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People vs. Silvestre and Atienza

En Banc Villareal, December 14, 1931
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts: Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage. Romana cohabited with codefendant
Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the
peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery. After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants
begged the municipal president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint. The two
accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed the
promise). On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the justice of the peace
dismissed the adultery case. The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong. About November 20,
1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol
(under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves). Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her
and lived in the home of Nicolas. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants
were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to
set fire to it. He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana. Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to
him. Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late. The fire destroyed about 48 houses. Witnesses saw
Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of
arson. Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal).
Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor). The court-appointed counsel for the accused-
appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice. The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of
insufficient evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding: No.: Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a
direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission
of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by
previous or simultaneous actions. In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of
an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not
constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson;
and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice. Mere
passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement
or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of
the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent. Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin
Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

People vs. Talingdan

En Banc Per Curiam, July 6, 1978
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts: Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag. No certificate or any other proof of
their marriage could be presented by the prosecution. They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra. Their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family home a couple of times and each
time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in
their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
daughter to go down the house and leave them. Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between
Talingdan and Teresa. About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back
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for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town
of Tayum, Abra during that time. Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent
quarrel. Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police. Accused Talingdan, a
policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan
instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him. On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down
in his house. The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations. Corazon's version: Friday morning:
Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo. She heard one of them say "Could
he elude a bullet" When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down the house to go to the
yard where she again met with the other appellants. She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying. Teresa came
back to the house and proceeded to her room. Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the
presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention. Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the
floor near the door. He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan. The four accused climbed the stairs of
the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not
fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help.
Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers, the former threatened to kill
the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone. The defendants'' version: Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled,
and her husband never maltreated her. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in
Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed between them. Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on
June 24; he escorted the Mayor in Bangued from June 22 to June 26. Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house
of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250-300 meters from the place of the killing

Issue: Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder. It is contended that there is no evidence
proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on
her part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death. It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere
cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction
as a conspirator

Holding: Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder. Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony. It is true that
proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as her
co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning and
preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. There is in the
record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed. She did not only order
her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects in mind when the peace officers
came into their house later to investigate. Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants. These
acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime". Male appellants sentenced to death.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not merely as an accessory, but of parricide as
principal and meted the death penalty, That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact has
been clearly demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared categorically that she plotted with
her co-appellants the assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time and time again by her repeated illicit
relations with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their neighbor.
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EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 165842; November 29, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner,
was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996
when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in
Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and
Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera
was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral
damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the
petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years.
Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally
presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as
moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the
good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged
with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court ruled against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the
petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and
the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
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People vs. Puno

En Banc; Regalado, February 17, 1993
Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts: January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs.
Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place. When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in
Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave,
it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs.
Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her. Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she
handed to the accused. But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more. The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two
P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check. Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his
mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to
the other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according
to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. The defense does not dispute the
above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely
allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway

Issue: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged and Whether or not the said
robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding: No. No. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation. For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for
robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery). PD No. 532 punishes as
highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim. The mere fact that the
robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the
case. This is not justified by the accused's intention. Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4
years and 2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code: "the act of one is the act of all"
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim; G.R. No. 142773 28; January2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE: It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas. Appellants
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On
January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him
outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put. Modesto's
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lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against
the charge. *alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? Yes:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if,
at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed with precision
evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted in the appellants case there are no evidence to the
particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it
cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the
appellants. Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took
advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD: APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE

US vs. Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272 En Banc; Carson, March 19, 1910
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts: The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Pascual
Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached
house some 40 meters from the nearest building. No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a
small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair. On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He called out twice, “Who is there?". He heard no answer and was convinced by
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant
warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you.". Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded. Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in
the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds. Pascual died from the effects of
the wound the following day. The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and
had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his
identity. The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies
in Fort McKinley. Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings. Defendant
was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years
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and 1-day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law

Issue: Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding: No. By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from criminal
liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally
liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of
homicide/assassination). The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. "The act
itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so". The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." If one has reasonable cause to believe
the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of
the homicide. The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense. He cannot be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts. RTC's
decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

TORRES, J., dissenting: while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real
negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous
belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred
responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive

People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257

G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.
Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS: Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major
Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four
men. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the
door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed
was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas,
she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.

ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance. YES. ignorantia facti excusat, but
this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. Appellants found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample
time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed. "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be
used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention."A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making
an arrest. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
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accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: offender
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office.-not present. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than
that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

PARAS, J., dissenting: the appellants cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo
Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith.

Padilla vs. Dizon

February 23, 1988
Per Curiam

Facts: Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai
had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00
under Central Bank Circular No. 960. Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. An information was filed
against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by
Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883. Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt to
take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding
such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by
the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who
shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of
the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00. At the trial, Lo
Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to
invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the
money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him. Because of the revolution taking place in
Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the
Philippines. Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo
Chi Fai.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding
that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused
had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held: Yes..Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the
possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not
correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations
were declarations belonging to other people. In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law.
There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount
of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Magno vs. CA
Oriel Magno vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
June 26, 1992; Paras, J:
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Facts: Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational,
approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries. VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if
LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement went on requiring Magno to
pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP
Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount. Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who
provided that amount. As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had
no sufficient fund. Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment. Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue: Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held: No To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it
having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question.
All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and
employees of LS Finance.

Garcia v. People (GR 157171, March 14 2006)

August 27, 2016 / Russell Jay

FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino Pimintel, Jr., was informed
that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the
candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes. Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was
acquited due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646,
Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881. Petitioner
appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC. Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is
erroneous and there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant. Respondent on the other hand
contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se. (2) Whether or
not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of election inspectors or board
of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of
the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable. (2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by
the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of
votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly
scrutinized. The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction
but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988
THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." "A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful
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and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."

FACTS OF THE CASE: The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20
years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Miranda and the accused
Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19,
1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson
with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun
of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do
the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and
barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the
criminal responsibilities of the accused?

There is no: CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is
sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the
incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda. Since there is no conspiracy
that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against
miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him. **Conspiracy
may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities: PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances
(treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. -
GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD: JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner herein, Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig with two separate offenses:

1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries

2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property

Petitioner pleaded guilty for the first charge, but moved to quash the second charge invoking double jeopardy having been
convicted for the previous offense. MeTC however, refused quashal finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his prosecution in the second offense
charged.

HELD: Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine
the penalty. The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the same provision
of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi offenses. The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of
the RPC) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simple a way of committing it. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi offense.

The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or acquitted to a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determined the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of an offense.

Tests to determine double jeopardy:

1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
2.Whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first if proven,
would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the other

People v. Guillen (G.R. No. L-1477)

January 18, 1950 | G.R. No. L-1477
PER CURIAM, J.:

FACTS: On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, Manila, Guillen planted
a hand grenade near the stage and threw another one toward then President Manuel Roxas in an apparent assassination
attempt born out of Guillen's spite for the President over the latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the
passage of the so-called parity measure. General Castaneda managed to kick the grenade off the stage. However, its
explosion caused the death of Simeon Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carillo,
and Emilio Maglalang. Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple frustrated murder filed
against him. At one point, he even tried to use the insanity excuse, but he was found to have been mentally stable. Later on,
by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was subsequently found guilty of all the charges and was sentenced
to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD: No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their penalties were covered by Art. 48 of the RPC,
not sub-section 1 of Art. 49. The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand grenade at President Roxas -- he
committed two grave felonies:
(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.
At the same time, the murder of Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, given that the victim was
not able to put up a defense against the attack, even though he was not the principal target.
And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims constitute attempted and not frustrated murder.
The Court reasoned that Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due to some reason or accident (General
kicking the grenade off the stage) other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence handed out by the lower court.
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Art. 48, RPC: "Penalty for complex crimes -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period."

G.R. No. 123485 August 31, 1998

PEOPLE vs. ROLUSAPE SABALONES
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a shooting incident in Cebu in 1985 which led to
the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The
victims were asked to bring the car of a certain Stephen Lim who also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the
car with Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove the owner-type jeep along with Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group
back to the party after parking the car at Lim’s house. When they reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of
gunfire. The accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Sabalones and Beronga appealed. Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of frustrated murder.
Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores testified about the shooting and
identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the car that is behind the jeep. He positively identified Sabalones
as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen fired at the car, driver Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at
Major Juan Tiempo’s house from which they have escaped death. Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants
Sabalones and Beronga denied their presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous
witnesses who stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired watching over his brother’s
wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by
10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of
the two victims. The defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses arguing that the place where the
incident happened is dim and not lighted.

RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.

Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible? Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with
appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There was positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered
during lulls in gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no
bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding though to the co-accused because it is
used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which
strengthen credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does not diminish culpability;
same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.

Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable? No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive
identification. Using the case of People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance
from the scene of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.

Issue 3: Whether the correct penalty is imposed? No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in computing
the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Because there are no mitigating or
aggravating conspiracy between the two accused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was
between the two who actually pulled the trigger that killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a
conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act. Also, there was a
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presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the crime was done at night time and that the accused hid
themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation is also an aggravating circumstance [the accused had planned to kill
the victim some days before].

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ,

G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Facts: Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma who was the boyfriend
of her daughter Pilar and was apparently got pregnant. Gines contends that he acted in legitimate self-defense and did not
intend to kill Osma. That he only intended to inflict a wound to Osma but never intended to kill him as it would frustrate his
plan of compelling him to marry his daughter.

Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause grave injury can be considered to lower the sentence?

Held: Yes. Gines committed homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal (Art. 249) In view of the concurrence
therein of the mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, he penalty next lower in degree, that is
prision mayor, should be imposed. Appellant is sentenced to 1 year up to 8 years and 1 day affirming judgment of the trial
court.

Bataclan v. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts: At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and driven by its
regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of
the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and
the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to
show that the freed passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue
the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch, approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it. That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus
were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for
sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC.

Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus,
including the 4 passengers left inside.

Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. The coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by
the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. In other
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words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus,
the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area
in and around the bus. The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus. In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina Transportation failed to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the
driver failed to change the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina. The driver had not been diligent and had
not taken the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, especially those in
front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.

People vs. Iligan

G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990
FERNAN, J.

Facts: Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis were convicted with the crime of murder sentencing them to suffer reclusion
perpetua and pay the heirs of Esmeraldo Quinones Jr. with 30k and 256k+ for the unrealized income by the lower court.

At around 2AM Esmeraldo Quinones, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home after attending a barrio fiesta. On
their way they met Fernando Iligan his nephew Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, Edmundo Asis pushed them aside
prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Upon seeing his nephew fall, Iligan drew a bolo from his back and hacked Zaldy but
missed. They ran for a while and even passed by Quinones house and when they noticed that they were no longer chased,
the three head back to Quinones house and suddenly Iligan emerged from the roadside and hacked Quinones on the
forehead causing the latter to fall down, the other two ran away and when they went back they saw Quinones dead.
Postmortem indicates that the victim died of shock and massive cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident.

Issue: WON an act that is not the direct cause of an injury or death can escape such liability

Held: No. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s
head might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. the sequence of events from
Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time
between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.

Urbano v. IAC
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored
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palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and
there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A
quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On
October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the
condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano
was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed
a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in
the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held: A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. "And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second
day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And
if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."