Contending Theories of

International Relations

A ComprehensiveSurvey
Fifth Edition

James E. Dougherty
St.Joseph's
University

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

TheFletcherSchoolof Law and Diplomacy,Tufts University

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Preface xi

Theoretical
Relations
Approaches
1
toInternational
' i

Introduction 1
EarlyApproaches
toInternational-Relations
Theory8
ModernApproaches
toInternationalRelations
Theory13
TheDevelopment
ofInternational-Relations
Theory-16
TheDenitionandScope
of International
Relations 19
TraditionalTheory:Balanceof Power 40
Conclusion 48
Notes 50 \ >&#3

FromRealistto-Neorealist
andNeoclassical
Realist Theory",.»,
63
Theoretical Founda »'
NeorealistTheory
Realism, Neoreal'
and Contributi
Notes 98
CONTENTS

System,
Structure,Agent,andInternational
Relations Theory 104
Systemand Structure 104
Structuralism and Structuration 106
OtherUsesof System 107
Systems
at theInternational
Level 118
Theoriesof PolarityandInternationalStability 121
System
Structure
andStability 123
Regional
Subsystems
in theInternational
System135
Conclusion 140
Notes 140 '

The Physical/Social/Environing
Context:
ConstructingReality 149
From Structure-Agentto Constructivism 149
EnvironingFactors:EarlierTwentieth-Century
Approaches 156
GeographicalFactorsof National Power 157
Mahan, the Seas,and National Power 159
The SproutsandHuman-MilieuRelationships 164
SpatialRelationships
and Conict: RecentWork 172
The Clash of Civilizations? 176
Redeningthe Meaningof Borders 177
Critiquesof EnvironmentalTheories 178
Conclusion 180
Notes 181

The Older Theories of Conict and War 188

Prerequisites
of a GeneralTheoryof Conict andWar 188
Micro- and Macro-Theories of Conict 192
Individuals and International Conict 193
Conict and Social Integration 194
Varieties of Conict 194
Theories of War and Its Causesin Antiquity 195
The PhilosophicalTheoriesof the Nation-StatePeriod 201
Modern Pacist Theories 202
Bellicist Theories 206
Bellicists and Antidemocratic Theorists 209
Anarchism and the Marxist Socialists 210
The NormativeTheoryof JustWar in the NuclearAge 212
Notes 219
 CONTENTS Vii

Microcosmic
Theories
ofViolent
Conict231
Modern Studiesof Motivations and War 231
BiologicalandPsychologicalTheories 2.32
InstinctTheoriesof Aggression 233
Animal Behavior Studies 235
Lorenz:IntraspecicAggression 2,36
Frustration-AggressionTheory 238
Socialization,Displacement,
andProjection 240
Learned
Aggression
andMilitaryTraining 242
Learning, Images,and International Conict 243
AggressionDiversionand Reduction 246
OtherPsychologicalTheories 249
Conclusion:
Microcosmic
Theories
in Perspective252
Notes 254

Macrocosmic Theories of Violent Conict:

International War 264
InsideVersusOutsideDimensionsof Conict 265
Lessonsfrom Primitive and Other Societies 268
OtherInsightsfromTheorists
of Society 271
Revolution and War 274
TheInternationalization
of InternalWarandLow-Intensity
Conict 277
PoliticalScience
and the Causesof War 282
The ScienticStudyof War 286
TheCorrelates
of WarProjectandStatistical
Analyses
of War 288
Arms Races,Alliances, and War 291
National Growth and International Violence 298
Power as Distance and Power Transition 301
Capability,
Risk,Expected
Utility,andProbabilityof War 303
CyclicalandLong-CycleTheoriesof War 308
Democracies,War, and Peace 313
Conclusion 321
Notes 321

Theoriesof Deterrence:Arms Control

and StrategicStability 344
HistoricalBackground 345
The Theoretical Debate 351
Dilemmas of Deterrence 354
Viii CONTENTS

Rationality
Versus
Irrationality357
NuclearDeterrence
andConventional
Defense366
Empirical
Studies
of Deterrence
371
Iiisarnlament,
ArmsControl,andDeterrence374
_ Endof theColdWar 378
RethinkingDeterrence
AftertheColdWar 382
InternationalTerrorism 386
Deterrencein the Twenty-First Century 390
Conclusion 397
Notes 397

/g International
Political
Economy
416
Mercantilism 418
Liberalism 419
The Resurgenceof Realism/Nationalism
in the InterwarPeriod 422
Marxist/DependencyTheory 428
The Theoryof Imperialism 431
Lenin and Conict Theory 433
Marxist-Leninist Theory Sincethe 195Os 436
Realist and Liberal Critics of the Economic Theories of
Imperialism 437
Post-World War II Economic Liberalism 442
Marxists,NeoMarxists,and the Third World 446
Critiqueof MarxistsandNeoMarxists 450
ImperialismasPoliticalSlogan 452
The Theory of Dependency 454
The CapitalistWorld Economy 458
Oil, Ination, and the Debt Crisis 460
The North-South Debate and the NIEO 464
Multinational Corporationsand Governments 469
Post-Marxist Critical International Theory 477
The Three Models Revisited 478
The Global Financial Crisis 480
Conclusion 483
Notes 484

Theories of International Cooperation

and Integration 505
CooperationandInternationalIntegration 505
JosephNye andNeofunctionalism 515
Transactions and Communications: Implications for Security
Communities 519
 CONTENTS ix

Alliances 532
NATO After the Cold War 540
Integration
Theory:Problems
of Conceptualization
and
Measurement 542
Limitationsof FunctionalismandNeofunctionalism 544
TheDevelopment
of Theories
of Integration
andCooperation
545
Notes 546

0 (CV
DePcislibi1Cl\l7lZll<ing
Theories:
Choice
and
the
Unit
Level Actor 553
Decision-Making
Analysis:
Its NatureandOrigins 553
Approaches
to Decision-Making
Theory 554
Bureaucratic Politics 556
Motivations and Characteristicsof Decision Makers 559
The DecisionMak1ng
Process 559
GameTheoryandDecision
Making 562
International Relations as a Game 568
Allisons Three Models 571
TheRenementsof Snyder
andDiesing 574
TheCybernetic
Theoryof Decision
Making 576
DecisionMaking in Crises 578
Towarda Theoryof CrisisBehavior 585
The Systematic
Studyof InternationalCrisisBehavior 589
Psychology
andDecision
Making 592
ForeignPolicyDecisionMaking and DomesticPolitics 598
Conclusion 599
Notes 600

12 InternationalRelationsTheory:Into the Third

Millennium 616
MajorFocalPointsof Contemporary
Theory 623
Emerging SubstantiveInterests 626
Policymaking
andInternational-Relations
Theory 644
Theorizingaboutthe Future 646
TheRoleof NormativeTheory 649
Notes 653

Name Index 662

Subject Index 680
Preface

Thisnew,fth editionof Contending Theories

of International
Relations
coin-
cideswith thebeginningof its fourthdecadeof usebyteachersandstudents
in
international
relations
courses
at hundreds
of universities
andcolleges
in the
UnitedStates
andmanyabroad.With theemergence
of newliteratureandthe
continuing
developmentof theeld,wehaverevised thetextthroughout
and
updated
thenotesforthebeginning of thethirdmillennium.
At thesame
time,
we haveendeavored to preservethe basicelements of the approach
that
guided us in the rst four editions:
1. An interdisciplinary
method
thatdrawsinsights
fromtraditional,
be-
havioralscientic,
andpostbehavioralelds,aswellasnormativethe-
ory,andthat includesthevariousgreatdebates
of international
rela»
tions
2. An effortto showhowlatertheorists
havebuiltupontheworkof their
predecessors;
howthenewertheories canbeintegrated
or compared
withtheolderones;andv
howthemorerecentapproaches, instead
of
beinglooked
uponastotallynovelandunprecedented,
maysometime
be viewedas subtleror morecomplexrecombinations
of reaction
against traditional theories
3. Animpartial,
objective
presentation
andanalysis ofcontending
theories
andtheorists,
alongwiththeviewsof theircriticswhere
appropriate
4. Theamplecitationof scholarlysources
on whichour discussions
and
analysesare founded
Theinsights
of earlierwritersmaybecome outdated,astheydoin all in-
tellectual
elds,buttheydonotbecome irrelevant
to a full understandingof
howinternational
relations hasdeveloped.Sofarasweareaware, thisis the
onlytextwhichenables
students
to surveynot onlytheclassical
andmodern
xi
xii PREFACE

historicalperiodin international
relationstheory,but alsothecontemporary
literature,the volumeof which is expandingat an exponentialrate. Extensive
endnotesare includedboth to deepenand broadenour coverageof theories
andto providehandybibliographic
sources.
Forthisfth edition,largenum-
bers of new sourcereferenceshave been added to those retained from the pre-
viousedition.It is to behopedthat undergraduate
studentspreparingterm pa-
pers,as well as graduatestudentsand othersworkingon moreadvanced
research
topics,will benetfromthisbibliographical
information.
Wewish to call attentionat the outsetto severalmajor changesin chapter
organization
in thisedition.All four chapters
dealingwith thecauses
of war
and the theoriesof deterrencehave now beenplacedin consecutiveorder.
Whatwaspreviously
Chapter6, Theoriesof Imperialism
andtheEconomic
Causes of International Conict, has been completely rewritten as a new
Chapter9, InternationalPoliticalEconomy.In this newchapterRealism,
Liberalism,Marxism,and their Neo-forms aretreatedat lengthin the con-
text of moderneconomichistoryfrom the mercantilistperiodof the sixteenth-
eighteenth
centuriesto the globalizationof the earlytwenty-rstcentury.
Another major changepertainsto the earlier Chapter 12, Game Theory,
Gaming,Simulation
andBargaining.
In orderto permittheincorporation
of
newtheories,we decidedto eliminatethat chapter,andto insertonly thoseba-
sic elementsof gametheory,gaming,and bargainingmostgermaneto interna-
tional relationstheoryinto Chapter11, Decision-MakingTheories.
This fth editionhasbeensubstantiallyrevisedto reect not only the par-
adigmatic
debate
sparked
bythetransformed
globalsystem
andtheendof the
Cold War, but also the largenumberof newerwritings on neorealist,struc-
tural-realist,and neoclassicalrealist theories,democraticpeacetheory, and
other neoliberaltheory; the,continuingdiscussionabout why the Cold War
endedasit did; the long peace,or why the Cold War did not resultin war be-
tween the United Statesand the Soviet Union; structural and institutionalist
theories;theoriesaboutthe causesof anarchyand the conditionsfor coopera-
tion andpoliticalintegration;
the debateaboutstructureagent
relationships
within and amongthe levelsof analysis;deterrencein the early twenty-rst
century;postmodernist-postbehavioralist theory;the causesof war; geography
andwar; constructivistapproaches; and recentdevelopments in theoriesof de-
cision making, crisis, and crisis management. We havecontinuedto update
these theories. This fth edition also contains new materials on feminist the-
ory, terrorism,transnationalethnicconict, identity andnationalism,and the-
ories about alliance and coalition behavior. V
Whereverpossible,we haveendeavored
to showrelationshipsamongthe
various theories of international relations. We have also addressed issues re-
latedto the natureof theoryitself.Theseissuesincludethe ongoingconsidera-
tion of how theoryis developed, the epistemological basisfor knowledge,and
the issueof rationality in the decisionsof individualsand the foreignpolicies
of governments. Encompassed in this discussionis the debateaboutthe extent
to which theoryin the socialsciences, and internationalrelationsin particular,
 PREFACE xiii

canor cannotbeseparated
from normativeconsiderations.
It alsoaddresse
theproblems
of theory
construction,
including
thoseposed
bythephenome
nonof non-linearity,
ortheextent
to whichtherearechaotic,
unpredictab
non-linear
dynamics
andprocesses
thatestablish
inherentboundaries
or limits
to theory.
As amplydemonstrated
in theburgeoning
literatureof international-rela
tionstheory,
theeldisalways
changing
in itssubstantive
andmethodologic
dimensions.
Yetweremainconvinced
thatin international
relations,
asin the
socialsciences
generally,
theorycanbeunderstood
bestwhenit is linkedto
andbuildsontheenduring insightsof thepast.At thesame time,aswemove
intoa newcentury,changesin theinternationalsystem seem to beoutpacing
theabilityof ourtheories
eitherto explainchange or to anticipate
change
based
onanadequate
understanding
ofthephenomena
thatarethenecessa
objectof theoreticaldevelopment
and analysis.Therefore,
we needto ask
whatenduresfromthepastto forma basisonwhichto develop futureinter-
national-relations
theory.
Weconfront a debate abouttheextentto which,in
a fragmenting
structure
thatincludes
failedstates andtheemergence of nu-
merousactorsotherthanstates,
anarchy at theinternational
leveldiffersap-
preciablyfrom otherlevelsof analysis.
Yetat the sametimethereexistsat
leasta certainminimum,oftenfragileorder,greaterin somesocieties
thanin
others.
Thetheoretical
discussion
of suchissues
isaddressed
in thechapter
that follow.
Theauthorsembarked
on thisprojectmorethan30 yearsago.While
codirectingthe graduateseminarin international-relationstheories at the
Universityof Pennsylvania,
andduringsubsequent
decades
of graduateand
undergraduateclasses,webecame awarethatstudents felt overwhelmedby
thegreatvarietyof theories
in theeld.It wasourpurpose,then,asit isnow,
to cometo theirassistance-notbypropagatinga single
favoritetheory,
butby
surveying
thegreatpanoplyof theliteratureavailable,
andtryingto assess
the
varioustheories
asobjectively
aswecould,settingforththetheoretical
points
of intersection
or overlap,
of convergenceor divergence.
Weknowfull well
thatthiseldissovastandcomplexthattheachievement of a single,
unied,
parsimoniousyetpowerfulexplanation
of international
phenomena mayal-
waysproveto beelusive.
Yettodaymorethanever, theoryisa fascinating
and
importantareafor study,reection,andresearch.
Theexpanding
literatureof
international-relations
theory,
together
withtherapidityandextentof change
in theglobalsystem,
increases
theneedfor a comprehensive
surveyof the
many older and newer theories.
In earliereditionswe notedmanypersons who profoundlydeserved
thanksfor theircontributions to our intellectual
developmentandto this
work.Thatdebtremains, forthispresent
edition,
likecontemporary
theoryit-
self,is builton all thathasgonebefore. Wewishespeciallyto acknowledg
our gratitudeto colleagues
at St. Josephs
University(especially
Professors
DavidH. Burton,ElwynF.Chase, Jr.,andFrankX. Gerrity),aswell asthose
at TheFletcher
Schoolof Law andDiplomacy,
TuftsUniversity,
andthe
xiv PREFACE

Institute for ForeignPolicy Analysis.Over the courseof decades,our col-

leagueshave contributedmuch to our understandingof internationalrela-
tions.We expressthanksto the manystudentswho haveposed,and continue
to ask,challengingquestionsabouttheoriesof internationalrelations.Both of
us havebenetedimmeasurablyfrom discussions with other scholarsas well
aspolicymakers
in theUnitedStatesandabroad,whoseperspectives
furnish
an indispensable basisfor assessing the relationshipbetweentheory and prac-
tice in theworld asit exists,in contrastto the world aswe might wish it to be.
We would be remissnot to singleout thosewho renderedvaluablecom-
ments for this edition and, in particular, the reviewerscommissionedby
Addison WesleyLongman,who providedusefulcritiquesthat were usedto
the fullest extent possiblein the preparationof this edition: Blaine David
Benedict,HoughtonCollege;Anthony Bichel,SamHoustonStateUniversity;
M. Kent Bolton, CaliforniaStateUniversity,SanMarcos;Bernard-Thompson
Ikegwuoha, Western Washington University; David Penna, Gallaudet
University;JamesRodes,Luther College;Philip A. Schrodt,University of
Kansas;Michael Wallack, Memorial University of Newfoundland.We are
particularlygratefulto Professor
RichardH. Shultz,Jr.,of TheFletcher
School
of Law andDiplomacy,TuftsUniversity,for materialsrelatedto the discussion
of low-intensityconict in Chapter7. We expressour thanksto colleaguesat
the Institute for ForeignPolicy Analysis,especiallyDr. JacquelynK. Davis,
ExecutiveVice President,and Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice Presidentand
Director of Studies,Institutefor ForeignPolicyAnalysis,for valuableinsights
into the linkagebetweentheoryand policy.
Polly Jordan,of the Institutefor ForeignPolicyAnalysis,furnishedindis-
pensable
helpin preparingthe manuscript
for publication,keepingtrack of
numerousand sometimesconfusingrevisions,and bringingto our attention
unintelligiblesentences,
aswell asinputting changesto the drafts.We alsoac-
knowledgethe assistance
of RobertaBreen,FredaKilgallen,and Daniele
Riggio of The FletcherSchoolof Law and Diplomacy;AleksanderMicic of
the John F. KennedySchoolof Government,HarvardUniversity;and Maggie
ForsterSchmitz,and Diana Laneof the Institute for ForeignPolicy Analysis.
To all who assistedin the productionof this fth edition,we expressour grat-
itude. May this edition contributeto an understandingof theoriesof interna-
tional relationsfor an emerginggenerationof scholars,students,and policy-
makersin the challenging,complex,and heterogeneous world of the early
twenty-rst century.

JamesE. Dougherty
RobertL. Pfaltzgraff,Jr.
Chapter 1
Theoretical Approaches
to International
Relations

lNTRODUCTION
Thepaceof globalchange hasquickened dramaticallysince1989,whenthe
dismantlingof theBerlinWall,togetherwith profoundpoliticaltransforma-
tion in CentralEastern
Europe,signaledthecollapseof theSovietempireand
of theSovietUnionitself.Forfourdecades
priorto 1989,theoverarching
concernof Westerngovernments,
and manytheorists
of internationalrela-
tions,hadbeen&#39;to
deternuclearwar andanyconventional
conictthatcould
escalate
to thenuclear
level.After1989,thesubstantialreduction
of military
forcesin Europe,the dissolutionof the WarsawPact,the unificationof
Germany, and the devolution of Gorbachev§ Soviet Union to Yeltsins
Commonwealth
of Independent
States
ushered&#39;in
anabruptdiscontinuity
in
whathadbeena familiarworld scenefrightening
attimes,but an environ-
ment to which we had&#39;become
accustomed,and one which had seemedim-
mune to drastic alteration.
Throughoutthe Cold War period,the internationalsystemretaineda
seeminglyrecognizable
shape,
despite
swingsbetween deepfreezes andwarm-
ing détentes.
Analystsdeveloped
coherenttheoriesandengaged, in sometimes
esotericdebatesabout realismversusidealism,mutual deterrenceand bal-
ancedarmscontrol,stabilityand instability,nationalinterestsand interna-
tional"
security;
aboutthetheoryandpractice
of crisismanagement,
regional
integration,andtheviabilityof alliances
understrain;andsoforth.Most,but
not all, analysts
in theeld shareda commonconceptual paradigmandpro-
fessional vocabularythatenabled themto carryona meaningful discussion
of
argumentaboutsuchthingsas power,strategy, andforeign-policydecision
makingunderconditions of bipolarityor multipolarity.
Thereweremanydis-
agreements, but theytted into thecomprehensive frameworkbasedon the
internationalsystemof a bipolarworld.
In theearlytwenty-rstcentury,
wearein themidstof afundamental
par-
adigmshiftin ourthinkingaboutthefutureof worldpolitics.
Theimportance
of paradigmatic
change liesin thefactthattheparadigm
provides
theessential
basisfor theory.Theparadigmfurnishes a comprehensive
frameworkfor the
1
2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

identication of the variablesabout which the theory is to be developed.As

the rst stagein theory building, the paradigm(frameworkfor theoretical
analysis)describesthe phenomenato be investigated.In internationalrela-
tions, thesephenomenarefer to the numbersand typesof actors.The para-
digmis essentiallya meansof selectingwhat will betheobjectof theory.It will
helpdirectattentionto thekindsof relationships
to beinvestigated
amongthe
units that composethe paradigm.To what extent,it is asked,shouldtheories
of the internationalsystemfocus on stateactorsor units other than states?
What arethe dening characteristics
of suchentities?What wastermeda tra-
ditional paradigmwas said to be state centric. To speakof paradigmatic
shift is to emphasize
thetransformationof a paradigmconsistingof statesin a
worldof two superpowers,
theirallies,andneutralsto onethathasa multi-
plicity of differingtypesof actors.
To indicatethe order of magnitudeof the shift required,it would be an
exaggerationto compareit with the transitionfrom the Ptolemaicview of the
astronomical universe to the modern scientic view that emerged with
Galileostelescopicobservationof the relationshipbetweenthe earth and the
sun in the early seventeenthcentury.Sucha comparison,however,has the
merit of showinghow difcult it can be for peopleand institutionsto move
from well-troddenterrain into the unknown. Galileoand other leadingcon-
tributorsxtothenewscienticvisionof that erametwith not only scientic,
but also religiousand philosophicalopposition,yet they were all convinced
that the old earth-centeredparadigmwas wrong. Hence,the aforementioned
analogyis not entirelyapt. ThePtolemaictheory,thoughsatisfyingto all but a
few thinkers for many centuries,neverconformedto cosmicreality. In con-
trast,thedominantparadigm
of theColdWarperiodsharedby mostanalysts
and policymakersbore at least someresemblance to what was widely per-
ceivedto be internationalpolitical reality from the late 1940sto the late
1980s.Nonconformistcritics had a point when they assertedthat the Soviet
communistsystemcould not last forever.Nonetheless, not eventhesecritics
predictedthe surprisingeventsof 1989and after.
A Thecomparison
is faultyin at leastoneotherimportantrespect.
It took
the great astronomersand mathematicalscientistsof EuropeCopernicus,
Brahe,Kepler,Galileo,and Newtona centuryand a half to completetheir
paradigmshift.International
theoristswereunderpressure
to producea new
grandconceptualvisionin a muchshortertime framepreferably lessthan a
decadeand to do so in a global settingthat, unlike the planetsin the solar
system,is undergoingdramaticandrapid change.Policymakers anddiplomats
arecompelled
to dealwith emerging.
problems
on anadhocbasis,relyingon
practicalor intuitive political wisdom (asthey haveusuallydonein the past),
or responding,as democraticleadersmust, by trying to balancea variety of
conicting demands.The searchfor a new geopoliticalcartographyto re-
placethe somewhatoversimpliedCold War notion of a world divided be-
tweendemocracyandtotalitarianism,suggests JohnLewisGaddis,might be-
gin with a look at the forces,of integration and fragmentationin the
contemporary
internationalenvironment.Integrationmay not be always
 INTRODUCTION 3

good,not fragmentationalwaysbad.Nationsmustnow striveto balanceone

setof forcesagainstanother.
Forexample,
neithera strongimperialistRussia
nor a chaoticallyweak one is desirable.Over the courseof more than two
decades,rst Iran and later Iraq becameextremelyhostiletoward the United
States,yet American policymakers did not want to seeeither one weakenedto
the point of destabilizinga local balance.
Theendof the ColdWarspawned
several
shorthand
descriptions
of the
transformedglobal setting. A former deputy director of the U.S. State
Departments policy planningstaff, FrancisFukuyama,in a widely cited and
controversialbook,proclaimedthe triumph of democracyand the freemarket
systemasthe endof history.2DuringthePersianGulfcrisisof 1990-1991,
President
Bushspokeof a newworldorderof cooperationamongnationsand
peaceful
settlement
of disputes,
anerain whichtheUnitedNationsmightbeable
to live up to theoriginalexpectations
of its founders.At thesametime,Bushwas
criticizedfor actingout a balanceof-powerpolicya la Nixon andKissinger
whileemploying therhetoricof Presidents
Woodrow WilsonandJimmyCarter,
with emphasison democracy, humanrights,andinternationallaw.3
Indeed,the early 1990swereyearsof almosteuphorichopein a universal
marchtowardpopulardemocracy andmarketeconomies. Fromall quarters,
analysts
werenotingtheobviousfactthattherewasonlyonesuperpowerleft,
without beingquite surewhat that meant.For well overa decade,writers had
beenpointingto a declinein theutility of militarypower(largelybecause the
possessors of nuclearweaponshadfoundthemto be;militarilyunusable), not-
ing that concernsabouteconomic securitywereovertaking thoseof military
security. Talk about threats of war and the need for nuclear:deterrencebecame
far lessfashionable than it had -beenin the late 1970sand early 1980s.
Illustrativeof thisperspective,
JohnMuellerarguedthat amongmodernized
nations,warhasbecome socatastrophic andrepulsiveaswto
besubrationally
unthinkablerejectednot becauseits a bad ideabut because it"remainssub-
consciousand nevercomesoff as a coherent-possibility.» Michael.Howard
assertedoptimisticallythat, althoughwarsarestill likely to occurin lessdevel-
opedsocieties,
it is quitepossible
thatwar . . . between
highlydeveloped
so-
cieties may not recur, and that a stable framework for international order will
become
rmly established.5
NotingthatRuthLegerSivardcounted127wars
in the developingworld, with 21.9 million ,casualties,between1946 and
1989,CharlesW. Kegley,Jr. concluded:The disappearanceof;large-scale
warfareconcomitant
with theascendance
of smalls_cale
warfarehasproduced
two systems,
a stablecentralsystem
andan unstableperipheral
system.5
Whethersucha neat dichotomyfits the Gulf War of 1991 and the U.S.led
coalitionof 30 statesagainstIraqfor havinginvadedandoccupied -Kuwaitis
debatable.Thisillustrates
thedifcultyconfrontingtheorists
in aneraof para-
digmatic shift, when the shapeof the new paradigmwas far from clear.
Indeed,its nal shapehasnot yetappeared,if it everwill.
Decadesof frustratinglyslow armscontrol negotiationshad finally pro-
ducedreductionsin the stockpileof nuclearweaponsand in conventional
forcesdeployedin CentralEurope,which had seemed, and actuallypromised
 4 THEORETICALAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

to be,unattainable
duringthe ColdWar.Nevertheless,
evenafterthe Cold
War,thetwoprincipal erstwhile
rivalscontinuedto maintain
sufcientcapa-
bilitiesto posea potential
threatto eachothers
existence.
Moreover,govern-
mentsexpressed
increasing
concernaboutthedangers of theproliferationof
weaponsof massdestruction,
includingnuclear,biological,andchemical ca-
pabilities,
to additional
independent
centersofcontrolin morevolatileregions
of theworld,whereconictsmightbreakoutandescalate. A growingcause
for concernwasthepossibility
thatterroristgroups
or roguestates might
gainaccess to stolenssionable
materials,
or evenwholenuclear weapons,
from an international black market.
k W7ar,wroteZbigniewBrzezinski,
in a veinechoing
JohnMuellerand
Charles
W.Kegley,
Jr.,hasbecome
a luxurythatonlypoornationscanaf-
ford.7Affordit theydid,eitherasindependent
not-so-poor,
oilproducing
states
(Iraqvs.Kuwait); national
groupsof different
religious
traditions
ght-
ingfor territoryin fragmented
multinational
states(EasternOrthodox Serbs,
RomanCatholicCroats,MuslimBosnians,
andAlbanianKosovars
in thefor-
merYugoslavia);
andvariouscivilwarsof anationalist,
religious,
secessionis
or tribalcharacter
(Iraqigovernment
vs.Kurdsandmarshland ShiiteArabs;
Buddhist Sinhalese
vs.HinduTamilsin SriLanka;conictsin Chechnya and
the formerSovietrepublicsof Georgia,Azerbaijan,
andTadjikistan; and
Hutusversus Tutsisin Rwandatomention onlya few).Bythemid-1990s,
theUnited
Nations
Security
Council
hadsomuchonitsdiplomatic
plate
morethantwodozen peacekeeping
andpeaceenforcing
operations,
actualor
proposedthat
it wasrunning
largedecitsbecausepoormemberswereun-
ableto payandrichmembers
(including
theUnited
States)
werefallinginto
substantial
arrears
ontheirnancialobligations.
In thepostindustrial,
infor-
mation-agedemocracies,
the political focus becameless international and
moredomestic,except
forthefactthatthepreoccupation of voterswithjobs,
ination,andthequalityof life (inthehomeandin theenvironment)cou-
pledwiththeconcernof economists andbankersoverinterest
rates,interna-
tionalcompetitiveness,
currency uctuations,
tradegaps,corporate
restructur-
ing,_
decits,anddebtsforcedtheirgovernments
to givehigh-priority
attention
totrends
shaping
theglobal
economy.
There
hasbeenmuchspecula
tion concerning
thepossibility
thatarmedconict.among
thegreatpowers
wasbeing
replaced
bytheprospect
oftradewarsamong
theworlds
principal
economic centersNorth America,the European Community/Union, and
Japan(orthePacicRim).conicts
repletewiththeirownjargonrelativeto
gapsandimbalances,currency
crisesandstockmarketvolatility,
unfairtrade
practices,
and retaliatory
movesto forceforeignmarketsto open.(See
Chapter 9.)
Samuel
P.Huntington
wasnotquitesatised
withanyof theforegoing
nascent
paradigms.
Hewasparticularlycriticalof whathecalledendism
endof theColdWar,endof history,endof waramongtheindustrially
ad-
vanced nations.8
Later,in an articlethatprovoked
considerable
debate,
Huntington wrote,
 INTRODUCTION 5

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conict in this new world will
notbeprimarilyideological
or primarilyeconomic.
Thegreatdivisions
amonghu-
mankind and the dominating source of conict will be cultural. Nation-states will
remainthe most powerful actorsin world affairs, but the principal conicts of
globalpoliticswill occurbetweennationsandgroupsof civilizations.The clashof
civilizations
will dominate
globalpolitics.9
His list includes seven or eight civilizationsWestern, Confucian,
Japanese,Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,Latin American, and perhaps
African-eachwith its own distinctivereligion;modesof thoughtand expres-
sion; traditions regardingthe state,marriage,and family; law and authority;
perspectives on liberty andequality;emphases
on tradition andchange;andso
on. Civilizationaldifferences,Huntington held, are real and basicenoughto
produceprolonged,violentconict. Communications technology,globaltrade
and investment,migration, and other factorshavemadeoncehomogeneous
civilizationsmorepermeableto eachother,but eachhasa distinctiveapproach
to the vital issuesof our time:humanrights,thenaturalenvironment,national
security,economicdevelopment, andthe kinds of ethnic,linguistic,territorial,
regional, and religious conicts that have intensied since the end of the ideo-
logical Cold War.Not only Islam, but also Christianity,Judaism,Buddhism,
and Hinduism are all manifestinga fundamentalistreactionagainstsecular,
materialistWesternculture. Within recentyearsmanyin the West,often
without critical analysisof all the backgroundfactors,havetendedto focus
blameon militant Islam for the risein anti-Westernterrorism.(SeeChapter
7.) If Huntingtonsanalysisis correct,it might imply for thefuturea shift from
the nation-stateto largercultural entitiesas basicunits for the studyof inter-
nationalrelationsor at leastfor someaspectsof it. (A half centuryago,the
historianArnold Toynbeehad urgeda civilizational approachto the studyof
internationalrelations.) Huntingtonsprognosis,of course,may not be on
the mark. He drewre from severalcritics. FouadAjami,for example,
notedthat Huntington,while concedingthat stateswill remainthe mostpow-
erful internationalactors,points to a comingwar of civilizations.According
to Ajami, Huntingtonviewedcivilizationsaswatertightcompartments, under-
estimatingthe degreeto which all non-Westerncivilizationshavebeenremade
by the Westssecularismand modernity,and apparentlyforgot that civiliza
tionsdo not controlstates;statescontrolcivilizations.12
Huntingtons
views
will comeup againin our discussionof environmentaltheories.Sincethe mid-
1990s,severalnew trendshaveemergedin internationaltheory,as scholars
havetried to cometo gripswith suchquestionsasthese:
0 How canwe bestexplainthe long peacethe eraof nucleardeterrence?
0 Why did the Cold War cometo a rather suddenand unexpectedend?
0 Has war amongindustriallyadvanced,democraticstatesreally become
unthinkable? How sturdyis the democraticpeace?
0 Sincethe end of the Cold War, has the internationalsystembecome
more or less stable?
6 THEORETICALAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

0 Does the transition from totalitarian/authoritarianregimestoward

popular democracy,from commandeconomiesto market systems,
andfrom nationaleconomic
particularism
to globalizationimplya
permanentshift from realist/neorealisttheories of power conict
amongstatesto liberal or othertheoriesof peacefulinternationalcoop-
erationtoward new,higherforms of universalhumandevelopment?
0 To what extent are statesbeing supersededby other political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, religious, and other institutions and forces as
shapersof the evolvinginternationalsystem?
StephenM. Walt, writing in 1998,dealt provocativelywith severalof
theseand related questions:
Thestudyof internationalaffairsis bestunderstoodasa protractedcompetition
betweentherealist,liberalandradicaltraditions.Realismemphasizestheendur-
ingpropensity
for conictbetween states;
liberalism
identiesseveral
waysto mit-
igate theseconictive tendencies;and the radical tradition describeshow the entire
systemof staterelationsmight betransformed.
Realism/neorealism,
saysWalt, despitedifferences amongits devotes(see
Chapter2), hadnocredible
rivalwhenit cameto explaining thecharacteristic
features
of theColdWar.Its mainlimitationwasits inabilityto forecastfun-
damentalchangein the international system,such as the end of the Cold
War.14
Liberalism
emphasizes
democracy
overauthoritarianism,
peace
over
conict, interdependence,and institutionalcooperation and freetradeover
selshprotectionism asthebasisof theinternational
politicaleconomy.While
recognizing the growingrole of transnational
actors,mostliberalsgenerally
viewedstatesasthecentralplayers,but theyfailedto givedueweightto the
importanceof power,andtheytoo failed to foreseethe endof the Cold War.15
Within the olderradicaltradition,the Marxisttheoryof capitalismandthe
Leninisttheoryof imperialism
evolved into neo-Marxist
theories
of dependen-
ciaandworld capitalism(described in Chapter9) which,according
to Walt,
were largely discredited before the Cold War even ended when free market
systemsseemedclearly more successfulthan socialist ones.
Waltthenproceeds to discuss
summarilya plethoraof post-ColdWardi-
agnosesof suchdisparate phenomena as the expansion of NATO, ethnic
cleansingin theBalkans, thepresumed erosionof statesovereignty,
anarchy
asa conditionof the internationalsystem,the democraticpeace,normative
regimes,and the impactof domesticpolitics on the internationalbehaviorof
states. He distinguishes from realism and liberalism the more recent radical
approachesto transformingthe internationalsystemunderthe headingof
constructivismtheories
that emphasize theimpactof ideas,language, social
discourse,
andcultureasfactorsthat determinehowstatesor,moreprecisely,
keyindividuals
andelitesdenethe interestsandidentitiesof [their]statesas
a highlymalleable
productof specichistoricalprocesses.17 As an example,
henotesthatsomeconstructivists,
perhaps simplistically,
attributedtheendof
the ColdWarto Mikhail Gorbachevs new thinking,especially the ideaof
 INTRODUCTION 7

commonsecurityin Europe,whichrevolutionized
Sovietforeignpolicy.
Gorbachevno doubt playeda considerablepart, but so did the policiesof
Presidents
ReaganandBush,which werenot totally divorcedfrom traditional
realistic approaches.Walt observesthat several of the more recent theories
complementoneor moreof the threemain paradigms.Although manyaca-
demics (and more than a few policymakers) are loathe to admit it, realism re-
mainsthe compellingframeworkfor understanding internationalrelations.13
Virtually all the theoriesthat Walt mentionsf along with others (including
feministtheory,which he omits),will becoveredin detailin subsequent chap-
ters of this book.
The prudentscholarmaydeemit unwiseto fastentoo earlyandtoo exclu-
sivelyon any oneof the theoreticalparadigmsnow beingofferedfrom several
quarters.Previouseditionsof this text reecteda convictionthat no singleap-
proachcan explainadequately, with comprehensiveness and subtlety,the full
rangeof phenomena that makeup the ever-evolving complexeinternationale.
As we have seen,the post-Cold War literature abounds in diverse views on
why the internationalstructurehaschanged.Giventhe vigorousdebateover
the stabilityof thefamiliar ColdWar system,no onecanpredictwith certainty
whether the unipolar systemwill be more stable and safer or more unstable
anddangerous
thanbefore.International-relations
theoryis nowin a highly
tentativephase,which makesit all the morechallengingand interesting.If We
think that ideashaveconsequences in history,then we must admit that some
of the ideasnow burgeoningon the academicscenemight havesomeimpact
on the shapeof the world beyondthe year2000,especiallyin view of the fact
that the revolution in telecommunications now facilitatesan unprecedented
globalcirculationof ideas.Internationaltheorychanges constantly,alongwith
the total environmentandthe humanresponseto it. In ancienttimes,the pace
of changewasslow andhardlynoticeable;in our age,it appearsto increaseat
an exponentialrate,largelybecauseof the informationtechnologyexplosion.
Todays
theoretical
explanations
mayhaveto berenedandcorrected
tomor-
row as new data are discovered, more accurate classications and measure-
mentsmade,and moreinsightfulanalysesperformedhereand abroad.
Imre Lakatos,a Hungarianmathematician,hassuggested the criteria for
determiningwhetherthe replacement of an oldertheoryby a neweronerepre-
sentsscientic progress.His formula is somewhatinelegantbut clear,and it
hasbeenquotedoftenby scientictheoristsof internationalrelations:
A scientictheory T is falsied if and only if anothertheory T1 hasbeenproposed
with thefollowingcharacteristics:
(1)T1hasexcess
empirical
contentoverT: that
is, it predictsnot/elfacts,that is, factsimprobablein the light of, or evenforbid-
den,by T; (2) T1 explainsthe previoussuccess
of T, that is, all the unrefuted

In his article,Walt mentionsmorethanforty authors.Citingthemall at this point would merely

confusereaders.Your authorswill cite mostof themthemoreimportantoneswhen treating
their theoriesin somedepth.
8 THEORETICAL APPROACHESTO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

content
ofT isincluded
(within
thelimitsofobservable
error)inthecontent
ofT1;
and (3) someof the excesscontentof T1 is corroborated.

In all scienticelds, newtheorybuilds on old. A certaindegreeof con-

ceptualcontinuityis essential
for rationaldiscourse.As JohnLewisGaddis
hasobserved, visionsof anyfuturehaveto proceedfromthe awareness of
somekindof past;otherwise
. . . therecanbeno language
for expressing
them.21
Nomatter
which
paradigm,
if any,mayultimately
holdsway,
it will
not beableto ignorethe&#39;concepts
of powerandinuence,in oneformor an-
Otherpolitical,military,economic,ideological,
religious
andcultural,related
to controlof communications,or whateverelsemayshapetheforcesof his-
toricaldevelopment.Wecannotprescind fromanyof thosesignicantdimen-
sionsthat affectthetoneandtint of international
politicsandthedialectical
process of contradictory
demands in whichmoderngovernments mustfashion
theirforeignpolicies.
In this introductorychapter,we show how the eld of internationalrela-
tionshasdevelopedihistorically
andhowitsscope
hasbeendenedsince
WorldWar II. We discussthenatureandfunctionof theoryandthevarious
typesof theory,andé"we
indicatesomeof thedifferentapproaches
thatmaybe
adopted.
Weoffera&#39;
fewthoughts
ontherelation
between
theory
andpractice.
Thatdiscussion
isIollowed
bya lookat thelevelof-analysis
problem:
Who
aretheinternatiorfal
actors
to bestudied?
Wethenbriey reviewthenoten-
tirelyarcanedebatebetweentraditionalists
and behavioralists
and conclude
bynoting
some
dfthedifculties
oftrying
toformulate
a coherent,
compre-
hensive
theory
inithis
eld.
1
I
I
EARLY APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL-
RELATIONS
THEORY
Efforts
attherizing
about
thenature
ofinterstate
relations
arequiteold.Wecan
nd seminal
igeas
inancient
andLordShang,
China, inthe
writings
ofMo-Ti, Mencius,
andinIndia,intheCodeofManu,dealing
Confu
withhonorable
con-
duct
inwarfare
andtheinviolability
ofdiplomats,
andintheworks
ofKautilya,
whohada complex
theoryof thebalance
of poweramong
princely
states.
(Referencesgare
made
toChinese
and
Indian
thought
inChapter
5.)
Moregpertinent
to«international
theory
in theWestis theheritage
of
thought from classicalGreece and Rome. The reections of Plato and
Aristotle
;onthesubjecg
yvere
rathersketchy,
buttheirphilosophies
(which
mightbel&#39;characterized
roughlyasidealist
orutopian
andrealist
or empirical,
respectivibly)
werecomprehensive
enough
toinclude
warandthenecessity
for
militaryjdefense
ofthecity-state
onwhichtheyfocused
theirattention.
The
ancient,GreekhistorianThucydides expanded his view to encompass
theGreekcity-state
systemandanalyzedproblemsofdiplomacy,imperialism,
themayingof alliances,
warandpeace, themotivesthatdrivepolitical
action
(fear,,honor,
andinterest),andthe dialectic
clashof powerversus moral
 EARLYAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONADRELATIONS
THEORY 9

values.Any studentof internationalrelationscan still read with prot

Thucydidessgreat history, The PeloponnesicmWar. Even some feminist theo-
rists havefound it worthwhile to rereadand reinterpretthis and other real-
ist classics
fromtheirownnewperspective.(Thefeministcritiqueof tradi-
tionalmale-orientedapproachesto international
theorywill subsequentlybe
treatedin appropriate
contexts,
especiallyin Chapter4.)_
Followingthefailure
of the Greek city-states to form an effective federal structure and their conse-
quentdecline,AlexandertheGreat,theCynics,andtheStoicsbequeathed to
theWesttheidealistconceptof cosmopolitanism,
citizenship
in a worldstate.
Duringits daysasa vigorousyoungrepublic,Romeandits juristsdevel-
opedthe ius gentium(law of nations),a body of legalprinciplesand practices
commonto the variousMediterraneanpeopleswith whom Romewasin con-
tact, which would later be lookedon as a customarybasisfor a _lawbetween
nations.23
In thelaterdaysof theRomanEmpire,therewereno realinterna-
tional relationscharacteristicof a statesystem,but Romanlegalideason the
just war survivedto be developed
by patristicWritersand theologians
in
ChristianmedievalEurope, (seeChapter5). NiccoloMachiavellimarkeda
radicaldeparturefrom the long tradition of ethicalpolitical theory by reect-
ing thenewsecularimperatives
andByzantine
diplomacy
of theItaliancity-
state systemin Renaissancetimes. Machiavelli&#39;s
The Prince,a harbingerof
modernrealistanalysisof powerrealitiesin the statesystem,usheredin what
purportedto bea value-free
approach
to thescience
of statecraft.24
Two centuriesbeforeMachiavelli,DanteAlighieri (1265-1321)was con.-
vincedthat the proper work of humankind.wasthe developmentof intellect
and culture, for. which work a peaceful world was essential.His De
Monarcbia(011World Got/eminent)wasthe rst powerfulappealin Western
political literaturefor internationalorganizationundera world ruler capable
of monopolizingmilitary power and enforcingpeaceamongprinceswithout
disturbingtheinternalautonomy
of politicalcommunities.
The Frenchwereprolic producersof plansfor internationalorganization
and the promotionof peace.PierreDubois(1250-1322)calledfor a regional
union of Christianprincesto establishpeacein Europeby displacingtheir ag-
gressiveurgesin an effort to recoverthe Holy Landfrom Turkishindels»The
Pope (then a client of France at Avignon)would summon a council that would
create an arbitration court with an effective systemof sanctionsto settle intra-
Europeandisputespeacefully.EmericCrucé-(1590-1648),
convinced
that
most peopleyearnto live in peace,stressed
the cooperativeover the corlict-
ual aspectsof international relations, exalted the role of the merchant in trade
over that of.the warrior in war (who becomeslessuseful and more dangerous
in times of peace),opposedimperialismand colonialismon the practical
groundsthat the,politicaland economiccostsexceedthe gains,and suggested
that a neutral city be madean internationalcenterfor peacemakingdiplo-
macy.Crucéfavoreda freezingof the territorial statusquo in&#39;Europe
and,like
Dutch scholarDesiderioErasmus,lookedtoward the completeeradicationof
war, in this respectparting company with Hugo Grotius, who defendedwaras
an instrumentof justice,providedthat its conductbe lirnited by the law of
\
10 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

nations.(SeeChapter5.) The Due de Sully (1560-1641),a chief minister of

Henry IV, envisagedan equilibrium of strengthamongthe Europeans(to be
achievedpartly through a reduction of territory ruled by the Hapsburg
monarchy) and propoundeda grand design for a confederationof the
Christianstatesof WesternEurope,with a councilpermanentlyheadquartered
at a central location for the peaceful settlementof disputes.Any redistribution
of territory wasto takeinto accountthe wishesof nationalpopulations.Abbé
de Saint-Pierre(1659-1743)alsoproposedorganizingthe Christianstatesof
Europeinto a federalunion, which he hopedwould ally defensivelywith a
counterpartgroupingthat it would try to form in Asia. (Crucé,by the way,in
sharpcontrastto Duboisand Sully,both of whom sawthe Turks as a conve-
nient outlet for the ghting energiesof Christian Europe,would have ac-
cordedthe OttomanSultana placeof honor in the peaceorganization.)27
In general,the Frenchwriterswhether they adoptedthe regionalor the
moreuniversal approachreliedheavilyon diplomacy,
arbitration,andadju-
dicationin theirplansfor perpetual
peace.
Thoseof theEnlightenment period
showed a marked preference for commerce and trade over war for the
achievement of foreign-policygoals,and they shareda particular abhorrence
for war wagedin the nameof religion.Somestressed the needfor severesanc-
tions againstdisturbersof the peace;othersdid not. Theydid not all agreeon
the importanceof maintainingthe territorial statusquo. Most of them as-
signeda roleto Franceasthenaturalleaderof Europe,because
theybelieved
(asgoodCartesians)thatFrancewasuniqueamongnationsin beingruledby
reasonrather than by passions.The major exceptionwas Jean-Jacques
Rousseau(1712-1778),who beganby editing Saint-Pierres
project for per-
petualpeaceandendedbycriticizingit andalteringit substantially.
Although
regardedasa romanticbecause
of his idyllic interpretationof innocent,benev-
olenthumannaturein thestateof nature,Rousseau
wasquitethecynicalreal-
ist in histheoryofihumanbehavior,
thestate,andinterstate
relations.Parting
company with what he called the absurdly reasonable Saint-Pierre,
Rousseauinsistedthat humanbeingsare seldomled by reasonand its logical
calculations
but oftenby passions.
Humannatureis basically
peaceful;
it be-
comeswarlike only whenit enterssociety;war is a productof civilization;it is
theinstitutionof privatepropertythathasalienatedhumansfromtheirorigi-
nalfreedomandhappiness, corruptingthembycreatinginequality,a classsys-
tem,a law based onforce,anda self-serving
rulingelitecapable
of tyrannizing
andimpoverishing theirsubjects
whilemakingwarto aggrandize theirpower.
In this regard,Rousseau may be regardedas a forerunnerof Karl Marx.
Whereas citizens
withinthestatearecontrolledbylaw,princescontinueto ex-
ist in a stateof nature,ruled only by the law of the strongest.
Rousseauscompatriot, Jean Bodin (1530-1596), had much earlier for-
mulated,
thedoctrineof sovereignty,
whichmadethemonarchsupreme inter-
nallywithin the realm,but equalexternallyvis-avisothersovereign rulers.
Bodin,however, wasenoughof a traditionalistto hold that the sovereigns
poweris not unlimited,for the princeis boundby the law of God,the natural
law _ofreason,andthe law of nations(iusgentium,basedon immemorialcus-
 EARLY APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS THEORY 11

tom, e.g., the principle that treatiesare to be keptpacta sunt serwmda).

Rousseaudid not set much store by such limits. He relied on the balance of
power to preserveorder of a sort within the anarchicstatesystem,but not
peace,for the maintenanceof the balancesometimesprescribedwar as a
method. Rousseau,convinced that princes would not consent to restrictions
on their power and freedom of action and that their ministers like to use the
occasionof war to advancetheir own privateinterests,was extremelyskepti-
cal concerningthe prospectsfor Saint-Pierres
federation,givenhis beliefthat
humanrationality is only potential,while peopleare actuallyso alienatedby
corrupt civilizationthat they cannotseewhat is in their own bestinterest.
Among the English,William Penn(1644-1718),a Quaker,and Jeremy
Bentham
(1748-1832),
a Utilitarianphilosopher,
formulated
plansfor univer-
sal and perpetualpeace,as did the Germanidealistphilosopher,Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804).Penn,anxious to replacewhat he called the Logic of
Fish, wherebystatesfeedupon eachother,proposedthat the European
princesremovethemselves from the stateof natureand subjectthemselves to
an effectivesystemof internationallaw and order.He wantedthe princesto
preservedomesticsovereigntybut to renounceit in their relationswith each
other by establishinga legislativeassemblyin which the voting power of each
member would be proportionate to the personal income of the ruler and the
valueof theterritoryruled. (Some
formulas
for proposedreform
of thesys-
temof votingin theUN General
Assembly havebeenbasedon a combination
of populationandgrossdomestic
product(GDP).)Benthamsouglitto pacify
and maximizethe happinessof Europeannationsthrough disarmament,the
emancipationof distantcolonies,and an internationalcourt or congress.The
latterwasto relyon opendiplomacy, thepowerof publicopinion,»and
a free
pressto supportits reasonable,
practicaldecisions.Kant,convinced
thathis-
tory wasmovingin a progressivedirectionandthat evenwarswouldeventu-
ally contributetoward an endof internationalanarchy,arguedthat stateswith
republican
constitutions
wouldgraduallyexpandthezoneof peace,
renounc-
ing war and armsracesamongthemselves
and building a federationof free
statesunderlaw,basednot on forcebut on principlesof right. (Therecent
debateover the Kantianthesisconcerningdemocracyand peaceis examined
in Chapter 8.)
Politicalphilosophersof the seventeenthandeighteenth centuriesThomas
Hobbes(1588-1679),BaruchSpinoza(1632-1677),and John Locke (1632-
1704) amongthem-agreedfully with the peacewriters that sovereignmon-
archs exist, with regard to each other, in a state of nature and recurring
wars, but they were much lesssanguineon the prospectsfor international
government.From the sixteenthcenturyonward,suchthinkersas Francesco
Guicciardini (1483-1540), Francois Fénelon (1650-1715), David Hume
(1711-1766),andFriedrichVonGentz(1764-1832)lookeduponthebalanceof
power as the most prudent policy to be pursued by monarchs interested in
maintainingthe independence
of their own realmsand overall stability, but
notnecessarily
peace,
in Europe.Thefounding
theorists
of modern
interna-
tional lawFrancisco de Vitoria (1480-1549), Alberico Gentili (1552-1608),
12 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Francisco de Suarez(1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (15831645 ), Christian Von

Wolff (16791754_),Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), and othersall viewed
war as a sort of substitutejudicial proceedingnot only permitted but sometimes
evenrequiredunderthe law of nationsasa meansof restoringjusticeandpun-
ishingwrongdoingstatesfor violatingwellestablishedrights.Evensowhenthe
right to go to war (iusad bellum)was justly invoked,the war had to be con-
ductedin a just,proportionate,limitedmanner(iusin ballo)accordingto widely
recognized
rules.33
(SeeThe NormativeTheoryof JustWarin the Nuclear
Age in Chapter5.) Someof theseearlytheoristsarecitedin succeeding chap-
ters;manyof theissuestheyraisedhaveneverbeensettledwith nality.
Despitethe classicalwritings just summarized,somemay considerit sur-
prising that Martin Wight, with the period prior to World War I in mind,
noted that if by internationaltheory,we meana tradition of speculation
about relations betweenstates,a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation
about the State to which the name political theory is appropriated, such a
traditiondoesnot exist.34
Wightsuggested
thatoneexplanation
for thisab-
senceis that sincethe time of Hugo Grotius,the Dutch jurist and statesman,
and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), the German jurist and historian, nearly
all speculationaboutatheinternationalcommunityhad fallen underthe head-
ing of internationallaw.Wight notedthat mostwriting on interstaterelations
before this century was contained in the political literature of the aforemen-
tioned peace writers, buried in the works of historians, cloistered in the pe-
ripheral reections of philosophers, or harbored in speeches,dispatches, and
memoirs of state leadersand diplomats. Wight concluded that in the classical
political tradition, internationaltheory,or-whatthereis of it, is scattered,un-
systematic,and mostlyinaccessible to the layman and largely repellentand
intractablein form.35Theonly theorythat infusedthethinkingof the pe-
riodand it Was,a theory somewhat dearer to practicing. diplomats than to
academicianswasthat of the balanceof power. Indeed, it was a collection of
what seemedto be commonsenseaxioms rather than a rigorous theory.
Whetherinternationaltheoryshouldbe separatedfrom traditio_nal,politi-
cal theory has been the object of debate. How different are international phe-
nomena
fromotherclasses
of objectswith whichthetheoryof thestatedeals?
Obviously,domesticfactors are interconnectedwith the foreign policies of
states. Chris: Brown seesthe theory of relations among states as an integral
part of a mucholder,morevenerableWesterntheoryof speculationaboutthe
political order. That theory was not merely empirical, but normative as well,
dealingwith the moral dimensionof politics,the ought aswell as the is. At
its most basic, writes Brown, normative theory addressesthe ethical nature
of the relations betweencommunities/states,whether in the context-of the old
agenda,which focusedon"violenceand war, or the new(er)agenda,which
mixes ,these traditional concerns with the modern demand for international
distributivejustice.f36
Thenormativedimension
hasreceived
evengreaterat-
tention among international theorists since the end of the Cold Warespe-
cially with regard to -suchissuesas the need to strengtheninternational peace-
keeping institutions, humanitarian intervention in ethnic conicts, and the
 MODERNAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS
THEORY 13

formulationof morecooperativeinternational
policiesandprograms related
to trade,technology
transfer,economicdevelopment,hungerandmalnutri-
tion, environmental
preservation,humanrights,health,"andotherproblems
pertinentto the quality of life.
Theperiodof European
historyfromtheendof theThirty YearsWarin
1648to the outbreakof World War I in 1914constitutedwhat hasoften been
seenasthegoldenageof diplomacy,
thebalance
of power,alliances,
andinter-
nationallawin astatesystem
characterized
alsobynumerouswars.Nearlyall
politicalthought
focusedonthesovereign
nation-state-the
origins,
functions,
and limitationsof governmental
powers,the rights of individuals
within
the state,the requirements
of order,and the imperatives
of nationalself-
determination
andindependence.
Theeconomic
orderwaspresumed
simplisti-
callyto beseparate fromdomestic politicsanddivorced fromtheinternational
politicsof diplomacy exceptasthefoundation of militarypower.Governments
wereexpected to promoteandprotecttrade,but not to regulateit. Various
branches of socialist
thinkingsoughtto strikeoutin newdirections,butsocial-
ists,despitetheirprofessedinternationalism,
didnotreallyproducea coherent
international
theory.
Theyadvanced
a theoryof imperialism
borrowed
largely
fromJohnA. Hobson(1858-1940), theBritisheconomist, andthusderivative
from an economic theoryindigenousto the capitaliststates.(SeeChapter9.)
Until 1914,international
theorists
almostuniformlyassumed thatthestructure
of internationalsocietywasunalterableand that the divisionof»the world into
sovereignstateswasnecessary and*natural.37
Thestudyof internationalrela-
tionsconsisted almostentirelyof diplomatichistoryand internationallaw,
ratherthanof investigation
intotheprocessesof theinternational
system.

MODERN APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL-

RELATIONS THEORY
Someimpetusto the seriousstudyof international relationsin this country
camewhentheUnitedStatesemerged asa world power,but ambiguities in
American foreignpolicy,combined with thetrendtowardisolationism during
the 1920sand1930s,hinderedthedevelopment of international relationsas
an intellectualdiscipline.
Althoughtherehavebeenmanyintellectual contri-
butionsto thedevelopment of international-relations
theory,theleadingrole
of theUnitedStatesassured that, asa result,muchof thetheoryof interna-
tional relationsthat emerged in the twentiethcentury,and especially after
World War II, would be written in the United Statesor would have the United
States-asa centralelement.Nevertheless,
Americancontributionsto interna-
tional-relationstheoryhavebeenheavilyinfluencednot onlyby theirrootsin
Western politicaltheory,butalsobythenumbersof immigrantscholars,espe-
ciallyin therealistschool.Theorists
suchasHansJ. Morgenthau, NicholasJ.
Spykman,Arnold Wolfers,Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Henry Kissinger
brought with them an intellectualtradition that enrichedAmericanscholar-
ship,theory,andpolicy.
14 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

Through
mostoftheinterwar
period
(1918-1939),
realist
theory
wasnot
yetin theascendancy.
Manyintellectual
idealists
shared
Woodrow
Wilsons
visionof peaceful
collective
security
through
theLeague
ofNations.
Thetwo
mostpopular
approaches
toteaching
worldaffairs
inAmerican
universities
werecourses
in current
events
andin international
lawandorganization.
The
former
weredesigned
to promote
international
understanding
ratherthan
to applysocialscience
methodologies
to theoretical
developmen
International
lawcourses
andtextsemphasized
thediscrepancies
between
the
formal
obligations
ofLeague
members
andtheiractual
conduct.
Scholars
began
to lookformorecomprehensive
evaluations
of dynamic
forces
and
events:
thecauses
of theGreatWar;4°
thephenomenon
of nationalism;
problems
ofsecurity,
war,anddisarmament;42
imperialism,
diplomacy,
and
negotiation,
thebalance
of power,thegeographical
aspectsof world
power;45
thehistory
ofinternational-relations
theory;46
andeconomicfactors
in internationalrelations.47
Meanwhile,althoughAnglo-American
policy-
makingthought andacademic
literature
weremoving
gradually
towardreal-
ism,bothBritish
andAmerican
publics
weredemanding
amoralandpeaceful
international
orderbut wereunwillingto paythe price.Thedichotomybe-
tweennobleimpulses
ontheonehandandBritishcomplacency
andAmerican
isolationism
on the otherwasreectedin the Kellogg-Briand
Pactof 1928,
whichoutlawed
warby piousdeclaration
whileproviding
no means
of en-
forcement.48
As the two English-speaking
countriesindulgedin pacist ap-
peasement
andaloofneutrality,
theintellectual
climatebegantochangeslowly
froma legalistic
idealism
towardamorerealistic
assessmentofinternationa
powerfactors.
In theUnitedStates,
a radical-liberal
theologian,
Reinhold
Niebuhr,
made thepointthatindividual
persons arecapable
of actingmorally
andaltruistically,
butlarge,egoistic
collectivities
suchasnation-states
arein-
variablymotivated
in theirbehaviorby self-interest.
According to Chris
Brown,themostinuential
critique
ofliberal
internationalism
came fromthe
British
quasi-Marxist
historian
andjournalist,
Edward HallettCarr,whomay
besaidto havelaunched
thefirst greatdebatein international
theorythat
between
utopian
idealism
andrealism.BritainandAmerica
werethe
homesof thenewthought,Brownsuggests,
partly . . . because
the anar-
chicnatureof worldpoliticsseemed particularly
unfortunate
to thosenur-
turedin theliberaltraditions
of thetwoEnglish-speaking
powers.5°

E. H. Carr and the Crisis of World Politics

NoonepriortoWorld
WarII more
trenchantly
analyzed
thephilosophical
dif-
ferences
betweenutopiansandrealists
thandidE.H. Carrin hiscelebrated
work, which,althoughpublishedin 1939,did not haveits impactin
Americauntil afterWorldWarII. Carr usedthe termutopiansfor idealists
whoplaced
emphasis
oninternational
lawandorganization
andontheinu-
ence
of moralityandpublicopinionin theaffairsof nations.
Heprobably
did
not intendthemorepejorative
connotation
thatattached
to thetermutopians
afterWorldWarII asnaiveopponents
ofpowerpoliticsexpounded
byrealists.
 MODERN APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS THEORY 15

Indeed,sincethe endof the Cold War,aswe showin Chapter2 whereCarr is

treatedmore fully, the idealistconceptof the harmonyof nationalinterestsin
peace
hasreceived
newattention
in amorerecent
neoliberalneorealist
debate.
The failuresof the Leagueof Nations in the 1930scastdoubt on the har-
monyof interestin peace,
whichappeared
to accordwith theinterests
of satis-
ed, status-quo
powerswith democratic
governments,but not with the per-
ceived needs of revisionist, totalitarian, or authoritarian states seeking
boundarychanges,
enhancedstatus,greaterpower,and,especiallyin thecase
of NaziGermany,
revengefor thehumiliationof thepost-WorldWarI settle-
mentimposedby the Versailles
treaty.Contraryto the utopianassumption,
national self-determination did not always produce representative govern-
ments.Instead,the overthrowof the old monarchicalordergaverise in many
places,
includingRussia,
to a morepervasiveandoppressive totalitarianstate.
TheMo1otovRibbentrop Pactof August1939between theSovietUnionand
Nazi Germanysetthestagefor AdolphI-Iitlersinvasionof Poland,theout-
breakof WorldWar II, the partitionof Poland,andthe absorptionof the
Baltic statesinto the SovietUnion, all in agrant contraventionof the stan-
dards of international conduct set forth in utopian theory.

PostWorld War II Realism

Not surprisingly,
WorldWarII andits immediate aftermathprovidedfertile
groundfor the reassertion and reformulationof a realisttheoryin Anglo-
American thinking.Evenidealisticallyinclinedanalysts-and thereweremany
whohadsupported thewareffortfor reasons of thehighestmoralidealism
became skepticalof utopianprograms andcalledinsteadfor a mergerof inter-
nationallaw and organization with effectivepowerto ensureinternational
peace,thesecurityof nations,andtheequitable settlementof disputes.
Throughout thepostWorldWarII period,boththeonsetof theColdWar
andtheemergence of theUnitedStatesasa powerwith globalinterests and
commitments generated within Americanuniversities a heightenedinterestin
the studyof international relations.Warveterans in collegeshowed a keen
concernoverforeignaffairs.Undertheimpactof criticalinternational devel-
opments
associated
withtheColdWar,theU.S.government
greatly
expanded
its operations
in theareasof nationalmilitarysecurity,
alliancesandotherin-
ternationalorganizations,and economic-development assistance to foreign
countries.
All of theseoperations,
of course;increased
theneedfor trainedper-
sonnel.Forthefirsttime,manyAmerican industries
became awareof interna-
tionaltradeandinvestment possibilities.
Scientists,
alarmed at theimplications
of thenewnucleartechnology thattheyhadjustproduced, entered politicsas
crusading
novices,
warningof dangers
confronting
humanity.
Civic-minded
persons
zealously
organized
councils
andassociations
to educate
andexhortin
order to make citizens more aware of international problems.
Academic scholars in Britain and the United States, the two countries
in which the universitieshad shownthe mostprogressin the interwarcurricu-
lar development
of international
relations,
produced
analyses
designed
to be
16 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
suitable
tothepostwar
reality.
Several
works
published
inthelate1940s
em-
phasized
the
power
approach
tothestudy
ofinternational
relations.
One
of
themore
frequently
quoted
English
authors
was
Martin
Wight,
already
noted
in thischapter,
whowrotethat
what
distinguishes
modern
history
frommedieval
history
isthe
predominan
of
theidea
ofpower
over
theidea
ofright;
thevery
term
power"
todescribe
astate
initsinternational
aspect
issignicant;
and
theview
oftheman
inthestreet,
who
isperhaps
inclined
totake
itforgranted
that
foreign
politics
are
inevitably
power
politics,
isnotwithout
ashrewd
insight.-52
Thetextbooksin international
relations
published
during
thefirsttwo
decades
after
World War 11
generally
recognized
powerasacentral
concept
inthe
eld.Thetextthathad
thegreatest
impact
ontheuniversity
teaching
ofinter-
national
relations,
thatofHans
J.Morgenthau,
explained
nationstate
behavio
onthebasis
ofnational
interest
(dened
interms
ofpower)
asthenormal
objec-
tive
pursued
bygovernments
when
possible.
Theother
important
textbooks
of
that
period
devoted
ontheaverage
atleast
three
chapters
tothenature
ofpower
and
theelements
orfactors
ofnational
power.
Mostcontemporary
political
scien-
tists
andstudents
ofinternational
relations
continue
toregard
power,
conceive
asacombination
ofpersuasive
inuenceandcoercive
force
capable
ofbeing
used
forpositive
aswell
asnegative
purposes,
asavariable
ofmajor
importance

THE DEVELOPMENTOF INTERNATIONAL-

RELATIONS THEORY
Theearlier
textbooks
contained
some
theoretical
observations
onsuch
topics
asnationalism,
imperialism,
colonialism,
theemergence
oftheThird
World
ideology
andpropaganda,
andtheimpact
ofeconomic
andtechnologica
fac-
torsoninternational
relations.
Somecontained
chapters
onalliances,
regiona
orfunctional
integration,
disarmament
orarmscontrol,
andsuch specic
techniques
of foreign
policy
asintervention,
nonalignment,
andisolation
Seldom
wasthereaneffortto drawprecise
linkages
among
thetheories
orto
findoutwhether
partial
theories
could
befittedtogether
intoalarger,
coher
entwhole.55
Thisis notto suggest
thattheauthors
necessarily
lacked
their
owninforming
theory.
However,
theydidnotpresent
generalized
theory
ina
systematic
manner.
Indeed,
several
ofthem
were
probably
suspicious
ofsingle
overarchingtheories.
Throughout
theperiod
since
thelate1940s,there
has
beenasteady
deve
opment
ofmethodologies
andtechniques
forresearch,
analysis,
and teaching
in
international
relations,
which
havecontributed
tothegrowth
oftheory.
The
effort
towardcomprehensivetheory
buildingbegan
withthefirstgreat
debate
betweenrealists
andutopians,which
willbetreated
inChapter 2.Subseque
the1960s witnessed a considerable
expansion of interestin theoretic
analysis,57
andin itsvalidation
bymeans of such
methodologies asconten
analysis
andbivariate
andmultivariate
correlations.
Insights
fromthebiolog
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF lNTERNATlONALRELATlONS THEORY 17

cal, psychological,anthropological,sociological,economic,and other behav-

ioral sciences
wereborrowedin the effort to explaininternationalpolitics.The
emphasis wason abstractmodelbuildingandon a varietyof newapproaches to
the understandingof (a) ecologicalfactorsand the individualrelationshipsbe-
tween humansand their milieu, (b) functionalismand regionalintegration,
(c) systemstheory, (d) the causesof war, (e) the conditionsfor deterrence,
(f) arms races,alliances,and arms control, (g) decision making, (h) gamesthe-
ory,and (i) relatedsubjectsin foreignpolicyandinternationalrelations.

Theory and Its Types

Thestudent
should
notbefrightened
bythewordtheory.
s nothing
but
stematicreection on henomena,desi ed to ex lain h and to show how
theyarerelatedto eachotherin a meaningful,
intelligent
pattern,insteadof be-
ing merelyrandomitemsin anin er &#39;
rse.Everydisciplinerequiresthe-
ory to guideresearch,to providea basisfor explanation,andif possible,to lead
to a probabilisticpredictivecapability.Biological,chemical,and otherscientists
seekingcuresfor diseases canhardly proceedin a purelyhit-and-missfashion
without any theoryto givethema senseof purposeand direction.Socialscien-
tistswho wouldrecommend to policymakers how toreducetheincidenceof do-
mestic crime or decreasethe likelihood of war in an international crisis need the-
oryto penetrate
to theunderlying
causes
of theproblems
theywishto solve.
Everyfield hasdifferentkinds of theoryalmost as many,perhaps,as it
hasdifferentquestionsto be answered.Socialsciencetheoriescan usuallybe
categorizedas historical-descriptive,
which seekfactualgeneralizations about
pastand presentreality;scientic-predictive,
which employmathematicalcor-
relationsandpoint to probablefutures;andspeculative-normative, which deal
deductivelywith how -thingsmight be or shouldbe improved.Sometheories
may combinetheseapproaches. Not all theoristsshowinterestin all the ques-
tions or all the theories.Even in such an exact scienceas astronomy, there con-
tinue to be fundamentaldisagreements over basicquestionsregardingthe ori-
gin of the solar system,the natureof black holes,and the likelihood that the
expansionof the universeis slowingdown orspeedingup. As in «all« scientific
elds, internationalrelationshascomprehensive or grandtheorieson the one
hand and partial or middle-rangetheorieson the other.Most of the better-
known writers usuallydevotetheir attentionto one favorite approachin ei-
ther categoryor elseassumea dominantgrand theory whilepursuingtheir
own work on a narrower front.
Grandtheorypurportsto explainin a generalizedway a wide rangeof in-
ternationalphenomena while prescindingfrom detailedvariationsin particu-
lar cases.Examplesincludethe realisttheoryof HansJ. Morgenthau,the neo-
realist theory of KennethN. Waltz, and the neo-Marxist theoriesof the
capitalistworld economyof ImmanuelWallerstein.
Examples
of partial,
middle-rangetheoriesdesignedto explaina limited rangeof phenomenawith
as few variablesas necessary
includethosepertainingto the inuence of the
geographicalenvironment (Harold and Margaret Sprout), functionalism
18 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(DavidMitrany), sectorintegration(ErnstHaas),nucleardeterrence(Bernard
Brodie);interdependence (RobertO. Keohaneand JosephS. Nye), expected
utility andtheprobabilityof war (BruceBuenodeMesquita),
democracy
and
peace(MichaelDoyle), internationalregimes(JohnRuggie),and bargaining
behavior(ThomasSchelling).Dozensof other mid-rangetheoriescould be
mentioned.
Theeffortto classifytheoriesasgrandor middlerangeoftenpro-
vokesdebate.They arenot completelydisjunctivecategories;somefall in be-
tween,especiallymiddle-range
theoriesthat fully acceptassumptions
basedon
a grand theory.
All the aforementioned theories, plus many others, are treated in subse-
quentchapters.The purposeof mentioningthemhereis to indicatethat there
arenot onlymanydifferenttheories,but alsovarioustypesof deductive
and
inductiveapproaches
to theorizingaboutinternationalrelations.Authorities
intheelddonotallagree
whichwouldbebetter¥toIbildpgrahdfheor
rst
andlet the formulationof middle-range
theories
flowfrom it, or to testout
and solidify a numberof middlerangetheoriesbeforeproceedingto a higher,
more abstract«level. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, prefers to start with
grand theory,whereasJ. David Singerwould leantoward laying the founda-
tion with middlerange,empiricallybasedtheories.The situationhaschanged
little since Glenn Snyderand Paul Diesing wrote,

In our teachingand research,we are like travelersin a houseboat,shuttlingback

andforth between
separate
islandsof theory,whoserelatedness
consists
only
in their being commonly in the great ocean of international behavior. Some
theoriststakeup permanent
residence
on oneislandor other,otherscontinueto
shuttle,but few attemptto build bridges,perhapsbecausethe islandsseemtoo
far apart.58

At the.risk of oversimplifying,we cansaythat thosewho adopt a careful,

countingapproachpreferthe moremodesthypotheses that becomeembodied
in middle-range or evensmall-scaletheories, whereasthose of a more philoso-
phizing bent favor the larger,more sweepingvision. Modern academicians
who are often unjustly accusedof knowing and writing more and more about
less and less significant things often exhibit impatience or contempt toward
the products of generalizing minds. Kenneth. Boulding, on the other hand,
shunned scholarly researchon a narrow scaleand urged those who would un-
derstand the international systemto abandon the microscopeand the innites-
imally trivial and take up the telescopeto encompass
the whole universeasit
evolves
throughspaceandtime. Onlythen,hewrote,canwe beginto see
how the international human society on this tiny planet ts into the increas-
ingly complex, interactive schemeof the larger universe. Becauseinevitable
changeis the fundamentallaw, he argued,we mustthrowoff the apparently
unchanging concepts of power politics inherited from Thucydides,
Machiavelli, and Hobbes, and recognizethat threat and conict will sooner or
later give way to mutually benecial cooperationand integration.Boulding
struck a novel and refreshingnote that probablysoundsmore comfortingto
the philosopherthan to the responsiblepolicymaker,who thinks not in terms
 THE
DEFINITION
ANDSCOPE
OFINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS19
of aeonsorcenturies
butofnextyear,
nextweek,
ortomorrow.
Themain
pointatthemoment
isthatmuch
dependsonones
general
philosophical
out-
look,including
ones
viewofhistory
andhuman
nature,
andonwhether
hu-
mannatureremains
prettymuchthesame
or undergoes
genuine
progressive
development
from
egoism
toaltruism
during
thecourse
ofhistory.
Obviousl
society
changes
outwardly
asaresultof accumulated
knowledge
andtheim-
pactofeducation,
science,
technology,
production,
economics,
religion,
and
culture.
However,
whether
humanbeings
experience
equally
profound inter-
nalchange
intheirpsychological
andmoral
qualities
isadifferent
question
aboutwhichhuman
beings
arenotlikelyto arriveatconsensus.

THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE

OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Denition
isonlythebeginning,
nottheend,ofsystematic
inquiry.
Modern
science
began,
asAlfredNorthWhitehead
noted
in a 1925lecture,
whenem-
phasis
wasshifted
fromtheAristotelian
methodofclassication
to the
Pythagorean-Platonist
method
ofmeasurement,
yethehastened
to addthat
classication
isnecessary
fororderly,
logical
thought.
Every
disciplinar
eld should
beableto deneitselfclearly,
justaseveryscientic
thinker
shouldundertake
aresearchproject
withaprecise
notionofthephenomeno
tobeinvestigated.
When thesubject
ofinternational
relations
wasjustemerg-
ingasaeldofstudy,
academicians
onbothsides
oftheAtlantic
haddifculty
comingtogrips
withitsnature
and,scope.
In1935,SirAlfred
Zimmern sug-
gested
thatthestudyof international
relations extends
fromthenaturalsci-
ences
at oneendto moralphilosophy. . . at theother.Hedenedtheeld
notasa single
subject
ordiscipline
butasa bundle
of subjects
. . . viewed
fromacommon angle.51
Many
teacherssince
histimehavewrylynoted
with
Zimmernthatstudents
whomajor
in international
relations
wishthatthey
knew
more
about
history,
politic;s,:econbmics,
geographyhdemograp
diplo-
macy,
international
law,ethics,
religion,
andnearly
every
branch
ofcontempo-
rary scienceandtechnology.
As ChrisBrownnotedin 1997,thesubject
matterof socialscientists
is
much
less
self-dening
thanthatofnatural
scientists
whostudy
such
things
as
quasars,
protons,
or ants.Denitions
of thescope
of politicalscience,
sociol-
ogy,andeconomics
usually
provoke.argument.
Feminists,
forexample,reject
thebasic
political
distinction
between
thepublicandprivate
spheres
oflifeas
reective
ofatraditional
malebias
inherited
fromanage ofpatriarchal
privi-
lege.
Brown,
echoing Nicholas].
Spykmanmore thansixdecades
earlier,
ques-
tionswhetherinterstate
is a moreappropriate
termthan international.
Nicholas].
Spykman,
among
therst to propose
arigorous
denition,
used
theterminterstate
relations,
which,
however,
hedidnotexpect
would
gain
wideacceptance: Internationalrelations arerelations
between
individuals
be-
longingto different
states,
. . . international behavior
isthesocialbehavior
of
individuals
or groupseaimedat . . . or inuenced bytheexistence
or behavior
20 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

ofindividuals,
orgroups
belonging
toadifferent
state.62
Theterminterna-
tional
relations
encompasses
manydifferent
activitiesall
international
com-
munications,
commercial
andnancial
transactions,
athletic
contests,
tourism,
scientic
conferences,
educational
exchange
programs,
andreligious
mission-
aryactivities.
Obviously
it istoolate
tochange thenameoftheeld.Besides,
pluralists,
neoMarxists,
and many,if notall,postmodernists
wouldrefuse
to
accept
sucharealist/neorealist
statecentric
denitionofthescope
oftheeld.
Intheend,
asweshall
seesubsequently,
Brown comes
down
infavor
ofamuch
broader
denition
and
anew
agenda
forthestudy
ofinternational
relations.
A halfcentury
ago,Frederick
S.Dunnwarned
thatthewordscope
isdan-
gerously
ambiguous
because
it implies
theexistence
ofclearly
discernibl
boundary
linesas.readily
identiable
asasurveyors
mark.
Afieldof,knowledge
doesnotpossess
axedextension inspace
butisaconstantly
changingfocus
ofdata
andmethods
thathappen atthemoment
tobeusefulinan-
sweringanidentiable
setofquestions.
It presents
atanygiven
timedifferent
as-
pects
todifferent
observers,
depending
ontheir
point
ofview
andpurpose.
The
boundaries
thatsupposedly
divideoneeld of knowledge
fromanother
arenot
xedwallsbetween
separate
cells
oftruthbutareconvenient
devices
forarranging
knownfactsandmethods
in manageablesegments
forinstruction
andpractice.
Butthefociof interest
areconstantly
shifting
andthese
divisions
tendto change
withthem. . . [T]he
subject-matter
ofinternational
relations
consists
ofwhatever
knowledge,
fromanysources,
maybeofassistance
inmeeting
newinternationa
problems
orunderstanding
oldones.
I
Should
international
relations
beconsidered
a discipline
withamethodol-
ogyandsubstantive
content
ofitsown,orisit soencyclopedic
astobelong
to
several
disciplines?
Quincy
Wright regarded
it asanemerging
discipline,
in
theprocess
offormation,
andargued
thatit meets.
thedenitional
criteria
of
itscriticsasdomostacademic
disciplines.
MortonA.Kaplan
insisted
that
international
relations
lacksthecharacter
of a discipline
because
thereis no
common
disciplinary
coreto beenriched
asthere
hadbeen
inthecompanion
subjectmatter
ofpolitical
science,
nosetofunique
skills
andtechniques,
and
nodeveloped
bodyoftheoretical
propositions.
Hepreferredtorecognize
in-
ternational
politics
merely
asasubdiscipline
ofpolitical
science.5§
Thisisafairlystandard
approach,
butisit adequate?
It iscomprehensiv
andit doesnotlimitthesubject
to ofcialrelations
between
states
andgov-
ernments.
However,
isthisdelineation
toobroad,
andwouldit bebetter
toin-
cludetransnational
relations
onthebasisof theirpoliticalsignicance,
for ex-
ample,
byfocusing
ontheinuences
thatthey
exert
ontheworlds
politica
units?
Asstudents
ofpolitics,
weareconcerned
withrelationships
between
or
among
alloftheactorsstate
andnonstate,
international
andtransnationa
to theextentthattheycontributeto anunderstanding
ofpoliticalphenomena
Wedeneinternational politicsastheeffortof onestate,or otherinterna-
tionalactor,
toinuenceinsome
wayanother
state,
orotherinternational
ac-
tor.Aninuencerelationship
mayencompass
theactual
orthreateneduseof
military
force,
orit maybebased
entirely
orpartlyonotherinducemen
 THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 21

suchaspolitical or economicones.Indeed,sincethe endof the Cold War,eco-

nomic instrumentscarrots and sticks from development aid and trade
concessionsto sanctionsandretaliatorytrademeasureshave beenusedmore
frequentlythan ever.Internationalpolitics, moreover,like all politics, repre-
sentsthe reconciliationof varyingperspectives,
goals,and interests.Thus,in-
ternational politics includes many but not all transactions or interactions that
takeplaceacrossnationalfrontiers.(Seethe discussionlater in this chapteron
the level-of-analysisproblem and the units of actors on which attention
should be focused.)
StanleyI-Ioffmannfound that debateswhich try to determinethe scope
of a social scienceare rather pointless becausethere are no immutable
essences in socialrelationships.In his view,all denitionsareboundto involve
ambiguitiesand difculties,especiallyin the caseof a eld markedby constant
ux. Preferringa formula that leadsto perceptiveinvestigationsand doesnot
violate commonsense,Hoffmann suggestsan operationaldenition of the
eld to encompassthe factors and the activitieswhich affect the external
policiesandthepowerof the basicunitsinto whichtheworld is divided.67
He warns,however,againsttrying to gathereverythingwithin the fold, noting
that a ea marketis not a discipline.
The prudentinternationaltheoristwill avoid the Scyllaand Charybdisof
either includingtrivia or excludingsignicant phenomena. A eld that is too
broad or clutteredcannot be comprehendedby the human mind and may
seemto outsidersin otheracademicdisciplinesto beintellectuallyarrogant,if
not downrightimperialistic.On the otherhand,if somethingcan be shownto
be relevantto a full understandingof an issuethat belongsto internationalre-
lations,it shouldnot bekept outsidethe walls on the groundsthat it is part of
a different academicpreserve.Much depends,of course,on the nature of the
problem under investigationand on the degreeto which material from an-
other eld canbeincorporatedandhandledcompetently.
Shouldinternationaltheory emphasize the contemporaryscene?Thereis
an inescapable attractivenessaboutthe present,boundedby what hasrecently
happenedand what is imminently*aboutto happen.Fascinationwith the con-
temporaryis heightenedby the attentionit receivesin the newsmedia,by the
preoccupationof policymakers,and by the fact that researchfunding is more
readily availablefor suchpolicy-orientedtopics of currentinterestand con-
cern as Islamic fundamentalism, trade wars, international terrorism, drug traf-
c, and intergovernmental cooperationon environmentalissues.Nevertheless,
most experienced scholarsin internationalrelationsrealizethat a knowledge
of history is essentialbecauseit broadensimmenselythe databasefrom which
extrapolationsinto the future areto bemade,and it alsorenesour ability to
formulatehypotheses that approximatesocialreality.
Accordingto Morton Kaplan, History is the great laboratory within
whichinternational
actionoccurs.58
Kaplancallsfor investigations
into the
ancientGreekcity-statesystem,the Italian statesystemof the Renaissance
pe-
riod, and the balance-of-powersystemthat dominatedEurope during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so that typical systembehaviors in differ-
22 THEORETICALAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

enterasmightbecompared.
In hisview,international
theorists
should
bein-
terested
in all systemspast,
present,
future,andhypothetica1.7°
(Kaplans
theoryis examinedin Chapter3.)
If we limit our attention exclusivelyto the existingnation-statesystem
andignorethevastrecord of thepastoutof whichpresentrealityevolved,
we
seriously
restrictourabilityto imagine
possiblefutures.
Thehistoryof inter-
nationalrelationsis not an international
theory,but asa primarysourceof
empirical
data,it ispartof theessential
rawmaterial
withwhichthetheoreti-
cian works.71One can hardly grasp,for example,integrationtheory
(cf. Chapter10) withoutsomeknowledge of the EuropeanCommunity/
Unions development andof thefactorsthatprevented
otherregions
from
achievingcomparablesuccess.

The Nature and Function of Theory

A theoryanytheoryin anyfieldis ageneral
explanationof certain
selected
phenomena,
setforthinamanner
satisfactory
tosomeone
acquainted
withthe
characteristics
of therealitybeingstudied.It neednot beacceptable
to all ex-
perts;indeed,
it maysatisfy
theexpounder
andhorrifyall others.
Powerful
theoriesarethosethat exercise
greatinuenceon thethinkingof largenum-
bers,perhaps
theoverwhelming
majority,
of knowledgeable
personsfora long
timebefore
beingreplaced
bynewtheories.
(Among
theenduring
theoriesare
thoseof theeconomists
thataddress
thedivisionof laborandtheprincipleof
comparative advantage;thoseof socialtheorists
pertainingto theethnocen
trismof groupsthepreference for traditionalandfamiliarovernewand
alienwaysandtherelationship between external conictandinternalcohe-
siveness; thoseof physicists
focusedonconservation of energyandtherelativ-
ity of thetimespace continuum;andthoseof internationaltheorists
in there-
alistschool pertaining
to thenearlyuniversal tendencyof states
to seektheir
interests,
asdefinedin termsof power.)In the socialsciences,
however,
not
eventhemostpowerfultheories
commandunquestioning
assent Withina dis-
ciplinaryeld.Aswesurvey
throughout
thistexta varietyof theories,
it be-
comes
clearthatno singlegeneralization,
principle,or hypothesis
hasyetbeen
demonstrated
withsufficient
forceto serve
asthefoundation
for a universally
accepted
comprehensive theoryof international
relations.
As Martin Hollis andSteveSmithpoint out, two basicintellectualap-
proaches haveshaped thedevelopment of thesocialsciences,
including the
studyof international
relationsandthedevelopment of internationalrelation
theory.72Therst hasits originin naturalscience,
whichseeks explanations
for thephenomena withwhichit deals.Thesecond canbetraced to thestudy
of historyandto a questfor anunderstanding of themeaning of phenomena.
Therst traditionis termedscienticbecause it relieson scienticmethodas
the essential basisfor explanation;the secondhasbeentermedhermeneutic
because it is essentially
interpretive.
Explanatory theoryis basedon a quest
for unifyingthemes,for anunderstanding
of thecauses
of humanbehavior,
for thediscovery
of lawsthatgovern
howpeopleandcollectivitiesincluding
 THEDEFINITION
ANDSCOPE
OFINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 23
nations,coalitions,
andalliancesact
underspecied
circumstances. In con-
trast,understanding
connotes
experience
andinterpretationhowthosewho
havebeena partof a majorevent,
suchastheCubanMissileCrisisor theend
of theColdWarhave
viewed
thesituation.
Thesearch
forcausal
explana-
tionhasbeen
likened
totheoutside
observer
whoviews
thephenomena
being
studiedwith the goalof developing
theorybasedon whatis observed.
Contrasted
istheapproach
thatfocuses
ongetting
theinside
story,
including
whosaidwhatto whom,whatwerethethoughts of twogreatleaders,
and
whatwerethedynamicsof theirrelationship.
Taken together,
Hollisand
Smithsuggest,
thesetwointellectual
traditions,
based respectively
oncausal
explanation
andinterpretive
understanding,
haveshaped
theevolution
of the
studyof international
relations
andtheorizing
aboutthephenomena
with
whichit isconcerned.
Bothhave
aroletoplayinthetheoretical
developme
ofthesocialsciences.
Exactly
whattheirrespective
contributions
have
been,
orcouldbe,remains
anobject
of debate,
aswenotein subsequent
chapters.
In literature
onthephilosophyof science,
thetermtheoryhasassumed a
specicmeaning. A theoryisdenedasasymbolicconstruction,
aseries
of in-
terrelated
hypotheses,together
withdenitions,
laws,theorems,
andaxioms.
A theorysetsforthasystematic
viewofphenomena
bypresenting
a series
of
propositions
or hypotheses
thatspecify
relations
among
variables
in orderto
present
explanations
andmake
predictions
about
thephenomena.
Inthephys-
icalsciences,
atheory
maybeviewed
asasystem
consisting
ofthefollowing
elements:
(1)a setof axioms,thetruthof whichisassumed
andcanbetested
onlybytestingtheirlogicalconsequences(anaxiomcannotbededuced
from
otherstatements
contained
in thesystem);
(2)statements,
or theorems,
that
arededucedfromtheaxioms, or fromothertheorems
anddenitions;
and
(3)denitions
ofdescriptive
termscontained
in theaxioms.73
A theory
isa
groupof lawsthataredeductively
connected.
Someofthelawsarepremises
fromwhichotherlawsarededuced.
Those
lawsdeduced
fromtheaxioms
are
thetheorems
ofthetheory.
Whether
alawisanaxiom
oratheorem
depends
on its positionin a theory.
Atheory
does
notnecessarily
dependonempirical
referents
forvalidity;
it
needonlystatelogically
deduced
relationships
among
thephenomena
with
which
thetheory
isconcerned.
According
toAbraham
Kaplan,
theability
to
applythetheorysuccessfully
isnotanecessary
condition
foritssuccess
because
thefailure
oftheapplication
maybetraceable
tomany
factors
external
tothe
theoryitself.75
Nonetheless,
thedevelopment
ofempirical
referents
makes
pos-
sible
thetesting
ofatheory.
CarlHempel
hasofferedthe
following
analogy:
A scientictheorymightthereforebelikened to a complex
spatialnetwork:Its
termsarerepresented bytheknots,whilethethreads connecting
thelattercorre-
spond,in part,to thedenitions
and,in part,to thefundamental
andderivative
hypotheses
contained
inthetheory.
Thewhole
system
oats,asit were,
above
the
plane
ofobservation
andisanchored
toit byrules
ofinterpretation.
Thesemight
beviewed
asstrings
whicharenotpartofthenetworkbutlinkcertain
parts
of
thelatterwithspecic
laces
in theplaneof observation.
Byvirtueof thoseinter-
pretive
connectors,
thenetwork
canfunction
asa scientic
theory.
Fromcertain
24 THEORETICALAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

observational
data,wemayascend, viaaninterpretive
string,to somepointin the
theoreticalnetwork,thenceproceed,via denitionsand hypotheses,to other
pointsfromwhichanother
interpretive
stringpermits
adescent
totheplace
of ob-
servation.75

Relation Between Theory and Practice

Despitetheir complementarity,
basicdifferences
existbetween
academic
social-science
theoryandpolitical-diplomatic
practice.Therearealsodiffer-
ences,
perhaps
lessbasic,between
general
theoretical
approaches
to interna-
tionalrelationsandthepolicysciences
that dealwith theforeign-policy
prob-
lemsof particularstates,
just astherearedifferences
between
the policy
sciences
andthe actualconductof diplomacy.
Eachof the severallevelsof
knowledge andactionhasa legitimacy
of itsownthatoughtnotto bedispar-
agedby onewhohappens to beoperating at another
level.In all cases,
it is
usefulto keepin mindthedistinctionbetween thescholar, whoseeks to
achieve
a theoretical
understanding
of phenomena
andto formulategeneral-
izationsaboutpoliticalbehavior
based
on a signicant
levelof probability,
andthedecision maker,whomustchoose a speciccourseof actionin a con-
cretesetof circumstances,
in whichprobabilityanalysis
maynot bean ade-
quatebasisonwhichto makeimportantpolicychoices.
Longago,Aristotledifferentiated
between knowinganddoing,between
the speculative
intellectandthepracticalintellect.77
DavidHumedrewa
sharpcontrastamongthreeclasses of knowledge: (1)deductive
reasoning,
whichrelatesto the logicalandnecessary
truthsof mathematics
andmeta-
physics;
(2)empirical
knowledge, whichpertains
to apparently
causalrela-
tionships
thatarenot reallyrationallynecessary;
and(3)valuejudgments,
which derivefrom an accumulationof historical facts as they have affected
humanemotionandintuition.ForHume,politicsandmoralsmustalwaysbe
inextricablyboundwith valuejudgmentsandhencecanbeneitherdeductive
norempirical.78
Tostatetheproblemof theoryandpractice
in Humeanterms,
wemightassert
thatwhereas
thepuretheorist
isusually
concerned
principally
with deductive
thoughtprocesses
to reachgeneralized
formulations,
thepoli-
cymaker hasa principal
interest
in theempiricalandinductiveknowledge de-
rivedfrompersonal experience
ratherthanfromanysystematic researchef-
fort.Thepolicymakerisconcerned alsowiththesubtledetails
of thepolitical
values,forces,andpreferencesoperatingin a particularsituationin all its exis-
tentialrealityratherthanwith a universal
abstractionor probability.Whereas
the social theorist wishesto concentrateprimarily on elementscommonto
manysituations,
thedecision
makerinvariably
wantscomplete
detailed
infor-
mation aboutthoseelementsthat areuniqueto the caseat hand.
However,
lestanyonereceive
thewrongimpression,
westress
thatthedif-
feringemphasesof theorist
andpractitioner
donotalterthedesirability
that
eachshouldtry to appreciate
themodes of knowledge
peculiar
to theother.
Neither can afford to dismissgeneralizedor particularizedknowledge.
Leadersandadvisors in thetwenty-rstcenturymustweighandmix different
 THEDEFINITION
ANDSCOPE
OFINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 25
theories
intheirongoing
efforts
tounderstand
developments,
choose
appro-
priate
policies,
andpredictoutcomes.
Theywillbelikely,
however,
tocontinue
toprefer
theirownintuitional
theoriesthe
cumulative
effect
oftheirowned-
ucation
andpolitical
experience,
whether
inelected,
appointed,
orusurped
of-
ces,in executive,
legislative,
ordiplomatic
positions.
These
intuitional
theo-
riesmayserve
asmore
reliable
guideposts
topolicy
choices
thanmayabstract
theoretical
constructs
developed
in academic
circles
andoftencouched
in ter-
minology
unfamiliar
to policymakers.
Academic
theoreticians
aimat under-
standing;
practical
politicians
mustchoose
courses
ofaction.
Theformer
try
to prescind
fromday-to-day
events;
thelattercannot.
Finally,
wemust rememberthatpolitical
leaders
areusually
preoccupie
withshaping
theforeign
policies
oftheirowncountries*vis-a-vis
major
allies
andadversaries.
Theirspanof attention
in theinternational
realmislimited
bythegreateramountof timeandefforttheymustdevoteto domestic
mat-
ters.Theycanseldomaffordtheluxuryofthinkingabout
theentire
interna-
tionalsystem.
Theinternational
theorist
maybedeeply interested
in thefor-
eignpolicies
of a number
of states,
depending
ontheprecise
phenomeno
beinginvestigated,
butrealizes
thatinternational
relations
aremorethan
merely
thesum
oftheforeign
policies
ofnations.
Eventhough
there
isastrong
linkage
between
international
anddomestic
politics
andeconomics,7?
which
growsevermorepowerful
astheprocess
of globalization
intensies,
therewill
always
remain
aninwardness
tothemaking
offoreign
policy
thatrequires
a
nationally
specic
perspective.
Theacademic
scholar
whodeals
withinterna-
tionaltheory
views
thesubject
froma largerperspective
andfocuses
onthe
net»
results
ofinteractive
processes
thatnational
policymakers
maytrytoun-
derstand
andinuence,butnot always
completely
or successfully.
Letus
quicklyaddthata greatdealof oursubstantive
knowledge
aboutinterna-
tionalrelations
hasalways
come
andwill continue
to come
fromstudies
ofna-
tionalandcomparative
foreign
policies.Thetwoapproaches
intersect
in
many places but are not identical.

DeductiveandInductiveTheorizing
According
to QuincyWright,a general
theoryof international
relations
means
acomprehensive,
coherent
andselfcorrecting
bodyofknowledge
con-
tributingto theunderstanding,
theprediction,
theevaluation
andthe.control
oftherelations
among
states
andoftheconditions
oftheworld.81
Wrights
mandate
isquiteambitious:
Hehasagrand
theory
inmind,
onethatcovers
all
aspects
of theeld.It should
beexpressed
ingeneralized
propositions
thatare
asclear,
asaccurate,
andasfewaspossible.
It should
notbecluttered
upwith
a lotof exceptions.
In short,
thetheory
shouldbeparsimonious;
thatis,it
shouldstate
an,important
truth.as
accurately,
elegantly,
andbrieyaspossi-
ble.-
Scientists
havealways been disposedto equate
scientic
truthwithaes-
theticbeauty,
andthelatterwithintellectual
simplicity.
The,principle
knownasOccams
razorprescribed
thatentities
should
not
bemultiplied
beyond
necessity
andthatoneshould
choose
thesimplest
possible
26 THEORETICALAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

explanation.
Einsteinadded
a caveat: Weshouldmakethingsassimple aspos-
sible,but no simpler.
Socialrealityresists
simplicity.
Everypartof a theory
should belogically
consistent
witheveryotherpart.Thetheoryshould befor-
mulatedin amannerconducive
to continualupdatingandimprovement
in the
lightofnewevidence.
Thus,it should
becapable
ofconstant
verication
andre-
nement.It shouldcontribute
to anobjective
understanding
of international
re-
ality,rather
thanonedistorted
bynational
perspective.
Theory,
says
Wright,
shouldenableusto predictat leastsomethingsandshouldhelpusto arriveat
valuejudgmentseven
if theprocess
of moralassessment
maynotbeentirely
consistent
with thevalue-free
traditionof Western
science.
James
Rosenau
warnsthatbeingableto denetheoryprecisely
furnishes
noguarantee
thatsone
will beableto theorize
imaginatively
or creatively.
Rosenau
woulddistinguish
moresharply
thanWrightbetweenempirical
and
normative
(orethical)
theory.
Heconsiders
bothtypesimportant
butfearsthat
bothcanbedistorted
if whatis andwhatoughtto bearemixedtoocloselyto-
gether.Thetheorist,
Rosenau insists,
mustassume thatin humanaffairsthere
is anunderlying
order,thatthingsdo not happen randomly,sbut
thattheir
causes canbeexplained
rationally
(evenwhenwhatwecallirrationalbehav-
ior isinvolved).
Heurges thetheorist
to seeknottheunique butthegeneral,
andto sacricedetaileddescriptions
of thesinglecasein favorof thebroader,
moreabstract patterns
thatencompassmanyinstances.
Thetheoristshouldbe
readyto tolerate
ambiguityandto becontented
withprobabilities
ratherthan
certaintiesand absolutes.
One mustgive the mind freerein to play with
unusual,evenabsurd,ideasthat may produceinsightsinto previously
unthoughtofexplanations.
International
phenomena shouldbelookedonas
puzzles
or mysteries
awaiting
solution
bytheinquisitive
mind.Finally,
thethe-
oristmustalways
bereadyto beprovenwrong.83
(Manyare,sooner or later.)
Rosenaucontinuesto deemit»sheercraziness
to dareto understandworld af-
fairs,yetheinsists
wemusttry.Hesuggests thatinstead
of focusingontheo-
riesandmethodologieswefirstyieldhumbly to aweandpuzzlement in faceof
thecomplexitiesandsurprisingmysteries
of international
relations.Thisis an
interesting
approach,butonenotlikelyto behelpfulto students in searchof
generalrecurring
patterns.
Thetwobasicapproaches to theorizingin theWesternintellectual
tradi-
tion are deductionand induction. The deductivemethodcan be traced to
Plato,whousedit to construct
hisidealrepublic.Onebegins withanabstract
concept,model,or majorpremiseowing froma setof denitionsandas-
sumptions drawnmorefromwisdomthanfromsystematically collected em-
piricalevidenceand thenproceedsbyplausible,logicalsteps
to deduce (draw
out)subordinatepropositionsandnecessary conclusions.Deduction is a for-
malprocess of deriving
hypotheses fromaxioms, assumptions,andconcepts
logically
integrated.
Thehypotheses soderivedshouldbetested withdatathat
arenotimpressionistic,
butratheraresystematically
andcarefullyselected.
Take,forexample,theViewexpounded byMorgenthau andWaltzthatall
politicalcommunitiesareconcerned in onewayor another with power-
acquiring,consolidating,
or expanding power,projectinganimage.of power
 THEDEFINITION
ANDSCOPE
OFINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 27

topreserve
it, balancing
power
forsecurity,
oraccommodating
to thepower
ofanother
political
community.
Thisisanexample
ofa deductive
theory
Theorists
ofpower
have
notpulled
it outofthinair.Farfromdisdaining
em-
piricaldata,theyhavedeveloped
theirideasonthebasis
of anextensive
read-
ingandinterpretation
of historical
evidence.
It is a mistake,
therefore,
to
equatedeductivetheorywithnonempirical
theory,
evenwhencombined with
a certainphilosophy
regarding
human
nature.Thedeductive
differsfromthe
inductive
methodin thewaythathistorical
factual
evidence
iscollected,
con-
verted
intousabledata,analyzed,
andinterpreted
forpurposes
oftheory.The
deductive
thinker
mayarrive ataconcept,
model,ormajorpremise
in anim-
pressionistic,
intuitive,
or insightful
mannerratherthanaccordingxto
strict
methodological
criteria
forselecting
cases,
rigorous
coding
rules
forclassify
ingevents,
or mathematically
-precise
waysof determining
correlations.
Theinductive
approach
entails
adifferent
routetoward
generalizing-fr
experience.
Instead
of leaping
intuitively
to a conclusion
bywayof aninner
mentallight,asit were,theinductiveempiricistis morecarefulaboutobserv-
ing,categorizing,measuring,andanalyzing
facts.Thismethodis traceableto
Aristotle,whowrotehis Politicsafterexamining
theconstitutions
of 158
Greek
city-states.
Theinductive
thinkermayconsider
thedeductive.meth
excellent
in mathematics,
logic,andmetaphysics
butprefers
to investigat
physical
andsocialphenomenaby observinga numberof instances
in the
sameclassandbydescribing
in detailboththeresearch
proceduresfollowed
andthesubstantive
results.
Thus,
others
(whomaybeskeptical)
canreplicate
theworkif theywishtodoso.Theinductive
methodproduces
nocertainties
onlyprobabilities,
andin thesocial
sciences
(ascontrasted
withphysics
or
chemistry),
theseprobabilities
are-usually
not of a veryhighorder.Forthat
matter,
certainties
arenotproducedbythedeductive method,or bythemeth-
odsused bychemists,
physicists,
orbiologists.
Newtonwasthegreatest
physi-
Cistof hisage,butEinstein
demonstrated
thathisworkwaspartialand
awed, justaseventually
even
Einstein-s
workmaybemodied orsupersede
bya newtheory.
In internationalpolitics
research,
it israreto obtainstatisti-
calcorrelations
athighlevels
ofsignicance-wsuch
as,point05,meaning
thattherewouldbeonlyvechances
in ahundred
thattheresults
weredueto
coincidence.
Deduction
andinduction
should
notberegarded
aseither
competitive
or
mutually
exclusive
approaches.
Somescholars
will preferoneovertheother
andwill makebetter
progress
withonethantheother.
Theory
building
re-
quiresa fruitfulcombination
of thetwo,plussomething
more,discussed
here
soon.Theargument thatinthenuclear
age,a bipolar
international
system
is
:_morestablethanamultipolarone,andviceversa,
isnotamenableto empiri-
calproof,soit usually
proceeds
bylogicaldeduction
fromassumed premises
regarding
theamount
of uncertainty
in thesystem,
thenumber
of actorsto.
3_
Whom thestates
mustallocatetheirattention;
andthedestructive
powerof
nuclearweapons.
(Seethereferences
toSinger,
Waltz,
andBueno deMesquita
in Chapter
7.)Ontheotherhand,themiddlerange theoretical
proposition
thatgovernments
ndit relatively
easytopursue
policies
ofregional
economic
28 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

integrationin periodsof prosperousgrowthandtendto retrenchtowardna-

tionalparticularismat timesof recession
canbearrivedat by logicaldeduc-
tion and can then be testedby referenceto the evolution of the European
Economic Community/Union (seeChapter10).
KennethN. Waltzdistinguishestheoriesfrom empiricaldata,statistical
correlations,hypotheses,
and inductivelyreachedlaws or generalizations.
Statisticalcorrelations,evenwhensignicant,arenot facts,andtheycannever
establishcausalconnections.We can arrive at laws and empiricalgeneraliza-
tionsthroughinductivemethods,
andthesemayidentifyinvariableor proba-
ble associations
but cannotexplainthem.TheancientBabylonians werefa-
miliar with the laws of tidal movements,which they could observe,measure,
andpredict,buttheycouldnotexplainthoselaws.Explanation is thefunction
of theory,whichcannotbereached by deduction
alone,for deduction merely
proceeds logicallyfrominitialpremisesandthuscanprovideno powerfulnew
explanations.Theorieshaveto beinventedby a creativeintellectualprocess
that takesa numberof disparate lawsandgeneralizations,
simpliesthemby
isolatinga fewkeyfactors,abstracting themfromwhatis not relevant,aggre-
gatingthemin a previously unknownway,andsynthesizing themin a new,
ideal,quasi-perfect explanatorysystem.Sucha process
canhardlybetaught.
A textbook can do no more than show how others have theorized. Students
canjifdgefor themselves
whethera particulartheoryis insightful,satisfying,
andpromising.It is hopedthat a surveyof theorieswill inspirethosewho
studythemto embarkontheirownroadto theorizing.

The Level-of-Analysis
Problem:The Actors
arid Their Relationship to Each Other
In all the socialsciencespolitics,economics,
andsociology,for exampleone
cannothelpwondering whereto begin,whereto focusattention,
whereto try to
geta handleonthesubject.
In all theseelds,themicroandmacroperspectives
havetheirardentpartisans.
Determining theproperfulcrumpointisparticularly
difficult in internationalrelationsbecause
of thecomprehensiveness
of the eld.
On which of manypossiblelevelsof analysisshouldwe focusour attention?
Whicharetheproperunitsof studyoractors?
Fromthemicroto themacro
level,onecandraw up a lengthyinventoryof logicalcandidates,
from empires
(eitherlongextinctor recentlydissolved)
downto theInternational
Olympic
Committee(IOC), AmnestyInternational,and McDonaldsfastfood chain.
According
to Kenneth
N. Waltz,thefocusof analysis
hasusually
beenindividu-
als,states,
andtheglobalsystem,
buthehimself
concentrates
onthelasttwo.85
Accordingto BarryBuzan;the levelsof analysis
haveemphasized
essentially
threeideas:(1) interactivecapacity,the typesand intensitiesof interactionof
which anyoneuhit is capablewith respectto othersin thesystem;(2)structure,
how the units arearrangedwith respectto eachotherandhow they are differ-
entiatedfrom eachother;and (3)process,the extent»towhichthe unitsinteract
with eachother in recurrentpatterns.The levelsof analysisprovidea concep-
tual basisfor askingsuchquestionsas,What is the effectof systemicstructure
 THEDEFINITION
ANDSCOPE
OFINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 9.9

(e.g.,
bipolarity)
onthebehavior
ofstatesorotherunits?
Bythesametoken,
howtheinteractive
capacity
oftheunitsshapes
thestructure
isofimportance.
IndividualsAlthough
mostinternational
theorists
wouldprobably
reject
thenotionthatindividuals
areinternational
actors(nearly
alllegalauthorities
havesimilarly
deniedthemanystatusassubjects
of international
law),a clas-
sicalliberal
wouldargue
thattheindividual
should
bethefoundation
forany
socialtheorybecause
onlyindividuals
arereal,whilesociety
isanabstraction.
Although
fewtheorists
wouldagree withtheclassical
liberalposition,
and
mostwouldprobably
tendtothinkthatsocial
forces
producetheheroicgure
moreoftenthantheotherwayaround,it cannotbedeniedthatscholars
in the
eldsof history,
politics,andinternational
relations
dopayattention
to lead-
erswhohaveplayed a prominent roleontheworldstage. Moreover,those
whosurvey, forexample,theattitudesofvoters
oninternational
issuesare,for
allpractical
purposes,placing
theindividual atthecenterof theirinvestiga-
tions.It bearsrepeating,
however, thatmosttheoristsdonotdothis,but
rather
subsume individuals
intoanation-stateorotherorganizational
context,
suchasthose decision-making
units(treated
inChapter 11)thatplaykeyroles
in formulatingforeignpolicieson behalfof states.

SubnationalGroups Thesemaytakemanyforms:politicalparties,the
communications
media,
andthemyriadspecial
interest,
groups
thatseekto in-
uence
foreign
policies
bylobbying
or shaping
publicopinion.
These
actors
fall primarilywithinthescope of foreign-policy
studies,
bothnationaland
comparative. International
theorists,
however,
whilenotplacingthemat the
center of theirattention,
areobligedto recognize
theirrelevance
because
of the
undoubtedly
signicant
linkage
between
domestic
andinternational
politics.
Nation-States Realisttheoristssubscribeto what is calledthe state-
centricViewof international
relations,focusingon the actionof statesand
governments.
Theyrecognize otherrealities
mentionedin thisinventory,
and
they»
takethose realities
intoaccount asappropriate,buttheyinsistthatall
others,
whetherless
ormore extensive,
aresubordinatetonation-states,
which
aretheprincipal
actorsattheinternational
level.
Inrecent centuries,
theworld
wasdividedintoimperialist
powers andcolonialterritories
orprotectorates
Thenumber
ofstates
claiming
tobelegally
sovereign
andpolitically
indepen-
denthasincreased
steadily
inthiscentury:
Whereasthere
wereonlyabout60
inthe1930s,
therewereabout190,attheendofthecentury.
Throughout
the
various
erasofhistory,
thepatterns
ofpolitical
organization
havealways
re-
flected
some
relationship
withpolitical,
military,
economic,
technological,
cul-
tural,andotherformsof power(including
religious
andpsychological
Realists
donotassertthatcurrentlyexistingnation-state
structures
will endure
forever,
buttheyhave
nodoubtthatthose
structures
arenowfirmlyen-
trenched andarelikelyto constitute
thebasic
unitsofinternational
political
realityfor a longtimeto come.87
Seethesection
laterin thischapter,
The
PersistingRealityof the State.
30 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Transnational
Groups
andOrganizations
NotMade
UpofStatesThis
category
includes
allentitiespolitical,
religious,
economiccommerci
and
soonthatoperate
transnationally
(across
one
ormore
international
bound-
aries)
butdonothave governments
ortheirformal
representatives
asmem-
bers.
These
entities
arecalled
nongovernmental
organizations
(NGOs).
For
centuries,
theCatholic
church
was
recognized
asanindisputable
example.
In
more
recent
times,
thisbroad
category
hasincluded
communist
parties,
na-
tional
liberation
guerrilla
movements,
international
terrorist
groups(such
as
Hezbollah),
international
armsdealers,
andmanyinternational
nongovern
mental
organizations.
Inrecent
years,
there
has
been
agrowing
awareness
of
Islamic
fundamentalism
(withitscenter
inShiite
Iran)asaforce
ofconsider-
abletransnational
potential.
Among thetransnational
phenomena
thathave
attracted
academic
atten-
tionisthemultinational
corporation
(MNC),
atermthathasbeen
subjected
toavariety
ofsubtle
denitionalrenementsbyotherscholars.
MNCs, in
contrast
to nation-states,
regard
boundariesandterritory
asirrelevant.
Despite
theamountofconcernexpressed
over
their
potential
forpolitically
in-
tervening
inhost
countries(especially
intheThird
World),theyareprimarily
interested
inprotsratherthanpolitics,
except
insofar
asthelatter
affects
the
former.
Apartfromtheliterature
ondependency
andinterdependence
(treated
inChapter
9)andthelimitednumber
ofcasestudies
ofspecicMNCs inspe-
ciccountries,
there
hasnotyetbeen
asufcient
amountofscientific
research
ontheroleofMNCs intheinternational
political
system,
ontheirpolitical
power
incomparison
with
that
ofhost
states,
and
onthedegree
towhich
they
arecontrollable
oruncontrollable
byhome
countries,
hostcountries,
orinter-
national
organizations,
toreach
denite/conclusions
concerning
their
leverage
relative
tothatofgovernments.
Much ofthedebate
hasbeen
normative,
turn-
ingonwhether
MNCshave
been
benecial
orharmful
toless
developed
coun-
tries(orless
advantaged
social
classes)
intheThird
World,
asubject
thatis
treatedingreater
detail
inChapter
9.Therecanbenodoubt,
however,
that
General
Motors,
Westinghouse,
RoyalDutch
Shell,
British
Petroleum,
SONY,
Volkswagen,
andInternational
Telephone
andTelegraph
areimportant
transnational
rms andinternational
actors.
International
Groups
andOrganizations
with Statesor TheirRepre-
sentatives
asMembers These
include
bothlimitedmembership
groups
such
astheOrganization
ofPetroleum
Exporting
Countries
(OPEC),
theEuropea
Community/Union,
theArabLeague,
andtheAssociation
ofSouth
East
Asian
Nations
(ASEAN);
such
principal
international
actors
astheLeague
ofNations
theUnited
Nations,
andtheWorld
Court;
andsuch
specialized
agencies
asthe
United
Nations
Educational,
Scientic
andCultural
Organization
(UNESCO
theWorld
Health
Organization
(WHO),theFood
andAgriculture
Organizatio
(FAO),
theInternational
Bank
forReconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD),
the
International
Monetary
Fund(IMF),
theInternational
CivilAviation
Organi-
zation
(ICAO),
theInternational
Telecommunications
Union(ITU),
andthe
International
FundforAgricultural
Development
(IFAD).
TheWorldTrade
 THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 31

Organization
(WTO),created
in December
1994by theUruguayroundof the
GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT),is anotherexample,as are
other intergovernmentalbodiesthat report to the UN Economicand Social
Council.During the Cold War, the two major regionalsecuritygroupsthe
North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and the now defunctWarsaw
TreatyOrganization
(W/TO)rivaledtheUnitedNationsin importance. Most
international
organizations
carryonroutineadministrative
activities
thatdonot
attract the interest of the international theorist. On those occasions,however,
whenthe ICAO debates
what to do aboutthehijackingof aircraftby terrorists,
or whentheadequacy
of theInternational
AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)safe-
guardssystem
becomes
anissuein regardto compliance
with theprovisions
of
theNuclearNonProliferationTreaty,the specialized
agencies
areremovedfrom
obscurityinto thespotlightof international
politicsandbecome,
for a timeat
least,bit playersif not fullfledgedactors.

The International System At themostcomprehensive

andabstractlevel,
we cometo the internationalor global system,which is givendetailedtreat-
mentin Chapter3. At this levelof analysis,the emphasisis "onthe whole
ratherthanon its component parts,or whatis termeda holistic/systemic
fo-
cus.The behavioral patternsof the partsarepresumedto be shapedby the
structuresthat constitutethe system.In this macrocosmic,
globalscheme,spe-
cific nation-states and other international actors are not absent, but they are
presentin blurredratherthansharpoutline.J. DavidSingerhasnotedthatthe
nation-statelevelproduces richerdescriptionsandcausalexplanations
(e.g.,
of howandwhyspecicwarsbegin),whereas thesystemicmodelis morecon-
duciveto broadergeneralizationsabouthowall statesnormallybehavewithin
the structurethat is saidto constitutethe internationalsystem.To focuson the
stateasthe unit actor is to engagein what is termedreductionistor atomistic
analysisof the parts rather than analysisof the whole. Singersees
Morgenthausthesisthatstatesseektheirnationalinterestdenedin termsof
powerasa systemic theory,a generalruleto whichonemightbeableto nd
someexceptions thatdonotvitiatetherule.9°
Generallyspeaking, thosewho favor an international-systemslevel ap-
proachareconvinced thattheinternational
system exertsa moreprofoundeffect
onthecomponent partsthantheotherwayaround.A holistic/systemic approach
assumesnotonlythatthewholeisgreater thanthesumof itsparts,butalsothat
thestructure
of thesystem moldsthebehavior of theunits.This,of course,
is a
modernversion of theancientphilosophicalproblemknownastheoneandthe
many,oneof thoseprofoundandrecurring problems.thatseem alwaysto&#39;de
solutionbut that makethe intellectuallife fascinating.In earlierhistoricalperi-
ods,it waspossibleto recognize
partialinternational
systems(e.g.,theGreekand
Italiancity-statesystems).
Therewasa Mediterranean statesystemof sorts
beforeRomebecame an empire,but an empireprecludes
thekind of interna-
tional relationsthat mark a systemof more or lessequalindependentstates.
TheRomans
mayhavebeenawareof theChinese
empire;
buttheycanscarcely
be said to havecarriedon internationalrelationswith China.The systemof
32 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

feudalism
thatprevailed
in medieval
Europe
wassucha complex
setof hierarchi-
calandautonomous relationshipspapacyandempire,kingdoms,principalities,
duchies,lordsandvassals,freecities,leagues,
guilds,andcorporationsthat our
modernconcept
of statecouldnotapply.(Il statocamein withMachiavelli.)
As we show subsequently(Chapters3 and 9), the modern nation-state
systemandwhat is calledthe world capitalistsystembegana processof
gradualdevelopmentsomeve centuriesago.Europebecame aninternational
statesystemduring the period following the Thirty YearsWar (1618-1648).
Two centuriesago,the UnitedStatesenteredthe system,as did the Latin
Americanrepublics(at leastformally)a few decades later.The Ottoman
EmpireandJapanweretherst nonWestern statesto enterthestatesystem.
Theperiodfrom the endof the FirstWorldWarto thestartof the Second
World War witnessedfundamentalfragmentingchangesin that system;World
WarII completed
thetransitionto a newsystem
with bipolarandmultipolar
characteristics(1945-1991).The global systemduring that period exertedan
increasing
impacton its componentstatemembers,
justaschanges
withinthe
component statemembers themselves
shaped
theinternational
systemic
struc-
ture. The sourceof suchchangesand their consequenceswithin
and among
thelevelsof analysisrepresents
a cruciallyimportantfocalpointfor interna-
tional-relationstheory building. Obviously,the internationalsystemis not a
static entity.
The international-systems
levelprovidesa neat,manageable, yet compre-
hensivemodel that assignshomogeneous goalsto all national actors,but it
alsogivesriseto simplisticimages of look-alikenation-states,
whileunderesti-
matingtheir differences,survival,and maintenance of independencein the
systemsand exaggerating the degreeto whichthe total systemdetermines
member-actorbehavior.Focusingon the nation-state,by way of contrast,en-
ablesusto seetheuniquecharacteristics andsituationalcircumstances
of the
actors,butit alsoinvolvestherisk of excessive
differentiation,
whichmayob-
scurethe generalpatternsfor which the theoristis searching.

The Persisting Reality of the State

Realists and neorealists continue to concentrate on the nationstate as a cen-
tral unit. The nation-state is assumedto be a rational actor pursuing its na-
tional interest(viewedin termsof power)within ananarchicalsociety,an in-
ternationalsystem. of self-helpin which security,dened as survival,remains
the primary concern.
For at leastthreedecades, pluralistswho studynonstateactorsand neo-
liberal theoristsof economicinterdependence havequestionedthe validity of
the state-centricparadigm.Both groupsinsistthat the realistsaretoo narrow
andsingleminded
in their approach.
Theycontendthat foreignpolicydeci-
sionsaffectingthe internationalsystemare not takenby nation-statesas uni-
taryrationalactors;theseareabstractions
reiedbytherealists.
Instead,deci-
sions are taken by individuals or groups within the complex bureaucratic
structuresof governments who actwith the authorityof the stateandwho are
 THEDEFINITION
ANDSCOPE
OFINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 33

ofteninternally
divided
among
themselvesasto whatthepolicies
shouldbe.91
Pluralists
andinterdependence
theorists
alsoarguethatsignificant
decisions
arebeing
increasingly
taken
outside
theframework
ofnation-statesby
inter-
national
organizations
(governmental
andnongovernmental),
byinternationa
regimes,
or byMNCs,
which,
invested
withformidable
economic
resources
maypursuepoliciesdifferentfrom thoseof governments.
Thestatecentric
system
asknownin thepastis nowbeingtransformed
intowhatSeyom
Brown calls

aglobalpolyarchy
inwhichnational
states,
subnational
groups,andtransnationa
interests
andcommunities
arevyingforthesupport
andloyaltyofindividuals
and
[inwhich]
conicts
areprosecuted
and
resolved
onthebasis
ofadhoc
power
plays
andbargaining
among
shiftingcombinations
of these
groups.
. . . Theinstitu-
tionswith thegreatest
coercivecapabilitiesnational
governments.. . arelos-
inga gooddealof theirlegitimate
authority.
All criticsof thestatecentric
paradigm Viewtheautonomy of theonce
sovereignstateassteadilyeroding
in thefaceof multinational,
transnational
andglobalinstitutions andforces.94Accordingto SusanStrange,stateau-
thority hasleakedaway,upwards,sidewardsand downwards.95
JessicaT. Matthewshasdescribed the growingrole of NGOsthat do
manyof thethingsfalteringgovernments
canno longerdo.
Theybreed
newideas;
advocate,
protest,
andmobilize
publicsupport;
dolegal,
scientic,
technical
andpolicyanalysis;
provide
services;
shape;
implement,
moni-
tor andenforce
international
commitments;
andchangeinstitutions
andnorms.

7,.
~
~m.
sV
«
rI.Y&
,,-._
,_,,.
p,,5
Increasingly,
NGOsareableto pusharoundeventhelargest
governments?
Matthews
goes
abittoofarhere.
Sheeffectively
describes
thepartplayed
bylow-cost
computer
andtelecommunications
technology,
whichhasbroken
governments
monopoly
onthecollection
andmanagement
of largeamounts
of
information
anddeprived
governments
of thedeference
theyeiijoyed
because
ofit.97Information
technology
hasagreat
democratizing
effect,
placing
un-
precedented
power
intothehands
ofindividuals
andorganized
groupstoapply
pressure
togovernments
innegotiating
suchmatters
asreduction
ofgreenhous
gases,
humanrights,trade,armscontrol,refugees,
narcotics,
crime,and
w6mensissues.
However, thefactthatdemocratic
governments
arebecoming
moresensitive
to andwillingto accommodate
theconcerns
ofNGOsin negoti-
atinginternational
agreernents
doesnotnecessarilytranslateintotheerosionof
statesasactors,&#39;but
ratherarguesto thetighteninglinkagebetween domestic
andforeign
policies.
Itiistempting
to exaggerate
thedegree
towhichgovern-
mentsmay be vulnerable to buffeting by nancialmarketvolatility.
Nevertheless,
governments
still makethepoliciesthat affectinterestrates,
trade,investment,
taxation,
thevalueof currency,capitalows,andsoon.
Theyalsodetermine
thecontent andpaceof international
negotiations
andthe
extent
to whichagreements
will beimplementedandenforced domestically.
After reviewingseveralof the more commonindicatorsthat the stateis
being
marginalized
asaneconomic
actor,
Peter
Evans
concludes
that,despite
54 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

the Anglo-Americanliberal convictionthat as far as capital and goodsare

concerned the less individual states behave as economic actors, the better off
the world will be,98nevertheless the economiclogicof globalization does
not in itselfdictateeclipseof thestate. In fact,hewrites,greaterreliance
on trade is associatedwith an increasedrole for the state rather than a dimin-
ished one and successfulparticipation in global markets may be best
achieved
throughmoreintense
stateinvolvement.1°°
In sum,insteadof lead-
ing to weaker states,greater trade may just as well create a need for stronger
onesto preserve
the stabilityof the internationalfinancialsystem.1°1
This
point will be elaborated upon in Chapter 9. Worth noting here is Richard
Littles summation of JamesN. Rosenausthoughts on pluralism and states as
crucialactors:
[I]t is necessaryto accept that contemporary world politics is bifurcated into the
familiar state-centric
world describedby realistsandthe lessfamiliar multi-centric
world exposed by pluralists. . . . Rosenau now acknowledgesthe potential for
the stateto reassertitself and for a purely statecentricworld to re-emerge.. . .
[but he] also insists that the forces of pluralism could still prevail. . . . [A]though
thereis somedegree
of overlap,the structures,
normsandprocesses
describing
thesetwo worldstendto be mutually exclusive.
1°2
SinceWorld War II, the study of international relations in American uni-
versitieshasusuallybeenorganizedwithin departmentsof political science,or
elsethose departmentshave played a pivotal role in interdisciplinarypro-
grams. Political scientists traditionally have focused their attention on the
policiesand actionsof governments,but in recentdecadesthey havebecome
interested in a broader range of phenomenathat inuence and are inuenced
by politics and diplomacy. In the international eld, no lessthan in the domes-
tic one,the tendencyaswe haveshownhasbeento expandthe conceptof the
political to include trends in economics, science,and technology, and even in
education, culture, and religion.
No sensibleobserverwould denythat the world hasbecomeprogressively
integratedas a result of economicand technologicaldevelopments that link
togetherin unprecedented fashionall partsof the globalsystem.It hasnot be-
comepolitically or culturally integratedto anycomparabledegree,however,
in spiteof the export of Americanfilms, TV programs,music,fast food, and
blue jeans. Indeed, many nations, regions, and subnationalgroups have
soughtto resistor limit integrativeprocesses(discussedin Chapter10) by as-
sertingtheir own identityand independence,
by violentactionif necessary,
againstlargerunifyingor centralizingforces.Not only in placeslike India and
Yugoslaviabut evenin the United Kingdom, Spain,Northern Italy, Russia,
Canada,
andtheMiddleEast,wecanseethecentrifugal
forcesof fragmenta-
tion competingwith the centripetal forces of integration. Powerful new
transnationalforcesthat haveemergedon the internationalscenemakeeven
morecomplexthedevelopment
of globalconsensus
leadingto aneffective
po-
liticalauthority.
 THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 35

The Condition of International Anarchy

In politicalparlance,
the termanarchydoesnot, asit oftendoesin popular
discourse,imply chaoticdisorder,but merelythe absenceof effectivegovern-
ment. When public authority totally collapses,as in the Boston police strike of
1919,inner-cityriots, or situationsof ethnicwarfare,societymay indeedre-
vert to a state of nature marked by looting, murder, rape, destruction, and
other crimes. But this is not what is meant by the condition of international
anarchyto whichstateshavebeenaccustomed
for centuries.It
is a self-help
systemin which statesmustlook out for their own securityand other vital in-
ferests. It is marked by intermittent wars, large and small. While some great
powersmay be preoccupiedwith securityconcernsand maintaina readiness
to resort to force if necessary,most statesin the anarchical society engagefor
fairly long periods in peaceful cooperation and in a quest for stable, orderly
equilibrium.1°3
On thewhole,the international
systemof the 1990swasfar
more peaceful than Bosnia, Chechnya,Kosovo, and East Timor.
That having beensaid, however,it is necessaryto emphasizethe difference
betweeneffectivepolitical authoritywithin statesandwithin the international
system.Oneof the mostfrequentlycitedmoderndenitionsof politics is that
of David Easton, who described it as the processwhereby..societalvalues are
authoritatively
allocated.1°4
Sucha denitionpresupposes
theorganization
of
a societyundereffectiveauthority ableto takedecisionson valuesand priori-.
tiesby way of the budgetprocessand ableto enforceits lawsby holdingginthe
background the threat of sanctions. Thus, the model of the national political
systemcannotbeextendedto the internationalrealmbecause there.isno effec-
tive authority in existenceat this level. Eastonhimselfadmittedthat deci-
sionsandactionsperformed
by international
systems
rely.for their.acceptance
on accord with the perceived self-interest of the participating members,
amongwhomthe impactof a sense
of legitimacyds
still extremely
lQw.1°5
RaymondAron,StanleyHoffmann,RogerD. Masters, Kenneth
N. Waltz,
and severalothertheoristsin the realistschoolhavefrequentlywarnedagainst
losingsightof thecrucialdifference
between
nationalsocieties,
in whiclival-
ues,law,andpowerareoftenquitehighlycentralized, andthe international
system,in which theyareso decentralized
that eachstate,taking into account
its owninterest,candecide
whichnormsit-twill.observe
andwhichqnesit will
ignore..,106
Sincethe early 1980s,as we have noted, severalinternationaltheorists
have sought to bridge the wide gap, as it were, betweennational and interna-
tionalsystems,
between thepoliticalandeconomic orders,andbetween there-»
alistsandpluralists-globalists
by spotlighting
theconceptsof interdependence
andinternationalregimes.Bothconcepts arediscussed
morefully in thechap-
ters on realismand on systems.Here it is sufcient to note that.interdepen-
dencecarriesthe connotationthat nation-states
are becomingincreasingly
sensitiveand vulnerableto economicand technologicalchangesin other
nation-statesand in the global systemas a,whole, and that they are slowly»
 36 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

adjusting
theirpolicies
accordingly.1°7
International
regimes,
discussed
more
fullyin Chapter
10,arethose
sets
ofgoverning
arrangementsproced
norms, rules,
and,insome cases,
special
functional
institutionsdesigne
to
regulate
andcontrol
certain
kinds
oftransnational
activity,
where
such
regula-
tionandcontrol
wouldseem
tobeamatter
ofcommon
interest
(oratleast
co-
incident
interest)
among
several
ormany
states.1°8
Examples
would
bethein-
ternational
regimes
designed
tomanage
currency
exchange
rates
(intheIMF),
to remove
impediments
to international
trade(intheperiodically
revised
GATT),
andtoprevent
theproliferation
ofnuclear
weapons
through
the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty,
thesafeguards
system
oftheIAEA,
and
various
agreements
among
nuclear-technology
andmissile-technolog
suppli-
ersto regulatetheir exports.

TheDebate
Between
Traditionalists
andBehavioralists
Theacerbity
ofthe1960s
debate
between
traditional
advocates
ofaclassica
approach
tointernational
relations
andthose
whopreferred
themethods
of
thenewer
behavioral
sciences
has
nowworn
off.The
twoperspectives
seemed
less
polariied
inthe1990s,
perhaps
because
thepostpositivists
lumpedthem
together
intheircritiques.
Atthetime,
however,
thecontroversy
reecteda
fundamental
dichotomy inthediscipline
ofpolitical
science,
atleast
inthe
United
States.
A summary oftheprincipal
arguments
oneach
sidecanstill
contribute
toanunderstandingofhowinternational-relations
theory
evolved
inthesecond
halfofthetwentieth
century.
Atthecore
ofthisdebate
wasthequestion
ofepistemology,
howweac-
quire
knowledge.1°9
Behavioralism
rested
onwhatistermed
aposftiz/ist
epistemology,
according
towhich
knowledge
arises
from
oursensory
experi-
ence,
from
Whatweobserve
about
theworld
around
us.Such
anapproac
contrasts
withmetaphysics,
whichtraces
knowledge
tosources
thatliebeyond
empirical
observation,
andencompasses
human
reasoning,
contemplation
in-
tuition,
andintrospection.
Intheeldofinternational
relations,
aswehaveal-
readyseeninthischapter,
wedeallargely
inconcepts
such
astheinternationa
system,
thestate,
theregional
subsystem,
ofalliances.
Because
concepts
areby
theirverynature
abstractions,
theircomponents
cannot
beobserved
Behavioral
science
hasonlylimited
relevance
tothedevelopment
ofinterna-
tional-relations
theory
if thephenomena
withwhich
wedealcannot
besub-
jectedto empiricalanalysis.
Behavioralist
writers,
including
manywho
would
callthemselves
realists,
became
dominant
intheUnited
States,
whereas
traditional
British
realistsre-
mained
generally
skeptical
ofthequantifying
method.HedleyBullcalled
classical
thatapproach
totheorizing
that
derives
from
philosophy,
history,
and
law,
and
thatischaracterized
aboveallbyexplicit
reliance
upontheexer-
ciseofjudgment
andbytheassumption
thatif weconne
ourselves
tostrict
standards
ofverication
andproof
there
isvery
littleofsignicance
thatcan
besaid
about
international
relations.°
Muchmorerecently,
Chris
Brown
hasobserved
thattheaimofthebehavioralists,
whichwastoreplace
the
 THE DEFINITIONAND SCOPEOF INTERNATIONALRELATIONS 37

wisdomliteratureandanecdotaluseof history. . . with rigorous,system-

atic scienticconceptsand reasoning,did not catchon well in Britain,
where an educational system still divided into two cultures meant that the
majority of InternationalRelationsscholarswere more amenableto attacks
on scientism than their North American cousins.1
Traditionalistsareusuallyskepticalof theeffort to predictor to applyprob-
ability analysisto humanaffairs.Theywill occasionally usequantitativedatato
illustratea point theyaretryingto makein anotherwisediscursive presentation,
but theyarecriticalof theproclivityof somecontemporary analyststo quantify
in orderto demonstrate by tortuousstatisticalanalysisa propositionthat ought
to beobviousto a personof commonsense. Traditionalistsaretypicallybut not
rigidly interestedin the singleand uniqueevent,case,situation,or problem,
which they seekto understandin the subtletyof detail,includingits relation-
shipswith otherrelevantphenomena. Oftenthetraditionalistwill studyseveral
casesof a similarnature,drawingappropriatecomparisons andcontrastsalong
theway,but thereis a dangerthat theveryselectionof a limitednumberof cases
might biasthe results.(Scientists,too, of course,mayrely on a smallnumberof
casestudiesto develop,illustrate,or testa generalmodel.)Traditionalistswould
insistthat theyareat leastasmeticulousin gathering,sifting,weighing,and in-
terpretingevidenceasanyothersocialscientists.Theywould highlightthe fact
that theymakeuseof judgment,intuition, andinsightasessentialin arrivingat
their conclusions, afterhavingreviewedanddigestedall thedatathat theydeem
relevant and reliable.
The behavioralquantifyingapproachplacesconsiderableemphasison
what it regardsas scientically precisemethods.Different social scientists
stressdifferentmethodsor combinationsof methods:attitudesurveys,content
analysis,simulationand gaming,statisticalcorrelations,modelbuilding, and
the useof computer-driven quantitativeanalysisasa basisfor achievingpreci-
sionin measurement andanalysis.Nevertheless,the scienticapproachshould
not be fully equatedwith quantitativemethodology,althoughthe latter is
muchmorelikely to beemployed,and is certainto beusedon agranderscale,
in the scientic than in the traditional approach.CharlesKegleyand Eugene
Wittkopf have noted that some behavioralists themselveswondered whether
they had becomepreoccupiedwith methodto the exclusionof real-world
problems[and] had focusedon testinginteresting[hypotheses]but onesthat
were largelytrivial and meaningless
to the policymakersresponsiblefor pro-
tectingtheirnationsandmakingtheworlda betterplacein whichto live.112
The traditionalistoften criticizesthe behavioralistfor (a) allegedlybeing
too condent of the ability to generalize,to convertproblematicstatements
into causalpropositions,and to usethesepropositionsto predict behaviorin
an areain whichthingsarenot predictable;(b) attributingto abstractmodelsa
congruence with reality that the modelsdo not have;(c) avoidingthe substan-
tive issuesof international politics because,in the zeal for scientic method,
the behavioralistmay neverhavereally masteredthoseissuesin all their com-
plexity; and (d) succumbingto a fetishfor measurement
that ignorescrucially
importantqualitativedifferences
amongthe phenomena
beingmeasured.3
38 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Behavioralistsassertthat whentheytestfor statisticalcorrelationbetween

two factors,they are determiningwhetherthe relationshipbetweenthe two
mightbemerelycoincidental,
andwhentheyengage
in multivariateanalysis,
theyaretrying to nd out which of severalfactorsconstitutesthe mostreliable
predictorof a particularoutcome.4Thescienticanalystregardsthetradi-
tionalistsdistrustof precisemethod,quantication, and verication through
statisticaltesting as irresponsibleand arrogant.115Traditionalistshave re-
spondedby assertingthat in their own way, they perform a careful content
analysisof the primary and secondarysources(documentaryand otherwise)
thattheyadduce
asevidencespeeches,
pressstatements,
government
reports,
diplomatic messages, personalmemoirs,newspaperaccountsand commen-
taries, interviews,scholarlystudies,and so onand intuitively selectwhat
theydeemimportantandrelevantwithouttheneedfor a systematic
counting
of wordsandphrases.The traditionalistremainsconvincedthat the essence
of
politicsis thequalitative
differenceasubtleshadeor nuance
of meaning
that
can be communicatedin the choiceof a singleword or phrasebut that does
not lend itself to quantication.

Into a Post-Positivist Era: Postmodernism

Severalfactorshaveconvergedto createthe basisfor yet a third debateabout

the natureof, andprospectsfor, international-relations
theory.Increasingly
sincetheendof theColdWar,several newradicalapproaches to theoryhave
emerged within BritishandAmericanacademic circles.Althoughtheygo by
different namespostmodernism, constructivism,poststructuralism,Critical
Theory,and feminism,to list the more prominentseveral of them tend to
overlapandthusmaybesaidto constitutein theaggregate
a third paradigm
that rejectstheassumptions
of neorealism
andneoliberalism
(or fourthpara-
digm,if we considertheMarxist,neo.:Marxist,
andworld capitalistweltan-
sclmmmgen asa separatethird paradigm).115
Theendof the ColdWar,togetherwith disillusionmentand dissatisfaction
with quantitativeempiricistpositivistcumulativetheorypromised bythebe-
havioralrevolution(second debate),helpsshapethe intellectualsettingfor
this latestreassessment.
However, thereareothercruciallyimportantdimen-
sionsaswell.Thesedimensions includea questioning of theparadigms that
havedominated thedevelopment of international-relations
theory,notablythe
realist/neorealist,
liberal/neoliberal,
pluralist,andglobalistmodelsdiscussed
in thisandotherchapters.SteveSmithhaslumpedall of theseearlier,morefa-
miliar approaches
looselyundera headingwhich he callsmainstreaminter-
nationaltheory,characterized
byanempiricist
epistemologythat
is,a philos-
ophy of knowledgebasedon the positivist outlook of social scientistswho
sought to emulate the methods of the natural sciences.117 Thedimension of
the third paradigm debate,which criticizes the behavioral revolution basedon
quantitativemeasurement and testablehypotheses,is termedpostempiricist.
Its proponentspoint to the impossibility,astheyseeit, of constructinga value-
free,objective,or completely
unbiased
socialscience,
includinga theory,or
 THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39

theories, of international relations. The postempiricist is concerned not as

muchwith paradigmaticissuesaswith the needto questionthe epistemologi-
cal and methodologicalbasisfor the developmentof empiricistknowledge
about international relations that was central to the behavioral revolution.
Somewhatbroader in focus, postmodernismquestionsnot only the basisfor
the development of knowledge, but also the nature, meaning, and value of
modernity itself, based as it is on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.
Modernization, owing from the Enlightenment principles, has represented
progress
leadingperhaps
ultimatelyto perfection,
assuggested,
for example,
in
utopian theory,addressed
in later chapters.The postmodernistrejectsthe in-
evitability, eventhe idea, of progress,or the notion that history is moving with
meaning toward any specic goal, including the perfection inherent in the
Enlightenment thoughtthat forms the intellectualcore of modernity.Instead,
progress,if it comesat all, will betheproductof discontinuity. Therefore,to the
postmodernist, unacceptable restrictionsto intellectualinquiry resultwhen the
methodological rigidity of the natural sciencesis applied to the social sciences;
further, the paradigmson which theoretical developmenthas beenpremisedare
similarly constraining.Instead,postpositivism,with postempiricistand postmod-
ernistemphasis,
celebratesdiversity,bothmethodologically
andconceptually. For
thepostmodernist,modernitywasneitherinevitablenor necessary, but simplythe
productof a particularperiodof Europeanhistory.In turn, this erahasshaped
theconceptionof realityon whichour social-science
theorieshavebeenbased.
To the postmodernist,existingparadigmsrepresenta particular view of
the world and, as such, preclude, or greatly restrict, the possibility of alterna-
tive waysof constructingreality.Upon suchparadigms,we basethe factsthat
shapeour theoreticalunderstandingof the world. Thus,theoryis the product
of our perception of reality, basedon cognition. The theories on-which we rely
shapethe way in which we seethe world and inuencethe data that we de-
velop or obtain in the processof conductingour research.~How
we Viewthe
world is also inuenced by language,how we communicatewhat we construct
as reality. A paradigm that produces a realist (or other) theory has important
implicationsfor policy and other action,basedon the assumptions
contained
in the theory about suchphenomenaas power.Accordingto the postmod-
ernist, realityincluding modernism itselfis socially constructed and cre-
ated by humans within a specic context and time. Other structures than
thosethat presentlyexistcould havebeendeveloped.How and why thoseso-
cially constructedstructurescameabout is relatedto the questionof who
makessuchchoices.A major focusof postmodernistthoughtis-theidentity of
those who make the choices on which reality is socially constructed. This fo-
cus leadsto issuesof authority structure, its ideological basis,and implications
of gender for social structures. What is regarded as important and what is
considered insignicant are determined by the identity of those making the
choicesthat producethe sociallyconstructedreality of the day.An emerging
literature of feminist international-relations theory, within this postmodernist
context,pointsto themaleidentitydominancein shapingthe reality on which
theoryis based.8Constructivist
theoryis considered
insubsequent
chapters
40 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

because it cutsacrossa broadspectrum of earlytwenty-rstcenturyinterna-

tionalrelations theory.(Feministtheories aretreatedin Chapter4.) According
to this approach, the politicsof identitywhetherbasedon suchfactorsas
masculinity, femininity,ethnicity,race,religion,age,generation,
or ideology-
needto beaddressedaspart of a postmodernistcritiqueof modernityasit has
beenshapedby the Enlightenment.
Postmodernismrepresentsa deconstructionof existingtheory, without
putting any clearly developedalternative in its place. It is consideredto be crit-
ical theorythat doesnot providenecessary criteria or prioritiesfor construct-
ing an alternativeparadigmor evenan adequatebasisfor developingalterna-
tive theory.In celebratingdiversity,postmodernism, accordingto YosefLapid,
whencarriedto its logicalconclusion,represents a form of epistemological an-
archythatwouldgiveequalemphasis
to nearlyanyapproach.
In thiscase,he
asserts,the result may be theoretical proliferation without theoretical
growth.119
Takinga differentperspective,
RichardK. Ashleyand R. B. J.
Walkercontendthatthecomplexityof theglobalsetting,with its burgeoning
problemsand challenges to existingstructures,theory,andknowledge,creates
the needfor new thinking that questionsall presumptivelysovereigncenters
of interpretationand judgment and thereforewelcomesthe dissidenceof
postmodernism.12°
Suchinternational
fermentis regarded
astheessential
pre-
requisiteto the developmentof alternativetheoriesof internationalrelations.
Postmodernism itself, however,asJohn A. Vasquezasserts,containsa logical
contradictionin its assumptionthat reality is a socialconstructionin which
thereareno permanenttruths. In this case,postmodernism itself must alsobe
nothingmorethana socialconstruction that hasno immanent truth.If post-
modernismis correctthatthereis no enduringexplanation
of historyor inter-
national behaviorovervasttime periods,then the postmodernisteffort to set
forthsuchanexplanation
is itselffundamentally
awed.121
Barry Buzan,after examiningvarioustheoreticalparadigmsthe realist,
liberal,Marxist,Grotian(ashe designatesthe EnglishSchool,associated
with MartinWightandHedleyBull,whichemphasizes international
society),
andpostmodernistconcludes that realism,despiteall theattacksuponit by
dissentersand radicals, remains the cornerstone of much theoretical debate
within the disciplineandstill providesa solidstartingpoint for the con-
structionof grandtheory.Headmitsthattheinsightsof realists, thoughsub-
stantial,maynot betimeless, but hefaultsthecriticsof realismfor failingto
do thehistoricalresearch.
requiredto testthe theoryadequately. On a more
hopefulnote,Buzanseesno reasonwhymuchof thepost-modern discourse
cannoteventuallybemergedinto realism.122

TRADITIONAL THEORY: BALANCE OF POWER

The oldest,most persistent,and most controversialof all theoriesof interna-
tionalpoliticsthebalance
of powerwasrecognized
at leastimplicitlyin an-
cient India and in ancientGreece,althoughit was neverformally articulated.
David Hume noted that althoughthe term balanceof power was associated
 TRADITIONALTHEORY:BALANCEOF POWER 4]

with the state systemof Europe, the maxim of preservingthe balanceof

poweris foundedsomuchon commonsense
andobviousreasoning
that it is
impossibleit could altogetherhaveescapedantiquity, concludingthat it had
beenpracticed
fromancienttimesto theeighteenthcentury.123
Insofar as it could be calleda formal theory of internationalpolitics, the
modern concept of balanceof power was associatedwith the Newtonian con-
ceptionof a universein equilibrium.Actually,the notion of equilibriumis ba-
sic to many sciences.Chemistsspeakof a solution in stable equilibrium.
Economistsperceivea balanceof countervailingforces,such as supply and
demand. Biologists warn against human activities that disturb the balance of
nature betweenorganismsand environment.Political writers often analyze
the interactionof interestgroupsor of governmentalbrancheswithin national
societyin termsof checksand balances.124
Naturally,theoristsof interna-
tional social reality employbalanceas a central organizingconceptfor the
powerrelationsof nation-states and then assumethat the latter aredriven,al-
most by a law of their own nature,to seektheir securityby someform of
power balancing.

Balance of Power: Problems of Denition

The term balanceof power has beenroundly criticizedfor causingconsider-

able semantic and denitional confusion. Ernst B. Haas found several distinct
meaningsfor the term, suchas any distribution of power,equilibriumor bal-
ancingprocess,stability and peacein a concertof power,power politics in
general,
a universal
lawof history,a system,
andguideto policymakers.12
The trouble with the balanceofpower, wrote Inis L. Claude,Jr., is not
thatit hasno meaning,
butthatit hastoo manymeanings.
Hefoundit exas-
peratingthat the termcanconnoteeitheran automaticandsélf-regulatingsys-
tem or a policy wholly dependenton manipulationby shrewdpolitical lead-
ers. Claudeconcludedthat the conceptof the balanceof power is extremely
difficultto analyze
because
thosewhowrite aboutit.not onlyfail to provide
precisecluesasto its meaningbut often slide blissfullyfrom oneusageof the
term to anotherand backagain,frequentlywithout postingany warningthat
plural meaningsexist.12
Nevertheless,it is theoreticallypossibleto conceiveof the balanceof
power as a situation or condition, as a universal tendency or law of state be-
havior,as a guidefor stateleadership,and as a modeof systemmaintenance
that is characteristicof certaintypesof internationalsystems.As long as we
think in termsof equilibriumratherthan of superiority,thesefour usagesneed
not be inconsistent with each other. Conceived as a situation or a condition,
balanceof powerimpliesan objectivearrangementin which thereis relatively
widespreadsatisfactionwith the distribution of powerand statesare not un-
duly concernedabout security.The universaltendencyor law describesa
probability and enablesone to predict that membersof a systemthreatened
by the emergenceof a disturber of the balancethat is, a power seemingly
bent on establishing an international hegemonywill form a countervailing
42 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

coalition. Balanceof power as a policy guideprescribesto stateleaderswho

would act rationally that they shouldmaintain eternalvigilanceand be pre-
paredto organizea countervailingcoalition againstthe disrupterof equilib-
rium. Balanceof poweras a systemrefersto a multinationalsocietyin which
all essentialactorspreservetheir identity,integrity,and independence
through
thebalancing
process.127

Balance of Power: Purposesand Functions

Variouspurposesand.functions
wereattributedto thebalanceof powerin clas-
sical theory, as expounded by Bolingbroke, Gentz, Metternich, and Castle-
reagh.It was supposedto (1) preventthe establishment of a universalhege-
mony,(2) preservethe constituentelementsof the systemandthe systemitself,
(3) ensurestability and,mutual security in the international system,and
(4) strengthenandprolongthepeaceby deterringwarthat is, by confronting
an aggressorwith the likelihood that a policy of expansion would meet with
the formationof a countercoalition.Thetraditionalmethodsandtechniquesof
maintainingor restoringthe balancewere (1) the policy of divide and rule
(working to diminishthe weight of the heaviersideby aligning,if necessary,
with the weakerside),(2) territorial compensationsaftera war, (3) creationof
buffer states,(4) formationof alliances,(5) spheresof inuence,(6) interven-
tion, (7) diplomaticbargaining,(8) legaland peacefulsettlementof disputes,
(9) reduction of armamerits,(10) armamentscompetition or races, and
(11) war itself, if necessary,to maintain or restore the balance.
If the balance
of powerhadworkedperfectlyaspoliticalleadershoped,
and if the existingdistributionof powerhad posedno threatto their national
security,thenthe balanceof powerassituation,law, policy,and systemwould
almostcertainlyhavecontributedto the prolongationof peace.However,the
dynamicsof the international political systemwere conduciveneither to
serenestability nor to prudent rational decision making at all times.
Moreover,stateleaderspursuingonly what they consideredtheir own legiti-
mate national interesta term closelyassociatedwith the balance-of-power
systemmayhaveappearedxin the eyesof other leadersof stateasconspiring
to overturn the internationalsystemand gain predominance.Conversely,a
governmentembarkedon a hegemonialpath might not provokethe formation
of a countercoalitionuntil it wastoo lateto preventa large-scalewar declared
to restorethe balance.In theory,the balancehelpedpreservethe peaceand
identity of memberstates,but in practice,balanceofpower policy sometimes
led to war andto the partitioningof lessessentialactors(suchasPolandin the
1799s).However,keepingthe peaceand preservingall the lessermembersin-
tact were subordinategoalsto the more fundamentalaimsof preservingthe
multistatesystemby observingthe maxim expressed by FriedrichGentz,:If
the statessystemof Europeis to exist and be maintainedby commonexer-
tions no oneof its membersmusteverbecomeso powerfulasto be ableto co-
erceall the restput together. 128
 TRADITIONALTHEORY:BALANCEOF POWER 43

Another key conceptin the classicaltheorymust be mentioned.For vari-

ousreasons, whenthebalance is on thevergeof breakingdown,animpartial
andvigilantholderof thebalance emerges, strongenoughto restorethebal-
ance.Historically,Englandplayedthisrolein theEuropean statesystem. In a
famousmemorandum publishedon January1, 1907,Sir EyreCrowewrote
that it had becomealmosta historicaltruismto identifyEnglands secular
policywith the maintenance of this balanceby throwingherweightnow in
thisscaleandnowin that,but everon thesideopposed to thepoliticaldicta-
torshipof the strongestsinglestateor groupat a giventime.129Winston
Churchillreiteratedthis asa fundamental tenetof Britishforeignpolicyin
1936.130 Accordingto HenryKissinger, whoseownstatecraft wasbasedon
balance-of-power principles,
thebalance of powerserves to restricttheability
of statesto dominateeachotherandto limit thescopeof conflicts.Its goalis
not somuchpeaceasit is moderation on thepartof states,leadingto stabil-
ity. Kissingerviewsthe balanceof powernot as an automaticmechanismbut
instead one of two possibleoutcomesof a situation in which statesare
obligedto dealwith eachother.One"statecanbecomeso powerfulthat it
dominates theothers,or elsethe pretensions
of themostaggressive
member
of theinternational
community arekeptin checkbya combination
of theoth-
ers;in otherwords,by theoperationof a balanceof power,chosenby pru-
dent leaders. 131

Critiques of Balance of Power

For manygenerations,
the balanceof powerhasencounteredcriticismfor rea-
sonsotherthanthesemantic
ambiguities
mentionedearlier.
Nicholas
J.Spykman
heldthatthetheoryinadequately
explainedthepractice: II
Thetruth of thematteris that statesareinterestedonlyin a balance
(imbalance)
whichis in theirfavor.Not anequilibrium, but a generousmarginistheirobjec-
tive.Thereis norealsecurity,
in beingjustasstrongasa potentialenemy; therelis
securityonly in beinga little stronger.Thereis no possibilityof action if ones
strengthis fullychecked;
thereis a chance
for a positiveforeignpolicyonlyif there
is a marginof forcewhichcanbefreelyused.132
Althoughthe balanceof powerhasits placein realisttheory,HansJ.
Morgenthau
foundthebalanceof powerdecientonseveral
grounds. Themul-
tistatesystemprecludinga singlestatefrom achievinguniversaldoininionhas
beenpreserved onlyat thepriceof frequentandcostlywars.He heldthatthe
balance of powerwas(1) uncertainbecause no completely
reliablemeansof
measuring, evaluating, andcomparing powerexist;(2) unrealbecause state
leaderstry to compensate for its uncertaintyby aimingfor superiority;and
(3)inadequate for explaining nationalrestraintduringmostof theyearsfrom
1648to 1914because it doesnotgivesufcientcreditto therestraining
inuence
of thebasicintellectualunityandmoralconsensus thenprevailing
in Europe.133
ErnstB. Haashasobserved that usingthebalanceofipowerasa policy
guideassumes a highdegreeof flexibility in nationaldecisionmaking.The
44 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

vigilant political leadermust engagein a constantpower calculusand be

ready to enter into a countervailingcoalition, regardlessof ideologicaldif-
ferences, economic interests, and domestic political attitudes. Haas had
questionedthe degreeto which policymakers, especiallyin democratic
countries,can enjoy the kind of exibility that the balance-of-powertheory
would seemto dernand.13_&#39;4
It shouldbe pointedout, however,that the
AngloAmericandemocraciesmanagedsufficiently to overcometheir aver-
sion to communism in World War II to enable them to align with the Soviet
Union againstNazi Germany.In the secondgenerationof the Cold War,the
United States adopted a balance-of-powerapproach, especially during
Henry KissingerstenureasU.S.National SecurityAdvisor and Secretaryof
State, vis-a-vis the PeoplesRepublic of China and the Soviet Union. What
evolved was a better relationship with both China and the Soviet Union
than either Beijing or Moscow could have had with each other. In other
words, the United Statesattemptedto exploit the SinoSovietrift to develop
a de facto alignmentwith China, the weaker of the two sides,againstthe
Soviet Union as a means of restraining Moscows hegemonic strategies and
ambitions.
Kenneth N. Waltz defendsthe balance-of-power theory against those crit-
ics.who, in his view, have misunderstood certain crucial points. Every theory,
he argued,mustbeginwith someassumptions. He assumed that statesareuni-
tary actorsthat seek,at a minimum, to preservethemselves
and, at a maxi-
mum, to dominate others if possible. They strive to achieve their objectives
throughinternalefforts(e.g.,increasing
capabilities)
andexternalefforts(e.g.,
strengtheningtheir own allianceand weakeningthat of the adversary).He
then addsthe conditionthat statesare operatingin a self-helpsystemwith no
superiorreferee.Thosewhodo not help themselves while othersdo will be-
comedisadvantaged. _InWaltzstheory of structuralrealism,the balanceof,
power is rooted inescapablyand necessarilyin the internationalsystemof
states.Thus,he partscompanywith other theoristsof the balanceof power-
Hume, Churchill,.Organski,Morgenthau,Haas,Kissinger,and otherswho
haveheldthat the balanceof-power policy is somethingto befollowedvolun-
tarily by wiseandprudentpoliticalleaders.
ForWaltz,the tendency
toward
equilibrium is automatic, regardlessof whether some or all statescconsciously
aim to establish and maintain a balance, or whether someor all statesaim for
universaldomination. Waltzwanteda theory applicableto the international
system
irrespective
of thebehaviorofrparticular
states.135

Balanceof Power:Contemporary
Models
Arthur LeeBurns,after studyingthe problem,ofthe systemin stablebalance,
concludesthat the moststablearrangement would seemto be a world of ve
or somegreaterodd numberof Powers,independentand of approximately
equalstrength, becausethesepowerswould not be readilydivisibleinto two
equalsides.135
Forsimplicity,
in calculating
relationships,
andfor thecertainty
and stability that suchsimplicitywould yield, Burnsheld that, optimally,the
 TRADITIONALTHEORY:BALANCEOF POWER 45

moststablesystemwouldbea world of ve roughlyequalblocs,eachin-

cludinga family of exchangeable
client*nations.137
Later, R. HarrisonWagnerarguedthat any numberof actorsfrom two
throughve canproducea stablesystem, butthatthemoststablesystem
is one
withthreeactors.138
Several
analystsin theeld of nuclear
deterrence
andarms-
control
theoryupdated
andcastintohighlysophisticated
formsthecategories
of
balance-of-power
thinking.139
Also,althoughmanyintellectuals
andacademi-
ciansregardthebalance-of-power
theoryasa crude,unsophisticated,
naively
simplistic,or obsolete
theoryof international
politics,largenumbersof state
leaders,
politicians,
diplomats,
pundits,
journalists,
andpeople-in-the-street
still
regard
it asanadequate explanation
of whatactually
happens
in theinterna-
tionalsystem
andthebasisonwhichforeignpolicyoughtto beformulated
and
conducted.
Thetheoryretained
a charmanda validityfor analysts
of strategic-
armslimitations
andothers
duringtheColdWarconcerned withtherelationship
of theUnitedStates,
theSovietUnion,China,Western Europe,
Japan,andother
potentialpowercenters
in theglobalsystem.In theaftermath
of theColdWar,
theUnitedStateshasfocusedstrategic
attentiononregions
of majorinterest,
in-
cluding
Southwest
AsiaandNortheast
Asia.A majorobjectofU.S.security
strat-
egyhasbeen
to assure
a formof equilibrium
and,principally,
to prevent
Iraqor
Iranfromdominating
thePersian
Gulfor to restrain,
if necessary,
NorthKoreain
theKoreanpeninsula
andChinavis-avis
Taiwan.
ThusthepostCold
War
worldprovidesanamplecontextfor theconceptualdiscussion
of thebalance
of
power.Russia,China,Europe,India,Japan,andothercountriesareboundat
timesto contemplate
realigning,
at leaston someissues,
against
U.S.hegemony.

Can
There
BeaScientic
International
Theory?
I-Iaving
discussed
thetraditionalistbehavioralist
controversy
asoneof the
majordebates
of international-relations
theoryandthepostmodernist
critique
of positivism,we returnto thequestionof the extentto whichtherecan,or
cannot,bescienticinternationalrelations
theory.Themeaning of scienticis
relative.
Thetermscience
connotes
nothingmorethana bodyof knowledge
anda wayof discovering
newknowledge.
Whateversatises
intelligent
hu-
manbeingsin anyageasthe optimummeansof enlarging their intellectual
frontierswill passmusterasbeingscientic.
Genuine scienticprogressis usuallymadewhenonestartsout by accept-
ingthatbodyof knowledge of theeld alreadygenerally
acceptedbyscholars,
but not necessarily
uncritically.
Individuals
maywishto reorganize somewhat
theexistingbodyof knowledgeto enhance
theirownworkingcomprehension
of it. Nonetheless,
theindividual
musttakesomething
asgiven-something
al-
readybasedon empiricalobservation,
experience,
deduction,
andhumanre-
ection.If learning
issocial,
theindividual
cannot
begin
every
dayto create
the universe de novo.
Havingmasteredthe existingknowledge,and organizedit for some
purpose,the investigator
pleadsa meaningfulignorance:Here is what I
know;whatdo I not knowthatis worthknowing?Thisis a veryimportant
46 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

question.Oncean areahasbeenselectedfor investigation,the questionshould

beposedasclearlyaspossible,andit is herethat quanticationcanproveuse-
ful,14°providedthat mathematicalmethodsare combinedwith carefullycon-
structedtheories,hypotheses, or researchquestions.Achievinga satisfactory
mergerof appropriatetools of analysiswith solidtypologiesis oneof the most
difcult aspectsof formulating a worthwhile and testablehypothesisin the
realmof political reality,wherethe nameswe call thingsandthe wordswe use
areof crucialimportance.Surveyingthe eld of internationalrelations,or any
sectorof it, we seemany disparateelementsand keepsifting them through
variouspermutations
in our minds,wondering
whethertheremaybeanysig-
nicant relationshipsbetweenA and B or betweenB and C. By a processthat
we arecompelled
to call intuition until welearnmuchmoreaboutit than
we now know,we perceivea possiblecorrelation,hithertounsuspected or not
rmly known, betweentwo or more elements.At this point, we havethe in-
gredientsof a hypothesisthat can be expressedin measurablereferentsand
that, if validated,would be both explanatoryand predictive.In the strictest
scientic sense,Carl Hempelinsisted,what we cannotpredictwe cannotfully
explain,141 but that is an extremelydemandingand seldomachievedcriterion
of explanation
in the socialsciences.
Accordingto Hempel,an eventcanbe
explainedby coveringit undera generallaw, specifyingantecedent
conditions
and explainingan observed
eventby a processof deduction.Accordingto
SteveSmith, however,David Hume demolishedthe notion of necessary
causes,reducingthem to constant conjunctions of antecedentand conse-
quence.Causationis reducedto mere statisticalcorrelation.Evenwhen we
canpredict,we still cannotalwaysexplain.Hempelscoveringlaw model
. . cantell uswhatwemightexpectto happen,but notwhyit happens.142
Nevertheless,manyhistoriansand moretraditionally orientedsocialscientists
considerit easierto nd a satisfactoryexplanationas to why somethingdid
happen,after the fact, than to predictit in advance.
From hereon, the scienticmethodbecomes morefamiliar.The hypothe-
sismust be tested.This testingdemandsthe constructionof an experimentor
the gatheringof data in other ways.In eithercase,everyeffort must be made
to eliminate the inuence of the unknown and to make certain that the evi-
dencesoughtpertainsto the hypothesisand to nothingelse.The resultsof the
data-gatheringeffort are carefully observed,recorded,and analyzed,after
which the hypothesisis discarded,modied, reformulated,or conrmed.
Findingsare published,and others are invited to replicatethis knowledge-
discoveringadventureand to conrm or denythe ndings. This, very roughly,
is what we usuallymeanby the scientic method.At everystepof the way,
thereis emphasis
on precisionof thoughtandlanguage
andon a distinction
betweenwhat is assumedand what is empirically testable.
Application of scientic methodduring the past 250 yearshasproduced
impressiveresultsin the physicalsciences
in the form of generalizedlaws. In
physics,astrophysics,chemistry,biology,and certain areasof psychology,a
high degreeof predictabilityhasbeenachieved.Eventhe exactsciences, how-
ever,with all their powerful methodologies,reach limits to what can be
 TRADITIONAL
THEORY:
BALANCE
OFPOWER 47

knownat anygivenmoment.Accordingto WernerHeisenbergs

principleof
indeterminacy,
for example,
it is not possible
to determine
simultaneously
both the position and the movementof a particleof matter.143
In all the sci-
ences,
physicalandsocial,wend that our effortsto measure
a phenomenon
maydislocate
orchange
thethingwearetryingto measure.
Surveyors
of pub-
lic opinion arewell awareof this phenomenon;
somehavebeenknown to ma-
nipulateit to their own purposes.

The Search for Recurring Patterns

Ariyone claiming to be a scientic theorist, whether traditional or future-
orientedbehavioral,is boundto searchfor regularities. Nonetheless, we
shouldremember that peculiardifcultiesconfrontall socialscientists,
andif
wekeepthesein mind,wearemorelikelyto makeintellectual progressthanif
we ignoreor forgetthem.Socialscientists studyinghumanaffairsencounter
problemsconcerning therelationof theobserver to theobserved to a greater
degreethanscientistsstudyingatoms,molecules, or stars.Physicalscientists
requirecertaininstrumentsandtechniques that arefairly standardized and
thatworkin thesamewayfor all observers. Physicalscientists,
nomatterhow
excitedthey might be abouttheir work, usuallyavoid the kind of emotional
involvement with theobservedphenomenon thatmightinuencetheirpercep-
tion andjudgment.In theinvestigation of humansociety,objectiveobserva-
tion is muchmorelikelyto beinfusedwith subjective purpose.A physicistor
a chemistwho happens to be an ardentpacifistin personaloutlookis not
proneto beswayed bythisconvictionin theanalyticapproach
to themores-
sionableatoms,ascomparedwith otheratoms.However,socialscientistswho
havestrongpreconceptions aboutsuchsubjectsaswar,terrorism,national
values,world populationandhunger,disarmament, internationalorganiza-
tion, or the conict between democracies and dictatorships
aremuchmore
likelyto run into difcultyin theireffortsto achieve
thecomplete detachment
that the scientic methodpresupposes.
(Thereis no needfor socialscientists
to apologize
for thishumaninvolvement.)
Althoughthemethodis supposed
to be value-free,the phenomenonbeing examinedis often overladenwith
valueimplications
that inuencetheintellectualandpsychological
setof the
observer-analyst.
Socialscientistshardly agreeon which of thesetwo attitudes
produces
thegreaterperceptual
distortionin thestudy,let ussay,of theprob-
lemsof war andpeace:a purelyneutralor nonethicaldesireto understandhu-
managgressiveness for thepurpose of explainingit andpredicting
its manifes-
tations,or a moralcommitment to studywar,with a Viewtowardabolishing it
to maketheworlda betterplace.Undoubtedly, theorybuildingwill continue
to be characterizedby the interpenetrationof thesetwo distinctpurposes,
both within individual minds and within the eld as a whole.144
The peculiaritiesof the relationshipbetweenthe observerand observedin
the socialsciencesgive rise to additional difculties. Someof theseare well
knownandfrequently
cited,suchastheinabilityto conductcontrolledexper-
imentsto isolatethe factorsbeingstudied.Eventhe mostruthlesstotalitarian
48 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

regime,whateverthe efficiencyof the technicalmeansof socialcontrol at its

disposal,would be extremelyhard pressedto conducta strictly controlledsci-
entic experimentwith a singlenation,not to mentiontwo or more.The point
is that in attemptingto studyanylargesocialaggregates
scientically,the con-
ditions of control for the sake of exactitude must be established primarily
through the clarication of onesown thought processes, rather than in the
confusingand uncontrollablesocialuniverse.
Other problemsare lessreadilyrecognized.Giventhe comprehensiveness
of the eld, the sheermassof pertinentdataseemsto exceedthe boundsof hu-
man mastery.Many dataareinaccessible and remainso eitherfor a very long
time (in governmentalarchives)or forever (in the minds of individualswho
forget or die beforethey transmitto scholarsall that they know about what
really happened).The scholarand theorist,therefore,oftenarrivesat general-
ized conclusionsfrom sketchyevidencethat might be unreliableon grounds
quite apartfrom its incompleteness. At the sametime, the informationrevolu-
tion is enhancingour ability to gain accessto data.On-linesourcessuchasthe
Internetprovidedirectaccess to vastinformationsourcesin manypartsof the
world without the userhavingto leavehomeor ofce, library or laboratory.
There is also the problem of language,in which all theory must be
couched. Even the exact sciences have not been immune from difficulties in re-
lating languageto observation,or verbalsymbolsto experience.It is inaccu-
rate to say that the exactsciences requirequantitativesymbols,whereasthe
socialsciencesrely on qualitativesymbols:Everyphysicalscienceand every
socialsciencerequiresomeempiricalfoundation,and the methodis not em-
pirical unlessit entailsthe essentialfunctionsof namingand counting.In all
the sciences,countingis a very simplething. An importantseparatorbetween
the physicalsciencesand the social sciencesis the realm of qualitative lan-
guage,or the namingprocess.No one debatesthe meaningof suchterms as
liquid, vapor,magnetic,electricallycharged,sodiumchloride,or nuclears-
sion. However,in analyzingthe socialuniverse,we constantlyfacetermssuch
as democratic,aggressive, revolutionary,illegal, discriminatory,violent, and
the conceptof the stateitself.Wehavealreadynotedthemultiplemeaningsat-
tachedto the term balanceof power.Not one of thesetermsis investedwith
completesemanticclarity.Thus,althoughall socialscientistscancount,and a
greatmany understandthe processof statisticallycorrelatingdependentand
independentvariables,or of performingfactor analysis,thereis reasonto be-
lievethat the basisof agreement on what is beingcountedor measuredin the
field of international relations is very narrow and precarious indeed.

CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this chapter has been to show generally how the study of in-
ternationalrelationshasevolved,in order to setthe stagefor examiningthe
major theories, past and present, in detail.
 CONCLUSION 49

In QuincyWrightsmajorwork,A Studyof International Relations, after

admittingthatinternational relationsis still an emerging
discipline
manifest-
ing little unityfromthepointof viewof methodandlogic,145hesuggested
thattheeld mightbestbeunderstood if approachedthroughfour basicintel-
lectualperspectives.In his opinion,all socialrealitycanbeconveniently di-
videdinto four categories:

1. the actual~-whatwas or what is, known through the methodof de-

scription
2. the possiblewhat can be, known through the methodof theoretical
speculation
3. theprobableWhatwill be,knownthroughthemethodof prediction
4. thedesirablewhatoughtto be,knownthroughthemethodof ethi-
cal, valuational, or normative reection

Thesefourcategories,
saysWright,correspond
to history,art,science,
and
philosophy.145
Theauthors
nd thiscategorization
to beusefulin thinking
aboutthevariousmeanings
of international-relations
theory.
Tosumup,theessential
functionof internationaltheoryis to enableusto
improveour knowledgeconcerninginternationalreality,whetherfor the sake
of pureunderstanding or for themoreactivepurposeof changingthatreality.
Theoryhelpsusto orderour existingknowledgeand to discovernewknowl-
edgemoreefciently.It providesa frameworkof thoughtin whichwe dene
researchprioritiesandselectthemostappropriateavailable
toolsfor thegath-
eringand analysisof data about phenomena.Theorydirectsour attentionto
signicant similaritiesand differencesand suggestsrelationships
not previ-
ouslyperceived.At its best,theoryserves
asa proofthatthepowersof thehu-
manmindhavebeenappliedto a problemat handwith foresight,imagina-
tion, and profundity,and this proof inspiresothersto further effortsfor
purposeseitherof agreeingor disagreeing.
Thereis no onemodelfor theory.Socialtheorizingoccursat manylevels
and\through manydisciplinaryperspectives,
with several experimentsat.inter
disciplinaryapproachesunderway.International theory,which» goes.beyond
foreign-policy
theory,containscomponentsthatareintended tobe descriptive,
speculative,
explanatory,
predictive,
andnormative. singlescholarmayem-
phasize anyoneof these,but themorehighlydeveloped theeld.of interna-
tionaltheoryasa wholebecomes, themore» likelywill it involvea synthesisof
whatis, whatmightbe,whatprobablywill be,andwhatoughtto be.Good
theory may be inductiveor deductive;micro or macro;highly specic,
midrange,or grand,in the senseof beingascomprehensive
asthestate of our
knowledge
at anygiventimepermitsandof explaining asiwidea numberof
phenomena
with asfewvariables
asnecessary.
All of theseapproaches
maybe
validandusefulwhenhandled
withintelligence
andmethodological
careand
whenappliedto theappropriate
level,or levels,of analysis
in thestudyof in-
ternational relations.
50 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOTES

1.

2.
John Lewis Gaddis,Toward the PostColdWar World, ForeignAffairs, 70
(Spring 1991), 102-103.
FrancisFukuyama,The End of History? The National Interest (Summer
1989), 3-5, 8-15, 18. Fukuyama,following in the philosophicalfootstepsof
Hegel,as interpretedby the Russianémigréto ParisAlexandreKoujéve,pre-
dicted that henceforth the movement of the civilized world would be ineluctably
toward a universal state of liberal democracy and bourgeois consumerism. He
elaboratedhis thesisin TheEnd of History and the Last Man (New York: Free
Press, 1992).
JosephS. Nye,Jr., What New World Order?ForeignAffairs, 71 (Spring
1992),84. SeealsoStanleyHoffmann,Delusionsof World Order, in StevenL.
Spiegel
andDavidJ.Pervin,
eds.,At Issue:
Politics
in theWorldArena,7thed.
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1994).
John Mueller,Retreatfrom Doomsday:The Obsolescence of Major War (New
York: BasicBooks,1989).In a reviewof that book, Carl Kaysenhasconcluded
that, althoughtechnologicaland economicchangessincethe nineteenthcentury
havemadewar amongindustrialpowersso muchmorehumanlycostly,physi-
callydestructive,
economically
unprotable,
andopposed
to thepoliticalgoalsof
democraticpublics,nevertheless, a certainculturelag affectsgovernmentaland
politicalelites.In Kaysens
view,eventhoughconscious attitudestowardwar have
changed,
war hasnot yet cfuitebecome
subrationally
unthinkable.Is War
Obsolete? International Security, 14 (Spring 1990), 42-64; quotation on p. 43.
Michael Howard, The Lessonsof History (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press,1991), p. 176.
Charles
W.Kegley,
Jr.,ed.,TheLongPostwarPeace:
Contending
Explanations
and Projections(New York: Harper Collins, 1991),Introduction,p. 8. Kegley
citesRuth LegerSivard,.WorldMilitary and SocialExpenditures(Washington,
DC: World Priorities,1989),p. 23.
ZbigniewBrzezinski,SelectiveGlobal Commitment,ForeignAffairs,70 (Fall
1991),5. His adviceto makersof foreignpolicy,not incompatiblewith that of
JohnLewisGaddis,wasto pursuea courseof functionallypragmatictransna-
tionalism. Ibid.
. Samuel
P.,I-iuntington,
Nd Exit:TheErrorsof Endism,TheNationalInterest
10.Samuel
(Fall 1989).
P. Htintington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, 72
(Summer1993),22-49, quotedat p; 22.
11. Ibid., 25-29. (Huntingtonis discussed
further in Chapter2.)
Seethe symposiumOn TheClashof Civilizations. (FouadAjami; Robert
L. Bartley,Liu Binyan,JeaneJ. Kirkpatrick-,KishoreMahbtibani,GerardPiel,
and Albert L. Weeks),ForeignAffairs, 72 (September/October 193),?22:6;
Arnold Toynbee,War and Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press,
1950).Also,M. F.AshleyMontagu,ed.,Tpynbee
andHistory:CriticalEssays
and Reviews (Boston: Porter SargentPublisher, 1956).
12. FouadAjami,The Summoning,
ForeignAffairs,72 (September/Octobe
1993),2-9, quotedat p. 9. Samuel
P.Huntingtonreiterated
hispositionthat
there is no better framework than the civilizatiohal for understandingthe
 132

14.
NOTES 51
15.
StephenM. Walt, International Relations: One World, Many Theories,
16.Ibid., 31, 38. Relations,(Spring1998),30.
International

Ibid., 32, 38.

Ibid., 33-34.
17. Ibid., 40.
18. Ibid., 43.
19. Samuel
P.Huntington,
TheLonely
Superpower,
Foreign
Affairs,
78(February
March1999),
35-49.Huntington
contrasts
theU.S.viewof itsownroleasco-
operative
leader
ofinternational
community
interests
withother
powers percep-
tionsoftheUnited
States
asawouldbe
hegemonic
power.
Forearlier
analyses
of
theunipolarsystem,
seeJohnMearsheimer,
WhyWeWill SoonMissthe
ColdWar,AtlanticMonthly,
266 (1990),
35-50;Charles
W.Kegley,Jr.,and
Gregory
A. Raymond, MustWeFeara PostCold
WarMultipolarSystem?
journalof ConictResolution,
36 (September
1992),
573-585;
Christophe
Layne,The UnipolarIllusion:Why New GreatPowersWill Rise,
InternationalSecurity,17 (Spring1993),5-51.
20. Imre Lakatos,TheMethodology of ScienticResearch
Programs, Vol. I
(London:
CambridgeUniversity
Press,
1978),
p.32(Emphasis
in original).
21. JohnLewisGaddis,International
Relations
TheoryandtheEndof theCold
War,International
Security,17(Winter1992/1993),
6.
22. Thucydides,
The History of the Peloponnesian
War, trans. Rex Warner
(Harmondsworth,
England: Penguin
Books,1954).SeealsoWilliamT. Bluhm,
Theories
of thePoliticalSystem:
Classics
of PoliticalThoughtandModern
Political
Analysis
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:Prentice
Hall,1965),
chap.
2;John
H.
Finley,
Jr.,Thucydides
(Cambridge,
MA:Harvard
University
Press,
1942);
Peter
J.
Fliess,
Thucydides
andthePolitics
of Bipolarity
(Baton
Rouge:
Louisiana
State
University
Press,
1966).RobertGilpin,Kenneth
Waltz,andRobertKeohane
have
claimed
Thucydides
asaforerunner
ofneorealism.
Foracontrary
view,
see
Daniel
Garst,
Thucydides andNeorealism,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
33(March
1989),3-27.Foraninteresting
feminist
approach
to Thucydides,
Hobbes,
and
Machiavelli,
seeJeanBethkeElshtain,Feminist
InquiryandInternational
Relations,
inMichael
W.Doyle
andG.JohnIkenberry,
eds.,
NewThinking
in
International
Relations
Theory(Boulder,
CO.Westvievg Press,~1997),
pp.79-80.
23. Sir HenryStunnerMaine,AncientLau/"(firstpublished
1861;Tucson, AZ:
University
ofArizona
Press,
1986),pp.37-52;R.and&#39;A.J.
Carlyle,
A Historyof
Medieval
PoliticalTheoryin theWest,6 vols.,(London: WilliamBlackwood 8C
Sons,1903-1936), I, pp.23 ff.; H. F.Jolowicz,HistoricalIntroductionto the
StudyofRoman Law(Cambridge,
England:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1932),
pp.46-48;A. P.DEntreves,
NaturalLaw(London:
Hutchi&#39;nsons
University
Library, 1955),pp. 19,24-30.
24. NiccoloMachiavelli,
ThePrinceandtheDiscourses
(NewYork:Random
House
ModernLibrary,1940);JamesBurnham,
TheMachiavellians
(NewYork:
Macmillan,
1956);Friedrich:Meinecke;
Machiauellism:
TheDoctrine
of Raison
52

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.
 NOTES 53

41. praisalof theworkof American historians,

seeWarren1. Cohen,TheAmerican
Revisionists:
TheLessonsof Intervention
in WorldWarI (Chicago:University
of
ChicagoPress,1967).
CarltonJ. H. Hayes,Essayson Nationalism(New York: Macmillan,1926);
42. HansKohn,A HistoryofNationalism
in theEast(London:
George
Routledge,
1932),Nationalismin theSovietUnion(London:George Routledge,
1933),and
TheIdeaof Nationalism (NewYork: Macmillan,1944).
PhilipJ. NoelBaker,Disarmament(NewYork: HarcourtBrace,1926);JamesT.
43. Shotwell,Warasan Instrumentof NationalPolicy(NewYork: HarcourtBrace,
1929); J. W. Wheeler-Bennett,Disarmamentand SecuritySinceLocarno,
1925-1931 (New York: Macmillan, 1932).
ParkerT. Moon,Imperialism andWorldPolitics(NewYork: Macmillan,1926);
44. HerbertI. Priestley,
FranceOverseas:
A StudyofModernImperialism
(NewYork:
Appleton,
1938);|HaroldNicolson,
Peacemaking,
1919 (Boston:
Houghton
Mifin, 1933),andDiplomacy (London: OxfordUniversity
Press,1939).
45. CarlJ. Friedrich,
ForeignPolicyin theMaking:TheSearch for a New Balance of
Power(New York: Norton, 1938); AlfredVagts,The UnitedStatesand the
Balance of Power,Journalof Politics,III (November 1941),401-449.
JamesFairgrieve,Geography and WorldPower(New York: Dutton, 1921);
NicholasJ. Spykman,Geographyand ForeignPolicy,I, AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview,XXXII (February1938), 213-236, and the followingtwo
books:AmericasStrategy in WorldPolitics(NewYork: HarcourtBrace,1942)
andTheGeography of Peace(NewYork: HarcourtBrace,1944).Spykman also
wrotetwo articleswith AbbieA. Rollins,GeographicObjectives in Foreign
46. PolicyI," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview, XXXIII (June1939),391-410,and
47. GeographicObjectives in ForeignPolicyII, ibid. (August1939), 591-614.
Thetheories of MahanandMackinderaretreatedin Chapter4 in thistext.
FrankM. Russell,Theoriesof InternationalRelations
(NewYork:Appleton, 1936).
Sir Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York: G. P. PutnamsSons,1933);
48. Lionel Robbins,EconomicPlanningand InternationalOrder (New York:
Macmillan, 1937); and EugeneStaley,WorldEconomyin Transition(New York:
Councilon ForeignRelations,1939). This is aboutthe 1930s.
Foster Rhea Dulles, Americas Rise to World Power, 1898-1954 (New York:
49. Harper 8c Row, 1963), pp. 158-161. For an excellenttreatment of the di-
chotomy,seeRobert E. Osgood,Ideals and Self-Interestin Americas Foreign
Relations(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1953).
Chris Brown, UnderstandingInternational Relations(New York: St. Martins
Press,1997), pp. 28-29. Brown citesNiebuhrs work, Moral Man and Immoral
Society(NewYork:Scribners,1932).Niebuhrwassignicantbecause
hisphilo-
sophicalviewof sinfulman,basedon theclassics
andscripture,
hadan impact
on the postwarRealistthoughtof Hans J. Morgenthauand GeorgeF. Kennan.
50.the haves
Brownprefers
themainspring
of CarrsRealism(scarcity
of goodswhichdivides
from the have nots) to that of Morgenthau(the will to power
of sinfulhumannature).Brown, p. 32.
51.E. H. Carr,TheTwenty-YearsCrisis,1919-1939:An Introductionto theStudy
Ibid., p. 22.

of International
Relations(London:Macmillan,1939; New York:Harper 86
54 THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
8.Another
excellent
survey
ofE.H.Carrs
work
within
broader
isfound
inTim
Dunne,
Inventing
International
Society:
AHistory
oftheE1lgl1Sl&#39;)
School
(New
York:St.MartinsPress,1998),esp.chap.2.
52. Martin
Wight,Power Politics,
Looking
Forward,
Pamphlet
No.8(London
Royal
Institute
ofInternational
Affairs,
1946),
p.11.
53. HansJ.Morgenthau,
Politics
AmongNations
(NewYork:
Knopf;
several
edi-
tions,
1948-1978;brief
edition
revised
byKenneth
Thompson,
New York:
McGraw-Hill,
1993);
Frederick
L. Schuman,
International
Politics:
An
Introduction
totheWestern
State
System,
4thand5theds.
(NewYork:
McGraw-Hill,
1948,
1953);
Robert
StrauszHupé
andStefan
T. Possony
International
Relations
(NewYork:
McGraw-Hill,
1950,
1954);
NormanD.
Palmer
andHoward
C.Perkins,
International
Relations
(Boston:
Houghton
Mifin,1953,
1957,1969);
NormanJ.Padelford
andGeorge
A.Lincoln,
The
Dynamics
ofInternational
Politics
(NewYork:
Macmillan,
1962);
Ernst
B.Haas
andAllenS.Whiting,Dynamics
of International
Relations
(NewYork:
McGraw-Hill,
1956);
Harold
and Margaret
Sprout,
Foundations
ofNationa
Power(Princeton,
NJ:VanNostrand,1945,1951)andFoundation
of
International
Politics
(Princeton,
N]:Van Nostrand,
1962.);
Quincy
Wright,
The
Study
ofInternational
Relations
(New York:
Appleton-Century-C
1955),
pp.
23-24;CharlesP.Schleicher,
Introduction
toInternational
Relatio
(EnglewoodCliffs,
NJ:Prentice
Hall,1954)
andInternational
Relation
Cooperation
and
Conict
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:
Prentice
Hall,
1962);
Frederi
H.Hartmann,
The
Relations
ofNations
(New York:
Macmillan,
1957,
1962);
A.F.K.Organski,
World
Politics
(New
York: Knopf,
1958);
Lennox
A.Mills
andCharles
H.McLaughlin,
World
Politics
inTransition
(NewYork:
Holt,
Rinehart
and
Winston,
195
6);Fred
Greene,
Dynamics
ofInternational
Relation
(NewYork:Holt,
Rinehart
and Winston,
1964);
W.W.Kulski,
Internatio
Politics
inaRevolutionary
Age(Philadelphia:
Lippincott,
1964,
1967).
Fora
content
analysis
ofsome
later
textbooks
and
other
teaching
materials,
see
Jame
N.RosenauetaI.,OfSyllabi,
Texts,
Students
andScholarship
inInternatio
Relations:
Some DataandInterpretations
ontheState
ofaBurgeoning
Field,
WorldPolitics,
XXIX(January
1977),
263-340.
54.
Fordiscussions
ofefforts
toclarify
thenotionofpower,
see
DavidV.J.Bell,
Power,
Inuence
and
Authority
(NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press,
1975)
Jack
H.Nagel,
The
Descriptive
Analysis
ofPower
(New
Haven,
CT:Yale
University
Press,
1975);
and
David
A.Baldwin,
Power
Analysis
and World
Politics,
World
Politics,
XXXI(January
1979),
161-194.
55.
Horace
V.Harrison,
writing
in1964,
criticized
notonly
thetextbooks
butnearly
allwriting
ininternational
theory
asbeingpartial,
implicit
rather
than
explic
toonarrowly
focused,
designed
toserve
particular
professional
interests,
andin-
capable
ofproviding
aguide either
toresearch
ortoaction.
Headded,
howev
thatsome progress
toward moregeneral
theories
hadbegun since
thelater
19505.
Seehisintroduction
tothebook
heedited,
TheRole
ofTheory
in
International
Relations
(Princeton,
NJ:VanNostrand,
1964),
pp.8-9.
56.
William
T.R.FoxandAnnette
Baker
Fox,
The
Teaching
ofInternatio
Relations
intheUnited
States,
World
Politics,
XIII(July
1961);
339-359.
See
also
Wright,
The Study
ofInternational
Relations,
chaps.
3 and
4;Kirk,
International
Relations
inAmerican
Colleges;
WaldemarGurian,
OntheStudy
ofInternational
Relations,
Review
ofPolitics,
VIII(July
1946),.275
Frederick
L.Schuman,
The
Study
ofInternational
Relations
intheUnited
State
 NOTES 55

Contemporary
PoliticalScience:
A Surveyof Methods,Research
and Training
(Paris:UnitedNationsEducational,Scientic,andCulturalOrganization,1950);
Frederick S. Dunn, The Present Course of International Relations Research,
WorldPolitics,II (October1949),142-146;KennethW. Thompson,The Study
of International Politics, Review of Politics, 14 (October 1952) 433-443;
L. Gray Cowen, Theory and Practice in the Teachingof International Relations
in the United States, in Geoffrey L. Goodwin, ed., The University Teaching of
International Relations (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1951); john Gange,
University Research on International Relations (Washington, DC: American
Councilon Education,1958);RichardN. Swift, WorldAffairs and the College
Curriculum (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1959); Edward
W. Weidner, The World Role of Universities, Carnegie Series in American
Education (New York: McGrawHill, 1962), especiallythe chapters dealing with
studentabroadprograms,exchangeprograms,and internationalprogramsof
university assistance.
57. The appearance
of severalanthologiesin internationaltheoryin the early 1960s
attested to a burgeoning interest in the eld. See William T. R. Fox, ed.,
TheoreticalAspectsof InternationalRelations(Notre Dame,IN: Universityof
Notre Dame Press,1959); Charles A. McClelland, William C. Olson, and Fred
A. Sondermann, eds., The Theory and Practice of International Relations
(EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1960);Ivo D. Duchacek,ed.,with the col-
laboration of Kenneth W. Thompson, Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); Klaus Knorrand SidneyVerba,
eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays, World Politics, XIV
(October 1961) and republished as a book under same title by Princeton
University Press, 1961; James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and
ForeignPolicy:A Readerin Research
and Theory(NewYork: FreePress,1961);
Harrison, Role of Theory in International Relations.
58. Glenn I-I. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining,
DecisionMalzing, and SystemStructure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press,1977), pp. 21-22.
59. Kenneth E. Boulding, Ecodynamics:A New Theory of SocietalDynamics
(BeverlyHills, CA: SagePublications, 1978), p. 9.
60. Alfred North V/hitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York:
Macmillan, 1925), pp. 41-44.
61. Alfred Zimmern, Introductory Report to the Discussions
in 1935, in Alfred
Zimmern, ed., UniversityTeachingof InternationalRelations,Report of the
EleventhSessionof the InternationalStudiesConference(Paris:International
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Leagueof Nations, 1939), pp. 7-9. Later, C.
A. W. Manningprepareda pamphletfor UNESCOon theuniversityteachingof in-
ternationalrelations,in whichhetook a similarposition.Thereis an international-
relationscomplexthat hasto beviewedfrom a universalisticangle,andnoneof the
establisheddisciplinesastraditionallytaughtcanbereliedon to supplythis neces-
sary perspective.SeeI. D. Marchant, Theory and Practicein the Study of
International Relations, International Relations,I (April 1955), 95102.
62. Nicholas J. Spykman,Methods of Approach to the Study of International
Relations,Proceedingsof the Fifth Conferenceof Teachers
of InternationalLaw
and RelatedSubjects(Washington,DC: CarnegieEndowmentfor International
Peace,1933), p. 60. SeeChris Brown, UnderstandingInternationalRelations
(New York: St. Martins Press,1997), p. 6.
56

63. THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

64.Brown,
ibid.,chap.12,Conclusion:
Frederick
S.Dunn,TheScope
NewAgendas.
of International
Relations,
WorldPolitics,
I
(October1948),1-42.
65. QuincyWright,TheStudy ofInternational
Relations
(NewYork:
Appleton-
Century-Crofts,
1955),pp.23-24.
66. MortonA.Kaplan, IsInternational
Relations
aDiscipline?
TheJournal
of
Politics,XXIII (August1961),p. 463.
67. Stanley
Hoffmann,ed.,Contemporary
Theory in International
Relations
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:Prentice
Hall,1960),
pp.4-6.Raymond Aron has
simi-
larly
noted
that,
although
thedenitional
difculty
isreal,
itshould
notbeexag-
gerated
because
everyscientic
discipline
lacksprecise
outerlimits.
Moreimpor-
tantthanknowing
where
phenomena
become
or cease
to bedataof
international
relations,
says
Aron,istheeldsprincipal
focus
of interest.
For
him,thisfocus
is oninterstate
relations.
Peace
andWar:A Theory
of
International
Relations,
trans.
Richard
Howard
andAnnette
Baker
Fox(New
York:Praeger,
1968),pp.5-8.
68. Morton
A.Kaplan,
System
andProcess
in International
Politics
(New
York:
Krieger,
1976),
p.3.Inanarticle
written
asarejoinder
toBull&#39;s
criticism
ofthe
scientic
writers,
Kaplan
accused
thetraditionalists
ofusing
history
ineptly,
of
falling
intothetrapofoverparticularization
andunrelated
generalization,
andof
beingunaware thatmanywriters
inthemodern
scientic
school
regard
history
asa laboratory
fortheacquisition
of empirical
data.See
hisTheNewGreat
Debate:
Traditionalism
vs.Science
inInternational
Relations,
World
Politics,
XIX (October1966),15-16.
69. Morton,A.
Kaplan,
Problems
ofTheory
Building
and
Theory
Conrmation
in
International
Politics,
in KnorrandVerba,
eds.,
Theoretical
Essays,
p.23;
MortonA.Kaplan,
NewApproaches
toInternational
Relations
(NewYork:
St.
&#39; pp.399-404.
Martins, 1968), SeealsoGeorge Modelski,
Comparative
International
Systems,
World
Politics,
XIV(July
1962),
662-674,
inwhich
he
reviewsAddaB. Bozeman,
Politicsand Culturein International
History
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1960).
70. MortonA. Kaplan,
System
andProcess
in International
Politics,
chap.
2. See
James
D.Fearon,
Counterfactuals
andHypothesis
Testing
inPolitical
Science,
WorldPolitics,43(2)(January1991),169-195.
71. Thesubstance
oftheoryishistory,
composed
ofunique
events
andoccurrences
Anepisodeinhistory
andpolitics
isinonesenseneverrepeated.
It happens
asit
doesonlyonce.
Inthissense,
history isbeyondthereach
oftheory.
Underlying
alltheory,
however,istheassumption thatthese
sameunique
eventsarealso
moreconcrete
instances
of moregeneral
propositions.
Thewhollyunique,
hav-
ingnothing
in common
withanythingelse,
is indescribable.
Kenneth
W.
Thompson,
Towarda Theory
of International
Politics,
American
Political
Science
Review,XLIX (September
1955),734.
72. MartinHollisandSteve
Smith,
Explaining
andUnderstanding
Internationa
Relations
(Oxford,
England:
Clarendon
Press,
1990),
pp.1-7,45-91,196-216.
73. See
FredN. Kerlinger,
Foundations
of Behavioral
Research
(NewYork:Holt,
Rinehart
andWinston,
1966),
p.11,andRobertBrown,
Explanation
in Social
75.
76.

77.

NOTES 57
78.
Abraham
Kaplan,
TheConduct
ofInquiry(San
Francisco:
Chandler,
1964),
p.319.
Carl G. Hempel,Fundamentals of ConceptFormationin EmpiricalScience
(Chicago:
University
of Chicago
Press,1952),p. 36.
TheEthicsofAristotle,
trans.D.P.Chase
(NewYork:Dutton,1950),
BookVI,
p. 147. HansJ. Morgenthau,echoingAristotle, stressed
the differencebetween
what is worth knowingintellectually
and what is usefulfor practice.
79.-
Reections
ontheStateof PoliticalScience,
Reviewof Politics,XVII (October
1955), 440.
DavidHume,A Treatise
of HumanNature:PartIII. Of Probability
and
Knowledge,
in TheEssential
Daz/idHume,Introduction
by RobertP. Wolff
(NewYork:NewAmericanLibrary,1969),pp.53-99.SeeSheldon
S.Wolin,
Hume and Conservatism, American Political Science Réview, XLVII
(December
1954),999-1016.MichaelPolanyi,too, hastreatedthe difference
between
thetheoryof affairsandthepractice
of affairs.Personal
Knowledge
(Chicago:
Universityof Chicago
Press,
1958),pp.49ff.
Foranalyses
of linkagesbetween
domestic
politicalstructures
andprocesses
on
80.
theonehandandforeign
policyontheother,seeJames
Politics(NewYork:FreePress,
Rosenau,
ed.,Linkage
1969);HenryA. Kissinger,
DomesticStructure
and ForeignPolicy,AmericanForeignPolicy:ThreeEssays(New York:
Norton,1969);WolframHanreider,
CompatibilityandConsensus:
A Proposal
for theConceptual
Linkage
of External
andInternalDimensions
of Foreign
81. Policy,in Hanreider,
York:McKay,
1971);
Jonathan
ed.,Comparative
Wilkenfeld,
ForeignPolicy:Theoretical
ed.,ConictBehavior
andLinkage
Essays
(New
Politics(NewYork: McKay,1973).
FredA. Sondermann,
The LinkageBetween
ForeignPolicyandInternational
82.Politics,in Rosenau,ed.,LinkagePolitics,pp. 8-17.
QuincyWright,Development of a GeneralTheoryof International
Relations,
in Harrison,Roleof Theoryin International
Relations,
p. 20.
83.James
Ibid., pp. 21-23.
N. Rosenau,
TheScienticStudyof ForeignPolicy,rev.ed. (London:
FrancesPinter,1980),pp. 19-31.
84. JamesN. Rosenau, ProbingPuzzles Persistently:
a Desirable
but Improbable
Futurefor IR Theory,in SteveSmith,KenBooth,andMarysiaZalewski,eds.,
International
Theory:Positiz/ism
andBeyond(Cambridge, England:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1996),pp. 309-317.
85. KennethN. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics,chap. 1, Laws and
Theories.(Reading,MA: AddisonWesley,1979).
86. Barry Buzan, The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations
Reconsidered,in Ken Booth and SteveSmith, eds.,International Relations
TheoryToday(UniversityPark:Pennsylvania
StateUniversityPress,1995),
pp. 204-205.
58

89.

THEORETICALAPPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Politics:Non-StateActorsin the Global System(EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice

90.Hall,
Samuel
1976).
P.Huntington,
Transnational
Organizations
in WorldPolitics,World
Politics,XXV (April 1973)333-368;JosephS. Nye,Jr., Multinational
Corporationsin WorldPolitics,
Foreign
Affairs,53 (October1974)153-175;
91.RobertGilpin,U.S.Power
andtheMultinationalCorporation(NewYork:Basic
Books, 1975);DavidE.ApterandLouisWoldGoodman, eds.,
TheMultinational
CorporationandSocialChange (NewYork:Praeger, 1976);
Raymond Vernon,
-92. Stormover the Multinationals:
The RealIssues(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
93.University
Press,
1977);George Modelski,
ed.,Transnational
Corporations
and
WorldOrder(SanFrancisco:
Freeman,1979);Charles
W.Kegley,
Jr.,andEugene
94. R.Wittkopf,
eds.,
TheRiseofMultinational
Corporations:
Blessing
orCurse?in
chap.
5oftheirWorld
Politics:
TrendandTransformation
(NewYork:St.Martins,
1981)§&#39;Joan
EdelmanSpero,
ThePolitics
ofInternational
EconomicRelations,
3rd
95.ed.(NewYork:St.Martins,1985),
chaps.4 and8;andRobertT.Kudrle,The
Several
Faces
of theMultinational
Corporation,
in JeffreyA. Frieden
andDavid
A.Lake,
eds.,
International
Political
Economy
(NewYork:St.Martins,
1987).
96.J.DavidSirfger,in Rosenau,LinkagePolitics,p.23.
Thepluralists
critique
oftherealists
iswelldescribed
inPaulR.ViottiandMark
V.Kauppi,
International
RelationsTheory:
Realism,
Pluralism,
Globalism(New
97.York: Macmillan,1987),pp. 7-8, 192-193.
Ibid.,p. 204;KegleyandWittkopf,Blessing
or Curse?,
p. 139.
Seyom
Brown,NewForces,
OldForces
andtheFuture
of WorldPolitics(New
98.York: HarperCollins,1995),p. 253.
Richard
Little,TheGrowing
Relevance
of Pluralism?
in Smithet al.,eds.,
InternationalTheory,PositivismandBeyond(op cit) pp. 77-78.
99.
Susan
Strange,
TheDefective
State,Daedalus,
124(Spring1995),56.
100.
Jessica
T. Matthews,
PowerShift,ForeignAffairs,76 (January/February
1997), 53.
Ibid., 51.
PeterEvans,
101. TheEclipse of theState? Reections onStateness
in anEraof
Globalization,WorldPolitics,50 (October1997),71.
Ibid., 73-74.
Ibid., 69-70.
102.
 NOTES 59

areconsidered
byinternational
lawauthorities
to belegally
binding,
states
re-
mainpolitically
freetodecide
forthemselves
whether tocomply,
because
noef-
fective enforcementmechanismexists.
106. Raymond
Aron,WhatIsa Theory
of International
Relations?
journal
of
International
Affairs,
XXI(2)(1967),
190;Stanley
Hoffmann,
TheState
of War
(NewYork:Praeger,
1965),chap.2; RogerD. Masters,
WorldPoliticsasa
Primitive
Political
System,
World
Politics,
XVI(July1964);
Waltz,
Theory
of
InternationalPolitics,p. 113.
107. RobertO. Keohane
andJoseph
S.Nye,PowerandInterdependence:
World
Politics
inTransition,
2nded.(Glenview,
IL:Scott,
Foresman,
1989),
chap.
1.
108. Ibid.,pp.5, 19-22;
ErnstB.Haas,
OnSystems andInternational
Regimes
World Politics,
XXVII(January
1975),
andWhyCollaborate?Issue-Linka
andInternational
Regimes, WorldPolitics,
XXXH(April1980);
StephenD.
Krasner,
Transforming
International
Regimes:
WhattheThirdWorldWants
andWhy,International
Studies
Quarterly,
25 (March1981);
StephenD.
Krasner,
ed.,International
Organization,
XXXVI(Spring
1982),
special
issue
devoted
to international
regimes.
109. Fora discussion
of thecritiques
of behavioralism,
seeDonald
J.Puchala,
Woe
to theOrphans
of theScienticRevolution,
in Robert
L. Rothstein,
ed.,The
Evolution
ofTheoryin International
Relations
(Columbia:
University
of South
CarolinaPress,1991),pp. 39-61.
110. Hedley
Bull,International
Theory:
TheCase
fora Classical
Approach,
World
Politics,
XVIII(April1966),
361.Bulls
essay
isreprinted
in thevolume
by
Knorr and Rosenau,
eds.,Contending
Approaches
to InternationalPolitics.
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,-1970)
pp.72-73.
111. ChrisBrown,Understanding
International
Relations
(NewYork:St.Martins
Press,1997),pp.36-37.By the two cultures,Brownmeantthe humanities
and the hard sciences.
112. Charles
W.Kegley,
Jr.,andEugeneR. Wittkopf,WorldPolitics:Trendand
Transformation,
4thed.(NewYork:St.Martins
Press,
1993),
p.27.
113. All of these
andothercriticisms
arepresented
byBull,Case
for a Classica
Approach.
114. J.DavidSinger,
TheIncompleat
Theorist:
Insight
WithoutEvidence,
in Knorr
andRosenau,
eds.,
Contending
Approaches
toInternational
Politics
pp.72-73.
115. KlausKnorrandSidney Verba,eds.,TheInternationalSystem:
Theoretica
Essays(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton University
Press,
1961),p. 16.
116. Itsalready
extensive
literature
includes
J.Baudrillard,
Seduction(NewYork:St.
Martins Press,1990);J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro,eds.,
International/Intertextual
Relations:PostmodernReadings of World..Politics
(Lexington,
MA:Lexington
Books,
1989); M. Foucault,
TheArchaeology
of
-Knowledge(NewYork:Pantheon,
1972); «Jim
George,
Discourses
of Global
Politics:
A Critical
(Re)Introduction
to International
Relations
(Bouldler,
CO:
LynneRienner
Publishers,
1994),
especially
pp.139-233;
Jurgen Habermas,
The
Philosophical
Discourse
of Modernity,
TwelveLectures;trans.Frederick
G.
Lawrence(Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press,1995);M. «Hollisand S:»Smith,
Explaining
and Understanding
International
Relations
(Oxford,England:
OxfordUniversityPress,1990);Yosif«Lapid,The.ThirdDebate:On the
Prospects
ofTheoryin aPost-Positivist
Era,International
Studies
Quarterly,
33
(1989),235-254;J. F. Lyotard,ThePostmodern Condition(Minneapolis
Universityof Minnesota
Press,1984);P.M. Rosenau,
Postmodernism
andthe
60 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Social
Sciences
(Princeton,
NJ: Princeton
UniversityPress,1992);Smithet al.,
eds.,International
Theory:
Positivism
andBeyond; MichaelW. Doyleand
G.JohnIkenberry,
eds.,
NewThinking
in International
Relations
(Boulder,
CO:
Westview, 1997).
117. Smith, Positivismand Beyond,in Smith et al., International
Theory:
Positivism
and Beyond, esp.pp. 11-18.
118. This feministliteratureincludesM. L. Adams,TheresNo PlaceLike Home:
On the Placeof Identityin FeministPolitics, Feminist
Review,
(31) (1989),
22-33;F. Anthiasand N. YuvaIDavid
with H. Cain,eds., Racialized
Boundaries,
Race,Nations,Gender,Colour,and the Anti-Racist
Struggle
(London:
Routledge,
1993);M. CookeandA. Wollacott,
eds.,Gendering
War
Talk(Princeton,
NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press,
1993);A. Curthoys,
Feminism,
Citizenshipand NationalIdentity, Feminist
Review,(44) (1993),19-38;
C.Enloe,Bananas,
Beaches
andBases:MakingFeminist
Sense
ofInternational
Politics
(London:
Pandora,
1989);P.HoldenandA. Ardener,
eds.,Images
of
Women
in Peace
andWar(London:
Macmillan,
1987);
M. Hutchinson,
The
Anatomy
of SexandPower
(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1990);S.Jeffords,
TheRemasculinization
of America:Gender andtheVietnam War(Bloomington:
IndianaUniversity
Press,1989);C. Mackinnon,Towards a FeministTheoryof
the State(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1989);N. Funk and
M. Mueller,eds.,Gender Politics
andPost-Communism (London:Routledge,
1993);V. Moghadam, IdentityPolitics:
CulturalReassertion
andFeminisms in
International
Perspectives
(Boulder,
CO:Westview Press,
1993);V. 5. Peterson,
ed., GenderedStates:
Feminist (Re)Visions
of International
Relations Theory
(Boulder,
CO:Lynne
Rienner,
1992);V.S.Peterson
andA. S.Runyan,
Global
GenderIssues(Boulder,CO: WestviewPress,1993); ChristineSylvester,
FeministTheoryand International
Relationsin a PostModernist Era
(Cambridge,
England:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1994);andJ. A. Tickner,
Gender
in International
Relations:
Feminist
Perspectives
on a Changing
Global
Security
(NewYork:Columbia
University
Press,
1992).
Christine
Sylvester,
The
Contributions
of FeministTheoryto International
Relations,in Smithet al.,
International
Theory:Positivismand Beyond; JeanBetheElshtain,¥eminist
Inquiryand International
Relations,
in DoyleandIkenberry
eds. New
Thinkingin International
Relations.
119. YoséfLapid, Prospects
of InternationalTheoryin a Post-Pdsitivist
Era,
International
Studies
Quarterly,33 (1989),249.
120. RichardK. AshleyandR. B. J. Walker,ReadingDissidence/Writing
the
Discipline:
CrisisandtheQuestion
of Sovereignty
in International
Sthdies,
International
Studies
Quarterly,34 (1990),368.
121. JohnA. Vasquez,
ThePost-Posivitivist
Debate:
Reconstructing
Scientic
EnquiryandInternational
Relations
TheoryAfterEnlightenments
Fall, in Ken
Booth and SteveSmith,eds.,International
Relations TheoryToday.(University
Park:Pennsylvania
StateUniversityPress,1995),p. 225.
122. BarryBuzan,TheTimeless
Wisdomof Realism?
in Smithet al., International
Theory:Positivism
and Beyond,esp.pp. 50, 55, 58-59. _
123. DavidHume,Essays andTreatises
on Several
"Subjects,
Vol.I (Edinburgh:Bell
and Bradfute,and W. Blackwood,1925),pp.331-339.Reprintedin Arend
Lijphart,
ed.,World
Politics
(Boston:
Allyn85Bacon,
1966), 228-234*.
124. All these examplesare cited in Morgenthau, PoliticsAmong Nations,
pp. 161-166.
 125.

126.

127.

NOTES 61

Ernst
B.Haas,
TheBalance
ofPower:
Prescription,
Concept
orPropaganda
WorldPolitics,
V (July1953),
442477.
Inis
128. L. Claude,Jr.,Powerand International
Relations
(NewYork:Random
House,1962),pp. 13,22.
Thisparagraph
andtheonefollowing constitute
a synthesis
fromseveral
differ-
entsources.
Forfullertreatment
ofthebalance
ofpower,seeClaude,
Powerand
129.
International
Relations;Edward
V.Gulick,EuropesClassical
Balance
ofPower
(Ithaca,
NY:Cornell
University
Press,
1955);
SidneyB.Fay,
Balance
ofPower,
130. in Encyclopedia
of theSocial
Sciences,
Vol.II (NewYork:Macmillan,
1930);
AlfredVagts,TheBalance
of Power:Growthof anIdea,WorldPolitics,
I
(October1948),82-101;and PaulSeabury,ed.,Balance
of Power(San
13_1.
Francisco:Chandler,1965).
Quoted
in Gulick,
Europes
Classical
Balance
ofPower,
p.34.
Memorandum
on the PresentStateof BritishRelationswith Franceand
132.
Germany,
inGooch
andTemperly,
BritishDocuments
onOriginof War,
IH,402.
Winston
S.Churchill,
TheGathering
Storm(Boston:
HoughtonMifin, 1948)3
pp. 207-210.
133.
134.
HenryKissinger,
Diplomacy
(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,
1994), p.20.
Nicholas
J. Spykman,
American
Strategy
and WorldPolitics(NewYork:
HarcourtBrace,1942),pp. 21-22.
135.
Morgenthau,
PoliticsAmongNations,chap.14.
Ernst
B.Haas,
TheBalance
ofPower
asaGuide
toPolicy-Making,
journalof
Politics,XV (August1953),370-398.
136.
Waltz,Theory
ofInternational
ArthurLeeBurns,
From
Politics,
Balance
pp.117-123.
toDeterrence:
ATheoretical
Analysis,
World
Politics,
IX (July1957),
505. Whereas
Burnsprefers
veastheoptimal
number
requiredforsecurity,
Kaplan says
thatveistheminimal
numberrequired
for
security,
butthatsecurity
increases
withthenumberofstates
uptosomeas-yet-
undetermined
upper limit. Traditionalismvs. Sciencein International
Relations,p. 10.
137. Burns,FromBalance
to Deterrence,
p. 508.
138. R.Harrison
Wagner,
TheTheory
of Games
andtheBalance
of Power,
World
Politics,38 (July1986),575.
139. SeeGlennH. Snyder,
Balance
of Power
in theMissile
Age,Journal
of
International
Affairs,XIV(1)(1960);Herz,Balance
Systems
and Balance
Policiesin a NuclearandBipolarAge,andthebooksandarticlescitedsubse-
quently
intheextended
discussion
ondeterrence
andarms
control
in Chapter
8
of this text.
140. Forekamples
of quantitative
studies
in international
relations,
seeClaudio
Ciof-Revilla,
The Scientic
Measurement
ofInternational
Conict:
Handboo
ofDatasets
onCrises
andWars,
1495-1988
A.D.(Boulder,
CO:Lynne
Reimer
62

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

L. Merritt and StinRokkan,eds.,ComparingNations:The Useof Quantitative

Data in Cross-NationalResearch(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1966);JohnE. Mueller,ed.,Approaches
to Measurement
in International
Relations:A NonEvangelicalSurvey(New York: Appleton, 1969); Emerson
M.S.Niou,PeterC. Ordeshook, andGregoryF.Rose,TheBalance
of Power:
Stabilityin InternationalSystems(New York: Cambridge
UniversityPress,
1989);CharlesW. Kegley, Jr.,andGregoryA. Raymond,WhenTrustBreaks
Down: AllianceNorms and World Politics(Columbia,SC:Universityof South
CarolinaPress,
1990);James
N. Rosenau,
ed.,International
PoliticsandForeign
Policy(NewYork:FreePress,
1969);James
N. Rosenau,
ed.,In Search
of
GlobalPatterns(NewYork: FreePress,1976);RudolphJ. Rummelet al.,
Dimensionsof Nations(Evanston,
IL: Northwestern
UniversityPress,1967);
Rudolph
J. Rummel,
Understanding
ConictandWar,(5vols.)(London:
Sage
Publications,1981); Bruce M. Russett,InternationalRegionsin the
International
System (Chicago:
RandMcNally,1967);BruceM. Russett,ed.,
Peace,War,and Numbers(London:SagePublications, 1972/1977/1978);
J.DavidSinger,
Quantitative
International
Politics:
Insights
andEvidence
(New
York:FreePress,1968);J. DavidSinger,
ed.,TheCorrelates
of War,(London:
Collier Macmillan Publishers,1979); J. David Singer and Paul F. Kiehl,
Measuring
theCorrelates
of War(AnnArbor,MI: University
of MichiganPress,
141.
1990);J. DavidSinger
andMichaelD. Walker,
eds.,ToAugerWell:Early
WarningIndicatorsin World Politics(London:SagePublications,
1979);
J. DavidSinger
andRichard
Stoll,Quantitative
Indicators
in WorldPolitics:
TimelyAssurance
andEarly Warning(NewYork:Praeger
Publishers,
1984);
142.
FrankW. WaymanandPaulF. Diehl,eds.,Reconstructing
Realpolitik(Ann
Arbor,MI: Universityof MichiganPress,1994).
CarlG. HempelandPaulOppenheim,
Studiesin theLogicof Explanation,
143.
Philosophy
of Science,
XV (1948),135-175; andCarlHempel, Reasons and
CoveringLaws in HistoricalExplanation,in PatrickGardiner,ed., The
Philosophy
of History(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,
1974),pp.90-105.
Smith,PositivismandBeyond,pp. 15, 19-20.
144. WernerHeisenberg, Physics
andPhilosophy (NewYork:Harper86Row,1958),
pp.179,183,186.It shouldbepointedoutthattheprincipleof indeterminacy is
oftenreferredto lessaccurately
bysocialscientists
astheuncertainty principle.
SeeQuincyWright,A Studyof International Relations,
chap.7; Educational
andResearch Objectives,Western PoliticalQuarterly,XI (September 1958),
598-606.Anotherpenetrating discourseontheroleof normative theoryin con-
145. trastto a purelyvalue-free
approachto international
relationsis to befoundin
CharlesA. McClelland,The Functionof Theory in InternationalRelations,
journal of Conict Resolution,IV (September 1960),311-314.
146. Wright, A Studyof InternationalRelations,p. 26.
Ibid., p. 11, andchaps.8-11.
 Chapter 2
From Realist
to Neorealist
and Neoclassical
Realist Theory
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Realist
theoryhasintellectual foundations in theancient
world,together
with
manifestations
extending into,andperhaps beyond,thecontemporaryworld.
Anydiscussion
of realisttheoryin itstotalitywouldbeincorr_1plete,withou
an
examination
of effortsto reinterpretand reviseit in light of new circum-
stances,
whileretaining
its enduring
elements
andcoreassumptions.
This
chapterdiscussesrealisttheoryin its broadest
dimensions.
Thisincludesclas-
sicalrealisttheoryasdeveloped by twentieth-century
theorists
suchasHans
Morgenthauandsubsequently
neorealiststructural
realisttheoryas con-
structed
byKenneth
Waltzand,mostrecently,
neoclassical
realisttheory,
the
latest
contribution
totherealist
intellectual
tradition
ininternational-relatio
theory.Sobroadanddiverse
is thistradition,thattakentogether,
whatwe
haveis not realisttheory,but insteadrealisttheories.
Several
theoriescohabi-
tatewithintherealistframework,
orparadigm. _
In thischapter
wesetforthcontrasting
realisttheories.
Classical
realist
theory
contains
essentially
twopoints
offocus:
theinternational
systems
level
ofanalysis
andthestate,
orunitactor.
Neorealist-structural
realist
theory
rep-
resents
an effortto address
thenatureof international
politicswith theinter-
nationalsystem
asthelevelof analysis. Neoclassical
realisttheoryplaces
em-
phasisonthestate,
ortheunit,levelof analysis.
Taken together,neorealist
and
neoclassical
realisttheoryenrichandreviverealisttheoryand,in doingso,
buildupontheintellectual
traditionof classical
realisttheory.
Realisttheoryhelda dominantpositionin thestudyof international
rela-
tionsin theyears
extending
fromtheendof WorldWarII intotheearly19805.
Centralto classical
realisttheoryareseveral
keyassumptions: (1)that thein-
ternationalsystemis basedon statesasthe keyactors;(2) that international
politicsis essentially
conictual,
a struggle
for powerin ananarchic
settingin
whichnation-states inevitably
relyon theirowncapabilities
to ensuretheir
63
64 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

survival;(3) that statesexist in a condition of legalsovereigntyin which nev-

ertheless
therearegradations
of capabilities,
with greaterandlesserstatesas
actors;(4) that statesareunitary actorsand that domesticpoliticscan be sep-
aratedfromforeignpolicy;(5)that statesarerationalactorscharacterized
by
a decision-makingprocess
leadingto choicesbasedon nationalinterest;and
(6) that poweris the mostimportantconceptin explainingand predicting
state behavior.
Althoughthereareareasof disagreement amongrealisttheorists,asdis-
cussed in thischapter,
theoverallconsensus is thattheyhavebeenpreoccupied
with two essentialquestions: (1)Whataccounts for statebehaviorin general
andin particularfor the survivalof states? and (2) Whatproduces andac-
countsfor thedynamics of theinternational
system?1 In realisttheory,answers
to suchquestions aresoughtat thestatelevelandat thesystem level.Morere-
cently,the studyof international relations,and its theoreticalagenda,have
beenshaped byneorealism andneoclassical
realism,whichnowoccupies a po-
sitionof increasing
importance asa reformulation of classicalrealisttheory.
Realisttheory hasbeenthe objectof greatdebate.As notedin Chapter1
and discussed in this chapter,realisttheoryrepresented
both a critiqueof, and
an alternativeto, what wastermedutopiantheory.The late twentieth-century
counterpart
to theutopian-realist
controversy
camein theform of a debate
with a neoliberalschool of theory, also discussedin this chapter.Realist
thoughtis basedon an internationalsystem,the deningcharacteristicof
which is anarchy,by which is meantthe absence of legalauthority.The
essenceof sovereigntyis the legalequalityof states.Because statesexist in a
condition of sovereignty,there is no higher legal authority than the state.
Nevertheless,statesare not equal in capabilities.Somehave vast meansat
theirdisposal.Othershavemeager power.Whatever hierarchy existsin thein-
ternationalsystem is theresultof differentiation
amongstatesin theircapabil-
ities.Althoughstatesform alliancesor coalitions,theyareultimatelycom-
pelledto rely on their ownmeansto ensuretheir survival.In this sense, the
structureof the internationalsystemleadsstatesto self-helpstrategies.
Theultimate,but byno means theonly,wayin whichstatesachieve
secu-
rity, basedon self-help,
is foundin armaments.If eachstatearmsagainstone
or moreotherstates,the resultis a securitydilemma. Thebasicissueis
this: At what point doesthe effort of one stateto ensureits securitycometo
be perceivedby anotherstateasa threatto that statessecurity? Doesone
statessense
of securitycomeat theexpense of a perceived
threatto another
states
security?
Because all statesexistin a self-help
system,
levelsof trustare
low. One state cannot be certain that another statesefforts to arm for its own
defenseare not also intendedto provide an offensivecapacity.Therefore,a
marginof safetywill be soughtin the form of yet greaterarmaments.
Such
suspicion
on both sidesis saidto leadto an armsrace.This is the security
dilemmathat characterizes
an internationalsystem,,thestructureof which is
anarchic,or basedon power but lackingauthority in the form of institutions
capableof formulatingrulesof behavior,
togetherwith enforcement
mecha-
nismsbasedon global consensus
or agreementabout the institutions them-
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 65

selvesand the lawsto be promulgated

and enforced.(On arms.races,
see
Chapter 7.)
Beforeaddressing
theprincipalassumptions
andcharacteristics
of realist
theoryanddrawing
contrasts
withutopian
theory,
it isappropriate
to suggest
that realismandutopianism,
asDavidBaldwinasserts,
areloadedterms.-°
Theyconnote,in someminds,the studyof the world in hard-headed
andreal-
isticterms,versusan approachcharacterized by wishfulthinkingand soft-
headed(utopian)analysis. Suchterminology, includingthe useof the terms
liberal,andneoliberal,
is unfortunate,
for it inaccuratelyattaches
to theories
labelsthatmayobfuscate asmuchastheyilluminate.
Utopianthoughtde-
scribesa worldthatits proponents
wouldliketo create.
Realistthoughtat-
temptsto describe
a world that is saidto exist.Althoughrealisttheoryat-
tachescentralimportance
to power,utopiantheoryacknowledges
power,
whichit seeks
to subordinate
to international
institutions
thatpossess
author-
ity.Boththeoriessetforthprescriptions
for bringing
aboutchange,
although
theydifferin fundamentalrespects,
notabouttheexistenceof powerasa key
variable,but abouttheextentof its importance
andtheprospects
for,andthe
meansby which, changecanbe broughtabout.Weturn first to a brief discus-
sionof utopiantheoryandwhathasbeentermedtheutopian-realist
debate.

The Utopian-Realist Debate

To a largeextent,whatwascalledthe utopian-realist
controversy-one
of
the greatdebates
of international-relations
theoryfocused
on the extentto
which political behaviorand the anarchicalcircumstances
of international
politicscouldbetransformed
to acondition
ofworldorder,
based
oncoopera-
tive normativestandardsandglobalinterdependence.
This debateis described
in greatdetailby E. H. Carr,in the contextof diplomacybetweenthe two
worldwars.4
Carrsawtheutopians,
for themostpart,asintellectual
descen-
dantsof eighteenthcenturyEnlightenment
optimism,nineteenth"-century.
lib-
eralism,andtwentieth-century
Wilsonianidealism.5
Emphasizing
how inter-
national relationshipsought to be conducted,the utopians=
disdained
balance-of-powerpolitics, national armaments,the use of force in interna-
tional affairs,andthe secrettreatiesof alliancethat preceded
WorldWar1.
Instead,theystressedinternationallegalrightsandobligations,a naturalhar-
mony ofaihterestin peacereminiscentof AdamSmithsinvisiblehand6as a
regulatorfor thepreservation
of international
peace,
a heavyrelianceon rea-
sonin humanaffairs,andcondence in thepeace-building
functionof world
public-opinion.
Utopianismin international-relations
theoryis basedon theassumption,
drawnfrom the eighteenth-centuryEnlightenment, thattenvironing
circum-
stancesshapehumanconductand that such&#39;factors
can be alteredas a basis
for changinghumanbehavior.Inxsharp contrastto realistr.theory,
utopianism
holdsthat humankindis perfectible;
or at leastis capableof signicantim-
provement.At the internationallevel,the political environmentcan be trans-
formedby thedevelopment
of new.institutionssuchastheLeague
of Nations
66 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

and the United Nations. By the establishmentof normsof conduct,political

behavior can be altered. Once such standards are set forth, it will be possible
to createeducatedelectoratesand leadershipcapableof acceptingand pro-
motingthosestandards.It is assumedthat enlightened publicopinioncanbe
expected
to makerationaldecisions.Centralto utopiantheory,moreover, was
theassumptionof a harmonyof interestin peaceat thelevelof thecollectivity,
or nation-state,basedon the interestof the individualin a peacefulworld. The
highestinterestof theindividualcoincides
with that of thelargercommunity.
If stateshavenot embracedpeace,it is because
the leadershiphasnot beenre-
sponsiveto thewill of thepeople.An international
system
basedon represen-
tative governments (a world madesafefor democracy, in the words of
WoodrowWilson)would necessarily
be a peacefulworld. It is for this reason
that a principaltenetof utopiantheorywasnationalself-determination.
If
peoplearefreeto selecttheform of government
underwhichtheylive,they
will chooserepresentative
formsof rule. The resultwill beto createthe neces-
saryframeworkfor therealizationof the harmonyof interestin a peaceful
world. As we show later, especiallyin Chapter8, the relationshipbetween
democracyand peacehasbeenan enduringpart of international-relations the-
ory. In its presentform it is termeddemocraticpeacetheory.
Utopianismaroseat an initial stagein the developmentof twentieth-
centuryinternational-relations theory,althoughtheoriesof internationalrela-
tions aredeeplyrootedin Westernthought,aswe havenotedin our brief sur-
veyin Chapter1.7In E. H. Carrswords,Internationalrelationstookits rise
from a greatand disastrouswar; and the overwhelmingpurposewhich domi-
natedand inspiredthe pioneersof the new sciencewasto obviatea recurrence
of this disease
of the internationalbody politic.3 The destructiveness
of
World War I had led to the questfor internationalnormsand institutionsin
the"form of the Leagueof NationsCovenantand the collectivesecurityframe-
work establishedby its founders.In Carrsperspective, the wish is saidto be
the father of thought,in the sensethat an abidingdesireto abolishwar or to
reduceits destructiveness shapedthe approachto international-relations the-
ory. Carr assertsthat purpose,or teleology,precedesand conditionsthought.
At the beginningof the establishment of a new eld of inquiry,the elementof
wish is overwhelminglystrong,and the inclinationto analyzefactsand means
is weak or nonexistent.&#39;9
The utopian perspectiveguidedthe developmentof
international-relationstheoryin the decadesbetweenthe two world wars, es-
peciallyin the AngloAmericansetting.The dominantapproachwas to em-
bracewhat wasinternational,to condemnwhat wasnational,and to evaluate
eventsof the day by referenceto the extentto which they conformedto the
standardsestablished by internationallegalnormsandthe Leagueof Nations.
A substantialliterature arose,highly normativein content,the purposeof
which was, as stated in the foreword to one such volume by G. Lowes
Dickinson,to disseminate knowledgeof the factsof internationalrelations,
and to inculcate the international rather than the nationalistic way of regard-
ing them . . . for the world cannotbe savedby governmentsand governing
classes.
It can be savedonly by the creation,amongthe peoplesof the world,
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 67

of such a public opinion as cannot be duped by misrepresentationnor misled

by passion.1°(In additionto Dickinson,the list of contributorsto this
utopianliteratureincludedNicholasMurray Butler,JamesT. Shotwell,Alfred
Zimmern, Norman Angell, and Gilbert Murray.)
Realists, in contrast to utopians, stressedpower and interest rather than
ideals in international relations. Realism is basically conservative, empirical,
prudent,suspiciousof idealisticprinciples,andrespectfulof the lessonsof his-
tory. It is morelikely to producea pessimisticthan an optimisticViewof inter-
nationalpolitics.Realistsregardpower as the fundamentalconceptin the so-
cial sciences(suchas energyis in physics),althoughthey admit that power
relationships are often cloaked in moral and legal terms. Moreover, they criti-
cizethe utopian for preferringvisionarygoalsto scientic analysis.Thus, al-
thoughthe utopianhopedfor changethat might permit disarmament,the re-
alist emphasizednationalsecurityand the needfor military forceand balance
of power to support diplomacy, based on the assumption that national secu-
rity represents
the greatestand most immediateneedof the state.To,thereal-
ist, appealsto reason and public opinion and reliance on international organi-
zations, namely the League of Nations, had proved woefully weak supports
for keepingthe peacein the 19305;for example,they did not saveManchuria
and Ethiopiafrom aggression, just asin subsequent
decades, they did not pre-
ventthe Cold War or theregionalandethnicconicts that havecomeafterthe
Cold War.
Analyzing international relations between the two World Wars, Carr con-
tendedthat the inner meaningof the moderninternationalcrisis.is the col-
lapseof the whole structureof utopianismbasedon the conceptof the har-
mony of interests? In his view, the utopian theory of that era merely
justiedtheinterests
of thedominantEnglishspeaking
status-quo,powers
of
thesatisedversus
theunsatised,
of thehavesversus
thehave-nots.
In,partic-
ular, the harmonyof interestin peace,a centraltenetof utopian,theory,ap-
pliedmoreto thosestates,suchasGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates,satis-
ed with the outcomeof World War I, than to revisionist,dissatisedlstates,
suchas Germany,Italy, andJapan.
Nevertheless,Carr, a pragmatist,took utopiansand realiststo task. He
suggestedthat whereas the utopians ignore the lessonsof history, the realists
oftenreadhistorytoo pessimistically.
Whereas
the idealistexaggerates free-
domof choice,therealistexaggerates
xed causalityandslipsinto determin-
ism. While the idealistmay confuse national self-interestwith universal moral
principles,
therealistrunstherisk of cynicismandtfailsto provideanyground
for purposiveandmeaningful action, that is, therealistdeniesthat human
thoiightmodieshumanaction.To the utopian,purposeprecedes observa-
tion;thevisionof a Platocomesbeforetheanalysis of anAristotle.Thevision
may evenseemtotally unrealistic.Carr citesthe alchernists
who tried to turn
leadinto gold,notingthatwhentheirvisionaryprojectfailed,.they,began
ex-
amining
factsmorecarefully,
thusgivingbirthto modern
science.
Hecon-
cludesthat soundpolitical theoriescontain elementsof utopianismand real-
ism,of powerandof moralvalues.
68 FROM REALISTTO NEOREALISTAND NEOCLASSICAL
REALISTTHEORY

The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate

The utopianrealistdebateaboutwhich E. H. Carr and otherswrote was re-
placedby an intellectual
successor generationon bothsidesof the divide,in
the form of a neoliberal-neorealist
debate.Its deningcharacteristicsbear
someresemblance to theearliercontroversy,
althoughthereareimportantdif-
ferencesaswell. Theneorealist-neoliberal
debatecontainsasa key element
discordnot abouttheexistence of anarchy,
whichbothsidesacknowledge to
exist, but rather its meaningand implicationsand the extentto which devel-
opmentof institutionssuchastheUnitedNations,theNorth AtlanticTreaty
Organization,or the EuropeanCommunity/Unioncan transcendthe basic
structuralcharacteristicsof theanarchicinternational
system.Neoliberalin-
stitutionalisttheory,asit hasbeentermed,containsthebasicrealistassump-
tions that statesare the principal actors,that statesact in accordancewith
theirconceptionof nationalinterest,that powerremainsan importantvari-
able,andthat thestructureof worldpoliticsis anarchic.Accordingto Robert
Keohane, neorealists
andneoliberalinstitutionalists,
if theyareto understand
international
relations,needto nd whatevercommongroundexistsbetween
themon the role of institutions.Keohane,himselfin the liberal institutionalist
camp,acknowledges that the factthat international
institutionsareusedby
statesto pursuetheirinterestsdoesnot demonstrate howsignicanttheywill
bewheninterests
change.15
Hegoesonto assert
thatrealistsandinstitu-
tionalistsagreethat withouta basiseitherof hegemonic dominance or coin-
mon interests,international institutionscannotlongsurvive.Furthermore,
neorealisfandneoliberal institutionalists
agreethatpossibilities
existfor inter-
national
cooperation,
buttheydiverge
onthelikelihood
of itssuccess,
Statedin contemporaryterms,the end of the Cold War hastransformed
thestructureof international
politics.In Europe,thesystem
of theColdWar,
to theextentthatit wasbipolar,
hasbeen
replaced
bypoliticalfragmentation
includingthe breakupor weakening
of alliancestructures,
thedisihtegration
of states,
andtheresurgence
of intrastate
ethnicconict.Thecontemporary
globalsettingcontainselements of cooperationand conict, togetherwith
patternsof behaviorthat draw statesinto both collaborative
arrangements
and conictual situations. The test for neoliberal institutionalists will be the
extentto whichorganizations suchasthe European Community/Union, the
WesternEuropeanUnion,the Organizationfor Securityand Cooperation
(OSC)in Europe,andNATOwill beableto diminishor eliminatepostCold
Warconicts.Fromtheneorealist perspective,suchclashes,reectingthedra-
maticallychanged structureof theinternationalsystem, cannotbeeffectively
managed within internationalinstitutions,unlessthoseinstitutionssomehow
reect the structureof the internationalsystemwithin which they exist.
According to theneorealistlogic,in JohnMearsheimers words,NATO was
basicallya manifestationof thebipolardistributionof powerin Europedur-
ing the ColdWar,andit wasthat balanceof power,not NATOperse,that
providedthe keyto maintaining stabilityon thecontinent.15 Accordingto
the neorealist,internationalinstitutionsprovideno substitutefor relianceon
 THEORETICALFOUNDATIONS 69

the capabilitiesof the state.Nevertheless,

the neorealist-neoliberal
debatehas
movedawayfrom the sharpdelineationthat existedduringthe utopian-realist
era to an effort towardsynthesis.
Suchanlevolution,discussed
in a later
sectionof this chapter,providesa potential basisfor further progressin
international-relations theory.
Beforediscussingin somewhatgreaterdetail neorealisttheory,it is neces-
saryto setforth classicalrealisttheory in its essentialelements.To do so, it is
importantto examinebriey its intellectualorigins.

Antecedents of Realist Theory

Realisttheoryhasintellectualrootsthat can betracedto the ancientworld. In
his celebratedhistory of the Peloponnesian
War,Thucydides(400B.C.)wrote,
What madewar inevitablewas the growth of Athenianpower and the fear
whichthiscaused in Sparta.l7His conception
of theimportanceof power,to-
getherwith thepropensity
of statesto formcompetingalliances,
is saidto place
Thucydideswell within the realistschool.Without everbestowingmoral ap-
provaluponthewaystates normallyact,henevertheless
recognizedthefactsof
politicallife. Thestatement
from Thucydidesswritingsthat the strongdo
what they havethe power to do and the weak acceptwhat they haveto ac-
cept18typiesmuchof tvventieth-century
realistthought.JustasThucydides
haddevelopedan understanding of statebehaviorin theancientworld from his
observationof relations betweenAthens and Sparta,Niccolo Machiavelli
(1469-1557)analyzedinterstaterelationsin the Italian systemof the sixteenth
century.In his writingsin general,and in ThePrincein particular,Machiavelli
isclearlylinkedto realisttheoryby(a)hisemphasis
ontherulersneedto adopt
moral standards different from those of the individual to ensure the states sur-
vival, (b) his concernwith power,(c) his assumptionthat politicsis character-
izedbyaclashof interests,
and((1)hispessimistic
viewofhuman
nature.
ThomasHobbes(1588-1679),like Machiavelli,viewedpower as crucial
in humanbehavior:Man hasa perpetualand restlessdesireof power after
powerthat ceasethonlyin death.2°Hobbesbelievedthat covenants,
with-
out the sword,arebut wordsandof no strengthto securea manat all.21
Without a strongsovereign,chaosand violencefollow: If therebe no power
erected,
or not greatenoughfor our ownsecurity,
manwill andmaylawfully
relyonhisownstrength
andartforcaution
against
allothermen.2z
Like othermodernrealists,Hobbesconcernedhimselfwith the underlying
forcesof politicsand with the natureof powerin politicalrelationships.
AlthoughHobbesbelieved that a strongsovereignwasmandatory for main-
tainingorderwithinthepoliticalsystem, hesawlittle prospect
for fundamen-
tally changinghumanbehavioror the anarchicsetting.In his emphasis on
strongpolitical institutionsfor managingpowerand preventingconict,
Hobbesparadoxicallywas closerto proponentsof world governmentor, to
bemoreprecise,
worldempirethanto realists,who stressa balance
of power
amongmajor political groups.Hobbesregardedthe latter conditionas
analogous
to an anarchical
stateof nature,but hedoubtedthepossibilityof
70 FROM REALISTTO NEOREALISTAND NEOCLASSICAL
REALISTTHEORY

establishing
a world empire.His response
to the conditionof anarchyde-
scribed by realists was the creation of a hierarchical order in which ultimate
powerwould bevestedin the sovereign.
GeorgHegel(1770-1831), morethananyotherpoliticalphilosopher,ele-
vatedthe positionof the state.Althoughrealistwritersare usuallyby no
meansHegelian,Hegelsbelief that the stateshighestduty lies in its own
preservationis found in realist theory.Hegelreasonedthat since statesare
relatedto oneanotherasautonomous
entitiesandso asparticularwills on
which the validity of treatiesdepends,and sincethe particular will of the
whole is in content a will for its own welfare it follows that welfare is the
highestaimgoverningtherelationof onestateto another.
23Moreover,Hegel
heldthat thestatehasan individualtotality that develops
according
to its
own laws. The statehasobjectivereality; that is, it existsapart from its citi-
zens.Hegelheldthat thestatehasmoralstandards
differentfrom andsupe-
rior to those of the individual. Without imputing superior status to state
moral standards,realisttheorycontainsthe propositionthat behavioron be-
half of thestatemayrequireconductthat wouldnot be_acceptable
within a
civilizedsociety.
Among the antecedentsof realist theory is the work of Max Weber
(1864-1920),whosewritings dealt extensivelynot only with the nature of
politicsandthestate,but alsowith powerascentralto politics.Althoughthe
richness of Webers politicalthoughtcannotbeencompassed in a shortanaly-
sis,sufceit to suggest that,with respectto realisttheory,manyof theformu-
lationscontained in his work shapedsubsequent generations of writing and
scholarship. ForWeber, asfor laterrealists,theprincipalcharacteristic of pol-
iticsis a strugglefor power.Thepowerelement of politicallifeis especiallyev-
ident at the internationallevelbecause everypoliticalstructurenaturally
prefersto haveweakratherthanstrongneighbors. Furthermore, aseverybig
politicalcommunityis a potentialaspirantto prestige, it is alsoa potential
threatto all its neighbors;hence, thebigpoliticalcommunity, simplybecause
it is big andstrong,is latentlyandconstantly endangered.24 Amongthedi-
mensionsof politicsasa strugglefor power,moreover,is that of economics.In
Webers thought,economic
policystandsin a subordinaterelationship
to poli-
tics,inasmuchasthepowerpoliticalinterests
of nationsencompass aneco-
nomic struggle for existence.
Amongtheconcerns of realists,
with whichWeberbeforethemwaspreoc-
cupied,is the ethicalproblemof intentionsversusconsequences, or what is
alsotermedtheabsolute ethicof convictionandthepragmatic ethicof respon-
sibility.To adhereto anabsolute ethicis to takeactionsin keepingwith that
ethicwithoutregardfor their consequences. However,accordingto Weber,
leaders in animperfectworldconfronttheneedto behave by a politicalethic,
in whichthe achievement of goodendsmaymakenecessary the useof less
than morally acceptablemeans.For Weberthe ethic of convictioncannot be
separatedfrom an understanding
of the consequencesof suchaction,which in
turn givesconcrete
meaningto anethicof responsibility.
In contemporary re-
alistthought,themeaning
of theethicof responsibility
comes forth in theno-
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 71

tion that eachpolitical action must be judged on specic merits, rather than in
accordancewith some abstract, universal standard.
The Weberian ethic of conviction and the ethic of consequencesassumed
in much of realist theory the formulation, as Hans Morgenthau suggests,that
abstractmoral principlescannotbe universallyappliedto specicpolitical ac-
tions. The political leader operatesin an anarchic society lacking authoritative
political institutions,legalsystems,and commonlyacceptedstandardsof con-
duct.Acting on behalfof stateinterests,thepolitical leadernecessarily
embod-
ies a standard of conduct substantially different from that of the individual
within a civilized political unit. Here we confront the realist assumption that,
while the international systemis anarchical, within the nation-state, law and
ordergenerallyprevailthe unitary statein an anarchicsociety.Theleader,by
oath of office, is sworn to safeguardthe state from external threat, to provide
for its common defense,and ultimately to ensureits survival in a world of an-
archy.Because thereis no legallyor politically superiorauthority,the powerof
the state becomesthe ultimate guaranteeof security.The protection of the
state from its enemiesin an international systemcontaining revolutionary and
expansioniststatesinevitablyleadsthe political leaderto adoptor to condone
policies that would be deemedunacceptableamongindividuals or groups
within a civilized state. For thesereasons,the realist holds that politics is not a
function of ethicalphilosophy.Instead,political theory,includingrealistthe-
ory, is derivedfrom political practiceand historicalexperience.
In contrast,utopianthoughtwasbasedon theideathat politicscanbemade
to conform to an ethical standard.Norms of behavior,suchas thosespecifiedin
internationallaw andorganization, canbeestablished andmadethebasisfor in-
ternationalbehavior.This utopian assumptionis challengedin realisttheory,
whichpositsinsteadsevere limitationsin the extentto whichpoliticalreform,in-
stitutionaldevelopment, or educationcanalterpoliticalbehavior,basedasit al-
legedlyis not only on theanarchicalstructureof theinternationalsystembut also
on a humannaturethat itselfis awed, power-seeking, andotherwiseimperfect.
Hence,realisttheoryemphasizes the balance:of poweras a regulatorymecha-
nismto preventanyonestateor otherpoliticalgroupfrom achievinghegemony.
Althoughthe term structurerefersto the units of the internationalsystem
and their relationshipto eachother,includingthedistribution of power,and
holds that systemicstructuralcharacteristicsdecisivelyshapebehavioralpat-
terns, other variables also have important implications for state actors.
Classicalrealist writers pointed to the importanceof geographicallocation.
Geographyis saidto shapethe optionsavailableto states.Evenin the nuclear
age,when any statecan be targetedby highly accuratemissilesarmedwith
atomic warheadslaunchedwith intercontinentalrange,geographyneverthe-
less renders certain states more vulnerable than others to foreign conquest.
Reecting this dimensionof realist theory, Henry Kissingermaintainsthat
both the Americanand the Europeanapproaches to foreignpolicy werethe
productsof their own uniquecircumstances.
Americans inhabiteda nearly
emptycontinentshieldedfrompredatory powersbytwo vastoceansandwith
weakcountriesasneighbors. . . . Theanguishing
dilemmas of securitythat
72 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

tormentedEuropeannationsdid not touch Americafor nearly 150 years.25

Theextentto whichthelocationof a stateexposes
it to, or affordsit protec-
tion from, hostileneighborscannotbut inuenceits foreignpolicy.

Power and International Behavior

Accordingto realisttheory,statesoperatein an anarchicsystemin which their

policiesare basedon.nationalinterestbackedby power.Because the structure
of the systemincludesthe distributionof power,it follows that poweris a key
conceptin realist-neorealisttheory.Furthermore,if we cannotdeveloptech-
niquesfor measuringpower, our ability to understandrelationshipsamong
unitsin thestructurewill beseverely
limited.Therefore,
realisttheoryhasin-
cludedboth the conceptualization
andmeasurement
of power.Althoughpower
is thekeyvariable
shaping
international
behavior,
powernevertheless
repre-
sentsone of the most important, yet troublesome,conceptsin international-
relationstheory.Because of its crucialimportancein classicalrealist,neorealist,
andneoclassical realisttheory,the needto dene,andto rene, the meaningof
power is abundantlyapparent.Accordingto RobertGilpin, the number and
varietyof denitions(of power)shouldbean embarrassment to political scien-
tists.26In its basicmeaning,
powerconnotes
theabilityof oneactorto inu-
enceanotheractorto do, or not to do, somethingdesiredby that actor.The ac-
tor exertingsuch inuence doesso by meansof the capabilitiesthat it has
available.Accordingto DavidBaldwin,The mostcommonconception
of
power in socialsciencetreatspower as a type of causalrelationshipin which
thepowerwielderaffectsthebehavior,
attitudes,
beliefs,
or propensity
to actof
another
actor.27
Asif to conrmRobertGilpins
characterization
of power,
we confrontwithin and beyondrealist-neorealist
theorynumerousdenitions
of power.Kenneth Waltz,asBaldwinpointsout,rejectsa causalconception of
power,preferring insteadto suggest
the oldandsimplenotionthatanagentis
powerfulto the extentthat he affectsothersmorethantheyaffecthim.28
Waltzgoesonto maintainthatit is possibleto rankthecapabilities of statesby
reference to how theyscoreon all of thefollowingitems:sizeof population
andterritory,resource endowment,economic capability,
militarystrength, po-
liticalstabilityandcompetence.29
Thediversityof denitionsof power,characteristicof its pervasivepres-
encein realist-neorealist
writings,canbeillustratedby referenceto other liter-
ature,in this casethat of therealisteraof the middleyearsof the twentieth
century.Accordingto Nicholas]. Spykman,All civilizedlife restsin the last
instanceon power. Poweris the ability to movethe individual or the human
collectivityin somedesiredfashion,throughpersuasion,
purchase,
barter,
andcoercion.3°
RobertStrausz-Hupé
maintained
thatinternational
politics
is dominatedby the questfor power,and that at anygivenperiodof
knownhistory,therewereseveralstateslockedin deadlyconict,all desiring
the augmentation
or preservation
of their power.31ArnoldWolfersargued
that poweris the ability to moveothersor to getthemto do what onewants
themto do and not to do what onedoesnot want themto do. Moreover,he
 THEORETICALFOUNDATIONS 73

deemedit important to distinguishbetweenpowerand inuence,the first to

meanthe ability to moveothersby the threat or iniction of deprivations,the
latterto meantheabilityto do sothroughpromises or grantsof benets.32
JohnBurton,himselfclearlynot anexponent of therealistschoolof theoryor
of realpolitik,suggests
that thereis probablynogreatercommonfactorin all
thinking on international relations than the assumption that Statesdepend for
their existenceupon power,and achievetheir objectivesby power,thus mak-
ingthemanagement
of powerthemainproblemto besolved.33
According
to
Robert Gilpin, power encompasses the military, economic,and technological
capabilitiesof states,while prestigeconsistsof the perceptionsof otherstates
with respectto a statescapacitiesand its ability andwillingnessto expressits
power.
34
The power of a stateis saidto consistof capabilities,someof which are
economic in nature, such as levels of industrialization and productivity, gross
national product, national income,and incomeon a per capita basis.In an
analysisof the economicdimensionsof internationalpolitics and the political
aspectsof internationaleconomics,assessing power in its intertwinedeco-
nomic and political contexts, Charles P. Kindlebergerdenes power as
strengthcapableof beingusedefficiently,that is, strengthplus the capacity
to useit effectively35
in supportof someobjective.
Thus,like severalother
writers, Kindlebergerdistinguishesbetweenmeansand ends,or the use of
meansfor the attainmentof ends.How capabilitiesareorganizedto achievea
specificobjectiveis the essenceof strategy.Without effectiveintegrationof ca-&#
pabilitiesin the form of a strategyfor the attainmentof an agreedobjective,
the physicalmeansavailablemay be squandered. Therefore,strategyitself be-
comesa capability.Means,in the.form of capabilities,exist whetheror not
they areactuallyusedfor a particulargoal.
Accordingto Kindleberger,strengthis a meansthat existsevenin the ab-
sence
of itsusefor someoal e use0 strengt or a par-
ticularpurpose.
In Kindleberger
s words,Prestige
is the"respect
whichis paid
to power.Inuenceis the capacityto affectthe decisionsof others.Forceis the
useof physicalmeansto affectthosedecisions.Dominanceis dened as the
conditionunderwhichA affectsa signicantnumberof Bsdecisions without
B affectingthoseof A.36Powerthusconceptualized
is relatedto adaptability
andsexibility in a nationseconomy.Suchis the meaningof efficiencyin the
useof power.Thus,poweris_c_l_y;1g,mic
andchanging, ratherthanstaticin na-
ture.Thosestatesor otherentitiesbestableto adjustto changearelikelyto
possess powerandto makemosteffectiveuseof it in supportof positedgoals.
er, interde endenceconnotesthe ability of onestate
to inuenceanotherin someway.If the interdependence ismutual,eachcould
damageboth the other and itself by severingthe relationshipthat existsbe-
tweenthem.Sucha conceptionof interdependence hasshapedthe deterrence
relationshipof the nuclearage.The survivalof eachnuclearpower is depen-
dent on the decision of one or more of the others not to destroy it with atomic
weapons.
In thissense,
thereisaformof interdependence.
Thecostsandthe
benets of exercisingpower by eachparty in an interdependent
relationship
74 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

increaseas the level of interdependencegrows.Accordingto David Baldwin,

dependency relationshipsrepresenta form overinuencein which oneactors
abilityfor example,to cut off the supplyof a critical resource,suchasoil, to
anotheractormay furnishthe basisfor inuenceof the disadvantaged party
in otherareasaswell.37Clearlyrelatedis theissueof costin analyzing
there-
lationshipbetweenpower and dependency. The levelof dependency is deter-
minedeitherby the opportunitycostsof forgoingthe objectat issue-for ex-
ample, oilor by the extent to which the dependentstate can substitute
anothersupplieror anothersourceof energyfor oil.38Similarly,JamesA.
Caporasomaintainsthat the natureof dependence would include(1) the mag-
nitudeof the dependentstatesinterestin a desirefor a good,(2) the extentof
the control of the goodin questionby the party exertinginuence,and (3) the
ability of the dependentstateto nd an alternativesourcefor the commodity
for which thereexistsa particularlevelof dependence.
It is generallyagreedthat power is situationallyspecic.Although power
is far lessfungiblethan money,any amountof which canbe spentfor any de-
siredpurpose,someaspectsof poweraremorefungiblethan othersandmight
be so rank ordered.If power must be relatedto the situationin which it is
used,or availablefor use, Baldwin maintains,categorizingstatesas great
powersor small powersis inadequate,if not misleading,becausesuchterms
relate,to a generalized,rather than to a specic, situationalcontext or to a
particularissuearea.4°
Theneedexists,it is suggested,
for students
of interna-
tional politics to examinethe multiple distributionalpatternsof power in a
largenumberof issueareas,while recognizingthe limitationsof power analy-
sisresultingfrom the absence of a commondenominatorof political valuefor
comparingdifferentformsand usesof power.
In work designedto synthesizeand analyzeefforts to measurepower,
Michael P.Sullivanacknowledges that a major difficulty arisesfrom the need
to specifythetypeof international
behaviorto beexpl_a_ined
by referenceto
powerasThekeyexplanatory variable.In the absence-of
suchspecicity,he
claims,we may erroneouslyconcludethat differenttypesof internationalbe-
havior can be explainedby the samemeasurement of power. Furthermore,
Sullivanmaintains,powerasan attribute,or capability,must be distinguished
from powerasinuence.Althoughstateswith the greatestpowerare likely,to
be the most inuential, there are exceptionsto this generalization.We may
needanalternative
explanation
togthatof powerasthekeyvariable.In hisdis-
cussionof power,Sullivannotesa largenumberof measurable
elements:pop-
ulation,territory,resources,
levelsof education
andskills,grossnationalprod-
uct,thescientictechnological base,exportsandimports,f_oreigr_1_in_ves_
militaryexpenditures, sizeof armedforces:agricultural
production,andfood
supply.Beyondsuchmeasurements
at the,nationallevel,it is possibleto spec-
systems-level
powermeasures.
They would includeallianceand non-
governmentalorganizationmembershipand the distribution of capabilities
throughoutthe systemas a basisfor giving operationalmeaningto bipolarity
and multipolarity. Our ability to categorizethe polarity of internationalsys-
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 75

temsdepends
on theextentto whichit is possible
to developadequate
tech-
niquesfor measuringpowerand alignment.
Becausepowerprovidesthe coreconceptin realisttheoryfor understand-
ing statebehavior,
theneedfor greaterdefinitionalclarityis abundantlyap-
parent.Although powerhasbeendened as the aggregateof the capabiliti
availableto the state,the power of one statea so is sai to e relativeto the
aggregate
capabilities
.
t as eenas nB , t-
dent
onthe
issue,
object,
orgoal
forwhich
it nomi?§Wv?r,
howevervast,cannothalt armoreddivisions,just as military poweritself
would not be sufficientto ensureglobal trade dominance.To specifyand
compare
attributes
orcapabilities,
represents
powerinitgst§t1§_Elim
§1t istheoutcome
of&#39;the
interactive
process,
whether
it
be who wins wars or who wins trade negotiations.How power is mobilized
on behalf of a goal is the meaningof strategy.The essence
of strategyis the
ization of ca abilitiesi ch a fashionasto maximizethe prospectfor
s ccess &#39;
&#39;
power in it ma y, t e itera ure on power,
aswe haveseen,include the extentto whi h ca abilities,basedon
strategies,translateinto ha e the behaviorof othersto ro uce
a desiredoutcome.Realisttheoryleft suc e nitiona and measurement
addressed bytheneorealist
successor
generation
andothers
concernedwith understandingthe role of power in historic, contemporary,
and future global settings.

Realist International-Relations Theory:

The Mid-Twentieth Century
Themajorassumptions
of realisttheory,deeplyrootedin historyandpolitical
thought,gainedintellectualascendancy in writings that includedthe work of
the ProtestanttheologianReinhold Niebuhr; the diplomatpolicy-planner-
historian GeorgeF. Kennan;the geographerpoliticalscientistNicholas J.
Spykman;policymakerhistorianstrategic analystHenry Kissinger;the politi-
cal scientistand studentof geopoliticsRobert StrauszHupé; and the seminal
writings of HansJ. Morgenthau.Morgenthaucastsa long, deepintellectual
shadowover the neorealistand the classicalrealistlandscape. Althoughspace
doesnot permita detailedexaminationof thewritingsof theseandothermajor
contributors,we turn to a descriptionand assessment of HansMorgenthau.

HansJ. Morgenthau No twentieth-century writer hashada greaterimpacton

the development of realisttheorythan HansJ. Morgenthau(1904-1980).The
realistconceptsrelatedto rationallydeterminednationalinterest,power,balance
of power,and the management of power in an anarchicworld werenowhere
morefully developed thanin Morgenthaus work. It is to Morgenthauthat critics
of realisttheoryusuallyturn andto whomthosewho seekto adaptrealisttheory
to a neorealistreconceptualization
referasa necessary beginningpoint.
76 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

Essential to Morgenthaus realisttheoryaresix basicprinciples.First,hesug-

gestedthat politicalrelationships
aregovernedby objectiverulesdeeplyrootedin
human nature. Becausetheserules are impervious to our preferences,they can
bechallenged
onlyat theriskof failure.42
If theserulesthemselvescannotbe
changed,
Morgenthau heldthatsocietycanbeimproved by rst understanding
thelawsthat governsocietyandthenby basingpublicpolicyon that knowledge.
In theorizingaboutinternationalpolitics,moreover, it is necessary
to employhis-
torical data for examiningpolitical actsand their consequences. In evaluating
and assimilatingthesevastamountsof historicaldata,Morgenthauasserts,the
student
of politicsshouldattemptto viewtheissuefromthepositionof a states-
manwhomustmeeta certainproblemof foreignpolicyundercertaincircum-
stances.The student must ask what the rational alternativesare from which a
statesman
may choosewho mustmeetthis problemunderthesecircumstances
(presuming
alwaysthatheactsin arationalmanner),
andwhichof these
rational
alternatives
this particularstatesman,
actingunderthesecircumstances,
is likely
to choose.
It isthetestingof thisrationalhypothesis
against
theactualfactsand
theirconsequences
thatgives
meaning
tdthéfactsofinternational
politics.43
Second, lylorgent_hau_ppsited
thatpolitical.leaders
_thinkandactin terms
of interestdenedaspowerandthathistoricalevidence provesthisassump-
tion.74
This concept,centralto Morgenthaus realisttheory,givescontinuity
and unity to the seeminglydiverseforeign policiesof the widely separated
nation-states.
Moreover,the conceptinterestdenedaspower makesit pos-
sibleto evaluateactionsof political leadersat differentpointsin history.In his
view,internationalpolitics is a processin which nationalinterestsare accom-
modated or resolved on the basis of diplomacy or war.

The conceptof the nationalinterestpresupposes neithera naturallyharmonious,

peacefulworld nor the inevitabilityof war as a consequence of the pursuit by all
nations of their national interests. Quite to the contrary, it assumescontinuous
conict and threatof war to be minimizedthroughthe continuousadjustmentof
conictinginterestbydiplomatic
action.45
Third, Morgenthauacknowledged that the meaningof interestdened as
power is not easilydetermined.However,in a world in which sovereignna-
tions competefor power, survival constitutesthe minimum goal of foreign
policy and the core national-interest.All nations are compelledto protect
their physical,political, andcultural identity,againstencroachments by other
nations. Thus, national interest is identied with national survival. Taken in
isolation, the determination of its content in a concrete situation is relatively
simple,for it encompasses
theintegrity,
of thenationsterritory,of its political
institutions,and of its culture.46As long asthe world is dividedinto nations
in an anarchicglobal setting,Morgenthauasserted,the national interestis
indeedthe lastword in world politics. Interest,then,is the essenceof politics,
which is dened as a struggle for power.
Once its survival is assured,the nation-state may pursue lesserinterests.
Morgenthauassumed
that nationsignorethe nationalinterestonly at the risk
of destruction. To illustrate the meaning of national interest and the need to
 THEORETICALFOUNDATIONS 77

distinguish
betweenthe most vital and the lessernationalinterests
Morgenthau setforth severalhistoricalexamples.If GreatBritain,in 1939
to 1940,hadbasedits policytowardFinlandon legalisticandmoralisticcon-
siderations,
backed
with large-scale
militaryaid against
Sovietaggression
thenBritainspositionmighthavebeenweakened
sufcientlyto ensureits de-
structionby Nazi Germany.Britain would haveneitherrestoredFinlandsin-
dependence nor safeguarded
its ownmostvital nationalinterest,thatof phys-
icalsurvival.Onlywhenthenationalinterestmostcloselyrelatedto national
survivalhasbeensafeguardedcannationspursuelesser
interests.
Fourth,Morgenthau
stated
thatuniversal
moralprinciples
cannot
beap-
pliedto the actionsof statesin theirabstract,universal
formulation,but that
theymustbelteredthroughtheconcrete circumstances of timeandplace.43
Inpursuitof thenational
interest,
nation-states
aregoverned
byamorality
that

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differsfromthemoralityof individuals
in theirpersonal
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In theac-

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pfvwrr
-.
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.-
. tionsof leaders

state
morality
of stateasstateleaders,
larpolicybecome thecriteria
isto courtnational
bilityof stateleaders
thepoliticalconsequences
forjudging
it. Toconfuse
disaster.
Because
individual
theprimary
of a particu-
moralitywith
ofcialresponsi-
is thesurvivalof thenation-state,
theirobligations
to the
citizenryrequirea differentmodeof moraljudgmentfrom that of theindividual.
Thisis not to suggest that Morgenthauignoredethicalor moralconsiderations.
Hecouldenvisage
noconception
of national
interest
thatwouldcondone
poli-
ciesof massextermination,torture,andtheindiscriminate slaughter
of civilian
populationsin war.Hesawethicsasprovidinga system of restraints
onpolitical
conduct, whilenevertheless,
asGregRussell suggests,
urgingtherealistto view
themoralsignicance of politicalactionasa productof theineluctabletension
between themoralcommand andtherequirements of politicalsuccess.49
(G
Fifth,Morgenthau
asserted
thatpoliticalrealismdoesnot identifythe
moralaspirations
of a particularnationwith themorallawsthatgovernthe
universe.5°
In fact,if international
politicsis placed
withina framework
of
deninginterests
in termsof power,we areableto judgeothernationsaswe
judgeour own.51Thisaspectof Morgenthaus realismbearsresemblanceto
thethoughtof ReinholdNiebuhr,a leadingtwentieth-century
Protestant
the-
ologian
whowroteextensively
oninternational
relations
andforeignpolicy.
Sixth,and nally, Morgenthaustressedthe autonomyof the political
sphere.
Politicalactionsmustbejudgedby politicalcriteria.The economist
asks:How doesthispolicyaffectthewelfareof society,or a segmentof it?
The lawyer asks:Is this policy in accordwith therules of law? The realist
asks:Howdoesthispolicyaffectthepowerof thenation?52
In powerstruggles,
nationsfollowpoliciesdesigned
to preserve
thestatus
quo,to achieve
imperialistic
expansion,
or to gainprestige.
In Morgenthaus
view,domesticand internationalpolitics can be reducedto oneof threebasic
types:A politicalpolicyseeks
eitherto keeppower,to increase
power,or to
demonstrate
power.53
Althoughthepurpose
of a status-quo
policyisto preserve
theexistingdis-
. tributionof power,
thenationadopting
sucha policydoesnotnecessarily
act
to preventall internationalchange.Instead,status-quonationsseekto thwart
78 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

change that mayproducefundamental shiftsin theinternationaldistribution

of power.Morgenthau citedtheMonroeDoctrineasanexampleof a status-
quopolicythat fullls histwo criteria.First,it wasdesignedto maintainthe
prevailingpowerbalance in theWesternhemisphere. Second, it expressedthe
unwillingnessof theUnitedStatesto preventall change. Instead,theUnited
Stateswould act only against change that threatened the existing distribution
of power.Likewise,
treatiesconcluded
at theendof warsinvariablycodifythe
thenprevailing status quo.
Imperialismis the secondmajor alternativeavailableto nations.This is a
policy designedto achievea reversalof existingpowerrelationsbetweenna-
tions.54The goalsof imperialistpowersincludelocal preponderance, conti-
nental empire, or world domain. Nations may adopt imperialistic policies as a
result of victory, defeat, or the weaknessof other states.A state for which its
leaders expect victory may alter its objectives from the restoration of the sta-
tus quo to a permanent change in the distribution of power. Moreover, a de-
feated nation may adopt an imperialistic policy to turn the scaleson the vic-
tor, to overthrow the status quo created by victory, and to changeplacesin the
hierarchyof power.55 Finally,the existenceof weak statesmay prove irre-
sistible to a strong state.
To attain imperialistic objectives, statesmay resort to military force or to
cultural and economic means. Military conquest is the oldest and most obvi-
ous form of imperialism. Economic imperialism is not as effective a technique
as military conquest, but if one imperialistic state cannot gain control over an-
other by armed force, it may attempt to do so by economic means. Cultural
imperialismrepresents
an attemptto inuencethe humanmind as an instru-
mentfor changing
thepowerrelationsbetween
two nations.56
(Foranexam-
ination of theories of imperialism, seeChapter 9.)
According&#39;to
Morgenthau, states may pursue a policy of prestige. This
may be one of the instrumentalities through which the proponents of status
quo and of imperialism
achieve
their ends.57
The objectiveis to impress
other nationswith the poweronesown nation actuallypossesses,
or with the
power it believes,or wants other nations to believe,it possesses.58
Morgenthau suggestedtwo specic techniques of this policy: diplomacy and
display of force. A policy of prestigesucceedswhen a nation gains such a repu-
tation for powerthat the actualuseof powerbecomes
unnecessarythepolit-
ical shadow allegedly cast in the form of inuence by the attributes or capabil-
ities that constitute power noted earlier in this chapter.The prestigeof a nation
might well survive for a considerabletime after its actual power has declined.
Morgenthau was concernednot only about the quest for power, but also
with theconditionsfor internationalpeace.His conceptof internationalorderis
closelyrelatedto his conceptof national interest.The pursuit of national interests
that are not essential to national survival contributes to international conict. In
the twentieth century especially,nations have substituted global objectives for
more limited goals that, in Morgenthausview, constitute the essenceof national
interest. Prudent stateleadersrealize that it is part of the national interest to re-
spectthe legitimatenationalinterestof otherstates.Modernnationalism,com-
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 79

binedwiththemessianic ideologies
of thetwentiethcentury,
hasobscured thena-
tionalinterest.
In theguiseof extending communism or makingtheworldsafe
for democracy,nationsintervene
in theaffairsof regionsnot vitalto theirsecu-
rity. Forexample,MorgenthauopposedU.S.militaryinterventionin Vietnambe-
causeSoutheastAsiaallegedlylay beyondthe mostvital interestsof the United
States,
andbecause
theUnited
States
wouldhavefoundit impossible,
except
per-
hapswith a vastexpenditure
of resources,
to maintaina balance
of powerin
Southeast
Asia.In contrast,heexpressed
greatconcernaboutSovietinuencein
Cubabecause of its geographic
locationin closeproximityto theUnitedStates.
ThusMorgenthau appliedhistheoreticalanalysis
to majorissues of U.S.Cold
Warnationalinterestandsecurity,writingextensivelyontopicsof importance.
Evenin an internationalsystemwithout the ideologicallymotivatedfor-
eignpoliciesthathesawduringtheColdWar,Morgenthau heldthatcompeti-
tion betweenopposingnation-states is likely. Like many other realists,
Morgenthau viewedthebalance of powerasthemosteffective technique
for
managing powerin ananarchic internationalsystem basedon competitivere-
lationships
amongstates. Hedenedbalance of poweras(1)a policyaimedat
a certainstateof affairs,(2) an actualstateof affairs,(3) an approximately
equaldistributionof power,and(4)anydistributionof power.However, it is
not the balanceof poweritself, but the internationalconsensus
on which it is
built that preservesinternational peace.Beforethe balance of powercould
imposeits restraintsuponthepoweraspirations of nationsthroughthe me-
chanicalinterplayof opposingforces,the competing nationshadfirst to re-
strainthemselves by acceptingthesystem of thebalance of powerasthecom-
mon frameworkof their endeavors. Sucha consensus kept in checkthe
limitlessdesirefor power,potentiallyinherent,as we know,in all imperi-
alisms,andprevented it frombecoming a politicalactuality.
59
Theinternational consensus that sustained the balanceof powerbefore
the twentiethcenturyhadceased to exist.Structuralchanges in the interna-
tionalsystem at leastdrastically
limited,if not rendered ineffective,theclassi-
calbalance of power.In Morgenthaus view,thebalance of worldpowerdur-
ing the Cold War restedwith two nations,the United Statesand the Soviet
Union, ratherthan with severalgreatpowers,asit had in earliereras.He con-
tendedthat alliesof onesuperpowercouldshifttheiralignment to theother
superpower,buttheycouldnot altersignicantlythedistributionof powerbe-
causeof their weaknessrelative to either the United Statesor the SovietUnion.
Nor wasanythird powerof sufcientstrengthasto becapable
of intervening
on eitherside-andgreatlychangingthe power distribution.
Likethebalanceof power,diplomacyplaysa crucialrolein thepreserva-
tion of peace.
Accordingto Morgenthau,
thediplomats rolehadbeendimin-
ishedby thedevelopment of advanced
communications, by publicdisparage-
ment of diplomacyand diplomats,and by the tendencyof headsof
governmentto conducttheir own negotiationsin summit conferences. The
rise in importanceof internationalassemblies,
the substitutionof opendiplo-
macyfor secrecy, andtheinexperienceon the part of thesuperpowers
con-
tributedto the declineof diplomacyduringmuchof the twentiethcentury.
80 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

Morgenthauclearlypreferreda diplomacysimilar to that of the international

systembeforethe twentiethcentury.His viewson traditional diplomacyas a
meansfor adjustingnationalinterestsresembled
thoseof Sir Harold Nicolson,
a leadingtwentieth-century
Britishdiplomatandtheoretician
of diplomatic
practice.
If it is to be revived as an effectivetechniquefor managingpower,
Morgenthau
asserted,
diplomacy
mustmeetfour conditions:
(1)It mustbedi-
vestedof its crusadingspirit, (2) foreign-policyobjectivesmust be dened in
termsof nationalinterestandmustbesupportedwith adequatepower,(3) na-
tions must view foreignpolicy from the point of view of other nations,and
(4) nationsmustbewilling to compromiseon issuesthat arenot vital to them.
If diplomacy
couldberestoredto a positionof importance,
Morgenthau
be-
lieved,it might not only contributeto peacethroughaccommodation, but also
to creatingan internationalconsensus on which more adequateworld politi-
cal institutions could be built.

NEOREALIST THEORY
The realist tradition has furnished an abundant basis for the formation of
what is termeda neorealistapproachto international-relations theory.A neo-
realist theory would inject greaterrigor into the realisttradition by dening
key conceptsmoreclearlyand consistently.Neorealismhasembracedwhat is
termedstructuralrealism,identiedwith thewritingsof Kenneth
Waltz. For
neorealism,power remainsa key variable,althoughit existslessas an end in
itself than asa necessary
and inevitablecomponentof a political relationship.
Amongthoseeffortsis thework of Gottfried-Karl
Kindermann.62
According
to Kindermann,just as the instrumentof power and of sanctionsdoesnot
exhaustthe natureof law, the natureof politics is alsonot exhaustedby pri-
marilyreferringto powerasits mostimportanttool.53
Indeed,neorealisttheoryrepresents
an effort not only to draw from classi-
cal realismthoseelementsof a theoryadequateto theworld of the latetwenti-
eth century,but alsoto link conceptuallyother theoreticalefforts. Thus the
structural realism of Kenneth Waltz draws heavily on systemsconstructs, and
the neorealism of KindermannsMunich School of Neorealism has as its basis
what is termeda constellationanalysis,an integratedmultimethodsystemof
inquiry. Constellationanalysisrepresentsan effort to movefrom the single-
factor approachof classicalrealism (Morgenthausconcept of interestde-
ned as power) in order to encompass phenomenaat eachof the levelsof
analysisextendingfrom the impact of domesticfactorson foreign policy to
the implicationsof internationalsystemicstructurefor interactivepatterns.
Constellation analysis includes six categoriesfor inquiry and analysis: (1) sys-
tem and decision,includinglinkagesbetweendomesticand foreignpolicy and
decisionmaking;(2) perceptionand reality,includingthe subjectiveimagesof
decision makers; (3) interest and power, including how decision makers dene
the role of power in achievingforeign-policygoals,basedon conceptionsof
 NEOREALISTTHEORY 81

national
interest;
(4)normandadvantage,
encompassing howlegal,moral,or
ideological
postulates
shapetheconduct
of unitsof theinternational
system
andof systemic
structures
themselves;
(5)structures
andinterdependencein-
cludingtheeffectsof structures
onlevelsof interdependence
andoverallinter-
activepatterns;and (6) cooperationand conict, or how all of theaforemen-
tionedcategories
shape
thestrategies
of actorstowardotheractorsandleadto
patterns
of cooperation,
conict,or neutrality.
Constellationanalysis
is in-
tendedasa neorealist
theoryto explain
thebehaviorof individual
actors(e.g.,
states)withinaninternational
constellation.
Constellation
analysis
is alsode-
signed
to analyze
multidimensional
patterns
of interactionawithin
a polycen-
tric settingconsisting
of two or moremonocentric
actionsystems(e.g.,states).
Whileretainingtheconceptof powerasanindispensable variablein ex-
plainingpoliticalchange
anddynamics,
neorealism,
as developed
by the
Munichschool,positspolitics,not power,asits keyconcept,
bothin domestic
politics and at the internationallevel.Thisform of neorealismhasas a basic
premisetheexistenceof aninternational
systemconsisting
of interactive
ele-
mentsthatareto bestudiedbyreferenceto concepts
derivedfromclassical re-
alisttheory,butalsobased
onvariables
drawnfromcrosscultural
compara-
tiveanalysis.
To quoteagainfromKindermanns
description:
Neorealism,
in
otherwords,proceeds fromtheassumption
thatamuchhigherdegree of con-
creteandquasi-institutionalized
crossdisciplinarycooperation
isrequired be-
foreessential
progress canbemadein ourabilityto analyze
and,if possible,
to
predictpoliticalactionprocesses
of systems
ascomplex as,for instance,the
nationstateand its structurallyessentialsubsystems.64
Othercontemporaryneorealist
analysis
hasasitsfocusa reinterpretatio
andrenementof classical
realisttheory.
According to RobertGilpin,states
engage
in cost-benet
calculations
aboutalternative
courses
of actionavail-
able
tothem.Histheory
issimilar
tobutbroader
thanBueno
deMesquita
expected-utility
theoryof decisions
to goto war,whichwetreatin Chapter 7.
Totheextentthattheanticipated
benetsexceedthecosts,
statesarelikelyto
attemptto maximizegainsthat leadto changes
at the internationalwsystef
levelbased
ongrowthor decline
attheactorunitlevel.In thisrespect,
Gilpin
attempts
torenetherationality
assumption
thatiscontained
inclassical
real-
isttheory.
In Gilpins
formulation,a statewiyllaattempt to change
theinterna-
tionalsystembymeans of territorial,political,or economic
expansionuntil
themarginalcostsof additionalchangebecome equalto or exceed the mar-
ginalbenets.An internationalsystem is in a conditionof equilibriumto the
extentthatits majoractorsaresatisedwith theterritorial,political,andeco-
nomicstatusquo.It is acknowledged that everystateor groupin thesystem
couldbenetfromsomeformof change; therefore,thecostsof changing form
theprincipalbarriersto disruptiveor destabilizingaction.Thedistributionof
powerrepresents the principalmeansfor controllingthe behaviorof states.
Dominantstatesmaintaina networkof relationships within the systemfor
this purpose.
Neorealism hasasits focustheinternationalsystemasthestructurethat
shapesthe politicalrelationships
that take placeamongits members. For
82 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

structural realism,internationalpolitics is more than the summationof the

foreign policiesof statesand the externalbalanceof other actorsin the sys-
tem. Thus, KennethWaltz arguesfor a neorealistapproachbasedon pat-
ternedrelationshipsamongactorsin a systemthat is anarchical.In this re-
spect,drawing on the paradigmof internationalpolitics of classicalrealism,
structural realismemphasizes those featuresof the structurethat mold the
way in which the components relateto oneanother.
Accordingto Waltz, the term structureconnotesthe way in which the
parts are arranged.In domesticpolitics,thereis saidto be a hierarchicalrela-
tionship, in which units standin formal differentiationfrom one anotherby
referenceto their degreeof authority or the function that they perform. By
contrast,the internationalsystemlackscomparablegovernmentalinstitutions.
Actors standin a,horizontalrelationshipwith eachother,with eachstatethe
formal equal(sovereignty)of the other.Waltz denesstructureby the princi-
ple (hierarchicalor anarchic)by which it is organized.Furthermore,Waltz de-
nes structureby the specicationof functionsof the units. The more hierar-
chical the system,the greater the differentiation of functions; the more
anarchical,
the greaterthe similarityin functionamongthe units. Finally,
structureis dened by the-distributionof capabilitiesamongthe units, includ-
ing, for example,the extentto which it consistsof actorsthat aresimilarto or
widely differentfrom eachother as to themeansin their possession. In keep-
ing with classicalrealism,Waltztreatsstatesas uriitary actorswho, at a min-
imum, seektheir own preservationand, at a maximum,strive for universal
domination. Therefore, in the realist tradition, he points to the necessary
emergence
of a balanceof power.
The focus of structural realism is the arrangementof the parts of the inter-
national systemwith respectto eachother.Accordingto Waltz, The concept
of structure is basedon the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined
behavedifferentlyandin interacting
producedifferentoutcomes.67
Basicto
an anarchicsystem,by virtue of its structure,is the needfor memberunits to
rely on whatevermeansor arrangements they cangenerateto ensuresurvival
and enhancesecurity.In sucha system,basedasit is on the principleof self-
help,statespursueoneor both of two basiccoursesof action,in keepingwith
Waltzsapproachto structureas a variableconditioning,or circumscribing,
political behavior.They engagein internal efforts to increasetheir political,
military, and economiccapabilitiesand to developeffectivestrategies.They
alsoundertakeexternalattemptsto align,or realign,with other"actors.
The structureof the system,notably the numberof actorsand their re-
spectivecapabilities,shapesthe patternsof interactionthat will takeplace,in-
cludingthe numberof statesalignedwith eachotherin opposinggroupingsas
part of a balanceof power.In the anarchicalstructure,all units confront the
minimal needor functionalrequirementfor security,althoughthereare wide
variationsamongthemin their respectivecapabilitiesfor this purpose.Indeed,
differencesamong statesin the meanspossessed for securityrepresentthe
principaldistinguishingcharacteristicseparatingonefrom.theother.
 NEOREALIST THEORY 83

In Waltzs
perspective,
international
systemsaretransguredbychanges
in thedistribution
ofcapabilities
among
theirunits.Asstructures
change,
so
do interactivepatternsamongthe members,
alongwith the outcomes
that
suchinteractions
canbeexpected to produce.
Although
capabilities
constitute
attributes
of theunits,theirdistribution
amongthevariousunitsformsa
dening
characteristic
ofthestructure
ofthesystem
and,inthiscase,
ofstruc-
turalrealism.
Insum,
central
tostructural
realism,
andespecially
totheap-
proachdevelopedbyWaltz,istheproposition thatonlya structural
transfor-
mationcanaltertheanarchical
natureof theinternational
system.
If structure
denes
thearrangement
oftheparts
oftheinternational
system
in thestructural
realism
of Waltz,whataccounts
for change
in thestructure?
According
toWaltz,
structures
emerge
fromthecoexistence
oftheprimary
po-
liticalunits
ofagiven
era.
They
maybecity-states,
nations,
orempires.
Hisap-
proachtostructural
realism
doesnotaddress
thequestion
ofhowandwhysuch
political
unitscome
intoexistence
ataparticular
timeinhistory.
Hisconcern
is
not with theunitsor with thecombinations
of unitsat thenationalor subna-
tionallevels.
Stated
differently,
Waltzs
structural
realism
does
notapproach
in-
ternational-relations
theoryfroma reductionist
theoretical
perspective.
In con-
trastto structural
realism,a reductionist
theorywouldexplaininternational
phenomena principally
byreference
to theactionsof theseparate
statesand
theirinternal
characteristics.
Structural
realism
initself,
Waltz admits,
doesnot
furnishLa-comprehensive
theory
of international
relations;thiswouldrequire,
forexample;a.theoryofdomestic
politics
because
theunitsshape thesystems
structure,
justasthestructure
affects
theunits.Changes in systems,
including
theirtransformation,
originate
notin theirstructure,
butin theirparts.Unit-
levelforces
aresaidto shape
thepossibilities
forsystemic
change.
Hereit is useful
to returnto theworkof Robert
Gilpin.In deciding
on
foreign
policiesthatwouldproduce change
intheinternational
system,
Gilpin
suggests
states
usually
maketradeoffs
among
various
objectives.~They
donot
attempt
toachieve
onegoalatthesacrice
ofall.o,thers,,
butslinstead
engage
in
a satiscingapproach,
designed
to attainvariouscombinations
of desifeid
re*
sults.69
Historically,
states
have
hadastheirgoaltheconquest
of territory
that,before
theIndustrial
Revolution
andtheadvent
ofadvanced
technology,
represented
the principalmeansfor enhancing
securityor wealth.
Furthermore,
statesstriveto increase
theirinuenceoverotherstatesby
meansofthreats,
coercion,alliances,
andspheres
ofinuence.Finally,
anin-
creasingly
important
goalof states
liesin theextension
of inuence
in the
globaleconomy.
In keeping
withthesatiscing
principle,
subgoals
arebyno
means
mutuallyexclusive.
Amongthe objectives
of states,Gilpinasserts,
thoseconsidered
to bemostimportantaredenedasvital interests
onwhose
behalf thestate
iswillingtogotowar.Forsome
theorists
ofinternational
po-
liticaleconomy (IPE),
asweshallshowin Chapter
9,industrially
advanced
states
havebeenreplacing
militaryconictaimedat theconquest of territory
witheconomic
conictaimed atmaximizing theirshareof theglobalmarket.
Bothformsrepresent
powercompetition.
84 FROM REALISTTO NEOREALISTAND NEOCLASSICAL
REALISTTHEORY

International
systems aresaidto undergo essentially
threetypesof change.
Firstandof fundamental importance is analterationin thenatureof theactors
or thetypesof entitiesempires,
states, or otherunitsthat compose a partic-
ularinternational
system,
whichGilpintermssystems
change.
Examples
in-
cludetheriseanddeclineof the Greekcity-statesystem,themedievalEuropean
feudalsystem,
andtheemergence of thenuclear
statesystemleading
to thepre-
sentera.What,it isasked,
aretheparticularsociopolitical,
economic,
andtech-
nological
factorsthatgiveriseto theorganizational
framework with which
groupsor individualsadvancetheirinterests?
A system changesasthecost-
benetratioof membership in theexistingsystemis altered.
A second dimensionof changehasasits focusnotthesystem itselfbutin-
steadthecomponents withinwhichchange takesplace.All internationalsys-
temsarecharacterized by theriseandfall of powerfulstatesthat shapepat-
ternsof international
interactionsandestablishtherulesby whichthesystem
operates. Thus,thedistributionof powerwithinthesystem is altered.Here,
theemphasis isplaced
notontheriseandfall of internationalsystems butin-
steadon thegrowthanddecline of theirconstituent
elementsthat is, the
greateror lesserpowersand,in particular,thereplacementof onedominant
entityby anothersuchactor.Whereas classical
realisttheorywasderived
largelyfromtheEuropean statesystem,a comparative studyof international
systems, including
earlier,
nonWestern systems,
wouldyieldanunderstandin
of howandwhysystemic change takesplace.Finally,
thethirdelement of this
neorealist
theoryof change hasasits focusthenatureof its members politi-
cal,economic,or socioculturalinteractions.
In sum,thestudyof changeem-
bracesthe systemitself,its constituent
elements,andthe interactiveprocess
among them.
Thepropensity of states
or otheractorsto seekto extend
theirterritorial
control,politicalinuence,andeconomic domination issaidto bea function
of theirpower.Sucha process, accordingto Gilpin,continuesuntilthemar-
ginalcostsof furtherchange equalor exceed themarginal benets. Asthe
sizeof the stateand the extentof its control grow, thereeventuallycomesa
pointat whichthecostof expansion relativeto thederivedbenetslimits
thecapacityfor controlandfor furtherexpansion. A system in whichthe
costofexpansion
equals
orexceeds
itsperceived
benefits
issaidtobeiii
equilibrium.
Bythesametoken,anequilibrium,oncereached,
is itselfsub-
jectto changebecause
thereis a tendency
for theeconomiccostsof main-
tainingthe statusquoto increase
fasterthantheeconomic
capacityto sup-
portit. Therefore,
disequilibrium
represents
a gapbetween
theunitsof the
internationalsystemandthecapacityof thedominantstatesto maintainthe
existing system.
Suchis the condition that resultsin the declineof a principal actor, a
phenomenon that can be observedhistoricallyin the Roman,Byzantine,
Chinese, andBritishempires
in successive
ages.In placeof theonedominant
actor,a newequilibriumeventually
arises,reectingthealtereddistribution
of power.Asits relativepowergrows,a risingstateattempts
to extendits
controlof territoryandto increase
its inuence,usuallyat theexpense
of the
 NEOREALIST THEORY 85

dominant,but declining,power.Thepowerin declinehasessentially several

options:to attemptto increasecapabilities
to matchthe risingunit; to re-
ducecommitments and thus to acquiesce, gracefully,in alteredcircum-
stances;
to enterinto alliances
or otherarrangementswith otherpowers;or
to makeconcessions
to therisingpower.However, Gilpinsuggests,
thepri-
marymeansbywhichtheissue of disequilibrium
hasbeenresolved
through-
out historyhasbeenby war,theresultof whichhasusuallybeena redistri-
bution of powerbetweenthe victoriousand the vanquished.
Thus,
international
politicsconsists
of forcesleadingto conflictor accommodation
in a succession
of international
systems
markedby change.
Ultimately,
Gilpin concludes,
international
politicsstill canbecharacterized asit wasbyThucydides: theinter-
playof impersonal forcesandgreatleaders.. . . Worldpoliticsis still character-
izedby thestruggle of politicalentitiesfor power,prestige,
andwealthin a coali-
tion of global anarchy.Nuclear weaponshave not made the resort to force
irrelevant;
economicinterdependence
doesnotguarantee
thatcooperation
will tri-
umphoverconict;a globalcommunity
of commonvaluesandoutlookhasyetto
displaceinternational
anarchy.7°
To returnto KennethWaltz,his neorealist
theorysparkedan unfolding
debatethat hasdominatedthe international-relations
theoreticallandscape
sincetheearly1980s.Muchof thediscussion
hasfocused ontheboundarybe-
tweenthe systemand the unit levelsbetweenthe structureof the interna-
tionalsystem andtheunit agent.Centralto Waltzstheory,aswehavenoted,
is hisassertionthatinternational
relationscanbedividedinto systemandunit
levelsof analysis,with whathetermsstructurerepresenting theinternational
system levelof analysis.
Thefocusof Waltzstheoreticaleffort,asalreadydis-
cussed,liesat theinternational
system level.Therefore,
hegivesrelativelylittle
attention to unit factors becausethey lie outsidehis denition of structure.
Accordingto critics,asa resultof hisemphasis on internationalsystem
struc-
tures,Waltzhasneglected both the role of the unitsandthe impactof the
structureof theunitsthemselves on thebehavioral patternsof theirmembers.
If structureat the international
systemic levelshapes actorbehaviorat the
stateunit level,why, it is asked,doesnot the structureof the units themselves
inuencehowthemembers
of theunit themselves
behave?
Thisquestioncan
be, and is, addressed
in neoclassical
realisttheory,to bediscussed
later in this
chapter.
How unitsrespond
to threatsor opportunities
fromtheinternational
systemstructuremayberelatedto the structureof the unitsthemselves.
Justas
internationalsystemshavestructures,sodotheunitshavestructures thatmay
affecttheir behaviorin theform of differingnationalsecuritystrategies
and
foreignpolicies.
Thisquestion
includes
theassumption,
alsosetforth byWaltzsneoliberal
institutionalistcritics,that a theory of internationalpolitics must includethe
domesticpoliticsof the units,to the extentthat theyshapeforeignpolicy.
Accordingto sucha conclusion,Waltz can be faultedeitherfor drawing too
narrowly the conceptualboundarybetweenthe systemand its units or for
86 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

havingtoo narrowlydenedthetermstructureandassuming thatonlythein-

ternationalsystemlevelcontainsstructure.Accordingto neoliberalinstitu-
tionalists,for example,international
organizations
aresystemic-level
phenom-
ena that may shapesystemstructure.The extentto which they do so
represents at theveryleasta questionto beaddressed
in thedevelopment of
theory.Accordingto BarryBuzan,who, togetherwith CharlesJonesand
RichardLittle,hasbeenin theforefrontof theeffortbothto reneneorealism
andto synthesize
neorealist
andneoliberalinstitutionalist
theory, Waltzs
fo-
cusonpoweranditsdistribution
at thestructurelevelheavilydiscounts
the
authorityandorganizational
dimensionsof international
parties.71
Instead,
it is suggested
that, in additionto power,thereis generalagreement
that
rules,regimes,
andinternational
institutions
needto bebrought
intothedef-
initionof international
politicalstructure.72
Sucha critiqueof Waltzleadslogicallyto the propositionthat system
structurecontainsa seriesof variables,including,but not conned to, power
and its distribution in the form of capabilitiesamongthe units of the system.
Buzan,Jones,andLittle introducewhat theycall deepstructure,by which
theymeanthat politicalstructureencompasses anarchy(no centralgovern-
ment)aswell ashierarchy(centralgovernment overtheunits).Buzan,Jones,
andLittlesdeepstructureencompasses organizational
principles basedon hi-
erarchyandanarchy. If theunitsof thesystem aresimilar,theirrelationship
to
eachotheris basedlogicallyonsovereignty, with eachdeningitselfashaving
ultimateauthorityandindependence. If theunitsaredifferentin termsof the
governmental
functions
theyperformor seekto undertake,
thismeans
that
theydo not have,or claimto have,completesovereignty.To theextentthat
unitsaresovereign
overa limitedsphere,
theyexistin a hierarchical
setting,or
at least in a structure in which organizationssuch as the European
Community/Union andthe UnitedNationsundertakesomegovernmental,
or at leastgovernmentlike,
functions.73
Furthermore,Buzan,
Jones, andLittlesuggest
thatdeepstructureincludes
not onlypowerandinstitutions,but alsorulesandnorms.System structure
containswhat is termedthe internationalpolitical system,aswell asthe inter-
nationalsocietalsystem,
with its emphasis
on cultural,legal,andnormative
behavioraldimensions.Althoughthe sovereignstaterepresentsthe dominant
unit in themoderninternational
system,
thestateis nottheexclusive
basisfor
government. To.theextentthatotherfactorsshapethestructure,
Waltzscon-
ceptionof systemstructure,howeverusefulasa pointof departure,
mustbe
broadenedwithin and beyondthe political sector.Accordingto Buzan,Jones,
andLittle,thoseadditionalsectors,
beyondthepolitical,thatwouldbeneces-
saryto understandinternational-system
structurewouldincludetheeconomic
andsocietalaswell asthestrategic(bywhichtheymeantheexercise of con-
trol by coercion).
HavingopenedWaltzsconception of systemstructurein this fashion,
Buzan,Jones,
andLittleassert thatthestructuralandunitlevelsof analysis
are
linkedandthat, therefore,
a theoryof structuralrealismmustdevelopsuch
linkages.
Whereas Waltzlargelyexcludestheunitlevel,Buzan,
Jones, andLittle
 NEOREALISTTHEORY 87

maintain
thatatheory ofinternational
relations
requires
asgreat
rigoratthe
unitlevelasatthesystem-structurelevel.
Neorealist,
orstructural
realist,
the-
orycanbeadapted toaccommodate
suchabroadening
ofitsscope.
Waltzhad
suggested
thattheunitlevelprovidestwosources of explaining
internationa
behavior:
theattributes
oftheunitsandtheinteractionsamong them.Whereas
Waltzconnes
suchexplanationsto theunitlevel,Buzan,
Jones, andLittleat-
tempttolinktheunitandthesystemstructure
levels.
Theyassert
thatexpla-
nationof behavior
intermsofpossession
ofacapability
byaunitisquitedif-
ferentfromexplanationin termsof thedistribution
of a capability
withinthe
system.74 Stated
differently,
theymaintainthathowstates chooseto usetheir
capabilities
isnotthesame
ashowactors
areranked
inthesystem
structure,
ac-
cordingto theirrespective
capabilities.
At theunit level,thereareaction-
reaction
patternsthatforma process.
Howpoweris employed, andtheout-
come
oftheinteractive
process
should
bedistinguished
frompower
asacapa-
bilityor frompowerin itsstatic,beancounting
dimension,
to recallthediscus-
sionof power
earlier
in thischapter.
Leaving
largely
intactWaltzs
boundary
between
thesystem
structure
andunitlevels,
Buzan,
Jones,
andLittleseekto
clarify
theconceptual
boundary
between
thetwolevels
andtodevelop
aclearer
understanding
between
powerat theunitandthesystemstructure
levels.
Buzan, Jones,
andLittlealsosuggest
thatthenatureof unitcapabilities
af-
fectssystem structure.
Specically,
these
include
technology andshared norms
andorganizations. Technologyprovides
animportant means bywhichunits
interact,justasnormsandorganizations shapethesystemic settingwithin
whichinteraction takesplace.Technology
producesinteractive
patternsand
opportunities
illustratedbythedifference
between
thoseavailable
in theeraof
horse-drawn
carriage
andthesailingship,contrasted
withthejumbojet,
globaltelecommunications,
and informationnetworks.To the extentthat
shared
normsexist,institutions
canbebuiltthatmayin turnstrengthen
and
broaden
patterns
of interaction.
According
to Buzan,Jones,andLittle,the
systemic
dimension
of interaction,
in contrast
with theunitor structure,
is
largelymissingfromclassical
realismandfromWaltzsneorealism
andneces-
sarilyformsa component
of a broadened
neorealiststructural-realist
theory.
Thiseffortto rethinkandexpandneorealist
theoryincludes
a focusonthe
relationship
betweensystemtransformation andsystem.continuity.
If world
historyunfolds
withinananarchicsetting
andif worldhistorynevertheless
ex-
hibitsdramatic
systemicchange,
it followsthatneorealist
theoryandanar-
chyinparticularneeds
tobetreated
asadifferentiated
structural
property
whichcanundergo
transformation.75
According
to Buzan,
Jones,
andLittle,
it is necessary
to movebeyondWaltzsidentication of structureasthe den-
ingcharacteristic
of theinternational
system.
Instead,
thestatesasunitsof the
international
system
themselves
areshaped by theirrespective
structures.
Thosedecision
makers,
oragents
of thestate,
facenotonlytheconstraints
im-
posedbythestructureof theinternational
system,
butalsotheconstraints
im-
posedbythestructure
of thestateitself.Fromdistinctive
domestic
settings,
Buzan,
Jones,
andLittlesuggest,
greatlydiffering
typesof states
mayemerge.
Contrary to Waltzs assertion,the anarchic structure of the international
88 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

systemdoesnot producehomogeneous units.Theheterogeneityof theinter-

nationalsystemat anytimein historycanbeexplained partiallyby thefact
that domestic structures affect the units that form the international system.
Thetypesof interactionamongunitsandtheirforeignpoliciesin generalare
shapedby domesticconstraints.
Thestructuralrealismdeveloped by Buzan,Jones,andLittle rejectsthe
realist-neorealist
assumption that anarchycharacterizesonlytheinternational
system andthat in contrast,theunitsarehierarchical in theirdomestic struc-
tures.Instead,accordingto thesestructuralrealists,unitshavedifferingstruc-
tures,extending fromempires to republicsandincludingstatesandnonstate
actors.Furthermore,in their internationalactions,the units exhibit coopera-
tive and competitivebehavior.They developalliances,coalitions,regimes,
norms,andinstitutionsfor international
cooperation.
Suchfeatures,common
to the internationalsystem,are saidto be explainable
by reference to the
structure of the international system.
Althoughtheanarchic societyproduces sovereign states,
theirsovereignty
doesnot meanthatanarchyis incompatible with cooperation andinterdepen-
dence.Thus,Buzan,Jones,andLittle attemptto broadenneorealist theoryto
encompass competition andcooperation. Theybelievethat structural-realist
theory,with its emphasis onsystem structureandonunitstructureandthere-
lationshipbetween domestic andinternational systemic constraints,provides
a basisfor developing a comprehensive theoryof international
relations.The
domestic structureof states,togetherwith the international systemic levelof
interactivecapabilities
suchastechnology, shapes theinteractivecapacityof
thesystem, with consequences for its structure.Change andcontinuityareaf-
fectedby interactiveelements between theinternational systemandits units.
Theneorealist theoryof Waltz,asbroadened by Buzan, Jones,andLittle,nev-
erthelessretains structural analysisas its core theoreticalconcept,together
with an international
systembasedon anarchybut still includingpatternsof
cooperation.

NeoclassicalRealist Theory
The neoclassicalrealist reformulationof realist theory includesan effort to
bridgedomestic
andinternational
politicsandspecicallyto relatedomestic
structuresto internationalstructures.Although survival representsthe ulti-
mategoalof thestate,according
to realisttheory,howthestateachieves
this
objective
depends
on the abilityof its leaders,
in the wordsof Michael
Mastanduno,David A. Lake,and G. JohnIkenberry,to meet and overcome
challenges
from, and maintainthe supportof, societalgroupsand condi-
tions.76 The leadersof statesseekcontrol over resourcesto advancetheir in-
ternationaland domesticagendasandto preservetheir leadershiplegitimacy.
Statesattemptto accumulate
economicwealthand technological
strength,
for both the international and the domestic benets that may result. States
engagein internationalstrategies
termedexternalextractionand external
valz&#39;dation.77
External extraction refers to the accumulation of resources
 NEOREALISTTHEORY 89

frombeyond
thestate
borders,
such
asaccess
toglobal
markets
orresources
thatcanbeusefulin achieving domesticobjectives.
Externalvalidationis de-
ned astheattemptsmadeby leadersto makeuseof theirauthoritative sta-
tuswithin theinternationalcommunityto enhance theirdomesticstatus.For
example,the ability of the leadership
of a newstateto gain international
recognition
isoftenseen
asanessential
basisforstrengthening
domestic
legit-
imacy.Because
the state1Scentralto neorealisttheory,whatyisneededis a
broadening
of neorealist
theoryto encompass
arecognition
of thefact,found
in neoclassical
realisttheory,thatstatesparticipate
simultaneously
in interna-
tionalanddomestic arenas.Neorealisttheory,it is suggested,
needsto take
into accountthepropositionthat statespursuegoalsin onearenathat affect
their pursuitin anotherarena.Statesmay respondto internationalevents
throughdomestic actionsand mayattemptto solvedomestic problems
throughactionsat theinternational
level.Thecombinations
of strategies
at
eachof theselevels,together
with therelationship
betweensuchstrategies
andinternationaldomesticstructures,
represent
animportantemergingdi-
mensionof neorealisttheory. 74
The effort to rene neorealist
theoryencompassesthe reformulationof
powerandthedevelopment of a greaterunderstanding
of theconditionsun-
derwhichcooperation
ratherthancompetition
will bechosen
asthepreferred
optionin whatis termedneoclassicalrealisttheory.A growingneoclassical
re-
alistliteraturebringstogetherinternationalsystems andunit levelvariables
based ontheassumption thatforeignpolicyis theresultof complexpatterns
of interaction
withinandbetween bothlevels.Although itsoverall
powerand
the placeof the statein the internationalsystem decisively-
shapes actor
choices,foreign
policyisalsoaffected
bychoices basedonperceptions,values,
andotherdomestic-levelfactors.
Whatfollowsis a briefsurvey of suchwork
designed
to setforth thekeyissues
andparameters.
In whatis termedcontin-
gentrealism,CharlesL. Glaserproceeds
from realiststructural
assumptions
butreachesdifferentconclusions
fromthosereached byrealistsandstructural
realists.78
Under
a broad
range
ofcontingencies,
states,
in aself-help
system,
decideto cooperateasa means of resolving
thesecurity
dilemma.
According
to Glaser,
a statewill weightheadvantagesandrisksof anarmsraceagainst
the benetsandcostsof enteringan armscontrol
agreement.
To the extent
thatarmscompetition
is perceived
asdiminishing
ratherthancontributing
to
security,adversaries
are likelyto prefercooperativearrangements, suchas
armscontrol agreements. In thissense,
suchstatesengagein self-helpbutin a
cooperativeratherthana competitiveform.Thistheoreticalanalysisis carried
onestepfurtherto includea rethinkingof power,thefocusof whichis mili-
tary capabilitieswith an emphasison considerationsof offenseand defense.
Glaser
suggests
thata stateseeking
security
in ananarchic
setting,
deciding
whetherto pursuecompetitive or cooperative
strategies,
confrontstwo funda-
mentalquestions:(1)Whichwill furnishthenecessary militaryforcesto deter
anadversaryor to providedefense in theeventof deterrencefailure?(2)What
levelsandtypesof capabilities
will ensureonestatessecuritywithoutthreat-
eningthe othersidesabilityto deterand defend?Contingentrealist theory
90 FROMREALIST
TO NEOREALIST
ANDNEOCLASSICAL
REALIST
THEORY

emphasizes
whatistermed
theoffensedefense
balance,
dened
astheratioof
thecostof offensive
forcesto thecostof defensive
capabilities.
Accordingto
contingentrealist
theory,
thegreater
theemphasis
ondefense,
theless
theneed
for armscontrol.Because
largeincreases
or asymmetries
in offensive
forces
areneededto gainsignicantmilitaryadvantage,
armscontrolwill beneces-
saryasa means of restraining
armsraces.In addressing
suchissues,contin-
gentrealism
opens
neorealist/structural-realist
theoryto inputs
fromtheories
ofcooperative
behavior,
theories
ofarms control,
andgame theory.
Totheex-
tentthat suchtheoriesareintegrated,
we haveenlarged
thebasisfor a com-
prehensivetheoryof international
relations.
Neorealisttheorymay be furthercategorized accordingto alternative
types
of outcomes
forstatebehavior.
Theassumption
thatunites
allpropo-
nentsof neorealisttheoryis the anarchicsociety,previouslydiscussed,
in
whichsurvivalis themostimportantgoal.To survivein theanarchicenviron-
ment,states,
ormoreproperly
theirdecision
makers,
mayadoptavariety
of
strategies.
Forexample,states
mayseek to balance
against
otherstates
by
formingalliances
or coalitions
with someagainst
others.States
mayadopt
bandwagon
strategies
byjoining
withthestronger
rather
thanopposing
such
a state.States
mayseekpeaceful
accommodations
by diplomatic
means,
in-
cluding
negotiations
andconcessions.
States
maygoto warin aneffortto
forestall
aggressive
behavior
onthepartof anadversary.
All suchstrategies
arecompatible
withneorealist
theory.79
Thus,neorealists
fallintodiffering
categories
in theirdelineation
andprioritization
of suchstrategies.
Whatare
termed
offensiveneorealists
holdthatstates
seekto achieve
maximum gainsin
theirpower
relative
tootherstates
tomaintain
amarginofsecurity.
Theulti-
mate example
ofsuch astate,
foroffensive
neorealists,
isthehegemon,
which
haslittle to fearfrom otherstates.In contrastarethe defensive
neorealists,
who seeknot to maximizerelativepowergains,but insteadto minimize
power losses
relative
totheiradversaries.
Survivalissought
notsomuch in a
questforgreater
power butinstead
in anefforttoachieve
security,
forexam-
ple,bybalancing
againsttheopposing
state.
Inother words,
theoffensive
neo-
realistseeks
securityby buildingsubstantially
greatercapabilities
thanits ene-
miescanamass,
whilethedefensive
realistadopts
otherstrategies
designed
to
prevent
theotherstates
fromincreasing
theirrelative
power.
Thegreater
the
emphasisuponstrategiesassociated with offensive neorealism,
according
to
theinternallogic,themoreacuteis likelyto bethesecuritydilemmaifone
states
questfor maximum powerrelative to its potential
opponents increases
thelatterssense
of insecurity.
Bysimilarlogic,themorestatesemphasize de-
fensiveneorealism,theloweris expectedto bethesecuritydilemmafor them.
Undersuchcircumstances stateshaverelativelylittle to fearfromeachother.
Thisdiscussion bringsusbackto classicalrealistnational
interest,
asdened
earlierin thischapter
byHansMorgenthau. Themorecircumscribedthecon-
ception of national
interest,
thelesslikelyit is,assuming
allstates
soconceive
theirnationalinterest,that armedconictsbasedonclashingnationalinterest
will arise.In this sense,Morgenthausconceptionof nationalinterestis in
keeping with defensive neorealist
theory.
 NEOREALISTTHEORY 91

Although neorealisttheory,aswe havejust seen,setsforth strategiesfor

foreignpolicy behavior,it doesso from an internationalsystemlevelof analy-
sis.In other words,the foreignpolicy optionsavailableto states,in neorealist
theory,are constrainedby the internationalstructureof the anarchicsociety.
Yet it is also the casethat states,faced with the problem of survival in an an~.
archicsetting,may choosewidely differing strategies,from war to accommo-
dation. What explainstheir propensityto opt for one suchstrategyor an-
other? To suggestthat the structure of the international systemalone is
determinantis to ignorewhat arelikely to be important,if not equallydeter-
minant,variableswithin the stateitself. Grantingthe importanceof the struc-
ture of the internationalsystemin delineatingthe anarchicsettingin which
statesarerequiredto providefor theirsurvival,howtheychooseto do so(or
theprocess by whichtheydecidehowto survive),togetherwith theotherdo-
mestic considerations that enter into the formation of strategiesfor state sur-
vival,represents
an importantareaof inquiry.Whetheror not statesaddress
the threatsor maximizethe opportunitiesthey faceasa resultof international
systems structureis dependent on a hostof otherfactorslocatedwithin the
unitsthemselves. Suchanalysis is theobjectof yetanotheremerging efforton
thepartof neoclassicalrealists,
whoseworkextends nowfromthe19905into
thetwentyfirstcentury.In contrastto the international systems structureof
neorealiststheory,neoclassical
realisttheoryplaces its emphasisat theactoror
unit levelof analysis.
Neoclassical realistsdo not denytheimportance of the"
international systemstructure,accepting alsothe assumption of an anarchic
society.However, theyseekto reinvigorate classical
realisttheoryandto do so
by lookingwithinthestateunitsto discover whytheybehave differentlyfrom
each other.
A comprehensive theoryof international relationsmustcontainhypothe-*
sizedrelationships betweenbehaviorthat originatesat the levelof interna-
tionalsystems structureandtypesof responses elicited&#39;at
theunit level.How
statesrespondin theform of strategies basedon foreignpoliciesdesigned to
achieve or assuresurvivalrepresents
an essential part of neoclassical
theory.
Tohelpanswersucha question, neoclassical realisttheoryderives fromanef-
fort to update,rene,expand, andelucidate propositions drawnfromclassical
realisttheory.As wehavealreadyseenearlierin thischapter, classical
realist
theoryplacedmajoremphasis onstatesasactorsor,morebroadly,realistthe-
ory emphasized thebehaviorof groupsof individuals attempting to survivein
a world in which,asMorgenthau put it, politicsis a strugglefor power.The
waysin which statesdevelopand engagetheir respective capabilities,
the
strategiestheyformulatefor survival,themechanisms by whichtheymakede-
cisions,the perceptionsthat collectively theyhaveaboutthe outsideworld,
the estimatesabouttheir own capabilitiesrelativeto thoseof their alliesor ad-
versaries,and the historical,cultural, and geographicalcircumstances upon
whichtheyshapetheirresponses to externalchallenges
areaddressed in classi-
cal realisttheory.Classicalrealisttheoristswerenot in full agreement with
eachother on the importanceor eventhe natureof suchphenomena.
Nevertheless, classicalrealisttheoryoffersto the neoclassical theoristthe
92 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

opportunityto bring into morecontemporarycontextwhat areregardedasa

seriesof enduringpropositionsaboutthe state,or group,behaviorin an anar-
chicalsetting.If we viewneorealisttheoryashavingbuilt uponthe intellectual
edice of classicalrealisttheory by placingemphasison the internationalsys-
temslevel,neoclassical realisttheory extendssuchupdating,revisionand re-
nement to the unit level. However, neoclassicalrealist theory doesnot ignore
the systemslevel.Instead,neoclassical
realist theoristsmaintain that foreign
policyis shaped
by systems
factors,aswenotedespecially
in thecaseof neo-
realists. In contrast defensive realists hold that systemsfactors may play a
lesserrole in shapinga statesforeignpolicy.Systemsfactorsare filtered
throughthe domestic,or unit, setting.Thesemayincludetheperceptions of
the international systemheld by key decisionmakers and other societal
groups.Thoseneoclassical realistswho downplaythe internationalsystems
levelfall withinwhatis termedInnenpolitik,or a focuson domestic
factors.8°
Taken together,neorealistsand neoclassicalrealist theory addresscru-
ciallyimportantaspects
of thestructureagent
problemhowstructures
shape
agentbehavioraloptionsandhowagents respond.
Theydoso,however,with-
out reachingconsensuswithin the broad realist framework, leaving unan-
sweredessentialquestionsconcerningthe relationshipsbetweenlevels of
analysis,
including,of course,theinternational
systems
structureandthefor-
eignpolicybehaviorof the variousstatesasunits.

Recent Realist Thought and International Institutions

Recentrealist,or neoclassical realist,writingshavealsoplacedemphasison in-
ternationalinstitutions:Generally,realistand neorealisttheoryhasmaintained
that institutionsreect existingstructures,includingtherelativecapabilities,of
the variousstateactors.Accordingto JosephGrieco,81for example, smaller
statesjoininternational
organizations
oiainternational
agencies to increase
their
relativepowercompared withlargerstates.
Forsomesmallstates andnearlyall
mini-states,votingin internationalinstitutionsis often the only way they can
exertanyinuenceat all on theglobalscene.In this sense, governments canmit-
igatetheeffectsof internationalanarchywithin internationalinstitutions.
In what is termedcontingentrealism,notedearlierin this chapter,CharlesL.
Glasercontendsthat internationalinstitutionscanplay an importantrole in re-
ducingor minimizing
thesecurity
dilemma.In particular,
theymayincludeal-
liancesandarmscontrolregimes.Whereasclassicalrealistandneorealisttheory
emphasizes institutionsasreectionsof thedistributionof capabilities,
recentre-
alistsareconcerned with institutionsastheyreectthepreferencesof actors.For
example,
democracies
arelikelyto differ..fromauthoritarian
regimes
in theirfor-
eignpolicy preferences,
includinggreatersupportfor internationalinstitutions.
To the extentthat domesticpreferencesvshape
the foreignpolicy of democratic
states,wecomecloseto democraticpeacetheory.Domesticfactorshelpmoldfor-
eignpolicypreferences,
including
supportfor international
institutions,
whilein-
ternationalinstitutionsthemselves
may modify preferences.Dependingon how
theyareused,internationalinstitutionsmaycontributeto statepower.Thus,re-
 REALISM,
NEOREALISM,
NEOCLASSICAL
REALIST
THEORY 93

centneoclassical
realisttheorycontributes
to a synthesis
between
neorealist
structural
realist
andneoliberal
institutionalist
theories.
Recent
realist
theory
sheds
much
oftheinnate
pessimism
contained
inclassical
realist
theory.
At the
veryleastwhatistermed
contingent
realism
leaves
openthequestion
oftherole
thatinstitutions
playin facilitating
international
cooperation.

REALISM, NEOREALISM, NEOCLASSICAL REALIST

THEORY: LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Theneorealist/structuralrealist/neoclassical
reformulations of classical
realist
theoryin themselves
represent
an ongoingcritiqueof the realisttraditionin
internationalrelations
theory.
Totracetheevolution of realisttheoryfromits
classical
to contemporaryversionsisto setforthcritiquesin theformof rene-
ments.Neorealist
andstructural-realisttheorysought bothto deepen andto
broaden classical
realisttheory.Specically,thismeantthedevelopment of
greater
rigorin theeffortto theoretically
deneandlink system
structure
to ac-
tor behavior.
Theneoclassical
realist
contribution
encompasseseffortsto assess
themeaningof domestic
structures
for theforeignpolicies
of states
in a self-
helpinternational
system.
Lastbutnotleast,withoutabandoning powerasa
centrallyimportantvariable
in ananarchic
society,
anefforthasbeenmadenot
onlyto deneandmeasure power,butalsoto delineate
itslimitations.
Recentcritiquesof realism,moreover,havefocusedon its relevance
for ex-
plainingtheendof theColdWarandthepostColdWarworld.It issaidthatre-
alisttheory,
asthedominant
paradigm
oftheColdWarera,based
onastruggle
forpower between
theUnited
States
andtheSoviet
Union,
doesnotadequate
accountfor the collapseof the SovietUnion andthe withdrawalof Sovietmili-
taryforces
fromCentral
Europe
without
ashothaving
been
red.juxtaposed
however,
is a realistexplanation
of thecollapse
of theSoviet
Union,based
on
theproposition
thattheColdWarwastheresultof theriseof Soviet
power,
whichposed
aperceivedthreat
totheUnited
States
anditsallies.Aslongasthe
Soviet
leadership
believed
thattheSoviet
Unioncouldmaintain thepowerto
compete,
thecompetition
continued.
OncetheSoviet leadership,
afterMikhail
Gorbachevcameto power,concluded
thatit no longerhadthecapabilities
needed
forcompetition
withtheWest,
theColdWarcame
toanend.
During
the
ColdWar,theSoviet
Unionwasa stateattempting
to challenge
thehegemonic
positionof the UnitedStates.It failed to do this because
of the distributionof
power,which by the end of the Cold War had shiftedin favor of the United
States.
In short,theessential
premise
setforthin thecontainment
strategy
outlined
byGeorge F.Kennan atthebeginning
oftheColdWar,wasfullled.
Because
of itsrichheritage
andmultiple
intellectual
sources,
realisttheory
is saidto reston whathasbeentermeda fracturedfoundation,theeffectof
whichis to undermine
realismsstructural
integrity.
Accordingto Thomas
R.
CusackandRichard J. Stoll,andassetforthin thischapter,
therearemajor
inconsistencies
and disagreements amongrealists.85
At the international-
systemlevel,thereis a diversityof viewsamongrealists,Cusackand Stoll
94 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAI. REALIST THEORY

suggest,
abouttheextentto whichmoderation
andrestraintin pursuitof na-
tional interest,for exampleare essentialrequirementsfor, or the inevitable
consequences of, a systembasedon principlesof realisttheory.They suggest,
furthermore,that thereis debateor confusionamongrealistsabout how im-
portantthe distributionof poweris andwhatform it shouldtake,together
with the signicanceof unevenpatternsof growthamongthe actorsof the
system.At theactorlevel,someassumptions maybedisputedaboutthefun-
damentalcharacteristics of the actorsthat constitutethe system.Somerealists
view the stateasa rational actorand military entity,from which domesticfac-
torsarelargelyexcluded.
Othershavequestioned
theassumption
of thestate
asa rational actor,the decisionsand policiesof which arepurposeful.
The differencesin technicalrelations,notedpreviously,to which Cusack
and Stoll refer,includethe extentto which war manifestsitself in behavioral
patternsamongstatesandits rolein the survivalof theinternational
system
and its units. Realistsdo not havea commonlyacceptedtheoreticalunder-
standingof the conditionsunder which statesresort to armedcombat,con-
trastedwith attemptsto nd solutionsotherthan war to resolvemajor differ-
ences.Last but not least, neorealisttheory, notably in the formulation
developedby Waltz, doesnot accountfor structuralchange.As John Lewis
Gaddissuggests,
if it is truethat systemic
structuresaffectthedistributionof
capabilities
amongunits,andif shiftsin thisdistributioncanproducechanges
in suchstructures,is it not the casethat thoseshiftsarethe resultof changesin
thecapabilities
of stateswithinthesystem?Actionswithintheunits,to the
extentthat they shapethe capabilitiesof statesas units, then haveimportant
implicationsfor internationalsystemicstructure.
Becauseclassicalrealist and neorealiststructural-realist theory is said of-
ten to providean explanationof statebehaviorin an anarchicsystem,it is ap-
propriateto testits essential
propositionsin thecontextof theinternational
system.In otherwords,if we examine in historicaldetailtheperiodbetween
the formation of the modernstatesystem,following the Treatyof Westphalia
in 1648, and the early twentyrst century, do we nd that the essential
premisesadvancedby realist theory are substantiated?
Without having
amassed historicalevidencefor or againstrealisttheory,Paul Schroedercon-
cludesthat in mostcases,statesdid not respondto crucial threatsto their se-
curity by resortingto selfhelp,dened as the useof their own power alone
or in combination with that of other states in the form of a balance of
power.87Instead,otherstrategies
weremorelikelyto beemployed, including
simplyignoringthe threat,hidingfrom the threatby declaringneutrality,
adoptinga strictlydefensive
position,or withdrawingintoisolation.Otheref-
forts includedattemptsto surmountinternationalanarchyby creatinginstitu-
tional arrangementsbasedon internationalconsensus.Yet anotherapproach
came in the form of bandwagoning,joining the stronger side to receive
advantagein the form of protection, even at the cost of sacricing some
independence.
Such.behavior,accordingto Schroeder, has beenmore commonthan re-
sortingto selfhelpin the form of balancing,especiallyin the caseof smaller
 REALISM,
NEOREALISM,
NEOCLASSICAL
REALIST
THEORY 95

states.For example,duringthe Napoleonicwars,stateslargeandsmallat

some
pointeitherhidorengaged
in bandwagoning
ratherthanghtingor bal-
ancing France.In the years leading to World War II, statessuch as the
Netherlands,
Denmark,
andNorwayrefused
eitherto armor to join anal-
lianceto oppose
NaziGermany.
Instead,theyremained
strictlyneutral.Great
BritainandFrance
sought
notto balance,
butinstead
to appease
Germany
by
abandoning
Czechoslovakia,
whichotherwisemighthavecontributedto a
balance
of poweragainst
Germany.
Schroeder
concludes
thatthemajorprob-
lemwith neorealism is its effortto prescribe
andpredicta determinateorder
for historywithouthavingadequately checkedthisagainstthehistoricalevi-
dence.
Theresultis saidto bea theorythatobstructs
newinsights
andhy-
potheses,while overlookinglarge bodiesof inconvenientfacts.38
For severalreasons,thenationalinterest
concepthasbeenthe objectof
criticism.According to onecritique,That nationalinterestis a necessary
cri-
terionof policyis obviousandunilluminating. No statesman, nopublicist,no
scholar
wouldseriously
argue
thatforeign
policyoughtto beconducted
in op-
positionto, or in disregard
of, thenationalinterest.89
Moreover,
it is difcult
to give operationalmeaningto the conceptof nationalinterest.Stateleaders
areconstrained,or givenfreedom, by manyforcesin interpreting thenational
interest.Theyareoftenthecaptiveof theirpredecessors policies.Theyinter-
pretnationalinterestasa resultof theirculturaltraining,values,andthedata
madeavailable
to themasdecision
makers.
According
to MichaelJoseph
Smith,realists,havingadoptedMax Webers
ethicof responsibility,
discussed
earlierin thischapter,
havenotpresented
a competent
setof criteriafor judg-
ingresponsibility.
Although,andperhaps because,
theyminimizetherelevance
of ethicsto international
relations,theyappearnot to recognize
that their
judgmentof morality and their definition of the national interestrestedon
their own hierarchyof values.9°
Nationalinterestdepends
on nationalidentity,whichis a construct
in our
mindsdescribing
andprescribing
howwe shouldthink,feel,evaluate, andul-
timatelybehavein group-relevant
situations.91The identitiesthat individuals
sharewith othersproducepatternsof interactionleadingto largeror smaller
group identitiesand ultimatelyto nationsand evenbroaderidentitiessuchas
the Westernworld or democracies. How identityis conceived and how it
evolvesshapesthecollective interestof thegroup.Interestis theproductnot
onlyof materialfactors,for if thiswerethecase,thenstates with similarchar-
acteristicswould behavein similarfashion.Instead,nationalinterestalsobears
an importantrelationship to how groupscomprising states,or agents,con-
structnationalidentityand,morespecically, how theydistinguish friends
from enemies. This.identity
hasbothan internal(howgroupsimaginethem-
selves)andexternal(howgroupsimagineothers)dimension. Bothhaveimpor-
tant implications
for nationalinterest.Groupscomprising states,or agents,
constructihtersubjective
consensus abouttheirexternalrolesthatin turnshape
nationalinterest.Nationalinterestarisesout of normsandrulesdeveloped
within the group:Suchphenomena, for example,differentiatesomestates
from others;according to democratic peacetheory,discussed in Chapter7,
96 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

democracies do not go to war with other democracies but insteadresolveby

peacefulmeansconicts of interest.To think of nationalinterestnot as some-
thing materiallyor inevitablydened by objectiveconditions,but insteadthe
productof sociallyconstructed
identityformsa part of constructivist
theory,
discussed
in subsequentchapters,but introducedhereaspart of a critiqueof
the national-interestconcept.To the constructivist,nationalinterestis not dis-
missedor rejectedas havingno signicance,but insteadit must be studiedas
part of a morebroadlysociallyconstructedworld. In otherwords,identityand
interestintermingle,just asagentsand structuresarecloselyintertwinedin so-
cial constructivism,aswe shallseemorefully in Chapters3 and4.
Amongthe focalpointsof neorealist
analysisis an effortto reformulate
and rene the national-interestconceptto encompass a perceivedcalculusof
benetsand losses,in accordance with alternativepositedgoalsfor the state.
Specically,
theregimeconcept(described in Chapter10)includesanattempt
to adaptnationalinterestto a theoretical
frameworkrelatedto statemotiva-
tion in the formationof what aredefinedasinternationalregimesfor collabo-
ration or cooperation.
Realistwriters, it hasbeennoted,havebeencriticizedfor their effortsto
draw from the Eurocentricsystemof the pasta seriesof political conceptsfor
the analysisof a vastly different contemporaryglobal internationalsystem.
Accordingto Stephano
Guzzini,92
realisttheoryis bestunderstood
asan at-
temptthat hasrepeatedlyfailedto translatethe maximsof nineteenth-century
European
diplomacy
into generalprinciplesof Americansocialscience.
Such
efforts haveshapedacademicresearchagendasand inuencedpolicymakers.
Because realisttheory existsin the mindsof many academics
and policymak-
ersalike;it represents
a construction
of realityandthusanimportantmindset
that leadsto academicanalysesand policy action.
Thepursuitof limitednationalobjectives,theseparationof foreignpolicy
fromdomestic politics,theconductof secretdiplomacy,theuseof balance of
powerasa technique for themanagement of power,andthepleasfor nations
to placereducedemphasis on ideologyasa conditioner
of internationalcon-
duct havelittle relevanceto the internationalsystemtoday.By urgingthat na-
tions return to the practicesof an earlierperiod,somerealistwriters overesti-
mate the extent to which suchchangein the presentinternationalsystemis
possible.
If nationsobeylawsof nature,whichtherealistpurportsto havedis-
covered,why is it necessary
to urgethem,asrealistsdo, to return to practices
supposedly
basedon suchlaws? Althoughhistoryprovidesmanyexamples
of internationalbehaviorthat substantiateclassicalrealist theory,historical
data offer deviantcases.In callingon stateleadersto alter their behavior,the
realistbecomes normativein theoreticalorientationandfails to providean ad-
equateexplanationasto why political leaderssometimes do not adhereto re-
alist tenetsin foreignpolicy.
In emphasizingpower as the principal motivation for political behavior,
realist theory has not producedan acceptabledenition of power.Similarly,
the term balanceof powerhasnumerousmeanings,asdiscussed in Chapter1.
Measuringpowerpresentsformidableproblems,asnotedearlierin this chap-
 REALISM,
NEOREALISM,
NEOCLASSICAL
REALIST
THEORY 97

ter.Thereis no commonunit intowhichpoweris convertedfor measuremen

in realistwritings.Moreover,
poweris necessarily
relatedto theobjectivefor
whichit is to be used.The amountand typeof powervary with national
goals.
In addition,
realists
havebeencriticized
for allegedly
having
placed
too
muchemphasis on power,to therelativeexclusionof otherimportantvari-
ables.In StanleyHoffmanns view,It is impossible
to subsumeunderone
wordvariables asdifferentas:powerasa conditionof policyandpowerasa
criterionof policy;powerasa potentialandpowerin use;powerasa sumof
resources
and powerasa setof processes.94
Neorealismand, specically,structuralrealism,haveencountered
several
criticisms,
includinganalleged
disregard
for historyasa process
thatiscontin-
uallyundergoing
redenition,
in whichindividuals
contribute
to themolding
of eachsuccessive
era.In this respect,the neorealistis consideredto havede-
partedfromclassical
realism,
whichheldthatthestateleader
wasshapedby
butalsohadanimportantinuenceonhistory.
Farfrombeingthecaptives
of
a particularsystem,
theindividualpersonholdsthepotentialto bethemaster
ofstructures,
notsimplytheobject.
Moreover,
neorealism
isfaulted
forhaving
presumablyreducedpolitics to thosedimensionsthat are conduciveto inter-
pretation by reference to rational behavior under various structural con-
straints.Because
of its focuson structure,neorealismis saidto haveignored
thesocialbasisandsociallimitsof power.It is saidthatpowercannotbere-
ducedto capabilities;
instead,
powerconsists
alsoof psychological
factors,
suchaspublicmoraleandpoliticalleadership,
andsituational
factorsandthe
extentto whichpoweris exercised
within a consensual,
ascontrastedwith a
conictual, framework.The state-as-actor
world of neorealismis faulted for
havingimputedto thestatetheroleof unitaryactor,thebehaviorof whichis
shaped
by thestructureof theinternational
system.Neorealism,
it is sug-
gested,
wasstatistbefore
it wasstructuralist.
In response,
neorealists
deny
that realismis, in fact,structuraldeterminism.
Althoughstructuralelements
exerta powerfulconstraining inuenceon politicalbehavior,
the neorealist
doesnotconsider
allofhuman politicalconduct
to bedetermined
bythestruc-
turewithinwhichthepolityis organized,
nordoestheneorealist
accept
the
criticismthatthestate-as-actor
worldrepresents
a negation
of theroleof those
individualsor groupsof personswho act asthe actualdecisionmakers.
Despiteits critics,realismranksasthemostimportantattemptthusfar to
isolate
andfocusonakeyvariable in politicalbehaviornamely,powerand
to develop a theoryof international
relations.If onlyasa resultof having
statedits premises
in suchboldfashion, realism haspainteda sharplycon-
touredglobaltheoreticallandscapethatcanbe(asit hasbeen) modiedbyan-
othergeneration of theorybuilders.In RobertO. Keohaneswords,Realism
providesa goodstartingpoint for the analysisof cooperationanddiscord,
sinceits tautological
structureandits pessimistic
assumptions
aboutindivid-
ualandstatebehaviorserveasbarriersagainst wishfulthinking.97
According
to R. B. J. Walker, political realism should be viewed less as a coherent theo-
reticalpositionin its own right than asthe siteof a greatmanycontested
claimsand metaphysical disputes.93 For example,realism,Walkerpoints
98 FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

out, and as this chapterillustrates,containsstructural and historicisttradi-

tions. To a far greaterextentthan their predecessors,
realiststudentsof inter-
nationalrelationsattemptedto constructtheoryfrom historicaldata.In addi-
tion to their efforts to determine how national actors in fact behaved,realists
developeda body of normativetheory,with prescriptionsparticularlyfor pol-
icymakers.Realistthoughthasaddressed itself to crucialproblems:the inter-
action and behavior of human beingsas decision makers, the nature of power,
the goalsof foreignpolicy,the techniquesfor measuringandmanagingpower,
the impact of environmentalfactors on political behavior,the purposesand
practicesthat oughtto guidepolitical leaders,the impactof structuresof alter-
native internationalsystems,and statesresponses to challengesfrom the in-
ternationalsystemin the form of nationalsecuritystrategyand foreignpolicy.
Theseproblemsare centralboth to the study of internationalpolitics and to
the practiceof statecraft.Becauserealisttheory,both in its classicaland con-
temporaryforms,addresses issuesthat arecruciallyimportantto international
relations,its impact has beenpervasiveand enduring.

NOTES

1. Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, Exploring Realpolitik: Probing

InternationalRelationsTheorywith ComputerSimulation(Boulder,CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 53.
2., John H. Herz, Idealist Internationalismand the SecurityDilemma, World
Politics, 5(2) (January 1950), 157-180. See also Paul R. Viotti and Mark V.
Kauppi, International RelationsTheory: Realism,Pluralism, Globalism (New
York:lMacmillan,
1987),p. 49.
3. David A. Baldwin,Neoliberalism,Neorealism,andWorld Politics, in David A.
Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New
York: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),pp. 9-10».Seealso RonanP.Palanand
Brook M. Blair, On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International
Relations, Review of International Studies, 19(4) (October 1993), 385-400.
4. E. H. Carr, The Twenty-YearsCrisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study
of InternationalRelations(London:Macmillan,1962).This book was rst pub-
lished in 1939.
5. Arnold Wolfers,Statesmanship and Moral Choice, World Politics,I (January
1949), 175-195, and Political Theory and InternationalRelations,in Arnold
Wolfers and Lawrence Martin, eds., The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign
Affairs (New Haven,CT: YaleUniversityPress,1956);KennethW. Thompson,
The Limits of Principle in International Politics: Necessity and the New Balance
of Power, journal bf Politics, XX (August 1958), 437-467. George F. Kennan
has commented as follows on the American legalistic and moralistic approach to
international problems: Our national genius, our senseof decency,our feeling for
compromise and law, our frankness and honestyhad not these qualities suc-
ceededin producing on this continent a society unparalleled for its lack of strain
and violence? There was no reason why the outside world, with our assistance,
should not similarly composeitself to a life without violence. From Realities of
11. NOTES 99

American Foreign Policy, excerpted in David L. Larson, ed., The Puritan Ethic in
UnitedStatesForeignPolicy(Princeton,NJ: VanNostrand,1966),p. 34.
Adam Smithand other eighteenth-century economists,following in the individu-

12.
alisticstepsof JohnLocke,taughtthat peoplein a competitivesystem,whenthey
seektheir own private gain, are led by an invisible hand to promote the interest
of the whole society.
For an extensiveexaminationof its origins,seeTorbjornL. Knutsen,A History of
International Relations Theory: An Introduction (Manchester, England:
Manchester University Press,1992), especiallypp. 11-24.
. E. H. Carr,TheTwentyYearsCrisis,1919-1939:An Introductionto theStudyof
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 9.
Ibid., p. 5.
. G. Lowes Dickinson, Causesof International War (London: Swarthmore Press
100 FROM REALISTTO NEOREALISTAND NEOCLASSICAL
REALISTTHEORY

andthe Limitsof Cooperation:

A RealistCritiqueof _theNewestLiberal
Institutionalism, in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
ContemporaryDebate (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1993),
pp. 116-140. Seealso Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of
Institutionalist
Theory,InternationalSecurity,20(1)(Summer1995),39-62;
JohnGerardRuggie,The FalsePremise of Realism,InternationalSecurity,
20(1) (Summer1995),62-71; CharlesA. Kupchanand Clifford A. Kupchan,
The Promiseof CollectiveSecurity, International Security,20(1) (Summer
1995),52-61.Fora collectionof recentarticlesfromInternational
Securityre-
latedto neorealisttheory,seeMichaelE. Brown,SeanM. Lynn-Jones, and Steven
E. Miller, eds.,ThePerilsof Anarchy:ContemporaryRealismand International
Security:An InternationalSecurityReader(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1995).
17. Thucydides,History of the Peloponnesian War,M. I. Finley,ed.; Rex Warner,
trans.(Harmondsworth,England:Penguin,1972),p. 49. For a critical Viewof re-
alist-neorealist
usesof thework of Thucydides,
seeDanielGarst,Thucydides
and Neorealism,International StudiesQuarterly, 33 (1989), 3-27. Seealso
StevenForde,InternationalRealismand the Scienceof Politics:Thucydides,
Machiavelli,and Neorealism,InternationalStudiesQuarterly,39(2) (June
1995), 141-160.
_18.Thucydides,History of thePeloponnesian
War,p. 402.
19. NiccoloMachiavelli,The Prince(Harmondsworth,
England:Penguin,1961),
chaps. 10-14.
20. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,editedand with an introductionby Michael
Oakeshott
(Oxford,England:
BasilBlackwell,
1946),p. 64.
21. Ibid., p. 109.
22. Ibid.
23. GeorgW. F. Hegel,Philosophy of Right(Oxford,England:Clarendon,
1942),
p. 264;Friederich
Meinecke, Machiavellism:
TheDoctrineof RaisondEtatand
Its Placein ModernHistory(NewYork:Praeger,
1965),.p.360.
24. Max Weber,EconomyandSociety, Guenther
Rothand ClausWittich,eds.(2
vols.)(Berkeley
andLosAngeles:
University
of California
Press,
1978),
p.911.
25. HenryKissinger,
Diplomacy (NewYork:SimonandSchuster,
1994),p. 20.
26. RobertGilpin, U.S.Powerand the MultinationalCorporation:The Political
Economy of ForeignDirectInvestment
(NewYork:BasicBooks,1975),p. 24.
27. DavidA. Baldwin,Neoliberalism,
Neorealism,
andWorldPolitics,in DavidA.
Baldwin,ed.,NeorealismandNeoliberalism:
TheContemporary Debate(New
York: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),p. 16.
28. Kenneth
Waltz,Theoryof International
Politics(Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley,
1979), p. 192.
29. Waltz,Theoryof International
Politics,p. 131.
30. NicholasJ. Spykman,America:Strategy in WorldPolitics(NewYork:Harcourt
Brace, 1942), p. 11.
31. RobertStrausz-Hupé
andStefanT. Possony,
International
Relations
(NewYork:
McGraw-Hill, 1954), 5-6.
32. ArnoldWolfers,Discordand Collaboration
(Baltimore:
JohnsHopkinsPress,
1962), p. 103.
33. John. W. Burton,InternationalRelations:A GeneralTheory(New York:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1967),p. 46.
34. RobertGilpin, War and Changein World Politics(New York: Cambridge
University Press,1981), p. 33.
 35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.
42.
NOTES 101

Charles P. Kindleberger,
Power and Money: The Politicsof International
Economics
andtheEconomics
ofInternational
Politics
(NewYork:Basic
Books,
1970), pp. 56, 65.
Ibid., p. 56.
David A. Baldwin, Power Analysisand World Politics:New TrendsVersusOld

43. Tendencies,WorldPolitics,XXXI(2) (January1979), 177. SeealsoOran R.

Young, Interdependenciesin World Politics, InternationalJournal (Autumn
1969), 726-750.
David Baldwin, Interdependenceand Power: A ConceptualAnalysis,
InternationalOrganization,34(4) (Autumn 1980), 499.

44. James A. Caporaso, Dependence, Dependency,and Power in the Global

System, InternationalOrganization,32 (Winter 1978), 32.
Baldwin, Power Analysisand World Politics, 161-194.
MichaelP. Sullivan,Powerin Contemporary International
Politics(Columbia,
SC:University of SouthCarolinaPress,1990),p. 103.
HansJ. Morgenthau, PoliticsAmongNations,5th ed.,rev.(New York:Knopf,
45. 1978),p. 4. For a retrospective
seeKennethThompson
assessment
of Morgenthaus politicalphilosophy,
andRobertJ. Myers,eds.,TruthandTragedy: A Tribute
to Hans ]. Morgenthau, augmentededition (New Brunswick and London:
Transaction
Books,1984).SeealsoJaapW. Nobel,MorgenthausStruggle with
46.
Power:TheTheoryof PowerPoliticsandtheColdWar, Reviewof International
Studies,
21(1) (January
1995),61-86.
Ibid., p. 5.
I 47. Ibid.
Hans J. Morgenthau, Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the
48.UnitedStates,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,LXVI (December1952),961.
Ibid. SeealsoHansJ. Morgenthau,
In Defenseof the NationalInterest(New
102

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

FROM REALIST TO NEOREALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY

68.Gottfried-KarlKindermann,The Munich Schoolof Neorealismin International

Politics,unpublishedmanuscript,Universityof Munich, 1985.
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
69.Ibid., p. 12. Seealso, Reinhard Meier-Walser,Neorealismus ist mehr als Waltz-
Der Synoptische
Realismusder MiinchenerSchule, Zeitschriftfiir Internationale
Beziehungen, 1(1) (June 1994), pp. 115-126; Gottfried-Karl Kindermann et al.,
Grundelemente der Weltpolitik(Munich:PiperPublishingHouse,1991).
Robert Gilpin, War and Changein World Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press,1981), pp. 9-11.
70. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 93-101.
71. Ibid., p. 81. For additionalanalysisof the conceptof anarchyand systemstruc-
ture, seeBarry Buzan, Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the
Study of International Relations, Journal of Peace Research, 21(2) (1984),
72.109-125;JosephM. Grieco,Anarchy andthe Limits of Cooperation:A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization,
42(3) (Summer 1988), 485-507.
73.Waltz,Theoryof InternationalPolitics,pp. 60-67.
Gilpin, Warand Changein WorldPolitics,p. 20. Gilpin borrowsthe term satis-
74. cing from HerbertSimon,who contraststhe goalof maximizingwith the goal
of satiscing, of nding a courseof actionthat is goodenough.HerbertSimon,
A BehavioralModel of Rational Choice, in Herbert Simon,ed., Models of
Man: Socialand Rational(NewYork: JohnWiley, 1957),especiallypp. 204-205,
247, 250, 252-253, 261, 271.

75. Ibid., p. 230.

BarryBuzan,CharlesJones,andRichardLittle, TheLogic of Anarchy:Neorealism
to StructuralRealism(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),p. 36.
 NOTES 103

alsoFareedZakaria,Realismand DomesticPolitics,International Security,

17(1) (Summer 1997), 162-183.
81. Joseph M. Grieco, State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A
NeorealistInterpretationof the MaastrichtTreatyand EuropeanEconomicand
Monetary Union, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatementsand Renewal
(London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 304.
82. CharlesL. Glaser,Realistsas Optimists:Cooperationas Self-Help,in Michael
E. Brown,SeanM. Lynn-Jones, and StevenE. Miller, eds.,ThePerilsof Anarchy:
ContemporaryRealismand InternationalSecurity(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,
1995), pp. 408-417.
83. For an extended discussionof this and related issues,seeAndrew Moravcsik and
JeffreyLegro,Is AnybodyStill a Realist?Weatherhead Centerfor International
Affairs, Harvard UniversityPaper,No. 98-14 (October1998),esp.pp. 23-37.
84. For an extended statement of this position, seeWilliam C. Wohlforth, Realism
and the End of the Cold War, InternationalSecurity,19(3)(Winter1994/1995),
91-129.
85. Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, Exploring Realpolitik: Probing
International Relations Theory with Computer Simulation (Boulder, CO, and
London: Lynne. Rienner Publishers, 1990), esp. pp. 21-40.
86. John Lewis Gaddis, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold
War, International Security, 17(3) (Winter 1992/1993), 34.
87. PaulSchroeder,
Historical Realityvs.NeorealistTheory,InternationalSecurity,
19(1) (Summer 1994), 116-117.
88. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
89. Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, The American Idea of International
Interest, American Political ScienceReview, XLVII (March 1953), 28.
90. Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge,
LA, andLondon:LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1986),p. 235.
91. Glen Chafetz, Michael Spritas, and Benjamin Frankel, Introduction: Tracing the
Inuence of Identity on ForeignPolicy, in Chafety,Spritas,and Frankel,The
Originsof NationalInterests(London:Frank Class,_1999), p. viii.
92. Stephano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political
Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1-12, 225-235.
93. CecilV. Crabb,AmericanForeignPolicy in the NuclearAge (New York; Harper
8: Row, 1965), pp. 458-459.
94. Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 32. For a more recent critique of realist theory,
seeStanley Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva: Essaysin the Theory and Practice of
International Politics (Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 1987), esp.
pp. 70-85.
95. Richard K. Ashley, Poverty of Neorealism, in Robert O. Keohane, ed.,
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press,1986).
96. Robert G. Gilpin, The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism, in
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 316-321.
97. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1984), p. 245.
98. R. B. J. Walker, Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,
International StudiesQuarterly, 31 (March 1987), 67.
 Chapter 3
System, Structure,
Agent, and International
Relations Theory
SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE
The term systemis widely usedin social-science
literatureand in particularin
political science and international-relations writings and discourse.
Theorizationabout internationalpatterns,especiallyin the decadessincethe
mid-twentieth
century,hasfocused
ontheconceptof aninternational system.
Fundamentalto thisconcept,
asweshallseein greaterdetailin thischapter,
is
theassumption
that
hgrriz asindividuals
orasgrous actinwas
behav
terns.Althoughtheterm/s-_
thc
pwmzvaTcmtral revolution, it
thséends thisphasein international-relations
theorizing.
Thinkingof inter-
nationalpoliticsasa systemor systems
is a necessary
partof levelsof analysis
conceptualization,discussed
in Chapter1,in whichtheglobalsystem contains
statesor otherunits,or subsystems,
whichthemselves containgroupsof indi-
viduals.Interactive
patternsof behavior
takeplacewithinandamongthevari-
ous
levels
ofanalysis.
heory,
primary importanceto
aswe have seeninChapter 2,attac
ructureof e &#39;ationalsystem(numbersand
t esof actorsor a ents:a distributionof capabilities
amongthem)in es-
ab1Smgthebehavioral
atterns
of t eunitscomposing
thesyste. Th§teTm
sg
st pter we
dis-
cussthemeaning of system
andits usage.ui ingontheneorealist-structural
- realisttheoryof the previouschapter,we examinethe extensive writingson
polarity,or how alternative structuresaresaidto affectinteractivepatterns
andthusto shapewhat arecalledinternationalsystems. This chapter.also
bringsinto our discussionof theoryillustrativeexamples
of internationalsys-
tems,-includingtheories.,abouthowtheydevelop,survive,change, transform,
and disintegrate.
»Systemasa concepthasbeenappliedacrossthe spectrumof international
relationstheory.In additionto neoreaiisttheory,this includessuchtheoriesas
thoserelatedto integration,
decision
making,conict,andanalyticallevels--l
levelsof analysisof internationalpolitics:

104
 SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE 105

0 Models of internationalsystemsin which patternsof interactionare

specified.
0 The processes by which decisionmakersin onenationalunit, interact-
ing with eachotherandrespondingto inputsfrom the domesticand in-
ternationalenvironment,formulate foreign policyalthough,as
Raymond Tanter has suggested,internationalsystemsapproaches
mayimplyinteraction
models,whereas
foreignpolicyapproaches
may
suggest
decision-makingmodels. Whatbothhavein common,how-
ever, is the fact that a system construct can be used to examine how
foreignpoliciesareformulatedandhow statesor otherunitsinteractor
relate to each other.
0 Interaction betweena national political system and its domestic
subsystemssuchas public opinion, interestgroups,and cultureto
analyze patterns of interaction. ,
0 External linkage groupsthat is, other political systems,actors, or
structuresin the internationalsystemwith which the national system
under examination has direct relations.
0 The interactionbetweenexternallinkagegroups2andthoseinternal
groupsmostresponsive to externalevents,suchasforeign-affairselites,
the military, and business
peopleengagedin world trade.
Theseanalyticfoci arebynomeansmutually*exChIsive&#39;:
Understanding
decision-making
processesandsystemsat thenationallevelisessential
to un-
derstanding
interactionamongthenationalunitsof theinternational
system.
As we havenotedin Chapter2, the structuralrealistis concernedwith the in-
ternationalsystemiclevelof analysisas the sourceof cruciallyimportant be-
havioralpatterns.Thestructureaffectshowtheunits,or agents,
relateto, or
interact with, eachother.To focus on national decisionmaking is to study
whatmaybetermeda subsystem
of theinternational~-system.
In thischapter,
we are concernedin particularwith thosetheoristswhosefocusincludesthe
international
system
andits regional
subsystems.
In subsequent
chapters,
in-
cluding decision-makingand integrationtheory,we examineother levels of
analysiscontainingunits that interactandin which inputsin the form of de-
mandsleadto decisionsproducingactionsor policiesasoutputs.
Theorizingbasedon systemsbringstogethertwo fundamentalapproaches
tointernational-relations
theory.
Therstisfocused
onactors
andtheinte&#39
©
p Thisbecauseit is attheleveo t e1n ividual
reductionist
approachhasbeen
participants
terme
or units,for
exafnple,nafidnfstatésrather
thanthe internationalsy§térrT:&#39;These&#
proach
places
emhasis
onthestructures ramevvork-withi
®
which such interaction occurs. Structure is said to have a decisive im act on
theinteraction
of actors.According
to tmcruraltheory,theactionsof individ-
uals or rou s w en
fundamentallydifferent from the behavior atternsthat would exist if the
106 SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

individual actor was part of other structures. In this sense,the behavioral

characteristics and the impact of behavioral patterns, or interactions, of the
aggregate are greater than, and differentiated from, those of its individual
parts.3As RobertW. Coxsuggests,
theactor-interaction
approachseeksex-
planationsfor themotivations,andfor theconsequencesof suchinteractions.4
The structuralapproachattemptsto explainhow the structureswithin which
actors exist affect the interactions between the actors, and how and why
changesin the structuretakeplace.As we havenotedelsewhere,
the structural
approach has beentermed holistic or systemicbecauseit is basedon the devel-
opment of explanations at a more macro level of analysis,such as the interna-
tional systemratherthan at the levelof the statesasactors.5

STRUCTURALISM AND STRUCTURATION

According toJohn.
Gerarg Ruggie estud
denitionthestudyof st" ture. Examples
ofchange isnecessari andby
of c angeincludethecollapse
of
theRomanE e modernstatesystem,
andthedemise
of the
Soviet Union. It is structure that establishes interactive patterns, which
change as structure changes.To add one more term to this discussion,we in-
troduce structuralism, which assumes the existence of structures that are er-
manent
ent, althoughits characteristic
features,
includingthe
numbersof actorsand the distribution of capabilitiesamongthem, may un-
dergo changefrom time to time, as we have seenwith the collapseof the
SovietUnion and its empireand the break-upof other states,a processthat
continuesinto the twenty-rst century. Structuresprovide the framework
within which actors,or agentsasthe term is often used,respondand relateto
one another.Within suchstructures,systemsare groupsof actors,or agents,
that are interactingwith eachother.How the actorsrelateto eachother and
the relationshipbetweenthe structureand the actors/agents (the structure-
agency
relationship)
formsa criticallyimportantpart of thequestfor anun-
derstanding
of change
at thesystemic,
holisticlevel.According
to Richard
Little, an importantkeyto understanding
how largescale
historicalchange
comesabout appearsto lie in the relationshipbetweenstructureand agency.7
Taking our discu,ssiQn,one step farther, systems,togetherwith agentsand
structures,form the three conceptscomposingwhat is termeda structura-
tionist ontology. -._
AlexanderWendtand RaymondDuvall describethe relationshipbetween
structuresand agentsas one of codeterminedirreducibility. The systemsof
interaction among agentsare ma e possi e y.t e-structurein which they ex-
ist. .Thesea L ial s stemsasthe regularizedpractices.
of.agents
that makepossiblethe.,s9c_ia_l
structures
that makexhose
.practices,
anfd/the
agentswho engagein those practices,themselvespossible.8Interactions
amongagentsshapethe structure,which in turn hasan impact-on,
the interac-
tions. Social structures arise out of, or are constructed as a result of, interac-
 OTHER USES OF SYSTEM 107

tivepatterns,
justassocialstructures
haveimplications
for theinteractive
pat-
ternsthemselves.
Thuswehavea basisfor constructivist
theory.
Howsocialstructures
arecreated
andwhocreates
themisfundamentally
importantto constructivist
theory,discussed
morefully in Chapter4 andad-
dressed
aswell in otherchapters.
In whathetermshis theoryof structura-
tion, Anthony Giddensgoesso far as to suggestthat: The basicdomainof
studyof thesocialsciences, accordingto thetheoryof structuration,
is neither
theexperience of theindividualactor,nor theexistenceof anyform of social
totality,but socialpracticesorderedacrossspaceandtime.-9Giddens main-
tainsthatneither
thesub&#39;ect,
thatis,human
agent,
o ci-
etyor socialinstitutions,
isinevitably
moreimportantthantheotherin shap-
ingthesocialpractices or behavior.
According
to Giddens:
Each(sub&#39;ec
and
Ol)]¬Ct$
1Sconstituted
__t_lirougE_
recurrentractices.1°
In ot erwordsagents
s apesociety,while societya s"6&#39;sEapes
the be avior of agentsin an interactive
setof patterns.Agents,asindividualsor groupsof individuals,operateac-
cordingto rulesthat theyhavedevelopedor accepted.
According to Giddens,
all rulesareinherentlytransformational.11
Giddens"theoryof structuration
containswhathesees asthedualitgof structure
and_systenl_.
A entso erate
withinstructures.
In doingso,theyrelatein some
fashion
to eachother,soas
E6produce
recurrent
behavioral
patterns,
or interaction,
thusconstituting
a
system.Structuresand systemsare inextricablyrelatedto eachother in struc-
turation,denedasthe Conditionsgoverningthe continuityor transmuta-
tion of structures,
andtherefore
thereproduction
of socialsystems.12

OTHER USES OF SYSTEM

Thetermsystem hasbeenusedin several
waysin writingsaboutinternational
relations.This includessystemsanalysis,
whichdescribesa varietyof tech-
niques,suchascost-effectiveness
studiesdesignedto allow rationalchoicede-
cisionsregarding
theallocationof resources.
In theliteratureof politicalsci-
ence,however,
systems
analysis
hasoftenbeenusedinterchangeably
with
systeins
theory,
insofar
asit isemployed
to describe
conceptual
frameworl_
andmethodologiesfor understanding
theoperationof politicalsystems.
As
Robert].Lieberhassuggested,
Systemsanalyisismisreally
a setbftechnilifiés
for systematic
analysis
that facilitatestheorganizing
of data,butwhichpos-
sesses
noidealtheoretical
goals.
Bycontrast,
systems
theorysubsumes
anin_te-
- grated
setof concepts;
hypotheses,
andpropositions,
which(theoretically)
are
&#39;
widelyapplicable
acrossthespectrum
of humank_nowledge.13
Wedenesys-
temstheoryasa seriesof statements
aboutrelationships
amongindependent
j; and dependentvariables,in&#39;whichcl1&#39;agésin
one or more variablesare ac-
_ companied;
or followed,by changes
in otherVariables
or combinations
of
variables.
AsAnatol"Rapoport
hassuggested,
A Wholewhich functionsas a
Awholeby
virtueof theinterdependence
of itswparfs
iscalleda system,
andthe
method
whichaimsatdiscoveringhowthisisbroughtaboutin thewidestVa-
T;riety of systems
hasbeencalledgeneralsystems
theory.
14JohnBurtonhas
108 SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

written that the conceptof systemconnotesrelationshipsbetweenunits.The

units of a system are of the same set, by which is meant that they have fea-
turesin commonthatenablea particularrelationship.15
Thehumannervous
system,a carmotor, the Hilton Hotel chain,an Apollo spacecraft,the Federal
Reservesystem,a sh,tank in a marineecologyexperimentalproject,and the
balanceof powerall of theseare systems.
A systemcan be describedin its successive states.It may be looselyor
tightly organized,stableor unstable.A stablesystemrequiresan input of con-
siderablepowerto upsetit; an unstablesystemis moreprecarious,andits bal-
ance, or equilibrium, is more easily disturbed. A stable system is capable of
absorbing new components and processinga variety of inputs while continu-
ing to function_normally,.
adjustingto changes,and correctingits behaviorby
making appropriate reactions to negatzvefeedback (i.e., information that it is
deviating from course,as when you are driving acar and continuously observ-
ing the road with inputs leading you to make mental calculations and deci-
sions about how to avoid oncoming traffic).
Smaller systems(or subsystems)may exist within larger systems.Think of
the academic department, for example Political Science, International
Relations,
or Historyasa subsystem
of thecollege
or university,
justasthein-
dividual college or university may be consideredto be a subsystemof the over-
all systemof highereducation.Accordingto John Burton, Whereasthe sub-
system is a system in itself that can be isolated (though in isolation its
functional relevance will not always be apparent) a system level refers to a
complex of relationships comprising all units at that level. Systemshave differ-
ent featuresat differentlevels.16
Everysystemhasboundaries
that distin-
guish it from its operating environment. Every systemis, in somesense,a com-
munications net that permits the ow of information leading to a
selfadjusting process. Every system has inputs and outputs; an output of a
systemmay reenter that systemas an input, through what is termed feedback.
To repeat, systemsrepresentthe interactive patterns among the units within a

structure.

Closely
related
isthe
tered tocharacterize
relatio
shipsin a lob l inter &#39;
s stem.Interdepende ult
o interactionamongcomponentsof a s erde
reater islikely
tobethe
loss
ofcon-
trol that they experience over all or part of their decisionmaking indepen-
dence.In the EuropeanUnion, for example,the introductionof the Euro as a
commoncurrency
with a CentralBanksettinginterestratesandregiitiiig the
moneysupply both illustratesthe growth of economicinterdependence
and
the lossof purelynationalcontroloverimportanteconomic
policiesin the
membercountries.At an abstractlevel,Wolf-DieterEberweinsuggests
that in-
terdependenceis a property resulting from the specication of the relation-
ships existing betweenthe actors in the global environment, on the one hand,
 OTHERUSESOF SYSTEM 109

%§

iswtepen
on
the
va -
LL T18
imensions:
The
same authors
conceptualize
sensitivityandvulnerability.
interdependenc
as
having
two
rkhow quicklydo changes
in one
countrybring costlychanges
in another,and how greatare the costlyef-
fects?19
Theysuggest
thatvulnerabilitcanbedenedas a &#39;
&#39;
t im ose xternal eventsevena er olicieshave be al-
tered.2°
Interdependence,
with its sensitivity
andvulnerability
dimensions,
can be social, political, economic,military, or ideological in nature, as
KeohaneandNye demonstrate in their analysis.
It followsthat interdepen-
denceis not symmetrical.
AsR. HarrisonWagnersuggests, aninterdependent
relationshipbetween
partiesthatarenot equalis likelyto becharacterized ei-
therby dependence,"denedasneed,or by asymmetry, whichrefersto a
situationin whichone partyneedsthe benetsderivedfrom a relationship
morethantheother.21In turn,interdependence asa concept iscloselyrelated
to power and dependency
theory,discussed
respectivelyin Chapters2 and 6.
Alsowidelyusedin international-relations
studies,
andespeciallyin sys-
temstheory,
is thetermlmteractionl
Thegreaterthelevelof interdeendené,
thegreatertheamountof interaction.
As we havediscussed,
s stemsarehy-
P2 i°3iZedI1SV&#39;. As thelevelof interdependence
andthe
amountof interactiongrow, the complexityof the systemincreases.
In turn,
interdependence
andinteraction,
like systems
theoryitself,arecloselylinked
to integrationtheory,which is discussedin Chapter10. Interactionconsists
not only of demandsand responses-theactionsof nation-states,interna-
tional organizations,and othernonstateactors,but alsoof transactionsacross
national boundaries,includingtrade, tourism, investment,technologytrans-
fer, and, more broadly,the ow of ideasand of informationasin the Internet
and global television such as CNN.
* Examiningthe internationalsystemof the late twentiethcentury,Andrew
M. Scottcharacterized
interactionin the following way:
Hundredsof actorsare pouringactionsinto the internationalarenaat the same
time, andthoseactionsarebeingvariouslydeectedandaggregated andcombined
with one another.. . . In an undirectedaggregativc. process,the behaviorof indi-
vidualactorsis purposive,but the processasa wholeknowsno purposeandis un-
der no overalldirection.. . . A processthat is only partly undercontrol doesnot
becomequiescent because thecontrolelementhasceased to beadequate,but rather,
continuesto functionandproducesresultsonly someof whichareintended.

In short, problems(inputs) in the international systemare multiplying

faster than solutions can be found, thus leading to systemsoverload.
Patternsof interdependenceand interaction grow more complexas a result
110 SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Interdependenceandinteractionprovidefocalpointsfor manywritersin
explainingsystems
transformation.Theemergence in thelatetwentiethcen-
tury of a globalinternationalsystemfor thefirst time in history,in placeof the
Eurocentric
system
thatendured
fromtheTreatyof Westphalia
in 1648until
thetwentiethcentury,wasrelatedto theglobaldiffusionof technology
that
createdextensiveand unprecedented levelsand typesof interaction.That in-
teractionshowsno signsof deceleratingbut insteadis becomingevenmore
pervasivein the early decadesof the tw&#39;éntyfirst
century.Edward L. Morse
refers to the twofold effects of modernization as the emergenceof certain
formsof interdependence
amonga largesetof statesandthetransnational
na-
ture of the internationalsystem.24Here, interdependence is definedas the
outcomeof speciedactionsof two or more parties(in our case,of govern-
ments)when the outcomesof theseactions&#39;a1emutually coritif1&#39;gent.
Morse
setsforth a seriesof propositionsabout interdependence within the interna-
tional system.For example,the greaterthe degreeof interdependence, the
greaterthe likelihood of crisis. Interdependence
doesnot only breedcrises
and various forms of linkage,it also increasesthe potential for any single
partyto manipulate
a crisisfor its owndomestic
or foreignpoliticalends.25
&#39;""()&#39;tli&#39;efvvfiters
havesoughtto dene iterdepen&#39;dence
and to ascertainthe
extentto which levels6f&#39;intérdepEndeée
arerising or declinihg7AcEo}d1ng&#
HaywardAlker,a synthetic,multifaceted.
definition_
of interdependence
is
possible.Interdependence
is a social relationshipamongtwo or morecross-
state actors observable in terms of actual or anticipated interactions among
them.26RichardRosecrance and Arthur Steinview interdependence, in the
mostgeneralsense,asconsistingof a relationshipof interestssuchthat if one
nationsposition changes,other stateswill be affectedby that change,or, in
an economicsense,interdependencies arepresentwhenthereis an increased
nationalsensitivity
to externaleconomic
developments.27Theytakeissue
with the conclusion of Karl Deutsch and his associates(seeChapter 10) that
levelsof transactions,especiallytrade, in the internationalstage,relativeto
thosewithin states,were decliningin much of the twentiethcentury.In their
view, the growth in the servicesector,most pronouncedin highly industrial-
izedstates,had beenunderestimated in grossnationalproduct(GNP)calcula-
tionsfor earlierperiods,especiallythepreviouscentury.Theauthorsnotedthe
existenceof a paradoxin the moderninternationalsystem:The verticalinte-
gration of nationalistprocesses hasmovedto a new peak.The horizontalin-
teractionof transnationalprocesses is higher than at any point sinceWorld
War I.28 Illustrativeof thesephenomena is the increasingglobalizationof in-
formation,trade,investment,andhumanmovementalongsidethe breakupof
statesand the emergence of new (or old) nationalisms,includinga renewed
questfor ethnic,religious,nationalidentity.
Althoughsystemand in particularthe conceptof internationalsystemex-
ertsa major inuenceon present-day internationalrelationstheory,the ideaof
systemsis not new.It is traceableat leastto ThomasHobbes,who in Chapter
22 of his Leviathan,writes of systems. S stemwas one of thosetermsand
conce ts that entered the ci iences rom the h sical sciences. One of the
 OTHERUSESOF SYSTEM 111

mostimportant exponentsof systems

theory,LudwigvonBertalanffy,
sug-
gested
that the ever-increasing
specialization
withinmodernscience
begets
fragmentation
amongdisciplines:
The physicist,the biologist,thepsycholo-
gistandthesocialscientist
are,soto speak,
encapsulated
in aprivate
universe,
andit is difcult to geta wordfromonecocoonto theother.3°Thegrowthof
disciplinesandgreateracademic specialization
threatento fragment
thescien-
tic communityinto isolatedenclavesunableto communicate
with eachother.
Systemstheoryrepresents a response to this problem.Anothertheoristof
systems,
AnatolRapoport,suggested that this theoryhad the potentialof
reestablishing
approaches that emphasize thefunctionalrelationshipbetween
partsand wholewithoutsacricingscienticrigor.He maintained that the
analogies
established
or conjecturedin systems theoryarenotmeremetaphors.
Accordingto Rapoport,theseanalogies arerootedin actualcorrespondences
betweensystemsor theoriesof systems.In otherwords,all patternsof inter-
actioncalledsystemsexhibit similarcharacteristics,
the mostobviousof which
arethattheyreceive
inputsfromthesurrounding
movement, produceoutputs,
andhaveinteractivepatterns
among theunitswithina structure.
Bertalanffy
discerned
similarviewpoints
andconceptions
in variouselds.Disciplines
such
asphysics
andchemistry
studyphenomena
in dynamic
interaction.
In biology,
thereare comparable problemsin that living organismsinteractwith each
other,with otherspecies,andwiththeirenvironment. In suchseeminglydiverse
disciplines,
it is essential,
accordingto Bertalanffy,
to studynot onlyisolated
partsandprocesses, buttheessential
problems thataretheorganizingrelations
thatresultfromdynamicinteraction andmakethebehaviorof partsdifferent
whenstudiedin isolationor within the whole.32
In international
relations
theory,
thismeans
thatthereareinteractive
pat-
ternsof behavior
a
withinandamongeachuof the
-
levels f -
&#39;
with agents
~L-::-jJ
receivinginputsfrom eachotheran relatingin somefashionto the structures
ofwhichthe area part.Such
relationships
havetheircounterparts
in thebe-
havipralpatternsof otherentitiesor unitswithinotherstructures
across
many
academicor intellectualdisciplines.

JamesRosenauand Systems,CascadingInterdependence,
and Postinternational Politics
Thereis generalagreement
that evenbeforetheearlytwenty-rstcenturythe
international
system
hadentered
anerathatJames
M. Rosenau
callscascad-_
, based
on rapidlychanging
pn 199
amongsuchphenomena
as siibrou ism theeffective-
nessof governments
transnational
issues,
andthea titudesof publics.33
It is
characterized
bytheexpanding
interdependence
and
fragmentation
ofade-

9934
centralizingworld that Rosenaucalls ostinternationalpolitics.
Postinternational
politicsmayevolvein eitherchaoticor coherentpatterns.
Takentogether,theriseto politicalconsciousness
andassertiveness
of previ-
112 SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

wideningavailability,or diffusion,of technologiesfor war or peace;and the

wideningand deepeningof economicand other forms of transactionsresult-
ing both in conictual and cooperativesolutionspoint to what Rosenaucalls
interlocking tensionsthat, beinginterlocked,derivestrengthand direction
fromeachotherandcascade
throughouttheglobalsystem.35
The rise of subgroupsin a fragmentingworld meansthat the loyaltiesof
individualshavebeentransferredfrom a largerto a smallerentity,with a con-
sequentweakening of theauthorityof theestablished
nation-state.Thecrisis
of authorityto whichRosenau refersdiminishes theutility of conceiving
of
the stateas an appropriatefocal point for theory building. It is both inade-
quateandmisleading
to referto a statesystem.Instead,theeffectof cascad-
inginterdependence
is to distributepowerin erraticfashionamongstateenti-
tiesandnumerous
subsystems at manylevels.
Cascadinginterdependence describesindividualsand groups occupying
variousrolesin differingsystems,includingsystemsof which they may previ-
ouslyhavebeenmembers,and thosein which they arecurrentlyparticipating
asofcial policymakersor in a privatecapacity.Theresultantpatterns-ofinter-
actioncreatewhat Rosenaucallsrole conicts, reectedin the values,capa-
bilities&#39;andhistories
that differentiatethevarious systemsin which the policy-
makingpositionis situated.37~
Rolesareviewedascontainingexpectations
held by the participantsboth of themselvesand of otherswith whom they are
dealing.The fact that role occupantsaspolicymakersenvisagea varietyof re-
sultsfrom the interactiveprocessin which they are engagedon a policy issue
lendsimportanceto scenarios asrelevantfocalpoints.To quoteRosenau,
u
They [role scenarios]are . . . the basison which publicsparticipatein globallife,
with choicesamongvariousscenariosunderlyingthe degreeto which they areac-
tive and the direction which their collective actions take. Stated more emphati-
cally,role scenarios
areamongthe basicunderstandings andvalues.thataretrans-
mitted through political socialization and that sustain collectivities across
generations.. . . Put in still anotherway,the task of leadershipis that of selling
action scripts,of gettingpublicsto regardone set of scriptsas more viable and
validthananyothertheymaynd compelling.
In Rosenausformulation,it is the existenceof sharedactionscriptsabout
how collectivities,or systems,resolvetheir problemsthat holdsthemtogether.
It is the emergenceof a cascade of disparateinteractingactionscriptsbasedon
changingrole scenarios that liesat the centerof the crisisof authoritydepicted
by Rosenau.If thecohesiveness of groupsand systemsis measuredby the ex-
tent to which the role scenariosof its members are compatible or congruent,
the cascadingof subgroupsacrossthe world characterizes
and contributesto
disaggregation.As Rosenaustatesit,
The more crisesof authority cascadesubgroupismacrossthe global landscape,
the moreextensiveis the disaggregation
of wholesinto parts that, in turn, either
get aggregated
or incorporatedinto new wholes.That is, cascadinginterdepen-
dencecan readily be viewedas continuousprocesses of systemicformation and
reformation.
 OTHER USES OF SYSTEM 113

Thus,Rosenaupositstheexistence
of opensystems subject to inputsbased
on recurrent
phenomena, thecumulativeeffectof whichis to yieldpatternsof
disorder.
Theearlytwenty-rstcenturyworldis characterized by theprolifera-
tion of actors,the bifurcationof world politicsinto statecentered
andmulticen-
tric worlds,the impactof technologies, the globalizationof nationaleconomies
heightening
levelsof interdependence,
theweakening
of authoritywithinstates,
theriseof newlyempowered
subgroups, anda wideninggulf betweenthedevel-
opedand lessdevelopedworlds. All of this addsup to what Rosenauterms
globalturbulence.
He describes
parametrictransformations
that aredriving
andsustainingturbulence
on a globalscalerepresenting
interactively
rein-
forcingprocesses
of globalizationandlocalization,theresult(of which)is a vast
arrayof fragmegrative
dynamics.
Thelatteris a newtermcoinedby Rosenau
to describecontrastingfragmentingand integrativeforcesat work simultane-
ouslyin theturbulentearlytwenty-rstcenturyworld.4°Cascading
interdepen-
dence is a functionof interaction
dynamics
producing
notnecessarily
justcoop-
erationbut alsothe conict that is inherentin systemicbreakdown.Hence,the
concept of cascading
interdependence
is saidto furnisha basisfor analyzing
au-
thorityrelationships,
thedynamics
of sociopolitical
aggregation, andtheadap-
tivemechanisms
of systems
inwhichthethreatened
oractual
use&#39;of&#39
the
prospeebforcooperativebehaviorrepresentpointsalonga continuum.
Buildingon this analysis,
Rosenau
asserts
that theprevailingglobal&#39;
tem, or global order,is characterizedprincipally by the extent to which its
unitsareconnected
to eachother. Thedeningcharacteristic
of thepresent
erais the degreeto which suchunits arelinked in realtime.Within this overall
context,global order is sustainedat three basiclevelsof interactivepatterns.
First,theideationalor intersubjective
levelis based
onwhatpeopleperceive to
betheorderingof theworld,or in theconstru_c_tiy_is_t
frame_ofreference,how
theworldissociallyconstructed in themindsof thosewhocomprise its agents
or actors.This level would include academic"af1&#39;d
friediacommentators,the
speechesof politicalleaders,
andtheoristssuchasthoserepresented in this
volume.Thesecond basiclevelof activitysustaining
globalorder,accordingto
Rosenau,existsat the behaviorallevel,what peopleactuallydo on a regular
basisto maintainexistingglobalarrangements,
basedon theirideationalun-
derstandingsor perceptions.This may include negotiations,instancesof re-
sortingto war,threatsto enemies,
andpromises
to allies.Thethird levelof
patterns sustaining global order, in Rosenausmodel, is the institutional level,
which consistsof the institutionsand regimeswithin or throughwhich states
andotheractorsactin keeping.
with their ideationalandb,ehaviofal"expres
sions.Theextentto whichglobalaffairsat anytimein historyareorderlyde-=
pendson activity within all three of theselevels,which, within and among
themselves,
areviewedby Rosenau
asan interactive
setof dynamics
produc-
ing change in the global system.
Theorderthat characterizes
theinternationalsysfefndoesnot presumeeither
theexistence
or theabsence
of government.
Governance
canbepresent
without
government, just as government can exist without governance.The examples
of governments
incapableof governingare numerous.Accordingto Rosenau,
114 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT.
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY
governance
without
government
means
simply
thatsystems,
assuch,
aredened
bytheir
capacity
toperform
necessary
functions,
aswehave
noted
inother
dis-
cussions
ofsystems
inthischapter.
Thefunctions
towhich
Rosenau
refers
include
coping
withexternal
challenges,
preventing
conicts
among
itsconstituent
units
fromtearing
thesystem
apart,
obtaining
necessary
resources,
anddeveloping
policies
based
ongoals.
Although
governments
exist
toperform
such
functions
suchinstitutions
appear
tobeinadequate
inaneraofrapid
change.
Undersuch
circumstances,
these
functions
areperformed
totheextent
thatthey
arebased
on
shared
goals
thatform
theessential
basis
for,and
dening
characteristic
of,gov-
ernance.
Governance,
asabroader
termthangovernment,
isnecessarily
depen-
dentoneither
intersubiective
consensus
orshared
goals.
Although
governance
canexist
without
government,
government
canhardly
beeffective
without
the
consensus
onwhich
itsauthority
isbased.
Totheextent
thattheyembody
gover-
nance,
theregulatory
mechanisms
ofsystems
donotnecessarily
dependonthe
existence
ofgovernments
endowed
withformal
authority
andpolice
powers.

KennethBouldingandSystems
Complexity
Systems
arecharacterized
bygreater
orlesser
levels
ofcomplexity,
andthese
varying
levels
ofcomplexity
have
been
ofinterest
inthesocial
sciences.-F
hisworkin economics
andsystems
theory,
Kenneth
Boulding
attempted
to
classify
systems
according
to levels
of increasing
complexity:
mechanica
homeostatic,
biological,
equivalent
to higher
animals,
andhuman.The
process
ofgathering,
selecting,
and
usinginformation
essential
topreservatio
isfarmore
complex
inthehuman
system
thaninasimple
mechanical
system.
A thermostat,
forexample,
reacts
onlytochanges
intemperature
andignores
other
data.
Thesimpler
thesystem,
thefewer
thedata
essential
forsurvival.
In
contrast
tosimple
sysfems,
humans haveacapacity
forselfknowledge,
which
makespossible
theselection
ofinformation
based
ona particular
cognitive
structure,
ormental
representation,
asabasis
fordecision
making,
discusse
inChapter
11.Themental
representation,
called
animage,
canfurnish
the
framework
forrestructuring
thestimulus
information
intosomething
funda-
mentally
different
fromtheinformation
itself.
Theresulting
humanbehavio
isaresponse
nottoaspecicstimulus,
buttoaknowledge structure
effecting
acomprehensive
viewoftheenvironment.
Difficulties
intheprediction
ofsys-
tembehavior
arise
to account
fortheimages
intervention
between
stimulus
andresponse.
Toafargreater
extent
thansimple
systems,
complexsystem
haveapotential
forcollapse
because
theimagehasscreened
outinformatio
essentialfor survival.
Social
andpolitical
systems
arestructured
fromtheimages
ofparticipan
human
actors.
Boulding
gives
thetermfolkknowledge
to thecollective
images
of themembers
of political
systems.
Think,forexample,
of theimages
that
shape
thehostile
views
ofethnic
orother
groups
inconictwitheach
other
in
theyears
since
theendoftheCold
War.
Such
images
formthebasis
forcon-
ictualinteractive
patterns.
Thedecisions
ofpolitical
leaders
conform
tothe
dictates
of folkknowledge,
screening
outconicting
information.
Boulding
 OTHER USES OF SYSTEM 115

wasconvincedthat the eliminationof the inuenceof folk knowledgeon deci-

sion making would have as great an effect on international behavior as the re-
moval of medievalnotionsabout cosmologyhad on developingmodernsci-
ence.Bouldingconsideredthe ideaof imagecrucialin understandingsystems
and in studyingsuchpolitical phenomenaas conict and decisionmaking.
Thus, systemstheory contributes to conceptualization at a level between the
highly generalizedconstructions of pure mathematics and the specic theories
of thespecialized
disciplines.43

Talcott Parsons

In sociology, Talcott Parsonswas the foremost twentieth-century student of

systemstheory.Parsonspostulatedthe existenceof an actor orientedtoward
attaininganticipatedgoalsby meansof a normativelyregulatedexpenditure
of energy.Because
therelationships
between
actorsandtheirsituationhave
a recurrent character or system, all action occurs in systems. Although
Parsonsrecognizedthat there can be action between an individual and an ob-
ject, he was more concernedwith action in a societalcontext,with what he
callsan action system.Parsonsactionsystemplacespeopleboth in the role
of subjects and in the role of objects. Subject (alter) and object (ego) interact
in a system.If actorsgain satisfaction,they developa vestedinterestin the
preservationand functioningof the system.Mutual acceptance of the system
f"&#39;"by
the actors createsan equilibrating mechanismin the system.

\;
At any giventime, a personis a memberof severalactionsystems,suchas
i family, employer,and nation-state.Threesubsystems
composethe Parsonian
system: (1) the personality system,.(2) the social system, and (3) the cultural
system.Thesesubsystemsare interconnectedwithin the action system,so that
each affects the other. In summary, Parsonsconceived of society as an inter-
locking network of action systems.A change in one subsystem affects the
othersubsystemsand the wholeactionsystem.
In his theory,-Parsonsattachedgreat importanceto equilibrium as a
meansof measuring uctuations in the ability of a social systemto cope with
problemsthat affectits structure. Equilibriumis a widely used,but lessthan
clearly defined, term in international relations theory as, for example, when
we askif thereis an equilibriumin the balanceof power.Thus,it is usefulto
givegreaterdenitionalclarityto equilibriumby reference
to the work of
116 SYSTEM.
STRUCTURE,
AGENT,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY
Parsons
was
concerned
withhow
social
systems
endure
stress,
how they
enhance
their
position,
andhow they
disintegrate.
If societal
equilibrium
and
ultimately
thesocial
system
itself
aretobemaintained,
four
functiona
conditions
are
prerequisite:
(1)pattern
maintenance,
ortheability
ofasys-
tem
toensure
thereproduction
ofitsown
basic
patterns,
values,
andnorms;
(2)adaptation
totheenvironment
andtochanges
intheenvironmen(3)
goal
attainment,
orthe
capacity
ofthe
system
toachieve
whatever
goals
the
system
hasaccepted
orsetforitself;
and (4)integration
ofthedifferen
functions
andsubsystems
intoacohesive,
coordinated
whole.
InParsons
social
system,
families
and
householdsarethesubsystems
thatserve
the
function
ofpattern
maintenance.
Adaptation
occurs
intheeconomy
and in
areas
ofscientific
and technological
change.
The
polity-the
governmen
in
particularperforms
the
function
ofgoal
attainment.
The
integrative
func-
tion
isfulfilled
bythe
cultural
subsystems,
which
include
mass communi
tions,
religion,
andeducation.
Parsons
functional
prerequisites
havebeen
adapted,
invarying
forms,
tothestudy
ofpolitics,
whichisitself
one ofhis
subsystems,
and they
have
influenced
theinternational-system
writers
dis-
cussed
inthischapter."
Although
Parsons
briefly
addressed
theconcept
of
international
systems,
hesawintheinternational
system
patterns
ofinterac
tionsimilar
tothose
within
theactionsystem
atthedomestic
level.
The ma-
jorproblem
fortheinternational
system,
and
forthedomestic
system
is
thatofmaintaining
equilibrium,
which
isimportant
if asystem
istomanage
its innertensions.
According
toParsons,
theformulation
ofcommon
values
thatcutacross
national
boundaries
isessential
tointernational
order.
Although
theinterna
tional
system
isdecient
insuch
values,
the
importance
attached
toeconom
development
and
national
independence
over
thepast
twogenerations
repre
sents
their
emergence,
atleast
inrudimentary
form,
asconsensus-b
forces
attheglobal
level.
Parsons
sawtheneed
forprocedural
consens
among
participants
ininternational
politics
about
the
institutions
andproce
dures
forthesettlement
ofproblems
anddifferences.
Healso
called
forthedif-
ferentiation
ofinterests
amongpeoples
inapluralistic
fashion
sothat
theywill
cutacross
thehistoric
lines
ofpartisan
differentiation.
Indomestic
politica
andsocial
systems,
people
achieve
greater
unity
asaresult
oftheircross
cutting
cleavages.
Forexample,
some Protestants
are
Democrats
andother
are
Republicans.
Such
pluralistic
differentiationat
theinternational
level,
he
believed,
would
enhance
theprospects
forinternational
stability.
David Easton and Others
Several
political
scientists
have
developed,
adapted,
andemployedsyste
theory.
These
scholars
have
concerned
themselves
withthepolitical
syste
which
has
been defined
byGabriel
Almondasthatsystemofinteraction
to
befound
inallindependent
societies
whichperforms
thefunctions
ofintegr
tion
and
adaptation
(both
internally
and
vis-a-vis
other
societies)
bymean
of
theemployment,
orthe
threat
ofemployment,
ofmore
orless
legitimate
phy
 omen uses OF SYSTEM 117

icalcompulsion.5°
KarlDeutsch,
whoalsoadhered
to thefunctional
prereq-
uisitesof Parsons,held.thata systemis characterized
by transactionsandcom-
munications.He wasconcernedwith the extentto which political systemsare
equippedwith adequatefacilitiesfor collectingexternaland internalinforma-
tion and for transmittingthis information to the points of decisionmaking.
Thosepolitical systemsthat survivestresscan receive,screen,transmit, and
evaluateinformation.Accordingto DavidEaston,systems
theoryis based
on the ideaof political life as a boundary-maintaining
setof interactionsem-
beddedin and surroundedby other social systemsthat constantlyinuence
it.52Further,politicalinteractions
canbedistinguished
fromotherkindsof in-
teractionsby the fact that theyareorientedprincipallytoward the authorita-
tiveallocationof valuesfor a society.
53
Suchscholarssharean interestin functionsperformedby thepolitical sys-
tem-an interestin the meansby which the systemconvertsinputs into out-
puts.Eastonin particularhasbeenidentifiedwith what is termedinput-output
analysis.The principal inputsinto the political systemare demandsand sup-
ports,whereasthe major outputsare the decisionsallocatingsystembenets.
Almond addressed the questionof how political systemsengagein (a) political
socialization,(b) interestarticulationand aggregation,and (c) political com-
mimication.Suchfactorsrepresentmeansfor makingdemandson the politi-
cal system;therefore,theyareinput functions.Almond wasconcernedpartic-
ularly with political output functionsinvolving rule making,rule application,
andrule adjudication.His output functions,in the caseof the Americanpolit-
ical system,correspondto the legislative,executive,and judicial branches,re-
spectively.Employinghis systemsmodel, Eastonsuggested the possibility of
studyingand categorizingpolitical systems,at both the nationaland interna-
tionallevels,according
to theircapacityfor authoritatively
allocatingvalues.

Structura1~Functiona1
Analysis
Systems theory encompasses
a basicconcernwith structural-functionalanaly-
sis that attemptsto examinethe performanceof certain kinds of functions
within suchseeminglydifferententitiesas a biologicalorganismand a politi-
cal system. Structural-functionalanalysis builds on the early twentieth-
century work of anthropologistsBronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) and
A. R. RadcliffeBrown(1881-1955).Subsequently, RobertK. Merton devel-
opeda frameworkfor structural-functional
analysis
in theeld of sociology.
Proponentsof structural-functionalanalysisassumethat it is possible,first, to
specifya pattern of behaviorthat satisesa functional requirementof the
systemand, second,to identify functional equivalentsin severaldifferent
structuralunits. Structural-functionalanalysiscontainsasconceptsstructural
and functionalrequisites.A structuralrequisiteis a patternor observableuni-
formity of actionnecessary
for the continuedexistence
of the system.55
A functionalrequisiteis a generalized
condition,giventhe levelof generaliza-
tion of the denitionandthe unitsgeneralsetting. Moreover,an effortis
madeto distinguishbetweenfunctions(or what Levy calls eufunctions)and
118 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY

dysfunctions.
According
to Merton,
eufunctions
arethose
observed
conse-
quences
which
make
fortheadaptation
oradjustment
ofthesystem.57
Thus,
structural-functional
analysis
mayenable theresearcher
to avoidthepitfallof
associating
particular
functions
withparticular
structures
and,forthisreason,
mayproveuseful
in comparative
research
andanalysis.
According
to John
Weltman,
theuseof systems
theoryin thestudyof international
relations
rep-
resents
a modeof analysis
growingoutof, andconditioned
by,two pervasive
currents
of thoughtfunctional
sociology
andgeneral
systems
theory.He
suggests
thatfunctionalsociology
andgeneralsystemstheory,takentogether,
aremutually reinforcing.
Thefunctionalsociologistsaremoreconcerned
withactivity
thanwiththeentitywithinwhichthisactivity
occurs,
towhichit
is related,
andin termsof whichit is assessed.
In contrast,
for systems
the-
ory,heproposes,Thenature
of theentitywithinwhichactivity
occursis
paramount,
oftentotheexclusion
ofdirect
concernwiththeconcrete
activity
itself. 58
BoththeParsonianfunctionalprerequisites
andthefunctionssetforth by
theorists
suchasAlmondandEaston canbelocatedanddescribed
withina given
political
system.Suchfunctions
relate
tothesystems goals,
tothesystems
main-
taininganequilibrium,
andtothesystemsabilitytointeract
withandadapt
to
changes withintheenvironment.Structuralfunctional
analysis
provides,
at a
minimum, aclassicatory
scheme forexamining
political
phenomena.

SYSTEMSAT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

In thestudyof international
relations,
MortonA. Kaplansuggests
theexis-
tence
of a system
of action
thathedefines
asa setof variables
sorelated,
in contradistinction
to its environment,
that describable behavioralregular-
ities characterize
the internalrelationships of the variablesto eachother
andthe externalrelationships of thesetof individualvariablesto combina-
tionsof externalvariables.6° Systemstheoryis saidto providea basisfor
theexamination
of linkages,
whicharerecurrent
sequences
of behavior
that
originate
in onesystem
andarereacted
to in another.
If suchsequences
of
interactions
canbeisolatedandexamined,
it maybepossibleto gaintheo-
reticalinsights
intothenatureof theinterdependence
of nationalandinter-
national systems.
George
Modelski
defines
aninternational
system
asasocialsystem
having
structuralandfunctionalrequirements.
International
systems
consistof a set
of objects,
together
with therelationships
amongtheseobjects
andamong
theirattributes.International
systems
containpatternsof actionandinterac-
tionamong
collectivities
andamong
individuals
acting
ontheirbehalf.
RichardN. Rosecrance
concludesthat a systemcomprisesdisturbanceinputs,
aregulator
thatundergoes
changes
asaresult
ofthedisturbing
inuence,
and
environmental
constraints
that translatethe stateof the disturbance
andthe
stateof theregulator
intostable
or unstable
outcomes.
 SYSTEMS
ATTHEINTERNATIONAL
LEVEL 119

Thesystems
approach
hashadmany
adherents
because
supposedly
it fur-
nishes
aframeworkfororganizing
data,
integrating
variables,
andintroducin
materials
fromotherdisciplines.
Kaplanhassuggested
thatsystems
theory
permitstheintegration
of variables
fromdifferentdisciplines.
Rosecrance
believes
thatsystemstheoryhelpslink generalorganizingconcepts
with
detailed
empirical
investigation.
Inhiswork,theconcept
ofsystem
provides
a framework
for studying
thehistoryof a particular
periodandenhancesthe
prospects
for developing
a theoretical
approach whichaimsat a degree
of
comprehensiveness.54
Dissatisfied
withpastapproaches
tothestudy
ofinter-
national
relations,
CharlesA. McClelland
pointedto systems
theoryasa re-
sponse
to theneedto gather
thespecialized
partsof knowledgeintoa coher-
entwhole.65Otherwritershavesuggestedthat,by virtueof theinherent
complexity
of globalpolitics,thereexistsno entityknownasaninternational
system. Instead,
therearemultipleissue-based
systems.International
poli-
ticsis hypothesized
asconsisting
of manydistinctiveandoverlappingsys-
temsthatdifferfromeachotherin termsof theirstructural
properties
andin
termsof thepurposes
of theindividuals
andgroupsthatconstitute
them.If we
allowthatthesemultiplesystems
canoverlap
and/orbecome linked,thenit
becomesapparentthatthereISmorethana singlerelevant
globalsystem as
wellasmanythatarelessthanglobalin domain.56
It isuseful
to drawa distinction
betweentheinternational
systemasasys-
temof states
andasasociety of states.
International
society
exists
assuchbe-
causeagentsof statesact,or interact,on behalfof their statesasmembers."It
ispossible,
asin thecase
of thehistoryof relations
among
thebasicpolitical
unitsof theworld,to haveaninternational
system
withouttheexistence
of an
international
society.
Thestudyofinternational
society
is animportant
focal
pointof whatis termedtheEnglishSchoolof International
Relations
consist-
ingof theworkof suchtheorists
asE.H. Carr,MartinWight,HedleyBull,
andR.J.Vincent andcomprising
a bodyofwritingsthatshare anapproachto
theideaof international
society.
Societies
in general aresaidto represent,
as
TimDunnesuggests, cooperativearrangementsfor securingthemutualad-
vantage
ofitsmembers.58
International
society
begins
withtheformal
equal-
ity,or sovereignty,
asa premise,
together
witha structure
thatincludes
legal
principlesandnormsor standardsof conduct.Wheneverthereis interaction+
in theform,for example,
of diplomatic
communications,
theexchange
of am-
bassadors,
andtheconclusion
of agreementsthere
is saidto bean interna-
tionalsystem. In HedleyBullsview,however,
aninternational
society exists
whena groupof states conceive themselves
to beboundbya common setof
rulesin theirrelations
withoneanother,
andsharein theworkingof common
institutions. . . suchastheformsof procedures
of international
law,thema-
chinery
of diplomacyandgeneral international
organization,
andthecustoms
andconventionsof war.69
In thisrespect,
hesuggestedthatstructures
shape
thenormsof behaviorthatgovern society.
Aninternational
society
ischarac-
terizedby sharednormative
standards
or rulesof conductin theform,for ex-
ample,
of international
law.At thesame
time,aninternational
society
hasas
120 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT.
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY

itsprerequisite
aninternational
system.
Among
theinternational
societies
of
thepast,Bullincluded
theclassical
Greekcitystate
system,
theHellenistic
statesin theerafromthecollapse
of Alexanders
empireandtheRomancon-
quest,
China
inthePeriod
ofWarring
States,
thestate
system
ofancient
India,
andthemodern
statesystem,
fromitsEurocentric
origins
to itspresent
global
structure.7°
Justasthere
aresimilarities
intheirdenitions
ofsystems,
those
writers
dis-
cussed
inthischapter
whoseworkhasdealt primarily
withtheinternational
level
havecommonelements
in their respective
international-systems
frameworks.
First,each
hasaninterest
inthose
factorsthatcontribute
tostability
orinstability
intheinternational
system.
Second,
thereisacommon concern
withtheadaptive
controlsbywhichthesystem
remainsin equilibrium,
orasteady
state. Suchpre-
occupation
inthestudy
ofpolitical
andsocial
systems
isanalogous
totheinterest
of biologistsin homeostasisin livingorganisms.Third,thereisa sharedinterest
in assessingtheimpact onthesystem of theexistence
of unitswitha greateror
lesserabilityto mobilize
resources andtouseadvanced technology.Fourth, there
is a consensus amongwritersthatdomestic forceswithinthenationalpolitical
unitsexerta majoreffect ontheinternational system.Fifth,theyareconcerned,
aspartoftheirinterest in thenature of stability,
withthecapacityoftheinterna-
tionalsystem to containanddealeffectively withdisturbances withinit. This
leadsto a sharedinterestin therole of nationalandsupranational
actorsasregu-
latorsin aninternational
system
thatischaracterized
bydynamic
change.
Thereis anemphasis
ontheroleof elites,
resources,
regulators,
andenvi-
ronmentas factorsthat enhanceor detractfrom systemstability.Moreover,
theflow of informationis crucialto the functioningandpreservation
of the
system.
In fact,system
theory
owes muchto principles
of Cybernetics
devel-
opedbyNorbert Wiener
andapplied
byscholars such
asKarlW.Deutsch (see
Chapter10).Interaction
among theunitsof a system
occurs
asa resultof a
communications
process.
In short,central
to systems
areseveral
categories
of
questions,
concepts,
anddata:
0 Theinternalorganization
andinteraction
patterns
of complexes
of ele-
mentshypothesized
or observedto exist asa system
0 Therelationshipandboundaries
betweena system andits environment
and,in particular,
thenatureandimpactof inputsfromandoutputsto
the environment
0 The functionsperformedby systems,
the structuresfor the perfor-
manceof suchfunctions,and their effecton the stability of the system
0 The homeostaticmechanisms availableto the systemfor the mainte-
nance of steady state or equilibrium
0 The classication
of systems
as openor closed,or as organismic
or
nonorganismic systems
0»Thestructuring
of hierarchical
levelsof systems,
thelocationof subsys-
temswithin systems,andthepatternsofvinteraction
bothamongsub-
systems
andbetween subsystems andthesystemitself
q..,..
NW
,_,,..
_
~
:~&
122 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY

alliancemembers,thegreater
thenumber of possible
partners
for interaction
in theinternational
system.
Althoughalliancemembership
minimizesboththe
range
andtheintensity
of conictamong
thosecountries
thatarealliance
members, therangeandintensity
of conictswithactorsoutside
thealliance
aresaidto beincreased.
Tojudgebytheexperience of theyearssince
thedis-
integration
of theSoviet
Union,theprospect for globalnuclear
warhas
greatlydiminished,
whilethenumberof lowerintensity
armed conicts
has
risen.Thisencompassesethno-religious
wars,thebreakup of additional
states,
andtheemergence
of violentsubstate
andnonstate
actors.
Nevertheless,Deutschand Singerset forth an alternative
modelin
whichinteraction
amongnationsis aslikelyto becompetitive
asit is to be
cooperative.
Theysuggest
thatthemorelimitedthepossibility
for interac-
tion,thegreater
thepotential
for instability.
Deutsch
andSinger assumed
that the internationalsystemis but a specialcaseof the pluralismmodel
namely,thatoneof thegreatestthreats
to thestability
of anyimpersonal
socialsystem
is theshortage
of alternative
partners.75 Interaction
witha
greatnumber of nations
producescross-cutting
loyalties
thatreducehostil-
ity between
anysingle dyadof nations.
Whatthisis supposed to mean in
practice
isthatanyoneactorhasmultipleinterests
andissues thatmustbe
addressed.
AlthoughActorA maydisagree
with a second
actor(ActorB)on
onetopic,it needsthesupportof thisactorin dealing
with a third actor
(ActorC) in whichbothActorA andActorB shareaninterest thatis op-
posedby Actor C. Multipliedby issues-conflictingandcooperative
among
manyactors,
theresultis crosscutting
interests
andloyalties
that
mustbetakeninto accountby anyoneactorin decidingto engage
in war
againstany other actor.
A closely
related
hypothesis
in support
of a correlation
between
thenum-
berof actorsandwar is basedon the degreeof attentionthat anynationin
thesystem
mayallocate
toalloftheothernations
ortopossible
coalitions
of
nations.76
Thegreaterthenumber of dyadicrelationships
(relationships
be-
tweenpairsof actors),
thelesstheamount of attention
thatanactorcangive
to anyonedyadicrelationship.
If some minimal percentage
of anations
exter-
nal attentionis needed
for behaviortendingtowardarmedconict,andthe
increasein thenumberof independentactorsdiminishes
thesharethatanyna-
tion canallocateto anyothersingleactor,suchanincrease
is likelyto havea
stabilizing
effectuponthe system.77
Multipolarityis saidto reducethe
prospects
foranarms racebecause
acountry
islikelytorespondonlytothat
partoftheincrease inarmaments
spending
ofarivalpower thatappears
tobe
directed
towardit, rather
thantoward
theotherpowerfulcountries.
Thepolarityliterature
isoftenunclear,andsometimesevencontradictory,
aboutwhether
thenumber of poles,or powercenters,
or thedistribution
of
capabilities
among
themrepresents
thedeterminant
ofthelevelandtypes
of
conict although,aswe haveseen,suchphenomena»
constitutethe structure
withinwhichthesystemic
interaction
takesplace.
Furthermore,
howpowerful
doesa statehaveto beto qualifyfor polarstatusor whataretherequirements
for unitsto comprise
amultipolar
system?
Whatisthegapthatmustexistbe-
 SYSTEM
STRUCTURE
ANDSTABILITY 123

tween
thosestates,
ontheonehand,thatarethekey,polaractors
in the
systemand,on theother,thosestates
thatarenotpolaractors? Neorealist
structuralrealist
theory,
aswehavenotedelsewhere,holdsthatit isthedistri-
butionof capabilities
thatexplains
interactive
patterns,
including
the
prospects
for peaceor war.Neorealist/structural-realist
theorists
countthe
numberof especially
powerfulstates
relative
to theremaining
statesto deter-
minewhether
thesystem
is unipolar,
bipolar,
or multipolar.
Polarity
is also
measuredby the extent to which statesform alliancesor coalitions.
Neorealist/
structural-realist
theorists
alsopointto theimportanceof thedis-
tributionof capabilities
among polarstates.
However, theydo notfocuson
disparities
incapabilities
between
oramong thepolarstates
and,inparticular
theextent
towhichsuchdisparities
mayaffect
(ornotaffect)
relationships
be-
tweenthe principalactorsandlesserstates.
According
to Edward
D. Manseld,
placingsoleor primaryreliance
on
thenumber
of poles
asa basis
formeasuring
thedistribution
of poweras-
sumesthatthepolesdonotdiffersubstantially
among
themselvesin theirre-
spective
power,or thattheyarestructurally
equivalent,
equal,or symmetri-
cal.78
Thefactthatpowerssuch astheUnitedStates
andtheSoviet Union
duringtheColdWarwerenot equallypowerfulis in itselfof theoretical
im-
portance.He suggests
that thereare important differencesbetweenthe num-
berof polesandtheconcentration
of poweramong
theirrespective
members
andtheconsequent theoretical
implications
forwar,peace,
andstability
inthe
system.If, forexample,thereis a bipolar
structure
containing
twoequalor
equivalentstates,
each ofwhichismorepowerful thananyremaining
state
in
thesystem, thesystemwillremain stable
solongasoneortheotherbipolar
power does notcreate
inequality
byincreasingitsowncapabilities
orforming
allianceswith lesserstates.According to balanceof-powertheorists,
Manseld
pointsout,warbecomesmorelikelywhenpowerinequalities
exist
among
themajor,polaractors.
Accordingly,
boththenumberof polesandthe
levelofpower
concentration
amongthepolarstates
formanimportant
deter-
minant of whether war will break out.

SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND STABILITY

Although
thereis,aswehaveseen,
littleagreement
among
writersonthesub-
jectof polarity,somecontend
thata multi olarworldi lik 1 belessstable

-
-M
WE
VY
,,.,..~..w-...,
thana bipolar
systemthe
element
of contradiction
thatexists
among
theo-
riesaboutsystem
structure
andstability.
Withfewerimportant
actorsand
greatercertaintyin militaryandpoliticalrelationships
based,
for example,
on
alliancesbetweenopposingblocsof statessuchasNATO andthe Warsaw
Pactin Europe duringtheColdWar,theprospectsfor misunderstandingsand
conictaresaidto belessunderconditions of bipolarity
thanin a multipolar
world.Thisis illustrated
bytheexample of Europe dividedbetweentheop-
posingNATOandWarsaw Pact,alliances,
eachof whichwasbacked bythe
mostformidable arrayof militarycapabilities,
including
nuclearweapons,
124 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY

everassembled.Yet therewasno war in Europe,a continentthat wasthe

sceneof two WorldWarsin thetwentiethcenturyandthesettingfor renewed
ethnicconict&#39;in
theBalkansafterthedisintegration
of theSovietUnion,the
WarsawPact,and Yugoslavia.
If there
isdisagreement
about
theextent
towhich
bipolarity
isconducive
tostability,
comparablediscord
exists
intheorizing
about
amultipolar world.
Stanley
Hoffmann, forexample,
suggested
thataninternational
systembased
onveasymmetrical power
centers,whichwerehypothesized
to existin the
early1970s,wasnotonlyundesirable,
butalsodangerous
because thebalance
ofuncertaintyisincreased
andmightleadtoanarms racethatinitselfcould
bedestabilizing. Another
writer,RonaldYalem,sawanemerging tripolar
world(United States,
Soviet
Union, andChina),inwhichtwopowers would
tendto coalesce
against
thethird.Because
of thetriplingof thenumber
of bi-
lateralinteractions
in comparison
with themoresimpleinteractionpatternin
a bipolar
world,andtheadditional
patterns
of potential
conict,therewas
saidto beagreater
possibility
forconictin a tripolarworld.Stability
in such
a systemdepends
ontheabilityof each
stateto prevent
theemergence of a
bipolaralignment
against
itself.Eachmustresist
thetemptation
toformbipo-
lar alignments
against
thethirdmajorpower. Yalem writes,Withoutany
balancer
of powerto affecttheinherent
tendency
of twoof theprincipals
to
combine
against
thethird,orastrong
supranational
actortoregulate
tripolar-
ity,thesystem
islikelytobesusceptible
tocontinual
instability.
8°
Empiricalstudies
byJ.DavidSinger
andMelvinSmallyielded
conclusions
notfullyin support
of thehypothesis
aboutbipolarity/multipolarity
andthe
outbreakof war.Analyzinghistoricaldatafor theperiodfrom 1815to 1945
forpossible
correlations
betweenalliance
aggregation
andtheonsetof war,
Singer
andSmall
tested
thefollowing
hypotheses:
(1)thegreater
thenumberof
alliancecommitments
in thesystem,
themorewarthesystem
will experience;
and(2)thecloser
thesystem
istobipolarity,
themore
warit willexperience.
Fortheentireperiodunderexamination,
thehypothesis
aboutalliance
ag-
gregationandtheoutbreak
ofwarwasnotconrmed.Inthenineteenth
cen-
tury,alliance
aggregation
andoccurrence
ofwarcorrelated
inversely,
whereas
in thetwentieth
century,
thevariables
covaried.In addition,
theauthorsdis-
covered thatregardless
of whether
wemeasure amount of warbynumbers
of wars,thenation-months
involved,
or battledeaths
incurred,
alliance
aggre-
gation
andbipolarity
predict
stronglyawayfromwarinthenineteenth
cen-
turyandeven
morestrongly
toward
it inthetwentieth.
32Inshort,
forthepe-
riod 1815to 1899,the evidence
presented
by Singerand Smallfailedto
support
thetheory
aboutbipolarity
andconictpresented
earlier
byDeutsch
andSinger.
Inthetwentieth
century;
wehavethreemostobvious
cases,
World
WarI, WorldWarII, andtheColdWar.WorldWarI wasprecededbythefor-
mationof opposingalliances,
eachwithrisinglevels
of armaments
reflecting
thepolitical
conicts
oftheearlytwentieth
century.
WorldWarII, it hasbeen
widelynoted,didnotariseoutof anopposing
alliance
structure
in anyway
comparable
to theFirstWorldWar.Norwasthereanarms
race.
In fact,the
democracies
werecriticizedfor havingacquiesced
in Germanrearmament
in
 SYSTEM
STRUCTURE
ANDSTABILITY 125

the1930sin violationof theVersailles

Treatythatended
WorldWarI. The
ColdWarpresents
yeta different
situation
in which,
aswehavenoted,
Europe,thesetting for thetightest
alignment
of opposing
blocs(NATOand
Warsaw Pact)didnotdescend intoarmedconict.Suchcases,
importantas
eachisin shaping,
if notdening, theinternational
landscape
of thetwentieth
century,
donotprovide
a basis
in themselves
for adequate
theorizing
about
alignment
andstability.
However,
takentogether,
theydoillustrate
theneed
fortheory
thattakes
account
of othervariables
notpresent
in analysis
based
onlyoncorrelations
between
polarityandstability.
Althoughstudiesusingaggregate
datacanshowtheexistence
of correla-
tions,theycannot, asSingerandSmallacknowledge,establish
a causal
rela-
tionship.A thirdvariablemaybethecausal factoraffecting
theothertwo
variables.Sucha thirdvariable
mightbetheperceptions
of national
decision
makers or theexistence
of nuclear
weapons,whichvastlyincreasedfor the
UnitedStates andtheSovietUniontherisk-gain
calculus
duringtheColdWar
andshapedthinking
onbothsidesoftheColdWarpolitical
divideinEurope
abouttheconsequences
of warontheNATOCentral Front.Forexample
leaders
maystepuptheiralliance-building
activities
asthey[perceive]
the
probability
ofwarto berising,
83ortheymayseek
todefuse political
escala-
tion to war,astheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUniondid at thetimeof the
Cuban
Missile
Crisis
in1962.
Thisthesuperpowers
aremost
able
todoif they
arein controlof theblocsof stateswhichtheylead.
Anotherstudytested
hypotheses
aboutthebalance
of powerfor a much
shorter
period187O
to1881.Drawing
oninternational-events
data,
speci-
callyacoded
compilation
ofsignicant
diplomatic
events
drawnfromdiplo-
matichistories,BrianHealyandArthur Steinfoundthat thealliances
of the
periodthe ThreeEmperorsLeagueof 1873 and the Dual Allianceof
1879didnotleadto anincrease
in cooperation
among
alliesandanincrease
inconictbetween
alliesandotherstates.
Inthecase
oftheThree Emperors
League,
Germanywastheobjectof sharply increased
hostilitybyanally,
Russia,
andevenbyAustria.Theauthorsconcluded
thattherewasa decrease
in cooperation
between
members
of theThreeEmperors
League
andoutside
states,
although
thisdecrease
wasless
thanwhatoccurred
withintheleague
it-
self.Similarly,
theperiodfollowingtheformationof theDualAllianceof 1879
betweenGermanyandAustriawasmarked bya deterioration
in relations
be-
f tweenthetwo signatories,
together
with an improvementin relationswith
I Russia,
againstwhichtheDualAlliancewasdirected.
These
ndings
pointtoamodicationoftheSinger-S-inall
hypothesis,
and
of theproposition
advanced
by ArthurLeeBurnsandothers,
in whichthe
Aalignment
of twoormorestates
witheach
otherheightens
theopposition
of
othersand enhances
therisk of war.Moreover,the formationof the Three
- EmperorsLeaguewasfollowedby a declineinwin __1:gr_a;;tipns,,among
allies,
fromwhichHealyandSteinconcluded
thatinteractions
between
members
of
theleagueandoutside
states
probably
increased.
However,thendings
ofthis
studysupported
theproposition
thatthere
wasatendency
towardequilibrium
inthisinternational
systembasedonamultipolar
balance
ofpower,
withthe
126 SYSTEM,STRUCTURE.
AGENT,AND INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY

inference
that unbalancedrelationships
aremorelikelyto beunstablethan
arebalancedrelationships,
andthe tensioncausedby theunbalanced
rela-
tionship
induces
a change
in interaction
behavior.
84
In our discussion of neorealist/structural-realist theory (Chapter 2.), we
notedeffortsto broadensuchtheoreticalfocusto encompass
propositionsand
ndingsfromthesystemic
andtheunitactorlevels.
Thefocusof suchefforts
is theimpactof thestructureof thesystem
ontheprospects
for waror peace.
Thenextstepbeyondtheorizingsuchasthat representedin thissectionis to
engage
in empirical
testsin aneffortto determine
theeffects
of international-
system
structures
onpeaceful or warlikebehavior
onthepartof thevarious
stateactors.BruceBuenodeMesquitaandDavidLalman,in sucha study,ex-
aminedwhether,between 1816and1965,warsin Europewerea functionof
thenumberof poles(bipolaror multipolar),thetightness
of suchpoles,and
thedistribution
of poweramong theactorsin thesystem.85
Conningtheir
analysis
to majoractorsin thesystem,
theymeasured thetightness
or loose-
nessof polarityby clustering
European statesaccording to theiralliancecom-
mitmentsandthesimilarityof theirforeignpolicies.Theyfoundlow correla-
tionsamongthethreevariables. In otherwords,whethera statewentto war
wasnot directlyrelatedto bipolarityor multipolarity,
measured by thetight-
nessof alliancesor the distributionof poweramongthe actorsof the system.
Nevertheless,theyconcluded that low correlations
do not necessarily
mean
that thesevariables,
takenseparately,arenot importantin understanding
the
relationship
between aninternationalsystem
structureandconict.
At theunitactorlevel,deMesquitaandLalmanaddressed thequestionof
the extentto which decisionmakerstakeinto accountsystemic-level
consider-
ationsin shapingtheirrespective
policies.In otherwords,whatdo theydo if
confrontedwith the choicebetweena policy leadingto greaterstability or
peace
attheleveloftheinternational
system
andapolicythatenhances
these-
curityof theindividualstate.Here,theseauthorsconstructa modelthat con-
tainsthe assumption that decisionmakerssubjectively
assess the anticipated
gainsandlosses
fromeitherchallenging
or notchallenging
a potential
adver-
saryin a crisissituation.Theprobabilitythatthechallengerwill useforcein-
creases in proportionto the expected gainsfrom suchaction.Finally,their
modelcontainsthe assumption that decisionmakers,in decidingwhetherto
challenge a potentialadversary basedon theperceived gainsat theactorunit
level,alsotakeinto accountsuchinternational-system-level
variablesaspolar-
ity,thenatureof alliances, andthedistributionof poweramongmajoractors.
Althoughconceding that decision
makersmayhavefactoredinto theircalcu-
lationsthe internationalsystem-leveleffects,deMesquitaandLalmanfound
no evidence that theyactasif theywereconstrained by thesystem structural
attributes examined.
Thes widely
acknowledged
torepresent
aprofound
structuralchange in theinternationalsystem.Specically
in Europe,thebipo-
lar structurethat sharplydividedthe continent,basedon the alliancerela-
tionshipssetforth in NATOandtheWarsawPact,disintegrated. Theresult,
accordingto John,@r;s,h_eim_§;:, is that the
 SYSTEM
STRUCTURE
ANDSTABILITY 127

Europe
will increase.
Hisassessment,
basedonstructural
analysis,
derives
fromthefamiliarstructuralist
assumption
thatthenumber
of actors
andthe
distribution
ofcapabilities
amongthemshapetheintensity
andfrequency
of
armed conict.Mearsheimercontends
thattheabsenceof warin Europe
sincetheendof WorldWarII anduntil theBalkanwarsof the19905wasthe
resultofthelgjgolar
power
distribution,
thea
gapabilities
between
the
two
sides,
and
the
l
ithe control,respectively,
of theUnit tatesandtheSovietUnion.The
collapse
of theSovietUnion,theunicationof Germany, andthedecline of
theUnitedStates asanactorin Europe
reectsanemerging multipolarstruc-
turethat,likeothermultipolar
systems,
will beproneto instability.
Totheex-
tentthatMearsheimer hadSoutheasternEuropein mind,hisforecastwasac-
curate.As long as the SovietUnionremainedintact,the Balkansconicts
were dormant.
Accordingto Mearsheimer,
thelongpeacethatwasthedeningcharacter-
isticof theColdWar,based
onmilitaryequivalence
underwritten
bynuclear
deterrence,
contrasts
sharply
witheras
ofwarandviolence
inEurope
lgfore
45. hemanyarmedconictsof this earlierperiodaroseessentiallfrom
theim g
Although
the
particu s
andorigins,it wasthepowerimbalance thatpermittedsuchfactorsto leadto
the outbreakof hostilities.This destabilizing
featureof earliererasis con-
trasted,
in Mearsheimers
work,withthebipolaritybased
onroughmilitary
parity andnucleardeterrence
that, in contrast,washighlystable.Domestic
factors,
including
nationalism,
contributed
to thewarsof thepast,justasdo-
mesticstructures
of the ColdWareracontributed
to peace.
Nevertheless,
ac-
cording
to Mearsheimer,
thestructural
realist,thekeysto warandpeace
lie
morein thestructureof theinternational
system
thanin thenatureof theindi-
vidual
states.87
Therefore,
Mearsheimer
arguedforthelimited
andcarefully
managed roliferati ompensate forthe
withdrawalof Sovietand nuclearcapabilities
from the region.
Specica
y,thebalancethathefavored in amultipolar
postColdWarEurope
encompassedproliferationto include,but ideallynot extendbeyond,
Germany
asa meansof achieving balance between Germany andRussia.
Theissueof polarityandits implications
for stabilityhavebeenaddressed
by othercontributorsto thisliterature.
AsJohnGaddis pointsout,systems
theoryprovides
criteriathatfurnishabasisfor differentiating
betweenstable
andunstablepoliticalcongurations, although,
it shouldbeadded,theappli-
cationof suchcriteria,asthissectionof thischapterillustrates,
doesnot lead
to agreedconceptionsof whichtypesof systems arestableor unstable.
Gaddis
himself,
building
ontheworkof DeutschandSnyder,suggests
thatstablesys-
temsaredenedascapable
of retaining
theiressential
characteristics,
prevent-
ing any onestatefrom dominatingthe system,ensuringthe survivalof its
members, andpreventingtheoutbreakof majorwar.88
Stablesystemsaresaid
to beself-regulating
to theextentthattheyhavethemeans
to counteract
pres-
suresthat mightjeopardize
theirsurvival.System
survivaldepends
to a great
128 SYSTEM,STRUCTURE,
AGENT,AND INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY

extentontheexistence
of agreed
procedures
amongtheprincipalmembers
for
resolving disputes.
TheColdWarsystem, Gaddissuggests,
largelymetsuchcriteria.Power,
especially
in its militarydimension,
washighlypolarizedbetweentheUnited
Statesandthe SovietUnion.Theresultingbipolar structurewasrelativelysim-
ple..Unlike_the
moreintimate
Eurocentric
multipolar
systems ofthenineteenth
centurythat_requir_ed
thepoliticalanddiplomatic
skillsof leaders
suchas
Metternichor Bismarck
to keepthemintact,thebipolarstructurelentitselfto
thedevelopment andpreservation
of alliances
thatthemselves
contributedto
predictability
aboutthebehavior
of members andthusenhanced
stability.
As thediversityof perspectives
represented
in thissectionsuggests,
there
is littleagreement
amongscholarsabouttherelationship
between multipolar-
ity,bipolarity,
andinternational
stability.
In markedcontrast
to Deutsch and
Singer, Kenneth
Waltzandothers,
including Mearsheimer,
argue thata bipolar
international
system,with its inherentdisparitybetween
thesuperpowers
and
the lesserstates,andwith both superpowers in possession
of vastnuclear
weaponsarsenals,
appears to bemorestabilizingthana multipolar
system.
Havingthecapacity
to inict andcontrolviolence,
thesuperpowersareable
both to moderateothersuseof violenceand to absorbpossiblydestabilizing
changes that emanatefrom usesof violencethat theydo not or cannotcon-
trol.39.In sucha system,bothsuperpowers, followingtheirinstinctfor self-
preservation,
continuallyseek
to maintainabalance
of powerbased
onawide
rangeof capabilities,
including
militaryandtechnological
strength.
Military
poweris mosteffectivewhenit deters
anattack.Hence,Waltzsees
utilityin
themaintenance
of strengthby eachof two competing
superpowers
in a bipo-
lar system
because
states
supreme
in theirpowerhaveto useforcelessof-
ten.9°Accordingto Waltz,Bipolarityis expressed
asthereciprocalcontrol
of thetwo strongest
statesbyeachotherout of theirmutualantagonism....
each
isvery_sensitive
tothegains
oftheother.91
Waltzs
theory
issupported
byAlvinM. Saperstein,.9,2
.W.l10,
discussesthe
stabilityimplications
of a transi-
tion froma bipolarto_a tripolarworld.Describing
aninternational
system in
whicheachof thetripolaractorshasa competitive relationship
with theoth-
ers,heconcludes that stabilitydecreases
assystemcomplexityincreases.
The
greaterthenumberof actors(threevs.two)constitutingthesystem, themore
complex
andlessstable
it becomes.
Furthermore,
withadditional
actors,
the
levelof uncertainty
risesabouttheresponses of thevariouspartiesin crisissit-
uations.Complexity, instability,andiuncertaintyallof whichareenhanced
in tripolar,compared with bipolar,systemsprovide the ingredients of war.
Thiswork,basedon a nonlinearmathematical modelof internationalcompe-
tition, accordswith Walfzscontentionthat a bipolarworld is morestable
than a multipolar system.
In anotherrenement
of tripolardynamics,
RandallL. Schweller93
at-
temptsto describe
the interactive
patternsamongthethreeleadingstatesin
suchsystems.The distributionof capabilities
amongsuchstatesand their
foreign-policy
orientation
(revisionist
states,
whichseekto increase
theirre-
sources,
or status-quo
states,
whichseekto keeptheirresources)
shapebehav-
 SYSTEM
STRUCTURE
ANDSTABILITY 129

iorinwhathecallscomplex
unitstructure
interactions,
thusrepresentin
a
critique
ofWaltzstheory,
regarded
asallstructure
andnounits.Theprinci-
palcriterion
forastate
toconstitute
oneofthethreepoles
isthatit mustpos-
sess
morethanhalftheresources
(militarypotential)
of themostpowerful
state
inthesystem.
Bysystems
stability,
Waltz
means
thatnoactor
inthesys-
temis eliminated.
According
to Scweller,
themostunstable
of tripolarsys-
ich thedistribution
ofresources
isequal
because
twoofthe
poles(A andB),if theyarerevisionist,
maycombinetheirresources
in an ef-
fortto destroy
thethirdpolarmember
(C).If onlyonepoleisrevisionist,
the
prospects
for stabilityare enhanced.
A tripolar system,in whichall three
n1en_1_b_ers/(A,
B,andC)grepfequal
str onist,
pecially
destabilizing
situatio onist states
(BandC)alignagainst
thethirdEEE , thelatterhasnoadditional
stateor states
to
whichto turnto create
a counterbalance
andtherefore
riskselimination.
By
contrast,
a tripolarstructure
in whichall threemembers
arestatus
quostates
represents
the moststablesystem.
Variants
onthismodelinclude
a tripolarsystem
in whichoneparty(A)is
slightly
stronger
thantheothertwo(BandC),whilethelattertwo(BandC),
if theycombine
theirresources,
wouldbegreater
thanthefirstpower(A).If
theslightlystronger
state(A)is alsoa revisionist
power,its attractiveness
asan
alliance
oralignment
partner
toeither
oftheothertwostates
(BandC)isvery
low.Thelattertwostates
(BandC)havea majorincentive
to alignwitheach
otherto restrain
thestronger,
revisionist
power(A).However,
if theslightly
strongerstate(A)is a statusquo
power,it mayprovideanattractivecoalition
partneragainsteitherof the othertwo states(B andC), andspecically

P&#
.,,,,..
W,
..
,,,,,,,
«
against
theonethatis revisionist.
If bothstates
(BandC)arerevisionist,
the
slightly
stronger
state(A)willhaveaninterest
in prolonging
theirrivalryby
playing
theroleof balancer,
although
suchacourse
mayberiskyto theextent
thatit leads
thetworivalstosetaside
theirdifferences,
if onlytemporarily
to
eliminatethe balancer.
Somewhat paradoxically,
Schwellerconcludesthat a
tripolarsystemis mostlikelyto bestableunderconditionsin whichthereis
inequalityin resources amongthe threemembers. He regards this as a
balance-of-power situation
in which,evenif eachof thethreepolesisrevision-
ist,twoof themjointogether forthepurpose of blocking thehegemonic aspi-
rationsof thethirdstate.However, healsosuggests thatif anycoalition
con-
sistinginevitablyof strongerand weakermemberswent to war and defeated
thethirdpole,theresultwouldbea situation
in whichthearemaining
weaker
memberwouldbeat themercyof thestrongermember. Undersuchcircum-
stances,realizingthe ultimateunstableoutcome,no coalitionwould be
formed.
Eachof thethreepolesattempts
to maximize
its advantage
without
resortingto war that would,by eliminatingoneof theactors,resultin insta-
bility.Theonlyexception
to thisproposition,
according
to Schweller,
isacase
in whichtwo of thethreepolesarestatusquostatesthatmaybemotivated to
goto warto destroya revisionist
statetheyregardasa threatto theirsecurity.
Asanexample
ofbehavior
in am withinthedenition
of
poles,WorldWarII pi nde§oQ_ Unionagainst
130 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY

Germany. Thus,twoof thethreepoles(theSovietUnionandGermany) were

re=vi&#39;s&#39;io1Ti&#39;st.
As a statusquo power,the UnitedStates hadthe supportof
Britain,alsoa statusquo
state.
Japan,whilenota polarstate,waslikeBritain
asa secondranking greatpowerbut,unlikeBritain,it wasa revisionist
state.
The_p_r_incipa_l
structural
characteristic
ofthesystemtripolarityshaped
the
atlignfiient
patterns.
""I"&#39;:
F
Asa predictor
of stability
in theinternational
system,
polarity
hasbeen
challenged
byanalyses
ofhistoricalperiods
ofEuropeandiplomacy
andwars.
Although
attention
hasbeenfocused
extensively
ontwentieth-century
interna-
tional
systems,
previous
eras
offerinsight
intopolarity
issues.
TedHopf94
sug-
gests
thatthekeyto explaining
international
politicsin sixteenthcentur
Europe
liesin variables
other
than
polarity.
These
include
theexisting
state
of
thetechnical
offensive/defensive
militarybalance,
theease
with whichmilitary
capabilities
wereacquired,
andthenatureof strategic
systems.
Between
1495and1521,theEuropean
system
wasmultipolar,followed
bya bipolarperiod(Hapsburg
andOttomanEmpires)from1521to 1529.
Hopfclaims thatthemultipolar
Europe
of thefirstperiod,
consisting
of
Austria,
England,
France,
Spain,
theOttoman
Empire,
andVenice,
waschar-
acterized
by26separate
wars.Duringthesubsequent
bipolarperiod,
there
were25 discrete
wars.Theaverage
durationof warsdid not differapprecia-
blyfromoneperiod tothenext.Although
it isnotpossible,
fromthisanaly-
sis,to suggest
a directrelationship
between theothervariables
studied
and
stability,
differences
in polaritydid&#39;not
affectthenumber,
frequency,
or inten-
sityofwars.Furthermore,
therelative
stability
oftheColdWarera,dened
bytheabsence of warbetweentheUnitedStates andtheSoviet
Union,wasat-
tributable
notto thebipolarstructure,
it is suggested,
butinsteadto theabil-
ity of eachsideto destroy
theotherandtherefore to determilitaryaction.
Thus,theoffense/defense
balance,
shapedbytheultimatedestructiveness
of
nuclear
weapons,
rather
thanpolarity,
accounted
forthelongperiod
of Cold
War stability.
Offering
analternative
system,
Richard
N. Rosecrance
is criticalof
boththeDeutsch-Singer
andtheWaltzmodels,
respectively,
of multipolar-
ity andbipolarity;
heargues
instead
forbimultipolarity.
Criticizing
V/altzs
formulationof bipolarity,Rosecrancecontends
that a bipolarworld in
whichthetwo superpowers areintensely
andvitallyinterested
in theout-
comeof all major internationalissuesis essentiallya zero-sumgame.
Hence,
themotivation
for expansion
andthepotential
for conictbetween
theblocleadersaresaidto begreaterin a bipolarsystemthanin a multipo-
lar world.
Although
theintensity
of conictmaybelowerin amultipolar
worldthan
inabipolar
system,
Rosecrance
suggests
thatthefrequency
ofconictwillbe
greater
inamultipolar
worldbecause
ofagreater
diversity
ofinterests
andde-
mands.
If a multipolar
orderlimitstheconsequences
of conictelsewhere
in
thesystem,
it canscarcely
diminish
theirnumber.
If abipolar
system
involves
a seriousconictbetween
thetwo poles,it at leastreduces
or eliminates
con-
ict elsewhere
in thesystem.96
Another
criticism
is that»,
whilereducing
the
 SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND STABILITY 131

signicance
of anychangein thepowerbalance, multipolarityincreases
the
uncertainty
asto whattheconsequences
will be.Thus,it makespolicymaking
complex and the achievementof stable results difficult.
The early twenty-rst century world bears some resemblanceto
Rosecrancestheory. There are numerous armed conflicts at lower levels of
. At the sametime uncertaintiesabout where and how such conicts will break
out, togetherwith debatesaboutthe extentto which they affectU.S.national
interest, increasethe difculty of developingadequatediplomaticpolitical
strategiesand policiesand appropriatemilitary forcelevels.This is often con-
trastedwith the relativeeasewith which thethreatto nationalsecuritywasde-
ned and agreedresponses formulatedduring the Cold War.
The alternativesystemproposedby Rosecrance combinesthe positivefea-
turesof bipolarity and multipolarity without their attendantliabilities.In bi-
multipolarity,the two major stateswould act asregulatorsfor conict in the
external areas; but multipolar states would act as mediators and buffers for
conict betweenthe bipolar powers.In neithercasewould conict be elimi-
nated,but it mightbeheldin check.97
Thebipolarnations,andin particular
thesuperpowers, wouldseekto restraineachotherfrom attainingpredomi-
nance,while actingtogetherfrom a mutual interestin minimizingconict or
challenge
in themultipolarregionof theglobe.Themultipolarstates,
although
havingrivalriesstemmingfrom a diversityof nationalperspectivesand inter-
ests,would havea commoninterestin resistingthe ambitionsof the bipolar
powers.Therefore,the probability of war would be lower in a bimultipolar
systemthan in either a strictly bipolar or a strictly multipolar system.
Rosecrance concludedthat the increaseof multipolarity would enhancethe
prospectsfor détentebetweenthe superpowers,and thusfor collaborationbe-
tweenthemon theresolutionof problemsof a multipolarnature.Sucha world
mayhavepartiallyexplained the~ColdWarworld,whichwasbipolarespe-
ciallyin theregionswherestatesweremostclearlyalignedwith therespective
superpowers. This includedWesternEurope,linked in NATO with the United
Statesand Canada,andJapan,SouthKorea,and (until 1979)Taiwanformally
allied with the United States.Until the 1960sMainland China was tightly
aligned with the Soviet Union, which dominated the Warsaw Pact in Eastern
Europe.Outsidetheseregionstherewas the vastThird World of largelynon-
alignedstates,most of which had recentlyemergedfrom colonialstatus.The
armedconicts of the Cold War period took placein the Third World. While
the superpowers did not wish to see such conicts escalateto war between
them,they soughtto restraineachother from expandinginuence.« The Third
World wasnot an arenafor détentebetweenthe superpowers. In fact,themost
tangibleevidenceof détente,limited as it was,camein Europe,which was at
the centerof the bipolarworld. Specically,by the early 1970sthe contending
partieshadworkedout agreements for assuredland access acrossagreedcorri-
dorsbetweenWestGermanyandWestBerlin,surroundedasthe city thenwas
by communist,Soviet-dominated EastGermany.
As an alternativeto eachof the foregoingmodels,Oran R. Young sug-
geststhe needfor a modelthat emphasizes the growing interpenetrationof
132 SYSTEM,STRUCTURE,
AGENT,AND INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY

theglobalor systemwideaxesof international

politicson the onehandand
several
newlyemerging but widelydivergentregionalareasor subsystemson
theotherhand.98Criticalof thebipolarandmultipolarmodelsfor theirfo-
cuson essentiallystructuralproblems,to the neglectof the dynamicsof inter-
nationalsystems,
Youngdevelopsa discontinuities
modelthatencompasses
thczconeurrent
i°nuenée«&#39;of-global
andregionalpowerprocesses in patterns
thatarestronglymarkedby elements
of bothcongruenceanddiscontinuity.
Youngusedthe conceptsof congruenceand discontinuityto refer to the de-
greeto which patterns of political interestsand relationshipsof power are
similaror dissimilaras between the globalareaandvariousregionalareas
andasbetween the differentregionalareasthemselves.1°°
Youngs concep-
tion of discontinuitiesis similar to the model of a world of multiple issue-
systems,notedearlier.1°1
Thecrisscrossing,
overlap,andlinkagephenomena
entailacuteboundaryidenticationproblems:
Wheredoessystem X endand
systemY begin?
No nal answercanbegivento suchquestions because systembound-
aries,like systems
themselves,
areimposed
by analystsfor particularresearch
purposes andareconstantly
changing.
Someactors,includingmilitaryor eco-
nomic superpowers,and certain issues,such as nationalism and economic de-
velopment,arerelevantthroughouttheinternational
system,
althoughthere-
gional subsystemsof the internationalsystemhaveuniquefeaturesand
patternsof interaction.Young proposesa model in which the existenceof
suchdiscontinuitiesis emphasized. Youngsdiscontinuities
modelis designed
to generateusefulinsightsabout(a)thevarietyandcomplexityof interpene-
trationamongsubsystems, (b)thetradeoffsandthepossibilities
for manipu-
lation acrosssubsystems, (c) the problemsof incompatibilityof the actors
with systemwideinterests,and(d) therelationshipsbetween varioussubsys-
temsandthe globalpatternsof internationalpolitics.
Theemergence of theUnitedStatesasthesoleremaining superpower has
spawneda growingliteratureon unipolarity.As in the caseof theorizing
aboutbipolarityand multipolarity,thereis a broadspectrumof thought.
Buildingonclassical balance of powerandrecenttheory,discussed in Chapter
1, theoristscontendthatunipolarityis bothdangerous andunstable. Thereis
a tendency for otherpowersto ally or coalesce to opposethestrongest state
that appears, by its very strengthand inuence,to posea threatto lesser
states.Accordingto this logic,a balancecanonly berestoredif the leading
stateis confronted with the.countervailing capabilities
of an opposinggroup
of states.
Therefore, unipolarityis likelyto betemporary. In theyearsleading
into thetwenty-rstcentury,RussiaandChinahadrepairedtheir ColdWar
schism with theavowedpurpose of posinga counterpoise to theUnitedStates.
France, with otherEuropean support,hadsoughtto strengthen theEuropean
Unionto includea defense capabilitythatmighteventually beableto operate
independently of theUnitedStates. Chinais seenbymanyobservers asa rising
powercapablein theearlydecades of thetwenty-rstcenturyof challenging
theUnitedStatesby becoming a peercompetitor.WhileFrance,together
with RussiaandChina,seeks to reduceU.S:hegemony, otherstates,notably
 SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND STABILITY I33

the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have joined the U.S.-led Atlantic
: Alliance, and additional stateswould like to do so. The enlargementof
NATO, following the end of the Cold War and the emergenceof the United
A Statesas the remaining superpower,runs counter to the logic that states join
togetherto balancethe mostpowerfulstate.Not only do statesseekingto join
? NATO not fear U.S.preponderance; they appearto«welcorn&#39;e.it
and-to-desire;
to be as fully associatedas possiblewith its securitybenetsand to be inte-
Tgratedmorefully into EuroAtlantic
institutionsextending
beyondNATOto
._iincludetheEuropean
Union.
This leads to discussion of another school of thought according to which
; unipolarityis both peacefulanddurable.Accordingto «WilliamC. Wohlforth,
unipolarityis denedasa structurein whichthecapabilities
of theunipolar
&#39;
stateareso greatthat no othercombination of statescanbalancethem.1°2
A The early twenty-rst century systemis unipolar becausethe United Statesis
A the first nation in the history of world politics to hold preponderanceacross
; the spectrumof capabilities,includingeconomic,military, political, geopolit-
ical, and technological.The relative power of the United States,compared
V;with other states,is greaterthan the advantageenjoyedin previousinterna-
tional systemsby the greatpowersof the day.For example,evenat the height
» of its hegemony,Great Britain did not possessthe global power projection ca-
T pabilitiesavailableto the United Statesin the earlytwenty-firstcentury.This
3 is not a situationlikelyto changerapidly.ThisleadsWohlforthto conclude
that thepresentinternational systemwill remainunambiguously unipolar
C for sometime to come.The fact remainsthe United Statespossesses sucha
1 greatmargin of power that no other stateis in a positionto challengeit for
hegemonicleadership.At the same-time the United Stateshas the meansto
operatedecisivelywithin securityinstitutions, as,in the caseof NATO in
Southeastern Europe,to managelocal conicts so as to limit their impact in
and beyondtheir respectiveregions.Preciselybecauseof the vast imbalance
that favorsthe United States,the internationalsystemwill probably remain
peaceful,or at leastthere will be no global cataclysmsuchas many feared
during
theCold
War.
Theconicts
oftheearly
twenty-rst
century
willtake
f placeat the lower end of the spectrum,largelywithin statesthat are in the
processof fragmentingasa resultof ethnicand other suchnationalforces.As
Wohlforth puts it: When balance-of-powertheorists argue that the
if post-Cold
Warworldisheaded
toward
conict,
theyarenotclaiming
that
unipolarity causesconict. Rather,they are claiming that unipolarity leads
quickly to bi-or multipolarity.It is not unipolarityspeacefulness
but its dura-
bility that is in dispute.1°3
This meansthat majorconictsarisefrom the
ability, and willingness,of aspirantstatesto challengemilitarily the prepon-
derantposition of the unipolar state.Clearly,this is not possiblein the early
twenty-rst century.
The durability of unipolaritydependson manyfactors,includingthe will-
ingnessof the unipolar stateto sustainits position.Wohlforth concedesthat
a unipolar statemay.not respondto challengesposedfrom the international
environmentbecauseits public is preoccupiedwith domesticpursuits, a
134 SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

conditionmadepossibleby the beliefthat its powermakesthe unipolar state

largelyimmuneto externalthreats.At the sametime, the unipolar statemay
seekto preserveits statusby cruise missilehegemony,the searchfor polar
statuson the cheap,and (becoming)a grandglobal broker of dealsfor which
otherspay.1°4If theyare crediblyto challenge
the unipolarstatusof the
UnitedStates,
Ether powerswould needfé pift far greaterresourcesinto de-
veloping counterbalancing capabilities. Such a situation could be accelerated
by the failure of the United Statesto preserveor developthe meansnecessary
to maintainorderin regionsaroundthe world. This eventualitymight occurif
the United Statesasthe unipolarpowerwereto disarm,fail to keepintact its
mostimportant securityrelationships,put asideeffectivestrategies,or loseits
strong economictechnological base.By the sametoken, the ability of lesser
statesto put into placestrategiesdesignedto defeatsuperiorU.S.capabilities
would hasten the demise of the United States as a unipolar power.
Historically,greatpowershavebeenweakenedor defeatedby smallerstatesor
groupscapableof actingagainstthem as a result of superiorstrategies.The
problemsfacedby GreatBritain at the heightof its imperialpowerin the late
nineteenthcenturyduring the BoerWar in SouthAfrica and the experience of
the United Statesagainsta far weakerNorth Vietnamcomeimmediatelyto
mind. Todaythe term most widely usedis asymmetricalstrategy,by which a
smallerpowerwould attemptto defeattheUnitedStatesby striking againstits
perceivedvulnerabilities, for example, its information infrastructure.
This surveyof theoriesaboutthe relationshipbetweenpolarity and stabil-
ity clearlyrevealswide areasof disagreement. As CharlesW. Kegley,]r., and
GregoryA. Raymondsuggest,the deductivemodelson which suchtheorizing
is basedmust be supplemented by insightsderivedfrom inductiveempirical
analyses,1°5
includinghistoricaldata.Deductive
reasoning
thatproceeds
from
differingsetsof assumptions
will producelogicallyconsistentrelationshipsbe-
tweenphenomenasuchaspolarity and stability,aswe haveseenin the exten-
sive literature on this topic.
Thetermstability,aswe havenoted,connotesthe absence-of majorwar be-
tweenthe major statesin the system.It is appropriateto ask, as Kegleyand
Raymonddo, whetherstabilitymeansmorethan simplythe absence of major
war and encompasses the absenceof major threatsto globalpeace.To the ex-
tent that, asin the ColdWar era,therewereendemicthreatsto peace,theworld
of that erawaspeacefulbut not stable.Therefore,thekey to stabilitywould lie
in the reductionor removalof threatsto peace.The fact that the Cold War su-
perpowerswent to the brink of war,without everactuallycrossingthat thresh-
old, may be more attributableto the restraininginuenceof nuclearweapons
than_tothe bipolar structureof the system.Nevertheless, however,it shouldbe
keptin mindthat structure,aswe havealreadydiscussed, encompasses not only
thenumberof actors,but alsotheir respective capabilities.The ColdWar struc-
ture of bipolarity containedtwo military superpowersarmedwith nuclear
weapons.Unlessthe relationship,respectively, betweennuclearweaponsand
superpowerstability, and betweenbipolarity and superpowerstability, can
somehow bedisentangled, accordingto KegleyandRaymond,we cannotassess
 REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 135

therelativeimportance
of eitherof thesevariables
(nuclear
weapons
or bipolar-
ity) in determiningthe requirements
for stability.If nuclearweaponsarethe in-
dependentvariable to carry forward such deductivelogic, it follows that a mul-
tipolar systemin which its major actorseachpossessednuclearweaponswould
be stable.Suchlogic,of course,is highlycontroversialin an erawhenprevent-
ing and counteringthe proliferationof weaponsof massdestructionhas_,,b,(;e;
the leading policy priority in the United Statesand elsewhere.

REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Theories based on systemsinclude subsystems,some of which encompassac-
tors in geographical regional context. Moreover, as noted elsewherein this
chapterand in Chapter10, systemsand integrationtheory havebeenclosely
associatedin the literature of international-relations theory. Becausemuch of
the theorizingaboutintegrationhasfocusedon the regionallevel,integration
studies and the regional subsystemhave also been linked. Thus, we can think
of the European Union (EU) as a regional subsystemof the international sys-
tem. The interactive patterns that make up the EU are of increasingcomplex-
ity and growing quantitatively.They include trade, investment,monetary
union, and cooperation in defenseand foreign policy. The greater the com-
plexity of the EU, the more highly integrated it becomes.As Michael Banks
has noted: A number of attempts have been n1ade.toapproach regional sub-
systemsfrom the traditionally ideographic standpoint of area studies, but in a
way which employs at least someof the more cogent of the systemsinsights
into the patternsof world politics.1°6Accordingto Louis Cantoriand Steven
Spiegel,the regional subsystemconsistsof one state, or of two or more prox-
imate and interacting stateswhich have some common ethnic, linguistic, cul-
tural, social, and historical bonds, and whose senseof identity is sometimes
increased
by the actionsandattitudesof statesexternalto the system.1°7
Such a denition goes far, but does not capture fully the EU, which contains
diverse peoples with many languagesand several religions. The systemsare
delineated by four pattern variables:
1. The nature and level of cohesion, or the degree of similarity or com-
plementarity in the properties of the political entities being considered
and the degreeof interaction betweentheseunits
2. The nature of communications within the region
L». The level of power in the subsystem,with power defined as the pre-
sentand potentialability and the willingnessof onenationto alter the
internal decisionmakingprocessesof other countriesin accordance
with its own policies
4. The structureof relationswithin the regionlos
Totakeaccount
_of_
overlapbetween
subsystems
andboundarydiffuseness
in regionalmembership,_
it is.necessary,
_as_
t_he_a_ut_hors
.suggest,.to
divide.ea_ch
136 SYSTEM,STRUCTURE,
AGENT,AND INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY

subsysteminto first, a core sector,a principal focus of internationalpolitics

withina givenregion;second,
a peripheral
sector;includingstatesthat playa
role in the political affairs of the regionbut are separatedfrom the core as a
result of social, political, economic,organizational,or other factors; and
third,anintrusivesectorthattakesaccountof externalpowers,theparticipa-
tion of which in the subsystem is important.
Anotherscholar,William R. Thompson,hasreviewedand synthesized the
literatureof internationalsubsystems. Accordingto Thompson,the attributes
setforth in this literatureincludeproximity of actorsto eachother;patternsof
relationsor interactionsexhibitingregularity;intrarelatedness, with a change
in onepart pfthe subsystemaffectingotherparts;internaland externalrecog-
nition as distinctiveunits of power that are relativelyinferior to thoseof the
dominantsystem;the.effectsof changein the dominantsystembeinggreater
on the subsystem than viceversa;a certain(unspecied)degreeof sharedlin-
guistic,cultural,historical,social,or ethnicbonds;a relativelyhigh levelof in-
tegration, including perhapsexplicit institutional relations;intrasystemac-
tionsthat arepredominantoverexternalinuences;distinctivemilitary forces;
a formof regionalequilibrium;anda commonlevelof development.1°9
Thus,
onecansaythat the levelof consensus on the attributesof a subsystem is low.
Thompsonconcludes,Strictly speaking,regionalsubsystems neednot be
geographicalregionsper se.Rather,the subsystems consistof the interactions
of nationalelites,not the physicalentitiesof political units, of which interac-
tions are observedto havemore or lessregionalboundaries.In this sense,it
shouldonly benecessary
to employtheminimalregionalcriterionnamely,
general
proximity.
11°Fromhisanalysis,
theauthorinfersthatthenecessary
andsufficientconditionsfor a regionalsubsystem
include:regularityandin-
tensityof interactions
sothat,achangein onepartaffectsotherparts;general
proximityof actors;internalandexternalrecognition
of thesubsystem asdis-
tinctive; and provisionof at leasttwo, and probablymore,actorsin the sub-
system.111
Usingsuchcriteria,it ispossibleto identifymanysubsystems,althoughtheir
boundaries maydifferfor differentpurposes. Fromaninstitutional
perspective,
wemayidentifythe European Unionasa subsystem. Froma geographic and
culturalperspective,we mayviewWestern Europeasyet anothersubsystem.
Theexistenceof a statesuchastheUnitedKingdom, France,
or Germanywithin
eachof thesesubsystems provides a seriesof inputsfromtheinternational
envi-
ronmentinto its foreignpolicy.Elsewhere in theworld,wecoulddevelop a se-
riesof regionalsubsystems that helpto shapetheforeignpoliciesof thestates
thatarecoreor peripheral members, or thatarelocatedoutsidethesubsystem.

World-System Analysis
Centralto theanalysis
of systems
is thestudyof theirstructures
andprocesses.
Worldsystemanalysisrepresentsan at1:em.pt.to
assessthe relationshi s of
struct &#39;
in contem orar and &#39;cal contex s. f funda-
 REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 137

mentalimportanceis the assumptionthat the ori ins of themodernworld sys-

tem can be tracedto aslong agoasthe late fteenth century.For severalcen-
t1Tfi&#39;e§,&#39;
therefore,
the pr various subsys-
tems,has beenevolvingfrom lesserto greaterlevelsof complexity,basedon
increasingforms of interaction.It is possibleto observeandto analyzea series
of structuresandprocesses in the world systemthat displayelements of conti-
nuity overa periodof at least500 years.Indeed,the world systemof the early
twenty-first century,howeverdistinctiveit may appearfrom that of earlier
eras, nevertheless is based on modications of the same structures and
processesfound in previouscenturies.In this sense,worldsystemanalysisrep-
resentsan intellectualreactionto what havebeendeemed to beexcessively
ab-
stract,ahistorical
social-science
models.
Historyis deemed
to bea vital ingre-
dient,not merelyasa basisfor descriptivenarrativenot the principalgoal of
the proponentsof worldsystemanalysisbut insteadas the cruciallyimpor-
tant meansof discerningandcomparingrepetitivephenomena and,in particu-
lar, cyclicalphases,which are describedin greaterdetail later in this section.
World-system
analysis
formsaneffort,in keeping
with muchof thestudy
of international_
phenomena,
to cut acrosstraditional disciplinaryboundaries.
It is basedon theassumption
thattheworld-system
containsa seriesof inter-
dependentpolitical, military,economic,and cultural subsystems,andthat it is
difficult, if not self-defeating,
to examine,for example,patternsof political
and economicinteractionin isolationfrom eachother."World-system analysis
shareswith structuralrealismthe fundamentalassumptionthat, asWilliam R.
Thompsonputsit, behaviorwithin the systemcanbestbeexplainedin terms
of world systemstructureand its critical processes.112However,for world-
systemanalysis,structuresexist at many levels.Thus, to quote Thompson
again,The operatingassumptionis that analystsmust&#39;at
somepoint decipher
the pervasivestructuralcontextwithin which all behavioris conducted,re-
gardlessof the level of interaction.3 Suchprocesses and structuresshould
be studiedin integratedfashion,by which is meantwithin a contextthat not
only cuts acrossacademicdisciplinaryboundaries,but alsobringsinto focus
what is termed worldsystem time.
In worldsystemanalysis,theoristsposit that rhythms and cyclesin the
processesof the systemcan be identied and examined.The world systemof
the pasthalf-millenniumcontainsa seriesof suchphenomena.Of importance
are not years and decadesthemselves,but instead the longer-term uctuations
that may be seenin the system.A largenumberof cycles-
areidentied by var-
ious contributors to the worldsystem analysis literature. According to
ImmanuelWallerstein,the world s stemhasbeencharacterized historicallyby
th sion oflabor
be y,
andby theriseandfall of hegemonic
powersandthegradualterritorialex-
dtheireventual
decline,
togeter.wit successive
pe-
r II&#39; Ineconomi
term
at anygiventime, the coreareaencompasses
thosestateshavingthe mostef-
cient agricultural and industrial production, together with the highest level of
capital accumulation. With such a frame of reference,Wallerstein discerns a
138 SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

first stage(1450-1600)in the developmentof the modernworld economy,

during which time the coreareashiftedfrom the Mediterraneanto northwest
Europe.This was a period, of course,in which the economywas primarily
agrarian.This was followed by an era of systemwidestagnationin a second
stage,beginningin about 1600and extendingaslong as 150 years.Only in a
third stage,beginningin 1750 and extendinginto the twentiethcentury,did
the industrial dimension becomepredominant, followed in turn by global eco-
nomic expansion and consolidation.
Of central importance in Wallersteins analysis for students of interna-
tional
politics
isthe
relationship
drawn
between
th n of
l and the concentration or 1 fusion of power with re-
spectto moreor lessdominant
states.
Iherehave[Seen
onlyEriéféds of
h ssociated with the world systemof the past 500 years.
These included the Netherlands (1625-1672/75), Great Britain (1763-
1815ca, 1850-1873), and the United States(1945-1965/1967). According to
Wallerstein, such erasarecharacterizedby the ncentration within the hege-
monic
state
ofagriculture
and
industry
gnd_9f_ ort
ness
of suchperiods
is§ e highcosfof-Treserving
hegemony
and
ith the
cyclicaldeclineof hegemoniccontrol, therefollows a period of power diffu-
sionand competitionamongrival corepowers.
GeorgeModelski has developeda form of worldsystem analysisbasedon
what he callslong cyclesof world leadership.115 Suchphenomena represent
a patternof regularityin balancein the world system.Accordingto Modelski,
the basic unit of the modern world system (since 1500) is a world region.
Before the modern period, such regions existed in relative isolation from each
other. It was only with the Age of Exploration that such interaction intensi-
fied. The greater the extent and scope of interregional interaction, the more
complex is the world systema characteristic of the modern world contrasted
with that of the premodern period.
In an examination of interactive patterns that bears some resemblanceto
traditional geopolitical analysis (see Chapter 2), Modelski views the devel-
opment of the contemporary world system as the direct result of sea power.
By meansof increasingmobility over the oceans,a complexinternational
systemwas forged,in placeof the premodernsystemin existencefor more
than a millennium before1500 and basedon a singlepath of interaction-
namely, the socalled silk road, linking China with Europe through
CentralAsia and the Middle East.Basedon seapower,a succession of lead-
ing statescame into existence.They included the Iberian order, in turn under
Portuguese
and Spanish
hegemony, followed by a,_p_er_io_d
of Dutch su-
prén1a&#39;cy,"vs;hichvvas§uperseded
by themaritimedominance of GreatBritain
and ultimately by the United States.Rejectingthe realist thesisof endemic
andpervasivéuanarchy,
Modelsl_<i
instead
__sugges_ts,
t_li:gi_t_
periodsof global
leadership
underleadingmaritimestateshavebeenaccompanied
by interna-
tional stability. It is in the interval betweenthe declineof one hegemonic
maritime state and the rise of anotherthat internationalconict increases.
 REGIONALSUBSYSTEMS
IN THE INTERNATIONALSYSTEM 139

Leadingworld stateshaveshowna remarkable

capabilityto forgemecha-
nisms such as alliances and coalitions for collaborative behavior within vari-
ousforms of a balanceof power.
Thelongcycleto whichModelskireferscontainsa patternthat beginsin
the aftermathof a major war. For example,the Italian wars at the end of the
sixteenthcentury,togetherwith the conicts betweenFranceand Spain,were
followed by the rise of Iberiandominancein placeof the Italian statesof the
previousera.Succeeding cycles,featuringthe riseanddeclineof leadingstates,
werepunctuatedby the warsthat, in their time, weresystemwide or global in
nature,culminatingof coursein World War II. At the heightof its capabilities,
a leadingworldstatepossesses
powerin excess
of 50percentof thatgenerally
available in the systemas a whole.
Of central importance as theoretical antecedentsfor Modelski are the bal-
anceof power,seapower,and transnationalism.
Within the balanceof power,
leadingstatespursued
strategies
designed
to preserve,
or restore,
stabilityfor
example,by aiding a weakerstatethreatenedby the powerof a strongerone.
The literature of seapower,and in particular that of Alfred ThayerMahan,
represents an importantcontributionto the studyof interactivepatternsof di-
rect importanceto worldsystemanalysis.Finally,transnationalism, in the to-
tality of theforcesconducive
to interdependence,
representsa focalpointfor
worldsystem analysisbecause,
in Modelskis
words,it setsup a usefulten-
sion betweenthe nationstate,a creationof the modernworld, and the forces
supplementingit or possiblytranscendingit in a postmodernsystem.116
Modelskiregards
thelong-cycle
theoryof worldsystem
anafysis
ashavingpo-
tentially important predictivepower,eventhoughskepticismand cautionare
justified.If, for example,
systemtimecanbeclearlydelineated fromonecycle
tothenext,it mightbepossiblenot onlyto discernrecurringpatternsof cycli-
calbehaviorbutalsoto assess thepositionof variousstatesin thepresentcy-
cle. To the extentthat suchan assessmentis deemedpossible,the world sys-
tem of the decadesthat lie aheadis said to be characterizedby.a tendency
toward increasedfragmentation,alongwith greatercompetitionamongmajor
powersin a systemof heightenedcomplexity.(SeeCyclical and Long-Cycle
Theoriesof War in Chapter7.)
In the world-systemconcept,the level of concentrationof power-
political,
military,
andeconomicsh this
respect,
world-systemanalysisresemblesothertheoriesin whichs -
e characteristics
of the relationshis amongentities
withinthesystem.
It followsthatrulesfor theoperationof thesystem
arefor-
periods ofhighpower
concentration
undertheleadership
ofa
dominantstate.The rhythm of the systemis that of alterationsin the concen-
tration of capabilitiesfollowedby major wars.In thewakeof a fragmentation
of powercomesa periodof warfare,succeeded in turn by a reconcentration
of
capabilities_in the hands of -a newly emergentleadingstate.Accordingto
KennethOrganski,for example,the internationalsystemis dividedinto two
tiersof major powers-a dominantstateandthe lesserof greatpowers.Taken
together, such states are divided between those that are satised with the
140 SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY

statusquoandthosethatseekto change theexisting

distribution
of capabili-
ties.Theerosion
of thepositionof thedominantpower, partof thecyclical
evolution
of worldsystemanalysis,
leadsdissatised
actorsto threaten
or ac-
tuallyto resortto usingforceto effectchanges
in theirfavor.

CONCLUSION
System
isaconcept
thathasprovided
abasis
fortheorizing
innumerous
disci-
plines,
encompassing
thephysical
sciences
andsocial
science
andextending
to
international
relationstheory.Systemhasprovideda conceptto identifykey
variables,
to askcruciallyimportantquestions
aboutrelationshipsor interac-
tion betweenstructureandagent,andto develophypotheses asa basisfor
analysis.
Aswehavealsoseen,
system
affords
a basisfor examining
the
sourcesof behaviorwithinandamongthevariouslevelsof analysis
of interna-
tionalrelations,eachof whichhasbeenhypothesized
asa systemor subsys-
tem,dependingonthelevelof analysis
atwhichattention
isfocused.
Theories
treated
in thisandpreviouschapters andin subsequentchapters
havebeen
shapedbysystem approaches to theorizing.
Thevarioustheories
thatareset
forth in thisandotherchapters
essentially
describe
aninternational
system
or
itscomponent
parts.
Mostnotably,
realist,
neorealist,
andneoclassical
realist
theoristssetforth an anarchicinternationalsystemcontainingsovereignstates
overwhichthereis no preeminent
authority.Accordingto n orealists e
states
asagents
arecon gcomplish b cture
_i_\_/_\
ft % Other
theorists,
aswehave
noted,
haveescriedalternative
in-
ternationalsystems
containingonemajoractor(unipolar),two majoractors
(bipolar),
orseveral,
majoractors
(multipolar).
Sometheorists
develop
models
orimages
of international
systems
exhibiting
greater
orlesser
conictorcoop-
eration.Theories
basedonthenumberandtypeof actors,or agents,
relatedto
patterns
of interaction
in alternative
structures
havebeensetforthin this
chapter.
Aswehaveseen,
polarityrefers
to thenumber
of states
andtheirre-
spective
capabilities
withinthesystem.
Aswenoted
in Chapter
1,among
the
international
systems
thathavebeenwidelydiscussed,
thereisthebalance of
power.Whatsystemshavein commonarehypothesized
patternsof interac-
tionbetween
theunitsthatcomprise
thesystem
andof structures,
leading
sometheoriststo setforth what is_termed
a strugturatjonistontology.Because
international-relations
theoryby its very natureis a questfor generalized
knowledge of relationships,or interactivepatterns,amongunits,systemre-
mainsa concept centralto theeld in theearlytwentyrstcentu£y..

NOTES

1. Raymond Tanter,International
Systems»
and ForeignPolicyApproaches
Implications
for ConictModeling
andManagement,
in Raymond Tanter
and
RichardA. Ullman, eds., Theoryand Policy in InternationalRelations
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1972),p. 8.
 NOTES 141

JamesRosenauhasdenedlinkageas any recurrentsequence

of behaviorthat
originates
in onesystem
andis reacted
to in another.
TowardtheStudyof
NationalInternational
Linkages,in JamesN. Rosenau,
ed.,LinkagePolitics
(NewYork: FreePress,1969),p. 45.
RichardLittle, Structuralism
andNeo-Realism,in MargotLightandA. J. R.
Groom,eds.,InternationalRelations:
A Handbookof CurrentTheory(London:
FrancesPinter,1985),p. 76. SeealsoWilliamC. OlsonandA. J. R. Groom,
InternationalRelationsThenandNow: Originsand Trendsin Interpretation
(London:HarperCollinsAcademics,1991),pp. 222-225.
RobertW. Cox, Production,the State,and Changesin World Order, in Ernst-
Otto Czempiel
andJamesN. Rosenau, eds.,GlobalChanges andTheoretical
Challenges:
Approaches
to WorldPoliticsfor the 1990s(Lexington,
MA, and
Toronto:LexingtonBooks,1989),pp. 37-38.
SeeRichardLittle, TheSystems Approach,in SteveSmith,ed.,International
Relations:
BritishandAmerican Perspectives
(Oxford,England:
BasilBlackwell,
in association
with theBritishInternational
StudiesAssociation,
1985),p. 74.
JohnGerardRuggie,InternationalStructureandInternationalTransformation:
Space,Time,andMethod,in Ernst-OttoCzempielandJames N. Rosenau,eds.,
GlobalChanges andTheoreticalChallenges:Approachesto WorldPoliticsfor
the 1990:(Lexington,MA, andToronto:LexingtonBooks,1989),p. 21. See
also StephenHaggard,Structuralismand Its Critics:RecentProgress in
International
Relations
Theory,in EmanuelAdlerandBeverlyCrawford,eds.,
Progressin PostwarInternational
Relations(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1991), pp. 403-437.
Fora discussion
of thisissue,
seeRichard
Little,International
Relations
and
Large-Scale
HistoricalChange,in A. J. R. GroomandMargotLight, eds.,
ContemporaryInternational Relations:A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter
Publishers,1994),pp. 9-10.
. AlexanderWendtandRaymond Duvall,InstitutionsandInternational
Order,
in Ernst-OttoCzempieland JamesN. Rosenau, eds.,GlobalChanges and
Theoretical
Challenges:
Approaches to WorldPoliticsfor the1990s(Lexington,
10.MA: LexingtonBooks,1989),pp.58-59.SeealsoGil FriedmanandHarvey
Starr,Agency,Structure,and InternationalPolitics:From Ontologyto Empirical
Inquiry (London:Routledge,1997).
AnthonyGiddens,The Constitutionof Society(Berkeley
and Los Angeles:
University of California Press,1984), p. 2. For an excellentexaminationof

11.
Giddensstructuration
theory,seeNicholasGreenwood Onuf,Worldof Our
Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theoryand InternationalRelations
(Columbia:University
of SouthCarolinaPress,1989),p_p..53&#39;65.
_
12.
Anthony.Giddens,Profilesand Critiquesin SocialTheory(Berkeley
and&#39;L
Angeles:
University
of CalifofniaPfE§s,&#39;1982),
p.8.
Giddens;Constitutionof Society,p. 17.
142

15.

16.

17.

18.

19. SYSTEM, STRUCTURE. AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

20.in JamesN. Rosenau,KennethW. Thompson,and Gavin Boyd, eds., World

Politics: An Introduction (New York: Free Press,1976), pp. 597-623.
John W. Burton, Systems,States,Diplomacyand Rules(Cambridge,England:
21. CambridgeUniversityPress,1968),p. 6.
Ibid., p. 14.
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, In Favor of Method, or How to Deal with International
Interdependence,
in Ernst-OttoCzempieland JamesN. Rosenau,eds.,Global
Changesand TheoreticalChallenges:Approachesto World Politics for the
19905 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 92-93.
22. Robert O. Keohaneand JosephS. Nye, Power and Interdependence:
World
Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989), pp. 9-10.
23. Ibid., p. 12.
Ibid., p. 13.
R. Harrison Wagner, Economic Interdependence,
Bargaining Power, and
24. Political Inuence, International Organization, 42(3) (Summer 1988), 461.
For an extended treatment of the economic dimensions of interdependence,see
John Gerard Ruggie, ed., The Antinomies of Interdependence:National
25.Welfare and the International Division of Labor (New York: Columbia
University Press,1983).
Andrew M. Scott, The Logic of International Interaction, International
26. StudiesQuarterly, 21(3) (September1977), 438.
According to Scott, they consist of environmental and resourcerequisites,system
ow requisites (materials, people, energy,technology, information), trained per-
27.
sonnel and their services,and control and guidance requisites; ibid., 445.
Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International
28. Relations (New York: FreePress,1976), p. 14.
Ibid., p. 130.
HaywardR. Alker,Jr., A Methodologyfor DesignResearch
on Interdependence
29.Alternatives, International Organization, 31(1) (Winter 1977), 31.
34.

35.

36. NOTES 1 43

JamesN. Rosenau,Global Changes and TheoreticalChallenges:

Toward
Postinternational
Politicsfor the1990s, in Ernst-OttoCzempiel
andJames
N.
37. Rosenau,
WorldPolitics
eds.,GlobalChanges
for the19905
(Lexington,
and TheoreticalChallenges:
MA,andToronto:
Legcington
Books,
Approachesto
1989), p. 19.
38.Ibid., p. 262.
Ibid., p. 264.
Ibid., p. 268.
39. Ibid.,
Ibid.,
p. 272.
p. 281.
40. JamesN. Rosenau,Along theDomestic-Foreign
Frontier:ExploringGovernance
in a TurbulentWorld(Cambridge,
England:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1997),
p. 77.
41. JamesN. Rosenau,Governance,Order, and Changein World Politics, in
James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance Without
Government:
Orderand Changein WorldPolitics(NewYork: Cambridge
UniversityPress,1992),pp. 1-29.
42. KennethE. Boulding,TheImage:Knowledge
in Life andSociety(AnnArbor:
Universityof Michigan Press,1956), p. 8; Political Implicationsof General
SystemsResearch,GeneralSystemsYearbook,VI (1961),17. For a treatment
of imagetheoryandinternational
conict,seechap.7,pp.290-298.
43. KennethE. Boulding,BeyondEconomics (AnnArbor:University
of Michigan
Press,1968), p. 83.
44. TalcottParsons
andEdwardA. Shils,eds.,Towarda General
Theoryof Action
(NewYork: Harper 86Row Torchbooks),p. 53.
45. TalcottParsons,An Outlineof the SocialSystem,in TalcottParsons,Edward
A. Shils,KasparNaegele,
andJesse
R.Pitts,eds.,Theories
of Society
(NewYork:
Free Press,1961), p. 37.
46. Parsonsand Shils,Towarda GeneralTheory,p. 107.Parsonsdenesprocessas
any modein which a givenstateof a systemor a part of a systemchangesinto
anotherstate, An Outlineof the SocialSystem,p. 201.
47. Accordingto Parsons,the traditional focusof political sciencehasbeenon such
concrete
phenomena asgovernment
andconstitutions ratherthanonconceptual
schemessuchassystems. Classical
politicaltheoryhasconsistedprimarilyof the
normativeand philosophicalproblemsof government insteadof empirical
analysis
of its processes
anddeterminants. Parsons
acknowledges that govern-
ment,which is one of themoststrategicallyimportantprocesses
andfoci of dif-
144

51.

52.

53.

54.
55.
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, AGENT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

56.Press,1960), p. 7. Seealso GabrielA. Almond and G. BinghamPowell,Jr.,

ComparativePolitics: A DevelopmentalApproach (Boston: Little, Brown,
1966),esp.chap.2.
57.
Karl W. Deutsch,The Nervesof Government(New York: FreePress,1964),
pp. 250-254.
David Easton,A Frameworkfor Political Analysis (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 25.
58.
Ibid., p. 50.
SeeRobert K. Merton, Social Theoryand SocialStructure(New York: Free
Press,1957).
59.
Ibid.
Marion J. Levy,Jr., FunctionalAnalysis,InternationalEncyclopediaof Social
Sciences,VI (New York: Macmillan and Free Press,1968), 23.
Merton, SocialTheoryand SocialStructure,p. 51. In addition, Merton distin-
guishesbetweenmanifestandlatentfunctions.Manifestfunctionsarethosewith
patternsthat produceconsequences that areboth intendedandrecognizedby the
participants.Latentfunctionsconsistof patternswith resultsthat areunintended
60.
and unrecognized by participants.
John J. Weltman, SystemsTheoryin International Relations:A Study in
61.
MetaphoricHypertrophy (Lexington,MA: LexingtonBooks,1973),p. 14.
SeeA. JamesGregor,Political Scienceand the Usesof FunctionalAnalysis,
AmericanPoliticalScience Review,LXII (June1968),434-435.Eventhoughthe
point is not centralto internationaltheory,the studentshouldbe awareof the
62.
important distinctiondrawn in recentyearsby scholarsof comparativepolitics
betweenstatic or equilibriummodelsof the systemwith dynamicor develop-
63. mentalmodels.SeeGabrielA. Almond,A Developmental
Systems,WorldPolitics,XVII (January1965), 182-214.
Approachto Political

Morton A. Kaplan, Systemand Processin InternationalPolitics (New York:

Wiley, 1962), p. 4.
GeorgeModelski, Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International
64. System,in Klaus Knorr and SidneyVerba, eds., The International System:
Theoretical Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961),
pp. 121-122.
70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

NOFES 145

Ibid., pp. 15-16.

See].DavidSinger,
TheLevel-of-Analysis
Problem
in International
Relations,
in Knorr andVerba,TheoreticalEssays,
pp. 77-92. SeealsoInternationalStudies

75. Quarterly(special
Forstudies
issueoninternational
oninternational
subsystems),
subsystems,
XIII (December
seeMichaelBrecher,
1969).
TheStates
of Asia:
A PoliticalAnalysis(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1963),pp.88-111;
LeonN. Linkberg,TheEuropean Communityasa PoliticalSystem,
Journalof
CommonMarket Studies,V (June1967),348-386;Karl Kaiser,The U.S.and
EECin the Atlantic System:
The Problemof Theory,ibid., pp.388-425;
StanleyHoffmann, Discord in Community:The North Atlantic Area as a

76. PartialInternational

subsystems),
System,

XHI (December
in Francis0. WilcoxandH. FieldHaviland,Jr.,
eds.,TheAtlanticCommunity:
Progress
andProspects
1969).
(NewYork:Praeger,
1963),pp. 3-31; InternationalStudiesQuarterly (specialissueon international

Foranextended
analysisof thisdebate,
seeBruceBuenodeMesquita
andDavid
Lalman, Empirical Supportfor Systemicand Dyadic Explanationsof
InternationalConict, WorldPolitics,XLI( 1) (October1988),1-20.
KarlW.Deutsch and].DavidSinger,MultipolarPowerSystems andInternational

77. Stability,WorldPolitics,
of multipolarity
to Deterrence:
XVI (April1964),390.Foranearliertheoretical
andinternational
analysis
stability,seeArthurLeeBurns,FromBalance
A TheoreticalAnalysis,WorldPolitics,D( (July1957),494-529.
146

82.

83.

84.
85.

86.

87.

88.

89.
100.

101.

102.

NOTES 1 47

Ibid.
Donald E. Lampert,LawrenceS. Falkowski,and RichardW. Mansbach,Is
There an International System? International StudiesQuarterly, 22(1) (March
1978), 150.
William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International
Security,24(1) (Summer1999), 9. See also Charles Krauthammer,The
Unipolar Moment, ForeignAffairs, 70(1) (Winter 1990),23-33; Christopher
103. Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will
InternationalSecurity,17(4) (Spring1993), 5-51; ChristopherLayne, From
Arise,

Preponderance to OffshoreBalancing:AmericasGrandStrategy,International
Security,22(1) (Summer1997),86-124; MichaelMastanduno,Preservingthe
Unipolar Moment: RealistTheoriesand U.S. Grand Strategyafter the Cold
104. War, International Security, 21(4) No. 4 (Spring 1997), 44-98; Charles A.
Kupchan,After Pax Americana:BenignPower,RegionalIntegration,and the
Sourcesof Multipolarity, International Security,23(3) (Fall 1998), 40-79;
Barry R. Posenand Andrew A. Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand
Strategy, International Security,21(2) (Winter1996/97), 5-54.

105. Wohlforth, Stability of a Unipolar World, p. 24.

Ibid., p. 40.
CharlesW. Kegley,]r., and GregoryA. Raymond,Must We Feara PostCold
War Multipolar System?journal of Conict Resolution,36(3) (September
1992), 574-575.
106. Michael Banks, Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions, International
StudiesQuarterly,13(4) (December 1969),357. Other earlyeffortsto studyre
gional subsystemsinclude Mario Barrera and Ernst B. Haas, The
Operationalizationof Some Variables Related to Regional Integration,
InternationalOrganization,23(1) (Winter 1969),150-160;JosephS. Nye, Jr.,
ed., InternationalRegionalismReadings(Boston:Little, Brown, 1968);Stanley
Hoffmann, Discord in Community:The North Atlantic Area as a Partial
International System, International Organization, 17(3) (Summer 1963),
521-549; Michael Brecher, International Relations and Asian Studies: The
SubordinateStateSystemof SouthernAsia, World Politics, 15(2)(January
1963),213-235;Larry W. Bowman,The Subordinate
State Systemof
SouthernAfrica, International StudiesQuarterly, 12(3) (September1968),
231-261; Michael Brecher, The Middle East Subordinate System and Its
Impacton IsraelsForeignPolicy, InternationalStudiesQuarterly,13(2) (June
148

107.

108.

109.

110.
SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE,
AGENT.
ANDINTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY
Louis J.Canton and
Steven
L.Spiegel,
TheInternational
Politics
ofRegions:
A
Comparative Approach
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:Prentice
Hall,
1970),
p.607.
111.
and
Ibid., pp. 7-20.
William
aPropositional
R.Thompson,
Inventory,
The
International
Studies
Regional
Subsystem:
Quarterly,
17(1)
(March
A Conceptual
Explicatio
1973),
93.
This
article
contains
anextensive
listofpropositions
about
regiona
subsystem
behavior
drawn
from
the
literature
ofthepast
generation.
112.
William
Ibid., p. 96.
Ibid., p. 101.
R.Thompson,
Introduction:
World
System
Analysis
Withand
Withou
the
Hyphen,
inWilliam
R.Thompson,
ed.,
Contending
Approaches
toWorld
SystemAnalysis
(Beverly
Hills,
CA:Sage
Publications,
1983),
p.9.
113. Ibid.
114.
ImmanuelWallerstein,
TheModernWorld-System:
Capitalist
Agriculture
and
theOrigins
ofthe
EuropeanWorld
Economy
intheSixteenth
Century
(New
York: Academic
Press,
1974);
TheModern
WorldSystem
II:Mercantilis
and
theConsolidation
oftheEuropean
World-Economy,
1600~1750(New
York:
AcademicPress,1980).
115. George
Modelski,
LongCycles
ofWorld
Leadership,
inThompson,
Conten
Approaches,
p. 115.
116. Ibid., p. 131.
Chapter 4
The Physicallsociall
Environing Context:
Constructing Reality
FROM STRUCTURE-AGENT TO CONSTRUCTIVISM
We have alreadydiscussed,in the two previouschapters,the debateabout
structureand agent.Structuresprovide parameterswithin which agentsen-
gagein variousforms of behaviorextendingfrom war to peace,from conict
to cooperation.Whetheror not structuresexistin reality or only asconstructs
in the humanmind, they shapethe choicesavailableto agents.Structurein-
cludesnot only the physicalenvironment(geographicfactors)but alsothe so-
cial setting (how agents,or more properly their decisionmakers,view the
physicalenvironment).Agentsareconstrainedby the world in which theylive,
including their respectivecapabilitiesand the opportunitiesand limits that
theyperceiveto exist.Agentsmay bring aboutchange,for example,by bridg-
ing distances,by buildinghighways(physicalstructures),or by inventingfast
modesof transportationand creatingglobal communicationsnetworkssuch
as the Internet.Whereand how structuresand agentsinteractrepresentsan
areaof greatcontroversyfor international-relationstheory.
International-relations
theoryin the earlytwenty-rst centuryincreasingly
emphasizesconstructivism,to be discussedin this chapter.According to
Nicholas_C_)_r_1_uf,
a leaderin constructivist
thought,by our socialrelationswe
construct ourselvesinto the ersonswe are, and we ma e t e wor w at it

éachotherandsayingwhatwesayto eachother.1 Whatwehave,Onufas-

serts,is a continuoustwo-way processin which peoplemakesociety,and
societymakespeople. In and from suchinteraction,we developrulesof be-
havior within institutions.
Whathasbeendescribed
in Chapter3 as*; basedon
the constructivist notion of structure set forth by Anthony Giddens, contains
two basicelements.
Thefirst is resourcesrencgmpassing
suchcapabilities
as
industrialstrength,levelsof technology,incomelevels,and population,along
with such factors as geography,climate, and natural resources.The secondel-
ementincludesthe meansb whi / communica &#39
h
each
otherandrules\c¥.c3nduct
aspartof thesocial
realitytheyconstruct
149
150 THE
PHYSICAL/SOCIALIENVIRONING
CONTEXT:
CONSTRUCTING
REALITY
Takentogether,
these
twomajorelements
comprise
thephysical
environmen
andthesocial
environment}
Although
weshall
return
toadiscussion
ofcon-
structivism,
it isnecessary
toremindourselves
thatwhat
istermed
structure
includes
alarge
number
ofenvironing
factors
(physical
andsocial)
thathave
longbeentheobjectof theoretical
interest.
Theeffects
ofenvironment
onbehavior
represent
anenduring
issue
for
theorists
andpractitioners
ofinternational
relations.
The
reality
thatiscon-
structed
(bythedecision
maker,
theorist,
orstudent)
bears
arelationship
to
thephysical
and.social
setting.
Therefore,
this
chapter
isdesigned
tobring
to-
gether
arange
ofcontemporary
andolder
theorizing.
We begin,
then,
witha
discussion
ofenvironing
factors,
notably
thephysical
milieu(geography),
and
then
turntotheorizing
about
thesocial
milieu(culture),
before returning
to
constructivist
thought
andtheburgeoning
literature
thatit hasspawned.
We
willalsodiscuss
feminist
writings,
which
generally
share
animportant
con-
structivist
element.
We survey
older
and
more
recent
theories
basedonenvi-
toning
factors.
Asweshall
see,
thecontext,
whether
isbephysical
orsocial,
is
said
toshape
behavioral
patterns,
including,
ofcourse,
theinteraction
be-
tweenagentsand structures.
International
theory
hasdrawnheavily
ongeography.
This
wasespeciall
thecase
untilthemiddle
ofthetwentieth
century.
States
were
said
tobead-
vantaged,
orhandicapped,
bygeographic
location
andcontrol
ofnatural
re-
sources,
and
thus
their
foreign
policies
wereshaped,
orconstructed,
asaresult
oftheconstraints
oropportunities
soafforded.
Withthedawn
ofthenuclear
age
andthedevelopment
ofpostindustrial
societies,
geography
diminished
in
salience.
Nuclear
systems
capable
ofintercontinental
range
greatly
reduced
se-
curity,,that
hadbeenconferred
bygeographic
location.
Inparticular,
the
United
States,
despite
itsgeographic
location,
became
vulnerable
to anun-
precedented
extent.
Bythesametoken,
postindustrial
societies
nowdependon
access
toinformationbased
technologies
andintellectual
capabilities
atleast
asmuch
asonphysical
control
of territory
containing
natural
resources
Japan,
although
devoid
ofrawmaterials
andnonhuman
resources
such
as
coal
andiron,
nevertheless
became
theworlds
second
largest
economybased
oncuttingedge
technologies.
Despite
their
remoteness
fromEurope
andAsia,
theUnited
States
and
EuropeanAsian-Pacic
states
camewithin
therange
of
ballistic
missiles
capable
ofreaching
their
targets
within
minutes.
Inthegener-
ation
afterWorld
WarII,theories
ofinternational
relations
drewheavily
on
concepts
derived
fromacademicdisciplines
otherthangeograp
Nevertheless,
throughout
thisperiod
environing
factors
were
never
totally
ig-
nored.
Enyironing
factors
encompass
what
HaroldandMargaret
Sprou
whose
writings
spanned
thedecades
preceding
andfollowing
WorldWarII,
termed
human andnonhuman,
intangible
andtangible
factors,
thephysica
environment
(geography)
andthesocial
environment
(culture).3
Takento-
gether,.the
physical
andsocial
environment
compose
what has
beenterme
the___rr1g&#39;lieu.
Sincethe__1_97Qs,_
however,
theenvironing
dimension
hasreceiv
renewed
attention.
Thefocus
isless
onthegeopolitical
concerns
oftheearlier
period
thanontherelationship
between
geography
and conict,
tobedis-
 FROM STRUCTURE-AGENT TO CONSTRUCTIVISM 151

cussedlater in this chapter.This encompasses

extensiveinterestin the analysis
of the implicationsof resourcescarcityand depletionfor internationalrela-
tions, including conictf Most recently,emphasishas beenplacedon the
broad rangeof factorsthat influencehow reality is perceivedand shaped,or
how agentsand structuresrelateto eachother.

Earlier Theories

Beforeturning to the mostrecentwork on environingfactors,we surveyear-

lier theories.Interestin theimpactof geographicaland broaderenvironmental
factorson politics extendsbackto the ancientworld. Aristotle, for example,
believedthat peopleand their environmentare inseparableand that they are
affectedboth by geographicalcircumstancesand by political institutions.
Location near the sea stimulated the commercial activity on which the city-
statewas based;temperateclimatefavorablyaffectedthe developmentof na-
tionalcharacter,
humanenergy,
andintellect.5
ThusAristotlegrasped
theim-
portance of the physical and social milieu. Writing in the late sixteenth
century,JeanBodin,too, maintainedthat climaticcircumstances inuencena-
tional characteristicsand foreign policiesof states.Accordingto Bo&#39;din,
the
extremesof northernand temperateclimatesoffer conditionsmost favorable
to building a political systembasedon law and justice.Northern and moun-
tainousregionswere said to be conduciveto greaterpolitical disciplinethan
weresouthernclimes,whichfail to sparkinitiative.5Montesquieu
believed
that islandscould preservetheir freedommore easilythan continentalcoun-
tries because
theyareisolatedfrom foreigninuences.7
Here,Montesquieu
had in mind Britain, which had evolveduniquepolitical institutionsthat he
greatlyadmiredandwhichhadwithstoodinvasionfrom continental
Europe
since 1066.
In Americanhistory,FrederickJacksonTurnerhypothesized that the exis-
tenceof the frontier, pushedwestwardby succeeding generationsof settlers
until the endof the nineteenthcentury,shapedthe Americancharacterand in-
tellectthatpractical,inventive
turn of mind,quickto nd expedients; that
masterfulgraspof materialthings,lackingin theartisticbutpowerfulto affect
greatends;that restless,nervousenergy;thedominantindividualism, a con-
ceptworkingfor goodandevil, andwithal that buoyancyandexuberance
which comeswith freedomthese are the traits of the frontier, or traits called
out elsewherebecauseof the existenceof the frontier.3 The rise of social-
Darwinian analysisin the late nineteenthcenturyalsoprovidedan important
intellectualstimulusto environmentallyorientedstudiesof internationalaf-
fairs, insofar as it transferredto the social order a scientic perspectivein
whichtheevolutionary development of a species
wasa functionof its ability
to adjustto its physicalhabitat.Theconceptof thesurvivalof thefittestwas
adaptedfrom livingorganisms to thestate,asexempliedin thegeopolitical
writingsof FriedrichRatzel(1844-1904), a Germangeographer whocoined
thetermAntbropogeograpbie, whichmeanta synthesis of geography, anthro-
pology,and politics.He claimedthat stateswereengaged in an unending
152 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

struggle
for livingspace;
hislehensraum
conceptgreatlyinuencedlaterwrit-
ers,notablyKarl Haushofer(1869-1946).
In turn, Haushofers
ideashada
major impact on Nazi German strategy.
Environmental factorsencompassresourcesandpopulation,andtheim-
pactof populationon resources,
includingthe availabilityof food supplies,
thusaffectswhatstates,
or agents,
canaccomplish.Thenotionof severe limits
to growthiscentral
to thethought ofThomas Robert
Malthus andto manyof
the writingson imperialism. Beginningin 1798,with his Essayon the
Principleof Population as It AffectstheFutureImprovement of Society,
Malthushypothesized that populationgrowthwill alwaysoutpacethe in-
crease
in food supplies.
If unchecked,
populationwill risein geometric
pro-
gression,
although
themeans
of subsistence
will beaugmented
onlyin arith-
meticprogression.
As a result,povertywill betheinevitable
fateof mankind,
unlesspopulationgrowth is checkedby war, famine,and disease. J. A.
HobsonandVladimir Lenin,in their respectiveanalysesof imperialism,sawa
questfor access
to markets
andrawmaterials,
leading
capitalist
states
to be-
comeimperialistic.
For Lenin,the ultimateeffectof capitalism,asnotedin
Chapter9, wouldbea struggleamongcapitaliststatesfor theworldsremain-
ing marketsand raw materials.
In a morecontemporary
study,NazliChoucriandRobertC.Northhypoth-
esized
aninextricable
relationship
between population
growthandresource
de-
mand:Themoreadvanced
thelevelof technology,
thegreaterwill betheneedfor
resources.
A population
increase
of 1 percent
is saidto makenecessary
a 4 per-
centincrease
in nationalincomemerelyto maintainliving standardsat their ex-
istinglevel.9 Astechnology advances,
together withpopulation growth,societies
seekgreater accessto resources.
Associeties attemptto extendtheirinterests
out-
wardin light of resource needs,
the likelihoodof conictis enhanced. Here,
ChoucriandNorthdrawlinkages amongresource factors,domesticgrowth,and
foreignpolicy.Theirhypotheses areexamined in greaterdetailin Chapter7,
alongwith thewritingsof QuincyWright,whoemphasized therelationshipbe-
tweenconictandcultural,political,institutional, andtechnological change.
Peace is saidto bedependent on anequilibriumamongimany forcesand
to bejeopardized by a transformation in factorssuchasdemography. Rapid
increases in populationin thepastcenturyhaveproduced culturalinterpreta-
tion and havegreatlyincreased communication. As a result,what Quincy
Wrighttermedtechnological distance hasnarrowed,whilethe opportunities
for frictionandfor conictamongpeoplehaveincreased.Wrightpostulated
that thegrowthin sizeof stateshadmadeit morenecessary andmorelikely
that conict would be resolvedwithout violence,but it had alsomademore
severe
thoseconictsthatcouldnot besettledby peaceful
means.
Thus, at the beginningof the twenty-rst century,population,resource,
andtechnology
factorsthe so-called
globalissuesof thepresenterahave
contributedto a literaturefocusedon the implicationsof populationgrowth
for resourcescarcity,the implicationsof resourcescarcityfor potential con-
ict, the relationshipbetweenresources
and geography,
and the impactof
technology on resources
andgeography.Technologyhasmadepossiblethe
 FROM
STRUCTURE-AGENT
TOCONSTRUCTIVISM
153

exploitation
ofresources
ininhospitable
andonce
inaccessible
environmen
such
astheseabed
and,intheyears
tocome,outer
space.
Atthesametime,
technology
hascreated
thegreatneedfor resources
thathascontributed
to
theirdepletion
andhasraised
thespecter
ofresource
scarcity
unless
alterna-
tive sources or substitutes are found.
Thepoliticalsignicance
of oneor another
geographical
location
hasbeen
inuenced
decisively
bytechnology
andbyresource
issues.
Thegeopolitica
signicance
of theStraitof Hormuz,commanding
theentrance
to thePersian
Gulf,liesin thelocation
ofvastoil reserves
in suchneighboring
states
asSaudi
Arabia,Kuwait,Iraq,andIran.In historical context,majoremphasis
was
placed
ontheimportance
oftheseas.
InthewritingsofAlfredThayer
Mahan,
thegeopolitical
signicance
of theseas
stemmed fromthemobility
theycon-
ferred,
byvirtue
oftheability
ofthesailing
vessel
andlaterthesteamship
to
movemilitaryresources
most effectively
from one point to another.
Subsequent
changes
intechnology
hadtheeffect
ofenhancing
theimportance
of othergeographical
elements,althoughthe vastbulk of world tradestill
movesbysea,becausemaritimetransportis themostcost-efcient
formwhen
time is not urgent.
Theendof theColdWarstimulated
renewed
thinkingaboutenvironmen-
talfactors.
Thegrowth
innumbers
andinuence
ofintergovernmental
organi-
zations,andof players otherthanthesovereign statesasimportantactors,
contributed to a needto reconsider
theimplications
of environing
factorsfor
politicalrelationships.
Such entities
andothertransnational
forces,
suchasthe
information
revolution,
challenge
thesovereignty
ofthegeographically
based
nationstate.
Forces
leading
to thebreakup
of existing
states,
including
the
Soviet
UnionandYugoslavia,
havetransformed
theglobalmap.Thebipolar
worldof theColdWarhasbeen
replaced
bynewspatial
patterns
analyzed
with referenceto environmental considerations.
Forexample,
RobertKaplanhaspointed
to anearlytwenty-rst
century
worldcharacterized
principally
bypockets
or islands
of afuence,
notably
North America,WesternEurope,andpartsof the Pacicrim. Thesead-
vanced
societies
arelinkedin anunprecedented
globalnetworkof trade,in-
vestment,
technology
transfer,
instantaneous
communications,
andmobilityof
persons
andideas.Theystandin sharpcontrast
to surrounding
regions,the
dening
features
of whichinclude
political
fragmentation,
ungovernability
majorpopulation
increases,
declining
livingstandards,
spreading
disease,eth-
nicandsectarian
conict,resource
depletion,andtheriseof radical,funda-
mentalist
ideologies.
Muchof Africa,portions of South
America,andpartsof
Central
AsiaandSouthAsiafallwithinthiscategory.
Kaplansketches
aworld
in whichstatesdisintegrate
undera tidalwaveof refugees
fromenvironmental
andsocialdisaster.
Warsbreakout overscarce
resources,
including
water,
whilethedistinction
between
warandcrimebecomes increasingly
blurred.
Privatearmiesght eachotherandstatesecurityforces.To describe
whathe
termsthebifurcated worldof thepostColdWarera,Kaplan
uses
theanalogy
of a stretchlimoin thepotholed streets
of NewYorkCity,wherehomeless
beggars live.Insidethelimoaretheair-conditioned
postindustrial
regions
of
154 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

North America,Europe,theemerging PacicRim, anda few otherisolated

places,with their trade symmetryand computerinformation highways.
Outsideis therestof mankind,goingin a completely differentdirection.14
According to Kaplan,in theworldof anarchyheis describing, politicalmaps
losetheirmeaningbecause thenationstatewith territoriallydenedborders
controlledby a government ceases
to exist.It is replacedby warringmilitias
whoseeffectivecontrol of territory may includeportionsof the stateand spill
overinto neighboring
stateswith little or no regardfor thelegallyestablished
frontiers set forth on maps.Sucha condition is found in the WestAfrican
countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Much of the essenceof international relations is the study of states and
otherinteracting unitswithin a spatialsetting.Conictstakeplaceacrossor
withinthegeographical boundaries of states.Warshavebeenwagedovercon-
trol of territoryandresources.Therefore,politicalgeography,
therelationship
between geography andpolitics,hasbeenof enduringimportance frombotha
theoreticaland a policyperspective. As GeorgeJ. Demkoand William E.
Woodpoint out, politicalgeography hasasits principalfocusthe studyof
how societiesmakedecisionsaffectingrelationshipsbetweenpeopleand their
environment
and involvingspatialpatternsof humansettlement.
Encompassed in thisdenitionareindividuals, groupsof people,socialinsti-
tutions,and governments. Environmental factorsincludenationaland hu-
mancreated systems, naturalresources, andurbanareas,basedon decisions
by individualsor groupsof individualsto settlein specicgeographic loca-
tions.Politicalgeography thenrepresents the studyof how andwhy people
adaptto andmodifytheirenvironments andtherefore constructreality.Such
decisions spana spectrum that encompasses naturalecosystems, themarket
for variousgoodsand services, relationsbetweenstatesdependent on the
samenaturalresources, andthequestof differentgroupsof peopleto control
territorytheycovet.Anotherwriter,GearéidTuathail,suggests that thevery
focusof geography is power:Althoughoftenassumed to beinnocent,thege-
ographyof theworld is not a productof naturebut a productof historiesof
strugglebetweencompetingauthoritiesover the power to organize,occupy,
andadminister
space.17
Warshavebeenwagedthroughout
historyfor access
to andcontrol overterritory,or geographicspace.
In whatis termedpostmoderngeopolitics,Tuathailpointsto theneed
to deconstruct
geopolitics.
Thetraditionalconception,
discussed subsequently
in thischapter,
inpwhich
theworldisviewed
ascomprised
of spatialblocsand
territorial units that are expandingand contracting,is no longer adequate.
Instead,whatis needed for theearlytwenty-rstcenturyis an approach that
takesaccountof the blurringof nationalboundaries andthe emergence of
economic globalization, globalmedia,theInternet,transnational entitiesfrom
corporations to crime,andtheeverincreasing availabilityof information,all
of whichseparately andin the aggregate havean importantimpacton how
statecraft
is practiced.Tuathailmaintains thatourchallenge is to rethinkthe
signicance of spatialrelationships
in lightof theemergence of newcenters of
powerandauthorityandto understand theimplications of suchphenomena
 FROM STRUCTURE-AGENT TO CONSTRUCTIVISM 155

asthe media,technology,andglobalizationfor spatialrelationships,the struc-

ture of international politics, and ways in which decision-makersand other
groupsand industriesconstructtheir view of the world. As a point of depar-
ture for suchan exercise,which lies beyondthe scopeof this chapter,it is es-
sential to survey existing geopolitical theories, asking ourselveswhat remains
useful for the future that can be derived from knowledge of how recent and
older writers havetheorizedabout differentspatialrelationshipsand, in par-
ticular, the geographical element.
Closely related is the term geopolitics, which expands the study of the re-
lationshipbetweengeographyandpoliticsto includethe studyof powerin its
geopoliticaldimension.Geopoliticsrefersto the impactof geography(spatial
features) on political power. As Saul B. Cohen has suggested,The essenceof
geopoliticalanalysisis the relationof internationalpolitical powerto the geo-
graphicalsetting.Geopoliticalviewsvary with the changinggeographicalset-
ting andwith mansinterpretation
of thenatureof thischange.19
According
to Raymond Aron, the term geopolitical encompasses
a geographical
schematization of diplomaticstrategic relations with a geographiceconomic
analysisof resources,with an interpretationof diplomaticattitudesasa result
of the way of life and of the environment(sedentary, nomadic,agricultural,
seafaring).2°
EwanAnderson
suggests
thatgeography,
aspartof geopolitics,
consistsof very smallareasthat form what he termsthe epicenters
of geopolit-
ical upheaval,with consequences that can extendfar beyondtheir point of
origin. As examples,
he citesthe Straitof Hormuzat the entrance
to the
PersianGulf, the SpratleyIslands in the South China Sea,the Strait of
Malacca that connectsthe Indian Ocean and the South China Sea,and, during
the Cold War,the dividedcity of Berlin.Suchgeopoliticallyimportant areas,
so-calledashpoints,are consideredlater in this chapter.In Colin Graysper-
spective,Physicalgeographyalone,while providing important constraints
and opportunities,is given specicstrategicmeaningonly with referenceto
time, technology,relativenational effort, and choiceseffectedamongstrate-
giesandtactics.22
Several
of the theoriesdiscussed
in otherchapters
attach
varyingdegreesof importanceto the environment,includingbut not conned
to geography.
Among the most recentthinking about spatial relationshipsare what
Demkoand Woodterm a geopolinomic world23 and what EdwardN.
Luttwaktermsgeoeconomics.
In placeof mapsbasedon nationalbound-
aries, telecommunication channels assume primary signicance. Decisions
about whereto locatea productionfacility are madenot primarily with re-
gardfor frontiersbetweenstatesbut insteadon the basisof suchfactorsasthe
availabilityand costof neededlabor,transportaccess to markets,currencyis-
sues,environmentalregulations,and hospitalityto investment.The geopoli-
nomicmap of the world is drawn by internationalnancial networks,invest-
ment patterns, the movementof people and ideas, and the ow of vast
amountsof information.Amongthe resultsis a world of regionstates,noted
later in this chapter.In a geopolinomicworld, the internationalizationof capi-
tal and the accelerating ow of informationweakenthe political foundations
156 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT CONSTRUCTING REALITY

of thegeographicallydenedstate.Suchentities,basedin xed territorialdi-

mensions, aredestabilizedor evendissolved
by theforcesassociatedwith in-
formationtechnologies. In a geoeconomicworld, power1Smeasured by the
ability,with highlevelsof research
anddevelopment, to conquerthemarkets
of the future by achievingdecisivetechnologicalsuperiority.Accessto emerg-
ingmarketsbecomes
moreimportantthanactualphysicalcontrolof territory.
The revolutionin technologythat shapespostindustrialsocietieshaspro-
ducedyetanotherspatialrelationship,
termedcyberspace.
Thisconcept
is not
dened in traditional territorial geographicaltermsbut insteadis directly re-
latedto the informationhighwayitselfan inadequatetermbecause a high-
wayconnotes timerelatedto distance.
In cyberspace,
in contrastto travel,in-
formationis sentand receivedinstantaneously.
Humaninteractionbeforeand
duringtheIndustrialAgetookplacealongdenedsealinesof communication
andtransportationroutesdetermined by rail linesandhighways,
followed,of
course,bythedevelopment of thetelegraph,thetelephone,andtheradio.The
informationhighwayexistsasa multimedia, multichannel,
globalcommuni-
cationscapabilitywith universalInternetaccess. Cyberspaceprovidesthe
meansto bypassandcircumvent traditionalstatesovereignty
andtranscend
geographically
boundentities.In cyberspace, wegainaccessto unprecedented
amounts of information in the immediate time frame, thus allowing us to
makedecisionsand take actions,suchasorderinggoodsand serviceson line,
perhaps
froma company
or shopsonanothercontinent.
Whetherin waror in
business,
the key to success
lies in commandingaccessto information.Justas
controlof particulargeographic
territorieswasdeemed essential
to Industrial
Agewarfare,in thepostindustrialera,thecrucialingredientin planningand
executinga militaryoperationor a businessventureliesin havingaccess to
largeamountsof informationif possiblefar greaterthanthat availableto
our enemyor competitortogether with theabilityto process
suchdataand
to incorporateit into our thoughtprocesses.

ENVIRONING FACTORS: EARLIER TWENTIETH~

CENTURY APPROACHES
Whetherimplicitlyor explicitly,environing
factorsaredeeplyrootedin much
of international-relations
theory.Illustrative of the placeof suchfactors are
utopianandrealisttheoriesandtheirmostrecentmanifestations
in theform
of neoliberal and neorealist structural-realist theories discussedin Chapter 2.
Utopianandrealisttheoryandtheirmorecontemporary intellectual
counter-
partsdiscuss the humanactorin relationto the environment. Nonetheless,
theybroaden thenotionof environmentto includetheproductsof humancul-
tureandthephysicalfeatures of theearth.Drawingon thewritingsof theo-
ristsof theEnlightenment,
utopiantheoristsclaimedthatinternational behav-
ior couldbechangedby transforming the institutionalsetting.Schemesfor
internationalorganizationand world governmentand for establishingnorms,
or standards,
or rulesfor international
conduct,weredesigned
to alterhuman
 GEOGRAPHICAL
FACTORS
OFNATIONAL
POWER 157

behavior
bychanging
theinternational
political
environment.
Incontrast,
as
theanalysis
undertaken
in Chapter
2 reveals,
realists
in international
relations
often
heldthatthegeographical
location
ofstates
inuence,
if notactually
de-
termine,politicalbehavior.
Amongthe mostinuentialrealisttheoristswho
alsowroteextensively
ontheimpact
of geography
oninternational
politics
wereNicholas
J.Spykman
andRobertStrausz-Hupé.
If thepoliticalbehavior
ofnational
unitsisin large
parttheproduct
ofenvironmental
circumstance
includinggeography,in whichnationsnd themselves,
theperennial
taskof
thepoliticalleader
is to workwithintheparameters
established
bytheenvi-
ronment.Tocarrythisdiscussion
forwardto neorealist
writingswouldleadus
to theagent-structure
relationship,
or howstructures
shape theoptions
avail-
ableto agents,
alreadyconsidered,
especially
in Chapters
2 and3.

GEOGRAPHICALFACTORSOF NATIONAL POWER

Withtheadvent
ofIndustrial
Agecommunication
andtransportation
technolo-
gies,from the nineteenth
to the twentiethcenturies,
increased
attentionwas
givento geography, focusingon population
andresource
distribution,
the
strategic
locationof states,
andtheforwardprojectionof nationalpower.
Because
geopolitics
hasasits focalpointnationalpowerandthecontrolof ter-
ritory,those
politicalentities
mostableto project
theircapabilities
overgreater
distances
wouldconstitute
thedominant
Industrial
Agepowers.
According
to
numerouswritersincluding,
forexample,KennethBoulding
andsubsequentl
PatrickOSullivanthere
is an inverse
relationship
between
poweranddis-
tancefromits corearea.25
In OSullivans
words,Most of theconictshave
arisen
inthecrush
zone
between
thegreat
powers.
Theforce
fields
ofthehege-
monies
maybethoughtof asextending
outfromtheircores,
overwhelming
smallernationswith theirpower,surrounding
thespheres
of inuenceof lesser
powers
andlapping
against
each
otherattheedges.25
Tobesure,theimpact
oftechnology
hasbeenofsuchimportance
thatthepolitical
signicance
ofge-
ographyhasbeen
altered,
although
noteliminated.
Totheextentthatweapons
ofmass destruction
canbelaunchedtostrikeatarget
anywhereonearth,
the
distinction
between
greater
poweratitscorecompared
withtheperiphery
has
lostsomeof its previous signicance.However, thecapabilitiesavailableto
politicalentities
arenumerous,withsome moreeasily moveable thanothers.In
anerabefore theairplaneandthemissile, whenmilitarycapabilitiesweremost
easilytransported bysea,thepoliticalunitmostableto master seapowerbe-
came thedominant state.
At anabstractlevel,therelationshipbetweengeogra-
phyandpower-geopoliticsresides in theability,atanytime,of onestateor
another to movepowerto inuence orcontroldesired territorydeemedto beof
strategic
importance.
In thegeopolinomic
or geoeconomic
world,therelation-
shipbetween
geography
andpowerisfoundin theabilityto movegoods,
ser-
vices,andinformationmostefcientlyandrapidlyfromonepointto another.
For the most part, thosewriters concernedwith the environmenthave
tendedto stressthe importance
of suchfactorsfor politicalbehavior.
158 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING
CONTEXT:CONSTRUCTIING
REALITY

Environment
not onlylimitshumanconduct,but alsoprovidesopportunities.
Of particular
importance
areclimatic
andgeographical
factors.
Uneven
distri-
bution of resourcesand differencesin geographicaland climatic endowments
shapethepotential powerof a state.Thesizeof thecountryinuences
the
availability
of indigenous
naturalresources,andtheclimate
affectsthemobi-
lization of humanresourcesnecessary
for exploiting thosenatural resources.
Variations
in thosefactorsmayhavecruciallyimportantimplications
for the
structure
of politicalsystems,
eveninuencing
theircapacity
for survival
un-
der stress.
If politicalbehavior
is affected
by environment,
individuals
havesome
capacityfor choice,evenwithin theconstraints
furnishedby environingcir-
cumstances. Of particularimportanceto writers suchas Alfred Thayer
Mahan(1840-1914),
anAmerican
navalofcerandhistorian;
SirHalford
Mackinder(18611947),a Britishgeographer;
GiulioDouhet,anItalianad-
vocate
of airpower;andHaroldandMargaret
Sproutistheimpactof tech-
nological
changeon ourenvironment.
Technology,
it is suggested,
doesnot
renderenvironmental
factorsunimportantor obsolete.Rather,it replaces
onesetof environmentalfactorswith still anotherset.Mahan sawnaval ca-
pabilities
asthekeyto nationalpower;Mackinder considered thetechnol-
ogyof landtransportation
ascrucial;Douhetfocused onthetechnology of
air powerasit wasalteringtheconduct of warfareearlierin thetwentieth
century byextending
ourcapacityfor projecting
powerfarbeyond historical
connes.Theadventof thetechnologies
of thelatetwentiethcenturyfor the
extensionof control both on the earthssurfaceand in inner and outer space
hasenhanced
the interestof scholarsandpolicymakers
in geopoliticaland
geopolinomic
relationships.
Thus,for example,
in an ageof ballisticmis-
siles,analystsengaging
in theconstantcalculusof deterrence
considersuch
geographic
factorsasa countrys
sizeandpopulation
distribution,
together
with weapondeployments
on landor sea,asrelevantto targetingstrategies.
In theageof theinformationhighway,theabilityto receive,
transport,
and
processvastamounts of datato achieve
information dominanceissaidto
representthe key to power.
Weturn nowto thewritingsof representativegeopolitical
theoristsfrom
theUnitedStates
andEurope.AmongtheAmericans, wefocusonMahanand
theSproutsandsubsequent, morerecentwritingsonpoliticalgeography, with
an emphasison the relationship
betweenterritorialboundariesandconict
and the efforts to dene and describethe postCold War geopoliticaland
geopolinomic
environment. Mahanconcentrated
on the impactof naval
poweronnational
politicalpotential.
TheSprouts
probedtheimplications
of
a broadrangeof environmentalfactorsfor politicalbehavior.
In additionto
Mahanand the Sprouts,a list of the mosteminentAmericanstudentsof
geopolitical
relationships
includes
suchdiverseearliertwentieth-centurywrit-
ers as IsaiahBowman,JamesFairgreave,C. W. Hayes,RichardHartshorne,
Stephen
B.Jones,
George
F.Kennan,
OwenLattimore,
HomerLea,General
William(Billy) Mitchell,EllenChurchillSemple,
Alexander
P.deSeversky,
 MAHAN, THE SEAS,AND NATIONALPOWER 159

Nicholas
J. Spykman,
RobertStrauszHupé,
Frederick
Jackson
Turner,
Hans
A.Weigert,
KarlA.Wittfogel,
Derwent
Whittlesey,
andQuincy
Wright.

MAHAN, THE SEAS,AND NATIONALPOWER

AlfredThayer
Mahanwroteduringtheperiodof thelastgreatwaveof
European
imperial
expansion
andtheriseoftheUnited
States
tothestatus
ofa
worldpower.
Hisideas
greatly
inuenced TheodoreRoosevelt
who,rstas
Assistant
Secretary
oftheNavyandlaterasPresident,
contributed
decisively
to
theriseof theUnitedStates
asa leading
navalpower.
Mahans
analysis
ofmar-
itimehistory,
particularly
thegrowthof Britishglobalinuence,
ledhimto
conclude
thatcontrolof theseas,
andespecially
of strategically
importantnar-
rowwaterways,
wascrucial to great
power status.23
Mahan based histheory
ontheobservation
thattheriseoftheBritish
Empireandthedevelopment of
Britain
asa navalpower hadoccurredsimultaneously.
Theworlds principal
searoutes
hadbecome theempires internal
communications
links.Exceptfor
thePanama Canal,Britain
controlled
alloftheworlds
majorwaterways and
narrowseas
or choke
points,those
bodies
of waterto whichaccess,
or passage
through,
couldberestricted
relatively
easily
fromeithershore:
Dover,
Gibraltar,
Malta,
Alexandria,
theCape
ofGoodHope,theStraitofMalacca
at
Singapore,
theSuez
Canal,
andtheentrance
totheSt.Lawrence
River.
Theocean
commerce
of Northern
Europe
passed
eitherthrough
thenar-
row Straitof Dover,
underBritishguns,or around
thenorthern
tip of
Scotland,
where
theBritish
navymaintained
constant
vigil.Britain
andthe
United
States
enjoyed
greateraccess
to theoceans
thandidGermany and
Russia.
Movement
byseawaseasier
thanoverland,andthelandmasses
were
surrounded
byoceans.
States
withready
access
to theoceans
hadgreater
po-
tential
formajor
powerstatus
thanstates
thatwere
landlocked.
Islands
hadan
advantage
overstates
sharing
landboundaries
withotherstates.
Maritime
states
formed
alliances
moreforpurposes
of commerce
thanof aggression.
InMahans
analysis,
seapower
wascrucial
tonational
strength
andpros-
perity.
Thecapacity
ofastate
toachieve
such
status
wasdependent
onitsgeo-
graphic
position,
landconguration,
extentofterritory,
population,
nationa
character,
andformof government.
Forexample,nationssuchasBritainor
Japan,
isolated
bywater,mustmaintain
large
navalforcesif theyaretobe
great
powers,because
fornations
withlong
coastlines,
theseaisafrontier
and
theirposition
relative
to otherstates
isafunction
oftheircapacity
tooperate
beyond thatfrontier.
Geographical position
contributed
to Britains
power-
withsufcient
proximitytocontinental
Europe
tostrike
potential
enemies
and
adequate
distance
fromcontinental
Europe
tobereasonably
safe
frominva-
sion.Byfocusing
seapower in theNortheastern
Atlantic
andtheEnglis
Channel,
Britain
couldcontrol
theworldcommerceofEuropean
powersbe-
cause
therewerenorivalsto Britishseapoweruntiltheriseafter1890.o
German,
Japanese,
andU.S.navalforces.
160 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

Suchan option wasnot opento France,whosepowerhadto bedividedto

protectits easternfrontierandits Mediterranean
andAtlanticcoastlines.
In
Mahansanalysis,the length of the coastlineand the quality of the harbors
wereimportant factors,althoughan abundanceof territory may constitutea
sourceof weaknessif the land doesnot haveadequatelevelsof population
and natural resources.Mahan held that the size and character of population
and an aptitudefor commercialpursuits,particularly thoseof international
trade, indicateda capacityin a nation to becomea major power.A nation
with a largeportionof its populationskilledin maritimepursuits,especially
shipbuildingand trade,had the potentialto becomea greatmaritimestate.In
sum,Mahancorrelatednationalpowerand mobility overthe seas,because at
the time he wrote, transportationover land was primitive in contrastto the
relativefacility of movementoverthe frictionlessoceans.

Building on the Work of Mahan

Otherwriters haveviewedseapoweras an essentialpart of powerprojection.
Sincethe sixteenthcentury,navieshavebeencritically important both in pre-
servingthe homebaseof the navalpowerfrom attackandin safeguarding
friendlycommunications andcommercialroutes,while denyingenemiesaccess
to the seas.Building on Mahanswork, GeorgeModelski and William R.
Thompson,
tracingthe relationship
betweenseapowerand globalpolitics,
concludedthat seapower hasrepresented
the sinequa non for global opera-
tions.29
Leading navalpowersnotonlyprotectsealinesof communication, but
alsoplaya criticalpart in preserving
thestatusquoestablished asa resultof
previouswars.Naviesrepresent a necessary,
but not sufcient,conditionfor
globalpowerstatus.Theyconferintercontinental mobility,givingtheirposses-
sorsthe means,asthe United Statesdemonstrated in the CubanMissileCrisis
of 1962,to block the forcesof a challenger.
Althoughland forceswereindis-
pensable to the ultimatedefeatandoccupation of an opponent, asin World
WarII, it wasnavalpowerthatlinkedthevarioustheaters of operation bycon-
ferringindispensable mobilityontheleadingpossessorsof suchcapabilities.
ModelskiandThompson go sofar asto suggest
that seapowerhasbeen
anessential partof worldpoliticssince1500,directlyrelatedto thelong-cycle
approach. It wasat thebeginning of thesixteenth
centurythattheglobalsys-
tem wastransformedinto an oceanicsystem,as a resultof navaltechnologies
linking previouslyisolatedcontinents
and openingthe world for Europeanim-
perialexpansion
andcolonization.
Successively,
Portugalin thesixteenth
cen-
tury,theNetherlands
in theseventeenth
century,the UnitedKingdomin the
eighteenth
andnineteenth centuries,
andthe UnitedStatesin the twentieth
centurybecamemajor powersbasedon their ability to masterthe navalinno-
vationsof the eraandto contributedecisivelyto maintaininginternationalor-
der.Eachlongcyclelastedapproximately
100yearsandwasidentifiedwith a
statehavingvastmaritimecapabilities.As notedinChapter3, the long cycle,
represented
by the work of Modelski,Thompson,and othercontributors,
holds that over time, the world systemdisplaysregularitiesthat are both
 MAHAN, THE SEAS,AND NATIONALPOWER 161

repetitive
andevolutionary.
Thisincludes
globalpowersandglobalwars.Such
conicts have had a crucially important naval dimensionbecausemaritime
poweris indispensable
to intercontinental
interaction.
Thetechnological
inno-
vationthat hasmarkedevolutiontowardgreatercomplexity
duringeachsuc-
ceedinglongcyclehasbeenassociated with seapower.Longcyclesaredis-
cussedfurther in Chapter7.

Mackinder and the Heartland

LikeMahan,SirHalfordMackindersawanintimaterelationship
between
ge-
ographyand technology.If the technologyof the earliererahad enhancedthe
mobilityof seapoweroverlandpower,thetechnology
of theearlytwentieth
centurygaveto land power the dominantposition.The railroad, and subse-
quently the internal combustionengineand the constructionof a modern
highwayandroadnetwork,madepossible rapidtransportation
withinmuch
of thelandmassof Eurasia.
Until then,theinnerregionsof Eurasiahadbeen
landlocked.Mackindernotedthat Eurasiasriver systemsdrain into none of
the major seasof the world. The Arctic freezesmuch of the northern Eurasian
coast.Nonetheless,
with the adventof the railroad, the Middle Eastwas be-
comingasaccessibleto Germany by landin theearlytwentiethcenturyasit
hadbeento Britainby seain previouscenturies.
AlthoughBritain,asa small
island,waswhatMackindertermedthe legatee of a depreciating
estate,the
major Eurasianpowerssat astridethe greatestcombinationof human and
naturalresources.
Mackindersawthe strugglebetween
landpowerandsea
power as a unifying themeof history.The first cyclein the evolutionof sea
power was completedin the closingof the Mediterranean Seaby the
Macedonians.In the next cyclein the evolutionof seapower,Mackinder
notedthat Rome,a landpower,haddefeated maritimeCarthage, andonce
againtheMediterraneanhadbecome a closedsea. In boththesecyclesin the
ancienterathe MacedonianGreekand the Roman-Carthaginian-aland
powerhad successfully
challengeda seapower.Technology,oncefavorableto
seapower,wassaidto be tipping the advantagein the earlytwentiethcentury
to land power.
First, in a famouspaper read beforethe Royal GeographicSocietyof
London in 1904, and later,just after World War I, in his book Democratic
ldealsandReality,
Mackinder
suggested
thatthepivotareaof international
politicswasthat vastexpanse
of territorystretching
from theEastEuropean
and Siberianplains:
As we considerthis rapid reviewof the broadercurrentsof history,doesnot a cer-
tain persistence
of geographical relationshipbecomeevident?Is not the pivot re-
gion of the worlds politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessibleto
ships,but in antiquitylay opento the horse-ridingnomads,andis todayaboutto
be covered with a network of railroads?

This area3 which coincidedwith the czarist RussianEmPire, occu Pies the
central strategicalposition and possessesincalculably great resources.
(Thispivot areaMackindercalledthe Heartland.) The region,he suggested,
162 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

wassurroundedby the inner crescent,which includessuchcountrieson the

peripheryof Eurasiaas Germany, Turkey,India,and China.This regionin
turn is surrounded
by the outercrescent,
whichincludessuchcountriesas
Britain, South Africa, and Japan.
Mackinder formulated the famous dictum:

Who rulesEastEuropecommandsthe Heartland

Who rules the Heartland commandsthe World Island Eurasia
Who rulesthe World IslandcommandstheWorld.
Mackinderfearedthe riseof Germanyandlaterthe SovietUnionasmighty
landstatescapableof becoming
greatnavalpowers.Whileemphasizing the
growingimportanceof landpower,Mackinder
didnotdeprecate
theroleof sea
power.Seapowerwasasvitalto worldpowerasit hadeverbeen.In thetwen-
tieth century,the statecontrollingthe heartlandcould becomea leadingsea
powerin thesamewayasMacedonia andRome,althoughprimarilylandpow-
ers,hadeventually
gainedcontrolof theseas.
In fact,Mackinder
correctlyfore-
sawinternationalpoliticsin therst half of thetwentiethcenturyasbeingprin-
cipallyastruggle
between Germany andRussiafor controlof theheartland and
adjacentareasontheEurasian landmass.Whathedid not foresee, of course,
wasthecollapse of the SovietUnion,basedon its inabilityto link politically
that vastregionbetweenCentralEastern
Europe,includingpart of Germany,
in. a politicalframeworkcapableof exertingcompellingpressure
from the
Eurasianheartlandinto andbeyondtherimlands.Theorganizationalandideo-
logicalfailuresof communism
provedto havea greaterimpactonworldpower
than the heartland resourcebaseabout which Mackinder had written.
Without necessarilyreferringto Mackinder or statingtheir assumptions
as explicitly,Americanpolicymakershavehad as a principal objectiveto pre-
ventthe dominationof the Eurasianland massby a hostilepowerhence, the
Americanirfterestin allianceswith WesternEurope,Japan,and the Republic
of Koreaandin securitycommitments elsewhereon therimlandsof Eurasia,
includingtheMiddleEast.Fromthisconception derivedAmerican diplomacy,
especiallyevidentin the NixonKissinger
foreignpolicyof the 1970sandin
subsequentadministrationsduring the Cold War,to strengthenlinks between
the UnitedStatesand the Peoples
Republicof Chinaand thusto helpprevent
a reconciliation
betweenthetwo largestlandpowersof EurasiaChinaand
the SovietUnion.With the endof the ColdWar,the UnitedStatesand-its
Europeanalliesmovedto updateandexpandNATO to includenewmembers,
while makingan effort to bring Russiaand other statesof the former Soviet
Union into closer association with NATO and other EuroAtlantic institu-
tions. In the AsiaPacicarea,after the Cold War the United Statescontinued
to Viewits securitylinks with Japanand SouthKoreaas indispensable to the
regionalsecuritysetting,while at the sametime attemptingto createa strate-
gic partnershipwith China.All of theseefforts are compatiblewith
Mackinders thesis.
During World War II, Mackinder revisedhis theory to include in an
Atlantic community a meansof balancingor offsettingthe aggregationof
 MAHAN, THE SEAS, AND NATIONAL POWER 163

power in Eurasia.Although he accuratelyforesaw that the Soviet Union

would emergefrom World War II as the greatestland power on the globe
and in the strategically strongest defensive position, the nations of the
North Atlantic basinwould form a counterpoise,
which in fact occurredwith
the formation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 as East-Westtensions deepened
in the earlypost-WorldWarII period. Accordingto Mackinder,
together,
Britain, France,and the United Statescould providepower adequateto pre-
vent a resurgenceof Germanaggressionand to balancethe SovietUnion.
Other writers, such as Nicholas J. Spykman and StephenB. Jones, suggested
that the rimland of Eurasiamight provestrategicallymoreimportantthan the
heartland if new centers of industrial power and communications were cre-
atedalongthe circumference of the Eurasianland mass.The rimlandhypothe-
sis was a centraltheoreticalfoundationof the policy for containmentof the
SovietUnion, beginningwith the TrumanDoctrineand the MarshallPlan in
1947,duringtheColdWar,andextending
into the1990s.34
The advent of the airplane, and subsequentlythe meansto penetrateouter
space,provideda whole new dimensionto geopolitics.Onceagain,technol-
ogy had the effectof alteringthe significanceof specicgeopoliticalrelations.
Just as Mahan and Mackinder had basedtheir geopoliticaltheories.onan
analysisof the implications,respectively,of technologiesfacilitating move-
ment over the seasand the land, Giulio Douhet, writing in the 1920s, saw the
airplaneas conferringunprecedentedpossibilitiesfor the conductof warfare
againsttargetspreviouslyinvulnerableto attack and destruction.As long as
human activities were restricted to the earths surface, they were subject to
constraintsimposedby the terrain.Althoughthe seasareuniform in character,
humanmobility via the oceansis limited by virtue of the coastlinesthat sur-
round them. No suchimpedimentsto mobility exist in the air. Writing with
greatforesightin 1921,Douhetconcluded,
The airplanehascompletefreedomof actionand direction;it cany to and from
any point of the compassin the shortesttimea straight lineby any route
deemedexpedient.. . . Byvirtueof this newweapon,therepercussions of war are
no longerlimited by the farthestartilleryrangeof surfaceguns,but canbedirectly
felt for hundreds and hundreds of miles over all the lands and seasof nations at
war. . . . Therewill benodistinction
anylongerbetween
soldiers
andcivilians.35
It followedthat the warsof the future would differ radicallyfrom thoseof the
past,and that control of the air would conferon statesunprecedented mobil-
ity of power and the capacityto inict devastationon an adversarys military
forces and industry.
Writing duringWorld War II, and buildingon the writings of Douhetand.
the ideasof U.S. GeneralBilly Mitchell, Alexanderde Severskyemphasized
theimplications
of advances
in technology
for rapidincreases
in therangeof
aircraft. This would renderunnecessary
the aircraft carrier,he predicted,be-
causeplanescould operatefrom land basesto attack targetsin the enemys
homeland.Thus,the unprecedented mobility conferredby technologyfor hu-
man,-operated
ight, notedby Douhet,wasgivenevengreateremphasis
by de
164 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING
CONTEXT:CONSTRUCTING
REALITY

Seversky.Air powermadepossible notonlygreater mobility,butalsofreed

peopleto anunprecedented extentfromdependence onanextensive ground
organization,includingbasesfor refueling,
astherangeof aircraft,andthus
theiroperating radius,grew.Controlof space above theearthssurface
be-
came vitallyimportantfortheprojectionof militarypoweranddefense of the
homeland.
Thesuperpowerstatus
of theUnitedStates
ismeasuredto asubstantial
ex-
tentbyitsaerospace
capabilities.
Theseencompass notonlytechnologically
ad-
vancedaircraftasin theNATO airstrikesagainstSerbiain 1999,but alsoin the
abilityto place
commercial
satellites
intoorbitandto launch
otherspace
probes
aswell.Thetermaerospace
represents
anenvironment
in whichair andthevast
expanse
comprising
space
thatliesbeyond
theearths
atmosphere
andgravita-
tionaleldscannotbeviewedasseparate entities.Instead,
asGeneral
Thomas
A. White,Air ForceChiefof Staff,described
it in 1958:Air andSpace
arenot
twoseparate mediato bedividedbya lineandto bereadilyseparatedintotwo
distinct
categories;
theyareintruthasingle
indivisible
eldofoperations.37
Whitewenton to describe spaceas a logicalextensionof airpower.
Thathasbeenimplicitin theincreasing
range,greaterspeed,
andhigheralti-
tude of aircraft that havebeencentralto the history of air power,sincethe
rst ightsof theWrightbrothers.
Givenits criticalimplications
for global
communicationsand national security,aerospace
activity is one dimensionin
whichpost-Soviet
Russia,with its Mir spacestation,hassoughtto remain
fully competitivewith the UnitedStates.

THE SPROUTSAND HUMAN-MILIEU RELATIONSHIPS

HaroldSprout(1901-1980) andMargaretSprout(1903)madea majorcon-
tributionto thedevelopmentof hypothesesfor examiningenvironing relation-
ships.TheSprouts emphasizedtheimportance of geography
in examining po-
litical behavior,contending
that most,if not all, humanactivityis affected
bytheuneven
distribution
of human
andnonhuman
resources.
TheSprouts
rejectedunidimensional,
geopoliticaltheoriesin favor of an ecological
per-
spectivebecause
it appeared
to providea moreintegrated, holisticviewof the
internationalenvironment,which took accountof its physicaland nonphysi-
cal featuresand is bestencompassedby the term milieu.The milieuwas
viewedasa multidimensionalsystem,
in whichtheperceptionsheldby politi-
cal leadersof environmentalconditions(thepsychomilieu),andthe conditions
themselves,weretheobjectsof studyandanalysis.
Suchresearch
emphasized
the interrelationship
of geography,demography,technology,
and resources,
andit focusedontheimportance of perceptual
variables,
andquantitative
fac-
torssuchaspopulationandterritorialsize.
The milieu is said to affect human activities in only two respects.First,
throughthepsychomilieu,
it caninuencehumandecisions
onlyif humanbe-
ingsperceive
factorsrelatedto themilieu.Second,
throughtheoperational
milieu,suchfactorscanlimit individualperformance
or theoutcomeof deci-
 THE SPROUTS AND HUMAN-MILIEU RELATIONSHIPS 165

sions,basedon perceptions
of theenvironment.
Thus,decisions
maybe
taken on the basisof erroneousperceptionsof the environment,with poten-
tially disastrousconsequences.The task confronting the decisionmaker,
thereforeto link the Sprouts analysis to decision-making theories consid-
ered in Chapter 11is to narrow the gap between the perceived and the real
environment.
The Sprouts regarded geography as concerned with the arrangement of
things on the faceof the earth, and with the associationof things that give
character to particular places. They believed that geography affected all hu-
man and nonhuman,tangibleand intangiblephenomenathat exhibit areal
dimensions
andvariationsuponor in relationto theearthssurface.41
Every
political communityhasa geographicalbase.Eachpolitical communityis set
on a territory that is a uniquecombinationof location,size,shape,climate,
and natural resources.Thus, transactionsamongnationsmust entail signi-
cant, even crucial, geographical considerations. The Sprouts noted that inter-
nationalstatecraftexhibitsin all periodsmore or lessdiscerniblepatternsof
coercionand submission,inuenceand deference; patternsreectedin politi-
caltermswith stronggeographic
connotations.42

Cognitive Behavioralism and the Operational Milieu

Importantto the Sproutsis the conceptof cognitivebehavioralism.
This con-
ceptassumes that a personconsciously
respondsto the milieuthroughpercep-
tion andin no otherway.43Erroneous
ideasaboutthemilieumaybejustas
influentialas accurateideasin forming moods,preferences,
decisions,and ac-
tions.The Sproutsproceedto distinguishbetweenthe environmentasthe ob-
serverperceivesit and the environment as it actually exists. The so-calledpsy-
chomilieumay be comparedto Platosshadowsin the caveimagesor ideas
which the individual derivesfrom interactionbetweenwhat he selectivelyre-
ceivesfrom his milieu, by meansof his sensoryapparatus,and his schemeof
values,conscious
memories,
andsubconsciously
storedexperience.44
Failure
to perceivethe limiting conditionmayresultin severeconsequences.
Inflatedil-
lusionsabout and misinterpretationsof geographiccircumstances may have
similarunfortunate
effects.45
Popularattitudesanddecisions
of stateleaders
are basedon geographicalconceptionsthat dependin no smalldegreeupon
Sthekindsof mapsto whichtheyareaccustomed,asis notedin greaterdetailin
a later sectionof this chapter.Therefore,an analysisof political behaviormust
takeaccountof assumptions that politicalleadersmakeabouttheir milieu.
The decisionalentity, actingwithin the operationalmilieu and having a
. psychomilieu,is an environedorganism(an individualor a population)
ratherthananabstraction
(thestate).Thisdecisional
entityis a principalcon-
cernof the socialscientistand a particularinterestof the studentof interna-
Vtional relationsand of decisionmaking, as noted in Chapter11. Thus, the
7.
Sprouts
objectto terminology
suchasthestatesmotivationandthestates
needs. They do not applypsyc/aoecological
(relatingto the psychologicalre-
lation between
organism
andenvironment)
concepts
to socialorganization
for
166 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT. CONSTRUCTING REALITY

muchthe samereasonthat theyrejectgivinghumanattributesto the national

or international
system. Theyattributetheseconcepts onlyto humanbeings.
Theybelieve thatpoliticaldiscussionon suchanabstractlevelmuddies rather
thanclariesanunderstanding of theworkingsof internationalpolitics."
Althoughdecisions arebased on theperceptionsof themilieu,theresults
of thesedecisionsare limited by the objectivenature of the operationalmi-
lieuthat is to say, by the situation as it actually exists and affectsthe
achievements and capabilitiesof the entity in question(whethera singleindi-
vidual,group,or communityasa whole).48 In short,theoperational
milieu
exists,eventhoughit maynot befully discernible
bythedecision
maker.Sofar
asdecisionmakingis concerned,theSproutsdo not seethemilieuasinevitably
conditioning,
drawing,or compelling
thepolicymaker
anddictatingchoices.
In their studyof environmentalrelationships,the Sproutsdrewfour major
conclusions.First, the ecologicalperspective
and frameof referenceprovidea
fruitful approachto the analysisof foreignpolicyand the estimationof a
statescapabilities.
Second, it is helpfulto distinguish
analytically
between
the
relation of environmentalfactorsto policy decisionsand their relation to the
operational
resultsof decisions.
In theSprouts
judgment,
muchof theconfu-
sion cloudingthe discussionof environmentalfactorsin internationalpolitics
stemsfrom the failure to makethis distinctionexplicit. Third, the ecological
approach
is a usefulcomplement
to thestudyof boththeforeignpolicyand
the internationalcapabilitiesof states.The Sproutsparadigmentailsthe ex-
aminationof suchlimiting conditionsasthe levelof availabletechnology,the
cognitionof essentialfactors,and the ratio of availableresourcesto commit-
ments.49
Finally,theyseetheecological
approach
asbroadening
thestudyof
internationalpolitics by integratinginto it relevanttheoriesand datafrom ge-
ography,psychology,sociology,and other systemsof learning.

Constructivism and Cognitive Evolution

From the discussionof the social-milieu that wascentralto the Sproutswork
and the emphasisplacedby variousother writers on environingfactorsshap-
ing agentsbehaviors,we turn now to constructivism,or what hasalso been
calledconstructivist-reectivist
approaches. Here,the principalfocusis the as-
sumptionthat our understandingof the world, and the intellectualtools used
for viewingthat world, arenot objectivelyderivedbut insteadarethe resultof
sociallyconstructedconcepts.In a way,the proponentsof this approachsug-
gestthat the world is in the eyeof the beholder and then proceedto ask
wherethoseinterpretationsof the world comefrom and how they inuence
the behaviorof individualand stateactors.
According to AlexanderWendt, constructivismis a structural theory
basedon the assumptionthat actorsaresociallyconstructed.What cameto be
defined as state or national interests was the result of the social identities of
the actors. Such interests and identities are in more or less constant ux in
what aretermedintersubjectiz/e
systemicstructures,consistingof what Wendt
termssharedunderstandings,
expectations,
andsocialknowledge.Similarly,
 THE SPROUTSAND HUMAN-MILIEURELATIONSHIPS 167

NicholasGreenwood
Onufmaintainsthat socialrealityis whatpeoplecon-
struct or constituteas socialreality. Thoseactivitiesthat are deemedto be
the most important to the interests of the members of a social unit such as a
stateare by denition political in nature.Whensuchactivitiesextendbeyond
the immediate locale or boundaries of the unit, they becomeinternational re-
lations. Accordingto Onuf, the terms constructand constituteare synony-
mousin the theoreticalsensethat peopleand societyconstruct,or constitute,
eachother.Thus,thereis an interactiveprocessin which peopleconstitutinga
group or a unit continuously construct in their individual and collective mind
the reality that forms the basisfor and is shaped by the decisionsmade.
A reectivistcomponentof this approacharisesfrom the assumptionthat
institutionsemergeas a resultof a deliberativeprocessthat, in turn, shapesthe
social milieu. The initiatives that develop are reective of values, norms, and
practices that, according to Robert Keohane, differ from one culture to an-
otherandthatmayundergochange
fromoneerato another.52
Changing
atti-
tudes toward slavery and racial and other forms of discrimination are illustra-
tive of the reectivistphenomenato which proponentsof this approachpoint.
What was deemedto be sociallyacceptableat the beginningof the twentieth
centuryis not acceptablein the early twentyfirstcentury.How suchchanges
comeabout and how they are embeddedor reectedin insti nge,
bothat thenation_a
_an___d1nternational
levels,is theessence
of constructivist-
reé?:"t1v1st,t y. T
o the constructivist-re c ivist re imes and other institutions m r
rising outof sharedneed,knowledge,
and inteTé&#39;sTas§i1g&#39;g¬c1in_tl1_e&#39;Eonstructivist-reectivi
literature,existing
institutional arrangementsthemselves
may contribute to a learningprocess
that enhances
theprospects
for convergent
statepolicies.Stateddifferently,
regimes,and institutionshavinggreaterauthority and structurethan regimes,
may enhancecognitive evolution.
Accordingto EmanuelAdler,thereis a dynamicrelationshipbetweenhis-
torical and structuralforcesthat helpsexplainthe natureof change.54
At any
moment in history, states and those actors composing states are affected by
their respectiveinterpretationsof the world that arethe resultof sociallycon-
structed concepts.Just as scienceprogressesby means of paradigmatic devel-
opmentone construct being replaced by another as knowledge evolves-
socialprocesses
areembedded
in regimesand institutionsthat produceamong
relevant actors what is termed intersubjectiz/econsensus.In a fashion analo-
gousto scienticrevolution,theremaybedramaticor evolutionarychangesin
shared beliefs about political practice, acceptablesocial behavior, and values
basedon what Adler termscognitiveevolution.Because our ideas,beliefs,and
behaviorare learnedfrom other people,the sourceof collectivelearninglies
in the ability of groupsto transmitto eachother the productsof their respec-
tive cognitive experiences.There is a dynamic processin which cognitive evo-
lution is aggregated
at the nationalleveland morebroadlywithin the interna-
tional system.Learning, in this sense,is defined as the ability of policymakers
to adopt new interpretations of realityto create a novel intersubjective
168 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

consensusthatare introducedinto the political systemfirst at the national

level and subsequentlyat the international level. It follows that, as the
Sproutsmaintained,the environmentdoesnot instruct policymakersor de-
terminetheir optionsany morethan scientic knowledgeitself is the basisfor
internationalbehavior.Instead,Adler suggests,commonpolitical action re-
sults from the extent to which a particular set of premisesis sharedwithin
and amonginstitutions,nation states,and other groups.Contrastedwith sta-
tic theoriesof internationalrelations,cognitiveevolutionrepresentsa process
of innovationand political selectionthat hasthe effectof channelingaction
in novel directions.
Cognitiveevolutionhas essentiallythree dimensions:(1) innovation,the
creationof new valuesand expectationsthat are acceptedby a group; (2) se-
lection,the extentto which valuesand expectationsbecomeembeddedin the
mindsof the group;and (3) diffusion,the degreeto which newvaluesand ex-
pectationsspreadfrom onegroup or stateto another.In the processthat con-
stitutescognitiveevolution, epistemiccommunities,dened as eliteswith a
sharedunderstanding of a particularsubjectwho developa strategyfor
achieving
theirgoals,playa majorinnovativerole.55In theselectionprocess
justdescribed,
statesareof majorimportance,whereas in thediffusionphase,
cognitiveevolutionis advancedat the internationallevelby regimesand other
institutionalstructuresreectiveof an evolvingintersubjectiveconsensus
that
shapesthe globalsocialmilieu.
Suchanintersubjective
consen_sus
shapesthe_identity
of stateswithinthe
internationalsystemandwithin whatHedleyBull andothermembers of the
EnglishSchoolof InternationalRelationsterm internationalsociety,dis-
cussedin Chapter3. As Tim Dunnesuggests, the two centralrules of inter-
national society,sovereigntyand nonintervention,are constitutive of the
societyof states,in otherwords,it is sustained
by thereproduction
of these
practices.5
Theinternational
society
is based
onintersubjective
structures
thatthemselves
aretheresultof ideasor beliefsthat producebehaviorbased
on commonlyacceptedrulesandvaluesembodied in institutionsandprac-
tices.In other words, the English Schoolof International Relationsshares
with realist/neorealist
theoriststheimportanceof anarchy, war,andbalance
of power,but onlyasideasthat shapepoliticalpractice,ratherthanaslaws
of natureor unchangingphenomena deeplyembedded in thestructureof the
internationalsystem.Accordingto the constructivist,and embodiedin the
EnglishSchool,howpolicymakers, diplomats,andbroaderpublicsconstruct
internationalsociety?To what extent,for example,do theyemphasizena-
tionalinterest,andhowdotheydeneandinterpretnationalinterestin rela-
tion to thebroadersocietyof nations?Cantheanarchical societydescribed
by writers such as Hedley Bull be transformed?The constructivistanswer
liesin thenatureof theintersubjective
consensus
reectedin theintersubjec-
tive structuresof the internationalsystem,notably the extentto which stan-
dardsor normsof conductchangenewrulesandvaluesemerge-inother
words,how andwhy onesociallyconstructed
internationalsocietyis trans-
formed into another.
 THESPROUTS
ANDHUMAN-MILIEU
RELATIONSHIPS 169

Constructivism
andFeministInternationalRelationsTheory
Illustrative
of theconstructivist
phenomenon
to whichproponents
of thisap-
proachpoint is the changingrole and statusof womenin manysocieties.
Becausethereis an importantconstructivist
component,aswe shallsee,we
turn nowto a discussion
of recentfeministtheories.
Amongthemajortopics
for contemporary
debate
is theextentto whichgender,
asSandra
Harding
putsit, is a systematic socialconstructionof masculinityandfemininitythat
is little, if at all, constrainedby biology.57Althoughfeminismis a diverse
bodyof thoughtextending far beyondinternational relations,agreement ex-
istsamongfeminists thattherolesassumed, respectively,
by menandwomen,
whetherin domesticor international society,aresocially-
constructed rather
thanbiologicallydetermined. Accordingto Elisabeth Priigl,the emphasis of
feministthoughtat the beginning of thetwenty-firstcenturyis genderrather
thansexin orderto focusattentionfromthebiologicalto thesocial.58 To
the extentthat genderroleshavebeensociallyconstructed, the linkagebe-
tweenfeministthoughtandconstructivism becomes apparent. For example,
mostif not all societies havehadsomeform of divisionbetween thepublic
andprivatespheres. Whatgoesonin thehomehasbeentreatedlargelyaspri-
vate and beyondthe control of the state.Feministspoint out that men have
traditionallyheldpublicrolesin government,
military,industry,andarts-
while women have assumedroles within the home. Suchrole differentiation is
sociallyconstructed.
The legalprotectionextended
to thoseengaged
in the
public sectorhas far exceeded
that providedto thosewhoseworld is within
thehousehold. Nowheremorethanin international relationshasthegender
differentiation
beenevident.Men servein militaryestablishmentsto defend
thestatewhiletherole of womenhasbeenconnedto managing thehouse-
hold. To be sure,this is a simplicationin an erain which womenservein the
U.S.and other militaries and act as breadwinnersfor manyhouseholds.The
very fact that traditionalrole differentiationbasedon genderhasbroken
down is seenastestimonyto the ideaof genderasa socialconstructionwhich
can be changed.

higQ
ctio xtends omenromequalaccess
far
beyond
the
legal
barrier
tha
to publiclife.In Western
societiessuchbarriersbeganto bebrokendownwith thegrantingof voting
rightsto womenin the earlydecadesof thetwentiethcentury.Beyondtradi-
tionallegalconstraints,
andagainin keeping
withconstructivist
thought,
the
sourcesof discrimination,feministwriters generallyagree,are embeddedin
economic, cultural,andsocialstructures.
Thus,according to J. Ann\Tickner,3
Marxistfeminists contendthatcapitalismliesat theroot of theoppressionof
wo1r1en,=vvhil&#39;es&#39;<&#39;51rIe*Tadical&#39;fem1n1sts
e ievet at gen er re ationslpSestab-
lishedat birth andin the earlyyearsof malefemale relationships
in them-
selvesdiscriminateagainstwomen.59 Theliteratureof international
relations,
includingits theories,hasbeenalmostexclusivelywritten by men.Its theoreti-
calfocus,byandlarge,hasbeenrelationsamongthemostpowerfulactors,or
the Great Powers,and its focus, most notably in realist theories,has been
170 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

power,with emphasison conict andwar. Giventheir own concernaboutop-

pressionand marginalizationbasedon gender,feminist:perspectives on inter-
nationalpolitics derivefrom a gender-driven experiencefundamentallydiffer-
ent from that of a powerful,dominantmaleexperience. Knowledgecannotbe
completeif its developmentdoesnot ow from multiple sourcesof masculine
and feministperspectives on the basicquestions.Feministscontendthat the
entireWesternscientic tradition, having beenessentiallya male-dominated
preservefor centuries,is awed by a pronouncedmasculinebiaswith regard
to methods,researchpriorities,goals,and ndings. Suchperspectives aresub-
stantiallydifferentas a resultof disparatehistoricallyconstructedroles,femi-
nist logic argues,so that existingmale-dominated international-relations
the-
ory is inadequateif not misleading.To quote J. Ann Tickner: Since
knowledgeaboutthe behaviorof statesin the internationalsystemdependson
assumptions that comeout of mensexperiences, it ignoresa largebody of hu-
man experience that hasthe potentialfor increasingthe rangeof optionsand
openingup new ways of thinking about interstatepractices.6°
Because
womenhavetraditionally beenon the fringesof society,accordingto feminist
theory,a view of the world from the perspectiveof the subjugatedcanprovide
a basisfor new ways of thinking about relationsamongstates.In the realist
tradition (seeChapter2), emphasishasbeenplacedon statesurvivalin an an-
archicalsystemof selfhelpasthe essentialbasisfor achievingsecurity.For the
feminist,a redenition of the meaningof securityis necessary. The greatcon-
f_l_icts_Qf
recentdecadeshavebeenlocatedin the worlds poorer regions,and
they haveusuallytakenplacewithin, rather,than_between, states.Oppressed
and disadvantaged groupsseekto overthrowan existingorder.How they act
to do so to achievesecurity,dened in political, social,and economicterms,
represents an important supplement, if not alternative, to realist theories.
Giventhe historic genderexperienceand the questfor their own emancipa-
tion, womencan bring a new sourceof understandingand opena variety of
newwaysof thinking aboutinternationalrelations,leadingultimatelyto new
modes of action, feminists maintain.
Although feministsinsist that genderrolesare socially determinedand
thereforechangeable,.whatcan.besaidab_ou_t__biological
differences? Are such
phenomenaas.aggression,.war,-and-violence more characteristicof malethan
of female behavior? Have men dominated women more as a result of inher-
ited, instinctive,geneticdifferencesthan becauseof sociallyconstructedroles
that can be altered?FrancisFukayamasuggests that, becauseall racesinter-
breed,the boundariesbetweenthemare blurredand,therefore,raceis largely
sociallyconstructed.This is not the casefor obviousreasonsbetweenmenand
womCQ.__I_l1_i_s
leadsEukayama_tocppclude:While somegenderroles are in-
deedsociallyconstructed,
initiallyall reputable
evolutionary
biologists
today
think there are profound differencesbetweenthe sexesthat are genetically
rather than culturally rooted, and that thesedifferencesextendbeyondthe
bodyinto the realmof the mind.61Specically,
this meansthat menas a
whole displayaggressive
tendenciesacrosscultures.Most criminal activity is
committedby youngmenbetweenthe agesof 15 and 30, not by womenin the
 THE SPROUTSAND HUMAN-MILIEURELATIONSHIPS 171

sameagecohort.Because of thecrossculturalnatureof thisphenomenon, it

cannotbeattributed,soit is argued,solelyto a socialization
processbasedon
role differentiation
between malesandfemales. Thusa basicproblemof all
societiesremainsthroughout theageshowto manage, control,or mitigatethe
aggressivetendenciesof its young men.
Tomakethisassertion,
asFukuyama
suggests,
is not to ignoredifferences
amongmenandamongwomen.Somemendisplaypassive tendencies,justas
some women are more aggressivethan some men in their behavior. Some
womenhavecommitted violentcrimes,whilesomemenarepacists.In polit-
ical life many womenhave becomegreat leaders,includingMargaret
Thatcher,GoldaMeir,andIndiraGhandiandin moredistanttimesQueen
ElizabethI of Englandand Catherinethe Greatof Russia.Suchwomencame
to high officeandvastpowerin maledominated
societies.
Theyemployed
strategies,stratagems,and tactics of their male counterpartsto attain and
maintainpower.Contemporaryfeministwriters on internationalpolitics,and
feministwritersasa whole,seeka world in whichmuchlargernumbersof
womenriseto the highestpositionsof authority,leadership,and power.Here
theyconfronta dilemma.To attainandkeepsuchstatus,mustwomenas-
sumethemalequalitiesof toughnessandforcefulbehavior, or is it possible
to
bringsufcientnumbersinto positionsof greatinuencesothat thepolitical
agendacanbetransformed andtherequirements for reachingthepinnacleof
power themselvesare changed?If the differencesbetweenmen and women
are an amalgamof biologicaldifferencesand socialconstruction,thereis an
inevitability in the persistence
of conicts borneof male aggressiveness
tem-
peredby femalepacificism.The debatewill persistabout the boundariesbe-
tweenthe biologicallydeterminedand sociallyconstructedand the extentto
whichwhat is biologicallyestablished
canbe modiedby what is socially
constructed.
Isit possible,
assome
feminist
writerssuggest,
to diminish
thetendencies
displayedby mentowardaggressiveness andviolence?
By andlarge,feminist
writersbelievethat a world in whichwomenruledwouldbemorepeaceful
than the existing maledominatedworld. The dilemma arisesin whether

e«w-u
womencanreplacemenin leadingpositionswithout» adoptingthe~
aggressive
tendencies
attributedto menin orderto riseto thehighestrank:Oncehaving
achieved
suchstatusby malelikeruthlessness,couldwomenin leadership
po-
sitionssimplytransformthemselves
to assumeonceagaintraditional feminist
qualities?More important,would a societyin whichwomenheldhighest
power,basedon a feministagendabe at an inherentdisadvantage if chal-
lengedby a staterun by menpracticingrealpolitikbasedon aggressionyvio-
lence,andwar?Again,to quoteFukuyama: In anythingbut a totallyfemi;
nizedworld,feminized policiescouldbea liability.62MargaretThatcher, as
PrimeMinister of the UnitedKingdom,displayedcharacteristics
of toughness

_
,
attributedby feministwritersto men,ratherthanwhatis expected
of women,
_
whenshetook militaryactionsagainstArgentinaoverthe FalklandIslands
andwhen she urged PresidentBush to act strongly and decisivelyagainst
SaddamHusseinafter his seizureof oil-rich Kuwait in August~1990.
172 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL./ENVIRONINGCONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

If womenasa wholearemorepassivethan menasa whole,it follows that

societiesin which womenhavegreaterinuencewill be lessproneto resortto
war or other forms of engagedviolence.Here we describedemocraciesin
which at leastasmanywomenas menvote and in which increasingnumbers
of womenattain positionsat the pinnacleof power.Thus,it is usefulhereto
pointto anintersection
betweenfeministwritingsanddemocratic
peacethe-
ory,discussed
in Chapter8. Thosestatesthat havedemocratic
formsof gov-
ernment,so the theorysetsforth, generallyrejectwar asa meansof resolving
differences with other democracies and do not easily resort to war even
againstnondemocracies.
A projectionof populationtrendswell into thetwenty-rstcenturyleads
inevitablyto the stark conclusionthat the ratesof growth will be the greatest
in regionsoutsidethe developedworld of North America,Europe,andJapan,
all of which are democraciesthat will experienceaging societies.Of this
group,the situationin the UnitedStateswill bemitigatedperhapsby continu-
ing substantialimmigration,resultingin the inux of largenumbersof
youngerpeople.Womenwill playincreasing rolesin democracies,
whichwill
be confronted with an outside world whose population includes compara-
tively largernumbersof youngermenpreciselythe cohort mostproneto vi-
olenceandaggression. If suchbehavioris gender-determined
andrelatedto in-
herent male characteristics most manifest in young men, the question arises
what, if anything, can be done to modify such patterns.Feministwriters
wpuld attemptover time to do so by socializingmento changegenderroles,
while at the sametime elevatingmorewomento high ofce. This is an un-
likely prospectin manysocieties.In anyevent,we areleft with the questionof
wherethe boundarylies betweenthat which is sociallyconstructed,environ-
mentally inuenced, and biologically determined.What leads men and
women,respectively, to act violently or passively,to be aggressive
or to be ac-
commodating,to becompetitiveor to beconciliatory?

SPATIALRELATIONSHIPSAND CONFLICT:
RECENT WORK
While muchof the contemporaryinternational-relations theory is basedon a
constructivistapproach,the contextdened in spatialrelationshipsis an en-
during part of our theories.Are there certaingeographiccongurations,for
example,
thatareto a greateror lesser
degree
conducive
to conict?
"" Writing in the mid-1970s,GeorgeLiska examinedthe natureof equilib-
rium in theinternationalsystem,with specicreferenceto conict and geopo-
litic&#39;al
factors. He concluded that conict between continental and maritime
stateshas beena recurrentphenomenonin internationalrelations,especially
in the European system:
Thequalitativedisparitybetween
principallyland-based
andsea-oriented
states
proved commonly incapableof assimilationby competitiveor other interac-
 SPATIAL
RELATIONSHIPS
ANDCONFLICT:
RECENT
WORK 173

tions.Theschism
wasconspicuously
manifest
whenever a strong
landpower
staged,andthedominant
maritime
powerresisted
to thepointof vetoing,
a
drivefor seaborne
outreach
thatwouldexpandthescopeof thebalance of
powerandadaptitsfunctioning
to overseas
extensions
of thesystems
continen-
tal core.

In an effortto determine
theimpactof insularstatuson nations,two
otherauthorsRobert Holt andJohnTurner-compared the policiesof
Britain,
SriLanka,
andJapan.Theiranalysis
revealed
thatinsular
polities
havea moreactive
involvement
withothercountries
thannoninsular
poli-
ties.Insularpoliticsaremorelimitedthannoninsular
states
in therangeof
foreignpoliciesavailable
to them.Theseauthorsfoundsimilarities
in thefor-
eignpolicies
of BritainandJapan.
Bothcountries
attempted
to occupy
sec-
tionsof the Eurasianmainland,especially
thoseareasfrom whichinvasions
mightbemounted againstthem.Bothtriedto maintaina balanceof power
among mainlandnations
bysupporting theweakercoalition.
Bothsought al-
liances
with powersoutsidetheregionto strengthen
theirpositionwith re-
spectto more proximate continental national units.
In assessing
the effectof noncontiguity
on theintegration
of political
units,RichardMerrittsstudyof territoriallydiscontiguous
politiesindicated
thatcentrifugal
forces
increased
withdistance.
Notsurprisingly,
especially
beforethe presentinformationage,therewasgreatercommunication
with
neighboring
thanwith physically
distantpeoples.
Thenoncontiguous
polity
depends
ontheexternal
environmentto preserve
communication
linksamong
its physicallyseparated
parts.Daily dependence
on communications
makes
noncontiguous
politiessensitiveto shiftsin the internationalenvironmentthat
affectcommunications.Suchpolitieshavebeenconcerned withtheapplica-
tionof international
lawto internalwaters,
territorialwaters,
highseas,
air
rights,andlandaccess,to citeonlythemodern historyof problemsexperi-
encedby suchstatesas Malaysia,Pakistan(19471974),the UnitedArab
Republic(Egyptand Syria,1958-1962),and the now-defunctWestIndies
Federation.
Thereis extensiverecentliteratureon therelationshipbetweenresource
scarcityandconict.Withinthenexthalfcentury,it is suggested,
increases
in
worldpopulationwill acceleratethedepletionof renewableresources
suchas
water,agricultural
land,forests,andsheries,together,
with nonrenewablere-
sources,includingfossilfuelsand othermineralssuchasbauxiteand iron ore.
According
to Thomas
F.Homer-Dixon,
reductions
in theamount
or qualityof
H7
resources
arereducing
theoverall
totalavailable,
whileincreases
inpopula-
tiondividewhatremains
intosmaller
portions.Population
growthandre-
.source
depletion
converge
toproduce
conicts
inmany
parts
ofthedevelopin
world.Thesources
of environmental
scarcityaresaidto lie in environmental
change
suchas droughtor soil erosion;
population
growth,whichplaces
greaterpressureon existing resources;and the unequaldistribution of re-
; sources,whichlimitsaccess. Basinghisndingson conclusions
from numer-
oils casestudiesof conictsin whichresourceissueswerepresent,Homer-
7 Dixon suggests that stateshave fought more over nonrenewable than
174 THE
PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING
CONTEXT
CONSTRUCTING
REALITY
renewable
resources.
Oil andminerals,
asnonrenewable
resources,
aremore
directly
linked
tonational
power
than
areforests
orsh,both
ofwhicharere-
newable
resources.
Therenewable
resource
mostlikelytocontribute
to inter-
state resource wars is water.
HomerDixon
ndsthatenvironmental
scarcity
leads
to economic
depri-
vation,
which
contributes
tocivilstrife
andincreases
economic
andpolitical
pressures
ongovernments,
possibly
resulting
inaweakening
ofstate
legiti-
macy.
Increased
gaps
between
population
groups
within
astate
asaresult
of
resource
scarcity
produce
grievances
andrivalries,
leading
toconict.
Asare-
sultofresource
scarcity,
population
groupsmayndit necessary
tomigrate
in
searchoflandandother
resources.
AccordingtoHomer-Dixon,
suchgroups
oftensparkethnic
conictsinareas
towhich theymove.Economic
pressures
onsuchgroups,
resulting
fromresource
scarcity,
cancontribute
toconicts,
including
insurgency
against
state
authority.
HomerD1xonseesmajor
empiri-
calsupport
fortheproposition
thatenvironmental
scarcity
willrise
sharply
in
thedecades
ahead.
Increases
inpopulation,
greater
resource
consumption,
and
inequalities
inaccess
toresources
willhave
anunprecedented
impact
onmany
regions.
The
potential
forviolent
conicts
arising
outofresource
issues
will
growdramatically.
Since
theearly1960s,
asnoted
atthebeginning
ofthischapter,
theem-
phasis
placed
ongeography
and
conict
hashad
essentially
twofocal
points
forempirically
based
research,
asPaul
F.Diehlpoints
out:(1)geography
asa
variable
thatisespecially
important
infacilitating
conict;
and(2)theroleof
geography
initself
asasource
ofconict.67
Therstfocalpoint
includes
work
thataddresses
such
questions
ashowgeography
affects
thelikelihood
that
states
willgotowarwitheach
other.
Thesecond
focal
point
centers
onthe
study
ofconict
inwhich
control
ofaparticular
territorial
area has
been
the
source of conict.
Geography,
andspecically
thelocation
ofpolitical
entities
inclose
prox-
imity
toeach
other,
issaid
tocreate
opportunities
forconict
totheextent
that
states
sharing
borders
witheach
other
aremore
likely
toengage
inconict
than
arestates
thatarenoncontiguous.
Suchworktakes
asitspointof departure
ndings
contained
inLewis
F.Richardsons
Statistics
ofDeadly
Quarrels
Richardson
found
astrong,
positive
correlation
between
thenumber
offron-
tiersa state
hadandtheextent
of itsparticipation
in warswithotherstates.
Thegreater
thenumber
ofborders,
thegreater
thelikelihood
thatanation
would bea partyto international
conict.
Richardson
foundthatcontiguit
wasacommon factorinthearmedconictshestudied
andthatshared
fron-
tiersincrease
thenumber andtypes
ofinteractions
thatstates
havewitheach
other.
Richardsons
workprovided
thebasis
foralargenumber
ofother
empiri-
calstudies
in which
hypotheses
about
therelationship
between
geograph
contiguity
andwarwere tested.
Forexample,
building
onRichardsons
writ-
ings,
HarveyStarr
andBenjamin
A.Most extended
theconcept
ofgeograp
contiguity
toinclude
notonlytheborders
ofthehomeland(metropoleto
each
other,
butalso
theiroverseas
territorial
extensions
ofstates
thathadfar-
 SPATIAL
RELATIONSHIPS
ANDCONFLICT:
RECENT
WORK 175

ungempires.59
Illustrative
of thishypothesis,
GreatBritainasanimperial
powerWith territoriesin nearlyeverypart of the world sharedcolonialfron-
tierswith asmanyas68 othernationsbetween1946and 1965,the period
chosenby Starr and Most for their study.Sucha condition led GreatBritain
into conictsin manypartsof the world, from Southeast
Asia(Malaya)to
East Africa (Kenya),from Palestinein the Middle East to Belizein South
America.Thus,thenotionof contiguous landbordersof themetropole does
not exhaustthetypesof bordersthatmustbeconsidered
in assessingtherela-
tionshipbetweenfrontiersandwars.Frontiers
encompassnotonlycontiguous
land borders,but alsobordersacrosswater.For example,islandstatesthat
claim jurisdiction over surroundingwatersmay placethemselves
in conict
with neighboring
states,asin thecaseof Greece
andTurkeyovertheAegean.
StarrandMost found that certainstates,suchasFranceand GreatBritain,en-
gagedin fewerarmedconictsastheircolonialpossessions
gainedindepen-
dencein theperiodbetween
1945and1965.ModifyingRichardsons general
nding that more bordersleadto more war, Starr and Most concludedthat
thegrowthin numbers of homelandbordershastendedto producelesswar,
whilelargernumbersof colonialborderswereaccompanied by morewar.7°
Accordingto StarrandMost,moreover,contiguousstatesaremorelikelyto
be perceived as threatening than those that are most distant. Statesthat have
manybordersfacea securitydilemmato theextentthat theymustcopewith
morethanonepotentialaggressorthatis locatedin closeproximity.
Two othermajorcontributorsto this literature,PaulF.DiehlandGary
Goertz,suggestthat, throughouthistory,conict has beenmore often based
on concrete territorialissuesthanon abstractpoliticalgoals.71
Basingtheir
work on 775territorialchanges duringtheperiodbetween 1816and1980,
theynd thatalmostall majorwarsbeganwith at leastoneof thepartiescon-
. tiguousto thedisputed site.Waris morelikelywhenthelocusof thedisputeis
, proximateto one or both of the protagonists.Stateddifferently,statesare
morelikelyto defendterritorialassets
closerto homethanto acquirenewand
3.moredistantareas
bymilitarymeans.
Contiguity
andwillingness
to resortto
violencein defenseof suchterritory arecloselyrelated.ThusDiehl and Goertz
j nd that geographic proximityto anareain dispute,ratherthansharedbor-
derswith a state,is a predictorof war.Nonetheless,
theyagreewith Starrand
AMostthattheopportunity
for conictis enhanced
by geographic
proximity.
?Therelationof territorialcontiguityto war frequency
will comeup againin
Chapter 7.
Anotherdiscussion
of literatureontherelationship
between
geography
and

&#39;riphery
concepts,
ascomponents of a politicalsystem.
JohnOLoughlin nds
1.13
at,whileimmediateneighbors
maybeof greatest concern
to a state,conict
inay spreadfrom its point of originto involveotherstateswithin geographic
re-
.ons.72
According
to OLoughlin,
theborder-warrelationship
mustbebroad-
edto includespatialeffects
thatextendto states
in closeproximityto conict,
176 THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

but whicharenot theimmediatepartiesin theconict. Suchstatesmayperceive

themselves to beincreasingly vulnerableto the effectsof war or heightened
ten-
sionsbetweenneighboringstates,asin thecaseof therapid expansionof thege-
ographiczoneof conict in the weeksleadingto the outbreakof World War I.
As in epidemiology,in which the increasein a particular diseasein one
country is directly relatedto its incidencein a neighboringstate,so conict
may spread.Theretendsto be a clusteringof conict in particularregions,or
what hasbeentermedshatterbelts,geographicregionsfrom which conflictes-
calatesto engageoutsidepowers.Suchregionsaresaidto includeEurope,the
Middle East,EastAsia, SoutheastAsia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and SouthAsia.
A large numberof the wars of the twentiethcentury originatedin suchre-
gions.Accordingto Philip L. Kelly,a sbatterbeltis dened asa geographicre-
gion over which major powers engagein competition becausethey have
strongperceived
nationalinterests.73
Therefore,
thepotentialfor majorcon-
ict escalationis present.The outbreakof crisisin suchregions,in light of ma-
jor powerinterests,holdsimportantpotentialfor suchintervention,providing
the spatialdimensionwithin a specicgeographicalsettingfor conict. There
are regional groupings of states having common borders, according to
AndrewM. Kirby and MichaelD. Ward,which tend to engagein armedcon-
ict.74Suchstatesaresituatedin regionsconstituting
shatterbelts.
Closelyrelatedas a focal point of analysisis the role of geographyin the
diffusion of conict beyondits immediatepoint of origin. This includesthe
extentto which statessharingborderswith other statesexperiencinginternal
conict are likely to undergosimilar uprisings.Accordingto Most and Starr,
the occurrence of war in one state increases the likelihood that there will be
war in oneor moreotherstatesperhaps
in domino-like
fashion.75
Theyuse
the exampleof Franceswithdrawal from Indochina,the Middle East, and
Africa asFrenchcolonialpossessions, which eruptedin wars leadingto inde-
pendence. To elaboratethis concept,the Frenchretreatfrom overseas territo-
ries coincidedgenerallywith comparablemovesby other Europeanimperial
powers,includingBelgium,GreatBritain,theNetherlands,andlater Portugal.
Pressures for independence, backedin many casesby violence,occurredin a
spatially dened regional context: SoutheastAsia, South Asia, the Middle
East,North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The outbreakof conict in sup-
port of independence
in onecolonialterritoryprovidedimpetusfor compara-
ble activityin adjacentterritories.Thus,conict tendedto diffuseacrossspace
from onestateto anotherin the periodstudiedby Most and Starr.

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

The endof the Cold War led..toother.effortsto rethink the geopoliticaldivi-
sions, or fault lines, that form the basis for future conict. In place of
U.S.Sovietrivalry andthe dividinglinesthat differentiatedtheWesternworld
from the Soviet bloc and from the Third World of less developed states,
SamuelP.Huntingtonsuggests
that cultureand civilizationwill dene the fu-
 REDEFINING
THEMEANING
OF BORDERS 177

tureconicts.75Warswill takeplacebetween Western andnon-Western civi-

lizations.Thegeopolitical
signicance
of stateswill bedetermined bytheirlo-
cationon or nearthe culturaldivideseparating civilizations.Accordingto
Huntington,
theworldof thefuturewill beshaped
byinteraction
among sev-
eralmajorcivilizations,
includingWestern,Confucian,
Japanese,
Islamic,
Hindu,Slavic-Orthodox,
LatinAmerican,
andpossiblyAfricancivilizations.
Huntingtonpointsto severalfactorsthat are contributingto the clashof civi-
lizations.Theyincludedeeplyrootedreligiousdifferences;
increasing
intercivi-
lization interaction,producingparadoxicallygrowingawareness
of differenti-
ation;the weakening
of the nation-state
asa sourceof groupidentity,with
religionoften movingin to ll the resultinggap;the dewesternization
and in-
digenization
of elitesin nonWesternsocieties;
therelativeimmutabilityof cul-
tural characteristics;
and the growthof economicregionalism,
the effectof
which is to reinforce civilization consciousness.
To identify the geographicpoints for crisis and conict, it is essentialto
understand wherethe fault lines lie betweencivilizations.Accordingto
Huntington,thecriticaldividingboundaryin Europerunsalongthefrontier
between FinlandandRussiaandbetween theBalticstatesandRussia.It sepa-
ratesCatholicwestern UkrainefromOrthodoxeastern Ukraine,andit divides
Transylvania from the remainderof Romania.In the Balkans,the historic
frontierbetween theHapsburg andOttomanempires, alongthelinebetween
CroatiaandSlovenia, representsanotherzoneof conict,aswehaveseenall
too vividlyin theBalkanwarsof the 1990s.Huntingtonbuttresses histhesis
by reference to the bloodyclashesbetweenMuslimsand Hindus,between
Pakistanand India. Thosestatescontainingpopulationsof differentciviliza-
tionsarelikelyto facedisintegrative
pressures,
aswehavealreadyseenin the
breakups of theSovietUnionandof Yugoslavia.Thus,Huntingtonviewscivi-
lizationasthedetermining factorshapingthesocialandpsychomilieu,
to use
theSprouts terminologyand,asa result,thegeopolitical
conguration
within
which future conicts will erupt.

REDEFINING THE MEANING OF BORDERS

Theadventof postindustrialsociety,basedon unprecedentedows of infor-
mation,altersthesignicanceof boundarieswithina broadercontextof spa-
tial relationships.
According
to FriedrichKratochwil,theconcept
of territorial
sovereigntyasthe organizingprincipleof internationalpolitics contendswith
transnational
exchanges
that cut acrossthe boundaries
of existingstates.77
Kratochwil discussesthe function of boundaries in territorial and nonterritor-
ial socialorganizations.In the statesystem,boundariesdenedzonesof exclu-
sivejurisdiction.Theinterdependenceof statesis measurablebytheextentto
whichterritorialboundaries arecrossed by varioustypesof interaction,in-
cludingeconomic networks.Territorialfrontiersaresupplemented or super-
seded
by boundaries
based,
for example,
in markets
for goodsandservices.
L Kratochwil
suggests
three
types
ofexchanges
thatareaffected
byboundaries
178 THE PI-IYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTING REALITY

First,theseexchangesincludetherelationship
between theunit andits envi-
ronment.Second, theyencompass exchangesbetweentheunitandotherunits.
Third,theyinvolveexchangesthattakeplacebetween thecoreof theunit and
its periphery.
Takentogether,suchexchanges constitutea systemthat canbe
studiedby reference
to thenatureandtypesof exchanges within andamong
the threecategoriesof transactions.
Closelyrelatedis thespatialrelationship
setforthbyKenichiOhmae,who
concludes
that theemerging geopoliticalmapfeatureseconomicbordersthat
are not the lines of division betweencivilizations or states,but instead the con-
toursof informationows.78As a result,we arein themidst,hesuggests,
of the
developmentof regionstatesthattranscend
existingnationalborders.
Hecites
asexamples the economic relationship
that links HongKongandSouthern
China;theregionbetween SanDiegoandTijuana;andthetriangleencompass-
ingSingapore,
neighboring
sections
ofMalaysia,
andpartsofIndonesia.
The
abilityto shiftcapitalinstantaneously fromonepart of theworldto another
produces in thissense a borderlessworldwithinthecontextof geopolinomics
andgeoeconomics, notedearlierin thischapter.Capitalows neednot betied
to thephysicalmovement of goods,with traditionaltraderepresenting onlya
smallanddecreasing amountof economic activityacross
borders; Thedening
characteristic of regionstatesis theirpossessionof capabilities
for full partici-
pationin theglobaleconomy. Thisparticipation includesreceptivityto foreign
investment andforeignproducts, andextensiveeconomic links,based onaccess
to vastandincreasingamountsof information.

CRITIQUESOF ENVIRONMENTAL
THEORIES
Criticsof environmental
theories,
includingtheSprouts,
takeissuewithwriters
who engage in environmentalistic
rhetoricandassumethat attitudesor deci-
sionsaredetermined,inuenced,or in someotherway causallyaffectedby envi-
ronmentalfactors.8°Althoughthe Sproutsrejectenvironmentasa determinant
of politics,theyconceive
ascrucial(a)theactorsperception
of environmental
factors
and(b)limitations
to human
activity
posed
bytheenvironment.
Accordingto RobertStrausz-Hupé,geographic
conditionshavebeen
modiedby humansthroughouthistory:Geographic
conditionsdetermine
largely
where
historyismade,
butit isalways
manwhomakes
it. 82Although
derivinghisownworkfromthegeopoliticalconceptsin Mackinders
writings,
NicholasSpykman criticizedMackinderfor overestimating
the potentialities
of theheartlandandunderestimating
thoseof the innercrescent:If thereis to
bea sloganfor thepowerpoliticsof theOldWorld,it mustbeWhocontrols
the Rimland rules Eurasia;who rules Eurasiacontrols the destiniesof the
world.83Spykman alsonotedthat a combination of seapowershadnever
beenalignedagainsta groupingof landpowers.Thehistoricalalignment has
alwaysbeenin termsof somemembers of theRimlandwith GreatBritainand
Russia
together
against
a dominating
Rimland
power.
84In hisanalysis
of the
German
geopolitical
schoolthatshaped
thethinkingof AdolfHitler andNazi
 CRITIQUES
OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TI-IEORIES 179

German aggression
in WorldWarII, StrauszHupé asserted
thatthereis,in
short,
nohistorical
evidence insupportofthecausal nexus
alleged
bythead-
vocates
oflebensraum
(livingspace)
. . . toexistbetween
population
pressure
andnational
growthin space.85
Historically,
national
expansion
hasresulted
fromconditions
otherthanpopulation
pressure.
Forexample,
Japanese
ex-
pansionismin Asia antedatedthe upsurgein Japanspopulation.Both
Germany
andJapan
nowhave
larger
populations
withinreduced
geographic
space.Livingstandards in bothcountriesaresubstantially
higherthanthey
werebefore WorldWarII. Nor doeslargespace necessarily
equatewithna-
tionalpower, asthecollapseof theSoviet
Union,oncetheworldslargest
land
stateterritorially,
amplyconrms, althoughwheneverlargespacewasthor-
oughlyorganized
by a state,smallnations. . . werenot ableto withstandits
expansive
force.86 I
Finally,it is oftenasserted
that technological
changehasrendered
Mackinders
heartland
conceptobsolete.
In the discussionfollowing
Mackinders
presentation
ofhispaper,
TheGeographicalPivotofHistory,
to theRoyalGeographic
Society,
LeopoldAmeryasserted,
Boththeseaand
therailwayaregoingin thefuture. . . to besupplemented
by theair asa
means of locomotion,
andwhenwecometo that,a greatdealof thisgeo-
graphical
distribution
mustloseitsimportance,andthesuccessful
powerswill
bethosewhohavethegreatest industrialbasis.87
According
to Strausz-
Hupé,If it [theHeartland]everwasa validconcept(for whichthereis no
convincingevidence), thereis no guarantee
thatmodern
technology
will not
invalidate
it. It may,indeed,havedonesoalready.
38TheSprouts
criticize
the
theories
of bothMahanandMackinderasbeingoutmoded
asa resultof inno-
vations
in militarytechnology
andfparamilitary
andnonmilitary
formsof po-
liticalinteraction.89
Kristof
faults
geopolitical
writers
forhaving
marshaled
factsandlawsofthephysical
worldtojustifypolitical
demands
andsupport
political
opinions.
Oneof thebestexamples
of thehopelessly
contradictory
arguments
to whichthismayleadis a concept
akinin spiritto thatof thenat-
uralboundary,
namely,theconceptof theharmonicstatei.
9°
Although thepsychomilieuthe world._as»it
is perceivedis
centralto the
workof writerssuchastheSprouts, otherwritershavefocused specically on
theeffects
of alternative
typesof mapsthevisualpresentation of spatial
and
geographicalrelationshipsas theyrelateto theformation of images about
theworld.Since WorldWarII, special
emphasis hasbeen placedonthedistor-
tionintroduced intopoliticalanalysis
byearlierrelianceonMercator equator-
based
projections.
Suchmaps
failed
topresent
theideaoftheearth
asasphere
andtherefore ashaving
geographical
unityandcontinuity.
TheMercatorpro-
jectionprovidedan erroneous conception
of distancesforexample,
the
proximityof theUnitedStates
to Russia
across
theArctic.Viewing
theworld
asa spheremakesevidentthat,for example, Buenos Aires*is fartherfromthe
UnitedStatesthanis everyEuropeancapital,includingMoscow.
Theadventof air power,andits indispensablecontributionto theAllied
victoryin WorldWarII, contributed
decisivelyto thealterationin traditional
Mercator-type
conceptions
of geography,
for the shortest
distance
by air
180 THEPHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING
CONTEXT:
CONSTRUCTING
REALITY

between
twopointslayin a linethatfollowed
thecontourof theearth.In its
place
came
asymmetrical
projections
based
mostlyonspherical
polecentered
maps.
Numerous
writers
during
WorldWarII pointed
totheneed
forsuch
al-
ternative
maps.Theneedfor suchmapsbecame
apparent
alsobecause,
as
RichardE.HarrisonandHansW.Weigert,
writingin the1940s,pointedout:
Wecontinued
usingit (theMercator
projection)
whenlandpowerandland-based
airpower
becamepivotal
inthegreatest
ofallworldconicts.
Inaworldwarthat
ismainly
being
foughtinthenorthern
hemisphere
thisproved
tobeanalmostfa-
talmisjudgment;
fortheMercator
projection
whose center
of accuracy
isalong
theequator
cannot
possibly
showtherelationship
between
thepower
spheres
of
thecontending
greatPowers.
If maps
shape
a persons
perceptions
of theworld,theyalsoreectthe
shared
constructs
of geographic
andspatialrelationships
thatareprevalent.
Mapsaredrawnandredrawn
to takeaccount
of those
geographical
factors
deemedto beimportantatagiventime.AsAlanHenrikson
haswritten,One
canregardsuchthingsasmapsaspuresubjective
ideographs,
or asconstructs
withonlyamathematical
relation
to objective
reality,
oreven
asmere
reec-
tionsof thematerialprocesses
of history,in whichcasetheywouldhavenoin-
dependent
determining
power.
. . . Theglobal
mapsthathelped
toguideand
explain
thewareffort(World
WarII)-andwerethusanessential
partofthe
warsintellectual
historyweretraceson the humanmind,etchedtherenot
onlybymans
experience
butbymans
imagination.92
Thisideaisreected
in
theworksof RichardEdesHarrisonandRobertStrauszHupé,
whowentso
far asto suggest
thatthepsychological
isolationisrn
of theUnitedStates
resultedfrom the decienciesof maps,notably the utilization of two-
dimensional
(Mercator)
projections
instead
of thoserepresenting
theearthas
aglobe.93
According
toW.H.Parker,
Mackinder
viewed
themapoftheworld
notasthephysical
or politicalmapfoundin anatlas,buta mentalmapin
whichthevarioushorizontaldistinctions
andmovements
of globalphenom-
enaarevertically
integrated
in dynamic
interaction.94

CONCLUSION
Technological
changes
mayhavealtered
thesignicance
of thetheorizing
of
certainof thewritersexamined
in thischapter,
althoughadvancedtechnology
hasrendered environmental
relationships
evermoreimportant.Asmanywrit-
ershavesuggested,
modern
science
andtechnology
havetransformed
theenvi-
ronmentin intended,but alsoin unintended
ways. Science
andtechnology
havebroughtuninvited
guests
in suchformsasair pollution,traffic-conges
tion,andresource
scarcity.
Thepaceof scientific
andtechnologicalinnovation
hasquickened
beyond
anyhistorical
precedent,
andpeople
in allpartsofthe
globe
havebeen
drawnintotheorbitofmodern
technology.
Whether changes
wroughtbytechnology
areaffectingtheenvironment
in waysbeyond the
means
of coping
withthemremains
anunanswered
question.
Whatiscertain
 NOTES 181

isthatinextricable
relationships
orlinkages
existamong
technology,
geogra-
phy,andinternational
politics.
Thus,atthebeginning
of thetwenty-first
century,
thefocusonthemilieu
in theliterature
ofinternational
relations
represents
aconvergence
ofseveral
principalinterestsof scholarsand policymakers.
Theseincluderesource
scarcityandconict,
populationgrowth,therelationship
ofgeographytopo-
liticalpower,
theemergenceof newgeopolitical
relationships,
andthein-
creased importance
of geopolinomic
andgeoeconomic concepts.
In short,a
newsetof geopolitical
or geostrategic
relationships
hascome intoexistence
largelyasa resultof thepervasive
impactof technologyoninternational
rela-
tionsgenerally
and,specically,
ontheforeign policies
of states.
Forexample, howweperceive, construct,andexperience international
politics
isshaped
byglobal
media
networks,
suchasCNN.Again,
toquote
Gearéid
O Tuathail:
Withinthecircuits,
feedsandowsof networks like
CNN(whose
iconis a perpetually
spinningglobe),
globalpolitical
space is
skimmedeverytwenty-four hoursa dayandpushed asa stream of televisual
images
featuring
a terroristattackhere,a currency
crisisthere,anda natural
disaster
elsewhere.
Globalspace becomes
globalpace.Beingthereliveis
everything.
Thelocalisinstantly
global,
thedistantimmediately
close.95 The
effect
isto speed
therequirementfordecisions
to bemadeandto givetothe
viewerasimmediate access
aspolicymakers
mayhaveto unfolding events
fromnearanddistantgeographic
regions.
Becausetheperception
ofthemilieu,
andtheimpact
ofthemilieuitself,
iscentral
to decision
makingandto political
behavior
generally,
those con-
cerned
withthedevelopment
of theories
of politicalbehavior
at theinterna-
tionallevelhavetakenrenewed interestin environmental
relationships
Political
systems
havebeen hypothesizedto beopensystemssusceptibleto
inputsfrom,andmaking outputs to,theirenvironments.
Lastbutnotleast,
theissuesofpollution
andecology andofpopulation growthandfoodsup-
plyhaveledto effortsbothto forecast
trends andto develop
modelsoften
neoMalthusianinnature.Themilieuthenprovides auniquefocalpointnot
onlyfor olderandcontemporarytheorizing,
butalsofor analytical
andnor-
mativetheoryin international
relations
in theyearsahead,for in thenal
analysis,all foreignpoliciesandotherpatternsof internationalinteraction
areset,or constructed,
withina political,social,cultural,andgeographic
environment.

NOTES

1. Nicholas
Onuf,Constructivism:
A Users
Manual,
in Vendulka
Kubélokova,
NicholasOnuf,andPaulKowert,eds.,International
Relations
in a Constructed
World(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe, 1998),p. 59.
2. Foranextended
discussion
of these
elements
andconstructivism,
seeColinH.
Kahl,Constructing
aSeparate
Peace:
Constructivism,
Collective
Liberal
Identity,
182

THE PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING
CONTEXT.CONSTRUCTING
REALITY

andDemocraticPeace,in GlenChafety,
Michael Spirtas,
andBenjamin
Frankel,
eds.,TheOrigins
ofNationalInterests
(London: FrankCass,
1999),
pp.99-144.
. HaroldandMargaret Sprout,
TheEcologicalPerspective
onHuman Affairswith
Special
Reference
to International
Politics(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1965),p. 27.TheSprouts
setforththefollowingdenitions:Environment
maybedened
asageneric
concept
underwhicharesubsumed
allexternal
forces
andfactorsto whichanorganism
or aggregate
of organisms
is actuallyor poten
tiallyresponsive;
or it maybelimited
to thematerial
andspatial
aspects
of the
surrounding
world,to theexclusion
ofthemelee of human
social
relations.
. Fora survey
of suchwritings,
seePaulF.Diehl,Geography
andWar:A Review
andAssessment
of the EmpiricalLiterature,InternationalInteractions,
17(1)
(1991), 11-27.
. Aristotle,ThePoliticsof Aristotle,trans.ErnestBarker(Oxford,England:
Clarendon, 1961), pp. 289-311.
. JeanBodin,SixBooksof theCommonwealth,
trans.F.J. Tooley(NewYork:
Macmillan, 1955), pp. 145-157.
Baronde Montesquieu,
TheSpiritof Laws,Vol. 1 (Worcester,
MA: Isaiah
Thomas,1802),pp. 154-159,259-274.
. Frederick
Jackson
Turner,TheSignicance
of theFrontierin American
History,
in DonaldSheehan,
ed.,TheMakingof American History,BookII (NewYork:
Dryden,1950),p. 200.
. NazliChoucri,
Population
Resources
andTechnology:
Political
Implications
of
theEnvironmental
Crisis,in DavidA. KayandEugene
B. Skolnikoff,
eds.,
10.
World-Eco-Crisis:
International
Organizations
in Response
(Madison:
University
of Wisconsin
Press,
1972),p.24.SeealsoNazliChoucriandRobertC.North,
11.Population
and(In)security:
National
Perspectives
andGlobalImperatives,
in
DavidDewitt,DavidHaglund,andJohnKirton,eds.,Building
a NewGlobal
Order:Emerging
Trendsin International
Security
(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
12.QuincyWright,A Studyof War(Chicago
Press,1993), pp. 229-256.
andLondon:
University
of Chicago
Press,1965), p. 1144.
Ibid., p. 1285.
See,for example,
Susan
L. Cutter,Exploiting,Conserving,
andPreserving
Natural Resources; RogerE. Kasperson,Global EnvironmentalHazards:
PoliticalIssuesin SocietalResponses;
PhyllisMofson,Global Ecopolitics;
George
J.Demko,
Population,
Politics,
andGeography:-«A
GlobalPerspective;
and William B. Wood, Crossingthe Line: Geopoliticsof International
13. Migrationin George
J. DemkoandWilliamB. Wood,eds.,Reordering
the
World:GeopoliticalPerspectives
on the Twenty-First
Century(Boulder,CO:
14.RobertD. Kaplan,TheComingAnarchy,TheAtlanticMonthly(February
Westview Press,1994), pp. 123-205.

1994), 44-76.
15.RobertD. Kaplan,Shattering
Ibid., 60.
theDreams
of thePost-Cold
War(NewYork:
 NOTES 183

Political
Geography
(London:
Methuen
andCompany
Limited,
1972),
pp.1-26;
J. C. Archerand F. M. Shelley,
Theoryand Methodology in Political
Geography,andS. D. BrunnandK. A. Mingst,Geopolitics,
in Michael
Pacione,
ed.,Progress
in Political
Geography (London:
CroomHelm,1985),
pp.11-76;
Harm J.DeBlij,Systemic
Political
Geography
(NewYork:
JohnWiley,
1973), esp. pp. 1-14.
17. Gearéid
O.Tuathail,
Critical
Geopolitics:
ThePolitics
ofWriting
Global
Space
(Minneapolis:
University
ofMinnesota
Press,
1996),
p. 1.
18. Gearéid
O. Tuathail,
Postmodern
Geopolitics?
TheModern
Geopolitica
Imagination
andBeyond in Gearéid
O. Tuathail
andSimon Dalby,eds.,
Rethinking
Geopolitics
(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,
1998),
pp.16-17.
19. SaulB.Cohen,
Geography
andPolitics
in a WorldDivided,
2nded.(NewYork:
OxfordUniversity
Press,
1973),p. 29.
20. Raymond
Aron,Peace
andWar(Garden
City,NY:Doubleday,
1966),
p.191.
21. Ewan
W.Anderson,
AnAtlasof World
Political
Flashpoints:
A Sourcehook
of
Geopolitical
Crisis(London:
PinterReference,
1993),
p.xiii.
22. Colin5.Gray.
TheGeopolitics
of Super
Power
(Lexington:
University
Press
of
Kentucky,1988),p. 45.
23. George
J. DemkoandWilliamB. Wood,Introduction:International
Relations
ThroughthePrismsof Geography,
in George
J.Demko
andWilliam
B.Wood,
eds.,Reordering
the World:Geopolitical
Perspectives
on theTwenty-Firs
Century, pp. 10-11.
24. EdwardN. Luttwak,Endangered
American
Dream(NewYork:Simonand
Schuster,
1993),pp. 307-325.
25. KennethD. Boulding,
ConictandDefense(NewYork:Harper86Row,1963);
Patrick
OSullivan,
Geopolitics
(NewYork:St.Martins
Press,
1986).
26. OSullivan,ibid., p. 69.
27. See,
for example,
AlbertWohlstetter,
Illusions
of Distance,Foreign
Affairs,
46(2) (1968), 242-255.
28. AlfredThayer Mahan, TheInuence of SeapoweruponHistory, 1660-1783
(Boston:
Little,Brown,1897),
esp.
pp.281-329.See
alsoMargaret Tuttle
Sprout,
Mahan: Evangelist of SeaPower, in EdwardMeadEarle, ed.,Makers of
Modern Strategy:MilitaryThought
fromMachiavelli
to Hitler(Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press, 1943),
pp.415-445; HaroldandMargaret Sprout,
TheRiseof American NavalPower (Princeton,
NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press,
1942);
WilliamReitzel,
MahanonUseoftheSea,andJamesA.Field,
Jr.,The
Origins
of Maritime
Strategy
andtheDevelopment
of Seapower,
in B.Mitchell
Simpson
IH,ed.,War,
Strategy
andMaritime
Power
(New
Brunswick,
NJ:Rutgers
UniversityPress,1977),pp. 77-107.
29. George
ModelskiandWilliamR. Thompson,Seapower
in GlobalPolitics,
1494-1993
(Seattle:
University
ofWashington
Press,
1988).
See esp.pp.3-26.
30. Halford
Mackinder,
Democratic
Ideals
andReality
(NewYork:Norton,
1962),
pp. 35-39.
31. Halford
Mackinder,
TheGeographical
PivotofHistory,
Geographical
journal,
XXIH(April1904),
434.Foranextended
discussion
andcritique
of Mackinders
thought
andwritings
ongeography
andgeopolitics,
withinthebroader
context
of
hislifeandtimes,
seeW.H.Parker,
Mackinder:
Geography
asanAidtoStatecraft
(Oxford,
England:
Clarendon
Press,
1982),
esp.chaps.~5-8.
32. Mackinder,
Democratic
Ideals
andReality,
p.150.SeealsoHansW.Weigert,
Mackinders
Heartland,
TheAmerican
Scholar,
XV (Winter
1945),
43-45.
184

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.
 54.

