Abaria vs.

NLRC Metro Cebu Community ISSUE: W/N MCCHI is guilty

G.R. No. 154113 Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI) of unfair labor practice?
presently known as the
Visayas Community Medical SC: No, MCCHI is not guilty
Center (VCMC), is owned by of unfair labor practice under
United Church of Christ in Art. 248 (259) (g) of the
the Philippines (UCCP). LaborCode or to violate the
Rev. Iyoy is the duty to bargain collectively..
administrator. National
Federation of Labor (NFL) is Records of the NCMB and
the EBA of R&F employees DOLE Region 7 confirmed
of MCCHI. that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had
not registered as a labor
Nava submitted a proposed organization, having
CBA that was not referred to submitted only its charter
NFL. This was rejected by certificate as an affiliate or
MCCHI. MCCHI attempted local chapter of NFL. Not
to take over the room being being a legitimate labor
used as a union office but organization, NAMA-MCCH-
was prevented to do so by NFL is not entitled to those
Nava and her group who rights granted to a legitimate
protested these actions and labor organization under Art.
insisted that management 242, specifically:
directly negotiate with them
for a new CBA. Atty. (a) To act as the
Alforque sent a letter representative of its
suspending Nava and others members for the purpose of
on their union membership collective bargaining;
for serious violation of the
Constitution and by-laws. (b) To be certified as the
Several union members led exclusive representative of
by Nava and her group all the employees in an
launched a series of mass appropriate collective
actions such as wearing bargaining unit for purposes
black and red of collective bargaining;
armbands/headbands,
marching around the xxxx
hospital premises and
putting up placards, posters NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not
and streamers. the labor organization
certified or designated by
DOLE found out that NAMA- the majority of the rank-and-
MCCH-NFL (union which file hospital employees to
Nava striked with) was not a represent them in the CBA
registered labor organization negotiations but the NFL, as
having submitted only its evidenced by CBAs
charter certificate as an concluded in 1987, 1991
affiliate or local chapter of and 1994. While it is true
NFL. NAMA-MCCH-NFL that a local union has the
filed a notice of strike, but right to disaffiliate from the
due to the lack of personality national federation, NAMA-
it was denied. Despite such MCCH-NFL has not done so
denial, Nava and her group as there was no any effort
still conducted a strike vote
that was approved by the
majority of the union.
For their continued picketing
activities despite the
warning by MCCHI, more
than 100 striking employees
were dismissed.
Unfazed, the striking union
members held more mass
actions. The means of
ingress to and egress from
the hospital were blocked so
that vehicles carrying
patients and employees
were barred from entering
the premises. Placards
were placed at the hospital’s
entrance gate stating:
“Please proceed to another
hospital” and “we are on
protest.” Employees and
patients reported acts of
intimidation and harassment
perpetrated by union leaders
and members. With the
intensified atmosphere of
violence and animosity
within the hospital premises
as a result of continued
protest activities by union
members, MCCHI suffered
heavy losses due to low
patient admission rates. The
hospital’s suppliers also
refused to make further
deliveries on credit.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged
MCCHI with refusal to
bargain collectively when
the latter refused to meet
and convene for purposes of
collective bargaining, or at
least give a counter-
proposal to the proposed
CBA the union had
submitted and which was
ratified by a majority of the
union membership. MCCHI,
on its part, deferred any
negotiations until the local
on its part to comply with the
legal requisites for a valid
disaffiliation during the
“freedom period” or the last
60 days of the last year of
the CBA, through a majority
vote in a secret balloting in
accordance with Art. 241
(d). Nava and her group
simply demanded that
MCCHI directly negotiate
with the local union which
has not even registered as
one.
In any case, NAMA-MCCH-
NFL at the time of
submission of said
proposals was not a duly
registered labor
organization, hence it
cannot legally represent
MCCHI’s rank-and-file
employees for purposes of
collective bargaining.
