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Positions of Turkish political parties on European integration

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Positions of Turkish political parties on European

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Filiz Başkan & Selin Bengi Gümrükçü

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 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2012, 25–44

Positions of Turkish political parties on European integration

Filiz Başkan* and Selin Bengi Gümrükçü

Department of International Relations and the European Union, Izmir University of

Economics, Sakarya Cad. No. 156, Balçova, İzmir 35330, Turkey
(Received 15 July 2010; final version received 25 October 2011)

Although academic studies on the positions of political parties in European

Union member states concerning European integration have increased since the
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end of 1990s, there is a lack of systematic and comprehensive research on this

topic in Turkey. This article examines the positions on European integration of
Turkish political parties competing in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elec-
tions. It shows that there are more Eurosceptic and Eurorejectionist parties than
Euroenthusiast parties. This can be explained by the lack of elite consensus on
European integration in Turkey due to specific features of Turkey–EU relations.
Keywords: European integration; Euroscepticism; political parties; Turkey

Since the end of the 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of academic
studies on party positions on European integration in general, and on Eurosceptic-
ism in particular, in both western European countries and new members of the
European Union (EU) from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). These include both
individual country studies and comparative works. Regarding comparative research,
Marks and Wilson (1999) examined party orientations towards European integration
and suggested that the traditional left–right spectrum will emerge as the major axis
of contestation over Europe. In another article, Marks and Wilson (2000) explained
the positions taken by national political parties on the issue of European integration
over the period 1984–1996 by developing a cleavage account of party responses to
this issue. There are also comparative studies analysing Euroscepticism across EU
member states. For instance, Taggart (1998) examined contemporary party-based
Euroscepticism in EU member states and Norway. In a later work, Taggart and Szc-
zerbiak (2002) analysed political party positions regarding the EU in CEE countries,
distinguishing two different types of Euroscepticism: hard and soft. On the other
hand, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) suggested an alternative conceptualization based
on the differentiation of support for European integration on the one hand, and sup-
port for the EU on the other.
Some of the articles on individual countries have focused on west European
countries, while others have focused on CEE countries. Harmsen and Spiering
(2005), in their edited volume, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and
European Integration, brought together individual country cases of France,
Germany, Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, Austria, Poland, Switzerland and Sweden.
Similarly, the first volume of Opposing Europe, edited by Taggart and Szczerbiak

*Corresponding author. Email: filiz.baskan@ieu.edu.tr

ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online

Ó 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.661220
http://www.tandfonline.com
 26 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

(2008), includes a number of pieces analysing individual western European

countries, such as Italy, Germany, Britain, Denmark and Finland, and CEE coun-
tries, such as Poland, Estonia and Slovakia.
Turning to Turkey, we find that there are only a few studies on Turkish politi-
cal party positions on European integration in general and Euroscepticism in par-
ticular. Some researchers focus on public opinion, such as Güneş-Ayata (2003),
who discusses public opinion concerning Turkey’s EU membership and Euroscep-
ticism, with a special emphasis on political parties, and the Turkey-scepticism of
European countries as a source of Euroscepticism in Turkey. Others, such as
Yılmaz (2006, 2009), focus on public and elite-based Euroscepticism. There are
also some studies on party-based Euroscepticism in Turkey. For example, Avcı
(2003) described Turkish political discourse about the country’s EU membership
application following the Helsinki summit, which granted candidacy status to
Turkey in 1999. Her study focused especially on members of the then coalition
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government of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti [DSP]), the
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [MHP]) and the Motherland
Party (Anavatan Partisi [ANAP]), which held power between 1999 and 2002.
Taraktaş (2008) examined both public Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscep-
ticism, with special reference to the 2002 general elections in Turkey, by compar-
ing it with CEE countries. However, there is a lack of systematic and
comprehensive research on party positions on European integration in general and
party-based Euroscepticism in particular, in Turkey.
This paper aims to determine the positions of Turkish political parties on Euro-
pean integration with special attention to parties criticizing or opposing Turkey’s
EU membership. We will examine the party programmes and election manifestos of
the 16 political parties who competed in the 2011 general elections, the 15 political
parties in the 2007 general elections, and the 18 political parties in the 2002 general
elections in order to show their changing positions regarding Turkey’s EU member-
ship candidacy. We believe that this will contribute to the literature, both by
accounting for Turkish political parties’ positions on European integration in general
and party-based Euroscepticism in particular, and by providing a comparative analy-
sis of the positions of all parties competing in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 general
elections. Such an analysis is essential since the unique and complicated Turkish
case can provide a data for further studies comparing the Turkish case with previ-
ous and current candidate countries.
The Turkish case is unique and complicated in several respects. First, Turkey
has a large population of 74.7 million, so it would become the second largest mem-
ber of the EU, entailing a considerable influence on the decision-making mecha-
nisms of the union, especially in the population-based European parliament.
Second, Turkey’s candidacy to the EU is particularly complicated because Turkey
would become the only predominantly Muslim country in the predominantly Chris-
tian EU. This factor has created doubts about the ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey (Müftü-
ler-Baç 1998), and even ‘Turcophobia’ among some EU officials (Güney 2005,
304). Third, allowing Turkey full EU membership would be particularly problem-
atic because, when Turkey becomes a member state, the EU’s borders will reach
the Middle East, a region characterized by political instability (Güney 2005, 304).
Lastly, Turkey has been experiencing the anxiety, at both public and elite levels,
engendered by having had to wait longer at the EU’s door than any other candidate,
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 27

having signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 1963 and a Customs

