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I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
Public policy makers have long been concerned with the welfare loss
associated with monopoly. This welfare loss arises because an unregulated
monopolist sets price above marginal cost and, thereby, restricts output
below the socially optimal level. A different public policy concern centers
around the structure of cost-based contracts used in procuring customized
products for the government. These two policy issues interact when the
government contracts with a producer having monopoly power in the
i In addition to the 14.56% of contracts awarded cost-plus fixed fee basis, a n o t h e r 7.76% of all
contracts over $25,000 were r e p o r t e d to be awarded as cost-plus-award-fee contracts. With a
cost-plus-award-fee contract, the contractor also receives full r e i m b u r s e m e n t for expenses; however
the plus may be partly based on the contractor's p e r f o r m a n c e in such areas as quality and
timeliness. See section 16.404-2, Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations for a complete
description of cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Fee Contracts with Payment Ceilings 247
2 See Bedingfield and Rosen (1985, pp. 2-4-2-7) for a description of the many p r o c u r e m e n t
contracts used by the g o v e r n m e n t .
248 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
3 However, in Appendix A, we present an example which shows that when the social welfare
function places equal weights on all three sets of interested parties, a p a y m e n t ceiling could lead to
an increase in welfare.
Fee Contracts with Payment Ceilings 249
4 Although the assumption that the direct costs are convex rules out the possibility of economies
of scale, this assumption is not strictly needed. We merely require that profits, excluding any cost
allocations, are strictly concave. That is, we require R ( Q ) - C ( Q ) to be strictly concave, where
R ( Q ) denotes the revenue function.
250 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
A = b - e + a(Q)J. (1)
5 O f c o u r s e this a s s u m e s G = 1, i.e., t h e c o n t r a c t is a w a r d e d . I f G = 0, t h e n a ( Q ) =- 0. F u r t h e r -
m o r e , if a l l o c a t e d cost w e r e a f u n c t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l , i n s t e a d o f actual, capacity, a n d , if p r a c t i c a l
c a p a c i t y w e r e a s s u m e d fixed in t h e s h o r t run, t h e n c t ' ( Q ) = 0 for all Q. W i t h s u c h an allocation
s c h e m e , t h e a w a r d i n g o f t h e c o n t r a c t (with o r w i t h o u t p a y m e n t ceilin3) w o u l d h a v e no e f f e c t o n
s u p p l i e r ' s c h o i c e o f level o f c o m m e r c i a l o u t p u t . T h e s i t u a t i o n is t h u s a n a l o g o u s to o n e in w h i c h
t h e r e is n o a l l o c a t i o n o f i n d i r e c t costs.
6 A l t h o u g h t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n d i r e c t c o s t s a r e all fixed g r e a t l y s i m p l i f i e s t h e analysis, it is n o t
crucial. W h a t is r e q u i r e d in t h e a n a l y s i s w h i c h follows is t h a t : (i) [1 - ct(Q)]J(Q, G) is i n c r e a s i n g in
Q, i.e., t h e a m o u n t o f i n d i r e c t costs b o r n e by the firm i n c r e a s e s as p r o d u c t i o n for the o u t s i d e
m a r k e t i n c r e a s e s , a n d (ii) J(Q, G) - J(Q, O) < ct(Q)J(Q, G), i.e., t h e i n c r e a s e in the i n d i r e c t costs
d u e to t h e g o v e r n m e n t p r o j e c t is less t h a n t h e i n d i r e c t cost w h i c h is a l l o c a t e d to t h e project.
C o n d i t i o n (i) will h o l d as l o n g as J(Q, G) is n o n d e c r e a s i n g in Q. C o n d i t i o n (ii) holds for m a n y
r e a s o n a b l e cost a l l o c a t i o n s a n d J f u n c t i o n s in w h i c h t h e r e a r e e c o n o m i e s o f scope. F o r e x a m p l e ,
c o n d i t i o n (ii) h o l d s w h e n J ( Q , G ) = v/Q + G a n d a ( Q ) = G / ( G + Q).