NOTES 185

55.
EmanuelAdler,Cognitive
Evolution:
A DynamicApproach
for theStudy
of
International
Relations
andTheirProgress,
in Emanuel
AdlerandBeverly
Crawford,eds.,Progress
in PostwarInternational
Relations
(NewYork:
Columbia
University
Press,
1991),pp.43-88.
See,
for example,
Emanuel
AdlerandPeter
M. Haas,Conclusion:
Epistemi
56.
Communities,
WorldOrder,
andtheCreationof a Reective
ResearchProgram,
International
Organization,
46(1)(Winter1992),367-390;Peter
M. Haas,Do
RegimesMatter?Epistemic
Communities
andMediterraneanPollution
Control,
InternationalOrganization,43(3) (Summer1989).377-403.
57.
TimDunne,
Inventing
International
Society:
A Historyof theEnglishSchool
(NewYork:St.MartinsPress,
1998),p. 187.In fact,theverytitle of thebookis
suggestive
of contructivism,for political communitiesare invented.
58.
Sandra
Harding,Introduction:
Is Therea Feminist
Methodology? in Sandra
Harding,ed.,Feminism
andMethodology (Bloomington:
IndianaUniversity
Press,1987), pp. 1-14.
59.
Elisabeth
Priigl,FeministStruggle
as SocialConstruction,
in Vendulkova
Kubalkova,
NicholasOnuf,andPaulKowert,eds.,International
Relations
in a
60. Constructed
World(Armonk,NY:M. E.Sharpe,1998),p. 125.
J. Ann Tickner,Gender
in International
Relations:
Feminist
Perspectives
on
AchievingGlobalSecurity
(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press,
1992),
p. 15.
61.Francis
Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Fukayama,Womenandthe Evolutionof WorldPolitics,Foreign
Affairs,77(5)(September/October
1998),p. 30.
62. Ibid., p. 36
63. George Liska,Questfor Equilibrium:
America
andtheBalance
of PoweronLand
andSea(Baltimore
andLondon:
JohnsHopkinsPress,1977),
p.4.
64. Robert
T.HoltandJohnE.Turner,
InsularPolitics,
in James
N. Rosenau,
ed.,
LinkagePolitics(NewYork:FreePress,
1969),pp.199-236.
65. Richard
L. Merritt,Noncontiguity
andPolitical
Integration,
in Rosenau,
ed.,
LinkagePoliticspp. 237-272.
66. ThomasF. Homer-Dixon,EnvironmentalScarcitiesand Violent Conict:
Evidence
fromCases,
International
Security,
9(1)(Summer
1994),
5-40.See
also
ThomasHomer-Dixon,
Jeffrey
Boutwell,
andGeorge Rathjens,
Environmenta
Scarcityand ViolentConict, ScienticAmerican,(February1993);Thomas
Homer-Dixon, Environmentala Scarcityand GlobalSecurity,HeadlineSeries
(NewYork: ForeignPolicyAssociation,1993).
67. PaulF.Diehl,Geography
andWar:A Review
andAssessment
of theEmpirical
Literature,InternationalInteractions,17(1)(1991),16-23.
I 68. LewisF.Richardson,
Statistics
ofDeadly Quarrels(Chicago:
QuadrangleBooks,
1960).Richardsons
theoryof armsracesis discussed
in Chapter7.
69. HarveyStarrandBenjamin A. Most, The SubstanceandStudyof Bordersin
International
RelationsResearch,
International
StudiesQuarterly,20(4)
(December1976), 581-621.
70.HarveyStarrandBenjaminA. Most,A ReturnJourney:Richardson,
Frontiers
and Warsin the 1946-1965
Era, journalof ConictResolution,
22(3)
71. (September1978), 441-467.
&#39;
PaulF.DiehlandGaryGoertz,TerritorialChanges
andMilitarizedConict,
186 THE
PHYSICAL/SOCIAL/ENVIRONING
CONTEXT
CONSTRUCTING
REALITY
York:
Routledge,
1992),
esp.
pp.105-127.
See
also
PaulF.Diehl,
Contiguity
and
Military
Escalation
in MajorPower
Rivalries,
1816-1980,TheJournal
of
Politics,
47(1985),
1203-1211;
David
Garnham,
Dyadic
International
War
1816-1965:
TheRoleof Power
ParityandGeographic
Proximity,
Western
Political
Quarterly,
27(1976),
231-242;
J.R.V.Prescott,
TheGeography
of
Frontiers
andBoundaries
(Chicago:
Aldine
Publishing,
1965),
esp.
pp.90-152.
72.John
OLoughlin,
Spatial
Models
ofInternational
Conicts:
Extending
Current
Theories
ofWarBehavior,
Annals
oftheAssociation
ofAmerican
Geographer
76(1)(1986),63-79.
73.Philip
L. Kelly,
Escalation
of Regional
Conict:
Testing
theShatterbe
Concept,
Political
Geography
Quarterly,
5(2)(April
1986),
161-180.
74.Andrew
M.KirbyandMichael D.Ward,TheSpatialAnalysis
ofPeace
and
War,
Comparative
Political
Studies,
20(3)
(October
1987),
303-304.
75.Benjamin
A.Most
andHarvey
Starr,
Diffusion,
Reinforcement,
Geopolitics,
and
theSpread
ofWar,
TheAmerican
Political
Science
Review,
74(December
1980),
932-945.
76.Samuel
P.Huntington,
TheClash
of Civilizations?
Foreign
Affairs,
72(3)
(Summer
1993),
22-48.SeealsoComments: Responsesto SamuelP.
Huntingtons
The
Clash ofCivilizations?
Foreign
Affairs,
72(4)(Septemb
October
1993),
1-26;Samuel
P.Huntington,
If NotCivilizations,
What?
Paradigms
ofthePost-Cold
WarWorld, Foreign
Affairs,
73(5)(Novembe
December
1993),
187-194.
SeealsoSamuel
P.Huntington,
TheClash
of
Civilizations
andtheRemaking
of World
Order(NewYork:Simon
8: Schuster
1996),esp.chaps.8-10.
77.Friedrich
Kratochwil,
Of Systems,
Boundaries,
andTerritoriality:
AnInquiry
intotheFormation
of theState
System,
WorldPolitics,
39(October
1986),
27-52;
Friedrich
Kratochwil,
Paul
Rohrlich,
andHarpreet
Mahajan,
Peace
and
Disputed
Sovereignty
(Lanham,
MD:University
Pressof America,
1985),
esp.
pp. 3-47.
78. Kenichi
Ohmae,
TheEndoftheNation
State:
TheRiseof Regional
Economic
(NewYork:FreePress,
1995),
esp.pp.79-100.
79.Kenichi
Ohmae,
NewWorld
Order:
TheRise
oftheRegion
State,
TheWall
Street
journal(August16,1994),p. A12.
80.HaroldandMargaret
Sprout,
Foundations
of International
Politics
(Princeton
N]:VanNostrand,
1962),
p.54.Examples
ofsuch
rhetoric
include:
Themoun-
tains
ofJapan
have
pushed
theJapanese
outupon
theseas
making
them
thegreat-
estseafaring
people
ofAsia.Ehgland,driven
totheseabyhersparse
resource
toseek
alivelihood
andtondhomesforherburgeoningpopulation,
andsitting
athwart
themainsearoutes
ofWestern
Europe,seemed
destined
bygeography
to
commandthe seas.(Italicsin original.)
81.Sprout
andSprout,
Ecological
Perspective
onHuman
Affairs,
p.11.
82. Strausz-Hupé,
Geopolitics,p. 173.
83. Spykman,
Geography
ofthePeace,
p.43.
84. Ibid., p. 181.
85. Strausz-Hupé,
Geopolitics,
pp.164-165.
86. Ibid., p. 181.
87. Geographical
Iournal,XXIII(April1904),
441.
88.Strausz-Hupé,
Geopolitics,
pp.189-190.
A half-century
afterLeopold
Amery
madehiscomment
about
theairplane,
long-range
bombers
carrying
nuclea
 NOTES 1 87

bombs
hadbecome
primesymbols
of international
power,
andanalysts
werestill
arguing,
notquiteconclusively,
astowhether
theadvent
ofairpower
andnuclear
energy
hadrendered
theHeartlandconceptobsolete.
See
W.Gordon East,How
Strong
Is theHeartland?
ForeignAffairs,XXIX (October
1950),78-93;and
Charles
Kruszewski,The Pivotof History,Foreign
Affairs,XXXII (April
1954), 338-401.
89. SproutandSprout,Foundations
of International
Politics,pp.338-339.
90. LadisK.D. Kristof,The OriginsandEvolution
of Geopolitics
]ournalof
ConictResolution,
vol IV (March1960),p. 29.
91. Richard
E.HarrisonandHansW Weigert,WorldViewandStrategy,
in Hans
W.Weigert
andVilhjalmut
Stefansson,
eds.,Compass
oftheWorld:
A Symposium
onPoliticalGeography
(NewYork:Macmillan,1947),p. 76.
92. AlanK. Henrikson, TheMapasanIdea:TheRoleof Cartographic Imagery
DuringtheSecond WorldWar,TheAmerican
Cartographerg
2(1)(1975),
46-47.
93. RichardEdesHarrison andRobertStrauszHupé,Maps,Strategy
andWorld
Politics,
in HaroldandMargaret
Sprout,
eds.,Foundations
of National
Power
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1945),pp.64-68.
94. Parker,
MacKinder: Geography asan Aid, p.133.Thephenomena to which
Mackinder
referred
arelithosphere(land),
hydrosphere
(water),
atmosphere
(air),
photosphere
(light),biosphere
(life),andpsychosphere
(mind)(pp.133-134).
95. See,for example,Robert StrauszHupé, Social Valuesand Politics:The
UninvitedGuests,Reviewof Politics,XXX (January1968),59-78.Another
writer,George
F.Kennan,
who,likeStrauszHupé,wasa prominent post-war
re-
alist,hassuggested
theneedfor aninternational
organization
for thecollection,
storage,retrieval,and disseminationof information and the coordinationof re-
search
andoperational
activitieson environmental
problems
at theinternational
level.SeeGeorge
F.Kennan,
To Prevent
a WorldWasteland,
Foreign
Affairs,
XLVIII (April 1970), 404.
. Gearéid
O Tuathail,
Critical
Geopolitics:
ThePolitics
of Writing
Global
Space
(Minneapolis:
University
of Minnesota
Press,
1996),p. 2.50.
Chapter5
The Older Theories
of Conict and War

PREREQUISITES
OFA GENERAL
THEORY
OF CONFLICT AND WAR
All theoristsof international
relationsrecognize
theproblemof war asa cen-
tralone.Thestability
oftheinternational
system
isusually
dened
interms
of
itsproximity
toorremoteness
fromtheoccurrence
orlikelihood
oflargescale
war.Manyscholarly
worksdevoted
to probing
thecauses
ofwarhavebeen
published,
although
interest
inthissubject
hasdeclined
since
theendofthe
ColdWar.1Priorto WorldWarI, writesMichaelHoward,historians
werein-
terested
in thecauses
of specic
warsbutdevoted
littleattention
to thequest
for thecausesof warin general.
Warasa recurringphenomenon wastaken
forgranted.
InHowards
view,
thecauses
ofwarhave
notchanged
fundamen
tallythroughout
thecenturies.
JustasThucydides
hadwritten
thatthecauses
of thePeloponnesian
Warwerethegrowthof Athenian
power andthefear
thiscausedin Sparta,
someoftheprincipal
causesofWorldWarI werethe
growthofGermanys
powerandthefearthisaroused
inBritain.
War,accord-
ingtoHoward,
does
nothappen
byaccident;nordoes
it arise
outofsubcon-
scious,
emotional
forces,
butrather
fromasuperabundance
ofanalytic
ratio-
nality.2
Thefears
ofthose
whomake
thedecision
forwarmayberational
or
irrational,
orbothin combination.
If fearisabasic
cause
ofwar,thenweare
forced
to conclude
thatwaristheproduct of bothirrationalandrationalfac-
torsandthatanunderstanding
of itscausesandof waysto prevent,control,
limit,regulate,
andterminate
itwouldrequireacomprehensive approach
to
theproblem.Whetherwarasaninstitutionalized
formof state
behavior
can
everbetotallyabolished
fromtheinternational
system
is a largerquestion
thatcannotbeanswered
until weunderstand
thecauses
of war.
Among
therecent
efforts
tounderstand
atageneral
level
theorigins
of
war,DonaldKagan,surveying
conflicts
from the Peloponnesian
War
(431404
B.C.)
totheCuban
Missile
Crisis
of 1962,
reaches
several
conclu-
sions.He seeswar not asanaberration,
but insteadasa recurringphenome-
non.It isauniquely
modern Western
characteristic,
notsubstantiated
byhis-
toricexperience,
to believe
thathumans
cansotransform
themselves
asto
makewarobsolete
or impossible.
According
to Kagan,
basing
hisconclusions
oncomparative
historical
analysis,
waristheresult
ofcompetition
forpower.
188
 PREREQUISITES
OFA GENERAL
THEORYOFCONFLICT
ANDWAR 189

In a world of sovereign
states,suchcompetitionis a normalconditionthat
sometimes
leadsto war.He alsofindsthatstatesseekpowernot onlyfor
greatersecurityor economic gain,but alsofor greaterprestige,
respect, def-
erence,in short,honor.Kaganalsoconcludes that fear,oftenunclearand
intangible,not alwaysof immediate threatsbut alsoof moredistantones,
againstwhichreassurance maynot bepossible, accountsfor thepersistence of
warasa partof thehumanconditionnotlikelyto change.3
Unfortunately,
westill donotknowwhatarethecauses of war,or if wedo
knowthem,wearefarfrombeingin agreement
aboutthem.Nosingle
genera
theoryof conictandwarexiststhatis acceptable
to socialscientists
in theirre-
spectivedisciplines,or to authoritiesin otherelds from which socialscientists
borrowinsights.
If acomprehensive
theory
iseverto bedeveloped,
it willproba-
blyrequire
inputsfrombiology,
psychologyandsocialpsychology,
anthropol-
ogy,history,politicalscience,
economics,geography,
theoriesof communica-
tions, organization,games,decisionmaking,military strategy,functional
integration,
systems,philosophy,
theology,
andreligion.Sucha vastsynthesis
of
human
knowledge
maybeimpossible
toachieve,
given
theincreasing
complexity
of theepistemological
problemin thecontinuing
intellectual
debateaboutwhat
weknowandhowweknowit. Merelyto contemplate theneedfor it, however,
servesto warnusagainst
whatAlfredNorthWhitehead calledthefallacyof the
single
factor.Wecannot
identify
anysingle
cause
ofconictorwar;theputative
causes
arenotonlymultiplebuttheyhavekeptmultiplyingthroughout
history.
The term conict usuallyrefersto a condition in which one identiable
groupof humanbeings
(whether
tribal,ethnic,linguistic,
cultural,religious,
socioeconomic,
political,or other)is engaged
in conscious
oppositionto one
or moreotheridentiable
humangroupsbecause
thesegroups
arepursuing
whatareor appearto beincompatible goals.LewisA. Coserdenesconict
asa struggleovervaluesandclaimsto scarce
status,power,andresources in
whichtheaimsof theopponents areto neutralize,
injure,or eliminate
theirri-
vals.?4
Conictis an interaction
involving
humans;
it doesnot includethe
struggle
of individuals
against
theirphysical
environment.Conictimplies
morethanmerecompetition.
Peoplemaycompete
with eachotherfor some-
thingthatis in shortage
withoutbeingfullyawareof theircompetitors
exis-
tence,or withoutseeking
to preventthecompetitorsfrom achieving theirob-
jectives.
Competitionshadesoff into conictwhenthepartiestry to enhance
theirownposition
byreducing
thatof others,
try to thwartothers
fromgain-
ingtheirownends,andtry to put theircompetitors
out of business
or evento
=destroy
them.Conictmaybeviolentor nonviolent
(i.e.,in termsof physical
force),dominantor recessive,
controllableor uncontrollable,
andresolvable
or insolubleundervarioussetsof circumstances.
Conict is distinctfrom ten-
~sions,
insofarastensions
usually
implylatenthostility,
fear,suspicion,
theper-
; ceiveddivergence
of interests,
andperhaps
the desireto dominateor gainre-
venge;however,tensionsdo not necessarily
extendbeyondattitudesand
,perceptionsto encompassactual overt opposition and mutual efforts to
.thwartoneanother.
Theyoftenprecede
andalways
accompany
theoutbreak
190 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

of conict,but theyarenot thesameasconict,andtheyarenot alwaysin-

compatible
withcooperation.
Moreover,
if tensions
become
powerful
enough,
theythemselves maybecome contributoryor preliminarycauses of theoccur-
renceof conict,insofarastheyaffectthedecision-making process.
WhatCoserhasprovidedis a sociological denition.He is interestedin
conictbetween groups.Otheranalysts insistthat thetermconictmustem-
bracenot onlyintergroupbut alsointerpersonal andintrapersonal phenom-
ena.Society wouldnotneedto beconcerned aboutconictwithintheindivid-
ual if it werenot for the plausibleassumption that thereis a signicant
relationshipbetweenconictswithintheinnerstructureof theindividualand
conicts in the externalsocialorder.No theoryof conict canignorethis rela-
tionship.
Theinternalandtheexternal
canneverbecompletely
separated.
Neithercanthe oneeverbereducedcompletelyto the otherand derivedsolely
fromit. Psychological
states
alonecannotexplainsocialbehavior,
andsocial
conditionsalonecannotexplainindividualbehavior.
Urs Luterbachernoted that two different theoreticalperspectivesand
methodologicaltapproaches
areusuallytakenin studyingproblemsof peace
andwar,conict and cooperation:
Thesecan be conceivedon the one hand as resultingmostly from nationaldeci-
sionmaking
processes
withingovernments.
Forinstance,
theconception
thatwars
are initiated becauserulers see a reasonablechance to win them . . . belongs to
thisgeneral
framework.
Ontheotherhand,a largebodyof literature
viewsthe
causes
of international
politicalactions,
andwarsin particular,
asbroadsociopo-
litical forces and movementsthat are beyond the control of any particular
rulers. . . . This distinction between rational and sociological explanations
is not alwaysso clear-cutfor particularauthors.However,. . . everyauthor
tendsto favoroneor theotherconception in theend.5
In hissignicantwork Man,theStateandWar,KennethN. Waltzdistin-
guished threeimages of international
relations,or levelsof analysis,
in terms
of whichweusuallytry to analyze thecauses of war.According to therst im-
age,waris traceable
to humannatureandbehavior.6 Partisans
of thesecond
imageseektheexplanation
of warin theinternalstructure
of thestate,and
this groupincludesboth liberals(who believethat democracies are more
peacefulthandictatorships)
andMarxistLeninists(whobelieve thatcapitalist
statesfomentwar,whilesocialismleadsto peace).Thethird imagepostulates
the causes
of war in the conditionknown to the classicalpolitical theorists(in-
cludingKant,Spinoza,
Rousseau,
and,in moderntimes,Waltzhimselfand
other realistsand neorealistsdiscussedin Chapter2) as internationalanar-
chythat is, the absenceof thoseinstrumentsof law andorganizationthat
wouldbeefcaciousfor peacekeeping. In otherwords,according to Waltzs
third image,a deciencyin thestatesystem makesit necessary
for eachstate
to pursueits owninterestsandambitionsandto actasjudgein its owncase
whenit becomes involvedin disputes
with anotherstate,therebymakingthe
recurrenceof conict, includingoccasionalwars, inevitableand givingriseto
theexpectation
of warasanormalfeature
of thestatesystem.7
 PREREQUISITES
OFA GENERAL
THEORYOFCONFLICT
ANDWAR 191

Waltz
bases
histheory
onthethirdimage.
Whereas
thehistorian
isusually
interested
in thespecic
andunique
factors
thatleadto theoutbreak
of apar-
ticularwar,a theoristsuchasWaltzseeks
to penetrate
beyondspecicwarsin
aneffortto explain
themoregeneral phenomenon of waritselfthatis,large-
scaleghtingor otheractsof violence
anddestruction of organizedmilitary
forcesof twoor morestates.
Thecausalityof international
warisprobably re-
latedin partto thecausality
of otherformsof politicalandsocialconict,
suchascivil war,revolution,andguerrillainsurgency,
butinternational waris
a specicphenomenon requiringa specicexplanation
of its own.In histreat-
mentof rst-imagetheorists,
Waltznotedthatbothutopiansandrealistsoften
agreein diagnosingthebasiccauseof warashumannatureandbehavior, but
disagreesharplyover whetherthat natureand behaviorcan be madeto un-
dergoa sufcient
change
to resolve
theproblem
of war.8Thus,Waltzprefers
to treatwarasa functionof thebalance of powerin ananarchic statesystem.
Conict is a universallyandpermanently recurringphenomenon within
andbetween societies.
It is not necessarily
continuousor uniformlyintense.
Many societiesexperience
longperiodsof relativepeace,both internalandex-
ternal.Quiteprobably,however,
a certainamountof lowlevel,muted,almost
invisibleconictgoesonconstantly
in all societies,
eventhoseapparently
most
peaceful.(Individualcriminal behaviorcan be considereda form of violent
conict.)Conict,aswestatedpreviously, neednot issuein violentbehavior;
it maybecarriedon bymoresubtlepolitical,economic, psychological,
andso-
cial means.Politicsitselfis a process
for resolvingconict.Whetherlarge-
scale,organizedinternationalwarfarecaneverbe eliminatedfrom humanaf-
fairsas weretheinstitutionsof slaveryandhumansacrice,alsoconsidered
naturalat onetimeremains a subjectfor debate.
Perhapsall that canberealisticallyhopedfor at presentis that themost
destructive
formsof organized international
violence(suchasnuclearwarand
conventionalwarsthat mightescalate to thelevelof nuclearwar)canbede-
terredindenitelyasa resultof intelligentpoliciesof mutualrestrainton the
part of governments until effectivemethodsof internationalpeaceenforce-
ment emerge,assumingthat they eventuallywill. However,it is too muchto
expectthat all socialconictcaneverbeabolished, or eventhatpoliticalvio-
lenceat all levelscanbepermanently ruledout.H. L. Nieburghasarguedthat
violence is a naturalformof politicalbehavior.
Thethreatof inictingpainby
resortingto violencewill alwaysbe a usefulmeansof politicalbargaining
withindomestic andinternationalsociety,
Nieburgcontends; thethreat&#39;o
re-
sortingto forcedemonstrates theseriousnesswith whichthedissatised party
setsforth its demands againstthesatised,theestablishment, thedefender of
the statusquoto confrontthelatterstarklywith the alternatives of making
ad]ustments or riskingdangerous escalation
of violence.9
Manysocial scien-
tists,includingseveral identiedwith thepeacemovement, recognize that to-
tal eliminationof conictfromthehumansituationis not onlyimpossible but
also undesirable, because conict in some forms is a condition of social
changeandprogress.
192 THEOLDER
THEORIES
OFCONFLXCT
ANDWAR

MICRO-ANDMACRO-THEORIES
OF CONFLICT
Mostsocial
sciences
canberoughly
divided
intotwogroups,
depending
on
whether
theyadoptthemacro
or themicroholistic
or reductionist-
approach
tothestudy
ofthehuman
universe.
Should
weseek
theorigins
of
conictinthenature
ofhuman
beings
orintheirstructures
andinstitutions?
Generally
speaking,
psychologists,
andsocialpsychologists,
biologists,
games
theorists,
anddecision-making
theorists
takeastheir
point
ofdepar-
turethebehavior
of individuals;
fromthis,theydrawinferences
to thebe-
havior
ofthespecies.
Sociologists,
anthropologists,
geographers,
organiza-
tionandcommunication
theorists,
political
scientists,
international-relation
analysts,
andsystems
theorists
typically
examine
conict
atthelevel
of
groups,
collectivities,
social
institutions,
social
classes,
largepolitical
move-
ments,
religious
orethnicentities,
nationstates,
coalitions,
andcultural
or
global
systems.
Some
scholarseconomists,
forexamplemight
divide
their
efforts
between
themacroand
themicro-dimensions.
Onehistorian
might
prefer
tostudy
theclash
ofnationstates,
while
another
might
prefer
tocon-
centrate
ontheuniquefactors
inthepersonality,
background,
anddecisional
behavior
of anindividual
stateleader
thatprompteda decision
to optfor
warorpeace
inaspecic
setofcircumstances.
(Microcosmic
andmacrocos
mictheories
expounded
bybehavioral
scientists
since
WorldWarII are
treatedin Chapters6 and 7.)
Historically,
theintellectual
chasm
between
themacro-and
themicro-
perspectives
ofhuman
conict
wasnowhere
better
illustrated
than
intheear-
lierpolarity
ofpsychology
andsociology.
The
former eldanalyzed
conict
fromaknowledge
oftheindividual,
thelatter
fromaknowledge
ofcollective
behavior.
Psychologists
havetended
toapproach human
problems
asarising
fromtheinner
psychic
structure
oftheindividual,
whence theyassumed
that
complexes,
tensions,
andother
disorders
were
projected
intotheexternal
so-
cialsituation.
Conversely,
sociologists
have been
disposed
to conduct
their
analysis
ofallhumanproblems
atthelevelofsocial
structures
andinstitu-
tions,
andtotrace
theeffects
ofdisorders
atthatlevel
back
tothepsychic
life
ofindividuals.
Thesharpness
ofthecleavage
asit wasperceived
around
the
turnofthecentury
isreected
inEmile
Durkheims statement
thatevery
time
thatasocial
phenomenon
isdirectly
explained
asapsychic
phenomenon,
one
maybesure
thattheexplanation
isfalse.11
Inthelatterpartofthetwentieth
century,
thedistance
between
thetwo
eldshadnarrowed.
Whileit wouldbegoing
toofartoconclude
thatthegap
has
yetbeen
fullybridged,
increasing
numbers
ofsocial
scientists
arebecom
ingconvinced
thatit isimpossible
toconstruct
anadequate
theory
ofconict
without
fusing
themacro-and
themicro-dimensions
intoacoherent
whole.
Inrecent
years,
asMichael
Haas
has
noted,
social
scientists,
armed withstatis-
ticalmethods
andaidedbycomputers,
havebegun
forthefirsttimeto study
international
conictsystematically
andtoaccumulate
adenitive bodyofsci-
enticknowledge
about
thesubject.
Nonetheless,
theoryoninternational
con-
ict,heconcludes,
remains
ataprimitive
level
partly
because
mostempirica
 INDIVIDUALS
ANDINTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 193

researchers
havebeenbulldozing
exhibitionistically
withoutattempting
to put
the subjectin order analytically.13

INDIVIDUALS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Socialpsychologists are morehesitanttodaythan weretheir predecessors
threeor four decades agoto extrapolate theexplanations of complexsocial
behavior, particularlyat thelevelof internationalrelations,fromtheirknowl-
edgeof individualpsychicbehavior. In thepast,somepsychologists whowere
concerned with theproblemof conictassumed too readilythattheexplana-
tion of groupaggression is a merecorollaryof theexplanation of individual
aggression.They took the Platonic notion that the state is the individual writ
largeandconverted thisinto a pseudoscientic
analogyunderwhichsociety
cameto be uncriticallyregardedas the psychological
organismwrit large.
Socialpsychologistsare now muchlesscondentin this respect.Stephen
Witheyand DanielKatz havewarnedagainstthe attemptto explainthe
functioningof social systemsby a simplereductionof a macroscopic
process.14
Herbert
C.Kelman
hasalsopointed
outthatmanyearlier
writings
on war and peaceby psychologists
and psychiatristswerenot germaneto the
interactions of nationstates. Kelman held that the earlier writers tended to
overemphasize
individualaggressive
impulses.
Thesewriterstook it for
grantedthatthebehaviorof states
is merelytheaggregate
of individualbehav-
iors, ignoring the fact that individualsdiffer widely in their roles, interests,
andabilityto inuencenal decisions.
Thebehaviorof sucha largecollectiv-
ity as a nation, according to Kelman, cannot be considereda direct reection
of the motivesandpersonalfeelingsof eitherits citizensor its leaders.
Onlyby analyzinginternational
relations,not by automatically
applying
psychological
findingsaboutthe individual,canwe identifythosepointsat
which suchapplicationis relevant.Kelmandefinedwar asa societalandinter-
societalactionconducted withina nationalandinternational politicalcontext.
Of crucialimportance in thestudyof international
relationsis theprocess by
whichnationsdeveloptheirnationalpoliciesanddecideonwar.In part,such
anexplanation includes
themotivations andperceptions of individuals aspol-
icymakers andrelevantpublicsplayingvariousrolesaspartof a largersociety.
However, Kelmancautioned thatpsychologicalanalysisis usefulto thestudy
of aggressivebehaviorin aninternationalcontextonlyif weknowwhereand
how suchindividualsfit into the largerpolitical and socialframeworkof the
nation and the internationalsystem,alongwith the constraintsunderwhich
theyoperate.
Most specialistsin the fieldsof political scienceandinternationalrelations
would heartily endorseKelmansconclusion.Psychologicalfactors alone
might go a long way toward explaininginstancesof anomicviolence(i.e.,ap-
parentlyspontaneous andirrational outburstsby eithera crowdor an individ-
ual), but evenin thesecases,socialscientistsarenow morewary of the fallacy
of the single factor. At more complexlevels of politicized conict, where
194 THE OLDERTHEORIESOF CONFLICTAND WAR

violencereectsto a muchgreaterextentsomedegree
of planning,organiza-
tion,management,
andeveninstitutionalization,
theneedfor circumspection
inexplaining
phenomena
byreference
topurely
psychological
factors
becomes
commensurately
greater.
Thepointis worthstressing:
Micro-andmacro-
theories
of humanaggression,
violence,
andwarcannot beneatlyseparated
from eachother.International
war cannotbeadequately
explained
solelyby
reference
to biological
andpsychological
explanations
of individual
aggres-
siveness,
norcanthelatterphenomenon
becomprehended
purely
internally,
without referenceto external social factors.

CONFLICTAND SOCIALINTEGRATION
Socialscientists
aredividedon thequestionof whethersocialconictshould
beregarded
assomething
rational,
constructive,
andsocially
functional
or
something
irrational,
pathological,
andsocially
dysfunctional.
MostWestern
psychologists
andsocial
psychologists
seem toregard
allviolent
formsofindi-
vidual,
group,
andpoliticized
aggression
asirrational
departures
fromnormal,
desirable
behavior.
Bywayof contrast,
mostsociologists
andanthropologists
in Europe
andAmerica
(withthenotable
exception
of theParsonian
school,
which,likeamajorityof psychologists,
stresses
theimportance
of compromise
andadjustment)
havebeenwillingto attributea constructive
purposeto con-
ict, insofarasit helpsto establish
groupboundaries,
strengthens
groupcon-
sciousness
andsense
of self-identity,
andcontributes
towardsocialintegration,
community
building,
andsocioeconomic
change
inaprogressive
direction.
KarlMarx,of course,
whowasmoresociologist
thaneconomist,
placed
the
greatest
emphasisonclass
conictandthenal conictbetweentheprole-
tariatandthebourgeoisie
astheforceps
thatissupposedtogivebirthtoajust
socialorder.
Manysocialscientists
tendto divideontheissue,
some
regarding
violentconictasirrational,whileothersjudgeit goodor bad,depending on
thecontextin whichit arises;
thepolitical,economic,
or socialvaluesat stake;
thecostsincurredin comparison with anticipatedgains;andthenetoutcome
for thegroup,thenation,or theinternationalsystem.

VARIETIES OF CONFLICT
Several
salient
questions
occurat theoutsetof ourinquiry.Should
westudy
thephenomenonofconictinterms
ofconscious motivations?
Dopeople re-
allyghtabout
whattheysaytheyarefighting
about?
Instead,
mustwegobe-
yondstated
reasons,
regardthemwithsuspicion
asmereself-rationalizatio
andtry to penetrate
to therealthatis,unconscious,
murky,andsordidim-
pulses
thatdrivepeople
to aggressive
behavior?
Isthisa falsedichotomy?
If
welookcarefully,
weseethatmicroscientists
aremore
inclined
toprobe
be-.
neaththe surfaceinto the unconscious,the innate,the instinctive(to usean
obsolete
term),whereas
macro-scientists
aresomewhat
morewillingto lend
credence
to conscious
motivations,
for thesemotivationspertainto thought,
 THEORIES OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES IN ANTIQUITY 195

language,andcommunications patterns,which, in contrastto internalpsychic

forces,are productsof society.Giventhat the humanbeingis a symbolicani-
mal, words are crucial links between the unconscious and the conscious, be-
tween micro and macro.
International war is one form of social conict-undoubtedly the most
importantsingleform in termsof its potentialconsequences for the individual
and nations.However,therearemanyother forms of socialconict: civil war,
revolution,coup,guerrillainsurgency, political assassination,
sabotage, terror-
ism, seizureof hostages,prison riots, strikes and strike-breaking,sit-ins,
threats, displaysof force, economicsanctionsand reprisals,psychological
warfare,propaganda,tavernbrawls,labor-management disputes,are-upsat
collegiateor professionalsportsevents,divorcecontestsand legalwrangling
overthe custodyof children,intrafamilyghts, and feloniouscrimes.
A crucial questionthat arisesfrequentlyin the socialsciences, regardless
of the phenomenonunder investigation,1Swhetherwe are dealingwith the
one or the many.CanWeunderstandwar as a separateconictphenomenon
in isolation,or must we study it as one highly organizedmanifestation,at a
specicsocialstructurallevel,of a generalphenomenon? Socialscientistsare
far from agreementas to whether human conict can be satisfactorilyex-
plainedasa continuumin whichviolentoutburstsdiffer only by suchacci-
dentsas the natureof the parties,the size,the duration,the intensity,the na-
ture of the issuesand the objectivessought, the processesand modesof
conict, and the weaponsemployed.Other approaches would emphasize the
underlyingcausesor view human conict as an indenite seriesof discrete
phenomena,
eachof which,despitea supercialexternalresemblance
to the
others,requiresits own uniquetheoreticalexplanation.

THEORIES OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES IN ANTIQUITY

Most of the older theories of war and its causeswe would now call prescien-
tic, eventhough someof them were basedon empiricalevidence,drawn
from history and human experience.Severalof the earlier theoriescontain
perceptive
insightsthatcontinueto meritour attentionaspartof our cultural
heritage.They enableus to seehow the problemof war was lookedupon in
otherhistoricalepochs
andwhyit wasnot alwaysregarded
asthegreatest
of
evils. They reect consciousmotivations for and rationalizationsof war,
which at the level of human decisionmaking can be causal.They provide
philosophical,religious,political, and psychological
argumentsfor and
againstwar, both in generaland in speciccircumstances.

China In virtuallyall theancientreligiousandethicalcivilizations,

theprob-
lem of war was approachednot only asone of political and military strategy,
but alsoasoneof spiritualandmoraldimensions. AncientChinaproduceda
broadrangeof theoriesfrompacism,or peace,to bellicism,or war.Mo-Ti
preached a doctrineof universallove,with whichthe wagingof war was
196 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

deemedutterlyincompatible;
hecalledwarlargescalemurder andattacked it
ongrounds thatit protsnobody(asNorman Angellsubsequently asserted
in
theearlytwentieth century).
Confucius andhisdisciple
Mencius taughtthat
states,
in dealingwithoneanother,
should observe
goodfaithandmoderation;
theyshould alsoavoidimperialism,
intervention
in theaffairsof otherstates,
andaggressive
warsofconquest.
Likemanymodern
idealists,
theybelieved
thatdiplomats
should
relyonthereasonableness
andjustice
of theirpositions,
ratherthan on the threat of force,to win their case.However,the Confucians
werenotpacists;
theydidnotcounsel
nonresistance
toattack.
Confucius,
al-
thoughhelookedonwarasanevil,insisted
thatwhenit comes,
it mustbe
wagedvigorously.
Asaprerequisite
ofsuccess,
thearmymusthaveaclear
idea
of whyit is ghtinganda strongconviction
thatits cause
is ]ust.Mencius
played
downthevalue
ofalliances
andwarned
rulers
notto depend
onthem;
therealstrength
of astatelieslessin strong
fortsthanin themorale
of itspeo-
pleandthemoralstamina of its defenders.
(In thetwentieth
century, Mao
Zhedongstressed
thatinwar,thepowerofhumans
countsformorethanthe
powerofweapons.)TotherightoftheConfucians
werethelegalists,
includ-
ingtherealorlegendary
LordShang,theMachiavelli
of ancient
China,who
advisedrulersto makethepeasants
work longandhardandto fill peasants
liveswithdrudgery,
sothatwhenwarcomes,
theywill greetit asa welcome
relief.

India Whereas
Chinaextolledthescholar,
IndianHindu(butnot Buddhist)
cultureassigned
a higherplaceto thewarriorclass.
Warwasaccepted
aspart
of theeternalschemeof thingsandwasmorehighlyinstitutionalizedin India
thanin China.Rulescalculatedto mitigatetheseverity
of warhadthesanction
of Indianreligious
authorities.
Unfair,
unchivalrous,
andinhumane
practices
in
warwerecondemned;
noteven
in Warwasthereanunqualied
rightto kill;
certainly
a kingmustnotkill thoseenemies
whothrowdowntheirarmsand
begfor mercy.Nonetheless,eventhoseHinduandBuddhistteachers
who
protested
against
wartookit for granted
thatwarwasa naturally
recurring
phenomenon.
Theancient
Buddhist
doctrine
ofa/aimsa
(harmlessness
toward
alllivingthings),famous
asoneof thesources
fromwhichGandhi
derived
his
doctrineof nonviolence,
wasnotunderstood
to forbidthewagingof war;actu-
ally,it promoted
vegetarianism
longbefore
it contributed
topacism.18
Greece TheGreeks
in general
hada similarlyfatalattitudetowardwar.The
philosopher
Heraclitus
postulated recurringstrifeasoneof theendlessunder-
lyingprocesses
of reality,alongwiththeattractingforceof love;thetwoalter-
natewith eachotherin gainingtheascendancyandthenbeingdrivenout but
nevereliminated.
In hisview,if war shouldperish,theuniverse
wouldbede-
stroyed,
forstrifeisjustice,
through
whichallthingscomeintobeingandpass
away.TheGreeks didnotproduce
muchin thewayof pacistthought.
The
Atheniansespecially
alwaysseemed
readyto ght fortheirfreedom
andinde-
pendence,
andsometimes
for imperialistic
ends.
 THEORIESOF WAR AND ITS CAUSESIN ANTIQUITY 197

Even in his most utopian work, The Republic, Plato was unable to dis-
pense with the role of military guardians. He suggestedthat there would be
no need for a warrior group to defend the state if people could be contented
with a simple,frugal existencehavingneitherthe desireto plunderforeign-
ers, nor wealth to tempt them to aggression.However, people want courte-
sans and cakes, imposing public temples and theaters, ne fabrics, elegant
dwellings, and exotic spicesall the fruits and comforts of civilization. War,
said Plato, results from the unwillingness of human beings to live within the
limitsof necessity.Aristotleaccepted
war asa legitimate
instrument
for set-
tling interstate disputes, but he never praised it. Rather, he insisted that, just
ashumansmust engagein economicactivity to enjoya life of leisureand cul-
ture, so they must occasionally carry on war to have peace.He strongly criti-
cized Sparta for gearing its educational and legal system to war as the ulti-
mateendof politics.
Pericles,a peerless
propagandist,usedhis famousFuneralOration to glo-
rify not war but the heroism of those Athenians who died defending the open,
democraticsociety againstthe closedsociety of the garrison stateof Sparta.The
historianThucydideslamentedthe destructiveness of war, acceptedit grudg-
ingly asa matterof defenseratherthan conquestor annihilation,and perhaps
cameascloseasany Greekwriter to a skepticalview of the utility of war when
hepragmaticallywarnedstateleadersto taketime overtheir decisionto opt for
war. He recorded(or composed)the words of one diplomaticenvoyurging a
king to ponderthe unpredictabilityof war beforemaking the fatal commit-
ment.The longera war lasts, hewrote, the morethingstendto dependon
accidents.. . . (and)we haveto abidetheir outcomein the dark.22
RecentlyAlan Beyerchen, an historianat Ohio StateUniversity,concluded
in a strikinglysimilarvein that ClausewitzsOn War is suffusedwith the un-
derstandingthat everywar is inherentlya nonlinearphenomenon, the conduct
of which changesits characterin ways that cannot be analytically pre-
dicted.23It is salutaryto remember
this caveatin the ageof scienceand
advancedmilitary technology.
Because the Greeksprizedlimit or measureas the key to humanperfec-
tion and to moderationin all things,and becausethey regardedthemselvesas
superiorto all non-Greeks(barbaroi),theysoughtto assuage the damagingef-
fectsof war amongtheir own city-states,which sharedcultural values.Thus,
the treaty of the AmphictyonicLeagueof Delphi prohibitedwar amongmem-
bers exceptfor good cause,and it forbadetaking Greeksas slaves,killing
civilians,burningmember
cities,or cuttingoff theirwatersupply.
Rome The Greeksneverworkedout carefullythe ideaof the just war. This
task was taken up by the Romanswho, in the early Romanrepublic,were
much more unabashedlymoral and legalisticthan the Greekshad beenin
their approachto war. The Romansweremeticulousin observingthe rulesof
warrules of their own devisingunderthe ius fetiale,that part of the sacred
law that regulatedthe solemnswearingof treaties,the settlementof disputes
198 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

betweenstates,andthe declaration of war.It wasthe functionof thefetial

judges,a religiopoliticalcollegeof priestofcials,to determinewhethera
neighboring
community
hadsowronged
Romeasto justifya resortto mili-
tary force.
TheRomansapparently
felt obligedto convincethemselves,
beforeem-
barkingonWar,
thattheircause
wasjustandpious(/ustum
et pium).The
mostcommonly recognizedcauses
were(1)theViolationof Romes
territorial
dominions;(2) violationof ambassadors
diplomaticimmunityby inicting
physical
harm;(3)violationof a treatyobligation;
(4)rendering
aidto anen-
emyof Rome;(5)desecrationof sacred places;
and(6)refusing
to surrender
thosewhohadcommitted
serious
offenses
againstRome.25
Romanswereinclinedto look on a military defeatasa signthat the gods
did not nd theircausejust;thiswasa powerfulincentiveto braveryon the
battleeld.The Romansusuallydemanded satisfaction
from the offending
partywithina specied
period.If thiswasnotforthcoming,
a heraldwould
readthe formal declarationand hurl a spearinto the soil of the enemystate,
indicatingtheprecisemomentwhenwar brokeout. Warandpeaceweresi-
multaneously incompatible.
Two stateswereeitherat war or at peacewith
eachother.Therewasno room for that ambiguityor uncertaintyoften found
in OrientalhistoryandduringtheU.S.Soviet ColdWar,whenlimitedconict
anduneasy cooperation werecommingled. TheRomans, evenmorethanthe
Greeks,believed at leastin theorythatno greaterforceshouldbeusedin war
thanrequired
by legitimate
militarynecessity
andthat deliberate
efforts
shouldbe madeto regularizebelligerentproceedings.Practice,however,
sometimesovercame theory,asit oftendoesin thepassions of war.Rome
treatedSpainwith harshbrutality,callouslyenslaved
moreintelligentGreeks
andothercivilizedpeoples,
andfinallysuccumbed to Catosoftrepeated
ad-
monition,
Carthage
mustbedestroyed
(Carthago
delenda
est).27
Islam TheprophetMuhammad preachedthe holy war (jihad)as a sacred
dutyanda guarantee
of salvation,
andfor several
centuries,Muslimtheorists
assumedthat the world was dividedinto the dar al-Islam(thepeacefulabode
of the true believers and those who submitted to their tolerant rule) and the
daral-harb(theterritoryof war).Inasmuch asIslamwasa universalistsystem
of belief,thetwo territorieswerealwaystheoretically
at war with eachother
becausewar was the ultimate devicefor incorporatingrecalcitrantpeoples
into thepeaceful
territoryof Islam.Thejihad,therefore,
wasmorea crusade
than the heliumjustum (just war), familiar to medievalChristianwriters.
Theconcept
of thejihadasa permanent
stateof war againstthenonMusl1m
world had becomealmostobsoletein moderntimes,at leastprior to the emer-
genceof MuammarQhaddhafi in Libya,AyatollahKhomeiniin Iran,andvar-
iousradicalfundamentalist groups(e.g.,theMuslimBrotherhood) andmili-
tant terrorists(e.g.,Jihad),whocall for a holywar againstenemies
of Islam.
Severalmodernwriters havestressed
that the termjihad referslessto military
conictthanto thespiritualstruggle
for perfection
withintheheartof individ-
 THEORIES OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES IN ANTIQUITY 199

uals.28
MahatmaGandhideclared
that hewasableto perceive
theoriginsof
the doctrineof nonviolenceandlove for all living thingsnot only in the sacred
Hindu andBuddhistwritings and the Bible,but alsoin the Koran.29

Judaism The predominant historical attitudes toward war that are found in
Westernculture are a product of severaldifferent sources,including the Judeo
Christian religioustradition, Greekphilosophy,Roman legalism,European
feudalism, Enlightenment pacism, and modern scientism, humanitarianism,
and other ideologies. The ancient Jewish scriptures reect the paradox of hu-
man yearning for a peaceful existenceamidst the constant recurrenceof war.
Surroundedby hostilepeoples,the Israelitesrelied heavilyon a combination
of religiousprophetismandmilitary organizationfor nation building,defense,
and territorial expansion. In the earlier history of the Jews, Yahweh often ap-
peared as a warrior-god. Joshua, Gideon, Saul, and David fought wars for
Yahwehshonor and glory, to demonstrateYahwehspower and Yahwehsspe-
cial relationship to the chosenpeople. Once the promised land had been won
from the Canaanitesand kings took over from judges, the wars of Israel and
Judahbecamelessferocious,and themesof love, justice,and peacebecame
moreprominentin theJewishscriptures.
War and Christianity The early Christians were divided in their attitude
toward the use of military force by the state. During the rst three centuriesof
the early Catholic Churchs history, when Christianity was regarded an alien
and subversivecreed within the Roman Empire, there was a strong tendency
toward pacism, especially among the intellectuals, many of whom believed
that the Christian both as private person and as a citizen should respond to in-
jury by turning the other cheek, regardlessof the consequencesfor the state.
Pacifism,however, did not becomethe orthodox Christian doctrine. The dom-
inant View among the leaders of the church was that political authority was
divinely instituted for the benet of the individual. When force was used
justly, they believed,it was good and not a moral evil. People are enjoined to
turn the other cheek when their own rights are violated, becausethey seek a
salvation beyond history, but the state, which must safeguardthe temporal so-
cial good here and now, may have to resort to force at times as an instrument
of justice for the common good. Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine, writing
after Christians in the West had begun to assumeresponsibility for the social
order,baptizedthe ancientRomandoctrineof the just war asa sad necessity«
in theeyesof menof principle.31
Scholasticphilosophers in the Middle Ages considerably rened the just-
war doctrine. The decision to initiate violent hostilities could not be taken by
a private individual, but only by public authority. Rulers were enjoined
against resorting to war unlessthey were morally certain that their causewas
just (jusad bellum)that is, that their juridical rights had beenviolatedby a
neighboringruler. Even then, they were exhorted to exhaustall peaceful
meansof settlingthe disputebeforeinitiating the useof force,andthesemeans
200 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

usually included arbitration. Furthermore, there had to be a reasonable

prospectthat the resort to force would be more productiveof good than of
evil and would restore the order of justice. The war had to be waged through-
out with a right moral intention, and it had to be conductedby meansthat
were not intrinsically immoral ([145in bello), for what begins as a just war
could becomeunjust in its prosecution. Thesewere the common teachings of
such medieval writers as Antoninus of Florence and St. Thomas Aquinas.
Emphasiswasplacedon what would later becalledthe principlesof propor-
tionality and discrimination. Under the first, the suffering and destruction
caused by the war should not be disproportionate to the causejustifying the
resort to war; under the second, innocent populations were considered im-
muneastargetsof militaryaction.
Throughout the Middle ;Ages,the Catholic Church attempted to impose
ethicalcontrolson the conductof war by specifyingtimeswhenghting could
not be carried on, sites where battle was prohibited, types of weapons that
couldnot legitimatelybeemployed,andclasses of personsthat wereeitherex-
emptedfrom the obligation of military serviceor protectedagainstmilitary
action. This effort to soften the cruelty of warfare was by no means new in
Western culture. The ancient Greeks and Romans had been familiar with such
agreedrules of war as thoseforbidding wanton destructionof populations,
the burningof cities,andthe severance of watersupplies.Many circumstances
of medievalEuropeanculture,includingthe commonvaluesof Christendom,
the natureof feudalism,prevailingeconomicconditions,the Teutonictradi-
tion of the chivalricwarrior, and the crudestateof the military sciences,
actu-
ally reinforcedthe moral effortsof the CatholicChurchto mitigatethe harsh-
nessof warfareduringthemedieval
period.
In the period of transition from medievalto modernEurope,three out-
standingexceptionsto the dominanttheory and practiceof morally limited
warfare can be identied. Thesewere invariably expressionsof ideological
conict that ran counter to the distinctive tendencies of medieval culture:
(1) the Crusadesiofthe twelfth and thirteenth centuries,fought againstan
alien and indel civilization; (2) the wars of the fourteenth and fteenth
centuries,especiallybetweenthe Frenchand English,in which the forcesof
national feelingtmadethemselves felt for the first time on a large scale;and
(3) the religiouswarsthat followed the Reformation.In all of thesecases,war
ceasedto be a rational instrumentof monarchicalpolicy for the defenseof
juridical rights. The conceptof war as a small-scaleaffair of skirmish and
maneuver lost its primacy when large numbers of nonprofessional
(i.e., nonthivalric) warriors, both volunteers and mercenaries, became en-
meshedwith cultural, national,or religiousantipathies.Whena cherishedset
of valuesor a way.of life was thought to hinge on the outcomeof an en-
counter,war becamean all-consumingpsychologicaland moral experience.
Hence,the battles of Antioch, Crécy,Poitiers,Agincourt, and Magdeburg
were bitter and bloody in the extreme. In the Thirty Years War between
Catholics and Protestants (1618-1648), the population of Germany was re-
 THEPHILOSOPHICAL
THEORIES
OFTHENATION-STATE
PERIOD 201

duced
from21millionto 13million.34
Thejustwartheory
inthenuclear
age
is treatedlater in this chapter.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF THE NATION-

STATE PERIOD

Duringtheclassical
periodof thebalance ofpowerushered
in bytheTreatyof
Westphalia
in 1648,theconcept of limitedwarregained
currencyin Europe.
At thebeginning
of themodernnation-state
periodin thesixteenthandseven-
teenthcenturies,
the traditionalWesterndoctrineof the just war wasreaf-
rmed by scholastic
theologians
andphilosophers,
suchas Victoriaand
Suarez,and by the earliestsystematic
expounders
of internationallaw-
Grotius,Ayala,Vattel,Gentilis,
andothers.Forthesewriters,thejust&#39;
emerged asa substitutejuridicalproceeding,a sortof lawsuitin defense
of the
legalrightsof thestate,prosecuted by forcein theabsence of aneffective in-
ternational
judicialsuperiorcapable
of vindicating
the orderof justice.
Virtuallyall the classical
European
writerson international
Warinsistedon
thenecessity
of sparing
thelivesof theinnocent
in war.Theslayingof the
guiltlesscouldneverbedirectlyintended; at best,it wascondoned asanindi-
recteffectasincidentalto thelegitimate
operations of a justwar.35
In thelatterhalf of theseventeenth
century,aftertheviolence of thereli-
giouswarshadsubsided, thependulum swungbackagaintowardmoremod-
erateformsof warfare.
Fromthenthrough
mostof theeighteenth
century,
the
Ageof Reason,
warswerelessideological
andmoreinstrumental
in thetradi-
tionalsense.
Armieswerelarger,but alsobetterorganized,supplied,
disci-
plined,andtrained,ofceredlargelyby aristocrats
whotried,notverysuc-
cessfully,
to imbuelowerclass
rankswith theidealsof theold chivalriccode.
John U. Nef suggestsa numberof factorsthat inuencedthe trend toward
greaterrestraint:a growingdistaste
for violence;
a raisingof thecomfortlevel
amongthe Europeanbourgeoisie; the refinement of manners, customs,and
lawsbyanaristocracy
thatnowadmired gentility,
agility,andsubtlety
more
thanprowess
in battle;thepursuitof commerce;andthegrowthof thene
arts,combined
with zealous
effortsto applyreasonto socialaffairs.All these
factors,
Nefconcludes,
helped
to weaken
thewill for organized
ghting.
Downto thetimeof theFrenchRevolution, thestatesof Europewerenot
willingto pursueobjectives thatrequiredinictinga greatdealof destruction
on theenemy. Thisperiodwitnessed theemergence of economic motivations
for conict,but,althoughit is truethatcolonialandcommercial rivalrieswere
addedto dynastic
feudsascauses
of international
disputes,
theriseof the
bourgeoisie
helpedbuttresspacifistratherthan militaristsentiments.
The
bourgeoisie
desiredmorethananythingelseanorderlyinternational commu-
nityin whichconditionsof tradewouldbepredictable.
Theveryfactthatthe
leadingcommercial nationsof Western Europe werealsodeveloping
naval
powerhelped to soften
theeffectsof warfare
in theeighteenth
century,
insofar
202 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

asnavalforcescouldcarryon hostileengagements
withoutdirectlyinvolving
landpopulations.
Suchlandwarfareasdidtakeplacewasusuallycharacter-
izedby adroitmaneuver,surprise,marchand countermarch,andrapier
thrustsat the enemyssupplylines,as exemplied
in the campaigns
of
Turenne,Saxe,andMarlborough. War,in thecenturyof drawing-room
cul-
ture,wasnot entirelyunrelated
to thegameof chessor theminuet.Thepre-
vailingsenseof restraint
probably
ledto a slowdownin therateof innovation
in militarytechnology.Encounters
between armiesin the Fieldwereoften
lookedon asmereadjunctsto thediplomaticprocess,
designed
to strengthen
or weakenthebargaining
positionsof envoysduringprolongednegotiations.
Historyshows that,timeandagain, changesin theeconomicandtechno-
logicalorders
andin religious,
political,andculturalattitudes
canhavea pro-
foundeffectuponthenatureandconduct of war.It shouldbekeptin mind,
however,
thatsuchchanges
areneverdistributed
equally
or symmetrically
throughout
anexpanding
andincreasingly
complex
international
system.

MODERN PACIFIST THEORIES

Meanwhile, thepost-RenaissanceandEnlightenmentperiodshadwitnessed
therisein Europeof a schoolof pacistthoughtthatrejected
themedieval
moralandlegaldoctrineof war.Thepacistwriters-Erasmus,
More,Crucé,
Fenelon,
Penn,
Voltaire,
Rousseau,
Kant,andBenthamtook
theirstandei-
theron StoicandearlyChristianradicalpositionsor on thenewerEuropean
idealsof cosmopolitanism,
humanitarianism,andbourgeois internationalism.
Practically
allof themexhibited
apronounced skepticismin theirattitudes
to-
wardwarandthemilitaryprofession.It wasparticularly
fashionable to com-
pareunfavorablythedestructive
lifeof thesoldierwiththeusefullifeof the
merchant. Theabolitionof forcefrominternational
politicscameto belooked
onasthenoblestobjective of stateleaders.
Thequestfor humanhappiness un-
marredby anytraceof thetragicbecame for European intellectuals
thegreat
goalof life.37
Thephilosophers
werenotagreed
among
themselves
asto whether
happi-
nesswasto beachieved
throughtheapplication
of scientific
andtechnical
rea-
sonor throughpeoplesreturnto natureandrediscovery of theiroriginalsim-
plicity.Nonetheless,
rationalistsandromantics alikewereconvinced that
societywasaboutto breaktheshackles of traditional
authorityandsupersti-
tion;dispel
thehistorical
cursesof ignorance,
disease,
andwar;andembark-
in the vision of Condorceton the absolutelyindenite perfectibilityof hu-
manity,
whichknowsnolimitotherthanthedurationof theglobeonwhich
nature has placedus.38The people,being more enlightened,wrote
Condorcet,will learnby degrees to regardwar asthemostdreadfulof all
calamities,
themostterribleof all crimes.39Theerawasmarkedby a bitter
cynicism
concerning
theconcept of thejustwar,whichwasregardedasmere
propaganda
calculated
to cloaktheaggressiveurgesof ambitious
emonarchs
No one at the time denouncedthe stupidity and incongruitiesof war with
 MODERN PACIFIST THEORIES 203

morescathing
sarcasm
thanVoltaire,whopokedfun at thetwokings,eachof
whom had Te Deumssungin his own campafter the battle. Therewas an
anticipation,reectedin the writings of Montesquieu,that the transitionfrom
monarchical to republican institutionswouldbeaccompanied by a shiftfrom
thespirit of war andaggrandizement to that of peaceandmoderation. (See
Chapter7, the sectionon Democracies, War, and Peace.)Theperiod
abounded in projectsfor abolishing war andestablishing perpetualpeace,
which lingered in the minds of Western thinkers as models for the interna-
tionalpeacekeeping
institutions
thatmaterialized
in thetwentiethcentury.
The hopesof the Enlightenmentwriters provedillfounded at the end of
theeighteenth
century.Liberalnationalistideologywasbornin Franceduring
theRevolutionandits Napoleonic aftermath,eventually
sparkingnationalist
reactions
elsewhere
in Europe.TheFrenchintroduced thelevéeenmasse,the
citizenconscriptarmythe nation at arms,backedby all the organizablere-
sources
of a newlyindustrializing
society.
Thus,Francebecame
theprototype
of economicregimentation,largescalefactory production for war, and the
mobilizationof popularopinionin supportof nationalexpansionist
policies.
The charismaticlittle Corsicanwas virtually the first to wagetotal war in
moderntimes.For a while,his powerfularmywasuncbnquerable.
Military
casualties
reached
unprecedented proportions.
Napoleon,however,had left the Europeanbalanceof power in a sham-
bles.The conservative
reactionof 1815 and thereafter,masterminded
by
Metternichand Talleyrandand basedon the prihciple of a return to monar-
chicallegitimacy,restoredthe classicalidea of the balanceof powera
Newtonian notion of an internationaluniversein equilibrium-"to
a central
placein thethinkingof European
leaders
of state.43
Thisrestoration
helpedto
limit war and-,with the exceptionof the Franco-PrussianWar,minimizethe
harsh effects of a developingmilitary technology for a hundred years.
Standingarmies were reducedin size everywhereoutside of Russia and
Prussia.In WesternEurope,the convictiongrew that science,industry,com-
municationstechnology,the growth of liberal parliamentaryinstitutions,edu-
cation,and internationaltradewereall combiningto makewar obsoleteand
perhapsimpossible.The era of the Concert of Powers,of which the Pax
Britannicawasan important feature,was marked by astutediplomacyand
short wars rather than by lengthy,destructiveengagements betweenmilitary
forces.Bismarck,the most cannymanipulatorof war, as an adjunct of his
diplomacytoward Denmark,Austria,and France,in his effortsto unify
GermanyunderPrussias
leadership,preferredto wield an iron st in a velvet
glove. Throughout
thenineteenth
century,
Europeexperiencedno
conictas
bloody as the AmericanCivil War,which was in severalrespectsa prototype
of modern
totalwarin whichpowerful
politicalandideological
motivations
pitted the industrial technologyof emergingcapitalistliberalismagainstthe
traditionalvaluesof an agrarian,slave-holdirigaristocracy.
Appearances in Europe,however,were somewhatdeceptive.Despitethe
return to limited war, fought for limited political objectives(e.g.,the unica-
tion of Germany),the latter decadesof the nineteenthcenturywitnessedthe
204 THE OLDERTHEORIESOF CONFLICTAND WAR

spread
ofuniversal
conscription
inEurope,
themass production
ofnewauto-
matic
weapons,
armaments
races,
thecreation
ofalliances,
increasing
colonial
andcommercial
rivalriesamongthepowers,
andthegrowthof a popular
press
thatcould
beconverted
intoapowerful
instrument
forstirring
belliger-
entsentiments.
Theriseof modern
warindustryhadan ambiguous
signi-
cance.On theonehand,it servedto makewar morefrightfulandmoreun-
protable
andhence
less
readily
undertaken.
Ontheother
hand,
it served
to
makeit muchmorelikelythatwar,whenit didcome,
wouldbetotalin na-
ture,absorbing
allavailable
energies.
Theclosely
packed
battle,
inwhichmass
ismultiplied
byvelocity,
becameadominantfeature
inmodern
Europeanmil-
itarythought.
Emphasis wasplacedonmeans of rapidmobilization:
the
telegraph
forordering
upreserves,
therailroad
fortransporting
troopsand
equipmenttothefront,andsteamships
forgetting
themtothecolonial
terri-
toriesofAsiaandAfrica.Thespeed
of mobilization
wassocriticalthatthede-
cision
tomobilize
became
tantamount
toadeclaration
ofwarby1914.47

Jonathan
Dymonds UncompromisingPacism
Throughout
thenineteenth
century,
thepacist
movement
slowly
extended
its
inuence
in England
andtheUnitedStates.
Jonathan
Dymond,
anEnglish
Quaker,
argued
thatwar,liketheslave
trade,
would
begin
todisappear
when
people
wouldrefuse toacquiesceinit anylonger
andbegintoquestion
itsne-
cessity.
Dymond denied
thatthepatriotic
warriorcelebrated
insong
andstory
forhavinglaiddownhislifeforhiscountry deserves
suchpraise.
Theofcer,
hesaid,entersthearmyto obtainanincome, theprivate
because
heprefers
a
life of idleness
to oneof industry.
Bothght because
it is theirbusiness,
be-
causetheirreputation
is at stake,
or becausetheyarecompelledto doso.
Dymond anticipated
thecontentionsofthesocialists
andthelaterexponents
of thedeviltheory.
of warbyinsinuating thattheindustrialists
whoprot
fromwarcombine
forces
withtheprofessional
military
forthepurposeof
promoting
war.Hedeclared
thattheChristian
scriptures
requiretheindivid-
ual to refrainfromviolenceunderall circumstances.
All distinctions
between
justandunjust
war,between
defensive
andaggressive
warhedismissed
asbe-
inginvain.Warmustbeeither
absolutely
forbidden
orelsepermitted
torun
its unlimitedcourse.48.-Dymond
wasoneof theearlyvoicesof thatmodern
movement of uncompromisingpacismthatsoughtnotonlyto givereligious
advice to theconscience
of theindividual,
butalsoto exertaninuenceonthe
policy
ofstatesor
atleast
those
states
inwhich
theclimate
ofopinion
issuf-
cientlyliberalto permitthepropagation
of thepacistdoctrine.
Theaversion
of modernintellectual
paciststo war cannotbeexplained
purely
in terms
of religious
andhumanitarian
factors.
Since
thenineteenth
century,
economicconsiderations,
eitherliberalor socialist
in theirfounda-
tion,have
entered
intothethinkingofmostpacists onthesubject ofwarand
peace.FromRichard
Cobdens erainthemid-nineteenthcentury downtovery
recent
times,
many
liberal
pacists
have
been
convinced
thatanintrinsic
and
mutually
causalrelationship
exists
be_tween*free
tradeandpeace
andthatthe
 MODERNPACIFIST
THEORIES 205

abolition
oftradebarriers
istheonlymeans
ofeffecting
permanent
peace.
The
heirsof thisintellectual
traditionin thecontemporary
eraaretheneoliberals
andtheinterdependence theorists
(discussed
in Chapters
1,2, and9)

Sir Norman Angell: War as an Anachronism

Theliberalviewthatwarrepresents
thegreatest
threatto theeconomic
health
ofmodern
industrial
civilization
reached
itsearlyculmination
inthewritings
of NormanAngell,
anEnglish publicist
whoachievedprominencein the
1920sand1930sandwhoseworkformedpart of theutopianphaseof inter-
national
relations
described previously.
Shortly
beforeWorldWarI, Angellar-
guedthatwarfarein theIndustrialAgehadbecome anunprotableanachro-
nism.Theeconomic futilityof militarypower,hedeclared,
hadbeenamply
demonstratedbyrecenthistory, whichshowed thatevenwhenvictoryin war
seemsatrst glance
to bringwithit substantialeconomicgains,
suchappear-
ancesaremisleading
andillusory.Nearlyeveryone
thoughtthattheGermans
hadreapedan advantage
fromthehugeindemnitythat Francewasforcedto
payafterbeingdefeated
in theFranco-Prussian
Warof 1870to 1871,but,
Angellargued,the indemnityactuallyinducedan ination that hurt the
German
economy.
No nation,hewenton to say,cangenuinely
improve
its
economic
positioneitherthroughwar or throughthoseimperialistic
opera-
tionsthatinvolvecostlypreparations
for militarydefense.
Angellwascon-
vincedthat the factorsthat reallydo constituteprosperityhavenot the re-
motestconnectionwith military or navalpower,all our politicaljargon
notwithstanding.
In the nal analysis,Angellwasa rationalistwho believedthat war could
beeliminatedthroughthegrowthandprogressive application
of humanrea-
sonto international
affairs.Themoderntechnical
statecouldnolongerexpect
to prot fromwaging
warbutcouldonlyanticipate
thedisintegration
of its
ownsociety.
Oncepeoplebecome
convinced
thatwarhaslostits meaning
ex-
ceptasa formof mutualsuicide,
thoughtAngell,disarmament
andpeace
wouldbepossible.
Hewascondentthatpeace
wasprimarilya matterof ed-
ucatingthe publicsof democraticsocieties,andhe choseto couchhis homilies
in termsof theeconomic self-interest
of aninterdependent Europeancommu-
nity,ratherthanin termsof traditionalreligiousmorality.In anycase,hehad
no doubtthat oncehumanbeingsfully realized
theirrelevance
of military
forcefor theattainment,
promotion,
andpreservationof prosperity
or socioe-
conomicwell-being,
thenpoliticalwarswouldcease
asreligiouswarsdid in
theWesta longtimeago.It isworthnotingtheparallelbetween
thethought
of Norman Angellwiththatof Herbert
Spencer in thenineteenth
century
and
of George
Liskain themid-twentieth,
all of whomheldthatindustrialnations
areboundto eschew
war.5°
Moreover,
mostcontemporary
strategic
theorists
(tobesurveyed
in Chapter
8),whocome
froma greatdiversity
of perspec-
tives,not only economic,
haveconcluded
that nuclearwar makesno sense,
thatnoexpected
gaincouldbeworthitscost,thatritis unwinnable,
andthat
nuclear
weapons
canhavenouseexceptasa deterrent.Deterrence
theorists,
it
206 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

mightbesaid,thinkthatAngellstheorycouldnot bedemonstrably
validated
until afterthe adventof nuclearweaponson a largescale,producinga balance
of terror.If Angellwascorrect,he wasat leasta half centuryaheadof his
time,for hisanalysisappearedirrelevantto thegovernmentsthat undertook
to participate in two world wars.

BELLICIST THEORIES
ModernWesterntheoriesof conict andwar, includingthoseof utopianpaci-
sm, cannotbeunderstoodwithoutsomereference to theappearance,follow-
ing theFrenchRevolution,
of a militaristschoolof thoughtwithin theWest.
Bellicism,asthis schoolmight becalled,developedat leastpartly in conscious
reactionto idealisticpacism. Perhapsit would be more accurateto saythat
the two tendenciesin Westernthought fed on eachother as polar opposites.
Western
culturehasneverlackedthinkerswho stressed
conict andtension
overcooperationand harmonyin socialreality.
Most Westerntheoristsof military strategyfrom the periodof the French
Revolutionuntil the early 1960s(when the emphasisshifted from conven-
tional strategyto the study of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency)
showeda distinctpreference
for directoverindirectstrategies,
for theblud-
geoningattackof the massed armyoverthe gracefulrapierthrust,for the
frontal assaultand the quick decisionover the more patient strategyof ma-
neuver,encirclement, attrition, and negotiation.The conceptof total war has
often beentracedto the writings of Karl von Clausewitz,who at times ex-
pressed
quitevividlythe ideaof war asan actof forcepushedto its utmost
bounds, as he did in the following passage:
Now philanthropic
soulsmighteasilyimaginethat therewasan artisticwayof
disarmingor overthrowingour adversarywithout too much bloodshedand that
this was what the art of war should seekto achieve.However agreeablethis may
sound,it is a falseideawhich must be demolished.He who usesthis forceruth-
lessly,shrinkingfrom no amountof bloodshed,mustgain an advantageif his ad-
versarydoesnot do the same.Therebyhe forceshis adversarys hand, and thus
eachpushesthe otherto extremitiesto which the only limitation is the strengthof
resistance on the other side.Neverin the philosophyof war canwe introducea
modifyingprinciplewithout committingan absurdity.Sowe,repeatour statement:
Waris anactof force,andto theapplication
of thatforcethereis nolimit.
Yet, accordingto an eminenttwentieth-centurystrategistof limited war
and opponentof total-war thinking, Sir BasilH. Liddell Hart, Clausewitzhas
often beenmisinterpreted.As a studentof ImmanuelKant, Clausewitzappre-
ciated the difference between the ideal and the real, between the tendency of
thoughtfor the sakeof clarityto carryanideato an extreme,abstractform
andthesignicantmodifications thatpracticalrealityimposes
ontheabstrac-
tion. Clausewitzspokeof absolutewar asa logicalextremeto which military
combat can be carried within the mind, a context in whicheach side strives
for perfectionof effort to breakthe otherswill to resist.However,he alsorec-
 BELLICIST THEORIES 207

ognized that there is no such thing in the real world, where war should be and
is an instrumentof statepolicy, a continuationof politics by other means.
Thus,war is alwayssubordinateto and limited by politics.Humanbeingsal-
waysfall short of absoluteefforts;they canneverdevoteall of their resources
to war becausethereis a continuingdemandthat many other needsbe met.
The aimsfor which a war is undertakenand the meansusedto wageit areto
becontrolledby a political intelligence.Echoingthe ancientChinesestrategist
SunTzu, the Prussiantheorist suggested that the decisivebattle neednot al-
waysbe fought. Especiallywhenthe two warring sidesare relativelyequalin
capabilities,they may wish to avoid a mutually destructivewar of attrition,
more costly than any political objective to be gained would be worth.
Clausewitzwas willing to contemplatelimited war not for any moral or hu-
manitarian reasonsin the senseof the medieval just-war doctrine, but rather
for reasonsconcerningthe interestsof the state.52
Other philosophers of the nineteenth centuryHegel, Nietzsche,
Treitschke,Fichte,and Bernhardiseemedat timesto exalt power and war
as endsin themselves.Hegel, for whom reality was the dialecticalclashof
ideas,was a communitarianwho thought that the individual is shapedby
national culture.He regardedthe autonomous,sovereignnationstateasthe
concretization of the absolute in history, the march of God in the world. On
the subjectof war, he has perhapsbeenmisunderstood.He did not glorify
war and its brutality, but becausehe valued the nation so highly, he ac-
ceptedwar as a phenomenonthat could contribute to national unity. Hegel
left himselfopeneither to misunderstandingor to justifiable criticism when
he said that through war, the ethicalhealth of nationsis maintained,just as
the motion of the winds keepsthe seafrom the foulnesswhich a constant
calmwouldproduce. SuchviewsledMartin Wight,mistakenly,
according
to Chris Brown, to identify the Nazis and communistsas Hegelsoff-
spring.54
Theharshestnineteenth-century critic of the valuesthat underlaynot only
the WesternChristiancivilization of his day but eventhoseof pure original
Christianitywas FriedrichNietzsche,famousfor his proclamationthat God
is dead. Emphasizingashe did the willto-power asthe basicdeterminantof
human behavior,Nietzschelooked on the Christian ethos,marked by self-
denial, resignation, humility, respect for weakness, and the renunciation of
power,asthe foe of the truly creativeimpulsesin a personalreligionof failure
that inhibits the full developmentof the superman. Even more than for
Hegel,war for Nietzscheplaysan indispensable role in the renewalof civiliza-
tions. In the following passage,publishedin 1878, the Germanphilosopher,
who wasdeterminedto destroyall old categoriesof thought,seemed to adum-
brate in a very stark way the theory of the moral equivalentof war that
William Jameswould expressmoreoptimisticallyin 1912:

For the present,[wrote Nietzsche]we know of no other meanswherebythe rough en-

ergyof thecamp,thedeepimpersonal
hatred,thecold-bloodedness
of murderwith a
good conscience,the generalorder of the systemin the destruction of the enemy,the
208 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

proudindifference
togreat
losses,
toones
ownexistence
andthatofones
friends,
the
hollow earthlikeconvulsionof the soul,canbe asforcibly and certainlycommuni-
catedto enervated nationsasis doneby everygreatwar. Culturecanby no means
dispense
withpassions,
vicesandmalignities.
WhentheRomans,
afterhaving
be-
comeImperial,
hadgrownrathertiredofwar,theyattempted
to gainnewstrength
by
gladiatorial
combats
andChristian
persecutions.
TheEnglish
of today,
whoappear
on the wholeto havealsorenouncedwar, adoptothermeansin orderto generate
anewthosevanishing
forces;namely,
thedangerous
exploring
expeditions,
seavoy-
ages, andmountainéerings,
nominally
undertaken
forscientic
purposes, butinreal-
ity to bringhome
surplus
strength
fromadventures
anddangersof allkinds.
Many
othersuchsubstitutes
for war will bediscovered,
but perhapspreciselytherebyit will
become moreandmoreobviousthat sucha highlycultivatedandthereforenecessar-
ilyenfeebled
humanity
asthatofmodern
Europe
notonlyneeds
wars,butthegreat-
estandmostterriblewarsconsequently
occasional
relapse
intobarbarism-lest,
by
themeans
ofculture,
it should
loseitsculture
anditsveryexistence.
Lesserminds than Nietzschesfollowed in his tracks. Johann Gottlieb
Fichte,an ardentadvocateof Machiavellis
ideasof raisondétat,warned
that a neighboring
powermaybeanally againsta commonfoebut will seek
to gainat thefriendsexpenseassoonasthe common threathasdisap-
peared;thisisnotamatterof choice,
buta dictate
of politicalwisdom.
Thus,
it is not enoughto defendthenationalterritory;therulermustbeconstantly
watching
theentiresituation
andneverfail to oppose
anydetrimental
devel-
opments or to exploitpossibilities
of gain.Whoeverfailsto increase
poweris
sureto decrease asotherspursuetheir advantages. TheGermanhistorian
Heinrichvon Treitschke,who spokefor the Prussianmilitary caste,also
drewhisinspirationfrom Machiavelli.Convinced that theindependent sov-
ereignnation-state
is thehighest
politicalachievement
of whichtheindivid-
ual is capable,herejectedasintolerablethe conceptof a genuineuniversal
politicalcommunity.
Waris frequently
theonlymeans
available
to thestate
to protectits independence, andthusthe abilityandreadinessto wagewar
mustbepreserved in a carefullyhonedcondition.Thestateoughtto beover-
sensitivein mattersof national honor, so that the instinct of political self-
preservation
canbedeveloped
to thehighest
possible
degree.
Whenever
the
ag is insulted,theremustbeanimmediate demandfor full satisfaction,
and
if this is not forthcoming,war mustfollow,howeverismall the occasion
mayseem.58 Thereis nothingreprehensiblein this,for in Treitschkes
eyes,
war itselfis majesticandsublime.
The ideasvoicedby Clausewitz, Hegel,Nietzsche, andTreitschke were
echoed byseveral philosophers
of militaryhistoryin Europeandin theUnited
States.GeneralFriedrichVonBernhardi,stronglyinuencedby the Darwinian
conceptof survivalof thettest (whichheunderstoodonlysupercially),
cor-
relatedwarwith humanprogress, holdingthat thoseintellectual
andmoral
factorswhichinsuresuperiorityin wararealsothosewhichrenderpossible a
general
progressive
development
among
nations.6°
Thegeopolitical
writings
of .RudolfKjellenand FriedrichRatzel,andthoseof the twentieth-century
Germanstudents of geopolitics
represented
by Karl Haushofer,
wereindebted
 BELLICISTS
ANDANTIDEMOCRATIC
THEORISTS 209

intellectually
to Darwinian
concepts.
(SeeChapter
4, in whichgeopolitical
theoriesarediscussed.)
AlfredThayer
Mahanalsosawhistoryasa Darwinian-
struggle
in which
fitness
ismeasured
in terms
of militarystrength.
Thehabitsofmilitarydis-
cipline,hethought,arenecessary underpinnings of anorderlycivilianstruc-
ture.He viewedthe nationsof theworld aseconomiccorporations locked
in a fierce survivalcompetitionfor resourcesand markets.Unlike the
Marxists,however, he attributedthis not merelyto theimpulses of capital-
ism,but ratherto humannatureandthe fact that the supplyof economic
goodsis finite.Contradictions
of nationalself-interest,
alongwith wideand
irreduciblediscrepancies
of power,opportunity,anddetermination, produce
theconditionsof permanent conflictandrenderit unrealisticto expectvio-
lenceto be eliminatedfrom international affairs. Mahan deemedfutile all
effortsto substitutelaw for force,sinceall law dependson forcefor its effi- .
cacy.Finally,Mahandefended theinstitutionof war againsttheaccusation
that it wasimmoraland un-Christian.He arguedthat war is the means
wherebynation-statescarry out the mandatesof their citizensconsciences.
A stateshouldgoto war onlywhenit is convinced of rightfulness,
but once
it hascommittedits conscience,thereis no choicebutwar (notevenarbitra-
tion),for thematerialevilsof war arelessthanthemoralevilof compliance
with wrong. (Mahans
viewson the geopolitics
of maritimepowerare
treated in Chapter 4.)

BELLICISTS AND ANTIDEMOCRATIC THEORISTS

Asthenineteenth centurygavewayto thetwentieth,theintellectual
polariza-
tion of Westernpacistsand bellicistsbecame
complete. The bellicistsand
their doctrinesmay beclassiedasfollows.
1. Realisticpositivism,was represented
by such turn-ofthe-century
Italian writers as Vilfredo Pareto(1848-1923)and GaetanoMosca
(1858-1941). Pareto,aneconomistandsociologist,andMosca,a po-
litical scientist,bothexpoundedthe concepts
of rule by the elite,the
importance of coercive instruments
in themaintenance of socialunity
and order, and the inevitable recurrenceof revolution. Mosca was not
as antihumanitarianand antidemocraticas Pareto, but he shared
Paretosprejudiceagainstpacism,fearingthat if war shouldbe elimi-
nated,nationswouldgrowsoftanddisintegrate.
2. Social Darwinists and nationalistswith proclivities toward social
Darwinismincludedsuchproponents
associologists
HerbertSpencer,
William GrahamSumner,and ErnstHaeckeland the jurist Oliver
Wendell Holmes.
3. -Certain
pessimistic
philosophers
of historyincludedOswaldSpengler
(1880-1936)and BendettoCroce (1866-1952).Spengler,a German
historian,wasparticularlyfascinated
by thewill-to-power,
thevirility
210 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

of barbarians,
thesubjugation
of weakerpeoples,
andthelaw of the
jungle,whilehesuffered
froma specialdreadof a worldwiderevolu-
tionof nonwhite
peopleagainstwhites.Croce,
anemergent antifascist
Italianphilosopher
andpoliticalleader,
although
acriticoftheexcesses
of militarismwhoreallyshouldnot becalleda bellicist,regardedwar
asanecessary tragedyof thehumancondition,indispensable to human
progress,
andviewed
thedream
ofperpetual
peace
asfatuous.
4. Theforerunners andcryptorepresentatives
of racisttheoryand/orfas-
cism,as well as the actualarchetypes
of thoseideologies,included
writers suchas Houston StewartChamberlain,Arthur de Gobineau,
GiovanniGentile,AlfredoRocco,Georges
Sorel,GabrieldAnnunzio,
and Benito Mussolini.
It would be unfair to insinuatethat all the foregoingschoolsof thought
shouldbelinkedwith thefascists, whethercloselyor remotely,
or eventhatall
fascists
tendto beracists,but all exalted,in varyingdegrees,
theroleof force
andvirileactionin socialprocesses.
Several
of theaforementioned individuals
aremoreappropriately treatedin worksonpoliticaltheoryorintellectual
(and
anti-intellectual)
history,but serious
students
of international
relationscannot
affordto ignore
theimpactthese
writershadonthethinkingof theirtime.

ANARCHISM AND THE MARXIST SOCIALISTS

Finally,
thereweretheanarchists
andtheMarxistsocialists.
These
twomove-
mentsof anextremist
nature,antithetical
in manyrespects,
produced
contrary
offshoots,
sometheoretical
andsomepractical.Bothmovements helped di-
alectically
to strengthen
thetheoryof pacismandthepractice
of politicized
violence
asaninstrument
eitherof abolishing
thestateor of promotingclass
revolution
asaprelude
toestablishing
acooperative
orasocialist
order.
The
Marxist-Leninist
theoryof imperialismandwaris examined in Chapter9.
Here,a briefwordaboutanarchismis in order,becauseit is oftenmisunder-
stoodbythepublicat largeandbecause it constitutes
a moresignicant ten-
dencyof thecontemporarymind,especially themindsof Western youthand
anti-Western
liberationists,
thanis generally
recognized.
Anarchism is the doctrinethat opposes
established
politicalauthorityin
all its forms.Anarchistsview life as a moral dramain which the individualis
arrayed
against
thestateandalltheoppressive
instruments
of coercion
that
theyassociatewith government-bureaucracies,
courts,police,themilitary,
andinstitutions
of privatepropertyandreligion.Theyseekliberation
from
theseand all forms of externalconstrainton human freedom.Firmly con-
vincedof humanitys
innategoodness
andreasonableness,
a benignanarchist
whofollowsKropotkin
believes
thatthebasiclawof society
isnotconictbut
mutual aid and cooperation.The anarchist,accordingto Irving Louis
Horowitz,in additionto beingantipolitical
is alsoantitechnological
and
antieconomic.
Thusanarchists
areessentially
foesof capitalistandsocialist
alike:If theformerkeeps
government
merely
to protecttheirbourgeois
inter-
 ANARCHISM
ANDTHEMARXIST
SOCIALISTS211

ests
andmanage
theiraffairs,
thelatter
would
replace
capitalist
tyranny
with
socialist
tyrannythedictatorship
of theproletariat.
Some
branches
ofanarchismnotably
collectivist,
communist,
syndicali
andconspiratorialopenly
espoused
theuse
ofviolence
bothintheory
andasa
tactical
necessity.
Sergei
Nechaev
(1847-1882),
adisciple
oftheRussian
revolu-
tionary
agitator
Mikhail
Bakunin
(1814-1876),
adopted
acreed
ofpropa
ganda
bydeedanduniversalpandestruction.
Headvocated
thenihilistic
tacticofassassination
foritseffects
ofpsychological
terrorandthedemolition
of
existing
institutions.
Enrico
Malatesta
(1850-1932),
anItalian
journalist,
re-
garded
wellplannedviolence
asanaptmeans
ofeducating
theworkingclasses
astothemeaning
oftherevolutionary
struggle.
Similarly,
theFrench
journalist
Georges
Sorel(1847-1922)
perceived
valuein proletarian
actsof violence
that
serve
todelineate
theseparation
ofclasses.
Suchviolence,
hemaintained,
helps
todevelop
theconsciousness
oftheworking
class
andkeeps
themiddle
class
ina
chronic
state
offear,
always
ready
to capitulate
tothedemands
madeonit,
rather
thanruntheriskofdefending
itsposition
byresorting
toforce.69
Not all anarchists
havebeenadvocates
of violence.
Individualist
anar-
chists
inAmerica,
suchasHenry
David
Thoreau
(1817-1862)
andBenjamin
R.Tucker
(1854-1939),
eschewed
violence
asunrespectable.
Theypreferred
toemphasize
nonviolent
civildisobedience.
Thetwomost inuential
pacist
anarchists
ofmodern
timesMahatma Gandhi(1869-1948)andLeoTolstoy
(1828-1910)radically
opposedapurereligious
ethictoapersons
willing-
ness
to submit
to thestate,
whichtheyexcoriated
for brutalizing
themasses
andconverting
military
heroism
intoavirtue.
Deemingit imperative
thatthe
lawof forcebesuperseded
bythelawof love,yetndingthisimpossible
withintheframework
oftheexisting
nationstate
system,
theyinsisted
thatthe
lattermustgivewayto a universal
society.7°
Anarchism hassometimes beenquitetrenchant
in its moralcriticismof
existing
institutions,
butit hasnotmadea signicant
contributiontowarda
scientific
understandingof thesources
of humanconict.Where onendsin
anarchistwritings
a keen
insight
intogroupsociology(e.g.,in Sorelsawarel
ness of thegroup-integrating
function.
of externally
directed violence),
this
usuallyreectsborrowing
frommoredispassionate
socialscientists(e.g.,
Sorel
wasstrongly inuencedbyDurkheim).In recent
decades, thechiefappeal of
anarchisttheories
intheUnitedStates,
whichhavealonghistory inthiscoun-
try,hasbeentointellectuals,
artists,
blackmilitants,
students, youth,andoth-
ersidentiedwiththecounterculture,
and,especially
in thelate1960s, the
protest against the Vietnam War.
Whetherdirectly
orindirectly,
thephilosophy
of suchviolentanarchists
as
Bakunin
hasinfusedthethinkingof manymodernterrorists
whoneverread
him.Theterrorist
seeks
totransform
societyortoprotest something
intolera-
ble(e.g.,thestatelessness
of Palestinians
or theimprisonmentof other
heroic
terrorists)bydelivering
random,indiscriminateblows
regardless
of
theguiltorinnocence
ofthosetargeted,
thusproducing widespread
insecurity
andsenselessshocks
thatshake society
to itsfoundations.Propaganda
by
deedremains thepreferred
strategy
of nihilistswho,likeVerloc
in Joseph
212 THEOLDERTHEORIES
OFCONFLICT
ANDWAR

Conrads
novel,The Secret
Agent,
askwhatresponse
canbemadeto anact
of destructive
ferocity
soabsurd
asto beincomprehensible,
inexplicable,
al-
mostunthinkablein
fact,mad?Madness
aloneistrulyterrifying,
inasmuch
asyoucannot
placate
it either
bythreats,
persuasion,
orbribes.71
Ontheinternational
plane,
anarchist
thought
hasbeenoneoftheintellec-
tualstreams
thatmergedwithotherideological,
nationalist,
andreligious
forces
toproduce
theproblem
oftransnational
terrorism
inthelatterpartof
thetwentieth
century.
Thephenomenon
of terrorism
is asoldasthevarious
forms
oftyranny,
oppression,
andinjustice,
which
through
theages
have
bred
feelings
ofrevolutionary
resentment
andrageagainstgovernments,
economic
institutions,
andotherentities
thatindividuals
andgroups havebeen deter-
mined to change
or to destroybyviolent
means. Onlysince
themid-1950s,
however,hasterrorism
come to beregardedasa signicant
factorwithinthe
international
system.
Theorists
arefarfromagreement
concerning
thenature
andcauses
of terrorism,
givenits multiplemanifestations,
andtheyhavenot
yetbeen
abletodetermine
inasatisfactory
waywhatitsimpact
hasbeen
on
thebehavior
ofgovernments
andthestate
system.
Themoralproblem
ofcop-
_ing
withterrorists
isgreatly
complicated
bythevirtual
impossibility
inmany
cases
ofcorrectly
identifying
theagents
responsible,
of establishing
theirguilt
intheeyes
oftheinternational
community,
andofretaliating
against
themef-
fectively
without
hurting
innocent
people.
HaigKhatchadourian,
distinguish
ingterrorism
fromfreedomghting,
forwhich
helays
downstringentcondi-
tionsderived
fromjust-war
theoryto makeit justiable,
argues
thatterrorism
isalways
wrong.72
(See
thesection
onInternational
Terrorism
inChapter
8.)

THE NORMATIVETHEORYOFJUSTWAR
IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
Mostof theoldertheories discussed
in Chapter7 andin thischapter hada
normativedimension. Anyone whosaysthatA is betterthanB or thatto do
thisisbetterthanto dothatismaking
a normative judgment.Normative the-
oryismore
qualitative,
inthesense
oftraditional
values,
thanistheory
witha
positivist,
empiricist,
or behavioralist
bent,whichstresses
a quantitative
valuefree
approach
inthesocial
sciences.
Theformer
deals
withamoral,
eth-
ical,political,
legal,
orstrategic
ought,
andnotmerely
withthefactual
is.The
theorists
treated
thusfaradvised
governments,
rulers,anddiplomats
(whether
optimists
orpessimists)
tothinkandactincertain
ways
thattheyregarded
as
better,
withrespectto decisions
forwarandpeace;theobligation
to obey
in-
ternational
law,fulll treaties,
andkeepfaithwithothers
(whether
formoral
reasons
or outof utilitarianmotives
of enlightened
self-interest);
andthead-
visability
ofcoping
withananarchic
worldbyrelying
onthebalance
ofpower
or on international
peacekeeping
organizations.
Asweshowin Chapter
9,
boththeMarxistsandnonMarxists
whoexcoriated
capitalistimperialistex-
ploitation
ofnonWestern
peoples
(core
versus
periphery)
andtheliberals
whoworked
forthepolitical
emancipation
andself-determination
ofcolonial
 THE
NORMATIVE
THEORY
OFJUST
WARIN
THENUCLEAR
AGE 213
territories
andoppressed
populations
weretheorizing
inanormative
manner
The
same
canbesaid
forthose
inmore
recent
decades
who
have
analyzed
de-
pendencia,
demanded
international
distributive
justice,
andfocused
concern
onsuch
problems
asworld
poverty
andhunger,
theeconomics
ofarms
andde-
velopment,
human
rights,
and thepollution
oftheenvironment.
Allthese
peo-
plehave taken
normative
positions
intheirrecipes
forwhatisbetter
orwhat
isright.TheendoftheCold
Warhasproducedaresurgence
ofinterest
innor-
mative
approaches
tointernational
relationsin
worthwhile
human
values
ideals,
andgoals
tobepursued
bygovernments.
It would
beamistake,
how-
ever,
toconclude
thatrealists,
whohave
ahealthy
respect
forthephenomeno
ofpower
relations,
ignore
thenormative
orvalue
implications
oftheory.
They
were
especially
compelled
tofaceuptothose
implications
during
decades
of
debate
about
themorality
ofnuclear
weapons,
war,anddeterrence.
Chris
Brown
hasnoted
thattheconcept
ofjustwarhastobeoneofthe
onlyareas
ofcontemporary
moral
philosophy
where
anessentially
medieva
theoretical
construction
stillhascommon
currency.
73There
aresome
who
wouldargue thatsuch
aconcept
has noplaceinmodern
international
theory
because
it isaphilosophical
andtheological
doctrine,
notatheory basedon
theempiricalmethods
ofscience.
Suchacriterion
ofexclusion,
if rigidly
ap-
plied,
would involve
setting
asideasirrelevant
virtually
allnormativeap-
proaches
tointernational
theory,
including
theutilitarian
andthemoralones.
Yetthejust-war
idea
wascentral
tothethinking
ofthefounders
ofmodern
in-
ternational
law.Theygrudgingly
accepted
thefactthatthedoctrine
ofsover-
eignty
inananarchical
system
leftit toevery
state
tojudge
thejustice
ofits
owncause
when makingthedecision
togotowar(iusadbellum),
butthey
in-
sisted
thatinternational
lawimposes
onstates
certain
limits
withregard
tothe
conduct
ofwar(iusin bello).
It isgranted
thatevery
government
initswar
propaganda
trumpets
thejustice
ofitscause,
aphenomenon thatlends
itselfto
empirical
studyandanalysis,
especially
astocredibility.
Theappeal
tojustice
isanimportant
partofthepolitics
ofwar,forit af-
fects
suchconsiderations
aspublic
support,
themorale
ofghtingforces,the
ability
toholdallies,
and
thepopularity
andfate
ofgoverning
elites.
Despite
whatseemedtobeavirtual
moratorium
onmoral
andethical
judgmentsdur-
ingWorldWarII (especially
withregard
totheobliteration
bombing ofcities),
thedebateoverthemorality
of warfare
hasbeen
revivedwithconsiderable
vigorsince
theNuremberg
andTokyo war-crimes
trialsandtheadvent
ofnu-
clear-weapons
technology.
Moreover,
theintellectual
and
political
controvers
intheUnited
States
during
theVietnam
Warandthemilitary
buildup
preced-
ingthePersian
GulfWar(DesertStorm)wascarried
onlargely
withinthe
framework
oftraditional
just-war
criteria.
Toa lesser
extent,z
echoes
ofthe
traditional
standards
were
heard
inthedebates
about
thewisdom
ofmilitary
intervention
forhumanitarian-purposes
inBosnia
andofthreatening
toinvade
Haitiin 1994tooustamilitary
juntaandinstall
anelected
president.
More
recently,
NATO governments
relied
heavily
notonlyonstrategic
arguments
about
theneed
to preserve
European
stability,
butalsoonimperative
moral/humanitarian
considerations,
to justifyalliance
cruisemissile
and
214 THE OLDERTl-IEORIESOF CONFLICTAND WAR

bombing
attacks
onmilitary
installations
inYugoslavia,
andeven
ongovern-
mentandcivilianfacilitiesin Belgrade,
in orderto halt ethniccleansing
ona
massivescalein Kosovo,a provinceof Serbia.
Several
writershaveargued
that,giventhedestructive
powerof modern
military
technology,
theconditions
ofajustwarspecically,
therequirement
thattheamount
of forceemployed
mustbeproportionate
to thepoliticalob-
jectives
soughtcan
nolonger
bevalidated.
Nuclear
pacists
contend
that,
eventhough
it mayhavebeentheoretically
possible
to justifytheresortto
force
bystates
inearlier
periods,
nuclear
warcannot
bedeemed
politically
or
morally
justiable
under
anycircumstances,
nomatter
howunjust
theaggres-
sionbeing
defended
against.
Theinhuman
consequences
ofmodern
warfare
haveprompted
increasing
numbersofethicists
andtheologians
toraise
again
theancient
questions
asto whether
wagingwarisevercompatible
withthe
Christianconscience.
Pacist
arguments
arewidespread
andwell-known:
During
theColdWar,
nuclearconictwassaidto threatennot onlymutualextinctionfor nations
partytomore thanaminimalnuclear
exchange,butalsotoposegrave
dan-
gersofwidespread
radioactive
fallout,
genetic
mutations,
andnuclear
winter
forlarge
segments of humanity.
In viewof thesuperpowerslarge
nuclear
stockpiles,
it seemedhighly
unlikely
thatanuclearexchangecould
havebeen
controlled
andkeptlimited.
Thestrategy
ofnuclear
deterrence
wasbasedon
anuncertain,
overly
optimistic
assumption
thatgovernmental
decision
makers
canbeexpected
to actrationally
in crisis.
(See
Chapter
8 onRational
Deterrence
andChapter
11onRationality
andDecision-Making
Theory.)
Anuclear
arms
race,
even
if it didnotleadinevitably
towar,nevertheless
piled
upanoverkill
capability,
wasting
resources
thatcould
have
been
channeled
intoeconomic
development
andproducing
a climate
of neurotic
fear.Priorto
theendof theColdWarandthebeginning
of substantial
nucleardisarmament
in thelate1980sandthe1990s,
some
writersweresoappalled
bythese
dis-
malprospects
thattheyadvocated
unilateral
disarmament
andnonviolent
re-
sistance
astheonlyescape
fromdisaster.75
Nevertheless,
despite
thepotential
horrors
of modern
warfare
andfre-
quent
distortions
ofthejust-war
notionthroughout
history
asmere political
propaganda,
modern proponents
ofthetheory
insist
thatthetraditional
mode
of rationalethicalanalysisone
thatseeks
to charta middlecourse
between
theextremes
ofpacismandbellicismcannot bediscarded.
Weaponstech-
nology
cannot
beallowed
to exploit
allscientic
possibilities
anddevelop
ac-
cording
to itsowndialectic
butmustbesubjected to a moralanalysis
of
poweranditslimits.
Writers
in thisveinhave
included
PaulRamsey,
John
Courtney
Murray,
Robert
W.Tucker,
Richard
A. Falk,WilliamV.OBrien,
James
Turner
Johnson,
Michael
Walzer,
andothers.76
Thegeneral
consensu
ofjust-war
writers
(apart
fromWalzer,
discussed
separately
laterinthischap-
ter)canbesummed
up in thefollowingpropositions:
1. In theabsenceof effectiveinternational
peacekeeping institutions,
the
moralrightof statesto resortto warundercertaincircumstances can-
 THENORMATIVE
THEORY
OF]USTWARIN
THENUCLEAR
AGE 215
notbedenied.
Within
theself-help
international
system,
it isprobable
thatstates
willcontinue
tofeelconstrained
attimes
toresort
totheuse
ofmilitary
force.
Anethical
doctrine
togovern
andlimitwar,there-
fore, remains essential.
2. Although
aggressive
war(whichwaspermitted
underthetraditional
doctrine
topunish
offenses
andtorestore
justice)
isnolonger
consid-
ereda lawfulmeans
available
to states
for thevindication
of violated
rights,
there
stillexists
therighttowage
defensive
waragainst
aggres-
sionandto givemilitaryaidto another
partywhois a victimof ag-
gression.77
3. Modern
military
technology
cannot
beallowed
to render
entirely
meaningless
thetraditionaldistinctionbetween
combatant
forcesand
innocents
evenin strategicwar.Evenwhenthe statehasthe moral
rightto wagewar(iusadbellum),
thereis anobligation to adhereto
thelawgoverning
themeans usedin war(msin bello).In twoairwars
againstSaddam Husseins
Iraq (1991and1998-1999) andin the
NATOair war againstSlobodan Milosevics
Serbiain 1999,the
United
States
anditsallies
made
strenuous,
though
notalways
success-
ful, effortsto targetonlymilitaryforcesandinstallations
whilemini-
mizing
collateral
damage
to civilian
livesandstructures.78
According
to someNATO militaryplanners,this effort prolongedthe air war.
Aftersixweeks
of air strikes
against
Yugoslavia,
however,
NATOdid
begin
to makelifemoreinconvenient
for thecivilianpopulation
by
targeting power plants.

Thedebate
overwarandmoralitywill goonindefinitely. Pacistsof vari-
ouspersuasions,
absolutist
or relativist,
will argue
thatit iseitherlogically
ab-
surdorethically
monstrous
to analyze
warfare
in terms
ofrationality
orjus-
tice.Othertheorists
will contend
thatin aglobalsystem
thatlacksaneffective
globalpeacekeeping
orpeace-enforcementauthoritythat
is,aninternational
forceorganized
insupport
ofinternational
justiceindependent
governments
andotherpoliticalentities
arelikelyto bedisposed
fromtimeto timeto resort
to the useof force.Theywill insistthat theworld will bebetteroff if those
whoadvisegovernmentsregardless
ofwhethertheyarepacists
orjustwar
theoristscan
haverecourse
to anintellectually
credible
codeof rational,
moral,civilizedbehavior
thatenjoinsdecision
makersto observe
humane
lim-
itsin theirstrategizing.
Despite
frequent
assertions
thatthejustwardoctrine
hasbecome
obsolete
inanuclear
eraofunlimited
destructive
capability,
there
havebeennumerous
instances
of limitedconventional
and unconventional
warfare,
andofefforts
todevelop
newsystems
ofadvanced
weapons
technol-
ogy,to whichthetraditional
analysis
of theconditions
required
for themoral
justication
ofdeterrence
andforceremains
quiterelevant.
Whatismore, this
analysis
isstillapplied
withremarkable
frequencyin thepublicpolitical
de-
bate.-79
Moreover,
writers
onthereligious
leftwhosought
during
the1970s
to
develop
theologies
of liberation
andrevolutionappropriated
someof theele-
ments
of thejustwardoctrine,evenwhileshiftingthepresumption
of justice
216 THEOLDER
THEORIES
OFCONFLICT
ANDWAR
away
from
incumbent
governments
(attempting
tomaintain
internal
peace
andorder)
toinsurgent
revolutionary
groups
(attempting
tooverthrow
incum-
bent
governments
they
deemed
oppressive).3°
Perhaps
nostudent
ofthejustwarhas
dealt
more
intricately
withthe
paradox
confronted
bystrategists
andmoralists
inthenuclear
age
than
Michael
Walzer.
Thehuman
mind
seems
unable
todevise
acoherent
concep-
tualframeworkpolitical
policy,
strategic
doctrine,
and
operational
military
planthat
neatly
combines
effective
deterrence
with
workable
defense,
and
that
iswidely
acceptable
ongrounds
ofrationality,
credibility,
and morality
Walzerreminds
usthatsuperpowergovernments
aredeterred
fromrisking
evenconventional
war,
nottomentionlimited
nuclear
war,
bythespecter
of
ultimate
horrorthe
dangerthatit might
escalate
toanuncontrollable
nu-
clear
exchange.
Inaneraofplentiful
nuclear
stockpiles,
hesays,
anyimagin-
ablestrategy
islikely
todeteracentral
warbetween
thegiants.
Once weun-
derstood
whatthestrategists
ofdeterrence
were
saying,
it became
unnecessa
toadopt
anyparticular
strategy
forfighting
anuclear
war.(Many
strategi
theorists,
ofcourse,
woulddenythis.)
Itwas deemed
sufcient
merely
topose
theultimate
nuclear
threat.
Deterrenceisfrightening
inprinciple
when we
stop
toponderthe
ultimate,
butinactuality,
deterrence
iseasy
tolive
withbe-
cause
it hasbeen
abloodless
strategy.
It causes
nopainorinjurytoits
hostages,
unless
they
stop
tothink
it through,
which
notmany
people
do.
Walzer
puts
distance
between
himself
andmost
just-war
theorists
when he
propounds
theview
that
allnuclear
war isimmoral,
even
onewaged
with
low-yield,
tactical
battleeld
weapons.
More
recently,
Walzer
reiterated
hisview
thatany
theory
ofwarisinher-
ently
imperfect.
Atheory
isnomore
than
aframework
fordecision;
assuch
it
cannot
provide
denitive
answers.
Moral
decisions,
heholds,
are
particula
difcult
inwar,
which
often
requires
achoice
between
equally
valid
butcon-
tradictory
claims
concerning
justicethe
common goodofthewhole
commu
nity
versus
theright
ofnoncombatant
civilians
toimmunity.
Walzers
advice
is
tomakeapractical
decision
ineachcase,
takingintoaccount
both
likely
con-
sequences
andprevailing
normativeprinciples.
Joseph
Boyledemurs
from
Walzers
useofcasuistry
(apragmatic
rather
than agenuinely
moralmethod
ofjudging
concrete
situations)
andofconsequentialism
(basing
moral
deci-
sions
ontheprobability
thattheestimated
benecialeffects
ofaction
willout-
weigh
theestimated
harmful
ones).
ForBoyle,
this
approach
weakens
theau-
thority
ofmoral
principles
byallowing
forexceptions
intime
ofemergen
IntheColdWarera,thedebate
among
ethicists
shifted
subtly
fromone
involving
themorality
orimmorality
ofwarand
strategic
policy
toone
that
pitted
theimmorality
oflarge-scale
nuclear
waragainst
theprobability
that
nuclear
warmight
occur
andspin
outofcontrol.
Virtually
allmoral
theolo
gians
andphilosophers
havelong
agreedthat,
if nuclear
deterrence
shou
breakdown,
carrying
outthestrategy
ofassured
destruction
(which
isde-
scribed
»in
Chapter
8)would constitute
amoralevilofhistorically
unprec
dented
magnitude.
Concerning
thatstrategy
itself,
writers
whodealwiththe
ethics
ofstrategy
were
inserious
disagreement
onfourpoints:
 THE NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUST WARIN THE NUCLEAR AGE 217

1. What was the intention underlying the strategy of assured destruc-

tion? Wasit the good intention of preventingnuclearwar or the rep-
rehensible intention to wreak catastrophic death and destruction in
retaliation? If the two intentions are combined in one, how is it to
be judged?
[Q.Wasit possibleto distinguishthe public threat embodiedin a strategic
deterrentpolicy,designedto preventwar,from the plan that would ac-
tually be executedif the deterrentfailed? (This questionalso caused
problemsfor strategicanalysts,governmentpolicymakers,and mili-
tary leaderswho wereconcernedwith keepingthe threatcredible.)
3. For purposesof moral evaluation,couldwe predicatethe intentionof a
government, just aswe wouldof an individualin a legalcase?In matters
of governmental policy,especially
in a pluralistconstitutionaldemocra-
tic system,who couldbeheldresponsible for intendingto do what?
4. Wasit morally permissible,for the sakeof preservingpeace,to con-
front the adversarywith a strategicthreat that would be immoral to
execute?

A compellingargumentcanbemadethat the morefrightful the threat,the

more effectiveit shouldbe as a deterrent,providedthat it is credible.That is
why the strategyof assureddestructionwas consideredso politically success-
ful and alsowhy it was so roundly condemnedby many churchleadersand
other moralists who xed their attention on the implicit, conditional intention
embodiedin it to destroyurban populationand industrial complexes.Some
arguedthat it was justiable to hold nuclearweaponsfor purposesof deter-
rence,but that theseweaponscouldneverbe usedin war. This argumentcon-
travenedthe requirementof deterrentcredibility,becauseit depriveddeter-
renceof an operationaldoctrine. (Whetherit is possiblefor a democratic
governmentto haveonedoctrinefor deterrence anda morelimited onein case
of deterrencefailure is debatable.)
Presumably,
any effort to renderthe threatlessimmoralandmorelimited
mightalsoseem,at leastlogically,lesseffectiveasa deterrent(eventhough
somewould arguethat this could enhanceits credibilityi.e., its certaintyof
being applied).When U.S. defenseofficials appearedto be consideringre-
sponses
to aggression
moremeasured
than all-outmassive
retaliationwith
strategicnuclearmissilesfor example,limited nuclearoptions,selectivetar-
geting,counterforce
ratherthancountercitystrategies,
battlefieldor tactical
nuclearweapons,horizontalescalation,or conventionaldeterrencethey
wereoften criticizedby moralistsfor makingnuclearwar lessunthinkableor
more likely to occur as a result of escalation.Thus, indirectly,the moralists,
whetherwittingly or not, havebeenindicatingtheir concernwith regardnot
onlyto themoralityof deterrencebutalsoto its effectiveness.
Theymightnot
condemn everyconceivableuseof nuclearweapons, andmightreluctantlyap-
provethepossibilitythatretaliatoryusein a limitedanddiscriminating
man-
ner againstmilitarytargetscouldbetheoretically justied.Nevertheless,
the
moralistsexhibiteda greatdealof skepticismthat a nuclearwar could be kept
218 THEOLDER
THEORIES
OFCONFLICT
ANDWAR

limited,
regardless
ofefforts
tocontrol
it.Fearing
theescalatory
process,
they
generally
opposed
anyfirstuse
ofnuclear
weapons.
Theprolonged
debate aboutthemorality
of nuclear
war,whichhas
passed
through
several
phases,
hasserved
amplytodemonstrate
thatthecon-
cept
ofdeterrence,
whichconstituted
animportant
theoretical
development
in
theinternational
relations
of thetwentieth
century,
represents
something
quite
newinhistory.
It seems
todefyadequate
evaluation
interms
ofthetwotradi-
tionalWestern
categories
of thoughton thesubject
of warandpeacejust
warandpacismandrequires
aunique,
rather
paradoxical
modeofethical
analysis.
Recent
years
havewitnessed
aninteresting
butsomewhat
esoteric
and
fruitless
debate
among
philosophers
asto whether
pacismandthejust-war
theory
canbereconciled.
JamesSterba
ofNotre
Dame
University
takesanaf-
rmative
position.
Hedenes
antiwar
pacism
asaviewthatwouldnever
jus-
tifyanywaronalarge
scale
butwhich
would
justify
violence
inacarefully
re-
stricted
manner
whendirected
in defense
of ones
ownlifeor thelivesof other
innocents
against
an unjustaggressor.
EricReitanof PacicLutheran
University
regards
thisasanincoherent
position
because
it lends
warrant
toat
leastsome
warsandthusshiftsfroma perspective
of moralpacism
to oneof
justwar.According
toReitan,
antiwar
pacism
canbecoherent
onlyif it re-
fusesto countenance
all effective,
organized
defense.
Reitan,however,
grants
coherence
to anantiwarpacismthatgivesmorallegitimacy
to unorganized
andineffective
private
violence
bycitizens
defending
theirhomes
andlives
against
anunjust
aggressor.
_Philosophers
andtheologians
drawsubtle
dis-
tinctionsbetween
intentionalkilling of innocentciviliansandkilling that is
foreseen asunavoidable
but not intended,and moderndemocratic govern-
mentsengaged
in militaryoperations
havebegun
to paymuchgreater
atten-
tion to suchdistinctionsthan they did in World War II.
TheColdWarended, of course,
withoutnuclear
weapons havingbeen
usedandwith theonlyinstances
of theiremploymenthavingbeenagainst
Japan
intheclosing
days
ofWorldWarII. Inplace
ofthedeterrence
relation-
shipthatevolved
during
theColdWar,
theprospect
loomed
thatweapons
of
mass
destructionnuclear,
biological,
andchemicalwould
beproliferated
to
larger
numbers ofstates,
andpossibly
tononstateactors
aswell.Theories
that
werefocusedonbipolardeterrence
needed
to beadapted to takeaccountof
suchchanges,asweshalldiscuss
inChapter8.Atthesame time,theprolifer-
ationofweapons ofmassdestruction
gives
risetoethical
questions,
including
theappropriatebasis
fordeterring
theemployment of suchsystemsbya re-
gionalactorsuchasIraq.Whatwouldhavebeentheappropriate U.S.re-
sponse
in theevent
thatSaddam
Hussein
hadusedchemical
or biologica
weapons
of massdestruction
against
Israelor Saudi
Arabia
duringthe
1990-1991
GulfWar?Havinggivenup its ownbiological
andchemical
weapons
programs,
theUnited
States
retained
anuclear
retaliatory
option
and
a sophisticated
conventional
response
capability.
At the sametime,the
postCold
Wareraholdsincreasing
potential
for armed conictbyactors
otherthanstates,with suchnonstate
entitiespossiblyin possession
of
 NOTES 219

weapons of unprecedented
lethality.Suchchangingparameters
for the con-
ductof warfareraisenumerousquestions aboutwhy armedconict occurs
and the meansby whichit canbe deterredor otherwiseprevented.In the
global-conict
settingof thetwenty-rst
century,
thesequestions
encompass
not onlyhowwarscomeaboutbut alsohow,or evenwhether, normative
the-
oriessuchasthosesetforth in thischapter,developedin theWestern
world,
will beapplicable
or acceptablein a worldof unprecedented
paradigmatic
di-
versity and complexity.

NOTES

1. Noteworthy samplespublishedsince1980includeFrancisA. Beer,PeaceAgainst

War:TheEcologyof InternationalViolence(SanFrancisco: Freeman, 1981);
BruceBuenodeMesquita, TheWarTrap(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversity Press,
1981);RobertG. Gilpin, War and Changein World Politics(Cambridge,
England:Cambridge UniversityPress,1981);SeyomBrown,The Causes and
Preventionof War(NewYork:St.Martins,1987);Geoffrey Blainey,
TheCauses
of War,3rded.(NewYork:FreePress, 1988);MelvinSmallandJ. DavidSinger,
eds.,InternationalWar:An Anthology(Chicago:DorseyPress,1989);Greg
Cashman, What CausesWar?An Introductionto Theoriesof International
Conict(NewYork:LexingtonBooks,1993);JohnA. Vasquez, TheWarPuzzle
(Cambridge,England:Cambridge UniversityPress,1993);Lawrence Freedman,
ed.,War(NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press,1994);RobertA. DoughtyandIra
D. Gruber,eds.,Warfarein the WesternWorld,2 vols.(Lexington,MA: D. C.
Heath, 1996); Claudio Ciof-Revilla, Origins and Evolution of War and
Politics,International
Studies
Quarterly,
40(1)(March1996),1-22;andseveral
articlesin International StudiesQuarterly, World Politics, AmericanPolitical
Science
Review,
journalof ConictResolution,
andInternational
Security,
which
are cited later in this text.
2. MichaelHoward,The Causesof War and Other Essays(Cambridge, MA:
HarvardUniversityPress,1983)pp.7-22, quotedat p. 14.J. DavidSingerhas
notedthat,with thepossible
exception of JeandeBlochs Futureof War(1899),
whichpredictedwith surprisingaccuracy what the nextEuropean war would
looklike,andPitirimSorokin,whose1937workSocialandCulturalDynamics
correlated
warwith cyclesin culturalpatterns,
QuincyWrightsA Studyof War
(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1992)and LewisRichardsons
studiesof
thestatistics
of armsraces,publishedin 1960onthebasisof earlierresearch (and
discussedin Chapter7) marktherst traceable effortsto bringscienticmethod
to bearon internationalconict.He adds,whilephysicalphenomena hadbeen
studiedin anessentially
scientific
fashionfor several
centuries,andbiological
phe-
nomena for nearlya century,
socialphenomena hadremained largelythedomain
of theological speculation, moral imperative, and conventional folklore.
Accounting
for International
War:TheStateof theDiscipline,
journalof Peace
Research,XVIII(1) (1981), 1. Singersjudgment may be a bit unfair to the
philosophers
andsocial,political,andlegaltheoristswho reectedprior to the
twentiethcenturyontheproblemof warwithoutemploying quantitative
method-
ologiesand whoseviewscan hardly be dismissedas conventionalfolklore. It is
correct,nevertheless,
to saythat thesustainedeffort to studywarsin a systematic,
220 THE OLDERTHEORIESOF CONFLICTAND WAR

scientic
way,employing
themethods
of thebehavioral
disciplines,
didnotget
underwayuntilaftertheFirstWorldWar.
. Donald
Kagan,
OntheOrigins
ofWar
andthePreservation
ofPeace
(New
York:
Doubleday,1995),pp. 1-11, 569.
Lewis
A.Coser,
TheFunctions
ofSocial
Conict
(New
York:
Free
Press,
1956),
p.3.
we LastWordsAboutWar? Journalof ConictResolution,
. UrsLuterbacher,
(March1984),
166. Hidemi
Suganamihasargued
againstefforts
toexplain
28
war
byreferring
tosuch
general
causes
ashuman
nature
ortheanarchic
nature
ofthe
international
system,
insisting
thatthecauses
ofwararemultiple
andvaried
and
ofteninvolve
unique
factors
in particular
cases.
OntheCauses
of War(New
York:OxfordUniversity
Press,
1996).
Others,
asweshallsee,
wouldagree.
Kenneth
N.Waltz,
Man,theState
andWar:
A Theoretical
Analysis
(NewYork:
Columbia
University
Press,
1959),chaps.
2 and4.
Ibid.,
chap.
6.Theanarchic
character
oftheinternational
system
isdiscussed
in
chap.
1,pp.60-62.
Seealso
Waltz,
WarandExpectation
ofWar,chap.
7in
Vernon
VanDyke,
International
Politics,
2nded.(NewYork:Appleton, 1966);
Gordon
W.Allport,TheRoleofExpectancy, in HadleyCantril,
ed.,Tensions
ThatCause
War(Urbana:University
of IllinoisPress,
1950);
andWerner Levi,
On theCauses
of WarandtheConditions of Peace,
journalof Conict
Resolution,
IV(December
1960),
411-420.
Levinotes
thatwarshould
betraced
nottoanyspecic
factor
buttoaconstellation
offactors.
Ibid.,p.418.
.°° Waltz,Man,theStateandWar,pp.18-20.
Seymour
Martin
Lipset
hasnoted
thatboth
Tocqueville
andMarx
emphasized
the
necessity
forconict
among
social
units,
andLipset
denes
theexistence
ofa
moderate
stateof conictasanother
wayof deninga legitimate
democracy.
Political
Man:TheSocial
Bases
ofPolitics
(Garden
City,NY:Doubleday-Anch
1963),
pp.7and71.Conictisanessential
aspect
ofgrowth,
onethatwecan
neither
fullycontrol
norprevent,
norshould
wewishtodoso.H.L.Nieburg,
PoliticalViolence
(NewYork:St.Martins,1969),pp.16-17.Humanexistence
without
conict
isunthinkable.
Conict
gives
lifemuch
ofitsmeaning,
sothatits
elimination,
even
if attainable,
wouldnotbedesirable.
10. Jerome
D.Frank,
Human
Nature
andNonviolent
Resistance,
inQuincy
Wright
etal.,eds.,
Preventing
WorldWarIII (New York:Simon
8CSchuster,
1962),
p.193.Kenneth
Boulding
has
suggested
thatinagiven
situation
there
may
betoo
muchortoolittleconict,or anoptimal
amount,
whichlends
to lifeacertain
dra-
maticinterest.
ConictandDefense
(NewYork:Harper86Row, 1962),
pp. 305-307.
11. Quoted
inAbram
Kardiner
andEdward
Preble,
TheyStudied
Man(New
York:
NewAmerican
Library
Mentor
Books,
1963),
p.102.Elsewhere,
EmileDurkheim
wrote,
Social
facts
donotdifferfrompsychological
facts
inquality
only:they
have
adifferent
substratum;
theyevolve
inadifferent
milieu;
andthey
dependon
different
conditions.
. . . Thementality
ofgroups
isnotthesame
asthatofindi-
viduals;
[thegroup
mentality]
hasitsownlaws.
IntroductiontoS.A.Solvay
and
J:K.Mueller,
TheRules
ofSociological
Method,
2nded.,trans.
G.E.G.Catlin,
ed.(New York:Free
Press,
1938),p.xix(emphasis
inoriginal).
12. See,forexample,
thecollection
ofessays
fromvarious
social-science
disciplines
in
EltonB.McNeil, ed.,TheNature of HumanConict(Englewood Cliffs,NJ:
Prentice
Hall,1963);
alsoJ.DavidSinger,
ManandWorld Politics:
thePsycho-
Cultural
Interface,
journalofSocial
Issues,
XXIV(July1968),
127-156.
13. Michael
Haas,International
Conict(NewYork:Bobbs-Merrill,
1974),
p.4.
 NOTES 221

14. StephenWitheyandDanielKatz,TheSocialPsychology
of HumanConict,in
Elton B. McNeil,ed.,TheNatureof HumanConict (Englewood
Cliffs,NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 65.
15. Herbert C. Kelman, Social-Psychological
Approachesto the Study of
International Relations, in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A
Social-Psychological
Analysis(NewYork:Holt, RinehartandWinston,1965),
pp. 5-6. Seealsothe references
to the work of WernerLevi in chap.6 on the mi-
crocosmic theories of war.
16. See M. Jane Stroup, Problems of Research on Social Conict in the Area of
InternationalRelations,journal of Conict Resolution,IX (September1965),
413-417. SeealsoCoser,Functionsof SocialConict, pp. 15-38;JessieBernard,
Partiesand Issuesin Conict, journal of Conict Resolution,I (June1957),
111-121;andRaymondW. Mack andRichardC. Snyder,The Analysisof Social
Conict: Towardan OverviewandSynthesis,ibid., I (June1957), 212-248.For
the argumentthat TalcottParsonss
structuralfunctional
approach,relegating
conict to the realmof the abnormal,deviant,andpathological,rendersitself in-
capableof explainingsocialchangeandconict, seeRalf Dahrendorf,Toward a
Theory of Social Conict, journal of Conict Resolution,II (June 1958),
170-183.Accordingto Dahrendorf,Parsonians focusedattentionon problemsof
adjustment
ratherthanof change.
Forthem,socialconictwasessentially
disrup-
tive and dysfunctional.Dahrendorf,in his sociology,stressedchangerather than
persistingcongurations,conict ratherthan consensus. He presentedhis postu-
latesnot to overturnthe Parsonianview,but ratherto complementit with an or-
ganicmodelof differentemphases. He believedthat neithermodelalone,but only
the two takensynthetically,canexhaustsocialreality and supplyus with a com-
plete theory of societyin both its changingand enduringaspects.SeeGeorg
SimmelConict, trans. Kurt H. Wolff, in Conict and the Web of Group
Affiliations (New York: FreePress,1955).Simmelwrote: Just as the universe
needsloveandhatethat is, attractiveandrepulsiveforcesin orderto haveany
form at all, so society,too, in order to attain a determinateshape,needssome
quantitativeration of harmonyand disharmony,of associationand competition,
of favorableand unfavorabletendencies.Ibid., p. 15. Evenin relativelyhopeless
situations,the opportunityto offer oppositioncanhelp to renderthe unbearable
bearable:Oppositiongivesus innersatisfaction,distractionandrelief,just asdo
humility andpatienceunderdifferentpsychological conditions (p. 19).SeeLewis
Coser,ed.,GeorgSimmel(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: TheFreePress,1955),pp. 1-77.
Seealso R. C. North et al., The IntegrativeFunctionsof Conict, journal of
Conict Resolution,IV (September1960), 355-374; Lewis A. Coser,Some
SocialFunctionsof Violence,Annalsof the AmericanAcademyof Politicaland
SocialScience, CCCLXIV (March 1966),8-18; and CharlesLockhart,Problems
in the Managementand Resolutionof InternationalConicts, World Politics,
XXIX (April 1977), 370.
17. Seethe excellentchapteron Ancient China, in Frank M. Russell,Theoriesof
InternationalRelations(New York: Appleton, 1936);MoushengLin, Men and
Ideas:An Informal History of ChinesePolitical Thought(New York: John Day,
1942); Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1939 Anchor edition, 1956);H. G. Creel, ChineseThoughtfrom
Confuciusto Mao Tse-tung(New York: New AmericanLibrary, 1960), esp.
pp. 51-53, 113-121,and 126-130;and Chu Chai and WinbergChai,eds.,The
HumanistWayin Ancient China:EssentialWorksof Confucianism(New York:
222

18.

19.

20.
29.
NOTES 223

30.For
Brown, WhiteUmbrella.p. 143.
thebeliefs
andpracticesoftheIsraelites
intheages
oftheprophets
andjudges,
before
theriseof politicalkings,seeExodus
15:1-21;Deuteronomy
20:1-20
and
23:15;Joshua
1:19,2:23,3:510,and6:119;Judges
722-22and2 Samuel
5:24.See
alsoEverett
F.Gendler,
WarandtheJewish Tradition,in James
Finn,ed., A
Conictof Loyalties
(NewYork:Pegasus, 1968);George FootMoore, judaism,
Vol.2 (Cambridge,England:
Cambridge UniversityPress,1966),pp.106-107;
RolanddeVaux,AncientIsrael:
ItsLifeandInstitutions
(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,
1961),pp.213-267;War,articlein theJewishEncyclopaedia,
Vol.12(London:
Funkand Wagnalls,1905),pp.463-466; Y. Yarden,Warfarein the Second
Millenium
B.C.E.
inBenjamin
Manzar,
ed.,TheHistoryofthe]ewish
People
(New
Brunswick,
NJ:Rutgers
University
Press,1970);andPeace(Shalom),
articlein
TheEncyclopaedia
Judaica,
Vol.13(Jerusalem:
KeterPublishing
Company, and
NewYork:Macmillan,
1971),
pp.274-282.
Forthelaterthemes
of love,justice,
andpeace,
seethebooksof Isaiah,
Jeremiah,
Hosea,andAmos.
31. In theNewTestament
scriptures,seeMatthew26:7and52;Luke14:31-33and
22:38.See
alsoJohnCadoux,
TheEarlyChurch
andtheWorld(Edinburgh:
T 85
T Clark, 1925), pp. 36 and 51-57; Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes
Toward WarandPeace (Nashville,
TN:Abingdon Press,
1960),
chaps.
4, 5,and
6; PeterBrock,Pacism
in Europeto 1914(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,1972),
pp.3-24;EdwardA.Ryan, Society
ofJesus
(S.J.).
TheRejection
of
MilitaryService
bytheEarlyChristians,
Theological
Studies,
13(March1952);
KnutWillemRuyter,PacismandMilitaryService
in theEarlyChurch,Cross
Currents,
32 (Spring1982);JoanD. Tooke,TheDevelopmentof theChristian
Attitude
Toward
WarBefore
Aquinas,
Chapter
1in ThejustWarinAquinas
and
Grotius(London:SPCK,1965);G.I. A. D. Draper,TheOriginsof theJustWar
Tradition,
NewBlackfriars
(November 1964); F.HomesDudden,TheLifeand
Timesof SaintAmbrose,Vol.2 (Oxford,England:ClarendonPress,1945),
pp.538-539;SaintAugustine,
TheCityof God,trans.Demetrius
B.Zema,S.J.
andGeraldG.Walsh, (NewYork:Fathersof theChurch,
1950),Book4, chap.
15, and Book 19, chap.12; JamesE. Dougherty,
The Bishopsand Nuclear
Weapons: TheCatholicPastoral
Letteron WarandPeace
(Hamden, CT:Archon
Books,1984),pp. 18-42.
32. St. ThomasAquinas,SummaTheologica,22ae,Question40, Article 1 in
Aquinas,
Selected
PoliticalWritings,
trans.J. G. Dawson(Oxford,England:
Blackwell,
1948),
p. 159;Tooke,Christian
AttitudeToward
War,21-29;James
E.Dougherty,
Bishops
andNuclearWeapons, pp.42-47.
33. James
TurnerJohnson,
The]ust WarTraditionandtheRestraint
of War:A Moral
and HistoricalInquiry (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton
University
Press,1981);
Frederick
Russell,Thejust Warin the MiddleAges(Cambridge,England:
CambridgeUniversity
Press,1975);E. B. F.Midgley,TheNaturalLawTradition
andtheTheoryof International
Relations (NewYork:BarnesandNoble,1975),
pp.62-93;JamesR. Childress,Just War Theories,Theological Studies,39
(September
1978).
Because
medieval
society
exalted
cavalry
overinfantry,
onlya
limited numberof full-edgedwarriorswas available.Giventhe low levelof the
armor-makingarts,thefullyequipped
mountedknightrepresented
a considerable
investment.
Monarchs lackedthenancialandorganizational
resources
to raise
224

THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

to manyconicts
of fealtyamong
vassals
andlords.In asociety
of delicately
bal-
ancedbargaining relationships,warswerefrequent,but theywerewagedon a
smallscalefor strictlylimitedobjectives.
SeeHenriPirenne, Economic andSocial
Historyof MedievalEurope(NewYork: HarcourtBraceJovanovich, 1937);
JosephR. StrayerandRushtonCoulborn,Feudalism in History(Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University Press, 1956);F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism(London:Longmans,
1952);andRichardA. Preston, Sydney F.Wise,andHerman0. Werner, Menin
Arms:A Historyof Warfare andIts Interrelationships
with Western Society
(New
York:Praeger, 1962),chaps.6 and7. Foranaccountof therulesof warfarelaid
34.downbytheCatholic Churchduringthetwelfthcentury
undertheTruceof
God andthe Peaceof God, seeArthurNussbaum, A Concise
Historyof the
Law of Nations(NewYork: Macmillan,1954),p. 18.
35.SeeFranciscodeVictoria,DeIndisetDeIureBelliRelectiones,
GwynneDyer,War(NewYork: Crown, 1985),p. 60.
trans.JohnP.Bate
(Washington,
DC:Carnegie
Endowment
for International
Peace,
1917);Francisco
Suarez,
DeTripliciVirtuteTheologica,
Disp.VIII, DeBello,in Selection
from
ThreeWorks(Oxford,England: Clarendon,
1925);Balthazar
Ayala,ThreeBooks
on the Law of War,the DutiesConnectedwith Warand Military Discipline
(Washington,
DC:Carnegie
Institute,
1912);
Emmerich
Vattel,LeDroitdesGens
(Washington,
DC:Carnegie
Institute,
1916);
andAlbericus
Gentilis,
DeIureBelli,
trans.JohnC.Rolfe(Oxford,England:Clarendon, 1933).
36. JohnU. Nef, WarandHumanProgress (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity
Press,1950),pp.250-259;RichardA. Preston
et al.,Menin Arms,chap.9; Dyer,
War,p.67;Bruce
Porter,
WarandtheRiseof theNation-State
(NewYork:Free
Press,1993).
37. PaulHazard,European
Thoughtin theEighteenth
Century,
trans.J. LewisMay
(NewYork: World, 1963),p. 18.
38. Kingsley
Martin,French
LiberalThought
in theEighteenth
Century,
2nded.
(NewYork:NewYorkUniversity
Press,
1954),chap.XI.
39. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas
de Caritat,Marquisde Condorcet,
Outlinesof an
HistoricalViewof the Progress
of theHumanMind, 1794.Excerptsfrom an
English
translation
of 1802in HansKohn,Makingof theModern
French
Mind
(Princeton,
NJ:VanNostrandAnvilBooks,1955),pp.97-98.
40. Candide,
chap.3,in Edmund
Fuller,
ed.,Voltaire:
A LaurelReader
(NewYork:
Dell, 1959), pp. 13-14.
41. WilliamPenn,
Essay
Toward
thePresent
andFuture
Peace
ofEurope,
reprinted
in
FrederickTollesandE. GordonAlderfer,eds.,The Witnessof WilliamPenn(New
York:Macmillan,1957),pp.140-159;AbbédeSt.Pierre,A Projectfor Making
Peace
Perpetual
in Europe,
reprinted
in C.E.Vaughan,
ed.,PoliticalWritings
of
Jean-Jacques
Rousseau:Volume1 (Cambridge,England:
UniversityPress,1915),
pp.364-87;
Jean-Jacques
RousseauA LastingPeace
throughtheFederation of
Europeand the Stateof Wat,trans.C. E. Vaughan(London:Constable
Publishers,
1917);ImmanuelKant, Perpetual
Peace(NewYork: LiberalArts
Press,1957);andJeremyBentham,
Planfor a Universal
and Perpetual
Peace,
reprinted
in Charles
W. Everett,
Jeremy
Bentham
(London:
Weidenfeld
and
Nicolson, 1966), pp. 195-229.
42. Dyer,War,pp.68-72.Thedeathtoll in theRevolutionary
andNapoleonic wars
cameto 4 million,mostof themsoldiers.
Thetotalnumberkilledwasonlyhalf
 NOTES 225

43. See
Henry
A.Kissinger,
A World
RestoredEurope
AfterNapoleon:
ThePolitics
of Conservatism
in a Revolutionary
Age(New
York:Grosset
andDunlap
Universal
Library,
1964).
SeealsoCharles
Breunig,
TheAgeof Revolution
and
Reaction
(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1970),
chaps.
3-5.
44. DavidW.Zeigler,
TheWars forGerman
Reunication, chap.
1in War,
Peace
andInternational
Politics,
4thed.(Boston:
Little,Brown,
1987);
GordonA.
Craig,
Germany
1866-1945
(NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press,
1978),
chap.
1.
45. IntheAmericanCivilWar,
622,000 soldiers
died.
Thattotalwasgreater
thanthe
combined
totalforU.S.military
personnel
inthetwoworldwars,plusKoreaand
Vietnam,
although thepopulationofthecountry
wasmuch larger
in the1980s
thanin the1860s.Dyer,War,p.77.
46. R.A.Preston
etal.,Approachto TotalWarfare,chap.15in Menin Arms:A
History
of Warfare
andItsInterrelationships
withWestern
Society,
4thed.(New
York:Holt, RinehartandWinston,1979).
47. Dyer,
War,
pp.7-8,150;Preston
etal.,Menin Arms
pp.244-245,
250-253;
Barbara
Tuchman,
TheGuns
ofAugust
(New
York:Dell,1962),
pp.91-95.
48.
Jonathan
Dymond,
AnInquiry
intotheAccordancy
ofWar
withthePrinciples
of
Christianity
andanExamination
ofthePhilosophical
Reasoning
byWhich
It Is
Defended,
3rded.(Philadelphia:
Brown,1834).
49. Norman Angell,TheGreatIllusion:
A StudyoftheRelation
ofMilitary
Power to
NationalAdvantage(NewYork:Putnams, 1910),p.71.Oneof thearguments
employedbyAngelltoprove thateconomic
prosperity
canbeseparated
frommil-
itarycapability
wasthatthenational bondsof smallnonmilitary
states
were
soughtafterbyinvestors
asmore securethanbondsofthelarger
military
powers.
Inrebuttal
toAngell,
J.H.JonesoftheUniversity
ofGlasgowpointedoutthatthe
militaryexpenditures
of thelargerpowers
created
theconditions
of international
stability
andsecurity
onwhich
smaller
nations
depended,
in TheEconomics
of
War andConquest(London:
KingandSon,
1915),
p.25.Foraskeptical
critique
of theviewthatrailways,
steamships,
andinternational
commercepromote
friendship
amongnations
andwereresponsible
forlongperiods
ofpeace
innine-
teenth-century
Europe,
seeGeoffrey
Blainey,
TheCausesof War,
3rded.(New
York:Macmillan-Free
Press,
1988),
esp.chap.
2.
50. Angell,
ibid.,p.335.ForHerbert
Spencers
viewthatwaristoocostly
anddestruc-
tiveforindustrial
societies,
seehisPrinciples
of Sociology,
Vol.11(NewYork:
Appleton,1898),pp.568-642.
George
Liskasviewsarediscussed
inchap.
4.
51. KarlvonClausewitz,
OnWar,trans.O.J.Mathhias
Jolles(NewYork:Modern
LibraryRandom
House,
1943),
pp.5,30,34;cf.alsoSirBasil
H.LiddellHart,
TheObjective
inWar,inB.Mitchell
Simpson,
ed.,War,Strategy
andMaritime
Power(NewBrunswick,
NJ:Rutgers University
Press,1977),p.33;Hans
Rothfels,
Clausewitz,
inEdward
Mead
Earle,
ed.,Makers
ofModern
Strategy
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1943),
pp.93-94;andPeter
Paret,
Clausewitz,
in Peter
Paret,
ed.,Makers
of Modern
Strategy
(Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press,
1986),pp.201-202.
52. Clausewitz,
OnWar,p.9,heldthattheabstractobject of disarming
theenemy
by nomeans
universally
occursin practice,
notis it a necessary
condition
to
peace.See alsoSunTzu,TheArtof War,
trans.andwithIntroduction
bySamuel
B.Griffith(Cambridge,
England:
ClarendonPress,
1963),pp.40-45.
53. G.W.F.Hegel,
Philosophy
of RightandLaw, paragraph
324,in CarlJ.
Friedrich,ed.,ThePhilosophy
of Hegel(NewYork:RandomHouseModern
Library,1953),p. 322.
226 THE OLDERTHEORZES
OF CONFLICTAND WAR

54. ChrisBrown,International
Relations
Theory:NewNormative Approaches
(New
York:ColumbiaUniversity
Press,
1992),pp.59-69.Browndiscusses
twoEnglish
idealists,
T.H. GreenandBernardBosanquet,
whowereinuencedbyHegelbut
reacheddifferent conclusions from his (pp. 68-69).
55. Whatis good?
All thatenhances
thefeeling
of power,
theWill-to-Power,
and
power
itselfinman.
Whatisbad?
Allthatproceeds
fromweakness.
Whatishap-
piness?
Thefeeling
thatpoweris increasingthat
resistance
hasbeenovercome.
Not contentment,
butmorepower;notpeace
at anyprice,butwar;notvirtue,but
efciency.
Theweakandthebotched shallperish:
firstprinciple
of ourhumanity.
Andtheyoughteven
to behelped
to perish.
Whatismoreharmful thananyvice?
Practical
sympathy
withallthebotched
andtheweakChristianity.FromThe
Twilight
oftheIdols(1888),
inGeoffrey
Clive,
ed.,ThePhilosophy
ofNietzsche
(NewYork: New AmericanLibrary,1965),p. 427
56. Human,All Too Human,Vol. I (1878),pp.372-373.In sharpcontrastto
Nietzsches
exaltation
of war,WilliamJames
hopedthatpeaceful
activities
involv-
inga challenge
to strenuous
exertion
andsacrice couldserve
asa substitute
for
warin providing
thesocialvitaminsgenerated bywar.Thephilosopher-psy
chologist
recognizedthatwarandthemilitarylifemetcertain
deep-rooted
needs
of societies
andsummoned
forthhumaneffortsof heroicproportions.
Hedid not
thinkit possible
to attenuate
theproclivity
to waruntilthese
sameenergies
could
beredirected-forexample,bytrainingyoungmento ght nototherhuman be-
ingsbutsuchnatural forces
asdiseases,
oods,poverty,andignorance.
If thena-
tion is notto evolveinto a societyof mollycoddles,
youthmustbeconscripted
to
hardship
tasksto getthechildishness
knockedoutof them.See
WilliamJames,
TheMoralEquivalent of War,Memories andStudies (London:
Longmans,
1912);andA MoralEquivalent for War(NewYork:Carnegie Endowmentfor
International
Peace,
1926).Later,AldousHuxleywasto popularize
thehypothe-
sisthatmanypeoplend anexhilaration
in warbecause
theirpeacetime pursuits
arehumiliating,
boring,andfrustrating.
Warbringswithit a stateof chronic
en-
thusiasm,
andlife duringwartimetakesonsignicance
andpurposefulness, so
thateventhemostintrinsically
boringjob is ennobled
aswarwork. Prosperity
isarticiallyinduced;
newspapersarelledwithinteresting
news;andtherulesof
sexual moralityarerelaxed
in wartime.However, Huxley,writingjustbefore
WorldWarII, conceded
that theconditions
of modernwar havebecome
soap-
pallingthatnotonlythecivilians
onthehome front,buteventhemostnaturally
adventurous andcombative human beings
will sooncometo hateandfearthe
process of ghting.EndsandMeans(NewYork:Harper86Row,1937).
Excerpted in RobertA. Goldwinet al.,eds.,Readings
in WorldPolitics(New
York: Oxford UniversityPress,1959),pp. 13-14.
57. Friedrich
Meinecke,
Machiavellism:
TheDoctrine
of Raison
dEtatandItsPlace
in ModernHistory(NewYork:Praeger,
1957),p. 371andff. in chap.14.
58. Heinrichvon Treitschke,Politics,11(NewYork: Macmillan,1916),p. 595.
59. Wehavelearned
to perceive
themoralmajesty
of warthroughtheveryprocesses
whichto thesupercialobserver
seem brutalandinhuman.Thegreatness ofwar
isjustwhatatrst sightseems
to beitshorrorthatforthesakeoftheircountry
menwill overcome
thenaturalfeelings
of humanity,
thattheywill slaughter
their
fellowmenwho havedone them no injury, nay whom they perhapsrespectas
chivalrous
foes.Manwill not onlysacricehislife, but thenaturalandjustied
instincts
ofhissoul;. . , herewehavethesublimity
ofwar.Ibid.,pp.395-396.
60. Quoted inFrankM. Russell, Theories
ofInternational
Relations,
p.245.
61.

NOTES 227

62.
AlfredThayer
Mahan,
Armaments
andArbitration
(1912),
p.31.Quoted
in
Charles
D.Tarlton,
TheStyles
of American
International
Thought:
Mahan,
Bryan,
andL1ppmann,
WorldPolitics,
XVII(July1965),
590.Theforegoing
summary
of Mahanis based
largelyonTarltons
analysis.
VilfredoPareto,TheMindandSociety, Vol.IV trans.A. BongiornoandA.
Livingston(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,
1935), pp.2170-2175and2179-2220;
63.
Gaetano Mosca,TheRulingClass,
trans.H. D.Kahn(NewYork:McGrawHill,
1939).Forinterestingandvaluable
assessmentsof bothPareto
andMosca, see
PartsIII andVI of James
Burnham,TheMachiavellians:
Defenders
of Freedom
(NewYork:JohnDay, 1943).
Holmes gloriedwarasa romantic adventure
andasa necessary
corrective
for
64.
theirresponsible
andsybaritic
tendenciesof modern
youth.SeeEdward
McNall
Burns,Ideas
in Conict:ThePolitical
Theories
oftheContemporary
World(New
York: Norton, 1960),p. 54.
65.
Oswald
Sengler,
TheDecline
of theWest,
trans.Charles
F.Atkinson
(NewYork:
Knopf, 1926-1928),2 vols., and The Hour of Decision,trans.CharlesF.
Atkinson(New York: Knopf, 1934); BenedettoCroce,Theoryand
Historiography,trans.D Ainslee(London:1921).
SeeA.James
Gregor,
TheFascist
Persuasion
in Radical
Politics(Princeton,
NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress,1974); Anthony JamesJoes,Fascismin the
Contemporary
World:Ideology,
Evolution,
Resurgence
(Boulder,
CO:Westview,
1978),chap.3; H. S. Harris, The SocialPhilosophyof GiovanniGentile
(Urbana:
University
of IllinoisPress,
1960).SeealsoNoelOSullivan,Fascism
(London:
J.M. Dent,1983);Ernest Nolte,ThreeFacesof Fascism
(NewYork:
Hold,Rinehart8CWinston, 1965);ZeevSternhell
et al.,TheBirthof Fascist
66.
Ideology,
trans.DavidMaisel(Princeton,NJ:Princeton
University
Press,1993);
WalterLaqueur,
Fascism: Past,Present,
Future(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
67.Press,1996).
IrvingLouisHorowitz,ed.,TheAnarchists
(NewYork:Dell,1964),fromtheedi-
tors introduction, p. 22.
68.Horowitz,
Seetheexcerpt
fromThomas
Anarchists,
G.Masaryk,in Horowitz,
ibid.,pp.469-473.
pp.44-55.SeealsoAlanRitter,Anarchism(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,1980);PaulThomas,
Karl MarxandtheAnarchists
(London:
Routledge
andKegan
Paul,1980);
DavidMiller,Anarchism
(London:
J.
M. Dent, 1984).
69. Georges
Sorel,
Reections
onViolence
(NewYork:Macmillan,
1961),
pp.77-79,
115. Seehis chap.2, Violenceand the Decadence
of the Middle Classes.See
alsoPartIV,Sorel,
A NoteonMythandViolence,
in Burnham,
Machiavellians;
andWilliamY.Elliott,ThePragmatic
Revoltin Politics:Syndicalism,
Fascism
and
theConstitutional
State(NewYork:Howard
Fertig,
1968),
pp.111-141.
70. Horowitz,
Anarchists,
pp.53-54;Francis
W.Coker,
Recent
Political
Thought
(New
York:Appleton,1934),chap.&#39;VII,
esp.pp.223-225.Seesources
citedin Note68.
71. Quotedin DanielBell,TheCulturalContradictions
of Capitalism
(NewYork:
Basic
Books,
1976),
p.6.Contemporary
terrorists
oftenselect
_atrandom,
forkid-
nappingor murder,typicalmembers
of thegroupor classtheyseekto terrorize
(e.g.,business
personnel,diplomats,air travelers,or restaurantdiners).See
EdwardHyams,Terrorists andTerrorism(NewYork:St.Martins,1974);Paul
Wilkinson,
PoliticalTerrorism
(NewYork:Wiley,1974);andJ. Bowyer
Bell,
228

72.
THEOLDERTHEORIES
OFCONFLICT
ANDWAR

See
J.Bowyer
Bell,
Explaining
International
Terrorism:
TheElusive
Quest,
in
Charles
W.Kegley,
Jr.,ed.,International
Terrorism:
Characteristics,
Causes,
Controls
(NewYork:
St.Martins
Press,
1990),
pp.178-184.
Haig
Khatchadouria
TheMorality
ofTerrorism,
Monograph
(NewYork:Lang,
1998).
Paul Johnson
73. has
called
terrorism
intrinsically
evil,necessarily
evil,
andwholyevil;TheSeven
Deadly
Sins
ofTerrorism,
inHenry
H.Hahn,
ed.,
Terrorism,
Political
Violence
and
74. World
Order
(New
York:
University
Press
ofAmerica,
1984),
p.50.
Chris
Brown,
International
Relations
Theory:
New Normative
Approaches
(New
York:Columbia
University
Press,
1992),p. 132.
Forarepresentative
sample
ofthevoluminousliterature
reflecting
these
attitudes,
seeRoland
H.Bainton,
Christian
Attitudes
Toward WarandPeace(Nashville,
TN:AbingdonPress,
1960);
John C.Bennett, ed.,Nuclear
Weapons
andthe
Conictof Conscience
(NewYork:Scribners, 1962);GordonZahn, An
Alternative
to War(New York:CouncilonReligionandInternational
Affairs,
1963);
JamesFinn,
ed.,
Peace,
theChurchesandtheBomb (NewYork:
Council
onReligion
andInternational
Affairs,
1965);Donald A.Wells,
TheWar Myth
(New York:
Pegasus,
1967);
James W.Douglass, TheNon-Violent
Cross
(New
York:Macmillan,
1968);
John
H.Yoder,
Politicsof]esus
(Grand
Rapids,
MI:
Erdmans,
1972);
GeneSharp,
ThePolitics
of Non-Violent
Action(Boston:
Sargent,
1973);
Joseph
Fahey,
justice
andPeace
(Maryknoll,
NY:Orbis
Books,
1979);
Thomas
Merton,
TheNon-Violent
Alternative
(NewYork:
Farrar;
Straus
andGiroux,
1980)
andTheChurch
andtheBomb:
Nuclear
Weapons
andthe
Christian
Conscience,
areport
ofaworking
party
under
thechairmanship
ofthe
75. Bishop
of Salisbury
(London:
Hodder
andStoughton,
1982);
James
T.
Burtschaell,
ed.,justWarNoLonger
Exists
(Notre
Dame,
IN:NotreDame
UniversityPress,1988).
SeeErichFrom, TheCase
for Unilateral
Disarmament,
in Donald
G.
Brennan,
ed.,Arms
Control,
Disarmament
andNational
Security
(New York:
76. Braziller,
1961),
pp.187-197;
Mulford
Q.Sibley,
Unilateral
Disarmament,
in
Robert
A. Goldwin,
ed.,American
Armed
(Chicago:
RandMcNally,
1961),
pp.112-140;
Zahn,Alternative
to War.
PaulRamsey,
War andtheChristian
Conscience
(Durham,
NC:DukeUniversit
Press,
1961)
andThe Limits
ofNuclear
War(NewYork:
Council
onReligion
and
International
Affairs,
1963);
JohnCourtney
Murray,
Morality
andModern
War
(NewYork:ChurchPeace
Union,
1959);
Richard
A.Falk,
Law,Morality
andWar
in theContemporary
World,
Princeton
Studies
inWorld
Politics
No.5 (New
York:
Praeger,
1963);
Robert
W.Tucker,
TheJust
War (Baltimore:
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press,
1960)
andJustWar
andVatican
II: A Critique
(New
York:
Council
onReligion
andInternational
Affairs,
1966);WilliamV. OBrien,
Nuclear
War,
Deterrence
andMorality
(Westminster,
MD:Newman Press,
1967)
andTheConduct
ofjustandLimited
War(New York:
Praeger,1981);
Michael
Walzer,
justandUnjust
Wars(New
York:
Basic
Books,
1977);
James
T.Johnson
]ustWar
Tradition
andtheRestraint
ofWar(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
Universit
Press,
77. 1981);Richard
J.Regan,
Just
War:
Principles
andCases
(Washington,
DC:
Catholic
University
Press,
1996);
Brian
Kane,
JustWarandtheCommon
Good
(Bethesda,
MD:International
Scholars
Publications,
1997).
78.OBrien,
Nuclear
War,Deterrence
TheGulfWarof1991
andMorality,
wastheoccasion
pp.34-41.
foraconsiderable
revival
ofinterest
injust-
 NOTES 229

AlanF.Geyer,
JustWar,JihadandAbuse of Tradition,Christianity
andCrisis,51
(March4, 1991),51-53;JohnHowardYoder, JustWarTradition:IsIt Credible?
ChristianCentury,108 (March13, 1991),295-298;StanleyHauerwasand
RichardJohnNeuhaus, Pacifism,
JustWarandtheGulf, FirstThings,13(May
1991),39-45;JeanB. Elshtain,ed.,Just WarTheory(NewYork:New York
University
Press,
1991);JamesT.JohnsonandGeorge Weigel,
JustWarandthe
79.
GulfWar,Center
forEthics
andPublicPolicy(Lanham,
MD:University
Press
of
America,
1991);MichaelK. Duffey,TheJustWarTeaching: FromTonkinGulfto
Persian
Gulf, America,164(February2, 1991),83ff; JohnP.Langan,TheJust
WarTheoryaftertheGulfWar,Theological Studies,53 (March1992),95-112;
BrianJ. Hehir,JustWarTheoryin a PostCold
WarWorld,TheJournalof
ReligiousEthics,20 (Fall1992),237-265.
See
RalphB.Potter,
WarandMoralDiscourse
(Richmond,
VA:JohnKnoxPress,
1969);RobertGinsberg,
ed.,The Critiqueof War (Chicago:
Regnery,
1969);
RichardA. Wasserstrom,
WarandMorality(Belmont, CA:Wadsworth,
1970);
MortonA. Kaplan,
ed.,Strategic
Thinking andItsMoralImplications
(Chicago:
University
of Chicago
Center for PolicyStudy,
1973);James
T. Johnson,
The
80. CruiseMissileand the NeutronBomb:SomeMoral Reections, Worldview,20
(December
1977);
Robert
L.Phillips,
WarandJustice
(Oklahoma
City:University
of Oklahoma
Press,1984);JohnD. JonesandMarcF.Griesbach,
eds.,JustWar
Theoryin theNuclear
Age(Lanham,
MD:University
Press
of America,
1985);
WilliamV. OBrienandJohnLangan,S.J., eds.,TheNuclearDilemmaandthe
JustWarTradition
(Lexington,
MA:D.C.Heath,
1986).
Forthedebateoverthetheologyof liberationandthemoralityof revolutionary
violence,
seetheOctober
1968issue
of Worldview,
devoted
to Revolution
and
Violence;GustavoGuttierez,LiberationandDevelopment,
CrossCurrents,
21 (1971);Philip E. Berryman,
Latin AmericanLiberationTheology,
Theological
Studies,34 (December 1973);GuenterLewy,Religionand
Revolution
(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,1974),
esp.chap.20;Francis
P.
Fiorenza,
PoliticalTheologyand LiberationTheology,in ThomasM.
McFadden,ed.,Liberation,
Revolution
andFreedom:TheologicalPerspective
81.(NewYork:SeaburyPress,
1975);Gustavo
Guttierez,
A Theologyof Liberation,
trans.CaridadInda andJohnEagleson
(Maryknoll,NY: OrbisBooks,1978);
Dennis P.McCann,
ChristianRealism andLiberation
Theology
(Maryknoll,
NY:
82.PaulII ConfrontsLiberationTheology(Washington,
Orbis Books,
1981);and QuentinL, Quade,
ed.,ThePopeand Revolution:
John
DC: EthicsandPublic
PolicyCenter,1982).
Walzer,just and UnjustWars,p. 278.
Ibid.,p.274.ChrisBrowndefends
Walzer
against
whatheregarded
aspatroniz-
ingBritish
critics
ofWalzers
book,
whocalled
hisphilosophical
graspoftheis-
83.sues
shallow
andhisnotionof moralityplatitudinous.
bookisthebestcurrentworkonthesubject.
In Browns
International
view,Walzers
RelationsTheory:New
NormativeApproaches,
p. 136.
Michael
Walzer,
A Response,
Ethics
andInternational
Affairs,
11(1997),
99-104.
84.Joseph
Boyle,
JustandUnjust
Wars:Casuistry
andtheBoundaries
oftheMoral
230 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR

Deterrence(NewYork:St.MartmsPress,1982);GermainGrisez,The Moral
Implications
of a NuclearDeterrent,Center
journal,2 (Winter1982);Francis X.
Winters,Societyof Jesus(S.J.),Nuclear DeterrenceMorality: Atlantic
Community Bishopsin Tension,Theological
Studies,43 (September 1982);John
Langan,(S.J.)The AmericanHierarchyandNuclearWeapons,ibid.; David
Hollenbach,S.J.,NuclearWeapons andNuclearWar:TheShape of theCatholic
Debate,ibid.(December 1982);TheChallengeof Peace:GodsPromise andOur
Response,U.S.CatholicBishopsPastoralLetteron War and Peace, Text in
Origins,NC Documentary Service
13(May19,1983);L. BrucevanVoorst,The
Churches and NuclearDeterrence, ForeignAffairs, 61 (Spring1983);Albert
Wohlstetter,
Bishops,
Statesmen
and OtherStrategists
on the Bombing
of
Innocents,
Commentary (June1983);DonaldL. Davidson,
NuclearWarandthe
AmericanChurches:Ethical Positionson Modern Warfare(Boulder,CO:
Westview,
1983);Jim Castelli,TheBishops
andtheBomb:Waging Peacein the
NuclearAge(GardenCity,NY:Doubleday-Image,1983);MichaelNovak,Moral
Clarityin theNuclear Age(Nashville,TN: Thomas
Nelson,1983);PhilipF.
Lawler,ed.,justiceandWarin theNuclear
Age(Lanham,
MD:University
Press of
America,1983);JudithA. Dwyer,S.J., ed.,TheCatholicBishopsandNuclear
War(Washington,
DC:Georgetown
University
Press,
1984);
James
E.Dougherty,
TheBishopsandNuclearWeapons (Hamden,CT:ArchonBooks,1984),esp.
chaps.
5 and6; BruceM. Russett,
EthicalDilemmas
of Nuclear
Deterrence,
International
Security,
8 (Spring1984);MichaelFoxandLeoGroarke,Nuclear
War:Philosophical
Perspectives
(NewYork:PeterLand,1985);George
Weigel,
TranquillitasOrdinis:The PresentFailureand FuturePromiseof American
Catholic
Thought onWarandPeace (NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,
1987);
TheNuclearDilemma, Statement
oftheCommission
onPeace,EpiscopalDiocese
of Washington,1987.Themoretechnical
questions
of deterrence
strategy,
the
controllability
of nuclear
war,a NATOpolicyof norst use,thepossibility
of
substituting
conventional
for nucleardeterrence,
andrelatedissues
arediscussed
in Chapter8. SeealsoRobertK. Tucker,TheNuclearDebate:Deterrenceand the
Lapseof Faith (NewYork: HolmesandMeier,1985)
86. James
Sterba,
Reconciling
Pacists
andJustWarTheorists,
Social
Theory
and
Practice, 18 (Fall 1992), 213-218.
87. EricReitan,
TheIrreconcilability
of Pacism
andJustWarTheory:
A Response
to Sterba,
ibid., 20 (Summer
1994),117-134.
SeeJamesSterba,
Reconciling
Pacists
andJustWarTheorists
Revised,
Response
to Reitan,ibid., 135-142.See
alsoGene
Sharp,
Beyond
JustWarandPacism:
Nonviolent
Struggle
Toward
Justice,
Freedom
andPeace,TheEcumenical
Review,
48 (April 1996),233-250;
DanielA. Brown,A JustPeace:
A ReviewEssayonChristian
Pacism
andJust
War,ReligiousStudies
Review,22 (April 1996),129-134;
Richard
B. Miller,
Interpretations
of Conict:Ethics,PacismandtheJustWar,NewOxford
Review,59 (JulyAugust 1992),30-31.
Chapter 6
Microcosmic Theories
of Violent Conict

MODERN STUDIES OF MOTIVATIONS AND WAR

In the recentdecades,
socialscientists
haveturnedincreasingly
towardmo-
tives,reasons,and causalfactorsthat may be operativeboth in individualhu-
man beingsand in socialcollectivities,eventhough peopleare not immedi-
atelyawareof themanddonot become
consciously
awareof themexceptasa
result of scientic observationand methodicalanalysis.Why do individuals
behaveaggressively?Why do statesandothergroupsor actorswagewars?
Thetwo questions arerelated,buttheyarenot thesame.Theformerpertains
to theinnerspringsof actionwithinindividualhumanbeings,
thelatterto the
decision-making processes of nationalgovernments.
Violent revolutionconsti-
tutes yet another phenomenon,different from individual aggressiveness
which is rooted in the biologicaland psychologicalcharacteristics
of human
beings,andfrom international
war,whichis a highlypoliticizedandinstitu-
tionalizedformof socialbehavior.
Revolutionitself,insofarasit requiresor-
ganization,leadership,
ideologyanddoctrine,propaganda, planning,strategy,
tactics,communications, recruitsand supplies,and veryoften a diplomacyfor
the acquisitionof foreignsupport,assumes a highly politicizedcharacterwith
the passageof time.Thus,it requiresmoreof a macrocosmic than a microcos-
mic analysis.(Seethe sectionRevolutionandWar in Chapter7.)
Psychological
(especially
socialpsychological) factorsalonemightgo far
to explaininstances
of anomiclviolence,suchasa food or language riot in
India,anoutbreakof ghtingat a sportsevent,or a racialdisorderat a public
beach.However, evenin thesecases,socialpsychologists wouldbewaryof
the fallacyof the singlefactor, and socialscientistswould arguethat some
instances
of apparently
anomicviolence
mightinvolveanelement
of political
organizationand can be adequatelycomprehended only whenplacedin their
total sociologicalandpolitical context.In all casesof socialviolence,we must
assumethe presence of multiple explanatoryfactors.
Thephenomenon
of international
waris themostcomplexanddifficultof
all to explain.It is impossibleto describethe causesof war purelyin termsof
individualpsychology,asif it werea caseof psychictensionswithin individu-
alsmountingto the breakingpoint andthen spillingoverinto largescale con-
ict. In the caseof war, thosewho make the momentousdecisionto lead a
231
232 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

stateinto war do not themselves do theghting on the battleeld,eventhough

in an ageof total war, the distinction betweenthe battleeld and the home
front hasbeenblurredbeyondrecognition.Conversely, thosewho actuallyen-
gagein battlearelikely to havehad little or nothingto do with the actualde-
cision to ght. Feelingsof hostility, moreover,might indeedbe widespread
within a nation vis-avis another nation and yet war might be averted by as-
tute diplomacy.By the sametoken,a governmentcanleada peopleinto a war
for which thereis little enthusiasticsupport,if not overt opposition.On this
subject, Werner Levi comments,
Whenfor instancewill certainnaturaltraits or psychological
drivesnd outletsin
war, and whenin somethingmorepeaceful?. . . What theseexplanationsfail to
do is to indicate how these human factors are translated into violent conict involv-
ing all citizens,regardless
of theirindividualnature,andperformedthrougha highly
complexmachineryconstructed overa periodof yearsfor just sucha purpose.
Thereis alwaysthe missinglink in thesefascinatingspeculationsabout the
psychological causesof war betweenthe fundamentalnatureof manand the out-
break of war. . . . Usually,the psychologicalfactors and human traits can be
classied
asconditions
of warmorecorrectlythanascauses.2

BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

Conict has an inside and an outside dimension. It arises out of the internal
dimensionsof individualsactingsinglyor in groups,and also out of external
conditionsand socialstructures.At all levelsof analysis,largerorganizedag-
gregatesof humanbeingsaffect smalleraggregates and individuals,and vice
versa.Individualsand groupsare in constantinteraction.Which is more im-
portant, the larger or the smaller?Scientistsfrom the many disciplinesinter-
estedin conict will probablyneverbeableto agreeon an answerto this fun-
damentallyimportantquestion.The only availablesolutionto this dilemmais
to regardsocialsituationsand individual inner processes as constantlyinter-
actingwithin an organicwhole.
PeterCorninghasnotedthat without an understandingof the evolution-
ary and geneticaspectsof behavior,we cannot fully comprehendthe inner
principlesby which humanlife is organized,and that socialscientistsmustat-
tend increasinglyto the interaction betweenthe organismand the environ-
ment.3Within recentyears,a controversialnew eld hasmadeits appearance
in academesociobioIogy. Sociobiologistsstudythe geneticrootsof socialbe-
havior in insects,animals,and humanbeingsand seekto bridgethe gap be-
tween the geneticinheritanceof individuals on the one hand and social
processes and institutionson the other.The founderand most prominentex-
ponent of the new discipline,Edward O. Wilson, professorof scienceat
Harvardandexperton insectsocieties,postulatesthat in placeof a generalag-
gressiveinstinct (treatedlater in this chapter),thereare particularpatternsof
aggressive behaviorthat havebeenadaptedby variousspeciesto ensuretheir
 INSTINCTTHEORIESOF AGGRESSION 233

survivalwithintheDarwinianevolutionary scheme. Wilsonanalyzed human

socialevolutionand aggressive behaviorprimarily as biologicallyinnate
ratherthanculturallydetermined. Theneweld is seenassomewhat preten-
tiousin its effortto combineethology(thestudyof animalbehavior)
with so-
ciologyandits tendency to makewide-sweeping assertionsaboutthegenetic
basis of behavior.4
All livingorganisms
havecertainfundamental,
species-specic
biological
requirements.Corningnotes,Theseneedsincludea reasonablypure atmos-
phere,numerousnutritional requirements,
freshwater,sleep,. . . shelterand
clothing(or,moregenerally,
maintenance
of bodytemperature),
healthcare,
including sanitation, physical security, procreation, and the nurture and train-
ingof theyoung.5Overtheworldasa whole,thegreaterpartof all economic
activityis devoted
to meetingbasicbiologicalneeds.
Amonghumans, biologi-
cal needsquickly shadeoff into higherpsychologicalneedsthat areofteneven
moredifficultto satisfysenseof belonging,
self-esteem
and prestige,self-
actualization,
andsoforth.5Muchof thepoliticalandeconomic competition
and conict among human societiesis traceableto the fact that the demand for
things requiredto satisfybiologicaland psychologicalneedsalwaysexceeds
thesupply.7
Thisdoesnotnecessarilyleadto theconclusion
thatnatureis red
in toothandclaw andthatviolentaggressionandwarareinescapableamong
humansocieties.Severalbiologistshaveinsistedthat tness for survivaldic-
tatescooperationandmutual aid at leastasoftenasaggressiveconict.8

INSTINCT THEORIES OF AGGRESSION

The key microcosmicconceptdevelopedby biologistsand psychologistsfor
theexplanationof conict is aggression.
Normally,&#39;wethink of aggression
asa
form of violent behaviordirectedtoward injuring or killing a humanbeing,or
damagingor destroyinga nonhumanentity. Somewriters havedistinguished
betweenhostileaggression,the aim of which is to inict injury, and instru-
mentalaggression, the purposeof which is to secureextraneousrewardsbe-
yondthevictimssuffering.Thisdistinctionhasbeencriticizedasmisleading
by Albert Bandura,who arguesthat mostactsof hostileaggression serveends
other than the mere production of injury and hence are instrumental.9
Banduradenesaggressionas behaviorthat resultsin personalinjury (either
psychologicalor physical)or in destructionof property,but he insistson the
importanceof the social labelingprocess-that is, on socialjudgmentsthat
determinewhich injurious or destructiveacts are to be called aggressive.
Neitherthe surgeonwho makesa painful incisionnor the bulldozeroperator
who razesa condemnedbuildingis accusedof committingaggression.
Do human beings carry within their genetic or psychic structuresan in-
eradicableinstinct or predispositionfor aggression?Giventhe way in which
the debateaboutinstinctivebehaviorhasdeveloped, it is usefulto examinerst
the positionstaken earlier by certainpsychologists.Generally,psychologists
234 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

have long agreedthat aggressionis to be understood in some sort of stimulus-

responseframework. A basic issuethat arosein their eld early in the twentieth
century was whether aggressivetendenciesare innate, instinctual, and ever-pre-
sent in humans,or whether they appear only as a result of externally produced
frustration.
Leadinggures identied with the instinct theoriesof aggressionduring
the early decades of the century were William James (1842-1910) and
William McDougall (1871-1938). McDougall, the leading British psycholo-
gist of his day,consideredinstinctasa psychophysical
processinheritedby all
membersof a species;it was not learned, but it could be modied by learning.
McDougall took issuewith the psychoanalystswho consideredthe aggressive
impulseasever-present
in humansand constantlyseekingrelease.McDougall
insisted that the instinct of pugnacity, as he called it, becameoperative only
wheninstigated
by a frustratingcondition. He did not look on humanag-
gressivenessas.abuilt-in impulse constantly seekingrelease.
The most famous and most controversial of the instinct theories was that
of the socalleddeathinstinct,Put forth by SigmundFreud.Originally,Freud
was inclined to the view thattaggressionresults from frustration, especiallythe
frustrationof the sexualimpulsesby restraintsimposedin civilizedsocieties.
After World War I, however, Freud postulated the existencein the human be-
ing of a fundamental eros, life instinct, and a fundamental tlocmatos,death in-
stinct. In no other way was the Austrian psychoanalyst able to explain why
millions of men went to their death on the battleeld between 1914 and
1918.13For Freud,all instinctsweredirectedtoward the reductionor elimina-
tion of tension, stimulation, and excitationa sort of nirvana or absenceof
all desire.Deathinvolvesthe removalof all excitation.Henceall living things
aspireto the quiescence
of the inorganicworld.14Nonetheless,
peoplego
on living despitethe death instinct, becausethe life instinct channelsthe anni-
hilativedrive awayfrom the selftoward others.Aggressive
behaviorthuspro-
vides an outlet for destructive energiesthat might otherwise lead to suicide.
According to this hypothesis, the recurrence of war and conict becomesa
necessary
periodic releaseby which groupspreservethemselvesthrough di-
vertingtheirselfdestructive
tendencies
to outsiders.
Most contemporary psychologists reject Freuds hypothesis of the death
wish as the basis for aggressiontheory. ProfessorLeonard B,erkowitz called it
scienticallyunwarranted16
anddecientfromthestandpointof positivist
logic and modernexperimentalscience.He maintainedthat Freudiantheory
attributes the causeof present behavior to a future goal-that is, the reduction
or removalof excitation.He also arguedthat researchperformedwith ani-
malsnegates
thevalidityof thenotionthatall behavioris aimedat thereduc-
tion.of tension,inasmuchas organismsfrequentlygo out of their way to ob-
tain additional stimulation from their external environment.17 It should be
rememberedthat Freudneveradducedany compellingbody of evidencein
supportof his,hypothesis;critics seeno scientic needto disproveit. Freud
thus fails to explain the causesof war.
 ANIMAL BEHAVIOR STUDIES 235

ANIMAL BEHAVIOR STUDIES

In recent
decades,
oneof themostrapidlyadvancing
branches
of biological
science
hasbeen etl7ologythe
study
of animal
behavior
in allitsaspects
withparticular
emphasisonthefourbasic
animal
drives
of reproductio
hunger,fear,and aggression.
Humanbehavior
andanimalbehavior
arequitedissimilar;
in somere-
spects,
though,
theymaybeanalogous,
anda comparison
of basicsimilarities
andsubtle
differences
canhelpustoavoid
oversimplied
single-factor
expla-
nations.
Fromaknowledgeof animalbehavior,wecannot directly
inferany-
thingabouthuman behavior.
Workononespecies,according to EltonB.
McNeil,canserveasa model onlyfor theformation
of hypotheses,about
otherspecies.19
Theprincipal
caveats
to remember,of course,
arethathu-
mans arevastly
morecomplexthaneven themosthighlydevelopedanimals,
thatthecomputing
organism
of thehumannervous
system
lendsitselfto al-
mostunlimited
learning
andadaptation,
andthat,above
all,human
beings
ex-
ist in a moral andspiritual order.
Thecausesof aggressive
behaviorin animals
arerelatively
few.Males,
forexample,
ghtoverfood,females, andterritory;
femalesdosotoprotect
theyoung.
All exhibithostility
whenstrange
members of theirownspecies
areintroduced
into theirmidst,whenothersmakeoff with objects
toward
whichtheyhavebecome
possessive,
andwhentheirexpectations
havebeen
firstaroused
andthenfrustrated.
Researchers
have
found
arelationship
be-
tweenaggressiveness
andtheproduction
of themalehormone(eventhough
in a few species,
thefemaleis moreaggressive
thanthe male).Withina
species,
somebreedsmaybernoreaggressive
thanothers.Theso-called
in-
stinctive
targets
ofaggression
(such
asthemouse
astarget
forthecat)appear
to bemoreamatterof learning
thanof heredity.
Researchershavenotedthat
ghtingwithina speciesmayproduceintricatepatterns
of submissionand
dominance
andthatananimal
will ghtratherthanbedeprived
of status.
Repeatedsuccess
in ghtingcanmakeananimalmoreaggressive, andvari-
ousformsof electrical,
chemical,andsurgical interventions
into thebrain
canproduce predictable
alterations
in animalaggressiveness.Studies
have
alsoindicated
thatthesame principles
of learningonwhichthestimulation
ofconictbehavior
isbased
maybeapplied
in reverse,
asit were,
to control
andreducetheaggressive
urge.21
Recent
feminist
approaches
tointernational-relations
theory
have
empha-
sizedtheimplications
of genderdifferences
for conict behavior.
Do women
andmenhavedifferent
interests,
perspectives,
andmotivations,
based
solely
or evenlargelyon gender?
Is gendermoreimportantthanclassor national
identity
indeningthebasis
forconict?
Arewomen moreorperhapsless-
innately
pronethanmento aggressive
action?
Aretherolesplayed
bymen
andwomen aswarriors
or homemakers,
respectively,
largelysocially
con-
i
structed,
or doesgreater
maleaggressiveness.and
female
passivity,
if suchis
thecase,
stemfromthebiological
differences
between
menandwomen? These
236 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

issuesare addressed morefully in Chapter4, wherewe examinefeministthe-

ory of internationalrelations.What is mostapparentin addressing
suchques-
tions is the obvious fact that wars have beenwaged, won, lost, and studied al-
most exclusivelyby men. Although decisionsabout war in advanced,
democratic societiesare no longer exclusively the preserveof men, it remains
the casethat menstill heavilyinuencehow and whetherwarswill be fought
and concluded.
Accordingto feministwritings, genderhasbeenof crucial importancein
sustainingmilitary activities.Militarism has beenmore fully associated
with
men than with women. Writers such as V. Spike Peterson and Cynthia Enloe
go so far as to ask whether militarism in the absenceof masculinism is possi-
ble,suggesting
thatthetwo areclearlyintertwined."Theideaof armedcom-
bat is a male characteristic if only becauseof the fact that men, rather than
women,historicallycomposepolitical and military decision-making
units and
the ranks of armed combatants. Therefore, militarism helps to sustain male
dominance. Although men are the principal actors in military situations, fem-
inist writers assert,major effectsof their military actionsare felt by women,
who composethe civilian populationsincreasinglytargetedin modernwar-
fare. Genderdifferentiatedeffects result from war; in other words, women are
affected in ways that differ from men. For example, women care for those
who are disabledby war.Womenand childrenbecomerefugeesand noncom-
batant casualties.To what extent, feminist writers ask, has the domination of
international relations by men both shapedthe conict setting and dened the
security agenda?What would have been different in the absenceof such con-
trol? Is it a paradox that women seekequality in the military?
John Paul Scott deniesthat there is any physiological evidencepointing to
a spontaneous
instinct"forghting within the body.There is, however,an in-
ternal physiological mechanism which has only to be stimulated to produce
ghting.23As Scottseesit, aggression
is the resultof a learningprocess
in
which the motivation for ghting is increased by success;the longer success
continues, the stronger the motivation becomes.Scott therefore roots the ag-
gressiveimpulsein physiologicalprocesses
but demandsa stimulusfrom the
environment and rejects the concept of selfactivation.
Generally speaking, biologists have been lessreluctant than psychologists
to speak of instinctnot so much as an explanation of an inherited pattern of
behavior (through genetic transmission) as a shorthand description of those
behavior differencesthat-are determined by the interaction of heredity and en-
vironment. However, most biologists now prefer the term innate behavior
over the older term instinct.

LORENZ:
Il\1TRASPECIFIC
AGGRESSION
Konrad Lorenz, an Austrian ecologistat the Max Planck Institute of Behavioral
Physiology,
studiedmorethan40 speciesof sh, dogs,birds,rats,deer,andfarm-
yard animalsandconcludedthat aggressionis somethingverydifferentfrom the
 LORENZ:
INTRASPECIFIC
AGGRESSION 237

destructive
principleof theFreudian
deathwish.ForLorenz,aggression
is anin-
stinct,whichundernaturalconditionshelpsto ensurethesurvivalof theindivid-
ualandthespecies.
Thetypical
aggressive
instinct,
hesays,
occurs
among
mem-
bersofthesamespecies,
notbetween
members of differentspecies;
in short,it is
intraspecic
rather
thaninterspecific,
andit isbestillustrated
bythetenacity
with
whicha sh, mammal,
or birdwill defendits territoryagainst
othersof its own
species.
It thereby
serves
aspecies-preserving
function,
intheDarwinian
sense,
by
spacingmembers of a species
overtheavailable
habitatinsteadof-bunching
to-
getherexcessively.
Nonaggressivespecies
donotformlovebonds,butall species
that exhibitbondbehaviorfor mutualprotectionof matingpartnersandsafe
rearingof theyoungarehighlyaggressive
towardterritorialneighbors,
perhaps
becausethesexualandfamilybondmustovercome thetendency towardrepul-
sionofothers
attheveryheartoftheindividuals
territory,.where
intraspecicag-
gression
oughtto bestrongest.
Theaimoftheaggressiveurge,Lorenzinsists,
is
to wardoff theintruder,
possessthefemale,or protectthebrood-,
notto extermi-
natefellowmembers of thespecies.
Hedescribed a phenomenon thathetermed
ritualization
of aggression,
a xed motorpatterninvolvinga ceremonialized se-
riesof menacing gesturesto wardoff interlopingmembers of thesamespecies
without resortto actualviolence,a sortof subtledeterrence. .
According
to Lorenz,several animalspecieshavedeveloped someremark-
able aggression-inhibiting
mechanisms or appeasement gestures.Lorenz
lamentsthatweakcreatures (suchasdoves,hares,andchimpanzees) thatnor-
mallylackthepowerto kill a foeof theirownsizeandcanrelyoneeinghave
not beenunderpressureto developinhibitionsagainstkillingtheirownkind.
He placeshumansin the samecategory(apartfrom their inventionof techno-
logicalweapons) anddeems themparticularlydangerous becauseof thiscom-
bination,buthedoesnot think,assomewritersdo,*thathumansareuniquely
viciousaskillersof theirownkind.27Hehasno doubtthathumansarevastly
moreadvanced andcomplex thanall otherprimates, buthewarnsthatthevery
facultiesof conceptualthoughtandverbalspeech that elevate
themto a level
aboveall othercreatures posetheriskof extinctionto humanity.Lorenzcon-
cludedthataggression is something verydifferentfromthedestructive principle
expressed in Freuds hypotheticalthanatos. Accordingto Lorenz,aggression,
theeffectsof whicharefrequentlyandmistakenly equated with thoseof the
deathwish,is aninstinctlikeanyother,andin naturalconditions, it helpsjust
asmuchasanyotherto ensure thesurvivalof theindividualandthespecies.
Lorenzhasbeencriticizedby analysts whoseenurtureasmoreimportant
thannatureasa determinant of behavior.ErichFrommrejectsthetheoryof
all instinctivistswho stressthe innatecharacterof aggression (including
Lorenzsrelatively benignform) as traceableto conservativeor reactionary
attitudes.In his view, sucha theory absolveshumanbeingsof a senseof re-
sponsibilityfor selfdestructive,
belligerent
behavior,
andit offerslittle hope
for lastingpeaceanddernocracy.3° Behavioralpsychologist
B. F.Skinnerand
anthropologist AshleyMontagualsotakeissuewith Lorenz.Whileadmitting
that thereis sucha thingasinstinctin humanbeings,theycontendthat asa
componentof behavior,it is much less important than conditioning and
238 MlCROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

learning. Sociallearning theoristAlbert BandurafaultsLorenzfor weak

scholarship,for errorsof fact andquestionableinterpretations,andfor fail-
ingto differentiateinbornpatternsof behaviorfromthoseresultingfromex-
perimental learning.Fellowethologists havecriticizedLorenznot onlyfor
extrapolating from his animalstudiesto humans,but alsofor reachingal-
legedlywrongconclusions aboutanimalsin generalafterhavingstudieda
relativelysmallnumberof species.
Otherbiologicalfactorsappearto havesomerelationship to humanag-
gressivebehavior. Prolonged hungeror chronicmalnutritionis likelyto affect
the operations of the brainandotherorgansandtheenergy, judgment,and
behaviorof humans.FrancisA. Beer,however,probablygoestoo far whenhe
suggests thatThirdWorldgovernments, possessing advanced militarytechnol-
ogyandfacedwith massstarvation, maythreaten, provoke,or launchnuclear
war overtheissueof hunger.In all likelihood,it is not theleaders of states
experiencing massstarvationwhothemselves will behungry.Therefore, espe-
ciallyin cases
of authoritarian
or totalitarianregimes,theimpactof hungeron
collectivitiesof individualsmay be irrelevantto decisionsby leadersto start a
war. Well-feddictatorsare not likely to initiate a nuclearconict that could
quickly leadto their own extinction.
Still other writershavesuggested that conditionsof humanovercrowding
cancausehyperirritability,
ghting,andinterference
with all normalbehavior
patterns.35
Moreover, it hasbeenplausiblyarguedthat an international
crisis
canbea stressinducing
stimulusfor politicalleadersanddecisionmakers(even
thoughsomemayfeela sense
of elationin themidstof crisispressures),
andthat
theirperformance
understressmaybesignicantlyaffectedby suchfactorsas
health,age,fatigue(especially
sleepdeprivation),circadiananddiurnalrhythms,
andtheintakeof tranquilizingdrugsor othermedication.Otherexamples could
be drawnfrom the eld of biopolitics,but thesefew will serveto illustratethe
varietyof waysin whichbiological
factorsaresaidto havea bearingonhuman
conictbehavior andpoliticaldecision
makings(See Chapter11.)

FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION THEORY
Mostpsychologists
todaytraceindividualaggression
to someformof frustra-
tion. The frustration-aggression
theoryis a relativelyold one,suggested
at one
time or anotherby McDougall,Freud,and others.It receivedits modernsci-
entic expressionin the work of John Dollard and his colleaguesat Yale
University,who beganwith the assumptionthat aggressionis alwaysa con-
sequenceof frustrationandthatfrustrationalwaysleadsto someformof ag-
gression.
Theydenedfrustrationasan interference with the occurrence
of
aninstigated-goalresponse
at its propertime.37Whena barrieris interposed
betweenpersonsand their desiredgoals,extraenergyis mobilized,which
ows over into generalizeddestructivebehavior.38Ephemeral deprivation
that is unimportantto the individual differsfrom a threat to a life goal; only
the latter,saidAbrahamMaslow,causes
lastingfrustration. Accordingto
 FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSIONTHEORY 239

the Dollard study,aggressiondoesnot occurif the deprivationis unperceived.

Not everyfrustratingsituationproducesovert aggression. Acts of aggression
maybeinhibitedif theyareexpected
to leadto punishment.
Thefrustrating
barrier-targetmay be physically,psychologically,or socially immuneto at-
tack-stronger,vestedwith an aura of authority,sacredin character,capable
of retaliatingwith sociallyapprovedpunishment,or otherwiserenderedinvul-
nerable.In suchcases,direct aggression may give way to indirect aggression,
which may be displacedtoward a targetnot responsiblefor the original frus-
tration, convertedinto imaginingor wishinginjury to the target,or turnedin-
ward regressively, in selfcastigation,self-injury,or, in the most extremecase,
suicide.Any act of aggression is supposedto producecatharsisthat is, a re-
leaseof aggressive energyand a reductionin the instigationto aggression.4°
Like most theories, this one has been criticized and modied since it was
formulatedin the early 1940s.Psychologists arenow widely..agreedthat frus-
tration may be worked off with differenttypesof responses, one of which is
aggression, andthat frustrationis not the only causeof aggression.Somear-
gue that frustration exertsno signicant inuenceas a sourceof aggression,
when comparedwith social-learningfactors,while othershold that the frus-
tration-aggression theoryasan explanationof individualbehaviorhasheldup
ratherwell. Psychologists
arestill far fromagreement
asto whetherthefrus-
tration-aggressionnexusis a simpleandvirtually automaticstimulusresponse
patternor whethersuchemotionalstatesas angerand fear must be or can be
interposed.Similarly,thereis disagreement as to whetheradditionalcues,re-
leasers,or other triggeringstimuli must be presentfor aggressionto occur.
What constitutesa frustrationis not a completelyobjectivematter;it oftende-
pendson cognitionandinterpretation by the individual.43
Varioustypesof
frustrations
mayleadto differentkindsof aggressivereactions.Althoughit
may be relativelyeasyto seethe operationof the frustrationaggression syn-
dromein children,it is considerablymoreambiguousin adults.
The frustration-aggression theory appealsto the commonsenseof most
people,who know from personalexperiencethat they haveat timesfelt ag-
gressiveurgesafter being frustrated.Therecan be little doubt of its utility
when it is appliedto certain limited and simpler aspectsof individual and
smallgroupbehavior.Its use,however,is not appropriatefor extrapolating
from relatively simple stimulusresponse experimentsto an explanationof
more complex modes of human action, at the much broader level of collective
socialbehavior.TheDollard groupsoughtto explainthe lynchingof blacksby
whitesin the AmericanSouthearlierin the twentiethcenturyand the scape-
goating of Jewsin Nazi Germanyas due to the displacementof aggression
owing from economicfrustration. They did this without offering any sub-
stantiatingevidencethat sucha transfercan in fact be made.45The Dollard
studysuggested that eventhe Marxist theoryof the classstruggle,culminating
in the final revolutionof the proletariat,dependsimplicitly on the frustration-
aggression principle.
Shiftingthe analysisof frustrationfrom the planeof the individualto that
of the societygivesrise to a major levelofobservation, or levelofanalysis,
240 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

problem.Althoughit may be quite easyto seethe frustration-aggression hy-

pothesisvalidatedin experimentswith individuals,it is moredifcult to verify
the hypothesisat the levelof large-groupbehavior.The time factor is quitedif-
ferent.Individualsreactquickly to frustration.Social-psychological phenom-
ena,apartfrom the behaviorof a crowd that is deliberatelyincitedto violence,
usually developat a slower rate. Frustratingsituationsare perceivedmore
slowly;theperceptions
arelessuniformandtheinterpretations
morediverse;
the extendedtime frame providesgreateropportunity for individualsto ad-
just;thevarietyof responsesis broaderfor largegroupsthanfor individuals;
responsesto frustratingsituations
arelikelyto varyaccordingto thepolitical
and cultural valuesof different groupswithin the socialstructure;and, per-
hapsmostimportantly,
a wholecomplexof externalsociological
(ratherthan
internalpsychological)
factorspertainingto aggregate
behaviorcontributes
toward determiningthe responseto frustration.Hence,it may be possibleto
verify the frustration-aggression
hypothesis
in the behaviorof smaller,un-
structuredgroups(e.g.,suchanomicoutburstsas the rioting of an unorga-
nizedmob),but it is muchmoredifcult, andperhapsimpossible,to applythe
theory in any preciseway to the behaviorof larger,morehighly institutional-
ized social entities.47

SOCIALIZATION, DISPLACEMENT,AND PROJECTION

The frustration-aggressionschoolhasattemptedto movefrom the individual
to the social level more by logical inferencethan by experimentation.The
principalconceptual
mechanisms
bywhichthetransferis madearethesocial-
ization of aggression,displacement,and projection.Psychologists hold that
the processof acquiringsocialhabitsinvariablygivesriseto frustrations,inas-
much as everyforcedmodication of spontaneous behaviorfrom childhood
to adulthoodinterferes
with goalresponses.
Frustration-aggression
patterns
areculture-bound;both the factorsthat makefor frustrationin humanbeings
and the directionsin which aggressiveimpulsesare turnedor the targetsof
aggressionwill dependlargelyon the valuesof the speciccultural system.
Everysocietyimposessocialcontrolson the spontaneous behaviorof individ-
uals. Thus, every social systemproducesin its membersfrustrations that
might eventuallylead to fear, hatred, and violent aggression.Every culture
mustdevelopits own solutionto the problemof sociallymanagingthe aggres-
siveimpulses
of its members.49
Thesocialization
of aggression
takesplacein
all humansocieties,
attenuatinghostileactionamongmembersof the in-group
by directingaggressive
impulses
againstoutgroups.5°
A child who is frustrated by the decision of a parent may seekreleaseby
substitutinga differentobjectof aggression,
suchasa toy,a pieceof furniture,a
sibling,anotherchildin theneighborhood, a teacher,
a pet,or a neighbors
prop-
erty.Therepression of hostileimpulsesfrom the levelof consciousness
canhelp
in the displacement processby allowingthe individualto forgetthe identityof
theoriginalsource
of thefrustration.Repression
canleadto projection,
which
 SOCIALIZATION,
DISPLACEMENT,
ANDPROJECTION 241

involves
attributingto, andexaggerating
in, otherstheunfavorable
qualities
and
maliciousmotivesthat oneis reluctantto recognizein oneself.Individualsseek
to reduce theirguiltfeelingsbyprojectingtheirintolerablethoughts andfeelings
to others.Oncetheyhavefastened ontheirtarget,perceptual distortionsetsin;
everything in thetargets behaviorconrmsandjustiestheirsuspicions.
It is quitecommonfor psychologists, especially
socialpsychologists, to
cite the frustration-aggressiondisplacement syndrome asthe explanation of
hostileattitudes towardscapegoat groupswithina societyandtowardforeign
nations.However, it isnotclearhowtheleapismade,or evenwhetherit can
logicallybemade,fromindividualpsychological theoryto theanalysis of atti-
tudesandbehavior at thelevelof largesociological
entities,evenif childrendo
assimilatethe attitudesand prejudicesof parentsand other adultstoward so-
calledenemygroups.In a differentvein,MarcHowardRosshasfoundthat,
whereasaffectionate
child-rearingpractices
andclosechild-parenttiesareas-
sociated
with cooperative
attitudesanda low propensity
to violence,
harshso-
cializationpracticesandmalegenderidentityconict (oftenthe resultof child-
fatherdistance)
tendto increase hostileattitudesandaggressivebehavior.54
Themechanism by whichindividualpsychicattitudesandcomplexes of a
quasi-pathological
character maybetranslated into theconcrete
politicaldeci-
sionsof leadersbuildingup towardtheactualoutbreakof organized conict
hasnot yet beenadequately denedanddescribed, muchlessexperimentally
tested,in a mannerintelligibleto politicalscientists.
Undoubtedly,
thefrustra-
tions of humanbeingsform an importantpart of the total matrix out of which
socialconict arises.The presenceof widespreadfrustration would seemto
lenda conictpotentialto anysocialsituation.It mightbesaidto constitute
a
prerequisite
or a necessary condition,at leastfor someformsof collective
ag-
gression.
Nevertheless,
wedonotunderstand
therelationship
between
child-
hoodfrustrationexperiences
(withtheiraccompanying
effectson personality)
andadultsociopolitical
attitudes.
Thefrustrationaggrgssion-displaceme
syn-
dromealonecannot
supply boththenecessary
andsufficient
conditions
forcol-
lectiveaggression
on a largescale.Frustration
mightisupply
thepotentialfor
conict,buta triggermechanismis required,
andthepotentialmustsomehow
be organizedandgivenspecicdirection.
One of the most glaring decienciesin the frustrationaggression-
displacement
theoryis its failureto explainadequately
whyparticularforeign
groupsareselected
astargetsof displaced aggression,
especially
whenalterna-
tivetargets
areavailable.At various
times,it hasbeensuggested
thatthey
arechosen
because
theyarevisible,because
theyaredifferentandstrange,
be-
cause
theyhavebeen
traditionally
mistrusted
anddisliked,
or because
theyare
mostfeared.At the levelof internationalrelations,the selectionof conict tar-
getshasmuchmoreto dowith macrocosmic
factorspolitical,economic,
ide-
ological, and socioculturalthan with the inner frustrations of individuals.
Bandura
citesanthropological
evidence
that,in somecultures,
aggression
is
not the typicalresponse
to frustration.He contendsthat the definitionof frus-
trationhasbecome sobroadasto losemeaning becauseit mayincludenotonly
interferingwith the achievementof desiredgoals,but also~personal
insults,
242 MICROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT

subjection
topain,
deprivation
ofrewards,
andexperience
offailure.
Hesees
frustration
asonlyone,
andnotnecessarily
themost
important,
factor
affecting
theexpression
ofaggression.
Heagreesthatthethreat
ofpunishment,
onthe
other
hand,
ismorecomplexthanoriginally
believed.
Convinced
ofthegreat
complexity
ofhumanresponsiveness
invarioussituations,
Bandura
sets
forth
a
sophisticated
andsomewhatintricate
theoryofaggressive
behavior
basednot
oninner
impulses
ordrives,
butonsociallearning,
social
contexts
androles,
re-
sponse-feedback
inuences,
modeling
andreinforcement,
and
thelearned
abil-
itytoassess
therewarding
andpunishing
consequences
ofany
given
action.5
Furthermore,
it should
beemphasized
thatmost
exponents
ofthefrustra-
tion-aggression
explanation
arecareful
toexclude
learned
aggression
fromthe
scope
oftheir
theory.
Learned
aggression
isimportant
toremember
inany
con-
sideration
oforganized
conict
(such
aswar,revolution,
ethnic
conict,
and
guerrilla
insurgency),
inwhich
training
foraggressive
conduct
plays
asignicant
role.Theorganized
warfare
thatischaracteristic
ofhumansocieties
requires
a
high
degree
ofsocial
learning
anddoes notowfrom
individual
aggressiven
John
A.Vasquez
concedes
thatwarisusually
associated
withsuch
mental
states
asextreme
hostility,
frustration,
andasense
ofinsecurity
andmaybepreceded
bywarhysteria.
However,
heinsists
thatwarisagroup
activity,
fundamen
tallydifferent
fromindividual
interpersonal
violence,
because
such
collectivitie
asbureaucratic
states
behave
differently
fromindividuals
andcannot
bere-
garded
simply
asindividuals
writlarge.
War,
inshort,
islearned
behavior.

LEARNED
AGGRESSION
ANDMILITARY
TRAINING
Those
whohave
pondered
thecauses
ofwarseem
attimes
unable
tomake
up
theirmindswhether
thefrequency
andferocity
ofwarinhistory
areduetothe
factthathuman
beings
liketoghtorwhether
mostpeople
actually
hatetogo
towarbutperformtheirsoldierly
dutiesoutofasense
ofobligation
toserve
theircountry
or to make a sacriceforpreserving
ideals
andloved ones.
Perhaps
theyarecoerced
byconscription
orpeer
pressures,
conditioned
to
ghtduring
military
training,
andfrightened
attheprospect
ofdeath
if they
donotkillrst.59
Withintwoconsecutive
pages
ofasingle
work,wearetold,
somewhat
contradictorily,
notonlythatpeople
arenaturally
inclined
tohurl
themselves
withprofound
passion
intoWaronslightornonexistent
pretexts,
butalso
thathuman
beings
ndthesightofthegore
ofwarfare
soutterly
re-
pugnant
because
resistance
tokilling
isrooted
intheir
whole
psychic
history
andthathatred
oftheenemy isdifculttoinculcate.
Bandurahasshownthattheconversion ofsocialized
individuals
intoeffec-
tivemilitary
combatants
requires
acarefully
conceived
andexecuted
training
program.
People
whohave
been
brought
uptoabhor
killing
asimmoral
and
criminal
mustbemade
to accept
killinginwarasjustied.Onlyinthiswaycan
they
escape
the
self-condenmation
consequent
ontaking
human
lifeinbattle.
Thesoldier
istaught
thatheorsheisfighting
forfamily
andfriends,
forcountry
andcivilization,
foracherished
wayoflifeandmoral
values,
andperhaps
for
 LEARNING, IMAGES, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 243

other high idealsfor example,in defenseof -religion,democracy,

freedom,or
lastingpeace.62
Recruits
to militaryservice
mustbecompletely
reoriented
from
familiarcivilianways.Theyareissuednew,distinctiveclothingandareindoctri-
natedwith new beliefsand modesof behaving.Many behavioralpatternsare
regulatedin accordance with a military codeof discipline,underwhich auto-
maticcompliance with ordersis expected. Soldiersaregivenanintensive,practi-
cal trainingin thetechniques of warfare,designed to inculcatea hostof survival
and combat skills, familiarize them with equipment and tactics, reducethe fear
of battle,andenhance
ghting-unitsolidarity,
morale,andcoordination.
Despitethe assertionof manysocialscientiststhat humanbeingskill en-
thusiasticallyfor abstractideasand theories,thosewho havemadea careful,
systematicstudy of the biological and psychologicalimpulsesto aggression
do not arguethat the typical soldier,in wagingwar, is working out any sort
of aggressive instinct or frustration-aggression-displacement
syndrome.If po-
litically organizedcommunitiesreally thought that human beingsare as in-
natelyaggressive as someintellectualstake themto be, societiesin all proba-
bility would long ago havefelt someneedat the end of a war to devotea
signicant effort to the retraining of ex-soldiersto peacetimelifeat least
comparableto the kind of training requiredto inculcatea warlike spirit. A
very small minority of veteransmay be psychologicallydisturbedand prone
to violentbehaviorasa resultof wartimeexperiences,
but mostveterans
seemable to managethe transition from war to civilian life without special
conditioning programs.

LEARNING, IMAGES, ANDINTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Weshouldnot discounttoo muchthe role of psychological
factorsin the onset
and conduct of war. Leaders and citizens alike form their attitudesfriendly,
hostile,or indifferentabout the world, foreigners,and othernationsandcul-
turesthrougha complexprocessof psychologicaldevelopmentfrom youth to
old age.Psychologicaland socialleadersespeciallyin democraticcountries,
whenmakingdecisions
relatingto war andpeace,
maynot beableto ignore
public sentimentsof isolationism,pacism, belligerentanimosity,humanitar-
ian sympathy,outrage,or chauvinisticdemandfor vindicating the nations
honor and securityor economicinterests.A half centuryago,KarenHorney
identied what shecalleda neurotic searchfor glory on the part of some
leaders. More recently,BernardSusserhaswritten,
Whatever
themethodological
difficulties
it poses,
thepsychological
approach
to
politics is inevitable,and irreplaceable.
Therewould be virtually universalagree-
ment,for example,that Lyndon]ohnsonscharacteris critical for understanding
the United Statesrole in the Vietnam War. Who would wish to disavow the inti-
matelink betweenHitlerspsychopathology
and the phenomenon of nationalso-
cialism?Could we considerseveringStalinspersonalidiosyncrasiesfrom the
great purgesof the 1930sor SaddamHusseins
from the Gulf Crisis of
1990-1991?Would anyoneseriouslycontendthat the dramatic power needs
244 MICROCOSMICTHEORIESOF VIOLENTCONFLICT

exhibited
by manypoliticalleaders
areexplicable
withoutpsychological
cate-
gories?
Inshort,
thepsychological
aspect ofpolitical
behavior
ismanifestandcrit-
icaleventhough
ourabilitytogetatit withprecision
andreliability
leaves
much
to be desired.
During
theKosovo
crisis
of 1999,
NATOleaders
became
aware
thattheyhad
failedto makean adequate
assessment
of the intransigence
of Slobodan
Milosevic.
Theimages
thatindividuals
andsocieties
formof foreigncultures,
peo-
ples,
nations,
andleaders
area product
of diverse
sources:
folklore;
social
background;
attitudes
ofparents
andteachers,
churches,
andschool
systems;
theroleof themedia;
personal
experience
andtravel;opinions
andprejudices
of peergroups
(co-workers,
professionalassociates,friends,
andacquain-
tances);
andtheparticular
goalsandpolicies ofpolitical
parties,
organized
in-
terests,
governmental
leaders,
ofcialelites,
andagencies. Inmoderndemocra-
tic states,
thequestion
is still openasto whether
elitesor thevotingmasses
playthemoredeterminative
roleinforming
modal
national
images
offoreign
countries,
fromfriendlyalliesto dangerous
enemies.
Eventhisquestion
is a
misleading
simplication,
giventhecomplexity
of theinteractive
process
in
modernsystems
of politicalcommunication,
markedbypositive
andnegative
feedback.
Thequestionof whether
democracies
arelesswarpronethannon-
democraticstatesis treatedat somelengthin Chapter7.
Kenneth
Boulding,
aneconomist ratherthana psychologist,
notedthat
thebehavior
of complex
politicalorganizations
is determined
by decisions
that arein turn the functionsof the decisionmakersimage.Theimageis a
product
of messages
received
in thepast,nota simple
accumulationof mes-
sages
butahighlystructured
pieceofinformational
capital.
Every
nationisa
complex
oftheimages ofthepersonswhothinkabout it; hence,
theimage is
notonebutmany.
Theimages
of thedecision
makers
aremoreimportant
than
theimages
of themasses.
Forbothgroups,
impressions
of nationality
are
formed mostlyin childhood
andusually
in thefamilygroup.Hedismisses
asa
fallacythenotionthattheimageis imposedbythepowerful onthemasses.
According
to Boulding,
thefolk-image
isamass
image,
shared
byrulersand
ruled alike.67
Thatlaststatement
aboutthefolk imagemayseema bit archaic,
especially
forindustrially
advanced
societies,
butit maystillbequitevalidforless
devel-
opedcommunities, andperhaps not entirelyinapplicable
to anycountry.
Nevertheless,
it is probablythe casethatwherever audiovisual
technology
spreads,
themasses
become
more
vulnerable
topropagandistic
manipulation
by
thosecapable
of controlling
the mediacharismatic
leaders,
governments
opinion-molding
elites,
andnancial
interests.
Indemocratic
states,
alltheinu-
entialforces
arerarelyfoundto bemoving
in thesame
direction:
There
ismuch
competition
andconictamong
political
ideologies
andparties
anddivergent
economic,
social,
andcultural
interests.
Moreover,
increasingly
frequent
attitude
surveys
show thatpublic
opinioncanshiftsubstantially
withinrelatively
short
periods
oftime.Thepicture
isfurther
complicated
bythefact,acknowledged
by
mostsocialscientists,
thatimageformationoftenreectsa process
of selective
 LEARNING,
IMAGES,
ANDINTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 245

perception,
misperception,
andperceptual
distortion.In anerawhenthehu-
manmindisinundated
dailywithnewinformation,
people
tendto takeshort-
cutsandsimplify
theirimages
oftheworldbyttingnewdataintotheirexisting
mental
schemasandbyltering
outfacts
thatruncounter
totheirexisting
prej-
udices
whileincorporating
thosethatreinforce
wellentrenched
stereotype
Thenotionof mirrorimagesbecamepopularduringtheColdWarand
wasbasedontheassumption thatthepeople
of twocountriesinvolvedin a
prolonged
hostileconfrontation
develop
xed,distorted
attitudes
thatarere-
allyquitesimilar.
Each
groupofpeople
sees
itselfasvirtuous,
restrained,
and
peace-loving,
andviews
theadversary
nationasdeceptive,imperialistic,
and
warlike.ArthurGladstone
described
it in thisway,
Each
side
believes
theother
tobebentonaggression
andconquest,
tobecapable
of
great
brutality
and evil-doing,
tobesomething
less
than
human
andtherefore
hardly
deservingrespectorconsideration,
tobeinsincere
anduntrustworthy,
etc.Tohold
thisconceptionoftheenemy
becomesthemoral
dutyofevery
citizen,
andthose who
questionit aredenounced.
Eachsideprepares
actively
fortheanticipated
combat,
striving
toamass thegreater
military
powerforthedestruction
oftheenemy. ...
Theapproaching warisseen
asdueentirely
tothehostile
intentions
oftheenemy.7
According to socialpsychologists,
theperceptionof theenemy,even
though it maybeerroneous,
canhelpto shape
realityandbringontheself-
fulllingprophecy:When suspicions
runhigh,a defensive
move byoneside
maylookprovocative
to theother,evoking
fromthelattera furtherdefensive
reactionthat servesonly to conrm the suspicions
of the former. Urie
Bronfenbrenner
argued
thatAmerican
andSoviet
citizens
believed
essential
thesame
things
abouteach
others
societies:
Theyweretheaggressors,
their
government
exploited
anddeluded
thepeople,
themassof theirpeople
were
notreallysympathetic
totheregime,
theycouldnotbetrusted,
andtheirpol-
icy vergedon madness.Evenwithin the restrictedcontextof Soviet-
American
relations,
theconcept
of themirrorimage
hadsome
serious
prob-
lems.In somehands,it ledto pseudocorollaries:
1. Thesocial
andpolitical
values
of thetwosides
werescarcely
distin-
guishablefrom each other.
2. Neither
partycouldproperly
becastin theroleofaggressor
ordefender.
3. Bothsides
wereequallyright,equallywrong,andequallyresponsible
for pursuingpoliciesthatproduced
international
tensions.
4. Thereduction
of imagedistortion
couldbeaccomplished
with equal
ease on both sides.

Theadvocates
of mirror-image
theoryoftenmadesomeeffort to dissociate
themselves
fromtheseillogicalinferences.
RalphK. Whitewarned,The
propositionthat thereis probablysometruth on both sidesshouldbedistin-
guished
fromthequitedifferent
proposition
thatthereis probably
anequal
amountof truth on both sides.73Bronfenbrennercalledattentionto an im-
portant asymmetry between a liberal democratic culture and that of a totali-
tarian society.
246 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

It proved
fareasier
to getanAmerican
to change
hispicture
of theSoviet
Union
thanthe reverse.Althoughshowingsomecapacityfor change,Sovietcitizenswere
morelikelythanAmericans
to clingto theirstereotypes
andto defendthemby de-
nialanddisplacement.
. . . Sovietsociety
wouldreveala stronger
predilection
. . . for black-and-white
thinking,moralself-righteousness,
mistrust,displacing
ofblameto others,
perceptual
distortion,
anddenial ofreality.74
Theconceptof the mirror imagein international relationswaslogically
relatedto a numberof suggestionsput forth at thattimefor reducingthehos-
tility of theColdWar,andtherisksof outrightwarbetween thesuperpowers,
throughunilateral
initiativebyoneside,designed
to reduce
international
ten-
sionsandevokereciprocalgestures
of cooperation
from the otherside.The
basicidea,of course,
wasthattheprocess of relating
tensions,
nolessthanthe
processof exacerbating
them,isa reaction
process;if onesidecanbringitself
to breakthe viciouscircle and take the initiative by makingfriendly gestures
andconcessions,
thebehaviorof theotherwill sooneror laterchange
for the
better.75
U.S.and Russianscholarshavesoughtto explainthe underlyingdy-
namicsof the reactionand learningprocesses
that enabledthe superpowers
to
movefroma dangerous
nuclearrivalryto at leasttentativecooperation.
Their
retrospective
analyses
of alternating
periods
of superpower
hostilityanddé-
tenteillustratethe complexityof suchcooperative learningprocesses at the
levelof vastbureaucraticgovernments, but castlittle light on the extentto
whichtheconcept
of mirrorimages
playedanypartat all in thethawingof
the Cold War.