Union Agreement in 1995.
Before examining Turkish political party positions on European integration in
general and Euroscepticism in particular, we need to discuss a number of back-
ground issues, starting with the 2002 general elections, since these are seen as
‘earthquake’ elections by scholars of Turkish politics (Çağaptay 2002; Çarkoğlu
2002a; Öniş and Keyman 2003). Eighteen parties ran in the 2002 general elections,
in which the centre-right Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Part-
isi [AKP]) won a landslide victory with 363 of the 550 parliamentary seats. Its suc-
cess was significant since AKP is the successor to the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah
Partisi [RP]) and Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi [FP]). Other than AKP, only the cen-
tre-left Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]) won parliamen-
tary representation with 19.4% of the vote and 178 seats. This result indicated the
almost complete erosion of support for the previously dominant centre-right parties,
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such as ANAP and the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi [DYP]), and their subse-
quent exclusion from the Turkish Grand National Assembly for failing to pass the
10% electoral threshold. In addition to ANAP, both DSP and MHP, the other part-
ners of the DSP–MHP–ANAP coalition government (formed following the 1999
general elections and ruling until 2002), failed to pass the 10% electoral threshold
and remained outside parliament. One of the key reasons for the coalition govern-
ment’s loss of electoral support is believed to be the deep economic crisis of 2001
(Çarkoğlu 2002a, 35; Keyman and Öniş 2007, 29).
Next, it is important to examine the Turkish party and electoral systems, which
were reshaped through the 1983 Election Law. This aimed to decrease the degree
of political polarization that had led to unstable coalition governments in the 1970s.
A proportional representation system was retained but with a new percentage barrier
(threshold principle), whereby no party failing to receive 10% of the national vote
could obtain parliamentary representation. This arrangement aimed to exclude
extremist parties from the political arena. However, in the 2002 general elections,
not only extremist parties, but also historically mainstream parties were excluded,
like DSP, MHP, ANAP and DYP.
Besides the 1983 Election Law, the Constitutional Court has also played a deci-
sive role in shaping the party system in Turkey, especially during the post-1980 per-
iod. It has dissolved 19 political parties, primarily because of their religious or
ethnic-separatist character, which the court saw as threats to the pillars of the Turk-
ish Republic, particularly secularism and the territorial integrity of the state. For
instance, the court dissolved both the Islamist RP and FP in 1998 and 2001, respec-
tively, on the grounds of acting against the principles of the secular republic (Güney
and Başkan 2008). FP’s dissolution led to the formation of two parties by ex-FP
members: Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi [SP]), which has retained FP’s Islamist rhet-
oric, and AKP, which has developed a centre-right orientation. Thus, the dissolu-
tions of RP and FP resulted in the emergence of the more moderate AKP, moving
towards the centre-right of the political spectrum.
Regarding the ethnically oriented parties, the Constitutional Court dissolved the
People‘s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi) in 1993, the Freedom and Democracy
Party (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi) in 1993, the Democracy Party (Demokrasi
Partisi) in 1994, the People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi) in 2003
and the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi [DTP]) in 2009, all
for activities infringing laws concerning the state’s territorial integrity and national
 28 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

unity (Güney and Başkan 2008). These repeated dissolutions have failed to stop the
same group of political leaders forming new parties, and, as discussed below, this
cycle of closures and party formations has significantly affected the positions of
Turkish political parties on European integration.
In examining Turkish political party positions on European integration, we adopt
Kopecky and Mudde’s (2002) two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions
on European integration in general, and on the EU in particular, distinguishing
between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration. According to
Kopecky and Mudde, who adopted David Easton’s distinction between different
forms of support for political regimes, ‘diffuse’ support means ‘support for the gen-
eral ideas of European integration that underlie the EU’, whereas ‘specific’ support
means ‘support for the general practice of European integration; that is, the EU as it
is and as it is developing’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, 300). The first dimension sep-
arates the Europhiles from the Europhobes; Europhiles ‘believe in key ideas of Euro-
pean integration underlying the EU’, while Europhobes ‘do not support (and often
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even oppose) the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU’
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002, 301). The second dimension separates the EU optimists,
who believe in the EU as it is and is developing, from the EU pessimists, who ‘do
not support the EU as it is at the moment, or are pessimistic about the direction of
its development’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, 302). Building on these two dimen-
sions, they create a fourfold typology: Euroenthusiasts are parties or groups that
‘support the general ideas of European integration and believe that the EU is or will
soon become the institutionalization of these ideas’; Eurosceptics support the general
ideas of European integration but disagree with the general practice of integration;
Eurorejects oppose both the ideas of European integration and the EU; Europragma-
tists do not support the ideas of European integration specifically, but support the
EU in general. For this study, we prefer the precision and comprehensiveness of
Kopecky and Mudde’s classification over other conceptualizations as it provides a
better analytical tool for understanding Turkish political party positions regarding
European integration in general and Turkey’s EU membership in particular. The next
section presents Turkish political parties’ positions on European integration.

Turkish party positions on European integration

As summarized in Table 1, of the 18 parties competed in the 2002 general elec-
tions, five can be labelled as Euroenthusiast, while two among the 15 parties in the
2007 general elections, and three of the 16 parties in the 2011 general elections
were Euroenthusiast. Four of the 18 parties in the 2002 general elections, four of
the 15 parties in the 2007 general elections, and three of the 16 parties in the 2011
general elections were Eurosceptic. Five of the 18 parties in the 2002 general elec-
tions, eight of the 15 parties in the 2007 general elections, and six of the 16 parties
in the 2011 general elections had a Euroreject position. As Table 2 shows, the pro-
portion of Euroreject voters increased from 12.1% in the 2002 general elections to
18.6% in the 2007 general elections, before declining to 15.5% in the 2011 general
elections. The mean levels of Eurorejectionism were lower than the mean levels of
Euroscepticism in all three general elections. The latter stood at 29.5% in 2002,
26.6% in 2007 and 26.6% in 2011.
The next section analyses the various positions of Turkish political parties, rang-
ing from Euroenthusiast to Euroreject. However, the Youth Party (Genç Parti), the
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 29

Table 1. Turkish political parties’ positions on European integration, 2002–2011.

2007 2011
2002 Election Election
Ideological Degree of Election result result
Party position Euroscepticism result (%) (%) (%)
Justice and Development Centre Euroenthusiast 34.3 46.6 49.83
Party right/
conservative
Republican People’s Centre left Eurosceptic 19.4 20.9 25.98
Party
Nationalist Action Party Nationalist Euroreject 8.4 14.3 13.01
Democratic Party Centre right Eurosceptic 9.5(DYP) 5.4 0.65
Young Party Populist – 7.2 3.0 −
Democratic People’s Ethnically Euroenthusiast 6.2 5.2 6.57
Party/Democratic oriented
Society Party/Peace
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and Democracy Partya

