muar Force" and fought a desperate four-day withdrawal, allowing remnants of the Commonwealth troops
withdrawing from northern Malaya to avoid being cut off and to push past the Japanese to safety. When the
Muar Force reached the bridge at Parit Sulong and found it to be firmly in enemy hands, Anderson, with
mounting numbers of dead and wounded, ordered "every man for himself". Those that could took to the
jungles, swamps and rubber plantations in search of their division headquarters at Yong Peng. The wounded
were left to the mercy of the Japanese and all but two out of 135 were tortured and killed in the Parit Sulong
Massacre. Anderson was awarded a Victoria Cross for his fighting withdrawal. The Battle of Muar cost the
allies an estimated 3,000 casualties including one brigadier and four battalion commanders.
On 20 January, further Japanese landings took place at Endau, in spite of an air attack by Vildebeest bombers.
The final Commonwealth defensive line in Johore of Batu Pahat-Kluang-Mersing was now being attacked
along its full length. Unfortunately, Percival had resisted the construction of fixed defences in Johore, as on the
North shore of Singapore, dismissing them in the face of repeated requests to start construction from his Chief
Engineer, Brigadier Ivan Simson, with the comment "Defences are bad for morale." On 27 January, Percival
received permission from the commander of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command—
General Archibald Wavell—to order a retreat across the Johore Strait to the island of Singapore.

Retreat to Singapore

On 31 January, the last organised Allied forces left Malaya, and Allied engineers blew a 70  ft (21 m)-wide
hole in the causeway that linked Johore and Singapore; a few stragglers would wade across over the next few
days. Japanese raiders and infiltrators, often disguised as Singaporean civilians, began to cross the Straits of
Johor in inflatable boats soon afterwards.
In less than two months, the Battle for Malaya had ended in comprehensive defeat for the Commonwealth
forces and their retreat from the Malay Peninsula to the fortress of Singapore. Nearly 50,000 Commonwealth
troops had been captured or killed during the battle. The Japanese Army invaded the island of Singapore on 7
February and completed their conquest of the island on 15 February, capturing 80,000 more prisoners out of
the 85,000 allied defenders.
By the end of January, Patrick Heenan—British Indian Army captain convicted of treason, after spying
for Japan—had been court-martialled and sentenced to death. On 13 February, five days after the invasion of
Singapore Island, and with Japanese forces approaching the city centre, Heenan was taken by military police to
the waterside and was hastily executed. His body was thrown into the sea.

Battles of the campaign

 Battle of Kota Bharu (1941)
 Bombing of Singapore (1941)
 Operation Krohcol (1941)
 Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse (1941)
 Battle of Jitra (1941)
 Battle of Kampar (1941)
 Battle of Slim River (1942)
 Battle of Gemas (1942)
 Battle of Muar (1942)
 Battle off Endau (1942)
Battle of Singapore
The Battle of Singapore, also known as the Fall of Singapore, was fought in the South-East Asian theatre of
the Second World War when the Empire of Japan invaded the Allied stronghold of Singapore. Singapore was
the major British military base in South-East Asia and nicknamed the "Gibraltar of the East". The fighting in
Singapore lasted from 8–15 February 1942.
It resulted in the capture of Singapore by the Japanese and the largest surrender of British-led military
personnel in history. About 80,000 British, Indian and Australian troops became prisoners of war, joining
50,000 taken by the Japanese in the earlier Malayan Campaign. British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill called the ignominious fall of Singapore to the Japanese the "worst disaster" and "largest
capitulation" in British military history. In just seven days, Singapore, the "Impregnable Fortress", had fallen.

Background
The Allies had imposed a trade embargo on Japan in response to its continued campaigns in China. Seeking
alternative sources of necessary materials for its Pacific War against the Allies, Japan invaded
Malaya. Singapore — to the south — was connected to Malaya by the Johor–Singapore Causeway. The
Japanese saw it as a port which could be used as a launching pad against other Allied interests in the area, and
to consolidate the invaded territory.