AGGRESSION DIVERSION AND REDUCTION

Social
psychologists
oftenpointoutthattheexpression
of aggression
withina
society
maybeeithercovertor overt.Physical
aggression
maybeeschewed in
favorof verbalaggression;
that is, murder,suicide,andotherformsof vio-
lencemaybe ratherrare,while the culturesanctions maliciousgossipand
slanderasmeansof retaliatingagainstthoseonedislikes.EltonB. McNeil
pointedoutthata relationship
appearsto existbetween
a highamountof
freedomfor theovertexpression
of aggression
anda lowdegreeto whichit
will takecovertforms,and viceversa.77Politicalscientists
havelong been
awareof thesafetyvalvetheory.Societies
maydevelopculturallyacceptable
waysof eitherreducing
or workingoff aggressive
impulses.
In thesearch
for
socialaggressioninhibitorsor aggressionreducers,
onemightlogicallylookto
suchareasof life asreligion,politics,business,
sports,andeducation.In each
oneof thesedimensions,we nd ourselvesfacedwith ambiguitiesthat prevent
us from drawingdenite conclusions.
Religionsthat preacha doctrineof loveandrenunciationof selfmay
significantly
lessen
theaggressiveness
of thoseadherents
whotakethedoc-
trine seriously,
who applyit not selectivelybut universally,and who are
sufficientlydisciplinedto follow it in practice.World War II brought
Catholicsand Protestantstogetherin resistancemovementsand concentra-
 AGGRESSION
DIVERSION
ANDREDUCTION 247

tion camps
andthushelped
pavethe wayfor vigorous
Christian
Democratic
parties,
theecumenical
movement
toward
Christian
unity,
and
a powerfulreligious-political
reactionagainstthe centuriesold
anti-
Semitism
thathadculminated
intheHolocaust.
Yeteven
intheclosing
quarter
ofthetwentieth
century,
religion
figured
significantly
inpolitical
economic
andcultural
conflicts
in Northern
Ireland,
theMiddle
East,
the
Balkans,
theIndian
subcontinent,
Russia,
China,
andelsewhere.
Thereis
also
abundant
evidence
thatreligious
organizations
haveplayed
amajor
rolein abating
conflict,
promoting
peaceful,
friendly
relations,
andabove
allproviding
humanitarian
relief
inwartorn
areas.78
Throughout
history,
however,
religious
differences
themselves
haveoftencontributed
to theoc-
currenceand ferocity of war.
In therealm
ofpolitics,
onemightargue
that,in comparison
to authori-
tarian
ortotalitarian
regimes,
democratic
states
should
beless
aggressive
be-
cause
theyprovide
avariety
ofoutlets
through
which
political
frustrations
can
bereleasedfree
speech
andpress,
election
campaigning,
voting,
lobbying
for
alaw,
ororganizing
aprotest.
Thereissomething
tothissafetyvalve
theory
of
democraticgovernment,
butthedemocratic
milieualso
permits
aggressive
in-
dividuals
andparties
toplayonxenophobic
attitudes
andpropagate
national-
isticpolicies,
whereas
inmore tightly
controlled
societies,
thepromotion
of
nationalism
andtheorganization
ofdemonstrations
aremuchcloser
tobeing
government
monopolies
(seeDemocracies,
War,andPeace,
in Chapter
7).
Infreemarket
economies,
business
enterprise
undoubtedly
siphons
offacon-
siderable
amountof creative
aggression.
However,
although
mostbusiness
people
prefertheconditions
of peace
andorderfor making
theirrational
protcalculus,
some
maysupport
trade,
investment,
andother
economic
poli-
cies
thatincrease
international
tensions.
Aminority
might
even
hope
togain
fromwarorengageinactivities
abroad
which arouse
antiimperial
resentmen
andtensions
thatcanlead
tointernational
conict (see
Chapter9).
Behavioral
andotherscientists
interested
in controlling
aggression
have
wondered
whetherasociety
mightdiminishitsfundsofpent-up
aggressive
en-
ergybydiverting
themintoharmless
channels
suchasorganized
athletic
con-
tests.
There
isnoclear
consensus
onthesubject.
According
toKonrad
Lorenz,
allhuman
sport
isaformofritualized
fighting.
Eventhough
it contains
anag-
gressive
motivation
absent
inmostanimal
play,
it helps
tokeep
people
healthy,
anditsmain
function
consists
inthecathartic
discharge
ofaggression.
Thus,it
provides
arelease
forthatdangerous
formofcollective
militantenthusiasm
that
underlies
aggressive
nationalism.79
D.O.Hebb
andW.R.Thompson
sugges
thatsports
maybea useful
means
ofcreating
andworking
offanoptimum
amount
of frustration
andthusof contributing
to socialstability.8°
Jerome
Frank calls
attendance
atsuch spectator
sportsasprizeghts
andprofessiona
footballgames avicarious
discharge
ofaggression.
Headmits,
however,
that
body-contactsports
often
involve
inicting
painandmayarouse
anger
andhos-
tility,buthenotes
thatthegamesthemselves
require
thedevelopment
ofself-
discipline
tocontrol
theexpression
ofanger.
Lorenz,
Frank,
andothers
have
perceived
muchgoodintheOlympics
asanexercise
inpromoting
international
248 MICROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT
cooperation
and
good
sportsmanship,
although
itcannot
bedenied
that
the
Olympic
Games
have
often
beenpoliticized.
They
havebeen
converted
into
an
arena
ofinternational
hostility
(Berlin
in1936),
violent
conict
(Munichin
1972),
protest
over
South
Africas
apartheid
(Montreal
in1976),
andintricate
diplomatic
maneuvering
and
boycott
toexpress
political
opposition
tothehost
countrys
policies
(Moscow
in1980andLos
Angeles
in1984).
Within
recent
years,
writers
haveexpressed
concern
that
under
somecir-
cumstances,
sports
may getoutofhand,
possibly
exacerbating
both
theag-
gressive
impulses
ofindividual
players
andspectators,
and
internationa
ten-
sion,
illwill,andhostility.
If there
issuch
athing
asafund
ofpent-u
aggressive
energy(ahypothesis
never
proven),
competitive
sports
could
repre
sent
onbalance
ahealthy
safety
valve
because
mostsports
contests
arecon-
ducted
peaceably,
and
the
losers,
ifthey
aregood
sports,
donotharbor
lasting
grudges.
International
and interracial
sports
competition,
if approac
purely
assports
inaspirit
offair
play,
can
contribute
tostrengthening
interna
tional
goodwill
and amity.
However,
sports
contests,
noless
thanreligion
and
trade,
are
neutral
fromapolitical
standpoint,
andtheydonot
necessarilead
topeace,
orespecially
tions,ethnicifgovernments,
partisans
attemptideological
to movements,
exploit
them political
forends
that organiz
havelittle
to
dowith
sports.
Inthenalanalysis,
wecannot
becertain
whether
sports
at-
tenuate
orstimulate
aggression
within
individuals
andamongnations.
The
answer
cannot
begeneralized
butmust
begiven
foreach
event,
anditproba
blydepends
less
ontheathletes
themselves
than
onsuch
factors
ascurren
prevailing
national
orracial
issues,
the
crowd
behavior
offans,
and
med
hype,
allofwhich
stirs
the
kindofnationalist
feelings
over
sports
contest
of-
tenmanifested
atworld
championship
soccer
matches.
Thearea
towhich
agreatmany
psychologists
and
social-learnin
theo
rists
attach
their
hopes
forreducing
humanaggressiveness
and
fostering
inter
national
understanding
iseducation.
Changes
inregard
toeducation
have
been
urged
attwodistinct
levels.
Thefirst
pertains
tobasic
modicatio in
the
method
ofrearing
children,
aimed
atreducing
thelevel
offrustration
the
modeling
ofviolence,
andthedisplay
ofaggression
within
asociety.
Somethe
orists
whoassociate
warlike
cultures
withasceticism,
celibacy,
and strict
code
ofsexual
behavior
advocate
greater
sexual
permissiveness.
Inmedie
Europe,
however,
the
celibate
priestly
class
wasforbidden
totakepart
inwar
fare,
andthe
knights
who didghtwereusually
farfrom celibate.
Franciof
Assisi
andmost
gentle,
peaceful
saints
lived
anascetic
life,and
Gandhiin-
sisted
onchastity
andascetic
practices
asaprecondition
forhissatyagr
(soul
force)
Some pacism. trace
psychologiststheproblem
tothereadiness
ofparents
tomet
out
physical
punishment
tochildren;
they
urge
parents
tobemore
toleran
of
childrens
desire
toexpress
themselves.
Still
others
argue
that
itisunhea
tobottle
upfeelings
ofrage
and
anger,
and
that theventilation
ofaggres
can
have
atherapeutic
effect,
despite
warnings
tothecontrary
byexperim
talpsychologists.
Recent
decades
have
produced
increasing
demand
no
just
from
social
psychologists,
for(a)
eliminating
depictions
ofviolence
inthe
 AGGRESSTONDIVERSION AND REDUCTION 249

massmediato decreasethe incidenceof violent behaviorby imitation, and

(b) banningthe manufactureof toy guns. Given the spateof U.S. school
shootingsin the late 1990s,blamedby manyeducatorsand psychologists on
Hollywood, TV, and electronicgames,the demandfor changingthe culture
of guns and violencehas increasedmarkedly.In opposition to those who
doubtthat themediaexerta significanteffecton thebehaviorof theyoung,
othersarguethat sucha positionundercutsnot only advertisingbut the edu-
cationalprocessas well. The foregoingproposedremediesinvolve consider-
ablecultural or socialchangesthat may not be acceptableor easyto achieve.
Thereis no way of knowing,however,whetherthesechangesassumingthat
they could be achievedwould be relevantto the propensitytoward interna-
tional war.
The secondproposed change pertains to the realm of formal educational
efforts,calculatedto attenuateinternationalhostility and conict by promot-
ing understandingamongsocieties.Theoristshavelong taken it for granted
that coursesin schoolthat increasethe studentsknowledgeaboutforeigncul-
tures and countriesalong with international teacher, student, and cultural
exchangeprogramsthat facilitatepersonalcontactsand learningexperiences
acrosspolitical boundariesareboundto contributeto the growth of interna-
tional goodwill and the strengtheningof international peace. However,
KennethN. Waltz hasquestionedwhethermisunderstandings amongpeoples
of diversecultural backgroundshaveanythingto do with the occurrenceof
most wars. Conversely, he asks, does understandingalways promote
peace,or do nationssometimesremainat peacepreciselybecause they do not
understand
eachotherwell?91Weprobablycannotassume
that increased
communicationleadsinevitably to improvedunderstanding,or that under-
standingnecessarily
makesfor cooperationratherthan conict.

OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

In addition to frustration-aggression
and sociallearningtheories,studentsof
international relationsshould be familiar with severalother psychological
theoriesof conict. Theseoften serveto complementand in somecasesto
modify the theoriestreatedin the foregoingsections.Theyincludethe studies
of Allport, Klineberg,and otherson suchphenomenaas bias,prejudice,and
stereotypes, and the part played by educational and mass communications
systems
in shapingintergroupattitudes.Thestudentshouldbeconversant
with the phenomenon that FrenkelBrunswik calls the intolerance of ambi-
guity, the tendency of human beings to reduce uncertainties and contradic-
tions perceivedasfrustratingor anxiety-producingby reducingsocialreality
to nice, neat, dichotomouscategories-blackand white, good and bad,
friendandfoe.93
Adornoandhiscolleagues
attempted
to correlatea highde-
greeof nationalisticfeelingwith an authoritarianpersonalitythat is charac-
terizedby neuroticisman exaggerated fear of weakness,
unquestioningsub-
missivenessto authority, a heavy emphasison conventionalbehavior,a
250 MICROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT
conservative
idea
ofamasculine-feminine
dichotomy,
and apreference
for
autocratic,
punitive
childrearing
methods.
Aquartercentury
later,
two so-
cial
psychologists,
received
some aware
harsh that
theauthoritarianpersonal
criticisms,
reported
thatthey
had hypothesis
found had
evidence
ofa
distinct
typeofpolitical
leader
whodisplayed
aconsistent
preference
forbel-
ligerence
and possessed
certain
recognizable
personality
traits,
whichtheyre-
lated
tothe notion
ofcompensatory
masculinity
andthearchetype
describ
bytheAdorno
Many group.
writers
havesought
toprobe
themurky
area oftheinfluence
that
thepersonality
ofnational
leaders
may
haveontheir
foreignpolicy
decision
Michael
P.Sullivan,
after
reviewing
afair
sample
ofthevoluminous
literature
onthe
subject,
reaches
thejudicious
conclusion
that
thepersonality
characte
istics
orattributes
ofpolitical
leaders
mustundoubtedly
havesome effect,
at
various
times,
onforeign-policy
decisions,
butwearestill
farfromsure
what
types
ofbehavior
can
be
accounted
for
bypersonality
factors.
The
eldofper-
sonality
psychology
was
dened
byGordon
Allport
and
Ross
Stagner
inthe
late1930s.
Allport
postulates
adistinct
personality,
aunityofself,
indepe
dentofthesocial
environment;
Stagner
integrated
thetwomoreclosely
Psychologists
andsocial
psychologists
have
notyetfully
agreed
onhow to
bridge
the
gapbetween
Virtually
the
independent
allWestern
political
andthe
ihtegrative
scientists
have
long
approache
recognized
national
asthe
mostvirulent
ideological
force
onthe
world scene.
Nationalism
cer-
tainly
contains
strong
and
unmistakable
psychological
ingredients.
Halfacen-
tury
ago,
Hans].
Morgenthau,
whowasarmbeliever
inauniversal
huma
power
the drive,
presented
phenomenon aplausible
inwhatwere yet
unprovable
essentially theoretical
psychologicalexplana
terms.
Hedrew of
a
sharp
contrast
between
elites
whoactually
wield
powerwithin
states
andthe
massofindividuals
whose
powerdrives
are
diverted,
controlled,
orsup-
pressed
byanetwork
ofrules
ofconduct
and
institutional
devices,
laws
ethics,
religion,
customs,
and
other
socialcultural
pressures.
Inconsequence,
most
people
are
unable
tosatisfy
their
desire
forpower
within
the
national
community
. . .Not
being
able
tond
full
satisfaction
oftheir
desire
for
power
within
tions
onto
the
the
national
boundaries,
international
the
scene.
people
There
they
project
those
unsatised
ndvicarious
aspir
satisfaction
inidenti
cation
with
the
power
drives
ofthe
nation
. . .Itisas
though
weall,
notas
indi-
viduals
but
collectively,
asmembers
ofthe
same nation,
owned
and
controlle
so
magnicent
apower.
Thus
individuals
who
may feel
powerless
andinsignicant
within
the
aggr
gate
domestic
population
canderive
psychological
compensati
from
the
diplomatic,
military,
economic,
and
other
exploits,
successes,
and
prest
theirnationenjoys
abroad.
Closely
related
isErich
Fromr&#39;ns
thesis
concerning
thedesire
ofthe
mode
human
being
toescape
the
burdens
offreedom.
Feeling
alone
andpowerle
in
the
face
ofgigantic
entities
and
social
forces
that
individuals
cannot
contro
we
are,
according
toFrom,tempted
todissolve
ourselves
inthe
omnipoten
stat
 OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 251

to identifyentirelywith the state,andto seeksatisfactionin the fortunesof the

larger collectivityto seekan escapefrom freedom. Readyto submit to
powerwithin our nation,we want our nationto assertitself at the expenseof
theweakbeyondits borders.Thesepsychological
interpretations
of political
behavior cannot be examinedhere in detail; however,it should be obvious to the
readerthat if eithernationalleadership
groupsor largesegments
of their publics
shouldlapseinto the pronouncedforms of the neuroticismthesetheoriesde-
scribe,it couldhavea profoundimpacton the internationalbehaviorof states.
Related to Frenkel-Brunswiks intolerance of ambiguity is the psycho-
logical theory of cognitive dissonanceand consistencyadvancedby Leon
Festinger.Statedsimply,thistheoryrefersto thenormaltendency
of thein-
dividual to reduceinconsistenciesthat may arisein the knowledgeconcerning
the personsvalues,environment,and behavior.Inconsistencymight be re-
ducedby modifyingany oneof the three.Festingerpresentsthe fertile exam-
ple of the mentalprocesses and rationalizationsthat a chain smokermay go
through to reducecognitivedissonanceby reconcilingthe valuesof health,
long life, and love of family with the personaladdiction to cigarettesthat
makes behavior modication the most difficult course to pursue.
The normal tendencyof the individualto shift from cognitivedissonance
to consistency mayhavesignificantimplicationsfor the studyof conict at the
levelof internationalrelations,eventhoughthis is not empiricallydemonstra-
ble.If it is operativeat all, it will probablybewithin the mindsof key decision
makers.A hypotheticalexamplemay illustratethe point. Early in the Cold
War,somepolicymakersmight havebeentemptedto think that permanentse-
curity could not be achieveduntil the adversaryhad beensubduedby war.
However,with the growth of nuclear-weapons stockpiles,they were com-
pelled to realizethat direct hostilities betweenthe two rival powerswould
provemutuallysuicidal.Theymay havebeenforcedto reducecognitivedisso-
nanceby restructuringtheir knowledgepatternsconcerningthe world situa-
tion, focusingon such notions as the balanceof terror, mutual deter-
rence, limited adversaryrelationship,and so forth.
In the NATO-Yugoslaviaconict of 1999,PresidentClinton and several
other alliedheadsof governmentkeenlyfelt for monthsthe dilemmaof being
determinedto achievetheir goalof returningthe Albanianrefugeesto Kosovo
by relyingon air attacksalone,withoutcommittinggroundtroopsto full-
scalecombat.Resistingthe adviceof most military strategists,the political
leadersseemedto alleviatetheir cognitivedissonance
by hopingthat air power
would sufciently weakenSerb,ground forcesto the point where Kosovo
could beconsidereda permissiveenvironmentfor the entry of peacekeeping
contingents.
The theoryof cognitivedissonance might alsocastlight on the phenome-
non of internalrevolutionwithin a society.It is oftensuggested
that whenhu-
manbeingsperceive an intolerablywidegapbetween their socialidealsand
the operatingrealityof the existingpoliticalsystem,
theybecomealienated
from the latter and seek to reduce their inner dissonanceby gravitating to-
wardrevolutionary
organization
for thepurposeof restructuring
theexternal
252 MICROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT
environment
according
totheir
ideal
vision.
Inrevolutionary
situations,
of
course,
manyindividuals
willhover
precariously
ontheborderline
between
continuing
togrant
thesystem
minimal
orpassive
support
and
withdrawin
from
the
system
tooppose
itactively
byviolence.
This
ispartly
amatter
of
weighing
prospective
rewards
andpunishments
and
thus
falls
under
thehead-
ing
ofwhat
psychologists
call
approachavoidance
conict
within
the
indi-
vidual,
inwhich
the
antagonistic
tendencies
are
both
sufciently
strong
topro-
duce
ambivalent
orneurotic
behavior.1°°
For
morethan
half
acentury,
social
psychologists
andother
behavior
scientists
have
been
exhorting
enlightened
governments
topursue
behaviora
scientic
approaches
calculated
toenhance
international
cooperation
and
to
prevent
war
through
educational
programs,
cultural
exchanges,
new
metho
ofchild/citizen
training,
conditioning
ofpublic
attitudes
toward
peace
through
the
media,
screening
outcertain
types
ofpersonalities
inthe
proces
ofselecting
leaders,
and
soon.
Unfortunately,
their
ability
toshowspecic
concrete
results
from
these
efforts
remains
quite
limited.
Inthe
industrially
ad-
vanced
nations
oftheworld,
developments
inmodern
weaponstechnolo
have
hadthe
effect
ofmakingwarincreasingly
abhorrent
toelites
andpublics
alike.
Education
atalllevels,
themass
media,
andawidevariety
ofinstitu-
tions
and
organizations,
from
churches
and
political
parties
toecologica
and
antiwar
groups,
haveplayedasignicant
part
intransforming
popular
psy-
chological
attitudes
toward
war
and
the
traditional
readiness
ofdiploma
andpolitical
leaders
tothreaten
ororder
theuseofmilitary
force
Nevertheless,
insome
regions
oftheworld
large-scale
violence
and
warre-
mainpossible
andcapable
ofserving
astinderboxes
fordangerous
interna
tional
conagrations.
Even
among
themosthighly
civilized
and
econom
cally
developed
societies,
future
warscannotberuled
outwith
certain
Perhaps
some
consolation
canbederived
from the
thought,
not
atallimplau
sible,
that
without
the
combination
ofallthe
aforementioned
efforts,
thesitu-
ationmightwellbefarworse
thanit is.

CONCLUSION:
MICROCOSMIC
THEORIES
IN PERSPECTIVE
The
various
theories
discussed
inthischapterbiological,
psychologic
so-
cial
learning,
personality
types,
and
soonhavebeen
presented
here
intheir
clear,
pristine
form
forthepurpose
ofhelping
toexplain
thesources
from
whichcontemporary
theories
are
evolving.
Students
arestrongly
encoura
togoback
cations,
tothe
original
including
theories,
tendencies
to
toward
trace
these
through
convergence,
and
subsequen
modi
toformulate
their
own
syntheses,
based
onreection,
analysis,
andinsights.
However
important
rst-image
causes
ofwar
may
beand
noone
denie
their
importancewe
maynever
completely
understand
the
factors
that
oper
ate,
consciously
orunconsciously,
atthe
personal
level.
We maynot
beable
to
ascertain
how
drives
and
motives
onthe
part
ofindividuals
are
translate
into
 CONCLUSION MICROCOSMIC THEORIES IN PERSPECTIVE 253

group and institutional behavior,much lessinto the public policiesof states

that makefor peaceor war. This chapterhasshownhowcomplexarethe bi-
ological and psychologicalfoundationsof politics. Both traditional and be-
havioral social scientists have ample reason to avoid simplied explanations.
Somepeaceresearchers and theoristsmay go too far in dismissingvalid bio-
logical and psychologicalexplanationsof human aggressiveness a bit too
hastilyin their understandableeffort to discreditthe war-in-our-genes
hypoth-
esis.In 1986, a group of behavioralscientistsfrom 12 countriesmeetingin
SpainissuedtheSevilleStatement,
whichincludedthefollowingassertions:
It is scienticallyincorrectto saythat we haveinheriteda tendencyto makewar
from our animalancestors. Warfareis a peculiarlyhumanphenomenon and does
not occurin otheranimals.. . . It is scienticallyincorrectto saythat war or any
otherviolentbehavioris geneticallyprogrammedinto our humannature.It is sci-
enticallyincorrectto saythatin thecourseof humanevolutiontherehasbeena
selectionfor aggressive
behaviormorethan for other kindsof behavior.. . . It is
scientically
incorrectto saythat humanshavea violentbrain. Whilewe do
havea neuralapparatus to actviolently,thereis nothingin our neurophysiology
that compels usto. It is scientically
incorrectto saythat war is causedby in-
stinct or any singlemotivation. . . . We concludethat biology doesnot con-
demnhumanityto war,andthathumanitycanbefreedfromthebondage of bio-
logicalpessimism.
Violenceis neitherin our evolutionarylegacynor in our
genes.1°1
The SevilleStatementon Violence(SSV)hasbeencriticizedby ethologists
asnarrowin focus,incompletein formulatingissues,
andnaiveandsimplistic
in its message.
Thecriticshavesoughtto correctwhattheyregardasaninad-
equateviewof the biologyof aggressionembodied in the SSV,which-they
seemto suggestimpliesthat animalsarepredominantlyaggressive
creatures
from whose modes of behavior humans must dissociate themselvestotally.
Theyarguethatpeacemakingis not uniqueto humansandthat aggression
is
not something
necessarily
alwaysto beavoidedandcondemned becauseit can
serve
adaptive
andmaladaptive
functions.1°2
In summary, it is uncertainandevenquestionable that biologicalandpsy-
chological mechanisms withintheindividualthatpertainto aggressive behav-
ior canexplainintersocietal warfare.Totheextentthatsucha relationship ex-
ists,it is probablyindirectratherthandirect,andit mayberatherremoteat
sometimesandmoreproximateat othertimes.Innateaggressive urgesor dri-
vesmayfeedor reinforcebelligerent politicalattitudesandmaygivetheman
emotionalbasis.In the caseof someindividuals,highly developedinner ag-
gressivenessmaymakethemeasierto train for ghting andkilling in war.
Aggressive impulsesfrequentlyindulgedratherthan controlledmightcon-
tributeto a shorttemperin a politicalleaderanddispose theleaderto resort
readilyto forceto solvea problemthatmightbemanaged adequately through
negotiation.Conversely,personality factorscanalsomakeanotherleadervac-
illateandprocrastinatein a stateof Hamlet-like
indecision
until eitherwarbe-
comesinevitable or peaceprevailsby default.Nonetheless,despitetheseand
severalotherlinkages thatcouldbedrawn,it wouldbeinaccurate to conclude
254 MICROCOSMICTHEORIESOF VIOLENTCONFLICT

thatinnatebiological
andpsychological
drives
arethecauses
of waror peace.
Theyprobably
constitute
oneof theimportant
necessary
conditions
for the
emergence
ofaggressive
discontents
amongindividual
leaders,
elitegroups,
and
masses
thatmaketherecurrence
of wara possibility
throughout
humanhistory.
Bythemselves,
however,theydonotconstitutea suicient
conditionof war.
Fortunately,
thereis nocompellingreason
to thinkthathumanity is being
pushed
inexorably
toward warbysome innate
biologicalpsychological
urgeto
aggress.
Warisamatterforpolitical
decision,
which canbetheresult
ofrational
as well as irrational processes.

NOTES

1. Thewordanornic
hererefersto a condition
of normless
violence
aringup
ratherunexpectedly.
2. Werner
Levi,On theCauses
of WarandtheConditions
of Peace.
journalof
Conict(December1960)Resolution
4, p.415.Seestatement
by HerbertC.
Kelman:
Anyattempt toconceptualize
thecauses
ofwarandtheconditions
for
peace
thatstarts
fromindividual
psychology
rather
thanfromananalysis
ofthe
relationsbetween
nationalstates
is of questionable
relevance;
International
Relations:
Psychological
Aspects,
in International
Encyclopedia
of theSocial
Sciences
Vol.8 (NewYork:Macmillan,
1968),
p.76.See
alsoSeymour Feshbach
andAdamFraczek, Aggression
andBehavior Change:
Biological
andSocial
Processes
(NewYork: Praeger,1979).
3. Peter
Corning,
TheBiological
Basis
of Behavior
andSome
Implications
for
PoliticalScience,
WorldPolitics,XXIII (April1971),339-340.
4. Thefounderofsociobiology
isEdward O.Wilson,aprofessorof scienceandcu-
rator of entomology at HarvardUniversity,who outlinedthe field in
Sociobiology:
TheNewSynthesis (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press,
1975).Since1975,severalworkshaveappeared eitherattackingor defending
theeldor presenting
thedebate.
These includeDavidP.Barash, Sociobiology
andBehavior (NewYork:Elsevier,1977);
ArthurL. Caplan, ed.,Sociobiology
Debate (NewYork:Harper86Row,1978);Michael S.Gregaroy et al.,eds.,
Sociobiology
andHumanNature:An Interdisciplinary CritiqueandDefense
(SanFrancisco:Jossey-Bass,
1978);GeorgeW.BarlowandJames Silverberg,
eds.,Sociobiology:
Beyond NatureNurture(Boulder,CO:Westview, 1979);
James A. Schellenberg,
TheScienceof Conict(NewYork:OxfordUniversity,
1982);andJames H. Fetzer,
ed.,Sociobiology
andEpistemology (Boston:D.
Reidel, 1985).
5. Corning,BiologicalBasisof Behavior,
339-340.SeeThomasLandon
Thorson,
Biopolitics
(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart
andWinston,
1970);
theessays
in AlbertSomit,ed.,BiologyandPolitics(Paris:Mouton,1976);andRogerD.
Masters,
TheBiological
Natureof theState,WorldPolitics,
XXXV(January
1983).Cf.alsoadditionalreferences
in Notes35and36.
6. AbrahamH. Maslow,MotivationandPersonality (NewYork:Harper86Row,
1954),pp.80-98.(A second
editionwaspublished
in 1970.)Maslowargues
thatbasicphysical
andsafetyneedsdemandsatisfaction
before
higherpsycho-
logicalneedsemerge.
 7.

NOTES 255

RobertC.North
hasshownthattheshortages
orscarcities
thatgive
risetopolit-
icalconict
areduenotonlytoobjective
physical
causes
(suchasentropy)but
alsotopsychological
perceptions
andanticipations
ofdemandinexcess ofsup-
ply. Towarda Framework
for the Analysis
of Scarcity
andConict,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
21(December 1977),569-591; seealsoDavid
Novicketal.,A Worldof Scarcities:
CriticalIssues
in PublicPolicy(NewYork:
Halsted, 1976).
See
William
Etkin,Social
Behavior
fromFishto Man(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1967),
p.33;George
Gaylord
Simpson,
TheMeaning
ofEvolution
10.
(New
Haven,
CT:Yale
University
Press,
1967),
p.222;Theodosius
Dobzhansky
Mankind
Evolving
(NewHaven,
CT:YaleUniversity
Press,
1962),
p. 134.
. Albert
Bandura,
Aggression:
ASocial
Learning
Analysis
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:
PrenticeHall, 1973),p. 3.
Ibid.,p. 5. Also,Corning,followingtheapproach
of theCommittee
onViolence
of theStanfordUniversity
School of Medicine,
denes aggressiveness
asencom-
passingtheentirespectrumof assertiveandattacking
behaviors
foundin hu-
mansandotheranimalspecies. It includes
overtandcovertattacks,
self-
directedattacks,
displacementattacks, dominancebehavior,
defamatoryacts,
andthemotivationalandemotional componentsof anydetermined
attemptto
accomplisha task;Biological
Basis of Behavior,
345.RolloMaynotesthat,
besides
being
physical,
aggression
mayalsobepsychological,
intellectual,
spiri-
11.
tual,or economic.
It mayemploy asitsweapons words,artisticsymbols,
ges-
tures,adhominemarguments,
insults,
or evenprolonged
silence calculated
to
hurtorpunish.
PowerandInnocence:
A SearchfortheSourcesof Violence
(New
York: Norton, 1972),pp. 148-152.
12.
WilliamMcDougall, An Introductionto SocialPsychology
(Boston:
Luce,
1926),esp.pp.30-45.See
alsohisOutline
ofPsychology
(NewYork:Scribners,
1923), pp. 140-141.
Sigmund
Freud,A GeneralIntroductionto Psychoanalysis,
trans.G. S. Hall
13.
(NewYork:BoniandLiveright, 1920),pp.170-174.JohnA. Vasquezcites
Freudonthispointwithoutsubscribing
to thepsychoanalytic
theorythatwars
areeventually
theresultof deepinnerdrives.TheWarPuzzle(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1993),pp.36-37.
SeeUrpoHarva,WarandHumanNature,in RobertGinsberg, ed.,The
14.Critiqueof War (Chicago:Regnery,1969),p.48. Aggressionand
necrophiliaareseenasthetwo deepsources
fromwhichwar derivesits mo-
tive energies, p. 49.
15.Sigmund
Freud,
Beyond thePleasure
WhyWar?in aletterfromSigmund
Principle
Freud
(NewYork:Bantam,
toAlbertEinstein,
1958), p.198.
writtenin 1932.
Textin RobertA. Goldwinet al.,Readings
in WorldPolitics(NewYork:Oxford
University
Press,1950).Afterdescribingthedeathinstinct,Freudwrote,The
upshotofthese
observations
. . . isthatthereisnolikelihood
of ourbeingable
to suppress
humanitys
aggressive tendencies.
. . . TheBolshevists,
too,aspire
to do awaywith humanaggressiveness
by ensuring
thesatisfaction
of material
needsandenforcing
equality
between
manandman.Tomethishopeseems
vain.Then,paradoxically,
headded
thatcomplete
suppression
of amans
ag-
gressive
tendencies
is not anissue;whatwemaytry is to divertit intoa channel
otherthanthatofwarfare,
p.29.Thislaststatement
seems
to parallel
William
256 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

16. Leonard
Berkowitz,
Aggression:
A Social-Psychological
Analysis
(NewYork:
McGraw-Hill,1962),p. 8; May,PowerandInnocence,
p. 155.Fora statement
byoneofFreuds
ownstudents
rejecting
hisinstinctivist
theoryofaggression,
see
ErichFromm,TheAnatomyof HumanDestructiveness(NewYork:Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1973).
17. Berkowitz,
Aggression,
pp.9-10.Human
beings
actively
seek
anoptimum
level
of frustration.
Cf.D. O. HebbandW.R.Thompson,
TheSocialSignicance
of
AnimalStudies,
in GardinerLindzey,
ed.,Handbook of SocialPsychology
(Reading,
MA:Addison-Wesley,1954).
Reprinted
in LeonBramson andGeorge
W.Goethals,
eds.,War:Studies
fromPsychology,
Sociology,
Anthropology
(New
York: FreePress,1968), p. 53.
18. Some
post-Freudian
psychoanalytic
writersadhered
to theaggressive
instinct
theory.
A few,suchasKarlMenninger,
retained
thenotionof death
instinct.
Others,
suchasHeinzHartmann, ErnstKris,andRudolphMaurice Loewenstein
continued to postulate
anaggressive
instinctbutdidnottraceit to thedeath
wish;Stillothers,
including
OttoFenichel,
shiftedbacktowardthefrustration
explanation ofaggression.
See
Berkowitz,
Aggression,pp.11-12.
19. SeeMcNeils chapter,
TheNatureof Aggression,in EltonB.McNeil,ed.,The
Natureof HumanConict(Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice
Hall,1965),p.15.
Corning
haswarned
thatit would
befallacious
tomake
anunqualied
identi-
cationbetween
anygivenhumanbehavior
andapparently
similarbehavior
in
lower animals;BiologicalBasisof Behavior,331.
20. Students
of animalbehaviorandphysiology
areproducing
someinteresting
in-
sights
intotheproblem
ofaggression,
buttheywould
bethersttoadmit
diffi-
culties
in interpreting
theirdataandto caution
against
thehastyapplication
of
theirndingsto themoremysteriousrealmofhuman affairs.
A useful
summary
of ndingson animalaggression canbefoundin McNeil,Natureof Human
Conict, pp. 15-27.
21. John
PaulScott,
AnimalBehavior
(Garden
City,NY:Doubleday
Anchor
Books,
1963),
pp.121-122.
Oneshould
notethatif human
aggressiveness
isto bere-
ducedor inhibited,
it will haveto bebywayof learning
becausetheavenues
of
electrical,
hormonal,chemical, andsurgical
interventions
intothehumanbody
areof necessity
quitelimited.
22. V.Spike
Peterson,
Security
andSovereign
States:
WhatIsat Stake
in Taking
FeminismSeriously?
in V. SpikePeterson,
ed.,Gendered
States:Feminist
(Re)Visions
ofInternational
Relations
Theory (Boulder,
CO,andLondon: Lynne
Rienner
Publishers,
1992),pp.31-64.In thesamevolume,
seealsoRebecca
Grant,The Quagmire of GenderandInternationalSecurity,
pp.83-97;
Cynthia
Enloe,Bananas,
Beaches
andBases:
MakingFeminist
Sense
of
International
Politics(Berkeley:
University
of California
Press,
1990).Seealso
Note118in Chapter1 andNotes57-61in Chapter
4.
23. JohnPaulScott,
Aggression
(Chicago:
University
of Chicago
Press,
1958),
p.62;
Berkowitz, Aggression,p. 15.
24. KonradLorenz,On Aggression,
trans.MarjorieKerrWilson(NewYork:
Bantam, 1967), p. x.
25. Ibid.,pp.28-32,161-164. Thisistheconcept
popularized,
perhaps
toosimplis-
tically,especially
in itsapplication
to humans,
byRobertArdrey,astheterrito-
rial imperative.RobertArdrey,The TerritorialImperative(NewYork:
Atheneum, 1966),p.103;seealsopp.47, 110-117,andhis bookAfrican
Genesis (NewYork:Dell,1967),p.174.Forsevere
criticisms
of Ardreys
work
 NOTES 257

onterritoriality
asunscientic,
seeGeoffrey
Gorer,
Ardrey
onHuman Nature,
Encounter,
28(June1967),
andtheessays
byR.L.Holloway,
Jr.,P.H.Klopfer,
Geoffrey
Gorer,
andJ. H. Crook,
in M. F.Ashley
Montagu,
ed.,Manand
Aggression,
2nded.(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,
1973).
26. Lorenz,
OnAggression,
pp.54-65,69-81,and99-110.Hegivesthefamiliar
exampleoftheceremonial
inciting
bythefemaleduck,
whowillcharge
menac-
inglytowardanenemycoupleuntil,frightened
byherownboldness,
shesud-
denlyhurries
backtoherownprotective drake
torefurbish
hercourage
before
thenexthostileforay.Thus,withoutactually
joiningbattle,shedelivers
her
warningmessage;
p. 127.Seealsopp. 72-74, 122-132,232-233.
27. Fora furtherelaboration
of Lorenzs
viewsconcerning
theimplications
of bio-
logicalndingsfor a knowledgeof humansocialbehavior,
seeA Talkwith
Konrad Lorenz,
Magazine Section,
TheNewYorkTimes (July5, 1970).
Lorenzswidely
citedexampleofthewolfwhosubmissively
exposes
hisjugular
veintotheadversary
waslaterdismissed
ashaving
been
based
onfaultyobserva-
tion. R. Schenkel,
Submission:
Its Features
andFrustrations
in theWolf and
Dog,AmericanZoologist,
7 (1967),
319-329.Mostbiologists,
however,
still
subscribe
totheconcept
of aggression-inhibiting
mechanisms.
28. Lorenz,
OnAggression,
p.233-234.
SeealsoJerome
D. Frank,
Sanity
and
Survival:Psychological
Aspects
of Warand Peace(NewYork:Random
HouseVintageBooks,1968),pp.42-45in chap.3, Why Men Kill-
Biological
Roots.R. L. Holloway,
Jr.,suggests
thattheaverting
of eyes,
cringing,
andsheddingof tearsmayserveaninhibiting
or appeasing
function
in humans,eventhoughtheyarequiteweak.HumanAggression:TheNeed
for a Species-Specific
Framework,
NaturalHistory,
LXXVI(December
1,
1967), 41.
29. AlecNisbett,KonradLorenz:A Biography
(NewYork:HarcourtBrace
Jovanovich,1976),pp. 171-172.
30. ErichFromm,
TheErichFromm
Theory
of Aggression,
Magazine
Section,
TheNewYorkTimes(February
27,1972),74,andMan WouldasSoonFleeas
Fight,Psychology
Today,
7 (August
1973),
35-45.A similar
criticism
maybe
foundin Holloway,HumanAggression,
41.
31. SeeB.E Skinner,
Beyond FreedomandDignity(NewYork:Knopf,1971),in
chap.1,A Technology
ofBehavior;
Meredith
W.Watts,B.F.Skinnerandthe
Technological
Controlof Social
Behavior,
American Political
Science
Review,
LXIX(March 1975);
AshleyMortague,
ManandAggression, p.9.
32. Albert
Bandura,
Aggression:
A Social
Learning
Analysis
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:
Prentice
Hall, 1973),pp.16-31.SeealsoT. C. Schneirla,
Instinctand
Aggression,
in Montagu,ManandAggression,
p. 61.
33. Thesecriticisms are documented in StephenD. Nelson,Nature/Nurture
Revisited.
I: A Review of theBiological
Bases
of Conict,journalof Conict
Resolution,18 (June1974),esp.pp.296-302, andin Samuel S.Kim,The
Lorenzian
Theory ofAggression
andPeace Research:
A Critique,
in Richard
A.
FalkandSamuel S.Kim,eds.,TheWar System:
AnInterdisciplinary
Approach
(Boulder,
CO:Westview,
1980),pp.82-115.
34. Francis
A. Beer,
Peace
Against
War:TheEcology
of International
Violence
(San
Francisco:
W.H. Freeman,
1981),p. 304.
35. George
M. Carstairs,
Overcrowding andHumanAggression,
in HughDavis
Graham
andTedRobert Gurr,eds.,Violence
inAmerica,
Report
to theNational
Commission
on theCauses
andPrevention
of Violence,
June1969(NewYork:
258

MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

36.
New AmericanLibrary,1969),pp.730-742.Cf. alsoJonathanFreedman,
Crowdingand Behavior(SanFrancisco:Freeman,1975); SusanSeagart,
Crowdingin RealEnvironments
(Beverly
Hills,CA:Sage,
1976);andLarry
Severy,
ed.,Crowding: Theoretical
andResearch
Implications
(NewYork:
Humanities SciencePress,1979).
37.
ThomasC. Wiegele,Decision-Making in an InternationalCrisis: Some
BiologicalFactors, InternationalStudiesQuarterly,7 (September 1973),
295-335,andBiopolitics(Boulder,
CO:Westview, 1979);MeredithWatts,ed.,
Biopolitics:Ethological
andPhysiological Approaches(SanFrancisco:]ossey-
Bass,
1981);Gerald
W.HoppleandLawrence
Falkowski,
Biopolitics,
Political
Psychology
andInternational
Politics(NewYork:St.Martins,1982).
38.
JohnDollard,Leonard
W. Doob,NealE. Miller,et al., Frustration
and
Aggression
(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversity
Press,
1939),p.7.Foranother ba-
39.
sicworkin theeld, seeNormanR. F.Maier,Frustration:
TheStudyof Behavior
Withouta Goal(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1949).Thepsychological concept
of
frustrationhasheldup well.SeeAbramAmsel,FrustrationTheory(NewYork:
40.
CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).
RossStagner,
The Psychology
of HumanConict, in McNeil, Natureof
Human Conict, p. 53.
AbrahamH. Maslow,Deprivation,Threatand Frustration, Psychological
Review,
XLVIII(6)(1941);reprinted
inJ.K. Zawodny,
ed.,ManandInternational
Relations,Vol.1: Conict (SanFrancisco:
Chandler,1966),pp. 17-19.
41.
Dollardetal.,Frustration
andAggression,
pp.39-47.According
to a laterrefor-
mulationof theconceptof catharsis,
aggressive
actionwasthoughtto havethree
possible
separable
effects:
reducing,
increasing,
or producing
no observable
change
in thelevelof aggressive
response.
S.Feshback,
Aggression,
in P.H.
42.Mussen,ed.,Carmichaels
Manualof ChildPsychology
(NewYork:Wiley,1970),
pp.159-259.
Citedin Bandura,
Aggression:
Social
Learning
Analysis,
p.37.
EltonB. McNeil,PsychologyandAggression,journalof Conict Resolution,
43. HI (September
1959),204;Berkowitz, Aggression,
seethetheorythat hasbeenrecentlydefended
p. 29.Forthenegative
view,
by AbramAmselin Frustration
Theory(NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).
44. Berkowitz, Aggression,p. 30.
For an elaboration of these rst two points, see Berkowitz, Aggression,
pp. 32-48.
SanfordRosenzweig,
An Outline of Frustration
Theory,J. McV.Hunt, ed.,
Personalityand the BehaviorDisorders(New York: Ronald, 1944),
pp.381-382.
McNeil,following
Rosenzweig,
says,Theprivation
ofbeing
born
45.into povertyposesa series
themdiffersconsiderably
of frustrations
for theindividual;but hisreactionto
fromhisresponses to beingdeprivedof wealth,once
he haspossessed
it; .Psychology
andAggression,203.
46.Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression,p. 2.
TheDollardgroupnotedthat whenMarxistshavedescribedthedynamichu-
maninterrelationships
involvedin theclassstruggle
andin thepreservation
and
47.

NOTES 259

not in the samesensein which psychologists

useit. Seealsopp. 44, 151-153,
and 153-158 on prejudice against blacks and Jews.
Sociologists
distinguishbetweenthe behaviorof smallgroupsand that of large
groups. Herbert Blumer has called attention also to the differencesbetween col-
lective behavior (evenby fairly large groups) in an undened or unstructured sit-
uation and organizedsocialbehaviorthat follows culturally prescribednorms.
CollectiveBehavior,in J. B. Gitter, ed., Reviewof Sociology:Analysisof a
Decade(NewYork: Wiley,1957),pp. 130,199.Neil J. Smelser, while modifying
some of Blumersideas, agreeswith the aforementioned distinction: Collective
48.behavior. . . is not institutionalizedbehavior.Accordingto the degreeto which
it becomesinstitutionalized,it loses its distinctive character. Theory of
CollectiveBehavior(New York: FreePress1963),p. 8. It is interestingto note
49.that Smelser,in his chapter on The Hostile Outburst, makesno mention of the
frustration-aggression
hypothesisin his effortsto explainaggression
in society.
Ibid., pp. 222-269.
Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression,pp. 55-76.
50. Martin Gold, Suicide, Homicide and the Socializationof Aggression,in
Bartlett H. Stoodley,ed., Society and Self: A Reader in Social Psychology (New
York: Free Press,1962), pp. 281-282.
Robert R. Sears, Eleanor Maccoby, and Harry Levin, The Socialization of
51. Aggression, in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L.
Hartley, eds., Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1958), pp. 350-352.
McNeil, Psychologyand Aggression,212. Banduranotes that the fear of punish-
mentproduces
aninhibitingor deterrent
effectandcauses
thedisplacement
of aggres-
sion from similar to dissimilar targets;Aggression,pp. 34-35. E. F. M. Durbin and
John Bowlby contendedthat the conict within the child arising out of the fear of
punishmentis an important sourceof aggressiveness in the adult becauseaggression
can be controlled but not destroyed.The boy, insteadof striking his father,whom he
fears,strikesa smallerboy,whom he doesnot fear.Disguisedaggressionhasmadethe
boyinto a bully.In thesameway,revolutionaries
who hateorderedgovernment,
na-
tionalistswho hate foreign policies,and individualswho hate bankers,Jews,or their
political opponentsmay be exhibiting characteristicsthat have beenformed by the
suppressionof simple aggressionin their childhood education.Durbin and Bowlby,
52. PersonalAggressiveness and War (New York: Columbia University Press,1939), ex-
cerptedin J. K. Zawodny, Man and International Relations, Vol. 1: Conict (San
53. Francisco:ChandlerPublishingCompany,1966),p. 97.
McNeil, Psychology and Aggression, 213; Stagner, Psychology of Human
Conflict, 55-56.
Stagner,Psychology of Human Conict, 54; and Ralph K. White, Images in
54. the Context of International Conict, in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International
Behavior:A SocialPsychological
Analysis(New York: Holt, Rinehartand
Winston, 1965), pp. 267-268.
55. Marc Howard Ross,Childrearing and War in Different Cultures, in FrancescaM.
260

57.
58.

59.
MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

60.
Bandura, Aggression,pp. 29-30, 32-36, 44.
Vasquez,WarPuzzle,pp. 37-41. SeealsoNote 98.
For a fascinatingaccountand analysisof how soldiersin battlefacethe prospect
of imminentdeath,seeJ. Glenn Gray, The Warriors:Reectionson Men in
Battle(NewYork:Harper,1967),esp.pp.100-121;JohnKeegan,
TheFaceof
Battle (New York: Penguin) 1983.
Donald A. Wells, The War Myth (New York: Pegasus,1967), pp. 174-175.
Withintwopages of histext,Wellsrst suggests
thatwar is notsonaturalor so
psychologicallygrounded in humannatureaswehavebeenledto believe,but
thenarrivesat whatappears to beanoppositeconclusion:Theemptinessof the
reasonsmenverbalizefor war suggests that war reallydoesnot reston anyratio-
nale. . . . After all, if peopledidnt like to ght, heconcludes,there areno
goodreasons
why theyshoulddo so muchof it. Ibid., pp.176-177.For a
61.ratherdepressing
andnot entirelyconvincing
picture,seeWilliamBroyles,
]r.,
Why Men LoveWar, in Cancianand Gibson,MakingWar/Making Peace,
pp.29-37.Thisfirst appearedin Esquire.Forquotations
fromvariousauthors
62. reectingambiguitywith regardto theattractiveness
andrepulsiveness
of war,
killing, and confrontationwith death in combat,see David P. Barash,
Introduction to PeaceStudies (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1991), pp. 150-156.
Bandura, Aggression,p. 99.
RaymondAron hasnotedthat, as modernwarfaretechnologyhasgrown more
63. frightful,industrially
advanced
societies
have,byarticulating
evermoregrandiose
statementsof war aims,soughtto inspiretheircitizensto sustainthehardshipsand
sacricesof war.TheCenturyof Total War(Boston:Beacon,1955),p. 26.
64.JohnH. Faris,TheImpactof BasicCombatTraining,in NancyGoldman and
David R. Segal,eds.,The SocialPsychologyof Military Service(BeverlyHills,
CA: Sage,1976), pp. 14-15.
65. Beer,PeaceAgainstWar,p. .128and documentation
on p. 339.
KarenHorney,Neurosisand HumanGrowth (NewYork: W. W. Norton, 1950),
pp.21-27.It is notclearwhetherthesearchfor glory is relatedto thepropen-
sity for risk-takingin international
crises,a subjectdealtwith in subsequent
chapters on macrocosmic causesof violentconflictanddecision-makingtheo-
ries.For a highlytechnical,somewhatesoteric,andnot entirelyconvincingstudy
69.

NOTES 261
70.

PamelaJ. Conoverand StanleyFeldman,How PeopleOrganizethe Political

71.
72
World, AmericanJournal of Political Science,28 (February1984), 95-126;
John Hurwitz and Mark Pefey, How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes
Structured? American Political Science Review, 81 (December 1987),
1099-1120.
Arthur Gladstone,The Conception of the Enemy, Journal of Conict
73.
Resolution, III (June 1959), 132.
Stagner,The Psychology
of HumanConict, 46.
74
. Urie Bronfenbrenner,
The Mirror Imagein SovietAmerican
Relations:A Social
Psychologists
Report,journal of ConictResolution,
XI (September
1967),
325-332;CharlesE. Osgood,Analysisof the Cold War Mentality, Journalof
75.
Social Issues,XVII(3) (1961), 12-19.
RalphK. White, Imagesin the Contextof InternationalConict, in Kelman,
ed., International Behavior p. 240.
. Urie Bronfenbrenner, Allowing for SovietPerceptions,in RogerFisher,ed.,
InternationalConict andBehavioralScience,TheCraigvillePapers(NewYork:
Basic Books, 1964), p. 172.
76.
See,for example,the discussionof Graduatedand ReciprocatedInitiative in
Tension-Reduction,(GRIT) in CharlesE. Osgood,An Alternativeto War or
Surrender(Urbana:Universityof Illinois Press,1962), and his Questioning
SomeUnquestioned Assumptions AboutNationalDefense, journal of Arms
Control,I (January1963),213. Cf. alsoArthur I. Waskow,The Limits of
Defense(GardenCity,NY: Doubleday,1962),chap.4.
See,for example,
the articlesby VictorA. Kremenyuk,
ManusI. Midlarsky,
VladislovZubok, andJack S. Levy on SuperpowerLearningin the Cold War
Period, in ManusI. Midlarsky,John A. Vasquez,and PeterB. Gladkov,eds.,
FromRivalryto Cooperation:
Russian
andAmerican
Perspectives
on thePost-
77.Cold WarEra (NewYork: HarperCollins,1994),pp. 3-86; GeorgeW. Breslauer
andPhilipE.Tetlock,eds.,Learningin U.S.andSovietForeignPolicy(Boulder,
CO:Westview, 1991).JohnA. Vasquez hascalledattentionto anothersetof
78. contrastingpersonality
traitsthat of hard-linersandaccomodationists-
thataffecttheprospects
for hostilityor cooperation
at anygiventime.TheWar
Puzzle, pp. 206-210.
McNeil, The Nature of Aggression,p. 35.
79.For a balancedview of the subject,seeSabrinaPetraRametand Donald W.
Treadgold, RenderUnto Caesar:TheReligiousSpherein WorldPerspective
(Washington,
DC: AmericanUniversityPress,1995).
80.HebbandThompson,SocialSignicanceof AnimalStudies,53.
Lorenz, On Aggression,pp. 271-272.

81 . Frank,Sanityand Survival,pp. 75, 87-88.

82. Lorenz,On Aggression,
p. 272;JeromeD. Frank,SanityandSurvival,pp. 88,241.
83 . WilsonCareyMcWilliams,
ThePoliticalOlympics,Worldview
(July 1984).See
alsoHarry Edwards,TheSociologyof Sport(Homewood,IL: DorseyPress,1973).
84. SeePartonKeese,
Violencein Sports:WhatIt CouldMean,TheNew York
262 MICROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

86. The relationshipbetweensex and violence18extremelycomplex.SeeElbert

Russell,Human Aggression,Paper presentedat CanadianPeaceResearch
Institute Summer School, Grindstone Island, Ontario, July 18, 1973; JamesW
Prescott,Body Pleasureand the Origins of Violence, The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists,XXXI (November 1975), 10-20; Amaury de Riencourt, Sex
and Powerin History (New York: David McKay,1974),pp. 220-223. Recently
Robert C. Treer has shown that the Europeanswho initiated the colonial
Empiresin the New World weregivento sexualandphysicalbrutality.Sexand
Conquest:GenderedViolence,PoliticalOrderand the Conquestof theAmericas
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1995).
87. Prescott,Body Pleasure;Frank, Sanityand Survival,68-69, 283. Bandura,
however,while agreeingthat punishmentmayhaveunfavorableconsequences if
it is excessive,ill-timed, erratic, or administered in a spirit of vengeancewithout
providingconstructivedirection,neverthelessarguesthat punishmentcan,under
certainconditions,effectivelymodify undesirablebehavior;Aggression:
A Social
Learning Analysis, pp. 289, 304-308.
88. SeeLeonard Berkowitz, The Case for Bottling Up Rage, Psychology Today
(July 1973), 24, 31.
89. Frank, Sanity and Survival, pp. 72-74, 283-284; Bandura, Aggression,
pp. 266-286. Banduradismisses
the disclaimersthat becausebehaviorISdeter-
mined by multiple factors, it is unfair to place blame on the massmedia and that
aggressive
modelingaffectsonly peoplewho are alreadydisturbedor predis-
posedto aggression.
He arguesthat in the faceof abundantexperimentalevi-
dencefor observational learning, continued equivocation on the aggressivemod-
eling impact of television on both children and adults cannot be iustied. Ibid.,
pp. 266-271;seealsoBanduraToy Guns:Do TheyFanAggression?TheNew
York Times (June 16, 1988), Section C, p. 1. Psychologistswere reported debat-
ing whether toy guns encourageviolent behavior among youngsters or acquaint
them with the horrors and death of war. Government officials have often blamed
toy guns for actual deaths when police ofcers mistook them for real weapons.
90. See, for example, Ithiel DeSoIa Pool, Effects of Cross-National Contact on
National and International Images, in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International
Relations: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1964), pp. 106-129.
91. Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 48.
92. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1954); Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
93. Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and
Perceptual Personality Variable, Journal of Personality, XVIII (September
1949),108-143;andSocialTensions
andtheInhibitionof Thought,Social
Problems, II (October 1954), 75-81.
94. T. W. Adorno, ElseFrenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, The
Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper 86 Row, 1950). For criticisms of
the hypothesis,
cf. RichardChristieandMarie Jahoda,eds.,Studiesin the Scope
andMethodsof theAuthoritarianPersonality(Glencoe, IL: FreePress,1954).
95. S. Griedlanderand R. Cohen, The PersonalityCorrelatesof Belligerencein
InternationalConict, ComparativePolitics,7 (January1975).
96. Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976), pp. 26-40. Seealso Alexander L.
 NOTES 263

George,Assessing
Presidential
Character,WorldPolitics,XXVI (January
1974) 234-282.
97. Thisinterpretation
wasincludedin everyeditionof Morgenthaus
majorwork
from1948onward.
Thequotation
isfromPolitics
Among
Nations:
TheStruggle
for PowerandPeace,
4th ed.(NewYork:AlfredA. Knopf,1967),pp.98-99.
The leadingauthority on the subject,HansKohn, callednationalismfirst and
foremosta stateof mind. TheIdeaof Nationalism(NewYork:Macmillan,
1944),p. 10. For later treatmentsof the subject,seeJohnBreuilly,Nationalism
andtheState
(Manchester,
England:
Manchester
University
Press,
1982);
Ernest
Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Oxford,England:BasilBlackwell,1983);
YaelTamir,LiberalNationalism
(Ewing,NJ:Princeton
UniversityPress,1993);
William Pfaff,The Wrathof Nations:Civilizationand theFuriesof Nationalism
(NewYork: Simon8CSchuster, 1993);JohnR. Gillis, ed.,Commemoration: The
Politicsof NationalIdentity(Ewing,NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press,
1994);Leon
P.Baradat, PoliticalIdeologies:
TheirOriginandImpact(UpperSaddleRiver,
NJ:Prentice Hall, 1997),esp.chap.3. Aswill beshownin thenextchapter,
the
subjectof nationalismis usually treated in the context of the macrocosmic
causes of war.
98. Erich Fromm,Escapefrom Freedom(New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston,
1941), pp. 21, 22, 141-142, and 164-168.
99. Leon Festinger,A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance(Stanford,CA: Stanford
UniversityPress,1957),and Conict, Decisionand Dissonance(Stanford,CA:
StanfordUniversity
Press,1964).Festingers
theoryhasbeenaccepted
by most
psychologists
and has becomepart of the warp and woof of the field. See
Harold B. GerardsRetrospective
Reviewof Festingerin Contemporary
Psychology,39 (November 1994), 1013-1017. 9"
100. JudsonS. Brown,Principlesof Intrapersonal Conict, journal of Conict so
Resolution,I (June1957), 137-138.Fora differentperspective
of howpsycho-
logicalfactorsin thepersonalbackground of a politicalleadermayaffectthe
leadersdecisionto becomea revolutionary,seeE. Victor Wolfenstein,Violence
or Non Violence:A Psychoanalytic
Explorationof the Choiceof Meansin Social
Change,
MonographSeries(Princeton,
NJ: Centerfor InternationalStudies,
Princeton University, 1965).
101. The SevilleStatementon Violence (SSV)is excerptedin David P. Barash,
Introductionto Peace
Studies(Belmont,
CA:Wadsworth,
1991),pp.140-141.
Barashidenties the Viewthat war is in our genesdisproportionatelywith
right-wingandpromilitarypersonsbut presentsno evidencefor suchan associa-
tion. Ibid., p. 140. Virtually all the contributorsto 211989interdisciplinaryan-
thologyonaggression
andwaragree
that,althoughsomehumanbehavioral
pat-
ternsare beyonddoubt geneticallybased,organizedaggressive behaviorfor the
most part is culturally inuenced. Jo Groebeland Robert A. Hinde, eds.,
Aggressionand War: Their Biologicaland SocialBases(Cambridge,England:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1989). Seealso Robert A. Hinde and Helen E.
Watson,eds.,War:A CruelNecessity? Basesof InstitutionalizedViolence(New
York: I. B. Tauris,1995), in which the emphasisis placedupon the multicausal-
ity of war andthe needto integratemicrocosmicand macrocosmic approaches.
102. JamesSilverbergand J. Patrick Gray, eds., Introduction to Aggressionand
Peacefulness in Humansand Other Primates(New York: Oxford University
Press,1992).
Chapter 7
Macrocosmic Theories
of Violent Conict:
International War
We now turn to those who theorize about war at the macro levelthe level of
societies,nationstates,and the global system.Here we examineinsightsinto
large-scalesocialstructural violence that can be obtained from the work of
anthropologists,sociologists,political scientists,and international-relations
specialists.Whereasthe microanalystslook within the individual memberof
thespecies
for unconscious,
aggressive
drivesandtendto besomewhat
skepti-
cal of consciouslyarticulatedmotivesfor social and internationalconict,
macroanalystsin generaltake seriouslystatementsof conscious,verbal mo-
tives and reasonsfor peoplesresort to violencewithin, between,and among
societies.Theyregardsuchstatements asparticularlyimportantfor explaining
why specicconicts breakout betweenspecicpartiesat specictimes.They
ascribea certainvalidity to the dictum of Thucydides:If you want to know
why peopleareghting a war, askthemandtheywill tell you.
Socialscientists,
especially
most sociologists
and anthropologists,
who
adopt a macro approachto human phenomenatend to regardconict as a
normal concomitantof group existence,not as the disruptive,dysfunctional,
or evenpathologicalconditionmostpsychologists takeit to be.Thosesociolo-
gistswho follow Talcott Parsonsin emphasizing socialadjustment,common-
valueorientation,and systemmaintenanceare an exception.More interested
in socialorderthan in socialchange,in socialstaticsthan in socialdynamics,
theParsonians
consider
conictasa disease
with disruptiveanddysfunctional
consequences.However, most Europeansociologistsfrom Karl Marx to
GeorgSimmeland Ralf Dahrendorf,and most Americansociologistsin the
pre-Parsonianera (e.g.,Robert E. Park, John W Burgess,William Graham
Sumner,CharlesH. Cooley,E. A. Ross,and Albion W. Small)and somein re-
centdecades(e.g:,JesseBernardand LewisA. Coser)haveviewedconict as
servingpositivesocialpurposes}Evenviolentconictsometimes
is seenasa
useful meansof resolving disputeswithin society and betweensocieties.
Political scientists,economists,and gametheorists,alongwith most rational
political leaders,usuallyprefer to evaluatespecic conicts on the basisof
probable or actual outcome_sthatis, by weighingthe gains of conict in
termsof valuesat stakeversusthe risks and costof the conict. That is gener-
264
 INSIDEVERSUSOUTSIDEDIMENSIONSOF CONFLICT 265

ally how NATO governments

and broaderelitesassessed
their attackin 1999
againstYugoslaviaoverKosovo.Bylimitingitselfto anair campaign, NATO
pursueda strategythat wasbasedon highmoralvalueswhilebeingremark-
ably low on casualtyrisks for NATO forces,eventhoughthe costsfor
AlbanianKosovars andSerbian civilianswerehigherthananticipated.
For conflict-as-functional
theorists,conict not only integrates,
but also
helpsto establishgroupidentity,claries groupboundaries,andcontributesto
groupcohesion. Nearlyeverysociologist andanthropologist postulates some
degreeof in-grouphostilityfor the out-group.Whenthereare manyout-
groups,thepoliticalscientist
cancastlightonthequestion of whya particular
onemaybesingled outat a particulartimeasthetargetof hbstility.Historians
of nationalismoften describethe importanceof the externalbétenoire in the
formativeperiodof a nationsconsciousness.
Theprimeexample in American
historyis theroleplayedby Britainin theearlyformativeperiodof national
feelingfollowingour Warfor Independence from Britain.Beyond.this
well-
knownphenomenon,
somesocialtheorists
contend
thatevenwithingroups,
discordandoppositionhelpto holdthegroupstogetherbyprovidinginnerre-
lief andmakingthe unbearable bearable}Thus,manythinkersin modern
timesacceptconict asthe centralexplanatory
categoryfor theanalysis
of
socialchangeor progress.3

INSIDE VERSUS OUTSIDE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT

Manysocialtheorists
sinceMachiavelli
havetakenit for grantedthata signif-
icant relationshipexistsbetweenconict within societiesandconict between
societies.
Thisgivesriseto oneof the mostdurable-ye"t
hardto-conrmhy-
pothesesin social-conicttheory.The relationshipcan be formulatedin two
ways: (1) internal conict variesinverselywith externalconict; and (2) do-
mesticcohesioncorrelatespositivelywith involvementin foreignwars.
Politicalrulersin all ages,facedwith growingtroublesandturmoilat home,
haveapparentlybeentemptedto provokeforeignmilitary adventuresas a di-
versionary tactic.
William GrahamSumneradvancedthe theory that groupsseekinternal
unity for strengthin competitionwith externalenemies;
that the sentimentsof
peace
andcooperationinside
thegroupcomplement sentimentsof hostilityto-
wardoutsidegroups;andthat societies
that experienced
frequentanderce
warsdevelopedgovernmentsandlegalsystems, whilethewholesocietalsys-
tem becamemore rmly integratedflWilliam James,too, saw war as the
gory nurse that trained societiesto cohesivenessin ancient times.5
Uncertainty over tenure of power among ruling elites, accordingto
Richard Rosecrance, may make war more probableby bringing aggressive
military and political personalitiesto the fore.5ClydeKluckhohnwrites, If a
nations intragroup aggressionsbecomeso serious that there is danger of dis-
ruption, war, by displacingaggressionagainstanothergroup, is an adjustive
266 MACROCOSMIC TI-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

response
fromthepointof viewof preserving
nationalcohesion.7
Students
of
primitive tribes have noted that where warfare once servedthose groups as a
safetyvalveinstitution, and intrasocietalaggressiveness
was siphonedoff by
directingconsiderable hostility toward the outsideworld to promotethe inte-
gration of the society,modernizationand peacehaveled to communityfis-
sion.3GeorgSimmel
notedthereciprocitybetween
socialandpoliticalcentral-
ization and the aggressive impulseto war. War promotesinner cohesiveness,
yet internal political centralizationincreases
the probability that externalre-
leaseof tensionswill besoughtthroughwar.Accordingto Simmel,War with
the outside is sometimesthe last chance for a state ridden with inner antago-
nismsto overcome
theseantagonisms,
or elseto breakupindenitely.
9
GeoffreyBlainey,on the contrary,rejectswhat hecallsthe scapegoatthe-
ory of war, despiteits undoubteduniversalglow in the eyesof political scien-
tists, historians,and anthropologists.Althoughadmittingthat more than half
of all international wars from 1823 to 1937 studied by him were immediately
precededby seriousdisturbances in one of the ghting nations,he concluded
that scapegoat
theoristsrely on dubiousassumptionsfor example,that war
can be blamed on one side, that strife-torn nations are more likely to initiate
war, andthat everymild disturbanceposesa threatof disintegrationin the ab-
senceof war. If scapegoat
theoristsreadthe evidenceof political history more
carefully,he observed,they would ceaseto overlook two important facts:
(1) The troubled nation can more easily suppressinternal discontent if it does
not becomeinvolved in international war; and (2) an external foe, seeingtur-
moil within a countryasa signof weakness,
is morelikely to try to exploit the
situationby makingwar.1°
The empiricalevidencefor the reciprocalrelationshipbetweeninternal
and external conflict is not as conclusive as it once seemed. Studies conducted
in the 1960s and 1970s, using quantitative methods to prove or disprove the
correlation,producedambiguous
results. BruceBuenode Mesquitaand
David Lalman have concluded, We do not know . . . whether the expecta-
tion of high domesticcostsmakesnationsmore or lesslikely to shunviolent
escalation
of crises.1?
In 1992,RandolphM. Siverson
andHarveyStarrren
dered this summary opinion:
The relationship between internal and external factors in the explanation of inter-
nationalpoliticsand foreignpolicy may be seenasan academicequivalentto the
questfor theHoly Grailmanyhavesearched
for it; thesearchhastakenplace
over long periods of time and in diverse researchareas. . . . Many signs point to
the reality of such internal-external linkages, but a systematicconnection has been
hard to demonstrate
consistently.

Nevertheless, despite the difculty of establishing a simple, generalized

correlation, political and other social scientists will probably continue to be
intriguedby thetheoryfor its utilityin explaining
suchtypesof cases,
andto
inquire into the similaritiesand dissimilaritiesof the typesof casesin which it
appearsvalid andthosein which it doesnot. Thereis no needto interpretthe
 INSIDEVERSUS
OUTSIDE
DIMENSIONS
OFCONFLICT 267

traditionaltheoryto meanthat externalconict alwaysmilitatesin favorof

increased
social
cohesion
or thatin theprolonged
absence
of external
conict,
internaldisintegration
necessarily
occurs.Both domesticand international
politicsaretoo complicatedand subtlefor suchfacilerulesof thumb.
Wellintegrated
communities
areheldtogether
bymorethanfear,hostility,
andexternalconict.Sharedbeliefsandvalues,
andtheexpectation
of mutual
benetsfrom livingtogether,
canbeimportantfactorsmakingfor cohesion.
Whatthetheoryasserts
is thatexternal
conictcanbeonesignicant
factor,
butcertainlynottheonlyone.If theprocess
of internalconsensus
anddisinte-
grationhasprogressed
too far,involvement
in a foreignconictmightacceler-
ateratherthanreversethatprocess.
Francebecame internally
dividedduring
theAlgerianconict,asdidtheUnitedStates
duringtheVietnam Warandthe
SovietUnionto a lesserextentasa resultof its intervention
in Afghanistan.
Anyeffortto correlate
internal
andexternal
conictbehavior
islikelyto bein-
conclusive
if it ignoressuchcrucialvariables asthedegree of consensus
that
existsconcerning thepriorityvaluesof thepoliticalsystem
andthesocietalbe-
liefsaboutwhatisatstakein theconict. _
In WorldWarII, whentheAmerican
peoplewerealmostunanimous in sup-
portingthewaragainst
GermanyandJapan,thepressgavelittleif anycoverage
to thosewho resisted.In sharpcontrast,the VietnamWar found the American
peopledeeply dividedoverthenatureof theconict(whether aninternational or
a civilwar),thepurpose of U.S.involvement(tofulll atreatycommitment, con-
taincommunism, preserveVietnamese nationalindependence, or establish
a bal-
anceof powerin Asia),andtheextentto whichdevelopments in SoutheastAsia
couldjeopardize theU.S.nationalinterest.Insteadof wagingalloutwar,the
UnitedStates imposed limitsontheconduct of itsownmilitaryoperations,partly
because
of criticism
andopposition
fromintellectuals,
students,
pacifist
groups,
themedia,manypoliticians,
andsubstantial
segments
of thepublicall of whom
wereincreasingly
confusedandfrustratedby a costlywar effort that seemed
fu-
tile.Moreover,
President
Johnson
wastornbetween
hisdomestic
andhisforeign
prioritiesbuilding
theGreatSocietyandprosecutingthewaragainsta small
countrythatwasableto mobilize
itsresources
fullyto achieve
victory.
The divisionsof opinion within and betweenthe United Statesand its
European alliesduringtheNATOYugoslavia conictoverKosovoprovided
anaptillustrationof a complexproblem.NATOgovernments becamepoliti-
callymorecohesive asalliesandremainedunitedasto theirgoals,despite
in-
ternalrifts in publicsupportandseriouscivilian-military
disagreements
over
the risk-freeair strategybeingpursued.At the sametime the UnitedStatesand
theEuropeanUnionengaged in diplomaticandpropagandatradewarsover
bananas,
hormonetreated beef,genetically
modiedfoodstuffs,the noiseof
commercial
aircraft,privacyrightsversustheelectronic
transmissionof per-
sonal data, and other trade issues.The relation betweeninternal and external
conict can be evaluatedonly within a total politicalcontextthat varies
greatlyfrom caseto case.Althoughempiricalstudiesin this areathusfar leave
muchto be desired,it would seemthat the theoryof an inverselinkage
268 MACROCOSMIC TI-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

between intrasocietal and extrasocietal conict needsgreater renement and

moredifferentiatedresearchby studentsof internationalrelations.

LESSONS FROM PRIMITIVE AND OTHER SOCIETIES

The experience
of primitive societiesis not directlyrelevantfor understanding
contemporary international relations. Modern technologically advanced civi-
lizations are not lineal descendantsof primitive cultures. Ever since the age of
discovery and exploration four centuries ago, Westernphilosophers and social
theorists have been fascinated by primitive ways of social organization and
life, and they have sought to gain from them insights into the problems of civ-
ilization, including war. In earlier times, when there were abundant casesof
societiesunaffected by contact with the West, there were practically no trained
scientic observers, and many supercial or erroneous conclusions were
drawn. (Hobbes,Locke,and Rousseau,for example,apparentlythoughtthat
the Indians of North America lived in a state of nature, without govern-
ment.) In the nineteenth century, as the scienceof cultural anthropology devel-
oped, the purity or authenticity of most primitive cultures had been diluted by
the importation of Western"religiousand socialbeliefs,ideas,and practices.
Considerable caremustbe exercised,therefore,in the interpretationof primi-
tive institutions and customs.
Anthropologists avoid striving for a single generalizationfor example,
that primitivesare basicallywarlike or that they are basicallypeaceful.Some
primitives are extremely belligerent and always spoiling for a ght; others are
almostexclusivelypeaceful.ClydeKluckhohnwrites,
Organized offensive warfare was unknown in aboriginal Australia. Certain areas
of the New World seem to have been completely free from war in the pre-
European period. . . . What is absolutely certain at present is that different types
of social order carry with them varying degreesof propensity for war. The contin-
uum rangesfrom groups like the Pueblo Indians who for many centuries have al-
most never engagedin offensive warfare to groups like some Plains Indians who
madeghting their highestvirtue.
Wherethe word for war as a form of sociallyorganizedaggressionor
ghting is not evena part of someprimitive languagesfor example,of the
Eskimos and the Andaman Islanderswe must hesitate to attribute this to the
inherentlypeacefulcharacterof the people,especiallybecausethey are in no
proximate contact with welldened societies. For technologically undevel-
opedsocieties,war, like violent crime,is usuallya function of physicalprox-
imity. Prior to the era of the airplaneand the missile,only maritimecountries
possessed the capabilitiesto mount offensivewarfare at a distance.In fact,
evenin recentdecades,most internationalwars have beenwagedbetween
thosecommunitiesthat usuallyhavethe mostfrequentoccasionsand perhaps
the strongestreasonsfor ghtingterritorially adjacentstates.Vasquezhas
argued,thatterritorial contiguityis the sourceof conict that mostfrequently
leadsto wars and suggests that it may havesomethingto do with an inher-
 LESSONSFROM PRIMITIVEAND OTHERSOCIETIES 269

itedtendency
towardterritoriality,whichis a phenomenon
described
by
DesmondMorris andRobertArdrey.
It wouldseemthat theexperience
of mostprimitivesocieties
is similarto
thatof manymodern
civilized
states:
Theyknowalternating periods
of war
andpeace,except
thatprimitivewars(or raids)aremorefrequent
andof
shorterduration.Nearly all primitive societiesseekto minimizeinternal vio-
lencebydeveloping
systems
of lawcalculated
to prevent
theapplication
of the
lex talionis,which permitsvindictiveretaliationby individualvictimsof
crime,from escalatingout of control. Nonetheless,
mostof thesesocieties
arewillingfromtimeto timeto resortto external
violentbehavior
for pur-
posestheyconsiderimportant.AndrewP.Vaydahaspointedout that war
amongprimitivesservesasa regulatingvariablefor the achievement
of several
different functions:

1. To removeinequalities
in thepossession
of, or access
to, certaineco-
nomicgoodsandresources
(land,camels,
horses,
water,hunting
grounds,etc.)throughredistribution;
2. Toregulate
suchdemographic variables
aspopulationsize,sexratios,
andagedistribution
(asa resultof war casualties),
obtaining new
sources
of foodandtakingwomenandotherscaptive;
3. Toregulate
relations
withothergroups(i.e.,to detercertaintypesof
undesirable
behaviorin thefutureby avenging
andpunishing
offenses
or wrongs committed); and
4. To regulate
psychological
variables
(anxiety,
tension,andhostility)
thatareadverse
to in-groupcohesion
by directingthemoutward.
Someanthropologists
stress
singularexplanatory
variables,
suchasthede-
sireto avengeinsultsor thedeterminationto protectthetribalreputation
against charges
of weaknessandcowardice
thatmayinviteattack.2° Vayda
re-
frainsfrominsisting
thathishypotheses
aboutprimitivewarcouldbeapplied to
warfarebetween civilized
states.
Theferocityof conictbetween neighboring
primitivescanbeattenuated
by commonreligiousbeliefs,by endogamy
(the
practice
of seeking
wivesfromothertribes,thereby
establishing
bloodties),by
imposingcertainlimitson warfare,by theconclusion
of peacetreatiesandthe
exchange of hostages,and occasionally evenby substitutingcold war (the
shouting
of epithetsandinsults)for physical
combat.However, Vaydaconcedes
thatsuchintercommunity tiesasintermarriage,
commerce, andbeliefsin com-
mon descentdo not constitutea guaranteeagainstthe outbreakof hostilities.
Accordingto Alvin andHeidiTofer,conictcanbetracedto whatthey
termthemassive changes thatperiodically
transformsocieties.
Writingabout
the generalcrisisof industrialismin 1970,the Toferspointedto the
dramatic changesthat accompaniedthe end of industrial civilization and
the dawnof a newpostindustrial era.22To describethe inherentdynamism
of sucha transition,theTofersusedthemetaphor of collidingwavesof his-
tory in whichcivilizations
clashwith eachother,unleashing powerfulconict-
ing crosscurrents.Theworld is in the midstof a deepening divisionamong
threedistinct,differing,andpotentiallyclashingcivilizations.Thewaves
270 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIESOF VIOLENTCONFLICT:INTERNATIONALWAR

described
bytheTofersinclude(FirstWave)agrarian societies,
theproduction
andwealthgeneration baseof whichis agricultural,
andthesocietalstructures
of whicharepremodern, with populationslivingat primitive,subsistence
lev-
els,andwith little or nochange fromhowtheirancestors lived;(SecondWave)
industria1age
civilization
basedon factoryproduction
resultingfrom the
IndustrialRevolution
andgivingriseto unprecedentedurbanization,
massedu-
cation,massmedia,anddramaticchanges in familyandothersocialstructures;
and(ThirdWave)
postindustrial
society
based
oninformationage
technologies
withaquickening
paceoftechnological
andcultural
change.
TheToferspoint
out thatFirstWavesocieties
provideagricultural
productsandminerals,
while
the SecondWavesectoris the sourceof cheaplabor and massproduction.The
ThirdWavenationsaredistinguished
bytheextentto whichtheysellinforma-
tion,engage
in innovation,andarethesourceof a broadening
rangeof ser-
vices,
including
militaryprotection,
suchasthatprovided
bytheUnitedStates
andotherhightechnations for KuwaitandSaudiArabiaduringthePersian
Gulf conict.
Although
ThirdWave
societies
will remain
dependent
onFirstandSecond
Wavesocietiesfor marketsand resources,Third Wavepartnerswill have a
greater
range
of interaction
witheachotherthanwithmembers
of theFirstor
the SecondWaves.As a result, the Tofers foreseerising tensionsbetween
Third WavecivilizationsandtheFirstandSecond Waves.Theypoint to the
destabilizing
conicts,includingwars,thatmarkedtheclashbetweenagrarian
andindustrialsocietiesastheIndustrialRevolution
unfoldedandspreadfrom
its pointof originto otherpartsof theworld.Theysuggestthatin everyin-
dustrializingcountrytherewereconicts,oftenviolent,between
Second Wave
industrialinterestsandFirstWavegroupssuchas landowners.
Millions of
peoplewerethrustintofactories
andsprawlingcitiesfromtheagrarianexis-
tencetheyandtheirforebearers
hadledforcenturies.
Thestrikes,
civildistur-
bances,nationalist
uprisings,
andwarssparked bythecollisionbetween the
agrarianandindustrial
wavescanbeexpectedto havetheircounterpart
in the
ThirdWaveera,andperhaps to beintensied
by theacceleratingpaceand
magnitudeof postindustrialchange.
Justastheclashbetweentherst twowaves produced achangein thecen-
terof gravityof worldpowerto theindustrialized
worldin EuropeandNorth
AmericaandawayfromtheOttomanEmpire,thelocusof globalpowerfor the
futurewill bedetermined
by the outcomeof theinformationrevolution.The
leading
ThirdWave
societies
will bethefuturemajorpowers,
justasthebasis
for a SecondWavegreatpowe&#39;r
statuswasdenedby industrialdevelopment.
The net effect,assertthe Tofers,will be to producea twenty-rst-century
globalsystemin whichthearena in whichfutureconictswill bewaged will be
shaped byfundamental differences
among thetypesof unitsin theirconnectiv-
ity witheachother,
in thespeedof change to whichtheyaresubjected, andin
theirrespective
interests,
includingsurvivalrequirements.Conictswill arise
fromincreasing economic gapsamong thethreewaves andfromthelikelyef-
fortsbytheThirdWaveto establish
globalhegemony,
asSecond
Wavesocieties
did with respectto premodernsocietiesin previouseras.
 OTHERINSIGHTSFROMTHEORISTSOF SOCIETY 271

In sum,accordingto theTofers,wearein themidstof historicchange

froma worldbased onagrarian andindustrial
societies to a systemthatin-
cludes,
asitsmostdynamic element,thepostindustrial,
information-ageThird
Wave.Theconictsof thefuturewill betheresultof effortsbystates
to posi-
tion themselvesin this emerging three-tieredsetting.The warsthat will be
fought,theTofersassert, will differfromthoseof the,past,asa resultof the
impactof information-age technologies. Suchtechnologies will dominatethe
digitizedbattleeld,while a multiplicityof transborder electronicnetworks
will create
newspatialrelationships
andconictdimensions.
Unlikeagrarian
states,Third Wavesocieties
will haveno needto acquirenewterritoriesor
evenasin the industrialSecondWave,to havedirect control over natural re-
sources.
Theirprincipalrequirement, in additionto energyandfood,will be
access
to knowledge that is convertible
to wealth.Specically,
thistranslates
into controlof databases
andtelecommunications
networks,
or cyberspace
together with accessto markets for informationbased services.

OTHER INSIGHTS FROM THEORISTS OF SOCIETY

Earlieranthropologists
andsociologistsformulateda greatmanyhypotheses
andpartialtheories
relatingto socialconict.Mostof these
hypotheses
and
theorieshavebeensuggested onlyin passing,withouteverbeingsubject
to
anythorough,systematic
development
andrigoroustesting.All that canbe
donehereisto present
in summary
formasample
of better-known
hypotheses
andtheories,someof whicharethe stockin-trade of so manyWritersthat
theyreallycannotproperlybeattributedto anyone.
1. Organized
andcollective
ghtingis distinctfromindividual,sporadic,
and spontaneous
actsof violence.The latter are antecedents
of llOl1ll-
cideandcivil disorder,
butnot of war. Foranthropologists
andsoci-
ologists,large-scale
conict andwar arisemoreout of socialstructures
andconditionsthantheydo out of biologicalurgesor psychological
states.
Warfare,saidMargaretMead,is a culturalinvention,not a bio-
logicalnecessity.
WilliamGraham
Sumner
argued
that war origi-
natesfrom a strugglebetweengroups,not betweenindividuals.
Bronislaw
Malinowskiheldthatwarisnotprimevalor biologically
de-
termined,and it makesits appearancelate in humanevolution.
Human beingsnever ght on an extensivescaleunder the direct
inuence
of an aggressive
impulse,Malinowski
declared,thereby
severing
the connection
between
psychological
pugnacityandcultur-
ally determinedghting. Most casesof violent action are seenas the
resultof purelyconventional,traditional,andideological
imperatives.
Malinowskifurtherstated,All typesof ghtingarecomplexcultural
responses duenotto anydirectdictates of animpulse,butto collective
formsof sentiment andvalue.28DavidBidneycriticizedMalinowski
for adheringtoorigidlyto theviewthatwarplayedno signicantpart
in theearlierstages
of humandevelopment. ForBidney,warcanbean
272 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT:
INTERNATIONAL
WAR

agent
ofcultural
change
andcanbring
about
signicant
alterations
in
socialstructure.
2. Discussion
of international
conictin the abstractlackscogency.
Social
scientists
shouldnotanalyze
thebehaviorof nations
without
reference
totheintervening
variable
ofculture,
warnMargaret Mead
andRhoda Metraux,
whociteasanexampletheimpossibility
ofun-
derstanding
conictin Lebanon
whileignoring
theroleof religious
communities.
3. Thebasic
attitudes
andvalues
of societies
aredeeply
embedded
in an
intricate
system
ofcultural
institutions
andprocesses.
Hence,
theycan-
notbeeasily
orquicklychanged.Clyde
Kluckhohnhasoffered
thisad-
viceto reformers:
Makehaste slowlyis usually
a goodmottofor
thosewhowishto instituteor direct
social
change.
Because
of the
enormoustenacity
of nonlogical
habits,
thehasty
attemptto alterin-
tensies
resistance
orevenproduces
reaction.31
4. In recent
decades,
manysocialpsychologists
andpoliticalscientist
have
sought
to minimize
themisleading
andpotentially
dangerou
consequences
of stereotyped
thinking
in aneraofmasscommun
ications,
sotheyhave
become
skeptical
,concerning
theconcept
of
national
character;
in contrast,anthropologists
aremoreinclined
to
attribute
acertain
validity
toit, provided
thatit ishandled
withappro-
-priate
care.32
5. Anthropologists
andsociologists
areforthemost
partsuspicious
of
&#39;psychopolitics
orpsychohistorythe
efforts
toexplain
policy
deci
sionsmade bysuch
leaders
asWilson,
Hitler,
Stalin,
deGaulle,orMao
Zhedong interms
ofchildhood
experiences
orpsychological
characte
istics.Theydonot,ofcourse,
deny
thatkeyindividuals
(asweindi-
catedintheprevious
chapter)
might
playanimportantpolitical
rolein
themaking ofcrucial
conict
decisions,
buttheyaredisposedtoex-
plain
those
decisions
interms
ofsocial
rather
than
psychologic
fac-
tors.(Although
psychohistory
hassometimes
been
severely
criticize
it continues
to haveits defenders.34)
6. Ethnocentrism,
theovervaluation
of ones
owngroupin compariso
withother
groups,
isvirtually
auniversal
phenomenon.
7. Therelative
persistence
ofcultural
patterns
does
notmean
thatnations
areincapable
ofundergoing
signicant
behavioralchanges
overtime
Many writers
have
called
attention
tothestriking
alteration
inthepo-
liticaloutlookandbehaviorof Germany
andJapan, andthesubstitu
tionof democraticconstitutional
systems
for dictatorial
andmilitarist
regimes
following
defeat
inWorld
WarII.These
extreme
cases
migh
prompt
ustoformulate
atrauma
theory
ofrapid,
fundamental
socia
change.
Weshall
see
inalaterchapter
thatit remains
difcult
todeter
mine
thedegree
towhichRussiahasbecome democratic
sincethecol-
lapse
ofSoviet
Communism
morethanadecade
ago.
 OTHER ENSIGHTSFROM THEORISTS OF SOCIETY 273

8. All throughhistory,from the time Archimedeswent to a mountaintop

near the seaand used a glassto focus the rays of the sun on the sails of
an enemyship, down to our own days of nuclearwarheads,laser
beams,and information-agewarfare, war and technologicalchange
havebeencloselyrelated.Preparationsfor war and wagingwar itself
bring science,technology,industry, and medicineinto cooperation
with governments for purposesof military researchand development,
which may have spin-off applications in nonmilitary dimensions.
Scholarshave shown how inventions from the canning of food and the
sewingmachinethroughchemicalsdown to jet engines,radar,nuclear
energy,rockets,electroniccommunications, andblood plasmareceived
their initial impetusfrom the military needsof the state.
. Someanthropologicalhypotheses may appearto be contradictorybut
actually are not. We are told, for example, that both differences and
similarities of peoples may lead to bitter conicts. Substantial differ-
encesof an ethnic, linguistic, religious, racial, cultural, or ideological
characterareeasilyperceivedandthuscangiveriseto animosityand a
senseof threat,especiallywhendifferentgroupsarephysicallycloseto
eachother,yet unequalin political and economicpower.Differences
that have beenpolitically muted or controlled for a long time within a
singlenationmayare up andgeneratepressures for separatismor au-
tonomy (e.g.,Quebecin Canada,the Scotsin the UnitedKingdom,the
Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium,the Basquesin Spain, and
AlbanianKosovarsin Serbia).37
On the other hand,it hasoften been
noted that the closer the parties are together in belief systems,the more
intense
a conictbetween
themis likelyto be.38
Thusconictis partic-
ularly intense when a group that was previously united undergoes
schismand both groupshenceforthclaim to be the the authenticheirs
to the tradition. Examples include Catholic and Protestant Christians,
Sunni and Shii Muslims, and Stalinists and Trotskyites.
10. Conict may be studied by referenceto the pattern of communications
betweenthe partiesand the languageemployedin the conict. As the
conict is developing,communicationbetweenthe partiesdeclinesand
intraparty communication(and cohesion)intensies.Maximum con-
ict intensitycoincides
with minimalcommunication
between
thepar-
ties and with intragroup propaganda of maximum hostility against the
enemy.Changesin patternsof communicationand propagandausu-
ally signal a change in conict intensity and a movement toward con-
ict resolution.Everyconict has its uniquestructure,arisingout of
the natureof the parties,the issuesat stake,the circumstances
in which
the conict is waged,and the particulardynamicaccordingto which it
develops.In analyzinganyspecicconict, a knowledgeof the particu-
lar features of that conict is just as important as, if not more impor-
tant than,generalized
knowledgeof conict processes.
 274 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

REVOLUTION AND WAR

Thephenomenon of revolution,quite separatefrom that of war, belongsprop-

erly to the study of the internal politics of states,and thus to the subeld of
comparativepolitics rather than to internationalrelations.In the late 1960s,
American social scientists, largely in responseto the Vietnam War, became
preoccupiedwith the problem of revolutionarywars of guerrilla insurgency
and national liberation in the Third World. Once nuclear deterrence had
greatly reducedthe likelihood of direct military hostilitiesamongthe major
powersandthosealignedwith oneof theprincipalrivals,it appearedthat mil-
itary strategists
hadshiftedtheirattentionto a differentdimension
of conict.
Such factors as nation building, alienation, rising socioeconomicexpectations,
the dislocatingeffectsof developmentand modernization,the breakdownof
traditional mechanismsof social integration, ideologicalpropaganda,and
communicationsmediaplayeda more importantpart in this dimensionthan
did advancedweaponstechnology.Becausethe SovietUnion was favorably
disposed
to supportdisputes
consideredto bejustwarsof nationalliberation,
whereasWesterngovernments usuallyfelt compelled
to supportincumbent
regimesin thosecountrieswheretheyhadpolitical, economic,and military in-
terests,severalof the gray-areawars in Asia,Africa, and Latin Americawere
drawn into the vortex of the Cold War betweenthe two superpowersand their
alliancesystems.Notableamongtheseweretheupheavalsin Laos,Cambodia,
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Mozambique,Angola,Algeria,theWesternSahara,Cyprus,Cuba,Nicaragua,
and El Salvador.The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
France,and the PeoplesRepublic of China at various times intervenedin
&#39;
some of theseand other so-called revolutionary insurgenciesby providing not
only political, diplomatic,and economicsupportbut alsomilitary assistance
in the form of advisers,training, equipment, weapons, and military forces.
Revolution is an old concept in social theory. Classical political writers
were intenselyinterestedin the problemsof cyclicalchange,efforts to over-
throw governments by violence,and the moral and political justificationsof
revolution. They usually attributed revolutionary pressuresto an intolerable
discrepancybetweenpeoplesdesiresand their perceivedsituation,leadingto
irreconcilable disagreementover how and by whom society ought to be politi-
cally organized.It is necessary
to distinguishbetweengenuinepolitical revolu-
tions and other phenomenathat are often calledby the samenamefor ex-
ample, the coup detat (including palace revolts by rival relatives of a
monarch,theillegalprolongation
of a leaders
termof office,militarycoups,
and other relativelysuddenseizuresof power by smallgroupsof high-status
individuals);39
variousformsof peasant,
urban,religious,and othershort-
lived uprisings; and political breaking away, known as secession(provincial,
colonial, ethnic, or religious). None of these need have the remotest connec-
tion with revolutionarychange,saysMark N. Hagopian,who denesrevolu-
tion as an acute,prolongedcrisisin oneor moreof the traditional systemsof
 REVOLUTION
ANDWAR 275

stratication
(class,
status,
orpower)
ofapolitical
community,
which involves
apurposive,
elite-directed
attempt
toabolish
ortoreconstruct
oneormoreof
saidsystems
bymeans ofanintensication
ofpolitical
power
andrecourse
to
violence. 40
Revolutions
areoftenconnected
in onewayoranother
withwars,
and
thusareof morethanpassing
interest
to international
theorists.
Anunder-
standing
ofrevolutionary
behavior
andoftheleaders
whomobilize
andgive
political
directiontocollective
frustration
andaggression
enablesusto differ-
entiate
between internal
revolution
andinternational
war.Moreover, revolu-
tionisoftenfraughtwithsignicant
implications
andconsequences
forthein-
ternational
system andthusprovides a salient
caseof linkagebetween
domestic
andforeign
politics.
Thiscertainly
holds
forthelargescale,
historic
truerevolutions,
suchastheFrench,
Bolshevik,
Chinese,
Cuban,
andIranian
revolutions.
Toalesser
extent,
thelinkage
applies
alsoto smaller-scale
revolu-
tionary
insurgencies
andguerrilla
warssuchastheaforementioned
(Laos,
Angola,
Nicaragua,
etc.),
which,
although
theyarise
outofinternal
causes,
of-
tenbecomeinternationalized
asaresult
ofindigenous
motives
(seeking
out-
side
support)
and/or
theinterests
ofexternal
states
inintervening.
According
to Stephen
M. Walt,studying
theinternational
effects
ofrevo-
lutionary
change
isanobvious
wayto compare
themerits
of systemic
and
unit-level
explanations
of statebehavior.
42Hecallsrevolutions
watershed
eventsin international
politics,inasmuch
astheycauseabruptshiftsin the
balance
ofpower,
place
alliance
commitments
andother
international
agree-
mentsin jeopardy,
andprovideinvitingopportunities
for otherstatesto im-
prove
theirpositions.43
Mostoftheliterature
onrevolutions,
helaments,
fo-
cuses
oneithertheircauses
or theirdomestic
consequences
(see
Note41),
whereas
astudyoftheforeign
policiesofrevolutionary
states
canshowhow
systemic
forcesmodifyrevolutionary
behavior
andhow unit-level
factors
(e.g.,
a revolutionary
regime)
maychangetheimpact
of normal
systemic
re-
straints
ontheaction
ofstates.44
Basing
hisndings
onastudyoftencases-
France (1789),
Mexico (1910),
Russia
(1917),
Turkey
(1919),
China(1949),
Cuba (1959),
Ethiopia
(1974),
Cambodia/Kampuchea
(1975),
Iran(1978),
andNicaragua (1979)45Walt
concludes
thatrevolutions
increase
thepres-
sures
thatleadtowar.Heregards
three
popular
explanations
asinadequate
eventhough
theymaybepartiallyvalidin particular
cases:
1. Revolutionary
regimes
cause
warbecause
theyinsist
onexporting
their
dogmatic,
radical,andaggressive
ideologies.
(Hecitesve of theten
cases
in whichpostrevolutionary
warswereinitiatedbyotherthanthe
revolutionarystates.)
2. Postrevolutionary
warsariseoutof thedomestic
political
situation,
whencontending
factions
exploitforeignwarsto advance
theirown
ends,
or therevolutionary
leaders
promote
foreign
conictto rally
popular
support,
justify
repressive
policies,
andprovide
ascapegoat
to
distract
fromcontinuing
domestic
ills.(Leaders
arejustaslikelyto
276 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIESOF VIOLENTCONFLICT:INTERNATIONALWAR

preferconsolidating
theirpowerby focusing
on domestic
problems
ratherthan by risking all in a foreignwar.)
3. Personality
traitsof revolutionary
leadersruthlessness,
arrogant
self-
confidence
tothepoint
ofrecklessness,
theneed
tomaintain
aheroic
im-
age,andsoonimpel themto provokeforeignconicts.(Waltrejects
the conceptof a revolutionary personalityasimprecise, inconsistent,
andextremelydifficultto relateeitherlogicallyor empirically
to thecon-
crete
foreign-policy
situations
thatareconducive
towarorpeace.)45
NeitherisWaltsatisfied
withanexplanation
based
ontheneorealist
balance-
of-power
theoryof Kenneth
N. Waltz,in whichsecurity
is thehighest
goalof
statesandthedistribution of powercapabilities
is theprimaryexplanatory
vari-
able.Because revolutions
mayalterthebalance of power,theycreateopportuni-
tiesfor eithertherevolutionary
regimesor otherstates
to improvetheirownpo-
sitions.47
Waltdemurs, arguingthatstates
donotrushto warmerelybecause the
balance
of powerhaschanged;
theymustalsoexpect
thatrushing
to warwill
makethemmoresecure.Walt abandonsbalanceof-power
theoryin favor of a
balanceof-threat
theory,in whichthreatis a matterof bothoffensive
powerand
intention.

In additionto changing
theoverallbalanceof powerandmakingit moredifcult
for states
to measure
it accurately,
revolutionsalsoreduce
eachsides
abilityto as-
sessthe othersintentionswith condence.Indeed,revolutionsencourageboth
sidesto believethat the others intentions are even more hostile than they
are. . . . Eachsidethus fearsthat it is vulnerableto ideologicalchallenge,yet
each
alsotends
to believe
thatitsopponents
arevulnerable
aswell.. . .43
Althoughbalance-of-power
theoryemphasizes
theimportance
of security,
it
is nottheaggregate
balanceof powerthatdrivesstates
to war.Rather,
it is each
sidesperception
of threat.Theseperceptionsarisebothfromsystems-leveland
unit-levelfactors.Revolutionsalterthe balanceof threatsby changingthe distrib-
utionof power,by increasing
perceptions
of hostility,andby increasing
percep-
tions of an offensiveadvantage.The problemis exacerbatedby uncertaintyre-
garding
each
ofthese
factors
andbytheotherdynamics
thatencourage
bothsides
to viewtheotherasespecially
hostileanddangerous.
WhereasWalt treatsthe relationshipbetweenrevolution and war as ex-
plicable
withintherealistframework,
HarveyStarrsuggests
thatsucha rela-
tionshipcastsdoubtontherealistassumption of Kenneth
N. Waltzthatinter-
nationalsystemicbehavioris ratherindependent of what happenswithin
states.In Starrsview,theearlierwritingsof RummelandTanteron the sys-
tematicrelationshipsbetween internalandexternalconictlackedtheoretical
specication,andtheiraws in logicandresearch designpertaining
to case
selection
andtimeperiods
coveredled
to problems
of validityandfailedto
demonstrate
the connection
betweeninternaland externalconict.5°Starr,
however,seemsto agreeessentiallywith Walt in this passage:
Wemustfirst differentiatebetweenthewaysin whichrevolutioncouldleadto war
andthewaysin whichwarcouldleadto revolution.
Lookingat revolution-to-war,
two basicrelationships
emergeinwhatwaysrevolution
wouldleada stateto at-
 THEINTERNATIONALIZATION
OFINTERNAL
WAR 277
tack
another,
orinwhatwaysrevolution
wouldmake
astate anattractive
targe
foranother
state.
War-to-revolution
maybebased
upon warasanagent of
change,
asafactor
inthegrowth
ofdomestic
discontent
. . .intheweakenin
of
government
legitimacy
and/or
strength,
or. . . inthechangingresource
baseof
opposition
groups.
Whether
awariswonorlostmust alsobefactored
intothe
war-to-revolution
relationship.
Starr
cites
George
Tsebeliss
notion
thatdecision
makersplaymultipl
games
inmultiple
arenas,
where
anyoftheactors
moves
hasconsequen
inallarenas
andwhere
anoptimal
alternative
inonearena
(03:
game)
will
notnecessarily
beoptimal
withrespect
to theentire
network«of
arenas
in
whichtheactor
isinvolved.52
ToputStarrstheoryassimply
aspossibl
Governments
require
resources
tosurvive
andremain viable
inthefaceofin-
ternal
opposition
andexternal
threat;
leaders
cantrytoextract
theneeded
re-
sources
fromeither
domestic
orforeign
sources;
thus
they
must
engage
ina
two-level
game,
estimating
internalversusexternalrisksandinternal
versus
external
defense
capabilities.
Starrnotes
thatbothKarlW.Deutschs inte-
gration
theory
(seeChapter
10)andNazliChoucri andRobert Northsinter-
national
lateral-pressure
theory (treated
laterin thischapter)indicate
that
governments
findthemselves
inaconstant
quest
forresources
andthatmany
other
scholars
inrecent
decades
havefocused
onthissearch
forresources.
Lateral-pressure
processes
playasignicant
partinthetheories
ofhegemon
warofGilpin
andofpower
transition
(ordifferential
ratesinthegrowth
of
nations
power)
ofA.F.K.Organski
andJacek
Kugler
(both
ofwhich
aredis-
cussed
later
inthischapter).
Harvey
Starr
adds
thatrevolution
canalso
pro-
duce
asignicant
effect
ondifferential
rates
ofpowergrowth
ordecline,
and
heconcurs
withStephen
Walts
complaint
thatthisphenomenon
hasnotre-
ceived
theexplicitrecognition
it deserves
in thewarliterature.

THEINTERNATIONALIZATION
OFINTERNAL
WAR
AND LOW~INTENSITYCONFLICT
Innearly
every
historical
age,theexistence
ofrevolutionary
conditions
within
states
hasledtointervention
bystrong
foreign
powers.56
Weaker
revolution-
aryforces
seek
toaugment
theirchances
forsuccess
byinviting
outside
aid,
usually
fromrevolutionary
or expansionist
powers.
Several
consideration
helptodetermine
thelocation
ofrevolutionary
conict.Insurgents
aredis-
posed toestablish
basesinregions
witharecord
ofprevious
revolutionary
ac-
tivityorsentiment.
Theywanteconomic
self-sufciency
andaccess
tomajor
political
targets.
They areanxious
tosecure
abaseinzonesofweak
political
control,
noteasily
accessible
to andpenetrable
bygovernment
forces.
Hence
theyareattracted
toprovinces
notserved
efciently
byroad,
rail,andair
transport
andtoterrain
that,although
lending
cover
tosmall
guerrilla
bands,
proves
hostile
tothemovement
oflarger
andmorecumbersome
conventional
military
forces:
mountains,
jungles,
forests,
riverdeltas,
swamplands,
and
deserts.
Notonlyphysical
geography
butalso
political
geography
enters
the
278 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT.
INTERNATIONAL
WAR

picture.
Whenever
possible,
insurgents
usually
ndit advantageous
toestab-
lishheadquarters,
training
camps,
andsupplyroutes
closeto or across
the
borders
of friendly
or neutral
countries.
Theguerrillas
maythenseek legal
sanctuary
orpolitical
haven
when
subjected
tohotpursuit,
thuscompelling
incumbent
government
forces
toincurinternational
censure
if theycarrytheir
punitive
action
tothearea
ofretreat.
Moreover,
borderlands
arefrequently
zones
of ethnic
heterogeneity
anddiversity
of political
loyalties,
factors
that
revolutionaries
mayndhelpful.
Logistical
considerationsalways
loomlarge.
Sources
androutesof foreignsupplyareextremely
important
factorsin the
politicalgeography
of guerrillarevolution.
During
theperiod
oftheColdWar,
thetwoprincipal
powers
committed
to a reversal
of theinternational
statusquostrongly
supported
nationallib-
eration
warfare(astheSoviet
Unioncalled it) or peopleswar (asthe
Chinese
called
it).These
modes
of indirect
conictwererelatively
safemeth-
odsofcarrying
ontheinternational
revolutionary
movement,
compared
with
themoredangerous
methods
of directconfrontation
withwhatwasunques-
tionably
a nuclearsuperior
West.If onesuperpower
intervened
in a Third
Worldinternalwar,the otherusuallyfelt sometemptation,
pressure,
or ten-
dency
todolikewise
insupport
oftheopposite
side.
Inthe1960s,theUnited
States,
theSoviet
Union,
andChinaintervened
at various
times
in Third
Worldinsurgencies,
particularly
in Asia.Inthe1970s
andsubsequently,
Asia
andAfricawerearenasof competitionamongthethreemajormilitarypow-
ers.It wasnotat all uncommon
to nd, in suchareas
asAngola,
Zimbabwe
(formerly
Rhodesia),
andEritrea,
twoorthreecompeting
revolutionary
orga-
nizations,
each
withadifferent
ethnic
orreligious
base,
alongwithincumbent
regimesall
supported
bydifferent
outside
major
powers,
or_
pairs
ofthem.
In
the1980s,
Afghanistan
andCentral
Americaconstituted
principal
areas
of
competitive
superpower
intervention.
Thesituation
changedsubstantially
af-
ter theendof theColdWar.Sincetheearly1990s,revolutionary
insurgencies
havedeclined,
whileethnic-religious
conicts
andterrorist
activities
havein-
creased in number.
During
theperiod
of superpower
confrontation,
virtually
every
conict
thatoccurred
withinthepurviewof news-gathering
agencies
became
anitem
inthecompetitive
environment
of_international
relations.
Revolutions
andin-
surgencies
produced
demonstrations
in distantforeigncountries
to support
onesideorprotest
against
theother.
Theworldcommunications
netwasfully
exploited
intheglobalization
oflocalized
conict,
asrevolutionary
andguer-
rillaorganizations
sought
to acquire
some
semblance
ofinternational
person-
alityandthustowinforeign
support
intheformsofmoney,arms,
diplomati
backing,popularsympathy,
andotherkindsof assistance.
Theprocess
by
whichthePalestineLiberation
Organization(PLO)achieved recognition
by
theUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblywasa classic
casein point.Manyother
internalconictsweredrawnintothevortexof worldpoliticswhentheybe-
cameitemsin thedecision-making
or deliberative
processes
of nationalmove-
ments,the UnitedNations,and suchregionalalliances
as NATO (e.g.,
Algeria),
theOrganization
of American
States
(e.g.,
El Salvador),
andthe
 THEINTERNATIONALIZATION
OFINTERNAL
WAR" 279

Organization
of AfricanUnity(e.g.,theWestern
Sahara).
Some
conictswere
internationalized
whenantistatus-quo
causes
were
taken
upbypolitical
par-
ties,churches,
peacegroups,
andethnic,
religious,
andideological
afliates.
Insome cases,
conictoutcomes
weredetermined
largely
byinternal
fac-
tors,suchasthemorale,
training,leadership,
andstrategic
andtacticaldoc-
trines
ofrevolutionary
andgovernmental
forces,
along
withtheirability
touse
themedia
andotherwise
inuence
elites
andmasses.
In othercases,
external
factors
such
aslargescale
armsaid,training
andadvice,
political
support,
and
economic
assistance
mayhavebeendecisive.
AsKarlW.Deutsch
observed
more
thanthree
decades
ago,
if outside
resources
constitute
themain
capabili
tiescommitted
tothestruggle
onbothsides,
thenit isappropriate
tospeak
of
warbyproxyan
international
conict
between
twoforeign
powers,
fought
outonthesoilofathirdcountry;
disguised
asconictoveraninternal
issue
of
thatcountry;
andusingthatcountrys
humanandnaturalresourcesandterri-
toryasmeans
forachieving
preponderantly
foreign
goals.Insuch
acase,
10-
calparties
totheconict
lose
thepower
ofinitiative
andcontrol
toacomplex
international
process
ofstrategic
planning,
diplomatic
bargaining
andnegoti-
ation,andpoliticalandmilitarydecision
making-aprocessin whichthelocal
partieswithintheconict-ridden nationmayplayonlya subordinate client
role.In the1970s,several
scholars began
to examine
thisnexusbetween the
internalandtheexternalcauses of revolutionary
conictin theThirdWorld.
Thisreected
arecognition
oftheincreasing
signicance
of state-suppor
and,in some
cases,
statesponsored
insurgency,
terrorism,
andotherformsof
lowintensity
conict.
Previous
studies
purporting
toidentify
thecauses
ofin-
ternal
warhademphasized
theimportance
ofindigenous
factors,
while
giving
onlyscantattention
to theimpactof forcesandinuences
fromoutside the
areaof conict.Whattendedto beoverlookedwasthedegreeto whichfor-
eignpowers
could
contribute
tothegrowth
andexpansion
ofrevolutionar
insurgent
andterroristmovements
throughtheprovision
of various
kindsof
military, political, and economicassistance.
BardONeill,MarkHagopian,Thomas Greene,andMostafa Rejai,
among
others,
raised
questions
about
thisoversight
inthescholarly
analysis
of
internalwar or lowintensity
conict.6°Theyargued
thatwhiletheinitial
causesor preconditions
of internalwarremainpredominantly
attributable
to
indigenous
political,
economic,
andsocial
developments,
animportant
factor
thatcouldcontribute
to thegrowthof insurgent
andterrorist
movements
to a
moreadvancedstageis thepresence
of assistance
fromgovernments
external
to theconict.In thelate1970sand1980s,theexaminationof externalfac-
torsproceeded in several
directions.
Thisincludedanassessment
of thestrat-
egyandtactics
oftheSovietUnionanditsallies
andsurrogates
astheyrelated
to thisformof conict.Forexample,
Stephen Hosmer andThomas Wolfe,
BrucePorter,
andJosephWhelanandMichael
Dixonsurveyed
Soviet
involve-
mentin lowintensity
conictsthroughout
theThirdWorldanddocumented
theways
inwhich
it hadevolved
andescalated.
While
noting
thatfromthein-
ception
of theSoviet
regime,
theCommunistPartyof theSoviet
Union(CPSU)
leadership
hadidentiedanalmostsymbiotic
relationship
between
itselfand
280 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT:
INTERNATIONAL
WAR

nationalliberationmovements
in theThirdWorld,theyattributedtheincrease
in boththelevelof support
andthenumber
of movements
receiving
assistance
to severalfactors, including
1. Militaryparitywith theUnitedStates;
2. Anenhanced
Soviet
capacity
toproject
power
andtosupply
arms
and
otherconicttechnology
wellbeyondits borders;
3.Thesharpening
ofactive
measures,
including
propaganda,
disinforma-
tion,agents
ofinuence,
international
fronts,
andrelated
instruments
of politicalandpsychological
warfare;
4. Thedeclining willingness
of theUnitedStates
to maintain
activesecu-
ritycommitments
intheThirdWorld,
asexemplied
byitswithdrawal
fromVietnam, andits subsequent
hesitancy,
perhapsdueto neo-
isolationist
tendencies,
to become
involved
in foreign
conicts;and
5. Anincreasing
number
of states
andpolitical
organizations
willingto
cooperate
withtheSoviet
Union forthepurposes
of fundamentall
transforming
thestructure
oftheinternational
system.
Somespecialists
concentratedonthespecific
political
andmilitaryinstru-
ments
usedbytheUSSR anditsallies
andsurrogates
toassist
revolutionary
in-
surgent
andterrorist
movements.
Forexample,
JohnDziak
andJohn
Collins
examinedtheparamilitary
roleplayed
bytheintelligence
andsecurity
services
of theSoviet
bloc.JohnCopper,Daniel
Papp,andW.ScottThompsonfo-
cused
onarmstransfers,
otherkindsofmilitaryassistance,
andforce-projection
capabilities.
Yetother
scholars
concentrated
ontheways
in which
propa-
ganda,
psychological
operations,
andpolitical
warfare
techniques
wereem-
ployed
bytheSoviet
blocaspartofitsoverall
strategy
foraiding
revolutionar
groups
withtactics
operationalized
and integrated
toadvance
thelegitimacy
of
movements
pursuing
revolutionary
warfare
strategies.
Decades
earlier,
Paul
Linebarger,
William
Daugherty,»
MorrisJanowitz,
DanielLerner,
Harold
Lasswell,
andJacques
Ellul,toname
themostprominent,
hadproduced
major
studies
onpolitical
andpsychological
warfare
asinstruments
ofstatecraft.
Whilethe1970ssawa markeddeclinein theattentionpaidby scholars
to po-
litical,
psychological,
andparamilitary
measures
astoolsofforeign
policy,
the
1980switnessed
a rekindling
of interest
in thetopic. Of special
interest
to
UriRaanan,
RoyGodson,
andRichard
Shultz
wastheroleofSoviet
allies
and
surrogates
inproviding
external
support
tointernal
war.57
They
argued
that
Sovietsurrogates
appeared
to bequitespecialized
in thetasksandmissions
theyundertook
andthatthedegree
ofMoscows
control
ofinuence
seemed
to
varywithanddepended
ontheideological,
political,
geographical,
andeco-
nomic nature of the client state itself.
The role of Westerncountries,particularlythe UnitedStates,in low-
intensity
conicts
intheThirdWorldlikewisereceived
considerable
scholarly
andpublic-policy
attention
duringthe1980s.68
However,
theliterature
has
beenmarkedbyconsiderable
disagreement
indeningtheparametersoflow-
intensity
conict.At minimum,specialists
suchasSamSarkesian,Stephen
Hosmer
andGeorge
Tanham,
andDavidDeanhaveargued
thatlowintensity
 THEINTERNATIONALIZATION
OFINTERNAL
WAR 281

conict,
asit relates
to U.S.foreign
andnational
security
policy,
includes
counterinsurgency,
insurgency
(resistance
movements),
counterterrorism,
con-
tingency
operations
(e.g.,
rescue,
raids,
anddemonstration),
andpeacekeep
ing.This
subject,
asit relates
topolicy
studies,
has
generated
alively
debate,
whichcanbeseen
bycontrasting
theworksof Sam
Sarkesian,
FrankBarnett
andcolleagues,
andRichardShultzwith thoseof MichaelKlareandPeter
Kornbluh,
D. Michael
Shafer,
andJohnPrados. Beyond these
broaderstudies
ofpolicy
andstrategy,
anextensive
literature
exists
oneach
ofthespecic
sub-
categories
of low-intensity
conict,includingseveral
casestudies.7°
DuringtheColdWar,revolutionary
insurgent
warfare
wasamong
the
mostprominent
formsof low-intensity
conict.Those
whoemployed
it com-
bined
ancient
guerrilla
tactics
withpolitical,
ideological,
andpsychologic
means
to seize
government
powerandtransform
politicalsystems.
Since
the
early1990s,
factions
andmovements
thatadopt
religion
andethnicity
astheir
ideological
basis
areemploying
insurgent
andother low-intensity
strategies
including
terrorism.
Thepace
ofethnic
andreligious
conict
begantopickup
inthelate1970s
andearly
1980s.71
However,
it hasescalated
intheaftermath
of theColdWarand,according
to several
specialists,
will continue
to dosoin
thecomingyears.Theseinternalconictsarea serioussourceof interna-
tionalinstability
todayanda causeofmuchoftheungovernability
thatnow
affectsanincreasing
numberof states,
manyofwhichcannolonger
contain
demands
forautonomy
frominternal
minorities.
Thegrowth
andspread
of
suchconictswithinstates,
theirseeming
abilityto leapnationalboundaries
in actsof terrorism,and the dangersof the escalation
of theseconicts
through
theproliferation
ofbothconventional
armsandweapons
ofmass
de-
struction
meanthatthreats
arisingfrom
ethnicandreligious
strifecannotbe
ignored.
It isclear
fromareview
ofpastandpresent
ethnic
andreligious
up-
heavals
thata greatdealremains
to belearned
aboutthenatureof theunder-
lyingcausesandwhat,if anything,
canbedone inresponse.
Anumber ofdifferentnonstate
actorsareadoptingthemethods
ofpoliti-
calviolenceassociated
withlow-intensity
strategies
andtactics.
Theyinclude
ethnicfactions,
various
kindsofreligious
radicals,
militias,
secessionists,
inter-
nationalcriminal
organizations,
andterrorists
andinsurgents.
Theyarehav-
ing,andundoubtedlywillcontinueto have,
anincreasingly
destabilizing
im-
pactonspecic
geographic
regions.
In fact,according
to DavidFromkin,
these
various
formsof low-intensity
conictmayresultin a testing
timeforthe
modernstatesystem.
. . . Theoverarching
issue,asthetwenty-rstcentury
maycometo seeit, will notbeonecause against another,or onepower
againstanother,
butorderversusanarchy.
73In otherwords,Fromkinfore-
seesagrowingglobalungovernabilityan
inabilityofgovernments to govern,
to providedomestic
security,
or to maintain
theintegrityof theirboundaries
andinstitutions.
Thisthreatanditseffects
willresult
in escalating
instability
in states
in various
regions
of theworldandin international
economic,
politi-
&#39;cal,
andsecurity
structures.
Thus,
low-intensity
conict
mayhave
a funda-
mentalimpacton theinternational
system
andits viabilityasweenterthe
twentyrst century.
282 MACROCOSMIC
TI-IEORIES
OF
VIOLENT
CONFLICT:
INTERNATIONA
WAR
Finally,
asduring
theCold
War, international
linkages
character
postCold
War low-intensity
conict.
Theselinkages
exist
both
between
states
andthevarious
nonstate
actors
noted
previously
andamongthese
nonstate
ac-
torsthemselves.
Thesurge
inethnic
conict
hasengendered
anincrease
inseces-
sionist
movements
andnationstate
disintegration.
Additionally,
state
support
forsecessionists
reveals
that
such
movements
have
access
tomore
outside
back-
ing
atthe
beginning
ofthe
twentyfirst
century
than
they
didinthepast.74
State
support
forreligious
movements
isalso
increasing.
The
riseoftransnatio
Islamic
radicalism
andthe
cooperation
between
Islamic
factions
and
states
isil-
lustrative.75
There
isalso
evidence
ofexpanding
ties
between
ethnic
and religious
groups
andorganized
crime.
Criminal
organizations
search
outopportuniti
in
themidst
ofethnic
conflict,
and
ethnonational
movements
likewise
findadvan-
tages
intheir
associations
with
organized
crime.
Ithas
become
increasingl
clear
that
ethnonationalist
and religious
groups
aretaking
advantage
ofinternatio
organized
crimetopurchase
arms,
share
information,
and
nanceoperation
Among the
bestknownofthese
groups
arethe
Sendero
Lurriinoso
(Shining
Path)inPeru andtheNational
Liberation
Army and
theRevolutionary
Armed
Forces
(FARC) inColombia.Another
case
inpoint
isHezbollah
inLebano
Since
themid1980s, ithasbecome
involved
indrug
trafcking
asawayofii-
nancingitsoperations.
TheHezbollah
provides
production
andtransshipm
protection
tocriminal
organizations
andcharges
fees
forfalse
document
used
bycouriers.
Asecond
example
isthe
Kurdish
Workers
Party
(PKK),
which
op-
erates
frombases
ineastern
Turkey
and
northern
Iraq.
ThePKK
has
links
to
Iran,
Iraq,
and
Syria
and
trains
inLebanons
Bekaa
Valley.
Italso
raises
funds
through
various
associations
with
criminal
organizations
and involveme
in
criminal
activities.77
Both
Hezbollah
andthePKK
have
challenged
existing
state
powerinLebanon
and
Turkey
and that
ofIsrael
insouthern
Lebanon.
Inshort,
notwithstanding
thedissolution
oftheSoviet
Unionandtheend
oftheColdWar,
thestudy
ofinternal
warand low-intensity
conictwithin
thetheory
andpractice
ofinternational
relations
willcontinue
tobeofimpor
tanceintheyears
ahead.
Itwill,however,
becastinaverydifferent
form,in
light
ofthefundamental
changesthat
theglobalsystem
isundergoing
inthe
early
twenty-first
century.
International
terrorism,
aformoflow-intensit
con-
ict,which
has
given
rise
toincreasing
concern
among
Western
governm
inthelasttwodecades,
istreated
atlength
inChapter
8.

POLITICAL SCIENCE ANDTHECAUSES OFWAR

Among political
scientists,
some canbefound
who arepartial
totheirown
single-factor
explanations
ofwar,butmost
are
likely
tobewary oftheor
thattrace
wars toonlyoneoverriding
cause,
whether
inner
biologica
and
psychological
urges,
theprotmotives
ofcapitalist
imperialists,
arms
racesor
alliances.
Recalling
thefateofearlier
predictions
thatthereplacem of
monarchies
byrepublics
wouldlead
toamore
peaceful
world,political
scie
tists
arecareful
about
postulating
aprecise
connection
between
theform
of
 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE CAUSES OF WAR 283

government
andthepropensity
to goto war.(Democratic
peace
theorywill be
treatedlater in this chapter.)Politicalscientistsarenot for the mostpart easily
impressedby the proposalsof thosewho, diagnosinga singlecauseof war,
prescribea singlepanacea
for it: universalsocialism,freetrade,universal
brotherhoodof goodwill,a radicalnewapproachto education,world govern-
ment, completedisarmament,maximum military preparedness, or standing
rm at all times. Each is woven into a multidimensional framework, and some
may be more importantthan othersas a meansof reducingthe likelihood of
specicwars.78
Quincy Wright, in his pioneeringand comprehensive surveyof the sub-
ject, stressedthe multiple causalityof war and warnedagainstsimplisticap-
proaches
to theproblem.79
In hismonumental
study,whichcannotadequately
be summarizedhere,Wright put forth a four-factormodel of the origins of
war, corresponding
to the levelsof technology,law,socialandpolitical organi-
zation, and cultural values. Karl W. Deutsch, in his preface to a reissue of
Wrightsclassicwork, wrote of theselevels,
Wheneverthereis a major changeat any levelcultureand values,political and
socialinstitutions,laws, or technologythe old adjustmentand control mecha-
nismsbecomestrainedand may breakdown. Any major psychologicaland cul-
tural, or major socialand political, or legal,or technologicalchangein the world
thus increases the risk of war, unlessit is balancedby compensatory political, le-
gal,cultural,andpsychological
adjustments.3°
ClydeEagleton
wrotea halfcenturyagoof theutility andfutility of war:
War is a meansfor achievingan end,a weaponwhich canbe usedfor goodor for
badpurposes. Someof thesepurposesfor whichwarhasbeenusedhavebeenac-
ceptedby humanityasworthwhileends;indeed,war performsfunctionswhich
areessential in anyhumansociety.It hasbeenusedto settledisputes,
to uphold
rights, to remedywrongs;and theseare surelyfunctionswhich must be
served.. . . Onemaysay,withoutexaggeration, that no morestupid,brutal,
wasteful,or unfairmethodcouldeverhavebeenimagined for suchpurposes,
but
this doesnot alter the situation.
Furtherinto thenuclearage,at theheightof theColdWar,MichaelHoward
summed
upthethinkingof mostprominent
realists:
Forceis anineluctable
ele-
mentin internationalrelations,not becauseof anyinherenttendencyon thepart
of man to useit, but because of its useexists.It thus hasto be deterred,con-
trolled,andif all elsefails,usedwith discrimination
andrestraint.
82
Nations resort to force to enhancetheir security by extending or preserv-
ing power,control,andinuenceovertheir environment, overtheterritory,
populations,governments, andresourcesof societies
with whichtheyarein
contact.In earliertimes,nationswereprimarilyconcerned aboutdisputes»
and
contestsof strengthwith neighbors that weregeographicallyproximateor
weremoreremoteyetreachable bymaritimeor overlandtransport.
In modern
times,developments in militaryandcommunications technologyandin inter-
nationaltrade,investment, and monetarymatters,havegraduallyforceda
diplomacythat wasuntil two centuries agoconnedlargelyto Europeto
284 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIESOF VIOLENTCONFLICT:INTERNATIONALWAR

become globalin outlook.Conventional

politicalscience,
basedon a knowl-
edgeof modernhistory,hascompiledan impressive inventoryof conscious
reasonswhy governments
havedecidedto go to war:
To gaindominionoverterritory
To enhancesecurity
To acquirewealthand/orprestige
Topreserve
(bydefending
or extending)
ethnic,cultural,andreligious
identity andvalues
Topreserve
or extenddynasticinterests
To weaken a foreign foe
To gainor hold a colonialempire
To spreada political ideology
Topreventsecession andnationaldissolution
or territorialloss
To intervene
in foreignconicts(whetherto honora treatyobligation,
support
a friendlygovernment,
overthrow
anunfriendly
one,aidin a
liberation struggle, etc.)
0 To maintain alliance credibility
To preserve
or restorea balanceof powerandto thwartthe hegemo-
nial aims of another power
Toprotecta vitaleconomicinterestabroad
Toupholdtheprincipleof freedomof theseas
Toll a powervacuum(beforesomeone elsedoes)
To ght a smallwarnowratherthana largeronelater,or a preventive
war thatcanbewonnowagainsta growingpowerthatwouldposea
greaterthreatlater
0 Tocarryoutreprisals
againstgovernments
for pastinjuriesinicted
0 To protectendangerednationals
0 To defendnationalhonor and avengea graveinsult
Eventhis list is not exhaustive.Thereare manytypesof wars: personal,
feudal,dynastic,
national,civil, revolutionary,
religious,ideological,
imperial-
istic,andanticolonial.
Therearealliancewars,localandgeneralwars,proxy
wars,limitedwars,andtotalwars.Themotivesfor whichpoliticalcommuni-
tiesgoto warchange
overtime.Fourhundred
years
ago,Europe
wastornby
a seriesof ferocious
warsoverreligiousissues. MostEuropeans todaywould
regard,such a casusbelliasunthinkable. Nonethelessthemixingof political
andreligiousissues canstill are up in virulentform,asin theUlsterconict,
thecivil warin Lebanon, thewar between IranandIraq,andtheconictsbe-
tweenSikhsandHindus,Sri LankanBuddhistSinhalese
andHindu Tamils,or
amongSerbs, Croats,andMuslimsin theformerYugoslavia.
Politicalscientists
generallyinsist,therefore,
that we cannotunderstand
thecausesof warexclusivelyin termsof biological,
psychological,or otherbe-
havioralfactors,but insteadwe mustalwaysreturnto the levelof political
analysis
to find outwhy a particulargovernment regardscertainforeigngov-
ernments as allies and others as adversaries.It is out of a matrix of political
 POLITICAL
SCIENCE
ANDTHECAUSES
OFWAR 285

communications-involving
politicians
anddiplomats,
thepublic,
thepress,
themilitary,
socioeconomic
elites,
special
interest
groups
intheforeign
policy-
making
process-that
governments
denetheirgoals,
interests,
policies,
and
strategies,
weighing
thelikelyconsequences
ofacting
ornotacting
in specic
situations,
andtheprospects
of success
or failurein invoking force.Thend-
ingsof thebehavioral
scientists
canserve
asvaluable illuminators
to ourun-
derstanding
ofthecauses
ofwar,provided
thatweplace
themin perspectiv
aspartialexplanatory
factors
withinthelargerinternational
politicalcontext
in whichthosewhowieldthepowerof decisionopteitherto goto waror to
refrain from it.83
Violentencounters
between
organizedpolitical
communities
mayhave
myriad
origins.
Theground,
sea,
orairforces
oftwoadversary
societies
might
suddenlyand spontaneously
nd themselves
involvedin hostileskirmishes
without
anauthoritative
political
decision
having
been
made
byeither
govern-
ment,or onegovernmentmight order a unit of its armedforcesto contrivea
military
confrontation
withaunitoftheadversarys
forces
merely
togauge
thepsychopolitical
reaction
withoutintending war.In aneraof advanced
mil-
itarytechnology,
manyanalysts worriedall throughtheColdWareraabout
thepossibility
of accidental
orunintentional
war,asif nuclear
warmightbe
triggered
automatically
byanincidentof technical
malfunction.Politicalsci-
entists
andothermacro-theorists
callattention
to thefactthat,sofar ashis-
toricalevidence
goes,
theinitiation
ofwarisamatter
ofconscious,
deliberate
choice,
notofdecisionless
outbreak.85 /
A number
of writerswhohavedweltontheconcept
of inadvertent
war
havefocused
onthecrisisofJuly1914asapowerful
example
of howinter-
lockingmilitarymobilizationschedules
(in that casewith the Schlieffen
Plan
of Germany
astheirlinchpin)
canhelptriggertheoutbreak
of war.Thelesson
oftendrawnwasthatin theageof nuclear
missiles,
preemptive
strikeor
launch-on-warning strategies
mightoverwhelm politicalleadersin timeof cri-
sis,leadto a lossof control,andprecipitate
anunintended war,onethatno
onewanted.MarcTrachtenberg rejects
therelevance of the1914casefor
thetheoretical
possibility
ofinadvertent
nuclear
war.
While
conceding
thatthe
mechanism of interlocking
mobilization
plansclearlyexisted,
hecontends
that
it cannotbeblamed asa cause
of WorldWarI, fortheprecise
reason
thatthe
prominentdecision
makersunderstood fullyin advancehowthesystem
workedandthatadecision
forpreemptivemobilization
wasreallyadecision
forwar.Mobilization
wasseen
astheinitialphaseofanoption
forwarunder-
takenwitheyes
wideopen.Afterreviewingtheempirical
evidence,
hedenies
thatEuropes
politicalleaders
wereignorant
of militarymatters,
ordered
mo-
bilization
light-heartedly,
andstumbled
blindlyandunwillingly
intowar.He
alsorejectstheexplanation
thatleaders
wereunderirresistible
pressure
toact
quickly,werenot reallyfreedecision
makers,andhadsurrendered
theircon-
trolofevents
tothemilitary.
Mostofthesignicant
political
andmilitary
de-
cisionmakers,
whiledreading
war,hadaccording
to Trachtenbergcon-
cludedthatwarwasinevitable
beforetheyorderedmobilization.87
286 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT.
INTERNATONAI.
WAR

THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF WAR

Aswesaw
inChapter
1,quantitative
analysis
isoften
associated
withabe-
havioral
rather
thanatraditional
orpostmodernist
approach
tointernational
theory.
Moreover,
realists
andneorealists
areoften
assumed
tobecommitted
tothetraditional
state-centric,
poweroriented
paradigm.
Such
categorizations
arenotentirely
accurate.
Neither
traditionalists
norbehavioralists,
neither
re-
alists
noridealists,
neither
deductive
norinductive
theorists
canclaim
amo-
nopoly
ofscientic
methodology.
Most
modern
scientific
studies
ofwar,
in-
cluding
thestatistical
analyses
conductedsincetheearly 1960s,
havebeen
related,
wittingly
ornot,directly
orindirectly,
positively
ornegatively,
tothe
dominantrealist
paradigmofananarchic
international
system.
Thetermanarchyinthiscontext
carries
noconnotationofchaos,
asit of-
tendoesinpopulardiscourse.
AsnotedinChapter 2,it simply
implies
that
thereisnointernational
political
authority
invested
withalegitimate
monop-
olyofforce
capable
ofenforcing
peace,
protecting
states
against
aggressio
andguaranteeing
thattheir
rights
willnotbeviolated.
The international
sys-
tem,
inshort,
isnotthesamekindofpolitical
systemasisthemodern,
effi-
cient,
sovereign
nationstate.
Thecollectivesecurity
experiment
undertake
through
theCovenant
oftheLeague
ofNations
was afailure:
themotto
ofthe
Three
Musketeers
(Oneforall,andallforone)could
notbeuniversalized
among
states.
Although
theUnited
Nations
hasbeen
more
successful
andhas
certainly
lastedmuchlonger
thantheLeague ofNations,
itsmixed
record
of
peacekeeping
and preventive
diplomacy over thepasthalfcentury,
despite
its
enhanced
rolesince
1989,
gives
states
littlereason
toexpectanyescape
froma
security
dilemma, which
continues
tocompel states
torelyonselfhelp
tode-
fendthemselves
andtheirvitalinterests
inadangerous world.
Thusforthetitleofhistext,RobertJ.Lieber
hasdrawnona linefrom
Thomas Hobbess Leviathan: Herebyit is manifest,
thatduringthetime
when
men livewithout
acommon power
tokeep
them inawe,theyareinthat
condition
whichiscalled
war.88
Since
WorldWarII,realists
andneorealist
have
notbeen
sopessimistically
Hobbesian
astothinkthatallstates,
oreven
allgreat
powers,
arenecessarily
disposed
atalltimes
toward
aggressive
expan-
sion.
Inanygiven
historical
age,it isprobable
thatanumber
ofgovernmen
prefer
topursue
peaceful
policies
andavoid
violent
conicts,
solong
asthose
thatmight
conceivably
posea threat
to themdolikewise.
Yetin every
era
sinceantiquityof
city-states,
empires,
kingdoms,andmodern nation-
statessome
organized
political
communities
haveperceived
anadvantage
of
gain
ingoing
towar,
andothers
have
perceived
threats
totheirsecurit
Threats
need
notbemilitary;
anation
mayreact
militarily
if avitaleconomic
interest
isjeopardized.
Theanticipations
ofgain
mayhavebeen
shrewdorun-
founded;thethreats
perceived
mayhave beenrealorimaginary.
Thefactre-
mains
thatwarshave
recurred
throughout
history.
Wars
canbringsuch
disas-
trousconsequences
thatthelikelihood
oreven
thepossibility
of credibl
futurethreatsto the securityof statesinducesmostgovernments-except
a
 THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF WAR 287

happyfew that feelremotefrom harmsway-to makeprudentpreparations

for war in peacetime.
Theperceptionof threat,therefore,becomes a matterof importanceto po-
litical scientists.
For onestateto perceiveanotherasa threat,it mustseethelat-
ter ashavingboth the capabilityand the intent to block goal attainmentor to
jeopardize
nationalsecurity.J. David Singer,for whomnationalsecurity
rather than abstractideologyconstitutedthe categoricalimperativein United
StatesandSovietforeignpolicyduringthe ColdWar,suggested that two powers
that find themselves
in a relationshipof rivalry or hostilitywill eachbeinclined
to interpreteachothersmilitary capabilityasevidence of military intent, and
he reducedthe perceptionof threat to the quasi-mathematical formula of
Estimated
capabilityX Estimated
intent.9°Singerhastened
to assertthat the
SovietUnion was more concernedover the British or Frenchnuclear capabilities
than was the United States,indicating that the mere possession
of nuclear
weapons
doesnot furnish,in the absence
of politicaldifferences
between
par-
ties,a basisfor apprehension.Nevertheless,
in the caseof two countrieswith a
history of conict, mutual suspicionand hostility,whenoneof them increases
its militarycapabilities
for whatit proclaimsto bea purelydefensive
or deter-
rentpurpose, theotheris likelyto perceive
suchanincreaseasexceedingthere-
quirementsof legitimatesecurity,thusreectingan aggressive
intent.
Raymond L. Garthoffwarnedagainstpossible
fallacies
in anyeffortto es-
timateandimputeintentions.
Amongcommonexamples of fallacious
reason-
ing, he citedthe following:
1. Becauseoverestimatingthe enemysintentionsmerely costs dollars,
whereasunderestimatingcancostlives,whenin doubt, it is bestto as-
sume the worst.
2. Because
it is impossibleto readintentionsaccurately,it is saferto esti-
matemeasurable military capabilitiesand assumean intentionto max-
imize those capabilities.
3. Assumethat the adversarys strategicperceptionsandwaysof thinking
are either the same as your own or necessarilyalways different.
(Garthoffadvisesthat both pitfalls shouldbe avoided.)
4. Assumethat the leadersof the adversarynationeithernevermeanwhat
theysayor always
meanwhattheysay.Bothassumptions areunfounded.
Estimatingintentions,
heconcluded, is difcult enoughwithoutallowingsuch
fallacies
astheforegoingto enterinto theprocess.
Throughout theperiodof theColdWar,mosttheorists whograppled with
the causesof war proceeded
from the realistpremisethat statescannotescape
fromthesecurity
dilemma.
Since
the1980s,a growingnumberof theorists
have
been dissatisedwith the realist paradigm.Thesetheoristshave sought to
demonstratethat theostensible
reasonswhy governments in thepasthaveopted
for war wereoftenat oddswith thepresuppositions
of therealistrational-actor
model.Theyhavehopedto contribute
towardtheemergence
of anewparadigm
in whichcooperation
amongincreasinglyinterdependent
statesbecomes
so
288 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT.
INTERNATIONAL
WAR

dominantoverconictthat,rst, theindustrially
advanced
powersand,eventu-
ally,allstates
willabjure
warinfavorofnonviolent,
mutually
constructive
com-
petition.
Intheremaining
parts
ofthischapter,
weexamineavariety
ofcontend-
ingapproachestothecauses-of-war
puzzle:
realist-neorealist
andneoliberal
traditionalist,
andquantitative-behavioralist.
Inourview,allcanqualify
assci-
entic.It is upto thereaderto weighthedifferent
theoriesandto decide
whether theoldparadigmwillsurvive,
givewaytoanewone, orbemerged ina
synthesis
theshape
ofwhichcannot
yetbediscerned.

THE CORRELATESOF WAR PROJECT

AND STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF WAR
Theage-old
quest
foranunderstanding
ofthecauses
ofwarhasculminated
in
thecollectionof a vastamountof quantitative
data.Thefirsttask,of course,
wasto compile
anaccurate
inventory
of warsin themodern
era.Notable
among
thepioneering
efforts
inthiseldduring
the1930s
were
theworks
of
PitirimA. Sorokin,
Quincy
Wright,andLewis
F.Richardson,although
Richardsons
research
didnotbecome wellknownuntilseveralyearsafterthe
Second
WorldWar.(Further
referencesto theworkof Sorokin,Wright,and
Richardson
aremadesubsequentlyin connection
withtherelationbetween
armaments
andwar,reactionprocesses, andcyclicaltheories
of conict.)
Sincethe19605,J.DavidSinger,
MelvinSmall,
andothershavebuiltonthe
earlier
studies,
rening
denitions,improving
thecollection
ofstatistical
data,
andconductingcontinuousresearch
onfactors
associated
withwarin the
Correlates
of War(COW)Project.Theclosing
quarter
of thetwentieth
cen-
turyhadwitnessed
aconsiderable
growth
ofinterest
in statistical
studies
of
war,building
onRichardsonswork,discussed inthischapter,
designed
tore-
latetheprobability
of warsoccurrence witharmsraces, alliances,
power
transitions,
theexpected
utilityof warin thedecision-making
processes
of
leaders
andgovernments,
andotherrelevant factors.
Upto thepresent,
the
statistical
methodologies
haveproduced
no startling
surprises,
andfewcon-
clusive
or unambiguous
results,
buttheyhavebrought
a certain
amount
of
scientic
precision
tothesubject
andhave
drawn
some
validandinsightfu
distinctions
amongfactors
that,in thepast,weresometimeslumped
together
uncritically
inthegeneral
explanationsoffered
byrealists.
Thestatistical
stud-
ieshavealsoraised
newquestions,
whichchallenge
neorealists
to probetheir
ownassumptionsmoredeeply
andcarefully
toreneandstrengthentheirthe-
ories.(Thisshould
notbetakento implyanadversarial
relationbetween
quantiersandneorealists;
many quantiersproceed
fromrealist
premises re-
gardingstatebehavior.)
Singer
andSmall
realized
thattherawdataavailable
to scholars
onthe
phenomenon
ofwarleftmuch
tobedesired.
Theybegan,
therefore,
bycom-
pilinganinventoryof informationonthefrequency,
magnitude,severity
andintensity
of internationalwarsin theperiodfromtheendof the
NapoleonicWars(1815) to 1945,subsequently
changing
theinitialdateto
 THECORRELATES
OFWARPROJECT
ANDSTATISTICAL
ANALYSES
OFWAR 289

1816andupdating
to 1965andthen1980.96
Theperiodcovered
appeared
to themto bemanageable
with respectto theavailabilityof reliablehistori-
calsources,
systemic
continuity,
anda sufciently
longtimespanto show
permutations
in the occurrence
of violence.It wasexpected
that otherre-
searchers
wouldbeableto taketheirdataasa convenient
pointof depar-
ture, and many did.
It shouldbemadeclearthatthecollection
of dataonwarsis nottheory
(i.e., explanation)but rather descriptionof the historicalevidenceon which
inductivetheorymustbebased.
Kenneth Waltz,a leadingdeductive
neorealist
theorizer,
hasarguedtrenchantly
that quantitative
analysis
in generalandthe
COW Projectin particularbased on the accumulationof statisticalinforma-
tionwill belikelyto leadto errorsof induction,not signicantnewknowl-
edge,unlessguidedby theory;withouttheory,onedoesnot knowwhatdata
to generateor howto testproperly.97JohnA. Vasquez, in anextensive
review
of theCOWndingsbyscholarswithinandoutside
theproject(including
not
onlySinger
andSmall,butalsoMichaelWallace,
BruceBueno deMesquita,
James
LeeRay,AlanNedZabrosky,
ZeevMaoz,RussellLeng,WayneFerris,
Randolph
Silverson,
Charles
Kegley,
JackLevy,ManusMidlarsky,
andoth-
ers),citescriticismsthat theprojecthasbeentoo inductiveandinsufciently
theoretical;
thatit hasfailedto offeranexplanation
of waror providerm
support
foraparticularsetof hypotheses
aboutwar;andthatitsndingshave
beencomplex, unclear,
andsometimes contradictory.
Whilenotdisagreeing
with Waltzthatwithoutsometheoretical
assumptions,
a research
analystdoes
notknowwhereto begin,Vasquez
defends
Singer
andSmallonthegrounds
that time andfundingconstraints
compelled
themto focuson suchcritical
variables
asalliances
andnational
capability,
bothof whichhavealways
been
deemedsignicant
byrealists.
Vasquez
sums upthedifferencebetween
Singer
and Waltz:

Singerdoesnotprofess
to knowwhatregularities
ofbehavior
pervade
worldpoli-
tics,andtherefore
hehasnothing
toexplain
untilhehasdocumented
theregulari-
tiesthatdoin factexist.Waltz,ontheotherhand,knowswhattheregularities
are
(indeed,
hemaynd themsomewhat
obvious),
andsees
hismainpurpose
asex-
plainingwhytheyoccur.. . . Aretheregularities
andlaws Waltzwantsto ex-
plainreallyknown,andaretheylaws,or, asSinger
wouldargue,merely
untested
propositions?
Cantheuseof thescienticmethodbringto lighthereto-
foreunknown
relationships?
If thescientic
studyof waris to bevindicated,
it
will haveto producea setof empiricalgeneralizations
for whichit hasadduced
newevidence
andwhich,atleastin some
cases,
reveal
relationships
previously
not
recognized.

Vasquez agreeswith Waltzat leastto theextentthatthequantitative studyof

war accumulates increasing
dataandbeginsto suggest empiricalgeneraliza-
tions,theneedfor a moreconscious theoreticalperspectivewill grow.
Onemuststartwith a cleardenitionof thephenomenon beinginvesti-
gated.Whatdowemeanby war? Vasquez is partialto HedleyBullsdeni-
tion: War«is organized
violence,carriedon by politicalunitsagainsteach
290 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: IN"ERNATlONAL WAR

other.1°° He nds it usefulbecause

it encompasses
all formsof collectivevio-
lence that are focusedand directed, not merely random, and it excludesnonvi-
olent conicts; it is formulated in a way that can be dealt with readily by po-
litical scientists,historians,anthropologists,sociologists,and others; and it
hasno biasedtheoreticalcontent.Vasqueznotesthat it is not limited speci-
cally to interstatewar, which is the objectof most international-relations
re-
search.He then focusesattention on the COW Project,which has provided
the mostthoroughand inuentialquantitativedataset on war.1°1The
COW Projectusedthe following preciseyet arbitrary operationaldenition:
An international war is a military conict waged between (or among) na-
tional entities, at least one of which is a state, which results in at least 1000
battledeathsof militarypersonnel.1°2
This,too,is freeof theoretical
precon-
ceptions,and it producesa data setthat can be usedto testhypotheses
based
on differenttheoretical
preconceptions.1°3
Wright had denedwars as all hostilitiesinvolvingmembersof the fam-
ily of nations,whetherinternational,civil, colonial or imperial, which were
recognized
asstatesof war in thelegalsense
or involved50,000troops.1°4
Richardson identied deadly quarrels only (including violent incidents that
werenonmilitary)accordingto the logarithmto the baseten of the total num-
ber of deaths.1°5Singerand Small, writes Vasquez,reviewedthe lists of
Wright and Richardsonbut eliminatedas nonwarsincidentsthat failed to
meetthe COW criteria becauseof the inadequatepolitical statusof the par-
ticipants or becausetherewere fewer than 1,000 battle deaths.Singerand
Smalldistinguishedbetweeninterstateand extrasystemic(imperialand colo-
nial) wars, and they collecteddata on both types.They found the data for
interstate wars more complete and accurate, becausethe Western imperial
powersdid not botherto keepbodycountsfor peoplesnotrecognizedasinde-
pendent members of the international diplomatic community. Moreover, any
war with fewer than 1,000 casualtieswas excluded. (Precisionin dening the
universeunderstudyrequiresstrict adherence
to rigid coding;the problemof
the numerical threshold would be the sameif they had selected500 as the cut-
off point.) Theycounteda total of 118 internationalwars between1816 and
1980-67 of theminterstate
and51 extrasystemic.1°6
Small and Singerfound that international war appearsto be neither wax-
ing nor waning, but that extrasystemicwars havenaturally declinedin fre-
quency toward the zero point, as colonial empireshave been liquidated.
Whether they focused on frequencies, magnitudes, severities, or intensities,
they did not nd appreciablymore or lesswar in any givenperiod; oncethey
took into accountthe expandingnumberof statesin the system,international
war did not appearto beon theriseor thedecline.1°7
Not surprisingly,
most
of the wars in the period after 1815 were fought by major or important mid-
dle powers.Largestnumbersof casualties,in descending
order,weresustained
by Russia, Germany, China, France, Japan, England, Austria-Hungary, Italy,
and Turkey.In about three quartersof the cases,statesinitiating wars were
victors, but this proved most valid for major power attacks on minor powers,
less so for minors versus minors, and not at all for major powers attacking
 ARMS RACES, ALLIANCES, AND WAR 291

major powers (whereinitiators won three and lost six wars).1°8For data
on geographicalproximity of statesand the occurrenceof war, seeChapter4,
pp. 172-178.
An alternative
setof datato that of the COWProjectwasdeveloped
by
Jack 5. Levy,who was interestedin working from a much longertime base,
backto 1495,andin conning his inventoryto great-powerwars,which have
been of chief importance for international relations:
They have generally been historys most destructive conicts and have had the
greatestimpacton the stabilityof the internationalsystem.For the mostpart, the
interactionof the GreatPowersdetermines the structureand evolutionof the sys-
tem andservesasthe basisfor mostof our theoriesof internationalpolitics.1°9
Greatpowersare denedas thosethat play major roleswith respecttosecu-
rity issues,possesshigh levels of capabilities (especiallymilitary), and receive
de facto recognitionof their statusby beingadmittedto major international
conferences and diplomaticactivitiesof principalplayersin the system.Levy
identies 14 such powers entitled to such status at one time or another in the
period 1495-1975.He countsonly warsfought betweenthe military forcesof
two or more great powers, involving at least 1,000 battle deaths, or an annual
averageof 1,000,amongthe powers.Levy excludedcivil, imperial,and colo-
nial wars (exceptfor the RussianCivil War, in which outsidepowersinter-
vened).° He counted64 wars that met his denitional termsfrom 1495 to
1975, the Korean War being the last. Under his criteria, the ArabIsraeli wars
of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973; the VietnamWar; the Iran-Iraq War; the
DesertStormPersianGulf War in 1991to reversethe Iraqi seizureof Kuwait;
the FalklandsWar of 1982; and the ethnicwars in the former Yugoslaviain
the 1990swould not qualify for the list becausethey did not involve great
powers ghting each other, even though the numbers of casualties in these
wars werehigh. Levysprincipal purposewas to castlight on the widely held
beliefthat the probabilityof war betweenthe superpowers wasdiminishingas
its potentialdestructivenessincreasedby examiningthe recordovernearlyve
centuries.Usinga combinationof frequencycountsand percentages, regres-
sion analysis,and rankordercorrelationanalysis,he found that war among
great powershas beendecliningsignicantly in frequencybut becomingin-
creasingly serious in extent, magnitude, severity, intensity, and concentration
in spaceand timein every dimension except duration, which has remained
relativelyconstant.111

ARMS RACES, ALLIANCES, AND WAR

During the period between the two world wars, virtually all the historians
who examined the origins of World War I cited among its chiefcausesmilitary
preparationsand the formation of alliances(discussed
laterin this chapter),
with other prominentcausesbeingnationalism,imperialisticrivalry, propa-
gandaandthe role of the press,andthe conditionof international
anarchy
292 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

(thatis,theabsence
of a mechanism
for settlinginterstate
disputes
peacefully).
Here we take up the questionof whetherthe competitiveacquisitionof arms
is more likely to escalateto war or to be conduciveto peacethrough deter-
rence.Theclassical
maximof theancientRomanwriterVegetius,
51&#39;
mspacem,
parabellum(If you wantpeace,preparefor war), hasalwaysbeena fa-
vorite of realists.
FrederickL. Schuman,noting that pacists havelong believedthat arms
leadto war anddisarmamentto peace,
wrote,In reality,thereverse
is more
nearlytrue: war machines
arereducedonlywhenpeaceseems probable,the
expectation
of conictleadsto competition
in armaments,
andarmaments
springfrom war andfrom the anticipationof war.112HansJ. Morgenthau
deliveredthistersedictum:Men do not ght becausetheyhavearms.They
havearmsbecause theydeemit necessary
to fight.113MichaelHowardhas
suggested thatweapons canbeusedfor essentially
four purposes:
to deteran
adversaryfrom resortingto war, to defendoneselfshoulddeterrencefail, to
wage aggressivewarfare, or to engagein political intimidation. As such,
weapons,
theimplements
of conict,areneutralinstruments
to beemployed
by the defenderor the aggressor.114
Michael D. Wallacehas calledthe evi-
dencecitedby the preparedness
schoolanecdotal andidiosyncratic,
andhe
hasarguedthatanarmsracebetweentwo statesis stronglyassociated
with es-
calationto full-scalehostilitieswhenthey areinvolvedin disputes.5

Richardsons Reaction Processes

Beforereviewingthedebateamongthe quantitative
theoristsduringthelast
quarter-century,
it is advisableto look at the work of the Englishphysicist-
mathematicianLewisFry Richardson,
whoseideaswereposthumously given
currencyamongAmericanpoliticalscientists
after1957.116
Usinglineardif-
ferentialequations,
Richardson
soughtto analyze thearmamentsacquisition
policies of two rival parties within the framework of a mutual stimulus-
responseor action-reactionmodel.117
DinaA. Zinneshaspointedout that Richardsons focuswasnot, strictly
speaking,a search
for thecauseof war,sincehedid not specicallyconsider
warsin hismodels,butmerelysoughtto describeprocessesthat precedeand
may producesomewe would say fewmodern wars.8 What Richardson
put forth wasa purelytheoreticalmodelof the way two rival statesinteractin
themilitary-expenditures
dimension.
CountryA is stimulated
by Bsarmsac-
cumulation,and what A doesby way of reactionservesas a further stimulus
to B, but eachcountryis constrainedby its own total amountof armsand the
effectsof anincrease of armaments on its owneconomy. Likeall purelytheo-
reticalmodels,it is a highlysimpliedonein whichtheonlytwo variables are
theuniquegeostrategic requirementsof eachparty,themilitarypreparedness
or vulnerabilityof alliedcountries,andthe*decision of the rivalsto pursue
initiative-aggressive
or reactive-defensive
policies.Accordingto Richardson,the
interactiveprocesscan be eitherstableor unstable.Nations,like individuals,
usually behavetoward others as others behave toward them. If both nations
 ARMSRACES,ALLIANCES,AND WAR 293

arexenophobicandmutuallyhostile,thereactioncoefcientwill begreater
thanone.Letusassume
that eachfeelssecureonlywith a 10percentmargin
of superiority over the other. The accumulation of 100 units of arms on one
side(A) will stimulatethe other (B) to accumulate110;this will provokeA to
aim at 121, and in turn B will insistupon 133, and so on, in an indenite es-
calation characteristicof an unstablesystemin which the acquisitionlines
move awayfrom the equilibriumpoint. Conversely, as two partiesattenuate
their hostility and turn toward increasedfriendlinessand cooperation,their
reactioncoefcientwill be lessthan one, they will de-escalate their ratesof
military expenditure,and their armsacquisitionlineswill convergetoward a
balanceof poWer.9
Zinnesmanifestsconsiderableadmirationfor the pioneeringresearchof
Richardson,yet concedes that his basicmodel is exceedinglynaivein its as-
sumptions.17°
Shejustifiesdevotingattentionto it on the groundsthat it
stimulatedthe efforts of many others to developextensions,modications,
and renementsof mathematicalarms-racemodelsandto apply Richardsons
interactionprocesses to other elds.121
Richardsons basicmodel,it shouldbestressed,
is morea purelytheoretical
constructthan a hypothesisthat canbeempiricallytestedin the complexlabo-
ratory of history.The modelhasbeencriticizedby Martin Patchenlzzon the
groundsthat it cannotexplainmorethan a smallportion of internationalbe-
havior. Some of Richardsons modications of his basic model fit the data for
the military expenditures of FranceandRussiaand of GermanyandAustriain
the periodbetween1909and 1914.His equationsarelessneatlyapplicableto
the periodprior to World War II, whenthe reluctanceof theWesterndemocra-
tic statesto modernizetheir militaryestablishmentsencouraged the anti-status-
quo dictatorshipsto increasetheir armamentrate andto becomemoreaggres-
sivein their foreignpolicies,ratherthan constrainingthem.
What the Richardsonmodeltells us is that if two rivals areengagedin an
unbridledandconstantlyescalatingarmsrace,thenthey areinteractingin this
onedimensionin a tension-increasing manner,and this may indicatethat they
will endup at war sooneror later unlessthey alter their coursebecausearms-
acquisitionpoliciesusually reect other basicdisagreements. His equations
cannotenableus to predictwhenthe tensionsbecomeso greatthat the break-
ingpointisreached.123
Eventhedatafromtheperiodpriorto WorldWarI do
not provethat the armsracecausedthat war, but only that it was one of the
severalcontributingfactors.
No simplifiedmathematicalmodelcan take into accountthe greatvari-
ety of factors that affect the courseof international relations and modify
action-reaction processes,perhaps leading one party to change more
rapidly than the other,or oneto misinterpretwhat the other is doing and to
react in a manner not in accordance with the model. This, of course, is a
shortcoming
not onlyof theRichardson
model,but alsoof all single-factor
explanations.Richardsonwas interestedonly in three arms racesbefore
1914, before 1939, and after 1945. Other writers (considered in a subse-
quent section)have examinedlarger numbersof arms races.Nor can we
294 MACROCOSMIC THEORKES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: lNTER.\1AT1ONALWAR

always measure arms races merely by reference to levels of military spend-

ing, even after correcting for economic fluctuations to obtain constant cur-
rency units over a period of time. A technological breakthrough might en-
able a country to enhanceits overall military capabilitiesat lower costs.
Conversely, it is quite conceivable, in a period of steady inflation and rising
costs, that a nations overall military capabilities would deteriorate despite
modestly rising budgets.

Later Studies of Arms Races and War

An arms race is not easyto dene. Certainly not every arms increasein every
dyad,or pair, of nationsconstitutesan armsrace.Theremust be somesort of
reaction processinvolving two states that are capable of harming each other.
An increase due to competitive pressure from a foreign rival is one thing,
whereas an increasethat results from purely domestic factors (for example, a
national policy of economic priming of the pump through the defensebudget,
an effort to placate a disgruntled military, or a strategy by an incumbent gov-
ernment to ward off oppositionparty criticism in an election campaign) is
quite another. Must the period of abnormal growth (however dened) meet a
minimum time requirement beyond the initial sharp acceleration?
Michael Wallace,using COW Projectdata (1816to 1965), and limiting
his denition to armamentscompetition betweenpowers of comparable capa-
bility, studied only great-power disputes that escalatedto war (that is, disputes
betweengreat powers or betweena great power and a minor power allied mil-
itarily with a greatpower).124Wallacesetashiscriteriaa 10-yearperiodand
anannualaverage bilateralgrowthrateof 10percent.125Othershaddifferent
criteria. Paul Diehl specied an annual military expenditure of 8 percent and a
minimumof threeyears.126
T. C. Smithwaswillingto consider
anyinteractive
increasein the quality or quantity of military equipment or personnel where
the competition lasted at least four years and involved palpable mutual hostil-
ity. (Obviously, differencesin denitional criteria can be expected to produce
different results.) A question arisesas to how one can measurethe intensity of
rivalry or hostility that enablesan arms raceto qualify. Must the two rival
governmentsmake clear in their public statementsthat they suspecteach
other, hate each other, and target each other as enemies?Rather inexplicably
and implausibly, T. C. Smith perceived an arms race between France and
Germany during 1961-1977, despite their joint membership in the Atlantic
Allianceandoft-avowed
rapprochement.127
Wallacewas primarily concernedwith determiningwhether arms races
leadto war or somehowcontributeto theonsetof war.He carefullyavoidedar-
guingthat military acquisitionsby themselves
arelikely to provokehostilities.
Someotherfactoror factorsmustleadnationsinto a disputeor confrontation
of sufcient severitythat the military dangerscreatedby the arms race are
transformed from chronic irritants into acute threats to national survival.123
In otherwords,hesawseriousdisputesastheoreticalpreconditionsto war.The
statisticalevidencehe gatheredwas rather impressive,
indicatingthat disputes
 ARMS RACES, ALLIANCES, AND WAR 295

precededby armsracesescalated to war in 23 out of 28 cases,while disputes

not precededby armsracesescalated to war only 3 out of 71 times;this repre-
senteda betterthan 91 percentconrmationof his hypothesis.129
Randolph M. Siversonand Paul F.Diehl casta shadowof doubt on Wallaces
ndings with the following observation:Determining whether or not arms races
increasethe likelihood of war is exceedinglydifcult unlessthe researcherknows
the probability,ceterisparibus,or escalationin the absence
of competition.130
They also askedwhether researchcan identify all the arms racesthat do not lead
to war, and they cited a study by Diehl and Kingston, which indicated that arms
competition does not increasethe likelihood that rival nations will becomein-
volvedin disputes.131
Theyalsocriticized
Wallace
for ignoringtheimpactof al-
liances on the diffusion of war. If nations are drawn into a war as a result of al-
liance ties, it is not appropriate to count such entries into war as caused by
previous arms buildups, eventhough the latter may not be irrelevant to alliance
andwar-entrydecisions.132
SiversonandDiehlsummarize
their extensive
review
of the pertinent literature by noting that the earlier absolutist position on when
arms racesescalateto war must be carefully qualied with regard to the type of
armsraceandothersurrounding
conditions
thatmaybedecisive.133
(Therelated
question of how and when arms competition can contribute toward the preven-
tion of war is examinedin the discussionof deterrencein Chapter 8.)

Studies of Alliances and War

No lessthan in the caseof military preparedness,political scientistshave been

dividedover the questionof whetheralliancesbetweenstatesare more likely
to contribute to peaceor to bring on war. Somewriters have argued that they
increasesecurityfearsand tensions,therebygeneratinghostility and exacer-
bating conicts; others View alliancesas having a stabilizing and war-deterring
effect. Certainly, alliancesare closely associatedwith wars, becausethey come
fully into play in wartime, but whether they can be credited with preventing
wars or blamed for causing them is harder to say.
Singerand Smallattemptedto correlatethe amountof war in the interna-
tional systemwith the number of alliancesin the system.Thus, they soughteto
determine whether alliance aggregation is a reliable predictor to the occur-
renceof war.Theybeganwith a theoreticalmodelthat might becharacterized
as the diplomaticequivalentof Adam Smithsinvisible hand, a mechanism
whereby the freedom of all nations to interact with each other as national in-
terests dictate would redound to the stability and advantage of the whole in-
ternational community. It would appear logical, then, that alliances, by reduc-
ing the interaction opportunitiesand freedom of choice of states,would
increasepolarizationandthechancesof war within the system.Underthis line
of reasoning,a highly polarizedsystemshouldproducea high incidenceof
war. This is essentiallythe hypothesistestedby Singerand Smallin a seriesof
bivariate correlations between several alliance indicators and the magnitude,
severity,and frequencyof war, allowingtime lagsof one,.»three,
and ve years
from the formation of the alliance to the onset of war. Over the whole period
296 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIESOF VIOLENTCONFLICTINTERNATIONALWAR

surveyed,
from 1815to 1945,theyfoundno signicantcorrelation.
However,
when they dividedthe period into two parts-nineteenthand twentiethcen-
turiestheyfoundtwocontrarypatterns.
Forthenineteenth
century,
thecorrela-
tionbetween gross-alliance
aggregation
andthefrequency,
magnitude,andsever-
ity of warwasstrongly
negative.
Forthetwentieth
century,
thesamecorrelation
wasevenmorestronglypositiveup to the endof WorldWar H.134As we shall
seelater,theadventof nuclearweaponsprovedto bea signicantwatershed.
Singerand Small,however,wereunable,on the basisof their data,to ex-
plainwhy alliances
appeared
to bemoresuccessful
in deterringwar or limit-
ing its magnitudein the nineteenthcenturythan in the rst half of the twenti-
eth century.Traditionalistshad long realizedthat there was a considerable
difference
betweeninternationalrelationsin post-Napoleonic
Europeandthe
subsequentcenturyof totalwar.JohnA. Vasquez clearlyrecognized
this:
In thenineteenth
century,
alliances
morefrequently
aimedto preventwarbetween
majorstatesby comingto anunderstandingabouthowto dealwith majorissues
. . . [or] to keepanywar that did occurlimited.This claimseemsto hold for the
two mostpeaceful periodsin thenineteenth
century-theConcertof Europeera
from 1816to 1848andtheBismarckian erafrom1871to 1895.. . . [Alliances]
did not poseanythreatto theexistingmajorstates,
sincetheyreecteda consen-
susanda setof understandingsamongmajor states. . . [Thus]thesealliancesdid
not giveriseto armsraces}-35

JackS.Levy,in hisstudyof great-power warsovertheperiod1495-1975

foundthat, apartfrom the nineteenth century(whichwasexceptional), the
majorityof allianceswerefollowedwithin ve yearsof their formationby
warsinvolvingat leastoneof theallies(butnot necessarily
all members of the
alliance).Duringthenineteenth century,no great-powerwarswereinitiated
withinthatve-yearperiod.135 CharlesW. Ostrom,Jr.,andFrancisW Hoole
foundin a similarveinthatallianceformationcorrelates
positivelywith anin-
creasedprobabilityof warwithin a three-year
period,afterwhichthedanger
of warsoccurrence
declines.137
Vasquez,
however,
hesitates
to regardal-
liances:ascauses of war.He citesLevysndingthatfromthesixteenth to the
twentiethcentury,only26-percent of wars,on average, werepreceded by an
allianceinvolvingoneof theparties.138 He alsonotesthat actorsoftenenter
into alliances
because theyanticipatethedangerof war dueto othercauses,
andthat whilestatesintendto increase theirrelativemilitarypowerby form-
ing an alliance,theyoftenfail to achievethepurposebecause theybringon
the creation of a counteralliance.139
Relyingon a studyby RandolphSiversonandJoelKing,both of whom
wereoutsidetheCOWProjectbut usedits data,Vasquez
agrees
that alliances
can act as a contagionmechanismfor the spreadand expansionof war. The
fewer,the alliances
within a system,the smallerthewars,andviceversa.14°
(Here,thedataof Siverson andKingdo little morethanconrmstatistically
what logic dictates.)Later work by BenjaminMost, HarveyStarr,and
RandolphSiverson identiedsharedgeographic bordersasa secondinterac-
tion opportunity,
whichcanrival alliancesascontributing
to thecontagion
ef-
 ARMS RACES, ALLIANCES, AND WAR 297

feetor spatialdiffusionof war.Theysuggest

that smallscale
warsmaybe
more likely to spreadthrough alliances.141Vasquez,who has conductedex-
tensivereviewsof the literature,suspects
that alliancesin generalare not con-
duciveto peace,but he is cautiousin ascribingcausalityto them:
Alliancesareprobablymoreresponsible
for the seve_rity,
magnitude,and duration
of war than for its onset. Sincethere is often an interval between the alliance and
the outbreakof war,it is a legitimateinferencethat alliancesdo not directlycause
war, but help to aggravatea situationthat makeswar more likely. They may do
thisin two ways:by promotingan atmosphere
thatpolarizes
thesystem
andby
encouraging
armsraces.142

Vasquezattachedimportanceto both armsracesand polarizationas fac-

tors relatedto the problem of alliancesand war. Referringto the work of
Nazli Choucri and Robert North on lateral pressures(discussed in the next
sectionof this chapter)and a later study by Wallace,
Vasquezarguesthat be-
tween 1903 and 1914,there was a dynamicinteractivepattern betweenal-
liancesand armsraces,as mutual perceptionsof threat fed on eachother.143
Concedingthat severalwriterson polarizationcameup with inconsistentnd-
ings, Vasquezwas partial to those of Wallace, who uncoveredcurvilinear rela-
tionshipsindicatingthat (1) warsof the greatestmagnitudeandseveritycorre-
late with systemsof maximum polarization (two blocs) and minimum
polarization(no blocs);(2) a moderateamountof war,or no war,is associated
with moderatepolarization (multipolarity); and (3) moderatecrosscutting
(links acrossblocs)reducesthe intensityof war, while very low and very high
crosscutting
linksincrease
it.144Vasquez
alsoconcurred
with thendingsof
BruceBuenode Mesquitaand Alan Ned Sabroskythat increasesin systemic
tightness(polarization)inducestepped-upmilitary preparationsandmakefor
wars of greatestmagnitude,severity,and duration.145
VasquezmakesWorld War I a classicmodelshowinghow alliancescanbe
an importantcontributortoward war.He is perhapson lessrm groundwhen
he relies on selectivequalitative literature and links the formation of NATO to
the outbreakof the KoreanWar as a casesupportingthe generalizationthat
alliances
arefollowedby war.146NATOwasintendedasan instrumentof
containmentin Europe,a meansof reassuringthe WestEuropeansthat peace
could bepreservedby a democraticalliancecapableof balancingSovietpower
and makingthe cost of any war too high for rational politics. Therewas no
war in the geographicareacoveredby NATO from its foundinguntil thecol-
lapseof the SovietUnion. It is importantto notethat statesdo not alwaysde-
cideto join alliancesexclusivelyor evenprimarily out of concernfor security.
Alliance choicesof states,especiallysmall states,may be determinedmore
by historical circumstances, and by political, cultural, ethnic affiliation, or
economicconsiderations,than by securityapprehensions.147 The formation
of the North Atlantic allianceillustratedthe point. The French,moreworried
about a resurgentGermanythan a warwearySovietUnion, would not spec-
ify the enemy.PortugalWasgeographicallyisolatedand not fearful about
security,but wasdrawninto the allianceasa longtimeally of Britain, because
298 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

the United Stateswanted an Azores air base143and becauseLisbon was inter-

estedin obtaining economicaid through OEEC under the Marshall Plan.
Sinceneutrality had not protected Belgium in 1914, or any of the Low
Countries in 1940, they were eager allies in 1949. As for the Scandinavian
countries,Denmarkand Norway enteredNATO, but Swedenmaintaineda
Western-oriented
neutralityasa quid pro quo for the Sovietenforced
neutral-
ity of Finland.149
Quantitative
studies,whichcorrelatean independent
vari-
able (alliances)with a dependentone (war), cannottake into accountother
factorsthat maysignicantlyaffectdecisionsto enteralliances,not to mention
alliancebehavior,cohesion,and willingnessto go to war after entry.
Vasquezseemscritical of the balance-of-power policy asa singlefactorex-
planation:There is no clearreasonwhy a balanceof power shouldproduce
peacein the nineteenthcentury,but war in the twentieth:A scientic explana-
tion that capturesthecausesof war shouldbefairly generalizable andnot shift
soradicallyfrom onecenturyto the next.15°This doesnot seemto be an ad-
equateformulationof the issue,for it appearsto equatethe balanceofpower
policy exclusivelywith allianceswhile ignoring other cultural, historical,so-
cial, and political factors(includingan intelligentdiplomacyof restraint)that
can make the policy work in one era, while their absenceor distortion con-
tributesto its failurein another.
Moreover,
it is too muchto speakof thepre-
World War I bipolar alliance situation as characteristic of the twentieth cen-
tury. The period betweenthe two world wars was not marked either by
balance-of-power
policiesor by analliancesystem
of thestatusquo
democra-
cies against the revisionist totalitarian or authoritarian states. For the second
half of the twentiethcentury,the situationwasin sharpcontrastwith the rst
half. Whereas most of the 16 members of NATO and seven members of the
WarsawTreatyOrganization(whichwasdissolvedin 1991),or their predeces-
sor states,had beenparticipantsin both world wars,no memberof eitheral-
liancesystem
became
involvedin a militaryconflictwith a memberof theop-
positeallianceduring the period of Cold War mutual deterrence.Moreover,
formerWarsawPactmembersrst receivedpartial admissionto NATO in the
form of the alliances
consultationprocedures
within the Partnership
for
Peace.By 1999,Poland,Hungary,and the CzechRepublichad beengranted
full membership.Vasquezhas producedin The War Puzzleone of the most
comprehensive andvaluablesurveys of thevoluminous literatureon thesub-
ject,buthescarcelymentionsthedeterrence of war,whichwasthepurpose of
the North Atlanticallianceand its counteralliance,
and which ultimately
provedto beits outcome overnearlyhalfa century,despiteprolonged andin-
tensearmscompetition,which nevertheless
waskept underpolitical restraint.

NATIONAL GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE

Writing on the relationshipbetweendomesticdevelopmentand war, Nazli
Choucriand RobertNorth contendthat the processes
of nationalgrowth
themselves
arelikelyto leadto expansion,
competition,
rivalry,conict,and
 NATIONALGROWTHAND INTERNATIONALVIOLENCE 299

violence.151
Selecting
WorldWarI asa testcase,
theyanalyzed
longrange
trendsoverthe periodfrom 1870to 1914.Theyappliedeconometric
tech-
niques
overtimeandacross
sixmajorpowers
(Britain,
France,
Germany,
Italy,
Russia,
andAustria-Hungary)
to a variety
of aggregate
data--demograph
economic,political,and militaryandinteractions
amongthosecountries.
ChoucriandNorthdidnotfocustheirattentiononsuchdiscreteeventsasthe
assassination
of the Archdukeor the Russiandecisionto mobilize,nor did
theyfocusonthepersonality
of keyleaders,
butrathertheyemphasized
the
dynamics of populationandtechnologicalgrowth,changes
in tradeandmili-
tary expenditures,
theconict of nationalinterests,
andpatternsof colonial
activity,allianceformation,andviolence behavior.
These arethevariables,
wroteChoucriandNorth,thatproduce changesin theinternational
system
conducive to crisisandwar.In theirview,theprobability
of warisnotsigni-
cantlyloweredby goodwillalone,by deterrence
strategy,
or by détenteand
partial arms limitations.152
ChoucriandNorthdevotea greatdealof effortto explaining their
methodology,
apologizing
forthelackof statistical
signicancein manyof the
correlations,
andpointing
outthedeciencies of datain thebook,whichthey
call a progress
reporton the initial phases
of theirresearch.153
Herewe are
principally
interested
in theexplanatory
theoryon thebasisof whichthey
proceed,
whichcanbesummarized
asfollows.Asnotedin Chapter4, Choucri
andNorthhypothesize thata growingpopulation
experiences
anincreasing
demand for basicresources.
As technology becomes
moreadvanced, the
greater
will bethekindsandquantityof resources
required
bythesociety.
If
thesedemandsare not met, the development of new capabilitieswill be
sought,andif thesecannotbeattainedwithinthenationsboundaries,lateral
pressureswill becreatedto attainthembeyond theboundaries.Lateralpres-
suremaybeexpressed throughcommercial activities,
thebuildingof navies
andmerchant eets,thedispatch of troopsintoforeignterritory,
theacquisi-
tion of colonialterritoryor foreignmarkets, theestablishment of military
bases
abroad,andin otherways.In a subsequent
reafrmationof theirbasic
hypothesis,
theauthorsaddedthe questfor investment
areasandsources of
cheaplabor;theextension
of religious,
educational,
andscienticactivities;
uses
of thecontinental
shelf,seabed,
andouterspace;
andinternational
migra-
tionsasmanifestations
of lateralpressures.154
A countryis not absolutely
de-
termined
to obtainsatisfaction
of its needs
beyond
its territory.It mightbe
contentwith lessand mind its own business,but most modernindustrialized
countriesmanifeststronglateralpressures
in someform.
Theexpansion
ofonecountrys
lateralpressure
maybeacquiesced
in orre-
sistedby othercountries. All lateralpressurecontainsa potentialfor interna-
tionalconict.Asinterests grow,it is usuallyassumedthattheyrequireprotec-
tion. Thismeansmilitaryexpenditures andanincreased senseof competition
or rivalry.Onecolonialpowerwaslikelyto feelthreatened eachtimeanother
acquired newterritory.Alliances areformedbothtoenhance nationalcapabili-
tiesandto moderate conictsof interestamongsomeparties,eventhough
thesealliances
mayarousethesuspicion of others,prompttheformationof a
300 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT; INTERNATIONAL WAR

countervailing coalition, and contribute to exacerbation of international con-

ict, astheprocess
of antagonizing
tendsto become
mutual.155
Thestudypar-
tially validates the Richardson reactionprocesshypothesis,but it also modies
the hypothesis in certain important respectsbecausethe data show that arms
increasesare sometimesbetter explained by domestic growth factors than by
international
competition.156
The most important nding to emerge from the study 1Sthat domestic
growth (measured
by populationdensityand per-capitanationalincome)is a
strongdeterminantof nationalexpansion,andthat both domesticgrowth and
national expansionare linked to military expenditures,alliances, and interna-
tional violence. Such a nding, in the View of Choucri and North, has omi-
nous implications for the conventional wisdom concerning the gap between
the strong, rich nations and the poor, weak nations. For a long time, a widely
shared assumption was that by narrowing this gap through technological and
economic growth, the probability of conict and war would be lessened.This
assumptionnow seemsdubious.157In the end, Choucri and North raise
somber questionsabout the ability of populous societies,equipped with highly
destructive military technology, to live together on a planet that now offers lit-
tle room for further lateral expansion and supposedly limited opportunities
for growth. If uninhibited growth and aggressivecompetition might lead to in-
ternational violence on a massivescale,Choucri and North ask, might not the
severe
curtailment
of growthleadjustassurelyto disaster?158
Nearlya decade
after publishing the book in which they set forth their lateralpressure expla-
nation of internationalconict, North and Choucrireiteratedthe hypothesis
in an assessmentof the economic and political factors that enter into the bar-
gaining and leverageof domestic and international actors. All forms of lateral
pressure,they -assert,are ultimately traceable to individual needs,wants, de-
sires,demands,and capabilities.The mix of leverages
that statesemploymay
lead to various outcomescooperation, competition, and conict, producing
peaceor war.159
Others have acceptedthe Choucri-North notion of lateral pressuresas
their point of departure in explaining international conict, Richard K.
Ashley,for example;assumes that humanbeingsact accordingto a dialectical
processto reducethe gap betweenwhat is and what oughtto be. Thus, they
interact with their environmentin an unendingcompetitionfor scarcere-
sources.Ashley stressesdemographic,technological,and economicfactors,
both within nations and in their interactions. He seemsto make economic ex-
pansion the crucial factor generatinginternational conict, as population
growth and technologicalprogressproduceever-mounting demandsfor satis-
faction,Whenthe expandingdemandsof countriesintersect,and cooperative
solutionscannotbe worked out, military conict may very well result.16°It
shouldbe noted,however,that in revisitingtheir theory,Choucri and North
observecautiously,
that lateralpressure
itself seldomtriggersa war.161It
can at timesleadto cooperation.The intersectionsmostlikely to turn violent
are thosewherefear,distrust,and hostility alreadyexist or whereone party
 POWER
ASDISTANCE
ANDPOWER
TRANSITION 301

interprets
theleveraging
activities
of another
asnegative,
threatening,
coer-
cive,or overtlyviolent.152
Theworkof Choucri
andNorth,of Ashley,
of MostandStarr,andof sev-
eralotherscholars
whohaveanalyzed
thewarproblem,
is useful,
in thatit
callsattention
to thefactthatstatepolicies
for peace andwararedetermined
notonlybywhatgoesonwithinthedomestic politicalsystems
butalsoasa
resultof interacting
withotherstates.
States
caninteract
withotherstates,
whether
friendlyor adversary,
withoutnecessarily
becoming
involved
in the
kindsof rigid actionandreactionprocesses
that Richardson
andsomeof his
mostorthodoxdisciples havein mindwhentheyspeakof armsraces.Arms
competition
is,in arealsense,
a formof bargaining
andleveragebuilding
that
neednotendin warandthatmightleadto a morestable
relationship
marked
byarelaxation
ofarms
competition
andatendency
toshiftthecompetition
to
other(say,economicor diplomatic)
foreign-policy
modes.Thedecision for
warcannot beentirely
isolated
andattributed
exclusively
to onestate,atleast
not in mostcases.
War is oftenthe culminationof a dyadicratherthan a
purelyunilateral
process.
It maybesomewhat
misleading,
therefore,
to inves-
tigatetheattributesof singlenation-states
in aneffortto discover
whichones
aremoreinherently aggressive or warpronethanothers.153

POWER AS DISTANCEAND POWER TRANSITION

Weturnnextto relativelevelsof power(orpowerasdistance
between
two ac-
tors)andto thedynamism
of shiftsin powerrelationships.
Fromthestand-
pointoftheory,
it isintriguing
toaskwhichismore
conducive
towarequal-
ity or inequalityof powerand whetherthe probabilityof war increases
or
decreases
asequality
isapproached.
At rstglance,
onemightdeem
it logical
to assumethatastworivalstatesmovetowardequality,
theyshouldbeable
to dealwith eachothermorefairlyandeven-handedly.
Certainly
oneof the
mostcommonlystatedassumptions underlyingUnitedStatesSovietrela-
tionsduringtheeraof thestrategic-arms
negotiations
between 1969andthe
late1980swasthatstrategicparitywasa prerequisite
of stablemutualdeter-
renceand of progressin armslimitation.The question,however,mustbe
probedcarefully.
A. F.K. Organski
wasamong therst to callattention
to thedanger
that
theprobability
of warmayincrease
duringa periodof powertransition.154
Perceptibleinequalityof powermakesit foolish for the weakersideto initiate
a war,whilethestrongersideneednotbeapprehensive.
Thisis borneoutby
theexperienceof IndiaandPakistan
followingtheBangladesh
Warof 1971.
Priorto that conict,thetwo subcontinentneighborslivedin analmostcon-
stantfearofand readiness forwar for a quarter-century.After Pakistans
population,territory,and resourcesweresubstantially reducedand India
testeda nuclear
explosive
device,Pakistans
resentment
ranhigh,but little
couldbedoneto alterthesituation,
andboththeprobability
andfearof an
302 MACROCOSMIC TI-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

Indo-PakistaniWar in the proximate future declinedmarkedly.155 One of

Organskisprincipal objections to the classicalbalance-of-powertheory
(which he agreedhad somevalidity in an earlierperiod)was that it presup-
posesa relativelystabledistribution of power amongunits and an ability of
prudent leadersof stateto act in time to compensate for disturbancesin the
balancefor example,by enteringan alliance.Technologypermitsthe occur-
renceof rapid shiftsof powerthat perhapscannotbe prevented.Balancesare
unstablebecause theyarenot durable.As powerparity is approached,two ri-
valsmay becomeincreasinglynervousaboutthe balanceand sensitiveto ue-
tuations within it, therebyincreasingthe dangerof war. As the challenger
overtakesthe erstwhileleader,its morerapid growth ratemay breedan excess
of selfcondenceand temptit to seekcompletevictory.166 The conversedan-
ger is that the dominantpower,viewing apprehensively the expandingcapa-
bilities of its rival, may go to war to defeat the latter while it can.
Inis L. Claudesuccinctlyexpressedthe ambiguityof the situation: If an
equilibriummeansthat eithersidemay lose,it alsomeansthat eithersidemay
win.167
MichaelP.Sullivanhassuggested
thattherelationship
between
two ri-
val powersapproachingequalitymay becurvilinear:
The moreequaltwo countriesare, the greaterthe probability of conict, except
that at somepoint theoppositeprocess,assuggested
by Claude,beginsto operate:
high equalitysties aggressive
tendencies
because
of thefty-fty chanceof losing.
Grossinequalitywould haveeitherlow probabilityof conict or low conict; the
greater the equality, however,the greater the chanceof conict and, if conict does
breakout, the greaterthe chanceof high levelsof conict. Whentwo powersare
exactlyequal,however,theprobabilityof conict dropsoff andif conict doesoc-
cur,it will below level.168

In our view,the processof makinga decisionto go to war cannotbe re-

ducedto a probabilitybasedon a merequantitativecomparisonof power be-
tween rivals. Much may depend on the attitude and outlook of the two states,
the natureof their political systems,the hostility or friendshipthat markstheir
relationship,the extentto which their vital interestsclash,the degreeto which
the dominantpower acceptsand accommodates its policiesto the expanding
powerof thechallenger,
andsoforth.159
A timid preponderant
powermight
loseits competitivespirit, whereasthe challenger,thoughgaining,1Sstill sub-
stantiallyweakerin termsof military power but strongerin ideology,morale,
and self-condence.Accommodationby the satised power may either ap-
peasethe dissatisedpower,makingit morepatientand cooperative,or serve
only to whet its appetiteand make it more aggressive. We cannot therefore
predictthe point at which the oppositeprocessbeginsto operate,nor cantwo
powersknow whentheyareexactlyequal.
Oneof the mostcontroversialaspectsof the debateaboutarmsracesand
escalationto war is the one attributing high dangerto power transition. As
wenotedearlier,A. F.K. Organskihaslongbeenidentiedwith thehypothe-
sisthat the probability of war increases
as the powergap narrows,especially
 CAPABILITY,RISK,EXPECTEDUTILITY,AND PROBABILITYOF WAR 303

asa rival revisionist

challenger
comescloserto equalizing
thecapabilities
of
the oncestrongerguardianof the statusquo. He continuedto adhereto this
viewin a bookcoauthored with jacekKugler,TheWarLedger.Theywrite
that war is caused
by differencesin ratesof growthamongthegreatpowers
and, of particular importance,the differencesin ratesbetweenthe dominant
nation and the challengerthat permit the latter to overtakethe former.17°
Thiswouldseemto conformto strategic
logic,sincetheleadingpowergrows
moreedgyandmaybe temptedto strikepreventively, while the secondary
power,awareof thistemptation,
mayinitiatewar to gaintheadvantage of a
surprise rst strike.
In a later retrospectiveanalysis,Kugler and Organskireafrmedtheir ba-
sicthesis.Power-transition
theory,theynoted,viewstheinternational
system
not asanarchicbutasa hierarchically
organizedorderin whichactorsaccept
their positionbasedon relativepowerdistribution.The power-transition
model postulatesa dominant nation, great powers,and a potential future
challenger.
Alliances
arestablewhenmostgreatpowersaresatisedandsup-
port the dominant nation. Most dissatised nations are weak middle or
smallerpowers.The United States,Japan,and Europeare alonestrong
enoughto maintainglobalstabilityagainstRussiaandChina.171 Instability
is likelyonlyduringperiodsof relativeparityamongpotentialcompetitors.
As
a dissatisedgreatnation approaches parity by growingin powermore
rapidlythanthedominantnation,instabilityincreases andsodoestheproba-
bility of conict.172
Thetheoryof KuglerandOrganskiis thusin sharpcon-
trast to that of Morgenthau,Kissinger,andWaltz,who hold out for a balance
of powerbased
ontheassumption
of powermaximization
asthegoalof states
and coalition diplomacy(whethervoluntaryasa matterof choiceor involun-
tary as a matter of necessity)to preventhegemony.Most theoriesrelatingto
the initiation of war run into paradoxes,dilemmas,and anomalieswhen it
comesto dealingwith nucleardeterrence, aswe showin Chapter8.

CAPABILITY, RISK, EXPECTED UTILITY,

AND PROBABILITY OF WAR
BruceBuenodeMesquitahastakenissuewith a basicassumptionof realpoli-
tik theorists-namely,that the probability of war involvingspecickey states
dependson the distribution of power amongthosestates.The realists,aswe
havenoted previously,are not entirely agreedamongthemselves concerning
powerdistributionandwar probability.Somethink that peaceis bestensured
when power is in equilibrium; others think that peaceis most likely when
thosestatesfavoringa peacefulstatusquo possess a preponderance
of power.
Buenode Mesquitacastsdoubt on both the Kissingerview that an equalbal-
anceof power is a preconditionof peaceand lowersthe probability of war
betweenthe two principalpowers173
and the hypothesis
of Organskiand
Kugler that the probability of war amongindividual key statesdecreases
as
304 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

the inequalityin the powerdistribution(or powerdistance)increases.174

Buenode Mesquitasimilarly dismissesthe comparablehypothesesof Zinnes
and colleaguesand Clauderelatingthe low probability of war to equalityor
inequalityin thedistributionof poweramongcoalitionsof keystates.175
Buenode Mesquitaconcedesthat the probability of achievingsuccess in
war is almost a certain function of relativepower capabilities.If power is
takenin its mostcomprehensive sense,this must be the case.The distribution
of power,however,whetherreal or perceived,is not the only determinantof
whetherpolitical decisionmakerschoosewar or peace.In any conict situa-
tion, individualdecisionmakerson both sidesmay assess differentlythe utility
(values)that attachto the possibleoutcomesof a givenwar (expanding,main-
taining, or losingpowerfor their state).Any givenprobability of success (ex-
pressedin rough percentages) may be sufcient for someleadersbut not for
others to undertake the risks of war.
Buenode Mesquitaassumesthat the probability of successin war cor-
relateshighly with the power of one nation or a coalition of nationsrelative
to that of the adversaryand assumesfurther that whetherleadersare risk-
acceptingor risk-averseis independentof the actuallyprevailingpower distri-
bution. Basedon thoseassumptions,he constructsnine hypotheticalinterna-
tional systemswith varyingdistributionsof strongand weak statesand vary-
ing risk-takingorientationsamongdecisionmakers.He analyzeseachof the
nine deductivemodels,covaryingcalculationsof the probability of success,
the actorsexpectedutility of war, and the actorsrisk-securitylevels.He also
reviewsSingersCOW Project,empiricalstudiesowing from it, and the theo-
reticaldebate(Deutsch
andSingervs.Waltz).175
He concludes
that no partic-
ular distribution of powerhasexclusiveclaim asa predictorof peaceor war,
eitherin theoryor in theempiricalrecordof theperiod18161965.177
In his investigations,somesystemsmarkedby powerpredominancesup-
port OrganskiandKugler;others,in which theprobabilityof war decreases as
the distributionof powerapproaches equality,lendweightto the Kissingerhy-
pothesis.In short, the distribution of power alone,without referenceto an-
other crucialvariablethe risk-takingpropensityof individual decisionmak-
ersis not systematically associated with the incidenceof war, and decision
makerswho presume,perhapstoo simplistically,that eithera power equilib-
rium or a powerpredominanceis essentialto peacemay be acting on false,
incomplete,
andpotentiallylethalpremises.178
He lamentsthe tendency
of
thosewho analyzewar probability to focusalmostexclusivelyon capability
differentialsandto neglectthe factor of risk-takingorientationamonggovern-
ing leaders,The principal exceptionto this tendency,he addssignicantly,is
to be found in strategicanalystsof deterrence, who pay a greatdealof atten-
tion to the unwillingnessof ruling elitesto run greatsecurityrisks of initiating
war in the nuclear age, but he fails to elaborate on this extremely important
exception.
In three subsequentarticles during the 1980s, Bueno de Mesquita (once in
collaborationwith David Lalman) continuedto develophis expected-utility
modelof internationalconict. Assumingthat theprobabilityof escalationof a
 CAPABILITY, RISK, EXPECTED UTILITY, AND PROBABILITY OF WAR 305

disputeincreases monotonicallywith leadersexpectationof gain in compari-

sonwith the expectedcostsof conict, herevisedhis earliertheoryanddiscov-
eredan improvedstatisticalability to discriminatebetweendisputesthat esca-
latedto warfareandthosethat did not in Europebetween1816and 1970.He
showedthat leaders,facedwith a decisionalproblemof whetherto challenge
an adversaryto altertheadversarys policies,estimatetherelativeutility of suc-
cessand failure. Leaderswho have adoptedforeign policiesthat leavethem
near the extremeof their possiblerangeof vulnerabilityare assumedto be
more willing to acceptrisks than those who have diminished their vulnerability
to externalthreats.Differencesin risk-takingpropensitiesare viewedas the
sourceof variationsin actorperceptions.179
BuenodeMesquitaandLalman
concludedthat a continuoustheory linking expected-utilityestimatesto con-
ict escalationprovidesa powerfultool for the futureanalysisof international
conict, both at the levelof individualdecisionmakersand at the levelof sys-
temicaction.18°
Morerecently,
T. V. Paulhasshownthatevenweakerpowers
will attackstrongeronesif they expectto succeedas a resultof a surpriseof-
fensive,
a reversion
to thedefense,
andsupportfromotherpowers.181
At this point, it may be usefulto go backto our discussionin Chapter1
about the differencebetweeninductiveand deductivetheory.Most of the sci-
entic studiesof war summarizedthus far havebeenof the inductive,empir-
ical, quantitative(statistical)variety. BruceBuenode Mesquitasexpected-
utility theory representsa deductive approach to the study of international
conict. He admits its limitations and distinguishes between formal mathe-
maticalmodelsand lessformal but moredetailedstudiesof particularevents.
Formal models are not intended to illuminate the rich details and texture of
events. Rather, they are designedto specify a simplied, ordered view of reality
that revealsinternallyconsistentand externallyusefulgeneralprinciples.Formal
models are not a substitute for rich information about the events studied. Rather,
theyaredesigned
to specifya simplied,orderedviewof reality.But theycancom-
plement the richnessof detail, providing more order and strengthening the ability
to generalize.
In doingso,formal modelsdo sacricedetailsfor breadthandspeci-
city for generality. When combined with expert knowledge, a powerful synergy
results in which the level of insight is often greater than can be gleaned from ex-
pert judgmentor formal modelsalone.182
(We refer again to Bueno de Mesquitas theory in Chapter 11 on decision mak-
ing.)
Expected-utilitytheory,Buenode Mesquitainsists,can accountfor be-
haviors that appear to be anomalous. He has shown that allies are more
likely to wage war (but not severewars) against one another than are ene-
mies.183
He attributesto greatpowersa highexpectation
of beingableto in-
uence the outcomeof conflictsamongsmallstates,as the United Stateshad
in Vietnam.

