Cadiz

Topic: X. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

375. Liang v. People (2000)

GR No. 125865

DOCTRINE: The mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the
charges. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.

FACTS:

 Petitioner Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before MeTC Mandaluyong with grave oral defamation. He was released on bail to the
custody of ADB Security.
 The next day, the judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity under Sec. 45 of the Agreement between ADB and
the Philippine Government. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal case. RTC set
aside MeTC rulings.

ISSUE/S: Whether Liang is immune from suit

RULING: No. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.

Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is
covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is
only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and
in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter’s right to due
process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it
has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of
the charges.

The immunity invoked in Sec. 45 does is not absolute, but is subject to the exception that the act was done
in “official capacity.” Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether Liang’s case falls within the ambit of
Sec. 45. Here, the SC held that slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.

Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED.