Bacik 2011

This article was downloaded by: [East Carolina University]
On: 27 August 2013, At: 11:11

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs

Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjmm20
The Genesis, History, and Functioning

of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC): A Formal-
Institutional Analysis
Gokhan Bacik
Published online: 15 Dec 2011.
To cite this article: Gokhan Bacik (2011) The Genesis, History, and Functioning of the Organization
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): A Formal-Institutional Analysis, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
31:4, 594-614, DOI: 10.1080/13602004.2011.630864
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.630864
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2011
The Genesis, History, and Functioning of the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC):
A Formal-Institutional Analysis
GOKHAN BACIK
Abstract
This article aims to analyze the functioning and efficacy of the Organization of the
Downloaded by [East Carolina University] at 11:11 27 August 2013
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) by applying a formal-institutional method. This

approach attends to the inner mechanism of an organization, in preference to the
“milieu” method, that examines an organization with reference to its members’
capacities and other conditions. Thus, analytical focus is on the formal edifices of
an organization: its charters, voting procedures, and committee structures. This
article embeds the formal/institutional method with the thesis that the absence
from the OIC’s structure of (i) an informed and costly membership requirement
and (ii) a rule-enforcing body, accounts for its current functionality problems. To
substantiate this argument, the paper compares the OIC with some other inter-
national inter-governmental organizations such as the European Union and the
United Nations. The conclusion follows that any reform plan should acknowledge
that the extant membership rules are a structural problem and the absence of enforce-
able regulations are a functional problem for the OIC. The analysis also suggests that
intra-OIC formations are necessary in order to stimulate the organization’s perform-
ance and effectiveness.
Introduction
Established by a group of non-Western states, the Organization of the Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), with its 57 member states covering an estimated population of 1.3
billion, stands unique on the global stage. However, the OIC has not yet been successful
in achieving a significant level of cooperation among its member states. It is still not a
rule-maker actor in global politics. Gilles Kepel argued that the impact of the OIC on
world history has remained slight.1 Kepel’s opinion is shared widely in the relevant
public and intellectual settings as well as those in the general public who know about
OIC, think the OIC more a symbolic forum than a dynamic political body.2 Several cir-
cumstances are to blame for this deficiency, including the member states’ democracy gap
and the lack of an economically-based orientation.3 Many apologists have advanced
rationalizations of the pertinent deficiencies.
This article, however, analyses the OIC from a more structural perspective. Although
other reasons for the weakness are recognized, it is argued that the OIC lacked coherent
membership criteria until 2008 and still lacks a functional body with rule-enforcing
capacity. It is proposed here that these are the most important structural reasons for its
inability to become an effective multinational organization on the world stage. Indeed
the institutional weakness of the OIC is strongly linked to the lack of a clear and exclusive
membership rules between 1972 when its Charter was launched and 2008 when it was
ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/11/040594-21 © 2011 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.630864
The Genesis, History, and Functioning of the OIC 595
amended. The OIC’s membership regulations during that period were broad and vague,
and this has continued to paralyse the Organization.
An oft-cited thesis is that the OIC and the state system (operating on the principle of
territorial sovereignty) are incompatible. It is the further purpose of this paper to take
issue with the priority so often afforded to this traditional argument: albeit granted that
the logic of the OIC’s structural identity is not in keeping with the principle of the sover-
eign state, it remains true that there are organizations that run successful integration
projects and are also structurally not akin to the nation-state system.
Reforming the OIC

Although the OIC has been unable to generate the results that justify its self-declared
raison d’être, the Organization has attracted a considerable measure of attention in the
post-9/11 era. Several issues such as global terrorism; the war in Iraq; the Afghanistan
issue, the Arab Spring, and Iran’s nuclear plans have pushed the OIC forward as an
important international diplomatic platform. Similarly, as a second factor in analyzing
the rise of the OIC’s role in world politics, the election of a Turkish professor, Ekmeled-
̇
din Ihsanoğlu, as the new Secretary General of the Organization is also of importance. To
begin with, this was the first democratically contested election. The former Secretaries
General were all appointed by means of a consensus mechanism. The formula applied
to the election of the present Secretary General, however, was quite different, for he
was chosen through a voting process. The election of the Turkish candidate is part of
the reform strategy that aims to improve the functioning of the OIC; this reform
process is supported by several important states, in addition to Turkey and Iran who
took the lead. According to Ashraf Rabbani, the reason behind such support is related
to both countries’ desire to transform the OIC into a functional negotiating body.4
The new Secretary General of the OIC, Professor Ihsanoglu, ̇ has confirmed publicly
that the Organization needs a “big reform”. 5
̇
During the period of Ihsanoğlu, the OIC has been subject to a serious transformative
agenda. First of all, the OIC’s global visibility and influence became more observable. It is
through the OIC that major inter-governmental organizations, including the United
Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), have launched significant projects in
pursuit of grand plans that would launch a “dialogue among civilisations”, or an
“East-West dialogue”. Second, the relations between the OIC and other important
global players including important international institutions have increased. For instance,
the US appointed a special envoy to the OIC in 2010 symbolizes the increasing role of the
organization. In 2011, the OIC signed the agreement for cooperation with the African
Union.6 Thirdly, the OIC has been subjected to a serious administrative reform
process. In 2008 Dakar Summit, the OIC has adopted radical changes in its charter
including changes to its membership criteria.7 New departments were created within
the OIC dealing with issues like human rights and gender issues. For example, the
OIC adopted a new resolution in Astana, 2011 Summit, where the organization urged
member states for taking strong measures including passing necessary laws to protect
̇
women’s rights.8 Fourth, unlike most former Secretary Generals, Ihsanoğlu has been
successful to channel important member states’ power behind his reformist and active
̇
agenda within the OIC. Finally, Ihsanoğlu period symbolizes a paradigmatic shift for
̇
the OIC. Ihsanoğlu did not hesitate to include very controversial issues into the
agenda of the organization. Part of the paradigmatic shift, for instance, the OIC agreed
to set aside its former strategy to introduce measures to prevent defamation of all
596 Gokhan Bacik
religions. Accordingly, the OIC would pursue new ways of resolving debates over Islam
without resorting to legal steps.9 Similarly, the OIC has developed more robust approach
to various issues including democratization. For instance, the OIC adopted the Statute of
the OIC Independent Permanent Human Right Commission in 2010. A recent develop-
ment to confirm the paradigmatic shift should be seen the decision of changing the name
of the organization. In Astana Summit of 2011, the organization replaced the word “con-
ference” with “cooperation” and declared itself as the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation. Indeed, this symbolic change implies that the organization wants to be
seen as a robust and well established institution rather than a loose and weak conference.
̇
In a broader context, the outline of Ihsanoğlu’s reformist agenda traces back to the Ten-
Year Programme of Action (TYPOA) which was adopted in 2005 Mecca Summit. In this
report, the organization presented its vision over major issues including the reforming the
OIC. In the 11th article of the program, it was underlined that the organization should
change its name, review its Charter, and “establish a mechanism for the follow-up of res-
olutions by creating an Executive Body’.10 In general, the content of the action program
can be categorized into two groups. The first group includes the new vision of the OIC
towards various issues such as human rights, good governance, combating Islamophobia
and political will. Naturally, the articles that fit to this group are conceptual suggestions.
However, the articles that fit to second group includes more concrete suggestions such as
creating an executive body, supporting the Islamic Development Bank and creating
common standards in different fields such as education and economy.
In line with these demands for reform, this paper aims to analyze the functioning of the
OIC in terms of its failure to become an efficient organization. To this end, a formal-insti-
tutional method is chosen in preference to the “milieu” method that analyses an organ-
ization with reference to its members’ capacities and other conditions. The formal/
institutional method attends to the inner mechanism of an organization. Thus, analytical
focus is on the formal edifices of an organization: its charters, voting procedures and com-
mittee structures.11 This article embeds the formal/institutional method with the thesis
that the absence from the OIC’s structure of (i) an informed and costly (i.e. difficult)
membership rule and (ii) a rule-enforcing body accounts for its functionality problems.
The recommendation follows that any reform plan should recognize that the extant mem-
bership rule is a structural problem.
The Difficulty of Theorizing the OIC: The “Contending World-Views” Problem