As the perceivedprobabilityof success in war, the utility for success

candecrease
and still satisfythecritical thresholdlevelof expectationat which oneis willing to
committroopsto combat.This meansthat greatpowershavea higherprobability
306 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

of ghting in wars whoseoutcomeis not of greatsignicanceto them than do

lesserpowers.Weakerpowerscannotrationallyengagein suchwars.Theyarelim-
ited to ghting in disputesin which they perceivetheir stakesto be quite large.4

The lessonhe drawsfrom this is that opponentsof the VietnamWar,instead

of arguingthat U.S.vital national interestswere not involved,should have
questioned]ohnsonsandthenNixonsperceivedprobabilityof success.135
JohnVasquez
agrees
with BuenodeMesquitathat, [d]espitelong-held
realistbeliefsto the contrary,the thrust of empiricalanalysisto datesuggests
thatcapabilityor differences
of powerareunrelated
to theonsetof warin any
signicant causalsense.Instead,it appearsthat capabilityand differencesin
power are relatedto the type of war that is fought and not to whetherthere
will bepeaceor war.185Vasquez
constructs
a typologyin whichheseparates
warsof rivalry from warsof opportunity.The formerare wagedbetween
equals,andaremoreorientedto thelogicof thebalance of powerandprey
to its deciencies,suchasmutualfear,suspicionandinsecurity,armsracesand
preventive
war.187
Warsof opportunityarefoughtbetween
unequals,
when
the strongersideperceives utility in startinga war.Thecontrastinglogic of the
two situationscan becomelinked if a weakstatemanagesto ally with one of
two strongrival powers.This is similar to T. V. Paulspoint mentionedearlier.
Wars of rivalry are more likely than wars of opportunity to becometotal.
Vasquez. also distinguishesbetweendyadicwars and the generalwars of the
great powers initiated in the expectationthat they would be limited, but
whichcouldnot be connedto the initial parties.He nds expectedutility
theorylessapplicable
to complexgeneralwarsthanto dyadicwars.Vasquez
questionssomeof the claimsmadefor the expectedutilitymodel. War can-
not beinitiated . . . just by a simpledecisionof the leader,because
other do-
mesticprerequisitefactorsmust be alreadyin placein the attitudesof leaders,
elites,and populace.188 He concurswith Wallaceand Buenode Mesquita
that alliance-making thatleadsto polarizationproduceswarsof thehighest
magnitude, severityandduration,althoughheis quickto addthatthe rea-
sonfor thisis notfully explained
in theliterature.189
In hisveryplausible
ex-
planationof the consequences of polarization,Vasquez showsconvincingly
that therearepointswherebehavioristsandtraditionalscholarscanfind com-
mon groundin realisticdeductivereasoning.19°
Vasquez himselfhasdone
muchin his effortsto bridgethe gap betweenquantitativeand qualitative
knowledgeaboutthe war phenomenon.
A greatdealof analysis
remainsto bedonebeforewecanfully understand
theinterrelationship
betweentheonsetof warandthemyriadfactorsthatmay
contributeto it: alliancesand armsraces,powertransitions,the utilitarian cal-
culationsof governmental
decisionmakers,cyclicalphenomena in theglobal
politicalandeconomicsystems, multipolarity,
bipolarity,andunipolarity,and
soforth.J. DavidSingeradmitsthat the reproducible
ndingsof theresearch
to datehardlypointin onecleardirectionbecause
politicalscientists
havenot
 CAPABILITY,
RISK,
EXPECTED
UTILITY,
ANDPROBABILITY
OFWAR 307
sufciently
specied
theirtheoretical
models
andmayhave
overlooked
anim-
portantvariablethatcouldresolve
apparent
anomalies.191
Thislatterobservation
highlights
aproblemthatpersistently
plagues
so-
cialscientists
whoemploy
statistical
correlations
andregression
analysis.
The
problem
wasidentied
in thelatenineteenth
century
bytheEnglish
mathe-
matician,
SirFrancis
Galton,
whoworked ingenetics,
psychometrics,
andan-
thropology.
Galton
warned
thatinanyefforttocorrelate
twovariables,
one
muststriveto makesurethattheyarenotbothdependent
ona thirdfactor
thatwould
make
thecorrelation
spurious.192
Instead,
bothvariables
maybe
skewed
byathirdfactorofwhichtheinvestigator
isunaware.
Themonumen
taldifculty
intheeldofinternational
relations,
asinallthesocial
science
isthatit isnever
possible
to isolate
a dependent
andanindependent
variable
in therealworldascompletelyasonecanisolate
themfor correlationin the
mind.Almostall statistical
correlations
arevulnerable
to criticismfor one
methodological
deciency
or another.
Investigators
mayusedifferent
data-
bases,
modifytheCOW Project
orLevydatabases
tosuitspecial
purposes
employ
different
classication
(denitional)
schemes,
andinterpret
ndings
differently.
Mostanalysts
arewellawareof thesedifculties.
Wedonotwishtoconvey
theimpression
thatthescientic
studyofwar
hasbeen
marching
offintoomany
divergent
directions
toproduce
anycoher-
enttheory.
Several
theorists,
bybuilding
onthepioneering
workofSorokin,
Richardson,
Wright,
SingerandSmall,
andLevy,
evenwhile
pursuing
distinc-
tive approaches,
havefoundsomepointsof intersection
with eachother.
Those
whostudy
theeffects
ofarms
races
donotignore
thepartplayed
byal-
liances
andshared
borders
in theinitiationof war.Theorists
whodealwith
thediffusion
of warthrough
theinteraction
opportunity
of alliances
and
shared
borders
realize
thatwhen
allies
andneighbors
refrain
fromentering
anongoing
war,thismayhaveto beexplained
byreference
totheexpected-
utilitycalculations
ofgovernmental
decision
makers.
Weshow
other
points
of
intersection
in theremaining
portionsof thischapter,
whicharedevoted
to
cyclical
andlong-cycle
theories
oftheoccurrence
ofwar,andtheincreasing
impressive
hypothesis
thatdemocratic
states
donotgotowarwitheach
other.
Analysts
areundermounting
internal
compulsion
andexternal
pressure
to
seek
linkages
between
theirownandother
theories
because
theyshare
agrow-
ingrealization
thatwaris a phenomenon
of multiple
causes,
notsingle
fac-
tors.Yetat thesametime,theyareawarethatpowerfultheoriesdo not liein
thecompilation
ofever-longer
listsofpossible
causes,
butrather
inexplana-
torytheoriesthatareparsimoniousthat is,simple,
readilycomprehensib
andcapable ofbeingapplied
toandveried inabroadrange ofcases.
Wecan-
notexpect,however,toformulate
forthecomplex social
universe
general
laws
thatoperatewiththeprecision
andcertainty ofphysical
lawsbecause,
aswe
notedin Chapter1,socialphenomena aremoredependent upondescription
in linguistic
symbols thatarelessaccurateandmoreambiguous thanthe
mathematicalsymbolsinwhichphysicallawscanbeexpressed.
308 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENTCONFLICT:
INTERNATIONAL
WAR

CYCLICAL AND LONG~CYCLETHEORIES OF WAR

Effortsto determinewhetherthereis a war-and-peace
cyclein the international
system
havebeen
made
since
themid-1930s
byseveral
analysts:
PitirimA.
Sorokin,
QuincyWright,LewisF.Richardson,ArnoldToynbee,J.DavidSinger
andMelvinSmall,Gaston Bouthoul,JacquesEllul,AlecL. Mace,Geoffrey
Blainey,
JackLevy,RobertGilpin,Immanuel Wallerstein,
GeorgeModelski,
WilliamR. Thompson,
Joshua Goldstein,LoisW.Sayrs,EdwardManseld,
andothers.
Theimplication
of allcyclical
theories
isthatwarsinevitably
occur
atperiodic
intervals,
whicharemoreor lessregular,
or atirregular
intervals
whenseveralclearlyidentiable,
contributing
conditions
(necessary
andsuf-
cient)converge.
Whilea fewof thestudies
conducted
thusfaragree
witheach
otherin limitedrespects,
mostof themhaveproduced
widelyvaryingoutcomes
because
theyhaveemployed different
databases(including
different
denitions
of war),different
timeperiods,
anddifferent
waysof interpretingtheresults.
Thecyclical
patterns
forwhichevidence
hasbeen
perceived
range
in length
from20years
to twocenturies.
Sorokin
counted
862Europeanwarsin thepe-
riod11001925, anaverage
of morethanoneperyear!193
Richardson,who
lumpedmajorinternational
anddomestic
violence
together,
identied
317inci~
dentsbetween
1820and1949.194
(These
totalswerecomparable
to thoselater
compiled
by Singer
andSmall,whodiscovered
367suchincidents
between
1815and1945.)195Richardsonwondered whetherthecyclemightcorrespond
to thetimeneeded
for a newgeneration
to forgetthesufferingandcostof the
previous
war,butneither
henorSorokin
could
ever
discern
much
ofapattern.
QuincyWright,whoestimated
thattherewereabout200warsbetween1480
and1941,concluded
thatmajorwarsarefollowed
byperiods
of peace
lasting
about50years.196
ArnoldToynbee foundwhatappeared to himto bea generalcycleof war
andpeace, lastingon the averagea little morethan100years.Whereas
Richardsonhadsuggested thattheimmunity to warmighttendto wearoff in
twodecades or sofollowinga bloodywar,Toynbee morehopefullythought
thatterriblycostlywarsbredpeace settlements (Westphalia,
1648;Utrecht,
1713;Vienna, 1815;Versailles,
1919)thatwouldendure forfairlylongperiods
among theleading powersexcept for short,minorwarssuchastheCrimean
andFranco-Prussian
duringthebenecent
Concertof Europebetween
thepro-
tracted
Napoleonic
Warsandtheoutbreak
of warin 1914.197
Blainey
made
shortshriftof Toynbees
Warweariness
explanation
of thecycle.Writingasa
historian
of particular
warsnotat all asa scientic-quantitative
theorist
Blaineynotedthatwarweariness,
whichisvirtuallyimpossible
to measure
em-
pirically
in anyevent,
didnothelptopreserve
thepeace
ofEurope
in thelate
1930s.Indeed,its manifestations in theform of pacismandappeasement in
theWestern democracies mayhavehelpedto bringonWorldWarII:
Toynbee himselfwaspuzzled thattheSecondWorldWarshouldhavecomeat a
timewhen, according to histheory,mentalimmunity
against
warshould stillhave
been high.At leasthetriedto facethedilemma;
heconfessed
thateitherhistheory
wasjeopardized or elsehuman naturemusthavechanged.
Likemostof usin a
 CYCLICAL
ANDLONG~CYCLE
THEORIES
OFWAR 309
similar
quandary,
heplumped
forhistheory.
The
Second
World
War,
hesugges
wasmanifestly
something
contraryto humannature.198
Theorists
havebeen
intrigued
bythepossibility
thattheperiodicity
ofwar
mayberelated
toworldwide
economic
cycles.
TwoFrench
social
analyst
Gaston
Bouthoul
andJacques
Ellul,pointed
in a Marxist
veinto theunem-
ployment
problem,
whichbecomes
severein certain
phases of theeconomi
cycle,
asafactorprovoking
theoutbreakofwar:theplethora
ofyoungmen
[surpasses]
theindispensable
tasks
oftheeconomy.199
Conversely,
Blainey
re-
liedona1938
study
byMace
tohypothesize
alinkbetween
theoptimism
thatusually
accompanies
anexpansive
upswing
inanations
economy
andthe
increased
readiness
of a government
to initiatewarbecause
itscostscanthen
bemore
easily
borne.
Macesstudy
hadbeen
quite
narrow
inscope:
Hehad
examined
theoutbreak
of 12warsin theverylimited
period1850-1914.?
William
R.Thompson
could
discover
nosuchcorrelation
asMace
hadpos-
tulated,
butsubsequently
several
analysts
(including
Thompson)
have
sough
to link warswiththeupswing
phaseof theeconomicK-wavesrst described
in the1920s byNikolaiD.Kondratieff
(discussed
later).2°1
In a sense,
allrecurring
phenomena
maybeconsidered
cyclical,
butthe
problem
inthesocial
universe
isthatnearly
allcycles
appear
tobeirregular
(Exceptions
canbecited,
ofcourse,
such
asperiods
between
elections
xedby
a constitution.)
Morethana quarter
of a century
ago,Small
andSinger
de-
nedthetaskasoneof delineating
thephenomenon
underexamination
from
the backgroundnoise:
Although
cycles
arenotapparent
whenweexamine
theamount
ofwarbegin-
ningin each
yearortimeperiod,
a discernible
periodicity
emerges
when
wefo-
cusonmeasuresof theamount of warunderway.Thatis,discretewarsdonot
necessarily
comeandgowithregularity butwithsomelevelof interstate
vio-
lencealways
present;therearedistinctandperiodic
uctuations
in theamount
of that violence.2°2

Formore
thanadecade,
George
Modelski,
William
R.Thompson,
andoth-
erssought
tondgreater
cyclical
regularity
inlongcycles
ofapproximatel
a
century.
Todothis,theyhadto drawonamuchlonger
historical
recordof the
modern
worldsystemback
to 1494,
notmerely
theSingerSmall
listofwars
since1816.Theydistinguished
whattheycallglobal.
warsfromlessercon-
ictsthatshowuponaninventoryof warsin general,
mostof whichdidnot
produce
anysignicant
change
inthestructure
oftheinternational
system.
They
dened
global
warsasthose
thatdetermine
succession
struggles
andusher
in
newleaders
oftheglobal
political
system
andnewphases
ofhighly
concen-
trated
global
reach
capabilities.2°3
Thesecapabilities
inthepasttooktheform
ofsea
power
(and
morerecently
sea
andairpower),
which
permits
theemerging
global
leader
toproject
political,
military,
andeconomic
inuence
soeffectivel
asto dominate
theinternational
system.
Modelski
andThompson discerned
a
pattern
whereby
thesystem
passes
through
fourcharacteristic
phasesoverthe
course
of abouta century:
macrodecision
(global
war),marked
bysevere
and
widespread
violence,
whichsettles
theissueof leadership;
implementatio
310 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENTCONFLICT
LNTERNATIONAL
WAR

(worldpower
phase)
in whichonenation-state
is ableto actasgloballeader
andimplement
newprograms;agendasetting(delegitimation
phase),when
questions
areraised
about
thelegitimacy
oftheworldleader,
andnewproblems
entertheglobalagenda;
coalitioning
(ordeconcentration
phase), in Wh1Ch
the
powerof theworldleader
declines
to a lowpoint,andnewcoalitionsareorga-
nizedby oneor morechallengers (perhapsformerlyalliedwith theglobal
leader).2°4
Spainchallenged
Portugal, Francechallengedthe Netherlands,
FranceandGermany
challenged
Britaina centuryapart.AfterhelpingBritain
repelthechallenge
of 1914-1918,
theUnitedStates
emerged
fromWorldWarII
astheglobal
leader
facing
anearlychallenger
intheUSSR.2°5
(Note:
Mostpri-
marychallengers
donotbecome
successor
globalleaders.)
According
to thismodel, theinternational
system is notalways
anarchic.
Fora substantial
portionof thecyclefollowingglobalwar,theworldleader
dominatesa unipolarsystemthe moststable
of allsystems.However,
sucha
stablesystem
does notlast.It gives
wayto abipolarandultimately
amultipolar
(deconcentrated)
system,whichisleaststable.TheModelskiThompson analy-
sists Toynbeeswarand-peace cycle(based
onthebalanceofpower model)
onlyimperfectly,
because
Toynbees
general
warsarenotreally
decisive.2°6
Thelong-cycle
approach
comes
closerto Gilpins
hegemonicwar
theory
andWallersteins
neo-Marxist
world-capitalisteconomy
model,whichcovers
ve centuries.
Gilpinfocuses
on theunevengrowthof poweramongnations
(notmerely economic,butall changesin transportation,
communication, in-
dustrialtechnology,
population,militarycapabilities,
etc.),whichmaychange
a nations perception
of thecost-benetratioof tryingto altertheinterna-
tionalstatusquo.Hisanalysis
helpsto explainhowthehegemon eventually
declines,dueto expandingcostsof maintainingdominance
in the system
whilevariouseconomic,
technological,
andmilitaryadvantages
andinnova-
tionsshiftto othernationsoncedeemed
inferiorby obsolescent
criteria.2°7
(Gilpin is discussed
in Chapter2.)
Wallerstein
haspresented
a morestrictlyeconomic
casefor theachieve-
mentof hegemonic
statusin the world economyby threepowersthe
Netherlands
in the 1600s,Britainin the 1800s,andtheUnitedStatesin the
mid1990s.Wallersteinassociates
the rise and fall of hegemonicpowerswith
phases
of expansionandcontraction
(or stagnation)
in theworldeconomy.
Theglobalwarsthatproduced
thethreehegemonicstates justmentioned
each
lastedabout 30 years(e.g.,19141945).2°8
(Wallerstein
is discussed
in
Chapter
9.)Morewill besaidsubsequently
concerning
therelationship
be-
tween the occurrenceof war and economic cycles.
ModelskiandThompson suggest
thattheirlong-cycle
theoryoffersa rich
frameworkfor solvingor at leastamelioratingsomeof the research
puzzles
debatedby scholarsin recentdecades.
In answerto thequestion
whether
bipolaror multipolar
systemsaremorestable,
long-cycle
theorynominates
unipolarity
asmoststable
andmultipolarity
asleast.
Whereas
Singer
found
evidence
to support
bothsides
of thequestion
asto whether
warismorelikely
in a situationof preponderance
or parity,long-cycle
theorypostulates
a con-
sistently
negative
correlation
between
preponderance
andwarfare.
According
 CYCLICAL
ANDLONG-CYCLE
THEORIES
OFWAR 311
tothelongcycle
theory,
thesearch
forananswer
tothecausesof-war
riddle
becomes
less
signicantat
least
forglobal
wars.
Such
theorists
asBlaine
Vasquez,
Bueno
deMesquita,
Singer
andSmall,
andothers
whostudy
the
causes
of warsin general,
including
bothlargerandlesser
wars,donotde-
serve
tobedismissed
aslightlyaslong-cycle
theorists
arewonttoputthem
aside.
Modelski
andThompson,
however,
would
relieve
them
ofthenecess
oflooking
forthecauses
ofglobal
wars,
which
occur
almost
regularly,
some
whatlikeelections
onaglobal
political
calendar
forthepurpose
ofmacrode
cision
making-choosing a newleader
whentheolderonehasdeclined
to a
pointofinability
topreserve
astable
international
system
inthefaceofdecon-
centration.2°9
Modelski
andThompson
donotrelyon,butfindsomeresonance
in,
Charles
F.Dorans
power-cycle
theory,
whichfocusesonthecycle
ofnation-
statepoweranditsroleastheunderlying
dynamic
of international
politics
(discussed
inChapter
2).According
toDoran,
since
thesixteenth
century,
12
states
have
passedthrough
thecurve
ofrelative
power,
evenif onlyforashort
time.Inaddition
totheeight
states
mentionedbyModelski
andThompson
Doran counts
Austria-Hungary,
Italy,Japan,
andChina.
Risingstatesenter,
anddeclining
states
exitthegreat-power
subsystem,
depending
ontheirdy-
namicrelative
power,
which
isafunction
moreofbehavior
thanofcapabili-
tiesperse.21°
What
matters
isnotmerely
thegrowth,
maturation,
anddecline
ofastates
power
measured
inabsolute
statistical
criteria
(such
asGNP,
pro-
duction
ofbasicindustrial
power elements,
ormilitary
spending),
buttheratio
ofastates
totalpower
relative
tothatofothers
inthesystem
atagiventime.
Doranidenties
fourcriticalpointsalongthegeneralized
curveof relative
power,
thedynamics
ofwhich areapplicable
toallstates
inthecentral
system
Twoareturning
points
(atthelowpoint,
whererelative
powerbegins
toin-
crease,andat thehighpoint,whereit startsto decline),
andtwo inection
points(oneontherisingsideandoneonthedeclining side,where
acceleration
gives
waytodeceleration).
It isatthese
fourcritical
points,
says
Doran,
that
wendcluestochanges
inastates powerposition
andinternational
political
role.Such
changes
mayinvolve
abrupt,
unpredictable
inversions
inthedy-
namics
ofthepowercycle,
which
upset
thenormalexpectations
ofgovern-
mental
planners
anddecision
makers?
Doranconcludes
thatthepower
cy-
cledynamic
contains
thecausal
mechanism
explaining
why,when, andhow
thepropensity
ishighest
formajorpowers
to initiatewarsthatbecome
exten-
sive.212
(Dorans
extensive
warsareessentially
thesame
aswhatothers
callhegemonic,
systemic,
andglobal
wars.)Decision
makers
usually
extrapolate
straightline
projections
of pastexperience
intothefuture;the
fourcritical
points
signal
anew
trajectory
forstate
power,
which
may
imply
a
transformation
of thesystem,
require
painfuladjustments,
andgiveriseto
misperceptions
andanxietyforwhich
boththestate
andthesystem
arejointly
responsible?
Because
passage
through
acritical
pointona single
nations
power
cycle
isdiffi-
cultforthatnationandforthesystem
to assimilate
andincreases
thelikelihood
of
majorwar,theroughly
simultaneous
passage
ofseveral»
states
through
critical
312 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

pointsontheirrespective
curves(withmultiplicative
aswellasadditiveeffects)
is
certainly
muchmoredifcultforthesystem
to absorb?

Dorannds somepointsof convergence

betweenhis relative-power-cycle
theoryandtheories
advanced
byOrganskiandKugleronpowertransition,
Levy
on the motivationof dominantstatesto block challengers, Gilpin on the cost-
versus-benetcalculationof the effort to alterthe statusquo,andothers,but he
rejectsthenotionsof determinism
implicitin theories
whichpresume
eitherthe
demiseof thenation-state
or theirreversibilityin thedeclineof a nationsrelative
powerposition.Moreover,
hepostulates
no deterministic
outcome or inevitable
connection
between a change
in a states
relativepowerpositionand.theout-
breakof war,fortheimpetus
to warmaybeeithercatalyzed
or constrained.21
Thedebateoverlongcyclesin the occurrence of war remainsunsettled.
Modelskiat onepoint (1981)suggested that theremaybea relationshipbe-
tweenhis century-longcyclebetween systemic macrodecisions
anda pair of
Kondratieffs50-yearcyclesin the economic order(25yearsof upswingand
25 yearsof downswing),215 but by theendof the 1980s,hedid not pressthe
pointtoo vigorously.217
EdwardManseld,notinga surprisingly low correla-
tion in two differentdata sets(thoseof Wright and of Singerand Small)be-
tweenthe numbersof warsbreakingout in particularyears,nds variationsin
the relationshipbetween
Kondratieffprice-uctuation
cyclesandhegemony
on the one hand and the incidenceof war on the other.218
After comparing
thosetwo data setsof wars in generalwith JackLevysdata set on wars in-
volvinga greatpowersince1495,219
Manseldconcludes
that hegemony
doesnot seemto be associatedconsistentlywith either a decreaseor an in-
crease
in warswith major-power
participants,
althoughit doesappearto be
strongly
associated
with a greater
incidence
of all typesof war.22°
If
Kondratieffcyclesreallyexist,headds,theyseemto havemoreinuenceon
the incidenceof war amongsmallerpowersthan amongmajor powersnot
a comfortingthought(henotes)to thosewhoholdthatinterdependence nec-
essarily
enhances theprobabilityof peace.221
TerryBoswellandMichaelSweat,employing time-seriesregression
analy-
sisandcomparing threeconceptions of hegemonyeconomic efficiency
in the
world economy(Wallerstein), global reachvia seapower (Modelskiand
Thompson),and relativetotal power of states(Gilpin, Organski,and
K~ugler)investigated the effectsof hegemonictransition, long waves
(§Kondratieffs),
andimperialexpansion on theintensityof majorwarsdur-
ing the period1496-1967.Theyconcluded that resourcetheoryprovidesa
betterexplanation thanlong-wave theoryfor thecausalconnections between
economic expansion andthe sizeof majorwars.Warsarelargerduringex-
pansionperiodsbecause greatpowerscanamasslargerarmies,sustainpro-
longedconicts,andreapgreaterbenetsfromplunderthanwhentheworld
economyis stagnating.222 In their view,stateleadersarelikelyto bemore
optimisticabouttheuniqueness andrelativevalueof theirnationsinternalre-
sources duringlongperiodsof economic expansion. Beyondresource consid-
erations,theoriesof long wavesand major warsarenot, in our estimation,ei-
 DEMOCRACIES,
WAR,AND PEACE 313

therlogically
plausible
orempirically
supported.223
They
areparticular
contemptuous
ofMarxist
crisis
theories,
which
predict
major
wars
during
pe-
riods of economicstagnation.
Some
analysts
havesought
tosave
theappearances
forthetheory
oflong
cycles
byeliminating
theneedfor regularity
in theirperiodicity.
JoshuaS.
Goldstein,
forexample,
hascontendedthatjustasNewtonian physicsissub-
sumed
bya moregeneral
relativistic
physics,
soxed-period
cycles
constitute
onlyonecategory
ofsocial
cycles
morebroadly
dened.224Cyclical
phenom-
enainthesocial
universe
need nothave
axedrepeating
relationship
withcal-
endartimeasdenedbytherotationof theplanetweinhabit.225
Hecon-
tendsthatperiodicity
is notappropriate
to thesocial
world. . . [where]
phenomena
are not well denedby physicallawsof mechanical motion.
Because
hedenesa cycleasa repeating
sequencethatinvolvesa causalmech-
anism,
Goldsteins
cycle
timecanvaryfromonecycle
toanother.
Periodicity
is
onlythesupercial
aspectof thecycletheessenceof a cycleisa (sometimes
unknown)innerdynamic thatgivesriseto repetition.225
LoisW.Sayrs, too,defendsthelongcyclein international relations,
de-
spitewhatshecallsmounting evidence-against
it. In herview,thosewhore-
jectthelongcycle
hypothesis
dosobecause
theymake
linearmodel
assump-
tionsabouttheshape
of thecycle,whicharenot applicableto nonlinear
processes,
wherethecycleoccurs
at irregularintervals.
LikeGoldstein,
she
recognizes
that the war cycleis mostlikely not periodic,andthusshedoes
not specify
a prioriits length,shape,
amplitude,
or frequency.Z27
Whereas
Modelski
hassuggested
a relationbetween
globalwarsandpairsof
Kondratieff
waves
(gradual
upswings
anddownswings
intheglobal
economy
occurring
at50-year
intervals),
for a century-long
cycle,228
Sayrs
ndsa cycle
ofapproximately
21years
(12ontheupswing
and9 onthedownswing).
Takingsharpissue
withGoldstein
(andimplicitlywithSayrs),
Nathaniel
Beckinsists
thatmodels
based
oncycles
ofxedperiods
areappropriate
for
thesocial
sciences,
andthatonlyxedperiod
models
aremeaningful
models
of cyclicphenomena.229Beckinsiststhatspectral
analysis
is thebeststan-
dardmethod of studying
thecyclicbehavior
of series,
andhenotesanexten-
siveinternational
relationsliteratureusingspectral
analysis
thatalmostinvari-
ablyndsnoevidence
forlongcycles.23°
InBecks
view,
without
periodicity
anda regularsinewave,thecycleis unpredictable
andtherefore
nonexistent
for all practical
purposes.
Despite
disagreements,
controversies,
andinconsis-
tencies(or contradictions),the theoreticaland statisticaldebatesabout war
cycles
areboundto continue.
Some
will seecycles
thatothers
deny.
Therethe
questionlies,not quitepeacefullyat rest.

DEMOCRACIES, WAR, AND PEACE

Oneof themostintensively debated questionsamong internationalrelation
theoristsin recent
yearspertains
to thehypothesis
linkingdemocracyto peace-
ful international
relations.
Stated in its crudest
andleastcredible
form,the
314 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL
WAR
hypothesis
runs
asfollows:
Liberals
tendtobepacifists;
liberal
government
prefer
negotiation
towar(asdotheirpublics);
liberal
democracies
pursue
peaceful
foreign
policies.
EvenImmanuel
Kant,
towhom
such
simplied
be-
liefsareoften
uncritically
attributed,
never
heldthatrepublics(thetermhe
used
in contrast
to autocratically
ruledstates)
didorshould
refrain
fromgo-
ingtowarunder
allcircumstances.
Infact,
Kant
took
itasnormal
thatliberal
republics,
seeing
themselves
threatened
byaggression
fromnonrepublics
(un-
constrained
astheyarebyrepresentation
andrespect
fortherights
ofothers),
wouldremain
in a stateof warwiththelatterandbeobliged
to goto war
against
themfromtime
totime.
According
toMichael
Doyles
interpretatio
ofKantsviews,
liberal
governments
arecompelled
tosuspect
theforeign
poli-
ciesofnonliberal
states
asnoless
aggressive
andunjust
thantheirdomestic
policies.231
Kant
looked
forward
toapacicfederation
ofliberal
republics
anenduring
andgradually
expanding
federation
likelyto prevent
war.
DoylequotesKants 1795 work,Perpetual Peace:
It canbeshown thatthisideaoffederalism,
extending
graduallytoencompassall
statesandthusleadingtoperpetual
peace,
ispracticable.
. . . Forif bygood
for-
tune onepowerful-andenlightened
nation
canformarepublic(which isbynature
inclinedto seekpeace),thiswillprovide
a focalpointforfederal association
among
other
states.
These
willjoinupwiththefirstone,
thus
securing
thefreedom
ofeach
state
inaccordance
withtheidea
ofinternational
right,
andthewhole
will
gradually
spread
further
and
further
byaseries
ofalliances
ofthis
kind.232
Several
other
liberal
andutilitarian
writers
ofthelateeighteenth
andmid-
nineteenth
centuriesAdam
Smith, JeremyBentham,HerbertSpencer,
and
JohnStuart
Mill,among
othersshared
theconviction
thatcapitalis
economies
andtheriseofindustrial
societies
reinforced
thetendency
ofconsti-
tutional,
parliamentary
governments
topursue
peaceful
foreign
policies,
sim-
plybecause
rational
bomooeconomicus
realizes
thatwardoesnotpay,and
thatlaissez-faire
andfree-trade
policies
canproduce
theirbeneficial
effects
onlyinapredictable
commercial
environment
ofinternational
peace.
Inthe
early
twentieth
century,
Woodrow
Wilson preached
thatworld
public
opinion
andapartnership
ofdemocratic
states
wereessential
prerequisites
tointerna-
tional
peace,
whileNorman
Angell
reiterated
theoptimistic
viewthatwar
would
become
increasingly
obsolescent
aspublics
andgoverning
elites
could
see
how
unprofitable
itis.(Angells
viewsare
treated
inChapter
5.)233
Moderndemocratic
peace
theorists
donotclaim
thatdemocracies
areless
war-prone
than
nondemocratic
states,
butrather
thatthey
rarely
if evergo
towaragainst
each
other.
Thatisaverydifferent
proposition,
oneantici-
pated
byKant.
Thephenomenon
was
firstpublicized
bySmall
and Singer
in
1976.234
Later,
PaulDiehlcalled
theno-war
thesis
axiomatic,asapplied
togenuinely
democratic
states,
even
thoughtheyarenotinhibited
fromgo-
ingto waragainst
authoritarian
ortotalitarian
dictatorships
thatpursue
provocative,
aggressive
foreign
policies.235
Asweshow
later,
there
isnotfull
agreement
concerning
howtodeneademocratic
state,
orexactly
how
 DEMOCRACIES, WAR, AND PEACE 315

manystatesfall into that categorytoday.If the phenomenonwasnot statisti-

cally noteworthyuntil the last half of the twentiethcentury,presumablyit is
becausedemocracies were few and far betweenprior to World War II; geo-
graphically distant statesare lesslikely to ght than contiguousones;the
democraciesgenerallyenjoyedgreaterpolitical and economicstability; and
leading democratic states were aligned against German autocracy in World
War 1, Axis totalitarianism in World War II, and Soviet Communism after
World War 11.235
Only two of the leastdemocraticmembersof NATO
(Greeceand Turkey at the time) fought each other over Cyprus. Despite
problemswith the hypothesis,Jack S.Levy hasassertedthat the absenceof
war betweendemocracies comesas closeas anythingwe haveto an empiri-
cal law in international relations.237Michael W. Doyle, who lists more
than 50 democratic statesat present, finds no wars waged between democra-
tic dyadsfor morethan 150 years.238
NicholasG. Onuf and ThomasJ.
Johnson note that advances in communications technology, together with
unprecedented levels of prosperity and the liberal preoccupation with hu-
man rights, tolerance,and diversity,contributeto and expanda cosmopoli-
tan perspective.This is most manifestin democracies, the dominant values
of whichreectdomestic
andinternational
peace.239
Granted that the statistical evidence is impressive, is there something in
the nature of democratic states that makes them inherently peaceful?
Rudolph Rummeloncearguedthat democraticor libertarian statesare less
war-pronethan otherstates.24°
His analysiswasfaultedfor coveringtoo
limiteda timeperiod? Rummelsubsequently concededthat democracies
may not be lesswarproneonce they are involved in a military confronta-
tion, but that theyarelesslikely to enterinto suchconfrontations?Here
we are concernedwith the more precisehypothesisthat democraciesdo not
ght each other.
Can this be explainedwith political logic?Kant contrastedmonarchies
and republics.Monarchsdo not personallyfeel the costsof war and loseno
privilegesby wagingit; republicanpeoplesdirectly suffer the disastroushu-
man and economic consequencesof war and thus are more hesitant about go-
ing to war unlessit is to promotefreedom,protecttheir private property,or
cometo the aid of republicanalliesagainstnonrepublicanfoes.Liberal states,
Kant believed, are more inclined to observe international law and to respect
the rights of others. As culture grows and men gradually move towards
greateragreementover their principles,they lead to mutual understanding
andpeace.243
Freespeech
andtheeffective
communication
of accurate
con-
ceptionsof foreign societies,Doyle notes, also foster the growth of peace
among states with similar cultural attitudes and political institutions:
Domesticallyjust republics,which rest on consent,then presumeforeignre-
publics to be also consensual,
just, and thereforedeservingof accommoda-
tion.244Kant apparentlyforesawthat both institutionaland cultural factors
would contributeto a senseof mutual securityand the gradualgrowth of a
uniquezoneof peaceamongliberal states.
316 MACROCOSMIC
THEORIES
OFVIOLENT
CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL
WAR
Inasimilar
vein,Carol
R.Ember,
Melvin
Ember,
andBruce
Russett,
citing
recent
studies
testing
alternative
hypotheses
withproper
statistical
controls,
have concluded,
Even
when
controls
forphysical
proximity,
alliances,
wealth,
economic
growth,
and
political
stability
areincorporated
intotheanalysis,
therestillremains
anin
dependent
explanatory
rolefordemocracy.
. . . Inshort,
peopleinademocrac
perceivethemselves
asautonomous,self-governing
people
who share
normsoflive
andletlive;they
respect
. . . others
whoarealso
perceived
asself-governing.
...
Theywillalso knowthattheinstitutional
constraints,
andtheneedforpublic
de-
bate
intheother
democracy,
willprevent
asurprise
attack
andsoeliminate
their
ownincentives
to launch
a preemptive
strike.
Twodemocratic
stateseach
con-
strained
fromgoing
towarandanticipating
theother
tobesimilarly
inhibited-
arelikely
tosettle
their
conicts
without
resort
towar.25
Questions
continue
toberaised,
evenbyanalysts
whoarefriendly
tothe
hypothesis
andwhowish
toclarify
howtheunwillingness
ofdemocratic
peo-
pletogotowaristranslated
intogovernmental
policy,
inasmuch
asmodern
democracies
neverputthedecision
forwarto a popular
referendum.
Bruce
BuenodeMesquita
andDavidLalman
havelamented
ourscant understan
ingofhowdomestic
attitudes
(especially
ofopposition)
produce animpact
on
foreign-policy
decisions.
Wedonotknow, forinstance,
whethertheexpecta
tionofhighdomestic
costs
makes
nations
more orless
likely
toshunviolent
escalations
of crises.245
Whereas
cultural
factors
affectgeneral
publicatti-
tudes
toward
foreign
democracies,
makingthem
seem
more
trustworthy,
rea-
sonable,
andamenable
tonegotiation,
it istheinstitutional
structure
ofdemo-
craticstates
thatconstrains
orinhibits
thegovernmental
elites
whomake
the
decisions
forwar.Nomoderndemocracy, T.Clifton
Morgan andSally
HowardCampbell
have
noted,
putsadecisionforwartoavoteoftheentire
electorate.247
Theyadd,however,
thata jingoistic
population
canpusha
government
toward
war.
(The
Spanish-American
War,
inwhich
case
ayellow
press
stirred
public
emotions,
provides
aclear
example.)
Morgan
andCampbell
identify
three
principal
types
ofdecisional
con-
straints.
First,leaders
whofacetheprospect
ofapopular
election
mustworry
more
thandictators
about
incurring
thewrath
ofvoters.
Second,
institutiona
ized
political
competition
within
thestate
affects
thedecision-making
proces
avigorouspolitical-party
opposition
constitutes
asignicant
constraint
on
anincumbent
government.
Thirdisthedegree
towhich aleader
mustshare
decision-making
powerwithotherindividuals
orinstitutions
(cabinet
mem-
bers,
legislature,
themilitary,
etc.).
Their
conclusion
isthatweshould
expec
to nd theleast
warpronenessnotmerelyamong popularlyelected
govern
ments butalsoamongthosefacingthemostsevere decisionalconstraint
Factors suchasthese
helpto explain,
at leastpartially,
whytheClinton
Administration
wassoanxious,
duringtheKosovo
conict,to pursue
a zero-
risk, nocasualtystrategy.
Morgan
andCampbell
point
outthatmanynondemocracies
arealso
af-
fected
bydecisional
constraints:
Authoritarian
leaders
might
beanswerab
to
ajunta
capable
ofoverthrowing
them andmight
face
factional
oppositio
 DEMOCRACIES, WAR, AND PEACE 317

Moreover,statesdo not facean equalnumberof decisionsfor war in a given

year; thus an instanceof disputeinvolvementis a more appropriateunit of
analysis
thana nationyear
in whichwarswereor werenot beingwaged.248
In
the end, they admit that the empiricaldata do not provideclear supportfor
their theoreticalargumentbecause their analysesuncoveredno strong statis-
tically signicant relationshipslinking high levelsof domesticpolitical con-
straintsto a low probabilityof war.249Bywayof interpreting
theirambigu-
ous results,they suggestthat the causalmechanismassociatingdemocracy
with warpronenessoperatesthrough political culture rather than domestic
political structure. They also note that their initial assumptionheadsof
state are more likely to opt for war than those they govern,but they are
pushed
towardpeace
bydomestic
constraintsnow
seems
questionable.25°
In
their view,democracydoesnot appearto bea forcefor peacein any straight-
forward,uniformor consistent
fashion.251
ChristopherLayneexaminedin depthfour historiccasesin which demo-
cratic stateswereinvolvedin disputesthat broughtthemto the brink of war
the United Statesand Britain in the Trent affair (1861) and the Venezuelacri-
sis (1895-1896), France and Great Britain in the Fashoda crisis (1898), and
FranceandWeimarGermany
in theRuhrcrisis(1923).252
If democratic
peace
theory is valid, he argues,it shouldprovidea satisfactoryexplanationof why
seriouscrisesbetweendemocraticstatesproducedthreatsof war, jingoistic
outburstsof public opinion, ultimata, and bigstickdiplomacyrather than a
desire for mutual accommodation. In all four cases,Layne contends, war was
nally avertedby a nearmiss,but in all four casesrealpolitik ratherthan dem-
ocraticpeacetheoryprovidesthe explanationof the outcome.The determin-
ing factors, as is normally the caseamonggreatpowersin the international
anarchicsystem,wererational calculationsby governmentsconcerningpres-
tige, national interest,the power equation,the possibilitythat other powers
might exploit the dispute, and so on. Layne concludesthat democratic
peacetheoryscausallogichasonly minimalexplanatory
power.
253He re-
mains unimpressedwith the logical casefor institutional and cultural con-
straintson the foreignpoliciesof democraticstates.Because the theorysde-
ductive logic lacks explanatorypower, he calls for further analysisof the
empirical evidence:
The statistical evidencethat democraciesdo not ght each other seemsimpressive
but in fact it is inconclusive,
because
the universeof casesprovidingempiricalsup-
port . . . is small,andbecause severalimportantcasesof warsbetweendemocra-
tic statesarenotcounted
for reasons
thatarenotpersuasive.7&#39;54
Layneciteswith approvalthe ndings of a fellow skeptic,David E. Spiro,
who criticizesDoyle for failing to perform any probability analysesto deter-
mine the statisticalsignicanceof zero wars since1816 among-thestateshe
listsasliberal.Spiroargues,on the basisof his ownstatisticalanalysis,
that
randomchanceis a betterpredictorof the absence
of war amongthe statesin
questionthanis democratic-peace
theory.He hasseriousproblemswith the
waysthe advocatesof that theoryselectdenitionsof the key termsof
318 MACROCOSMIC Tl-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

democracyand war, . . . the methodsthey choosefor statisticalanalysis. . .

and operationalization
of variablesthat undergocontortionsbeforethey yield
apparently
signicantresults.255
In Spiros
view,the absence
of warsbetween
democracieswould not be a conrmation of this theory, unless we were also
ableto provethat democracies
foughtfewerwarswith non-democracies.25
He notes that Zeev Maoz and Michael W Doyle disagreefor two thirds of the
nations that either or both list as democratic, regarding either the nature or
yearsof democracy.257He faults Doyle,Russett,and othersfor arbitrary clas-
sications (ignoringancientdemocracies, womenssuffrage,and slavery,and
disagreeingover other criteria, suchas degreeof participation,competitive-
nessof executiverecruitment, restraints on the chief executive,political stabil-
ity, domestic
oppression
of individualrights,etc.).253
Spironds thatthecrite-
ria for determiningwhat was and what was not an interstatewar are hardly
lessarbitrary than thoseusedfor dening whethera statewasdemocraticat a
givenperiod.259
Spiroseems
to commend
MaozandRussettfor restricting
their analysisto the period 1946-1986becausethis enabledthemto usecon-
temporaneous standards(which did not changefundamentallyover the four
decades)for decidingwhich nations are liberal, thus avoidingthe shifting
threshold[which] is muchmore of a problemfor studiesthat considerlonger
sweeps
of history.26°
(Forthe analysisof MaozandRussett,seethe latter
part of Spirosarticle.)
David A. Lake addsan interestingpostscriptto the debate,noting the
propensityof democraciesto win the wars that they do ght, a paradox,in
Viewof the.problemsof cumbersome decisionmakingand proneness to stale-
mateor paralysisoftenassociatedwith the democraticconductof foreignpol-
icy.261
Lakeemploys
a complexmicroeconomic
theoryof thestateasa profit-
maximizingrm that tradesservicesfor revenues.The stateis the monopoly
providerof protectionagainstexternalthreats;this is the statesforemostser-
vice.Because evenhigh levelsof defensespendingseldomcreatefeelingsof to-
tal security,the stateas monopolyprovider can control the quantity of pro-
tection suppliedand chargewhateverthe market will bear,whether at a
normal prot level or at a supernormalprot level, which he calls rent.
Statescan articially increasethe demandfor and the price of protection
through extortion or racketeering,or by exaggerating foreignthreats,supply-
ing incompleteinformation and falsepropaganda.Staterent seekingcre-
ates an imperialistbias in foreign policy, which leadsto expansionismand
war proneness; this is greaterin autocraciesthan in democracies whereindi-
vidual citizenshave better opportunitiesto assessthe foreign threat level,
monitor the statesperformance,criticizeits strategicpolicies,and control its
rent-seekingbehavior.Lake hasno difculty nding congruencebetweenhis
own economic explanation of the difference between democratic and auto-
cratic stateswith regardto rent-seekingand the political theoriesof Kant and
Doyle, summarizedearlier concerningthe reasonsfor wars betweendemo-
craticandautocraticstates.262
Lakesmoreoriginalcontributionpertainsto
the democracies
propensityfor victory in war. He arguesthat democratic
states,earning fewer rents,
 DEMOCRACIES, WAR, AND PEACE 319

tend(1)tocreate
fewereconomic
distortions,
possess
greaternational
wealth, and
devotemoreresources
to security;
(2)to en}oy
greater
societalsupport
for their
policies
andtherefore
agreater
extractive
capacity;
and(3)to formoverwhelming
countercoalitions
againstexpansionistautocracies.253

Accordingto Lakeslist of 26 wars fought from 1816 to 1988 between

democracies
andautocracies,
theformerhavewon21 (81percent)andlost5
(19 percent).2"4
MaozandRussett call thedemocratic-peaceresultprobablyoneof the
mostsignicantnontrivialproductsof thescienticstudyof worldpolitics
perhapsthe basisof far moreimportantinsightsinto theworkingsof thein-
ternational
politicalworldin modern
times.255
Whattheynd moststriking
is the fact that democracies,
althoughtheycannotbeshownto belessconict-
pronethannondemocratic states,do not ght eachother.Theyaskwhether
thisis moreattributable
causallyto a normativemodelof behavior, in which
domesticpoliticalnormsareexternalized in relationswith otherstates,
or to a
structuralmodel,in whichtheprocess of mobilization for waris considerably
more difcult and cumbersome
in democraticstates.Maoz and Russettcon-
trastdemocracies,
whereinternalconictsareresolved
throughcompromise
ratherthanelimination
of opponents,
with nondemocracies,
wherecoercive
or
violentoutcomesaremorelikely.In thenormativemodel,democracies
deal
with oneanotherto resolveconicts in a nonviolentmannerof reasonableac-
commodation,accordingto democraticvalues;conicts betweendemocratic
and nondemocratic statesare dominatedby nondemocratic normsbecause
nondemocraticstatestendto forcetheissueby takingadvantage of themod-
erationinherentin democracies.In thestructuralmodel,thecomplexityof the
democratic
process
makes
leaders
reluctant
to mobilize
to wagewarexcept»as
a last necessary
resort;two democraticpartiesto a conict takesufcient time
to pursueprocesses
thatenablediplomatsto work out nonmilitarysolutions.
Conversely, nondemocratic leaders are under fewer structural constraints to
mobilizefor war,lessconcerned
aboutpublicopinion,andthusin a betterpo-
sition to escalatethe conict quickly to a levelof violence.
Theauthorsadmitthat thetwo modelsareextremelydifcult to distin-
guishconceptuallyand that cost-benetcalculationsof war are different for
richer democracies
than for poorer nondemocracieszAfter extensivetheo-
reticalanalysisof thenormative/cultural
andstructural/institutional
models,
MaozandRussettconclude that bothmodelsprovidereasonably goodex-
planationsof why democracies rarelyght eachother,but that the norma-
tivemodelis somewhat morerobustthanthestructural.267In drawingout
the implications,they suggestthat newly createddemocraciesin transition
maystill experience
someinterstateconict, but that the spreadof democ-
racy may makefor a more stableinternationalsystem,one in which norms
andrulesbecome morepeacefulandaccommodating, reectingtheinternal
culturalandpoliticalvaluesof systems
in whichgovernments arepopularly
controlled? Conversely, EdwardManseldandJackSnyder, on the basis
of a recentstudy,warnedthat statesin transitionto democracy are two
320 MACROCOSMIC Tl-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

thirds more likely over the courseof a ten-yearperiod to ght wars than
thoseundergoing
no regimechange.269
In what he describesas an effort to span history and political science,
SpencerR. Weart studied virtually all cases,from ancient Greeceto the pre-
sent, in which democracieshad political differenceswith each other. He con-
cludes that Well established democracies have never made war on one an-
other.27°He acknowledges
that there have beenconfrontationsin which
democracieshave deployed military forces against each other without actually
goingto war. Therehavealsobeenwars betweenregimesthat had some,but
not all, of the characteristics of democracies. Although Britain and France
were democracies, they came close to war in 1898 over the outpost at
Fachoda in the Sudan. The War of 1812 between the United States and
Britain, he contends, involved regimes that had at least something in com-
mon with modern democracies but which by early twenty-rst-century stan-
dards of political participation were less than modern democracies. Weart
compiled a list of crisesin which regimes resembling democraciesthroughout
history haveconfrontedeachother up to 1994,the cutoff dateof his research.
War he dened as conicts in which there were at least 200 deaths resulting
from armedcombatby political units acrosstheir boundaries.He concludes
that such violence comprisesbut a tiny fraction of the countless interactions
thathavetakenplaceamonghundreds
of republics
across
manycenturies.271
Here it is useful to point out that Weart definesa republic as a unit in which
political decisionsare made by a body of citizens who have equal rights. A re-
public was saidto be a democracyif the body of citizenswith political rights
included at least two thirds of the adult males.Those republicswith en-
trenched elites that rule over the population he terms oligarchies.Such
regimes,contrastedwith republicsthat are democracies, haveresortedto War
with every type of regime,including democracies.In his categorizationof
democracies Weartincludesthoseof ancientGreeceand the cantonsof early
modernSwitzerland,in all of which the absenceof war asa meansof settling
their political disputesis abundantlyevidentfrom his research.
As explanations for why democraciesdo not go to war with each other,
Weartsuggests a structuraland normativecombination.Structurally,asother
democraticpeacetheoristshave pointed out, constitutionallimitations, re-
quirementsfor domesticpolitical supportand accountabilityto an electorate
placemajor constraintson the ability of a leaderto commita democracyto go
to war.Normative standardsagainstresort to war, especiallyagainstother
peopleswith the samenormativestandards,shapethe peacefuloutlooks of
democraciestoward each other. In social constructivist fashion, it becomes
simply unthinkablefor a democracyto resortto war againstanotherdemoc-
racy. Instead,democracies form what Weart describesas durable, peaceful
leagues.He goesso far asto conclude:Whereverin historyseveralrepublics
were found, they surrenderedsomedegreeof sovereigntyto international
councilsof representatives who negotiatedand votedasequals.The spectacu-
lar recordof republicanConfederations is further evidenceof a powerful ten-
dencyfor political cultureto extendfrom domesticinto foreignaffairs,among
 NOTES 321

thosewhoperceive
eachotherasequals.
Republican
leaders
establish
the
same
kindsof mechanisms
forpeaceful
decision-making
internationally
that
theyarefamiliarwith domestically.272
Manyexamples,
suchastheNorth
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization,
theUnited
Nations
Charter,
andtheLeague
of
Nations Covenant,comereadilyto mind.

CONCLUSION
Thedebate
overtherelative
warproneness
of top-down
(nondemocratic)
ver-
susbottom-up(democratic)
politicalsystems
will undoubtedly
continue.Even
granting the persuasiveness
of.the statisticalevidencethat democracies
have
notfoughteachotherduringthepastcenturyanda half,it is legitimate
to
wonderwhether thistrendwill remainrm in thetwenty-rst
century,
when
thenumberof democraticstatesislikelyto increase,273
becoming
alargerpro-
portionof thetotaluniverseof states,
especially
if wereacha situationof con-
ict overscarceresourcesor overtrade,monetary, environmental,
andother
economic policiesthatmightseverely testwhatnowstrikesmanyanalysts as
theclosestapproximation to a validempiricallaw in internationalrelations.
GellerandSingeroffera helpfulobservation
thatappliesto empirically
based
theories
related
notonlytowar,butto allinvestigations
ofsocial
phenom-
ena.Theynotethatalthoughseveral
studies
maybedesigned
to testthesame.the-
oreticalmodel,theyfrequently
donot.Theyoftenmeasure
thesame variables
in
different
ways,focusin different
regions
oftheworldordifferent
historical
peri-
ods,postulate
differenttimelapsbetween
predictions
andoutcome variables,
or useuniquemethods to compute movingaverages
overvarioustimelengths.274
As thischapterhasamplydemonstrated, theoristshaveidentifiednumer-
ouscorrelations
with respectto factorsassociated
with theoccurrence of war,
but aswe haveindicatedpreviously,thereis a differencebetweencorrelations
andcauses.Correlations
pertainto aggregations
of warincidents,
andarelim-
itedto dyadsof dependent
andindependent variables.
Thustheycannottell us
muchaboutthe onsetof anyparticularwar,whichalwayshasmultiple
causes-some perhaps fairlysimpleandeasyto identify,otherscomplex,sub-
tle andquitedifficultor impossible
to penetrate. &#39;

NOTES

1. SeeGeorgSimmel,Conict, in Cgnictandthe Webof Group-Afliations,

trans.Kurt H. Wolff (NewYork:FreePress,1964),pp.15-38;JesseBernard,
PartiesandIssues
in Conict,journalof ConictResolution, I (March1957);
and Ralf Dahrendorf,Towarda Theoryof SocialConict, trans.Anatol
Rapoport,fournal of Conict Resolution,11(June1958).Dahrendorf,a German
sociologist,
arguesthat whencertainsocialand structuralarrangements are
given,conict is boundto arise.He tracesthe responsibility
for the shift of
emphasiswithintheeld of sociology fromsocialconictto socialstabilityto
TalcottParsons andParsonss structural-functional
approachto the studyof
322 MACROCOSMIC T-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

society. (For a discussionof the work of Parsonsand structural functionalism,

see Chapter 3.) This approach contains the following implicit postulates: (1)
Every society is a relatively persisting conguration of elements.(2) Every society
is a well-integrated conguration of elements.(3) Every elementin a society con-
tributes to its functioning. (4) Every society rests on the consensusof its mem-
bers. Dahrendorf believesthat this socialequilibrium conception of society is not
compatible with the serious study of conict. The foregoing postulates not only
fail to explain changeand conflict, but they also exclude thesephenomena alto-
gether. When confronted with instances of conict, the structural-functional
school treats them as abnormal, deviant, and pathological. In contrast to the
structural-functionaltheory, Dahrendorf offers four different postulates:(1)
Every society is subjectedat every moment to change;changeis ubiquitous. (2)
Everysocietyexperiences
at everymomentsocialconict; conict 1Subiquitous.
(3) Every elementin a society contributes to its change.(4) Every society rests on
constraint of some of its members by others. Dahrendorfs postulates are not
presented to replace the Parsonian view, but rather to complement it. The two
organic models together,he suggests,would exhaust social reality, and a synthe-
sis of the two would supply us with a complete theory of society in both its en-
duringandits changingaspects.
Dahrendorf,1bid.,esp.pp. 173-175.
Simmel, Conict, pp. 16-20.
DJ
. Lewis A. Coser,The Functions of Social Conict (Glencoe,IL: Free Press,1964),
p. 8. Western theorists as far apart in their fundamental premises as Saint
Augustineand Karl Marx regardedconict as the motor of socialchange.See
Robert A. Nisbet, Social Changeand History: Aspects of the WesternTheory of
Development
(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,
1969),pp.76-90.
. William Graham Sumner, War and Other Essays (New Haven, CT: Yale
UniversityPress,1911),excerptedin Leon Bramsonand GeorgeW. Goethals,
eds., War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, rev. ed. (New
York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 210-212.
. William James, The Moral Equivalent of War, Memories and Studies
(London: Longman, 1912), p. 23.
Richard N. Rosecrance,Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little,
Brown,. 1963), pp. 255, 304-305.
Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man: A Survey of Human Behavior and Social
Attitudes (Greenwich,CT: Fawcett World Library, 1960), p. 173. Seealso
StephenWithey and Daniel Katz, The Social Psychologyof Human Conicts,
in Elton B. McNeil, ed., The Nature of Human Conict (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 81; and Nicholas S. Timasheff, War and Revolution
(New York: Sheedand Ward, 1965), chap. 5.
. Robert F. Murphy, Intergroup Hostility and Social Cohesion, reprinted from
American Anthropologist, LIX (6) (December 1957), 1018-1035, in ]. K.
Zawodny,
ed.,ManandInternational
Relations
(SanFrancisco
Chandler,
1966),
pp. 602-603. R. F. Maher has reached a similar conclusion from his study of
tribesin New Guinea.SeeRobertA. Leyine,Socialization,SocialStructureand
Intersocietal Images, in H. C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A
SociologicalAnalysis(NewYork: Holt, RinehartandWinston,1965),p. 47. For
thecaseof theTetonIndians,~supporting
a comparable
hypothesis
in anobverse
form, seeElton B. McNeil, The Nature of Aggression, in McNeil, Nature of
Human Conict, p. 37.
 NOTES 323

9. Simmel,Conict, p. 93; seealso pp. 88-89. M. Mulder and A. Stemerding

haveshownthat a groupfacedwith a threatbecomes cohesiveand highly toler-
ant of strongleadership.Threat, Attraction to Group, and Need for Strong
Leadership,HumanRelations,XVI (November1963),317-334.
10. GeoffreyBlainey,The Causesof War (New York: FreePress,1973),pp. 71-86.
(Samepp. in 3rd ed.,publishedin 1988.)
11. RudolphJ. Rummelconcluded
that foreign-conict
behavioris generally
unre-
lated to domestic-conict behavior, Dimensions of Conict Behavior Within
and BetweenNations, General SystemsYearbook,VIII (1963), p. 24. In a sub-
sequent
replication,
Raymond
Tantersimilarlyfoundlittle positiverelationship.
Dimensions of Conict Behavior Within and BetweenNations, 1958-1960,
journal of Conict Resolution,X (March 1966),65-73. Laterstill, in a studyof
theU.S.domesticsceneduringthe VietnamWar,Tantersuggested a positivecor-
relationbetweena foreignwar that continueswithout apparentsuccess and the
incidence of domestic turmoil. International War and Domestic Turmoil, in
Violencein America,A Reportto the National Commissionon the Causesand
Preventionof Violence,preparedby Hugh DavisGrahamandTedRobertGurr
(New York: New AmericanLibrary, 1969).JonathanWilkenfeld,usingpolitical
variablesanalyzedby Philip M. Greggand Arthur S. Banks,Dimensionsof
Political Systems,AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,59 (September1965),
602-614, rearrangedthe nationsof the world into threepolitical-typegroups
(personalist,
centrist,andpolyarchic),
andheconcluded
thatthereis a relation-
ship betweendomesticand foreign-conict behaviorif the type of political
regimeis takeninto account;Domesticand ForeignConict Behaviorof
Nations, in William D. Coplin and CharlesW. Kegley,]r., eds.,Analyzing
International Relations: A Multimethod Introduction (New York: Praeger,
1975),pp.96-112.SeealsoKarenRasler,War,Accommodation
andViolence
in the United States, 1890-1970, American Political Science Review, 80
(September
1986);OleR. HolstiandJames
N. Rosenau,
American
Leadership
in World Affairs: Vietnamand the Breakdownof Consensus
(Winchester,
MA:
GeorgeAllen 8CUnwin, 1984).
12. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, Domestic Opposition and
ForeignWar, AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,80 (September
1990),747.
13. Quoted from a 1992 paper by RandolphM. Siversonand Harvey Starr in
HarveyStarr,RevolutionandWar:Rethinking
theLinkageBetween
Internal
and External Conict, Political ResearchQuarterly, 47 (June 1994), 481.
14. Jack S. Levy concludes,Whereasthe theoreticaland historicalliteraturesug-
geststheimportance of thediversionary
useof forceby politicalelitesto bolster
theirinternalpoliticalpositions,
thequantitative
empirical
literaturein political
sciencehasrepeatedlyfound that thereis no consistentandmeaningfulrelation-
ship betweenthe internaland externalconict behaviorof states:The
DiversionaryTheoryof War: A Critique, in Manus I. Midlarsky,ed.,
Handbookof WarStudies(Boston:Unwin Hyman,1989),p. 282. Levygoeson
to observethat the scapegoathypothesisor diversionarytheory of war is not
the sameasthe relationshipbetweeninternalandexternalconict; p. 283.
15. Kluckhohn,Mirrorfor Man,p. 48.According
to Alexander
Lesser,theconcept
of war doesnot appearamongAndamanIslanders, aboriginalAustralians,
MissionIndians,Aruntans,
WesternShishonis,
Semangs,andTodas;War and
the State, in Morton Fried et al., War: The Anthropologyof Armed Conict
324 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

andAggression
(Garden
City,NY: NaturalHistoryPress,
1968),p. 94.In con-
trast,theYanomamo,
wholivealongtheOrinoco
RiverinVenezuela
andBrazil,
believethat humansare inherentlyerce and warlike. Their entire culture is
geared
tothedevelopment
of belligerence-threats,
shouting,
duels,
wife-beating
a strongpreference
for malechildren,andencouraging
theyoungto striketheir
elders;
Napoleon
A. Chagnon,
Yanomamo
Social
Organization
andWarfare,
in Friedet al., ibid., pp. 109-159,esp.pp. 124-133.
16. JohnA. Vasquez makes thispointthecentralthesisof hisbook,TheWarPuzzle
(NewYork:Cambridge UniversityPress,1993),p. 10,andhereiterates it fre-
quently.Onp. 126hecitesa studybyPaulDiehlshowing thatonequarterof dis-
putesbetween contiguous majorrivalsescalated
to war,whileonly2 percentbe-
tweennoncontiguous rivalsdidso.ContiguityandMilitaryEscalation in Major
PowersRivalries1816-1980,journal of Politics,47 (4), (1985),11-27.In a
1990unpublishedlecture
attheU.S.Air Force
Academy,
J.DavidSinger
noted
that57 outof 70warsstudied
werewaged between
neighbors,
butheragarded
that ndingastrivial;citedin Vasquez,
pp.335and 361.LewisF.Richardson
showedthatbetween1820and1945,thenumber of foreignwarswithmore
than7,000wardeadcorrelated
withthenumberof borderingneighbors
for 33
countries
studied;
Statistics
ofDeadlyQuarrels
(Pittsburgh,
PA:Boxwood Press,
1960),
p.176.See
alsoJamesPaulWesley,
Frequency ofWars andGeographica
Opportunity,
journalof ConictResolution,
6 (September
1962),387-389.
17. See
Robert
Redeld,
Primitive
Law,in PaulBohannan,ed.,LawandWarfare:
Studiesin the Anthropologyof Conict, AmericanMuseumSourcebooksin
Anthropology
(Garden
City,NY:NaturalHistoryPress,
1967),
pp.3-24.
18. AndrewP.Vayda,Hypotheses
AboutFunctions of War,in Friedet al.,
Anthropology
of Conict,pp. 85-89.Accordingto J. P.Johansen,
theMaorisof
NewZealandsometimes resolved
intragrouptensions by havinga memberof
thetribecommit anactofviolence
against
another tribe,thereby
provoking
are-
taliation
thatwouldreestablish
groupunity;citedbyAndrew P.Vayda,
Maori
Warfare,in Bohannan, Lawand.Warfare, p.380.WilliamT. Divale,An
Explanationfor Primitive
Warfare:
Population ControlandtheSignicance of
PrimitiveSexRatios,TheNewScholar(2) (1970),173-192;MarvinHarris,
Ecology,
Demography
andWar,in hisCulture,
ManandNature(NewYork:
ThomasCrowell,1971),pp. 200-234.
19. See,
for example,
KajBirket-Smith,
Primitive
ManandHis Ways(NewYork:
New AmericanLibrary,1963),pp. 67 and 195.
20. AnthonyF. C. Wallace
hasobserved
thatfor theIroquois,
thesymbolically
arousingstimulusthatpreceded
mobilization
for war wasa reportthat a kins-
manhadbeenslainanda survivorwascallingfor revenge; Psychologica
Preparations
for War,in RobertF.Murphyet al.,eds.,Selected
Papers
from
The AmericanAnthropologist 1946-1970(Washington, DC: American
Anthropological
Association,
1976),pp.175-176.
21. AndrewP. Vayda,PrimitiveWarfare,in D. Sills,ed., International
Encyclopedia
of theSocial
Sciences,
XVI (NY:Crowell CollierandMacmillan,
1968), p. 468.
22. AlvinandHeidiTofer,FutureShock(NewYork:Bantam,1970). Bythesame
authors,
Powershift
(NewYork:Bantam, 1990);Previews
andPremises (New
York:WilliamMorrow,1983);TheThirdWave
(NewYork:Bantam, 1980).
23. AlvinandHeidiTofer,WarandAnti-War:
Survival
attheDawnof theTwenty-
rst Century
(Boston:
Little,BrownandCompany,1993),esp.pp.18-25.
24.

25.

26.
326 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

38. Simmel,
Conict, pp.43-48;Coser,
Functions
of HumanConict,pp.67-72.
Seereferenceto Jesse
Bernardin Note 1 supra.
39. EdwardLuttwak,CoupdEtat: A PoliticalHandbook(Harmondsworth
England:
Penguin,
1969);WilliamG.Andrews
andUri Raanan,
eds.,ThePolitics
of theCoupdEtat(Princeton, NJ:VanNostrand,1969);MorrisJanowitz,
MilitaryInstitutionsand Coercion in the Developing Nations(Chicago:
Universityof ChicagoPress,
1977);AmosPerlmutter andGavinKennedy, The
Militaryin theThirdWorld(NewYork:Charles ScribnersSons,1974);Amos
Perlmutter,TheMilitaryandPoliticsin Modern Times(NewHaven, CT:Yale
UniversityPress,
1977);RobertW.Jackman et al.,Explaining
AfricanCoups
dEtat,American
PoliticalScience
Review,
80(March1986),225-250.
40. MarkN. I-Iagopian,
ThePhenomenon
of Revolution
(NewYork:Dodd,Mead,
1974), p. 1.
41. Earliereditionsof this book carriedan extensivediscussion
of revolution.Those
interested
in its causes,
nature,ideology,strategy,leadership,
characteristic
phases,
andconsequences
shouldconsultthestandard
workson thesubject:
CraneBrinton,Anatomyof Revolution(NewYork:Norton, 1938;Random
House, 1965),
a studyof foursuccessful
revolutions
(English,
American, French,
andRussian);AlexisdeTocqueville,
TheOldRegime andtheFrench Revolution,
originally
published
inFrenchin 1856,trans.byGilbert
Stuart (GardenCity,NY:
DoubledayAnchor, 1955); HannahArendt,OnRevolution (NewYork:Viking,
1965), ananalysis
ofthephenomenon asmarkedbyapathos ofnovelty,anotion
that the courseof historyis aboutto beginanew;Chalmers Johnson,
Revolutionary Change (Boston:Little, Brown,1966);JamesH. Meisel,
Counterrevolution:
HowRevolutions Die(NewYork:Atherton, 1966),in which
it isargued
thateveryrevolution
diesin overorganization,
terror,oppression,
the
restoration
of theold order,or sheerboredom
andnal alienation;
Karl Leiden
and Karl M. Schmitt,ThePoliticsof Violence:Revolutionin the Modern World
(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall, 1968);PeterCalvert,Revolution(New
York:Praeger,
1970); TedRobertGurr,WhyMenRehel (Princeton,NJ:Princeton
University
Press,1970),in whichtheauthoridentiesthefrustration-aggressio
mechanismastheprimarysource of thehuman capacityfor violence,
andeco-
nomicdeprivation
in theThird Worldasa majorprecondition
of violentcivil
conict;James C. Davies,
ed.,WhenMenRevoltandWhy(NewYork:Free
Press,
1971),inwhichDavies presents
auseful
Jcurve
theory,
whichsuggests
that
thedanger of revolutionary
conictbecomes
moreacutewhena society
onthe
long-termpathtowarddevelopment suddenly
experiences
aneconomicdown-
turn, whichfrustrates
popularexpectations;
JohnDunn,ModernRevolutions
(Cambridge,England:
Cambridge UniversityPress,
1972);DavidWilkinson,
Revolutionary
CivilWar(PaloAlto, CA:Page-Ficklin,
1975);MelvinLasky,
UtopiaandRevolution:
OntheOriginsof a Metaphor (Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress,
1976),
a workthathighlights
thecausal
roleof utopian rhetoric;
BruceMazlish,
TheRevolutionary
Ascetic:Evolution
of a PoliticalType(New
York:BasicBooks,1976);MostafaRejai,TheComparativeStudyof Revolu-
tionaryStrategy
(NewYork:McKay,1977);Charles
Tilly,FromMobilizationto
Revolution(Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Anthony Burton,
Revolutionary
Violence:
TheTheories (NewYork:Crane, Russak,
1978);James
Billington,
Firein theMindsof Men:Origins of theRevolutionaryFaith(New
York:BasicBooks, 1980);WilliamH. Friedlandet al.,Revolutionary
Theory
42.

43.

44.

45.

46.
328 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

58. SeeKarlW.Deutsch,ExternalInvolvement
in InternalWar,in HarryEckstein,
ed.,InternalWar:Problems
and Approaches (NewYork:FreePress,1964) 9
pp. 100-110, esp. p. 102.
59. EkkhartZimmerman,
PoliticalViolence,
Crises,
andRevolution
(Cambridge
MA: Schenkman,
1983);JackA. Goldstone,
Theoriesof Revolution,World
Politics(April 1980),425-453.
60. BardONeill,WilliamHeaton,and DonaldAlberts,eds.,Insurgencyin the
ModernAge (Boulder,.CO: WestviewPress,1980);Mark Hagopian,The
Phenomenonof Revolution(NewYork:Dodd,Mead,1974);ThomasGreene,
Comparative
RevolutionaryMovements(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: Prentice
Hall,
1974);MostafaRejai,TheComparative
Studyof Revolutionary
Strategy(New
York: David McKay,1977).
61. StephenHosmerand ThomasWolfe, SovietPolicy and PracticeToward Third
WorldConicts(Lexington,
MA: LexingtonBooks,1983);BrucePorter,The
USSRin Third WorldConicts(London:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1984);
JosephWhelan and Michael Dixon, The Soviet Union in the Third World:
Threatto WorldPeace
(NewYork:Pergamon-Brasseys, 1986).
62. JohnDziak,Military Doctrineand Structure,in Uri Raanan,RobertL.
Pfaltzgraff,
Jr.,Richard
Shultz,
ErnstHalperin,
andIgorLukes,
eds.,Hydraof
Carnage:InternationalLinkagesof Terrorism(Lexington,MA: Lexington
Books,1985);JohnJ. Oziak,Chekisty,
A Historyof theKGB(Lexington,
MA:
Lexington
Books,1987);JohnCollins,GreenBerets,
SEALS,andSpetsnaz:U.S.
andSovietSpecial
MilitaryOperations
(NewYork:Pergamon-Brasseys,
1987).
63. JohnF. CopperandDanielS. Papp,eds.,Communist
NationsMilitary
Assistance
(Boulder,
CO: Westview Press,1983);W. ScottThompson,
Power
Projection
(NewYork:NationalStrategy
Information
Center,
1978).
64. RichardShultz,TheSovietUnionand Revolutionary
Warfare:
Principles,
Practices,
andRegionalComparisons (Stanford,
CA:HooverInstitutionPress,
1988);Raananet al., eds.,Hydra of Carnage;
DennisBark,ed., The Red
Orchestra
(Stanford,
CA:HooverInstitutionPress,1986);WalterLaqueur,
ed.,
ThePatterns
of Soviet
Conduct
in theThirdWorld(NewYork:Praeger
Press,
1983).Shultzexamines
four specicinstances
in his thoroughevaluationof
Sovietsuccesses
andfailuresin the periodfrom the late 1960sto the mid-1980s.
65. Paul Linebarger,
PsychologicalWarfare(Washington, DC: InfantryJournal
Press,1948);WilliamDaugherty andMorrisJanowitz,eds.,A Psychological
WarfareCasebook (Baltimore,
MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1958);
Daniel Lerner,ed., Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: Stewart
Publishers,1950);Harold.Lasswellet al., Language of Politics(NewYork:
StewartPublishers,
1949);Jacques Ellul,Propaganda:TheFormationof Mens
Attitudes(NewYork:AlfredA. Knopf,1965).
66. RichardShultzandRoy Godson,Dezinformatsia: ActiveMeasures in Soviet
Strategy(NewYork:Perganion-Brasseys, 1984);PaulA. Smith,Jr.,OnPolitical
Warfare(Washington, DC: NationalDefense UniversityPress,1988);Carnes
Lord, ed.,Psychological
Warfarein U.S.Strategy(Washington, DC: National
DefenseUniversityPress,1988); Donald Brown, InternationalRadio
Broadcasting(NewYork:Praeger, 1982);LadislavBittman,TheKGBandSoviet
Disinformation
(NewYork:Pergamon-Brasseys,
1985)andTheNewImage-
Makers:Soviet
Propaganda
and«Disinformation
Today(NewYork:Pergamon-
Brasseys,1988).
 NOTES 329

67. Raanan et al., eds.,Hydra of Carnage;Bark, ed., Red Orchestra;Shultz,The

Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare and Soviet Use of Surrogates to
Project Power into the Third World, Parameters(Autumn, 1986), 32-42.
68. The term low-intensityconict beganto be usedby U.S.national-securityspe-
cialistsin the secondhalf of the 19703.SeeGeorgeTanhametal., United States
Preparationfor FutureLow-LevelConict, Conict, (12) (1978),1-20; Sam
Sarkesian andWilliam Scully,eds.,U.S.Policyand Low IntensityConict (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981). The terminology may have been bor-
rowed from the British specialist, Frank Kitson; see Kitson, Low Intensity
Operations(Harrisburg,PA:Stackpole,1971).
69. Sam C. Sarkesian,The New Battleeld (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,1986);
StephenI-Iosmerand GeorgeTanham,CounteringCovert Aggression(Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986); David Dean, ed., Low Intensity
Conict and Modern Technology(Maxwell Air ForceBase,AL: Air University
Press,1986). Seealso U.S. Army Training and Doctrine CommandPamphlet
52544, U.S. Army Operational Conceptfor Low Intensity Conict (Fort
Monroe,VA: ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,1986).
70. Sarkesian,New Battleeld; Frank Barnett,Hugh Tovar,and Richard Shultz,
eds.,Special
Operations
in U.S.Strategy
(Washington,
DC:NationalDefense
University Press,1984); Richard Shultz, Discriminate Deterrenceand Low
Intensity Conict: The UnintentionalLegacyof the ReaganAdministration,
Conict (June1989),21-44; MichaelKlare and PeterKornbluh,Low Intensity
Warfare(New York: Pantheon,1988); D. Michael Shafer,Deadly Paradigms
(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press,1988); John Prados,Presidents
SecretWars (New York: William Morrow, 1986); A. J. Bacevich,JamesD.
Hallums,RichardH. White, and ThomasYoung,AmericanMilitary Policy in
Small Wars:The Caseof El Salvador(New York: Pergamon-Brasseys, 1988).
For otherstudies,seeCollins,GreenBerets,SEALS,and Spetsnaz;
Richard
Shultz,RobertL. Pfaltzgraff,Uri Raanan,William Olsen,andIgor Lukes,eds.,
GuerrillaWarfareand Counterinsurgency:
U.S.SovietPolicyand the Third
World (Lexington,MA: LexingtonBooks,1988);David Chartersand Maurice
Tugwell,eds.,Armiesin Low IntensityConict (Ottawa,Canada:
Department
of National Defense,1985);Ian F. W Beckettand John Pimlott, eds.,Armed
Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985);
William Burgess,Iranian SpecialOperationsin the Iran-Iraq War, Conict
(August1988);RichardH. Shultz,Jr.,RobertL.Pfalt&#39;zgraff,
Jr.,andW.Bradley
Stock,Rolesand MissionsSpecialOperationsForcesin the Aftermath of the
Cold War (Ft. Bragg,NC: United StatesSpecialOperationsCommand,1995).
71. DonaldHorowitz, Ethnic Groupsin Conict (Berkeley:Universityof California
Press,1985); and Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of
Ethnopolitics (Washington,DC:U.S.Instituteof Peace, 1993).SeealsoRobert
L. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr.,andRichardH. Shultz,Jr.,eds.,EthnicConict andRegional
Instability:Implications
for U.S.PolicyandArmyRolesandMissions (Carlisle,
PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,U.S.Army War College,1994).
72. Gurr, Minorities at Risk;Richard H. Shultz,Jr., and William J. Olson,Ethnic
and ReligiousConict: EmergingThreat to U.S. Security(Washington,DC:
NationalStrategyInformationCenter,1994);Myron Weiner,Peoplesand
Statesin the New Ethnic Order? Third World Quarterly, (2) (June1992),
317-334; Paul Weaver,Flashpoints, ]anes DefenseWeekly (January11,
330

MACROCOSMIC Tl-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR

1992),53; Vladimir Kolossov,Ethno-TerritorialConictsand Boundariesin the

FormerSovietUnion (Durham,England:Universityof Durham,International
73.
Boundaries
Research
Unit, 1992);DavidA. LakeandDonaldRothchild,Con-
tinuing Fear:The Originsand Managementof Ethnic Conicts, International
74.
Security,Vol. 2 (Fall 1996), 41-76.
DavidFromkin,The ComingMillennium:WorldPoliticsin theTwenty-First
Century,WorldPolicyjournal (Spring,1991),4.
AlexisHeraclides,TheSelf-Determination
of Minoritiesin InternationalPolitics
75.
(London:Frank Cass,1991);Heraclides,Secessionist Minorities and External
1nvolvement, InternationalOrganization
(Summer1990),341-378;Joseph
Rothchild,Ethnopolztics
(NewYork:Columbia University
Press,
1981).
Nikki R. KeddieandFarahMonian,MilitancyandReligionin Contemporary
Iran, in Martin Marty and R. ScottAppleby,eds.,Fundamentalisms
and the
State(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1993),pp.511-528;Graham
Fuller,The Centerof the Universe:The Geopolitics
of Iran (Boulder,CO:
Westview,1991);JohnEsposito,
ed.,TheIranianRevolution:Its GlobalImpact
(Miami:FloridaInternationalUniversityPress,1990);Martin Kramer,Hezbullah:
The Calculusof Jihad, in Marty and Appleby,eds.,Fundamentalisms and the
State;AbdulazizSachedina,
ActivistShiismin Iran,Iraq,andLebanon,111
Marty andAppleby,eds.,Fundamentalism Observed (Chicago:Universityof
76. ChicagoPress,1991);Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?Religious
NationalismConfrontsthe SecularState(Berkeley: Universityof California
Press,1993).
77.Ibid.
ShultzandOlson,EthnicandReligious
Conict,p. 32.
78. Dean Pruitt andRichardC. Snyder,eds.,Theoryand Research
on the Causes
of War(Englewood Cliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall, 1969),pp.4-5.
79. QuincyWright,A Studyof War,Vol.I (Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress,
1942),p. 17.SeealsoVol.II, p. 739,wherehe asserts that war haspolitico-
technological,
jurideological
socioreligious
andpsychoeconomic causes.
Wrights
classicwas reprinted in 1983.
80. Karl W. Deutsch,Quincy WrightsContributionto the Studyof War: A
Preface
to theSecond
Edition,journalof ConictResolution,
XIV (December
1970), 474-475.
81. ClydeEagleton,
International
Government,rev.ed.(NewYork:Ronald,1948),
p. 393.SeeQuincyWrighton ThePoliticalUtility of War,in A Studyof War,
Vol. II, pp. 853-860.
82. MichaelHoward,Studies
in WarandPeace
(NewYork:VikingPress,
1970),p. 13.
83. For a thoughtfuland critical analysisof the contributionsbehavioralscientists
hadmadepriorto 1959towardthecontrolof interstateviolence,
seeKenneth N.
Waltz,Man,theStateand War(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,1958),
pp.42-79.Waltzanticipatedtheconclusion reachedheren_amely,that thebe-
havioristsmusttakeinto greateraccountthepoliticalframeworkof war and
peaceissues.SeealsoL. L. Farrar,Jr., ed., War:A Historical,Politicaland Social
Study(Santa
Barbara,
CA:ABC-Clio,
1978);Geoffrey
Blainey,
TheCauses
of
War,3rd ed.(NewYork;FreePress,1988);andManusI. Midlarsky,On War:
PoliticalViolence
in theInternational
System
(NewYork:FreePress,
1975).
84. SeeFranklynGriffithsandJohnC. Polanyi,eds.,TheDangersof Nuclear
 NOTES 33 1

more,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1981);DanielFrei,with thecol-

laborationof ChristianCatrina,Risksof Unintentional
NuclearWar,United
NationsInstitutefor DisarmamentResearch (Totowa,NJ:Allenheld,Osmun,
1983).
85. SeeTheodore
Abel,TheElements
of Decision
in thePatternof War,American
SociologicalReview,VI (December
1941),853-859.
86. See,for example,
Thomas C. Schelling,
ArmsandInuence (NewHaven, CT:
YaleUniversity
Press,1966),pp.221-225;GrahamT.Allison,
AlbertCarnesale,
andJoseph Nye,Jr.,eds.,Hawks,DovesandOwls:An Agenda for Avoiding
NuclearWar(NewYork:Norton,1985),pp.30, 43, and210;RichardNed
Lebow,NuclearCrisisManagement:
A Dangerous
Illusion(Ithaca,NY: Cornell
University Press,1987), pp. 24-26, 32-35, 109-113.
87. Marc Trachtenberg,The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914, International
Security,
15 (Winter1990-1991),120-150.Cf. thefollow-upcorrespondence
by JackLevy,ThomasJ. Christensen, andMarcTrachtenberg, Mobilization
and Inadvertencein the July Crisis, InternationalSecurity,15 (Summer
1991), 189-203.
88. RobertJ. Lieber,No CommonPower:Understanding InternationalRelations
(NewYork:HarperCollins,
1995).Thequotationfollowinghistitlepageisfrom
Chapter 13 of Leviathan.
89. Motives andPerceptions
UnderlyingEntry into War, Introductionto Part 2 in
PruittandSnyder,
eds.,TheoryandResearch
ontheCauses
of War(Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1969),pp. 22-26.
90. J. DavidSinger,
ThreatPerceptionandNationalDecision-Makers, in Pruitt
andSnyder,eds.,TheoryandResearch on Causes,
pp.39-42.
91. Raymond L. Garthoff,On Estimating
andImputingIntentions,International
Security,
2 (Winter1978),22-32.SeeRichardPipes,Why the SovietUnion
ThinksIt CouldFightandWin a NuclearWar,Commentary, 64 (July 1977),
21-34;PaulH. Nitze,DeterringOur Deterrent,ForeignPolicy (25)(Winter
1976-1977),195-210; Soviet Strengthand Fears,Report by the Centerfor
the Studyof DemocraticInstitutionsin WorldIssues(October-November
1977),22-30; BernardBrodie,The Development of NuclearStrategy,
International
Security,
2 (Spring1978),65-83;andStanley Sienkiewicz,
SALT
andSovietNuclearDoctrine,International
Security,
2 (Spring1978),84-100.
. Pitirim A. Sorokin,Socialand CulturalDynamics,Vol. 3 (NewYork: American
Book,1937);Fluctuation
of SocialRelationships,
WarandRevolution,
Vol. 3
(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: BedminsterPress,1962).
93. QuincyWright,A Studyof War(Chicago:
University
of Chicago
Press,
1942),2
vols.
94. Lewis F. Richardson,Statisticsof Deadly Quarrels(Pittsburgh,PA: Boxwood,
1960).
95. John A. Vasquez,
The Stepsto War: Towarda ScienticExplanationof
Correlates
of War Findings,ReviewArticle, WorldPolitics,XL (October
1987), 109-110. This article has often been cited in the literature as an excellent
andcomprehensive
accountof the COWProjectandthe subsequent
research
thafit stimulated. _
96. Theprimary databasefortheCOWProjectisto befoundinJ.DavidSinger
and
MelvinSmall,TheWages of War,1816-1965:A Statistical
Handbook(New
York: Wiley, 1972).Their original researchwasupdatedand rened in J. David
Singer,ed.,The Correlatesof War,Vol. I. ResearchOriginsand Rationale(New
332

97.

98.
99.
100.

101.

102.

103.
104.
105.
 NOTES 333

117. LewisP.Richardsons
principalwork on the mathematics
of armsracesis Arms

and Insecurity:A Mathematical

Studyof the Causesand Originsof War
(Pittsburgh,
PA:Boxwood Press,
1960),pp.13-15.In another&#39;work,
Statistics
of
Deadly
Quarrels
(Chicago:
Quadrangle,
1960),
heclassied
deadly
quarrels
be-
tweenstateson thebasisof thenumberof personskilled,andhe examinedthefre-
quency of warbetween dyadsof states,
thelengthof warsandpeaceintervals,
the
118.
patternof warrepetitions,
theprobabilitythatalliesandenemies
groupthemselves
similarlyin subsequent
wars, and the correlationbetweenthe incidenceof wars
andsuchfactorsasgeographical
proximity,
population,
religion,andlanguage.
Dina A. Zinnes,ContemporaryResearch in InternationalRelations(New York:
FreePress,1976),p. 332.Sheaddsthat while it is probablyfair to saythat anun-
derlyingassumption
of thearmsracemodels
isthattheyprovidea possible
expla-
nation for processes
that appearto resultin somewars,it mustbe admittedthat
Richardsondoesnot formallylink defense expenditureandtheoutbreakof war in
anyofthearms
racemodels
whichheconstructs;
p.332.Thisisanextremely
im-
portantpoint to keepin mind,inasmuchassomanywriterswho havenot studied
RichardsonascarefullyasZinneshas,or perhapshavenot evenreadhim,have
oftencitedhis researchas demonstratingscienticallyand conclusively
that
armsracesleadto wars.Thestudenttrainedin mathematicswill nd a complete
exposition
andanalysis of Richardsons
basicmodelin Zinnes,Contemporary
Research,
pp. 333-369.MichaelD. Intriligator andDagobertL. .Britoadmitthat
Richardson-type
modelscanbecriticizedasmechanisticbecause
theytreatarms
119. races
fromoutside
instead
of insidethemindsof decision
makers,
andthustheyig-
nore strategic considerations; Richardson Arms Race Models in Manus I.
Midlarsky,
ed.,Handbook
of WarStudies
(Boston:
UnwinHyman,1989),p. 226.
SeeZinnes,ContemporaryResearch,
pp. 339-354;KennethBoulding,Conict
120.
and Defense(New York: Harper 86 Row, 1962), pp. 19-40; and Robert C.
North, RichardA. Brodie,andOle R. Holsti, SomeEmpiricalDataon the
Conict Spiral, InternationalPeaceResearchSocietyPapers,1 (1964), 1-14.
121. Zinnes,Contemporary Research,
p. 369.
Zinnesdevoteschap.15 of Contemporary
Research
to the~workof Quincy
Wright,KennethBoulding, DeanPruitt,andseveral
others.Forthedescription
of aneffortto applytheRichardson
modelto armsnegotiations,
seeP.Terrence
Hopmann and TheresaC. Smith, An Application of a RichardsonProcess
Model:Soviet-American
Interactions
in theTestBanNegotiations,
1962-1963,
journal of Conict Resolution,XXI (December1977),701-726.
122. Martin Patchen,Models of Cooperationand Conict: A Critical Review,
journal of Conict Resolution,XIV (September1970),389-408.
123. John V. Gillespie,Dina A. Zinnes, and othershave noted that Richardsons
model
contains
nodecision
calculus.
Theequations
areme\rely
a description
of
whatpeoplewoulddo if theydid not stopto think; Ari OptimalControl
Model of ArmsRace,AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,LXXI (March 1977),
226-244, quoted at p. 226. Later, Dina Zinnesand Robert G. Muncaster con-
cludedfroma modelof hostilitydynamics
thatit is possible
to predictthetime
when war will occur and the level of hostility necessary
to provokeits onset;
The Dynamicsof Hostile Activity and the Predictionof War, journal of
334

124.

125.

126.
127.

128.

129.

130. MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

Michael D. Wallace, Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence,

journal of Conict Resolution, 23 (March 1979), 3-16.

131.
Ibid., 5, 13.
Paul F. Diehl, Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look, International
StudiesQuarterly, 20 (June 1983), 205-212.
T. C. Smith,Arms RaceInstability and War, journal of Conict Resolution,
24 (June 1980), 253-284. Cited 111Randolph M. Siverson and Paul F. Diehl,
Arms Races,the Conict Spiral,and the Onsetof War, ManusI. Midlarsky,
ed.,Handbookof WarStudies(Boston:Unwin Hyman,1989),p. 198.
Wallace, Arms Racesand Escalation, 5.
Ibid., 14-15.
SiversonandDiehl, Arms Races,Conict Spiral, p. 198.
132.
Paul F. Diehl and J. Kingston,Messengeror Message? Military Buildupsand
the Initiation of Con1ct, journal of Politics,49 (December1987), 789-799.
Citedby SiversonandDiehl, Arms Races,Conict Spiral, p. 207. ErichWeede
identifiedthreeperiodsof substantiallength(1852-1871,1919-1938,and from
1945onward)whenthe escalationof disputeswasnil, regardless of high or low
armsrace indices. Arms Races and Escalation, International Studies
Quarterly, 27 (June 1980), 233-235.
Siversonand Diehl, Arms Races,Conict Spiral, pp. 207-211, cite Michael
143.

144.

145.

NOTES 335
146.
Vasquez,
WarPuzzle,
pp.172-173.He citesWallace,
Polarization:
Towardsa
Scientic
Conception,
in AlanNedSabrosky,
ed.,PolarityandWar(Boulder,
147. CO: WestviewPress,1985), pp. 110-111; and Nazli Coucri and Robert C.
North,Nationsin Conict(SanFrancisco,
CA: W. H. Freeman,
1975),
pp. 106-111, 117.
148.
Vasquez,
Stepsof War, 123-125,wherehe summarizes
Wallace,Alliance
Polarization,
Cross-Cutting,
andInternationalWar,1815-1964,
journalof
149.
ConictResolution,
17(December 1973),575-604.
Charles
W.Kegley,
Jr.,and
GregoryA. Raymondfoundin thissame
articleofWallaces
a possible
compro-
150.
misebetweenWaltzonbipolarity
theirdebate
andDeutsch andSinger
onmultipolarity
in
overwhichismorestable;AllianceNormsandWar,International
StudiesQuarterly,26 (December
1982),572-595.
Vasquez,
151. StepsofWar,125-128.
HecitesBruce
BuenodeMesquita,
Systemic
Polarization
andtheOccurrenceandDurationof War,journalof Conict
Resolution,
22 (June1978),241-267;andAlanNedSabrosky, Alliance
152. Aggregation,
CapabilityDistribution,andtheExpansion
of Interstate
War,in
153.
Sabrosky,
ed.,PolarityandWar,pp.148,151,181.Vasquez
opshisviewsonpolarization
in TheWarPuzzle,
reafrmsanddevel-
pp.251-258,261-262.
Vasquez,WarPuzzle,p. 173.
DanReiter,Crucibles of Beliefs:Learning,Alliances,
and WorldWars(Ithaca,
154.
NY: Cornell University Press,1996).
DeanAcheson,FifteenYearsAfter, The YaleReview,Vol. 51 (Autumn
1961), 9.
Samuel
Abrahamsen,
Sweden?
ForeignPolicy(Washington,
DC:PublicAffairs
155.
Press,1957), p. 91.
Vasquez,War Puzzle,p. 54.
NazliChoucriandRobertC. North,Nationsin Conict:NationalGrowthand
156.
International
Violence
(SanFrancisco:
W.H. Freeman,
1975).
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., p. 278.
Seeibid., pp. 15-17, and their later work, Lateral Pressurein International
336 MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

of japan BeforeWorldWar II and After:A Study of NationalGrowthand

Expansion(New York: Routledge,1992).
163. BenjaminA. Most and Harvey Starr, ConceptualizingWar: Consequences for
TheoryandResearch,journal of Conict Resolution,27 (March 1983), 154-157.
164. A. F.K. Organski,WorldPolitics(NewYork:Knopf,1958),chap.12; (2nded.,
1968), chap.14.
165. SeeG. S. Barghava,India&#39;s
Securityin the 1980s (London:InternationalInstitute
of Strategic
Studies;
AdelphiPaperNo. 125, Summer1976), pp.5-6. Erich
Weedehasfoundthatoverwhelmingor ten-to-one
preponderanceisfavorable
to
thepreventionof war.OverwhelmingPreponderanceasa PacifyingCondition
Among ContiguousAsian Dyads, 1950-1969, journal of Conict Resolution,
XX (September1976), 395-411.
166. Organski,WorldPolitics,1958,pp.319-320; 1968,pp.357-359.Thehypothe-
sisthat lethalinternational
violencebetweenpairsof contiguous
states15more
probable if thetwostatesareequallypowerfulwassubstantiated
in an empirical
studyof a brieffive-yearperiod.SeeDavidGarnham,Power ParityandLethal
InternationalViolence,1969-1973, journal of Conict Resolution,XX
(September 1976),379-391.
167. InisL. Claude,PowerandInternational Relations(NewYork:RandomHouse,
1962), p. 56.
168. MichaelP.Sullivan,InternationalRelations: TheoriesandEvidence (Englewood
Cliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall, 1976),pp. 166-167.
169. JohnW. BurtonhasarguedthatJapanresorted to a policyof forcein the 1930s
because otherpowerswerenot prepared to maketheadjustments necessary to
allowJapanto develop throughaccess to international
markets; PeaceTheory:
Preconditionsof Disarmament (NewYork:Knopf,1962),p. 9.
170. A. F. K. OrganskiandJacekKugler,The War Ledger(Chicago: Universityof
Chicago Press,
1980),p. 61.
171. JacekKuglerandA. F. K. Organski,The PowerTransition: A Retrospective
and Prospective Evaluation, in Midlarsky,ed., Handbookof War Studies,
pp. 171-194, esp.pp. 172-174.
172. Ibid.,p. 175.DouglasLemke/andJacekKuglerconclude thata largenumberof
studiesconsistentlyconfirms
the claimthat parityandtransitionincreasethe
probabilityof war; The Evolutionof the PowerTransitionPerspective,in.
KuglerandLemke,eds.,ParityandWar:Evaluations andExtensions of theWar
Ledger(AnnArbor,MI: Universityof MichiganPress,1996),p. 14.
173. BruceBuenode Mesquita,Risk, PowerDistributions, andthe Likelihoodof
War, InternationalStudies
Quarterly,25 (December 1981).Theauthorsmajor
book-length work is The War Trap (New Haven,CT: YaleUniversityPress,
1980). The articlecitedand other articleswritten since1980 containrenements
of hismajorwork.SeealsohisSystemicPolarization
andthe Occurrence
and
Durationof War, Journalof Conict Resolution,
22 (June1978), 241-267;
The Costsof War: A RationalExpectations
Approach,AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview, 77 (June 1983), 347-357; and The War Trap Revisited:A
RevisedExpectedUtility Model, AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,79 (March
1985), 157-177. With additionalrenements, he says,the revisedversion. . .
isa powerfultoolforintegrating
manyextanthypotheses
aboutconict, andhe
expresses
condencethat hisapproach mayyieldsignicant, lawlikegeneral-
izations about the initiation, escalationand terminationof internationalcon-
ict. Ibid., pp. 156, 172.
174.

175.

176.

177.

178.

179.

180.

181.

182.

183.

184.

NOTES 337
185.
Ibid.
338

MACROCOSMIC THEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR

Misperceptionsand the Causesof War, World Politics, XXXVI (October

1983), 76-99, and Theories of General War, World Politics, XXXVI (April
1985), 344-374; Randolph M. Siverson and Michael P. Sullivan, The
Distribution of Power and the Onset of War, Journal of Conict Resolution, 27
(September1983), 473-494; Randolph M. Siversonand Michael R. Tennefoss,
Power, Alliance and the Escalation of International Conict, 1815-1965,
American Political ScienceReview, 78 (December 1984), 1057-1069; George
Modelski and Patrick Morgan, UnderstandingGlobal War, journal of
193. Conict Resolution, 29 (September 1985), 391-417; Paul A. Anderson and
Timothy J. McKeown, Changing Aspirations, Limited Attention, and War,
World Politics, XL, (1) (October 1987), 1-29.
194. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War and Revolution
(New York: American Book Company, 1937), Vol. 3 in his three-volume series,
195. Social and Cultural Dynamics, p. 283.
Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood,
1960), chap. 2.
196. J. David SingerandMelvin Small,Alliance Aggregationandthe Onsetof War,
1815-1945, in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics (New
197. York: Free Press,1968), pp. 247-286.
Quincy Wright, A Study of War, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
198. 1942), p. 651.
Toynbee covers the period from 1494 down to 1945. A Study of History, 12
199. vols., Vol. 9 (London: Oxford University Press,1954), pp. 250-255.
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causesof War (New York: Free Press, 1973; 3rd ed.,
200. 1988), p. 8.
Bouthouls view is cited with approval by JacquesEllul in The Technological
Society (New York: Random House-Viking Books, 1964), p. 137.
201. Blainey, Causesof War,pp. 91-96.
William R. Thompson, Phasesof the BusinessCycle and the Outbreak of War,
International StudiesQuarterly, 26 (June 1982), 301-311. Seealso his Uneven
Economic Growth, Systemic Challenges, and Global Wars, International
Studies Quarterly, 27 (September 1983), 341-355; and Raimo Vayrynen,
Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Power Management and Wars Between
Major Powers, International Studies Quarterly, December 1983, 389-418.
Small and Singer tentatively mentioned the possibility of a 15- to 20-year cycle,
but they xed the cycle at irregular intervals between20 and 40 years.
202. Melvin SmallandJ. DavidSinger,Patternsin International
Warfare,The
Annals(CollectiveViolence),No. 391 (September
1970),147-148.The authors
cite Frank H. Denton and Warren Phillips, who derived from the data of Wright,
Sorokin, and Richardson a cycle of wars every 30 years since 1680. Some
Patternsin the History of Violence,journal of Conict Resolution,XII (June
1968), 182-195.
203. GeorgeModelskiandWilliam R. Thompson,Long Cyclesand GlobalWar, in
ManusI. Midlarsky,ed.,Handbookof WarStudies(Boston:UnwinHyman,
1989), pp. 23-54, quoted at p.36. Seealso GeorgeModelski and Patrick
Morgan, Understanding Global War, journal of Conict Resolution, 29
(December 1985), 473-502; George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics
(Seattle,WA: University Press,1987); William R. Thompson, Polarity, the Long
204.

205
.
206.
207.

208.

209. NOTES 339

210.
toWorld
Politics
(Columbia,
SC:University
ofSouth
Carolina
Press,
1988);
and
Balances
of Power,
Transition
andLongCycles,
in Kugler
andLemke,
eds.,
Parity and War,pp. 163-165.
ModelskiandThompson,
LongCycles
andGlobalWar,p. 24.
Ibid., tableon p. 25.
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
211. Ibid.,pp.30-31.Heretheauthors
relyonRobertGilpins
WarandChange
in
WorldPolitics(NewYork:Cambridge University
Press,1981).Seethediscus-
sion on this topic in The InternationalSystem:CyclicalTheoriesand
Historical-Structural
Theories
of War,chap.9 in GregCashman, WhatCauses
212. War?An Introductionto Theoriesof InternationalConflict(New York:
LexingtonBooks,1993),esp.pp. 254-257.
Immanuel
Wallerstein,
The Politicsof the WorldEconomy
(Cambridge
England:
Cambridge
University
Press,1984),pp.37-46.Citedin Modelskiand
Thompson,LongCycles
andGlobalWar,pp.31-32.

213. ModelskiandThompson,
Charles
Commonalities
LongCycles

andConiplementarities,
andGlobalWar,pp.34-42.
F.Doran,PowerCycleTheoryof Systems
Structure
in Midlarsky,
andStability:
ed.,Handbook
of War
Studies,pp. 82-110,citedat pp. 85-87. Internationalrelationsare . . . the re-
sultantof foreignpolicyinuences
operating
bothonthehorizontal
chessboard
of short-term
strategic
calculation
andbalance
andonthevertical
planeof
214. long-term
upwardanddownward
movement
alongthestatecycles
changein powerandrole. Ibid., p. 83.
of differential
Ibid., p. 88. SeealsoDoransWar and PowerDynamics: Economic Under-
215. pinnings,InternationalStudiesQuarterly,27 (December 1983),419441;
Systemic Disequilibrium,
Foreign
PolicyRole,andthePowerCycle:Challenges
for
Research Design,journalof ConictResolution,
33(September
1989),371401.
216.
Doran, Power CycleTheory,p. 103.
Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., p. 91.
Doran, War andPowerDynamics,431-438.
340

223.
224. MACROCOSMIC Tl-IEORIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL WAR
Ibid., 145.
225. JoshuaS. Goldstein,The Possibilityof Cyclesin InternationalRelations,
InternationalStudiesQuarterly,35 (December1991),477-480.Bothquota-
226. tions at p. 477.
227. JoshuaS. Goldstein,Long Cycles(NewHaven,CT: YaleUniversityPress,
1988), p. 176.
Goldstein,Possibilityof Cycles,478; andLong Cycles,p. 177.
228. Lois W. Sayrs,The Long Cycle in InternationalRelations:A Markov
Specication,
International
Studies
Quarterly,37 (June1993),215-237,espe-
cially 216-218.
229. GeorgeModelski,LongCycles,Kondratieffs
andAlternating
Innovations,
in
CharlesW. Kegley,
Jr.,andPatrickMcGowan,eds.,ThePoliticalEconomyof
230.
ForeignPolicyBehavior(BeverlyHills, CA: Sage,1981).
Nathaniel
Beck,TheIllusionof Cycles in International
Relations,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
35(December
1993),455-476,quotedat p. 456.
231.
Ibid.
MichaelW. Doyle,LiberalismandWorldPoliticsRevisited,in CharlesW.
Kegley,Jr.,ed.,Controversies
in International
Relations
Theory:Realism andthe
NeoliheralChallenge (NewYork:St.Martins,1995),p. 102drawson Doyles
earlierimportantarticle,LiberalismandWorldPolitics,AmericanPolitical
Science Review, 80(December 1986),1151-1169,whichis citedby virtuallyall
who havewritten subsequently
on the subject.SeealsoWadeL. Huntley,Kants
Third Image:Systemic Sources of the LiberalPeace,InternationalStudies
Quarterly,40 (1) (March1996),45-76.For anotherperspective, seeJohnR.
Oneal,Frances H. Oneal,ZeevMoaz,andBruceRussett, The LiberalPeace:
Interdependence,
Democracy, andInternational
Conict,1950-1985,journal
of PeaceResearch, 33 (1) (1996),11-28.SeealsoHenryS.FarberandJoanne
Gowa,PoliticsandPeace, International
Security,
20 (2)(Fall1995),123-146;
and Ido Oren, The Subjectivityof the DemocrativePeace:ChangingU.S.
Perceptions
of ImperialGermany,International
Security,
20 (2) (Fall 1995),
147-184. For recent collections of literature on democratic peace theory, see
Miriam FendiusElman, ed., Paths to Peace:Is Democracythe Answer?
(Cambridge,
MA, andLondon:TheMIT Press,
1997);andMichaelE. Brown,
SeanM. Lynn-Jones,
and StevenE. Miller, eds.,Debatingthe DemocraticPeace
(Cambridge,MA, andLondon:TheMIT Press,1996).
232. Doyle,Liberalismin WorldPolitics,p. 95. Thequotationsaretakenfrom
KantsPoliticalWritings,ed. by Hans Reissand trans.by H. B. Nisbet
(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970),pp. 105, 104.James
LeeRayhaspointedout that JeremyBentham, ThomasPaine,andG. W. F.
Hegelhadadvancedsimilararguments, Democracy andInternationalConict
(Columbia,
SC:University of SouthCarolinaPress,1995), citedin Gellerand
Singer,
Nationsat War,p. 85.[D]espitethefactthatdemocraciesappearnoless
war-prone
thannondemocratic states,recentdyadic-level
analyses suggest
that
 NOTES 341

234. Melvin
Small
andJ.David
Singer,
TheWar-Proneness
ofDemocratic
Regimes
Jerusalem
journalofInternational
Relations,
1 (Summer
1976),
50-69.
235. PaulDiehl,ArmsRaces
andEscalation:
A Closer
Look,journalof Peace
Research,
20(3)(September
1983),
205-112,
andArmaments
Without
War:An
Analysis
of Some
Underlying
Effects,
journalof Peace
Research,
22(3)
(September1985),249-259.
HenryS.FarberandJoanne Gowand nolinkbe-
tweendemocracy andwarpriorto 1914,butonlysince1914.Politicsand
Peace,International
Security,
20(Fall1995),
pp.123-146.NilsPetter
Gladitsch
testedandrejectedthegeographical
distanceexplanation
for thedemocratic
peace,concluding
thatdoubledemocracyis a near-perfect
sufficient
condition
forpeace.
Geography,
Democracy,
andPeace,
International
Interactions,
20
(1995), p. 318.
236. CarolR.Ember,
Melvin
Ember,
andBruceRussett,
Peace
Between
Participator
Politics:
A Cross-Cultural
Testof theDemocracies
Rarely
FightEachOther
Hypothesis,
WorldPolitics,44 (July 1992),574-575.
237. Jack5.Levy,
DomesticPolitics
andWar,in Robert
J.Rotberg
andTheodore
K.Rabb,eds.,
TheOrigin
andPrevention
ofMajorWars (Cambridge,
England
CambridgeUniversity
Press,
1989), p.88.
238. Doyle,Liberalism
andWorldPolitics
Revisited,
pp.89-92.
239. NicholasG.OnufandThomas J.Johnson, Peace in theLiberalWorld:Does
Democracy Matter?in CharlesW. Kegley,Jr., ed., Controversies in
International
Relations
Theory:
Realism
andtheNeoliberal
Challenge
(New
York:St.Martins
Press,
1995),
pp.192-193.
Foranother
perspective,
see
John
R.Oneal,
Frances
H. Oneal,
ZeevMaoz,andBruce
Russett,
TheLiberal
Peace:
Interdependence,
Democracy
andInternational
Conict,1950-1985,
Journal
ofPeace
Research,
33 (1)(1996),11-28.
240. Rudolph
Rummel,
Libertarianism
andInternational
Violence,
Journal
of
ConictResolution,
27 (March1983),27-71.
241. S.Chan,Mirror,Mirroron theWall. . . AretheDemocratic
States
More
Pacic?
Journal
of ConictResolution,28(December
1984),
617-648;
and
EricWeede,
Democracy
andWarInvolvement,
journalof ConictResolution,
28 (December
1984),649-694.
242. RudolphRummel,LibertarianPropositions
on Violence
Between
andWithin
Nations,
journalof ConictResolution29 (September 1985 ), 419-455.
Zeev
MaozandNasrinAbdolali, in anextensive
replication
of studies,
reached
the
robustconclusion
thatthereisnolinkbetweenregimetypeandwaratthena-
tionallevelof analysis,
butthatdyadic analyses
generally
provide clearsup-
portforthehypothesisthatjointpolitical
andeconomic
freedomisinversely
re-
latedto conictinvolvement; Regime TypesandInternationalConict,
1816-1976,
fournalof ConictResolution,
33(March1989),30.
243. Immanuel
Kant,PerpetualPeace,quotedby Doyle,Liberalism
andWorld
PoliticsRevisited,
p. 99,fromReiss,
ed.,p. 114.
244. Doyle,Liberalism
andWorldPoliticsRevisited,
p. 99.Doylewritesin a
laterwork,concerning
Kant:Peace holdsonlyin theinteraction
between
Liberals,he argues,not in relationsbetweenLiberalsandnon-Liberals.
The
peacetheyenjoyis,moreover,
a stateof peace,
notmerelysuccessful
deter-
renceor anabsenceof opportunity
for war. Waysof Warand Peace (New
York:WW.Norton,1997),p.252.Heelaborates uponKar1ts
viewsin ibid.,
pp. 252-258.
342

245 .

246.

247.

248.

249.

250.

251.
252.

253.

254.
264.

265.

266.

267.

268.
NOTES 343

269. Ibid., 31. The statisticalevidence,includingreasonsfor includingor excluding

certain wars, is discussedover pp. 31-33.
Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causesof Democratic
Peace,1946-1986, AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,87 (September1993),
270. 624-638,quotedon p. 624.On this point, theycitepreviouswork by Levy,Ray,
and Russett.Throughout the article, they make points previouslymade by
Maoz, Chan,Abdolali,Doyle,Lake,Rummel,andotherscitedpreviously.
Ibid., 625-627.
Ibid., 636.

271. Ibid., 636-637.

EdwardManseld andJackSnyder,Democratizationand War, International
Security, 20 (Summer1995), 5-38, esp. p. 12.
272.
Spencer
R.Weart,Neverat War:WhyDemocracies WillNot FightOneAnother
(NewHaven,CT,andLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1998),p. 13.
Ibid., 297.
273. Ibid., 22-23.
Someof thosewho are skepticalof the democracies-dont-fight
hypothesis
fear that it will buttress the Wilsonian belief that making the world safe for
democracy oughtto bea centralfocusof postColdWarU.S.foreignpolicy,
justifyingintervention
abroadto expandthe zoneof democratic peacefrom
Haiti to EastCentralEuropeto the formerstatesof the SovietUnion.SeeLayne,
Kant or Cant, 46-49. See also Scott Gates,Torbjorn L. Knutsen, and
Chapter 8
Theories of Deterrence:
Arms Control and
Strategic Stability
No singleconceptdominated
internationalstrategictheoryduringthe four
decadesof the Cold War so much as that of nuclear deterrence.Sincethe mid-
1980s,therehasbeenmuchdiscussion aboutconventional deterrence,a subject
of growingimportance
in theaftermath of theColdWarandin aneramarked
bysubstantial
reductions
in thesizeof thelargestnucleararsenals.At theoutset
therehasalsobeengrowingconsideration of otherweapons of massdestruction
(WMD)biologicalandchemical, together with theproliferation
of suchcapa-
bilitiesto states
andactors
otherthanstates.
Thischapter
surveys
theevolution
of deterrence
theoryfromtheColdWarto theearlytwenty-rstcentury.
It also
considersthat thetermdeterrence
is a productof thenuclearage.It did not ap-
pearin theliteratureof international
relationsor strategic
theorypriorto World
WarII. Previously (sincethelatterpart of thenineteenthcentury),it hadbeen
commonfor legaltheorists,followingthe UtilitarianphilosopherJeremy
Bentham, to justifypunishment asa meansof deterring peoplefrom criminal
behavior.Since thedevelopment of nuclearweapons, wroteBernardBrodie,one
of the seminaldeterrence
theoristsof the nuclearage,the term hasacquired
not onlyspecial
emphasis
butalsoa distinctive
connotation.
RobertJervis
calleddeterrence
theoryprobablythemostinuentialschoolof thoughtin the
Americanstudy of internationalrelations, perhapsbecausemost American
scholars
accepted
realism
andfoundthetheorycongenial?
The nuclear-weapons
componentis not essentialto the denition.
Alexander
L. George
andRichardSmokewrote,In itsmostgeneralform,de-
terrenceis simplythe persuasionof onesopponentthat the costsand/orrisks
of a givencourseof actionhe mighttakeoutweigh
its benets.3
Glenn
Snyderdenedit asa combination
of stickandcarrot:One detersanother
partyfromdoingsomething
bytheimplicitor explicitthreatof applyingsome
sanctionif the forbiddenact is performed,or by the promiseof a rewardif the
actis not performed.Thebulk of theliteratureon deterrence,
with only a
few exceptions,whicharenotedlater,hasfocusedon the threatof punish-
ment,while the prospectof rewardhasoften beenignored.Nonetheless, when
understoodin eithersense,the idea of deterrenceis a very old one. One can
nd examplesof the ideain the writings of Thucydidesand Machiavelli,even
344
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 345

though they never used the term. The ba1anceofpowersystemthat prevailed

in Europefor a centuryafter the NapoleonicWarswasessentiallya technique
for the managementof power in which state leaders usually sought to make
war unprotable. Deterrencewas implicit in suchsignalingor warning com-
munications as the dispatch of naval forces, the exchange of military ob-
servers,or the conclusion of alliances, but it cameto mean more in the nuclear
age, when it took on the character of an explicit threat of heavily damaging
retaliation.5
As we show subsequently,those who use statistical or comparative case-
study methods to test hypothesesabout deterrencesuccessand failure must
rely on the history of conventional deterrencecases.Nevertheless,becausethe
great debate for decadesturned on the issue of nuclear deterrence, and be-
causeit was that strategicpolicy that gaverise to later studiesof deterrence
successand failure, it is important to understand how that idea came to loom
so large after World War IIat first in the policy sciencesand then in the early
stagesof theoretical development.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND"
The generally acknowledgedpioneer theorist of strategicdeterrencewas
Bernard Brodie, a former Yale professor who becamean analyst at the RAND
Corporation.Brodieponderedthe new internationalreality within monthsof
the Hiroshima and Nagasakibombings.He wrote, Thus far the chief pur-
pose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its
chief purposemust be to avertthem.It can havealmostno other usefulpur-
pose.6Brodieoverstatedhis casein that last sentence
quoted,but subsequent
historysubstantiated
the mainpoint he wastrying to makeat the dawn of the
nuclearageat leastsofar asstrategic,allout war wasconcerned.He consid-
ered the atomic bomb, as it was then called, the absolute weapon, and any
war wagedwith suchweaponsthe greatestof catastrophes, to be avoidedat
almostany cost.Deterrencewas to be accomplished by convincingpotential
aggressors(assumingtheir decisionmakingrationality) that the gainsto be
achievedby deliberatelyresorting to nuclearwar on a sizablescalecould
never outweighthe costsof embarkingon such a course.At that time, of
course,the UnitedStatespossessedan atomicmonopoly,but atomicscientists
had no doubt that the Soviet Union would test a similar weapon within about
five years.(It did so in 1949.)It .isimportant to emphasize at the outsetthat
theconceptof nucleardeterrence restson the assumptionthat moderngovern-
mentpolicymakers,beforeoptingfor war, normallyperformthe kind of cost-
to-gainsratio analysisof which economictheoristshavelong beenfond, and
which underlies Bruce Bueno de Mesquitas expected-utility theory, discussed
in Chapters 7 and 11.
The theoryof deterrence
did not emergesuddenly;rather,it evolvedgrad-
uallyandwasdeveloped
in stages
(or whatJerviscallswaves).7Duringthe
346 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

period when the United Statesenjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons

(1945-1949), there was no systematic strategic theory of deterrence.It was
precededby the policy of containment, based on a concept recommended by
GeorgeF. Kennan.8The policy of containmentas a responseto the threat of
Sovietexpansiondid not involveany specicmilitary doctrinefor supporting
the policy. In fact, Kennan neither emphasizednor ruled out military meansof
containment, but he assumedthat they were part of the panoply of diplomatic
instruments,
alongwith politiéalandeconomic
leverage
available.9
True,the
idea was gradually taking shape in many quarters that the very existence of
atomic weapons had radically altered the character of warfare and would
everyonehopedprecludehenceforththe wagingof all-out war. The Soviets,
however, did not yet possesssuch weapons. Among American military plan-
ners in the Truman years, it was taken for granted that if general war should
break out between the United Statesand the Soviet Union, the former would
achievevictory, as in World War II, by relying on its long-range bomber force,
the principal difference being that the planes would carry the new absolute
weaponsratherthan conventional
bombs. Still recuperating
from heavy
lossesin World War II, the Soviet Union hardly appearedready to becomeem-
broiled in all-out war with the worlds only nuclear power, the United States.
It was under the impact of certain developments
and perceptionsin the
early 195Osthat Westernanalystsbeganto sharpenand rene their theories of
nuclear deterrence.Thesedevelopmentsand perceptions included the Korean
War; the growing awarenessthat two powers would soon possesssubstantial
arsenalsof nuclearweapons(both atomicand thermonuclear);
and an appre-
hension that the Westerncountries, having carried out rapid military demobi-
lization after World War II, were inferior to the communist bloc in conven-
tional forces and probably would find it politically and economically difficult
to match the communist statesat that level for a global application of the con-
tainment policy over the long haul.
The Korean War produced a strategic literature devoted to the concept of
limited war. The costly,prolonged,and ambiguousconict in EastAsia had
proved highly frustrating to the American people, who had become accus-
tomed in this century to ghting all-out war to total victory and unconditional
surrender of the enemy.Even though the Soviet Union was not prepared for
general war at the time (and the PeoplesRepublic of China was less so), the
United States,under strong political pressurefrom its European allies to con-
tain the conict, and unwilling to becomeinvolved in a largescaleground war
on the Asian mainland, imposed severelimits on its military operations. It re-
frained from employing atomic weapons (despiteits near monopoly) and from
bombing beyond the Yalu River, North Koreas border with China. In addi-
tion, the United Statespreventedthe forcesof ChiangKai-sheksNationalist
government on Formosa (as Taiwan was then still known) from joining the
United Nations police action. Against General Douglas MacArthurs declara-
tion that in war there is no substitute for victory, the advocatesof limited
war argued that in the emerging nuclear era, wars must be kept nonnuclear,
 HISTORICALBACKGROUND 347

and war aimsmust be strictly limited. In their view,it was essentialto devise
groundrulesfor preventing
warfromescalating,
evenif thismeantanagoniz-
ingly bitter strugglethat resultedonly in stalemate.
The debate over nuclear deterrencebegan in earnestafter the Eisenhower
Administration enunciated the doctrine known as massive retaliation. The
UnitedStateswould no longerfeelconstrainedto ght an indenite numberof
costlyand protractedlimited warsof the Koreanvarietywithout resortto nu-
clearweapons.Accordingto Secretaryof StateJohnFosterDulles,Local de-
fensesmust be reinforcedby the further deterrentof massiveretaliatory
power. . . . The way to deteraggression
is for the freecommunityto bewill-
ing and ableto respondvigorouslyat placesandwith meansof its own choos-
ing.12It is importantto keepin mindthatthedoctrineproclaimed
by Dulles
was not at all identicalwith the policy of deterrencethat emergedgradually
throughoutthe 19505;rather,it was only an early,crude,and controversial
application of the concept of deterrence,and it soon came in for much criti-
cism.The Air Forcehad beenarguingfor strategicnuclearforcesvastlysupe-
rior to thoseof the USSR,suchthat the UnitedStatescouldprevailin a strate-
gic exchange.
President Eisenhower,however, as a fiscal conservative concerned about
the economicsof deterrenceand defenseover the long haul, was convinced
that superiorityand a counterforcecapability(to destroyenemyforcesbefore
they could inict heavydamageon the United Statesand its allies)would be
too expensive. Such an approach would undermine the notion that nuclear
weaponsprovidedan economicallyefficientsubstitutefor largeconventional
forces.Eisenhowersettledfor the conceptof strategicsufciency,which pre-
supposedthe maintenance of large,yet not unlimited,nuclearforcesa pos-
ture midwaybetweenstrategicsuperiorityand minimumdeterrence.
This
strategy, wrote Jerome H. Kahan, did not merely reect a doctrinal choice
but representeda bureaucraticcompromisebetweenthosewho arguedthat
Americahad too muchstrategicpower and thosewho arguedthat it had too
little.13Evenwith sucha policy,theUnitedStates
enjoyeddefactostrategic
superiorityovertheUSSRfor manyyears,but the U.S.governmentneverseri-
ouslyconsideredthe option of preventivewar duringthe periodwhenit could
haveachieveda decisivevictory.
Within a relativelyshort time, the credibility of the Dullesdoctrineas an
effectivebulwark againstCommunistexpansionexceptin the caseof large-
scaleattack againstWesternEuropewas beingquestionedby severalcritics.
The doctrineof massiveretaliationimpliedthat the UnitedStateswould reply.
to a future Communist attack on such in-between areasas Asia, and on NATO
territory,with nuclearstrikesby the StrategicAir Commandagainstthe Soviet
Union and/orChina.William W. Kaufmannraisedobjectionsto suchan oper-
ationalpolicy.Althoughconcedingthat the UnitedStatespossessed the capac-
ity for carryingout long-rangestrikes,he questionedwhetherthe policy met
the fundamentalrequirementsof effectivedeterrencewhen consideringthe
problemof makingintentionscredible.Kaufmanngavehis reasons:
348 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

They [the Communist leaders]would seethat we have the capability to implement

our threat, but they would also observethat, with their own nuclear capability on
the rise, our decision to use the weapons of mass destruction would necessarily
come only after an agonizing appraisal of costs and risks, as well as of advan-
tages. . . . Korea and Indochina are important symbols of our reluctance, not
only to intervene in the peripheral areas,but also to expand the conicts in which
we have become engaged. . . . Finally, the state of domestic and allied opinion
provides them with ample reason to believe that the doctrine would be, if not a
caseof outright bluff, at the very most a proposal that would still have to undergo
searchingandprolongeddebatebeforebecomingaccepted
policy.
Paul Nitze, who had servedearlier as Director of the Policy Planning Staff
in the Department of State, criticized the Dulles pronouncement by distin-
guishing between a purely declaratory policy, designedfor a psychological or
a political purpose, and an active policy, which lends itself realistically to im-
plementation. Nitze contended that the Dulles doctrine contained too wide a
gap betweenwhat wasdeclaredand what could be done. In the mid] 950s,
Western strategic analystssought to tone down the doctrine of massiveretali-
ation and to reducethe gap betweenrhetoric and reality by speakingof
graduateddeterrence.The term wasnot a particularlyapt one,insofarasit
implied that deterrenceitself can be graduated. One can argue that aggression
either is or is not deterred, but that the application of military force can be
graduated once aggressionhas occurred. The exponents of graduated deter-
rence suggestedthat the Western deterrent would be more credible if the
Westsinferior conventional posture were to be compensatedfor by a doctrine
calling not for massiveretaliation but for the minimum amount of nuclear
force neededto discourage,repel, or defeataggression-entailing
the useof
tacticalnuclearweaponsagainstthe Communistheartland.
Convinced that total nuclear war would destroy all political and social
values, Brodie rejected those approachesto strategic planning that might in-
creasethe probability of nuclearwarpreventive war, striking preemptively
whenwar seemed
imminent,andmassive
retaliation.Helinkedthestrategy
of deterringgeneralwar to the complementary principleof limiting thosemil-
itary conicts that might breakout from time to time. He wassurethat the
U.S. government would not deliberately start a nuclear war and deemedit es-
sentialto persuadepotentialaggressors
that theycouldnevergaina signicant
advantage
by strikingrst.19Theonlywayto do this,heargued,wasto en-
surethe survivabilityof forcesthat would be capableof wreakingdevastating
damageon an aggressorin retaliation:
For one thing, it [the policy of deterrence]usesa kind of threat which we feel must
be absolutely effective, allowing for no breakdowns ever. The sanction is, to say
the least, not designedfor repeating action. . . . Deterrence now means some-
thing asa strategicpolicy only whenwe arefairly condentthat the retaliatoryin-
strument on which it relies will not be called upon to function at all. Nevertheless,
that instrument has to be maintained at a high pitch of efciency and readiness
andconstantlyimproved. . . at high cost.2°
 HISTORICALBACKGROUND 349

Brodiesawnoserious
problem
of thecredibility
of U.S.deterrent
policy
with regardto a direct,strategic
nuclearattackontheUnitedStates,
sinceno
adversary,
plotting a first strike,couldcounton the inability,muchlessthe un-
willingness,
of U.S.leadership
to retaliate.Thecrucialproblem,in his view,
arosefrom the likelihoodthat the adversarywould nd it hard to believethat
the United Stateswould everretaliatemassivelyin casesof lessthan massive
aggression
because
no government
wouldrisk resortingto nuclearweapons
unlessvital nationalinterestsweregravelythreatened.Yethe hastenedto cau-
tion that it would be a tactical mistake to give the enemy an advance assur-
ancethat nuclearwar is so unthinkableas to be impossible,for this might
temptthe foe to makethewrongpredictionandinadvertentlyprecipitatetotal
nuclearwar by takinganill-conceived
gamblerAlthoughhedid not admire
massiveretaliationasan operativedoctrine,he did not objectto allowing the
enemyto think that this wasthe Americanpolicy whenthe United Statesen-
ioyed nuclear superiority.
He was more worried about thosewho would placeless relianceupon
deterrenceof vastretaliatorypower andwho would resortto the useof tacti-
cal nuclearweaponsin local wars. Dulleshimself,stungby criticismsof his
massiveretaliationstance,appearedwilling to movein this directionin 1957,
and Brodiehad misgivingsabouta shift that might increasethe risk of nuclear
warsoccurrence.Evenin the earlydaysof deterrence
theory,therewere
subtletiesin the debateasto whetherit waspossibleto distinguishclearlybe-
tweenstrategicand tacticalnuclearweapons,whethersucha theoreticaldis-
tinction could be maintained under actual combat conditions, and whether a
war involving nuclearweaponsof any sorttactical or strategiccould be
kept limited. Questionssuchasthesecameup repeatedlyin the theoreticalde-
bateaboutdeterrence duringthe periodof the Cold War.
As we notedearlier,Brodiesthinkingprofoundlyinuencedhis cotheorists
of deterrenceat RAND. Albert Wohlstetter,for example,agreedwholeheart-
edly on the needfor a survivablenuclearretaliatoryforce. Recognizingthat
weaponstechnologyundergoesconstant dynamicchange,he arguedtren-
chantly that deterrencerequiredthe constructionof an invulnerablesecond-
strikecapabilityto inict an unacceptablelevelof damagein a retaliatoryblow
againstany aggressor who would try to carry out a surprisefirst strike against
the deterrer.Writing afterthe USSRhad launchedtherst earth-orbitingsatel-
lite in 1957, Wohlstetterpointed out that impendingtechnologicaldevelop-
mentswould renderstrategicweaponsmorevulnerableto surpriseattack and
that deterrencecredibility could henceforthbe maintainedonly through the
dispersal,
mobility,andprotection(or hardening)
of nuclearmissilesystems.
Fixed,unprotectedmissilesabovegroundcould not servea second-strike role
becausethey were vulnerableto a rst strike and would thus appear.to be
provocativerst-strike weapons.If both sidesretainedsuchforces,the interna-
tional situationwould be characterizedby a condition of trigger-happyner-
vousnessand instabilityin time of crisis,when eachsidemight be temptedto
seekthe undoubtedadvantages of a rst strike.
350 Tl-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

Brodie concurred on the need for expensive technological innovation to

maintain up-to-datedeterrence,becausehe knew that stablemutual deter-
rencecould not be achievedonceand for all with any givenlevel of stateof
theartweaponstechnology.He did, however,think that Wohlstettersanalysis
concerningthe requirementsof deterrencewas too exclusivelytechnological
andfailedto takeinto accountrelevantpoliticalandpsychological
factors.
Althoughhe respected
HermanKahnstechnicalcompetence
and the original-
ity of his imaginative.
war scenarios,Brodieregarded
Kahnasunwarrant-
edly optimistic in thinking that the United Statescould survivea thermonu-
clear war.25
For more than a quartercentury,Brodie was a consistentadvocateof
credibledeterrencethroughthe maintenanceof a survivablesecond-strike re-
taliatory capability,but he remainedskepticalof most proposalsfor policies,
weaponssystems,conventionalbuildups(or counterinsurgency buildups),and
strategicand tacticaloptionsthat might tempt policymakersto plungeincan-
tiously into conict situationswith a potentialfor escalationto nuclearwar.
One effectiveway of keepingout of trouble is to lack the meansof getting
into it.27 By no meansdid he regardnuclearweaponsasuseless. Their most
importantuseis to inhibit large-scalemilitary hostilitieswith potentiallycata-
strophicconsequences.
While the UnitedStatesenjoyedstrategicnuclearsuperiority,virtually no
one doubtedits ability to deter a direct attack on itself. Many, as we have
seen,doubtedthe credibility of a policy that threatenedthe useof nuclearre-
taliation againstCommunistaggressionin suchperipheral(or gray) areas
as Asia and the Middle East. (It is much harder for a nation to maintain a
crediblethreatthat it will run the graverisk of nuclearwar for the sakeof al-
lies just as it would for its own vital national interestsor survival.)The most
seriousquestionwas whetherWesternEurope,givenits political, economic,
and cultural importance,fell into a specialgeographiccategory.Could the
United States protect Europe through indirect or extended deterrence?
Whether the Soviet Union under Stalin had any serious plans to ll the post-
war powervacuumin Europeby resortingto military forcehasremainedde-
batableevenin the postCold War era.What is certainis that in the yearsaf-
ter 1945,responsibleleadersin WesternEuropewere deeplyconcernedover
the regionsvulnerablecondition. Accordingto historian Michael Howard,
Europeansweremoreworried about their own political, economic,and mili-
tary weaknessthan overany specic,imminentthreat of attackfrom a Soviet
Union sufferingfrom evenworsepost-WorldWar II exhaustionand destruc-
tion. What they needed,saysHoward, wasreassurance morethan deterrence.
He suggests that the Marshall Plan, by sharplycontrastingthe economicre-
coveryprowessof the Westwith the bleak prospectsfor improvementin the
East,might havebeenperceivedas a threat to Moscowsability to maintain
control of EasternEurope;and this, in turn, he says,may haveprovokedbe-
havior (sucha the Berlin blockadeand the Czechcoup)that connotedaggres-
sivedesignswestward.29
Stalinsseizureof EasternEuropehad beenquite
ruthless; the United Stateshad quickly demobilizedits wartime military
 THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 351

strength,leavingonly a modest-sized
occupationforce in Germanyand
Austria; large Communistpartiesin Franceand Italy were acting like disci-
plined subversives,loyal to Moscows party line.
West Europeanswere not reassuredby Americaseconomicaid alone;
many fearedthat the restorationof their industrialand agriculturalcapacity,
far from enhancingtheir security,might makeWesternEuropea moreinviting
target.Beingthe historicalinventorsof and staunchbelieversin the balanceof
power,they wantedfrom the United Statesan assurance that would eliminate
completelywhatevertemptationthe SovietUnion might haveto attack. The
resultwas the Atlantic Alliance.The allied governments,after calculating(at
the Lisbon meetingof 1951) the high costsof matchingformidableSoviet
conventional forces in a traditional balancing process,decidedto pursue their
policy of containmentby relying on what Prime Minister Churchill and
President Eisenhower (the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander) re-
gardedasa cheaper
andmoreeffectivestrategyof nucleardeterrence.3°
This
provedto be an excellentdealfor the Europeans,reducingtheir defensebur-
den costs below what they would have otherwise been, but, as Michael
Howard notes, it meant that the credibility of the deterrent posture de-
pended on a continuing American nuclear ascendancyover the Soviet
Union. . . . (and)that the peoplesof WesternEuropeeffectivelyabandoned
responsibility
for their own defense.31
For reasons
of nationaldignity,the
British and Frenchgovernments, determinedto preservea semblanceof mili-
tary independence,developedstrategicnuclear forces of their own, even
thoughthis involveddefensebudgetsof 4 percentof GDPratherthan about3
percentfor all other Continentalallies.Thesenationalnuclearforceswerenot
militarily signicant at rst. In fact, their credibility was often ridiculed, but
they were politically important to the two countries,and they eventuallybe-
cameimpressiveenoughto complicateU.S.Sovietarms-controldiplomacy.

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

Most of the advocatesof nuclear deterrencewere in fundamental agreement
about certainessentialpropositionsmost of the time. However,they could
seldomengagein discourse,spokenor written, without nding points of di-
vergence.Somecritics, of course,rejectedoutright the strategicpolicy and
strategyof nucleardeTerrence alongwith the theoryon which it wassupposed
to be based.At this point, it is usefulto summarizethoseessentialproposi-
tions on which therewas a near-consensus amongthoserealistswho found
this conceptof deterrence
intellectuallycompelling:
1. The principal purposeof nuclearweaponsis not to wagebut to pre-
cludelarge-scalewar amongthe major powersnot only nuclearwar
but alsoconventionalwar with a seriouswpotential
for escalationto the
nuclear level.
2. Nucleardeterrence
cannotbe expectedto preventmost forms of
conictbrushre wars or guerrillainsurgencies,
civil wars, local
352 Tl-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

international wars, or ethnic genocide in areaswhere a nuclear power

has no vital interests or where its nuclear threat would lack credibility
and relevance.
. Effective deterrencerequires constant and costly technological innova-
tion (modernization) to maintain international strategic stability
through the planned updating of secure,invulnerable, second-strikeca-
pabilities. (By the mid-1960s, there was a widespread assumption
among strategic analysts that the superpowers either had achieved or
were moving deliberately toward stable mutual deterrenceas a result of
dispersingand protectingland-basedICBMs and sea-based
SLBMs.32
4. Deterrence is as much a psychologicalpolitical concept as a military-
technological one. Becauseits successdependson the perceptions and
evaluationsthat go on in the decision-making
mindsof a potentialag-
gressor,credibility is always a principal requirement. A threat is most
crediblewhen it appearsto be basedon an adequatemilitary capabil-
ity to inict an unacceptable
level of damage,coupledwith a clear
intention and determinedpolitical will to use it punitively. Henry
Kissinger wrote,
From the point of view of deterrencea seemingweaknesswill have the
sameconsequencesas an actual one. A gestureintended as a bluff but taken
seriouslyis moreusefulasa deterrentthan a bonade threatinterpretedas
bluff. Deterrencerequiresa combinationof power,the will to useit, and
the assessmentof theseby the potentialaggressor.
Moreover,deterrence is a
product of thosefactorsand not a sum.If any one of them is zero,deter-
rence fails.33

To be effective,a deterrentcapabilitycannotbe kept secret.A certain

amount ofknowledgeabout it must be communicatedto the adver-
sary. If one side deploys additional weapons or modernizesits
weaponsarsenalin total secrecy, then it hasnot reallyupgradedthe ef-
fectivenessof its deterrentforce.(For a discussionof strategiccommu-
nication,seethe referenceto ThomasC. Schellingin Chapter11.) At
any giventime, of course,governmentalpolicymakersmay feel com-
fortablewith their estimatesof the existingmilitary situation.All gov-
ernmentscarry on intelligence-gathering activitiesand expectothers
to do likewise.Different departmentsand agenciesof a government
may disagreeamong themselvesconcerningintelligenceestimates.
Individualsmayfearinadequatedata,contradictionsin the data,delib-
eratedeceptionor distortion of data, and interpretationsof the data
that are deemedunduly optimisticor pessimistic.Althoughdeterrence
requiresthat someknowledgebe communicatedto the other side,
transmittingtoo much intelligencemight weakenthe deterrentif it
wereto facilitateplanninganattack.
. Deterrenceand defenseare conceptuallyquite distinct.Yet for practi-
cal planningpurposes,they are inextricablyrelated.A nuclearpower
relies on deterrenceto prevent a nuclear attack on its own or its allies
 gi,
THETHEORETICAL 353
vitalinterests,
butit alsoneeds
conventional
defense
capabilities
to
protectagainst
nonnuclear
militarythreatsto itsvitalinterests
in areas
of the world where a nuclear deterrent is highly incredible.
. Thus
theadvent
ofnuclear
weapons
didnotbyanymeans
prompt
eithergovernments
or military advisersto concludethat military
power(nuclear
or conventional)
hadlostitsutility,asWalterMillis35
andotherwriterssuggested.
KlausKnorr,BarryBlechman
andStephen
Kaplan,Laurence
Martin,andRobertGilpin,amongothers,noted
thatmilitaryforces,bothnuclearandconventional,
wouldcontinueto
castashadow
of powercapable
of inuencing
thepoliticalbehavior
of
states,eventhoughtheymightnot be usedin combat;that conven-
tionalwarsmightstill bewaged
with signicant
international
conse-
quences
whileremaining
below
thelevelofthenuclear
threshold;
and
thattheimplicitthreatof escalation
to thenuclear
levelcouldserve
asa powerful
deterrent
to conventional
aggression
in some
areas.
Martinargued trenchantly
thatthestrategic
nuclear
balance
between
thetwosuperpowers hadproducedawidespread
butunwarranted
be-
lief thatnuclear
weaponscanhaveno functionbeyond
neutralizing
eachotherin theframeworkof nucleardeterrence,
andthat the inac-
curateassumption
concerning
theuselessness
of nuclear
weapons
for
positive
purposes
hadhelped toshape botheliteandpopular attitudes
towardnegating
theutilityof militaryforcein general.37
In hisview,
nuclear
weapons
couldbesaidto possess
considerable
utilitybecause
theyprovide
theonlyrmassurance
ofimmunity
fromattack
andthe
onlyreliable
guarantee
against
extreme
pressure
fromother,black-
mailing,nuclear
powers.33
Healsomadea convincing
casethatnu-
clear
weapons,
combined
withadequate
conventional
defenses,
cande-
ter a Sovietattackby superior
conventional
forceson U.S.alliesin
Europe,
evenif suchanattackdidnotthreaten
thesurvival
of the
UnitedStates.Wereturnlaterto the issueof deterrence
versusde-
fensein NATO Europe.
. Theproponents
ofdeterrence
werefairlywellagreed
ontheirbasic
al-
beitsometimes
esoteric
andacronymridden
terminology.
Theydistin-
guished
between
preventive
war(premeditated
to becarried
outata
timeof theattackers
ownchoosing)
andpreemptive
war (resorted
to
byagovernment
under
thepressure
ofaconviction
thattheoutbreak
of nuclearwaris imminentandthatit muststrikerst ratherthanfor-
feittotheadversary
theundoubted
advantages
ofexecuting
adisarm-
ing blow).Theyalsodistinguished
between
a counter:/alue
strategy
(under
whichtheadversarys
population
centers
aretargeted)
anda
counterforce
strategy
(whichaimsat destroying
theadversarys
strate-
gicweapons
sites
andothermilitary
capabilities).
Theydened
strate-
gicweapons
asthoseof intercontinental
range (longrange
bombers
ICBMS,andSLBMS);tactical
weapons
asthoseof short-range
usedon
thebattleeld;
andtheater
weapons
asthoseof intermediate
rangein
Europe
(e.g.,
theSoviet
SS20s,
andNATOTomahawk
cruise
missiles
354 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

dismantled under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in

1987).The situationhaschangedsincethe disintegrationof the Soviet
Union, and attentionis paid toward the end of this chapterto deter-
rencein thepostColdWarera.A distinction, too,wasdrawnbetween
a deterrentstrategy
of massive
retaliationor Defense
Secretary
Robert
McNamarasassureddestruction,which may implicitly involve the
threat of allout useof nuclearweapons(or spasmresponse),and
the damagelimiting strategyof actuallyusingnuclearweapons
with
restraintin militaryoperationsoncedeterrencehasfailedandwar has
brokenout. (Seethe following sectionon Dilemmasof Deterrence.)
Earlier studentsof international-relations
theory had to be familiar with
suchbasicconcepts of nuclearstrategyandalsowith thevariousfactorsthat
enteredinto thecalculus of deterrenceanddefense capabilities:multiplewar-
heads,hardening, dispersalandmobility,warningtimes,effectiveness of sur-
veillance,C3systems (command, control,andcommunication), reliabilityand
guidance-system accuracyof missiles,
andthecharacteristics of varioustypes
of weapons. Yetthearchitectsof nuclearstrategy basedonmutualassured de-
struction(MAD)considered thetechnicaldetailsirrelevant; theycontinued to
warnthat serious thoughtshouldnot begivento thepossibilityof deterrence
failure,for thismightincrease theprobabilityof its failureby makingnuclear
war appearlessunthinkable.
Theconcept
of mutualdeterrence
is,in a sense,
theclassical
notionof bal-
anceof powerin modernguise.Manywriters,including
Bernard
Brodie,
HedleyBull, HenryA. Kissinger,
RobertBowie,RobertOsgood,DonaldG.
Brennan,
ThomasC. Schelling,andHermanKahntreatedmutualdeterrence,
stabledeterrence,balanceddeterrence,and stablearms balancein terms re-
markablyreminiscent of earliertreatises
on the balanceof power,andthese
writersreecteda keenawareness of thesamedifcultiesthatplagued theolder
theory.It hasoftenbeensaidthat the balanceof powerdoesnot providea
goodtheoreticalbasisfor foreign-policydecision
makingbecause it is uncertain
(in theabsenceof reliablecriteriafor measuringcomparative power)andbe-
causeit is unreal(because
nations,feelinguncertain,arenot contentto aim at
achievinga balance,but seekinsteadamarginof superiority or a unilaterally
favorablebalanceof power).Thus,politicalleaders andtheiradvisors haveal-
wayshaddifcultyin determining whetherstablemutualdeterrence describes
a conditionthatexistsor prescribes
a course thatshouldbepursued, whetherit
is anobjective
situationbestachieved automaticallybythecontinued effortsof
bothsidesto attainsuperiorityin militarytechnology or whetherit is a policy
requiringa cooperativeconscious questfor paritybyrivalgovernments.

DILEMMAS OF DETERRENCE
Eventheoristsimpressed by the powerof the nucleardeterrence ideareal-
izedthat it gaveriseto seriousintellectualdifculties,dilemmas,
..andself-
contradictions:Deterrencepresupposesrational decision-makingprocesses
 DILEMMAS or DETERRENCE 355

within the bureaucraticgovernmentsof industriallyadvancedpowers,which

aresupposed
to actaccording
to expected-utility
modelsandcost-benefit
cal-
culations.4°Because
thecapitalistandcommuniststatesweresaidto subscribe
to ideologies
basedonrationalbehavior,bothsuperpowers appeared to t the
categoryof rationalactors,capable
of makingcool,clear-headed
choices after
weighingtheprosandconsof alternative coursesof action.Yetasthousands
of warheads accumulatedin their nuclear arsenals,it becameincreasingly dif-
ficult to believethat rational political leaderscould seriouslythreatenretalia-
tion on a large scale.
Eventhoughassureddestructionseemedlogicallyto be the surestway to
holdanadversary
at bayandpreventwar,American
theorists
andpoliticalde-
cision makersweremotivatedto makethe strategyof nucleardeterrenceap-
pearmorecredibleby probingthepossibilities
of so-called
exibleresponse,
limited nuclearoptions,selectivecounterforcetargeting,and demonstration
usesof nuclearweapons (thenuclearshotacross
thebow)simply,asKenneth
N. Waltzput it, to remindeveryone-shouldanyoneforget-thatcatastro-
phethreatened. Raymond Aron,GlennH. Snyder,RichardRosecrance,Leon
Wieseltier,and othersdistinguishedbetweena deterrentthreat of devastating
damage
posedbeforethestartof a war andtheresponse
actuallymadeafter
hostilities break out. Nevertheless,many deterrencestrategistswarned
againstthinkingseriouslyaboutthe failureof deterrence,
fearingthat this
might increasethe likelihoodof its failing.
Waltzsoughta middleview,basedon practicalpoliticalexperience,
be-
tweenthetwin pessimistic
positionsthatdeterrence
cannotpossiblywork and
that the failure of deterrence
must necessarily
leadto mutual superpowerin-
cineration.Drawing a stark contrast betweenthe logic of nuclearweapons
andthat of conventional
weapons,Waltzreturnedto theoriginaltheoremof
Brodie-thatpurenucleardeterrence
precludestheneedfor an elaboratede-
fense.One neednot build up large,expensiveconventionalforcesto convince
theaggressor that thecostof victoryon an invadedterritoryis too high;all
thatis needed is to persuade
thepotentialattackerthattheriskof havingcer-
tain, quick,andcatastrophic destruction
inictedon its ownterritoryis too
frightful. The absolutequalityof nuclearweaponssharplysetsa nuclear
world off from a conventionalone.42Moreover,successful
deterrencedoes
notrequirea MAD strategy of destroying
citiesalongwitha sizable
portionof
theadversarys populationandeconomic-industrial base.In thenuclearage,
thethreatto useonlya smallamountof forceis sufcient,because oncethe
willingness
to usea little forceis shown,theadversary knowshoweasilymore
can be added.43Wemight saythat Waltz advocatedminimaldeterrence,
not
with respect
to thesizeof theforce,butwith respect
to thepunishment
to be
threatenedasthe initial responseto attack.
Thus,thesecond dilemmaof deterrence
arosefromthefactthat,asmili-
tarytechnologybecomes morecomplex,uncertainties
in themindsof strategic
plannersandpoliticaldecision
makersincrease.Thedeployment of eachnew
generationof advancedweapons systemsmakesit moredifcult to calculate
thestrategicbalance
andthepossibleeffectsof a nuclearexchange.
Doesthe
356 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

compoundingof uncertainty(which occursin spiteof computers)seemlikely

to strengthen or to weaken the condition of mutual deterrence?
Robert E. Osgoodaptly describedthe part playedby uncertaintyin the
delicateand fragile calculusof deterrencea calculusthat involvesa process
of mutual mind readingin an effort to secondguessan opponentwith respect
to intentions, values assignedto an objective, estimatedcostsand effectiveness
of certain actions,and the probability of specic interactiveresponses.He
noted that up to a point, the elementof uncertaintyin nucleardeterrence,
taken togetherwith the frightful implications of miscalculation,may con-
tribute to caution and restraint, and thus to internationalstability. None-
theless,he warnedagainstan excessive relianceon uncertainty:
It leadsto a kind of strategicmonismthat reliestoo heavilyuponthe undeviating
self-restraintandlow risk-takingpropensitiesof statesmen.It ignorestheprovoca-
tive effect of the fearful uncertainties and risks, to breed unwarranted condence
in the regularityand predictabilityof that balance,which in turn diminishesthe
restraintsuponmilitary action.

Later, StanleySienkiewicznameduncertaintyas the central problem in

contemporarystrategicanalysis.A nuclearaggressor planningan attack does
not know whetherthepotentialvictim will launchvulnerableretaliatoryforces
as soonas it is clearthat an attackis underway,nor canthe aggressor predict
how the enemyscommandand control systemwill functionand how well the
retaliatoryforceswill operate.Sienkiewicz concludedthat thegreaterthe oper-
ational uncertaintyassociated with the forcesof both sidesparticularly with
thosethat havefirst-strikecapabilitiesthegreaterthe crisisstability of the
strategicnuclearbalance.
The superpowersremainedpreoccupiedwith the ne points of the mili-
tary balanceat the strategiclevel.New developments in the elds of ballistic
missiledefense,multipleindependently targetedreentryvehicles(MIRVS),and
severalother signicantareasof advancedmilitary technologypromptedwrit-
ersthroughoutthe 1960sto expressconcernoverthepossibilitythat the inter-
national strategicsituation, viewedin objectivemathematicalterms, would
becomeunstable.It was suggested that a ballisticmissiledefense,if deployed
to protecta nationspopulationcenters,might arousean adversarys fearsthat
the nation wasenhancingits rst-strike option by preparingto blunt the retal-
iatory blow; MIRVs werelookedon by someasmeansof increasingthe num-
ber,penetrability,and accuracyof warheads,and thus of threateningto elimi-
natea largepart of a landbasedICBM forceon which the ability to carry out
assureddestructionin retaliationheavilydepended.Someanalystsdiscerned
an actionreactionrelationshipin superpowerarmamentscompetition:If one
sideinsistedon deployinga ballisticmissiledefenseto protectits strategicmis-
siles,the other allegedlywould probablydevelopMIRVs to compensate with
augmentedoffensivepowerandmight actuallyovercompensate; thusprompt-
ing the rst party both to speedup its strategicdefenseeffortsand alsoeven-
tuallyto developMIRVs.46
Essentially
similararguments,
appropriately
up-
 RATIONALITY VERSUS IRRATIONALITY 357

dated,wererevivedin the 1980sby the critics of proposalsfor a space-based

missiledefense,treatedsubsequently in this chapter.
The strategictheoristswerenot alwaysconsistent.Someof themopposed
ballisticmissiledefenseon the groundsthat it wastechnicallyandmilitarily of
low effectiveness againstincomingmissiles,and at the samecriticizedit be-
causeit would allegedlybe highly destabilizing.Somearguedthat if the
Sovietsinsistedon deployingtheir own antimissilemissiles,it would be much
cheaper andmoreeffective
for theUnitedStates
to upgradeits offensive
capa-
bilitiesby deployingMIRVs;theylaterarguedagainstMIRVsbecause they
weredestabilizing,wouldsetthearmsraceinto anupwardspiral,andwould
not substantially
improvethesecurityof theUnitedStates
or theeffectiveness
of the deterrent,sincetheywould supposedlyprovokethe SovietUnion into a
compensatory
effort.47

RATIONALITY VERSUS IRRATIONALITY

More seriouscriticismsof deterrence
theorycamefrom thosetroubledby doubts
abouttheassumption of policymakersrationalityonwhichit heavilydepends.
Some of themostastuteanalysts
of deterrence,whogrudgingly supportedit in its
nuclearform,giventheabsence of politicallyfeasible
andavailablealternatives
duringtheColdWar,neverthelessfeltconstrained to pointoutitsshortcomings,
ambiguities,
andcontradictions.Theleadinggure in thisgroupwasRobert
Jervis,whofoundit oddthatsomanyanalysts tendedto relyondeductive logic
whileignoringtheemotions andperceptions of decision
makers. Participants in
internationalrivalriesandconicts,hewarned,seldomhavean adequate
under-
standingof eachothersperspectivesandgoals.Thereceiver, therefore,
often
misses
or misinterprets
signalsthatappearperfectly
clearto thesender.
Jervisraisedsuchquestions asthese:Arethepsychological attitudesand
decisional
processes
similarfor challengers
anddefenders of thestatusquo?Is
thedefender capable
of understandingthechallengers
fearsthatthedefender
mayconstitute
a security
menace?
Do bothpartiesviewthecredibilityof
threatssymmetrically?
Canleaders
knowtheintentionsof theothersideand
predicthowit will respond?
Arebothsides
equally
concerned
abouttheirrep-
utationfor livingup to theircommitments?
(InJerviss
view,theUnitedStates
was much more sensitiveon that scorethan the SovietUnion.) In short, he
sawdecision
makersasburdened
with unmotivated
biasesbeliefs,
images,
preconceptions,
andothercognitive
predispositions.
Yethedid not entirely
discountthe assumption
of deterrence
rationality.The factthat peopleare
notcompletely
rational
does
notautomatically
vitiate
thisapproach.48
Aswe showin Chapter11,a numberof theorists havequestionedtheas-
sumption thatmoderngovernments arerationalactors.GregCashman hassum-
marizedtheimpediments to rationaldecision
makingwithinbureaucratic orga-
nizations:(1) Not all decisionmakersarecompletely rationalin termsof the
nationalinterest;someat all levelsmayactout of subconscious psychological
358 TI-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

needs.(2)Misperception maythwartanaccurate
imageof theinternational
situ-
ation.(3)In crisissituations,
leaders
mayhaveto makedecisionsundercondi-
tions of stressand lack of sleep.(4) The quality or quantityof informationre-
quiredfor rationaldecisions maybe lacking.(5) Thetimeavailablemaybe
limited,notusedefciently,or shortenedby a desirefor speedy action.(6)The
abilityto predictlikelyoutcomes
of variouspolicyoptionsin a crisisis oftenim-
perfect.(7)Performing adequate
cost-benetanalysis onall feasible
alternatives
is a dauntingtaskwithinothergivenconstraints. (8)Individualswithinvarious
advising anddecision-making groupsvaryin theirrationalassessments of policy
options,
preferred
means,
andlikelyoutcomes.
Theforegoing
list of problems
indicates
thatevenwhengovernmental
bu-
reaucracies
want to formulaterational policy in time of crisis,theymay beun-
ableto makeoptimumdecisions,
in spiteof MaxWebers optimisticthesisthat
bureaucracies
canceloutthepersonal
values, goals,andpsychological
idiosyn-
crasiesof individualsandinstitutionalizerational procedures
in decisionmak-
ingonbehalfof thestate.Beyondthedifcultiesfacedbyrationalbureaucra-
cies,sometheorists
discern
morefundamental deciencies.
Christopher
Achen,
forexample,
rejects
deterrence
theoryaslogically
incoherent.
Jervis,
too,has
heldthat a rational strategyfor the employmentof nuclearweaponsis a con-
tradictionin terms.52 Jervisalsonds thetheorywantingbecause it is derived
fromtheexperience, culture,andvaluesof theWestin short,it is ethnocen-
tric. It restson theassumption that whilenationsmaypursuecontrarygoals,
theyall sharethesamebasicbehavioral patterns,
andit failsto considerthat
people
fromother»cultures
mightdevelop
quitedifferent
analyses.53
Patrick
M. Morgannotedthat classiccriticismsof deterrence theoryturn on the
chargethatgovernments simplylackthenecessary rationalityto makeit work,
thattheyareparticularlysubjectto irrationalityin timesof intensecrisisor ac-
tilal attack.54It has becomecommonplaceto regardnucleardeterrence,at
timesof crisis,asanirrational
game
of Chicken(described
in Chapter
11).
FrankC. Zagarehastriedto squarethecirclebetween
rationalandirra-
tional decisionmakingby distinguishingbetweenprocedural and instru-
mentalrationality.Theformeris whatmostWestern
thinkers(includingcrit-
ics of nucleardeterrence
theory)haveusuallymeantby rational (basedon a
sensiblecost-benetcalculus).According to Zagare,proceduralrationality
requiresomniscience
and excludesmisperceptions
and psychological
and
emotionaldeciencies.In Westerncivilization, rational action has normally
beentakento meanactionthat is predictable,prudent,reasonable, and appro-
priatein thelight of dominantsocialvaluesandpreferences.
Zagaredoesnot
say this, but this seemsto be what he meansby proceduralrationality.
Instrumentalrationality,in his view,is somethingmorelimited.The instrumen-
tally rationalplayeris onewhohasa logicallyconsistent
orderof preferences
on which choicesarebased,regardless
of whethertheyimpressothersasratio-
nal on ethical,strategic,political, or moral grounds.Thus, Hitler and
Khomeiniare tted underthe canopyof instrumentalrationality: One under-
standstheir behaviorsimplyby understandingtheirgoals. The individual
decisionmakersanalyzed by rationalchoicetheoristscanbe,at oneandthe
 RATIONALITYVERSUSIRRATIONALITY 359

sametime, rational in the limited instrumental sense,and irrational in the sense

of theproceduralist.57
Compare thiswith thejudgment of OleR.Holsti,who
heldoutfor themoretraditionalinterpretationof whatconstitutes
rationality:
Although the assumptionsof deterrenceare valid in most times and circum-
stances,nevertheless
deterrencedoespresuppose rationaland predictabledeci-
sionprocesses.He warned,therefore,that no systemof deterrence
is likely to proveeffectiveagainsta nation led by a triggerhappyparanoid,or by
someoneseekingpersonalor nationalself-destruction or martyrdom,or by deci-
sion makers willing to play a form of international Russian roulette . . . or by
thosewho regardthe lossof mostof their nationspopulationresources
as a rea-
sonablecostfor the achievement
of foreign-policygoals.58
Jervisobservesthat the theory doesnot demandtotal rationality to be
valid. He doesnot agreewith Patrick Morgan when Morgan cites a basic
paradoxnamely, that the classicdeterrencetheory may be counterproduc-
tive if it alwaysseeksto enhancethe condenceof governments in their ability
to remainperfectlycool anddeliberatein timesof crisis.Jervismovescloserto
one of the most sophisticatedtheoristsof deterrence,
ThomasC. Schelling,in
the following passage:
Theparadoxis not asgreatasMorganthinks.Thereis an irreducibleminimumof
unpredictabilitythat operates,especiallyin situationswhich engagea stateshigh-
estvalues.Thus,eventhoughthereis no rational argumentfor a countercityre-
sponseto a Sovietattackon the UnitedStatesor WesternEurope,the merepossi-
bility may be an effectivedeterrent.. . . it is bizarrefor a stateto maintainits
securityby makingits adversaries believethat it is preparedto bring aboutthe end
of its civilization.This policy makesmore sensewhen we considerthreatsthat
leavesomethingto chance:it can be rational to threaten,and carry out, a move
that increasesslightlythe dangerof an all-out war, while it would be completely
irrational to launch an attack. Indeed, much of deterrencerests on the fact that
bothsidesknowthatevents arenotentirelyundertheircontrol.
The threat that leavessomethingto chancewasan inventionof Thomas
Schelling.Thefearof thingsgettingout of handwasSchellings favoritemethod
of solvingthecredibilityproblem.A response that carriessomerisk of war can
beplausible,evenreasonable at a time whena nal, ultimatedecisionto havea
generalwar wouldbeimplausible
or unreasonable.50
Whilethefearof irra-
tional actioncanstrengthen
deterrence,an excess
of rationalitymightleadto an
unwantedwar, accordingto Jervis,if onerationalparty initiatesa crisisor de-
cidesto stand rm in the conviction that the other is bound to retreat, while the
latter calculates that it can make one more last safe move because the former is
thought to be rational enoughto back down. The status-quoor defending
powermayfearthe dominoeffectsof retreatingin a crisis,includingthe impact
of suchbehavioron thirdpartyalliesand on the self-condence of the aggres-
sivepartyin futureconfrontations.
Beyondthedangers of misunderstanding
misperception,andmisjudgment,therealsolurksthedangerof theaccidental
andthe irrational,eitherof whichcancausethingsto go wrongor to getout of
hand, thus interferingwith the neat, calculableoperationof deterrencepre-
scribedby the intellectualtheoryof deterrence.
360 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

In the nal analysis,Jervis,following Brodieand Schelling,is more inter-

estedin achievingdeterrencethrough manipulatingthe level of risk than
through acquiringa military capabilityfor escalationdominance.Jervissees
deterrencethrough the acceptance of a spectrumof risks as preferableto de-
terrence through a spectrum of planned violence:
The rst problemwith the escalationdominancelogic 1Sthat a statecondent of
winning at a given level of violence may be deterred becauseit judges the cost of
ghting at that level to be excessive.On the other hand, even if defensecannot
succeed,
the threatto defendcan deterif the othersidethinks that the statusquo
power-is sufficiently strongly motivated to ght for a losing cause. Nuclear
weaponshavenot changedthe fact that defeatingan enemyis not worthwhile if
the costs entailed are greater than the gains.
. . . It is not correct to claim that the threat to escalatewill be credible only if
it is believedthe actionwill bring a military victory; onemustconsiderthe price
that both sideswould have to pay. Thus, the U.S. might deter a Soviet invasion of
WesternEuropeby threateningto usetacticalnuclearweaponsevenif the Soviets
believed
thattheycouldwin sucha war.
Zagare concluded from his studies that we are ignorant about the condi-
tions underwhich statesmenarepreparedto ght or capitulate,that is, we do
not as yet havean understandingof the forceswhich giverise to the prefer-
encesof the players.52
Nonetheless,
because
eachplayer,whencontemplat-
ing changein the statusquo, is uncertainabout the opponentspreferences,
and whetherthe opponentmay be instrumentallyrational (andperhapsself-
programmedto executethethreat),Zagaretook successful deterrence(if cred-
ible)to belikelyalthoughnot certain.

The Limits of Deterrence

In one of Jervissdenitions of deterrenceas a theory about the ways in
which an actor manipulatesthreatsto harm othersin order to coercethem
into doingwhathedesires,he seemsto confusedeterrence with compellence,
althoughhe is well awarethat thereis a considerabledifferencebetweentry-
ing to dissuadean adversaryfrom undertakingan actionyou want to prevent
and trying to compelthe other party to take somepositiveaction that you
want done.The threatof nuclearpunishmentcanbe usedto deter,but hardly
to compel,exceptperhapsto reversea dangerousprocessalreadyset in mo-
tion that might conceivablyleadto nuclearwar (e.g.,removingSovietmissiles
from.Cubaduringthe CubanMissileCrisisof 1962). A threatto employ
U.S. strategicnuclearsuperiorityin the 1950sto force the SovietUnion to
withdraw from EasternEuropewould havelackedany semblance of credibil-
ity or politicalandstrategicprudence.
Jervishimselfadmitsthat deterrence
theorists present reasonableargumentsabout why compellenceis usually
moredifcult thandeterrence,65 butheexpresses
doubtthatit is easierto de-
ter thanto compelin all circumstances,
especiallyiif
theaggressor decides to
risk taking the initiative:
 RATIONALITYVERSUSIRRATIONALITY 361

It has been said that the state trying to change the status quo is in a weaker
bargainingposition becauseit can drop its demandwithout raising the danger
that the statusquopower will raisenew demands.But it is hard for the,latter
to retreat without damagingits ability to standfirm againstdemandsfor fur-
ther changes;therefore,it should be able to prevail.,Thereis a difficulty with
this argument,however.
Onemustlook at what eachsidewill gainif it pre-
vails. Here the very advantagejust ascribedto the statusquopower turns out
to bea disadvantage.
Whattheaggressor
cangainis notlimitedto thespecific.
issue,but includesan increasedchanceof prevailingin future attemptsto alter
the statusquo. The statusquopower,by contrast,gainsonly a temporary
respite.
Jerviscriticizeddeterrence theoryon thegroundsthat it sayslittle about
howto change . . . anadversaryor to determine whetherchanges havetaken
place.67Deterrence, however,mayproduce stabilitylongenoughfor otherfac-
torsto bringaboutchange. Asaguide,it tellsleaders howto maintaina hostile,
mutuallydangerous relationship,
but not howto alterthesituation.Thus,it
providesa greaterhelpin understanding crisesthanin understandinglong-run
disputes,but it offersno adviceon how to avoidcrisesor how to decide
whether the national interestsat stake are sufcient to warrant the resort to mil-
itaryforce;andit is inadequate because it failsto takeinto accountthat suc
cessfulaccommodation usuallyrequires at leastsomechange in thevaluesand
goalsof bothsides.58 Jervischargesfurtherthatdeterrence theoryneglectsthe
roleof rewardsandcompromises in theresolution of confrontational
crisesbe-
cause
it issimpler
to ignore
outcomes
thatarenotclear-cut
andbecause
real-
ist scholarswho dominatethefield assume
that promisesof rewardsarelesspo-
tentthanthreats
ofpunishment
in inuencing
thebehavior
of states.59
A decade
afterJervispublished
hiscriticism,PaulHuthandBruceRussett
reiteratedthe view that not only the negativethreat of punishmentor sanc-
tionsbut alsothepositiveofferof rewardsor inducements
constitutes
a logi-
calpartof rationaldeterrence
theory,
andtheylament thefactthatthislatter
aspect
hasbeensolongneglected or consideredfor
example, by Richard
NedLebowandJanice GrossSteinasanalternative
to deterrencetheory.7°
Thedebatebetween
the two pairsof scholars
is considered
subsequently,
in
connectionwith effortsto testdeterrence
empirically.

Deterrence and the Arms-Reaction Process

WastheU.S.Soviet
nuclearweapons
competition
from thelate1940sto the
late 1980san armsrace,embodyingthe sort of action and reactionprocess
that hadbeendescribedby Richardson (discussedin Chapter7)?Thosewho
werenot merelyskepticalaboutcertainaspectsof deterrence theorybut
deeplyandemotionallyopposed to the.conceptof deterrence
andthenuclear
strategybasedonit wereofteninclinedto thinkthateveryadditionto thesu-
perpowers arsenalswasboundto«increase theprobabilityofwar.Theyac-
cepted
theconventional
wisdom
thatno weapon*
haseverbeeninvented
that
wasnot eventually
used.Theyignoredthefactthatbothsuperpowers
retired
362 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

and replaced earlier generations of nuclear missiles without ever employing

them in war. (Nuclear weaponsmight be used in the future, but they were not
used in a military conict betweenthe United Statesand the Soviet Union, al-
though both sides used the possessionof these weapons for the political and
psychological purpose of deterrence.)
Therewere occasionalcalls for minimum or nite deterrence,accompa-
nied by assurancesthat modestsizedforces--much smaller than those in exis-
tence, perhaps as few as 50 or 100 nuclear missi1eswould be quite sufcient
to deter nuclear war. That may have been true, but in the context of the Cold
War,sucha judgmentwas politically irrelevant.Both superpowers
carriedon
more or iess steady competition in the researchand development,production,
and deploymentof advancedweapons.Eachsidehad to makesurethat it had
enough for adequatedeterrence,given the uncertainty factor discussedearlier
and the lack of progress toward negotiated arms reduction before the late
1980s. Barry Nalebuff summarizedthe dilemma:

The theory of minimal nucleardeterrencehighlightsthe degreeof cooperation

that two mutually suspiciouscountries can achieve.If perfect monitoring and en-
forcement of«agreementswere somehow available, then both sides would have
great incentivesto reduce their weapon supplies.But there is no supreme
enforcer.. . . Without monitoringand enforcement, the noncooperativesolution
becomesunstableat low levelsof arms. . . . At low enoughlevels,at leastone
sidewill havean incentiveto breakany agreement andattemptto achievea domi-
nantposition.Therationalfearof a violationputsa limit on how far onecantrust
an opponentto disarmratherthan attack.

Albert Wohlstetter argued in 1974 that over a nineyear period

1962-1971, there had not really been an arms race. He contended that the
United States,still strategicallysuperior,insteadof overreactingto Soviet
armsprograms(asrequiredby the Richardson
process
modeldiscussed
in
Chapter 7), had underreacted with self-condence and restraint, reducing
constantdollarexpenditures
on strategicweapons
by two thirds.72
U.S.de-
fense budgets continued to decline after the end of the Vietnam War (which
had absorbeda substantialfraction of U.S.expendituresin the latter part of
the period studiedby Wohlstetter).In contrast,the SovietUnion, which was
not a participant in the Vietnam War except as a supplier at much lower cost,
not much more than 10 percentof the Americancommitment,devotedthe
bulk of its military budgetto acquiringnew capabilities,with seeminglylittle
regardfor resourceconstraints.73
After a quarterwcentury in which the United Stateshad enjoyedvirtually
unquestionedstrategicsuperiority,the late 1970sand early 1980sproduced
a growing perception throughout the West that,,in view of Soviet heavy
multiple-warheadstrategicmissiles(intercontinental)and multiple-warhead
intermediate-range missilesin the Europeantheater,the global strategicand
theaterbalancewastilting graduallyin favor of the SovietUnion.74U.S.and
NATO problemswereexacerbated by the fact that the two superpowers(re-
gardlessof their actualstrategicintentions)maintainedvery different public
 RATIONALITY VERSUS IRRATIONALITY 363

strategic
doctrines
in theirofficialgovernmental
statements
andmilitarylitera-
ture concerningwhat they would do in the eventof deterrencefailure. The
United Statesadheredto a second-strikestrategy in the event of a direct attack
onitself;it wouldneverinitiatea firststrategic
strikeontheUSSR. (U.S.strat-
egyfor its extendeddeterrentin Europeis discussed later.)TheSovietUnion,
which was undoubtedlyno lessinterestedthan the United Statesin deterring
nuclearwar,madeit fairlyclearthat if nuclearwar shouldeverappearto be
imminent,
it wouldpursue
a preemptive
rst-strike
strategy.-75
Grantedthat strategicdoctrineis not the sameastheory,differences
in
doctrinenevertheless
certainlyinuencedandcomplicated thetheoretical
de-
bate. Matters were not helpedby the fact that Washingtonwas sometimes
too explicit and at othertimestoo vaguein promulgatingofcial policy,
whileMoscowplaceda highpremiumon secrecy, asa UnitedNationsdocu-
ment noted:

Theconcept of militarydoctrine
isused
in somewhatdifferent
waysbythemajor
militarypowers.. . . Sovietnuclear
doctrines
aregenerallynot asopenlyex-
pressedasisthecase intheUnitedStates.
Soviet
thinking onthesubject
to alarge
extenthasto bededucedfromverygeneral statements,
frommilitaryforcedispo-
sitions,andfromSovietmilitarywriting.
Many Westernanalysts,
therefore,wereskepticalas to whetherthe Soviet
Unionaccepted
theconceptof mutualdeterrenceasunderstood in theWest.
Those who believed that the Soviet Union was an inherently expansionist
powerbenton theeventual achievement
of globalhegemony
tookoneap-
proachto theSoviet
threat;thosewhoconsidered
theSoviet
Uniona tradi-
tionalnation-state
givento revolutionary
rhetoricbutincreasingly
defensive
in
outlooktook quiteanother.Eventhe formergroupdividedbetweenthose
whothought
thattheleadership
in Moscow
strongly
preferred
a psychopoliti-
cal strategythat prescribed
the avoidance
of a decisive,
frontalmilitaryen-
counterat all costsand thosewho wereconvincedthat Moscowwas seeking
military superiorityfor a strategicfirst strike.Up to the mid-1970s,most
American strategic
analysts hopedthatSovietplanners couldgraduallybeper-
suaded to adoptAmerican theoriesof deterrence andarmscontrol.
Themostcrucialissuein thestrategic debate wastherelationship
between
deterrence anda war-ghtingcapability. Thosewhofollowedalongthepath
marked outbyBernard
Brodie heldthattheonlypurpose
of possessing
stock-
pilesof nuclear
weapons
is to deternuclear
waror anywarwitha potential
for escalating
to the nuclearlevel.For this schoolof thought,nuclearwar
mustremainunthinkable, andnuclearweapons mustneverbeused.Themere
existence
of nuclearweapons shouldbe sufcientto dissuadethe opponent
fromcarrying
outa strategic-nuclear
firststrikeagainst
theUnitedStates
or
large-scale
conventional
aggression
against
Western
Europe.
Jervis
andothers
arguedthatnuclear
superiority
didnotmatter.77
Others,following
morealongthelinessuggested
by Herman Kahnand
AlbertWohlstetter,
argued
thatdeterrence,
to bemostcredible
andeffective,
re-
quires
anoperational
doctrine
anda perceived
capability
forghting,winning,
364 TI-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE&#39;
ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

surviving,andrecoveringfrom a nuclearwar.This typeof strategypresupposes

the achievementof strategictmilitarysuperiority,involvinginvulnerable(hard-
ened,dispersed,and/ormobileforces),a damage-limiting capability(to destroy
the adversarys
nuclearweaponsbeforethey could be used),activeantimissile
andpassive
civil defenses,
a highlyefficientandsurvivable
C31system(com-
mand, control, communications,and intelligence) for early warning and battle
management, an arsenalof reliablemissilesand warheadsaccurateenoughto
kill hardenedtargets,all combinedwith the political will and psychological
readinessto strikefirst.78The debateovernucleardeterrentstrategywasnever
nally settledbeforetheglobalsituationbeganto undergoa fundamentaltrans-
formation in the late 1980s. (PostCold War thinking about nuclear policy and
strategyin the twentyfirstcenturywill beexaminedlaterin this chapter.)
It is worth stressing,however,that the U.S.Sovietarmsraceif that IS
what it wasdid not escalateto war, despite the many fears expressedfrom
the late 1970s until well into the 1980s that the Soviet Union was trying to
overtakethe United Statesin strategicmilitary power.Two Dutch scholars,
Hank Houwelingand Jan Siccama,provideda theoreticalbasisfor the fears
by concurringwith the OrganskiKuglerhypothesis(discussed in Chapter7)
that war occurswhen a powerful challengerovertakesa formerly powerful
dominantnation, and they arguedthat this would hold true in the nuclearas
in theprenuclear
age.79
ConcernoverSovietheavymultiplewarhead
missile
deployments,after the SALTI Accordhad allegedlycodied strategicparity,
led U.S.defenseofficials(includingJamesSchlesinger,
a Secretaryof Defense
in theNixon Administration, and Harold Brown, the Secretaryof Defensein
the Carter Administration)to raise questionsas to how certain the United
States could continue to be about the maintenance of an assured-destruction
capability,that is, the ability to inict an unacceptable
amountof damagein
retaliation after a surpriserst strike. Schlesinger
calledfor limited nuclear
optionsandselective
targeting;8°
Brownadopteda countervailing
strat-
egy, which waswidelyinterpretedasa signthat theUnitedStateswasregear
ingfromdeterrence
to war-fighting
plans.81
RichardL. Garwinwarnedstrategistsworried overthewindow&#39;of
vulner-
abilitynot to advocate
a policyof launchon warning.82
Thecentralissues
in this-phaseof the debatewere (1) whetherthe adoptionof a warfight1ng
strategy by the United Stateswould strengthen the deterrent against war or
make war more likely to occur,besidesthe obviouslycontroversialissueof
whethernuclearwar could be won in any politically meaningfulsense;and
(2) whether nuclear war, should it ever begin, could be limited and controlled
belowthe levelof mutualextinctionof the superpowers andthe destructionof
a largepart of the humanraceand its civilizationsasa resultof nuclearblast,
fallout, and nuclear winter. The answer to the first question is highly subjec-
tive, for it dependson the psychologyand politics (or psychopoliticalcharac-
teristics) of each individual making the judgment. Some would argue, as
McGeorgeBundy did, that no rational Americanor Sovietleaderwould be
willing to contemplatethe lossof evenone or two citiesfor the sakeof Win-
ninga foreignpolicy
crisis.83
At theoppositesideof thepsychopolitical
spec-
 RATIONALITY VERSUS IRRATIONALITY 365

trum, somewould insistthat the SovietUnion,havingrecovered from the

highlydestructive
WorldWarII (in whichmilitaryand»civiliandeathsin ex-
cessof 20 million werea hundredtimesgreaterthan Americanlosses),might
bewillingto placea higher
priceonanuclear
warthatit thought,
in a critical
confrontation,
it mightwin andfromwhichit couldrecover.

The Controllability of Nuclear War

Thesecond
questionCan
nuclearwar,oncebegun,be limitedandcon-
trolled?is more technical.The limitation of nuclearwar would requireon
bothsides
a greatdealof politicalself-restraint
andahighlydeveloped
system
of C31.Forinstance,
let usassumea verystrongmutualdetermination
to pre-
ventuncontrollable
escalationanda desireto avoiddamaging
theadversarys
C31structure
(despite
powerful
militaryincentivesinsomecases
to destroyit),
sothattheadversary
canknowtheintentionto limitandcanrespondin kind.
Evenif we makethisassumption,it wasnevertheless
suggestedthat theper-
formanceof theC31structuremaynot proveadequateto theheavydemands
placed
onit during
anuclear
exchange
because
ofmany
factors:
jamming,
de-
ception,
inltration,andsabotage
byspecial
forces,
or defense-suppressio
at-
tacksbystrategic
forces;
stafng
byincompetent
orpoorlytrained
personne
whoundergo
psychological
shockoncenuclear
hostilities
havebeeninitiated;
improper
netting
andcoordination
of communicating
units;technical
equip-
mentfailures;
timelags;human
operating
errors-under
conditions
of extreme
stress;
misinterpretation
of information
and/ororders;
atmosphericand
ionospheric
disturbances;
communications
blackout
effects
(lasting
severa
hours)of electromagnetic
pulse(EMP)fromthe detonation
of largether-
monuclear
weapons
inandabove
theatmosphere;
andother
causes.
Desmond
Ballanalyzed
thevulnerabilities
of C31
systems
andtheirim-
plications
forthecontrolof nuclear
war.Hepointed
outthattheNational
Command Authorityisvulnerable
to attackbysubmarine
launched ballistic
missiles
(SLBMs),for whichthewarningtimewouldbeminimal.Ballde-
scribedtechnologically
morecomplexdifcultiesandfailuresthat could
arisein theoperation
of airborne
C3systems
oftheStrategic
Air Command
or theNavy,affecting
thecommunications
linksbetween
command
centers
andintercontinental
ballisticmissiles(ICBMs)or SLBMS,
or both;of satel-
litewarning,
reconnaissance,
andcommunication
systems
(thereby
degrad-
ingintelligence
concerning
whatis actually
happening
worldwide);
of the
WashingtonMoscow
HotLine,onwhichsuperpower
emergency
communi-
cations
depend;
andofthesubmarine
command
andcontrol
system,
notbe-
causeof thesubmarine
survivabilityfactorbut ratherbecause
of the special
problems
associated
withmaintaining
reliable
communications
withsub-
mergedsubmarines,
properly
functioning
navigation
systems,
andtheability
to use SLBMS selectively.
Ball andotheranalysts,
including
MichaelHoward,AndreiSakharov
Spurgeon
M.Keeny,
Wolfgang
K.H.Panovsky,
IanClark,
andRobert
McNa-
mara,
concluded
thatnuclear
Warcould
notbecontrolled,
except
perhaps
fora
366 TI-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

relativelysmallportionof strategic
nuclearforces,onlyfor a briefperiod,and
only in situationswhereall nuclearweaponspowerspracticedrestraint.
Controlwould quicklybe lost in a high-levelnuclearexchange in which
strategically
important
military,political,andadministrative
powerandC3
centers
werebeingdestroyed
atarapidrate,theyconcluded.Soviet
analysts,
throughoutmostof the nuclearage,while insistingthat the useof nuclear
weapons mustalwaysbe subjectto politicalcontrol,did not think asthor-
oughlyaboutcontrolledor limitedwarasdid earlierWesternadvocatesof the
concept.Theyenvisagedsimultaneous andmassive blowsagainstanyandall
targetscapableof causingdamageto the SovietUnion,not sequential, re-
strained,discriminatingsurgicalstrikes.
Throughout
theColdWarperiodof intensive
superpower
rivalry,theworld
wassaidto bebetteroff if principaldecisionmakersin all nuclearweapon
states
remained rmly convincedin advance of anoutbreak of warthata nuclearex-
change couldnot belimited.Sucha sharedconviction tendedto strengthende-
terrence by creatinga mentalblock,asit were,againsta deliberate choicefor
initiatinganywar containing a builtinpotentialfor escalation
to thenuclear
level.Thiswill hold truefor thefuture.Uncertaintyaboutcontrollabilityshould
compelresponsible
leaders
to conduct
themselves
withconsummate
prudence
in
time of crisisand future crisescannot be ruled out summarily.
Despitethe nonproliferation regime(discussed subsequently),
nuclear
weapons maycomeintothepossession of states
with leaders
whoarelessexpe-
rienced,moreimpulsive,
moreproneto risktaking,andlessconstrained by ra-
tionalprocesses
and/orotherpolitical,cultural,andmoralinhibitorsthanthose
who haveavoidednuclearwar up to this time.Moreover,thereremainwaysin
whichnuclearwar may beginunintentionally, ormore preciselywithout
carefulpremeditation by theleadersof statesgoverned by rationalbureaucra-
cies.86*
In anyevent,if total deterrence
shouldfail, responsibleleaders
mustbe
readyto dowhatever theycanto compensate with rationaldecisionmakingaf-
ter the fact of the outbreakof war for the collapseof rationaldecisionmaking
beforethefact.It will thenbeof theutmosturgency
for politicalandmilitary
leaderson both sidesto becomeconvincedquickly that nuclearwar can and
mustbelimited,thatcitydestructionmustbeavoided, thattheC3networksof
theadversary
mustbeleft intactfor thesakeof controllability,andthatif nu-
clearweaponsareintroduced,theiruseagainststrictlymilitarytargetsmustbe
asdiscriminatingaspossible,with minimalcollateraldamageto innocentpopu-
lations and civilizationalstructures,until the conict can be terminatedas
quicklyaspossible
ontermslessdisadvantageous
to eachsidethana continua-
tion of nuclear war would be for both and for the international community.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND CONVENTIONAL

DEFENSE
The debateabout controllabilitypertainedmainly to the possibilityof a lim-
ited strategicnuclearexchange
between
the superpowers.
Whatabouta nu-
 NUCLEARDETERRENCE
AND CONVENTIONALDEFENSE 367

clear war that did not involve intercontinental attacks but the use of nuclear
weapons
ontheinbetween
battleground
of Europe?
Sucha warmightappear
to be tactical and limited for the superpowers,but the Europeanswould re-
gardit asstrategic,
sofar astheirowninterests
wereconcerned.
Manypeople,
includingmediacommentators and perhapssometheorists,wereconfusedby
the apparentcontradictionin Westerndeterrence
policy:TheUnitedStatesde-
clared that it would never launch a rst strategic strike, while NATO, under
U.S.leadership,refusedto subscribeto a no-rst-usepolicy regardingnuclear
weapons in Europe.
The U.S.pledgeto defendWesternEuropewas quite believablewhen the
United Statesenjoyedunquestionedstrategicnuclearsuperiority.The mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance and its integrated military organization, NATO,
had no choicefrom the beginningbut to rely on U.S.nuclearpowerbecause
of
the SovietWestern conventional force imbalance and the prohibitive cost of
trying to matchWarsawPactconventionalstrengthoverthe long haul.
Ideally,it is desirableto haveboth a high deterrentpostureand a high de-
greeof defensereadinessin casedeterrencefails. Sucha combinationof nu-
clearthreat and warghting capabilityenhances the credibilityof deterrence,
for it eliminatesthe dangerof self-paralysis in time of crisisthat inheresin the
possession of a capabilityto makeonly an all-ornothingresponse. In contrast
to the last yearsof the EisenhowerAdministration,when the air was lled
with talk abouta conventionalpause,dualcapabilityforces, and tactical
or limited nuclearwar, the KennedyAdministration,stronglyinuenced by
DefenseSecretaryRobertMcNamarasdoctrineof exible response,tried to
separatenuclearfrom conventionalforcesand responses by time, geography,
and commandand control systems.The administrationpursuedwhat it re-
gardedasthe prudentand responsibleway of reducingthe probability of nu-
clearwar and increasingthe optionsavailablebetweenholocaustand surren-
der. Americanpolicymakersbelievedthat, in order to minimizethe risk of
escalation to allout nuclear war, NATO had to reduce its reliance on tactical
nuclearweaponsandmaintaina clearrebreak betweenconventionaland nu-
clear hostilities because the distinction between tactical nuclear war and
strategicor centralnuclearwar would behighly ambiguousandextremelydif-
cult to maintain under actual combat conditions.87
WestEuropeanstrategistsand policymakers,analyzingthe situationfrom
a very differentgeostrategicspaceandgeopoliticalperspective, werequite un-
derstandablyof two mindson the subject.At times,theyfearedthat in a crisis,
the United Stateswould not bewilling to defendthemwith nuclearweapons;
at othertimes,their fearwasthat it would bewilling andperhapstoo quick to
do so. Most Europeanpolicymakers,rememberingthe terrible carnageof the
two world warsconventional warspreferred maximumrelianceon nu-
cleardeterrence to precludeany war at all. Theycertainlydid not want tacti-
cal, limited nuclearwar, nor did they want a purelyconventionalresponseby
NATO, involvinga NATO fallbackand a subsequent liberationcounteroffen
sive.(Theyhad had a tastein World War II of what that would mean.)Some
American policymakersand strategic analystsundoubtedlyregardedthe
368 THEORIES
OFDETERRENCE:
ARMSCONTROL
ANDSTRATEGIC
STABILITY

European
attitude
asillogical,
unrealistic,
or perhaps
ostrichlike
in itscharacter-
istic avoidance
of thinkingthroughthe potentialconsequences
of relyingtoo
heavilyona nuclear strategy.
In themindsof manyEuropeans, theAmericans
werebeingtoologicalandtoomathematical, butnotsufcientlyintelligent
in
termsof European psychologyandpolitics. Thestrategy
of deterrenceworks,
Europeans argued. Bytakingaremote hypothesis
ofhowdeterrence mightbreak
down,andmaking thatthebasisof a newstrategicdoctrinefor NATO,the
UnitedStates,in European eyes,mightincreasetheprobability
of militarycon-
ict thatcouldeventually become nuclear.FromoneEuropean perspective,
exi-
bleresponseinvolved aweakening ratherthanastrengthening
ofdeterrence.
Moreover,if warwasbeingdeterred bythespecter
of swift,condignpun-
ishmentto be inflicted on an aggressor,
why shouldEuropeangovernments,
whichwerebeingurgedby theKennedy
Administration
andlaterby the
Carter Administration to increasetheir conventionalforce contributions,
wasteresources
on expensive
militarycapabilities
that werenot necessary?
Modest-sized
conventional
forces,includingsomefrom theUnitedStateson
European
territory,
weredeemed
quitesufcient
to serve
asa tripwirefor a
NATOnuclear
response.
Thus,logicwoulddictate
thecontinued
effectiveness
of thedeterrent
at a low levelof actualwar-ghtingcapability.
Unfortunately,
however,thedangerof attackstill couldnot bedismissed
lightly.
AsFrankC.Zagare asked, giventheoverallstabilityat thehighest
level
of general strategic
deterrence,
whydoesnt onesideor theothersimplyesca-
lateto thepenultimatestageof thegame since,
byassumption, eachplayeris
deterred in thenextandlaststage of thegame?88 In otherwords,couldthe
SovietUnioninvadewith conventional
forceson the assumption
that each
sidesnuclearweaponsweredeterred?Thatoptionmayhavesounded theoret-
icallyattractive,
andsomemilitaryplanners
worriedaboutit, butit wasunre-
alistic for three reasons:

1. TheSovietUnion,asa strategically
conservative
andcautiouspower
could neverbe certainthat NATO, unableto repela conventionalat-
tack,wouldrefrainfromintroducing
nuclear
weapons.
Evenat the
heightof themassiveWestEuropean
antinuclear
protestin theearly
1980s,NATO wouldnot renounce
the possiblerst useof nuclear
weapons,
asadvocated
byleading
American
ex-policymakers.
The
AtlanticAlliancefeareddecouplingthe defense of Europefrom the
centralstrategic
deterrence
capabilities
of theUnitedStates,
therebyre-
movingfromthemindsof Soviet
planners
thecrucialuncertainty
that
servedas the ultimateguarantee
of WesternEuropesdefense.9°
ProminentEuropean
defense
specialists
arguedthat the problemwas
to deternotonlynuclear
war,butalsowaratanylevelin Europe.
Theydidnotwishto makeEurope
safefor a conventional
warwith
nonnuclearweapons thathadbecome quitecapable
of decimating
civ-
ilizationmorethoroughlythanin WorldWar11.92
2. Evenin theimprobable
contingencythattheUnitedStates,
ata critical
juncture,
should
decide
in its ownnational
interest
notto fulll its al-
 NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE
ANDCONVENTIONAL
DEFENSE 369

liancepledge,but to withholdthe useof its nuclearweapons

in the
European theater, there remained the possibility that Britain and/or
France might invoke their own national nuclear deterrents to defend
supreme
nationalsecurityinterests.
3. Moreover, despitewhat Western analysts generally considereda three-
to-one margin of superiority in armor and other conventional force ca-
pabilities, Soviet planners may not have been as condent as some of
their Westerncounterpartsthat theycouldpenetrateNATO defenses.

The effort to persuade NATO to renounce the first use of nuclear

weapons in caseof war in Europe must be placed in the context of the time.
There was concern in many quarters that not only the U.S.-Soviet global
strategic balance but also the theater balance betweenNATO and the Warsaw
Treaty Organization was tilting ominously eastward. In the late 1970s, the
SovietUnion, havingachievedthe formal codication of strategicparity in the
StrategicArms Limitation Talks and the SALT I Accords of 1972, beganto ac-
quire a formidable array of theater nuclear capabilities, including SS-20land-
based missile delivery systemsof considerably longer range than those at the
disposal of NATO. Rather than forfeit to the Soviet Union a monopoly of the
right to modernize intermediaterange theater nuclear forces, NATO in
December 1979 took a two-track decision to modernize its own Europe-based
nuclearcapabilities
by deployingground-launched
cruisemissiles(GLCMs)
in ve countries
and,in Germany,Pershing-2
missiles
thatcouldreachtargets
in the USSR.Thesewereto be deployedduring negotiationsfor a European
balance at lower or zero levels. The NATO governmentsinsisted that
such deploymentswere necessaryto prevent WesternEurope from being
Finlandizedthat is, made politically more sensitiveto Moscow by being
brought further into the shadowof its military powerand also to threaten
the USSRwith the prospect of symmetrical vulnerability with Western Europe
while arms reductions were being negotiated.
Soviet leaders during the Andropov and Chernenko years charged that
the United States and NATO were attempting to deploy on European terri-
tory weaponsthat would threatenSovietstrategiccentralsystems.The early
1980s was the period when the fear that nuclear war was imminent began to
reach unprecedentedheights. This was paradoxical, inasmuch as the assump-
tion.of deterrence
success
wasconsiderablystrongerat earliertimeswhen the
size of nuclear arsenalswas less formidable. These were the years when the
peace,nuclearfreeze,and antinuclearmovementsof a religious,ethical,and
political character reached their highest and most emotionally intensive
peaks. Millions of WestEuropeans
were no longerreassured
by the
American nuclear deterrent pledge, and they poured out into the streets in
protestoften in anti-U.S.termsrather than anti-Sovietterms.(TheNether-
lands, which had been the rst NATO country to welcome U.S. nuclear
weapons in the late 1950s, was also the first to stage large-scaledemonstra-
tionsof moralprotestagainstthemin the early1980s.)96
Despitewhat ap-
pearedto be a political crisis that threatenedto split the Atlantic Alliance,
370 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

NATOgovernments wereunitedin their determination

to retainthefirst-use
option.Severalanalystsin the 1980ssuggested that WarsawPactconven-
tional superioritywas exaggeratedand that conventional defenseoptions
wereavailable, antinuclearists
arguedthat thesewould allow NATO to sub-
scribe to a norst-use agreement.
RichardK. Bettspresenteda theoreticalexplanationof the NATO pOSl-
tion. While accepting
the needfor improvingconventionalcapabilities,
he
challengedthosewho would rely completelyon conventional deterrence.
Substantialimprovementsin the conventional
militarybalancemightenable
NATO to withstandattack,he conceded,but theywould produceuncertainty
rather than condence:

Uncertainty(aboutconventional outcomesor aboutwhat couldmotivatean enemy

attack)is conduciveto deterrence
whenbuttressedby a threatof awesome punish-
ment (nuclearretaliation)that dramaticallymagniesthe risks for the attacker.
Withoutthat support,extremely
highconfidence
in conventional
options,rather
thanuncertainty,
would benecessary
to providethesamedegreeof deterrence.. . .
It is prudentto raisetheprobabilitythatconventional
defense
wouldsucceed,
but
little canbegainedfrom dispensing
with thecomplementary nucleardeterrent.
Pureconventionaldeterrence
raisesthe dangerof nuclearwar by makingthe
potentialconsequences
of resortto conventionalwarlessunthinkable for theat-
tacker.Aslongasnuclearweapons exist,sodoesthedanger thatanywarbetween
the superpowerscouldescalate despitedeclared doctrinesor actualintentions.
Shortof abandoning
deterrencealtogether,thebestwayto minimize thedangerof
nuclearwar is to minimizethe chanceof conventionalwar.
Severalof the conventionaldeterrenceoptions proposedwere criticized
on thegroundsthat theycouldproveto berecipesfor defeatin caseof war
andmightwell increasetheprobabilityof war.JohnJ. Mearsheimer,for ex-
ample,warnedthat a strategyof maneuverorientedNATO defense, falling
back in one sectorand thrustingforward in another,could be a formula for
disaster,enablingthe attackerto penetratedeeply,envelopNATO forces,and
severtheir lines of communications. SamuelHuntingtonsproposalfor a
NATO strategyof threateningto carry out a counterattackinto Eastern
Europe,threatening Moscows controlof that region,wascommended asa
plausiblemilitarystrategyin an actualconict situation,but it wasargued
that if sucha politicalstrategywerepubliclyadoptedin peacetime, it might
well beprovocative andbringwar closerratherthandeterringit. A leading
theorist of conventionaldeterrence,Richard Ned Lebow,also criticized the
Huntingtonproposal,alongwith otherstrategic
concepts
thencurrentfor air
and land battle,follow-on forcesattack (FOFA),and deep-strikeoptions,for
theywouldhavebeenperceived
by the Sovietleadersasevidence
of hostile
Western intentions.
Perhaps
thegreatest
ironyis thatmanyAmerican
militaryofcersanddefense
in-
tellectualsare attractedto offensivestrategiesat a time whenan effort shouldbe
made to dissuadethe Soviets from their commitment to the offensive. Surely if
thereis anythingmoredangerousthan one sidecommittedto an offensivestrat-
egy,it wouldbebothsidescommitted
to it.1°°
 EMPIRICAL
STUDIES
OFDETERRENCE 371

Throughout
theColdWar,thequestfor anoperational
strategic
doctrine
of combined
nuclear/conventional
deterrence,
onethatwouldsimultaneously
provideassurance
to theEuropeans,
calmtheirfears,appearcrediblebut not
provocative
to the SovietUnion,andbe theater-stabilizing
by decreasing
ratherthanincreasing
theprobabilityof war,provedfrustratingly
elusive.
Yet
somehow theactualmilitarypostures
whichslowlyevolvedthroughdecades
of often heateddebatedid not producethe oftpredicteddisasterof a cata-
clysmicEuropeanwar.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF DETERRENCE

Mostof thischapterhasdealtwith thesubjectof nucleardeterrence,
whichis
in a separate
category fromconventionaldeterrence.
Nonetheless, asthepre-
vioussectionillustrated,therewasa growinginterestin the 1980samong
political and military leaders,defenseintellectuals,and academictheoristsin
thepossibilities
of conventional
deterrence.
Thisprobablycontributed at least
indirectlyto thesuccess
of thenegotiations
for a treatyin 1987to eliminate
intermediate-range
nuclearmissilesfrom Europeand to reducerather than
modernize
shortrange
nuclearmissiles
by theendof thecentury.It alsostim-
ulated theoriststo study historicalcasesof deterrencesuccess
and failure in
both the prenuclearandthe nucleareras.
RaymondAron arguedthat there is no deterrentin a generalor abstract
sense;it is a caseof knowing who can deterwhom, from what, in what cir-
cumstances, hy whatmecms.101 Thus,according to thelatepoliticalsociolo-
gistof theUniversityof Sorbonne, deterrencemustalwaysbeanalyzed in spe-
cic, concreteterms.Whatdetersonegovernment mightnot deteranother.
Whatsucceeds in onegeographical andculturalcontextmightfail in another.
Forthisreason,Aronquestioned thevalueof a certaintypeof strategic fiction
that describes dozens of conictsituationsor scenarios,reducedto simplied
schemes that lackhistoricalreality.Suchwriting,in Aronsview,mightmake
stateleadersoverestimate thetechnicalaspectof thediplomaticor military
problems, andunderestimate theimportance of thepsychological, moral,and
politicaldatathatareuniquein eachsituation.1°2 Thestudyof actualhistor-
icalcases,therefore, canbea corrective to ctionalscenarios andvaguegener-
alizations;overa periodof time,it contributes to a moresubtleunderstanding
of whatdeterrence is andwhatit is not;howit differsfromcompellence; and
underwhat conditionsit is morelikely to succeedor to fail.
Successfuldeterrence
involvesa nonevent.It is difficultenoughin the
realmof humanaffairsto demonstratewhy something did happen;it is im-
possible
to proveconclusively
whysomething did not. Canwebecertain,for
example, that the Cuban Missile Crisis did not lead to war becausenuclear de-
terrence
wassuccessful in that case?
Or waswar deterred at thetimeof the
CubanMissileCrisisbecause theUnitedStatespossessed
overwhelming con-
ventionalmilitarysuperioritynearandaroundCuba?Alternatively, wasit a
combination of U.S.nuclearandconventionalsuperioritythat ledthe Soviet
372 THEORIES
OFDETERRENCE
ARMSCONTROL
ANDSTRATEGIC
STABILITY

Union to backdown?Whateverthe answerin the CubanMissileCrisiscase,is

this all that is meantby deterrencenamely,
that the thing feared(nuclear
war)didnot occurundercircumstances whereit appeared to bea distinctpos-
sibility?
Waseither
superpower
strongly
motivated
to goto waratthetime,
onlyto beheldbackbyanassessment
oftheconsequences,
orwerebothsu-
perpowers
determined
throughout
theseries
of events
composing
thatcrisisto
do their utmostto achieve
their objectives
withoutresortingto actualwar-
fare?(TheCubanMissileCrisisis treatedin Chapter11,DecisionMaking
Theories)Suchquestions canprobablyneverbeanswered withnality.The
strategic
theoryof deterrence
isnotquitethesame asmathematics,
whichpro-
ceedsby anintrinsiclogicalnecessity
of its own.Theanalysis
of deterrence
always
involves
debatable
factorsof humanjudgment,
suchaspolitical
commonsense
basedon experience
(whichsomemightcall intuition or a
hunch),theinterplay
of individual
andbureaucratic
rationality,
second-
guessing,
andrisktaking.
Some
scholars,
however,
havewarned
thatintu-
itiveevaluations
of deterrence
credibilityareunreliable.1°3
This,too,furnishes
a strongmotivation
for seeking
greater
objectivity
through
thestudyof con-
crete historical cases.
PatrickM. Morganhasdrawna usefuldistinction
between
general
deter-
renceandimmediate
deterrence.
Generaldeterrence
impliesa policystanceof
regulating
anadversary relationship
andbalancing
poweroverwhatmaybea
longperiodof time,through maintenance
of a satisfactory
levelof forces.
Most of thetime,adversaries
do not regardwar asimminentor proximate.
Immediate (or pure)deterrence,in contrast,
impliesa specicsituationin
whichonesideisseriouslyconsideringmounting anattack,whereastheother
sideis preparing
a threatof retaliation
to prevent
it, andbothsidesrealize
whatis goingon.1°4
AsGeorge
andSmoke
havepointed
out,deterrence
atthelevelof limited
war and sublimited* conict is much more complexthan at the strategic
level.Whetherweconsider
theobjectives
of theplayersor themeansat their
disposal,
thenumber
ofvariables
involved
isgreater.
Eachsideislikelyto be
unsureof its ownmotivationandthatof theothersideto achieve
variousob-
jectives.
Deterrence
oflower-level
conictisnotasreadily
modeled
asthenu-
clearstrategy
of assured
destruction.
Theselection
of themeans
to beem-
ployed mustbesubordinatedto theimperativeof escalation
control,the
political
objectives
of theactors
in theconict,andthereassuranceand/or
placation
ofallies,
neutrals,
anddomesticopinion.
Atlowerconictlevels,
de-
terrence
isa context-dependent
problem.
George
andSmoke conclude
thatit
is dependentnot uponcomparatively
fewtechnical
variables,
knownwith
highcondence
onbothsides,
butupona multiplicity
ofvariables,
manyof

The
term
sublimited
conict
wasintroduced
inthe1960s
torefer
toabroad
spectrum
ofconict
belowthelevelof conventional
war.It included
insurgency,
inltration,demonstration
of force,
navalblockades,
andsimilar
modes
of applying
pressure.
It waslaterreplaced
bythetermlow-
intensity conict.
 EMPIRICALSTUDIESOF DETERRENCE 373

thempartiallysubjective,
that uctuateovertime andarehighlydependent
uponthecontextof thesituation.1°5
Thiscompounds thedifcultyof identi-
fying and analyzinginstancesof deterrence.
PaulHuth andBruceM. Russettpickedup on Morgansdenition of imme-
diatedeterrenceasa situationwhereat leastonesideis seriouslyconsideringan
attackwhiletheotherismounting a threatof retaliation
in orderto prevent.1°5
Theymadeanempirical studyof 54casesovertheperiod1900to 1980,in anef-
fort to determine under what circumstancesimmediate extended deterrenceis
likelyto besuccessful
in preventing
attacksonthirdparties.
Thecasestheyiden-
tied therefore
stretched
overboththeprenuclear andthenuclearera;theyalso
includednuclearand nonnuclearstatesin the role of would-bedeterrers.1°7
Huth and Russettassumed,
for purposesof their investigation,that statesare
unitary(ratherthanpluralistbureaucratic)
actors,thatkeydecisions
for waror
peacearemadebysingledecision makersor smallgroups,andthatthedecision
makersoperate according
to BruceBuenodeMesquitas expected-utility
model
in theirassessment
ofutilities
andprobabilities
attached
to outcomes.1°8
Fortheattacker,
theoptionsareholdingbackor pressing
aheadwithmilitaryforce
against
theprotégé.
Forthedefender,
thechoicesareaccepting
theconsequences of
thelossoftheprotégé
ormeeting
theattack
withsubstantial
militaryforce.1°9
Because the mereabsenceof an attack doesnot necessarily argueto the suc-
cessof deterrence(if the attackerdid not intendto attack),the proper assess-
mentof threatsandintentionsbecomes a matterof crucialimportanceand,as
weshowsubsequently, a sourceof controversyamongscholars.
Huth andRussett judgeddeterrence to besuccessfulin 31 (or 57 percent)
of the54casestheyexamined. Theygroupedtheirhypotheses to betestedun-
derthreecategories:(1) relativemilitarycapabilities,
(2)therole of pastbe-
haviorin signalingcurrentintentionsfor example,did the defenderback
downthelasttime;will thismakethedefender moreor lesslikelyto ght this
time?-and(3)thenatureandextentof themilitary,economic, andotherties
of mutualinterestbetween defender andprotégé.Thethird categoryof fac-
tors,theyfound,ismoreimportantthantheothertwoin inuencingthemoti-
vation,commitment, andresolveof thedefender.11°
RichardNed LebowandJaniceGrossSteinwereunableto replicateeither
the selectionor the codingof casesin the Huth-Russett
dataset,andthey
foundthat only9 out of the54 cases qualiedasimmediate extended
deter-
rence in their view.