Hence, even assuming that
NAMA-MCCH-NFL had
validly disaffiliated from its
mother union, NFL, it still did
not possess the legal
personality to enter into CBA
negotiations. A local union
which is not independently
registered cannot, upon
disaffiliation from the
federation, exercise the
rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor
organizations; thus, it cannot
file a petition for certification
election. Besides, the NFL
as the mother union has the
right to investigate members
of its local chapter under the
federation’s Constitution and
By-Laws, and if found guilty
to expel such members.
MCCHI therefore cannot be
faulted for deferring action
on the CBA proposal
submitted by NAMA-MCCH-
NFL in view of the union
leadership’s conflict with the
national federation. We have
union’s dispute with the
national union federation
(NFL) is resolved
considering that the latter is
the exclusive bargaining
agent which represented the
rank-and-file hospital
employees in CBA
negotiations since 1987.
held that the issue of
disaffiliation is an intra-union
dispute which must be
resolved in a different forum
in an action at the instance
of either or both the
federation and the local
union or a rival labor
organization, not the
employer.
Not being a legitimate labor
organization nor the certified
exclusive bargaining
representative of MCCHI’s
rank-and-file employees,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot
demand from MCCHI the
right to bargain collectively
in their behalf. Hence,
MCCHI’s refusal to bargain
then with NAMA-MCCH-NFL
cannot be considered an
unfair labor practice to justify
the staging of the strike.
ISSUE: W/N the strike and
picketing activities
conducted by union officers
and members were illegal?
SC: Yes. As borne by the
records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL
was not a duly registered or
an independently registered
union at the time it filed the
notice of strike on March 13,
1996 and when it conducted
the strike vote on April 2,
1996. It could not then
legally represent the union
members. Consequently,
the mandatory notice of
strike and the conduct of the
strike vote report were
ineffective for having been
filed and conducted by
NAMA-MCCH-NFL which
has no legal personality as a
legitimate labor
organization, in violation of
Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the
Labor Code and Rule XXII,
Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the
Labor Code.

ISSUE: W/N dismissal of the

striking workers and officers
are valid?

SC: Yes. Art. 264(a) makes

a distinction between
workers and union officers
who participate in an illegal
strike: an ordinary striking
worker cannot be terminated
for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be
proof that he or she
committed illegal acts during
a strike. A union officer, on
the other hand, may be
terminated from work when
he knowingly participates in
an illegal strike, and like
other workers, when he
commits an illegal act during
a strike.

Considering their
persistence in holding
picketing activities despite
the declaration by the
NCMB that their union was
not duly registered as a
legitimate labor organization
and the letter from NFL’s
legal counsel informing that
their acts constitute
disloyalty to the national
federation, and their filing of
the notice of strike and
conducting a strike vote
notwithstanding that their
union has no legal
personality to negotiate with
MCCHI for collective
bargaining purposes, there
is no question that NAMA-
MCCH-NFL officers
knowingly participated in the
illegal strike. The CA
therefore did not err in ruling
that the termination of union
officers Perla Nava, Catalina
Alsado, Albina Bañez,
Hannah Bongcaras, Ernesto

Bigg’s vs. Boncacas Bigg's (employer) alleges
G.R. No. 200487 that around 50 union
members staged an illegal
"sit-down strike" on February
16, 1996 (first strike) in
Bigg's restaurant. The union
did not comply with the
requirements of sending
Notice of Strike to the
(NCMB). Neither did the
union obtain the "strike vote"
from its members. According
to Bigg's, the union belatedly
filed a Notice of Strike with
the NCMB on the same day
to conceal the illegality of
the sit-down strike. Bigg's
Canen, Jesusa Gerona and
Guillerma Remocaldo was
valid and justified.
With respect to the
dismissed union members,
although MCCHI submitted
photographs taken at the
picket line, it did not
individually name those
striking employees and
specify the illegal act
committed by each of them.
As to the affidavits executed
by non-striking employees,
they identified mostly union
officers as the persons who
blocked the hospital
entrance, harassed hospital
employees and patients
whose vehicles were
prevented from entering the
premises. Only some of
these witnesses actually
named a few union
members who committed
similar acts of harassment
and coercion.