The OIC presents itself as a unique international organization. It has always insisted on
the central role of Islam in its founding ideology. It set itself up on the idea of the Islamic
ummah, essentially a religious phenomenon. According to Ahsan, the OIC’s singularity is
in that its foundation was laid 14 centuries ago, in the time of the Prophet. He holds also
that the philosophy of the OIC “was formulated in the Qur’an”.12 Thus, a Qura’nic
concept is fundamental in the OIC.13 The outcome is that the OIC imports the
Islamic notion of the ummah into the secular nation state system within which it operates.
It is the only international organization in the world with a religious basis.14 The OIC is
putting traditional Islam to work in a contemporary context. This is an awkward duality,
which sets the OIC inexorably on a course of constant structural tension. Herein lay the
problem that challenges this Organization’s conceptualization.
Typical of the OIC’s awkward duality is that, despite its emphasis on the ummah, the
OIC has never criticized the idea of sovereignty or nation-statehood. Thus, it occupies its
chair in other inter-governmental organizations (inter alia the OAU, NAM, and the UN)
as just another actor in the modern state system.15 What is more, the OIC recognizes the
authority of international law.16 As Abdullah al Ahsan noted, the OIC insists upon the
foundational status of the Islamic idea of ummah in the cooperation of Muslim countries,
yet recognizes national sovereignty, a product of European secular thought.17
Equally important is the duality in the relationship between the OIC itself and its
member states: The OIC proposes religious ethos, but its members are nation-states.
The institutional history of the OIC reflects nationalism and the ummah in competition
in the very organizational structure that styles itself a promoter of Islamic one-ness.
Yet the most cursory glance is enough to note that its members approach it in their
own right as nation-states, intent upon their national interests, apparently oblivious to
the trans-national Islamic ethos of the Organization.18 Ahsan argued soundly that the
nation-state defeats the ummah whenever push comes to shove.19 Crises see the behavior
of members determined by national motivations rather than religious ones. For example,
several member states, close to the then Soviet Union, blocked the OIC on the Afghani-
stan issue.
Despite this, the OIC has never stepped back from championing the ummah in its offi-
cial jargon. At the1981 summit, it declared that “all Muslims, different though they may
be in their language, colour, domicile or other condition, form but one nation”.20 The
same institutional self-confidence is shown also in other fields: The Islamic Development
Bank, a major subsidiary body of the OIC, declared the mission of fostering economic
relations among member states “in accordance with the principles of the Sharia”.21
Given that most members of the OIC operate in a capitalist economic order, such bold
language shows the tenacity with which the OIC clings to the ummah, the real world of
its members’ preoccupations notwithstanding. That tenacity is more than jargon deep.
Reflection brings to mind a number of written and un-written religious principles that
have played themselves out in OIC practice. For instance, an un-written law requires
that the position of the OIC Secretary General be occupied by a Muslim citizen of any
member state.22 Here, the principle of citizenship, which is the major principle of the
nation-state, is apparently defeated by the principle of ummah/religion.23 It brings off
the de facto denial of citizenship as the major qualifier for this position.
Another, and more critical, semblance of the ummah/religion ascendency is in the
status of the International Islamic Court of Justice (IICJ). To be appointed to the IICJ
as a judge, one needs several credentials. The Court’s statute lists them thus: (i) being
Muslim and (ii) being the national of an OIC member state.24 Admittedly, the religious
criterion has primacy over the nationality one. Those who are not Muslims, even though
they are citizens of an OIC member state, are not eligible. Clearly, the organizing prin-
ciple of the modern state system, citizenship, is of secondary importance. Moreover,
the IICJ’s Statute declares that the court is a Sharia court.
Meanwhile, several major subsidiary organs of the OIC are open to non-Muslim citi-
zens of member states. For example, the Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology
and Development accepts the employment, and even the appointment, of non-Muslim
citizens from member countries. But, interestingly, following a universal ummah
notion, the Islamic Development Bank, another very important subsidiary organ of the
OIC, employs Muslims from non-member states.25 Then the universal Islamic perspec-
tive is again blurred when it comes to the Muslim minorities of non-member states. The
Charter is neither clear nor determined with regard to them. Here, the Charter tacitly
respects the idea of national sovereignty.
An event that occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1981 at the Third Islamic Summit Confer-
ence was a very interesting illumination of the centrality of religion. The inaugural session
598 Gokhan Bacik
was held in the Ka’bah in Mecca. Since non-Muslims are not allowed to enter the Ka’bah
area (as per the regulations maintained by the host member state, Saudi Arabia) the Leba-
nese President, a Christian, was excluded by the Saudi officials.26 This is an important
event, for it afforded an insight into the delicate intricacy of dealing with the respective
laws and regulations within member states that the OIC must deal with.
The oscillation between the nation-state/citizenship model and the ummah/Muslim
model is thus the most important of the tricky characteristic to be given prominence in
an analysis of the nature of the OIC. Given that there is not always a perfect equation
between the citizen and the Muslim, the OIC is always expected to operate in two over-
lapping environments. Naturally, the recognition of Sharia by the ummah/Muslim model
definitely excludes a good number of non-Muslim citizens who live in the various
member states. Thus, the picture of the OIC from the lens of the nation-state/citizenship
model is not the equal in size of the ummah/Muslim model.
The Genealogical Trace

A genealogical survey yields further important hints about the nature of the OIC. How
and why an inter-governmental organization was created brings some instructive infor-
mation about the operational logic of the institution itself, and even more about the con-
verged expectations around it. An interestingly neglected fact is that the origin of the OIC
was in the numerous conferences convened in the early twentieth century to fill the gap
left by Turks upon the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. In May 1926, a conference was
held to deal with the problem of the Caliphate.27 That conference established a perma-
nent institution called Mu’tamar al-‘Alam al-Islami, or the Muslim World Congress.
Several other conventions with the same purpose took place in 1931, 1934, 1949,
1950, 1952, 1960, 1962, and 1964. All these conferences somehow shared the same
objective: how to unite Muslims in the era of nation states in which the historical insti-
tution of the Caliphate has been abolished? Of course, several new issues, such as the
Palestinian one, entered the Mu’tamar’s agenda naturally. Interestingly, the Palestinian
case somehow rationalized the series of Mu’tamars. The idealistic mission driving the
conferences now realized that unity was the only way to support the Palestinians and
stop Israel. The 1967 meeting therefore played a crucial role in the institutional history
of the OIC. Finally, it was the 1969 meeting of the Mu’tamar which called for the estab-
lishment of an ummah-level organization after an arson attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Thus, the origin of the OIC was in the search for a Caliphate-like institution. Like,
Abdullah al-Ahsan, Mouniddin also believes that the Mu’tamars were the starting point
of the OIC.28 Similarly, Shahnaz Akhtar argues that the OIC is primarily an outcome of
that kind of pan-Islamic vision.29 In other words, the OIC is an institutional reflection of
this urge among the Muslims to unite and to form some sort of association which could
deal with the problems faced by the Muslims in the post-caliphate period.30 Confirming
this, Ahsan argued that apart from the OIC, no other institution has claimed the political
loyalty of all Muslims since the abolition of the Caliphate.31 That does not mean that the
OIC is a new and complex institutional form of Caliphate. Rather, the OIC is the outcome
of a political belief, following the historical model of the Caliphate, which argues that all
Muslims should somehow be united at the highest level. Thus, reminding this theological
point, scholars like Jeff Haynes compares the OIC with the Roman Catholic Church, as
both institutions support a universal ideology.32 Hence, there is no exaggeration in the
claim that the OIC is the fruit of a felt need to reintroduce the pan-Islamic paradigm of sta-
tecraft at the very moment when secular world views were failing to protect the interests of
Muslims.33
The Founding of the OIC

As already noted, the OIC is the product of the series of Mu’tamars that culminated in the
1969 meeting in Rabat, Morocco where the King Hassan II of Morocco and King Faisal
Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia brought together leaders and representatives of 25 Islamic
states which marked the start of the establishment of the OIC. This was followed by a
meeting of the foreign ministers in Jeddah in 1970 and the adoption of the OIC
Charter in 1972 “defining the Organization’s objectives and entrusting it with the duty
of defending the causes of the Muslim world”.34 The trigger for the launch of the OIC
was the 1969 arson attack on the al-Aqsa Mosque.35 Indeed, the concern for holy
places forced the ongoing process of Mu’tamars that eventually took an institutional
form. Thus, the OIC had from its inception a raison d’être that was somehow religious,
and, in Aristotelian discourse, the efficient cause (the productive event) was the arson
attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Comparison with the EU