Motherland Party Centre right Euroenthusiast 5.1 – –
Felicity Party Islamist Euroreject 2.5 2.3 1.27
Democratic Left Party Centre left Euroenthusiast 1.2 – 0.25
New Turkey Party Centre left Euroenthusiast 1.2 – –
Great Union Party Nationalist/ – 1.0 – 0.75
conservative
Homeland Party Nationalist/ – 0.9 – –
conservative
Independent Turkey Nationalist/ Euroreject 0.5 0.5 –
Party conservative
People’s Ascent Party Centrist Euroreject − 0.5 –
Workers’ Party Ulusalcıb Euroreject 0.5 0.4 –
Freedom and Solidarity Socialist Eurosceptic 0.3 0.2 –
Party left
Liberal Democratic Liberal Eurosceptic 0.3 0.1 0.04
Party
Communist Party of Communist Euroreject 0.2 0.2 0.15
Turkey
Nation Party Nationalist/ – 0.2 – 0.14
conservative
Enlightened Turkey Nationalist/ Euroreject – 0.3 –
Party conservative
Labour Party Extreme left Euroreject – 0.1 0.07
People’s Voice Party Islamist Euroreject – – 0.77
Rights and Equality Nationalist Euroreject – – 0.29
Party
Nationalist and Nationalist/ − – – 0.08
Conservative Party conservative
True Path Party Centre right – – 0.15
Independents 1
Total 100 100 100
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Results of the General Elections of Representatives http://www.
tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=42&ust_id=12 (consulted September 2011) and http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/
docs/2011MilletvekiliSecimi/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.pdf (consulted September 2011).
a
The DTP’s and BDP’s candidates ran as independents in 2007 and 2011 general elections, respectively,
to bypass the 10% threshold barrier.
b
We explain what we mean by Ulusalcı party where we discuss the Workers’ Party.
 Downloaded by [Izmir University] at 02:02 05 October 2015

30

Table 2. Percentage of votes for each category of Turkish political party in the Turkish Parliament.

2002 General elections 2007 General elections 2011 General elections

Number of parties Vote share Number of parties Vote share Number of parties Vote share
Euroenthusiast 5 48.0 2 46.6 3 56.7
Eurosceptic 4 29.5 4 26.6 3 26.7
Euroreject 5 12.1 8 18.6 6 15.6
Europragmatist − – – – – –
Ambiguous 4 9.3 1 3.0 4 1.2
Source: Prepared by the authors using data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute, results of the General Elections of Representatives
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=42&ust_id=12 (consulted 15 June 2009).
F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 31

Grand Union Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi), the Homeland Party (Yurt Partisi), the
Nation Party (Millet Partisi), the Nationalist Conservative Party (Milliyetçi Muhaf-
azakar Parti) and DYP1 are not included in our analysis. This is because none of
them gave any detailed information in their party programmes about their positions
regarding Turkey’s EU membership bid, so we were not able to evaluate their
stance regarding the EU issue.

Euroenthusiasts
Five Euroenthusiast parties competed in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections,
namely AKP, DSP, the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi
[DEHAP])/DTP/Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi [BDP]),
ANAP and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi [YTP]).
The most outspoken Euroenthusiast party in Turkey was AKP. Its stunning 2002
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election victory, achieved within just 14 months of its establishment in 2001 under
the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, enabled it to form a single party govern-
ment, the most powerful since the ten-year era of the Democratic Party in the
1950s (Parslow 2007, 37). AKP repeated this victory in the 2007 general elections
with 46.6% of the total votes, gaining 341 of the 550 parliamentary seats, and
unprecedentedly increased its vote again to 49.8% of the total votes in the 2011
general elections, gaining 327 seats.
AKP has thus emerged as the key actor in the process of Turkey’s Europeaniza-
tion, although its religiously conservative constituency is known to be sceptical
about EU membership (Çarkoğlu 2002a, 30; 2002b, 136). After the dissolution of
its predecessors, RP and FP, AKP’s leaders calculated that EU membership could
prevent further dissolutions by requiring a pluralist democracy, greater human rights
and religious freedoms. From its foreign policy formulations, it was obvious that
AKP would give priority to Turkey’s EU membership bid due to its close relation-
ship with European countries. AKP argued that Turkey should meet the EU mem-
bership criteria as soon as possible, and this commitment to the Copenhagen criteria
and Europeanization can be seen in the following extract from AKP’s party pro-
gramme:

Taking as a basis the principles pertaining to democratization of the Copenhagen Cri-

teria, which constitute the minimum standards to which members of the European
Union must conform, amendments which must be made in our national judicial system
shall be carried out in the shortest possible time. (AKP Party Program 2001)

AKP emphasized the historical and geographical dimensions of Turkey–EU rela-

tions in its programme (AKP Party Program 2001). It perceived EU integration as
a process of democratization and modernization, seeing EU membership criteria
as ‘crucial for the realization of basic human rights and freedoms in Turkey’
(Tanıyıcı 2003, 479). The party programme promised that ‘Turkey shall rapidly
fulfill its promises in its relations with the European Union and the conditions,
which the union demands of other candidate nations as well’ (AKP Party Program
2001). This determination was also proved in the reform packages passed through
parliament thanks to the party’s absolute majority. For example, the seventh pack-
age sent an important signal to EU member states that Turkey would rapidly leg-
islate sweeping reforms. Indeed, in the first eight months of AKP rule, the pace
 32 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

of reforms was incredible. Serious measures were taken to end torture, reduce
restrictions on freedom of expression, revise laws on associations and enhance the
quality of life for ordinary citizens. The AKP government also managed to push
through several laws giving citizens of Kurdish origin the right to learn Kurdish
in schools, to allow people to publish and broadcast in Kurdish, and allow politi-
cal parties to campaign in Kurdish.2 Following these reforms, on 17 December
2004, the European Council decided that accession negotiations with Turkey
would start in October 2005.
In its 2007 election manifesto, AKP declared that the party regarded Turkey’s
EU membership as an important stimulus for increasing the quality of life of Turk-
ish people and constituted an area of security and stability around Turkey, indicat-
ing that full EU membership would be one of the party’s four key goals (AKP
Election Manifesto 2007). Similarly, in its 2011 election manifesto, AKP stated that,
despite the unfair and ungrounded opposition of some European countries, it would
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keep its commitment to Turkey’s full EU membership, and continue to take the nec-
essary steps on the way to the EU (AKP Election Manifesto 2011).
Analysis of the party programme and the election manifestos of AKP show
clearly that the party is in favor of European integration and Turkey’s EU member-
ship. Thus, it can be labelled as a Euroenthusiast party in terms of Kopecky and
Mudde’s classification.
Another Euroenthusiast party is DSP. For DSP, the future of Turkey lies in full
EU membership (DSP Election Manifesto 2002). Like AKP, DSP regards Turkey’s
EU membership as one of its main foreign policy goals, justifying its approach
towards the EU as follows:

This approach, finding its origins in the great leader Atatürk’s ideas to reach the level
of contemporary civilization, overlaps with the main principles of the Constitution of
the Republic of Turkey and opens up new horizons for Turkey to reach modern eco-
nomic and social standards. (DSP Election Manifesto 2002)