Consequently, we find no
error committed by the CA
when it modified the
decision of the NLRC and
ruled that the dismissal of
union members who merely
participated in the illegal
strike was illegal.
ISSUE: W/N the strikes held
on Feb 16, 1996 and March
5, 1996 were illegal?
SC: Yes, both strikes were
illegal. With regard to the
strike held on Feb. 16, 1996
(first strike). There was
failure of the union to
comply with the
prerequisites for a valid
strike. The union did not file
the requisite Notice of Strike
and failed to observe the
cooling-off period. In an
effort to legitimize the strike
on February 16, 1996, the
issued a memorandum to
the striking union members
placing them under
preventive suspension and
requiring them to explain
their actions within 24 hours
from notice. The union
members did not comply
with the company's order.
Thus, they were sent
employment termination
letters. The Union members
filed a complaint before the
NCMB for ULP, illegal
dismissal, and damages.
Bigg’s also filed a complaint
before NCMB for illegal
strike against the union
members.
Bigg's further alleges that
during the second strike on
March 5, 1996, the union
members were disruptive
and violent. They prevented
ingress and egress of
employees and customers
to and from the company's
premises. They also
stopped Bigg's vans from
making deliveries by
throwing stones at the vans
which caused injury to the
driver as well as damage to
vehicles and to the
guardhouse. They shouted
at customers using
megaphones to prevent
them from going to Bigg's
Diner. The strike was later
stopped when both parties
agreed to compulsory
arbitration.
LA ruled in favor of Bigg’s
and held that the 2 strikes
were both illegal. The first
strike was illegal for not
furnishing Bigg’s a Notice of
Strike and did not observe
the cooling-off period. The
second strike was also
illegal, although the union
complied with the procedural
union filed a Notice of Strike
on the same day. This
cannot be considered as
compliance with the
requirement, as the cooling-
off period is mandatory. The
cooling-off period is not
merely a period during
which the union and the
employer must simply wait.
The purpose of the cooling-
off period is to allow the
parties to negotiate and
seek a peaceful settlement
of their dispute to prevent
the actual conduct of the
strike. In other words, there
must be genuine efforts to
amicably resolve the
dispute.
With regard to the strike
held on March 5, 1996,
despite the compliance with
the procedural requirements
of a valid strike, it was
established that the striking
union members committed
acts of violence, aggression,
vandalism, and blockage of
the free passage to and
from Bigg's premises.
While the law protects the
right of workers to engage in
concerted activities for the
purpose of collective
bargaining or to seek
redress for unfair labor
practices, this right must be
exercised in accordance
with the law. Article 279
(formerly 264) (e) of the
Labor Code provides:
No person engaged in
picketing shall commit any
act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the
free ingress to or egress
from the employer's
premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares.
requirements to conduct a
valid strike, the union Thus, in this matter, the CA
performed prohibited acts correctly upheld the findings
which rendered the strike of the labor tribunals.
illegal, such as acts of
violence, aggression, and The Court, however,
obstruction of the free reverses the CA's findings
ingress and egress from that the union president
company premises. Boncacas' dismissal was
invalid as he did not commit
The union members illegal acts during the March
maintain that the strike held 5, 1996 strike. The Labor
on March 5, 1996 was not Code provides for a stricter
illegal. They did not commit standard on union officers.
violence, coercion, or any
other prohibited act during For union members, what is
the said strike. required is that they knowing
participated in the
Granting arguendo that the commission of illegal acts
March 5, 1996 strike was during the strike for there to
illegal, the union members be sufficient ground for
contend that their dismissal termination of employment.
was still illegal because their For union officers, however,
employment had already it suffices that they
been illegally terminated knowingly participated in an
prior thereto. Bigg's had sent illegal strike.
them notices of termination
on February 19, 1996. Thus, It must be noted that
the commission of any Boncacas not only
alleged prohibited acts knowingly participated but
during the March 5, 1996 was the one who principally
strike cannot be used as a organized two illegal strikes
justification for their illegal on February 16, 1996 and
dismissal on February 19, March 5, 1996. Thus, the
1996. The union members dismissal of Boncacas and
thus prayed that its union the other union officers after
officers Liria, San Juan, and the illegal strike on February
Junie Arines should also be 16, 1996 as well as the
reinstated, with payment of March 5, 1996 strike was
backwages. valid. However, as to the
union members who did not
participate in any prohibited
act during the strikes, their
dismissal was invalid.