The operational culture of an institution is to a large extent determined by the general
conditions and motivations in its formation process. So the genealogical individuality
of the OIC should be seen as important in an explanation of why it is different from
other inter-governmental organizations. At this point, a short comparison of the OIC
and the EU will be helpful. The idea of a united Europe has a long pedigree in philosophy
and statesmanship. But the major impetus to the creation of the EU was the post-World
War II desire to cure the devastating effects of the war in Europe. The climate was right
for the major functional projects with potential spill-over effects such as the European
Defence Community (EDC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
It should be noted that all historical documents that were recognized as the founding
texts of the EU, such as the Schuman Declaration36 or the Monnet Plan,37 were
mainly technical documents dealing with the idea of integration from a very materialistic
perspective.38 In this context, it was particularly the ECSC, aiming to initiate a process of
economic integration sector-by-sector that was behind the European integration process.
The ECSC was founded in 1951 to pool the steel and coal resources of its member
states. The aim was, therefore, a common program for the post-war production and con-
sumption of steel and coal in Europe. There was a desire to unite countries by controlling
steel and coal, the fundamental equipment of war industries. As a matter of fact, it was the
ECSC that would gradually reconfigure the political landscape of Europe.39 In other
words, European integration was initiated by a material concern. Thus it is not surprising
that EU leaders did not permit Christianity to become a commitment of the proposed
European Constitution. (There were also the well-known fears that a Christian
constitutional commitment may offend non-Christians.)40 Displaying its materialistic
nature, the Union had no misgivings about excluding religion from the text of its
future Constitution.
The EU comparison puts into high relief the non-material motivations that gave rise to
the OIC. First, it was religious issues or problems that produced the OIC. Secondly, the
motivating event, or, the efficient cause (the arson attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque) of the
establishment of the OIC was also religious. And the leading actors in this process
600 Gokhan Bacik
believed that Islam has a high capacity for bringing Muslim unity into reality. It is there-
fore on the basis of its origin and purposes that the OIC uses religious narrative even in its
projects that are mostly materialistic.41 Naturally, the ideational factors that played a sig-
nificant role in the formative years of the OIC generated a strong institutional legacy.
The OIC versus the State System: Does it Matter?

As a frequently repeated thesis, the clash between the state system and the trans-national
logic of the Organization often serves as the explanation of the OIC’s weakness and failure.
State sovereignty is a central organizing principle of international relations in the modern
era. The modern international system consists of sovereign and territorial states.42 It is on
the principle of nationality and citizenship that the modern state coheres as a legal entity.43
Therefore, any other type of identity-constructing form, such as religion, ethnicity, or sec-
tarianism, is deemed to be incompatible with the spirit of the modern international system.
On the modern sovereign-state model, international relations cannot be depicted as the
relations of Christians and Muslims or Christians and Christians. Ignoring the differ-
ences and commonalities of religious identity, international relations are practiced
between nations, i.e. Turkey, Germany, Denmark, etc. Sovereignty, as the organizing
principle, also determines the borders in the international system of states. It delineates
authority not according to function but to geography.44 Geographical organization is one
of the most important features of the modern state. Yet, no geographical border in the
modern system can be read ex facie as a religious border. Sovereignty rejects the
geographical imaging of a globe partitioned by religious borders. Rather, sovereignty
images the secular and nationalistic divisions of the globe.
In this era of the territorially divided world of nation-states, concepts such as “the
abode of Islam”, or the OIC Charter’s term, “Islamic solidarity”, are problematic. The
basic rule of membership is also a thorny matter in this age. The OIC’s spirit is in
essence the antithesis of the modern state system,45 for, as already noted, the basic prin-
ciple of the modern international system, sovereignty, delineates authority according to
geography. Despite the large Muslim populations of several states, the system recognizes
those states as the territorial nation-states Turkey, Iran, Syria, or Iraq. Whereas the OIC
points to a trans-national Islamic identity, it is constrained by the sanctity of sovereignty.
This contradiction raises another very important question: What is the basic motive
behind the actors’ behavior? Is it shared religious identity or national interest?
The OIC, although it underlines the role of religion in international cooperation, seems
to be paralyzed by its member states, which are primarily driven by their national inter-
ests.46 Ironically, then, the OIC members are not keen on abiding by the trans-national
values of the Organization. Thus while member states are operating within the system in
which citizenship of a nation-state is the organizing principle, the OIC is striving to
promote a regime that expects action on the basis of religious identity. Unlike the
casual observer, it has not come to terms with the fact that homo nationalis seems to
have eclipsed homo Islamicus.
However, efforts to explain the failure of the OIC on the basis of the cited contradiction
between this Organization and the state system are still far from convincing, despite their
substantial explanatory value. A deeper structural diagnosis is necessary, for the trans-
national nature of an organization cannot alone bear the blame for failure so long as
other successful trans-national samples thrive in the system. For instance, the EU is a suc-
cessful integration project that operates mainly within a trans-national logic. This, in
many respects, clashes with the traditional understanding of “state system”. The EU
can even be depicted as an actor that is transforming the traditional principles of the inter-
national community. It attests clearly that trans-national actors can be successful.
Several successful international organizations, among them the World Trade Organis-
ation (WTO), work with membership rules that admit actors other than sovereign states.
The WTO admits non-state actors into its dispute settlement procedures.47 Further-
more, not only states but also any “separate customs territory possessing full autonomy
in the conduct of its external commercial relations”48 may become a WTO member:
Three of the 22 contracting parties to the GATT, Burma, Sri Lanka, and South Rhodesia
were not sovereign states at the time that Agreement was drafted. And Hong Kong
secured its 1986 WTO membership while it was a still a British colony.49 (It is now
still not a sovereign state, but a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic
of China.) Also, the 25 states of the EU are represented collectively as the European
Communities, as well as individually. In other words, the countries of the European
Communities are dually represented. And Taiwan, a polity which is almost a non-recog-
nized state, having had only observer status in the UN since its expulsion from the UN
Security Council in 1971 and its simultaneous re-naming (from “the Republic of
China” to “Taiwan”) by the international community, joined this WTO in January
2002. Overall, then, the WTO does not make sovereign statehood a strict requisite of
membership. Therefore it is not correct to depict the OIC as the only organization of
non-nation-state members.
To sum up: the trans-national character of the OIC cannot be the conclusive expla-
nation of its failure. An international organization that is strongly equipped with other
prerequisites of efficiency can be functional even though it acts on certain trans-national
principles.
Institutional Reasons of Weakness

Borrowing Kratochwil and Ruggie’s concept of “deficits in formal institutions”,50 this
paper’s analytical method explains the weakness of the OIC in terms of the problems
in its formal structure. The two major problems that are identified and discussed are
(i) the non-informative membership rule in effect from 1972 to 2008 and (ii) the lack
of a rule-enforcing body.
The Non-Informative Membership Rule

The relationship between membership and institutional efficiency deserves special atten-
tion when the problematic nature of the OIC’s membership criteria is proposed. The
membership criteria, which were adopted in 1972 and gave form to the Organization
until 2008, should be isolated as the major cause of its institutional weakness. The
vague and non-disciplining nature of this membership regime created a colossal organiz-
ation of 57 members without a disciplining and homogenizing membership process.
Although it was amended structurally in 2008, the original membership rule presided
over the OIC for 36 years. It was certainly decisive in the expansion of the OIC into a
huge structure. The recent amendment is a late intervention. While it remained
without a functional membership criteria for the period between 1972 and 2008, the
OIC demanded virtually nothing from states seeking membership. Its “easy member-
ship” regime eventually paralyzed it, leaving it a huge organization without any effective
strategy or shared ambition. This calls for an understanding of the link between member-
ship regime and institutional efficiency.
602 Gokhan Bacik
The membership criteria of an international organization directly affect its efficiency.