Invasion of Malaya

The Japanese 25th Army invaded Malaya from Indochina, moving into northern Malaya and Thailand
by amphibious assault on 8 December 1941. This was virtually simultaneous with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, which was meant to deter the US from intervening in Southeast Asia. Japanese troops in
Thailand coerced the Thai government to let the Japanese use their military bases for the invasion of other
nations in Southeast Asia and then proceeded overland across the Thai–Malayan border to attack Malaya. At
this time, the Japanese began bombing strategic sites in Singapore, and air raids were conducted on Singapore
from 29 December onwards.
The Japanese 25th Army was resisted in northern Malaya by III Corps of the British Indian Army. Although
the 25th Army was outnumbered by Allied forces in Malaya and Singapore, Japanese commanders
concentrated their forces. The Japanese were superior in close air support, armour, coordination, tactics and
experience. Moreover, the British forces repeatedly allowed themselves to be outflanked, believing—despite
repeated flanking attacks by the Japanese—that the Malayan jungle was impassable. The  Imperial Japanese
Army Air Force was more numerous, and better trained than the second-hand assortment of untrained pilots
and inferior allied equipment remaining in Malaya, Borneo and Singapore. Their superior fighters—especially
the Nakajima Ki-43—helped the Japanese to gain air supremacy. The Allies had no tanks and few armoured
vehicles, which put them at a severe disadvantage.
The battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers (Force Z) reached
Malaya before the Japanese began their air assaults. This force was thought to be a deterrent to the Japanese.
Their aircraft, however, sank the capital ships, leaving the east coast of the Malayan peninsula exposed and
allowing the Japanese to continue their amphibious landings. Japanese forces quickly isolated, surrounded, and
forced the surrender of Indian units defending the coast. They advanced down the Malayan peninsula
overwhelming the defences, despite their numerical inferiority. The Japanese forces also used bicycle
infantry and light tanks, allowing swift movement through the jungle.
Although more Allied units—including some from the Australian 8th Division—joined the campaign, the
Japanese prevented the Allied forces from regrouping, they also overran cities, and advanced toward
Singapore. The city was an anchor for the operations of the American-British-Dutch-Australian
Command (ABDACOM), the first Allied joint command of the Second World War. Singapore also controlled
the main shipping channel between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. On 31 January, the last Allied forces left
Malaya and Allied engineers blew up the causeway linking Johor and Singapore. Japanese infiltrators—many
disguised as Singaporean civilians—crossed the Straits of Johor in inflatable boats soon afterwards.
Prelude
During the weeks preceding the invasion, the Allied force suffered a number of both subdued and openly
disruptive disagreements amongst its senior commanders, as well as pressure from the Australian Prime
Minister, John Curtin. Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, commander of the garrison, had 85,000 soldiers,
the equivalent, on paper at least, of just over four divisions. There were about 70,000 front-line troops in 38
infantry battalions—13 British, six Australian, 17 Indian, two Malayan—and three machine-gun battalions.
The newly arrived British 18th Infantry Division—under Major-General Merton Beckwith-Smith—was at full
strength, but lacked experience and appropriate training; most of the other units were under strength, a few
having been amalgamated due to heavy casualties, as a result of the mainland campaign. The local battalions
had no experience and in some cases no training.
Percival gave Major-General Gordon Bennett's two brigades from the Australian 8th Division responsibility
for the western side of Singapore, including the prime invasion points in the northwest of the island. This was
mostly mangrove swamp and jungle, broken by rivers and creeks. In the heart of the "Western Area" was RAF
Tengah, Singapore's largest airfield at the time. The Australian 22nd Brigade was assigned a 10 mi (16 km)
wide sector in the west, and the 27th Brigade had responsibility for a 4,000 yd (3,700 m) zone just west of the
Causeway. The infantry positions were reinforced by the recently arrived Australian 2/4th Machine-Gun
Battalion. Also under Bennett's command was the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade.
The Indian III Corps under Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Heath—including the Indian 11th Infantry Division,
(Major-General B. W. Key), the British 18th Division and the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade—was assigned the
north-eastern sector, known as the "Northern Area". This included the naval base at Sembawang. The
"Southern Area"—including the main urban areas in the south-east—was commanded by Major-General Frank
Keith Simmons. His forces comprised about 18 battalions, including the Malayan 1st Infantry Brigade,
the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force Brigade and Indian 12th Infantry Brigade.
From aerial reconnaissance, scouts, infiltrators and high ground across the straits, such as at Istana Bukit
Serene, the Sultan of Johor's palace, the Japanese commander—General Tomoyuki Yamashita—and his staff
gained excellent knowledge of the Allied positions. Yamashita and his officers stationed themselves at Istana
Bukit Serene and the Johor state secretariat building—the Sultan Ibrahim Building—to plan for the invasion of
Singapore.

Although advised by his top military personnel that Istana Bukit Serene was an easy target, Yamashita was
confident that the British Army would not attack the palace because it was the pride and a possession of the
Sultan of Johor. Yamashita's prediction was correct, as the British Army did not dare attack the palace.

From 3 February, the Allies were shelled by Japanese artillery and air attacks on Singapore intensified over the
next five days. The artillery and air bombardment strengthened, severely disrupting communications between
Allied units and their commanders and affecting preparations for the defence of the island.