Additional Note:
The Labor Code and the
IRR limit the grounds for a
valid strike to: (1) a
bargaining deadlock in the
course of collective
bargaining, or (2) the
conduct of unfair labor
practices by the employer.
Only a certified or duly
recognized bargaining
representative may declare
a strike in case of a
bargaining deadlock.
However, in cases of unfair
labor practices, the strike
may be declared by any
legitimate labor
organization.

In both instances, the union

must conduct a "strike vote"
which requires that the
actual strike is approved by
majority of the total union
membership in the
bargaining unit concerned.
The union is required to
notify the regional branch of
the NCMB of the conduct of
the strike vote at least 24
hours before the conduct of
the voting. Thereafter, the
union must furnish the
NCMB with the results of the
voting at least seven days
before the intended strike or
lockout. This seven-day
period has been referred to
as the "seven-day strike
ban" or "seven-day waiting
period."

In Lapanday Workers Union

v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court
reasoned that the period is
intended to give the NCMB
an opportunity to verify
whether the projected strike
really carries the imprimatur
of the majority of the union
members. In a strike due to
bargaining deadlocks, the
union must file a notice of
strike or lockout with the
regional branch of the
NCMB at least 30 days
before the intended date of
the strike and serve a copy
of the notice on the
employer. This is the so-

Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. Respondent Union and
Genuine Labor Organization petitioner Grand Boulevard
G.R. No. 153664 Hotel (then Silahis
International Hotel, Inc.)
executed a CBA. Petitioner
dismissed some of its
employees and suspended
others who were members
of the respondent union.
Respondent union filed a
notice of strike with DOLE,
called "cooling-off period"
when the parties may enter
into compromise
agreements to prevent the
strike. In case of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice
is shortened to 15 days; in
case of union busting, the
"cooling-off period" does not
apply and the union may
immediately conduct the
strike after the strike vote
and after submitting the
results thereof to the
regional arbitration branch of
the NCMB at least seven
days before the intended
strike.
Thus, in a strike grounded
on unfair labor practice, the
following are the
requirements: (1) the strike
may be declared by the duly
certified bargaining agent or
legitimate labor
organization; (2) the conduct
of the strike vote in
accordance with the notice
and reportorial requirements
to the NCMB and subject to
the seven-day waiting
period; (3) notice of strike
filed with the NCMB and
copy furnished to the
employer, subject to the 15-
day cooling-off period. In
cases of union busting, the
15-day cooling-off period
shall not apply.
ISSUE: W/N the strike
staged by the respondents
on nov. 16, 1990 up to Nov.
29, 1990 was legal?
SC: No. The strike staged
by respondents was illegal.
A striker cannot invoke good
faith where assumption
orders of the SOLE, which
operate as an injunction
based on the following
grounds: illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension, CBA
violations, and harassments.
SOLE issued a status quo
ante bellum order certifying
the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Art.
263(g) of the Labor Code.
The petitioner wrote the
SOLE of its decision to
implement its retrenchment
program to stem its huge
losses. On November 5,
1990, the petitioner
disseminated a circular to all
the employees, informing
them that the personnel
plantilla would be decreased
by two hundred employees
to be implemented on a
staggered and "last in, first
out" basis. It terminated the
employment of sixty
employees and two officers
of the respondent union
effective December 6, 1990.
Moreover, the said
employees, including the
two union officers, were
immediately barred from
working. On November 7,
1990, the respondent union
protested the actions of the
petitioner invoking Section
15, Article VI of the CBA.