Accordingly, despite DSP’s nationalistic concerns, the coalition government of

DSP–MHP–ANAP, in which DSP was a leading partner, made a series of signifi-
cant legislative changes demanded by the EU for full membership, like the aban-
donment of the death penalty and the extension of cultural rights (Avcı 2003, 163;
Keyman and Öniş 2007, 43).
For various reasons, three other Euroenthusiast parties that participated in the
2002 general national elections no longer exist in Turkish political life. The first of
these, DEHAP, was founded in 2002 as the successor to banned ethnically oriented
parties. In 2003, the Chief Prosecutor petitioned the Constitutional Court to ban
DEHAP, on the grounds that it acted against the democratic republic, equality and
the laws and principles of the state (Güney and Başkan 2008, 275). Therefore,
DEHAP’s leaders decided to dissolve the party in December 2005 and join DTP,
which was itself later banned by the Constitutional Court, in December 2009. The
latest party representing this tradition is BDP, founded in 2009 after the dissolution
of DTP. All the legal ethnically oriented political parties in Turkey that emerged
onto the political scene in the early 1990s have followed the same path, albeit with
some nuances, mainly focusing on the same issues in their party programmes.
These parties tend to support Turkey’s EU membership since they regard the EU as
a significant actor contributing to freedom of speech and the extension of cultural
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 33

rights. Therefore, these parties can be defined as Euroenthusiast. For example, in its
party programme (2009), BDP states its support for Turkey’s EU membership pro-
cess in relation to democratization, promising that harmonization of Turkey’s
national laws with EU norms would be its priority if it came to power (BDP Party
Program 2009). The party also promised to find solutions to the Armenian and
Cyprus issues that have also impeded Turkey’s EU membership bid.
The second defunct Euroenthusiast party was ANAP, founded in 1983 under the
leadership of Turgut Özal. It ruled the country between 1983 and 1991, but
received only 5.1% of the total votes in 2002, so it did not gain any parliamentary
seats. It did not run in the 2007 national elections and merged with the Democratic
Party in 2009. While the party did not mention the EU issue in its 2002 pro-
gramme, it adopted a clear pro-EU stance in its election manifesto by accepting
Turkey’s EU membership as one of its priorities. Stating that full EU membership
was an integral part of its major transformation project, the party argued that ‘EU
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membership means transparency in every aspect, respect for the right to education
and different lifestyles and ideas, political and economic stability, wealth, domi-
nance and competence for Turkey’ (ANAP Election Manifesto 2002).
The third party, YTP, founded in 2002 by ex-DSP parliamentarians, received
only 1.2% of the total votes in the 2002 general elections, and in 2004 it merged
with CHP. Like other Turkish centre-left parties, YTP argued that EU membership
followed Mustafa Kemal’s goal of reaching the level of contemporary civilization.
The programme stated that

[u]nder the current conditions of the world and Europe, it [EU membership] will turn
Turkey into a center of attraction, investment and welfare. Turkey has reached a stage
of opening accession negotiations in relations with the EU. Turkey should not miss
this chance. NEW TURKEY will lead the process of Turkey’s EU membership and is
determined to take every necessary step. (YTP Party Program 2002)

Eurosceptics
Four of the 18 parties that ran in the 2002 general elections, four of the 15 parties
in 2007 and three of the 16 parties in 2011 adopted Eurosceptic positions. These
parties are located on both wings of the Turkish political spectrum. Among them,
only CHP was able to gain parliamentary seats in any of the three elections. DYP
and its successor, DP, never managed to pass the threshold, while the Freedom and
Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi [ÖDP]) and the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (Liberal Demokrat Parti [LDP]) are both marginal parties, receiving a
maximum of only 0.3% of the total votes in any of the three elections.
CHP, located on the left of the political spectrum, can be defined as a Euroscep-
tic party in terms of Kopecky and Mudde’s classification, although it claims that it
has supported Turkey’s EU membership from the very beginning. For CHP, the tar-
get of EU membership is a social transformation project that can be regarded as an
extension of Atatürk’s vision of modernization. Therefore, Turkey should become a
full member of the EU, but on the basis of equality and EU respect for the found-
ing principles of the Turkish Republic. The party emphasizes that it does not accept
any other option (CHP Election Manifesto 2002; CHP Party Program 2008, 124),
such as granting Turkey a special status different from other member states. For
CHP, Turkey should meet the conditions like all other member states, fulfil the
Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria, and adopt EU law in order to be an EU mem-
 34 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

ber with equal rights. However, it opposes accepting any concessions that were not
asked of other member states. Accordingly, CHP demands the removal of the EU’s
permanent derogations on the free movement of labour, agricultural subsidies and
regional funds (CHP Election Manifesto 2011; CHP Party Program 2008, 124–5).
CHP also maintains that if the policies of some EU states for granting Turkey a
special status other than full membership for cultural or geographical reasons turn
out to be official EU policy, Turkey will re-evaluate the Customs Union and act in
accordance with its interests (CHP Party Program 2008, 125).
CHP also opposes the linking of Turkey’s EU membership to the Cyprus issue,
since it finds acquiring EU membership through one-sided concessions to be unac-
ceptable. According to CHP, the EU should take measures against those member
states that oppose Turkey’s EU bid, and set a firm date for membership. In return,
Turkey should finalize the reforms needed to adopt the EU acquis.
For CHP, Turkey has a right to EU membership, based on existing agreements
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between the EU and Turkey, as well as its connections to Europe due to its history
and geography. In addition, the EU would strengthen its own peace and stability by
accepting Turkey as an EU member. However, CHP remains concerned that, while
taking its place in the EU, Turkey should preserve its identity, values and honor.
The party promised its electorate to make Turkey a member of the EU as soon as
possible while emphasizing these sensitive issues. It stated, in its 2002 election
manifesto, that it would pass EU harmonization laws and the national programme
with the aim of adopting the EU acquis: ‘Turkey is on the eve of starting accession
negotiations. The party will lead this process in order not to miss this opportunity’
(CHP Election Manifesto 2002).
In its 2007 election manifesto, the party repeated its claim that CHP has, from
the very beginning, supported Turkey’s EU membership bid for equal rights with
other member states (CHP Election Manifesto 2007). Having this aim, the party has
supported the passing of EU harmonization laws in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly. The manifesto claims that, were CHP in power, it would keep the aim of
full EU membership but it would resist the permanent derogations and the option of
a special status for Turkey. Under these conditions, the party would complete the
reforms required for Turkey’s EU membership and carry out the activities needed to
integrate Turkey into the EU.
CHP’s party programme and election manifestos indicate that CHP supports the
general idea of European integration but opposes some specific membership
options, like permanent derogations on the free movement of labour and the option
of a special status for Turkey rather than full membership. Thus, it falls into
Kopecky and Mudde’s Eurosceptic category.
DP, the successor of the centre-right DYP, founded in 1983, is a right-wing
Eurosceptic party. It changed its name to the Democratic Party as part of the pro-
cess of unifying ANAP and DYP just before the 2007 general elections. DP has
adopted a strategic position regarding Turkey’s EU membership bid. In its 2007
election manifesto, it considered Turkey’s full membership of the EU as a tool: ‘As
the Democratic Party, we see membership to the EU as a tool, rather than a goal.
Our goal is to carry Turkey beyond the contemporary level of civilization’ (DP
Election Manifesto 2007).
DP, in line with other opposition parties, criticizes the AKP government for
approving the open-ended negotiation process and accepting EU demands that were
not part of the Copenhagen criteria, and which could threaten Turkey’s indepen-
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 35