All international organizations aim to create an international regime of rules, norms, prin-
ciples, and procedures.51 Those regimes, created usually by agreement among the signa-
tory parties, reflect the nature of an international organization’s membership. To create
standards of behavior, any regime must have a disciplining and enforcing mechanism.
Indeed, there is a straightforward relationship between the demands of the membership
status and an organization’s level of efficiency. For that relationship to become dynamic,
a regime’s membership rule must be disciplining, informative, detailed and costly. It is
the high costs of regime building that helps existing regimes to persist.52 Easy and
cheap membership rules—which are, by their nature, unclear—impede the success of
the international inter-governmental regime.
Membership first delineates who belongs to an organization. Thus, the nature of mem-
bership—i.e. whether it is exclusive or restrictive—matters.53 Once it is acknowledged
that membership is a strong determining factor, it is inevitable that its effects are manifest
throughout an organization’s realm. It is relatively easy to become part of some inter-
national organizations, and difficult to accede to others, for example, to the EU. The
EU evaluates candidate states according to very detailed criteria, such as the Copenhagen
criteria or the Maastricht criteria. Those criteria include very specific prerequisites. The
membership process is long and difficult. All prospective members must enact legislation
in order to bring their domestic laws in line with the body of European law, known as the
acquis communnautaire, built up over the history of the Union. The acquis is divided into
separate chapters, each dealing with different policy areas.
Organizations that impose precise and difficult membership procedures are expected
to be more functional. Thus, the nature of membership criteria is directly linked to
both the nature and the efficiency of an organization. The criteria for inclusion directly
affect its homogeneity and asymmetries. Loose membership criteria may bring very
different (heterogeneous) states together, which would naturally create frictions and pro-
blems. Besides, loose membership criteria fail to constrain member states to abide by the
shared principles.54 Thus, one of the most important tasks of an organization is to define
its membership boundaries. The link between membership and efficiency has several
strands. First of all, the cost of membership is an important signal. As already noted
the high cost of regime building helps existing regimes to persist. In other words, an
easy membership process disables the whole system in terms of policy enforcement.
Secondly, well defined and restrictive membership criteria convey much to a member
state about the other member states: “Membership enables states to learn about each
other’s preferences”.55 Membership must be informative. When the price of membership
is too low, the membership status does not say anything. It must be clear where the organ-
ization ends and the “outside” environment begins.56 Finally, it is only when membership
rules oblige the clearance of a significant hurdle that they convey something significant
about non-members.57 When membership rules are of this caliber, an organization is
taken seriously even by non-members. Also, the prestige of membership enables an
organization to use certain types of soft power. In sum, the causal link between member-
ship rules and institutional efficiency is very clear. The restrictions placed on membership
are a crucial part of the goods offered to the members of the organization.58 In a sense,
membership rules are the features of an infrastructure that enable the generation of
soft power that is the ability of a political actor to indirectly influence the behavior or
interests of other political actors by using certain various instruments.59 Organizations
lacking an informative membership rule normally fail to develop a functional soft-
power capability.
The analysis of the history of the OIC through the lens of membership regime evidently
displays the practical link between effectiveness and membership rule. Article 8 of the
OIC Charter which was ratified in 1972 was the first membership regime of the organiz-
ation, and yet it ruled the whole system for the following 36 years. A brief glance at the
provisions of this Article will demonstrate that they were not adequate:
The Organisation of the Islamic Conference is made up of the States which took
part in the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government held in
Rabat and the two Foreign Ministers’ Conferences held in Jeddah and
Karachi, and signatory to the present Charter. Every Muslim State is eligible to
join the Islamic Conference on submitting an application expressing its desire and
preparedness to adopt this Charter. The application shall be deposited with the
General Secretariat, to be brought before the Foreign Ministers’ Conference
at its first meeting after the submission of the application. Membership shall
take effect as of the time of approval of the Conference by a two-third majority

of the Conference members. (Emphasis is mine.)
Clearly, the OIC’s membership rule of 1972 was very simple: “every Muslim State” was
eligible to join the OIC. In terms of the foregoing discussion, those membership rules
were not informative. Besides, the Charter did not stipulate any further requirements
of membership, so membership was not costly. Thus, the OIC’s was an inclusive, not
a selective or disciplining, logic. Because of the ease of obtaining membership in the
Organization, the OIC today has 57 member states. The OIC in practice did not push
candidate states into a difficult membership process and did not ask candidate states to
abide by and internalize a complex acquis. Consequently, the Organization failed to
assemble homogenous members with fully shared principles and common ends. The
failure of the OIC in creating a homogenous member block is even confirmed by the Sec-
̇
retary General Ihsanoğlu ̇
in his last book. Ihsanoğlu admitted that in an organization
composed of 57 members with different political and ideological orientations “achieving
goals is likely to be hampered”.60
Just as problematic was the Charter’s use of the term “Muslim state”. Logically, Article
8 of the 1972 Charter can be read as having infused this term with two different meanings.
One of them is “a state that has an Islamic or religious political regime”. Iran’s is arguably
such a regime. Article 1 of the Iranian Constitution declares that the form of government
in Iran is that of an Islamic Republic.61 Similarly the Saudi Constitution is by royal decree
“a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion”. The Constitution itself pro-
vides that “God’s Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet are the Constitution”.62 Some
other states also present themselves as constitutionally Islamic states. However, this
cannot be assumed to be the intended meaning of the OIC Charter’s Article 8, consider-
ing that the Organization includes secular states such as Turkey and Algeria. Moreover,
the Turkish system is very critical of the role of religion in political procedures. Concern
about this did even delay Turkey’s membership of the OIC.
When Turkey was invited to the Rabat Summit in 1969, the Turkish President
declined to join it on the basis that Turkey is a secular state. The President deemed it
not proper for a secular state to become part of a conference dubbed as an Islamic
one. Other bureaucratic units, including the army, also opposed Turkey’s participation
in the Rabat Summit. Facing the state elite’s criticism, Turkey took part in the Rabat
as an observer.63 Nigeria is another case. Half of the Nigerian population is composed
of non-Muslims, making the notion of its being an “Islamic” state difficult. The discus-
sion, however, is not over. Ironically, some states like Austria, where Islam is recognized
604 Gokhan Bacik
as an official religion, pose important questions too. Islam is an officially recognized reli-
gion in Austria because Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1912 and
regulated the religious life of Muslims there. In meaningful contrast, Islam is not an
official religion in many OIC states.
A Matter of Definition
Such indeterminate cases necessitate an alternate reading of the OIC Charter’s “Muslim
State”. It may be read as a demographic frame. In fact, most member states have demo-
graphically large Muslim populations. According to Ahsan, despite that the Charter does
not define what it means by “Muslim state”, but it appears from OIC publications and
lectures delivered at OIC meetings that the term means “a nation state where Muslims
constitute a majority of the population.64 However, Muslims constitute minority
groups in some OIC member states, such as in Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Uganda,
Cameroon, Surinam, and Gabon. Besides, OIC membership has been criticized in
many states in which other religious groups are demographically significant. For
example, in Nigeria, the mainly Christian opposition groups were against OIC member-
ship. For many, OIC membership was a clear violation of the Constitution of their
country, which proclaimed it a secular state. More importantly, taking a demographic
perspective, these same groups argued that OIC membership was tantamount to the
elevation of Islam above Christianity.65
On the one hand, the institutional history of the OIC presents several intriguing cases
on this point: in 1969, India applied for OIC membership. India argued that it had a
sizable Muslim population, but its application was rejected on the grounds that
Muslims were a persecuted minority in India. When India applied for membership,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan declared that “if India with a popu-
lation of 10% Muslims could be regarded a Muslim state so could Israel with a population
of 11% Muslims”.66 On the other hand, the OIC accepted the membership of Uganda in
1974, although the majority of its population is not Muslims. Apparently, that was
because Uganda at that time had a Muslim president.67 Therefore, a demography-
based interpretation of the Charter is also problematic, particularly for the fact that the
OIC contains some member states with minority Muslim populations. For instance,
Stefan Voigt proposes that “all countries in which adherents of Islam form a relative
majority in comparison with the followers of other religions are coded as Islamic” and
counted only 47 Muslim countries who would be thus eligible for membership.68
Therefore, how was the “Muslim states” component of the OIC membership rule to be
understood? Since both the readings attempted above have proven inadequate, a third
reading commends itself. That might be one on which “Muslim state” denotes a state
in which the proportionate Muslim population is significant. Yet another reading
might be that a state is a Muslim state if it is so perceived by the international community.
This reading might have some scope, for, despite the secular and national nature of the
modern international system, people are still given to categorizing states as Muslim,
Christian or Western. The OIC Charter meaning of “Muslim state” might well have
no further denotation than this colloquial one. However, such a meaning would be
legally very problematic, since the regulating of an international organization cannot
proceed with such fuzzy and colloquial meanings.
Despite the legal controversies in the Charter, the OIC was ruled by it until 2008. In
this period, the criteria which could prove useful in determining the Islamic character
of such states were kept controversial.69 In consequence, the OIC has become an inter-
national organization which is made up of countries that have some kind of link with
Islam.70
In terms of its effects on intuitional efficiency, the OIC membership rules, from a
theoretical perspective, were not informative. Besides, they failed in presenting a clear
line between the Organization and the environment. Its membership rules could not
define the boundaries of the OIC. It was relatively easy to become part of the OIC.
Because the OIC membership rules were not informative, their loose structure brought
very different (heterogeneous) states together as members, creating certain problems.
In other words, the OIC did not create homogeneity. Equally, loose membership rules
failed to discipline member states into conformity with shared principles. Finally, since
the membership rules of the OIC were not costly, it had almost no regulating effect on
candidate or member states. Since an easy membership process disabled the Organiz-
ation in terms of policy enforcement, the OIC was plagued by this problem. The mem-
bership requirements of the OIC did not necessitate any structural reform process.
Several recent developments reminded once again of the fussy nature of the Charter.
Former Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration that Russia would like to join
the OIC is another interesting case that displays the problematic nature of the OIC’s
membership rule. During an official visit to Malaysia, Putin said that Russia—a
country with 20 million Muslims and therefore with “more [Muslims] than [Malaysia],
a leading country of the Muslim world”—should become an OIC member.71 Indeed,
given that Malaysia does not have an Islamic form of government, the membership of
Russia, which has more Muslims than Malaysia, seems logical: If Malaysia does not
have an Islamic form of rule, and if the number of Muslims is lower there than in
Russia, what differentiates Russia from Malaysia? (It should be noted that Muslim
groups, including their leaders, welcomed Putin’s proposal.)
Another curious case is India. With more than 130 million Muslims, India expects to
become part of the OIC. Although influential OIC member Saudi Arabia supports
India’s candidacy, many other states are critical, mainly because of India’s Hindu
nature. Interestingly, self-interest-based conflicts and concerns among member states
shape the course of discussions over India’s membership. Keeping in mind the proble-
matic nature of the OIC Charter’s membership rule, one can even ask whether member-
ship is possible for some states like Germany, where a considerable Muslim population
lives, to become part of the Organization.
Amending the Charter

Facing such controversial cases, in March 2008 the OIC made the following important
amendment concerning membership to its Charter:
Any State, member of the United Nations, having a Muslim majority and
abiding by the Charter, which submits an application for membership may
join the Organisation if approved by consensus of the Council of Foreign
Ministers on the basis of the agreed criteria adopted by the Council of
Foreign Ministers.
The amended article brought several new prerequisites. The Charter now stipulates two
specific conditions that states seeking accession must meet: (i) United Nations member-
ship and (ii) a Muslim majority. Indeed, this amendment ended the controversies over
which state is a Muslim state. In fact, the amended article does not even use the term
“Muslim state”; instead, it refers to “any state”. The amended Charter, having intro-
606 Gokhan Bacik
duced a demographic criterion, now displays a more secular logic, thereby dampening
insinuations about the political role of Islam.
Being a very late amendment, this one had no capacity to transform the OIC. The
Organization had already almost reached its optimum size. Unless new states with
Muslim majorities come into being upon a declaration of independence, no state from
the current list of independent states can aspire to membership. The only practical
effect of the amendment is that it prevents states like Russia aspiring to OIC member-
ship. However, the amendment has only clarified that states with Muslim majority can
be member of the OIC. Still, the charter does not envisage an informative membership
process in which applicant states would harmonize themselves with the OIC. Thus,
membership of the OIC still stands as a pure political decision lacking a detailed
process where candidate states are expected to harmonize their standards with those
of the OIC.
The new amendment’s UN-membership pre-condition all but stripped the OIC of its
authority as an independent body. (Pursuant to the UN Charter, before the General
Assembly can admit a state as a new member, the Security Council must recommend
its admission.)72 Having made UN membership a precondition of OIC membership,
the OIC ceded its supremacy to another international body. This naturally was a critical
transfer. Recently, Kosovo—a political entity with a Muslim demographic majority—
declared its sovereignty. However, Kosovo’s membership of the UN has so far been
blocked by Russia.73 This has served to demonstrate that the amended membership cri-
teria has paralyzed the OIC’s powers of receptivity. The future might see similar demon-
strations.
Once the combined effect of the two prerequisites (UN membership and Muslim
majority population) become operational, OIC membership is very difficult to attain, if
not impossible. First, there is no state with Muslim majority in the international
system that is not already an OIC member. Secondly, potential states with Muslim
majorities, such as Kosovo, face the UN membership hurdle. It transpires, therefore
that the OIC’s UN membership pre-condition is less a move to facilitate membership
than a tacit declaration of a preference to avoid conflict with the state system.
Prominently important in this amendment is “the agreed criteria” provision. But its
meaning is obscure. The OIC document does not elucidate it at any point. For instance,
if Kosovo becomes a UN member and applies for membership of the OIC, what will be
the role of the “agreed criteria”? Logically, the OIC cannot be expected to ask for strict
criteria such as the Copenhagen criteria. Given the democracy deficits of many member
states, the OIC would probably deal with some technical details such as border problems.
The OIC cannot introduce criteria, such as civil rule, that most of its members cannot
perform. This sort of problem illustrates that the OIC still does not have a disciplining
membership process.
The Kosovo holds the potential for the OIC of an experimental process. So far, due to
its non-informative membership process, OIC membership was gained on membership
decision instead of through a membership process. Actually, the current intra-OIC debate
over Kosovo is not about its membership process. A de facto process for Kosovo’s mem-
bership is already in progress. When Turkey wanted to include in it a few ideas supporting
Kosovo’s independence, several other states, such as Azerbaijan, Sudan, Egypt, and
Indonesia, prevented this inclusion. In the end, it was decided that the document
should include only an article expressing solidarity with the people of Kosovo.74
It should also be remembered that Egypt blocked the participation of a Kosovo delegation
in an Islamic Conference event in November 2008.75 Most probably, if the OIC members
overcome this quarrel, Kosovo will become part of the OIC in a very short time, outside
of any disciplining membership process.
The Absence of a Rule-enforcing Body

The other major reason for the failure of the OIC is that it does not have a rule enforcing
body. Despite its colossal size and loose membership criteria, no rule-enforcing body
exists to steer it. Without the coordinating power of such a body, it faces events in per-
plexity rather than with a harmonious stand.76 Given this problem, some argue that
the structure of the OIC can be compared with that of the UN, in the sense that both
organizations are based on universal ideologies and neither can react to events as a har-
monious unit.77
It is often recalled that the UN was designed to be the center of multilateral diplomacy
in post-war world politics.78 As a platform organization, UN has an “arena” role. In Clive