The respondent union filed
an urgent motion for a
reconsideration by the
SOLE of the Certification
Order dated October 31,
1990. On November 14,
1990, the petitioner
terminated the employment
of eighty-six more
employees effective
December 14, 1990. The
remaining employees were
also informed that it will
close in six months. On
November 14, 1990, the
petitioner terminated the
against a prospective strike,
are disregarded. The
respondents failed to prove
that the petitioner had
committed any ULP on the
respondents and its
employees. The testimony
of respondent Rogelio
Soluta and the other officers
of the respondent union
before the Labor Arbiter did
not constitute sufficient proof
of ULP. If the respondents
perceived that the petitioner
committed ULP, the matter
should have been threshed
out with the appropriate
labor tribunal (NLRC or CA).
Instead, the respondents
staged a strike. Thus, the
retrenchment by the
petitioner of its employees
was within its prerogative
and was necessitated by
serious financial reverses.
Under Art. 263 of the Labor
Code, the requisites for a
valid strike are as follows:
(a) a notice of strike filed
with the DOLE thirty days
before the intended date
thereof or fifteen days in
case of ULP; (b) strike vote
approved by a majority of
the total union membership
in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; (c)
notice given to the DOLE of
the results of the voting at
least seven days before the
intended strike. The
requisite seven-day period is
intended to give the DOLE
an opportunity to verify
whether the projected strike
really carries the approval of
the majority of the union
members. The notice of
strike and the cooling-off
period were intended to
provide an opportunity for
employment of Kristoffer So, mediation and conciliation.
effective December 14, The requirements are
1990. mandatory and failure of a
union to comply therewith
By way of riposte, the renders the strike illegal. A
respondent union filed on strike simultaneously with or
November 16, 1990 another immediately after a notice of
notice of strike because of strike will render the
what it perceived as the requisite periods nugatory.
petitioner's continuing unfair
labor practices (ULP). On Moreover, a strike that is
the same day, at about undertaken, despite the
12:00 noon, the officers of issuance by the SOLE of an
the respondent union and assumption or certification
some members staged a order, becomes a prohibited
picket in the premises of the activity and, thus, illegal
hotel, obstructing the free pursuant to Article 264 of
ingress and egress thereto. the Labor Code of the
At 3:00 p.m., the police Philippines, as amended. As
operatives of the Western this Court ruled in Union of
Police District arrived and Filipro Employees v. Nestle
dispersed the picket line. Philippines, Inc., under
Police officers detained the Article 264(a) of the said
respondent union's code, once an assumption
president Rogelio Soluta, certification order is issued
Henry Baybay and Dennis by the SOLE, strikes are
Cosico. On November 17, enjoined or if one has
1990, the petitioner sent already taken place, all
identical letters to the strikers shall immediately
officers and members of the return to work.
respondent union
terminating their In this case, the respondent
employment effective that union filed its notice of strike
day. with the DOLE on November
16, 1990 and on the same
On February 1, 1991, the day, staged a picket on the
petitioner filed a complaint premises of the hotel, in
with the Regional Arbitration violation of the law. Police
Office of the NLRC for illegal operatives of the Western
strike against the union, its Police District had to
members and officers. disperse the picketers and
take into custody Union
LA ruled in favor of the President Rogelio Soluta
petitioner. It held that there and the other officers of
was failure to comply with respondent union, Henry
the requirements laid down Babay and Dennis Cosico.
in Art 263 and 246 hence The respondents cannot
the strike that was staged on argue that since the notice
Nov. 16, 1990 up to Nov. 29, of strike on November 16,
1990 was illegal. 1990 were for the same
grounds as those contained
NLRC affirmed LA. The in their notice of strike on
NLRC ratiocinated that the September 27, 1990 which
compliance by therein complied with the
 respondents of the
requirements laid down in
Articles 263 and 264 of the
Labor Code respecting the
September 27, 1990 notice
of strike filed by the union
cannot be carried over to the
November 16, 1990 notice
of strike. Resultantly, for
failure of the union to
comply with the
aforementioned
requirements for its
November 16, 1990 notice
of strike, the strike staged
on November 16 up to
November 29, 1990 was
illegal.
