SSS

Jurisdiction and 2016 Rules of Procedure of SSC (Sec. 5)

1. SSS v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc., et al.,

 The law clearly vests upon the Commission jurisdiction over "disputes arising under this
Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any matter
related thereto..."
 Dispute is defined as "a conflict or controversy”; From the allegations of the respondent’s
complaint, it readily appears that there is no longer any dispute with respect to
respondents’ accountability to the SSS.
2. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by SSC, et al. v. Asiapro Cooperative
 The SSC's jurisdiction is clearly stated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as
in Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure.
 Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 provides: SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. — (a) Any
dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and
penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission.
 Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states: Section 1.
Jurisdiction. — Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to
coverage, entitlement of benefits, collection and settlement of contributions and
penalties thereon, or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission after the SSS through its President, Manager or Officer-in-charge of the
Department/Branch/Representative Officer concerned had first taken action thereon in
writing.
3. Social Security System v. Jarque Vda. De Bailon
 Without a nullified marriage, the subsequent spouse shall continue to be the rightful
beneficiary of the deceased spouse.
 The Court held that petitioner SSS, while empowered to settle controversies on
coverage and benefits, have no power to withdraw and much less to reverse decisions
by court of law. When it made its own findings on the validity of one marriage and the
invalidity of the other, the SSC acted as an appellate court.
4. Signey v. SSS, et al.,

Employer (Section 8[c])

5. SSC, et al. v. Alba
 An administrator is considered an employer, within the purview of Section 8(c) of the
Social Security Act of 1954. As such, an administrator may be held liable for SS
contributions.
 Section 8(c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 defines an employer as "any person,
natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade or
business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another
person who is under his orders as regards the employment."
6. Haveria v. SSS, et al.,
 For compulsory members under RA 1161 (Social Security Act of 1954), both the
employer and employee contribute to the employee's monthly premium contributions.
  For compulsory members, both the employer and employee contribute to the employee's
monthly premium contributions. On the other hand, voluntary members pay for their own
monthly premiums; as such, they are required to pay twice the amount of the employee's
contribution prescribed in Sec. 19 of RA 1161

Employee (Section 8[d])

7. SSS v. CA, et al.,
 When a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others of an independent
contractor, which make him fall within an intermediate area, he may be classified under
the category of an employee when the economic facts of the relations make it more
nearly one of employment than one of independent business enterprise with respect to
the ends sought to be accomplished.
 In Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor, the Court ruled that "When a worker possesses
some attributes of an employee and others of an independent contractor, which make
him fall within an intermediate area, he may be classified under the category of an
employee when the economic facts of the relations make it more nearly one of
employment than one of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends
sought to be accomplished."
8. Lazaro v. SSC, et al.,
 The fact that respondent was paid by way of commission does not preclude the
establishment of an employer-employee relationship. Neither does it follow that a person
who does not observe normal hours of work cannot be deemed an employee.
9. Gapayao v. Fulo, et al
 There is no doubt that his activities were necessary and desirable to Gapayao’s
plantation, making him a regular employee of the latter. Again, the Compromise
Agreement is the most telling, as it is basically an admission by Gapayao that Jaime was
his employee.
 Despite the contention of Gapayao that Jaime was a mere pakyaw worker, the Court has
ruled in Legend Hotel Manila v. Realuyo that as long as the employer has the right to
exercise control and supervision over the performance of duties by the employee, no
matter his employment type, there exists an employer-employee relationship

Final Judgment on relationship/conclusiveness of judgment

10. Co v. People
 When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final
judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated
between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
11. SSC v. Rizal Poultry & Livestock Association, Inc.,
 Section 8 (d) of the Social Security Act of 1997 defines an employee as any person who
performs services for an employer in which either or both mental or physical efforts are
used and who receives compensation for such services, where there is an employer-
employee relationship.
 There is no indication that there is an essential conceptual difference between the
definition of "employee" under the Labor Code and the Social Security Act.
 In the instant case, therefore, res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment"
applies. The judgment in the NLRC case pertaining to a finding of an absence of
 employer-employee relationship between Angeles and respondents is conclusive on the
SSC case.