It is a commonly repeated misconception that Singapore's famous large-calibre coastal guns were ineffective

against the Japanese because they were designed to face south to defend the harbour against naval attack and
could not be turned round to face north. In fact, most of the guns could be turned, and were indeed fired at the
invaders. However, the guns - which included one battery of three 15 in (380 mm) weapons and one with two
15 in (380 mm) guns — were supplied mostly with armour-piercing (AP) shells and few high explosive (HE)
shells. AP shells were designed to penetrate the hulls of heavily armoured warships and were virtually
ineffective against personnel. Military analysts later estimated that if the guns had been well supplied with HE
shells the Japanese attackers would have suffered heavy casualties, but the invasion would not have been
prevented by this means alone.
Yamashita had just over 30,000 men from three divisions: the Imperial Guards Division under Lieutenant-
General Takuma Nishimura, the 5th Division under Lieutenant-General Takuro Matsui and the 18th
Division under Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi. The elite Imperial Guards units included a light tank
brigade.
Percival incorrectly guessed the Japanese would land forces on the North East side of Singapore. This was
encouraged by the deliberate movement of enemy troops in this sector to deceive the British. Therefore a large
portion of defence equipment and resources was allocated to the North Eastern sector and the Australian sector
had no serious fixed defence works or obstacles. A daring Australian night patrol in the days leading up to the
Japanese attack discovered hidden naval assault boats and a concentration of troops. The Australians requested
the immediate shelling of these positions to disrupt the Japanese preparations but Percival and his senior
commanders ignored the request, believing that the real assault would come in the North Eastern sector, not the
North West. Like so many other times in this campaign, Percival and his commanders' poor leadership and
decision making made the job of his troops almost impossible.

Battle
Blowing up the causeway had delayed the Japanese attack for over a week. Prior to the main assault the
Australians were subjected to a terrific artillery bombardment that cut telephone lines and effectively isolated
forward units from rear areas. Even at this stage, a counter artillery barrage as a response could have been
mounted by the British on the coastline opposite the Australians that would have caused casualties and
disruption among the Japanese assault troops. But the bombardment of the Australians was not seen as a
prelude to imminent attack, despite its ferocity exceeding anything the Allies had experienced thus far in the
campaign.

At 20:30 on 8 February, Australian machine gunners opened fire on vessels carrying the first wave of 4,000
troops from the 5th and 18th Divisions toward Singapore island. The Japanese assaulted Sarimbun Beach, in
the sector controlled by the Australian 22nd Brigade under Brigadier Harold Taylor. Spotlights had been sited
by a British unit on the beaches to enable the Australians to clearly see any attacking forces on the water in
front of them. But the British commander of this unit could not be contacted when the communication lines
were cut, so the Australians were forced to fire into the darkness at the sound of approaching boats or at their
silhouettes from the few burning vessels that had been hit by lucky mortar fire. What was supposed to be an
illuminated killing field was instead a difficult, dark area that favoured the attackers more than the defenders.
Once the Japanese reached the darkened shorelines, they could easily disperse into the undergrowth and jungle
terrain where they would be unseen by the Australians in their static, fixed positions. This allowed the mobile
but hidden Japanese to either surround and destroy pockets of Australian resistance or simply bypass them to
reach other objectives. As was the case throughout the Malayan and Singapore campaign, the fast moving,
mobile Japanese always had the advantage over the static Allied positions, who because of limited visibility
caused by the terrain, could rarely tell if they were being attacked by small or large numbers of their concealed
enemies.

Fierce fighting raged all day, but eventually the increasing Japanese numbers—and the superiority of their
artillery, aircraft and military intelligence—began to take their toll. In the northwest of the island they
exploited gaps in the thinly spread Allied lines such as rivers and creeks. By midnight, the two Australian
brigades had lost communications with each other, and the 22nd Brigade was forced to retreat. At 01:00, more
Japanese troops were landed in the northwest of the island and the last Australian reserves went in. Near dawn
on 9 February, elements of the 22nd Brigade were overrun or surrounded; the  2/18th Australian Infantry
Battalion had lost more than half of its personnel.

Air war

Air cover was provided by only ten Hawker Hurricane fighters of RAF No. 232 Squadron, based at Kallang
Airfield. This was because Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery at Johor Bahru.
Kallang Airfield was the only operational airstrip left; the surviving squadrons and aircraft were withdrawn by
January to reinforce the Dutch East Indies.
At 04:15 on 8 December 1941, Singapore was subjected to aerial bombing for the first time by long-range
Japanese aircraft, such as the Mitsubishi G3M3 "Nell" and the Mitsubishi G4M1 "Betty", based in Japanese-
occupied Indochina. The bombers struck the city centre as well as the Sembawang Naval Base and the island's
northern airfields. After this first raid, throughout the rest of December, there were a number of false alerts and
several infrequent and sporadic hit-and-run attacks on outlying military installations such as the Naval Base,
but no actual raids on Singapore City. The situation had become so desperate, it included a British soldier
firing a Vickers machine gun from the middle of a road at any aircraft that passed. He could only say: "The
bloody bastards will never think of looking for me in the open, and I want to see a bloody plane brought
down."