CA reversed NLRC. Even if
the strike was staged
without the proper notice
and compliance with the
cooling-off period, resort
thereto was simply triggered
by the petitioners' belief in
good faith that respondent
Silahis was engaged in ULP.
Philippine Diamond Hotel Respondent filed a Petition
vs. Manila Diamond Hotel for Certification Election
Employees Union before the DOLE-National
G.R. No. 158075 Capital Region (NCR)
seeking certification as the
exclusive bargaining
representative of its
members.
The DOLE-NCR denied the
union's petition as it failed to
comply with legal
requirements and was seen
to fragment the employees
of petitioner.
On June 2, 1997, Francis
requirements of the law on
the cooling-off period, strike
ban, strike vote and strike
vote report, the strike staged
by them on November 16,
1990 was lawful. The
matters contained in the
notice of strike of September
27, 1990 had already been
taken cognizance of by the
SOLE when he issued on
October 31, 1990 a status
quo ante bellum order
enjoining the respondent
union from intending or
staging a strike. Despite the
SOLE order, the respondent
union nevertheless staged a
strike on November 16,
1990 simultaneously with its
notice of strike, thus
violating Article 264(a) of the
Labor Code.
The respondents' claim of
good faith is not a valid
excuse to dispense with the
procedural steps for a lawful
strike. Thus, even if the
union acted in good faith in
the belief that the company
was committing an unfair
labor practice, if no notice of
strike and a strike vote were
conducted, the said strike is
illegal.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of
the union officers are valid?
SC: Yes. As the appellate
court correctly held, the
union officers should be
dismissed for staging and
participating in the illegal
strike, following paragraph
3, Article 264(a) of the Labor
Code which provides that ". .
.[a]ny union officer who
knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who
knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts
Mendoza (Mendoza), one of
the Hotel's outlet cashiers,
was discovered to have
failed to remit to the Hotel
the amount of P71,692.50 at
the end of his May 31, 1997
duty. On being directed to
explain such failure,
Mendoza claimed that after
accomplishing his daily cash
remittance report, the union
president Jose Leonardo B.
Kimpo (Kimpo) also an
outlet cashier, who signed
the same and dropped his
remittances.
The union went on to file a
Notice of Strike on
September 29, 1997 with
the NCMB due to ULP in
that the Hotel refused to
bargain with it and the rank-
and-file employees were
being harassed and
prevented from joining it.
During the conciliation
conference, the union
suddenly went on strike and
was joined by NUWHRAIN.
At about this time, Hotel
supervisors Vicente T.
Agustin (Agustin) and
Rowena Junio (Rowena)
failed to report for work and
were, along with another
supervisor, Mary Grace U.
de Leon (Mary Grace), seen
participating in and
supporting the strike.
Mary Grace, who was
directed to explain her
participation in the strike,
alleged that she was merely
trying "to pacify the group."
Petitioner, finding her
explanation "arrogant" and
unsatisfactory as her active
participation in the strike
was confirmed by an eye
witness, terminated her
services, by communication
sent on December 9, 1997,
during strike may be
declared to have lost his
employment status . . ."
An ordinary striking worker
cannot, thus be dismissed
for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be
proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike,
unlike a union officer who
may be dismissed by mere
knowingly participating in an
illegal strike and/or
committing an illegal act
during a strike.
In this case, the
photographs show that
some of the workers-strikers
who joined the strike indeed
committed illegal acts –
blocking the free ingress to
and egress from the Hotel,
holding noise barrage,
threatening guests, and the
like. The strikers were, in a
list attached to petitioner's
Position Paper filed with the
NLRC, named.
The list failed to specifically
identify the ones who
actually committed illegal
acts, however. Such being
the case, a remand of the
case to the Labor Arbiter,
through the NLRC, is in
order for the purpose only of
determining the respective
liabilities of the strikers listed
by petitioner. Those proven
to have committed illegal
acts during the course of the
strike are deemed to have
lost their employment,
unless they have been
readmitted by the Hotel,
whereas those not clearly
shown to have committed
illegal acts should be
reinstated.