Compulsory coverage
12. Chua v, CA, et al.,
 Suffice it to say that regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or
project, private respondents are subject to the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law,
their employment not falling under the exceptions provided by the law.
 This rule is in accord with the Court’s ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. SSS to the
effect that all employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory membership
in the SSS, except those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social
Security Act.

Dependents and beneficiaries (Section 8 [e] and [k])

13. Signey v. SSS, et al., G.R. No. 173582, January 28, 2008
 Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her
right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary
and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent
illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as
primary beneficiaries.
 The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a "dependent,” the only
requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.
 In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April
1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and
Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn
would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said
legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn
and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to
100% of the benefits

14. Social Security System, et al. v. De Los Santos,

 However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she
is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the
requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.
15. Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Journal Employees Union,(coverage of term “legal
dependent” as used in a stipulation in a CBA which is silent about it)
 the controlling consideration in order that a person may qualify as the employee's legal
dependent is not the employee’s married status but the fact that the spouse, child, or
parent is actually dependent for support upon the employee
 It is clear from these statutory definitions of dependent that the civil status of the
employee as either married or single is not the controlling consideration in order that a
person may qualify as the employee's legal dependent. What is rather decidedly
controlling is the fact that the spouse, child, or parent is actually dependent for support
upon the employee
16. SSC v. Azote,
 Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it
is required by Section 4 (b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine available statistical and
economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
Retirement benefits (Section 12-B)
17. Dycaico v. Social Security System, et al.,
 The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses
whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the
latter's retirement of their survivor's benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits
due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their
respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latter's
retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivor's pension does not rest on real and
substantial distinctions.

Death Benefits/Qualifying factors and meaning of “dependent”

18. SSC, et al. v. Favila,
 A surviving spouse must actually be dependent on the member spouse for support
during the lifetime of the member including the very moment of contingency to be
entitled to benefits.

Permanent Disability Benefits (Section 13-A)

19. Ortega v. SSC, et al.,

Right to institute (Section 22 [b])

20. Lo v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
 An action can only be instituted when the delinquency was made known to the employee
and not when the obligation to pay the premiums accrued. The 20-year prescriptive
period only runs from that moment.

Penal clause (Section 28)

21. Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al.,
 In case of violation of the SSS law, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
 As held by the CA, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal intent for the
petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the respondents' contributions deserve
scant consideration. The violations charged in this case pertain to the SSS Law, which is
a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses known as mala prohibita, where
when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
22. Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, et al.,
 The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social
Security Law does not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant to
Section 28(f) is Section 22 of the same law. Under Section 22(a), every employer is
required to deduct and remit such contributions penalty refers to the 3% penalty that
automatically attaches to the delayed SSS premium contributions.
23. Mendoza v. People,
 The term "managing head" in Section 28 (f) is used, in its broadest connotation, not to
any specific organizational or managerial nomenclature. To heed petitioner's reasoning
would allow unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently escape liability by the creative
adoption of managerial titles.
24. Kua, et al. v. Sacupayo, et al.,
  Good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction
between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of
premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to
make such remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed,
the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by force of law
25. Navarra v. People,
 Prompt remittance of SSS contributions is mandatory. Section 28 (f) of RA 8282
explicitly provides that "if the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an
association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head,
directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense." It
is considered mala prohibita and, thus, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal
intent are rendered immaterial.

Applicability of novation
26. SSS v. DOJ, et al.,
 The original relationship between SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law — RA 1161,
as amended — which requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic contributions
to petitioner under pain of criminal prosecution. No amount of agreements between
petitioner and SENCOR can change the nature of their relationship and the
consequence of SENCOR's non-payment of contributions.
 Although novation is not one of the means recognized by the Revised Penal Code to
extinguish criminal liability, it may "prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on
the true nature of the original basic transaction," provided the novation takes place
before the filing of the Information with the trial court.
 Thus, any payment respondent Martels would have made to petitioner (and it appears
that pending this petition, respondent Martels partially paid SENCOR's liability) only
affects their civil, if any, but not their criminal liability for violation of Section 22 (a) and
(b) in relation to Section 28 (e) of RA 1161, as amended.