The next recorded raid on the city occurred on the night of 29/30 December, and nightly raids ensued for over
a week, only to be accompanied by daylight raids from 12 January 1942 onward. In the days that followed, as
the Japanese army drew ever nearer to Singapore Island, these day and night raids increased in frequency and
intensity, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties, up to the time of the British surrender.

During December, 51 Hurricane Mk II fighters were sent to Singapore, with 24 pilots, the nuclei of five
squadrons. They arrived on 3 January 1942, by which stage the F2A Buffalo squadrons had been
overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron was formed and No. 488 Squadron RNZAF, a Buffalo squadron had
converted to Hurricanes. 232 Squadron became operational on 20 January and destroyed three  Nakajima Ki-
43 "Oscars" that day,[14] for the loss of three Hurricanes. However, like the Buffalos before them, the
Hurricanes began to suffer severe losses in intense dogfights.
During the period 27 January–30 January, another 48 Hurricanes (the Mk IIA variant), arrived with No. 226
Group (four squadrons) on the aircraft carrier HMS  Indomitable, from which they flew to airfields code-named
P1 and P2, near Palembang, Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies. The staggered arrival of the Hurricanes — along
with inadequate early warning systems — meant that Japanese air raids were able to destroy a large proportion
of the Hurricanes on the ground in Sumatra and Singapore.
On the morning of 8 February, a number of aerial dogfights took place over Sarimbun Beach and other western
areas. In the first encounter, the last ten Hurricanes were scrambled from Kallang Airfield to intercept a
Japanese formation of about 84 planes, flying from Johor to provide air cover for their invasion force. [12] In
two sorties, the Hurricanes shot down six Japanese planes for the loss of one of their own; they flew back to
Kallang halfway through the battle, hurriedly re-fuelled, then returned to it. [15] Air battles went on for the rest
of the day, and by nightfall it was clear that with the few machines Percival had left, Kallang could no longer
be used as a base. With his assent the remaining eight flyable Hurricanes were withdrawn to Palembang,
Sumatra, and Kallang merely became an advanced landing ground.No Allied aircraft were seen again over
Singapore, the Japanese had achieved complete air supremacy.
On the evening of 10 February, General Archibald Wavell ordered the transfer of all remaining Allied air force
personnel to the Dutch East Indies. By this time, Kallang Airfield was so pitted with bomb craters that it was
no longer usable.

Second day
Believing that further landings would occur in the northeast, Percival did not reinforce the 22nd Brigade. On 9
February, the Japanese landings shifted to the southwest, where they encountered the 44th Indian Infantry
Brigade. Allied units were forced to retreat further east. Bennett decided to form a secondary defensive line,
known as the "Jurong Line", around Bulim, east of Tengah Airfield and just north of Jurong.
Brigadier Duncan Maxwell's Australian 27th Brigade, to the north, did not face Japanese assaults until the
Imperial Guards landed at 22:00 on 9 February. This operation went very badly for the Japanese, who suffered
severe casualties from Australian mortars and machine guns, and from burning oil which had been sluiced into
the water. A small number of Guards reached the shore and maintained a tenuous beachhead.