dence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Like the Christian Democratic
People’s Party of Hungary, which is defined as a Eurosceptic party by Kopecky and
Mudde (2002, 310), DP has a deep concern about Turkey’s potential loss of sover-
eignty. In other words, DP does not reject EU membership in principle but, due to
a rising tide of nationalism in Turkey in recent years, it has begun to use more
nationalist rhetoric, especially under the leadership of Mehmet Ağar. This positions
DP in Kopecky and Mudde’s Eurosceptic category.
The third Eurosceptic party is ÖDP, a socialist party founded in 1996. While the
party does not completely reject Turkey’s EU membership bid, it is against the EU’s
current form, which it considers neo-liberal and capitalist. Thus, ÖDP offers to
‘cooperate with the groups within the EU who are struggling for “another” Europe
which would be “social” by defending labor, equality, freedom, participatory democ-
racy, ecology and citizen rights’ (ÖDP Party Program 2006). The party criticizes the
EU for excluding its citizens from decision-making processes, for its anti-democratic
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organizational structure that prevents participation, for its neo-liberal policies, and
for the elitist character of the European Commission. The party considers a revolu-
tionary transformation of the EU to be a necessity (ÖDP Party Program 2006).
Another party that can be described as Eurosceptic is LDP. In its party pro-
gramme, LDP proposed that ‘Turkey should not abandon its objective of full EU
membership but should refuse to wear the bureaucratic straitjacket of this organiza-
tion’ (LDP Party Program 2002). In its 2007 and 2011 election manifestos, LDP
maintained its sceptic stance regarding Turkey’s EU membership, as promised in its
manifesto: ‘We will determine the nature of current Turkey-EU relations. We will
explain to the Europeans that we cannot conclude accession negotiations just with
Turkish concessions in return for ambiguous commitments from the EU’ (LDP
Election Manifesto 2007, 2011).
Overall, we can say that Turkish Eurosceptic parties, except for ÖDP, regard
Turkey’s EU membership application as part of the project of the westernization of
Turkey begun by Atatürk, that is why they are not against Turkey’s accession to the
EU in principle. However, they do emphasize that Turkey should take its place in
the EU while preserving its national identity, moral values and honor. They criticize
what they see as EU double standards: the permanent derogations, the option of a
special status for Turkey, the EU’s discriminatory and biased approach, the open-
ended negotiation process and ambiguous EU commitments. Only ÖDP among the
Eurosceptic parties is against the current form of the EU.

Eurorejects
Five of the 18 parties in the 2002 general elections, eight of the 15 parties 2007
and six of the 16 parties in 2011 are unambiguously Euroreject parties. These are
MHP, SP, the Independent Turkey Party (Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi [BTP]), the Com-
munist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi [TKP]), the Labour Party (Emek
Partisi [EMEP]), the Workers’ Party (İşçi Partisi [İP]), the People’s Ascent Party
(Halkın Yükselişi Partisi [HYP]), the Enlightened Turkey Party (Aydınlık Türkiye
Partisi [ATP]), the Rights and Equality Party (Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi [HEPAR]) and
the People’s Voice Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi [HAS]).We find that Euroreject parties
are located both on the extreme right and extreme left of the political spectrum and,
except for MHP, they are all marginal in the Turkish political system. As Table 1
 36 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

shows, in 2002, none of them gained parliamentary seats because of failing to pass
the 10% electoral threshold. In the 2007 and 2011 general elections, only MHP
crossed the threshold, gaining 14.3% of the total votes and 70 seats, and 13% of
the total votes and 52 seats, respectively. SP gained 2.5, 2.3 and 1.27% of the total
votes in the three elections, but the rest never gained more than 0.5% in any of
them.
The first Euroreject party to consider is SP. Regarding Turkey–EU relations, its
2001 party programme stated:

The EU’s unacceptable attitudes, in particular during the full membership process, that
are against our nation and our nation’s interests, demonstrate that the EU mentality is
not sophisticated enough in terms of human rights, freedom of belief, and respect for
religious beliefs, pluralism and cohabitation with members of different civilizations. It
is obvious that Western countries could not get rid of their imperialist habits. (SP
Party Program 2001)
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The party opposed Turkey’s EU membership under these conditions, maintaining

that Turkey can form bilateral relations with the EU on an equal basis instead of
full EU membership. The party claimed that full EU membership means giving up
Turkey’s independence, and the country’s disintegration in accordance with the aims
of the imperialists. According to SP, following the fall of communism and the disin-
tegration of the USSR in the 1990s, the EU has turned into an institution that
serves imperialism in a uni-polar world (SP Party Program 2001).3
However, the party’s position in its 2002 Turkish election manifesto was far
from being Euroreject:

The Felicity Party considers the EU as one of Turkey’s strategic options … The Felic-
ity Party believes that Turkey’s EU membership will be meaningful when Turkey
becomes an EU member, equal with other member states and protecting its culture,
identity and values … Such a kind of membership would increase the quality of
democracy and human rights in Turkey. (SP Election Manifesto 2002)