Archer’s formula, arena-style organizations provide meeting places for members to come
together to discuss, argue, cooperate, or disagree.79 In this role, the UN’s activities have
sometimes borne fruit. For example, the 7th Special Session of the UN General Assembly
(1975) dealt with development and international economic cooperation.80 The OIC also
can be said to have been created to manage a multilateral diplomacy among Muslims in
post-Caliphate politics. In fact, several criteria yield more similarities between the OIC
and the UN. As stated above, both organizations follow a kind of universalist ideology:
they have loose membership criteria, they are inclusive, and neither of them imposes a
disciplining and costly membership process. For both, political decisions instead of a
gradual and costly membership process determine the status of an applicant’s future.
Arguably, such platform-like organizations with universal ideologies may have compara-
tively loose rule-enforcing bodies. Cultivating common understandings among members
is their greater concern.
Despite the several similarities, an important difference requires attention. The UN,
arguably the biggest of all international inter-governmental organizations, has the Secur-
ity Council, a very strong rule-enforcing body. The OIC has no such rule-enforcing body.
In the UN system, the Security Council is a very important body with a core of five veto-
wielding permanent members and 10 elected non-permanent members with 2-year
terms. Each member state in the Security Council must keep a representative available
at area headquarters at all times. Further, the UN Charter exacts all members’ agreement
that the Security Council acts on their behalf, and that they will carry out and abide by all
Council decisions. On the provisions of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions are
binding,81 and every member state is obligated to implement them and to see to their
implementation by others.82 A secondary but important function of the Security
Council that it shares with the General Assembly is its participation in the elective
process. Before the General Assembly can admit a state as a new member of the UN,
the Security Council must recommend admission. Any permanent member of it can
block an applicant’s membership. The process of selecting a new Secretary General is
identical every time. These certainties inevitably increase the significance of the Security
Council. States mount major campaigns to secure a seat on the Council as interim
members. The many critical resolutions of the Security Council are practical proof of
this body’s significance.83
Compared with the UN, the OIC is a “relatively unstructured organization”.84 It plays
a platform role. It has a capacity “to bring together all the nations of the Muslim world,
even those who have declared war on each other”.85 But it is not strong in that it has no
608 Gokhan Bacik
permanent operating bodies. By nature, the OIC as a platform observes a conference

diplomacy that always requires a complex decision-making process. Here, the word “con-
ference” throws light on the loose character of the OIC.86 Conference diplomacy has a
scheduled beginning and end.87 It is not permanent. But with this limited capacity, the
OIC is very accommodative and has a sort of umbrella character.88 It does not possess
any power to implement its decisions. This makes the OIC a weak authority. In other
words, it lacks a body with the capacity of rule enforcement. The OIC’s major bodies,
include the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Governments, the Conference
of Foreign Ministers and the General Secretariat. The subsidiary organs have no auth-
ority to enforce rules of the Organization.
Establishing a New Rule Enacting Body

Despite the need for an executive body was confirmed in TYPOA, it is still not realistic to
expect such a body within the OIC due to the lack of a consensus among member states.
Thus, the International Islamic Court of Justice (IICJ) can be seen as the most promising
body for rule enforcement. It was created at the 1981 OIC meeting. Once it is fully con-
stituted, the IICJ might play a kind of rule-enacting body. If ratified, it will be the highest
judicial organ of the OIC. Article 38 of its Charter declares that its judgments are binding
only upon the parties to the dispute, and Article 39 affirms that those judgments are final
and cannot be appealed.89 But as yet the Charter has not been ratified by all members.90
Though it is unrealistic to expect the IICJ be an autonomous body in the short term, it
will be in a position to bring down judgments that are binding upon the OIC members
who have ratified it.
As things stand, the OIC cannot do much to bind its members. Since the problem of
not having an executive body was felt at various levels, a proposal to set up such an organ
was addressed at the 6th Islamic Summit Conference in Dakar in 1991 and the 7th
Islamic Summit Conference in Casablanca in 1994. But no solution was reached.91
Thus, the OIC, when compared with some other international organizations, is neither
comprehensive nor institutionalized.92 More, the OIC is relatively unstructured when
compared with the UN, despite their similarity in that both are grounded in a universal
ideology. Clive Archer estimates the institutional power of an organization in terms of the
level of power sharing among its plenary and executive organs. To him, the plenary
organs include all member states. They are representative bodies in which the sovereign
equality of all members is recognized and displayed. However, it is its executive organs
that lead an organization. They are not always representative, yet they have the power
to create rules that are binding on all.93 On Archer’s reasoning, the OIC seems weak
because of the limited mandate of its executive organs. Without strong executive
organs, the OIC, at most, comes out as a weak confederation. The obligations on its
members are few, and it has no enforcement facility.94
On Sanctions and Suspensions