ISSUE: W/N the strike was
 drawing her to file a
complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner.
Agustin, who was also
terminated, filed a similar
complaint against the Hotel.
On January 14, 1998,
Rowena, whose services
were terminated, also filed a
complaint against petitioner
for illegal dismissal.
NLRC issued TRO.
Petitioner filed a petition to
declare the strike illegal.
NLRC declared the strike
illegal and that the union
officers and members who
were reinstated to the
Hotel's payroll were deemed
to have lost their
employment status. And it
dismissed the complaints
filed by Mary Grace,
Agustin, and Rowena as
well as the union's complaint
for ULP. CA affirmed NLRC
that the strike is illegal; that
the union officers lost their
employment status when
they formed the illegal strike
and that the dismissal of Ms.
De Leon, Mr. Agustin and
Ms. Junio valid, but modified
the NLRC resolution by
ordering the reinstatement
with back wages of union
members.
Solidbank vs. Gamier Sometime in October 1999,
G.R. No. 159460 petitioner Solidbank and
respondent Solidbank
Employees' Union (Union)
were set to renegotiate the
economic provisions of their
1997-2001 Collective
Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) to cover the
remaining two years thereof.
Negotiations commenced on
November 17, 1999 but
illegal?
SC: Yes.Under Art. 255 of
the Labor Code, the
provision declares, only the
labor organization
designated or selected by
the majority of the
employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit is
the exclusive representative
of the employees in such
unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
The union (hereafter
referred to as respondent) is
admittedly not the exclusive
representative of the
majority of the employees of
petitioner, hence, it could
not demand from petitioner
the right to bargain
collectively in their behalf.
Respondent insists,
however, that it could validly
bargain in behalf of "its
members," relying on Article
242 of the Labor Code.
Respondent's reliance on
said article, a general
provision on the rights of
legitimate labor
organizations, is misplaced,
for not every legitimate labor
organization possesses the
rights mentioned therein.
Article 242 (a) must be read
in relation to above-quoted
Article 255.
ISSUE: W/N mass actions
conducted by the Union
were illegal?
SC: Yes. The said mass
actions constituted illegal
strikes. The concerted
action of the respondents
was not limited to the protest
rally infront of the DOLE
Office on April 3, 2000.
Respondent Union had also
seeing that an agreement
was unlikely, the Union
declared a deadlock on
December 22, 1999 and
filed a Notice of Strike on
December 29, 1999. During
the collective bargaining
negotiations, some Union
members staged a series of
mass actions. In view of the
impending actual strike, then
Secretary of Labor and
Employment Bienvenido E.
Laguesma assumed
jurisdiction over the labor
dispute, pursuant to Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code,
as amended. The
assumption order dated
January 18, 2000 directed
the parties "to cease and
desist from committing any
and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation." In
his Order dated March 24,
2000, Secretary Laguesma
resolved all economic and
non-economic issues
submitted by the parties.
Dissatisfied with the
Secretary's ruling, the Union
officers and members
decided to protest the same
by holding a rally infront of
the Office of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in
Intramuros, Manila,
simultaneous with the filing
of their motion for
reconsideration of the March
24, 2000 Order. Thus, on
April 3, 2000, an
overwhelming majority of
employees, including the
individual respondents,
joined the "mass leave" and
"protest action" at the DOLE
office while the bank's
provincial branches in Cebu,
Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga
followed suit and "boycotted
regular work."
picketed the Head Office
and Paseo de Roxas
Branch. About 712
employees, including those
in the provincial branches,
boycotted and absented
themselves from work in a
concerted fashion for three
continuous days that
virtually paralyzed the
employer's banking
operations. Considering that
these mass actions
stemmed from a bargaining
deadlock and an order of
assumption of jurisdiction
had already been issued by
the Secretary of Labor to
avert an impending strike,
there is no doubt that the
concerted work
abandonment/boycott was
the result of a labor dispute.
Moreover, it is explicit from
the directive of the Secretary
in his January 18, 2000
Order that the Union and its
members shall refrain from
committing "any and all acts
that might exacerbate the
situation," which certainly
includes concerted actions.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of
respondents were illegal
since the strike conducted
infront of the SOLE’s office
was illegal?