Command and control problems caused further cracks in the Allied defence. Maxwell was aware that the 22nd
Brigade was under increasing pressure, but was unable to contact Taylor and was wary of encirclement. In
spite of his brigade's success, and in contravention of orders from Bennett, Maxwell ordered it to withdraw
from Kranji in the central north. The Allies thereby lost control of the beaches adjoining the west side of the
causeway.
Japanese breakthrough
The opening at Kranji made it possible for Imperial Guards armoured units to land there unopposed. Tanks
with buoyancy aids attached were towed across the strait and advanced rapidly south, along Woodlands Road.
This allowed Yamashita to outflank the 22nd Brigade on the Jurong Line, as well as bypassing the 11th Indian
Division at the naval base. However, the Imperial Guards failed to seize an opportunity to advance into the city
centre itself.
On the evening of 10 February, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, cabled Wavell, saying:
I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. It was reported to Cabinet by
the C.I.G.S. [Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke] that Percival has over 100,000 [sic]
men, of whom 33,000 are British and 17,000 Australian. It is doubtful whether the Japanese have as many in
the whole Malay Peninsula... In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber Japanese forces
who have crossed the straits, and in a well-contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage
be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all
costs. The 18th Division has a chance to make its name in history. Commanders and senior officers should die
with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake. I rely on you to show
no mercy to weakness in any form. With the Russians fighting as they are and the Americans so stubborn at
Luzon, the whole reputation of our country and our race is involved. It is expected that every unit will be
brought into close contact with the enemy and fight it out 
Wavell subsequently told Percival that the ground forces were to fight on to the end, and that there should not
be a general surrender in Singapore.
On 11 February, knowing that Japanese supplies were running perilously low, Yamashita decided to bluff and
he called on Percival to "give up this meaningless and desperate resistance". By this stage, the fighting strength
of the 22nd Brigade—which had borne the brunt of the Japanese attacks—had been reduced to a few hundred
men. The Japanese had captured the Bukit Timah area, including most of the Allied ammunition and fuel and
giving them control of the main water supplies.
The next day, the Allied lines stabilised around a small area in the southeast of the island and fought off
determined Japanese assaults. Other units—including the 1st Malaya Infantry Brigade—had joined in. A
Malayan platoon—led by 2nd Lieutenant Adnan bin Saidi—held the Japanese for two days at the Battle of
Pasir Panjang. His unit defended Bukit Chandu, an area which included a major Allied ammunition store.
Adnan was executed by the Japanese after his unit was overrun.

On 13 February, with the Allies still losing ground, senior officers advised Percival to surrender in the interests
of minimising civilian casualties. Percival refused, but unsuccessfully sought authority to surrender from his
superiors.

That same day, military police executed a convicted British traitor, Captain Patrick Heenan, who had been an
Air Liaison Officer with the British Indian Army. Japanese military intelligence had recruited Heenan before
the war, and he had used a radio to assist them in targeting Allied airfields in northern Malaya. He had been
arrested on 10 December and court-martialled in January. Heenan was shot at Keppel Harbour, on the south
side of Singapore, his body was thrown into the sea.

The following day, the remaining Allied units fought on; civilian casualties mounted as one million people
crowded into the area still held by the Allies, bombing and artillery fire increased. Civilian authorities began to
fear that the water supply would give out.

Alexandra Hospital massacre

At about 13:00 on 14 February, Japanese soldiers advanced towards the Alexandra Barracks Hospital. [21] A
British lieutenant—acting as an envoy with a white flag—approached the Japanese forces but was killed with
a bayonet. After the Japanese troops entered the hospital, a number of patients, including those undergoing
surgery at the time, were killed along with doctors and members of nursing staff. The following day about 200
male staff members and patients who had been assembled and bound the previous day, many of them walking
wounded, were ordered to walk about 400 m (440 yd) to an industrial area. Anyone who fell on the way was
bayoneted. The men were forced into a series of small, badly ventilated rooms where they held overnight
without water. Some died during the night as a result of their treatment. The remainder were bayoneted the
following morning.
Private Haines of the Wiltshire Regiment—a survivor—had been in the hospital suffering from malaria. He
wrote a four-page account of the massacre that was sold by his daughter by private auction in 2008; Haines
described how the Japanese did not consider those who were weak, wounded or who had surrendered to be
worthy of life. After surrendering, staff were ordered to proceed down a corridor, where Sergeant Rogers was
bayoneted twice in the back and another officer, Captain Parkinson, was bayoneted through the throat. Others
killed included Captain Heevers and Private Lewis. Captain Smiley and Private Sutton were bayoneted but
survived by playing dead. Many who had not been imprisoned in the tiny rooms in the industrial area were
systematically taken away in small groups and bayoneted or macheted to death. This continued for 24 hours,
leaving 320 men and one woman dead. Those who lost their lives included a corporal from the Loyal
Regiment, who was impaled on the operating table, and even a Japanese prisoner who was perhaps mistaken
for a Gurkha.
There were only five known survivors, including George Britton (1922–2009) of the East Surrey Regiment,
[28] and Private Haines. Also Hugo Hughes, who lost his right leg, and George Wort, who lost an arm, both of
the Royal Malay Regiment. There may have been others. Haines' account came to light only after his death.
Survivors were so traumatised that they rarely spoke of their ordeal.

After three days with no food or drink, those unable to walk were taken to Changi on wheelbarrows and carts,
no motorised vehicles being available.