In thirty-seven
cases,
wend no evidence
thatthealleged
attackerintended
to use
force or that the putativedefenderpracticeddeterrence;both are necessary
to
identifyvalidcases of deterrence.
Fourcases arereclassiedascompellence,and
theremaining fourcases areambiguous;eithertheyareopento multiplehistorical
interpretations,
or insufcientevidence
is currentlyavailable
to permitcondent
classicationancoding.1
Lebow and Steinfault Huth and Russettfor improperlydesignatingat-
tackeranddefender,
incorrectlyidentifyingthird partiesastargetsof attack
374 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

or deterrence,and confusingboth direct with extendeddeterrenceand deter-

rencewith compellencediscrepancies that reveal alarminglylow levelsof
cross-studyreliabilitybetween two teamsof investigatorsclassifyingand
codingprecisely
thesamesetof cases.112
Of theninecases
that Lebowand
Steinacceptedas meetingtheir criteria, noneof the threethey codedas suc-
cesseshad beenso designatedby Huth and Russett.The latter pair subse-
quentlydefendedtheir work and attributedthe discrepanciesto the useof dif-
ferenttheoreticalconceptsand operationalrulesfor identifyingand selecting
cases.They criticizeLebowand Steinfor restrictingdeterrence casesto those
in which the attacker has a serious intention to use force; this to Huth and
Russett means a rm resolution and commitment to use force from the outset
of the dispute.This is wrong, argueHuth and Russett,for it eliminatesall
casesof bluff and uncertaintywherethe potentialattackermay not be certain
about its own intentionsuntil after it hasprovedthe defenders
resolve.The
two pairsof scholarsdivergewidelyoverhow to differentiate
seriousfrom
nonserious threats.3 Huth and Russett are accusedof bias in favor of deter-
rencefailure. The net result of the debateis a recognitionthat data setsfor
deterrencecaseshave a way to go before they are sufficientlyrened to
achievethe level of acceptabilityaccordedto the lists of wars discussedin
Chapter 7.

DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, AND DETERRENCE

Arms control and disarmamentare relatedand overlappingbut nevertheless
distinct conceptseven though they are sometimesused interchangeably.
Disarmament in the strict sense involves the reduction or elimination of arma-
mentsand the prohibition againsttheir future production.Disarmamentmay
bepartial or complete.It mayincludea specicweaponssystem,or it may ap-
ply to mostif not all of the armamentsof a nation.Disarmamentmay becom-
plete,for example,if a nation is defeatedin war and surrendersuncondition-
ally, as in the caseof Nazi Germanyand Japanat the end of World War II.
Althoughsubstantialdisarmamenthasbecomea persistentpropagandatheme
in the foreign-policystatements of manystates,no governmenthasevertaken
seriouslythe utopian goal of generaland completedisarmament(GCD), at
leastnot on a voluntarybasis.Reductionsin levelsof armaments,partial dis-
armament,are usuallyundertakenin situationsin which the partieswish to
preservea deterrence relationshipwith eachother.In the strategicarmsreduc-
tions negotiatedby the United Statesand the SovietUnion in STARTI and in
subsequent negotiationsfor strategicweaponsreductions,the goal was deter-
renceand thus strategicstability at lower levelsof nuclearsystems.In con-
trast,armscontrol,presupposing
thatnationswill continueto possess
armsat
levelsdeemedadequatefor security,aimsat managingthemto enhancesecu-
rity and promote desirablepolitical and strategicobjectives,rather than al-
lowing*weaponstechnologyitself to dictatepoliciesin waysthat reducethe
safetyand predictabilityof the internationalenvironment.Thus armscontrol
 DISARMAMENT,
ARMSCONTROL,
ANDDETERRENCE 375

policiestypicallyseekto imposesomekind of restraint,regulation,or other

limitationsonthequalitative
design,quantitative
production,methodor loca-
tionof deployment,
protection,
command andcontrol,transferto thirdpar-
ties,andplanned,
threatened,
or actualuseof militaryforces
andweapons.
Such policies,may imply collaboration between adversaries:formal
agreements, tacit understandings, or informalcooperation. Theymay also
embrace unilateraldecisions that weremadewith thehopeor expectation of
reciprocalaction,or unilateraldecisions deemed worth makingevenif the
adversary doesnot respond, simplybecause theyenhance thestabilityof the
deterrent,controllability,securityagainstunintended war,anddamage limi-
tation if war shouldoccur.Centralto the thinkingof disarmament/arms
controlproponents is the reductionof tensions,risks,anddangerswithout
weakeningdeterrence. Specicarms-control proposals,however,may have
otherpurposes in themindsof theirsupportersforexample, to promotedé-
tente,to effectbudgetcuts,to permita shiftof resources to nondefense pro-
grams,to preserveexistingarmscontrolmomentum,to satisfypublic opin-
ion, and so on.114
It is not the function of a text on international-relations theories to detail
the provisionsof diplomaticallynegotiatedarmsinstruments.Welimit our at-
tention hereto selectedaspectsof the subject,most of which havelent them-
selves
to theorizingonlyto a limiteddegree.
Takethenucleartestban,for ex-
ample.Originally,theWestern powersrefusedto accepta cessation
of nuclear
testing exceptas an integral part of a comprehensive
nucleardisarmament
program,on theplausible
groundsthatsolongasnuclearweapons
werenec-
essaryfor deterrence,continuednucleartestingwould also be essentialfor
keepingthe deterrenttechnologicallyup to date.Later,whenradioactivefall-
out from testingbecame a seriousproblem,thesuperpowers andBritain,but
not FranceandChina,agreed to eliminateall exceptunderground testing.
The nonaligned bloclong urgeda comprehensive test ban (CTB)as a
meansof curbingthearmsraceandnuclearproliferation.Thesuperpowers,
however,despiteimprovedvericationtechnology, continuedunderground
detonationsto prooftestthe reliabilityof their stockpiles
andto modernize
their nuclear-weapons systems(offensiveor defensive), while citing the
nonuniversalityof adherence asreasons for theirinabilityor unwillingnessto
reachagreement.115
Meanwhile,
theSALTAccords
of 1972,including
the
AntiballisticMissile(ABM)TreatyandtheSALTII Treatyof 1979(whichwas
observed eventhoughnot ratied),placedsevere restrictions
on the deploy-
mentof a missiledefenseandsetceilingson strategic
offensiveweapons,but
theybroughtaboutnoreductionin thesuperpowers lethalarsenals.116
The armscontrolscenewas fundamentallytransformedin the 1980sand
evenmore so in the yearsafter the collapseof the SovietUnion in December
1991.Fromtheearly1990stherewasincreasing
concern
abouttheprolifera-
tion of weaponsof massdestructionand actorsother than states.Thesein-
cludednuclear,biological,and chemicalweapons.As additionalstatesor
groupsacquiredsuchcapabilities,theymight be far lessrestrainedin contem-
platingtheir use,or in actuallyusingthem,than had beenthecasebetweenthe
376 THEORIES
OFDETERRENCE:
ARMSCONTROL
ANDSTRATEGIC
STABILITY

UnitedStates
andtheSoviet
Union.Proliferation
provided
animportant
setof
securityissues
forpolicymakers
aswellastheorists
andanalysts.
Asdiscussed
laterinthischapter,
there
wasincreasing
consideration
ofthemeansbywhich
theacquisition
ofsuch weapons
might
beprevented
ortheirproduction
anduse
mightbedeterred.Inthe1980s,
several
factors
hadcontributed
tothechanging
armscontrolscene:
(1)President
Reagans
1983Strategic
Defense
Initiative
(SDI);117
(2)NATOs deployment of intermediate-range
nuclear
forces
(INF);
(3)theriseof Gorbachev,
whowasanxious to avoidanoutright
arms
racein
outerspaceandwaswillingtoreach
anINFagreement rejected
byhispredeces-
sors.In addition,
GorbachevwithdrewSoviet troopsfromAfghanistan,
mani-
festedaninterest
in attenuating
conictin otherregions,
andadopted
a more
practical
approach
inotherarms-limitation
areas.
Whether
hisnewthinking-
lessintransigent
andfarmoreexiblethanthatof Brezhnev,
Andropov,
and
Chernenkowas dueprimarily
to thedemands
of internal
perestroika
cannot
beknownfor certain,
buttherecanbenodoubtthatGorbachevs
diplomacy
proved
remarkably
successful
bothinWestern
Europe
andintheUnited
States,
atatimewhensignicant
elements
onbothsides
of theAtlantic
were,for ava-
rietyof political
andeconomic
reasons,
reassessing
theAtlantic
Alliance
and
the needfor and cost of alternative strategies.
SDIhadasignicant
impact
onSoviet
thinking
about
arms
control
inthe
Gorbachev
era.Priorto theReagan-Gorbachev
SummitMeetingin Geneva
in
November
1985,theSoviet
Unionmadeanunprecedented
announcement:
It
wasready tonegotiate
reductions
ofstrategic
nuclearweaponsontheorderof
50percentif theUnited
States
wouldrenounce SDI.(Backin1977,it hadsum-
marilyrejectedPresident
Carters
callfor25percentcuts.)
InhisJanuary 1986
planforaworldwithout nuclearweapons bytheyear2000,Gorbachev pro-
posedanearlyliquidationof SovietandU.S.intermediate-range
missiles
in
Europe.A yearlater,
heagreedtounlinktheINFissuefromthoseofstrategic
missiles
andspace defense,
andheaccepted Reagans zero-zerooptionof
November 1981.
Afterseveral
years
of negotiations
theUnitedStates
andtheSoviet
Union
signed
theINFTreaty
in 1987.Under theINFTreaty,
it wasagreed
thata
whole
important
class
ofnuclearweaponswouldbeeventually
removedfrom
Europeanddestroyed.
Therestillremained
tactical
orshorter-range
battleeld
nuclearweapons,mostof whichin a futurewarwouldfall onlyonGerman
territory.
Naturally,
theGermans wanted to getrid of all nuclear
weapons in
CentralEuropeandto cancel
anearlierNATOdecision to modernizesome of
itsshort-range
weapons.
Britainandotherallieswereconcerned lesta totally
denuclearized
CentralEuropeforeshadow a drift byWestGermany toward
neutralism,
perhaps
asaprelude
tonational
reunication
(anunfounded
fear,
aslaterevents
wereto show).Germany
did gaina reversal
of theNATOmod-
ernization
decision,
butNATOrefused to abandon
nuclear
deterrence
entirely
andinsistedthatgreater
stabilityin Europecouldnot beachieved
without
substantialreductionsin WarsawPactconventionalforces.
In December
1988,Gorbachev
announced
sizableSovietunilateralcuts
thebeginning
of amassive
militarywithdrawal
thatwould,withinthreeyears,
 DISARMAMENT,ARMSCONTROL,AND DETERRENCE 377

bringaboutfundamental
changesnotonlyin themapof Europe butalsoin
thepatternof East-West
relations.
Withina year,theBerlinWallcamedown,
a non-Communist governmentwasrulingPoland, andCommunist parties
werelosingtheirmonopolycontrolin Hungary,Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria,
andRomania.
Withinanother
year,Communist
parties
werechanging
their
names
almost
everywhere,
asothers
in theEastern
blocwerehailingtheendof
theColdWarandtryingto movetowardunfamiliardemocratic methodsand
marketeconomies. TheWarsawPactfounditselfin thethroesof dissolution.
Mostunexpectedly of all, Germany
wassuddenly uniedpeacefullyanevent
that, hadit happeneda fewyearsearlier,wouldcertainlyhavebeena casus
belli.In 1991,theStrategic
ArmsReduction
Talks(START
I) Treaty
paredthe
strategicarsenalsof thesuperpowersby 25 to 30 percent,andthiswassoon
followedby informalreciprocalmovesby Presidents BushandGorbachev to
acceleratetheir negotiatedcuts,togetherwith negotiationsin the Clinton
Administration
onstrategicnuclear
issues
withRussia,
including
a START II
Treatyandeffortsto reach
agreement
onmodifying
theABMTreaty to permit
the UnitedStatesto deploya nationalmissiledefense.
Thesedevelopments,
whichcontributedsignicantlyto the attenuation
of international
tensions
(andeventually to U.S.aidin theSoviet
dismantling
effort,aid to Sovietnuclearfacilitiesandscientists,andthereaimingof
erstwhileadversarymissilesaway from eachotherstargets)cameafter
Moscows somewhatlukewarmcooperation with Washington
in thePersian
Gulf DesertStorm War in early 1991.An abortedcoupin Moscowin
August 1991 led to the political supremacyof Boris Yeltsin over Mikhail
Gorbachev,
the demiseof Sovietcommunism,
and the dissolutionof the
SovietUnion into its constituentrepublicsbeforethe endof 1991.Within the
shortspace
of threeyears,
theinternational
system
hadundergone
changes
at
a breathtaking
speedthat no Westernpolicymakers
or scholarshad antici-
pated,andthatmanyaslateas1989deniedcouldhappen.
As the Cold War cameto an end,the United Statesand the SovietUnion
reached
armsreductionanddisarmament
agreements
thatwereconsidered
to
beimpossible
several
years
earlier.
These
included
notonlytheINFTreaty,
but
alsotheSTART
I Treaty
andtheConventional
Forces
in Europe
Treaty.
Aswe
think aboutthebackground
conditions
for suchagreements,
it becomes
obvi-
ous that they cameabout as East-Westtensionsdeclinedand as the Soviet
Unionretrenched in its foreignpolicyandnationalsecuritystrategiesandca-
pabilities.As thepoliticalissuesthat haddividedthesuperpowers duringthe
ColdWarwereresolved andaspoliticaltensionsdiminished,
theprospects for
extensive agreements reducing,abolishing,or otherwisecontrollingarma-
mentsgrewdramatically. Whenwemostneeded armslimitationsagreements
duringtheheightof theColdWar,theywerenot attainable. In otherwords,
suchagreements, whentheywerepossible to reach,hadtheeffectof codifying
a strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
At whatpoint,it canbeasked,do disarmament/arms controltreatiessimply
codifyan existingsituationthat is deemedto be acceptableto all parties
andto whatextentandunderwhatcircumstances cantheycontributeto the
378 THEORIESOF DETERRENCE:
ARMSCONTROLAND STRATEGIC
STABILITY

emergence
of newnormative
standards
thathelpshape
theinternational
sys-
tem?The debateaboutsuchissuescontinuesin the earlytwentyrst century.
The 1990s,especially
the earlyyearsof the decade,
werea periodin
whicha newagendafor armscontrolnegotiations
emerged
whileissues
of the
legacy
oftheColdWar,suchasfurtherreductions
in thestrategic
nuclear
arse-
nalsof theUnitedStates andRussia, remained. Thenewagenda encompassed
such efforts to strengthennonproliferationas the ChemicalWeapons
Convention with its highlyintrusiveon-siteinspection
provisions.Included
alsoonthisagenda wastheNon-Proliferation Treaty(NPT),originallysigned
asa 25-yeartreatybut extended indefinitelyin 1995aspart of an interna-
tionaleffortto preventthefurtherspreadof nuclearweapons. Therewasin-
creasing
concern
in theUnitedStates
in theyearsleading
intothetwentyrst
centurythat,despitesucharmscontrolconstraints,
additionalstateswereac-
quiringWMD,including
missiles
capable
of strikingtheUnitedStates.
Instead
of the massivedefensiveshieldenvisaged
in PresidentReagans
SDI to counter
thehugeSoviet
nuclear
arsenal,
whatwasnowenvisaged
wasa muchmore
limiteddefense
againstjusta fewwarheads,
asmightbedeployed
by a small
emerging
nuclear
statesuchasNorthKorea.Therefore,
theUnitedStates
an-
nouncedin 1999that it faceda threat sufficientlygreatto justify deployment
of a limited nationalmissiledefenseas soonas it was satisfiedthat necessary
technologies
wereavailable.
Asnotedelsewhere
in thischapter,
thisledto ef-
forts to modifythe ABM treatyby negotiations
with Russia,togetherwith
controversyabouttheoverallvalueof theABM Treatyin light of thetrans-
formedglobalsecurity
setting
of theearlytwenty-first
century.
Implicitin the
casefor missiledefensewasthe assumptionthat the ability of a stateto inter-
ceptmissiles
mightnotonlyprovide
needed
protection.
It mightevendeterthe
launchof a missileif sucha system couldbeintercepted andtherefore
would
fail to reachits intendedtarget.In otherwords,justasColdWarnuclearde-
terrence hadrestedupontheprospect of retaliationin response
to aggression,
postCold
Wardeterrence,
discussed
elsewhere
in thischapter,
couldinclude
denial.Thatisto say,anadversary
couldbedenieditsgoalbecause
its military
capabilitycouldbeeitherbluntedor completely
negated.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

WhenJohnLewisGaddissuggestedin.1987thattheColdWarmightcometo
an end,118
he caused
no ripplesamongtheoristsor diplomatsprobablybe-
causesucha notion contravenedthe fundamentalassumptions
on which the
paradigmsof realistsandneorealists,
liberalists
andMarxistswerebased.
Evenpluralists
andglobalists
whoplayed downthenotionof powerrelations
in-astate-centric
systemfailedto predictthe dissolution
of theEast-West
ri-
valry.Afterthefact,of course,
postmortem
diagnoses
abounded.
If academic
theoristsandpoliticalpractitioners
hadbeenunableto forecast
thenatureand
timingofwhathappened
in 1989to 1991,it mayhavebeen
because
therehad
neverbeen
anythingquitelike the ColdWarin history.Internatipnal
theory
 .1-112
END OF THE com WAR 379

arisesout of empiricaldataandintellectual
reectiononhumanexperience, In
theabsence of evidence,theorycannotbetestednorpredictionsmade.Besides,
asWilliamC. Wohlforthhaspointedout, socialscience theoriesdo not pre-
dictor explainsingleevents. . . onlygeneral
patterns
of outcomes.9
Sincethe end of the Cold War, neorealistsand neoliberalshave argued
over what preservedthe Long Peace (as it cameto be called) until the Soviet
Union disintegrated as a failed political and economic system.Such realists as
Hans J. Morgenthau,KennethN. Waltz in his earlier writings, Karl W.
Deutsch and J. David Singer,and Richard N. Rosecrancehad attributed the
long peaceto the structureof the internationalsystem,whetherbipolar,multi-
polar, or a mix of the two. From 1981 onward, Waltz upgradedthe role of nu-
clear weapons (which he had earlier deprecated)as a factor making for stabil-
ity.120
FrankC. Zagarenotedthat the majorityof Western
strategic
thinkers
hold that the existenceof the U.S. nuclear deterrent is uniquely responsiblefor
thestabilityof theinternational
system
since1945. 121
Gaddis, unwilling either to discount entirely or to exaggeratethe role of
nuclear deterrence,attributes the long peace to several factors that mutually
reinforced each other: the bipolar configuration of power (buttressed by the
existence of nuclear weapons) which had a stabilizing effect that would not
havelastedso long without nuclearweapons;hegemonicstability,which pre-
supposesa singledominantpower that can maintainthe rules neededfor a
liberal world economic order; the tacit cooperation or unintentional help
which the Soviet Union provided as an unequal co-hegemonin managing the
postwarinternationalsystem;the triumph of liberalism andthe glaringfail-
ure of the command economies;the permeability of bordersthat is,. the
erodingability of statesto wall off-externalinuencesfrom foreigncultures,
technologies,ideologies,andcommerce;and a growingrealizationon the part
of Gorbachev,in his new thinking, that there is a linkage betweendemocra-
tization and economic renewal and an inverse relation between technological
modernizationand political repression.Gaddisrefersto the most inuential
article of 1989, in which Francis Fukuyama heralded the total exhaustion
of viablesystemic
alternatives
to Western
liberalism.122
As we saw in Chapter7, long-cycletheoristsModelski and Thompson
postulatedan extendedperiodof global stability as a normalconsequence of
major-powerwars and a predictablephasein the centurylongcyclethrough
which the internationalsystempassesperiodically.In their view, weishould
not be at all surprisedby the long peace.Postwarperiodsare propitiousfor
peace;nuclearweaponshavevery little to do with the phenomenon.For all
practicalpurposes,theydenythat nucleardeterrence hasbroughtabouta fun-
damentalchangein internationalpolitics.If their theoryis valid, they declare,
it may take anotherhalf centuryto determinewhethernuclearweaponsareas
important as deterrence theoristssaythey are, becauseaspart of the natural
cyclicalprocess,we canexpectthe probability of globalwar to increasein the
next few decades(say,up to the year(2030),as the global systemmovesto-
ward its next macrodecisionthe selection of a new managementstructure.
Gaddismentionslong-cycletheoriesof war asa possibleexplanatoryfactor in
380 THEORIES
OF DETERRENCE:
ARMSCONTROL
ANDSTRATEGIC
STABILITY

thelongpeace,
buthewrylylaments thatit maytaketwo centuries
or moreto
determine
thevalidityof thosetheories.123
RichardNedLebowraisedquestions abouttherealistanalysis
of interna-
tionalpolitics
based
onsystemic
structure.
Whendidthebipolarworldbegin
in thelate1940s,
before
theSoviet
Uniondevelopednuclear
weapons (aperiod
thatLebowcategorizesasunipolar)?
In viewof therealists
insistence
that
power
involves
a panoply
of several
different
elements
in addition
to military
strength
(e.g.,population,
territory,resources,
economic
capability,
ideology,
morale,
qualityof government),whendidtheSoviet
Unionbecome a super-
power?
Whendidthebipolar
system
givewayto multipolaritywhen
the
Soviet
Unionbrokeuporearlier?124 (Someanalysts
wereperceiving
ashiftfrom
bipolarity
to multipolarity
asearlyasthe1970s,
identifying
JapanandWestern
Europeaseconomic superpowers,
andSaudiArabiaasanancialsuperpower.)
Lebowsawmuchof the discussion
of polarity,includingits denitions
andmeasurements,
asin needof greaterprecision.
Lebowadmitsthat Soviet
policyseemed
consistent
withrealist
theories
(including
power-transition
the-
ory)untilthelate1980s.
In hisview,thepolicybecame
increasingly
inconsis-
tent with thosetheoriesunderGorbachev,
whoseretreatfrom the Soviet
Unions
principal
security
zoneandsphere
of interest
in Central
andEastern
Europe
wentfarbeyondanyrealist
conception
ofretrenchment
thatmight
beexpected
of a hegemonic
power in economic
decline.125
Correctly
or not,
Lebowappears
to conclude
thattheendof theColdWarandthedemiseof
theSoviet
communist
empire
mayhavesounded
thedeath
knellfortraditional
realist theories,accordingto which nationscannotescapethe security
dilemma,andalsofor thosetheoriesof deterrence
in whichnuclearweapons
constitute
themosteffective
means
of preventing
greatpower
war.126
The obsolescence
of war hasbeenan ideaattractiveto thinkersthrough-
out history,increasinglysosincetheEnlightenment era.RichardFalkand
AnatolRapoport, bothwritingin afranklyutopian vein,havediscerned
hope-
fultrendsin anevolving politicalculture,
whichtheyseeasmoving awayfrom
realistpremisestowardtherestructuring of amorehumane, cooperative,
law-
dominated globalcivil society.127
JohnMuellerhasgonebeyond Norman
Angell, who(aswenotedin Chapter 5)arguedpriorto WorldWarI thatwar
hadbecome
an unprotable,suicidal,anachronistic
methodof resolving
con-
icts,fromwhichthegovernments
of industrial
nations
canderive
nogain,and
thatwarwouldeventually
beeliminated
throughdemocratic
education
andthe
application
ofreason
toforeign
policies.
Inthelate1980s,
Mueller
setforththe
thesisthatwaramongmodernnationsis nowsubrationally
unthinkable.
An ideabecomes impossible
notwhenit becomes reprehensible
or hasbeenre-
nounced, butwhenit failsto percolate
intoones consciousness
asa conceivable
option.. . . Ontheonehand,peace islikelyto berm whenwarsrepulsiveness
andfutilityarefullyevidentas whenitshorrors aredramatically
andinevitably
catastrophic.Ontheotherhand,peace is mostsecurewhenit gravitates
away
from conscious rationalityto becomea substantial, unexamined mental
habit.. . . [Waris]rejected
notbecause itsabadideabutbecause it remains
sub-
conscious
andnevercomes
off asa coherent
possibility.128
 THE END OF THE COLDWAR 381

According to Mueller, the fundamental changein the attitudes and behav-

iorsof nationshadnot beenwroughtby theexistence
of nuclearweapons;
it
would have occurred even had they not been invented. He contends that nu-
clear weapons made no signicant difference during the Cold War and had
nothingto do with its demise.If theyhad neverbeeninvented,Muellerargues,
the history of the postwar world would have come out much the same.129
Theywerenot necessary for deterrence,becauseotherfactorswerequite suf-
cientto preventWorld War III: the memoryof World War II, the fearthat any
war among the great powers would escalateinto an even more destructive
conict, the Sovietpreference
for a cautions,indirectstrategy,the changeof
ideas introduced by Gorbachev, and the Wests favorable reaction to his
oVertures.13°
The governmentsof civilized statesrememberingthe human,
economic, and social costs of two world warswere sufciently appalled at
the destructiveness
of modernnonnuclearweaponstechnologyto shrink from
initiating hostilities. Thus within a decade, from the late 1970s to the late
1980s, the intellectual mood of the critics of realism had swung from one ex-
treme to the otherfrom gloomy pessimism to neo-utopian optimism, from
regardingArmageddonas inevitableto dismissingthe possibility of major-
powerwar asunthinkableand obsolete.
Carl Kaysen, himself a realist, was inclined to concur with Muellers basic
conclusion about the obsolescence of war, if limited to modern Westernizedin-
dustrial societies,but he criticized Muellers explanation or, more precisely,his
failure to explainthe changeshe postulatesin mentalhabitsthrough socio-
culturalevolution,asif war will becomeunthinkableandridiculous,just asdu-
elingandslaverydid morethana centuryago,andall thegreatindustrialpowers
will go the way of their predecessors: Holland, Sweden,Switzerland,Spain,
Denmark,andPortugal.(It is interestingto notethat all theexamples citedwere
quiteWestern.) Kaysen,inuencedby BruceBuenodeMesquitas expected-utility
modelof war decisions, preferredto attributemodernWesternized governments
aversionto large-scalewar to changes sincethe nineteenthcentury,which have
madewar unattractiveto governingeliteschanges of a political,economic,and
technologicalcharacter(democraticattitudes,cost-versus-benet calculations,
and the destructivepowerof weaponry).If war hasa positivepayoff,asin the
Falklands/Malvinas conict (and one could add the Persian Gulf War over
Kuwait), it remainsthinkable.KaysenfaultsMuellerfor ignoringthe extentto
whichnuclearweaponsandtherisksof escalation strengthen theanimustoward
war.131
Whatismore,Muellerfailscompletely
to confrontthetraditionalrealist
andneorealistargumentthat war is an inescapable featureof the anarchicinter-
nationalsystemin whichindependent statesseekpowerandsecurity. . . oneof
the dominantmodelsof internationalrelations,if not thedominantone.132
StephenVan Everaexplainedthe aversionto war asa resultof vanished
and vanishingcausesof war. Offensivedominancehasbeenreplacedby nu-
cleardeterrence, which favorsthe defenderoverthe aggressor. (Not all nuclear
proliferation,therefore,is bad;it shouldbemanagedandlimited to statesthat
are capableof maintainingsecuredeterrents.)The spirit of militarism,hyper-
nationalism,and socialimperialism(characteristic of formeraristocraticelites
382 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

that could divert domesticdiscontentby provokingforeignwars)hasbeenvir-

tually eliminatedby the processof democratization; socialand economic
stratification
hasgivenwayto socioeconomic leveling.Aggressivestates,both
capitalistandrevolutionary,havedisappearedandhavebeenreplaced by re-
sponsible socialdemocracies.
VanEveracitesthreeillusorydangers: European
multipolarity,a resurgenceof Germanaggressiveexpansionism, andthe risk
that praetorianstateswill emergein the East.He doesadmitthat two real
dangers couldspoilanotherwisepeacefulpicture:a breakdown of established
internationaland domesticorder in EastEuropeand the reappearance
of na~
tionalityandminorityconictsandborderdisputes
in thatregion,suchaswe
have witnessed in the Balkans in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia
andin partsof theformerSoviet
Unionin theyearsfollowing
itscollapse.133

RETHINKING DETERRENCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Nuclearand conventionaldeterrencein the postCold War period has some
generalelements
in commonwith, but in manyrespects
differsconsiderably
from, the earliermodelof the U.S.-Soviet-NATO-WarsawPactconfrontation.
That modelevolvedgraduallyover a very long period of time. It underwent
alteration,neversuddenbut slow and measured,by the two principal adver-
sarieswho behavedsomewhatlike two cautiouschampionchessplayers,thor-
oughlyfamiliarwith the board,the pieces,the rules,andincreasingly
over
time with the thinking and preferredmodusoperandiof the opponent.The
currentstrategic
terrainis lessfamiliarandmorenebulous
with regardto the
location of threats,the number,identity, and intentionsof potential adver-
saries,probablythequalityandcomprehensivenessof intelligence
concerning
theirmilitarycapabilities,
andmutualtacitunderstandingconcerningtherules
of the game.During the Cold War,decisionsabout deterrencestrategywere
madeafterlong,carefulreection;sometimes
monthsor yearsintervened
be-
fore thosedecisionswereactuallytranslatedinto military posturechanges.In
the current and future environment,decisionsand movesmay have to be
mademorequickly,with little timefor theluxuryof theoretical
reection,de-
bate,signaling,probingintentions,and negotiationbasedon the assumptions
of mutualrationalitywhichcharacterized
the U.S.-Soviet
nuclearstandoff.
Central to Cold War deterrencewas the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation, the
purposeof whichwasto prevent,or deter,theSovietUnionfromlaunching a
nuclearor conventional
attackagainsttheUnitedStatesor its allies.Nuclear
forceshad to be sufficientlysurvivable,reliable,and secureto survivea strike
againstthe United Statesand subsequently to be ableto retaliateagainsttar-
gets,basedon theassets
that the Sovietleadership
mostvalued.Suchdeter-
rence,termedassured
destruction,or mutualassured destruction,
Wasbased
not on the ability to defendthe United States,but insteadon the capacityto
deterby inicting unacceptable
levelsof destruction
on theadversary.
It was
not until the 1980s,with PresidentReagansSDI, that thinking about deter-
rencebeganto embracethe conceptof defenseagainstnuclearweapons,or
 RETHINKING
DETERRENCE
AFTERTHEcom WAR 333

strategic
defense,
asabasisfordeterring
theuseofnuclearweapons_
If both
parties
to anuclear
relationship
could
survivetliatistosay,neither
could
destroy
theother-itwasasked,
wouldwenothave achieved
deterrence
by
ourability
topreserve
theUnited
States
anditsallies
rather
thanbyourca-
pacity
todestroy
theSoviet
Union?
However,
offensively
based
deterrence
destruction
of theadversary
(assured
destruction)rather
thandefensively
based
deterrence
(assured
survival)
dominated
Western
deterrence
thought.
Military
capabilities
intheformofdefense
against
ballistic
missiles
werere-
jected
because
it wasbelieved
they
might
upset
adeterrence
relationsh
deemed
tobestable
because
it wasbased
onmutual
U.S.
andSoviet
vulnera-
bility to nuclearretaliation.
Whether
therewouldhavebeen
general
warbetween
theUnited
States
andtheSoviet
Union
intheabsence
ofthedeterrent
relationship
providedby
nuclear
weapons
willnever
beknownwithcertainty.
If nuclear
deterrenc
contributed
insomefashion
tosuch
superpower
stability
asexisted
forthe
twogenerations
ofColdWar,
what
arethedeterrence
requirements
inthe
early
twenty-rst
century?
Toanswer
thisquestion,
it isessential
tocompare
andcontrast
theassumptions
abouttheconditions
thatframed
theColdWar
U.S.-Soviet
deterrence
relationship.
These
conditionsinclude
expectation
about
howleaders
willthinkandbehave,
howtheywillformulate
policy
andexecute
decisions,
andhowtheywillcontrol
themilitary
forces
under
their command.
According
toKeith
Payne,
several
important
assumptions
guided
theCold
War superpower
deterrence
setting,
contributing
tostability.134
Their
absenc
following
thecollapse
oftheSoviet
Union
andthepotential
forproliferatio
inamultinuclear
worldenhances
theneed
torethink
deterrence
requiremen
forthisnewera.
Insummary
form,
these
ColdWarassumptions
included
the
following:
(1)Rational
leaderships,
inthecase
oftheUnited
States
andthe
Soviet
Union,arecapable
ofmakingdecisions
onthebasis
ofcost-benet,
or
risk-versus-gain,
calculations
andincontrol
ofthedecision-making
proces
andable
toexecute
theirdecisions;
(2)theability
ofeach
side
tocommunica
athreatened
sanction
effectively
toanopponent
isclearly
understood
andis
regarded
asdecisive
indeveloping
costbenet
calculations;
(3)both
partie
share
alevel
ofmutual
understanding
andcommunication
aboutbehavior
expectations
and
about
theresponses
that
actions
taken
byone
sidewillelicit
fromtheother;
and(4)thethreatened
retaliatory
action
hasalevel
ofplausi-
bility
sufcient
toinuence
inadesired
fashion
thebehavior
oftheadversa
Rationality
isarequirement
fordeterrence.135
Thiscomponent
ofdeter-
rence
doesnotassume
thatopponents
necessarily
sharesimilar
value
struc-
tures.
Instead,
it means
thatarational
actor
hasapriority
ofpreferences,
en-
gagesinanendsmeans
calculation
andanassessment
ofalternative
course
havingdifferent
outcomes,
andchooses
thealternative
deemed
tobeoptima
inlightofthepreferred
outcome.
As~Keith
Paynesuggests,
behavior
thatis
considered
bizarre
orhorrible
need
notbeirrational.
Thepreference
hierarch
ofone
leader
maydiffer
drastically
fromthatofanother
leader.
Bythisdeni-
tion,such
behavior
wouldstillbetheresult
ofarational
decision-m
384 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

process.Thus, the preferences

of the leaderare not the issue;the processby
which suchpreferences aredeveloped,adopted,and executedshapesthe de-
nition of rationality.
In the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrencerelationship, in retrospect, there
evolved a level of mutual understanding within the posited conditions of de-
terrence just set forth. Both sides devoted extensive intelligence resourcesto
understandingthe political motivations,military strategy,decision-making
structure, command and control systems,and force levels of the other. The
leadershipsof both sideswererisk averse,apparentlyunderstandingthe need
to preventcrisisescalationto nuclearuseconsiderations
deemedessentialto
nuclear deterrence.Suchattributes enhanceddeterrenceto the extent that they
helped reduce the prospectsfor misunderstandingand miscalculation.
Nevertheless,the potentialfor deterrence
failure basedon escalationto the use
of nuclear forces was presentat least twice during the Cold Warin the
CubanMissileCrisisof 1962andthe Yom Kippur War of October1973.
As early as January 1988, the Commissionon IntegratedLong-Term
Strategydeliveredto the Secretaryof Defenseand the Assistantto the
President for National Security Affairs a report entitled Discriminate
Deterrence.135
Thereportnotedthatthenextfewdecades
will probablybring
signicantchangesin the numberof major military powers,the acquisitionof
advancedweaponstechnologyby lesserpowers,the impact of arms agree-
mentson superpowerforcesboth nuclearandconventional,andthe uncertain
behaviorof alliesand friends.All of thesewill modify the internationalenvi-
ronmentto which policiesand strategiesof deterrencemustbeaddressed:
We shouldemphasize a wider rangeof contingenciesthanthe two extremethreats
that have long dominatedour alliancepolicy and force planning:the massive
WarsawPactattack on CentralEuropeand an all-out Sovietnuclearattack. By
concentratingon theseextremecases,our plannerstendto neglectattacksthat call
for discriminatingmilitary responses
andthe risk that in thesesituationssomeal-
liesmightoptout.137
The bipolar superpowerdeterrence relationshipof the Cold War hasbeen
replacedby a group of states,and possiblyeventuallynonstateactors,in pos-
sessionof nuclear and other weaponsof massdestruction(biological and
chemicalcapabilities)or havingprogramsthat may leadto the acquisitionof
suchweapons.If the conditionspositedfor Cold War deterrencesuccess can-
not be met in the future, it follows that deterrenceas a basisfor stability is
likely to belessreliablewhenthe UnitedStatesconfrontscountrieswith which
it is lessfami1iarleaderswhosevaluepreferences arenot well known or eas-
ily knowable,with whom we may havefew provenchannelsof communica-
tions or sharedbasicassumptions aboutthe relationship.The emergingstruc-
ture of the internationalsystem,including the fragmentationor breakupof
several
existingstates,theresurgence
of ethnicandsectarian
conict,138
reli-
gious fundamentalism,the potential for acquisitionof weaponsof massde-
structionby actorsother than statesall within a contextin which dual use
(civilian and military) technologies
are morewidely availableprovide a for-
 RETHINKINGDETERRENCE
AFTERTHE COLDWAR 385
I
midable and complex challengeto deterrence.As the number of countries that
the United Stateswill have to deter increases,the likelihood that their leader-
shipswill haveanygreatfamiliarity with the UnitedStateswill diminish.If the
emerging paradigm contains a large number of states as well as nonstate ac-
tors, it follows that the operational requirements for deterrencewill become
more complex and therefore the possibility of deterrencefailure will increase.
Accordingto Keith Payne,the difculties inherentin attemptingto estab-
lish a reliable postCold War deterrencerelationshipare bestillustrated by
setting forth a checklist of questions that U.S. leaders would have to address
as a necessarybasisfor a predictable deterrencestrategy.Suchquestionsderive
from the conditions posited for deterrence successduring the Cold War.
Becausethere will be a needto deter more than one potential adversary,deter-
rence strategieswill have to be designedfor specic purposesto take into ac-
count the diverse value structures of numerous prospective regional oppo-
nents.Therefore,deterrencewill haveto be tailored to the particular threat
situation, as Raymond Aron, discussedearlier in this chapter, suggested-
namely, that deterrencemust be situation-specic if it is to have any real hope
of effectiveness.The need will increasefor a greater understanding of how to
communicate deterrencethreats credibly to a larger number of adversaries,
who themselvesmay hold a variety of opinions about the credibility of U.S.
declaratorypolicy. It will be essential,although difcult, to establishthose
threats likely to be most effective, given the specific context and opponent
against which deterrenceis to be applied. R. JamesWoolsey,as Director ofthe
Central Intelligence Agency,observedthat we have slain a large dragon. But
we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.
Andin manyways,thedragonwaseasierto keeptrackof.139
If the United Statesis unlikely to be able to establishwith multiple and di-
versethird parties the level of mutual understanding and effective communica-
tion necessaryfor confidenceto be placed in a policy of deterrence,it follows
that preparation for deterrencefailure will becomeincreasingly important. In
the Cold War period,nuclearforcesconsideredessentialfor punitive retalia-
tion were deemedto be stabilizing, while defensesystemsin the form of strate-
gic defensewerecriticizedas destabilizingbecausethey would allegedlylead
the Soviet Union to build larger offensive forces designedto penetrate what-.
ever defensiveshield the United Statesmight put into place. Such a conception
of missile defensewas basedon the assumption that offensively based deter-
rence (assured destruction) between the United States and the Soviet Union
would not fail. In the postCold War era,asthe prospectsfor deterrencefail-
ure increase,the debateabout defensivecapabilitieshasintensied.This has
led to an increasinginterestin missiledefenseas a componentof deterrence
and as a hedgeagainstdeterrencefailure in a multipolar world of stateand
nonstateactors.During the Cold War a missiledefense,to beeffectiveagainst
thousandsof Soviet nuclearwarheads,would have required technological
sophisticationthat its critics believedwas unattainable.Early twenty-first
centurymissiledefenseis intendednot againstRussia,but to deteror respond
to a small number of warheads from a small nuclear state. It is based on a
386 TIIEORIES OF DETERRENCE; ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

perceptionof an emergingthreat that is deemedboth to be more likely and

more manageable than that onceposedby the SovietUnion. Three decades
ago,GlennH. Snyderobservedthat considerationsof reducingthe probabil-
ity of war and of mitigating its consequences
must be evaluatedsimultane-
ously,andthatplanningfor theconsequences
of deterrence
failureis a matter
of political judgmentthat must be weighedagainstthe likelihood that deter-
rencewill succeed.14° Preparationsfor the failure of deterrenceare essential,
but suchpreparationsshouldbe carefullymanagedso as not to increaseits
likelihood. Thus, the end of the Cold War produced a long list of issuesthat
establishthe context for theorizingabout the requirementsfor stability in a
globalsystemcontainingunprecedented numbers,types,and categoriesof ac-
tors. Suchissuesencompass deterrenceof armedconict in an era of increas-
ing possessorsof a broaderrangeof destructivecapabilitiesand the needto
continue to theorize about the deterrenceof armed conict in the postCold
War era.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The phenomenonof internationalterrorism,a matter of growing concernto
governmentssincethe 1980s,cuts acrossseverallevelsof analysisfrom the
psychologicalmakeupof individualsand the religious/ideological belief sys-
temsof groupsto internalfactionalpolitics within statesand to governments
Ofitargetedcountriesandof statesthat sponsor,support,host,train, and she]-
ter terroristorganizations.141
Manyorganized
terroristgroups142
havelong
beenactivewithin specicregions;severalof thesehavebecomemoresophis-
ticatedin exploitingmodernweaponstechnology,electroniccommunications,
internationaltransportationfacilities, and computerizedoperations.As the
third millenniumapproached, experienced policymakersandanalystssounded
the alarm over the dangers,in the not distantfuture, of catastrophicterror-
ism by groupspossessing weaponsof massdestruction(nuclear,biological,
andchemical)
andcomputer
viruses.143
Somein themedia,whichoftensensa-
tionalized terrorist acts in the past, began to ask Whether the threat was real
or exaggerated.
Just as diplomats,lawyers,and scholarshavealwayshad difculty den-
ing aggression,so they havedisagreedwidely on the meaningof terror-
ism. It took the UN GeneralAssemblycloseto a quarter-century to dene ag-
gression,and when it nally did so in April 1974, it included a clause
acknowledging the right of peoplesstruggling for self-determination to resort
to all availablemeans,includingarmed struggle.144
This hassincerenderedit
virtually impossible for the United Nations to come to grips with a denition
of terrorism, even when the 49th General Assembly in 1995 adopted a
Declaration on- Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. One author as
earlyas1983offeredmorethana hundreddenitions.145
Theproblemderivesfrom the diversityof motivesthat driveterrorists,the
goalspursuedby them,andthe methodstheyemploy,compoundedby the fact
 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 387

thatonepersons
terroristis oftenanothers
freedom
ghter,heroically
strug-
glingfor a causeof liberationor justice.Asweemploythetermhere,terror-
ism involvesthe useof violenceby nonstateentitiesagainstthe institutionsor
citizensof statesfor political or ideologicalpurposes,in a mannercalculated
to producemaximumshockandfeareffectbecause
of its apparently
bizarre,
random, absurd, senselesscharacter. The terrorist intends dread to create an
atmosphere of trauma,chaos,andfearof theunknown,whichwill makepeo-
ple feelvulnerableandundermine their condencein the abilityof govern-
mentsto protect them.The purposeis often to put pressureon the targeted
governmentto compelit to take somespeciccourseof actiondesiredby the
terroristsfor example,to releasepolitical prisoners,to stop a war, or to
grant autonomyor independence to a territory. Terroristsmay also be moti-
vatedby a desireto avenge
historicinjustices,
demonstrate
hatredfor thecap-
italistic systemas symbolizedby MNCs or other foreign businessrms, or
giveventto fundamentalistrageagainstreligiousindels or heretics.Methods
includeassassinations,kidnappingof prominentpersons(ofcials,military of-
ficers, businessexecutives,humanitarian agents,etc.), hijacking airliners,
bombing (by truck, car, or letters and boxesthrough the mail), arson and
other forms of sabotage,violations of diplomatic immunity, seizure of
hostages,spreadinglethal biological/chemical weapons,and so onthe list is
not exhaustive.Terroristsseemto havea preference for shocking,hurting, and
killing innocent people in public squares,airports, governmentbuildings,
stores,schoolsand school buses,restaurants,and subways.The calculated
madnessof the terroristconsistspreciselyin the fact that the victimshavelittle
or nothing to do with the causeand even lesspower to effect any of the
changesdemanded.146
One might questionwhy our denition is limited to nonstateentities
when we often hear governmentsaccusedof employingterror againsttheir
ownpopulations
or in foreignwarfare.147
Nationalandinternational
public
law prevalentin the modern state systemhas always assumedrightly or
wrongly that governments possess
a monopolyof the useof domesticforceto
quell domesticdisturbances(as Russiaclaimed it had the right to do in
Chechnya)and to conductwarfareaccordingto the requirementsof military
necessity.Individualscan be prosecutedfor committingwar crimes,but no
stateassuchcanbeprosecutedandpunishedfor actsof terror exceptthrough
economicsanctionsimposedeither by a coalition of statesor by the United
Nations. The latter involvessucha tortuous processthat NATO decided.to
bypassthe UN SecurityCounciland take actionon its own in the Kosovo»=cri
sis.148
In the past,IsraelheldLebanonresponsible
for housingPalestinian
liberation groups that launchedattacks from their territory. The United
Stateshas at times soughtto penalizestatesit identied as sponsoringand
supportingterroristactivities;it hasdonesowith economicsanctionsor retal-
iatory military strikesfor example,againstLebanonin 1983,Libya in 1985,
and the Sudanand Afghanistanin 1998. Economicsanctionsare of limited
effect againstgovernmentsthat cannot control terrorist groups and of no
effectagainstthosethat do not wish to do so. Unilaterallyexecutedmilitary
388 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

reprisals involve a risk that the attacking government will be accusedof en-
gaging in terrorist acts itself, in view of the great difculty, if not impossibility
(absentclear legal standards)to prove convincinglythat a particular state
sponsoredor allowed specic acts. A nation that retaliates unilaterally usually
mustpay a political pricein the nebulouscourt of world publicopinion and
in the reaction of other governments,especiallyif collateral damagehas
caused civilian casualties. In the absenceof credible evidence incriminating
terrorists and their installations, there will inevitably be suspicionsand allega-
tions that the retaliatory responsewas carried out with an eyeto domestic po-
liticalconsiderations.149
Suchsuspicions
areboundto complicate
intergovern-
mental cooperation in the effort to curb international terrorism. Multilateral
efforts to combat terrorism through the United Nations are further frustrated
by political, ideological,cultural and religiousfactorsthat inuencethe poli-
cies of states. Socialist and Third World countries that still harbor sentiments
against capitalist imperialism resent retaliatory strikes by Western govern-
ments. Moreover, their leaders,intellectual elites, and media are often sympa-
thetic to some terrorist causes.
Recent decades have seen international initiatives among likeminded
statesto control terrorism, beginningwith efforts to protect air travelers
againsthijacking and hostagetaking. Through Interpol and other channels,
governments exchangeinformationaboutthe movementsof suspects, the pur-
chaseand shipmentof dangerousmaterials,and other intelligencegathered
from monitoringdrug trafc, bank accountsthat indicatemoneylaundering,
and electroniccommunications.Many governmentshavetightenedcoopera-
tive efforts in recentyears,in light of sensationalbombing,hijacking, and
otherincidentsin New York, OklahomaCity,Northern Ireland,Israel,Egypt,
Algeria, France,Sri Lanka, Japan, and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.The total numberof personskilled by terroristsworldwide in the
last quarter-centuryamountsto. a signicant human tragedy,but it has not
beenso enormousin any one country as to force governmentsto abandon
their normal policiesof refusingto negotiatewith terrorists who threaten
hostages.15°
Terroristsdid not compilean impressive
recordof success
at
achievingtheir statedobjectivesup to the end of the twentiethcentury.On
severaloccasions,governmentshavemanaged,either by efficientoperations
or luck, to thwart terroristplots; sometimes
terroriststhemselves
haveproved
incompetentand failedto executetheir missionasplanned.
The situationmayworsenin the new century,now that rogueregimesare
bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of de-
livering them by clandestineinltration or missiletechnology.Richard K.
Bettshaswarnedthat thereis now less dangerof completeannihilationbut
more dangerof massdestruction,and that our chief worry should be not
about an adversary with thousands of WMD but rather foes with a hand-
ful.151
In hisview,biologicalweapons
arelikelyto betheweapons
of choice
for terroristsout to kill largenumbersof peoplebecausethey are relatively
easyto make,carry,and smuggle,hard to detectand highly lethal in their ef-
fects.Only threatsof large-scale military retaliationmight be sufcient to de-
 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 389

ter some rogue states from resorting to WMD attacks. Betts reminds
Americanpolicymakersthat if the UnitedStates,havingdestroyedits own BW
arsenal under the Biological WeaponsConvention of 1972, now also destroys
its chemicalweaponsstockpileby 2008,asrequiredby the ChemicalWeapons
Convention, which enteredinto force in 1997, it will have no WMD available
to threatenretaliationexceptnuclearweapons.152
(See
thesectionlaterin this
chapter,Nuclear Deterrencein the 21st Century.)
Defenseanalystsand theoristswho studyworst casescenariosabout ter-
rorist attackswith WMD do so not to generatemorbid fearsand panic reac-
tions, but rather to help policymakersheadoff dire happeningsthat may be
preventablewith foresightand prudentplanning.They prompt policymakers
to ask:How urgentandrealisticis the threat?How canthe dangerbestbe de-
terred?If deterrencefails, how can the damageeffectsbe limited?Two sepa-
rate but relatedchallenges must be faced:(1) from terroristswho operateos-
tensibly on their own; (2) from rogue states that sponsor and support
terrorists.The line betweenthe two may be impossibleto draw.Many terror-
ist individualsand groupsrequirestatesupport;somemay be opposedto the
governments
of statesonwhoseterritorytheyoperate.
Governments
naturally
denyand concealtheir role.
Shoulddemocraticgovernmentstargetedby terroristsgive priority to a
long-termstrategyof militaryactionagainstterrorists?Retaliatoryattacks
maybeappropriate whenthereis substantialandconvincingevidence of state
sponsorship andsupport.In theabsence of suchevidence,militaryattackson
the territoryof a sovereignstateraisepoliticalproblemsandsetbad legal
precedents. Resourcesmightbetterbespenton intensive operationsto track
andapprehend terroristswhiletheyarestill in theconspiracy
stage,relying
wherepossibleon extraditionproceduresto bring themto justice.Roguegov-
ernments,however,are seldomcooperative.Libya protectedthoseaccusedof
bombingan airlineroverLockerbie, Scotland, for morethana decade before
agreeing to a complexcompromise. It takesa longtimeto applysufcientpo-
liticalandeconomic pressureto a roguestate(throughtheseverance of diplo-
maticrelationsanda broadrangeof sanctions) to inducethatstateto moder-
ateits behavior.153
Theremaybetimeswhenjustiablemilitaryretaliationis
theonlycourseavailable.In thatcase,precaution wouldhaveto beexercised
to minimizethe risk that the host country, especially,
if armedwith WMD,
wouldinterpretretaliationagainsta terroristbaseasa full-scaleattackupon
thecountryandrespond with disastrous
consequences. Whenever militaryac-
tion is takenagainstterrorists,thequestionarisesasto whetherit is likelyto
deter them in the future, assumingthat they engagein rational cost-versus-
gainsanalysis,
or,if theyarereligious/ideological/nationalist
fanatics,
whether
the iniction of casualtiesis more likely to attract additional recruits to a
causedeemed worthyof theultimateself-sacrice.154
Finally,shoulddemocratic governmentstakeit for grantedthat sooner
or later therewill be threatenedor actualmassiveor cataclysmicattacksand
developnew,elaborate
organizational
structures,
eitherto foil terroristplots
in advanceor limit the damageafter the attacks?Accordingto someexperts,
390 THEORIES OF DETERRENCE ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

modern democratic governments (including the United States)are not at all

prepared for the emerging threat, partly becauseof attitudes bordering on
fatalistic resignation and despair. They call for effective systems that inte-
grate international, federal, state, and local resourcesand institutional capa-
bilities for intelligence and warning; prevention and deterrence; crisis and
consequencemanagement; and coordinated acquisition of equipment and
technology.155They suggestimaginativeand drastic innovationsfor gov-
ernments, defenseestablishments,intelligence agencies,lawenforcement in-
stitutions, and industry and for individuals involved in planning terrorist ac-
tivities. Coordinated planning and acquisition is needed for emergency
medical care, distribution of protective gear, medications and vaccines, and
perhapspopulationevacuations
andareaquarantines
aftera BW attack.156
Richard K. Betts, while concurring fully on the urgent need for a civil de-
fenseprogram, goesfurther and recommendsnot a neo-isolationist policy by
any means but a scaling down of those U.S. commitments abroad that make
the worldspolicemantheterroristsNo. 1 target.]57
Thosewho urgently
advocate the intensication of security against terrorists, including height-
ened surveillance and more efficient methods of gathering evidence and ap-
prehending suspectedcriminals, realize that countermeasureswill not only
cause inconveniencesto citizens of democratic states but may also at times
impinge upon their constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties and pri-
vacyrights.158
It is safe to conclude that international terrorism is such a diffuse phe-
nomenon that it is not only difcult to define with precision but even more
difcult for modern democratic governments to combat. More than two
decadesago, W. Phillips Shively cautioned against the use of multidimensional
concepts
thatleadto confusing
theories.159
Terrorism
wouldappearto beone
such concept. If so, there probably can be no coherent theory of the phenome-
non. With or without a theory, governmentshave no choice but to cope with
it as well as they can.

DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As the UnitedStatesenteredthe third millennium,the political pendulumwas
swinging from a decadeof priority in American policy thinking from concernfor
economic prosperity to problems of military security, deterrence,and defense.
FollowingtheGulf Warof 1991,U.S.armedforceshadbeendeployedabroadin
substantial numbers on several occasionsagainst Iraq, in Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo,andtheTaiwanStraitsandin smallercontingents in Macedonia,East
Timor, and other areasof actualor potentialconict, asif the U.S.capability
to carry out international interventions was virtually unlimited. Analysts were
raising questions about the armed forces state of readiness,the size of the de-
fense budget, the use of the military for humanitarian and peacekeepingmis-
sions insteadof actual combat operations,the match betweenequipment
inventories and the probable threats to be confronted, and whether the multi-
 DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 391

plication of commitmentsto stabilizea global environmentseeminglyfraught

with increasing ethnic violence was stretching the hegemons resourcestoo
thin. As former Soviet republics were shipping their nuclear missiles back to
Russiaand the United Statesand Russiawere intensifyingtheir cooperationin re-
ducing and enhancingthe safety of nuclear and chemicalweapons,severalnon-
Europeanstateswereeitherdevelopingor acquiringWMDnuclear, chemical,
andbiologicaland themissiles
to deliverthem.In thelate1990s,at leasta half
dozen countries besidesIndia and Pakistan were interestedin nuclear weapons
development, two dozencountrieshadchemicalweaponsprogramsandanother
ten had biologicalweaponsprogramsunderway, and an estimatedtwenty or
moredeveloping
countries
couldacquiremissiles
overtlyor covertly.15°
Theold
familiarthreatwasbeingsuperseded
by a numberof new,unfamiliarones.In the
late 1990sone of the most frequently voiced criticisms was that, sincethe end of
the Cold War, the United Stateslacked a coherentstrategictheory concerningits
futuresecuritygoalsandwasdrifting alongin anad laocway,happythat thefor-
mer threat of nuclear Armageddonhad beenlifted and reacting on a pragmatic
casebycase
basiswithout a clearframeworkto guidepublicpolicy.
Moderate realists/neorealistsamong academic and governmental experts
with extensiveexperiencein nationalsecurityaffairshaveconcludedthat nu-
clearweaponswill continueindenitely to form the centralcore of deterrent
strategyas a vital hedgeagainstan uncertainfuture in a changing,com-
plex, and dangerousinternational environment,although their role in the
earlytwenty-rst centurywill differ from that of thepast.Granted,therehave
beenfundamentalchangesin the U.S.Sovietstrategicrivalry that dominated
deterrencetheory for 40 years,during most of which nuclearweaponswere
instrumentalin maintaininga balanceof terror betweenuneasilycoexist-
ing adversaries.The threat of war betweenthe United Statesand Russia,or
betweenRussiaandWesternEurope,hasbeengreatlydiminishedaspolitical,
economic,and military cooperationhas improved.Sincethe collapseof the
Berlin Wall, U.S. conventional forces in Europe have been reduced by two
thirds and restructuredfor other typesof conicts, while U.S.theaternuclear
forceshave declinedby more than 90 percent.SinceRussiasconventional
military forces have undergoneconsiderabledeteriorationduring the last
decade,Russiashigh command,which has recentlydeployeda new ICBM
and is expectedto retain 10,000to 15,000theaternuclearweapons,will un-
doubtedlyrely moreheavilyon nuclearstrategiesand forcesthan in the past.
However,the massivestrategicnuclearforce that Russiainheritedfrom the
SovietUnion is an agingasset.Therefore,Russiais likely to havea moremod-
em but greatlyreducedstrategicnuclearforcein the earlyyearsof the twenty-
rst century.As an emergingglobal power,with modestbut growing nuclear
missilecapabilities,China may posea more uncertainthreat to the United
Statesthan does Russia.151
EventhoughtheWestern
nationsandJapanhavebeenintensifying
their
links with Russiaand Chinathroughinvestment,trade,andeventualmember-
ship in the World TradeOrganization,thosetwo countriesremainprone to
occasionaloutburstsagainstwhat theyregardashegemonic pretensions
in U.S.
392 THEORIESOF DETERRENCE:
ARMSCONTROLAND STRATEGIC
STABILITY

policies
of international
militaryinterventionandliberaleconomic globalization.
Bothshareaninterest in counteringtheUnitedStates wheretheycandoso.
GeorgeH. QuesterandJames J. Wirtz havewarnedthat, althoughit is
possiblefor theUnitedStatesandRussiato maintaina stablestrategicrela-
tionshipwith eachotherat levelsof nuclear-weapons equalitynearlythree
quarterslowerthanthatwhichtheypossessed at theheightof the ColdWar,
succeeding phasesof the STARTprocess shouldnot carrynucleardisarma-
ment too far toward minimum or nite deterrenceat a time when the number
of othernuclear-weapon powerswith growingarsenals is on the increase.
This,in theirview,canbeconduciveto instabilityanda breakdown of deter-
renceon the part of other regionalaggressors armedwith a varietyof
WMDs.152 Thedangercouldbecomeacutein timesof crisis.Sucha worst
casescenariomight neverbeplayedout, but if it shouldbecomeevena theo-
reticalpossibility,
it will haveanimpacton thecalculations
of government de-
cisionmakerswhenthereareseriousconfrontations involvingthevital inter-
ests of nations.
Effectivedeterrence
will alwaysbea functionof realcapabilities andthe
perceptionof a crediblenationalwill to respondto aggression. Duringthe
ColdWar,aswehavenoted,deterrence reliedheavilyon a readinessto retali-
atewith robustandsurvivable nuclearforces-in-being(structured
in theTriad
of long-range
bombers,ICBMs,andSLBMs). Thisrequired
anoperational
doctrine
aimedat destroying
notsimplyurbanpopulations
buttargets
most
valuedby theadversary:bothconventional andnuclearmilitaryforces,lead-
ershipcenters,
andindustrialfacilitiesundergirding
thepowerof thestate.(It
is probablethat boththe Sovietdoctrineof preemptivestrikeandtheU. S.
doctrine
of retaliation
oncertainassurancethatanattackwasunderwayen-
visaged
suchselective targeting.)
In thefuture,theretaliation
component
of
deterrence,
whileremainingessential,
will requirea morebalanced
relation-
shipwithtwootherelements
of deterrence
thatreceived
lessemphasis in the
pastdenialanddissuasion.
Denyinganadversarytheabilityto achieveits
goalswill involvethe development and deploymentof activedefensesthe
kindthat werestrictlylimitedby the1972ABM Treaty,whichin effectmade
thepopulationof eachsidehostage to theotherandvulnerableto attackasa
paradoxical
signof mutualtrust.Dissuasion
involves,
beyond
forces-in-being
a rangeof political,economic,
andtechnological
capabilities
that,usedin in-
telligent
combinations,canpersuadepotential
adversaries
notonlyof theulti-
matefutilityofthreatened
or actualaggression,
butalsoof thegreater
advan-
tagesinherentin the pursuit of policiesaimedat peacefulinternational
cooperation
ratherthanmischievous
or disastrous
conict.Whenthestrategic
rivalrybetween
theWestandtheSovietblocreachedthepointof greatest
in-
tensityin the 1980s,a displayby memberstatesof the Atlantic Alliancethat
theywerewillingto assume
risksto provethattheypossessed
a broader
spec-
trum of capabilities thandid the SovietUnion,led the latterto realizethe
bleakness of its long-termprospects.163
If theindustriallyadvanced Western
nations,includingJapan,wereableto prevailin thatsituation,it seems
logical
thattheyshouldbeable,withconstructive
andfar-sighted
leadership,
to con-
 DETERRENCE
INTHETWENTY~FIRST
CENTURYH393

tain futurethreatsfromlessindustriallyadvanced
powerssuchasChinaand
Indiaandwith roguestates
suchasIraq,Iran,andNorthKorea,which
manageto equipthemselves
with the technologiesof modernWMDSand the
meansof deliveringthemovergreatdistances.
Wecannot,however, assume
that otherstatescanalwaysbeexpected
to respond
to deterrence
in thesame
way as did the Soviet Union.164
KeithPayne
hasraised
serious
questions
aboutthevalidityof thetheory
of deterrence
duringthe ColdWarastakenfor grantedby manyacademics
andgovernment
policymakers.
Heis not surethatwecancallthestrategic
deterrentpolicy asappliedto the SovietUnion for four decadessuccessful.
Theonlythingcertainis thatit did not fail. Aswenotedpreviously,
it is not
possibleto provewhy something did not happen.Payneconcludes that it
wasdifcultenough,
throughall thechanges
in weapons
systems,
deploy-
ments,and doctrinal terminology(massiveretaliation, assureddestruc-
99 C
tion, warghting strategy, selectivetargeting,etc.)duringthe Cold
War, to know exactly how the Soviet Union could best be deterred. In
Paynesview,it maybeevenmoredifficultto knowhowto deterrogue re-
gionalpowers,in whichcategory
heincludesChina,duringthe secondnu-
clearagethatwearenowentering.Hewarnsagainsttryingto applynow-
traditionalColdWarapproaches
to U. S.deterrence
policyin theemerging
global situation.

ColdWarthinkingaboutdeterrence waspopularizedbythe1960sandcameto be
regarded
asa reliablesetof general
axioms,includingtheproposition
thatnuclear
deterrence
serves
to makelarge-scale
warunthinkable,
andlargely
implausible.
Moreseriousandcautionary discussionsof thesubject. . . seeminglyhavebeen
withouteffectonU.S.policymakers,in partbecausethosediscussions andwarn-
ingsarebogged downin abstract
andtechnical language. . . soabstractasto be
largelyinaccessible
to thepolicy-attentive
publicopinion-shaping elitesandmost
incumbents[of relevantgovernmentofces].165

Asanexample of whathemeans,
Payneciteswhathappened prior to the
l990 Iraqi invasionof Kuwait.Despiteintelligence
assessments
warningof
SaddamHusseinspreparations,senior officials in the Bush*Administration
and othergovernments
in the Middle Eastremainedunpersuaded because
they}udgedSaddam
to betoorationalto do something
which,fromtheirper-
spective,did not reallymakesense.156
ColinS.Gray,agreeing with KeithPayne,makesthethought-provoking
point that the successof ColdWardeterrencemayhavebeendueto luck,
or to the fact that an adversary
mustchooseto be deterred.167
Why both
sides chose to be deterred will be debated for some time to come.
Furthermore,Graysuggests that,in postColdWarretrospect,
thereis a ten-
dencyto claimthat the strategicrelationshipbetween
thetwo superpowers
was meta-
stable,158
thatisthatnuclear
weapons,
bytheirverynature,
wereboundto
deter.Instead,Graymaintainsthat whateverconcerns theymayhavehad
abouttheneedto deternuclearwar asa resultof thegreatdestructiveness
of
394 TI-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE2ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

such weapons. the task of military planners on both sideswas to plan for the
unthinkable. He writes: none of this is to deny for a moment the terrible
moral, ecological-,and other implications of nuclear war. But viewed in nar-
rowly military operationalterms,Victory in a nuclearwar periodically ap-
peareda possibilityto plannersand to intelligenceanalystschargedwith giv-
ing anestimate
of theopponents
viewof theworld.169Thismightseemto
put both Gray and Payne in agreement with Mueller inasmuch as they are
willing to consider other possible explanatory factors besides nuclear
weaponsin the outcomeof the Cold War without the actualuseof nuclear
weapons. That is not the case,however. Both would undoubtedly take strong
exceptionto Muellersview that both nuclearweaponsand realismare fun
damentally
-irrelevant.17°
Althoughthe ColdWarendedwithoutthe useof
nuclear weapons by the superpowers against each other, we can never be cer-
tain whether or not they were the leading reason that the superpowers did
not go to war with each other. It is likely that some combination of factors,
including nuclear weapons, shaped the Cold War security setting. Precisely
what those factors were and how important nuclear weapons were will re-
main the object of discussion and debate.
Colin Gray has subjected to thoughtful examination the question as to
whether technological change itself, specically computerized technology in
the information age,hascreatedsucha revolutionin military affairsasto re-
placethe nuclearage.He concurswith Keith PaynesViewthat we cannotbe
certain about the Cold War and demurs from Michael Howards conclusion:
What is beyond doubt is that we effectively deterred the Soviet Union from
usingmilitaryforceto achieve
its objectives.171
Graythinksthat our
knowledge
of whatworked. . . to deterduringtheColdWarremainsover-
whelmingly
conjectural.172
Nevertheless
Gray,like Payne,
is unwillingto
write off the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. He predicts that as WMD
proliferate, the cost-benet calculus of intervening in foreign conicts Wlll
have a damping effect on U.S. readiness to act as world policeman except
when national survival or vital national interests are clearly at stake, espe-
cially if the United Statesfails to deploy defensesagainst WMD while this is
possible. To those advocates of cyberspace warfare who hold that the
weapons most characteristic of the new models of military operations will
beableto locateand striketargetsovergreatdistanceswith a degreeof preci-
sion that obviates the needto usenuclearwarheads,173Gray warnsthat in
the secondnuclearage,even the high lethality expectedof informationage
weaponryshouldnot be expectedto neutralizeAmericanfearsfor the safety
of U. S. forcesin regionswell sownwith WMD.174In the future,rogue
statesthat are not proficient in cyberwaroperationswill try to deter those
that are procient by resortingto WMD threats.Nuclear weapons,there-
fore, are not obsolescentor obsoleteeitherfor superandgreatpowersor for
regionalrogues.175In fact,nuclearweaponscouldbecome weapons of first
resortin the handsof smallerstatesseekingto neutralize
U.S.information-
age technologies.Gray takes exceptionto those Westernantiproliferation
 DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 395

theoristswho postulatethe emergence

in the last quarter-centuryof a nuclear
taboo,a selfinhibiting
convictionthat evena threatto usenuclearweapons,
especiallyagainst a nonnuclear-weapon state, has been anathematizedby
world public opinion because
they areillegitimate,excessively
destructive,in-
humane, obsolete, andlackingin credibility.176
Hedetects
a tendency
toward
a doctrinairestrategic
devaluationof nuclearweaponsamongdefense policy-
makersand a fashionablefaith in conventionalweaponsin cyberwaropera-
tions comparableto the faith placedin 1943in theNorden bombsight,which
gavethe United Statesunprecedented accuracyin its strategicbombingraids
and thereforewas seenas the goldenkey to victory through air power.He
would not dismissthe possibilitythat a non-cyber-warriormight be tempted
to placecyber-prowess at a discountby resortingto weaponsno longercon-
sidered cricket, as part of a strategy of asymmetric warfare against the
United States.177
T. V. Paulpresentsa more subtly reasonedcasefor the decliningimpor-
tanceof nuclearweaponsin internationalpolitics and a much lesssweeping
indictment of them than does Mueller. Paul acknowledgesthat such
weaponsdid play a major role during the Cold War,and contributedgreatly
toward preventing wars. The two superpowers, he says, possessedstruc-
tural power during the Cold War (especiallyin their respectivespheresof in-
uence), largely due to their overwhelming possessionof military and eco-
nomiccapabilities,
particularlynuclearweapons.178
He agrees
with Robert
Gilpin and John Lewis Gaddis, that the possessionof nuclear weapons be-
stowed on the United Statesand the Soviet Union a political prestige of the
rst rank, which set them apart from all other states. They were able to
engage in crisis bargaining, coercive threats and military/diplomatic ma-
neuverswithout riskingor provokinga war.179
Pauloffersan interesting
suggestion:

Nuclear deterrent relationships are most pertinent among enduring rivals . . . The
probabilityof war is highin [such]conict relationships. . . anda deningcharac-
teristic of such a rivalry is high military readiness. . . . Nuclear weapons are pre-
sumedto reducethe opportunityandwillingnessof enduringrivalsto initiatewar,
asthe costof attackis higherthan anyperceivedbenetsgainedthroughbattle.18°
Paul wrote that passagebefore India and Pakistan conducted nuclear
weapons tests in May 1998 in an effort to validate their. claim to be nuclear
powers. His suggestionmay lend support to those who hope that the endur-
ing rivals on the Asiansubcontinentwill be as successful
asthe Cold War ri-
vals were in stabilizingtheir relationshipand avoidingwar through mutual
assureddestructionstrategies.India and Pakistan,of course,eachblamedthe
other for posinga securitythreat that motivatedthe other to go nuclear,as
intelligence
agencies
for sometime had expected
themto do. India had al-
ways refusedto adhereto the Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT), which went
into effect in 1970 on groundsthat it was discriminatory;bestowingprivi-
legesin internationallaw on the nuclearpowersand restrictionsand burdens
396 TI-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

on others. SinceIndia refusedto sign the NPT, so did Pakistan.India also

refusedto signthe Comprehensive TestBanTreatyin 1996,as did Pakistan,
the former becausethe Big Fivenuclearpowerswould not set a deadlinefor
total nuclear disarmament.The Indian foreign minister characterizedhis
countryspositionasa protestagainstnuclearapartheid.TheIndiangov-
ernmentinsistedthat it was primarily interestedin maintainingminimum
credibledeterrence
andcalledfor a mutualno rst usepledge.181
It was
ironic that Indian ofcials and elites who had often derided the Western the-
ory of nucleardeterrence
asa theorythat wasboundto fail now asked:If
deterrence
worked in Europe,why shouldit not work in Asia? It might well
work if bothgovernments
behavein a similarlyrationalmannerashadthe
two Cold War antagonists.Thereare substantialdifferencesbetweenthe two
situations:(1) The Cold War adversaries
were half a globeapart, with long
ight timesanda hot line for emergency communication,
not next-door
neighborswith a commonboundaryand an emotionladen territorialdis-
pute,shortight times,andno hot line.(2)Thesuperpowers
hadneverbeen
at war with each other; India and Pakistanhave fought three wars since
1947. (3) The ideologicaldifferences betweenthe UnitedStatesand the
SovietUnionwerepoliticalandeconomic, whichlendthemselves
to rational
decisionmaking,not religious(HinduversusMuslim),whichoftendo not.
Still,theacquisition
of nuclearmissilesby IndiaandPakistanmightconceiv-
ablyendfesteringsuspicions that existedbeforethetestsandgraduallypro-
ducea stablerelationshipin SouthAsia. It might also provefortuitous that
theircapabilities
werebroughtto light beforeratherthanaftera fourthwar
broke out betweenthem. During the Kargil military skirmishin the fall of
1999,bothpartiesmanaged
to exercise
restraint,but thelevelof mutualre-
criminatoryrhetoric remainedhigh.
Pauldenies,however,that the development of nuclearweaponsnecessarily
enhances the statusor rank of a nation in the internationalpower hierarchy.
He notesthat Britainspossession of nuclearweaponswas not usefulin the
1956 Suezcrisis,nor did Francescapabilityhelp it to retain its position in
Algeria
in 1962.Hedoes
notcallattention
to thefactthatbothofthoserever-
salsoccurredwithin a few years(four and two, respectively)
after Britain and
Franceacquireda smallnumberof weapons;neithercouldbeconsidereda nu-
clearpowerat the time,andeachwouldhaveforfeitedthe supportof the
United States if it even threatened to use such an instrument. Such a threat
would havemadeno military sense;it would havefracturedthe allianceand
would have undoubtedlyevokeda massivecounterthreatfrom the Soviet
Union. (In fact, Khrushchevdid frighten Europein November1956 with an
ambiguous
reference to rocketsrainingdown.)Paulpointsout thatnuclear
weapons
areoflittle utility in dealingwith postColdWarintrastateethnic
conicts, but he concurswith Patrick Garritysview that during a period of
transition,greatpowerswouldwantto keepnuclearweapons
asa hedgein the
event that international relations should deteriorate and as a meansof keeping
themajorpowercompetition
at thepoliticalandeconomic
andnot at themil-
itarylevel.182
 NOTES 597

CONCLUSION
Duringmostof theColdWarandsinceitsdemise,
Western
policymakers
and
academictheoristshavecometo believeasan articleof faith that nuclearwar
is unthinkableand that deterrence
backedby a nuclearthreatcannotfail. Yet
all theoristsagreethat deterrencepresupposesa rationaldecision
process.
In
fact,opponents of thestrategyof nucleardeterrencein thepastwerecertain
that someday it would break down as a result of irrational behavior under
conditionsof stress,miscalculation,
misinterpretation
of intelligence
data,
technicalmalfunctionof command, control,and communications systems,
andso on. Thetwo ColdWaradversaries hadcarefullystudiedeachothers
behaviorfor yearsand managedto act and survivethroughmutual restraint.
In thesecondnuclearage,KeithPayneadvises,
it will beessential
to getto
knowseveralpotentialopponents
thoroughlyandtheirdistinctive
concepts of
strategicrationality,so that regionaldeterrencecanbe tailoredto the individ-
ual actor and to the speciccircumstances of the deterrencesituation.That
will bea tall order.DuringtheColdWar,Paynerecalls,theoft-repeated
ques-
tion was How muchis enough?Henceforthit will benecessary to devoteat
leastas much attentionto a differentfundamentalquestion:How much do
you knowP133
If largernumbersof states,togetherwith actorsotherthan
states,acquireWMD, the complexityof deterrencegrows and its prospects
for effectiveness
decline.Nevertheless,
aslong astheproblemof preventing
the useof force by aggressors
remainscentral to internationalrelations,the
needfor theoriesuponwhicheffective policiescanbebasedwill beapparent.
It is in this overallcontextthat deterrence,
whetherthroughpunishment(re-
taliation) or denial (defense),
will continueto attract the attentionof strate-
gistsand policymakers.

NOTES

1.Bernard
Brodie,
The
Anatomy
of
Deterrence,
World
1974), 174.
Politics
XXVI
(Jan
2. Robert Jervis, DeterrenceTheory Revisited, World Politics, XXXI (April
1979), 289.
3. AlexanderL. GeorgeandRichardSmoke,Deterrencein AmericanForeignPolicy:
TheoryandPractice(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1974),p. 11.
4. Glenn Snyder,Deterrenceand Defense(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press,1961), p. 9.
398
THEORIES
OFDETERRENCE.
ARMS
CONTROL
AND
STRATEGIC
STABILITY
Brodie,
Strategy
intheMissile
Age (Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1959);
Albert
Wohlstetter,
TheDelicate
Balance
ofTerror,
Foreign
Affairs,
37
(January
195
9);Herman
Kahn,
OnThermonuclear
War(New
York:
Free
Press,
1960);
ThomasC.Schelling,
Strategy
ofConict
(Cambridge,
MA:Harvard
University
Press,
1960);
HenryA.Kissinger,
Nuclear
Weapons
andForeign
Policy
(NewYork:
Harper
Sc
Row,
1957);
Herman
Kahn,
Thinking
About
the
Unthinlzahle
(New
York:Horizon
Press,
1962);
Bruce
M.Russett,
The
Calculus
ofDeterrence,
journal
ofConict
Resolution,
VII(March
1963);
Thomas
C.Schelling,
ArmsandInuence
(New Haven,
CT:Yale
University
Press,
1966);
George
H.Quester,
Deterrence
Before
Hiroshima
(New
York:
Wiley,
1966);
James
L.Payne,
The
American
Threat:
The
Fear
ofWar
asan
Instrument
ofForeign
Policy
(Chicago:
Markham,
1970);
Alain
C.Enthoven
andK.Wayne
Smith,How MuchIsEnough?
(NewYork:
Harper
8:Row,
1971);
Bernard
Brodie,
Warand
Politics
(NewYork:
Macmillan,
1973);
Richard
Rosecrance,
Strategic
Deterrence
Reconsidered,
Adelphi
Papers,
No.116
(London:
Institute
forStrategic
Studies,
1975);
Patrick
M.Morgan,Deterrenc
A Conceptual
Analysis
(Beverly
Hills,CA:Sage,
1977).
Jervis,
Deterrence
Theory
Revisited,
291.
. Kennans
famous
longtelegram
ofFebruary
22,1946,
from
Moscow
tothe
O0
State
Department
inWashington,
D.C.,
istobefound
inthe
U.S.
Departmen
of
State
Series,
Foreign
Relations
oftheUnited
States,
1946(Washington,
DC:U.S.
Government
Printing
Office),
Vol.VI,pp.696-709.
Kennans
policy
views
were
published
inmodied
form
inthearticle
signed
byX,The Sources
ofSovie
Conduct,
Foreign
Affairs,
XXV (July
1947).
Concerning
Kennans
backgrou
especially
his
outpost
service
asayoung
diplomat
inRiga,
where
his
attitudes
to-
ward
theSoviet
Union
were
formed,
see
Daniel
Yergin,
Shattered
Peace:
The
Origins
oftheCold
Warand
theNational
Security
State
(Boston:
Houghto
Mifflin,
1978),
chap
2.One
ofthemost
inuential,
although
notuncontro
verted,
interpretations
ofKennans
concept
ofcontainment
and
themeanings
at-
tached
toit byvarious
administrations
istobefound
inJohn
Lewis
Gaddi
Strategies
ofContainment:
ACritical
Appraisal
ofPostwar
American
Nation
Security
Policy
(New
York:
Oxford
University
Press,
1982).
See
also
Walte
Isaacson
and
Evan
Thomas,
The
Wise
Men:
SixFriends
andtheWorld
They
Made
(New
York:
Simon
86Schuster,
1986),
pp.
238-239,
353-355,
and
484-485;
andStephen
M.Walt,
TheCaseforFinite
Containm
International
Security,
14(Summer
1989),
5-50.
. Gaddis,
Strategies
ofContainment,
pp.39-40.
. Donald M. Snow,NuclearStrategyin a Dynamic
World(University
Alabama:
University
ofAlabama
Press,
1981),
p.50;Richard
Smoke,
National
Securi
and
theSecurity
Dilemma,
2nd
ed.(NewYork:
Random
House,
1987),
p.53.
See
alsoSamuel
P.Huntington,
TheCommon
Defense:
Strategic
Programs
in
National
Politics
(New
York:
Columbia
University
Press,
1961),
pp.33-47.
11.
George
andSmoke,
Deterrence:
Theory
andPractice,
pp.
23-27;
Smok
National
Security,
pp.77-82.
Forathorough
examination
ofthetheory
oflim-
itedwar,
seeHenry
A.Kissinger,
Nuclear
Weapons
and
Foreign
Policy
(New
York:
Harper,
1957);
Robert
E.Osgood,
Limited
War
(Chicago:
Universi
of
Chicago
Press,
1957);
Klaus
Knorr
and
Thornton
Read,
eds.,
Limited
Strate
War
(NewYork:
Frederick
A.Praeger,
1962);
Robert
E.Osgood,
Limited
Wa
Revisited
(Boulder,
CO:Westview
Press
1979).
12.

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

21.

22. NOTES 399

Excerpts
from
Dulles,
Address
totheCouncil
onForeign
Relations,
NewYork,
January
12,1954,
inThe
NewYorkTimes,
January
13,1954.
Dulles
published
a
clarication
of hisviewsin Policyfor Security
andPeace,Foreign
Affairs,
23. XXXH(April1954).
ments,
1967),
see
pp.276-282.
Foralater
Foranaccount
Louis].Halle,
ofthealarm
raised
TheColdWarasHistory
retrospective
account,
cf.Samuel
bysome
(New
F.Wells,
The
ofDulless
York:Harper
state-
86Row,
Origins
ofMassive
Retaliation,
Political
Science
Quarterly,
96(Spring
1981).
24. Jerome
H.Kahan,
Security
intheNuclearAge:
Developing
U.S.Strategic
Arms
Policy
(Washington,
DC:Brookings
Institution,
1975),
p.34.
Kaufmann,
Requirements
ofDeterrence,
pp.23-24.
PaulNitze,Atoms,
Strategy
andPolicy,
Foreign
Affairs,
XXXIV(January
400

33.
THEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

34.Chairmanof the Chiefsof Staff,seeMichaelHoward, The ClassicalStrategists,

AdelphiPapers
No. 54 (London:
International
Institute
for Strategic
Studies,
February1969),esp.pp. 20-30.
. Howard, ReassuranceandDeterrence,p. 312.
. ThomasC.Schelling andMortonH. Halperin,Strategy andArmsControl(New
York: TwentiethCentury Fund, 1961), 50-54; Morton H. Halperin,
Contemporary MilitaryStrategy(Boston:LittleBrown,1967),pp.19-20;Kahan,
Securityin theNuclear Age,p. 271.Sovietstrategists
appeared lessinterested
than
theirAmerican counterpartsin a secondstrikestrategy.
TheUSSR didnotachieve
a signicantdegree of invulnerability
of missileforcesuntilthe1970s.
Kissinger,NuclearWeapons andForeignPolicy,p. 12.
For an excellentaccountconcerning the effortsof the Americanintelligence
community to monitorandpredictthedevelopment of Sovietnuclearforces,as
36. well as the debatesover the reliability of various estimates,seeLawrence
Freedman,U.S.Intelligenceand the SovietStrategicThreat,2nd ed. (New
York:Macmillan,1986).SeealsoRobertL. Pfaltzgraff,Jr.,Uri Raanan,and
WarrenH. Milberg,eds.,Intelligence
PolicyandNationalSecurity(London:
Macmillan,1981);Christopher Andrewand DavidDilks, eds.,TheMissing
Dimension:
Governments andIntelligence
Communities (London:Macmillan,
1984);andJeffreyRichelson,The U.S.Intelligence
Community(Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger, 1985).
37. . WalterMillis,A WorldWithoutWar(Santa
Institutions, 1961).
Barbara,
CA:Centerfor Democratic

KlausKnorr,On theUsesof MilitaryPowerin theNuclearAge(Princeton, NJ:

PrincetonUniversityPress,1966),andOn theInternational
Usesof Military
Forcein the Contemporary World, Orbis,21 (Spring1977),5-28; BarryM.
38. Blechman andStephen

Martin,Strategic
S.Kaplan,ForceWithoutWar:U.S.ArmedForces

Thoughtin theNuclearAge(Baltimore,
MD: JohnsHopkins
asa
Political Instrument(Washington,DC: BrookingsInstitution, 1978);Laurence

UniversityPress,1981);RobertGilpin, War and Changein WorldPolitics

(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981).

39. Martin, StrategicThought,p. 5.

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 9.
40. SeeSidneyVerba,fAssumptionof RationalityandNon-rationality
in Modelsof
the InternationalSystem,in Klaus Knorr and SidneyVerba,eds., The
International
System:TheoreticalEssays(Princeton,
NJ: PrincetonUniversity
 NOTES 401

827-847.Wieseltier
rejected
thehiddenapocalyptic
premise
in muchthinking
aboutnucleardeterrence:
It implies that the endof deterrence
will be the same
astheendofhistory.
Morespecically,
it implies
thatonceanynuclear
weapons
areused,all nuclear
weapons will beused.. . . It implies,too,thatimmediately
afterdeterrence
fails,fromthemomentthata nuclear weapon is red, therewill
be nothing left to save; ibid., 829.
42. KennethN. Waltz, Nuclear Myths and PoliticalRealities,AmericanPolitical
Science
Review,84 (September1990),732.For a debateon thedeterrenteffectsof
nuclear
weapons,
seeScottD. Sagan
andKenneth
N. Waltz,TheSpread
ofNuclear
Weapons:
A Debate(NewYork and London:W. W. Norton, 1995).SeealsoL.
BritoDagobert
andMichaelD. Intriligator,Proliferation
andtheProbability
of
War,journal of Conict Resolution,40(1)(March1996),206-214.
43. Sagan andWaltz,Spread of NuclearWeapons,p. 734.Deterrence,Waltzheld,
depends onwhatonecando,notonwhatonewill do; ibid.,p. 733.
44. RobertE. Osgood,StabilizingtheMilitary Environment,in DaleJ. Hekhuis
et al.,eds.,International
Stability(NewYork:Wiley,1964),p. 87;A. R. Hibbs,
ABM and the Algebra of Uncertainty, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
XXIV (March1968),31-33;D. G. Brennan,UncertaintyIs Not the Issue,
ibid., 33-34.
45. StanleySinkiewicz,
Observations
on the Impactof Uncertainty
in Strategic
Analysis,
WorldPolitics,
XXXII(October
1979),
98-99.See
alsothereferences
in thetext, andin Note 98,regardingtheviewsof RichardK. Bettson the role of
uncertainty
in NATOsnuclear
deterrent.
Benjamin Isambethnotedthat a great
dealof uncertainty
remains
aboutSovietstrategic
uncertainty.
Thereis muchwe
do not know (andcannotknow) abouthow Sovietleaderswould act in the face
of a majortest.Uncertainty
cancut two ways,depending
on how the Soviet
leadershipperceivestherisksandstakesof a situation.It couldeithermakethem
hesitantor providea powerfulincentivefor the leadersto seizethe initiative and
try to dominatethe outcomebeforeit is too late. Uncertaintiesfor the Soviet
War Planner,InternationalSecurity,7 (Winter 1982-1983),164-165.
46. Fora representative
sampling
of theliterature,seeCarlKaysen,Keepingthe
Strategic Balance, Foreign Affairs, XLVI (July 1968), 665-675; Harold
Brown, SecurityThroughLimitations, and Donald G. Brennan,The Case
for MissileDefense,both of which are in ForeignAffairs, XLVII (April
1969), pp. 422-432 and 443-448, respectively;and J. W. Fulbright et al.
Missiles and Anti-Missiles: Six Views, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
XXV (June1969),20-28; William R. Kintner, ed., Safeguard:Why the ABM
MakesSense(NewYork:Hawthorne,1969);AbramChayesandJeromeB.
Weisner,eds.,ABM: An Evaluationof the Decisionto Deployan Anti-
Ballistic Missile System(New York: Harper 86 Row, 1969); Morton H.
Halperin, The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucraticand Domestic
Politics in the Johnson Administration, World Politics, XXV (October
1972), 62-95.
47. U.S.Defense Secretary RobertMcNamararegardedballisticmissiledefense astech-
nicallyand militarily ineffective,potentiallydestabilizing
at leaston the American
side, and much more costly than MIRVs to saturateSovietballistic-missiledefense.
48. Robert Jervis, chap. 1 and 2, in the book he edited with Richard Ned Lebow and
JaniceGrossStein,Psychologyand Deterrence(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkins
UniversityPress,1985),esp.pp. 3-12, 18-19; quotedat p. 5. Jervisaddsthat
in an uncertainworld the utility of the rationality postulateis not undermined
402

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.
59.

60.
61.

62.

63.
64.

Tl-IEORIES OF DETERRENCE: ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

by the profusionof casesin whichthe policyturnsout to havebeenill de-

signed;ibid.,6. Herefershereto cases
of conventional
deterrence.
GregCashman, WhatCauses War?An Introductionto Theories
of International
 NOTES 403

70. PaulHuthandBruce
Russett,
Testing
Deterrence
Theory:
RigorMakesa
Difference,
World
Politics,
42(July
1990),
466-501,
esp.
469-471;
Richard
Ned
Lebow
andJanice
Gross
Stein,
Rational
Deterrence
Theory:
I Think,
Therefore
I
Deter,WorldPolitics,41 (January
1989),208-224;andDeterrence:The
Elusive
Dependent
Variable, WorldPolitics,42(April1990),
336-369.
71. Barry
Nalebuff,
Minimal
Nuclear
Deterrence,
journalofConict
Resolution
32 (September
1988),411425,quotedat 423-424.
72. AlbertWohlstetter,
Is There
a Strategic
ArmsRace?ForeignPolicy,
15
(Summer1974),
320;andRivals
butNoRace,Foreign
Policy,
16(Fall
1974),
48-81.,
Another
analyst,
afterstudying
U.S.andSoviet
armsexpenditures
overa
longer
period
(1948-1970),
attributed
U.S.
increases
tochanges
inmilitary
tech-
nology,
whiletheSoviet
Unionkeptexpanding
productive
capabilities
atamore
stable
levelof militarytechnology;
W.LaddHollist,An Analysis
of Arms
Processes
in theUnitedStates
andtheSovietUnion,International
Studies
Quarterly,
21(September
1977),
503-528.
SeealsoMiroslav
Nincic,TheArms
Race(NewYork: Praeger,1982).
73. JohnC.Lambelet madea persuasive
case
thatallgovernments,
regardless
of
theirideological
andpolitical
goals,
nallymustconfront
thelimitsimposed
by
available
resource
restraints;
DoArmsRaces LeadtoWar? journalofPeace
Research,12(2)(1975),123-128.
74. Seethefollowing
publications
oftheInternational
Institute
forStrategic
Studies
(London):
TheMilitary
Balance
for1974-1975,
pp.4;for1978-1979,pp.3-4;
for 1979-1980,
pp.34; andStrategic
Survey
forthefollowing
years:1977,
pp.10-11;1978,p. 6; 1979,2, 4; and1980-1981,
pp.3-6.
75. FritzErmarth,
Contrasts
in American
andSovietStrategic
Thought,
International
Security,
3 (Fall1978),138.Robert
Legvold
contended
thatwhile
theUnited
States
hada doctrine
of deterrence
based onbargaining
theory,
the
Soviet
Union hadnotheory
of deterrence,
onlya science
ofwar,and:
regarded
thesophisticated
subtleties
of theAmerican
strategic
debate
asrationales
forus-
ing nuclearweapons.StrategicDoctrineand SALT:Sovietand American
Views,Survival,21 (January-February
1979).Soviet
strategists
probablydid
notbelieve
thattheUnited States
wouldabidebyitsownprofessed
second-strike
doctrine
in a crisis.Oneschool
of tough-minded
Americananalysts
inclined
to
theposition
thatSoviet
political
andmilitary
leaders,
whilewishing
to avoid
general
nuclearwaratallcosts,
preferred
activeto,passive
deterrence,
involving
awar-ghting,
war-winning,
andwar-recovery
capability.
SeealsoRichard
Pipes,
WhytheSoviet UnionThinks It CouldFightandWina Nuclear War,
Commentary,
64 (July1977),21-34;JohnErickson,TheChimeraof Nuclear
Deterrence,
Strategic
Review,
VI (Spring
1978),
11-17;
PaulNitze,Assuring
Strategic
Stability
in anEraof Détente,ForeignAffairs,54(2)(January1976),
207-32;Dimitri K. Simes,Deterrence and Coercion in SovietPolicy,
International
Security,5 (Winter1980-1981), 80-103.According to Leon
Gouré,theSoviet strategy
of deterring
warbypreparing to wageit requires
a
muchgreater
interestonthepartofmilitaryplannersinproblemsof-/civil
defense
andpost-attack
recovery thanhasbeenshownsincetheearly1960sby their
Americancounterparts;WarSurvival in SovietStrategy:
USSR CivilDefense
(Miami:Center
forAdvanced International
Studies,
University
ofMiami,1976).
Cf.alsoDavidHolloway, TheSovietUnionandtheArmsRace(NewHaven,
CT:YaleUniversity
Press,
1983),pp.176-177.
404
TI-IEORIES
OF
DETERRENCE:
ARMS
CONTROL
AND
STRATEGIC
STABILITY
76.
United
Nations
General
Assembly,
Comprehensive
Study
onNuclear
Weapons
(A/35/392)
(New
York:
United
Nations,
1980),
pp.
94,
103.
Robert
L.Jervis,
Why Nuclear
Superiority
Doesnt
Matter,
Political
Science
77.
Quarterly,
94(Winter,
1979-1980),
626-633.
R.Harrison
Wagner
criticized
the
Jervis
article
onthe
grounds
that
Jervis
based
his
analysis
too
muchonthe
game
ofChicken,
which
Wagner
deemed
irrelevant
totheproblem
ofdeterrenc
DeterrenceBargaining,
journal ofConictResolution,
26(June 1982).
Wagner
argued
that
astrategy
oflimited
nuclear
exchange
isamore
potent
de-
terrent
thanthethreat
ofall-outretaliation;
ibid.,
356.Barry
M.Blechman and
Robert
Powellpointed
outthat the possession
ofnuclear
superiority
intheearly
1950sprobably
helped
PresidentEisenhower
inhisefforts
tobringtheKorean
Wartoanend in1953,
butthat thethreats
anddecisions
ofthat
erahavelittle
if
anyrelevance
inthelater
period, when
both
superpowers
possess
nuclearcapa-
bilities
ampleandsecure
enough towithstand
arststrike
andstill
inictdevas
tating
retaliatory
destruction
onthe opposing
society.
BlechmanandPowell
What inthe
Name ofGodIsStrategic
Superiority?
Political
ScienceQuarterl
97(Winter 1982-1983),601-602. See
also Hans Bethe,
Meaningl
Superiority,
Bulletin
oftheAtomic Scientists,
37(October
1981).
See
Colin Gray,
NuclearStrategy:The
CaseforaTheoryofVictory, Inter-
78.
national
Security,
4(Summer 1979);Colin
S.GrayandKeithPayne,
Victory Is
Possible,
Foreign
Policy,
39(Summer 1980).
DonaldW.Hanson, criticizin
Colin
Graysthesis,
wrote,Itisonething
toinsist
that
deterrence
canfail,
asit
surely
could,
andtoargue
that
nuclear
weapons
mayhavetobe
used:
that
is,to
posit
the
needforaviable
employment
doctrine.
Butitisquite
another
thing
to
claim
that,
because
the
need
isthere,
itmust
bethe
case
that
astrategy
forvictory
and
survival
also
exists;
IsSoviet
Strategic
Doctrine
Superior?
Internatio
Security,
7(Winter
1982-1983),
83.
One might
plausibly
argue
thatmilitary
the-
oreticians
andplanners
haveacertain
psychological
need
topropound
agoalof
victory
forthe
sake
ofstrategic
logic
andthe
morale
ofmilitary
forces,
simply
to
avoid
asenseofutter
futility
ofaprolonged
period
ofdeterrence,
andthis
need
not
bedangerous
solong
asthemilitary
remains
under
the
control
ofrational
po-
litical
leaders
who
can
calculate
the
political
consequences
ofnuclear
war.
Inany
event,Hanson
makes
apoint
inpositing
theneedforaviable
employme doc-
trine.
Michael
Howard,
aleading
British
theorist,
has
madethecase
that
the
West
does notneed
awar-fighting
capability,
notforthepurpose
oftrying
togain
an
impossible
mutually
annihilative
victory,
but
onethat
willsetonvictory
forour
opponent
aprice
hecannot
possibly
afford
topay:OnFighting aNucle
War,
International
Security,
5(Spring
1981),
16.
Insum, forallsensible
advo
cates
ofdeterrence,
theonly
victory
lies
inpreventing
nuclear
war.
Hank
Houweling
andJan
Siccama,
Power
Transitions
asaCause
ofWar,
79.
journal
ofConict
Resolution,
32(March
1988),
87-102.
They
noted
tha
Organski
andKugler,
inThe
War
Ledger
(Chicago:
University
ofChicago
Pres
1980),
had
found
great-power
wars
preceded
bypower
transitions
but
Organ
and
Kugler
had
not
tested
todetermine
whether
power
transitions
were
alway
followed
bywars.
Using
different
measurements
ofpower
andalonger
listof
wars,
they
concluded
that
powertransitions
were
significant
predictors
ofwars
Report
ofthe
Secretary
ofDefense
tothe
Congress
onthe
FY1975
Defen
80.
Budget
(U.S.
Government
Printing
/Ofce,
March
4,1974),
pp.
35-41.
Excerpts
from
address
byDefense
Secretary
Harold
Brown,
Naval
War
Colle
81.
Newport,
RhodeIsland,
August
20,1980
Brown
Says
ICBMs
MayBe
 NOTES 405

Vulnerable
to theRussians
Now,in TheNewYork Times
Section
A, p_1,
August 21, 1980. Accordingto Walter Slocombe,this countrysdoctrinehad
neverbeenbasedsimplyand solelyon reexivemassiveattackson Sovietcities
andpopulation,despite
widespread
misconceptions
to that effectin thepast
He assertedthat previousadministrations,goingbackalmosttwo decades,
rec.
ognizedthe inadequacy of a strategictargetingdoctrineaplan for useof
weapons if deterrence
failedth-atwouldgiveustoonarrowa rangeof employ.
ment options. He addedthat the unquestionedattainmentof strategicparity
by theSovietUnionhasunderscoredwhatwasclearlongbefore-thata policy
basedonlyonmassiveretaliationagainstSovietcitiesis aninadequate
deterrent
for the full spectrumof potential Soviet aggressions;The Countervailing
Strategy,
InternationalSecurity,5 (Spring1981),19.Duringthedebate
thatac-
companied thewritingof theCatholicBishops
PastoralLetteronWarandPeace
discussed
in Chapter5, NationalSecurityAdviserWilliamP. Clarkissueda
statementthat saidin part: For moral,political andmilitary reasons,theUnited
Statesdoesnot targetSovietcivilianpopulationas such. . . . We do not
82. threatenthe existence
of Sovietcivilizationby threateningSovietcities. Defense
Secretary
CasparWeinberger
submitteda parallelstatement.
Quotedin the
PastoralLetter,Challengeof Peace,in Chapter5, Note 84.
RichardL. Garwin, Launch UnderAttack to RedressMinutemanVulnerabil-
ity? International
Security,4 (Winter1979-1980).
AlbertCarnesale,
PaulDoty,
and othersin the Harvard Nuclear Study Group also doubtedthat the Soviet
Union would ever attack the U.S. land-based ICBM force alone (which carry
fewerthana quarterof allAmerican
strategic
nuclear
warheads),
ontheexpecta-
tion that the President of the United Stateswould choose neither to launch the
ICBMson warningnor to retaliatewith submarine-launched
missilesaftera
Sovietattackon the Minutemanforce.In short,theHarvardGroupconsidereda
Soviet attack on Minuteman alone unlikely; Living With Nuclear Weapons
83.(NewYork:BantamBooks,1983),p. 52.SeealsoAlbertCarnesaleandCharles
Glaser, ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse Than the Disease,
International Security, 7 (Summer 1982).
84.McGeorge
Bundy,To CaptheVolcano,ForeignAffairs, 48 (October
1969),9.
DesmondBall, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?Adelphi PapersNo. 169
(London:HSS,Autumn 1981),pp. 9-14. SeealsoDesmondBall, U.S. Strategic
Forces: How Would They Be Used? International Security, 7 (Winter
1982-1983).SeealsoHoward, On Fightinga NuclearWar; Andrei Sakharov,
The Dangerof NuclearWar,ForeignAffairs, 61 (Summer
1983),especially
1009-1011; SpurgeonM. Keenyand WolfgangK. H. Panovsky,MAD vs.
NUTS:TheMutualHostage
Relationship
of theSuperpowers,
ForeignAffairs,
60 (Winter 1981-1982); Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War (Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress,1982); and Robert S. McNamara, The Military
Roleof NuclearWeapons,ForeignAffairs, 62 (Fall 1983).
85. Desmond
Ball,CanNuclearWarBeControlled?
pp.30-35;Raymond
L. Garthoff,
Mutual Deterrenceand StrategicArms Limitation in SovietPolicy, Strategic
Review,
10(Fall1982),36-51;RichardPipes,
SovietStrategic
Doctrine:
Another
View, ibid., 52-57; GerhardWettig, The Garthoff-PipesDebateon Soviet
Strategic
Doctrine:
A European
Perspective,
Strategic
Review,
11(Spring1983),
406 THEORIESOF DETERRENCEARMSCONTROLAND STRATEGIC
STABILITY

86. SeeDanielFrei,with the collaboration

of ChristianCatrina,Risksof
Unintentional
NuclearWar,UnitedNationsInstitutefor DisarmamentResearch
(Totowa, NJ:Allenheld,
Osmun,1983).
87. Seethereferencesto ThomasC. Schelling
in Note32;Bernard Brodie,Warand
Politics(New York: Macmillan,1973),pp.396-412;Laurence M. Martin,
Changesin American
StrategicDoctrineAnInitialInterpretation,Survival,
XVI (July/August
1974);Michael J. Brenner,
TacticalNuclear Strategy
and
EuropeanDefense:
A CriticalReappraisal,
InternationalAffairs(London),
LI
(January
1975);Tactical
Nuclear Weapons:European Perspectives,
Stockholm
InternationalPeaceResearch
Institute(London:Taylor andFrancis,1978).
88. Frank C. Zagare,Rationalityand Deterrence,World Politics,XLII(2)
(January
1990),
256.Zagare
notes
thatRobert
Powell
similarly
suggests
thates-
calationwould not occurbecauseboth sideswould be afraid of thingsgetting
out of control.CrisisBargaining,
Escalation,
andMAD, AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview,81 (September
1987),717-735.
89. McGeorgeBundy,
George
F.Kennan, Robert S.McNamara,andGerard Smith,
NuclearWeapons
andthe AtlanticAlliance,Foreign
Affairs,60 (Spring
1982), 753-768.
90. VincenzoTornetta,TheNuclearStrategy
of theAtlanticAllianceandtheNo-
First-UseDebate, NATO Review(September-October 1982). See also
Francois
de Rose,UpdatingDeterrence
in Europe:
InexibleResponse?
Survival,XXIV (JanuaryFebruary
1982),19-23; and Henry A. Kissinger,
Strategyand the AtlanticAlliance,SurvivalXXIV (September-Octobe
1982),
194-200. Foracontraryview,seeMichael
Carver,
NoFirstUse:A View
FromEurope,Bulletinof AtomicScientists,
39 (March1983),22-27.
91. KarlKaiser,
GeorgLeber, AloisMertes,andFranz-Joseph
Schulze, Nuclear
WeaponsandthePreservationof Peace:
A Response
to anAmerican Proposal
forRenouncing
theFirstUseofNuclear
Weapons,
ForeignAffairs,60(Summer
1982), 1157-1170.
92. JohnKeegan notedthat conventional war wagedwith modernhigh-tech
weaponrycouldproduce
horrorsvirtuallyindistinguishable
fromthose of alim-
itedwarwaged withlow-yield
nuclearweapons against
militarytargets.
The
Specter
of Conventional
War,Harpers (July 1983),8,10-11,14.
93. SeePeterNailorandJonathan
Alford,TheFutureof BritainsDeterrent
Force,
Adelphi
Papers No.156(London:IISS,Spring1980);FutureUnitedKingdom
Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent
Force(London:HerMajestys StationeryOffice,
July1980).Duringthe1980s,
plansto modernize
theBritishandFrench strate-
gicnuclear
forces
enhanced
theirdeterrent
credibility.
SeeDavidS.Yost,Frances
DeterrentPostureandSecurityin Europe:PartsI andII, AdelphiPapersNo.
194 and 195 (London:IISS,Winter1984/85);JohnPrados, JoelS.Wit, and
MichaelJ. Zagurek,Jr.,The Strategic
NuclearForcesof BritainandFrance,
ScienticAmerican,255 (August 1986),33-41.
94. John].Mearsheimer,
WhytheSoviets
CantWinQuicklyin Central
Europe,
InternationalSecurity,7 (Summer1982),38-39.
95. SeeBrucevanVoorst,TheChurches andNuclearDeterrence, Foreign
Affairs,
61 (Spring1983),827-852;JeffreyBoutwell,PoliticsandthePeace
Movement
in Germany, International
Security,7 (Spring1983),72-93;FritsBolkestein,
Neutralismin Europe:TheDutchQualmDisease,TheEconomist, June5,
1982,
43-45;andtheessays
inJames
E.Dougherty
andRobert
L.Pfaltzgraff,
Jr.,
 96.

97.

NOTES 407

eds.,
Shattering
Europes
Defense
Consensus:
TheAntinuclear
Protest
Movement
andtheFuture
ofEurope(Washington,
DC:Pergamon-Brasseys,
1985).
ClayClemens,
The Antinuclear
Movement
in theNetherlands:
A Diagnosis
of
Hollanditis,
inDougherty
andPfaltzgraff,
Shattering
EuropesDefense
Consensus
See,for example,
JohnJ. Mearsheimer,
Manuever,MobileDefense,andthe
NATOCentralFronts,InternationalSecurity,
6 (Winter1981),104-23;and
Why the SovietsCant Win Quicklyin CentralEurope, 3-40; SamuelP,
Huntington,
Conventional
Deterrence
andConventional
Retaliation
inEurope,
International Security, 8 (Winter 1983-1984), 32-56; General Bernard W.
Rogers,
GreaterFlexibility
forNATOs FlexibleResponse,
Strategic
Review,
XI
(Spring 1983), 11-19. SamuelHuntington contendedthat NATOs traditional
98. forwarddefense
strategy
of puredenialwasnotsufcientto deter,for it eased
the
aggressors
taskof weighingthe costsandgainsof attack.He urgedNATO to
99. breakout of its Maginot Linementalityand seekto deterwith a nonnuclearthreat
of retaliatoryoffensiveattacksinto what were then East Germanyand
Czechoslovakia. Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in
Europe,International Security,
8 (Winter1983-1984),32-56.TheReportof the
100. EuropeanSecurityStudy(ESECS),Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in
Europe:Proposals for the19805(NewYork:St.MartinsPress, 1983)concluded
thatdeterrencecouldbeenhanced throughthedevelopment,
acquisition,andde-
ploymentof emergingtechnologiestarget-acquisition capabilities,
precision-
guidedmunitions (PGMS),etc.SeealsoBarryR. Posen onNATOs conventional
101. abilityto preventtheWarsawPactforcesfrommakinga cleanarmoredbreak-
through. Measuring the EuropeanConventionalBalance, International
Security,9 (Winter 1984-1985), 47-88.
RichardK. Betts,ConventionalDeterrence:
Predictive
Uncertainty
andPolicy
102. Condence, WorldPolitics,37 (January1985), 153-179,quotedat 154-155.
John J. Mearsheimer, Manuever Mobile Defense and the NATO Central
Front, International Security,6 (Winter 1981). See also his Conventional
103.
Deterrence
(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity
Press,1983),andNuclear Weapons
andDeterrencein Europe,InternationalSecurity,
9 (Winter1984/1985).
RichardNed Lebow,The SovietOffensivein Europe:The Schlieffen Plan
Revisited?InternationalSecurity,9 (Spring1985), 78. SeealsoFen Osler
104. Hampson,Grasping for TechnicalPanaceas:
Balanceand NuclearStability, International
The EuropeanConventional
Security,
8 (Winter1983/1984),
57-82.
408 THEORIESOF DETERRENCEARMSCONTROLAND STRATEGIC
STABILITY

108. HuthandRussett
citeBuenodeMesquita,
TheWarTrap(NewHaven,CT:Yale
University
Press,
1981),pp.27-29.Theexpected-utility
modelis discussed
in
Chapters7 and 11.
109. I-IuthandRussett,
WhatMakesDeterrenceWork?499.Theylaterpublished
a revisedand expanded
datasetcoveringthe periodfrom 1885to 1983in
DeterrenceFailureand CrisisEscalation,InternationalStudiesQuarterly,32.
(March1988),29-45.SeealsoPaulHuth,Extended
Deterrence
andthe
Outbreakof War, AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,82 (Summer1988),
423-444;andhisExtended
DeterrenceandthePrevention
of War(NewHaven,
CT:YaleUniversityPress,1988).
110. HuthandRussett,
WhatMakesDeterrence
Work?"523-524.Thendingthat
thepossession
of nuclear
weapons
hadlittleinuence
ontheoutcome
should
havecaused
no surprise
because
theauthorsexcludecases
of directdeterrence
between
comparable
nuclear
powers
(e.g.,theCuban
Missile
Crisis),
andin the
1956SuezCrisis,theUnitedStatessidedwith the SovietUnion againsttwo most
importantU.S.alliesfor reasons
of MiddleEastpolicy.
111. RichardNed Lebow and JaniceGrossStein, Deterrence:The Elusive
Dependent Variable,
WorldPolitics,
42(April1990),336-369, quotedat337.
Theyalsonoteat340thatHuthandRussettin their1988articleeliminated
16
oftheiroriginal
cases,
added
13newones, andrecoded 5 ofthe38theyretained,
without offeringexplanations.
112. Ibid.,340.SeealsoLebowandStein,RationalDeterrence
Theory:
1Think,
ThereforeI Deter, WorldPolitics,41 (January1989),208-224.
113... PaulHuth and BruceRussett,TestingDeterrence Theory:Rigor Makesa
Difference,WorldPolitics,XLII(4) (January1990),466-501,esp.469 and
478-483.Seealso StephenJ. Cimbala,The Pastand Futureof Nuclear
Deterrence(Westport,CT:Praeger,
1998).
114. Forthevarietyof meanings
of thetermarmscontrol,seeDonaldG. Brennan,
ed.,ArmsControl,Disarmament, andNationalSecurity(NewYork:Braziller,
1961);HedleyBull,TheControlof theArmsRace(NewYork:Praeger, 1961),
pp.168-169;Schelling
andHalperin,
Strategy
andArmsControl;J. David
Singer,
Deterrence,ArmsControlandDisarmament (Columbus:
OhioState
University
Press,
1962);RichardN. Rosecrance,
ed.,Dispersion
of Nuclear
Weapons (NewYork:Columbia University
Press,
1964);Kathleen
C. Bailey,
Strengthening
Non-Proliferation
(Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress,
1993);
LewisA.
DunnandSharonA. Squassoni
(eds.),
ArmsControl:WhatNext?(Boulder,CO:
WestviewPress,1993);Nancy W. Gallagher(ed.),Arms Control; New
Approaches
to TheoryandPractice
(Portland,
OR:FrankCass,
1998);Colin
Gray,Houseof Cards:WhyArmsControlMustPail(Ithaca,
NY: Cornell
University
Press,
1992);PeterL. Hays,VincentJ.Jodoin,andAlanR.VanTassel
(eds.),Countering
theProliferation
and Useof Weapons of MassDestruction
(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,
1998);BradRoberts,
Weapons
Proliferation
and
WorldOrderaftertheColdWar(Cambridge, MA: KluwerLawInternational,
1996);BradRoberts,Weapons Proliferation
in the1990s(Cambridge,
MA: The
MIT Press,1995);Sidney
D. Drell,AbrahamD. Sofaer, andGeorge
D. Wilson
(eds.),TheNewTerror:FacingtheThreatof BiologicalandChemicalWeapons
(Stanford,CA:HooverInstitutionPress,
1999);BarryR. Schneider
andWilliam
L. Dowdy(eds.),PullingBackfrom the NuclearBrink: Reducing
and
CounteringNuclearThreats(Portland,OR: Frank Cass,1998);JeffreyA.
 NOTES 409

Larson
andGregory
J. Rattray(eds.),
ArmsControlToward
the21 Century
(Boulder,CO: LynneRienner,1995); Gary K. Bertschand William C. Potter
(eds.),DangerousWeapons,DesperateStates:Russia,Belarus,Kazakstanand
Ulzraine(New York/London:Routledge,1999);and Gary K. Bertschand
WilliamC.Potter(eds.),
ArmsontheMarket:Reducing
theRiskof Proliferation
in the FormerSovietUnion(NewYork/London:Routledge,1998).
115. Forbackground
narrative
andtextof theTreatyBanning
NuclearWeapons
Tests
in the Atmosphere,in Outer Spaceand Under Water,seeArms Control and
DisarmamentAgreements:Textsand Histories of Negotiations,1982 edition
(Washington,DC: U.S.GovernmentPrinting Ofce, 1982),pp. 34-47. Seealso
TheNuclearTestBanTreaty,Reportof the Committee
on ForeignRelations,
U.S.Senate,September
3, 1963;Harold K. Jacobsonand Eric Stein,Diplomats,
Scientists and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban
Negotiations(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,1966); Donald G.
Brennan,A Comprehensive Test Ban: Everybodyor Nobody, International
Security, 1 (Summer 1976), 92-117; Donald R. Westervelt, Candor,
Compromiseandthe Comprehensive TestBan, StrategicReview,V (Fall 1977),
3344; Paul Doty, A NuclearTestBan, ForeignAffairs, 65 (Spring1987),
750-770; Frank von Hippel et al., A Low ThresholdNuclear Test Ban,
International Security, 12 (Fall 1987), 135-151; Steve Fetter, Stockpile
CondenceUnder a Nuclear Test Ban, International Security,12 (Winter
1987/1988),132-167;J. CarsonMark, Do We NeedNuclearTesting?Arms
Control Today,20 (November1990), 12-17; Diane G. Simpson,Nuclear
TestingLimits: Problemsand Prospects,Survival, 33 (November/December
1991),500-516; Eric Arnett (ed.),Nuclear Weaponsafter the Comprehensive
TestBan Treaty:Implicationsfor Modernizationand Proliferation(New York:
Oxford UniversityPress,1996); Eric Arnett (ed.), Implementingthe
ComprehensiveTest Ban: New Aspects of Definition, Organization, and
Verication(New York: Oxford UniversityPress,1994);and ThanosP.Dokos,
Negotiationsfor CTBT 1958-1994: Analysis and Evaluation of American
Policy (Lanham,MD: UniversityPressof America,1995).
116. Theliterature
ontheSALTprocess
andtheSALTI Accords
andtheSALTII Treaty
is voluminous.Full textsand ofcial backgrounds
of SALTI and SALT H are in
Arms Control and DisarmamentAgreements:Texts and Histories of the
Negotiations (Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1990), pp. 150-176 and 261 -300. SeeWilliam R. Kintner and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff,Jr., eds., SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 19705
(Pittsburgh,PA:Universityof PittsburghPress,1973);GeorgeW. Rathjens,The
SALT Agreements: An Appraisal, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,38 (June
1972), 8-10; John Newhouse,Cold Dawn (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1973); Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander,eds., SALT: The
Moscow Agreementsand Beyond (New York: Free Press,1974); Richard Butt,
The ScopeandLimitsof SALT,ForeignAffairs,56 (July1978),751-770;James
E. Dougherty, SALT: An Introduction to the Substanceand Politics of the
Negotiations,in PaulH. Nitzeet al., eds.,TheFatefulEndsandShades of SALT
(NewYork: Crane,Russak,1979),pp. 1-36; StrobeTalbott,Endgame:TheInside
Story of SALT II (New York: Harper 8: Row, 1979);RaymondL. Garthoff,
Mutual Deterrence andStrategicArmsLimitationin SovietPolicy,International
Security, 3 (Summer 1978), 112-147; McGe0rge Bundy, Maintaining Stable
410 THEORIESOF DETERRENCE:
ARMSCONTROLAND STRATEGIC
STABILITY

Deterrence,
International
Security,
3 (Winter
1978/1979),
5-16;Michael
Nacht,
In theAbsence
of SALT,ibid,126-137;andAndrewPierre,
TheDiplomacy
of
SALT,InternationalSecurity,5 (Summer1980).
117. Presidents
Speech
onMilitarySpending
andNewDefense,
TheNewYork
Times,March24,1983,Section
A, p. 20.Theaddress
hasbeenreprintedin sev-
eralanthologies
of nuclear-age
issues.
Extensive
series
of articles
on SDIand
spacedefense
appearedin TheNewYorkTimes,
Series,
Weapons in Space:
The
Controversy
OverStarWars,March3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and8, 1985,Section
A, p. 1;
and The ChristianScienceMonitor, Scott Armstrongand PeterGrier Series,
StarWars:Will It Work?November
4, p. 28;November
5, p. 20;November
6, p.20;November
7, p.16;November8, p.18;all 1985.Forcriticisms
of
space-based
defense,
seeRichard
L. Garwinet al.,TheFallacy
of StarWars
(NewYork:Random House,1984);HansBetheet al.,SpaceBased Ballistic
MissileDefense,
ScienticAmerican,
251 (October1984),39-49;McGeorge
Bundyet al., ThePresidents
Choice:
StarWarsor ArmsControl,Foreign
Affairs,63 (Winter1984/1985),
26-78;Charles
L. Glaser,
Do WeWantthe
Missile DefensesWe Can Build? InternationalSecurity,10 (Summer1985),
25-57.A well-balanced
treatment
of thetechnical
issues
maybefoundin Harold
Brown,Is SDITechnically
Feasible?Foreign
AffairsAmerica
andtheWorld
1985,64(3)(1986),
435-454. SeealsoJoseph
S.Nye,ArmsControlAfterthe
ColdWar,Foreign Affairs,68 (Winter1989/1990),42-64;BradRoberts,
Arms Control and the End of the Cold War, The WashingtonQuarterly,
(Autumn 1992),
39-56;IvoH. Daalder,
FutureofArmsControl,Survival,
34
(Spring1992),51-73;RobertL. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr. (ed.)Security,
Strategy
and
MissileDefenseSpecialReport,Institutefor ForeignPolicyAnalyses,
Washington,D.C.:Brasseys,1995.BallisticMissileDefenseOrganization,
Summary Reportto Congress
onUtilityofSea-Based Assets
toNationalMissile
Defense,June1, 1999;A Planto Meetthe UrgentThreat,TheHeritage
Foundation,
March1999;NationalMissileDefense: A Candid
Examinationof
PoliticalLimits and Technological
Challenges,
Institutefor ForeignPolicy
Analysis,
June1998;Michael
OHanlon,
StarWarsStrikes
Back:CanMissile
Defense
WorkThisTime?ForeignAffairs,November/December 1999;Charles
V. Pea and BarbaraConry, National Missile Defense:Examiningthe
Options,
PolicyAnalysis,
337,March16,1999;Report
of theCommission
to
Assessthe BallisticMissile Threatto the United States,RumsfeldReport,July
1998;ExploringU.S.MissileDefenesRequirements
in 2010,Institutefor
Foreign
PolicyAnalysis,
April 1997;andK. ScottMcMahon,Pursuitof the
Shield:The U.S.Questfor LimitedBallisticMissileDefense(Lanham,MD:
University Pressof America, 1997).
118. JohnLewisGaddis,
HowtheColdWarMightEnd,TheAtlanticMonthly,
260 (November 1987), 88-100.
119. William C. Wohlforth,Reality Check:RevisingTheoriesof International
Politicsin Response
to theEndof theColdWar,WorldPolitics,50 (July
1998), 655.
120. Morgenthaus
text,Politics
Among Nations,
5thed.(NewYork:AlfredKnopf,
1973)
andWaltzstext,TheoryofInternational
Politics,
(Reading,MA:Addison-
Wesley,
1979),
bothofwhichattributedstability
to abipolarstructure,
weredis-
cussed
in Chapter2. Theviewsof DeutschandSingeron multipolaritywere
treated
in Chapter
3,alongwithRosecrances
critique
andpreference
forabimul-
tipolarmodel.
ForWaltzs
laterviewsontheroleof nuclear
weapons,seeThe
 NOTES 411

Spread
of NuclearWeapons:
MoreMayBeBetter,
AdelphiPaperNo. 171
(London:International
Institutefor Strategic
Studies,
1981),pp.3-8; andThe
121. EmergingStructureof International
Politics,International
Security,
18 (Fall
122. 1993),44-79.All of these
aresummarized in Richard
NedLebow, TheLong
Peace,
theEndoftheColdWar,andtheFailure ofRealism,intheSymposium on
theEndof theColdWarandTheories
of International
Relations,
International
Organization,
48(Spring1994),
esp.252-255.
SeealsoWaltz,Nuclear
Myth
andPolitical
Realities;
andScottD.Sagan
andKenneth
N.Waltz,TheSpread
of
123.
NuclearWeapons:
A Debate(NewYork:WW Norton,1995).
Zagare,Rationality andDeterrence,48.
john LewisGaddis,GreatIllusions,the LongPeace, andthe Futureof the
124. International
System,
in Charles
W.Kegley, ]r., ed.,TheLongPostwarPeace:
Contending Explanations
and Projections(NewYork:HarperCollins, 1991),
pp.25-55.Thequoteis fromFrancisFukuyama, The Endof History?The
NationalInterest.16 (Summer1989),3.
125.
GeorgeModelskiandWilliamThompson,
Long CyclesandGlobalWar, in
ManusI. Midlarsky,ed.,Handbookof WarStudies(Boston:UnwinHyman,
1989),pp. 41-42, 50-51. Gaddis,Great Illusions, p. 146.
126.
Lebow,The LongPeace,255-259.He interpretsWaltzs1993article(see
Note42)to meanthattheinternational
system
remains
bipolarevenafterthe
breakupof the SovietUnion; Lebow,ibid., 254.
Lebow,ibid., 260-268,quotedat 262.
Ibid.,276-277.Fordifferentrealistinterpretations,
seeDanielDeudneyandG.
JohnIkenberry,The International Sourcesof SovietChange,International
Security,16 (Winter 1991-1992),74-118, and StephenM. Walt, The
Renaissanceof SecurityStudies,InternationalRelations
Quarterly,35 (June
1991),211-239.Walt notesa widespreadbeliefthat theendof the ColdWar has
lessened
theriskof warbutdoubtsthatthisis a permanent
condition,
for asthe
127.
war in the PersianGulf remindsus, military powerremainsa centralelementof
international
politics,andfailureto appreciate
itsimportance
invariablyleadsto
costly reminders, 222.
SeeRichardFalk,Explorations
at theEdgeof Time:TheProspectsfor World
128.
Order(Philadelphia,
PA:Temple University
Press,1992),esp.pp.146,196,and
227;andAnatolRapoport,Peace:An IdeaWhose TimeHasCome(AnnArbor:
129.
Universityof MichiganPress,1992),esp.pp. 107-108,150,and 199.
JohnMueller,RetreatfromDoomsday:
TheObsolescence
of Major War(New
130.
York: BasicBooks,1989),p. 240.
JohnMueller,The Essential
Irrelevance
of NuclearWeapons:
Stabilityin the
PostwarWorld, InternationalSecurity,13 (Fall 1988),55-79.
131.
Ibid.
Carl Kaysen,Is War Obsolete?A ReviewEssay,International
Security,14
(Spring 1990), 42-64.
132. Ibid., 47. GeorgeLiska,in a similarvein,notedthat conict andwar arestill re-
gardedasnatural,evennecessary,
to givehistorya pushin theproperdirection.
412

THEORIES OF DETERRENCE ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

Europeafterthe ColdWar,InternationalSecurity,
15 (Summer
1990),5-56;
Stanley
Hoffmann,RobertO. Keohane, andJohnJ. Mearsheimer,
Backto the
Future, Part II: InternationalRelationsTheory and PostColdWar Europe,
InternationalSecurity,15 (Fall 1990),191-199;and BruceM. Russett,Thomas
134. RisseKappen,
andJohnJ. Mearsheimer,
Backto theFuture,PartIII: Realism
and the Realitiesof EuropeanSecurity, International Security, 18 (Winter
1990/1991), 216-222.
For an extendeddiscussionof Cold War/post-Cold War deterrenceissuesre-
ected in this section,seeKeith B. Payne,Deterrenceand U.S.StrategicForce
Requirements
Afterthe ColdWar, Comparative
Strategy
(July-September
1992),269-282;Keith B. Payneand LawrenceFink, Deterrence:Gamblingon
Perfection, Strategic Review (Winter 1989), 25-40; Keith B. Payne,
Proliferation, Deterrence,Stability and Missile Defense, Comparative
Strategy,
13(1)(January-March 1994),117-130;andKeithB. Payne,Missile
Defensein the21stCentury:Protection
AgainstLimitedThreats(Boulder,
CO:
WestviewPress,1991),esp.pp. 113-125;LewisA. Dunn, Deterring the New
Nuclear Powers, The WashingtonQuarterly, 17(1) (Winter 1994), 5-25;
135. RobertL. Pfaltzgraff,Jr., Nuclear Weapons:Doctrine,Proliferation,and Arms
Control, in RichardShultz,Roy Godson,and Ted Greenwood,eds.,Security
Studiesfor the 19905(Washington, DC: Brasseys
[US], 1993),pp. 141-179.
136. In addition to the works cited in Notes 48-63 and 65-69, seeFrank C. Zagare
and D. Marc Kilgour, AsymmetricDeterrence,InternationalStudies
Quarterly, 37 (1993), 1-27.
137.
Fred C. Iklé, Albert C. Wohlstetter,Henry Kissinger,et al., Discriminate
Deterrence,Report of the Commissionon Integrated LongTerm Strategy
(Washington, DC: U.S.GovernmentPrintingOfce, January 1988).
Fromthe Commissions Summaryof Findingsand Recommendations, ibid., p. i.
138. SinceWorld War II, scoresof ethnicconicts haveclaimedconsiderablymore
than 10 million livesand havebeenextremelydifficult, often impossible,either
to deteror to control.DonaldL. Horowitz hasproduceda comprehensive study
of suchconicts, manyof which havea potentialfor causinginternationalten-
sionanddrawingmajorpowersinto confrontation;
EthnicGroupsin Conict
(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1985).
139. PaulQuinn-Judge,
With SovietThreatGone,U.S.Focuses
on WorldFull of
Snakes,BostonGlobe,March 17, 1993,SectionA., p. 20.
140. GlennH. Snyder,Deterrence
and Defense:Towarda Theoryof National
Security(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress,1961),p. 4.
141. At one time or anotherduring the 1990s,the U.S.governmentconsideredthe
followingstatesto besponsoring
or aidingterroristsin someway:Afghanistan,
Cuba,Iran, Iraq, Libya,SouthYemen,Sudan,and Syria.
142. Duringthepastdecade,
organized
terroristgroupshaveincluded
theRedBrigades
in Italy,Hamas,Hezbollah,
IslamicJihad,the IslamicSalvation
Frontandthe
ArmedIslan1icGroupin Algeria,ShiningPathin Peru,theBasqueETA,theKhmer
Rougeof Cambodia,the Qaidagroupof Osamabin Laden,Supreme Truth (Aum
Shinrikyo)in Japan,and severalother Islamist,Palestinian,Latin American,Sri
Lankan,Greek,andTurkish-based groups.TheUnitedStatesdroppedthePalestine
LiberationOrganization(PLO)from its list yearsago,asthepeaceprocesswasget-
 NOTES 413

Revises
ListofTerror
Groups,
International
Herald
Tribune,
October
9-10,
1999.
143. Richard
K.Betts,
TheNewThreat
ofMass
Destruction,
Foreign
Affairs,
77
(January/February
1998),26-41;AshtonCarter,
JohnDeutch,
andPhilip
Zelikow,
Catastrophic
Terrorism:
Tackling
theNewDanger,
Foreign
Affairs
77 (November/December
1998),80-94.SeealsoRaymond Tanter,
Rogu
Regimes:
Terrorism
andProliferation
(NewYork:St.Martins
Grifn, 1999).
144. UNGeneralAssembly,
Special
CommitteeontheQuestion
ofDening
Aggressio
1974,International
LawManual 13 (1974)713(A.Res.40161). Seealso
Abraham
Sofaer,
TerrorismandtheLaw,Foreign
Affairs,
64(Summer
1986
145. AlexSchmid,
Political
Terrorism
(NewBrunswick,
NJ:Transaction
Books
1983), pp. 119-152.
146. Foravariety
ofviews
oninternational
terrorism,
see
Raymond
Tanter,
Rogu
Regimes:
Terrorism
andProliferation
(NewYork:St. MartinsPressand
London:Macmillan,
1998);
Walter
Laqueur,
Postmodern
Terrorism,
Foreig
Affairs,
75(September/October
1996),
24-36;
Virginia
Held,
Terrorism,
Right
andPolitical
Goals,andMartinShubik,
Terrorism,Technology
andthe
Socioeconomics
of Death,Comparative
Strategy,
16 (October-Decem
1997),399-414, in R.G.FreyandChristopher W.Morris,eds.,Violenc
Terrorism,
andjustice(Cambridge,England:
Cambridge
UniversityPress,
1991)
CharlesW.Kegley, jr., ed.,International
Terrorism:
Characteristics,
Cause
Controls(NewYork:St.Martins Press,1990);
Peter
C.Sederberg,Terroris
Myths:Illusion,
Rhetoric, andReality(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice
Hall,
1989);Shireen
T.Hunter, Terrorism:
A Balance
Sheet,
Washington Quarterly
12(Summer 1989),17-29; Robert Oakley,
International
Terrorism,
Foreign
Affairs,65 (Summer 1987);WalterLaqueur, Reections on Terrorism,
Foreign
Affairs,65(Fall1986);86-100;MarthaCranshaw,An Organizationa
Approachto theAnalysisofPolitical
Terrorism,
Orbis,29(Fall1985).
147. SeeMichaelStohlandGeorge A. Lopez,eds.,TheStateas Terrorist:
The
Dynamicsof Governmental Violence
andRepression
(Westport,
CT:Greenwoo
Press,1984).
148. Thereasons
forthecumbersomeness
ofUnited
Nations
procedures
arespelled
outin Saadia
Touval,WhytheU.N.Fails,Foreign
Affairs,73 (September
October 1994), 44-57.
149. When
theUnited
States
redcruise
missiles
at a pharmaceutical
plantin the
Sudanin August1998,in retaliation
for allegedly
havingconnections
with
Osama binLaden
andproducing a keycomponent of VX nerve
gas,U.S.of-
cialsclaimed
thattheyhadacted
oncompelling
evidence
andhighly
reliable
evidence
of complicity
between thechemical
plantandthepersonaccused
of
masterminding
theterroristbombingof two U.S.embassies
in Kenyaand
Tanzania
two weeksearlier.JamesRisen,Evidence
on SaudiExileIs Called
Very
Compelling.
International
Herald
Tribune,
August
22-23,
1998.
A year
later,officials
in Washington conceded,astheSudanese governmenthadinsisted
all along,thattheplantproduced medicinesandmaynothavemanufacture
chemical weapons. Vernon Loeb,YearLater,U.S.Wavers onSudan PlantIt
Razed, InternationalHeraldTribune,August 19-20,1999.
150. Despite publicstatementsofrefusaltonegotiate,governments
sometimesdone-
gotiatequietly. Indianofficials
didnegotiate
in late1999withhijackersof an
IndianAirlines jet.CeliaW.Dugger,IndiaDenies It Agreed
toFreePrisonersto
EndHijacking, International
HeraldTribune,December 31,1999.Indiadidre-
lease
three
of36militants
inexchange
formore
than150hostages
ontheplane.
414

151.
152.

153.
154.

155.
156.

157.

158.

159.

160.

161.

162.
170.

171.

172.

173.

174.

175.

176.
Chapter 9
International Political
Economy
It isnotpossible
neatly
toseparate
therealms
ofpolitics
andeconomics
inso-
cialreality,
even
thoughacademicians
havemanagedtodosointheirminds
and,asweknow, anextensive
bodyoftheories
andliterature
hasdevelope
in theseparate
disciplines
of economics
andpolitical
science.
Throughou
much oftheperiod
ofthemodernnation-state,
fromthemidseventeentto
themid-nineteenth
century,
leading
thinkers
wrotenotexclusively
about
poli-
ticsoreconomics,
butrather
aboutpolitical
economy, whichrepresents
the
pointof litics. Crucial
toanunder-
standing
ofthisrelationship
between
economics
andpolitics
istheassumptio
that
the
behavi
economic
cemusttakesufficient
fgggs.Ourtheories account
noton
to
tates
asactors,
butalsotheymustinclude
nonstate
actors
suchasmultination
corporations,
banks,andinvestment
firms.
Issues
suchaslevelofeconomi
development,
growthrates,
trade
patterns,
investment,
monetaryandscal
policy
must
betaken
intoaccount.
Illustrative
ofthisclose
relationship
be-
tween
politics
andeconomics
thatexisted
inearlier
centuries,
theeconomi
Jacob
Viner
hasshown
persuasively
thatpower
andwealth
were
invariab
perceived
astwosides
ofthesame
coin.
Contrary
toawidely
heldassumptio
thatall economic
activitywasmaderuthlessly
subservient
to thepowerinter-
ests
andgoals
ofthestate,
Viner
showed
thatsuch
astereotypical
Viewneeds
somemodication.
Accordingto him,theprevailing
bodyof thoughtabout
economics
andthestate,
whichwascalledmercantilism
(tobediscussed
more
fullysubsequently),
contained
essentially
fourkeyassumptions
that,taken
to-
gether,
pointuptheinextricable
relationship
between
political
andeconom
factors:

(1) wealthis anabsolutely

essential
means
to power.. . ;
(2)power
isessential
orvaluable
asameans
to theacquisition
orretention
of wealth;
(3)wealthandpower
areeach
proper
ultimate
endsofnational
policy;
(4)there
islong-run
harmonybetween
these
ends,
although
inparticular
cir-
cumstances
it maybenecessary
foratimetomake
economic
sacrices
intheinter-
estofmilitary
security
andtherefore
alsooflong-run
prosperity.
1
Therelationshipcommonlycharacterized
todayasgunsversus
butter
wasgenerally
seen notasmutually
exclusive
butrather,
oneofmutual
suppor
and shiftingprioritiesovertime.
416
 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 417

Nevertheless,towardthe endof the nineteenth

centuryandthroughout
much of the twentieth,professional
academicscholars,especiallyin the
UnitedStates,separatedthestudyof politicsfrom the intellectualfocusof eco-
nomicswith thedisciplines
of politicalscience
andeconomics
eachdeveloping
their own theories.This trend stood in sharpcontrastto that of suchearlier
writersasAdamSmith(1723-1790),
DavidRicardo(1772-1823),
Richard
Cobden(1804-1865),andJohnStuartMill (1806-1873)-allliberaltheorists
of politicaleconomy whoconsidered freetradea sureguarantorof peace.
The
liberalschool,or classical
liberalschool,aswetermit in thischapter,
particu-
larly thebranchthat stronglyemphasized thenotionof laissez-faire
(govern-
mentsshouldkeephandsoff businessactivity) undoubtedlycontributedto the
tendency
of politicalscientists
andeconomists
to adopta ratherexclusivist
ap-
proachto their own disciplines,eachclaiming superiorityfor itself over the
other.Political economy,asa eld that examinesthe intersectionand interac-
tion of the two orders,graduallylapsedinto disuseand becamea quaint, ob-
solescent
term.Onlyin thelastthreedecades
or sohaveglobaldevelopments
lent impetusto the revivalof interestin internationalpoliticaleconomy(IPE).
IPE focusesprimarily but not exclusivelyupon the behaviorof interna-
tionaTpolitical
andeconomic
actors:states,transnational
corporations,
nan-
cial ons, politicalmilitary
organizations,
socialandculturalmove-
ments,and a great variety of nongovernmentalgroupswith special-interest
agendas.
Theeld alsodelves
asnecessary
or appropriate
intodQme_sEc~
fac-
tors within particularcountriesasit seeksto understandthe impactof internal
stru?tTiTes
andprocesses
uponforeignoperations
andpolicies.
ThusGeorge
T.
CraneEd Abla Amawi seeIPEas in part a responseto perceivedshortcom-
ingsin the dominantrealistparadigmof internationalrelations.-
One can nd in the burgeoningliteratureof IPE a diverseassortmentof
theoreticalframeworkswith which to approachthe eld. The three most
commonly cited categorizationsor paradigmsare realism, liberalism, and
Marxism, with somevariationsin terminology,subtypes,and combinations.
In IPE realism has been closely identied with mercantilism or statismwith
statesderivingpowerfrom wealth.Historically,liberalismhasbeenassociated
with free marketsand industrial countriesbehavingin sucha fashionas to
maximize their economic self-interests. Of course, the term liberalism itself
hastaken on statistconnotationsin recentdecadesin sharpdistinctionfrom
its classicalmeaning.Marxist IPEcontainsotherradicalanddependency vari-
ants. Someanalystssuggestthat this approachcan be termedradical, with
Marxistandde endency
alternatives.3
RobertGilpinprefersnationalism
to
realismas the major category,and includesunderthat headingmercantilism,
statism,protectionism,and the GermanHistorical School,all of which hold
that economicactivitiesare and should be subordinateto the goal of state
buildingand the interestsof the state.4Writersin the eld of IPEareoften in
disagreementas to where the theoriesof economicinterdependence, Third
Worlddependency,
theworld capitalistsystem,the coreperiphery
model,
and otherst into the threemajor categories,if theyt at all, or whetherthey
4 18 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

require
categories
oftheirown.5
Weshalldealwiththese
in duecourse.
To
understand
howIPEdeveloped,
it is advisable
to beginwiththeoldestof the
theoriesmercantilismdespite
thefactthatit wasnotreallya formalintel-
lectual
theory
butapolicy
rulethatkingsandtheirnancial
advisers
tookfor
granted
ascommonsenseintheearliest
historical
stagesofthenation-state
system.
(Subsequent
versions
ofrealist
ornationalist
theory
willbetreated
later.)

MERCANTILISM
_,__
Intheageofmercantilist
thought,
which
predominated
fromtheseventeent
to thenineteenth
century,
virtually
everyone
assur;1_e_d
thata societys
wealth
depended
upona favorable
balance
oftrade
andthattrade
among
nations
wasa zerosum
game
in whichn e couldrealize
gainsin powerand
wealthe tiste Colbert (1619-1
ministerto LouisXIV,andmanyotherswerecertainthatthewealthand
power
ofnations
depended
uponaccumulating
precious
metals
(gold
andsil-
ver).Thismeant
centralized
governmental
efciency
in thecollection
of tax
revenues
andmaking
themasses
workhardto maximize
theexcess
of exports
overimports,
thelattercurbed
byprotective
tariffs.
Mercantilism
wasadoc
trine not of serious
economic
theorists,
whoscarcely
yetexisted,
but of prac-
titioriersiwho
tookit for granted
ascommon
sense
withoutsystematic
analy-
sis.Thepolicywasdesignedto generate
money fortheroyaltreasury,
which
couldbespent to enhancethestates
militaryprowess, thesplendour
of the
court,andtheluxurious
lifestyle
ofthearistocracy.It wasnotdesigned
topro-
motethegeneral prosperity
of thepopulace at large.Thesystemenabled
statesto maintainstrongarmiesand naviesandeventually
to establish
colonies abroadthatcouldserveasexclusive
preserve
sources
of rawmaterials
for theirmanufacturing
industries.5
Mercantilist
convictionsdidnotsuddenly
givewaytoanintellectual
on-
slaught
byclassical
liberalism,
whichrejected
protectionism
andextolled
the
virtuesof freetrade.Actually,the transitionwasgraduallyextendedover
morethana century.
In theUnitedStates,
Alexander
Hamiltonwasa quasi-
mercantilist.
Hecertainlydidnotadvocate
theaccumulation
of goldandsil-
verasa primegoalof monetary
policy,
or anendin itself,buthewasbent
onprotecting
thegrowth
of national
manufactures
asaninstrument
of
power
forthenascent
republic,
whichwouldnaturally
resultin a favorable
balance
of trade.7
In Germany, Friederich
List(1789-1846)
wasa national-
istwhofavoreda policyof protectionism
asa necessity
for countries
stillin
theearlystages
oftheIndustrial
Revolution
untiltheyhavedeveloped
suf
ciently
to benet
fromfreetrade.8
Indeed,
mercantilist
habits
ofthought
sur-
vivedwell into the ageof economicliberalismand havebeenknown to
reemerge
andcoexist,
asweshallsee,
withtheneoliberal
assumptions
ofthe
global free market.
 LIBERALISM 419

LIBERALISM
Economicliberalismemergedrst in Francewhen a group of thinkersknown
asPhysiocratsspokeout on behalfof bourgeoisfarmersandmerchantsagainst
policies of rigid regulation of industry and trade by the state. Francois
Quesnay (1694-1774) and A. R. J. Turgot (1727-1781), respectivelydefend-
ers of the interestsof agricultureand manufacturers,criticizedmercantilist
policiesthat involvedheavytaxes,price xing, and policiesto maximizethe
excessof exportsover imports,on the groundsthat they stied free initiative
andhinderedeconomic
growth.9In England,
JohnLockestill believed
that a
nations riches should be measuredin its accumulation of gold and silver, but
David Hume,politically lessliberalthan Locke,arguedfor the national stock
of labor as the real sourceof power and wealth, and ardentlyespousedthe
causeof free trade even earlier than did Adam Smith. There are some small
anomalieshere,for Lockeis oftencreditedasthe originatorof the labor the-
ory of value.
Adam Smith,who wasinuencedby Quesnayand Hume,is generallyre-
gardedas?lEfounderof moderneconomic
science,
whichfor himwasanim-
portant branch of a comprehensivemoral philosophy for mankind. -I-Iis
Wealthof Nations, publishedin 1776, provideda thoroughcritique of that
mercantilistorthodoxy,which, as we have seen,was alreadyon the wane
amongpracticalthinkersbut still entrenchedamongpowerfuldomesticinter-
eststhat demandedand receivedlegislativeprotectionagainstforeigncompe-
tition. Smith,a liberally educatedman and a systematicobserverof economic
phenomena,insistedwith persuasiveeloquencethat wealth and power are
functigig
notofvolume
ofprecious
metals
intheroyaltreasury
butofthena-
tions
t capacity.
Thegrowth
ofanations
economy
ISa quite natural process,just like the growth of knowledge.It doesnot re-
quiremanagement by the state.Individualsinvariablyperceiveutility in a divi-
sion of labor that allows themto keepincreasingtheir wealth-gettingability
by specializingin productiveactivity bestsuitedfor their talents.(Thismerely
reiteratesa fundamentalpoint madeby Platoin TheRepublictvventy-twocen-
turiesearlier.)Smithwasconvincedthat nationalwealthwould naturallykeep
growing at a certain rate as the amount of work performedincreases,pro-
videdthat economicprocesses areallowedto operatefreely,_withoutthe inter-
ferenceof sucharticial barriersof ignorance,superstition,counterproductive
custom,and governmentallyimposedlimitations.Internationaltrade.isnot a
zero e inwhich
onestate
cangainonlyatthenexpense
ofanother
or
others;ratherit is an activitypotentiallybenecialto all participants.If the di-
visionof
tic economy,1 ISa sur 0 i nore its advantages
«Tim
in the trade amongnations
byerectin nefcient producers
and
tokeep
out
goods
that
can
bebo a an eycanemaeathome.
Later
DavidRicardowouldapplythe.divisionof laborprincipleto theinternational
dimension
with mathematical
precisionby elaborating whatPaulSamuelson
420 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

calledthe mostbeautifulidea in economic

theory,thelaw q_LQo_m-parative
12
advantage
bywhichs ecialization
ofeffortissaidto roduce
mutual
gains.
AdamSmithin hismoralphilosophy
hadnodoubtthatbenevolence
aimed
atthegreatest
possible
goodwasthehighest
virtue,
butnevertheless
hetook
it forgranted
thatmost
human
beings
actoutofmotives
ofself-interest.
Hede-
rivedcomfortfromhisreligious
conviction
thatselfinterest
wasanintegral
partofGods
providential
plan.According
tohisfamous
theoryoftheinvisi-
blehand,whenindividuals
pursue
theirowninterests
theyunintentionally
promote
thewellbeing
ofsociety.
Totalsocial
wealthincreases,
andeven
though
somebecomemoreprosperous
thanothers,
some partofthehigher
standard
oflivingreaches
thelowerranks
andimproves
theirlotatleast
abit.
(Modern
critics
oftheolder
typeofliberalism
callthisthetrickle
downthe-
ory.)Thereason
forthedisparity
ofwealth
arises
fromthefactthattheowners
of landandfactories
buyupluxuries
instead
of sharing
theirprotswiththe
workers,a situationwidelyresented
longbeforeMarx.
AdamSmithwasundoubtedly
a decent,
sympathetic
human being.
Hedid
notcondone
themiserable
workingconditions
thatwerealready
a feature
of
mining
andfactory
operations,
norcould
heforesee
those
worse
conditions
still
to comein the nineteenth
century,described
by Dickensandcondemned
in
tones
ofOldTestament
prophecy
byMarx.In Smiths
view,nohuman
system
is
perfect.
Thebest
economic
systemliberalismwill
failtoachieve
itsfullpo-
tential
because
ofignorance,
stupidity,
greed,
andthefailure
ofindividuals,
es-
pecially
bankers,
factory
owners,
andcommercial
traders,
tocalculate
correctly
theirownselfinterest
in thelongterm. Hehimselfrecognized
thattheprinci-
pleofthedivisionoflaborhasaseriousdownside.
When specialization
iscar-
riedtoofar,andtheproductive
functionsofworkers
arereduced
toafewsim-
ple,routine,
andboring operations
forthesake
ofincreased
outputefficiency
thecreativepowersof theindividuals
arediminished.Probably
hisgreatest
shortcomingwashistendency to conceive
laborasacommodity,
thepriceof
whichisdetermined
solely
bysupply
anddemand,
anotionthatdeparted
from
theviewsof humanworththatprevailed
withinthemedieval
guilds.
It isnotnecessary
to tracein detailthehistorical
development
of industry
andinternational
tradethroughthe periodfrom the seventeenth
centuryto
WorldWar1,sincethereis anampleliterature
onthesubject
whichstudents
mayconsult
if theywish.(Morewillbesaidlaterabouttheworldcapitalist
system.)
Here,in connection
withliberaleconomicthought,
onlya fewrele-
vantpoints
need bemade. Britain,
of course,
tooktheleadin theIndustrial
Revolution
thatbegan
in themideighteenth
century
andsweptacross
andbe-
yond
much
ofEurope
toembrace
countries
suchasGermany,
Japan,
andthe
UnitedStates
andin thepromotion
of freeinternational
trade,witha fewex-
ceptions.
AdamSmith
hadcountenanced
twotypes
ofgovernmental
interfer
encein freetradethat seemed
reasonable
to him: (1)A countrycouldlegis-
latespecial
regulations
regarding
itsownandforeign
shipping
intrade
forthe
sakeof nationalsecurityandensuring
adequate
navalcapabilities
in wartime.
(2)If a domestic
product
should
betaxed,similarproducts
fromabroad
shouldbe taxedat leastasheavilyor moreso. TheBritishmassively
dis-
 LIBERALISM 421

ruptedtradewith theContinentby blockading

its portsduringthewar with
Napoleon.(Aswe shallseelater,this was a clearapplicationof national,real-
ist politicaleconomy.) Havingbeenself-sufficient in agricultureduringthe
eighteenth century,Britainlostits capacity
to feeditselfbythemid-nineteenth,
and thus in the 1840srepealedthe Corn Laws (protectivetariffs on agricul-
ture) and the NavigationActs,which had limited foreigntrade-carryingto its
ownships. Suchchanges
wereintended
to giveBritainaccess
to agricultural
products that were grown more cheaply abroad than on British farms. This
wasreectedin decliningpricesfor food in Britain, which had becomehighly
urbanized and industrialized. Meanwhile, the United States,Germany,France,
and other industrial countries that were about a half century -behindBritain in
their development cycles all resorted to protective tariffs. Britain helped them
to catch up by investingcapital and by exporting railroad equipmentand
other machinery that contributed greatly to the building of their
industrialeconomic infrastructures. Germany, well-endowed with coal and
other raw materials,emphasized scientic and technicaleducation,which fa-
cilitated the growth of chemicaland machinetool industries.The United
States,which possessed abundantnaturalresources, spawnedmoderncapital-
ism in newforms giantcorporationsthat separated management from own-
ershipand fully exploitedlarge-scale
massproductionfor a hugesinglemar-
ket eagerfor novel productsand ripe for attractiveadvertising.At the same
time, industrywasbeginningto emergein Japan,Russia(with Frenchcapital),
and even in China and India.
Internationaltradewas burgeoningin the earlytwentiethcentury.Liberal
theoristslookedupon freetradeas a guarantorof peaceand friendlyrelations
amongnations.It wassupposed to buildsucha networkof economicinterdepen-
denceasto rendervirtuallyimpossible theresortto war.Prosperitywasexpected
to divertpublicattentionfrom nationalistrivalriesandmilitaryventuresbecause
of theirpotentiallydisruptiveeffectson tradeandeconomicgrowth.Nevertheless
in 1914World War I brokeout, hasteninga British relativeeconomicdecline
from a hegemonic positionthat had alreadybeenslowlyunderway for decades.
The war also brought about a fundamentalchangein the attitude of liberal
thinkers toward the role of the state.F.S.Northedge and MJ. Grievewrote:
TheEuropeanWar of 1914-18wasa total war in thesensethat, to ensurevictory,
the belligerentswere nally compelledto mobilizetotally their resources,their
manpower,their farming,shipping,transportand extractiveand manufacturing
industries,communications systems. . . The governments weresuddenlyforced
to do what all their principlesand experiencetaughtthemcouldnot or shouldnot
be done,to take overthe directionof industry,farming,labour.For all practical
purposesby the endof the war in November1918--allthe belligerents which had
survivedthe ordealweresocializedstatesin&#39;which
hardlyanymajoreconomicde-
cision could be made without the governmentsconsent.This experiencebe-
queathedto socialcriticsin all countriesthe ideathat nationaleconomicplanning
which had servedthe causeof war . . . could equallywell servethe causeof
peace.
422 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

Wellbefore
WorldWarI, liberalthoughthadbegun
to undergo
a funda-
mental
change.
T.H. Green
(1836~1882),
a leading
English
liberaltheorist,
voicedcriticismof statesin which the apparentelevationof the few is
founded
onthedegradation
of themany.2°
Breaking
awayfromtheunlim-
itedfreedom
of individuals
to pursue
theirownself-interest,
heredened
free-
domas liberationof the powersof all menequallyfor contributions
to a
commongood.21
Hebelieved
thatnocontract
isvalidwhichdeals
withhu-
manbeings
ascommodities,
where
theworker1Scompelled
byneed to agree
to laborunderconditions
fatalto health.In hisviewstates
mustregulate
the
hoursof laborforwomen andchildren,
eliminate unwholesome
housing,and
require
bylawadequate
education
forall. LeonP.Baradat,
contrasting
clas-
sicalliberalismwith the modernvariety,notesthat Greens
positionwasan
early
philosophical
justification
forthewelfare
state.23
Whatwasonce
desir-
ableto liberals
is nolongeracceptable.
Contemporary
liberalspreferto use
government
asa toolto helpimprove
theconditions
ofhuman
life,rather
thaninsisting,
asdidtheclassical
liberals,
thatgovernment
stayoutofpeoples
affairs.24
Theevolution
of liberalthought
hasprovided
plentyof gristforthe
mill in thedebatebetween
liberalsandconservatives
in thedomestic
politics
of nationsafactor,asweshallsee,
withprofound
implications
forIPEatthe
turn into a new millennium.

THE RESURGENCEOF REALISM/NATIONALISM

IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Mercantilism,
aswehave
seen,
wasaformofnationalist
economic
thought
in
reaction
to whichIPEemerged
asa subject
of theory.Realist
thought,
how-
ever,didnotoriginate
withthemercantilists.
Sofarasgoverning
leaders
and
theirpolicyadvisers
areconcerned,
realist
theoryistheoldest
andmostpersis-
tentof all international
theories,
havingevolved
fromancient
timesasde-
scribed
in Chapter
2.Intherealmofstateeconomicpolicy,
it wasrivaled
and
attimes
superseded
byliberalism
in partsofthenineteenth
andearlytwenti-
ethcenturies,
butrealism
reemerged
in the1930s
largely
asaresultoftwofac-
tors:(1)theGreatDepression
and(2)theriseof totalitarian-authoritar
regimes,among
otherreasons,
asdiscussed
ingreaterdetailinChapter
2.
Theperiodbetweenthetwoworldwarsprovidedthesetting
forthedevel-
opment
ofmodern
IPEtheory.
Therefore,
abriefreview
ofthisperiod
asit af-
fected IPE is in order.
WorldWarI hadbrought
profound
changes
in international
tradeandii-
nance.From1914to 1917,BritainandFrancehadto importhugeamounts of
war-related
materialfromtheUnitedStatesby liquidatingtheirtransatlantic
investments
and borrowingfrom privatebanks.After the UnitedStatesen-
teredthe war in April 1917,theU.S.government
providedloansto the
European
alliesfor suchpurposes.
Bywarsend,theUnited
States
wasthe
THE RESURGENCE OF REALISM/NATIONALISM IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 423

worldsleadingcreditornation and had beneted,alongwith Japan,from the

wartime disruption of trade by expandingits own marketsin Europeand
Asia.The long war effort had exhaustedor destroyedmuchof Europespro-
ductivecapability.This,combinedwith rampantpostwarination, largetrade
decits and huge indebtedness, sharplyreducedEuropesinternationaleco-
nomiccompetitiveness.25
Thestagewassetfor international
controversy
over
relationshipbetweeninter-alliedwar debtsand war reparations.
TheVersaillesTreatyassessed Germanywith compensation for all damage
doneto the civilian populationof the alliesand to their property,but xed no
sum, which was to be determinedby an Allied ReparationCommission.
Germanycould not afford to pay for threeyearsafter submittingthe rst in-
stallment;by 1922the fall of the mark reachedcatastrophicproportions.In
January1923,France andBelgium senttroopsto occupytheRuhroverBritish
opposition.In the matterof inter-alliedwar debts,the UnitedStateswasa
creditor, Franceand other allies on the Continent were for the most part
debtors,and Britain was part debtor,part creditor.Francedeclaredthat it
couldpayits debtsonlyif Germany madereparations.
Britainofferedto cancel
its debtsexceptfor whatit owedtheUnitedStates.
TheEuropeans, whohad
sufferedthe severesthumanand physicallosses,thoughtthat the Americans,
havingbenetedfromwartimetradeexpansion,
oughtto maketheircontribu-
tion by writing off the debts.The U. S. Congressand the StateDepartment
balked,insistingthat reparationswere a purely Europeanaffair (because
the
UnitedStateshad soughtnone)and that the two issuesmustbekept separate.
Therewasno precedent
for canceling
contractual
obligations
out of political
considerations,
but that fact did not assuage
the Europeanschagrin.Finally,
theDawesandYoungPlanshelpedpartiallyto solvethereparations
problem,
and a settlementwas reachedon repayingloans to the United Statesover
62 years.In thelate1920s,bothsolutionsworkedand.produced a periodof
prosperityin Europe,thankslargelyto thegenerous
extension
of U.S.creditto
thedebtorsandto U.S.investment in Germany.26
The GreatDepressionof the 1930swas one of thosetraumatic=experi-
ences,which,according to RobertGilpin,theworldeconomy goesthrough
approximately everyhalfcentury.Headmitsthat a regularized,systemic and
cyclicalpatternof expansion andcontractionmaynot exist, yet he takes
noteof alternatingperiodsof rapidandslowgrowth that affectthe price
levelandmayentailsignicantchanges in economic outputandin therateof
unemployment on a globalscale.27
(Cyclicaleconomictheoriesaboutthein-
cidenceof war aresurveyed in Chapter7.) JoanEdelmanSperodefinesde-
pressionasa prolonged andseveredeclinein nationalbusiness
activity,ordi-
narilyoccurringoverseveral scalyears. . . characterized
by sharplyfalling
ratesof productionandcapitalinvestment; by therapidcontractionof credit;
andby massunemployment
andhighratesof business
failure.28
Thiscon-
trastswith a recession,
whichrepresents
a short-term
decline,usuallylasting
for at leastthreeconsecutive
quartersof a scal year,markedby rising unem-
ploymentandslowerratesof economic growthbut lesssevere
andpersistent
thanthoseoccurringin a depression.)-9
424 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Everyone
agrees
thattheGreatDepression
washeralded
bythestockmar-
ket crashof October 1929.Severalinterrelatedreasonsare usuallycited for
the Wall Streetcrash,which reverberated
aroundthe world:

1. World War I tax burdens and armaments costs

2. A returnto U.S.protectivetariffs,whichmadeit moredifficultfor
Europeansto payWorld War I debtsandreparations
3. A long declineof agriculturalpricesfollowingwartimeexpansion,
which translatedinto loweredpurchasingpowerfor farmers
. Disequilibriumof overproductionand decliningconsumption
U1-l>
. Inadequate
government
regulationof corporations,
banks,holding
companies,
investment
trusts,and stockexchangesaconditionfa-
vorableto shadyor downrightdeceptivepractices
6. Speculationby severalmillionsmallstockholders whowereluredby
get-rich-quickhopesinto converting savings
into investments
with-
out understandingthe systemwherebyan increasing proportionof
stockswereheldon margin(Thisenabledoneto buystockswith a
smallinvestmentandpayfor themlaterfromtheprot realized when
thepricewentup.Themistaken assumption wasthattherisesin ue-
tuatingpriceswouldalwaysovertimebegreaterthanthedeclines.)
7. Theination of stockpricesin the bull marketof late1929beyond
anyrealisticexpectation
of increasedearnings,
leadingto whatecono-
mistsregardasa bubble waiting to burst
8. Tendency to unloadstocksupon receiptof newsthat priceswere
fallingon Wall Streetor in Europe,leadingto panicsellingandsui-
cides in late October 1929
9. Denialsfrom nanciers that stockswere overpriced,and refusal to
heeddangersignals,
includingwarningsby President
Hooverandoth-
ersconcerningthe needto restrictcredit

The last four factorslistedwereimmediateprecipitantsof the Wall Street

collapse.
Therst ve weremoredeep-seated
causes
of theentirecatastrophic
downturnin theeconomy, whichresultedin bankclosingsandbusiness fail-
ures,rapidreductionof purchasing power,massiveunemployment, andthe
fatalresortto protectionism
in theformof theHawley-Smoot Tariffof 1930,
whichraisedthegeneral levelof duties(925onmanufactures
and75 on farm
products)fromtheearlier33to 40 percent. Withintwo years,25 foreigngov-
ernmentshad retaliatedwith tariffs of their own, andU.S.exportswerecut in
half.3°Panhandlers
multiplied,breadlines
lengthened,
displaced
workerssold
apples
onstreetcorners,
veterans
carriedouta bonusmarchonWashington
andTin PanAlleysoptimisticlyricswerefinallyovertaken
by Brother,Can
You Sparea Dime?
Neitherin the UnitedStatesnor in Europedid governments
know how to
copewith the most glaringfailurein the historyof capitalism.President
Hoover was an intelligent,superb,and well-meaningadministrator,a man
with a splendidreputationfor havingsupervised
foodreliefin Europeduring
 THE RESURGENCE OF REALISM/NATIONALISM IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 425

andafterWorldWar1.Hewasanxiousto do something toalleviate

thehard-
shipof Americans, andhedid takestepsin theearlystagesof thedepression
that seemed for a timeto haltthedownwardspiral,but everysmallupswing
wasfollowedby morebadnews.Hooverwasnot alwaysa competent politi-
cianin his dealings with Congress
andthepublic,andheremained ideologi-
cally committedto ruggedindividualism,a rm classicalliberal beliefin the
superiority of private initiative over governmentalinterventionin the eco-
nomicorder.Asthecrisisworsened, whenhedid actit wasreluctantly,
slowly,
andbelatedly.
Hefavoredassistance to business
asa stimulantto theeconomy
ratherthandirectreliefprograms
to farmersandworkers.Hoovers optimistic
statementsaboutthe basicsoundness
of the Americaneconomyrang increas-
inglyhollowasthe downwardspiralcontinued.
Thefactis that no one,in-
cludingthepresidents
challenger,
FranklinD. Roosevelt,
hadanybetteran-
swers at the time. Nevertheless,Hoover was unfairly malignedand held
responsible
for a depression
whoseunderlying
causes
antedated
hispresidency
or werebeyondhis control. Oneof his helpful movesto easethe international
nancialcrisiswasto call for a one-yearmoratoriumon the paymentof
WorldWarI debtsandreparations, shortlybeforeBritainwasforcedto aban-
donthegoldstandardin 1931.Exceptfor a trickleof payments
afterthat (no-
tably from Finland),the moratoriumbecamepermanent.
CharlesP.Kindleberger
maintained
that the nancialcrisisspunout of
control becauseno singlecentral bank (suchas the Bank of Englandor the
U.S.FederalReserve
Bank)waswillingto actaslenderof lastresort.Perhaps
nonewasable,sincetherewasno hegemonic powercapable of exercising
leadership
in managingthe nancialcrisis.32(Similardiagnoseswould be
voicedagainduringthe globalnancial crisisof the late 1990s.)
Oncein power,Roosevelt,who hadcompounded uncertainty
duringthe
periodbetweenhiselectionandinauguration by disdaining
Hoovers propos-
alsfor cooperation
to easethecrisis,actedwith vigorbutwithoutanycoher-
ent plan. He experimentedwith severaltrial-anderrormeasuresto stir the
moribundeconomy:
declaringa bankholiday,callingCongress
into special
sessionfor the famous Hundred Days, creatingrelief and public works
projects,providingfor therenancingof farmandhomemortgages to prevent
foreclosures,
reducingagriculturalproductionto givefarmerspriceparity,
andrelaxingantitrustlawsto permitthe draftingof codesof fair competi-
tion in eachindustrythat forbadechild labor,setmaximumhoursand mini-
mum wagesfor workers,and productionquotasand pricesin someareas.33
Roosevelttook the nation off the gold standardin 1933.Classicalliberalsre-
gardedsucha measure,designedto permit greaterexibility in the manage-
ment of the currency,as anothermove toward nationalismand away from
freetrade principles.The gold standardhad beenthe foundationof an inter-
nationalmonetaryorderwhich,accordingto the theory,wassupposedto pro-
vide a xed exchangerate mechanismthat automatically,impersonally,and
symmetricallyadjustedthe paymentsimbalancesamongnationswith trade
surplusesand decits through the ow of gold and consequentprice
changes.34
RobertGilpin,whileadmittingthat the systemwasa successful
426 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

stabilizer,
denied
thatit operated
automatically,
impersonally,
or symmetri-
cally.
Banks
cushioned
theeffects
ofgoldowsondomestic
prices;
Britain
had
to useitshegemonic
position
to enforce
therules;andtheprocess
of adjusting
payment
imbalances
produced
unequalresults
for advanced
andlessdevel-
opedcountries
because,
lacking
theleverage
of wealthier
trading
states,
they
couldnot cushionthedomestic
effectsof capitalows.35
Theprincipal
ingredient
in Roosevelts
pragmatic
NewDealeffortsto
solvethe nationseconomic
morasswasthenotionof primingthe pump.
Thismeantusing.
thegovernments
resources
to stimulate
purchasing
power,
consumption,
andnewproduction,
allofwhichhopefully
wouldbringpeople
fromreliefrollsto thefactoryor theworkingfarm.Forseveral
years,despite
theoptimistic
rhetoricof theNewDealers (manyof whose programs conser-
vativesandoldstyleliberalsregardedasabsurdlywasteful or unconstitu-
tional)theeconomy asa wholeremained stubbornly,
intractably sluggish.
As
late.as1938,almost10millionwereunemployed andat leastasmanywere
onreliefor engaged
in federalandothergovernmentalmakework programs,
severalof which(especially
theconstruction
of roads,dams, bridges,
postof-
ces,andartisticpublicbuildings)
werevaluableadditionsto thenationseco-
nomic
andcultural
infrastructure.
Meanwhile,
thetheoretical
explanation
for
theGreatDepression andforRoosevelts
recovery
policies
wasfurnished
after
thefactbya brilliant,somewhat
eccentric
English
economist,
JohnMaynard
Keynes,who met Rooseveltin 1934.
In contrastto othertheories
concerning
thecause(s)
of prolonged
depres-
sion,someodd(sunspots,
masspsychosis
leading
to hysterical
buying
and
panickyselling)
andsome
plausible
(hesitant
andmyopicpolitical
leadership
technological
change),
Keynesin hiswork,General
Theory
of Employment,
Interest
andMoney,
offered
a purelyeconomicmathematical
diagnosis
which
RobertL. Heilbronersummarized
as follows.The interestrate, whether
linkedto thegoldstandard
or not,is supposedto maintain
a delicate
seesaw
balancebetweensavings
andinvestment.If apeoplesaves
(thatis,hoards)
too
muchof its totalincome,thevitalizingow of moneythroughthesocietydi-
minishes;
purchasing
power,investment,
andpricesdecline;
andunemploy-
mentgoes
up.If apeople
invests
toomuch(through
lending
banks
andstock
brokers),
production
in expanding
enterprises,
employment,
andpurchasing
power
increase,
resulting
inination.
Interest
istheselfcorrecting
device
that
keeps
theeconomy operating
on a moreor lessevenkeelbetween runaway
growthandslowdown towardstagnation.
In theearly1930s, theAmerican
people
hadexhaustedtheirsavings,
tryingto keepthecupboard fromgoing
completely
bare.Therewerenoprivateresourcesleftto primethepump.As
Heilbroner put it:
Thustheparadox
ofpoverty
amidst
plenty
andtheanomaly
ofidlemenandidlema-
chines. . . Fortheeconomy
doesnotoperate
to satisfyhumanwants. . . It turns
outgoods
tosatisfy
deman_dand
demand
isassmall
asapersons
pocketbook
ForKeynes,
everyeconomic boomcontained
withinitselfthethreatof
collapse.
Whatwasneededin theabnormal
situation
of theGreatDepression
 THE RESURGENCE OF REALISM/NATIONALISM IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 427

was deliberategovernment investment

throughdecit spending. Although
governmentinvestmentin largescale
projectssuchas the Tennessee Valley
Authoritywas intendedto help business
by developing infrastructure
and
buildinguppurchasingpowerto stimulatedemand,it wasseenby business
asa threat,anda socialist
oneat that.Heilbroner
maintainsthatthepump-
priming programof the New Deal did not end the depressionbecauseit did
not go far enough.He suggests,
andmanywouldagreewith him, that the
UnitedStatesdid not reallypull out of the depression
until the outbreakof the
Europeanwar in 1939 precipitatedRooseveltsefforts, following the 1940
election, to reversethe courseof isolationism and make the United Statesthe
arsenalof democracy.
38
Theworldwidedepression
contributedsubstantiallyto theconditionsthat
ledto WorldWarII. It fueledtheforcesof economic
discontentin Germany-
risingunemployment amongworkersanda growingsense of insecuritywithin
themiddleclass~which HitlerandtheNaziPartywereableto exploitin their
rise to power in 1933. Hitlers own pump-priming policy was sometimes
compared to Roosevelts
NewDealprograms.Thedepression alsodidmuch
to validateMussolinis
stricturesagainstparliamentary
democracy
andcapi-
talist individualismand Stalinsanticapitalistpropagandain the SovietUnion
duringthe 1930s.Oncethe powerfulAmericaneconomywentinto a pro-
tractedslump,the downturnin world tradecompounded
the problemsof
]apanpoverty of resources,
racial restrictionson migration,and the barriers
posedby risingforeigntariffstherebystrengthening
thehandof amilitary
regimeanxiousfor aggressive territorial expansion.Onenation after another
abandonedthe gold standardandfreetradein favor of exchangecontrolsand
protectionistbeggarmyneighborpolicies.Thesetrends-,which were only
partially reversedby Secretaryof StateCordellHulls effortsafter 1934to ne-
gotiatetariff-cuttingreciprocal
tradeagreements,
playedtheirpart in raising
the internationallevelof political suspicionand hostility.Togetherthe Great
Depressionand the emergingthreat of regimeswilling to alter the statusquo
by forcepunctured
theliberalsfaithin a naturalharmonyof interests
among
nations.The Westerndemocracies
reluctantlyshiftedfrom idealism(or what
E. H. Carr called utopianism) to nationalist realism as the basis of their for-
eign policies.
The essential characteristics of economic realism/nationalism can now be
quicklyrecapitulated.Thebasicactorsin the internationalsystemaresovereign
states,whichrecognizeno superiorauthority.The systemis an anarchicone,in
which eachstateseeksto determineits own policieswith asmuchfreedomas
the distributionof powerpermits.Whetherin peaceor war,statesmustlook to
their own security,makingwhateverprovisiontheycanfor their own freedom
of choice,thesecurityof theirterritoryandpopulation,
andtheprotectionof
vital intereststhat closelyimpingeuponthe prosperityof thenationaleconomy
asa wholeand of its mostimportantcomponents. Realistsfully agreewith the
mercantilisttenetthat power and wealth are for all practicalpurposesinter-
changeable concepts.As rational,unied actors,statescannothelp estimating
actualandpotentialchanges in thestructureof internationalpowerrelations.4°
428 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Theystrive
to make
certain
thatotheractors,
suchasinternational
organiza-
tions,transnational
corporations,
andothergroupsdonotactcontraryto state
interests
if theycanprevent
themfromdoingso.Aswenotedin Chapter
1 and
will seefurtherin thischapter,
oneof themajorcontemporary
controversies
in
international
theoryis whether
states
areassovereign
astheythinktheyare,
evenif lesssothan.informertimes,or whethertheworldis nowsopluralist
and diffuseas to rendereconomicrealist/nationalist
assumptions
obsolete.
Despite
such
debates
about
sovereignty,
ampleevidence
suggests
thateven
lib-
eralscanabandon
theirowncherished
principles,
astheydid in WorldWarI,
andaccept
substantial
governmental
intervention
in theeconomy
whenna-
tionalsecurity
isatstake,
andastheydidonanevenmoremassive
scale
of to-
tal state control in World War II.

MA HEoRv
In markedcontrasttotheliberaltheoryof freetradebasedon competition
and,,theRealist/Nationalist
theoryof an economic
ordersubservient
to the
power
interests
ofthestate,
Marxist,
Leninist,
neoMarxist,
dependencia,
and
othersocialistschools
of thoughthavearguedthatbothliberalism andnation-
alistrealismareessentially
intellectual
justicationsfor a capitalisticsystem,
whichis a principaldeterminant
of exploitation
andconictwithinand
among
thenations
of theworld.At some
riskof oversimplifying,
butin a
summary
that is essentially
correct,FriedenandLakenotethat where
Liberalsfocuson individualsand Marxists on classes,
realistsconcentrateon
nationst\a_c_es
andinvariably
seek
to control
orinuence
thedomestic
econ-
omygand
itsplaersforthep sts but
in sharp.
contrast
with liberals,
realists
denythatpoliticsandeconomics
are
separable.Oneshould
keepin mind,however,thatthese
termsreferto
purely
theoretical
models.
In political,
economic,
andsocial
reality,
onemay
bepredominant
yetcontain
elementsnormally
associated
withothers,or a
particular
system
maycontain
such amixture
andmodications
ofallthree
as
to be difcultto characterize.
Moreover,the meaningof termsmaychange
from onehistoricperiodto another,
requiringsuchtheoreticalrenements as
neoliberalism,neorealism,
andneoMarxism. Asmentioned earlier,somespe-
cialtheoriesforexample,
pluralism,
dependencia,
andworldcapitalism
maycutacross
twoorallthree
ofthebasic
models.
Finally,
wemustbeware
of
rhetoric
andpropaganda
thatpresent
simplied
caricatures
thatdistortthere-
alityofanincreasingly
complex
global
economy.
Withthese
caveats
in mind,
we cannow proceed.
Centra d waristheassumption
(re-
jected
bytheauthors
of_
thisbook)
thatallinternational
issues
arereducible
to
issues
of The
strength
ofsuch
an
assumptio
lies
inthe
considerale in u e of the philosophical
systempropounded
originallyby
KarlMarxandFriedrich
Engels
andthepronouncements,
whether
consistent
or contradictory,
of theirnumerous
socialist
andcommunist
descendants
 MARXIST/DEPENDENCY THEORY 429

Generations
of academic
andjournalistic
theoreticians
andwould-be political
practitioners
whoneverlivedundera communist or a socialist
regime
have
expounded an essentially
Marxistanalysisof theworld.Largenumbers of
otherwisenon-Marxistteachers,students, politicians,writers,andevenbusi-
nesspeoplehaveadoptedaneconomic interpretationof historybasedat least
in partonquasi-Marxiananalysis.In nearlyall thedeveloping countries,
elites
longtook for grantedthevalidityof Leninsnotionof imperialism, andthis
powerfully inuencedtheir attitude toward the West.The main elementsof
Marxist theorydatebackto 1848whenKarl Marx producedhis famous
Communist Manifesto.Yetthetheoryshoweda remarkable survivability
into
thenal quarterof a centurythatoftenprovedbrutallycriticalof abstractions
inheritedfrom the past. It would be a mistaketo think that the demiseof
SovietCommunismportendsthe permanentobsolescence of Marxist Socialist
theory,whichhaspersistedfor nearlya centuryanda half.It exerteda power-
ful impactonmanymindsin manypartsof theglobe.Indeed,someaspects of
the theory,suchas the inuenceof economicrelationships on the higher
spheresof humanculture,havebeenenduringly integratedintothemodernin-
tellectualapproach
to thestudyof philosophy, history,thesocial
sciences,
lit-
erature,andthearts.Thefactthatcentraleconomic planningasembodied in
SovietCommunismhas beenwidely rejectedas a failed systemsincethe late
1980s,andthat themarketeconomy andliberalor populistdemocracy be-
cameobjectsof almostuniversalacclaimin the 1990s,doesnot justifyignor-
inga long-livedexplanation
of howsocietyshouldbeorganized economically
and politically.
Marxismis anadmixtureof metaphysics
(dialectical
materialism),
theory
of history(economic
determinism),
economicandsociological
science,politi-
cal ideology,theory and strategyof revolution,socialethics,and an eschato-
logical moral theologythat looks toward a secularsalvation:the adventof a
classless
socialorderof perfectjustice,in whichconict ceases
andthe psy-
chologyof a newhumanbeingis generated. Marx,morethananyotherindi-
vidual, strengthened
the ideathat conflict arisesinevitablyout of the life-and-
deathstruggle of socioeconomic
classes.
Capitalismisthebondagefromwhich
peoplestriveto beliberated,
andthisliberationwill beaccomplished
through
knowledge of the inexorable
dialectical
lawsof historicalandsocialchange.
Up to now,classconict hasbeenthe motor of socialchange.Onceclasscon-
ict comes
to anendwith theestablishment
of communism,social
change
will
occuronly asa resultof rationalplanning,debate,anddecisionmaking.
Karl Marx (1818-1883)evolveda theory of history basedon dialectical
materialism,in which the systemof economicproductiondeterminesthe insti-
tutionaland ideologicalstructures
of society.43
Whoevercontrolsthe eco-
nomic systemalso controls the political system.Marx and Engelsstudy of
history and of nineteenth-century Britain led them to concludethat eachpe-
riod containsclashingforcesa dialecticfrom which a new order emerges.
All history is the history of classstrugglebetweena ruling group and an op-
posinggroup,from which comesa neweconomic,political, andsocialsystem.
Marxsmodelfor the studyof societyand its transformationcontainsa thesis
430 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY

(ruling
group)
andanantithesis
(opposing
group),
which
clash
andproduce
a
synthesis
(anew
economic,
political,
andsocial
system).44
Likethesystems
thatpreceded
it,capitalism
contains
theseeds
ofitsown
destruction.
Marxbelieved
thatthegrowing
impoverishment
oftheworking
classthe
proletariat-would
leadto a revolution
to overthrow
theruling
capitalist
class.
Thelower
strata
ofthemiddle
class
areabsorbed
intothepro-
letariat
because
theydonothave
thecapital
tocompete
onthescale
oftheir
more
fortunate
confreres,
andtheirspecialized
skillsbecome
worthless
asare-
sultofnewmethods
ofproduction.
Astheranks
oftheproletariat
increase,
the
struggle
withthebourgeoisie
growsinintensity.
Initially
thestruggle
iscon-
ducted
byindividual
members
oftheexploiting
capitalist
class.
Marxenvis-
aged
aseries
ofclashes
ofincreasing
intensity
between
theproletariat
andthe
bourgeoisie,
untiltheeruption
ofarevolution,
nallyresulting
intheover-
throw of the bourgeoisie.
InMarxs
doctrine
ofsurplus
value,
thesocially
useful
laborthatproduces
a commodity
isconsidered
to betheonlymeasure
ofitsworth.Capitalist
themselves
produce
nothing.
Instead,
theylivelikeparasites
fromthelabor
of
theproducing
class.
Thecapitalist
pays thelaborer
asubsistence
wageand
keeps
therest.
According
toMarx,
thevast mass
ofthepopulation
isreduce
towage
slavery
inacapitalist
society.
Theproletariat
produces
goods
andser-
vices
forwhichit receives
littleornoreturn.
In acapitalist
system,
thebour-
geoisie,
whichcontrols
themeans
ofproduction,
exploits
theworker
and
widens
thegapthe
surplus
valuebetween
theprice
paidworkers
fortheir
labor
andtheprice
obtained
bythebourgeoisie
inthemarketplace.
Thecomingclash
between
thecapitalist,
bourgeois
class
(thesis),
andpro-
letariat
(antithesis)
wasexpected
tolead
toasocialist
order.
Therewould bea
period
ofextensive
government
controls
overproduction
anddistribution
un-
til thelastvestiges
ofcapitalism
were
removed.
Marxpredicted
thewithering
away
ofthestate
withthedevelopment
ofacommunist
economic,
political
andsocialorder.
Anarchists,
aswesawinChapter5,despised
Marxist
social-
istsforadvocating
adictatorship
oftheproletariat
asaruthless
necessity
be-
forethestatewitheredaway,if it everwould.
Orthodox
Marxists
viewallpolitical
phenomena,
including
imperialism
andwar,asprojections
ofunderlying
economic
forces.
Allforms
ofconsciou
ness
aresubordinated
totheeconomic.
Religious,
humanitarian,
political,
cul-
tural,andmilitarystrategic
motives
foranykindofpower
relationship
be-
tweena stronger
andaweakercommunityareexplained
bytheMarxistas
rationalizations
designed
todisguise
theeconomic
substructure.
Thishasbeen
essentially
truethroughout
history,
butit becomes
most
apparent
intheeraof
capitalism.
Inoneoftheirmost
stridently
polemical
passages,
Marxand
Engels
indignantlydeclared:
Thebourgeoisie
. . . hasleftnoother
bond between
manandman thannaked
self-interest,
thancallous cash payment.
It hasdrowned
themost heavenly
ec-
stasies
ofreligious
fervor,ofchivalrous
enthusiasm,
ofphilistine
sentimental
intheicywater
ofegotistical
calculation.
. . .The
bourgeoisie
hasstripped
ofits
haloevery
occupation
hitherto
honored
andlooked
uptowithreverent
awe.It
 THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM 431

hasconverted
thephysician,
thelawyer,
thepriest,thepoet,themanof science,
into its paidwage-laborers.
Marxhada visionof peacethepeace of theself-alienated
person re-
storedasa resultof thenegation of thenegation,therevolutionary
self-
appropriation by the proletariat,
takingthat whichrightfullybelongs to
itself.47
In hisearlier
years,
hemayhavepreferred orhopedthattheinevitable
victoryof socialismcouldbeachieved
througha nonviolentworkingout of
thedialectic.As hegrewolder,however,
Marxsyouthfulphilosophical ideal-
ismgaveway to the thoughtmodesof a frustrated,impatient,professional
revolutionary.JohnPlamenatzput it asfollows:
Logically,violence,the sheddingof blood, is no essentialpart of revolution as
Marx and Engelsconceivedit. True,they thoughttherewould be violencewhen
theproletariattookoverpower,in mostcountries
if notin all.Theyevenat times,
I suspect,took pleasurein thethoughtthat therewould be. &#39;
They werenot very gentlepersons;nor did they believe,ascertainother so-
cialistsandcommunistsof theirdaydid,thatviolenceis wrongor thatit corrupts
thosewhouseit. Butall thistakesnothingawayfromthepointI ammaking:rev-
olution, as Marx and Engelsconceived of it, doesnot necessarily involve
violence.

It wasLenin,comingoutof a traditionof Russian

revolutionary
conspira-
torial activitythathadbecome
a mirrorimageof theczaristoppressiveness
it
fought,who morethan anyoneelseimpartedto twentiethcentury Marxist
communismits predilectionfor violenceand terror. Lenin was reactingin
part againstthe revisionismof suchGermanMarxistsas Karl Kautsky
(1854-1938)and EduardBernstein(1850-1932),who realizedthat someof
Marxs predictionshad gone awry and that the achievementof socialism
mightbea long,gradualprocess
employing
education,
psychological
intimi-
dation, and the ballot box. Lenin insistedthat the appealof violencewas in-
herentin themakeupof thetruerevolutionary,
andthat thebourgeoisstate
cannotbereplaced
bytheproletarianstatethrougha witheringawaybut,asa
generalrule, only through a violent revolution,becausecapitalistswill never
relinquishtheir dominantpositionpeacefully.

THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM

AlthoughMarx fully appreciated the worldwidescopeof capitalistoperations
for acquiringraw materialsandfor marketingmanufactured goods,hehimself
did not elaboratea theory of imperialism.This task was left to his twentieth-
centuryintellectualheirsRudolph Hilferding (1877-1941),a GermanSocial
Democrat; Rosa Luxembourg (1870-1919), a German Socialist;and, of course,
Lenin.The account,however,beginswith a born liberal.
Curiouslyenough,mostof the cluesto the communisttheoryof imperial-
ismin thiscenturywereprovidedby theEnglisheconomist
JohnA. Hobson
(1858-1940).Hobson, an Oxford graduate,was a journalist, essayist,and
432 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

university
lecturer
whohadbeeninuenced
towardliberalism
byJohnStuart
Mill andtowardthescience
of societybyHerbertSpencer.
Attractedto idealist,
humanitarian,
andethical
causes
of socialreform,hebecame
a selfdesignated
religious
andeconomic
heretic
andgravitated
toward aFabian-type
socialism
ashegrewincreasingly
disenchanted
withwhathecalledmechanized
capital-
ism. During
theBoerWar,hewentto South
Africaasa correspondent
for
TheManchester
Guardian.His coverage
of that conict,whichhesawasa
concoction
of diamond
monopolists
andothereconomic
exploiters,
moved
himfurtherin thedirectionof ananticapitalist,
antimilitaristpolemicthatwas
not freeof anti-Semitic
overtones.In anyevent,it is not too muchto saythat
Hobsonpractically
inventedthemodern theory
of imperialism,
andhedida
great
dealtocreateanintellectual
andmoral revulsion
against
it intheEnglish-
speaking
world.(Liberalopinionin theUnited
Stateswasalreadymanifest-
inga guiltfeeling
overCubaandPacicexpansionism in thewakeof the
Spanish-American
War.5°)
Morethan60yearslater,twoscholars
wouldconclude
thattheworld-
widemisinterpretation
oftheBoer
Warasacapitalist
plot. . . became
theba-
sisof all subsequent
theories
of imperialism.51
Theverywordimperialism,
hadhithertobeeninvoked
proudlyto implywhatBritainhadcontributed
to-
wardcivilizing
thepartsoftheworldonce
orstillcontrolled
byBritainthe
ruleof law,parliamentary
institutions,
a rationaladministration
of civilser-
vantswithsome sense
of publicresponsibility
(hitherto
aratherrarephenom-
enoninmanyregions),
andaconvictionoftheworthandrights
ofhuman
be-
ings(even
rarer).Thetermbecame in Englanda recognizedsymbol
of a
strongmoralrevulsion
onthepartof a minority
withLiberal,
Radical,
and
Labourleanings,
orwithstrongreligiousscruples.52
Hobson arguedthatimperialism
resultsfrommaladjustments
withinthe
capitalist
system,
in whicha wealthyminorityoversaves,
whileanimpover-
ishedof bare-subsistence
majoritylacksthepurchasing
powerto consume all
thefruitsof modernindustry.Capitalistsocieties
arethusfacedwith thecriti-
cal dilemmaof overproduction and underconsumption. If capitalistswere
willingto redistribute
theirsurplus
wealth
in theformof domestic
welfare
measures,therewouldbenoserious structural
problem. Thecapitalists,
how-
ever,seekinstead
to reinvest
theirsurplus capitalin prot-making
ventures
abroad.Theresultisimperialism,
theendeavor of thegreatcontrollers
of in-
dustryto broaden
thechannel for theow of theirsurpluswealthbyseeking
foreign
markets
andforeign
investments
totakeoffthegoods
andcapital
they
cannotsellor useat home.53
Hobson was aware that noneconomicfactors were at work in late
nineteenth-century
European
expansion
abroadforcesof a political,mili-
tary,psychological,
religious,
andphilanthropic
character.
Heinsisted,
how-
ever,thattheessential
ingredient
in imperialism
is nancecapitalism,
which
galvanizesandorganizes
theotherforces
intoa coherent
whole:
Financecapitalism
manipulates
thepatrioticforceswhichpoliticians,
soldiers
philanthropists
andtraders
generate;
theenthusiasm for expansion
whichissues
 LENIN AND CONFLICT THEORY 433

fromthesesources,
thoughstrongandgenuine,
isirregular
andblind;thenancial
interest
hasthosequalities
of concentration
andclear-sighted
calculation
which
are neededto set imperialism at work.54

InHobsonsview,imperialism
inthecase
ofBritain
hadnotbeen
necessary
to
relieve
population
pressure,
forBritain
wasnotoverpopulated,
anditsgrowth
rateat the turn of the centurywasdeclining
towarda stationary
level.
Furthermore,
henoted,Britishpeopledidnot seemat all anxiousto resettlein
mostareasof the Empireacquiredafter 1870.55
Hobsoncondemned
latenineteenth-century
imperialism
asirrationaland
asbadbusiness
policyfor thenationasa whole,eventhoughit wasrational
andprotable
forcertain
groups:
bourse
participants,
speculative
miners,
en-
gineers,
theshipbuildingandarmamentsindustrialists,
exporters,
contractors
to themilitaryservices,
andmembers
of thearistocratic
classes,
whosenttheir
sonsto beofcersin thearmy,navy,andcolonial
service.Although
theeco-
nomicactivitiesof thesegroupsconstitutedbut a smallfractionof Britainsto-
tal enterprise,
thegroupsbeneting
fromimperialismwerewellorganized
for
advancingtheirinterests
through
politicalchannels.
Imperialism,
saidHobson,
involves
enormous
risksandcosts
to thenation,
compared
withitsrelatively
meagerresultsin the form of increasedtrade, and hencethe rationalefor it
mustbesought
in theadvantages
it brings
to specialgroups
withinthesociety.
E.M. Winslow(1896-1966),
evaluating thesignicance of Hobsonsstudy,
concluded:
No otherbookhasbeen soinuentialin spreadingthedoctrine
of
economic
imperialism.57
Later,Leninclearlyacknowledged hisindebtednes
to Hobsons work.
Hobson anticipated
thelaterLeninist
attackoncapitalist
proteering
as
amajorfactorin causing
international
war.Policies
of aggressive
imperialism
andwarleadto vastarmsbudgets, publicdebts,andtheuctuationof these-
curitiesvaluesfrom whichthe skillednancierbenetsmost.To be sure,
Hobsondid not hold that thecapitalistsareresponsible
for the warsfrom
whichtheyprot. Nonetheless,
the unmistakablethrustof his reasoning,
latermademoreexplicitbyLenin,wasthatif thebehaviorof capitalists
is
primarilymotivatedby the desireto gainprots, andif certainsegmentsof
capitalistsocietycanprofit from imperialisticwars,thentheseelements
can
beexpected to bendeveryeffortto bringaboutwarwhencircumstances call
for it.

LENIN AND CONFLICT THEORY

RosaLuxembourg,a theoretical
Germansocialist,closelyfollowedHobsons
analysis,
whileRudolphHilferdingsoughtto reneit byattributingtheexport
of capitalto theoperation
ofcartelandmonopoly
systems
thatlimitdomestic
investment
possibilities.
The best-known
theoristof imperialism
in modern
times, of course, was Lenin. The architect of the Bolshevik Revolution was
neitherthe scholarnor the originalthinkerthat Hobsonwas.In additionto
434 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

borrowingideasfromHobson,LeninreliedonHilferdmgs
analysis
of therole
of monopoly capitalism:

Imperialismis capitalismin the stageof developmentin which the dominanceof

monopolies
andnancecapitalhasestablished
itself;in whichtheexportof capi-
tal has acquiredpronouncedimportance;in which the division of the world
amongthe internationaltrustshasbegun;in which the divisionof all territoriesof
theglobeamongthegreatcapitalist
powershasbeencompleted.
Leninderivedmonopolycapitalism, whichheequated with imperialism,from
four factors:(1) theconcentration
of productionin combines, cartels,syndi-
cates,andtrusts;(2)thecompetitivequestfor sourcesof rawmaterials;(3)the
developmentof banking oligarchies;and (4) the transformationof the old
colonialpolicyintoa struggle
for spheres
of economic
interest
in whichthe
richerandthe morepowerfulnationsexploitthe weakerones.ThusLenin
tookstrongexception
to KarlKautskys
thesisthatimperialism
wasmerely
the preferredpolicyof capitaliststates;for Lenin,imperialismwas an in-
evitableconsequence.Moreover, in theLeninistinterpretation,
thereceiptof
monopolyprofits by the capitalistsof certainindustriesenablesthem to cor-
rupt theworkersin thoseindustries,
whofor thesakeof a higherstandardof
livingally themselves
with thebourgeoisie
againsttheirfellowworkersof the
exploited,imperializedcountries.
Becausenancecapitalism
is thesourceof imperialism,
it alsobecomes
for MarxistLeninists
theprincipalsource
of international
warsin thecapital-
ist era,or at leasttheonly sourcein whichtheyareinterested. If thereare
othersources of conict,Marxistsprefernot to callmuchattentionto them.
Hobson
hadconceded
thatprimitive
instincts
in thehuman
raceplayed
apart
in nineteenthcentury
imperialism:
theinstinctfor thecontrolof land,theno-
madichabitthatsurvives
asloveof travel,thespiritof adventure,
thesporting
andhuntinginstincts,andthe lust of struggle, whichin theageof spectator
sportsis transformedinto gamblingon the outcomeof athleticgamesand
whichis transformed into jingoismduringwar. Nonetheless, Hobsoncir-
cumvented thetheoretical
difculty implicitin thepluralityof factorsmerely
by accusing
thedominant
classes
in capitalistic
societies
of advancing
their
owninterests
by playingon theprimitiveinstinctsof theraceandchanneling
theminto imperialisticventures.
Leninscontributionwastwofold.First,he impartedan organizational
theoryin whichthecommunist
partybecame
the vanguard
of theprole-
tariat to hastenthe comingof the revolutionthat Marx had foreseenas in-
evitable.Lookingbackon thehistoryof Europeafter1848,Leninconcluded
thattheproletariat
wouldnotrevoltspontaneously
against
therulingbour-
geoisie,as Marx had predicted.In his famous1905 tract entitled What Is to
BeDone?Lenininsistedthat a strong,tightlyknit, highlymotivatedpartyof
professionalrevolutionaries,
trainedthrough
rigiddiscipline
andreadyto use
all legalandillegalmeans
to carryoutordersfromtopleadership,wasessen-
tial to overthrowingthe capitalistsystem.6_"
Second,drawingheavilyon
Hobson, Lenindevelopeda theoryof imperialism
thatpurports
to explain
in-,
 LENINANDCONFLICT
THEORY 435

ternational
relations
inaglobal
system
dominated
bycapitalist
states.
Infact,
Leninperceiveda directconnection
to thefailureof Marxsprediction.
The
capitalists
exploitation
ofthepoorercolonial
regions oftheworldimproved
thestandard
oflivingoftheEuropeanworker classjustenoughtostave
offor
postpone
its revolt.Lenin,according
to RobertGilpin,
converted
Marxism
fromessentially
atheory
ofdomestic
economy
toatheory
of
international
politicalrelations
among capitalist
states.
. . . Marxhadwritten
abouta capitalism
largelyconned to Western
Europe. . . . Between
1870and
1914,
however,
capitalism
hadbecome avibrant,
technological
andincreasing
global
andopen
system.
. . . Furthermore,
Marxscapitalism
hadbeen
compose
mainly
ofsmall,
competitive,
industrial
rms.Bythetime
ofLenin,
however,capi-
talisteconomies
weredominatedbyimmensegindustrial
combines
that. . . were
controlled
bythegreatbanking
houses
(hautnance).
ForLenin. . . thecontrol
ofindustrial
capital
bynance
capital
represented
thepristine
andhighest
stage
of
capitalistdevelopment.
In capitalist
systems,
competition
is eventually
replacedbycapitalist
mo-
nopolies.
Imperialism
isthemonopolystageof capitalism.
Thecountries
that
aretheprincipal
exporters
ofcapital
areable
toobtain
economic
advantag
based
ontheexploitation
ofpeoples
abroad.
Theestablishment
ofpolitical
controloverterritories
overseas
isdesigned
to provide
a dependable
source
of
raw materialsandcheaplaborandto guarantee
marketsfor the industrial
combinesof advancedcapitalistcountries.
Writingin thespringof 1916,nearlytwoyears
aftertheoutbreak
of
World
WarI, Leninviewedthehistory
oftheprevious
generation
asastruggle
among
theadvanced
capitalist
powers
forthecontrolof colonies
andmarkets.
Capitalistcountriesare compelledto engagein a scramblefor colonies.
Especially
in EastAsiaandAfrica,theimperialist
powers
hadclaimed
territo-
riesandspheres of inuence.Somecapitalistcountriesevenformedalliances
in the lastquarterof the nineteenth
century,
but suchalliances
couldbeno
morethanbreathing
spells
between
wars.
Because
oftheultimate
dependenc
of capitalist
economic
systems
onoverseas
markets
andresources,
interna-
tionalconict is endemicin a world of capitaliststates.Theeliminationof
capitalist
states,
Lenin
concluded,
wastheessential
precondition
toabolishing
international conict.
ForLenin,capitalism
haddeveloped
at itsownpacein each
country
earlierin Holland,England,
andFrance;
laterin Germany
andtheUnited
States;
andlaterstill in JapanandRussia.
Thiswasthelaw of unevendevel-
opment,whichmadeit inconceivable
thatanyprecarious
stabilitybased
on
balanceofpowerpolitics
couldlast
verylong.Leninwasoftheopinion
that
byhistimethecartels
hadvirtually
completed
theprocess
ofparceling
outthe
territories
of theworldfor exploitation.
Because
theplanethadalready
been
divided
up,further
expansion
bysome
capitalists
couldoccur
onlyattheex-
pense of othercapitalists,
andthuscapitalistic
imperialism
wouldprovoke
in-
ternationalWars.Stalin,remembering theAlliedintervention
in Russia
at
theendofWorldWarI, regarded thecapitalist
Westwithsuspicion
andhostil-
ity,andhespoke oftenof thoseoutside
plottingaggression
against
theSoviet
436 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Union.Nonetheless,in hisfamouslast thesis,issuedon theeveof the 1952

meetingof the Communist Partyof the SovietUnion,Stalinarguedthat the
frightfulclashes
that Leninhadpredictedbetween thecapitalistandsocialist
campswereno longerinevitable,because
sucha warwouldjeopardizethe
Veryexistence
of capitalism.
Stalinthenwentonto declare
thatcontradictions
within the capitalistsystems
madethe recurrence
of war amongcapitalist
statesinevitable.