SC: Only with respect to
union members who were
dismissed. A worker merely
participating in an illegal
strike may not be terminated
from employment. It is only
when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may
be declared to have lost
employment
status. We have held that
the responsibility of union
officers, as main players in
an illegal strike, is greater
On the third day of the
concerted work boycott,
Vistan issued another
memorandum, this time
declaring that the bank is
prepared to take back
employees who will report
for work starting April 6,
2000 "provided these
employees were/are not part
of those who led or
instigated or coerced their
co-employees into
participating in this illegal
act." Out of the 712
employees who took part in
the three-day work boycott,
a total of 513 returned to
work and were accepted by
the bank. The remaining
199 employees insisted on
defying Vistan's directive,
which included herein
respondents. The herein
129 individual respondents
were among the 199
employees who were
terminated for their
participation in the three-day
work boycott and protest
action. On various dates in
June 2000, twenty-one (21)
of the individual respondents
executed Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim in favor of
Solidbank.
Solidbank ceased banking
operations after being
acquired by Metrobank and
was merged with FMIC.
Petitioners duly filed a
Termination Report with the
DOLE and granted
separation benefits to the
bank's employees.
Respondents Gamier,
Condevillamar, Arriola and
De Guzman filed separate
complaints for illegal
dismissal, moral and
exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. Respondent
Union joined by the 129
than that of the members
and, therefore, limiting the
penalty of dismissal only for
the former for participation in
an illegal strike is in order.
Hence, with respect to
respondents who are union
officers, the validity of their
termination by petitioners
cannot be questioned.
Being fully aware that the
proceedings before the
Secretary of Labor were still
pending as in fact they filed
a motion for reconsideration
of the March 24, 2000
Order, they cannot invoke
good faith as a defense.
For the rest of the individual
respondents who are union
members, the rule is that an
ordinary striking worker
cannot be terminated for
mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be
proof that he or she
committed illegal acts during
a strike. In all cases, the
striker must be identified.
But proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not
required. Substantial
evidence available under the
attendant circumstances,
which may justify the
imposition of the penalty of
dismissal, may suffice.
Liability for prohibited acts is
to be determined on an
individual basis.
Petitioners have not
adduced evidence on such
illegal acts committed by
each of the individual
respondents who are union
members. Instead,
petitioners simply point to
their admitted participation
in the mass actions which
they knew to be illegal,
being in violation of the
Secretary's assumption
dismissed employees filed a
separate suit against
petitioners for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor
practice and damages.
LA and NLRC (3rd division)
- ruled in favor of the
respondents and union.
CA - affirmed. The mass
action resorted to by the
employees of Solidbank, the
CA ruled that it was a
legitimate exercise of their
right to free expression, and
not a strike proscribed when
the Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over
the impassé between
Solidbank and the Union in
the collective bargaining
negotiations. The mass
action was done, not to
exert any undue pressure on
the petitioner with regard to
wages or other economic
demands, but to express
dissatisfaction over the
decision of the Labor
Secretary subsequent to his
assumption of jurisdiction.
order. The dismissal of
herein respondent-union
members are therefore
unjustified in the absence of
a clear showing that they
committed specific illegal
acts during the mass actions
and concerted work boycott.
ISSUE: W/N the
participation of respondent-
members in the illegal mass
actions constitutes
misconduct which is a just
cause under Art. 282 for
terminating an employee?
SC: No. The Labor Code
protects an ordinary, rank-
and-file union member who
participated in such a strike
from losing his job, provided
that he did not commit an
illegal act during the strike.
Article 264 (e) of the Labor
Code, as amended,
provides for such acts which
are generally prohibited
during concerted actions
such as picketing.
Petitioners have not
adduced substantial proof
that respondent-union
members perpetrated any
act of violence, intimidation,
coercion or obstruction of
company premises and
public thoroughfares. It did
not submit in evidence
photographs, police reports,
affidavits and other available
evidence.