US v.

HACHAW - Fuentes
FACTS 1. Defendant Hachaw was convicted of the crime of having opium in his
possession without authority of law. His conviction was based upon evidence
of 3 prosecution witnesses (Jose Mendoza, Alejo Hilario and Antonio
Aquino).
2. Witnesses contend that Hachaw, a Chinaman, who was passing along a
certain street in Cavite was acting very suspiciously. They called him to stop
but instead of doing so, he started to run. They pursued and compelled him to
go with them to the presidencies. He was compelled to take everything out of
his pockets and among the things he brought was a small quantity of opium
done up in paper.
3. Defendant Hachaw denies witnesses’ story. He asserts he never used opium;
did not deal in drugs and at time of his arrest, he had no opium in possession,
if any, it must have been placed in his pocket by the witnesses. He presented
testimony of 3 persons who were all members of the Constabulary. They were
dressed in civilian clothes and were standing upon the street where Hachaw
was arrested. They assert that Jose Mendoza proposed to them if they wanted
to make some money by putting opium in the pocket of some Chinaman and
he would arrest Chinaman; that in all probability Chinaman would try to bribe
them and they would have their opportunity to make money. They rejected
Mendoza and testified how he surreptitiously inserted the opium previously
shown to the pocket of accused.
4. Trial court rejected testimony of the Constabulary soldiers on ground that it
was unreasonable.
ISSUE W/N trial court erred in convicting Hachaw
RULING Trial court decision is reversed. Defendant is acquitted.

SC held that the story told by the Constabulary soldiers is fully reasonable as that told
by Mendoza.

Mendoza presents as the only reason why he ordered the arrest of the Chinaman that
he was acting suspiciously. He did not say in what way he was acting suspiciously or
what was the particular act or circumstance which aroused his curiosity. This
testimony of the witness does not present any clear reason why he arrested the
Chinaman. He arrested him because, as he said, "I wanted to see if he had committed
a crime." Among free men and under constitutional and statutory guaranties of
personal liberty, this furnishes no reason whatever why a person should be arrested.

SC believes that the testimony of these three witnesses for the defendant, given as it is
by persons whose reputation" is apparently good and whose allegations have not been
discredited in any way, is strong evidence in the case and sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
US v. BATTALONES - Fuentes
FACTS 1. Defendants Jose Batallones (Justice of the Peace), Maximo Cuadro and Isaac
Demo (policemen) were charged with the crime of illegal detention for
arresting Apolonio Gumarang and Inocencio Reyes and detaining them
overnight.
2. On Dec. 5, 1909, 2 secret service agents connected with BIR (Gumarang and
Reyes), were in Cabuyao on official business, and were arrested by Cuadro
and Demo and were taken before Batallones, who directed that they be
 detained in municipal jail until next morning when their information to their
identity was released by municipal treasurer.
3. The 2 secret service agents, strangers in the municipality, were seen spying
about in the neighborhood of the market place. A woman named Restituta
Catindig, having had her attention attracted by the peculiar conduct of the 2
men complained to the 2 policemen on duty. Cuadro and Demo called upon
the secret service agents to give an account of themselves, and to explain their
suspicious conduct, and at the same time demanded that they produce their
cedulas. Gumarang and Reyes were unable to do so, claiming that they had
forgotten them in the neighboring town of Calamba. They undertook to
identify themselves by producing certain documents in English to show just
what was their business. The police officers, who did not know English, were
unable to read these documents, and believing that their conduct and their
inability satisfactorily to account for themselves justified the suspicion that
they were in some way connected with the recent robberies, or that they were
about to commit theft or robbery, placed the two men under arrest and took
them forthwith to the house of the justice of the peace informing them that the
justice of the peace would be able to understand the documents produced by
them and to decide what was proper to do under all the circumstances.
4. Trial judge found Battalones, Cuadro and Demo guilty of the crime of
arbitrary detention.
ISSUE
RULING Judgment of conviction on case of Batallones is affirmed but in the cases of
Cuadro and Demo is reversed.

Supreme court held that the action of the police officers in promptly bringing the
Gumarang and Reyes before Battalones clearly indicated that their acts were wholly
inspired by a genuine desire to faithfully perform their duties as guardians of the law
and of the good order of the community. And we conclude, therefore, that though the
suspicions on which they based the arrest were not well founded, they are in no wise
criminally responsible for their action in making the arrest; the facts, as they appeared
to them at the time, having furnished reasonable grounds for their suspicions under all
the circumstances. The failure to produce cedulas on demand was not in itself offense,
but in the minds of the two policemen , it was undoubtedly calculated to confirm their
suspicions already aroused.

But the facts as developed by the evidence of record to not in our opinion sustain the
defense offered by Jose Batallones, the justice of the peace, and wholly fail to justify
his conduct in arbitrarily issuing the order for the confinement of the suspected secret
service agents. 

There is no ground for the belief that in acting as he did, the justice of the peace was
actuated by any special malice or illwill toward the prisoners, and the only
explanation of his conduct is that he was willfully negligent of their rights, and willing
arbitrarily to detain them rather than to take any trouble to verify their claims.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK (SHEN) v. ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL
FACTS 1. 6 petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging
constitutionality of RA 9372 (Human Security Act)
2. Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman
 Santos Jr. also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-
reaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372
under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of
human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants
with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of
sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule
otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public
3. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. KARAPATAN,
Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, allege that they have been
subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their
members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They
likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State”.
4. Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly
being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat
of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function
5. Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and
"coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited
acts.
ISSUE
RULING Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners,
a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a

credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension
of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

FACTS
ISSUE
RULING