Thus, SP now regarded EU membership as an opportunity for the implementation

of human rights, although mainly seen in terms of the expression of religious free-
doms and identity. In this sense, SP has a Europragmatic position. In other words,
although it does not support the general ideas of European integration, accusing the
EU of being an agent of imperialism, SP supports Turkey’s EU membership in
order to establish a safer political environment in which Muslims can practise their
religion freely.
On contrast, for the 2007 general elections, SP adopted a Euroreject position,
claiming that the EU was trying to annul the Lausanne Treaty4 and re-apply the
Sevres Treaty.5 Therefore, it asked its electorate to make a choice between the EU
and a union of Islamic countries. Similarly, in its 2011 election manifesto, SP
claimed that EU was not a modernization project, and that the Turkey’s EU mem-
bership bid would be abandoned if it came to power (SP Election Manifesto 2011).
This suggested that SP now opposed Turkey’s EU membership, and had adopted
a Euroreject position for ideological reasons, but, as mentioned above, sometimes it
had adopted a Europragmatic stance. Thus, we can conclude that SP has hovered
between Europragmatic and Euroreject positions.
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 37

The second Euroreject party is the right-wing BTP. The party’s slogan for the
2002 elections was: ‘We are the only party opposing the European Union’. This is
very similar to the Slovenian National Party, which also claimed in its 2002 election
manifesto that ‘it [was] the only party that would not allow Slovenia to be sold due
to EU accession’ (Krasovec and Lipicier 2008, 319). In its party programme, BTP
considers both globalization and the EU processes as imposing a ‘new Sevres’
Treaty (BTP Party Program 2003). This justifies labelling BTP as Euroreject. The
party claimed that, under its rule, Turkey would cooperate with the rest of the world
in economic, scientific and industrial areas. However, the party would not act in a
concessive manner regarding national independence, the indivisible integrity of the
country and the Cyprus issue (BTP Party Program 2003). In the case of BTP, oppo-
sition to the EU appears to be ideological rather than tactical.
The next Euroreject party, TKP, located on the extreme left of the political spec-
trum, opposes the EU for ideological reasons like SP and BTP. In its 2002 election
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manifesto, the party claimed that Turkey’s EU membership would only benefit the
‘imperialists’ who wanted to plunder and gain control over Turkey (TKP Election
Manifesto 2002). In its 2007 election manifesto, it opposed both the Customs Union
and Turkey’s accession to the EU without hesitation since it believed that the key
for Turkey’s development and modernization was independence (TKP Election
Manifesto 2007). Therefore, we can argue that the left-wing TKP, like the Islamist
SP and right-wing BTP, falls into Kopecky and Mudde’s Euroreject category.
Another extreme left-wing party opposing Turkey’s EU membership is EMEP.
Its party programme states bluntly that ‘NATO and EU memberships will be
annulled’ (EMEP Party Program).
İP, founded by Doğu Perinçek in 1992, can also be undoubtedly labelled as
Euroreject. Despite its name, the nationalist discourse of İP makes it hard to define
it as a left-wing party. Some scholars of Turkish politics describe it as an ulusalcı
party, defined as a ‘reactionary “movement” that calls for mobilization to protect
national sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (Taraktaş 2008).
In its party programme, İP states that it is totally against Turkey’s EU member-
ship bid, and that under İP rule, Turkey would abandon its EU candidacy because
it makes Turkey dependent on Europe, would eliminate the Turkish nation state,
and reverse Atatürk’s revolution (İP Party Program 2006). The party promises that,
if it gained power, it would abolish the Accession Partnership and Negotiation
Frame Document, which it also sees as a kind of new Sevres Treaty (İP Party Pro-
gram 2006). In its 2002 election manifesto, the party declared that ‘only İP is plan-
ning to withdraw Turkey’s EU candidacy, since Turkey will not accept being
dissolved, poor and enslaved’ (İP Election Manifesto 2002).
İP thus opposes Turkey’s EU membership bid because it considers this member-
ship and reform process to cause a loss of sovereignty and Turkey’s domination by
‘imperialist powers’. In this respect, İP is similar to the right-wing nationalist League
of Polish Families, which is ‘opposed to the European integration project as embod-
ied by the EU, regarding it as a clear threat to Poland’s continued sovereign state-
hood’ (Szczerbiak 2008, 226). It is also similar to the far right Republican Party of
Czechoslovakia, which also considers EU membership ‘as a violation of national
sovereignty’ (Haley 2008, 250). In short, as a Euroreject party, İP opposes Turkey’s
EU membership bid for ideological reasons rather than strategic or tactical reasons.
The sixth Euroreject party is HYP, which claims, in its party programme that
rising above the contemporary level of civilization is an inevitable consequence of
 38 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

Atatürk’s revolution (HYP Party Program 2005). Thus, the party argues that it is
natural that Turkey turns its face to the West and maintains close relations with
western countries. For this reason, Turkey has had the aim of gaining full EU mem-
bership for decades. However, for HYP, the EU does not share Turkey’s aim and
does not treat Turkey as an equal partner. Instead, Turkey’s insistence on EU mem-
bership has led to the emergence of unacceptable demands by the EU (HYP Party
Program 2005). In its 2007 election manifesto, the party promised to withdraw Tur-
key’s EU membership application after coming to power (HYP Election Manifesto
2007), indicating that HYP has a Euroreject position and that, like other Euroreject
parties, it is against Turkey’s EU membership for ideological reasons.
Another right-wing political party with a Euroreject position is the marginal
party, ATP. ATP states in its party programme that it ‘opposes Turkey’s EU mem-
bership in this phase, but it is not an enemy of the EU’ (ATP Party Program 1998).
Regarding Turkey’s EU membership bid, ATP proposes the postponement of EU
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membership:

We want to discuss the membership issue with the EU but with our own conditions.
However, we will not ask to be an ordinary member state. In this phase we will pro-
pose to suspend the membership negotiations, and postpone the discussion of full
membership. (ATP Party Program 1998)

HEPAR is another right-wing party with a Euroreject position. In its 2011 election
manifesto, HEPAR stated that Turkey’s willingness to join EU at all costs represents
an obsession and surrender (HEPAR Election Manifesto 2011). It promised to sus-
pend EU negotiations if it came to power.
HAS is an Islamist party that adopted a Euroreject position for the 2011 general
elections. The party did not consider the EU as a project of civilization, stating that
Turkey’s EU membership goal and Turkey–EU relations would both be reassessed
under HAS party rule (HAS Election Manifesto 2011).
Our analysis of the Euroreject parties in Turkey reveals a number of common
characteristics. First, many of them see the EU as an imperialist actor that should
be opposed. Second, all Euroreject parties consider the EU as a threat to Turkey’s
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. Third, they are all
opposed to the Customs Union Agreement. Fourth, they frequently refer to the
Sevres Treaty, a stance that has been termed the ‘Sevres syndrome’, which includes
‘the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the
Turkish state’ (Taraktaş 2008, 255).