Fall of Singapore
By the morning of 15 February, the Japanese had broken through the last line of defence; the Allies were
running out of food and ammunition. The anti-aircraft guns had also run out of ammunition and were unable to
repel any further Japanese air attacks which threatened to cause heavy casualties in the city centre. Looting and
desertion by Allied troops further added to the chaos in this area.
At 09:30, Percival held a conference at Fort Canning with his senior commanders. He proposed two options:
either launch an immediate counter-attack to regain the reservoirs and the military food depots in the Bukit
Timah region and drive the enemy's artillery off its commanding heights outside the town; or capitulate. All
present agreed that no counterattack was possible. Percival opted for surrender.
A deputation was selected to go to the Japanese headquarters. It consisted of a senior staff officer, the colonial
secretary and an interpreter. They set off in a motor car bearing a Union Jack and a white flag of truce toward
the enemy lines to discuss a cessation of hostilities. They returned with orders that Percival himself proceed
with staff officers to the Ford Motor Factory, where Yamashita would lay down the terms of surrender. A
further requirement was that the Japanese Rising Sun Flag be hoisted over the tallest building in Singapore, as
soon as possible to maximise the psychological impact of the official surrender. Percival formally surrendered
shortly after 17:15.
The terms of the surrender included:
 The unconditional surrender of all military forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) in Singapore.
 Hostilities to cease at 20:30 that evening.
 All troops to remain in position until further orders.
 All weapons, military equipment, ships, planes and secret documents to be handed over intact.
 To prevent looting, etc., during the temporary withdrawal of all armed forces in Singapore, a force of
1,000 British armed men to take over until relieved by the Japanese.
Earlier that day Percival had issued orders to destroy before 16:00, all secret and technical equipment, ciphers,
codes, secret documents and heavy guns. Yamashita accepted his assurance that no ships or planes remained in
Singapore. According to Tokyo's Domei News Agency Yamashita also accepted full responsibility for the
lives of British and Australian troops, as well as British civilians remaining in Singapore.
Bennett caused controversy when he handed command of the 8th Division to a brigadier and—along with
some of his staff officers—commandeered a small boat. They eventually made their way back to Australia.

Aftermath
The Japanese occupation of Singapore started after the British surrender. Japanese newspapers triumphantly
declared the victory as deciding the general situation of the war. The city was renamed Syonan-to.
Southern Island gained in the age of Shōwa, or "Light of the South"). The Japanese sought vengeance
against the Chinese and to eliminate anyone who held any anti-Japanese sentiments. The Japanese
authorities were suspicious of the Chinese because of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and killed many
in the Sook Ching massacre. The other ethnic groups of Singapore—such as the Malays and Indians—
were not spared either. The residents would suffer great hardships under Japanese rule over the
following three and a half years.
Numerous British and Australian soldiers taken prisoner remained in Singapore's Changi Prison. Many would
never return home. Thousands of others were shipped out on prisoner transports known as "hell ships" to other
parts of Asia, including Japan, to be used as forced labour on projects such as the Siam–Burma  Death
Railway and Sandakan airfield in North Borneo. Many of those aboard the ships perished.
An Indian revolutionary Rash Behari Bose formed the Indian National Army with the help of the Japanese,
who were highly successful in recruiting Indian soldiers taken prisoner. From a total of about 40,000 Indian
personnel in Singapore in February 1942, about 30,000 joined the pro-independence Indian National Army,
which fought Allied forces in the Burma Campaign as well as in the northeast Indian regions of Kohima and
Imphal.[33] Others became POW camp guards at Changi. An unknown number were taken to Japanese-
occupied areas in the South Pacific as forced labour. Many of them suffered severe hardships and brutality
similar to that experienced by other prisoners of Japan during the war. About 6,000 of them survived until they
were liberated by Australian and US forces in 1943–45.
After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Yamashita was tried by a US military commission for war crimes
committed by Japanese personnel in the Philippines earlier that year, but not for crimes committed by his
troops in Malaya or Singapore. He was convicted and hanged in the Philippines on 23 February 1946.
Philippines Campaign (1944–45)
The Philippines campaign of 1944–1945, the Battle of the Philippines 1944–1945, or the Liberation of the
Philippines was the American and Filipino campaign to defeat and expel the Imperial Japanese
forces occupying the Philippines, during World War II. The Japanese Army had overrun all of the Philippines
during the first half of 1942. The Liberation of the Philippines commenced with  amphibious landings on the
eastern Philippine island of Leyte on October 20, 1944, and hostilities in a small part of the Philippines
continued through the end of the war in August 1945.

