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NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY PLACE OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE

U.S. V. LAHOYHOY PEOPLE V. MABUYO

In crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as a matter The appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him of a crime
essential to the proper description of the offense. not properly charged in the information since he was charged with murder
allegedly committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, Tanauan, Batangas, but was
To constitute robbery, the property obtained must be that of another, and
found guilty of said crime committed in Bo. Ambulong, some 12 kilometers
indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this
away in the same municipality and province. The alleged irregularity does
respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also
not constitute a reversible error.
necessary in order to identify the offense.
It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an
According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint
essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it
charges that the property taken belonged to Roman Estriba. By reason of
appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged in the
the lack of conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the
information, provided the place of actual commission was within the
ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of
jurisdiction of the court.
the offense of robbery committed by them in this case; and therefore they
cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with homicide. In the instant case the place of commission does not constitute an
essential element of the offense charged and the evidence discloses that
PLACE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME
said offense was in fact committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
US V. ARCEO trial court. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the appellant was
misled or surprised by the variance between the proof and the allegation
It is a general principle of law that the place where a crime is committed is in the information as to the place where the offense was committed.
the first thin to be ascertained in determining the jurisdiction of judge or
court.  PLACE OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE

The crime was committed in the pueblo of Tambobong, which is now CATINGUB V. COURT OF APPEALS (1983)
included in the territory of Rizal Province. It was held that the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction over crimes Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 14(a) also
committed in the Province of Rizal and within the 5-mile limit. provides:
Any change in the territorial jurisdiction of a court enlarging or restricting
Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. - (a) In all criminal
the same can never be established by mere deduction or inference.
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
Judicial divisions and boundaries of provinces and districts are always
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of
fixed by law. So that alterations of such boundaries can only be made in the essential ingredients thereof took place.
express terms by the legislative body. 
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It is alleged in the information that he had his "headquarters at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan" but it is also alleged that he was a "Travelling
Sales Agent of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in said City,"
(Manila) ... "charged with selling sweepstakes tickets entrusted to him for
sale in his district, with the obligation of turning over the proceeds of the
sale of said tickets to the Treasurer of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office in Manila,"
Since petitioner had the obligation to turn over the proceeds of his ticket
sales to the PCSO Manila and he failed to do so, the courts of Manila had
the jurisdiction to try the malversation charge against him.
It was held that estafa was consummated in the place where the accused
is required to render an accounting and failed to do so. Applying the same
ruling in the instant malversation case. It was held that the present case
of malversation may be tried in Manila since the offense charged was
consummated in Manila.
TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE
ROCABERTE V. PP
It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit.
The statement of the time of the commission of the offense which is so
general as to span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to
August, 1912," has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives
the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense. The dismissal of the
case by the Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since to allow
amendment of the indictment to conform to the evidence would be
violative of defendant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime
charged is not, however, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116
of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account
will be denied since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment;
instead, the court shall order the amendment to be made by stating the
time with particularity.11
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the
commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill
of particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court of
1964.12
Bill of particulars. — Defendant may, at the time of or before
arraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement or a
bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to plead or
prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained
of and the details desired.
TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE
PP V. OPEMIA
It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise time at which an
offense was committed need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint would permit.
In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25,
1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The period
of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of
time that one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different
from that committed by the Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by
them in 1947. 
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The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional
right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them
and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover,
they cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not charged.
Amendment of date of the commission of an offense is not proper as to do
so would prejudice the constitutional right of the accused. It is also a
cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendant has entered
his plea, the information or complaint may be amended only as to all
matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the Defendant.
An amendment that would change the date of the commission of the
offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form.  It is
apparent that the proposed amendment concerns with material facts
constituting the offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the Defendants.
DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE CHARGED
BROCKA V. ENRILE
The law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and
filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double
jeopardy.
The respondents acted with manifest bad faith when, aside from the
charge of rebellion, they charged a second offense against Brocka of
inciting to sedition. Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show
that the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having
been undertaken by state officials in bad faith. As a result, there is merit
in enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues
raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition
charge.
DUPLICITY OF CHARGE; FAILURE TO MAKE TIMELY OBJECTION,