Latent Euroreject
Among these Euroreject parties, we need to discuss MHP separately, since we
define it as a ‘latent Euroreject’ party. After explaining our reasons for labelling it
as a Euroreject party, we will discuss MHP’s Euroreject position.
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, aimed at raising Turkey to the level
of contemporary civilization through modernization and westernization. Thus, the
Turkish political elite has always regarded Turkey’s EU membership as a compo-
nent of Atatürk’s project, and so it ‘places the utmost importance on becoming a
full member’ (Güney 2005, 304). In other words, there has always been a
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 39

‘consensus among the major political parties, groups and elites that Turkey should
pursue EU membership’. This meant no major political groups questioned the
objective of Turkey’s EU membership in a substantive manner (Avcı 2003, 155).
Due to this consensus within the political elite, Turkish Eurosceptics were hesitant
to oppose or criticize EU membership (Avcı 2003, 156). However, since the grant-
ing of candidacy status at the Helsinki summit in 1999, and the start of accession
negotiations in 2005, the Turkish political elite has begun to discuss Turkey’s EU
membership explicitly. This has placed MHP in a difficult position. On the one
hand, the party does not want to abandon the Atatürk’s westernization project. On
the other hand, due to its nationalistic outlook, MHP cannot approve of the EU’s
demands for full membership. Thus, after examining its party programme and elec-
tion manifestos we can define MHP as a ‘latent Euroreject’ since it does not explic-
itly oppose Turkey’s EU membership, yet it did object to EU reforms while it was
a partner of the coalition government of DSP–MHP–ANAP, and has proposed sus-
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pension of Turkey–EU relations since 2007.

MHP is a nationalist party located on the right of the political spectrum. It sup-
ports, in principle, Turkey’s EU membership application, considered as a matter
above party politics, and believes that Turkey–EU relations should be based on
cooperation and tolerance. For MHP, Turkey’s EU membership does not only mean
Turkey’s joining a regional organization, but also means a strategic choice that will
lead to new developments in the social, economic and international arenas. However,
for MHP, Turkey-EU relations cannot continue on the basis of the EU’s current
expectations and Turkey’s sacrifices, as it has in the past. Instead, Turkey should
develop a foreign policy that eliminates its obligations and maximizes mutual inter-
ests. MHP maintains that the party does not have any prejudices regarding Turkey’s
relations with the western world; the only important matter for the party is respect
for Turkish national culture, the unitary state and its territorial integrity. For MHP,
EU member states’ respect for Turkish national sensitivities will determine the nature
and future of Turkey–EU relations (MHP Party Program 2009).
However, MHP also believes that the EU adopts a discriminatory and biased
approach that treats Turkey as a ‘handicapped candidate country’. Therefore, unless
the EU abandons this approach, an honorable and realistic negotiation process that
aims at full EU membership cannot continue. For MHP, Turkey can only become
an EU member on condition that it preserves its national and moral values, and
keeps its religious and cultural identity.
MHP’s discourse regarding the EU became more severe, as will be seen below,
after the start of accession negotiations in 2005. In its 2007 election manifesto,
MHP described the recent course of Turkey–EU relations as a ‘story of disappoint-
ment’ characterized by blackmails, preconditions, impositions and unjust demands,
with the EU treating Turkey as a ‘handicapped’ country (MHP Election Manifesto
2007). This position resembled that of the self-defence of the Republic of Poland
which ‘is extremely critical about the Polish position in negotiations, sensitive to
the loss of national sovereignty and to the unequal position of Poland in a future
Europe’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, 313). MHP believes that it is obvious that the
EU does not want to give Turkey full membership status with equal rights to other
member states, and resents the country’s unequal treatment. Therefore, it wants the
framework of Turkey–EU relations to be clarified and redefined. Otherwise, the
party believes it will be impossible to continue accession negotiations.
 40 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

In its 2011 election manifesto, MHP maintained that EU membership should not
be regarded as Turkey’s inevitable fate (MHP Election Manifesto 2011). In other
words, Turkey should not enter the EU at any cost. Currently, the manifesto claims
that both the EU and Turkey need a ‘strategic thinking period’ in order to make a
healthy and realistic evaluation of Turkey–EU relations. This can be interpreted as
proposing the suspension of Turkey–EU relations. Thus, it is fair to argue that MHP,
like the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life, which also proposed postponing Hun-
gary’s EU membership bid (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, 310), does not categorically
reject EU membership, but proposes postponement of Turkey’s EU membership.
Parallel to this rhetoric, MHP objected to EU reforms while it was a partner of
the DSP–MHP–ANAP coalition government that was established following the
1999 general elections and ruled the country until the 2002 general elections. For
example, on 3 August 2002, the party voted in parliament against a reform package
on human rights (Avcı 2003, 163).
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Conclusion
Having classified Turkish political parties in relation to their positions on European
integration according to Kopecky and Mudde’s model, we can focus on four distinct
characteristics of the Turkish case. First, as Figure 1 shows, there are more of both
Eurosceptic and Euroreject parties than Euroenthusiast parties. This indicates the
current lack of elite consensus on European integration within Turkey.
Second, we can claim that Euroenthusiasm, Euroscepticism and Eurorejection-
ism in Turkey transcend the normal left–right political spectrum. In relation to
Euroenthusiasm, we find that right-wing parties like AKP and ANAP, left-wing par-
ties like DSP and YTP, and also ethnically oriented parties like DEHAP–DTP–BDP
all have Euroenthusiast stances. When we examine Euroscepticism, we see that both
right-wing parties such as DP and left-wing parties such as CHP and ÖDP express
Euroscepticism. Regarding Eurorejectionism, our analysis shows again that parties
on both the right (MHP, ATP, BTP and HEPAR) and left (TKP and EMEP) have
adopted Euroreject positions, as have the Islamist SP and HAS, and ulusalcı İP.
Third, major parties exhibit a range of positions regarding European integration,
from Euroenthusiasm to Eurorejectionism. AKP, the most outspokenly Euroenthusi-
ast party, currently controls almost two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. The major
parties, namely CHP and MHP, represent Eurosceptic and Euroreject stances,

Support for European Integration

Europhile Europhobe

Euroenthusiasts Europragmatists
EU-optimist
Support for EU

AKP, DSP, ANAP, YTP

DEHAP/DTP/BDP,

Eurosceptics Eurorejects
EU-pessimist
CHP, DP, ÖDP, LDP MHP, SP, BTP, TKP, EMEP, İP,
HYP, ATP, HEPAR, HAS
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of their analysis of party programs and
election manifestos

Figure 1. Classification of Turkish parties by positions on European integration.