Fee Contracts with Payment Ceilings 251
Because the realized direct costs of the project are reimbursed by the
government, b - e is both a revenue and a cost of the supplier, and thus
does not appear in the maximand. From equation (3), we see that there is
no gain to the supplier by incurring effort: benefits of effort accrue to the
government, while the disutility of effort remains as a non-reimbursed
cost. Thus, the supplier's optimal effort, ~1, is still zero. The optimal
quantity of commercial output, Ql, is characterized by the first-order
condition:
R'(0I) = C'(01)- a'((~,)J. (4)
As a ' ( Q ) J < 0, the firm's effective marginal cost in the commercial
market is shifted upward, resulting in reduced sales to the outside market,
i.e, Q1 < QM- Hence, the effect of the government contract is to cause the
supplier to reduce output below the already reduced monopoly level, QM,
thereby exacerbating any welfare loss in the commercial market.
With the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracL the supplier always earns positive
rents from obtaining the contract. As Q1 maximizes R(Q) - C(Q) - [1 -
a(Q)]J, and as a(Q) > 0:
R(01) d- g - C(01) - [1 - og(0l)]J > R(OM) -- C(OM) -- J, (5)
7As the monopolist's effort affects only the direct costs of fulfilling the government contract in
our model, the monopolist's profits, expression (2), would be more completely written as R ( Q ) -
C ( Q ) - J - tp(e).
252 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
T=b + o l ( O _ c ) J - ~ c + K; (6)
(ii) Q, < Qc -< QM; (iii) if b > T, then ~c > O; and (iv) if 0c = O, then
Oc>O.t.
(d) If the payment ceiling is set so that T > b + o~(Q1)J + K, then
Q.c = Q_t and ec = O.
9Suppose ~O(eFB) were sufficiently large so that 0 < a ( Q . M ) J ~ qJ(eFB) -- K ; then there exists a
level of effort, ~ ~ (0, eFB], such that a ( Q M ) J = qJ(~) -- K . The proofs which follow could be
modified by replacing eFB with ~, for the cases where a ( Q M ) J < ~ ( e F B ) -- K .
254 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
no effort
decision
=~ >0 =0
C FB C c
>0
C
or
O. > 01
O T1 T2 T3 paymentceiling
project project
accepted rejected
no effort
=0 ->0 =~
C C C FB
decision
Qc ->01 0 c = O_M Q = 0M
>0
C
or
O b3 b2 bl intrinsiccost
plus the fixed fee is greater than the ceiling. For this quantity and effort, a
small increase in the commercial output increases profits in that market
and has no effect on revenues from the government contract. Similarly, a
small increase in effort will reduce the supplier's costs by more than the
increase in the SUl~plier's disutility of effort without affecting revenues.
Thus, the supplier will always choose an effort level and a commercial
output level so that the accounting cost plus the fixed fee is less than or
equal to the ceiling. However, if the accounting cost plus the fixed fee is
less than the ceiling, then the supplier could always do better by a small
reduction in effort (as all the benefits accrue solely to the government);
thus, effort would be set at zero. By assumption, the ceiling would bind if
the commercial output were set at Q1 and effort were set at zero. Thus,
the supplier would have to select an output level greater than Q1 in order
to shift indirect costs away from the government contract, so that the
ceiling would not bind. However, because the supplier's profit function,
unconstrained by any payment ceiling, decreases as the commercial output
moves away from Q1, any quantity o f commercial output for which the sum
of the accounting costs of the government project plus the fixed fee are
strictly less than the ceiling, could always be improved upon by increasing
the commercial output slightly. Therefore, at the optimal commercial
output and effort level, the sum of the accounting costs and the fixed fee
cannot be strictly less than the ceiling. Hence, the ceiling exactly binds.
As the sum of the accounting costs of the project plus the fixed fee
would be greater than the ceiling if effort were set at zero and commercial
output were set at ihe no-ceiling maximizing quantity, Q1, it must be the
case that effort is positive, output is greater than Q1, or both. A sufficient,
though not necessary, condition of effort to be positive for a ceiling in
range (c) is that b > T, the intrinsic cost is greater than the payment
ceiling. We also note that the commercial quantity selected by the supplier
would always lie in the interval [Q1, QM]- If the quantity selected were
greater than QM, a reduction in quantity, while leaving the effort level
unchanged, would keep the government payment the same (although the
accounting cost plus the fixed fee would then be greater than the ceiling)
and increase profits in the commercial market. Similarly, when the supplier
cuts the commercial output level below Q1, the indirect costs allocated to
the government increase, but as the contract exactly binds in region (c),
effort increases leading to a decrease in the direct cost of the contract.
However, due to the nature of Q1, the supplier suffers a higher loss of
commercial market contribution than this level of increased benefit. Hence,
the supplier would never set commercial output below Q~.
Finally, in region (d), we see that when the payment ceiling is set
sufficiently high, the supplier's decisions are unaffected by the ceiling.
Hence, the contractor puts forth no cost-reducing effort and restricts
commercial output below the monopoly output level.
Fee Contracts with Payment Ceilings 257
The proposition given above shows that there exist some values of the
ceiling for which the levels of cost-reducing effort and commercial output
are strictly greater than the levels chosen when the contract contains no
ceiling. Further, the ceiling never induces levels of cost-reducing effort and
commercial output below the no-ceiling levels. Because the government
does not know the value of b, the imposition of a payment ceiling would
result in higher expected values of the supplier's commercial output level
and effort level. Given that the supplier is assumed to face a downward
sloping demand curve in the commercial market, the higher expected
quantity produced for that market implies a lower expected price. Hence,
the addition of a payment ceiling would result in an expected increase in
consumers' welfare.
Note from Proposition 1, that although the addition of a payment ceiling
to a cost-plus contract may result in an increase in the commercial output
level from Qi, the quantity selected without the ceiling, the supplierwould
never increase the commercial output beyond the monopoly level, QM) °
10/~tS our analysis is limited to cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, we cannot exclude the very real
possibility that some other type of contract (with or without a ceiling) could induce the supplier to
set c o m m e r c i a l output at a level exceeding QM.
It The exogenous specification of the expected benefits to the purchaser is also employed in
footnote 17 of Reichelstein (1992, p. 719).
258 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
on R(.), C(-), and a(-), but not on b. Although these assumptions are
restrictive, we still believe the following analysis of the choice of payment
ceiling level provides additional insight.
The government uses backwards induction in calculating the optimal
payment ceiling. Using the analysis summarized in the first proposition, the
government determines how the supplier will respond to any level of the
payment ceiling as a function of the project's intrinsic direct costs, b
(known only to the contractor). We saw that the contractor's optimal
decision rule was to accept a project whenever b < T + erB - - ~ b ( e F B ) , and
that the government will pay exactly the ceiling for accepted contracts for
a range of values of b (i.e., whenever T - a ( Q 1 ) J - K < b < T + eF8 --
qJ(eFB)). This is because in this range, the supplier, in order to reap the
benefits of having the government pick up some of the indirect costs,
increases output in the commercial market and effort so that the account-
ing costs plus the fixed fee just equals the payment ceiling. If the ceiling
were set at the expected net benefits, H, there would a range where the
government's expected net benefits would be zero. By reducing the ceiling
slightly below H, the government increases the range where it earns
positive net benefits, even though it increases the probability that the
project will not be accepted. The larger the portion of indirect costs which
would have been allocated to the government using the contract without
ceiling, the larger is the range where the accounting cost of the project
plus the fixed fee will be just equal to the payment ceiling. Thus, the larger
the allocated indirect cost at the no-ceiling level of commercial output, the
smaller will be the optimal payment ceiling. Our second proposition
characterizes the government's decision rule for selecting the payment
ceiling.