Planning
By mid-1944, American forces were only 300 nautical miles (560 km) southeast of Mindanao, the largest
island in the southern Philippines – and able to bomb Japanese positions there using long-range bombers.
American forces under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had advanced across the Central Pacific Ocean,
capturing the Gilbert Islands, some of the Marshall Islands, and most of the Marianas Islands, bypassing many
Japanese Army garrisons and leaving them behind, with no source of supplies and militarily impotent.
Aircraft carrier-based warplanes were already conducting air strikes and fighter sweeps against the Japanese in
the Philippines, especially their military airfields. U.S. Army and Australian Army troops under the
American General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Theater of
Operations, had either overrun, or else isolated and bypassed, all of the Japanese Army on New Guinea and the
Admiralty Islands. Before the invasion of the Philippines, MacArthur's northernmost conquest had been
at Morotai in the Dutch East Indies on September 15–16, 1944. This was MacArthur's one base that was within
bomber range of the southern Philippines.
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army as well as Australian and New Zealand forces under the command of
Admiral Nimitz and Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. had isolated the large Japanese South Pacific base at
Rabaul, New Britain, by capturing a ring of islands around Rabaul, and then building air bases on them from
which to bomb and blockade the Japanese forces at Rabaul into military impotence.
With victories in the Marianas campaign (on Saipan, on Guam, and on Tinian, during June and July 1944),
American forces were getting close to Japan itself. From the Marianas, the very long-range B-29
Superfortress heavy bombers of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) could bomb the Japanese home islands
from well-supplied air bases – ones with direct access to supplies via cargo ships and tankers. (The earlier B-
29 bombing campaign against Japan had been from the end of a very long and tortuous supply line via British
India and British Burma – one that proved to be woefully inadequate. All B-29s were transferred to the
Marianas during the fall of 1944.)
Although Japan was obviously losing the war, the Japanese Government, and the Imperial Japanese Army and
Navy, showed no sign of capitulation, collapse or surrender.
There had been a close relationship between the people of the Philippines and the United States since 1898,
with the Philippines becoming the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935, and promised their
independence in mid-1946. Furthermore, an extensive series of air attacks by the American Fast Carrier Task
Force under Admiral William F. Halsey against Japanese airfields and other bases on the Philippines had
drawn little Japanese opposition, such as interceptions by Japanese Army fighter planes. Upon Admiral
Halsey's recommendation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in Canada approved a decision to not only
move up the date for the first landing in the Philippines, but also to move it north from the southernmost island
of Mindanao to the central Philippine island of Leyte. The new date set for the landing on Leyte, October 20,
1944, was two months before the previous target date to land on Mindanao
The Filipino people were ready and waiting for the invasion. After General MacArthur had been evacuated
from the Philippines in March 1942, all of its islands fell to the Japanese. The Japanese occupation was harsh,
accompanied by atrocities and with large numbers of Filipinos pressed into slave labor. From mid-1942
through mid-1944, MacArthur and Nimitz supplied and encouraged the Filipino guerrilla resistance by U.S.
Navy submarines and a few parachute drops, so that the guerrillas could harass the Japanese Army and take
control of the rural jungle and mountainous areas – amounting to about half of the archipelago. While
remaining loyal to the United States, many Filipinos hoped and believed that liberation from the Japanese
would bring them freedom and their already-promised independence.
The Australian government offered General MacArthur the use of the First Corps of the Australian Army for
the Liberation of the Philippines. MacArthur suggested that two Australian infantry divisions be employed,
each of them attached to a different U.S. Army Corps, but this idea was not acceptable to the Australian
Cabinet, which wanted to have significant operational control within a certain area of the Philippines, rather
than simply being part of a U.S. Army Corps. [1] No agreement was ever reached between the Australian
Cabinet and MacArthur – who might have wanted it that way. As a result, the Australian Army played
virtually no part in the Philippines. However, units from the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal
Australian Navy, such as the heavy cruiser HMAS Australia were involved.
During the American re-conquest of the Philippines, the guerrillas began to strike openly against Japanese
forces, carried out reconnaissance activities ahead of the advancing regular troops, and took their places in
battle beside the advancing American divisions.[2][3]
Leyte
On October 20, 1944, the U.S. Sixth Army, supported by naval and air bombardment, landed on the favorable
eastern shore of Leyte, one of the islands of the Visayas island group, northeast of Mindanao. The Japanese
miscalculated the relative strength of the naval and air forces, and they attempted to destroy the landing. This
brought about the massive sequence of battles called the Battle of Leyte Gulf, fought on October 23 through
October 26. This decisive victory by the U.S. Navy, its Fast Carrier Task Force, its  surface fleet, and its
submarines effectively destroyed the remainder of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), which had already lost all
of its effective aircraft carrier forces. The IJN had four of its carriers sunk (ships with depleted air squadrons –
which were used only as decoys), numerous battleships and heavy cruisers, and a large number of light
cruisers and destroyers. The IJN was never able to fight a major battle after this.
The U.S. Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the Ormoc
Bay area on the western side of the island. While the Sixth Army was continually reinforced, the U.S. Fifth Air
Force was able to devastate the Japanese attempts at air attacks, and also provide much support to the Army's
ground troops.
The Filipino guerrillas also performed valuable service in maintaining public order and in keeping the roads
and highways free of congestion. After the American beachheads were established, the Leyte guerrilla groups
were attached directly to the Sixth Army corps and divisions to assist in scouting, intelligence, and combat
operations.[4][not in citation given] With the initial U.S. Sixth Army landings on the beaches at Tacloban and
Dulag, Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon's units went into action. They dynamited key bridges to block Japanese
displacement toward the target area; they harassed enemy patrols; and they sabotaged supply and ammunition
depots. Information on enemy troop movements and dispositions sent from guerrilla outposts to Kangleon's
Headquarters was dispatched immediately to Sixth Army.[5]