 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 41

respectively. Other Eurosceptic and Euroreject parties lie at the periphery of the
Turkish political party system, and have no parliamentary representation due to the
10% electoral threshold.
Fourth, there is no obvious Europragmatist party in Turkey, although we should
point out that the Islamist SP sometimes adopts a Europragmatic position. However,
we cannot unambiguously label it as a Europragmatic party since it hovers between
a Europragmatic and a Euroreject position.
Finally, it is essential to discuss the basic reasons for the increasing Eurorejec-
tionism seen in Turkey. We can claim that after the start of accession negotiations
in October 2005, the discourses of political parties regarding Turkey’s EU member-
ship have become more Eurorejectionist. As Table 2 shows, at the 2002 general
election, there were five Euroreject parties before the accession negotiations started.
However, after accession negotiations started, the political elite began to realize
more clearly the costs of EU accession, particularly the loss of national sovereignty,
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so the number of Euroreject parties increased to eight in the 2007 general election.
We would also suggest that the nature of the long history of Turkey–EU rela-
tions has led to a lack of elite consensus regarding Turkey’s EU membership bid
and this, among other factors, can be regarded as a significant reason for the high
level of Euroscepticism and Eurorejectionism in Turkey. In fact, the Turkish politi-
cal elite have been experiencing a dilemma. As mentioned earlier regarding MHP’s
stance, on the one hand the elite claim that they wish to follow the path of Atatürk,
who wanted to westernize Turkey. On the other hand, they suffer from the ‘Sevres
syndrome’, which involves ‘suspicions of Europeans as having sought to divide up
Turkish territory ever since World War I’ (Gürleyen 2008, 207). Thus, it appears
that both the Turkish public and political elite have continued fears about the poten-
tial break-up of Turkey. One of the grounds for this fear relates to the fact that ‘dur-
ing the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence, Turks fought mainly
against European powers’ (Volkan and Itzkowitz 2000, 240).
Another reason for increasing Euroscepticism and Eurorejectionism is that Tur-
key has been waiting for EU membership since 1963. This long history of frustra-
tion has caused anxiety about the EU among the Turkish political elite. Finally,
Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population, and this has created tensions at
both public and elite levels, both in Turkey and in the EU (Kentmen 2008, 503).
This difference has helped decrease the commitment of the Turkish political elite to
European integration.
In conclusion, this study has succeeded in outlining the major trends in political
party positions towards Turkey’s EU membership in terms of Kopecky and Mudde’s
model, particularly the variety of oppositional stances. However, further researches
would provide a more detailed account of the high level of Euroscepticism and
Eurorejectionism of Turkish political elite.

Notes
1. DYP was re-established by a group of right-wing politicians in 2007, soon after the uni-
fication of the old DYP with ANAP under the name of Democratic Party.
2. Turkish Daily News, 1 August 2003.
3. Surprisingly however, in the English version of the party programme, SP presents a pro-
EU attitude: ‘In the opinion of the Saadet Party, Turkey’s relations with the European
Union are important in the implementation of human rights and democracy in our coun-
try, in conformity with the EU criteria, and in improving these values through the admis-
sion of Turkey to the EU. Therefore, we consider as an opportunity the new phase of
 42 F. Başkan and S.B. Gümrükçü

Turkey–EU relations that was brought about by the Helsinki Document in December
1999’ (SP Party ‘English’ Program 2001).
4. As a result of Turkey’s national independence struggle, the Lausanne Treaty was signed
on 23 July 1923 by the Ankara government and the Allied forces. It ‘granted interna-
tional recognition to Turkey’s new borders’ (Ahmad 1993, 3).
5. The Sevres Treaty, which was signed on 10 August 1920 by the Sultan’s government
and the Allied forces, ‘officially ended the Ottoman Empire and divided the empire’s
Anatolian territory to create an Armenian state and a Kurdish autonomous region having
the possibility of independence in the future’ (Aydınlı 2002, 223).

Notes on contributors
Filiz Başkan is a Professor of Political Science teaching at the Department of International
Relations and the European Union, Izmir University of Economics.

Selin Bengi Gümrükçü is a Research Assistant at the Department of International Relations

and the European Union, Izmir University of Economics and a PhD candidate at the
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Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.

Party Documents
AKP Party Program. 2001. Consulted April 2009. http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-
programi.
AKP. 2002. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. http://www.belgenet.com/secim/
bildirge/akp2002-1.html.
AKP. 2007. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. www.yayed.org.tr/resimler/ekler/
718499c1c8cef67_ek.doc?
AKP. 2011. Election manifesto. Consulted September 2011. http://www.akparti.org.tr/
beyanname2011.pdf.
ANAP. 2002. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/anap_prog.
doc.
ATP Party Program. 1998. Consulted April 2009. http://web.archive.org/web/20070827223638/
http://www.atp.org.tr/detail.asp?strID=31.
BDP Party Program. 2009. Consulted April 2009. http://www.bdp.org.tr/hakkimizda/program.
html.
BTP Party Program. 2003. Consulted April 2009. http://www.btp.org.tr/index.php?sayfa=ics-
ayfa&sirano=67.
CHP. 2002. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?mod-
ule=chpmain&page=list_party_info&pid=148.
CHP. 2007. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?
module=museum&page=show&entry_id=1274.
CHP. 2008. Party Program. Consulted April 2009. http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?mod-
ule=museum&page=show&entry_id=1659.
CHP. 2011. Election manifesto. Consulted September 2011. http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-
content/uploads/secim_bildirgesi-web.pdf.
DP. 2007. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. http://www.dyp.org.tr/Dokumanlar/
secim2007beyanname.doc.
DSP. 2002. Election Manifesto. Consulted April 2009. www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/dsp_prog.
doc.
EMEP Party Program. Consulted April 2009. http://www.emep.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=63.
HAS. 2011. Election manifesto. Consulted September 2011. http://www.hasparti.org.tr/news/
news.aspx?id=941.
HEPAR. 2011. Election manifesto. Consulted September 2011. http://www.hakveesitlik.org.
tr/dosya/secim_bildirgesi.pdf.
HYP Party Program. 2005. Consulted April 2009. http://www.hyp.org.tr/hypprogram.asp.
HYP. 2007. Election manifesto. Consulted April 2009. http://www.hyp.org.tr/haber.asp?
hid=3337.
 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 43

İP Party Program. 2006. Consulted April 2009. http://ip.org.tr/lib/pages/detay.asp?goster=tbelgel-

er&belgetur=2.
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