ACCUSED CAN BE CONVICTED OF BOTH CHARGES.
PP V. COSARE
Although both the complaint and the information, in their caption, merely
designate the crime charged as that of "Acts of Lasciviousness" yet if the
averments appearing therein charge the accused not only with that
offense but with trespass to dwelling as well, he can be found guilty, if
proven, both charges, in the absence of a timely objection against such
duplicity of charge. 
The charge under which accused stands indicted is that of "Acts of
Lasciviousness" However, upon a cursory reading of the averment
appearing in both pleading one cannot fail to note that what is charged
against the accused is not only the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness’ but
that of trespass to dwelling as well.
It is true that both the complaints as well as the information, in their
caption, merely designate the crime charged as that of "Acts of
Lasciviousness", but such designation is not controlling. It is a mere
conclusion of law. The factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts.
That, it was held that:
"The crime of which the defendant stands accused is that described by the
facts stated in the information, and not that designated by the fiscal in the
preamble thereof . . . The designation of the crime by name in the caption
of the information is a conclusion of law on the part of the fiscal, . . . It is
not necessary, for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused,
nor the effective preparation of his defense, that he be informed of the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to
the facts alleged."
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY;
The rule regarding double jeopardy only applies when the case against the
accused is dismissed or is otherwise terminated without his express
consent (section 9, Rule 113). This situation does not, however, obtain
where the case was neither dismissed nor terminated but merely
remanded to the Justice of the Peace for a new preliminary investigation.
And even if the action of the court might be considered as dismissal, still
the rule would not apply where it was done with the express consent of
the accused, or at least with the confirmatory of his counsel.
DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE, COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF
CRIME
ENRILE V. AMIN
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed
against him.
All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which
are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and
charged as separate crimes in themselves.  The proposed amendments in the amended informationare clearly
The factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or
include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation
under Presidential Decree No. 1829. The crime of rebellion consists of
many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net
of intrigues and plots. Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion.  the essense of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the
In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.   It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-
AMENDMENT
PEOPLE V. MONTENEGRO
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on
Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a
plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the
information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no
prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the
rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. 3
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information,
and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from
"Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited
Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby
exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen
into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects
opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the
preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them.
after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been
convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To
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charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from
that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be
allowed by the Court.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CAES V. IAC
The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for
the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the
filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or
revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the
parties to the action. Their only function is to testify. In a criminal
prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or
one acting under his authority, and by no one else.
The right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for
a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The
purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the
danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.
It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on
motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the
express consent of the accused. 25 Such a dismissal is correctly
denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so
designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of
the accused.
Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not
having expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases
against him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
FISCAL’S AUTHORITY V. COURT’S JURISDICTION
CRESPO V. MOGUL
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal.
The action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal
or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
AUTHORITY OF THE FISCAL/ PROSECUTING OFFICER
ABELA V. GOLEZ
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The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and discretion in the
appreciation of evidence presented to him and, in the exercise thereof, he
may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether an information should be
filed in court is a matter address to the sound discretion of the fiscal RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. ZALDIVIA V. REYES

In case the provincial fiscal should fail or refuse to act even when there is
sufficient evidence on which action may be taken, the offended party may
take up the matter with the Secretary of Justice who may then take such
measures as may be necessary in the interest of justice under Section
1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Pañgan vs. Pasicolan, 103 Phil.
1143). " He may also file with the proper authorities or courts criminal and
administrative charges against the prosecuting officer.
 The prosecuting officer would be committing a serious dereliction of duty
if he files the information based upon a complaint, where he is not
convinced that the sufficiency and strength of the evidence would warrant
the filing of the action in court against the accused. This duty of the
prosecuting officer involves discretion, hence, it cannot be controlled by
mandamus unless there has been a grave abuse thereof which is not
shown in the case at bar."
PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE INFORMATION
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that.
The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced
from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as
this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after
the crime had already prescribed.

PP V. ROMAGOSA

Whether, in view of appellant’s plea of guilty to the information, he should

be deemed to have admitted the commission of the simple crime of
rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other separate crimes, if any of the
counts of the information charges crimes independent of and not
constituting essential acts or ingredients of the rebellion charged. 

Appellant Abundio Romagosa alias David is convicted of the crimes of

simple rebellion and murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his
plea of guilty, appellant is sentenced for the rebellion.