Effect of pendency of rehabilitation proceedings on criminal action

27. Panlilio, et al. v. RTC-51 of City of Manila, et al.,
 The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a
legal ground for the extinction of petitioners’ criminal liabilities. There is no reason why
criminal proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so,
since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society,
reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

Condonation Program (RA No. 9903 and SSC Circular No. 2010-004, Series of 2010 on IRR
of RA No. 9903)
28. H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., et al. v. SSC, et al
 Under R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR, an employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the condonation program
provided that the delinquent employer will remit the full amount of the unpaid
contributions or would submit a proposal to pay the delinquent contributions in
installment within the six (6)-month period set by law.
  The Court finds that employers who have paid their unremitted contributions and already
settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties before R.A.
No. 9903's effectivity do not have a right to be refunded of the penalties already paid

GSIS
1. Ø People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Div.), et al., G.R. No. 145951,
2. August 12, 2003
3. Valdez v. GSIS,
 The last paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8291 dictates that for purposes of computation
of government service, only full-time services with compensation are included:
For the purpose of this section, the term “service” shall include full time service with
compensation: Provided, That part time and other services with compensation may be
included under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the GSIS.
 While petitioner invokes the proviso in the above-quoted provision of law, the GSIS, which
has been given the authority to include part-time services in the computation, has pointed
out that the services in the MMSU, PHIVIDEC and as OIC Vice-Governor of Ilocos Norte
cannot be credited because, aside from having been rendered part-time in said agencies,
the said positions were without compensation as defined in Section 2 (i) of R.A. No. 8291.
4. GSIS v. Pauig
 Here, the primordial reason why there were no deductions during those fourteen (14) years
was because Pauig was not yet a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal
obligation to pay the premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since
only periods of service where premium payments were actually made and duly remitted to
the GSIS shall be included in the computation of retirement benefits, said disputed period of
fourteen (14) years must corollarily be removed from Pauig's creditable service.
 Therefore, Pauig's casual and temporary service in the government from February 12, 1964
to July 18, 1977 must necessarily be excluded from the creditable period of service for
retirement purposes.
5. Ø GSIS, Cebu City Branch v. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004
6. Ø A.M. No. 10019-Ret. February 22, 2001 (Re: Application For Survivor's Benefits
7. Of Ms. Maylenne G. Manlavi, Daughter Of The Late Ernesto R. Manlavi)
8. Ø GSIS v. COA, G.R. No. 138381, November 10, 2004
9. Ø Santos v. Committee on Claims Settlement, et al., G.R. No. 158071, April 2, 2009
10. Ø GSIS v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186560, November 17, 2010
11. Ø GSIS v. Court of Appeals-Cebu City, et al., G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018
12. Ø CSC v. Moralde, G.R. No. 211077, Aug. 15, 2018
13. Lledo v. Lledo,
 May a government employee, dismissed from the service for cause, be allowed to recover
the personal contributions he paid to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)?
 Neither P.D. No. 1146 nor R.A. No. 8291 contains any provision specifically dealing with
employees dismissed for cause and the status of their personal contributions. Thus, there is
no inconsistency between Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146, and, subsequently, R.A. No. 8291.
 The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended, continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause and their claims for
the return of their personal contributions
 Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to
be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. The money subject of the
instant request consists of personal contributions made by the employee, premiums paid in
 anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a contingency, i.e., his
dismissal from the service prior to reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of the
money that belongs to him from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal
contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment.
.
14. Rubia v. GSIS
 Exemption of GSIS from execution does not cover refund of amortization payment
 “GSIS cannot claim a special immunity from liability in regard to its business ventures under
said Section. Nor can it deny contracting parties the right of redress and the enforcement of
a claim, particularly as it arises from a purely contractual relationship, of a private character
between an individual and the GSIS.”
15. Ø The City of Davao, et al. v. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Davao City, et
16. al., G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005
17. Ø GSIS v. City Treasurer of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 186242, December 23, 2009
18. Ø GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010; SC A.M. No. 08-2-
01-0, Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees, February 11, 2010
19. Ø GSIS v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 180045, November 17, 2010
20. Ø Garcia v. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010
21. Ø GSIS, et al. v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132,
22. December 6, 2006