4. Summary
The welfare losses associated with monopoly have been seen to be aggra-
vated when the government awards the monopolist a cost-plus contract for
a related product. This comes about because the monopolist cuts back on
the commercial output in order to allocate additional indirect costs to the
government. We saw that using a payment ceiling in connection with a
cost-plus contract helps to alleviate the tendency of cost-plus contracts to
motivate reductions in output (below the already diminished monopoly
level). Additionally, the imposition of a payment ceiling helps reduce the
usual moral hazard problem associated with cost-plus contracts.
The monopolist benefits from the government cost-plus contract through
the fixed fee and through the allocation of indirect costs which, in the
absence of the contract, would have to be charged against commercial
product revenue. Because of the payment ceiling, for high cost projects,
the monopolist may not be able to benefit from allocating more costs to
the government contract by reducing the output level in the commercial
market (below the monopoly level). Furthermore, for high cost projects,
the payment ceiling converts the cost-plus contract to a near fixed-price
contract and, thereby, handles the moral hazard problem.
We have seen that the purchaser's expected welfare increases when an
optimal payment ceiling is added to a cost-plus contract. The introduction
of the ceiling motivates the supplier to reject some projects which would
not be beneficial to the purchaser, but would have proceeded in the
absence of the ceiling. The ceiling further benefits the purchaser by
motivating the supplier to increase productive effort for some cost parame-
ters (and never leads to a decrease).
Our simple model enabled us to study the welfare effects of introducing
payment ceilings into cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. However, a number of
limitations of our analysis should be highlighted. Although cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts are widely used, we did not examine when such contracts are
optimal, nor did we search for the optimal contract over the space of all
contracts. In a similar vein, we treated cost allocations as exogenously
determined, and we did not search for an optimal allocation. In addition,
although we assumed that the government faced uncertainty concerning
260 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
the direct costs of the project, when we turned to the examination of the
optimal ceiling, we made the assumption that the government knew the
level of indirect costs which would be allocated to the project in the
absence of a payment ceiling. Yet another limitation of our analysis
resulted from the fact that the supplier faced no uncertainty in our model
and that the government was assumed to be risk-neutral, so that issues of
optimal risk-sharing did not arise.
Supplier's Problem
Case 1. N o G o v e r n m e n t C o n t r a c t
In this case, the supplier, acting as a monopolist, maximizes profits in the
commercial market.
Q( = QM) is chosen to maximize the supplier's utility given by:
0 2
R(Q) - C(Q) -J = Q(6 - Q) 3,
2
2. G o v e r n m e n t C o n t r a c t with N o Ceiling
The supplier, accepting the government contract, maximizes total profits
from the commercial market, as well as the government contract. The
decision variables are the commercial market output, and the level of
cost-reducing effort on the contract.
For a given level of commercial output Q, the supplier's payment from
the contract is b - e + a ( Q ) J . T h e direct cost of the contract is b - e,
and the disutility of effort is qJ(e). The supplier's outside market contribu-
tion is R ( Q ) - C ( Q ) . Therefore, the supplier chooses Q( = Q1) and e( = 81)
to maximize utility given by:
R(Q) - C(Q) - J + b - e + a(Q)J - (b-e)- qJ(e)
Q2 3 ez
=Q(6- Q)----3 + (b-e) + - - (b-e)--
2 I+Q 2
81 = 0 , and Q1 = 1 . 8 7 9 < Q M = 2.
The commercial output price is 6 - 1.879 = 4.121, and the supplier's
utility at (Ql, el) = 4.020 > 3 (the supplier's profits in the no government-
contract case (1) above). For a given level of intrinsic cost b, the govern-
ment's net benefits are:
= H - payment to supplier;
=H- [ L b - - 8 1 + a ( 0 )1 J ] = 5 -
[b-0+
6.5 + 0 . 5 )
= 3.958 - E [ b ] = 3.958 - ~ = 0.458.