Apart from the lack of an executive body, another equally troublesome situation is the
OIC Charter’s silence on the imposition of sanctions. Consequently, the Charter has
only a declaratory capacity. It does not contain any express provisions for the imposition
of sanctions.95 For instance, Article II, paragraph (B) speaks of the inspiration and gui-
dance that member states might gain from these declarations. The phrase “shall be
inspired and guided” does not create legal obligation in express terms. Member states
of the OIC neither give any solemn affirmation or declaration of adherence to principles
stipulated in Article II (B) of the Charter, nor do they pledge themselves to observe these
scrupulously.96
A controversy arose in 1981 with Egypt’s suspension from the OIC following its signing
of a treaty with Israel. In retrospect, this case was exceptional, for it made the OIC seem
to be united and firm in disciplining a major Arab Muslim member. This case has been
analyzed closely and often as an indicator of the OIC’s capacity. However, those analyses
are not sufficiently attentive to the salient points of the case. To begin with, several
members with close ties to the USA did not support the OIC resolution suspending
Egypt from the Organization because that country had concluded a treaty with
Israel.97 Those states kept their bilateral contacts with Egypt. Secondly, Egypt was sus-
pended for violating several resolutions regarding Jerusalem and Palestine, which viola-
tions were deemed to be violations also of the Charter.98
However, it was never clear on whose interpretation of the OIC Charter Egypt was
found to be in violation of it. Also, when Egypt was readmitted in 1984, nothing was men-
tioned about her deviation from the OIC Charter. The reason for her suspension was the
view that by signing an agreement with Israel, Egypt had violated the Charter-prescribed
attitude that should be expressed on the issue of Palestine. Egypt argued that it never
deviated from the OIC Charter, neither before signing the agreement with Israel nor
after.99 Mouiniddin, arguing in support of Egypt’s position, noted that the Camp
David Accord between Egypt and Israel achieved substantial concessions in favor of
Palestinians. Thus, the legal basis of the suspension was not clear, nor even persuasively
declared. For the reacting states, the important fact was the formal recognition of Israel
by Egypt. But this was a political standpoint that should have been kept separate from the
legal argumentation. It was not. So it is reasonably posited that Egypt’s suspension from
the OIC had no legal basis.100
As it happened, within a few years, the OIC itself had changed its position. In January
1984, at the 4th Summit Conference in Casablanca, the OIC again condemned the Camp
David process. But this time, Egypt was not condemned. A resolution lifted the suspen-
sion of Egypt’s membership. The Guinean leader, Ahmad Toure, even argued that the
OIC had not conclusively suspended Egypt’s membership at the Taif Summit (1981).
Similarly, the then President of Egypt, Husni Mubarak claimed that Egypt had always
been committed to the OIC Charter.101 Thanks to the Charter’s legal ambiguity,
actors within the OIC had different ideas about what had happened. Thus, neither
Egypt’s suspension nor re-inclusion occurred as a transparent legal process. Beyond pol-
itical debates, the legal aspect of the Egyptian case was never clear and consistent. This is
symptomatic of OIC’s loose institutional structure.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the OIC has become a more influential actor both in terms of
global affairs and intra-Muslim affairs. However, this success should be read very care-
fully as it is mainly the product of three major trends: first is the global conjecture that
forces other international actors such as the UN and the EU to develop close relations
with the OIC because of complex problems such as Islamophobia, the rise of racism in
the West and as well as other regional problems such as Afghanistan or the Arab
Spring. Second is the strong political will of the Secretariat and of some members such
as Turkey and Malaysia that works as a motor behind the organization. This political
will has not permitted the OIC to stay silent facing serious global problems and forced
610 Gokhan Bacik
the organization to adopt a more interventionist agenda towards these problems. The
final one is the limited success of the reformist agenda that was adopted in the past by
various declarations including TYPOA.
Despite these positive developments, the OIC is still burdened with the major struc-
tural deficits analyzed in this paper. In retrospect, the lack of an informative membership
rule in the last 40 years transformed the OIC into a colossal body lacking common stan-
dards. Today, the lack of an executive body still weakens the OIC. Despite the confir-
mation of these reform demands in TYPOA, the OIC has not been successful in
generating the needed political will to realize these reforms. Even the resolution on the
implementation of TYPOA which was declared after the 2011 Astana Summit is quite
low-profile in terms of its lack of poignant words about several reformist strategies that
were declared 6 years ago such as creating an executive body.102
Despite the progress made in the last 6 years, the negative legacies of non-informative
membership regime and the lack of an executive body still weakens the OIC. Thus, these
two deficiencies should be taken into consideration in analyzing how the OIC approaches
political issues be it at global or at intra-Muslim levels. Practically, the headquarters of the
OIC seems to be more active and disposed compared with many members. The disparity
should be seen as the result of the two structural weaknesses that are analyzed in this
paper: Non-informative membership rule and the lack of an executive body.
In elaborating the disparity between the OIC and its members, one should analyze
several recent developments. For example, only 17 members of the OIC have recognized
Kosovo so far despite the Organization’s frequent calls.103 Similar problems can be
observed in other issues such as Libyan crisis and the Arab Spring. In March 2011, the
OIC adopted a Final Declaration about Libya after an emergency meeting of the perma-
nent representatives of the member states. This text, notwithstanding its good will in
its content, is a typical sample of how the OIC is in a weak position in regard to its
members.104 In fact, the OIC organized emergency meetings, dispatched a delegation
to Libya to observe the ground conditions there,105 oppose any ground military interven-
tion in Libya,106 however it has failed to generate a common strategy among its members.
For example, the six Muslim nation Gulf Cooperation Council and Turkey have devel-
oped their somehow independent positions. A similar case was observed in the case of
Bahrain as Sunni and Shi’a members of the OIC have almost different policies. For
instance, Turkey which came out as the defender of change in Egypt, assumed a position
that defended the Sunni status quo in Bahrain concerning mainly from Iran’s position in
the region. A similar case is the OIC position regarding the Arab Spring. Despite the pol-
itical will that was made public by the Secretary General, the OIC has carefully kept itself
away from generating an official position. Even no words were uttered on the Arab Spring
in the Astana 2011 Summit which was right after the Arab Spring. Once analyzed there is
no word about the conflicts in the Arab word in 38 political resolutions made in this
meeting. Such cases should be seen as the negative outcomes of the structural weakness
of the Organization in the form of lacking an informative membership rule and of an
executive body.
What is the solution? Since the current situation within the Organization is untenable,
some radical agendas are not totally improbable. Logically, adding strict objectives and
principles such as radical reform agendas into the Charter would be a practical move.
For many member countries, however, such plans are naturally offensive and they
would not allow the OIC to become a platform on which their political regimes are
attacked. Similar fears exist when it comes to economic liberalization or regulations on
social policy, since many members have closed political and economic systems. There-
fore, adding new objectives to the Charter would not ensure their operational uptake, for
though the OIC is a Colossus, it is without the homogeneity that would enable it to act as
a body with a commitment to common principles.
If it were to seriously contemplate reform, the OIC might follow one general and one
specific agenda. The general OIC agenda should be to present itself as a useful platform.
Actually, the OIC has already attracted the attention of major actors such as the UN, the
EU, and even the USA. These influential entities appear ready to use the OIC as the
forum for dialogue with Muslims. Russia’s plans for OIC membership would support
such an agenda. Logically, this is the best option for the OIC: to be a significant forum
for dialogue with the great global powers is the best status that an organization without
an informative membership rule can aspire to. The specific OIC agenda should be the
enabling of the emergence of intra-OIC formations with strict and costly demands
upon aspiring members. The grand idealistic framework of the OIC should not be
allowed to prevent such functionalist and pragmatist formations. Rather than pursue
unfeasible new projects that involve all 57 member states, new projects should proceed
with strict prerequisites brought to bear on member states desirous of participating in
them. Naturally, countries that are not equipped to meet these prerequisites, or are not
disposed to meet them, should not be included in such projects. It should be made
known that intra-group formations are normal in any big organizations. Successful
samples of them are available in the EU’s operations. Although it is not officially part
of the OIC, the D-8 (Developing Eight) initiative is a proper example. The D-8
Charter is relatively informative, as it underlines that membership will be open to other
countries subscribing to the goals, objectives, and principles of the group, and generally,
sharing common bonds with it.107 Indeed, successful intra-organization formations may
enliven the entire OIC as well. In fact, recent attempts to activate the Trade Preferential
System for the countries of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation should be seen as
a concrete step to realize such agendas.
NOTES
1. Gilles Kepel, Jihad The Trail of Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 74.
2. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Connor, “The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Sharing an
Illusion”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 2005, p. 80.
3. Masood Khan, “What is in name?”, available online at: www.arabnews.com (accessed 5 July 2011).
4. Ali Ashraf Rabbani, “Why Iran Chose Turkey”, Turkish Daily News, 16 September 2004.
5. Mehmet Kalyoncu, “A Quest for Reform across the Muslim World”, Today’s Zaman, 24 January
2011. Mehmet Yılmaz, “Örgüte Vizyon Kazadıracak” [A New Vision to the Organization],
Aksiyon, 21 June 2004.
6. OIC Resolution, 4/38-LEG on Cooperation Agreement Between The OIC and the African Union, 30
June 2011.
7. Final Communiqué of the 11th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, OIC/Summit-11/2008/FC/
REV.6, Dakar, 13–14 March 2008.
8. OIC Resolution, 4/38-C on Family Issues Promoting Women’s Status, Astana, 30 June 2011.
9. Reuters, 15 July 2011, 15.49 EDT.
10. Ten-Year Programme of Action, Article 11, available online at: http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/
english/10-years-plan.htm
11. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an
Art of the State”, International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 4, Autumn 1986, p. 755.
12. Ibid.
13. The word ummah is not a clear one, as it refers to various different sets of meanings in the Qur’an.
What Frederick M. Denny wrote in 1977 is still informative: “There is no simple formula for defining
the term ummah in the Quran, because it covers a variety of realities. …So when we speak of the
612 Gokhan Bacik
ummah concept in the Quran, we must distinguish which ummah concept we mean”. Frederick
M. Denny, “Ummah in the Constitution of Medina”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 36,
No. 1, January 1977, p. 39. See also Frederick M. Denny, “The Meaning of Ummah in the
Quran”, History of Religions, Vol. 15, No. 1, August 1975, pp. 34–70.
14. Kevin J. O’Toole, “Islam and the West: The Clash of Values”, Global Change, Peace & Security,
Vol. 20, No. 1, February 2008, p. 35.
15. Noor Ahmad Baba, “Organization of the Islamic Conference: Conceptual Framework and Insti-
tutional Structure”, International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1993, pp. 37–49.
16. Michele Lombardini, “The International Islamic Court of Justice: Towards an International Islamic
System?, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2001, p. 667.
17. Abdullah al Ahsan, OIC The Organization of the Islamic Conference (An Introduction to an Islamic Pol-
itical Institution), Herndon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1998, p. 24.
18. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that most Islamic—particularly Arab—states have severe pro-
blems with securing their full sovereignty. Several transnational or sub-national challenges are still
putting at risk those states’ capacities for sovereignty. Therefore the duality between nationhood
and the power of transnational or sub-national identities is a natural feature of the domestic politics
of Muslim societies. See Gokhan Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of
Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
19. Abdullah al Ahsan, Umma or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society, Leicester: The
Islamic Foundation, 1992, p. 50.
20. Kevin J. O’Toole, “Islam and the West: The Clash of Values”, op. cit., p. 35.
21. Abdullah al Ahsan, Umma or Nation?, op. cit., p. 37.
22. Ibid., p. 27.
23. On the structural link between citizenship and the nation-state, see Gershon Shafir, The Citizenship
Debates: A Reader, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 2. Also see Patrick Weil,
“Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws”, in Citizenship Today:
Global Perspectives and Practices, ed. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2001, p. 18.
24. Michelle Lombardini, The International Islamic Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 672.
25. Ibid., p. 110.
27. Ibid., p. 11. The early Turkish reservations about the Mu’tamars should be remembered here. The
Turks noticed correctly that the groups in those Mu’tamars were somehow linked with the idea of
the Caliphate.
28. Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation
among its Member States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 70.
29. Shahnaz Akhtar, The Role of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Political and Economic
Co-operation of the Muslim World (1974–1994), Unpublished PHD Thesis Submitted to Bahauddin
Zakariya University Multan, 2002, p. 62.
30. Noor Ahmad Baba, “Organization of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 42.
32. Jeff Haynes, “Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics”, Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 152.
33. Naveed S. Sheikh, The New Politics of Islam Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States, London:
Routledge, 2003, p. 36.
34. “Organization of the Islamic Conference: OIC – 40th Anniversary” General Secretariat, Information
Department, Jeddah Saudi Arabia, No Date, p. 15.
35. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Connor, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 80;
Davut Dursun, Islam ̇ Dünyasında Dayanışma Hareketleri [The Solidarity Movements in the Islamic
̇
World], Istanbul: Agac, 1992, p. 84.
36. John A. McKesson, “The Shuman Plan”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1, March 1952,
pp. 18–35.
37. Walter Yondorf, “Monnet and the Action Committee: The Formative Period of the European
Community”, International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 1965, pp. 885–912.
38. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Craig Parsons, “Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of
the European Union”, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1, Winter 202, pp. 47–84.
39. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge
2006, p. 3.
40. Terrence Murray, “Europe Debates God’s Place in New Constitution: A Divine Reference is Among
the Most Contentious Issues as Delegates Reconvene this Month”, The Christian Science Monitor, 10
April 2003. See also Honor Mahony, “Does God Belong in the Future EU Constitution?”, The
Parliament Magazine, 10 March 2003, p. 12.
41. For example, The Statute of the Islamic States Telecommunication Union (ISTU) states that the first
objective of the Union is “to promote Islamic solidarity in the telecommunication field”. Article 2,
The Statute of the Islamic States Telecommunication Union (ISTU).
42. Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and
Contemporary Considerations”, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker
and Cynthia Weber, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 82. Also see Daniel
Philpot, “Westphalia, Authority, and International Society”, Political Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3,
Special Issue 1999, p. 567 and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territorially”,
World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, October 1986, p. 27.
43. Gershon Shafir, The Citizenship Debates, op. cit., p. 2. See also Patrick Weil, “Access to Citizenship:
A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws”, in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and
Practices, ed. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2001, p. 18.

44. Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory
and Empirical Research”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 1995, p. 227. See also
David Newman, “Boundaries, Borders, and Barriers: Changing Geographic Perspectives on Terri-
torial Lines”, in Identities Borders Orders Rethinking International Relations Theory, eds. Mathias Albert-
David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2001, pp. 137–151.
45. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Connor, The Organization of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., pp. 80 and 81.
46. For instance, in matters such as the status of the Caspian Sea or energy routes, intra-member ten-
sions are very common. See “Iran Says Ready to Negotiate with Azerbaijan on Caspian Debate”,
People’s Daily Online, 28 July 2001.
47. Pascal Lamy, Director General of the World Trade Organization: “Members of civil society can send
amicus curiae briefs to WTO adjudicating bodies (Panels and the Appellate Body) during dispute settle-
ment procedures”. Available online at: http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=5742.
48. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article XII(1).
49. Scott Pegg, De Facto States in the International System, Institute of International Relations, The
University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 21, February 1998, p. 9.
50. See footnote 17.
51. Robert Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes”, in International Regimes, ed. Stephen
D. Krasner, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 153.
52. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 103.
53. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Insti-
tutions”, International Organization, Vol. 70, No. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 770.
54. Ibid., p. 783.
55. Ibid.
56. Christer Jönsson, “Interorganisation Theory and International Organization”, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 1986, p. 41.
57. Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design, op. cit., p. 783.
58. Michael Wesley, Regional Organisations of the Asia Pacific: Exploring Institutional Change, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 115.
59. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs,
Vol. 61, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 82–84.
̇
60. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, The Islamic World in the New Century, the Organization of Islamic Conference,
1969–2009, London: Hurst & Company, 2010, p. 37.
61. Available online at: http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-1.html
62. Available online at: http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sa00000_.html
̇
63. Melek Firat-Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Ortadoğu’yla Ilişkiler” [Relations with the Middle East], in Türk
Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlarv” [“Turkish Foreign Policy,
Documents, Cases and Comments”], ed. Baskın Oran, Istanbul: ̇ ̇
Iletişim, 2003, 792.
64. Abdullah al Ahsan, Umma or Nation?, op. cit., pp. 45–46.
65. Salahudeen Yusuf, “Nigeria’s Membership in the OIC: Implications of Print Media Coverage for
Peace and National Unity”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999, p. 240. Also
614 Gokhan Bacik
see Leo Dare, “Political Instability and Displacement in Nigeria”, Journal of Asian & African Studies,
Vol. 32, Nos. 1/2, June 1997, p. 30.
66. Kevin J. O’Toole, Islam and the West, op. cit., p. 30.
68. Stefan Voigt, “Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society”, The Independent Review, Vol. 10, No. 1,
Summer 2005, p. 64.
69. Hassan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 10.
70. Noor Ahmad Baba,Baba, Organization of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 39.
71. Vladimir Kovalev, “Russia Wants to Join Islamic Organization”, Week in Review, 5–11 August 2003.
72. A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, International Organizations Principles and Issues, London:
Prentice Hall, 2002, p. 72.
73. “An Independent Kosovo Can Never Join UN: Russia”, Reuters, 17 January 2008.
74. “Rift Among OIC Experts over Kosovo”, Tanjug News Agency, 11 March 2008.
75. “Egypt blocks Kosovo delegation participation OIC”, Egypt News, 26 November 2008. (Available
online at: http://news.egypt.com/en/200811264968/news/-egypt-news/egypt-blocks-kosovo-
delegation-participation-oic.html)
76. Malaysian Foreign Minister, also the chair of the OIC 2005 summit, described the loose character of
the OIC as the real problem. Cited in Also see Mehmet Ozkan, “Turkey in the Islamic World: An
Institutional Perspective”, Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2007, p. 164.
78. Kelly-Kate S. Pease, International Organizations Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century,
New York: Prentice Hall, 2003, p. 21.
79. Clive Archer, International Organizations, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 73.
80. Ibid., p. 76.
81. A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, International Organization, op. cit., p. 72.
82. Kelly-Kate S. Pease, International Organizations, op. cit., p. 23.
83. Although not the equal in importance of the Security Council, the International Court of Justice
in The Hague can be cited as another organ that displays the UN system as a relatively strong
intra-institutional body. All members of the UN are automatically members of the ICJ. Yet ICJ
judges are drawn from the different legal systems of the world. A. LeRoy Bennett and James
K. Oliver, International Organizations, op. cit., p. 78.
84. Haynes, Traditional Religious Actors, op. cit., p. 152.
85. Ziyauddin Serdar, Islamic Futures, The Shape of Ideas to Come, London: Mansell, 1985, p. 51.
86. Hassan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 74.
87. Noor Ahmad Baba, Organization of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 41.
88. Ibid., p. 38.
90. Shahnaz Akhtar, The Role of the Organization of the Islamic, op. cit., p. 97. Michelle Lombardini, The
International Islamic Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 671.
92. Kelly-Kate S. Pease, International Organizations, op. cit., p. 31.
93. Clive Archer, International Organizations, op. cit., p. 58.
94. Here A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver’s analysis on the UN is applied. Bennett and Oliver,
International Organizations, op. cit., p. 59.
95. Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 85.
96. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 115.
99. Ibid., p. 116.
100. Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference, op. cit., p. 101.
102. OIC Resolution, 1/38-POA on the Implementation of the Ten-Year Programme of Action, 30 June
2011.
103. “OIC calls on Islamic countries to recognize Kosovo”, www.albeu.com, 28 July 2011.
104. “Final Declaration on Libya”, www.rohama.org/en/pages/?cid4337, 9 March 2006.
105. “OIC Sends Delegation to Mediate in Libya Crisis”, Daily Trust, 23 June 2011.
106. “OIC rejects military action on Libya”, www.presstv.ir/detail/168830.html, 8 March 2011.
107. Available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/d-8/facts.figures01.htm

Bacik 2011

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bacik 2011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [East Carolina University]

On: 27 August 2013, At: 11:11

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs

The Genesis, History, and Functioning

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.630864

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

The Genesis, History, and Functioning of the

Islamic Cooperation (OIC) by applying a formal-institutional method. This

Reforming the OIC

The Difficulty of Theorizing the OIC: The “Contending World-Views” Problem

The Genealogical Trace

The Founding of the OIC

Comparison with the EU

The OIC versus the State System: Does it Matter?

Institutional Reasons of Weakness

The Non-Informative Membership Rule

The membership criteria of an international organization directly affect its efficiency.

take effect as of the time of approval of the Conference by a two-third majority

Amending the Charter

The Absence of a Rule-enforcing Body

in post-war world politics.78 As a platform organization, UN has an “arena” role. In Clive

permanent operating bodies. By nature, the OIC as a platform observes a conference

Establishing a New Rule Enacting Body

On Sanctions and Suspensions

International Peace, 2001, p. 18.

You might also like