During many torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance continued across Leyte and onto the major
island of Samar, just north of Leyte. On December 7, 1944, the U.S. Army units made another amphibious
landing at Ormoc Bay and, after a major land and air battle, the landing force cut off all Japanese ability to
reinforce and resupply their troops on Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months, the U.S.
Army was always in control.

Mindoro
The U.S. 6th Army's second major target to attack was Mindoro. This large island is directly south of Luzon
and Manila Bay, and MacArthur's main goal in taking it was to be able to construct airfields on it for fighter
planes that could dominate the sky over the most-important Philippine Island, Luzon, and its major seaport and
capital city of Manila.

The Seventh Fleet's large invasion convoy from Leyte to Mindoro came under strong attack by kamikazes, but
they could not delay the American invasion of Mindoro. Mindoro was only lightly occupied by the Japanese
Army, and much of it was held by Filipino guerrillas, so Mindoro was quickly overrun. U.S. Army engineers
set about rapidly constructing a major air base at San Fabian. Besides being close to Luzon, Mindoro has
another advantage: good flying weather nearly all the time, because this is a part of the Philippines that is
relatively dry – quite unlike Leyte which receives torrential rains most of the year, not only giving it poor
flying weather, but making it very muddy and difficult to construct airfields.

San Fabian was also the location of another breakthrough: the first appearance during the War in the Pacific of
USAAF squadrons flying the fast, long-range P-51B Mustang fighters – far superior to anything that the
Japanese Army or Navy had.

Mindoro was a major victory for the 6th Army and the USAAF, and it also provided the major base for the
next move of MacArthur's 6th Army: the invasion of Luzon, especially at Lingayen Gulf on its western coast.

Luzon
On December 15, 1944, landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island
of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on
Luzon. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General
Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km)
beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles
(64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute
drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry
Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment (organized as infantry)
passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.

As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured.
On February 16, paratroopers and amphibious units simultaneously assaulted the islet of Corregidor. It was
necessary to take this stronghold because troops there can block the entrance of Manila Bay. The Americans
needed to establish a major harbor base at Manila Bay to support the expected invasion of Japan, planned to
begin on November 1, 1945. Resistance on Corregidor ended on February 27, and then all resistance by the
Japanese Empire ceased on August 15, 1945, obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.

Despite initial optimism, fighting in Manila was harsh. It took until March 3 to clear the city of all Japanese
troops, and the Japanese Marines, who fought on stubbornly and refused to either surrender or to evacuate as
the Japanese Army had done. Fort Drum, a fortified island in Manila Bay near Corregidor, held out until 13
April, when a team of Army troops went ashore and pumped 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the fort, then set
off incendiary charges. No Japanese soldiers in Fort Drum survived the blast and fire.

In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest American
campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or
southern France.

Finishing up the campaign

Palawan Island, between Borneo and Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island,
was invaded on February 28, with landings of the U.S. Eighth Army at Puerto Princesa. The Japanese put up
little direct defense of Palawan, but cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, with the
Japanese using their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountains and jungles, dispersed as small units.
Throughout the Philippines, U.S. forces were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts,
[6] the last of whom, Hiroo Onoda, did not surrender until 1974, in the mountains of Lubang Island in
Mindoro.
The U.S. Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao (April 17), the last of the major
Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao was followed by invasion and occupation of Panay, Cebu, Negros
and several islands in the Sulu Archipelago. These islands provided bases for the U.S. Fifth and Thirteenth Air
Forces to attack targets throughout the Philippines and the South China Sea.
Following additional landings on Mindanao, U.S. Eighth Army troops continued their steady advance against
stubborn resistance. By the end of June, the enemy pockets were compressed into isolated pockets on
Mindanao and Luzon where fighting continued until the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945. However,
some units of the Japanese Army were out of radio contact with Tokyo, and it was difficult to convince some
of them that Japan had surrendered. As at many Pacific Islands, major Japanese officials, including members
of the Imperial Family, visited in person to convince the soldiers that they must surrender by order of the
Emperor.