C a s e 3. G o v e r n m e n t C o n t r a c t with Ceiling
A. The Optimal Ceiling
First, we calculate allocated indirect costs a ( Q ) J for Q = Q1 = 1.879 and
Q = 0 M = 2. Thus, ot(OM)J 3 / ( 1 + 2) = 1, and a ( Q 1 ) J = 3 / ( 1 +
=
262 M.P. Loeb and K. Surysekar
is given by:
subject to a ( Q ) J - e = 0.458.
Fee Contracts with Payment Ceilings 263
S e t t i n g a(Q)l/1 + Q, J = 3 , 7~ = 3 . 4 5 8 , b = 3 , a n d ~ O ( e ) = e 2 / 2 , t h e
n u m e r i c a l s o l u t i o n to the a b o v e p r o b l e m is Q¢ = 1.949, ec = 0.559. Thus,
t h e s u p p l i e r ' s utility is 3.857, a n d t h e c o n s u m e r s u r p l u s in t h e c o m m e r c i a l
m a r k e t is 1.901. T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s n e t benefits a r e 1.542, w h e r e a s t h e y
w o u l d b e .958 using the c o n t r a c t w i t h o u t ceiling.
H- (b + o t ( Q 1 ) J ) = 5 - 1.542 = 3.458.
> R ( Q . M ) -- C ( O . M ) -- J , (B7)
where RHS of equation (B7) represent the (maximum) profits, given that
the project is rejected. As the optimal output and effort levels, given
Fee Contracts with Payment Ceilings 265
acceptance, must yield profits at least as high as LHS of equation (B7), the
supplier's profits will be at least as great by accepting the project.
^ Clearly, if the project is rejected, no effort is taken and the supplier sets
O c = OM > Ol . []
I I ( O , e ) = R ( Q ) - C ( O ) - (1 - a ( O ) ) J - tp(e) + K
<R(Q)- C(Q) + T-b +e-J- $(e). (B9)
If b - e + o t ( Q ) J + K > T, then the supplier's profits would be:
II(Q, e) = R ( Q ) - C ( Q ) + T - b + e - J - O ( e ) . (B10)
As QM maximizes R ( Q ) - C ( Q ) , for all Q > 0, and as eFB maximizes
e -- ~O(e) for all e > 0, RHS of equation (B8) is at least as large as RHS of
equations (B9) and (B10). Thus, H ( Q M, eFs) > II(Q, e); that is, (Q.M, eFe)
is optimal for payment ceilings in the given range. []
Case c:
(i) We will show that the ceiling binds using^proof by contradiction.
First, we consider the case where b + a ( Q c ) J - ec + K < T and
then the case where b + a ( o - c ) J - ec + K > T.
Suppose b + a ( o - c ) J - ec + K < T. If ec > 0, there would exist
~ ( 0 , ec), such that b + a ( o - c ) J - ~ + K < T. At ((~c,e) the
supplier is better off than at ( Q o e c ) by 0(~ c) - 0(e) > 0. Thus, if
b + o t ( o - c ) J - ec + K < T, then ec = 0, so b + c~(o-c)J + K < T.
A s b + a ( Q l ) J + K > T, it must be the case that O-c > O-1. But_by
continuity of a(Q), there exists L9 ~ (QA, Q c ) such that b + c d Q ) J
+ K < T. However, as R ( Q ) - C ( Q ) - (1 - a ( Q ) ) J is decreasing
^
> R ( O - c ) - C ( O - c ) - (1 - a ( o - c ) ) J ) + K (Bll)
R(Q1) - C ( Q , ) - (1 - a ( O l ) ) J + K
R ( Q ) - C ( Q ) - (1 - a ( Q ) ) J - tp(e) + K
For any exogenous level of fixed fee, we can derive the optimal payment
ceiling, denoted T, by the following first-order conditions: 13
^
This implies:
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