MARXIST~LENINIST THEORY SINCE THE 19505

Thehistoryof international
relationsafterWorldWarII did not dealkindly
with the MarxistLeninisttheory,especiallyas it pertainedto imperialism;it
washardpressed to explainSovietcommunistimperialismin EasternEurope.
Stalinslast thesisconcerningthe inevitability of war within the capitalist
campcannotbevalidatedunless
westretchhismeaning
to includetradewars
andcompetitiveness
in theglobaleconomy,whichhaveneverledto military
conict.
Longbeforethecollapse of theSovietUnionandits empire,thecommu-
nist statesystemitselfhad beentorn by seriousconicts.Soviettroopshad
suppressed the workersrevolt in EastGermanyin 1953and crushedthe
Hungarianuprisingin 1956. WhenCzechoslovakia in 1968experienced the
liberationstirringsknown asthe PragueSpring, it had eliciteda responsein
the form of an invasionby the armedforcesof ve WarsawPactcountries.
LeonidBrezhnevsubsequently justied the action by enunciatingthe Soviet
doctrine that bore his name:

When internal and external forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development
of any socialistcountrybacktoward a capitalistrestoration,whena threat arises
to the causeof socialismin that country,a threat to the securityof the socialist
communityas a whole, that is no longer a problem only for the peopleof the
country
in question,
butageneral
problem,
theconcern
ofallsocialist
states.
Throughoutthe decadeof the 19605,the relationshipbetweenthe Soviet
Union and the Peoples
Republicof China(PRC)had becomeincreasinglypo-
larizedoverseveralissues:
ideological
purity,supportfor world revolution,
foreigndevelopmentassistance, nuclearproliferation,territorial disputesas a
resultof old unequaltreaties,and the foolhardinessof socialiststatesentering
into disarmamentand armscontrolnegotiationswith capitaliststateswhile
thelatterremained
militarilypowerful. Bytheearly1970s,theleadership
of
the PRCwasdecryingthe armscontrol collusionof the two imperialistsuper-
powers,capitalistand socialist.Within a few years,asthe United Statespre-
paredto disengage
from Southeast
Asia,rulersin Beijingconcluded
that the
growth of&#39;Soviet
military powerwas becominga greaterdangerthan a wan-
ing U.S.imperialistpower,and it beganto warn Japanand other Asianstates
against
Soviethegemonic aimswithintheirregion. SomeMarxistscontinued
to explainSovietinterventions
in EasternEuropeandVietnamin termsof a
 REALIST
ANDLIBERAL
CRITICS
OFTHEECONOMIC
THEORIES437
moral
struggle
between
theforces
ofgood
andevil,ofsocialism
andcapital
ism.However,
suchexplanations
grewfeeblewithtime,aftertheSoviet-
backed
Cuban
intervention
inAngola
after1975,
theVietnameseinvasion
of
Cambodia
inDecember
1978,
thePRC
attack
onVietnam
inFebruary
1979,
andtheSovietinvasion of Afghanistan
in December1979.Thelast-named
militaryintervention
ledto mountingdomestic
discontent
withintheSoviet
Unionandalienated muchof theIslamicworld,muchastheU.S.war in
Vietnam
hadaroused
anti-American
sentiment
inmany
Western
anddevelop
mg countries.
Theclosing
years
of theBrezhnev
era(1980-1982)
sawa subtler
formof
Soviet
imperialism.
WhenthePolish
worker
movement
known
asSolidarit
(Solidamosc)
extracted
fromthegovernment
several
concessions
thatseemed
to threaten
communist
control,
theKremlin conductedmilitarymaneuver
alongthePolish
border.
Thisfanned Polish fearsof aninvasionandpaved
thewayfor a declaration
of martiallawin late1981,whichprecludedthe
necessity
of overtSovietintervention.
TheAndropov
andChernenko
.inter-
regnum(1982-1985)
wasa transitionalperiodof oundering,unstable
lead-
ership,
without
precedent
in Soviet
history.
It wasmarked
byfrustratin
stalemate
in East-West
arms-control
negotiations,
strident
polemics
aboutthe
military balancein Europe,frantic concernin Moscowover President
Reagans
Strategic
Defense
Initiative(SDI),58
anda spreading
impression
that
theSovietUnionwasapproaching
aninternalcrisis.Thedramaticreversalof
Soviet
imperialism
initiated
byMikhailGorbachev
istreated
subsequently
in
this chapter.

REALIST AND LIBERAL CRITICS OF THE ECONOMIC

THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM
Modern
criticsoftheeconomic
theories
ofimperialism
have
taken
strong
ex-
ception
to theconclusions
of Hobson,
Lenin,andtheirfollowers
ongrounds
of bothsemantics
andeconomic
andpolitical
analysis.
Generally
speaking
thesemantic
attackhastakentheshapeof anaccusation
thatthefollowersof
Leninhavebeensoobsessed byanideological
aversionto nancecapitalism
asto confuse
a particular
historical
manifestation
of theimperialistic
impulse
with a muchmorecomprehensive sociological
politicalphenomenon-wha
St.Augustine
calledtheanimusdomimmdiwhich hasassumed manydiffer-
entshapesthroughouthistory.
Earlyin the ColdWar,themostimportantcritic of theHobsonLeninist
theoryof imperialism
asa terminological
perversion
for narrowpolemical
purposeswastherealistHansJ. Morgenthau.
Morgenthaulamented
theap-
plicationof the termimperialism
to anyforeignpolicythat the userof the
termfoundobjectionable,
andheurgedthepostWorld
WarII generation
of
universitystudentsto acceptan objective,ethicallyneutraldenitionof im-
perialismas a policythat aimsat the overthrowof thestatusquo,at a re-
versal of the power relationsbetweentwo or more nations.69He denied
438 lNTERN
ATlONALPOLITICAL
ECONOMY

thatevery
increase
intheinternational
powerofanation
isnecessarily
impe-
rialistic.
Moreover,
hewarned
against
thedisposition
toregard
every
foreign
policy
thataims
conservatively
atmaintaining
analready
existing
empire
as
imperialistic
whentheterm
should
beproperly
reserved
forthedynamic
process
ofchanging
theinternational
status
quobyacquiring
anempire.
Theeconomic
interpretation
ofimperialism,
contended
Morgenthau,
errsin
theattempt
tobuild
auniversal
lawofhistory
onthelimited
experience
ofa
fewisolated
cases.
Such
atheory,
inhisview,
ignores
theproblem
ofprecapi
talist
imperialism
(including
theancientempires
ofEgypt,
Assyria,
Persia
andRome; Arabimperialism
of theseventh
andeighthcenturies;
the
European
Christian
imperialism
oftheCrusades;
and
thepersonal
empires
of
such
leaders
asAlexander
theGreat,
Napoleon,
andHitler).71
Moreover
Morgenthau
contended
thatthetheory
fails
toprovide
aconvincing
explana
tioneven
ofcapitalistage
imperialism
inthebelle
époque
ofimperialism
1870 to 1914.
Inthefollowing
summary
ofarguments
against
theHobsonLenin
inter-
pretation,
theMorgenthau
refutation
isjoined
withthatofseveral
other
prominent
theorists,
including
theFrench
political
sociologist
Raymond
Aron
(1905-1983);
theAustrian
economist
Joseph
A.Schumpeter
(1883-195
whotaught
atHarvard
University;
theAmerican
diplomatic
historian
William
L.Langer
(1896-1978);
andtheAmericaneconomist
Jacob
Viner(1892-
1970).
Also
covered
here
arethendings
ofmorerecent
scholars
whohave
uncovered
several
anomalies
intheHobsonLenin
hypothesis.-/2
1. ThefollowersofMarx,Hobson,
andLeninwere
saidtoconfuse
apar-
ticularhistorical
manifestation
of theimperialistic
impulse
with a
muchmorecomprehensive,
multifaceted
political
andsociologic
phenomenon
thathas
assumed
many
different
shapes
throughout
his-
tory.
Theturnofthe-century
economic
theory
ofimperialism
isseen
as
adistortion,
insofar
asit subordinates
international
politics
tointerna-
tionaleconomics,
bothrigidlyandsupercially.
Economic
interests
are
frequently
onlyarationalization
foranations
will-topower.
Jacob
Viner arguedthat in mostcases
thecapitalist,
instead
ofpushing
hisgovernment
intoanimperialistic
enter-
prise
inpursuit
ofhisown nancialgain,was pushed,
ordragged,orca-
joled,
orlured
intoit byhisgovernment,
inorderthat,
initsrelations
with
theoutside
worldandwithitsownpeoplethisgovernment
mightbeableto
pointtoanapparentlyrealandlegitimate
economic
stakeintheterritor
involved
whichrequired
militaryprotection.73
2. Schumpeter
insisted
thatimperialism
cannot
bereduced
tothemere
pursuit
ofeconomic
interest
whenhistory
isreplete
withexample
of
societies
thatseek
expansion
forthesake
of ghting,
victory
forthe
sake
of winning,
dominion
forthesake
of ruling.74
Wars
arenot
fought
torealize
immediate
utilitarian
advantages,
even
ifthese
are
the
professed
purpose.
Imperialism
rather
istheobjectless
disposition
on
 REALIST AND LIBERAL CRITICS OF THE ECONOMIC TI-IEORIES 439

the part of a stateto unlimited forcible expansion.75Like national-

ism, it is irrational and unconscious, a calling into play of instincts
from the dim past. Imperialism,in short, is an atavismin the social
culture. If one wants to trace it to economic roots, it should be attrib-
uted to pastratherthan presentrelationsof production.Undoubtedly
it is the ruling classes
in any statewho makethe decisionsfor war, but
it is not the businessbourgeoisiewho constitutethe principal foreign-
policy decisionmakersin the modernworld; it is the vestigialaristo-
cratic classesof an earlierregimewho still ll the important govern-
mental,diplomatic,andmilitaryposts.75
. Notwithstandingthe simplisticdevil theory of war, which tracesthe
causalityof war to munitionsmakersand otherswho standto reap-
nancialgain from its outbreak,capitalistsas a whole are not givento
bellicosity.Becausewar involvesthe irrational and the unpredictable,
whereascapitalismthrivesbeston rational foresightandplanningin a
stable international environment, most capitalists are partisans of
peacerather than of war, simply becausethosewho suffer from the
disruptionof war greatlyoutnumberthosewho prot from it.77
Competitiveenterprise in thecapitalistsystem,accordingto Schumpeter,
absorbstremendousamountsof human energyin purely economic
pursuits,leavinglittle excessto beworkedoff in war andevenlessten-
dencyto welcomewar as a diversionfrom unpleasantactivitiesor
from boredom.Capitalistsocietycreates
thesociological
basisfor a
substantialpopular oppositionto war and armamentsand to socially
entrenched professional
armies.Beforethe ageof capitalism,
pacist
principles
hadbeentakenseriouslyin theWestonlyby a fewminority
religioussects.Modern pacism as a signicant political movement
emergesonly in capitalistsocietyin which organizedpartiesproduce
peaceleaders,peaceslogans,and peaceprograms,alongwith a popu-
lar aversionto imperialismand popularsupportfor arbitrationof dis-
putes,disarmament,
andinternational
organization.
(Thequestionof
whetherwar is becomingobsoleteis taken up in Chapter8. Seethe
section, The End of the Cold War)
. Hobsonstheoryhasnot stoodthe testof critical examination.The ex-
amplesgiven by him for the fateful inuence of capital investments
overseasSouthAfrican minesand Chineseconcessionsprovedof
ephemeral
signicance.Theeffortto producea universal
theoryon
the basisof suchscantevidenceleadsto severalglaring anomaliesin
regardto what it leavesunexplained.
Accordingto that theory,the
most advancedcapitalistnations should have beenthe most expan-
sionistand colonialistin the era of the highestdevelopment
of monop-
oliesandfinancecapitalism.
Actually,Europes
acquisition
of colonial
territoriesin the late nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturieswas less
extensivethanin theperiodfromthesixteenthto theearlynineteenth
century.European settlements
in North andSouthAmericainvolved
440 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY

genuine
colonization;
European
imperialism
inAsia
andlater
inAfrica
didnot,except
forrelatively
small
areas.
Thelogical
corollary
ofthe
Lenin-Hobsontheory
isthatless
capitalist
states
should
beless
imperi-
alistandcolonialist.
YetPortugal,
backward among
capitalist
coun-
tries,
wasaleading
colonial
power.
Incontrast,
Sweden
andSwitzer-
land,
twostates
profoundly
imbued
withthecapitalist
spirit,
exhibited
noinstinct
whatever
forimperial-colonial
ventures.
Schumpeter
pointedtotheUnited
States,
a developing
country
in
thefirsthalfofthenineteenth
century
anda rapidly
rising
capitalist
power
after
theAmerican
CivilWar(1861-1865).
According
tothe
theory,
theUnited
States
should
havetriedto seize
itstworesource-
richbutmilitarily
weak
neighbors,
Mexico andCanada,
butit didnot
doso.Finally,thetheory
ignores
theroleofWestern
capitalinmak-
ingJapan
anindependent
power
offormidable
proportions
bythe
early
twentieth
century
andoftheUnited
Statespostwar
policy
ofre-
building
Western
Europes
andJapansability
tocompete
in world
markets.
Contrary
toLenins
analysis,
capitalist
collusion
andalliances
since
WorldWarII havelasted
morethanahalfcentury,
longer
than
thebriefperiod
hepostulated
inthelawofuneven
development.
. It canbenoted,
inrefutation
ofHobsonsunderconsumption
andover-
savings
hypothesis,
thattheexport
of surplus
capitalwasnotab-
solutely
essential
forgrowth;
asrevisionist
Marxists
such asKarl
Kautsky
andEduardBernstein
realized,
thecapitalists
were notplay-
ingMarxsironlawofwagesgame tobring
about theincreasin
immiseration
oftheworkers;
actually
theworkers
standard
of liv-
ingwas
ontherise,
anddomestic
purchasing
powerwas
increasing
in
realterms,
asa consequence
oftrade-union
activity
andtheenfran-
chisement
oflarger
numbers
ofpeople.82
During
theperiodfrom1870
to1914,morecapital
moved
intoEngland
thanoutof it, andthree
quarters
of thecapital
exported
fromBritain didnotcomefrom
monopoly
companiesbutconsistedof loans
to governments
and
government-guaranteed
public
utilities.Colonies
were
notasimpor-
tantin thetradeandinvestment
patterns
of thecapitalist
countries
as
thetheory
indicated.
Nomore
than10percent
ofFrances
overseas
in-
vestments
priorto 1914
were
directed
totheEmpire.
Apart
from
India,
thecolonies,
especially
thoseinAfrica,
were
notasource
of
muchprottoBritain.
Aronwrites,
Thetwonationswhichduring
thehalfcentury
before
theFirst
World
Warconquered
thelargest
terri-
tories,
France
andGreat
Britain,
were
alsothenations
which,
econom
ically,
least
needed
toacquire
newpossessions.85
Mostofthecapita
exportedfromtheadvanced
capitalist
countries
during
thatperiod
wentto otherindustrially
advanced
countries,
orelseto suchcountries
asRussia
thatwerejustbeginning
to develop
industriallyand
that
France
wasanxiousto buildup for politicalandstrategic
reasons
againstGermany.
 REALIST AND LIBERA- CRITICS OF THE ECONOMIC TI-IEORIES 441

6. Leninscontentionthat imperialism,as he dened it, is the principal

causeof war in the capitalisticera has not stood up well under the
scrutinyof scholars.The major wars since1870havenot beenfought
primarily for economicmotives.The BoerWar in SouthAfrica andthe
Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1935) were, but not
the Franco-German War, the SpanishAmerican War, the Russo-
JapaneseWar, or the TurkoItalian War, and certainly not the two
World Wars, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Korean War, the Indo-Chinese
War, the Indo-Pakistani Wars over Kashmir and Bangladesh, or the
VietnamWar (eventhoughleftist critics of the war in the Westsome-
timestried unconvincinglyto reducethe SoutheastAsianconict to a
capitalistimperialistplot, mainly because
theUnitedStateswas identi-
fiedastheleaderof thecapitalist-imperialist
system).35
A bettercase
can be made for the PersianGulf War of 1991, in which Western states
had concernsover future accessto Middle East oil, but the elementsof
Iraqi aggression versusinternationallaw, intra-Arabpolitics,the secu-
rity of Israel,and other factorswerealsoinvolved.It remainsdifcult
to discern economic elementsas controlling in the tragic religious and
ethnic conicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Againstthe backgroundof World War I, Aron assignsa centralplaceto

Anglo-German
rivalry,especially
thenavalarmsrace,but hedeniesthat this
had muchto do with capitalism.The British wereawarethat Germanyrepre-
senteda threat to their prosperity,but they alsoknew that eachcountry was
the bestcustomerof the othersgoods.If capitalistimperialismhad beenthe
mainmotivefor Englandsgoingto war in 1914,thenthe countryshouldhave
arrayeditselfagainstits majorcompetitorsincetheturn of thecenturythe
United Statesbut such a courseof action was unthinkable. Marxism can-
not explainthe fact, saysGilpin, that the threemajor imperialrivalsGreat
Britain, France,and Russiawerein fact on the sameside. . . . andthat they
fought againsta Germanythat had few political interestsoutsideEuropeit-
self.88 Comingto morerecenttimes,no onehaseverbotheredto try making
a casefor economicimperialismas the causeof the KoreanWar; sucha task
must strike eventhe most singlemindedMarxist as futile. KennethBoulding
wrotethatanyeconomic
benefits
theUnitedStates
mighthavehopedto derive
from the VietnamWar would hardly beworth the costof wagingthat war for
oneday.89 In theArab-Israeli
conictsince1948,anyone whowishesto prove
thatAmerican policyhasbeenbasedonconsiderations of economic imperial-
ism is hard-pressed to explainwhy the UnitedStateshassupported Israel,
evenat the risk of alienatingthe oilproducingArab states.The foregoing
anomaliesshouldserveto castseriousdoubt on the explanatorypower of the
Leninist-Stalinist theory.
MichaelDoylesuggested that earliertheoristsof imperialism-notably
Hobson,Lenin,andSchumpeterwere lessinterestedin producingscholarly
explanations
of a particularphenomenon in internationalrelationsthanthey
442 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY

were
inpresenting
either
apolitical
condemnation
ordefense
ofcapitalism
Hedenies
thattheforces
driving
andshaping
imperialism
areeither
primarily
economic
orprimarily
military;
rather,
theyareeconomic,
military,
political,
social,
andcultural.
Boththeopportunities
thatgive
rise
toimperialism
and
themotives
thatdriveit areto befoundin a fourfoldinteraction
among
me-
tropoles,
peripheries,
transnational
forces,
andinternational
systemic
incen-
tives.91
Whereas
Hobson,
Lenin,
andSchumpeter
tracethecauses
totheme-
tropolesthe
desire
fornancial
prot,thenecessities
ofmonopoly
capital,
theatavistic
impulses
ofmilitary
elitesothers,
suchasJohn
Gallagher
and
Ronald
Robinson,
see
theroots
ofimperialism
inthecrises
ofweak,
vulnera-
blesocieties
ontheAfrican,
Asian,
andLatinAmerican
peripheries.
Benjamin
Cohen,
Kenneth
Waltz,
A.J.P.Taylor,
Morton
Kaplan,
EdwardGulick,
and
other
theorists
explain
imperialism
asanormal
concomitant
ofthestructura
dynamic
implicit
inaninternational
system
inwhich
stronger
states
engage
in
apowerbalancing
process
byexerting
their
sway
over
weaker
states.
Robert Gilpin
presents
a useful
summary assessment
ofthedebate
over
Leninslawofuneven developmentasthecausalexplanation
ofimperial-
ism:there
isnoreliable
methodofresolving
thistheoretical
controversy.
Each
side
explains
away
theevidence
adduced
bytheother
side.
Scholars
must
choose
onthebasis
of theirassumptions
about
therelationship
of politics
to
economics
intheinternational
system.
Gilpin
comes
down
ontheside
ofpolit-
icalrealism
andholds,
witheconomist
Simon
Kuznets,
thatuneven
economic
growth
triggers
political
conict
because
itposes
athreat
totheexisting
polit-
icalpowerstatus
quo.93

POSTWORLDWARII ECONOMIC
LIBERALISM
Despite
thedominance
ofpolitical
realism
in international
relations
after
World
WarII,except
forsuch
idealistic
impulses
astheproposal
toshare
the
secrets
oftheAbomb
withtheSoviet
Union,
there
wasarevival
ofeconomic
liberal
thought
thathadbeen
increasingly
discredited
bytherising
curve
of
national
particularism
from1929to1944.
Thedepression,
theabandonme
ofthegoldstandard,
andtheexigencies
ofwaging
warhadbrought
currenc
exchange
controls,
protectionism,
andvirtually
totalgovernmental
restric
tionson foreign
tradeeverywhere.
Manyliberalpolicymakers
(notably
Cordell
Hull)andeconomists
were
convinced
thattheimposition
ofstate
con-
trolsinthe1930s
hadcontributed
mightily
totheriseofinternational
hostility
andtheonset
ofthewar.In1944,
ledbytheU.S.
andBritish
Treasuries,
44al-
liednations
metatBretton
Woods,
NewHampshire,
in thesummer
of,1944
and
drafted
what
theconferees
hoped
would
bethecharter
ofanew
liberal
in-
ternational
monetary
order.
According
toBenjamin].
Cohen,
theprewar
and
nowrepudiated
order
hadbeen
characterized
byfreely
(sometimes
chaoti
cally)
oatingcurrency
exchange
rates
which
tempted
countries
toseek
trade
advantages
byengaging
incompetitive
devaluations,
designed
tostimulate
ex-
ports
anddiscourage
imports
(arecurring
problem
uptothepresent
time)
 POST~WORLD WAR II ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 443

Nationsdid not wish to go backto permanentlyxed ratesthat would elimi-

nateexibility in dealingwith domestic
economic
crises.94
(This,too,remains
a persistingproblem.)Anotherfeatureof the previous,discreditedsystemwas
the lack of any internationalinstitutionalmechanismfor dealingwith funda-
mentalproblemsof recoveringfrom wartime destructionor glaring inability
evento start on the roadto economicgrowth and development.
The oods Conference
setup two newnancialinstitutions,
one
to deal with tem roblems, and the
other to provide onger-term eveopmentloans. The rst was the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund IHVIFKWIEIWVEintendedto servethreemain func-
tions descr nmin Cohenas follows: (1) To preventthe buildup of
trade decits that would lower international liquidity and restrict commerce,
countrieshad to haveassuredaccessto an adequatesupplyof monetaryre-
servesfrom which to borrow short-term.This was to be achievedthrough a
pooledfundof nationalcurrencies
andgoldsubscribed
by member
countries
accordingto a complexquota systemroughly equivalentto its rank in the
world economy.The IMF would serveas lender of last resort to countries
with seriousbalance-of-payments
problemsif they could promiseto make
a reasonableeffort (neverpreciselydened) to overcometheir decits.
(2)Governmentswereforbidden, apartfroma fewspecicandreasonableex-
ceptions,
to resortto discriminatory
currency
practices
or to imposeexchange
controls.(3) In orderto correctthe harmful drift of the 19305,whenBritain
lackedtheabilityandtheUnitedStates
lackedthewill to leadtheworldout of
the depression,the IMF wassupposedto providea forumfor consultation
andcooperationin the management of internationalmonetaryrelations.(This
ideawasthe forerunnerof thelater G-7 meetingsamongthe leadingindustrial
nations.)The BrettonWoodsregimeled governmentsto expecta period of
postwarmonetarystabilitywithoutexcessive
or disruptingpayments
imbal-
ancesthat would stie trade.Suchoptimismprovedunjustiedsimplybecause
the architectsof the IMF couldnot foreseethe rapid postwarexpansionin the
volumeandcomplexityof world trade.Only the strengthof theU.S.economy,
which madethe dollar the principalcurrencyfor trade,investment,andrecov-
ery aid (in the Marshall Plan),and the indispensablereserveassetfor central
banks,enabledthe BrettonWoodssystemto surviveintact until the Nixon
Administrationdevaluedthe dollar in 1971.95Why the BrettonWoodsregime
collapsedwill be explainedbelow.
The secondinstitutionestablished at BrettonWoodsin 1944,largelyat the
urgingof JohnMaynardKeynes,
wastheInternational
Bankfor Reconstruc-
tionandt (IBRD),
whichbecame e World
Bank.Whereas
theIMFwasdesigned
to dealwithbalance-of-payments
[E
len&#39;1_s7)f
a temporary
shortto mid-termnature,theWorldBankwasintended
tonancelongerterm
projectsthatwouldpromoteeconomicdevelopment.
It
wasoriginally expectedthat the Bankwould play a role in the postwarrecon-
structionof war-tornEurope,but that task was performedthroughthe
MarshallPlan,underwhichtheUnitedStatesfurnished$13billionin aid to
Europefrom1948to 1952.TheWorldBanksoonshifteditsfocusto themore
444 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY

daunting
challenge
ofassisting
thepoorer,
less
developed
regions
beyond
the
industrialized
world.
It relies
onprivate
capitalmarketsthrough
bondissues
andlends
nottowealthynations
butonlytothosethatcannot
borrow
onreg-
ularcommercial
terms. It alsomanages theInternational
Developmen
Association
(IDA),
which1S
fundedbygrants
from
wealthier
states
andlends
onaninterest-free
basis
withalowservice
charge
over
very
longperiods
(up
to40years)
tothepoorest
countries.
Over
thecourse
ofahalfcentury
it has
helped
many
countries
makeimpressive
gainsmostinAsia,
less
inLatin
America,
andleast
inAfrica.
Worldwide,
rates
oflifeexpectancy,
infant
mor-
tality,
food
production,
adult
literacy,
and
access
tosafe
water
andhealth
clin-
icshave allimproveddramatically.
Even though
morethanabillion
people
stillliveinabjectpoverty,
defenders
oftheWorld
Bankarecertain
thatthesit-
uation would bemuch worse
hadit notexisted.95
Theinstitution
hasbeen
criticized,however,forfunding
awedpro]ects,
allowing
itself
tobeused as
aninstrument oftheColdWartosupport
repressive
military
regimes
anddic-
tatorships,
benetingwealthycountries
attheexpenseofthepoor,
and ignor-
ingthe
environmental
harmresulting
fromsome ofitsdevelopment
projects
InAugust
1971,President
Richard
Nixonunilaterally
abrogated
theU.S.
commitment
to_tliF
Bretton
Woodsused to
exchange
S. gold
reserves
andtookthedollaroffits
fixed
exchange
ratewithother
countries.
Thisledtooa,ting_exchange
rates,
determine ot governments,
andcaused trouble
forthe
Europeans
firstattempt
toachieve
currencystabilization
within
theirre-
gion.
Nixon tooksuchadrastic
step-theJapanese
called
it aslaokkuin
reaction
totrends
thathadoriginated
morethanadecade
earlier.
Upto1958,theindustrialized
nations
oftheworld
hadexperienced
adol-
larshortage,
whichafter
thattimebegantoturn
intoadollar
glut. Given
the
economic
miracles
enjoyed
bytheEuropean
countries
andJapan,
theallies,
wishing
toavoidfurther
dollaraccumulations,
began toconvert
their
curren-
cies
intogold.
In1960,Yaleeconomist
Robert
Trifnwarned thatastrong
dollar
andchronicU.S.
paymentsdecits
couldnotindenitelycoexist.9
ThedilemmaposedbyTrifnresulted
from
thefactthattheUnited
States
was
apolitical-militaryeconornic
hegemonic
power
withvast
worldwide
defen
anddeterrent
responsibilities.
InthelastyearoftheEisenhower
Adminis
tration,
economists
began
tofear
thatthecountry
wasoverextended.
The
con-
cernaroused
byTrifns
book,
GoldandtheDollarCrisis,wasthatgovern
ments
andprivate
bankswouldeventually
begin
tolose
condence
inthe
dollar,
atwhich
point
either
thesystem
established
atBretton
Woods
would
break
down
ortheAme&#39;ri&#39;ca&#39;n
payments
decit
would
end,
thesupply
ofmone-
tary
reserves
would
contract
andeconomic
expansion
. . .would
cease.
Eisenhower,
ascal
conservative,
considered
curbing
theoutward
flowofgold
bybringing
homeU.S.
military
dependents
from
NATO Europe.
Theincom
ingKennedy
Administration,
however,
rejected
theidea
onthegrounds
that
such
amove
would
hurttroop
morale
andfrighten
theallies
intoexpecting
ei-
theratotalU.S.military
withdrawal
orawar.1°1
 POSTWORLD WAR II ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 445

Althoughboth the BrettonWoodssystemand the MarshallPlanreected

far-sighted
thinkinganda swift,generous
response
to postwarproblems,
both
werealsobaseduponclassicalliberalprinciplesimbuedmorewith self-interest
thanwith altruism;internationaleconomicstabilityandthe expansionof trade
were good for business,especiallyAmericanexports.For severalyears,the
Trifn dilemma was of interest only to academics. Policy officials in
Washingtonwere contentwith what BenjaminJ. Cohencalledthe implicit
bargainthat hadbeenstruckbetween
theUnitedStates
andits majorallies,
Europe and Japan:
Americasalliesacquiesced
in a hegemonicsystemthat accordedthe UnitedStates
specialprivileges
to actabroadunilaterally
to promoteU.S.[politicalandstrate-
gic]interests.
TheUnitedStates,in turn,condoned its alliesuseof thesystem
to
promotetheirowneconomic prosperity,evenif thishappened to comelargelyat
theexpense of theUnitedStates.1°2
DuringtheKennedy
Roundof Negotiations
undertheGeneral
Agreement
on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),* which was initiated in 1962 and concludedin
1967,U.S.protectionist
barrierson agriculturalproductswerereduced,
de-
spiteprotestsfrom Americanfarmerswho failedto extractcomparable
con-
cessionsfrom the EuropeanEconomicCommunity.
Duringthe 1960s,theUnitedStatesand.itsalliesbecame somewhatirri-
tatedwith eachother.American
policymakerscharged thattheEuropeans,
de-
spitetheir U.S.-underwritten
prosperity,were not adequately sharingthe
NATO defenseburden.The Europeans,noting that they contributedthe bulk
of NATOs conventionalforces,claimedthat they were doing their part to
matchtheU.S.nucleardeterrentin Europe.1°3 TheychidedWashington for
suggestingthatit wasdefending Europefor altruisticreasons ratherthanfrom
strategicself-interest.
American businesscomplained aboutgrowingcompeti-
tion from EuropeandJapan,andaccused themof unfairor discriminatory
tradepractices. TheUnitedStatesadmonished its alliesto revalueor inflate
their currencies;the latterretortedthat the UnitedStatesshouldreduceits
budgetdeficitsandtradegap.Followinga seriesof liquiditycrisesin themid-
1960s,theworldstenleadingindustrialnationsin 1969createdon papera
newnancial instrumentknown asthe SpecialDrawingRight (SDR)to serve
asan internationalunit of account,exchangeable
amongcentralbanks,to sup-
plement
eachmembers
reserve
assets.1°4
Thevalueof theSDRwasbased
on
a weightedbasketof thefiveleadingcurrencies:
thedollar,thedeutschmark,
theFrenchfranc,theJapanese yen,andtheBritishpound.Bythelate1960s,
the Vietnam War was overheatingthe hitherto stableU.S. economy.Since
manyforeigncurrencies
werepegged
to thedollar,U.S.inationwasbeingex-
portedabroad. Therhetoric
of blamegrewmorerancorous,
butneverreached
thepointof intracapitalistic
conicteagerly
awaitedbythedisciples
of Lenin

Theorigins,
purposes,
andrecordof theGATTwill besummarized
laterin thesection
on
International Trade Negotiations.
446 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

andStalin.
In anyevent,
bytheearly1970s
Americans
werebecoming
disillu-
sionedwith trade liberalization.1°5When the Bretton Woodscurrencyex-
change
system,
liberalin formbutrealistin purpose,
nolonger
served
the
U.S.nationalinterest,
it wasdiscarded.
Thesystems
twoprincipal
nancial
institutionstheIMF andtheWorldBank-wereretainedto continuefunc-
tioningin themorecomplex
environment
of oatingcurrency
exchanges.

MARXISTS,NEO-MARXISTS,AND THE THIRD WORLD

Marxisttheoryin general
andtheLeninisttheoryof capitalist
imperialism
havesurvivedandourishedsinceWorldWarII mostnotablyamongintellec-
tualsin the lessdeveloped
countries(LDCS)of the Third Worldandamong
manyMarxists,
NeoMarxists
andquasi-Marxists
in theindustrialized
countries,
whether
capitalist,
socialdemocratic,
or socialist/communist.
The
twoprincipal
formsofNeo-Marxist
thoughtrelevant
totheThirdWorldare
thedependency
theory
andtheclosely
related
worldcapitalist
system
theory.
Beforeexamining
theselattertwo, we shouldseewhatvariousmodern
Marxists,neo-Marxists,
andquasi-Marxistshavesaidconcerning
Western
capitalistimperialism
in theThirdWorld.
Contemporary Marxistwriterswho adhere,
howevervaguely,
to the
Leninisttheoryof imperialism
oftencharge
thatWestern
colonialism
sup-
pressed
theeconomic,
social,
andpolitical
development
ofthecountries
that
now constitutethe Third Worldandthat theWestis still to blamefor the
poverty
ofthose
countries.
Khrushchev,
following
Lenin,
hadcontended
that
theeconomic
advancesmadeby someWestern countries
weredueto theun-
derdevelopment
of Asia,Africa, and Latin America.Westerngovernments
wereroutinely
faultedfor havingfailedduringtheeraof colonialruleto in-
troducecentraleconomic planningin theirterritories
(a mostanticapitalist
idea)
andtopromote thegrowthofindigenous
industry
withprotective
tariffs
(arealist
protectionist notion).
AndréGunderFrankhasdenied thatunderde-
velopment is attributable
to thesurvival
of archaic
institutions
andcapital
shortages
in regions isolated
fromthemainstreamof worldhistory.
Onthe
contrary,
underdevelopment
wasandstillisgenerated
bytheverysame
histor-
icalprocess
whichalsogenerated
economic
development:
thedevelopment
of
capitalism
itself.1°5
Marxistsgenerally
accuse
theWestortheworldcapitalist
systemof
keeping
thepoorcountries
in a position
of subordination,
dependence,
or
bondage by limitinginvestmentsto theextractive
(rawmaterials)
industries
andbywesternizing, subjugating,andbribingtheneweliteswhohaveanin-
terestin modernizing theirsocieties.
Before
theperiodof decolonization,
the
Marxists
predicted
thatonce
thecolonial
territories
hadgained
political
inde-
pendence,
theywouldbecome
masters
of theirowneconomic
destiny,
and
thusthecapitalists
wouldfightto theendto prevent
themfromachieving self-
governmentbecause thatwouldspellthecollapse of thecapitalist
system.
Marxhimselfsawcapitalpenetration andimperialismasprogressive
forces,
 MARXISTS,NEO-MARXISTS,
AND THE THIRD WORLD 4-47

bringing
civilization
andcapitalism,
whichheheldto bethenecessary
prereq-
uisites to socialism.
TheEuropeans
carriedouttheprocess
of decolonization
at a rapidpace
afterWorldWar II. By the 1960s,mostof the coloniesin AsiaandAfrica
hadgainedtheirindependence,
several
withoutadequate
preparation.
The
Westerncapitalistshad certainlynot fought effectivelyto hold them as
colonies.
TheBritishandtheBelgiansifnottheFrench, theDutch,andthe
Portuguese-seemed
almosteager
attimesto getridof theirempires,
asif they
weremillstones
aroundtheirnecks.1°7
Conictdidindeed attend
theindepen-
dence
of some
imperial
possessionsAlgeria,
Indonesia,
Cyprus,
theCongo,
Kenya,India,andPakistan(due,in thelattercases,
to historicreligiousdivi-
sionsin the subcontinent)yet more than 40 colonial territoriesin Asia and
Africaachieved
statusasindependentstateswith relativelylittle or no vio-
lence.Furthermore,
becausethe standardof living of the masses in the
Western
capitalist
states
hadbeenalleged
by theMarxiststo bearticially
highbecause
it hadlongbeen
based
ontheexploitation
of nativepopulations
disimperialism shouldhaveledto a perceptible
declinein theWestsstandard
of living, but this did not occur.To the contrary,the formationof the
European
Economic
Community
(nowtheEuropean
Union)ushered
in a pe-
riod of unprecedented
economic
growthandprosperityduringthedecade
of
decolonization.
Despitethesteadymovement
of AsiaandAfricatowardpoliticaldecolo-
nization, the SovietUnion frequentlywarnedthat the Westernnationswere
seeking
newformsfor keeping thepeoples
of economically
underdevelope
countries
in a stateof permanent
dependence.1°3
Ofcialcommunist
theory
singledout theEuropean
Economic
Community
asaninstrument
of neocolo
nialism,
against
whichthenewstates
hadto beparticularly
ontheirguard.1°9
Followingindependence,
development
in ThirdWorldcountries
didnotspurt
ahead dramatically,
butcontinued
prettymuchasbefore.
Thishistoricreality
of the processof decolonizationand its aftermathnecessitated
further modi-
cation of MarxistLeninisttheory.Politicalindependence
for the former
colonies
wasportrayed
byMarxists
asa sham,
because
it ledto nosignicant
improvement in theireconomic status.Thepoorcountries;
saidtheMarxists,
werestill lockedinto thecapitalistsystem
andwerebeingimpoverished
by its
ironlawof prices.
Thisnewexplanation
offsetthefailureof the.prediction
that the capitalists
wouldght tenaciously to hold on to theircolonies:
The
capitalists
knewthat theywouldhaveno difficultycontinuing theireconomic
domination. AsRalphPettman put it, theolderformof politicalandmilitary
imperialism gaveway in the secondhalf of the twentiethcenturyto a neo-
imperialismthat disdaineddirectcontrolof territoryin favor of political-
economic andpolitical-cultural
linksbasedon collusionbetween globalcapi-
talistsand Third World compradoreliteswho benetedby facilitating
trade, investment, and labor connections with the advancedindustrial coun-
tries.11°
ThomasE.Weisskopf notedseveral factorsat workwithintheworld
capitalistsystem,which,in his view,reinforcethe subordination
of poor to
rich countries:
448 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

0 Rising elitesin the poor countriesare persuadedto emulatethe con-

sumptionpatternsof thebourgeoisie
in therichcountries
andto create
a demandfor Westernimportsthat satisfyeliteconsumers without con-
tributing to economicdevelopment.
0 The brain drain of scientists,engineers,managers,and other techni-
callyeducated professionals
from poorto rich countriesincreases
the
dependence of theLDCsontheindustrializedregions.
0 Foreignprivateenterprise
perpetuates
theconditionsthatmadeforeign
capitalindispensableand discouragesthe growth of host-country
knowledge,technology,skills, and incentivesthat would enhanceits
independence.
0 Westerncapitalistscreatea labor aristocracyin the poor countriesby
payinga smallernumberof skilled workers higherwagesrather than
paying
a largernumber
of unskilled
workers
lowerwages.-1
11
Weisskopfs
theoryprovidesa link between
Marxismandthetheoryof depen-
dency,which will betreatedlater in this chapter.
Marxistsrejectthe liberal contentionthat the afuenceof Westernsociety
has beendue to human energy,scientic inventiveness, technologicalpro-
ciency,managerial andorganizational efciency,
economiesof scale,anda cli-
mateof politicalfreedom in whicheconomic decisions,
whilesubjectto public
policyregulations,canbetakenwithoutexcessive constraints
beingimposed
by bureaucraticcentralplanners. Instead,theyhaveexplained that afuence
as attributablein large measureto the exploitationby Europeanand
American capitalismof thepeoples of Asia,Africa,andLatinAmerica,anex-
ploitationin whicheventhe bourgeois workersof theWestparticipated. To
offsettheparadoxof thecontinued risein theWests standardof livingwhen
it shouldhavedeclinedafter the lossof empire,Marxists laid increasingem-
phasison the argumentthat the Westerneconomies
werebeingarticially
stimulatedby the armsrace.
The notion that colonial exploitationwas replacedby the armsracedid
not standup underseriousscrutiny.TheUnitedStates, which,compared to
theEuropean nations,hada verymeager overseas
empire(and,in European
eyes,ananticolonialideology),wouldundoubtedly havebecome theprincipal
militarydefenderof Western civilizationafterWorldWarII regardless
of de-
velopments in the colonialworld.TheWesternEuropean nations,whichre-
nouncedrather enormouscolonial holdings,consistentlyallocateda lower
percentage
of their grossnationalproductto defense
than did the United
States,and the casecould be made that the West German,French, and
Japanese
standards
of livingrosemorerapidlythanthat of theUnitedStates
duringthe Cold War.
AmongMarxisttheoristsin the postWorldWar11periodwho argued
that Americanforeignpolicyxwasessentiallyimperialistic,Harry Magdoff was
oneof the leadingwriters.Magdoff took issuewith thosewho heldthat polit-
ical aims and national security,rather than economicimperialism,were the
primemotivatorsof UnitedStatesforeignpolicy.Suchpeople,saidMagdoff,
 MARXISTS,
NEO-MARXISTS,
ANDTHETHIRD
WORLD 449
relyontheargument
thatforeign
trade
and
investment
make
upsuch;
smal
partoftheGDP oftheUnited
States
(less
than
5percent
inthecase.-of
total
exports)
thateconomic
factors
could
notpossibly
determine
American-fm
policy.
Magdoff
denied
that
thesize
ofratios
wasbyitself
anadequate
juridic
torofwhatmotivates
foreign
policy.
Hefurther
argued
thatthestake
Of
American
business
abroadismany timeslarger
thanthevolume
ofmerchan
diseexports.
Heestimated
thatthesizeoftheforeign
market
forallUnited
States
rms(domestic
andthose ownedabroad)came toabout
twofthsof
thedomestic
output
ofallfarms,
factories,
andmines.
Hesaw
foreign
eco-
nomicactivityasof growing
importance
to thiscountry
andits national-
security
policy,usually
justiedin politicalandmilitaryterms:
Thewidespread
military
bases,
thefar-ung
military
activities,
andtheaccomp
nying
complex
ofexpenditures
athomeandabroadserve
many purposes
ofspe-
cialinterest
to thebusiness
community:
(1)protecting
present
andpotentia
sources
of rawmaterials;
(2)safeguarding
foreign
markets
andforeign
invest-
ments;
(3)conserving
commercial
seaandairroutes;
(4)preserving
spheres
ofin-
uence
where United
States
business
getsa competitive
edge
forinvestment
and
trade;
(5)creating
newforeign
customers
andinvestment
opportunities
viaforeign
military
andeconomic
aid;and,more
generally,
(6)maintaining
thestructure
of
world
capitalist
markets
notonlydirectly
fortheUnited
States
butalso
foritsju-
nior partnersamongthe industrializednations.2

Marxismhasoftenbeenrentbyinternaltheoretical
disputesforexam-
ple,betweenRevisionists
andLeninists.
Aftertheliberal
Bretton
Woods sys-
temofexchangerates
wassetaside
in 1971,Marxistwriters
divided
inpre-
dicting
thefuture
ofcapitalist
imperialism.
Would American
hegemony,
then
beyondquestion,
continue
indenitely
inaglobally unied
imperialist
system
orwouldrivalnational/regional
centers
emerge
tochallenge
theU.S.position
in a moreconictfulworld?HarryMagdoff,
PaulSweezy,
andotherMarxists
predicted
thattheUnited
States
wouldbecome
increasingly
predominant,
sim-
plybecause
American
capitalist
rms,being
thebiggest,
fastest
growing,
and
mosttechnologically
advanced,
wouldtakeoverkeyareas
ofEuropes
indus-
trialeconomy
andcompel Japan
to openits markets.
Thebourgeoisie
of
EuropeandJapanwouldbedenationalized
andhaveno choicebut to ac-
quiesce.
Therivalryof nationalcapitalisms
predicted
by LeninandStalin
woulddiminish
andbesucceeded
byaU.S.-led
imperialism
thatwouldgoon
exploitingthe Third World.113
BobRothorn,ErnestMandel,andotherMarxists
in 1971drewa differ-
entscenario.
Theyforecast
thatmergers
andtakeovers
in Europe, sparked
by
economic
integration
towarda commonmarketandpoliticalunitymoves
to-
warda superstate,
alongwithcomparable
economies
of scaledevelop-
mentsin Japan,
"wouldin timereduce
thesizeandefficiency
advantages
of
American companies.
This,inturn,wasexpected
toleadtostiffer
competition
andheightened
contradictions
andconictamongnationalandregionalcapi-
talistsystems4
Asthetwentiethcentury
drewtoaclose,Europe wasintran-
sitionto monetary
unionanda singlecurrency
(theeuro),WhileJapanwas
450 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
struggling
torecover
from
itsworst
postwar
recession,
and
Marxists
could
be
nomore
certain
than
liberals
orrealists
concerning
the
direction
oftrends
in
the
international
economy.
Therobust
American
economy
stillappeared
tobe
hegemonic,
despite
occasional
misgivings
about
abubbleabouttoburst.
The
Norwegian
theorist
]ohan
Galtung
viewed
trade
relationships
be-
tween
European
and
Third
World
countries
ascharacterized
byastructur
dominancethe
already
mentioned
exploitation
oflow-wage
labor,plus
two
additional
meansofperpetuating
theexploitative
status
quo:(1)fragmenta
tion
(therelative
absence
ofhorizontal
economicrelationships
among
the
de-
veloping
countries);
and (2)penetration
(which
involves
the growth,
previ-
ously
alluded
to,ofeconomic,educational,
cultural,
andotherrelations
betweenlocal
rising
elites
inThirdWorldcountries
and
theformer
metropo
tanpowers).115
Galtung
faulted
theEuropeanCommunity
forpermitting
the
Associated
States
ofAfrica
toproduce
only such
processed
goodsaswillno
longer
becompetitive
withEuropean
Community exports.
Evenbygrantin
Associated
status
andselective
tariff
preferences
tocertain
African
states,
he
declares,
the
EuropeanCommunitygivesthem
aprivileged
position
vis-a-v
the
restoftheThird
World andthus
fragments
theGroupof77inUNC-
TAD (the UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeand Developm
Galtung,
notaMarxist,
employed
inhisstructural
theory
ofimperialism
sev-
eral
ofthesamecategories
ofthought
asdotheMarxists.
UnlikeLenin,
how-
ever,
Galtung regarded
any system
ofcore and
periphery
relations
inwhich
the
states
are
unequal
asimperialistic.117
(See
also
Galtungs
views
later
inthis
chapter
onthe
New
International
Economic
Order,
orNIEO.)

CRITIQUE
OFMARXISTS
AND
NEO-MARXISTS
Before
turning
todependency
andworld
capitalist
systems
theories,
we
should
see
how
liberal
andrealist
writers
have
criticized
the
views
set
forth
in
the last section.
Marxists
andothers
whoblame
the
West
forthe
poverty
ofthe
LDCs
have
been
roundly
criticized
foroversimplifying
the
situation.
Nomatter
how
muc
goodmay
bedone,
itisalways
easy
(andusually
true)
tosay
that
more
shou
havebeen
done.
Nonetheless,
toblame
the
European
governments
forfailing
tocarry
outahigherdegree
ofdevelopment
intheir
empires
when
they
held
theresponsibility,
saysP.T.Bauer,
istooverstate
thepotentialities
ofstat
powerasaninstrument
ofeconomic
progress.8
Actually,
Bauer
insis
colonial
status
was
notincompatible
with
economic
development.
Where
there
hadbeen
virtually
noeconomic
growth
inAfrica
before
theEurope
arrived,
between
1890and1960West
African
trade
(particularly
forthe
Gold
Coast
and
Nigeria)
increased
byafactor
of100ormore.
According
toBaue
Itishighly
probable
thatthe
establishment
ofcolonial
rule
inAfrica
andAsia
has
promoted,
andnotretarded,
material
progress.
Withrelatively
little
coercio
or
eveninterference
inthelives
ofthe
great
majority
ofthe
people,
thecolonial
gov
ernments
established
law and
order,
safeguarded
private
property
andcontra
 camour or MARXISTS
ANDNEO-MARx[s&#39;1s
451
relations,
organized
basic
transport
and
health
services,
and
introduced
some
mod-
ernnancial
andlegal
institutions.
Theresulting
environment
also
promoted
thees-
tablishment
orextension
ofexternal
contacts,
whichinturnencouraged
theinow
of external
resources,
notably
administrative,
commercial,
andtechnical
skills,as
wellascapital.
. . . It isunlikely
(though
thiscannot
beproved
conclusively)
that
in theabsence
of colonial
rule,thesocial,
political,
andeconomic
environment
in
colonial
Africa
andAsia
would
have
been
more
congenial
tomaterial
pr-ogress.9
Bauermakesthetellingobservation
that theAfricanstatesnot subject
to
Western
imperialismLiberia
andEthiopiaare
todaymoreeconomically
backward
thantheirneighbors
thathadbeen
colonized.12°
Therelationship
between
theWest
andthecolonial
peoples
wasfarfrombeing
one-sidedly
ex-
ploitative.
WithWestern
domination
cameliteracy
andeducation,
hospitals,
hygiene,
sanitary
methods,
andatleast
arudimentaryknowledge
ofscience
andtechnology.
Thepolitical
impact
oftheWest
onthecolonial
lands
wasin
some
respects
greater
thantheeconomic
impact.
Theconcepts
ofindepen-
dence,
self-determination,
freedom,
andsovereign
equality
thatthepeoples
of
AsiaandAfrica
employed
withgreat
effect
after
World
WarII toexpress
their
political
aspirations
were,
asHans
Kohn
pointed
out,borrowed
from
the
Western
political
vocabulary
bynative
leaders
whohadreceived
theiruniver-
sityeducation
inWestern
countries.121
OthernonMarxist
analysts
haveargued
persuasively
thatthere
isnonec-
essary
relationship
between
povertyandthereliance
ofThirdWorld
countries
onextractive
andagricultural
industries.
Posingaserious
challenge
tothefun-
damental
assumptions
ofthisparticular
iron-law
thesis
aretheanomalies
of
Australia
andNewZealand.
Taking
issue
withGaltung,
Andrew
Mack
writes:
Theeconomicexchange
relationships
whichlinkAustralia
andNewZealandwith
therichindustrialized
countries
areprecisely
those
which
Galtungheldnotonly
characterize
Third
World/EC
relationships
butwhicharealso
therootcause
ofthe
formers
underdevelopment.
Bothcountries
depend
ontheexport
ofprimary
com-
modities
. . . characterized
bynonexistent
orvery
lowdegrees
ofprocessing.
On
theother
hand, bothcountries
depend onimports which
aretypically
highly
processed.
. . .Inother
words,
both countries
lieatthelower
end ofthe
vertica
division
ofinternational
labor.
. . . Yetboth
countries
have
experienced
steady
economic
growth andasignicant
degreeofdomestic
industrialization.
This
isin-
deed
ananomaly
which
Galtungs
theory
cannot
explain.122
Marxist
analysts
seemtobelieve
thatwhatever
capitalists
doconstitute
exploitation.
Atthesame
time,
theycondemn
Western
governments
anden-
trepreneurs
fornothaving
donemoretohelp
thecolonial
territories
and
theirsuccessor
independent
states.
Seldom
doMarxists
spell
outwhatcapi-
talists
ought
tohavedoneforThird
World
economic
developmenand
failed
todo.Perhaps
Marxists
cannot
dothis,forthemore
active
capitalis
are,themore
"exploitative
theyarebydefinition.
Marxists
alsoassum
thatthesocialist
system,
bydefinition,
cannot
beexploitative.
Here they
prefer
toignore
theSoviet
Unions
postwar
record
inEastern
Europe.
For
many
years,
elites
intheLDCs.were
strongly
attracted
totheSoviet
mode
452 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

of economicdevelopment.Sincethe fragmentation of the USSR,manyof

thosesameeliteshavebeenextollingthevirtuesof themarketeconomy and
seekingcapitalist investment.It is difficult for them, however,to divest
themselves
of MarxistLeninist thought patternsinstilled in them over much
of the twentieth century.
Sovietpostwar imperialist expansioninto EasternEuropeinitially pro-
videdeconomic
advantages
(looted
industrial
andagricultural
production,
ex-
ploited technologyand labor skills, an expandedareafor the commandecon-
omy,etc.).123
WhenMoscowsoughtto expandits inuencein the Third
WorldduringtheKhrushchev
years,it washighlyselective
in targeting(and
trumpeting)a very limited amountof foreignaid to ten countries.124
Most of
theaidsentabroadto theThirdWorld(NorthKorea,Egypt,NorthVietnam,
Algeria,
Libya,Syria,Iraq,Cuba,Somalia,
Ethiopia,
andAngola)
camefrom
its mostefficientindustrialsectormilitaryproduction.Neglectof consumer
goodswasoneof the chieflegaciesof the Stalinistera.

IMPERIALISM AS POLITICAL SLOGAN

Imperialismremained a principalsloganor shibboleth
of worldpoliticsprior
to thelastdecade
of thetwentiethcentury.TheLeninisttheoryhasoftenbeen
callednarrowlyEurocentric,butthetermtookon a universalapplicabilityaf-
terWorldWarII. All of theleading
powers
employed
it to describe
thepolicies
of their rivals. Arab nationalistsrailed againstBritish and AmericanZionist
imperialismin the Middle East.It was inevitablethat the activitiesof United
States
oil companies
in theMiddleEastandfruit companiesin LatinAmerica
shouldbelabeledprimeexamples of imperialismandthat tradeagreements
betweenthe EuropeanCommunity/Unionand its AssociatedStatesof Africa
and Asia shouldbe characterized
as instruments
of neo-imperialism.The
IndonesianleaderSukarnoand otherThird World neutralists,in the late
1950s,excoriated
theWestfor havingsubjugated
all thepeoples
livingalong
the imperialisthighwayfrom the Atlantic Oceanto the Indian Oceanand the
SouthChinaSea.125
Untilthelate1960s,
whentheSoviet
Unionreplaced
the
UnitedStatesasBeijingsprincipalenemy,
Mao Zhedong,adheringto a hard
Stalinistline,madeimperialismthemainsloganin Chinaspropaganda war
againsttheUnitedStates.Onedevelopment after anotherMossadeqsna-
tionalizationof theAhgloIranian
Oil Company(1951),thedefeatof French
forces
atDienBienPhu(1954),
Nassers
takeover
of theSuez
CanalCompany
(1956),Castrosascentto power (1960),the U.S.withdrawal from Vietnam
(1975),theoverthrowof theShahof Iran,andthevictoryof theNicaraguan
Sandinistas (1979)eachwas hailed throughoutthe Secondand Third
Worldsasa historictriumphoverWestern imperialism.
Most Westerntheoristsof internationalrelationsand Westernpolitical
leaders,
regarded theSovietdominationof Eastern
Europeasimperialism,
even
thoughThirdWorldintellectuals
werenotgreatlyexercisedovertheSovietsup-
pressionof theHungarianuprisingin 1956.KennethE.Bouldingwrote:
 IMPERIALISM AS POLITICAL SLOGAN 453

It is quiteimpossible
to explainmodernimperialismin economic terms.Theonly
possible exception
to this,paradoxically
enough,
is thesocialist
imperialism
exer-
cisedbytheSovietUniononEastern EuropeandespeciallyonEastGermany after
the Second WorldWar.TheSovietUnionprobablyextracted moregoodsfrom
East Germany in the ten years after the SecondWorld War than Britain did in two
hundredyearsfrom India,andthis waspuretribute.125
Theneutralistsof theThirdWorld,for threedecadesafterWorldWarII,
seemed
to takeit for granted,asmanyhadearlier,thatimperialists
arepeople
who comein shipsfrom distantlands.Thosewho could imposetheir domi-
nancesimply by marchingarmiesacrossborderswere for a long time ex-
cludedfrom the denitionof imperialists.
It wasthe Peoples
Republicof
China,which itself had engaged in someimperialisticadventuresagainstIndia
and Tibet, that beganto accusethe SovietUnion of imperialismin a manner
credibleto leftist elitesin the Third World. While trying to replacethe Soviet
Unionasthe leaderof the forcesof world revolution,Mao rst accusedSoviet
leadersof revisionism,bourgeoisication,
and betrayalof the revolution,
through arms-controlcollusionwith capitalistimperialists.Later the Chinese
leaderscondemnedcapitalistand socialistimperialismin one breath.Later
still, theybeganto indicatethattheyregarded
thesocialistimperialism
of the
SovietUnion as a greaterthreat than the capitalistimperialismof the United
States,
andtheyactedasif theywouldwelcome a tacitalliance
with theenemy
fartherawayagainsttheenemynearer.At thesametime,theyencouraged the
strengtheningof NATO, urgedEuropeto unite, and warnedthe Westnot to
takea Soviet-promoted détente too seriously.
In July1978,theforeignminis-
tersof morethan 100nonaligned states,meetingin Belgrade,hintedfor the
rst timethat theywerebecoming moreworriedaboutSovietexpansion, es-
peciallyin Africa,thantheywereabouta waningWestern imperialism.127
Nevertheless, despiteits manytheoretical decienciesandfailuresof pre-
dictionandpracticefor example, several
countriesorganized alongMarxist
communist lineshavefoundit harderto feedthemselves thantheydid be-
foreMarxismcontinued for a longtimeto exercise a worldwideappealasa
vehiclefor the expression of criticism,resentment, and protestagainstthe
complexities andfrustrations of contemporary socialreality.123
Accordingto
Adam B. Ulam, the Hobson-Leninisttheory of imperialism,becauseof its
simplicity,becauseof its psychologicalappealand becauseof the undoubted
depredationsand brutalitiesthat accompaniedthe processof colonization,
retainedits inuence by enablingthe disadvantaged of the world to express
theirrageandto disturbtheconscience
of a guilt-ridden
West.129
In the nal analysis,the Leninisttheory of imperialismdid a disserviceto
thedevelopingnationsof thenon-Western world. Thesimplistic,polemicalurge
to blameall or most of thosecountriestroubleson the exploitationof a few
capitalisticstates,asAnthonyJamesJoesnoted,divertstheattentionof planners
who taketheideologicalexplanationseriouslyfrom examiningcarefullythe ob-
staclesposedto modernizationby indigenouspolitical,cultural,economic,and
geographicfactors.The theorywas~also self-serving
to someThird World lead-
ers, said Joes,for it exculpatesdogmatictheorists,incompetentwindbags,
454 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

epauletedmegalomaniacs,and village tyrants from all responsibility for the de-

plorable condition of their suffering countrymen even after two decades0r
two centuriesor two millenniaof politicalindependence.13°

THE THEORY OF DEPENDENCY

Most of the LDCS had emergedin the latter half of the twentieth century from
a past in which either political colonialism, economic imperialism, or both
predominated. Whereas all Western industrial countries and Japan experi-
enced some problems in the transition from traditional to modern societies,
for most of them the processwas gradual and phased over a longer period.
Many Third World countries, suddenly caught up in rapid social change,have
felt revolutionary pressuresas a result of the modernization process.Most of
them manifest glaring inequities in patterns of accumulatedwealth and annual
income distribution. Most suffer from high or above-averagerates of popula-
tion growth, infant mortality, malnutrition or hunger, contagious disease,and
illiteracy along with inadequate programs of education, health, and welfare.
Throughoutthe Third World, planningfor coherenteconomicdevelopmentis
hampered by shortagesof technical and administrative expertise, political in-
stability,ination, unfavorabletermsof trade (because
of dependence
on the
export of a few primary products and the import of costly capital and manu-
factures, plus large-scaleindebtednessto foreign banking institutions, whether
national or international), and pressuresfor consumption that more often
thannot outstripdomestic
productivity.131
Dependencytheory originated during the 1970s as one school of structural-
globalist thought, the object of which was to explain the gap betweenthe rich
andthe poor nationsof the world. It wasdevelopedlargelyby Latin American
analysts of the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) and was
quickly adopted by UNCTADoriented writers who were not satised with the
explanations of those who attributed the developmentfailure of Third World
societiesto the assumptionthat religious and cultural traditions acted as a bul-
wark against modernization. The basic thesis of the dependentistasis that de-
pendencydiffersfrom the dependencethat mostcontemporaryscholarshavein
mindwhentheyreferto an interdependent world, evenwhentheyacknowledge
inequitiesin interdependent
relationships.
JamesA. Caporasodistinguishedthe
two conceptsas follows:
Thedependence orientationseeksto probeandexplorethe symmetries and asym-
metriesamongnation-states.This approachmost often proceedsfrom a liberal
paradigmwhich focuseson individual actors and their goals and which sees
power in decisionalterms. The individual actors are usually internally unied
stateswhich confront the externalenvironmentas homogeneous units. . . . The
dependency orientation,on the otherhand,seeksto exploretheprocessof integra-
tion of the peripheryinto the internationalcapitalistsystemand to assess the de-
velopmentalimplicationsof this peripheralcapitalism.This approachproceeds
from a stmcturalist paradigmwhich focuses on the class structure and interna-
 THE THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 455

tional capital,and the role of the statein shapingandmanagingthe national,for-

eign,and classforcesthat propeldevelopment within countries.The dependency
framework, in other words, explicitly re]ects the unied state as actor as a useful
conceptualbuildingblockof theory.132
Caporaso noted that when development theory emergedfrom the 1950s on-
ward, it focused exclusively on conditions in the LDCs that thwarted eco-
nomic growth as measuredin Westerncapitalistterms and failed for a long
time to takeequitabledistributioninto account.Whereasgeneraldevelopment
theory,he says,emphasizes domesticobstaclesto growth in the LDCs,depen-
dency theory examines the interaction of external and internal factors. Like
good Marxists, dependentistaswish not only to explain reality, but also to
change
it.133
In the View of dependency theorists, the relationship between the
Northern core and the Southernperiphery,far from beinga relationshipof
mutual-interest cooperation, connotes both the subordination of the latter to
the former and the exploitation of the latter by the former. Thus, in the eyesof
dependentistas,
the poor countriesdo not lack capital and lag behindthe rich
becausethey lie outside or on the edge of the capitalist world but rather be-
cause they have been integrated into the international class structure of the
capitalist system.In this respect,dependencytheory is essentiallya variant of
the neoMarxist perspectiveon the situation facing the erstwhile colonial ter-
ritories. Tony Smith characterizeddependencytheory as follows:
Put briey, it holds that economic processesare the basic structural force of his-
tory, and that over the last several centuries it has been northern capitalism (rst
in its mercantile, then in its free trade, later in its nancial, and today in its multi-
national guises)that has been historys locomotive. Those lands and peoples are
dependent that are not autonomous (a favorite word of many of thesewriters
that is never rigorously dened . . . ) in the face of these external economic
forces. . . .
The major criticism to be made of dependencytheory is that it exaggerates
the explanatory power of economic imperialism as a concept to make senseof his-
torical changein the south. Too much emphasisis placed on the dynamic, molding
power of capitalist imperialism and the socioeconomicforces in leaguewith it 10-
cally; too little attentionis paid to political motivesbehindimperialismor to the
autonomouspower of local political circumstances in inuencingthe courseof
change
in Africa,AsiaandLatinAmerica.134
Samueland Arturo Valenzuelacriticized the modernization perspective
that economists,anthropologists,sociologists,and political scientistshad de-
velopedin the postwarperiod to explainthe failure of new nationsto reach
the economictakeoffpoint following an infusionof Westernforeignaid. Such
a perspective, in their view,was an outgrowthof the dichotomybetweentra-
dition and modernityof nineteenth-century Europeansociologythat sawcul-
ture itself, resistantto change,as the main obstacleto economicmoderniza-
tion. Traditional societiesare marked by ascription,not achievement;by
socialstatusand not individual effort; and by an extendedkinship structure
rather than the nuclear family. Such societiesmanifest little occupational
456 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

specializationand socialmobility, a highly stratied systemof upward defer-

ence,and an emphasison elitism and hierarchicalauthority.By contrast,the
featuresof modernsocietyareconceptuallyquite differentindeed, polar op-
posites:high ratesof socialmobility; a complexoccupationalsystem;a pre-
dominanceof secondaryover merelyprimary economicactivities(i.e.,manu-
facturingand service-«industriesbeyondagricultureand mining);differentiated
political, legal,and social structures;and an institutionalizedcapacityfor
change,rather than a rigid patterncalculatedto preserveimmemorialsocial,
religious,and cultural values.Westernmodernizationists werefaultedfor as-
sumingthat unlesstraditional societiescould learn to innovateand adopt
Westernideas,techniques,organizationalmethods,incentives,and institu-
tionsa whole new set of attitudes and way of life-they must continue to
languishon the fringeof poverty.
Dependencytheorists,note the Valenzuelas,reject the modernizationist
assumptionthat genuinedevelopmentcanresultonly throughan appropriate
response to stimuli from exogenous sourcesaccordingto the uniquelysuccess-
ful Westernmodel, as if developmentand Westernizationwere identical
processes. Thesetheoristsalsorejectthe notion that the nationalsocietyis the
proper unit of analysisin this context.The Valenzuelasarguethat different
levelsin the transitionfrom tradition to modernitycannotexplaindifferences
in levelsof economicgrowth achievement. Nations and regionscan be ana-
lyzedonly by referenceto their locusin the world political and economicsys-
temwhether they are closerto the coreor to the periphery.This is a central
tenetrunningthroughall dependency literature.Dependency literature,unfor-
tunately,is marred by suchimpreciseor inelegantconceptsas associated-
dependentdevelopment,inwardly [or outwardly] directeddevelopment,
global historical-structuralprocesses,the operationalizationof depen-
dency,anddiachronicanalysis.135
Beforeand after World War II, severaldevelopingcountries,especially
in Latin America, tried to reducetheir dependencyon the industrialized
capitalist system by pursuing a strategy of import substitution.
Governmentsencouragedindigenousindustrieswith high protectivetariffs.
Earningsfrom agricultural exportswere usedto pay for the importation of
neededcapital equipment,while a variety of policies discouragedthe im-
portation of consumergoodsthat would henceforthbe producedat home.
This import-substitutionstrategypromoted developmentfor a while, until
it required large-scaleborrowing by governmentsto finance heavy indus-
trial enterprisesthat, in restricted domesticmarkets,were unable to pro-
duceat efficient economiesof scale.Suchfirms often enjoyedso much pro-
tection and ,public assistanceas to becomevirtual monopoliesunable to
facecompetition.135
A numberof developingcountrieshavebecomesubstantialproducersof
manufactures.The newly industrializing countries (NICS) include South
Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, India, the Philippines, Hong Kong,
Singapore,Mexico, Venezuela,Thailand, and Malaysia.In somecases,the
NICs themselves
havebecomemajorexporters,evento suchcountriesas the
 THE THEORYOF DEPENDENCY 457

United
States.
Stephen
Haggard
compared
theEastAsian
strategy
of export-
led industrialization
with theimport-substitution
strategy
of several
Latin
Americancountries,and he found the formernotablymoresuccessful
in
termsof national
economic
independence,
equityof income
distribution,
and
qualify-oflifeindices.l37
Dependency
theoristsadmitthat MNCshavebeen
attracted
to thesecountries,
butit is because
of cheaper
laborcostsand,in
manycases, shortersupplylinesfor raw materials. Nevertheless,
the depen-
dentistascontend,suchdevelopment asdoesoccuris not reallyautonomous
butis dictatedby theglobalrequirements of theworldcapitalistsystem. Neo-
Marxistsanddependency theorists preferto emphasize thecontinued subordi-
nationof this semiperiphery to thecoreandignorethefactthat someentire
countriesarenowbetteroff thanbeforeandenjoyrisingpercapitaincomes.
Whereas Caporaso, theValenzuelas, andotherdependentistas both em-
ploy and criticizesociological conceptsin their analyses, Theotoniodos
Santos,a Brazilianeconomist, presentsa primarilyeconomic explanation as
to why capitalism produces underdevelopment in theLDCs.&#39;First,
hedenes
dependency asa situationin whichtheeconomy of certaincountriesis con-
ditionedby thedevelopment andexpansion of anothereconomy to whichthe
formeris subjected.138 It is not exactlyinterdependence whena dominant
economy cancarryout self-sustaining expansion-but a dependent
onecannot
do thisexcept
asa dominantdirected
adjunctto thatexpansion.
Hepasses
overthe earlierperiodof colonialexpansion andtight trademonopolies by
thecolonizer,
andtheindustrial-nancial dependence fromthelatenineteenth
centuryto WorldWarII, markedbycapitalistinvestment in agricultural
prod-
uctsandraw materialsfor exportto themothercountryfor consumption or
reprocessing
in factories.Theseformshavebeensucceeded by a newdepen-
denceof subsistenceeconomies that providelow-costlaborpowerasdeter-
minedby therequirements of commodityandcapitalmarketsandthedegree
to whichlocalconditionsfavornewinvestments andtechnology transfers
in
theformof capitalratherthancommodities
for sale. .
The foreigncapitalists,
saysdosSantos,preserve the traditionalexport
sector,backwardrelationsof production,and the maintenance of political
powerby decadent oligarchies.139Foreigncapitalretainscontrolof themost
dynamicsectorsof the economy througha monopolyofpatentandroyalty
rightson moderntechnology. It alsorepatriates
thebulkof its prots,thussi-
phoningoff the hostcountryseconomicsurpluswhichcouldotherwisebe
usedfor local development.
Theexit of prots resultsin decits and debtsthat
necessitate
burdensome
loansandservice
charges
fromforeignbanksandin-
ternational capitalist institutions such as the IMF and the WorldBank. Santos
diagnosis
coincideswith thecriticismsleveledbyMarxistsandothers.14°
RobertGilpinspeaks for realismwith a slightnodto interdependence
the-
oristsin rejectingdependency
theory:

Every LDC is certainlydependentupon uctuating world market conditions;

each must import capital, technology,and industrialknow-how.. . . A con-
tinuum existsin which everycountry is more or lessdependentupon others.If,
458 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

however,one employs this condition of dependenceas an explanation of underde-

velopment,
theargument
losesmuchof its force.141
Actually,in Gilpinsview, the LDCSare dependentand vulnerablepre-
cisely becausethey are underdevelopedrather than vice versa and because
they are the weak in a world of the strong, suffering not from external de-
pendence,but from internal inefciency.142
Someof themthe NICs men-
tioned previouslyhave becomeefcient enoughto achieverapid rates of
economic growth. Gilpin does concede,however, that the immense gap be-
tween the developed and less developed economies has made it much more
difcult to escapedependencein the late twentieth century than it was for de-
velopingeconomies
in thenineteenth
century.143
In otherwords,thereis a
considerabledifference between being early and being late in the global devel-
opment cycle.

THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY

Related to, yet different from, the theory of dependenciais the broader school
of thought that looks beyond the current problems of the Third World in an
effort to understand the uneven development of the world capitalist systemas
a whole, in its variouspolitical, economic,and socialaspects,and to fit the
historical evolution of eachcountry or region into a global spatiotemporal
perspectiveencompassing the capitalistworld economysincethe sixteenth-
century.
transitionfrom feudalism.
The principalspokesperson
for this ap-
proach is Immanuel Wallerstein.
Wallersteinsanalysis is essentiallyneo-Marxist, but he combineselements
of realist theory and Marxism. He shareswith such realists as Kenneth Waltz
and HedleyBull the view that the inte haracterized by an-
arghgkthe
absence
of a single
globalpoliticalauthority.
It isprecisely
thiscon-
dition
that
makes
to regulate
the
caitalist
modeofproduct
across
national
boun
aries.
Consequen national eco-
nomicdivisicof laborconsisting of a centralcoreof powerful,industrially
advancedcapitaliststates;a periiiigrymadeup of weak§tates,kepton a level
of technolog/igLuad-erdevelopment andsubordinatedto the status
-.1
of provider
of raw materialsfor the core;and a semiperiphery
of states,the economicac-
tivitiesof whicharea mixturein between
thoseof coreandperipherythe
NICs. This is not an unprecedentedphenomenon.Originally,the world sys-
tem in 1600 includednorthwesternEuropeas the core, easternEuropeand
Latin Americaasthe periphery,and MediterraneanEuropePortugal, Spam,
Italyas the semiperiphery.144
Wallersteinavoids the excessiveand exclusiveemphasisthat classical
Marxists have placed on the classstruggle. He recognizesthe important roles
playedwithin the capitalistworld economyby nation-states;
ethnic,religious,
racial, and linguistic groups; and evenhouseholds.He realizesthat the compe-
tition o_fbourgeoisieand proletariathasthe effectof strengtheningthe state
because
both classes,
regardless
of whethertheypursueexploitativestatus
 THECAPITALIST
WORLDECONOMY 459

quo,reformist,
or revolutionary
strategies,
workconsciously
orunconsciousl
to enhance
thefunctionalpowersof government
andinuencegovernments
to
regulatethe marketto their benet.Wallersteinreadilyconcedes
that the inter-
nationaldistributionof poweramongstatesshiftsconstantly
asonehistoric
periodgivesway to another.In the end,however,he is moreMarxist than re-
alist when he insiststhat the balanceof power is a func L of economic
processes
that
transcend
purely
national
boundariessuch
a m-
ple,by_vVh-ich
theUnitedStates
replaced
Britainastheworlds
premier
power
in theearlydecadesof thetwentiethcentury.145
Thedifferences
in strengthof
statepoliticalstructuresand their uneveneconomicdevelopment depends
upon when variousgeographicareaswere incorporatedinto the system,the
natureof their resources,and the interactionof political and economicfac-
tors, both internaland international,asthe world systemhasexpanded.145
ChristopherChase-Dunn,following Wallerstein,inquired into the rela-
tionshipbetween
economic
andpoliticalprocesses
within the capitalistsys-
tem. SomeMarxists, he observed,joined such realists as Waltz and Modelski
in reactingagainsttheeconomism
of Wallerstein
by reemphasizing
theauton-
omy of political factors, the interstatesystem,and geopoliticalprocesses.
Chase-Dunncontendedthat the interstatesystemand the capitalistmodeof
productionandwealthaccumulationarenot only interdependent, but alsoin-
tegrallyunied. He attributesthe separationof politics and economicsin the
pastto the fact that economicphenomenaseemmoreregularand moredeter-
minedby mechanisticlaws, whereasthe order of political phenomenaseems
to bemoreinuencedbyfreewill andtherefore
lesspredictable.
Henotesthat
AdamSmithandhisfollowersalsoattributedtheseparationtothedichotomy
betweenpublic and private,the statebeingequatedwith the publicrealmand
economicactivity with the private. Chase-Dunnrejectedboth the explana-
tions of the separationandthe separationitself.
Whetherstatespursuefree enterpriseand trade policiesor imposestrict
controls over the economydependson their position within the capitalist
world economy.(In this regard,Chase-Dunnagreedessentiallywith Waller-
steinsassumptionthat socialiststateswereneverableto escapefrom the fact
that,like it or not,theyalwayswereandsomestill area partof thecapitalist
worldeconomy andcannotisolatethemselves
fromit, tryastheymight.)Not
only hegemoniccorestatespossessing productiveadvantages,but alsoperiph-
eral statesdominatedby capitalistproducersof cheap-laborgoodsfor export
to the core,supportfreetrade.Lessfavorablysituatedcorestatesand semipe-
ripheralstates(NICs)seekingto improvetheir positionrelativeto the coreare
usuallycharacterized by centralizeddirectionof the economyand protection-
ist policies.Chase-Dunn
elaborated
onWallersteins
Viewthat theglobalsys-
tem is anarchic.Both insiststronglythat the capitalistworld economyprefers
to preserve
thisconditionandopposes
theemergence
of a singlepowercapa-
bleof actingasa universal
hegemon
or worldstate.Rivalstates
engage
in a
balanceof power that operatesto preventthe establishment
of a worldwide
monopolystatestrongenoughto imposecontrolson the globaleconomicor-
der,for capitalismcould not thensurvive.147
460 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

OIL,INFLATION,
ANDTHEDEBTCRISIS
History
isnottheory.
Nevertheless,
withoutknowledge
ofcertain
historica
developments
in thelastthreedecades
of thetwentieth
century,
onecannot
fullyunderstand
current
problemsandtheoretical
debates
within
IPEtoday.
Aswehave
seen,
inationintheUnited
States,
traceable
totheVietnam
War
andmountingtrade
decits,
promptedNixontowithdraw
fromthecurrency
stabilization
provisions
oftheBretton
Woods system.
Moreover,
bytheearly
1970s
Western oil companies
werelosingcontrolof oil production
in the
MiddleEast-
thisat a timewhentheindustrialized
nations (except
for the
Soviet
Union),
werebecoming
moredependent
onMiddle
Eastsupplies
and
worldindustrial
demand
for oil wasgrowing.148
Overtheprevious
15-year
period,
theU.S.share
ofworldoiloutput
haddropped from43percent
to
21percent,
while
theMiddle
Easts proportion
hadrisen
from19percent
to
41percent.
During
theArab-Israeli
War ofOctober 1973,Arabstates
employ
ingtheoil weapon,embargoed shipments to theNetherlands
(since
Rotterdam
wasthemajorportofentryforoilintoEurope)andreduced
their
production
bymore
than
athird.AndtheUnited Statesprecipitated
anenergy
crisis
andaneconomicslowdown whichhadamoresevere
impact
onthefor-
mer,sincetheUnited
States,
withaccess
toWestern
Hemisphere
sources,
was
lessvulnerable.
ManyEuropeans werechagrined
athaving
topaytheheavier
pricefortheUS policyofsupporting
Israel.
Theination
problem
was
considerably
magnied
andglobalized
whenthe
Organization
ofPetroleum
Exporting
Countries
(OPEC)
quadrupled
theprice
ofabarrel
ofcrude
oilin 1973-1974.
Following
theoverthrow
oftheShah
of
IraninJanuary
1979,
OPEC
again
quadrupled
theprice
ofoiltonearly
$40.(It
hadbeen
inthe$2range
in 1971.)149
Thisseriously
compounded
thenancial
problems
notonly
oftheadvanced
industrial
nations
(AICs),
butalsoofsevera
resource-poor
LDCs heavily
dependent
uponoilimports.
Infact,
it divided
the
ThirdWorldintorichoil-exporting
andpooro1limporting
states.
Theinternational
monetary system
changedsignicantly
duringthe
1970s.
Thevolumeof dollars
in worldwide
circulation
heldbyparties
other
than
national
central
banks
(as
ofcialreserves)
kept
rising.
These
were
called
Eurodollars,
deposited
byprivate
individuals
andcorporations
inEuropea
commercial
banks.
Theofcialreserves
of central
banks
werebacked
upby
U.5.government
obligations;
Eurodollars
werenot,buttheyourished
sim
plybecause
thedollar
wasassumedtobebasically
sound.
Eurodollars
plus
other
foreign
currencies
(pounds,
francs,
deutschrnarks,
etc.)
heldbyoff-
shore
banks(incountries
thatdidnotissue
those
currencies)
madeupwhat
wasknownasthe_Eurocurrency
market.In otherwords,capitalbecame
denationalized,
ascommercial
bankoperations
evolved
fromanalmost
ex-
clusively
intranational
toamuch
more
international
form.
Bythemid1970s
xedexchange
rateshadgivenwayto a volatileoatingsystem
thatintro-
duced
unfamiliar
risksanduncertainties
for international
traders
andin-
vestors.Bankfailuresin onecountrycouldhaveadverse
repercussio
 OIL, INFLATION, AND THE DEBT CRISIS 461

abroad. Banks increasinglybought and sold foreign currencies,sometimes

evenspeculating
for prot onwhichnationalcurrencies
werelikelyto gainor
lose value.15°
As a result of the oil price shock,hugeamountsof petrodollars were
depositedin the Eurocurrencymarket by the newly rich oil-exportingcoun-
tries.(It shouldbenotedthat oil priceswereusuallydesignated
andpaidin
US. dollars,or dollar equivalentsin other hard currenciesacceptable
to the
exporters.)Vastsumsof thesepetrodollarshad to be recycledif the interna-
tional economicsystemwas to keepowing normally and not becomepara-
lyzedby cloggingup, somewhat
ashighwaysdo in severe
trafficcongestion.
It was clearthat the LDCs,facedwith skyrocketingbills for oil imports,
would havesufferedsevereenergyshortagesand economicdepressionunless
manybillionsof dollarscouldbetransferred
to themfromthefundsdeposited
by the oil-exporting nations. OPECcountrieswere not really interestedin
buyingthe goodsthat oil-poor LDCs had to sell.Thusthe LDCs had no way
of earningenoughdollars to pay for much-needed oil imports for industries
and agriculturalfertilizer.It seemedto someobserversatthe time that a be-
nign invisible hand (the model describedby Adam Smith) was at work
when banks awash with liquidity (asformer FederalReserveBoardchair-
manPaulVolckerput it) beganon their own initiative to lendwhat distressed
LDCswereeagerto borrow.151
EthanB.Kapstein
callsthata myth.Heinsists
that banks werehesitantto placetheir fundsin developingcountriesin the
absenceof governmentsupport, which theygot from the centralbanksof the
G-8nationsa safetynetin theformof a guarantee
thathelpwouldbeavail-
able if the banks should run into trouble.157&#39;
The electionswhich brought"Margaret Thatcher to power in Britain
(1979), Ronald Reaganin the United States(1980), and Helmut Kohl in
Germany(1982)signaleda return to conservativeeconomicpolicies--Iaissez-
faire,deregulation,
international
freetrade,increasing
disenchantment
with
the escalatingcostsof welfarestateprograms,and tighter monetarypolicy in
the form of higherinterestratesto bring aboutination. The swingto classi-
cal liberal principleswas much more pronouncedin London and Washing-
ton than in Bonn,wherethe ChristianDemocratswerejust moderatelyright
of center,but continuing severalSocial Democraticprograms,where the
Bundesbank wasalwaysan anchorof anti-inationary policy.
The second half of the 1970s witnessed a marked slowdown in the
economiesof the AICs, sincethe highercost of fuel promptedbusinessrms
to reassess
expansion
planslaid earlier,whentheoutlookhadbeenbrighter.
Unemployment,
ination, andinterestrateswereon therise.Economistswere
perplexedby an unfamiliarphenomenon knownas stagation,denedby
RobertGilpinasthe combination of a low rateof economic growth,mass
unemployment, anddouble-digit ination.153Normally,ination hasbeen
associated
with periodsof growthlow interestrates,investorconfidence,
andjob creation.Theoil pricerisehadchanged all that.Furthermore,
U. S.
industries and labor, faced with increasingcompetition from Japan, the
462 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

EuropeanEconomicCommunity,
andtheNICs,were demandingmore
effec-
tiveprotection,
intheformofimport
quotas
if nottariffs.
World
trade
growth
wasdramatically
reduced.
Thepolicies
of theAICgovernments
hada con-
tracting
effect
ontheabilityof LDCsto selltheirexports
abroad.
Tighter
monetarypolicies
oftheAICsintheearly1980sraised
thevalue
ofthedollar
andsome Europeancurrencies,
makingit harderforLDCstoservice
thedebt
charges ontheloans
whichNorthern
banks
hadbeen
willingtoissue
tocoun-
triesintheSouthwhenNorthern
prospects
hadgrowndimmer.154
Thenetresultof these
developments
wasa serious
debtcrisisaffecting
a
large
number
ofThirdWorld
countries
inthe1980s.
It began
inAugust
1982
whenMexico
announced
thatit could
notmeet
itspaymentobligations.15
Creditors
fearedthatdefaultby anysinglemajordebtorsuchasArgentina,
Brazil,
or Mexico
couldhaveserious
consequences
fortheinternationa
monetary
systemzv
a collapse
of confidence
in theinternational
banking
sys-
tem.. . . dangerous
disruption
of thenancialmarkets
andin aworstcase
scenarioworld recession
or depression.156
Thecreditorsfearswerejusti~
ed. Mexicos troublesweresoonreplicatedin Brazil,Argentina,
Chile,
Venezuela,
andotherLatinAmerican
andAfrican
countries.
Bytheendof
1982,morethantwodozen countries
werein arrears
in making
payments
on
morethan$200billionin bankloans.Asthecases
of MexicoandVenezuela
demonstrated,
not evenoilexportingstateswereimmune.Energyconserva-
tioneffortsbytheindustrialized
nations,
exploitation
of newoil sources
(e.g.,
offshore
deposits
in theNorthSeaandNorways
waters),
combined
with
Saudi
Arabias
effortsto forceworldprices
downbyincreasing
itsproduction,
causedaglutonthemarket,
wrought
havoc
withproduction
quotas,
forced
theprice
down to$12abarrel
in1986,
andgenerated
serious
divisions
within
OPEC.157
Meanwhile,
all debtridden
states
suffered
fromoutbound
capital
ight northward.
AsRichard E.Feinberghasargued,
in timesof economic
crisis,eitherdo-
mesticor international,
conservative
liberals(sincetheGreatDepression)
havebeenwillingto setaside
theirpreference
for freemarket,
invisible
handsolutions in favorof emergency
measures bygovernments
andmultilat-
eralinstitutions.158
TheUnitedStates
hadlittlechoice
except
to cometo the
rescue
with publicsectorintervention.
Reluctantly
but ineluctably,
the
Reagan
Administration
contained
itshostility
toward
multilateral
nancial
in-
stitutions
andapproved
the doubling
of the resources
available
to the
International
MonetaryFund.159 U. S. Treasury
Secretary
JamesBaker
workedwithIMFto cajolewarycommercialbanks
thattheyshould
continue
lending
atmodest
levels
torescue
distraught
countries
while
rescheduling
debt
liquidation
payments
notmerely
forshort
terms
butover
several
years.
Atthe
sametime,theIMFimposed
reformandausterity
programs
asacondition
of
assistance,
andthesenaturally
aroused
resentment
among
theLDCs.
Farfrom
improving,
thesituation
grew
worse
astotalSouthern
indebtedness
continued
tomount
during
the1980s
towellover$1tril1ion.16°
Private
lending
to the LDCsground
to a halt in mid1982.15
Governments
andpubliclending
institutions
hadto stepintothebreach.
 OIL,INFLATION,
AND
THE
DEBT
CRISIS 463
Whereas
in1979
theIMFhadbeen
lending
only1percent
asmuch
asprivate
sources,
by1983
itsproportion
was50percent.
TheIMFbecame
akey
player,
calculating
debtorsneeds, serving
asaconduit
ofinformation
betwee
debtors
andcreditors,
tryingto restore
thebanks
condencein thecredit-
worthiness
ofspecic
debtorstates,
andurgingbanks
tocontinue
lending,
re-
duce interest
rates,
andundertakemultiyearreschedulingofloansinsteadof
merely injecting
shortterml1quidity.152
TheIMFseemed to beblurringthe
distinction
betweenitsownfunction of lendingfor temporarycurrencyex-
change emergencies
andtheWorldBanks functionoflongtermdevelopme
lending.At thesame time,theIMFxedtheresponsibility for thecrisis
squarelyuponthedebtor governmentsownnancial policies
andimposed
stabilization
measures upontheLDCs.These involved austerity
programs
whichnaturallyaroused resentment
in theSouth against
Northern capitalis
imperialismcurbing ination,
shrinking publicsectorbudgets,
reducing
im-
ports,devaluingcurrencies,
andkeepingwageincreases
belowthe ination
rate.Suchbelt-tightening
programs
contributed
signicantly
to negative
eco-
nomic
growth
rates,
a substantial
decline
in workers
realincomes,
a height-
enedincidence
of strikes,anda potentialfor socialunrestandturmoil.163
U.S.TreasurySecretaryJames Baker,realizingthatLDCindebtedness was
increasing
fasterthanexportearnings
andovertaking
eventheabilityto ser-
vicethe debt,concluded
that austerityprogramsalonecouldnot solvethe
problem.
Whatwasneeded wasa greater
emphasis
onthesupply-side
eco-
nomics
highly
favored
bytheReagan Administrationmore
newlending
by
commercial
bankstonanceinvestments
intheLDCsexport
industries,
plus
anexpanded
rolefor theIMF.Therewasto benoreduction,
however,
either
ofthedebtortheinterest
rate;theIMFwouldcontinue
toinsistonreforms,
andthecreditor
nationswouldnotcontribute
largeadditional
sumsto thein-
ternational
institutions.
TheBaker
Planfailedbecauseprivatebanks
wereun-
willingtolendeven
athirdoftheamount
called
foroverathreeyear
period.
Theow of capitalfromSouthto North exceeded
theinvestment
fundsmov-
ingin theopposite
direction.
TheUnitedStates
itselfwasshifting
fromacred-
itor to a debtor nation.154
Fearing
defaults
on.a disastrous
scale,
privatebanksbegan
to cuttheir
losses
byselling
riskyThirdWorldloans
to othernancial
institutions
(banks
or investment
companies)at discounted
pricesthepercentage of discount
(say,20percent
or 30percent)
depending
«upon theprospectsthatthedebtor
countrywouldeventually
beableto payoff thefull obligation.
In 1989,an-
otherU.S.Secretary
of theTreasury,
Nicholas
Brady,
supported
a proposal
initiatedby Japananddeveloped
a setof incentives
for banksto lendnew
moneyto theLDCs.Bankscouldexchange theiroldbonds carrying
eithera
reduced
principal
or lowerinterest
rates. . . [bondsthat]include
guarantees
of repayment
secured
byspecial
fundssetaside
forthispurpoSe.165
Japan
helped
morethananyothercountryto nancetheBradyPlan.Thesituation
was easedsomewhat,but the debt problemremainedfar from solved.
Countrieskept slippingbacktowarddefault.In the mid-1990s,
the United
States
againhadto cometo therescue
of Mexicoor elsesufferthedanger
of
464 INTERNATIONAL POLlTICAL ECONOMY

serious
politicalinstability
onitssouthern
border.
Thesituation
worsened dra-
matically
duringtheglobalnancialturmoilof 1997-1998.Not until late
1999weretheleadingindustrialnations(G7)willingto pledge$27billionto
forgive
thedebtsof 26poorest
nations,
provided thatthemonies
savedwould
bedevotedto education
(schools)
andhealth(clinics
andhospitals).155

THE NORTH~SOUTH DEBATE AND THE NIEO

Sincetheearly1970s,andevenmoresoafterthecollapse
of theSovietUnion,
manypoliticians
andacademictheorists
havebeenarguingthat economic
problems
havereplaced
thetraditional
security
concerns
of nations.
Longbe-
fore the endof the ColdWar,therewereThird Worldstatements that the
North-Southdebate,whichfocuseson structuralinequitiesin the interna-
tionaleconomy, hadsupplantedtheEast-West
contest,preoccupied asit was
withpolitical,ideological,
andmilitaryissues.
TheThirdWorld,withpersis-
tent vehemence, condemned the armsracebetween theNATO andWarsaw
Pactalliances andpressedhardwithin theUnitedNationsfor nucleardisar-
mamentasa meansof shiftingresources devotedto the chimeraof deter-
rencetowardinternational development.157
It is a grossoversimplication
to identifytheNorthernindustrialcountries
with the rich and the Southernless-developed
countrieswith the poor.
Bothwithinandamongstatesof theNorthwecannoteeconomic
disparities-
for example,
between
thenorthern
partof ItalyandtheMezzogiorno
in the
south,or betweenthe slumsand the suburbsof manycitiesin the United
States,
or between
PortugalandGreece ontheonehandandthemoreafuent
northwesternEuropeon theother.Afterthe oil pricerisein the 1970s,some
Third World countrieswereableto boastper-capitaincomeshigherthan
thoseof a few Northern countries.As notedearlier,severalof the more than
100statesthatidentifythemselves
with theSoutharethemselves
NICswith la-
bor-intensive
economies, the manufacturingexportsof whichhaveproved
highlycompetitivein internationalmarketsagainstcountriesthat enjoya
higherstandardof living.
Finally,the-gapbetween
thewealthyandthe poverty-stricken
classes
in
the urban areasand countriesof the Southis often more glaring than in the
Northor in theglobaleconomic
systemasa wholebetween NorthandSouth.
Indeed,Third Worldvoicesthat aremostscathingin theircondemnation
of
the Westernindustrializednationsfor consumingthreequartersof theworlds
resources
to satisfyonequarterof its populationoftencondoneglaring1n-
equalities
in theclassstructures
of theirownsocieties,
whichtheyusually
blameonthecapitalistWest.153
After all the caveatshavebeennoted,it cannotbe deniedthat the bulk of
humankindliving in the morethan 100 countries(outsideNorth America,
Western,»Central,
andEasternEurope,Japan,OPEC,andtheNICs),andes-
pecially
in the40withthelowest
per-capita
incomes,
issubstantially
worseoff
in materialterms(although
perhaps
not culturally,psychologically,
or spiritu-
 THENORTH-SOUTH
DEBATE
ANDTHENIEO 465

ally)thanthepeople
wholivein the40wealthiest
countries.
Mostpeople
in
theNorthnd it hardto comprehend
thechasmbetween
thetwo standards
of
living. Saturatedwith imagesandinformationby the mediaandhumanitarian
organizations,the well-off becomeimmuneto the grim picturesand statistics
of poverty.
Not surprisingly,
theperspectives
of the globalproblemadoptedby the
North and South are poles apart. In 1976, Mahbub ul Haq, the Pakistani
Directorof PolicyPlanningandProgramReviewat the InternationalBankfor
Reconstruction
and Development
(the World Bank)in Washington,
D.C.,
summedup two points of view as follows:

Thepoor nationsarebeginningto questionthe basicpremisesof an international

order that leadsto everwideningdisparitiesbetweenthe rich andpoor countries
andto a persistent
denialof equalityof opportunityto manypoornations.They
are, in fact, arguingthat in the internationalorderjust as much as within na-
tionalorders-alldistributionof benets,credits,services,
anddecision-making
getswarpedin favor of a privilegedminority and that this situationcannot be
changedexcept through fundamental institutional reforms.
Whenthis is pointedout to therich nations,they dismissit casuallyasempty
rhetoricof the poor nations.Their standardansweris that the internationalmar-
ket mechanismworks, eventhoughnot too perfectly,and that the poor nations
arealwaysout to wring concessions from the rich nationsin the nameof pastex-
ploitation.Theybelievethat the poor nationsaredemandinga massiveredistribu-
tion of incomeandwealthwhich is simplynot in the cards.Their generalattitude
seemsto be that the poor nationsmust earntheir economicdevelopment, much
thesamewayastherichnationshadto coverthelasttwo centuries,
throughpa-
tient hard work and gradualcapitalformation,and that thereareno shortcutsto
this processand no rhetoricalsubstitutes.
The rich, however,are generous
enoughto offersomehelpto thepoornationsto acceleratetheireconomic
devel-
opmentif the poor areonly willing to behavethemselves.169

Chris Brown, in his normativeapproachto IR theory,askswhetherthe

glaringinequalitybetweenrich and poor nationsis a matterof strict intersoci
etaljustice,imposinga remedialobligationon FirstWorld states,or whetherit
is a matterof interpersonalbenevolence
andcharity.Are the rich guilty andre-
sponsiblefor the povertyof the Third World?He readilyconcedes that there
was grossexploitationin previouscenturies,but also insiststhat imperialism
had both good and bad effects.He notesthat neitherliberals,Marxists, nor
postcolonial
elitesdenythat the newsocieties
aresuperiorto the onesde-
stroyedby the imperialists.He rejectsthe reparations argumentfor that
reasonand also becauseits force dissipateswith the passageof time. Those
living today cannotbe held responsiblefor injusticescommittedlong ago.If,
however,thereis a continuingstructureof trade discriminationbetweencen-
tersandperipheries,this posesdifferentquestionsof moral obligation.He de-
niesthe gratuitousassertionof Marxists that in all economicexchangesbe-
tween rich and poor it is axiomatic that the rich are gougingthe poor.
Economicgrowth and developmentare taking place,within a frameworkof
dependence, it is true, but those processeshave never been independent.
466 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ShouldThird Worldcountriesbreakall tieswith the FirstWorldandtry to

solve
theirproblems
ontheirown?
Evenif manythingsbeing
done
todayby
somerichgovernments,
rms,andotherinstitutions
maybeworsening
the
condition
of some
poor,theguiltof therichcannotbemadethedetermining
factorin theexistence of radicalinternational
economic inequality.
Brownis
convinced that therich musttakepracticalstepsto alleviatetheplightof the
poor,butremains
uncertain
astowhatthemosteffective
remedies
are.In do-
mesticsocieties
whateverinequitiesexistmustbejustifiedby rationalargu-
ments;thatrequirements
of basicjusticeshouldnowbeapplied
to interna-
tionalsociety.
Thepowerless
cannotcompelthe powerfulto grantthem
justice;
theymustusepersuasion,
notbyseeking
to induce
guiltandself-
recrimination
but by appealing
to commonconcerns
andencouraging
cooper-
ationonthebasis
of reciprocal,
mutually
benecial
policies.17°
Thesituationfor the40 poorestcountriesis in somewaysworsetoday
thanit wasa quartercenturyago.Theiraverage percapitaincome is only
(about3 percent of thatof thewealthiest
countries.
Churches, philosophers,
theologians,socialtheorists,
andothersmayarguewith forcefuleloquence
thatthefortunately situated
peoples
of thisworldhavea highmoralobliga-
tionto helpthosemuchlessfortunate.
Theyareundoubtedly right.Evencer-
taincourageous
politiciansagree,despite
thefactthat sucha message
is never
popular
withtaxpayers
in democratic
parliamentary
countries
(andit was
neverheardpreachedin thesocialist
bloc,becauseMarxistsblamecapitalists
for thepovertyandrejectbenevolent
actionasa solution).
People
in afuent
Westernsocietiescan exhibit extremelygenerousimpulseswhen it comesto
helping
people
whomtheyknowin circumstances
of chronic
hardship
(at
home)or emergency
needs
(athomeandabroad).
It hasneverbeeneasyfor
anygovernment,
however,
to generate
muchenthusiasm
forsustained,
long-
range,
wellplanned,andmassiveprograms of internationaldevelopment
as-
sistance.
Regardlessof whatthemoralobligations of nations
maybe,there
exists
noeffective
worldpublicauthority
to enforcetheobligation
bytranslat-
ingit intopolicythrough
a taxation
system
thatwouldredistribute
someof
the Northswealthto the South.This would,in a sense,createa welfare
world whichneoMa.rxistswill probablycriticizeasa newform of depen-
dency enslavement designedto perpetuate
Northerndomination of theSouth.
Thesuccess of theoil-producing
countries
in usingtheoil weapon and
raisingthepriceof theirproductconvinced
manypoliticalleaders,
alongwith
theiradvisers,
thattheThirdWorldcouldemployvariousformsof commodity
powers
asleverage
against
whattheyregard
astheoppressive
global
liberalism
of the industrialized
West.Theybelieved
that theycouldex their muscles
through
theirvotingpowerintheUnited
Nations
General
Assembly,
UNCTAD,
andUNCLOSIII (theThird U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Seas),
and
throughtheirsuasive
rhetoricin theIMFandtheWorldBank.Theirobjectives
wereto speedupthepaceof theirowneconomic development
andto shiftthe
pattern
of incomedistributionless fortherichandmoreforthepoornations.
Bynomeans wereall ThirdWorldstates agreedonwhathadto bedone,be-
causeof thedivergences
of interestthathadbecome obviouswithintheirown
 THENORTH-SOUTH
DEBATE
ANDTHENIEO 467

ranksforexample,
between
oilexporters
andoilimporters,
betweencoasta
andlandlocked
states,
betweenagriculturalcommoditydependent
states
and
theNICs.Generally,
however,
therewaswidespread
agreement
in whatwas
termed
theNewInternational
Economic
Order(I£_O)thattheNorthmust
A. ensure
a quickened
rateof technology
transfer
(formostThirdWorld
countrieswereafraid that the technologygap would continueto
widenratherthan narrow);
B. improve
thetermsof tradefortheSouthandexpand
tradepreference
for its manufacturers;
C. multilateralize
foreigneconomic development assistance
to insulate
it
against
theattachment of politicalstrings
thatoftenaccompaniedbi-
lateraltransactions;
D. negotiate
withUNCTAD
andotherThirdWorldgroups
commodity
price-stabilization
agreementsto protect
primaryproducts
exported
to
theNorthagainstwidepriceuctuationsin theworldmarket;
E. imposemorestringent controlson FirstWorldcapitalinvestmen
abroadandontheoperations of MNCS;
F. grantdebtreliefby rescheduling
or canceling
Third Worldindebted-
nessto Northern banksand other North-dominatedinternational-
nancialinstitutions;
G. accept
priceindexation,
under
whichtheprices
of ThirdWorldpri-
mary productsexportedto the First World would be linked to the
pricesof manufactured
goodsimportedfromit; and
H. accepta newinternational
legalregimefor the highseasthat would
recognizethe mineralresourcesof the oceanbedas the commonher-
itageof humankindandrequire
thata portionof anyeconomicbene-
ts resulting
fromtheexploitation
of thoseresourcesbythetechno-
logicallyadvanced
FirstWorldgointo aninternational
fundfor Third
World development.171
ThedebateoverNIEOwasa rhetoricalexercise
in theUnitedNationsabout
multilateral
cooperation
thatproduced
norealchange
in the19703,
despite
warm endorsements
from PresidentJimmy Carter and West German
Chancellor
Willy Brandt.172
TheNorthwaswillingto heartheNIEOdis-
cussed
butrefused
to negotiate
it. Modest
progress
hasbeen
made,
however
towardthepartialfulllmentof certain
NIEOdemands, mainlyasa resultof
bilateral
investmentandaid.Technology hasmoved to theNICs,whichnow
producetextiles,
clothing,shoes,steelandsteelgoods,machinetools,autos,
radios
andotheraudio
equipment,
toys,chemicals,
medical
supplies,
andbasic
appliancesmanyitemsthattheNorth,withhigh-cost
labor,
cannolonger
turnoutasefcientlyor ascheaply.TheNorthhasapproved
a Generalized
Systemof Preferences
(GSP)for themanufactured
{butnotagricultural)
ex-
portsof andthe Europeanmenhasgranted, in the Lomé
Convention,trading arrangementsthat discriminatein favor of the Third
World.TheIMF,theWorldBank,andNorthern
privatebankshavebecome
moresensitiveto balance-of-payments
and debtproblemsof Third World
468 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
countries.
Someoilproducers,
able
toidentify
with
the
poor
states
and
unable
toabsorb
alltheir
petrodollar
wealth,
initiated
aidprograms.
The
subseque
experience
ofOPEC
from
the
late
1970s
amply
demonstrated
that
the
solidar
ityofthe
South
was
becoming
fragmented,
along
with
itscommodity
power.
r Johan
sis
oftwo
Galtung
has
basic
indirectly
criticized
approaches,
toward
one
the
NIEO
bypresenting
ofwhich
heseems
more
ananaly-
partial.
The
NIEO,hesays,
ing\aboutaims
at
imrovedreorderin
terms
oftrade mindustrialized
between bybring-
regions
andthe
LDCs;
anequalization
ofcontrol
between
thewealthier,
industrialize
core
and&#39;flT<?
poorer,
less
developed
periphery
over
the
system
anditscycles;
and
increased/improved
trade
among
periphery
countries
(which
arenow
exces-
\sj,vely
oriented
toward
the
core).
Achieving
the
rstgoal
alone,
Galtung
con-
tends,
willnot
besufcient
toalter
theexisting
unjust
internationa
socia
structure.
Hemakes hispoint
byarguing
thatimproved
terms
oftrade
foroil-
exporting
countries
inthe1970s
ledtoindustrial
growth,
the ostentati
purchase
ofluxury
goods,
sophisticated
weapons
technology
andmoder
equipment
with which
the
police
could
suppress
the
discontented.
Such
expen
ditures
failtomeet
thebasic
humanneeds
ofthemasses.
Galtung
does
notop-
pose
industrial
andeconomic
growthascapitalists
like
tomeasure
it.He
would,
however,
postpone
such
growthandgive
toppriority
tosupplying
the
basic
needs
ofthe
bulkofthe
population
inthe
LDCS:food,
clothing,
shelte
household
equipment,
furniture,
drinking
water,
sanitation,
public
transpor
health,
educational,
and cultural
facilities,
and
higher
spiritual
needs.Unde
existing
conditions,
anysurplus
generated
through
increased
trade
islikelyto
beused
toexpandindustries
thatbenefit
elites.
Galtung
warns
againsttaking
ashallow
interpretation
ofthetwoapproaches.
Heanalyzes
the
positiveand
negative
aspects
ofeach
andinsists
that
theycan
becompatible
onlyifNorth
andSouth
probe
therichness
ofthetwo
concepts
asthey
apply
tothemsel
now
both
tend
toignore
their
exploitation
oftheir
ownpoor.
Bothtend
toen-
gage
inself-righteous,
selfserving
debatesthe
South
todismantl
the
Norths
dominance
andthe
North
toperpetuate
itsprivileged
position.1
Stephen
D.Krasner
has
shown
that
LDCs
pursuesimultaneou
sever
different
objectives
intheinternational
system,
someofwhichmay strike
Western
observers
asinconsistent.
Hedivides
Third
World
political
behavi
into
twogeneral
categories.
Thersthecalls
relational
powerbehavio
which
accepts
existing
regimes
andworks
through
established
economic
insti
tutions
such
astheIMF andthe
WorldBanktoalleviate
foreign-exch dif-
culties
andcapitalshortages,
orthrough
bilateral
channels
toconcludetax
treaties
andorderlymarketing
agreements.
Such
anapproach
may involv
hard
bargaining
and reluctant
submission
tounpleasant
conditions
(e.g.,
debt
service
charges
and pledges
toreduceimports).
Thesecond
typeofpolitic
behavior,
says
Krasner,ismeta-power
behavior,
which
aims
atrestructur
international
regimesaltering
institutions,
rules,
principles,
values,
and
norms
infavor
ofthe
weaker,
poorer,
more
vulnerable
states.
The
LDCS,
lack
ing
material-power
capabilities
(although
these
are
growing
inmanyarea
have
relied
more
onpolitical
rhetoric
and
their
voting
power
asformally
equ
 MULTINATZONAL CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS 469

sovereigncommunitiesin internationalorganizationsto effect fundamental

changesin the way the internationaleconomyoperates.Up to now,aswe have
seen,the changeshave beenfar from fundamentalin the eyesof the Third
World,buttherehavebeensubstantial
changes,
andtheprocess
of change
will
undoubtedlycontinue,more through the exerciseby the Southof relational
powerratherthanmetapower.174

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND GOVERNMENTS
Multinational corporations(MNCs)" or transnationalcorporations(TNCs)
canbeidentiedsimplyasrms with headquarters in onecountryandsub-
sidiaryunitswhichtheyownandmanage in morethanoneandusuallyin sev-
eralforeigncountries.175
Earlyin thetwentiethcentury,corporationsinvested
abroadin theagricultureandextractive industriesof lessdeveloped
countries
in LatinAmerica,Africa,andAsia.175 Earlierin historycompaniessuchasthe
EastIndiaCompany madeoverseas investments andthemselves hadgreatpo-
liticalandeconomicpower.MNCs,however, didnot become majorplayersin
the internationaleconomyuntil well after World War II. They beganto
emergeon a large scalein the 1960s,when American manufacturersre-
spondedto the formationof the EuropeanEconomicCommunity(or
CommonMarket but not yet the EuropeanUnion),which wasreducingin-
ternal trade barrierswhile erectinga commonexternaltariff. The multina-
tionalwasa means
of jumpingoverEuropes
protectionist
wall.Oil compa-
niesin the Middle East,alongwith Europeanand to a lesserextentJapanese
corporationsand thoseof other nations,followed the Americanexampleof
investingin foreign operations.It was not long beforesomeNICs, suchas
Brazil,India,andSouthKorea,hadMNCsof theirown.177
Generally
speak-
ing, U.S. multinationalshaveremainedon the technologicaland organiza-
tional cutting edgewhile others,with somenotableexceptions,havebeenimi-
tators.MNCs beganexclusivelywith the productionof goods;only later did
they move into services. By 1980, there were some 16,000 MNCS in the
world, most of them relatively small, but the 350 largesthad more than
25,000 affiliates and accountedfor 28 percentof production in the non-
Communist world.173
RaymondVernonoffereda product-cycletheoryto explainthe growth
of multinationals.Firms with technologicaland cost advantagesintroduce
new products,satisfythe domesticmarket,and export the surplusto foreign
markets,wheretheygeneratelocalcompetition.Theymeetthis by investingin
new productivefacilitiesabroad.Whentheir goodsbecomestandardizedand
the marketdwindles,they againinnovatetechnologicallyand continueto ex-
pand.179
Theproduct-cycle
theorythrowslight on oligopolistic
competition,

We prefer the term MNCS, as do most writers on IPE.

470 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

the diffusionof industrialtechnology,

andthe selection
of afliatelocations,
butit doesnotexplain
everything.
It wassupplemented
bytheindustrial
orga-
nization
theory
of vertical
integration,
whichtransfers
themodern
theory
of
the rm to the internationaleconomyanapproachfirst developedby
Stephen
Hymer
andCharlesP.Kindleberger.
Thistakes
intoaccount
such
fac-
torsasmanagerial
skills,
economies
ofscale,
sources
andprices
ofrawmateri-
als,costsof labor,research
anddevelopment
(RSCD),
localinfrastructure,
im-
provements
in transportation
andcommunication,
tax benets,
tariff
schedules,
exchange
rates,
andcurrency
instabilities.18°
According
to RobertGilpin,the international
operation
of MNCsis
consistentwith liberalismbut contravenes
the doctrinesof economicna-
tionalismandsocialiststate-directed
economies.181
Nevertheless,mostgov-
ernments
apparently
believe
thatforeignexpansionof theirhomebased
corporations
serves
importantnational
interests.
Theyprovide access
to
sourcesof raw materialsand foreignmarkets,benefitthe homecountrys
balance-of-payments,
andserve
occasionally
asuseful
instruments
of diplo-
macy.
Ontheotherhand,MNCssometimes
pursue
policies
whicheither
arouseresentment againstor otherwisedispleasethe homegovernment.
Criticsin thehomecountryoftenchargethat theydisplacedomestic
invest-
ment,exportjobsto foreign
nationals,
andreduce
theexportof goods
and
services.182
Morecontentious,
especially
in theNorthSouth
debate,
hasbeenthe
question
whether
themultinationals
onbalance
have
beneted
orexploited
hostcountriesin the Third World.It shouldrst be notedthat morethan
twothirdsof theforeignafliatesof MNCsheadquartered in theindustrially
advancedworldhappen to belocated withinthatworld,not in theThird
World,andthatthreequarters of all FirstWorldforeigninvestmentsarein
FirstWorldcountries.183Morethanhalf of all U.S.directforeigninvestment
is locatedin ve industrializedcountries(Britain, Canada,Germany,
Switzerland,andtheNetherlands).184
It hasbeensaidthat theannualvolumeof salesof thetenlargestMNCs
wasgreater
thanthegross
domestic
product
(GDP)
ofmore
than130develop
ingmembers
oftheUnited
Nations.185
It hasusually
beeninferred
fromthis
thatMNCscanreadilyinterfere,
directlyor indirectly,
in theeconomic
and
political
lifeof hostcountries,
andevenexercise
a dominating
inuence
in
poorer ThirdWorldcountries.
Corporations
can,asmentioned
above,
serve
theforeignpolicy
interests of theirhostgovernments, justastheycancontra-
venethoseinterests.
Theycanengage in intelligence-gathering
activities;
they
canintervenelegallyor illegallyin thedomestic politicalaffairsof thehost
(forexample,
bytryingto inuence
theoutcome
of elections,
or persuadin
thehostgovernment
to altercertain
policies);
andtheycanpressure
theparent
state
government
to pursue
legislatively
enacted
andforeign
diplomatic
poli-
ciesthatwill promote
theinterests
of MNCs,regardless
of theconsequenc
for hostcountries.Thenumberof documentablecases,
however,
is not large
enoughto justifytheelaboration
of a general
theory.
 MULTINATIONALCORPORATIONS
AND GOVERNMENTS 471

It is possible
to present
a balanced
assessment
of thepositiveandnegative
aspectsof the MNCstheir economicbenets and coststo the host coun-
tries.136
Advocates
argue
thatMNCshave
served
asaprincipal
means
ofsat-
isfyingthe overwhelmingdesireof most countriesin the world to attract for-
eign investmentcapital and technologicalknowhow. The initial ow of
capitalimprovesthe balanceofpaymentspicture;bringsin advancedtechnol-
ogynot available
domestically;
creates
jobslocally;effectssavings
onresearch
and development; enhancesthe technical,productive,and organizational-
managerial
skillsof indigenous
personnel;
andexertsa continuing positiveef-
fectonthebalance
of payments,
bothbyelevating
thehostcountrys
export
capacityand by manufacturing for domesticconsumption, therebysaving
whatwouldbespenton comparable imports.MNCsalsointroduce, through
their ownpersonnel
policies,higherstandards of wages,housing,andsocial
welfare,whicheventually
affectothersegments of society.
Theyalsoaugment
tax revenues.
CriticscontendthatMNCsarenothingbutinstruments of neocolonialist,
protseekingcapitalism,
whichabsorbmorelocalcapitalthantheybringin
from abroad;transferandovercharge
for older,obsolescing
technologythat
has becomelessefficientunder the higher-costlabor conditionsof the First
Worldandthatoftenhaslittle relevance to therealneeds of poorercountries;
takeadvantage of localcheaplaborwhileexcludinghost-country nationals
from higher-paying technicalskill and management positions;reaphigher
prots thantheycouldin theirparentcountries,by locatingwherenational
taxesarelow; importfromparentcountry afliatesinsteadof purchasing
lo-
cally,therebyburdening thehostsbalanceof-payments; andmanipulate interna
nationaldifferencesin prices,licensing,interestrates,and othereconomicfac-
tors for their own advantage,and with minimal considerationfor the
economicand environmentinterestsof the host country.
JoanEdelmanSpero(fromwhomthe foregoingbalancesheetwaspar-
tially drawn)hastrenchantly
described
howThirdWorldgovernments mani-
festeda learningcurvein theirresponse
to MNCS,aslocalelitesdeveloped
technical,legal,managerial,and financialexpertise.They alsobecameaware
thatonceMNCShadbecome established,
thehostcountrys
bargainingpower
becamestrongerthanit hadbeenwhenthecountrywasseekingto attractfor-
eigninvestment.The hostcountrycouldgraduallyadoptlawsandadministra-
tiveregulations
to bringthecorporations
undergreatercontrol.Originalin-
vestmentagreementsbecomesubject to later revision on more favorable terms
for thehostcountry,especially
asthenumberof foreigninvestors
competing
for entryinto the Southincreases.137
In reallytoughbargainingconfronta-
tions,the threatof expropriationmay becomemorecrediblethan thethreatof
disinvestment. At any rate,manygovernments within the Southernperiphery
have becomeconfident that they can hold their own in dealingwith the
MNCs; that local control or ownershippatternsareimprovingovertime; and
that most MNCS,even-thffughthey may take more than they giveon current
account,are becominguseful instrumentsof developmentand channelsof
472 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ingress-egress
intotheglobaleconomic
system.
Thedebate
abouttheeffects
of
MNCson hostgovernments, business,
labor,andgeneraleconomic growth
will undoubtedly
continue,but probablyin a lesspolemical
tonethantwo or
threedecades
ago.138
Oneof thepersistent
conundrums in IPEduringthelastquarterof the
twentieth
century
waswhether nation-states
hadlosttheirprimacy of placein
an increasingly
pluralisticinternational
system.Liberalslike to thinkthat
MNCshavesuperseded statesasdominantactors.RaymondVernonargued
that MNCshold sovereigntyat bay.189
CharlesKindleberger
insistedthat
directforeigninvestment
hasrendered the nation-state
obsoleteas an eco-
nomicunit.19°RobertKeohane andJosephNye,leadingtheoristsof interde-
pendence
(whichisdiscussed
in Chapter
3),havesought
to combine
realistin-
ternationaltheoryand liberalIPEwith their view that MNCs, insteadof
replacing
politics,haveushered
in a newandmorecomplex
typeof poli-
tics.191
Forthem,thepowerstruggle
shiftsfromthemilitarydimension
to the
globaleconomy
in a questnotfor territorybutfor a largershareof themar-
ket.Susan Strange,a leadingBritishstudentof internationalpoliticalandeco-
nomicrelations,criticizesfellowsocialscientistsfor failingto recognizethe
decliningauthorityof statesin viewof growingpopulardisillusionwith gov-
ernmentofficials at all levels.Her thesisis that the impersonalforcesof
worldmarkets,integrated
overthepostwarperiodmoreby privateenterprise
thanby cooperative
decisions
of governments,
arenowmorepowerful
than
the statesto whomauthorityallegedly belongs.192 Intervention
by govern-
mentbureaucracies in thedailylivesof citizens,sheadmits,maybegrowing,
buttheproliferationof thetrivial functionsof governmentcannotmaskthe
factthat mostgovernments havelostcontrolof technology andnancein a
world now described in suchvague,undenedandwoolytermsas global-
ized,interdependent,
andtransnational.193
In contrast,HendrikSpruytaftermucheruditehistoricalstudyconcluded
thatwhilethesovereignstatehasbeenseriously
challenged by its competitors,
the contemporary statesystemis becomingmorermly entrenched rather
thandeclining,
save
perhaps
in thecase
oftheEC.194
Hecitesseveral
reasons:
politicaleliteshaveno incentiveto alterthe statusquo;changeinvolvesre-
learningandothercosts;it is extremelydifcult to altertherules,norms,and
assumptions on whichtheexistinginternational system is based;
andeventhe
growingimportance of international
organizations andnancialinstitutions
strengthens
morethanxitweakens
thenation-state.195
LouisW. Paulyand
SimonReich,afterexaminingthe internalgovernance,
nancingstructures,ap-
proachesto RSCD, andinvestment andintrarm tradingstrategiesof leading
MNCsin Japan,Germany, andtheUnitedStates,foundfewsignsthatpower-
ful marketforcesareeithermovingtowardconvergence or replacingpolitical
leadership.
Durablenationalinstitutions
anddistinctive
ideological
traditions
stillseem
to shape
andchannel
crucialcorporate
decisions.1%
PeterEvans,who haddefended the importance of the statein the mid-
1980sagainstclassical
liberalscelebrating
its demise
asananachronism, more
recentlyhascastdoubtonthethesisof Susan Strange
that,asa resultof freely
 MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
AND
GOVERNMENT
473
owing
market
transactions
across
state
borders
and
over
theheads
ofgov
ernments,
stateauthority
hasleaked
away,
upwards,
sidewards,
anddown
wards andinsomematters
justevaporated.197
Evans realizes
thattrad
owsincreasingly
inglobal
and
notmerely
national
networks.
Yetodd
enough,heobserves,
when
states
become
more
reliant
onforeign
trade,
thei
roleineconomic
transactions
isnotdiminished
butincreased.
The countr
mostactive
inglobal
tradehave
thelargest
governments,
indicating
thatsuc
cess
inforeign
markets
mayrequire
morethanless
involvement.
If theroleof
thegovernment
should
bereduced
toomuch,thebusiness
environment
coul
become
intolerably
unpredictable,
ifnotchaotic.
Neoclassical
liberals
mayse
thestates
passing
intoeclipsepossible
butunlikely
inEvans
eyesbu
MNCs,while
anxious
tominimize
allgovernmental
restrictions,
willneve
theless
continue
todepend
heavily
uponstates
toprotect
theirinvestme
abroadand their returns.198
Linda
Weiss
waspuzzled
astowhy,
more
thanadecade
after
Evans
move
ment
which
shecalls
BSBI(after
his1985
work,Bringing
theState
Back In),so
many
social
scientists-excluding
mostpolitical
scientistswere
stillregard
thestate
amoribund
institution.199
Weiss
isimpressed
with
Evans
concep
of
embecifed
autonomy,
anattribute
ofstate
capacity
internal
tostate
structu
founded
uponasetofinstitutions
which
simultaneously
insulate
theeconom
bureaucracy
from
specialinterests
andestablish
cooperative
links
between
bu-
reaucrats
andorganized
business.2°°
TheJapanese
Ministry
of Trade
and
Industry
(MITI)
iscited
asaprime
example
ofcoordination
between
govern
elites
andindustrial
organization,
and
even
though
therole
ofMITI
may
hav
become
less
central
thanitonce
was,
Weiss
contends
that
embe omy
canbeapplied
insome
degree
toallormost
modern
industrial
states.2°1
She
perceives
asimilar
pattern
ofrobust
linkages
between
government
andindus
tryinKorea,
TaiwanandGermany,
andpredicts
thatatleast
thestrong
nation-statesfor
there
isahierarchywill
notonly
retain
their
importan
buteven
increase
their
ability
toadapt
inthetwenty-rst
century
toglobaliz
tion(which
shecallsabigidearesting
onslimfoundations).2°2
RobertGilpin,
aprofessed
liberal
whousuallydichotomizes
stateand
market,ratherthanstateandMNC, regrets
thedecline
oftheUnitedStates
anditshegemonic
roleintheBretton
Woods system,
andviewsthefuturewith
apprehension.
Writing
atatime
when
Japan
appeared
tobedisplacing
the
United
States
asthedominant
nancial
power
andtheEuropeans
were
mov-
ingtoward
a single
closed
system,
Gilpindiscerned
anintensication
ofna-
tionalist
mercantilist
competition,
astruggle
forexport
markets,
andareturn
to protectionism
onbotha national
andregional~
basis
(North
America
Japan-Pacic
Basin,
andEurope).
Inshort,
theliberal
international
economi
order
wasrapidly
eroding;
themultilateral
principles
,ofBretton
Woods
were
giving
way tobilateralism
anddiscrimination,
andstates
were
playing
anin-
creasing
roleininternational
economic
relations
asgovernments
sought
to
manipulate
economicpolicies
topromote
their
own interests
while
minimizin
thecosts
ofglobalinterdependence.2°3
Perhaps
Gilpin,
likeWallerstein,
was
premature
inwriting
offthehegemonic
position
oftheUnited
States,
despite
474 INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY

theemergence
ofchallengers
in Europe
andAsia.In anyevent,
Gilpin,a lib-
eralbypreference,
exhibited
littlefearthatMNCs
areabout
to supersed
nationstates
asprimaryinternational
actors.

International Trade Negotiations

Thesubject
of tradewassupposed to bepartof theBretton
Woods system
Parallel
negotiations
were conducted
inHavanaforanewinternational
institu-
tionto supervise
tradeliberalization,
buttheproposedInternational
Trade
Organization
(ITO)never came
intobeing.TheHavana Charter
of 1947en-
counteredstiffopposition
in theUnitedStates;
criticsfaultedit for restricting
U.S.tradetoomuch,whilecreating toomanyexceptions thatwouldbenet
othernations.President
Truman, therefore,
didnotsubmit theITOCharter to
Congress.
Provisional
arrangements
weremade
for a General
Agreement
on
TariffsandTrade(GATT),
whichcorroborated
anoldFrench
adage
(Onlythe
provisional
becomes
permanent)
byenduring
forhalfacentury.
Eventual
theGATThadto beinstitutionalized
witha secretariat
anda director-gener
to provide
continuity,
monitor
compliance
withagreedupon
rules,
andplan
follow-onnegotiations.2°4
TheGATTwasbased
uponfourprinciples
or norms:
(1)Members
agreed
to grantmostfavorednation
(MFN)status
to oneanother,
meaning that
tradepreferences
granted
toanyonemember
would beextended
toall.(2)If
anycountryshould
benetfromanotherstariffreduction,
it should
recipro-
cate.(3)Temporary,
short-term
reductions
wereto beallowed forbalance-o
payments
reasons
ortostabilize
domestic
marketsdisturbed
byincreased
im-
ports.
(4)Special
exceptions
werepermitted
to grant
unreciprocated
prefer
ences
for lessdeveloped
countries
(LDCs).2°5
Since1947,priorto theestab-
lishmentof theWorldTradeOrganization (WTO)in 1994-1995,the GATT
heldve roundsof talksin or nearGeneva
upto 1962,whichsubstantially
re-
ducedtariff barriersonmanufactured
goodsin accordance
with GATTnorms.
Later rounds are discussedlater in this chapter.
Several
IPE analysts,
includingCharlesKindleberger,
RobertGilpin,
Stephen
Krasner,
andBeth
V.andRobert
M.Yarbrough,
haveinterpreted
the
GATT(andthewhole Bretton
Woods system)aspartofaliberal
global
order
thatrequires
a hegemonic
powerto supervise
itsproperfunctioning
anden-
surestability
through
aproper
usage of carrots
andsticks.Others,
includ-
ing RobertO. Keohane,Duncan Snidal,DavidLake,andJohnA. C.
Conybeare,
have
either
questioned
ordenied
theneed
forahegemonic
stabi
lizer.2°6
Prescinding
fromthatyetto-be-settled
theoretical
dispute,
perhap
theprudent conclusion
isthattheGATT representedaliberal
multilateral
ap-
proach tomaking international
trademorefreethanit hadbeen,butnotper-
fectlyfree,because
therewouldalwaysbea need to permitsome exceptio
andprotect certain
interests.
TheGATTitselfwasdesigned to advance
U.S.
interests;
it wasnegotiated
largely
withstatesthatrecognizedtherealityof
theireconomic andsecurity
dependence
uponthehegemonic power.2°7
 MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
ANDGOVERNMENTS475

TheGATT became,
in theoretical
parlance,
a regime-thatis,a setof
mutualexpectations,
principles,
norms,rules,anddecision-making
proce-
dures
accepted
bya groupofstates.(See
Chapter10.)Evenin anessentiall
anarchic
system,
nation-states
seekto moderateconictandfostercoopera-
tion.2°8
When
situations
change,
andthenumber
and/or
complexity
ofissues
anomalies,
andviolationsof expected
behaviors
increase,
regimes haveto be
renegotiated
andupdated.Afterthefirst ve GenevaRoundsof tariff reduc-
tionshadbeennegotiated
on an item-by-item
basis,the Kennedy
Round
(1963-1967)shiftedto lineartariff cutsby speciedpercentages.
As noted
earlier,the UnitedStatesmadeunilateralconcessions
to the EC because
the
promotion
of European
integration
wasdeemed
to bein itsbroader
strategic
interests.2°9
Prior to the Tokyo Round(1973-1979),PresidentNixon adopteda
tougherstancetowardtheECoverits Common
AgriculturalPolicy(CAP)and
toward Japansclosed economy.The Trade Act of 1974 establishedthe
Presidents
authority
to negotiate
andto retaliate
against
unfairtradepractices
(suchasdumping,or sellingbelowcostin foreignmarkets).
Although the
TokyoRounddevoted
muchtimeto nontariffbarriers,effortstowardfurther
liberalization
metwithonlylimitedsuccess
against
a risingtideof newpro-
tectionism.After the oil price shock,retrenchmentbecamethe order of the
daythroughout
theeconomies
of theUnitedStates,
Western
Europe,
and
Japan,butsomedealsweremadeto establish voluntaryexportrestraintson
Japanese steel,textiles,andothercommoditiesto preventfurtherdeteriora-
tion in the U.S.Japanese relationship?The UnitedStateshad, after all,
granted
Japan
privileged
access
to itsdomestic
marketaspartof thepostwar
peacetreaty,helpedto integrate
Japaninto theworld economy, andstriven
overseveral
yearsto sponsor Japanese
membership in suchinstitutionsasthe
GATTandIMF,overthestrongoppositionof theEuropean allies.
Questionsof trade in agriculturalcommoditieswerenot dealt with seri-
ouslyin the GATTuntil theUruguayRound(1986-1992).
Thatroundwit-
nessed
some
heated
controversies
overtheEuropean
Communitys
pricesup-
ports and export subsidiesfor farm products,with the United States,
supportedby the 13member Cairnsgroupof nonEuropean producers(in-
cludingLDCs)demanding basicreforms in Europes
Common Agricultural
Policy.Agricultural
traderemains an intractable
issuebecause
it is closely
boundup with domestic politics,evenmoresoin EuropeandJapanthanin
the UnitedStates.TheUruguayRoundleft mostof the basicproblemsun-
solved.It did examinefor thefirsttimethepossibilityof extending
theGATT
to suchareasasservices (banking,insurance,legalandaccounting, construc-
tion, etc.)andintellectualproperty(patents,
copyrights, computersoftware,
andotherobjectsof piracy),butprogress onthesenovelandcomplexissues
wasminimal?Oneof themoreinteresting
disputes
arose
whenFrance,
as
the selfprofessed
protectorof Europes
culturalintegrityagainsttheinroads
of Hollywood,insistedon maintaining
minimumlocalcontentrequirements
in TV broadcasting.
476 INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Liberal
defenders
oftheGATT
regime
assign
toit amajor
share
ofthe
credit
forthepostwarrecovery
ofthedefeated
Axis
powersandthegrowth
and
prosperityofthe
international
system
prior
tothe
oilprices
shockofthe
1970s.
Susan Strange
concedes
thatthere
was
acorrelation
between
multilat-
eral
tariffreductions
conducted
undertheaegis
ofGATTandtheeconomic
expansionoftheindustrialized
countries,
butshedenies
that
thiswasneces-
sarily
acausal
relationship.
Inher
view,
itwas
more
probable
that
prosperi
permitted
liberalization
oftrade.
Trade
revived
after
the
war,
andcontinue
togrow,
because
theUnited
States
injected
large
doses
ofpurchasing
power
into
thesystem.212
Going further,
Strangeattacks
asamyththeliberal
as-
sumption
that
theless
governmentsintervene
toobstruct
free
tradewith
pro-
tectionist
measures
thebetteroffallwillbe.The
favorite
goal
ofliberals~
maximizing
efciency
iiitheproduction
ofgoodsandservicescannot
bethe
sole
criterion
forstate
policy.
Itmay
sound
logical
intheory,
but,Strange
con-
tends,
inthereal
world
external
security
against
aggression
andinternal
secu-
rityagainst
social
discontent
leading
torevolution
are
always
high
priorities
Moreover,
people
throughout
history
have
often
chosen
other
values,
includ-
ing
nationalism
and
tariff
protection
ofitsdomestic
industry,
over
laissez-f
policies
asthemost
efficient
guarantor
ofprosperity.
Participatory
democr
cies
bytheir
very
nature
generate
policies
designed
toprotect
the
special
inter-
ests
ofsubnational
groups.
Politicians
whoselivelihood
depends
uponthefa-
vorofvoters
areforced
tomakepolitical
choices
which
liberal
free
trade
economists
oftenconsider
irrational.213
Bytheearly
1990s,
it was
becoming
clear
thattheGATT
regime
was
no
longer
functioning
tolerably
well.
InApril
1994,
125
nations
atMarrake
Morocco,
signed
theFinal
ActoftheUruguay
Roundcreating
theWorld
Trade
Organization
(WTO),
apermanent
institution
legally
equivalent
tothe
IMFand
the
World
Bank.This
converted
GATTfromasystem
ofpurely
vol-
untary
compliance
with
trade
rules,
plus
retaliatory
measures
bystates
acting
ontheir
own against
offenders,
intoamoreformal,
legally
binding
arrange
ment.
Thevarious
agreements
negotiated
inrecent
GATT rounds
were
incor-
porated
into
asingle
document
requiring
ahigher
level
ofcommitme
by
memberstoobserve
substantive
and
procedural
regulations.
TheWTO estab
lishes
amore impartial
instrument
forresolving
denitional
differences
and
aimsatreducing
conict
bymaking
available
astronger
mechanism
forset-
tling
disputes
somewhat
moreauthoritatively?
Thenew
organization
stilldoes
notpreclude
states
frominterpreti
principles
differently
orfrom
violating
therules
anditspower
toenforce
therules
issomewhat
peculiar.
In July1999,
it punished
theEuropea
Unions
banonU.S.
hormone-treated
beef
byauthorizing
theUnited
State
toimpose
retaliatory
tariffs
onEUexports.
Inthat
instance,
it upheld
the
right
ofeach
party
topursue
protectionist
policies
that
contradict
the
libera
commitment
tofree
trade.215
AstheSeattle
Round
ofWTO
negotiations
got
under
waywith135-member
delegations
inNovember
1999,
theissues
of
EUexport
subsidies
and
other
supports
forfarm
productions
andtherigh
ofnations
toimpose
restrictions
ontheimport
ofgenetically
modied(GM)
 POST-MARXIST CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL THEORY 477

foodstuffs from the United Statesloomed large as likely to generateran-

corousdebatefor years.Other thorny issuesincludedthe secretivebureau-
cracy of the WTO, LDC discontentwith its liberal policies of promoting
globalization that benefitedthe First World, unions demandsfor higher
labor standardsin the Third World, and chargesthat the WTO put capitalist
prots aboveenvironmental concerns? All of thesecontributedto the
protests(violentand nonviolent)at the abortedopeningof WTO trade
round talks in Seattle in late 1999.217

POST-MARXIST CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL THEORY

AlthoughMarxisttheoryassuchhasbeenwidelyrejected, wehavewitnessed
theemergence of a formof post-Marxistcriticaltheory.Asdescribed
andelab-
oratedby AndrewLinklater,realism,rationalism, andrevolutionism
represent
the threeprincipaltraditionsof international-relations
theory.As we have
notedelsewhere,realismemphasizes a strugglefor powerand security;ratio-
nalismstresses
the levelof orderachievableby statesunderconditionsof anar-
chy;andrevolutionism attachesprimacyto thepromotionof humanemanci-
pationwithina contextof realizing
thefullesthumanpotential.
Takentogether,
thesetraditions,rst described
by MartinWight,asLinklateracknowledges,
coexistand contendwith eachother,althoughthe revolutionistor emancipa-
tory is superiorandconstitutes
whatLinklatertermscriticalinternational
the-
ory.Radicallydifferingfromeachother,thesedominantperspectivesprovidea
sequence of successivelymoreadequate approaches
to theoreticaldevelop-
ment,of whichcriticalinternational
theory,basedon revolutionism, consti-
tutesthe highestof the threetraditions.
AlthoughMarxismpurportedto bea theoryof emancipation,
Linklater
pointsout,Marxandmanyof hisfollowers
failedto understand
thepotential
for totalitarianoppression
anddominationwithin Marxismitself.Linklater
refersextensivelyto theFrankfurtSchool,andin particularto thewritingsof
Jurgen
Habermas,
whose
workhasbeenof centralimportance
to criticalthe-
ory assuchand,therefore,
to criticalinternational
theory.Underthetutelage
of Habermas,the essentialtenetof the Frankfurt Schoolis that humanreason
providesthe basisfor emancipation.
In this regard,so the argumentgoes,
Marx contendedthat the circumstancesunderwhich historyis normallymade
are inherited and transmittedfrom one generationto another.The circum-
stancesto whichMarx referred,of course,wereinextricablyboundup with
the classstruggle,from whichinstitutionspromotingthesubjugation
of one
classto anotherarose.The issue,for Marx and for critical theory,is how to
free,or emancipate,
human
beings
fromthedeadweightof thepast,includ-
ing political,social,and economicinstitutionswithin whichthey are op-
pressed.FortheFrankfurtSchool,
humanshavewithinthemselves
theca-
pacity,throughreason,
to produce
fundamental
or revolutionary
change
Nevertheless,
Marxsoptimismaboutthe inevitableoutcomeof the class
struggle,
based
ontheunfolding
dialectical
process,
allegedly
blindedhimto
478 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

thecapacityof thestate,asin thecaseof theThirdReichor theSovietUnion,

under fascismor communism, to dominate whole societies.
AcceptingMarxsessential
premisethat humanscanbe liberatedfrom
historicalcircumstances,
the Frankfurt Schoolassertsthat oppressionis not
reducible
simplyto classdomination
basedoncontrolof themeans
of produc-
tion. Other forms of domination exist, such as those basedon gender,race, re-
ligion,ethnicity,or nationalism.Thusthereis an importantlinkagebetween
criticalinternationaltheoryandconstructivist andfeministtheoriesdiscussed
in Chapter4. Therefore, emancipation encompasses theanalysisof otherphe-
nomenaextending beyondwhatMarx sawastheproletariats questfor con-
trol of the meansof productionwithin Marxian dialecticalmaterialism.
Accordingto Linklater,the strugglefor emancipation, whichis thefocusof
criticalinternationaltheory,makesnecessary a rejectionof theideathatclass
conict hasbeenresponsible, in dialecticalfashion,for advances in political
andsocialdevelopment. Thestruggle for emancipation hasbeenconducted, as
Habermas alsosuggested, in arenasandspheres otherthanthat of controlof
themeans of production.Thus,thedeterminants of historycannotbereduced
to economics or technology,howeverimportantsuchfactorsmaybein shap-
ing the state,the natureof warfare,and culture.
Thestrugglefor militarypower,or for economic
hegemony,
asthe basis
for the extensionof political control overspace,a centralrealisttenet,appears
to beat leastasimportantasMarxsemphasis onthemeansof productionin
shapinginternationalbehavior.Therefore,
accordingto Linklater,bothreal-
ismandMarxismhavea placein constitutinga criticalinternational theory
which,in addition,mustaddress andanswerquestions relatedto howto es-
tablishemancipatorypoliticalcommunitiesasthe essential
basisfor human
change, progress,
andrevolutionism.218

THE THREE MODELS REVISITED

In recentdecades,
aswehaveseen,international
politicaleconomists
havedi-
videdtheir field into threebroadschoolsof thoughtliberal, Marxist, andre-
alist.Theseschoolsof thoughthavealsosometimes beentermedthe liberal
approach, the dependency approach,
andthe nationalistapproach. Liberals
look on politicsandeconomics astwo separate
dimensions.Politicsis a pub-
lic affair;economicactivityproceeds
according
to naturallawsthat aredeter-
minedbythesumtotalof myriadprivatechoices of productionandconsump-
tion, savingand investment.Thus classicalliberalismdrew a clear-cut
distinctionbetweenthe public political, governmentalsector,and privateeco-
nomic sector.
Whereas orthodox liberals contend that neither politics nor economics
shouldor doesdominatethe other,Marxists,neoMarxists,and realistsagree
that the two ordersarecloselyrelatedand interpenetrateeachother.Marxists
and realistspart company,
however,in assigning
dominance
to oneor the
other. Realists,as we have seen,seenation-statesas the primary actors,
 THE THREE MODELS REVISITED 479

whichsubordinate
economics to theirquestfor power.219
JoanEdelman
Spero
argued
thatthepoliticalsystemshapestheeconomic
system,
thatpolit-
ical concerns
oftenshapeeconomic
policy,andthat international
economic
relations
arereallypoliticalrelations.22°
Asmentioned
previously,
thecom-
munistpartyof the SovietUnionpreached
an ideologyof economic
domi-
nance,butin practice invariably
gavepriorityto thepolitical-military
goals
for whichcentraleconomic planningwasthemeans. Perhapswe cansee
Sperospointasequally applicable
to nonsocialist
countries
bycontemplating
theinterplayof politicalandeconomic factorsin thedomesticandforeign
policies
of thosecountries.Forexample, duringtheColdWar,for security
andpoliticalreasons,
Westerngovernments
imposedpenaltieson their do-
mestic
industries
byprohibiting
theexportof a broadrangeof technologica
productsto communist
countries.
An evenclearerexample
is to befoundin
the trade wars of the 1990s betweenthe forces of the free international
marketandthoseof protectionism
amongtheEuropean
Union,Japan,the
North AmericanFreeTradeArea (NAFTA), and the Asia PacificEconomic
Cooperation (APEC) countries.
Protectionismhas a long history, much longer than that of free trade.
Plato,Aristotle,andmanyduringthe medievalperiodadvocated
economic
self-sufciency
asanidealfor thepoliticalcommunity.-1
In theearlydaysof
nationstates
andcapitalism,thepreferencewasfor a policyof state-directed
trade,knownasmercantilism, aimedat theenhancement of statepowerand
wealth.Theclassical
liberaleconomistslatercarriedthedaywiththeirargu-
mentthat themostefcientlocationof manufacturing productionis ensured
by the law of comparative
advantage basedon economic specializationde-
rived from what eacheconomycould do bestin a climateof free trade.The
old Viewof comparative
specialization,
however,
cannotexplainthefactthat
tradingpartnersoftenexportandimport the sameproducts.Governments
frequently
manipulate
freemarket
forces
in response
to pressure
fromspecial
interestgroupswith sufcientdomestic politicalclout.Manyof thesegroups
areundoubtedly actingout of theirowneconomic andpoliticalmotivations,
but thereis sucha diversityof pressuresin moderndemocratic states(politi-
cal,economic, moral,etc.)that it requiresa sophisticated
politicalprocess to
determine theirpriority.Governments applystrategictrade-policyinstruments
to promotethenationalinterest(e.g.,bymaintaining theviabilityof anindus-
try vital to defenseor promotingtechnologicalinnovation),to stabilizeor en-
hancethenationaleconomy (e.g.,by forestalling
thelossof industry,a risein
theunemployment rate,a widertradegap,or a currencydevaluation), or to
protecta specicdomestic group(e.g.,by providingsubsidies to farmers,ne-
gotiatingexportrestraints
or importquotas,or takingunilateralactionto pe-
nalizedumping).EversinceWorld War II, the UnitedStateshasbeenthe chief
proponentof theglobalfreetrade ideology,
yetfor politicalreasons
(foreign
and domestic), it hasat timespursuedmanaged-trade policies.222
In other
words,politicalandeconomic factorsshapethe choicesandbehavioral pat-
ternsof individuals,
groups;andlargersocieties
withinandbeyondthenation
state.Togetherthey shapethe IPEagenda.
480 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

EthanB. Kapsteinsuggests
that the combination
of political,economic,
corporateorganizationaland technologicalfactors that have producedthe
phenomenon knownasglobalizationhavecreateda world not of laissez-
fairecapitalismbut of managedliberalism.223
Susan Strange,
earliercitedas
urgingliberalsto acknowledgethat theforcesworkingfor nationalinterests
andprotectionof subnationalinterestscannotbeconjuredaway,hasalsore-
mindedus that the individualpursuit of privategain is not necessarily
consis-
tentwith thegeneral
welfare,andthatthelawof comparative
advantage
byit-
self fails to do the work of justicewithin either domesticor international
society.
Why?Because in bothdimensionswhatis advantageous for someis
oftendisadvantageous
for others.-4
Whereasliberalsboastof wealthcreation
in theaggregate
andMarxistsdemandequitable distributionof socialwealth
amongall classes(butespecially
for workersin a classless
society),
it is the
task of the realistpolitical leadersto judgewhat is the mostpracticalbalance
betweentheseconicting demandsat any giventime. This balancemust en-
ablea nationalsocietyand internationalsocietyto remainfairly stableand to
survivethosetensionsand revolutionaryexplosionsthat destroymuchmore
thantheygain.International
liberalism,
writesCharles
R. Beitz,in orderto be
defensible,mustbe baseduponmoral principles,takeinto accountboth inter-
nationalpoliticaland distributivejustice,and upholda doctrineof human
rights.Thisseems to meanthat liberalsmustgravitatetowarda morerealist,
centristview that recognizes
both the properprerogativesand responsibilities
of states,
theprivatesector,
andinternational
institutions.225
A realistbalance
betweenan extremethesisand an uncompromisingantithesiswill probably
neversatisfyeitherpureLiberalsor pureMarxists.
Lastbut not least,asMichaelNicholsonhassuggested,226thethreebasic
approaches
to IPEsetforth in thischaptercontaindescriptive
andnormative
elements.Eachpurportsboth to describea particulartype of internationalpo-
litical economyand at the sametime to setforth a conceptionof what, accord-
ingto therespective
proponents,
oughtto betheinternational
politicalecon-
omy. It is obviousthat none of the three approacheshas existedin its pure
form. Statesthat enactlawsprovidingfor free,or freer,trademay alsoretain
protective
tariff barriersandprovidesubsidies
designedto favoroneindustry
or corporation.Asin thecaseof theories
surveyed
in otherchapters,
eachrep-
resentsan imageof the world and providesa frameworkfor analyzingand
evaluatingglobalandinternationalpolitical andeconomicrelationships.

lg[TI-IEv
GLOBAL
FINANCIAL
CRISIS
The crisis beganin Thailand in the summerof 1997. It quickly spreadto
neighboringstateswith wobbly economiesIndonesia,Malaysia, and the
Philippines.Such once-vauntedtigers as South Korea, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan felt the impact. In the early stages,there was an expectationthat
Japanwould serveas a locomotiveto pull the region back to recovery,but
Japanwastrying to copewith its own indigenousproblems.The Asian u
 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 481

andtheJapanese virusbecame mutuallyreinforcing.

Thenextserious
shocks
werefeltin Russia wherethetransition
froma planned
to a market
economyhadalready been
boggingdown.Thecrisisgenerated
similar
symp-
tomswherever it hit-widespread
bankfailuresandcompanybankruptcie
sharp
fallsinstock markets
andthevalueofnational
currencies,
andincrease
in unemployment
andcrimein countries
thatprovidednoadequatesocialnets
for workers.
Thecrisisspawned
ethnictensionsin states
thathadachieveda
remarkable
degree
ofracial
harmony
intheprevious
quarter
ofacentury.
The
mostunpredictable anduncontrollable
effectwaspsychologicalthe lossof
investor
condence leadingto outwardcapitalight fromshakyeconomies to
saferhavens,
suchasU.5.Treasury bonds. Thisleftonecountryafteranother
unableto meetits foreigndebtobligations
on schedule.LargeIMF bailout
loansprovedinsufcientto reverse the downwardspiralin Asia and
Russia.227
TheU.S.
Congress
balked
atpouring
endless
amounts
ofmoney
down the drain of failing economies.
Several
Americananalysts
blamedAsiastroubles
oncronycapitalism
a system
in whichrelatives
andfriends
of thosein power(politicians,
bankers,
business
executives,
andbureaucrats)
profitedfroma complex networkof in-
breeding,
graft,mutual
support
andprotection,
andsecrecy.
Western
govern-
mentsin theIMF,criticalof Asianpractices
asundemocratic,
inefcient,
and
corrupt,demandedfundamental reforms,greater
transparency
in economic
dealings,
moreprudentmonitoringby governments
of investment
anddisin-
vestment
decisions,
andbelt-tighteningausterity
programs.
(Manyecono-
miststhoughtthatthelatteronlyworsened thesituationin ThirdWorldcoun-
tries.)Asiangoverning
elitesresentedbeinglecturedby Western freemarket
liberalswhoseconceptsof democracy, ethics,and businessmethodsseldom
conformed to nonWestern
traditionsandcustomary modesof behavior.Asian
economistsdenied
thatcronycapitalism
couldadequatelyexplainthere-
gionalcollapse
because
thatsame
system hadalsoprevailed
duringtheyears
of
boominggrowth.Z28
Theytendedto attributethecrisisto excessive
reliance
on
thedollarasa reserve currency;worldwide productive overcapacity
in certain
industries;
overinvestmentin computers,software, andpaperwealt indus-
tries,whichenhance lifequalitymorein theWestthantheEast;andpanicky
reactions
byWestern investorswhoreapprotswhenAsianeconomies enjoy
highgrowthratesbutwhowithdraw theircapitalat therst signsof a slow-
down.Asiangovernments hoped to recoup theirlossesbycuttingimports and
increasing
exportsto Western industrialized
nationsjustastheEuropeans were
pursuingtheir own austerityprogramspreparatoryto launchingthe euro,
whiletheUnitedStates,
facedwitha widening
tradedecit,waspressing
for
moreopenmarketsin Asia.ThetransPacic arguments
becameacrimonious:
Americans
calledfor reformsto cleanup themess;Asiansaccused
Western
capitalism
of exploiting
Asias
woesto perpetuate
its owninationfree
pros-
perity.Liberaleconomists
worriedlestAsiangovernments
revertto protection-
ismandstatecontrols
on capitalmovements.
Thatwouldmeanabandoning
thefreemarketglobalization
policies
whichhadrecently
broughtunprece-
dentedgrowth.229
482 TNTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Because
oflarge
U.S.
investment
inLatinAmerica,
Washington
wasmore
worried
about
thatregion
thanthepossibility
thattheAsian
crisis
alone
would
disrupt
theAmerican
economy.
IftheAsianLatin
American
contagion
were
tospread
toChina,
thesituation
wouldhave
become
worse,
butBeijing
held
steady
anddidnotdevalue
theyuan.
Meanwhile
theG-8nations
were
slow
torespond.
Their
leaders
engaged
inrhetoric
designed
tocalm
market
volatility
and thenervousness
ofinvestors,
exacerbated
byinstantaneous
com-
municationandon-line
trading.
Manyinthetroubled
states
blamed
liberal
globalization.
Theycomplained
that
theLDCs
suffer
theworst
pains
ofbusi-
ness
cycles
while
thewealthier
countries
manage
toescape.
The
World
Bank,
contrary
totheorthodox
doctrine
oftheIMF,
which
prescribed
austerity
called
fordecitspending
tostimulate
growth.23°
Foralongtimethegovern-
ments
oftheindustrialized
nations
hadnoclear
strategy
beyond
hoping
that
theglobal
slump
would
soon
bottom
out.
Europeans
lamented
theabsence
of
vigorous
leadership
from
thehegemonic
power.231
Attheheightofthegloom
inSeptember
1998,
President
Clinton,
noting
thattheUnited
States
hadaninescapable
obligation
tolead,
summoned an
urgent
world
meeting
oftheG-8
nations
toconfront
thebiggest
nancial
challenge
facing
theworld
inhalfacentury,
andtorecommend
waysto
adapt
the
international
nancial
architecture
tothe
twenty~rst
century.
232
Finance
ministers
metinWashington
inOctober,
along
withofcialsfrom
175members
oftheIMFandtheWorld
Bank.
President
Clinton
proposed a
newemergency
fund
mechanismwithintheIMFframework
toprovide
tem-
porary
relief
forcountries
ontheverge ofeconomic
collapse.233
Franc
wanted
astronger
IMFtostabilize
exchangerates
worldwide;
Germany
ad-
vocated
setting
target
zones
tox thelimitsofuctuation
amongtheworlds
three
major
currenciesthe
dollar,
theeuro,and
theyen.
Britain
suggeste
a
partial
merger
oftheIMFand
theWorld
Bank;
Japan
would
impose
control
ontheowofcapitalintimes
ofcrisis.7&#39;34»
TheUnitedStates,
duringfour
months
ofdiscussions,
opposed
anynew international
institutions
orradical
changes
thatmight
interfere
withtheoperation
ofthefreemarket
system
HansTietmeyer,
president
oftheBundesbank,
asked
bytheG-8nations
to
review
thevarious
proposals
fora newinternational
nancial
architec
ture,
delivered
areport
thatrecommended
nonewinternational
regulato
structure
butonlyaforum
inwhich
theG-8nations
would
meetperiodica
toidentify
emerging
systemic
problems
within
thesystem
anddiscuss
appro-
priate
political
andeconomic
responses.235
Everyone
agreed
ontheneed
for
moreopennesstransparency was
thebuzzwordon thepartofborrow
ers,
lenders,banks,
governments,
andinternationalinstitutions,
andmore
careful
riskassessment
allaround,butthere
waslittleconcrete
action
andno
clear
agreementonthefuturemission
oftheIMF. Signsofglobaleconom
recoverybegan
toappearinthesummer of1999,thanks innosmallpartto
thestrengthand
growthoftheU.S.economy,theAmerican appetite
forim-
ports,
thegradual
loweringofinterest
rates
intheUnited States
andEurop
belated
Congressional
appropriations
fortheIMF(which
admitted
havin
made
somemistakesin executing
otherwise
sound
policies),
andthe
 CONCLUSION 483

restoration
of investorcondence.
ByJanuary2000,panichadbeenreplaced
byanoptimism
bordering
onexuberance?

CONCLUSION
At the start of a new millennium,punditsare askingto what extentthe
twenty-first
century
will resemble
ordifferfromthetwentieth,
whichatitsend
wasbeinghailedastheAmerican century.Thattermconnotes notonlythe
hegemonicposition
of theUnitedStatessinceWorldWarII, butalsothepolit-
ical,economic,
scientictechnologicaI,
andculturalinuencethiscountryhas
wieldedthroughouttheworld since1900.A quarterof a centuryagosome
observerswere forecasting
that Japanwould be the dominanteconomic
powerafter2000,or thatJapanandEurope
together
wouldhaveovertaken
Americaseconomictechnological
advantages and substantially
erodedits
uniquehegemonic
role.Thusfar,thosepredictions
havenot cometo pass.
Thedawnof Y2K, whicharrivedwithoutthelong-awaitedanddreaded
computerglitches
thatmanyhadpredicted, foundtheAmerican
economy on
thevergeof breaking
all records
for sustained
growth.Europe
wasstill lag-
gingbehind,
andJapanhadnot yet fully recovered
froma prolonged
slump.237
Theeurohadfallen
below
paritywiththedollara16percent
drop
in valueduringits firstyearbutEuropean
Unionofficials
andbankers
ex-
pressed
condence
thattheEUeconomieshadturned
thecorner
andthatthe
long-range
prospects
werebright.
InIPE,there
isnever
anyunmitigated,
good
or badnews.Whenunemployment
figuresrise,investors
feara slowdown;
when
thegures
fall,theybecome
nervous
about
ination.
When
theU.S.dol-
lar strengthens
against
theeuroandtheyen,European andJapanese exports
increase,American exports
decline,
andthetradegapwidens towarda point
of unsustainability.
Whentheyenrisestoorapidlyagainst thedollar,econo-
mistswarnTokyothatthismightgiveriseto unwarranted euphoriaandjeop-
ardizea fragilerecovery
before
neededbankingandotherreforms havebeen
carriedout.Evenwhenthingsseem to belookingup,economic historians
warnthattherehavealways beenboomandbustbusinesscycles, thatthe
valueof stocksmaybeovervaluedandcannot keeprisingforever,
andthatthe
longer
theprosperity
persists,
creating
anenormous
U.S.tradedeficit,
the
moresevere
thenextrecession
is likelyto be.Economics
cannotshakeits rep-
utation as the dismal science.
Despite
theoptimism
thatmarked
theadvent
of themillennium,
the
global
economy
continues
toface
serious
challenges.
It iswidely
agreed
that
theUnitedStates
cannotsustainindefinitely
anincreasing
decitin its current
account
balance
(ortradegap),whichhas,aswehave
mentioned,
helped
to serve
asa locomotive
to haulsome
afictedeconomies
outof theirdecline.
Many
economists
seealong-term
weakening
ofthedollar
unless
Europe
and
Japan
speed
uptheir
growth
andbuymore
American
products.233
TheUnited
States
stilldisagrees
withitsEuropean
andJapanese
allies
onways
ofstabiliz
ingtheiructuating
currency
exchange
rates.
Noclear
paths
to thefuture
484 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

haveyet beenchartedto guidethe missionsof the threeprincipalinterna-

tional economic institutionstwo of which, the IMF and the World Bank, of-
ten seemmore competitivethan cooperative,while the third of which, the
WTO, is subjectto mountingcriticismfrom organizedlabor,advocatesof hu-
man rights, environmentalists,and Third World governmentsthat remain
suspiciousof what globalizationmeansfor them. Meanwhile,the gap be
tweenthe rich and poor continuesto widen,partly dueto the very processof
internetting
whichwassupposed
to bringabouta moreuniedworId.Z39
The
principalcontemporarychallengeto liberal globalizationis to devisewaysof
enhancingthe quality of life for thosewho are its victimswithout jeopardiz-
ing the potential gains yet to be madefor the world from free, innovative
competition.

NOTES

1. Jacob Viner, Power VersusPlenty as Objectivesof Foreign Policy in the

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, World Politics, 1 (October 1948).
Reprintedin JeffreyA. Friedenand David A. Lake,eds.,InternationalPolitical
Economy: Perspectiveson Global Power and Wealth (New York: St. Martins
Press,1987), pp. 71-84, quoted at p. 72.
2. George T. Crane and Abla Amawi, eds., The Theoretical Evolution of
InternationalPoliticalEconomy:A Reader(NewYork: Oxford UniversityPress,
1997), Editors Introduction, p. 4.
3. See,for example, Karen Mingst, Essentialsof International Relations (New York
and London: WW. Norton, 1999), pp. 197-202.
4. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ:
PrincetonUniversity Press,1987), chap. 2, Three Ideologiesof Political
Economy,p. 31. Gilpin distinguishesbetweenbenign mercantilismand the
malevolent,aggressiveform manifestedin Nazi economicpolicies.Ibid., p. 32.
5 . For discussionsof liberalism, interdependence,mercantilism, nationalism, hege-
monic stability, Marxism, dependency,and world systemstheory, see C. Roe
Goddard, John T. Passé-Smith,and John C. Conklin, eds.,International Political
Economy:State-MarketRelationsin the ChangingGlobal Order (Boulder,CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 9-212.
6. Jacob Viner, Mercantilist Thought, in David L. Sills, ed., International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,(IESS)Vol. 4 (New York: Macmillan Co. SC
The Free Press,1968), pp. 435-442; PreservedSmith, The Enlightenment
1687-1776, Vol. II of A History of Modern Culture (New York: Collier Books,
1962), pp. 194-202; Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International
Economic Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), pp. 5-6;
Gilpin, Political Economy, pp. 180-183; Ralph Pettman, Understanding
International Political Economy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996),
pp. 34-36.
7. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, reprinted in Crane and
Amawi, Theoretical Evolution, pp. 37-47.
8. FriederichList, Political and CosmopoliticalEconomy,reprintedin Craneand
Amawi, Theoretical Evolution, pp. 48-54.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.
17.

18. NOTES 485

JosephJ. Spengler,
Physiocratric
Thought,in Sills,International
Encyclopedia
of the SocialSciences,
hereaftercitedas IESS,Vol. 4, pp.443-445;Smith,
Enlightenment,pp. 194-202;J. Bronowskiand BruceMazlish, The Western
IntellectualTradition(NewYork: HarperTorchbooks,1960),pp. 336-340.
Smith,Enlightenment,pp. 195-196;Craneand Amawi, TheoreticalEvolution,
pp. 48-49.
Adam Smith,Of the Principleof the Commercialor MercantileSystem and
Of Restraints Upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of Such Goods as
19. Can Be Produced at Home, reprinted from The Wealth of Nations (New York:
ModernLibrary, 1937)in CraneandAmawi, TheoreticalEvolution,pp. 58-71;
Bronowskiand Mazlish, WesternIntellectual,chap. 19, Adam Smith, esp.
pp. 340-356.
Samuelsonsphrase is reported in Gilpin, Political Economy, p. 22. Ricardos fa-
486

26.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

E. H. Carr, InternationalRelationsBetweenthe Two World Wars1919-1939

27. (London:Macmillan, 1965),pp. 52-60 and 85-87; RichardLamb, Versailles
and the ReparationsCrisis, chap. 1 in The Drift to War 1922-1939 (New
York: St. Martins Press,1981), pp. 3-26.
28.Spero,Politicsof EconomicsRelations,pp. 399-400.
Gilpin, Political Economy, p. 105.

29. Ibid., pp. 402-403.

30. For the dismal facts of the Crash and the Depression, seeWilliam Manchester,
The Glory and the Dream:A NarrativeHistory of America1932-1972(New
York: BantamBooks,1975),pp. 3-70; OscarTheodoreBarck,]r., and Nelson
ManfredBlake,Since1900:A History of the UnitedStatesin Our Times,3rd ed.
(NewYork: Macmillan,1961),pp. 406-423.Thepoint concerningforeignretal-
iation againstthe Hawley-SmootTariff is in Dixon Wecter,The Age of the
GreatDepression,1929-1941, in AndrewS.BerkyandJamesP.Shenton,eds.,
The HistoriansHistory of the United States,Vol. II (New York: Capricorn
Books,1972),p. 1253. Seealso Lairsonand Skidmore,InternationalPolitical
Economy,pp. 52-56 and RobertL. Heilbroner,The Worldly Philosophers, 4th
ed. (New York: Simon 8c Schuster,1972), pp. 242-244.
31. Barck and Blake, Since 1900, pp. 429-432.
32. Charles P. Kindleberger,The World in Depression1929-1939 (Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress,1973),citedin EthanB. Kapstein,Governingthe
Global Economy: International Finance and the State (Cambridge,MA:
Harvard University Press,1994), p. 19.
33. Barck and Blake, Since 1900, pp. 453-464.
34. Benjamin].Cohen,Organizingthe WorldsMoney:ThePoliticsof International
Monetary Relations(New York: BasicBooks, 1977), p. 79. Cited in Gilpin,
Political Economy, p. 123.
35. Gilpin, PoliticalEconomy,pp. 123-127.A hegemonicpower, saidGilpin, is
neededto reconcilethe nationalpoliciesof individualstatesand to establishthe
prerequisites of a stableinternationalmonetaryorder . . . Britain performedthe
task of leadershipbecause it had the powerand the will to do so . . . Although
Germany,Franceand the United Statesresentedthe specialbenetsthat world
monetary
leadership
conferred
on theBritish,theyhadneitherthewill nor the
capacityto challengethis leadershipeffectively.The lessdevelopedcommodity
exporters. . . faredlesswell; the burdensof adjustmentusuallyfell on themand
the terms of trade for their commodity exports frequentlysuffered. Ibid.,
p. 127. David A. -Lake discusses Kindlebergersand Gilpinsthoughtson eco-
nomichegemonyandthe will to leadin InternationalEconomicStructuresand
American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934, in Frieden and Lake,
International Political Economy, pp. 140-147.
36. RalphPettmanobserves
that liberal theoryexplainseconomiccyclesin termsof
technological change, but also expects new productive investments and new
spurtsin growth to restoreequilibriumin a free market. UnderstandingIPE,
p. 113.Gilpin citesJosephSchumpetersview that periodsof expansionare due
to such technological innovations as iron and steel railroads, automobiles, elec-
trical and chemical industries, etc. These furnish new investment opportunities,
which eventuallybecomeexhausted,
causingan economicslowdown.Gilpin ad-
 NOTES 487

by FrencheconomistJean-Baptiste Say(1767-1832), supplycreatesits ownde-

mand,andthetwo tendto adjusttowardbalance in thelongrun.Whenover-
37. productionoccurs,producers will sufferlosses
unlesstheyreduceoutputor in-
novate.Thus,longperiodsof overproduction weresupposed to beimpossible
38. according
to classical
liberaleconomics. Marx, likeJohnMaynardKeynes, de-
niedthatthistendency
towardequilibriumexisted
. . . There
is,Marxargued,
aninherentcontradiction
in capitalism
between
its capacity
to produce
goods
andthe capacityof consumers
(wageearners)
to purchase
thosegoods. . .
Gilpin, PoliticalEconomy,p. 36.
SeeChapter
IX, TheHeresies
of JohnMaynardKeynes,in RobertHeilbroner,
The WorldlyPhilosophers,
esp.pp. 253-268,quotedat page263.
Ibid., pp.269-270.Keyneshimself,althoughhe startedas a liberal,became
39.
morenationalistin his thinking asa resultof the depression.
He becamean ad-
vocateof nationalautarky,which he preferredto foreigntradeand investment
entanglements.While favoringinternationalexchangeof ideas,scienticknowl-
edge,hospitality,and travel, he said: Let goodsbe homespunwheneverit is
40.
reasonablyandcommerciallypossible,
andaboveall let nancebeprimarilyna-
tional. National Self-Sufciency,
Yale Review(1934),cited in Pettman,
Understanding
IPE, p. 54.
GordonA. Craig,Germany1866-1945(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,
1978),pp. 550-551and 604.SeealsoA. J. Ryder,TwentiethCenturyGermany:
41.
From Bismarckto Brandt(New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1973),
42.
pp. 64-67, 270-271, 277-279, 307, 309, and 344-357.
Barry Buzan,The TimelessWisdomof Realism, and StephenKrasner,The
Accomplishments
of International
PoliticalEconomy,
pp.47-63and114-115,
respectively,in SteveSmith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., Inter-
nationalTheory:Positivismand Beyond(Cambridge,
England:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1996).SeealsoGilpin, PoliticalEconomy,pp. 31-34.
43.
FriedenandLake,InternationalPoliticalEconomy,pp. 10-11.
These
included
KarlKautsky
andEduardBernstein
(Germany);
G.D. H. Cole,R.
H. Tawney,Sidneyand BeatriceWebb,Harold J. Laski, and ClementAttlee
(England);
JulesGuesde,
JeanJaurés,andLeonBlum(France); andDanielDeLeon,
44.HarryW.Laidler,NormanThomas,MorrisHillquit,andHerbertMarcuse(United
States).
Onecouldalsolist severalChristiansocialists,
utopiansocialists,
anarchists,
recentrevisionisthistorians,andadvocates
of a varietyof New Left causes.
45. For a detailedexaminationof this concept,seeGustavA. Wetter,Dialectical
Materialism:A Historical and SystematicSurveyof Philosophyin the Soviet
Union (New York: Praeger,1963).
Karl Marx andFriedrichEngels,Manifestoof the CommunistParty.
SeeKarl Marx, Capital:A Critiqueof Political Economy(New York: Random
46. HouseModernLibrary,n.d.),especiallychaps.1, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18,and24 for
Marxsmostextensivetreatmentof the conceptof surplusvalue.SeeNote 37 on
the similarviewsof KeynesandMarx concerningprolongeddepressions.
47.Marx and Engels,Manifesto.
488

49.

50. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

51. in a similar vein that Marx was aware of the role of violence in history but
deemedit lessimportant than the contradictionsinherentin the old societyin
bringingaboutthe old society&#39;s
end,in On Violence(NewYork: HarcourtBrace
Jovanovich, 1969), p. 11.
SeePhilip Siegelmans
Introductionto J. A. Hobson,Imperialism:A Study(Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press,1965). Hobsons work was originally pub-
lishedin Londonby GeorgeAllen andUnwin in 1902.Subsequent
references
are
to the 1965 edition.
Foster Rhea Dulles, Americas Rise to World Power, 1898-1954 (New York:
Harper85Row, 1954),chaps.2 and 3.
Richard Koebner and I-Ielmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and
Signicanceof a Political Word, 1840-1960(New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press,.1964), p. 249. For a discussion of the anti-Semitic theme in Hobsons
thought, seepp. 226-228. George Lichtheim notes that the American founding
fathers, both Federalistsand Republicans, had no qualms about calling the fed-
eral union an empire, and that in nineteenth-centuryEngland, both Liberals and
Tories employed the term imperialism for its popular appeal. Imperialism (New
York: Praeger,1971), chaps. 4, 5, and 6. For a thorough analysis of British im-

52.perialism of free trade, see William Roger Louis, ed., Imperialism: The
Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976). This
book refers to an article by John Gallagherand Ronald Robinson, The
Imperialismof FreeTrade, originally publishedin EconomicHistory Review,
53. 2nd series,6,1, (1953),in which the authorsinsisted,in supportof Marxist the-
ory, that free tradeas practicedby Britain in the nineteenthcenturywas an in-
strumentof imperialistdomination,intendedto tie muchof the world into the
54. British economy.The authorsdid insist, however,that imperialistphenomena
arefunctionsequallyof economicandpolitical factors.Thearticleis reprintedin
Frieden and Lake, International Political Economy, pp. 116-127.
55.KoebnerandSchmidt,Imperialism,p. 233.
J. A. Hobson,Imperialism:A Study(Ann Arbor: Universityof MichiganPress,
1965), p. 85.
Ibid., p. 59.
Ibid., pp.,41-45.Later,Italy and Germanyemployedthe argumentconcerning
populationpressureto justify their questfor coloniesin Africa prior to World
War I, and the Japanese did likewisein their Manchurianventurein the early
1930s.However,in all the caseswherethe lebensraum argumentwasemployed,
56. subsequent movementof populationto the conqueredareasprovednegligible.
SeeN. Peffer,The Fallacyof Conquest,in InternationalConciliation(New
York: CarnegieEndowmentfor InternationalPeace,No. 318, 1938).
57. Hobson,Imperialism,pp. 46-51.
E. M. Winslow, The Patternof Imperialism(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
59.

NOTES 489

(London:Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1951),p. 362. Quotedin Pettman,

Understanding
IPE, p. 192.
jingoismis merelythelustof thespectator,
unpiirgedby anypersonalleffort,
risk, or sacrice,gloatingin theperils,pains,andslaughterof fellow-menwhom
hedoesnot know,but whosedestruction
he desiresin a blindandarticially
60.
stimulated
passion
of hatredandrevenge.
. . . Thearduous andwearymonot-
ony of the march,the longperiodsof waiting,the hardprivations,the terriblete-
diumof a prolonged campaign playno part in his imagination;
theredeeming
factorsof war,thefinesense of comradeship
whichcommon personal periledu-
cates,thefruitsof discipline
andself-restraint,
therespectfor thepersonality
of
enemieswhose courage he must admit and whom he comesto realize as fellow-
beings-allthosemoderating elements in actualwarareeliminated fromthepas-
sionof theJingo.It is preciselyfor thesereasons that somefriendsof peace
maintainthatthetwomostpotentchecks of militarismandof wararetheoblig-
61.
ationof theentirebodyof citizensto undergo militaryservice
andtheexperience
of an invasion.Hobson,Imperialism,p. 215.
For the completeworks of Lenin, seeV. I. Lenin, CollectedWorks(Moscow:
ForeignLanguages PublishingHouse,1963),44 vols.For a biographicalaccount
of Leriinslife, seeLouis Fischer,The Life of Lenin (New York: Harper 86Row
62.
ColophonBooks, 1965); Robert Payne,The Life and Death of Lenin (New
63. York: Simon 8CSchuster,1946); StefanT. Possony,Lenin: The Compulsive
Revolutionary (Chicago:Regnery,1964); ChristopherHill, Lenin and the
RussianRevolution (London: English UniversitiesPress,1961); Bertram D.
Wolfe,ThreeWho Madea Revolution(Boston:Beacon,1955).
Gilpin, PoliticalEconomy,p. 40. EventhoughMarx did not developa theoryof
64. imperialism,he realizedthat as the working classbecomesimmiserated,un-
derconsumption at homeforcescapitaliststo seeka constantlyexpandingmar-
ket . . . over the whole surfaceof the globe, Craneand Amawi, Theoretical
Evolution, p. 83.
Lenin,Imperialism:TheHighestStage,pp. 16-30.

65. Lenin,CollectedWorks,Vol. XIX, pp. 87 and 104.

BernardTaurer,StalinsLastThesis,ForeignAffairs, XXXI (April 1953),374.
Statementto the Fifth Congress
of the PolishUnitedWorkersParty,November
12, 1968. L. I. Brezhnev,Following Lenins Course:Speeches and Articles
(Moscow: ProgressPublishers,1972).
66. Allen S. Whiting, ForeignPolicy of CommunistChina, in Roy C. Macridis,
ed., ForeignPolicy in World Politics, 3rd ed. (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1967),pp. 223-263; The DisarmamentIssuein the SinoSovietDispute:
A ChronologicalDocumentation,Appendix in AlexanderD&#39;allin et al., The
Soviet Union, Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: School of
490

68.

69.

INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY
70.
Relations
withtheUnitedStates,
theSoviet
Unionandjapan(NewYork:
Praeger,
1974);
AllenS.Whiting,
Foreign
Policyof Communist
China,in
71.Macridis,
Foreign
pp.251-297;
Policy,
Steven
7thed.(Englewood
1.Levine,
China
Cliffs,NJ:Prentice
inAsia:
ThePRCasaRegional
Hall,1989),
Power,
inHarry
Harding,
ed.,Chmas
Foreign
Relations
inthe19805
(New
Haven,
CT:
Yale
University
Press,
1984),
pp.117,12.4;
andJonathan
D.Pollack,
China
and
72. theGlobalStrategic
Balance,
ibid.,pp.157,166-169.
SeeBenjamin
Lambeth
andKevinLewis,
TheKremlin
andSDI, Foreign
Affairs,66(Spring1988),755-770.
Hans
J.Morgenthau,
Politics
Among
Nations:
TheStruggle
forPower
and
73. Peace,
4thed.(New
York:Knopf,
1966),
p.42.Thisdenition
hasbeen
carried
in all editions of the book since 1948.
Ibid.
Ibid.,p.47.Cf.Raymond
Aron,Peace
andWar:A Theory
ofInternation
Relations,
trans.Richard
HowardandAnnette
BakerFox(NewYork:Praeger,
1968). p. 259.
RaymondAron,TheCenturyof Total
War(Boston:
Beacon,
1955),chap.
3,
74. TheLeninist
Mythof Imperialism,
esp.p.59;Morgenthau,
Politics
Among
Nations,
pp.47-50;William
L. Langer,
A Critique
of Imperialism,
Foreign
75.
Jacob
Affairs,XIV (October1935),102-115.
Viner,
Readings
International
in theTheory
Relations
Between
State-Controlled
of International
Trade,
Economies,
Vol.IV,American
in
Economic
Association
(Philadelphia:
Blakiston,
1949),
pp.437-458.
Foramore
subtle
and
complexanalysis
of theprimacy
of statepoliticalinterests
overcorporate
eco-
76. nomicinterests,
Press,
1986),
cf.Michael
chap.13,ThePolitics
pp. 339-349.
W.Doyle,Empires
of Nineteenth
Century
(Ithaca,NY:Cornell
Imperialism,
University

Joseph
A.Schumpeter,
Imperialism
andSocial
Classes,
trans.
Heinz
Norden,
ed.
PaulM. Sweezy
(Oxford,
England:
BasilBlackwell,
1951),
p.5.
77.
Ibid.,
Ibid., p. 6.
Morgenthau,
Politics
pp.84-85.
Among
Kenneth
Nations,
pp.48419.
E.Boulding
hasreiterated
Schumpeters
viewthatim-
perialism
wasaformofsocial
lagand,
fromaneconomic
standpoint,
unprof-
itableto thepointof being
a fraud.Reections
onImperialism,
in David
Mermelstein,ed.,Economics:
MainstreamReadings
andRadical
Critiques,
2nd
ed.(NewYork:Random House,1970),
p.201.Schumpeter
heldthata com-
80.

81.

82.
83.

84.
NOTES 491

85. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 47.

Schumpeter, ImperialismandSocialClasses, p. 57.
Andrew Mack, Theories of Imperialism:The EuropeanPerspective,The
journal of Conflict Resolution,18 (September1974), 518. As noted earlier,
Lenin too realizedthis and attributedit to the exploitationof colonialpopula-
86. tions by imperialist capitalism.
Ibid., where Mack cites as authoritiestwo Marxist critiquesof the Leninist
theory: Michael Barratt Brown, A Critique of Marxist Theories of
Imperialism, and Harry Magdoff, ImperialismWithout Colonies,in Roger
Owen and Bob Sutcliffe,eds.,Studiesin the Theory of Imperialism(London:
I.ongmans, 1973).
Aron, Peace
and War,p. 261.SeealsoLanger,A Critiqueof Imperialism,p. 105.
Aron, Peaceand War, pp. 262-263.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 46-47; Aron, Century of Total
War, pp. 59-62. Referring to the Spanish-AmericanWar, Eugene Staley
wrote, The causesof this war, and of the expansionismexhibitedin connec-
tion with it, havebeenlaid at the door of private investmentinterestson the
whole, erroneously.Their role was slight comparedwith that of the interests
of the yellow pressand of other internal inuences in Americanlife which
madefor chauvinism. War and the Private Investor (Chicago:Universityof
Chicago Press,1935), p. 433. Most diplomatic historians who studied the
origins of World War I, including SidneyBradshawFay,G. P. Gooch,A. J. P.
Taylor, BernadotteE. Schmitt, Nicholas Mansergh,and Raymond Sontag,
492

93.
94.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

J. Woodis,
Introduction
to NeoCulonialism
(NewYork:Internationa
Publishers,1971), p. 56.
Gilpin, PoliticalEconomy,p. 53.
95. Benjamin
J. Cohen,
A BriefHistory
of International
Monetary
Relations,
in
Frieden
andLake,International
Political
Economy,
pp.256-257.
See alsoC.Roe
GoddardandMelissaH.Birch,TheInternational
Monetary
Fund,in Goddard,
Passé-Sniith,
andConklin,
International
Politiazl
Economy,
pp.215-216.
They
furnish
detailed
information
onIMFfunding
quotasandvoting
rights
ofindivid-
ualorgroups
ofmember
nations.
Ibid.,pp.218-221.
Cohen,
BriefHistory,
pp. 257-262.
[S]ince
theIMFs
poolof liquidity
was
96. manifestly
inadequate,
theUnited
States
itselfbecame
theresidual
source
of
global,
liquidity
growth
through
its balance-of-payments
deficits.
Ibid.,
pp.260-261.
This
wasespecially
thecase
during
theperiod
ofthedollar
short-
age,which
lasted
until1958,
theheyday ofAmericas
dominanceofinterna-
tional
monetary
relations.
Ibid.,
p.262.Formore
ontheIMF,seeNotes 140,
153-156, and 158.
S.Sarwar
Lateef,
TheWorldBank:
ItsFirstHalfCentury,
Goddard
et al.,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.291-304.
Lateef
emphasizes
theimportance
97. ofeconomic
growth
strategies
thattakeadvantage
ofthemost
abundant
asset
of
poor
countries:
labor;
providing
basic
social
services
tothepoor;
helping
govern-
mentsto cutdecitsand_avoid excessiveborrowing
andmonetary
expansion,
98. whichcausesination;attracting
foreign
investment
andtechnology;
improving
market
competitiveness,
building
infrastructure,
protecting
theenvironment;
and
promoting
astable
andresponsible
political,
legal,
administrative,
andscal
order.
99. These
criticisms
canbefound-
in Bruce
Rich,WorldBank/IMF:
FiftyYears
Is
Enough,
in ibid.,pp. 305-313.
TheBank,
heconcludes,
is aninstitution
out
oftimeandplace. . . [and]mustliterallyremake
itself,p. 313.
Susan
Strange,
Casino
Capitalism,
in Kendall
W.Stiles
andTsuneo
Akaha,
100.
eds.,
International
Political
Economy:
A Reader
(New
York:Harper
Collins,
1991), p. 114.
DavidP.Calleo,
HaroldvanB. Cleveland,
andLeonard Silkthussummarize
Trifns
101. main
thesisin TheDollar
andtheDefense
of theWest,in Stiles
and
Akaha,
International
Political
Economy,
p.69.Theyreferto Robert
Trifn,
GoldandtheDollarCrisis(NewHaven,
CT:YaleUniversity
Press,
1960).
Ibid,Gilpinoffers
asimilar
analysis
inPolitical
Economy,
pp.134-135.
TheBalanceof Payments
andGoldOutowfromtheUnitedStates.Message
ofPresident
to theCongress,
February
6,1961.Textin Richard
P.Steggins,
ed.,
102.
Documents
onAmerican Foreign
Relations
1961(NewYork:Harper86Bros.,
1962),pp-.26-38. Citedat p. 37.
Cohen,Brief History, p. 262.
103.
NATOdefense
ministers
andeconomists
argued
foryears
overburden
sharing
andhowto calculate
thetotalcostof theU.S.militarycontribution
to NATO.
Some
based
theircomputations
ontheproportion
oftheU.S.defense
budget
al-
locable
to NATO,othersontheproportion
of thetotalNATObudget.
Three
104.

105.
106.
NOTES 493

tionalforces
inthemaintenance
ofsecurity
inEurope. Intheend,NATO mem-
bersdecided
bycommon agreement
thattheirentire
defense
budgets
contributed
totheAlliancegoals
ofdeterrence
anddefense andthusshould
bethebasisfor
any burden-sharing
calculations.
107.
Goddard andBirch,TheInternational
Monetary
Fund,p.226.
DavidP. CalleoandBenjaminM. Rowland, FreeTradeandthe Atlantic
Community,inFriedenandLake,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.346-349.
108.
AndréGunder Frank,TheDevelopmentof Underdevelopment,
in RobertI.
Rhodes,
ed.,Imperialism and Underdevelopment:
A Reader(NewYork:
109. Monthly
Review
Press,
1970),
p.9.Moreover,
PaulBaran
hasbeen
among
the
firstto arguethattheexpansion
of capitalism
fromtheindustrially
advanced
countries
produced
underdevelopment
in theLDCs,
ThePolitical
Economy
of
110.
Growth(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,
1957).
Boulding,Reections
onImperialism,
p. 201.
NikitaS.Khrushchev,
For Victoryin Peaceful
Competition
with Capitalism
111.
(NewYork:Dutton,1960),pp.33,628-629,and750-751.
SeealsoG. Mirsky,WhithertheNewlyIndependent Countries?
International
Affairs(Moscow),
XII (December1962),2, 23-27.
Pettman,Understanding
IPE, pp. 67, 192.
Thomas
E.Weisskopf,
Capitalism,
Underdevelopment
andtheFutureof thePoor
Countries,
in Mermelstein,
Economics:
Mainstream
Readings,
pp.218-223.
LydiaPottsconcluded
that in the nal analysisit is debatable
whetherthe
worldmarket
forlabourhascontributed
moreto thedevelopment
ofthemetro-
112.
pole or to the underdevelopment
of the colonisedterritories. The World
LabourMarket(London:
ZedBooks,
1990),
quoted
in Pettman,
Understanding
IPE, p. 192.
113.
HarryMagdoff,TheAmerican
EmpireandtheU.S.Economy,
chap.5 in The
Ageof Imperialism(NewYork:MonthlyReview Press,
1969).Reprintedin
Rhodes,Imperialism
andUnderdevelopment,
pp.18-44;seeesp.pp.18-29.
114.
BobRothorn,Imperialismin the Seventies:
Unityor Rivalry?NewLeft
Review,69 (Sept/Oct1971),reprintedin Friedenand Lake,International
PoliticalEconomy,p. 194.
Ibid.,pp.194-207.
Rothornsidedwith thosewhoforesaw growingrivalry.
115.
Fora detailed
analysis
of theprospectsfor cooperation
andconictamong
capitaliststates,seechaps.5 and 6 in Lairso&#39;n
and Skidmore,
International
116.
Political Economy,pp. 95-155.
JohanGaltung,TheEuropean
Community:
A Superpower
in the Making
494

121.

122.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
123.
HansKohn, Reectionson Colonialism,in Robert Strausz-Hupé
and Harry
W Hazard,eds.,TheIdea of Colonialism(New York: Praeger,1958),pp. 6-14.
124. Mack, Theories of Imperialism, p. 526.
SeeJan Wszelaki,CommunistEconomicStrategy:The Role of East Central
Europe(Washington,
DC: NationalPlanningAssociation,1959).
The Soviet economic offensive was aimed largely at Egypt, India, Syria, Ethiopia,
125.
Guinea,Yemen,Afghanistan,Burma,Ceylon,and Indonesia.SignicantIssues
in EconomicAid, StaffPaperof the InternationalIndustrialDevelopment
Center
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford ResearchInstitute, 1960).
126. Koebner and Schmidt, Imperialism, pp. 321-322.
Boulding, Reections on Imperialism, p. 202.
127. Flora Lewis, Superpower Proxy Wars and the Difculty of Remaining
Nonaligned,New York Times,July 31, 1978.p. 6. SeealsoDavid Andelman,
NonalignedNations End DivisiveTalks;Plan Club Meeting, also New York
Times,July 31, 1978, p. 1.
128. RobertG. Wesson,Why Marxism?The ContinuingSuccess
of a FailedTheory
(New York: Basic Books, 1976).
129. Adam B. Ulam, The Bolsheviks (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 311. Seealso
Bauer, Economics of Resentment, pp. 57-58.
130. AnthonyJamesJoes,Fascismin the ContemporaryWorld:Ideology,Evolution,
Resurgence(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978), p. 103.
131. SeeJoan Robinson,Trade in Primary Commodities,in Friedenand Lake,
International Political Economy, pp. 371-381.
132. James Caporaso, Dependenceand Dependencyin the Global System,
International Organization, 32 (Winter 1978), 2.
133. JamesA. Caporaso,DependencyTheory: Continuities and Discontinuities
in DevelopmentStudies, reprinted from International Organization, 34
(Autumn 1980) in Stiles and Akaha, International Political Economy,
pp. 49-64.
134. Tony Smith, The Logic of DependencyTheory Revisited, International
Organization,35 (Autumn1981),756-757.Smithbecamelessunsympathetic to
dependencytheorya few yearslater,concedingthat it hadpromptedthosein the
mainstream to think in broader, more complex, and normative terms about
Third World development.
Requiemor New Agendafor Third World Studies,
World Politics, XXXVII (July 1985).
135. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, Modernization and Dependency.-
AlternativePerspectivesin the Study of Latin AmericanUnderdevelopment,
ComparativePolitics, 10 (July 1978),535-557. The Valenzuelas
makeit clear
that they are criticizing the modernization perspectivesof such writers as Sir
Henry Maine, Ferdinand Tonnies, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Robert
Redeld, Harry Eckstein,David Apter, Daniel Lerner,Neil J. Smelser,Alex
Inkeles, Cyril Black, Gabriel Almond, James 5. Coleman, Talcott Parsons,
Seymour Martin Lipset, Kalvin H. Silvert, and others. Other representative
works on dependency theory include Fernando Henrique Cardozo and Enzo
 136.

NOTES 495

Labor,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
25(September
1981),
351.
See
also
David
B.Yofe,
TheNewlyIndustrializing
Countries
and
the
Political
Econo
137. ofProtectionism,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
25(December
1981).
ThomasD.Lairson
and
DavidSkidmore,
International
Political
Econo
138. TheStruggle
forPowerandWealth
(New York:
Harcourt
Brace,
1993
pp.202-204.
Theyconclude
thattheimport-substitution
strategy
may
once
have
played
anecessary
roleinjumpstarting
the
process
ofdevelopment
Many
observers
now
think
that
itsrigidities
and
inefciencies
. . .have
more
recen
139. served
tohindergrowthanddevelopment.
Ibid.,p.204.
140. Stephen
Haggard,
Pathways
fromthePeriphery:
ThePolitics
ofGrowth
in
Newly
Industrializing
Countries
(Ithaca,
NY:Cornell
University
Press,
1990).
Theotonio
dosSantos,
TheStructure
of Dependence,
reprinted
fromThe
American
Economic
Review,
60(May1970),
pp.231-236,
inGoddardetal.,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.Q65175;Dependency
Theory,
in the
samevolume,
p.157,
offers
more
asociological
than
aneconomic
analysis.
DosSantos,
Dependency
Theory,pp.168-169.
See,
forexample,
Cheryl
Payer,
TheDebt:
TheIMFand
theThirdWorld
(New
YorkandLondon:
MonthlyReview
Press,
1974).
No lessthanorthodox
Marxists
dodependentistas
pointtoclass
conict
intheLCDs.
But,asStephen
D.Hymer
hasshown,
Marxhas
turnedouttobewronginanother
ofhispredic
tions,
namely,
thattheproletariat
increases
commensurately
withtheaccumula
tionof capital.
Theinternationalization
of capital,
however,hasnot been
matchedbytheinternationalization
of laborwithregard
to organization
and
141.
class
consciousness.
Whereascapitalists
cancolludeandcooperate
internation
ally(ananti-Leninist
hypothesis),
workers
compete
anddivide
along
racial,
reli-
gious,gender,
agecohort,and nationallines.International
Politicsand
142.
International
Economics: ARadical Approach,reprinted
fromMonthly
Review
(1978)in Frieden andLake,International Political
Economy,
pp.37-38.
143.
Globally,laboris notreadyfor classconict.
Gilpin,Political
Economy.
pp.303-304.
Ibid., p. 304.
144.
Ibid.
Immanuel
Wallerstein,
TheModern
World
System
I: Capitalist
Agriculture
and
theOrigins
oftheEuropean
World
Economy
intheSixteenth
Century
(New
York:Academic
Press,
1974),pp.126-127.
145. Immanuel
Wallerstein,
TheFuture
of theWorldEconomy,
in Terrence
K.
Hopkins
andImmanuel
Wallerstein,
eds.,Processes
of theWorld
System
(Beverly
Hills,CA:Sage
Publications,
1980).
Wallersteins
theory
istobefound
in twovolumes:TheModernWorld System
I: Capitalist
Agriculture
andthe
Origins
oftheEuropeanWorldEconomyintheSixteenth
Century
(NewYork:
Academic
Press,
1974),
andTheModern
World
System
II: Mercantilism
andthe
Consolidation
of theEuropean
World-Economy,
1600-1750
(NewYork:
Academic
Press,
1980).
SeealsohisCapitalist
World-Economy
(Cambridg
England:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1979).
496 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Hollist and JamesN. Rosenau.Cf. also William R. Thompson,Christopher

Chase-Dunn, andJoanSokolovsky,An Exchangeon the InterstateSystemand
theCapitalistWorld-Economy,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
27 (September
1983). Seealso ChristopherChase-Dunnand Richard Rubinson,Toward a
Structural
Perspective
on theWorldSystem,
in StilesandAkaha,International
PoliticalEconomy,pp. 27-48. Wallersteinmodied his positionin 1983by dis-
tinguishing
between hegemony andworldempire.Hegemony in theinterstate
systemrefersto that situationin which. . . onepowercanlargelyimposeits
. in theeconomic,political,military, diplomaticand even&#
rules and its wishes . .
cultural arenas.Repeatedattemptsto transformthe capitalistworld-economy
haveall beenfrustrated.Evenhegemonies havenot succeeded for morethan rel-
ativelybrief periods.ThreeInstances
of Hegemony in the Historyof the
CapitalistWorldEconomy,Internationaljournal of Comparative Sociology,
24 (1-2) (1983);reprintedin Craneand Amawi, TheoreticalEvolution,
pp.244-252,quotedat p.245.Thethreesuccessfulcases weretheDutch,from
theThirtyYearsWarupto 1672;theBritishaftertheNapoleonic Warsto 1873;
andUnitedStates1945-1967.Ibid., p. 246.His estimateof the endof U.S.hege-
monyduringtheVietnamWar now seemsquitepremature.
148. Lairsonand Skidmore,InternationalPoliticalEconomy,p. 90. The literatureon
thepolitical-economic
historyof theMiddleEastisrepletewith accounts
of how
thatregionsoil industryhasevolvedsincetheendof thenineteenthcentury.
Up
to 1950,themajorWestern oil companies,
knownasthe SevenSisters,had
extractedhighlyprotableconcessions fromweakcountries in returnfor small
xed royalty payments.Growingnationalistresentmentafter World War II led
to moreaggressive
attitudeson the part of hostgovernments,
which broughtim-
provedroyaltyandotherterms.In 1950,SaudiArabianegotiateda 50/50divi-
sionof prots.In 1960,Iran,Iraq,Kuwait,SaudiArabia,andVenezuela
formed
the Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries(OPEC).Startingin the
early1970s,the exportingstatesbeganto take overcontrol of pricesandgradu-
ally assumedfull ownership,leavingthe technicaltasksof production,rening,
marketing,and shippingto the oil companies.SeeGeorgeLenczowski,Oil and
Statein theMiddle East(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress,1960);StephenH.
Longrigg,Oil in theMiddle East:Its Discoveryand Development,3rd ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press,1968); Fadhil J. al-Chalabi, OPEC and the
InternationalOil Industry (Oxford, England:Oxford UniversityPress,1980);
PeterBild, Oil in the Middle Eastand North Africa, in TheMiddle Eastand
North Africa 37th ed. (London:EuropaPublications,Ltd., 1990),pp. 127-166;
Daniel Yergin; The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New
York, Simon 86 Schuster,1991); Oil and Cartel Power, chap. 9 in Spero,
Politics of International Economic Relations, pp. 293-338.
149. Thereference to the doublequadruplingof the priceof crude,found oftenin the
literature,is itselfcrude.During the decadeof the 1970s,oil priceskeptuctuat-
ing, rising at one point in the winter of 1973 to $16 for Algerianand $17 for
Iranian oil. Bild, Oil in the Middle East, pp. 138-142.
150. For a more detailed account of Eurodollars and Eurocurrency, seeJim Hawley,
The Internationalization
of Capital:Banks,Eurocurrency
andtheInstabilityof the
World MonetarySystem,in Friedenand Lake,InternationalPoliticalEconomy,
esp.pp.275-383;Kapstein,Governingthe GlobalEconomy,pp. 31-37, Gilpin,
PoliticalEconomy,pp. 314-317.The loansissuedby Americanbanksto central
banksthroughEuromarketbanksincreasethe availabilityof world reserves, but
 151.

152.
NOTES 497

they
153. donot
gure among
ofcial
American
debts,
unless
the
central
banksredepo
thefunds
intheAmerican
market.
Riccardo
Parboni,
The
Dollar
Standard
in
Frieden
and
Lake,
International
Political
Economy,
p.292.
Onchanges
inthe
banking
system,
see
Kapstein,
Governing
theGlobal
Economy,pp.37-43.
154. Kapstein
quotes
PaulVolcker
in hisChapter
3, ThePolitics
ofPetrodolla
Recycling,
Governing
theGlobalEconomy,at p.61,butdisagrees
with
Volckers views.

155. Ibid., p. 66.

Gilpin,
Political
Economy,
p.341.U.S.ination
caused
interest
rates
tosoar
above
16percent
in 1980.
IMFInternational
Financial
Statistics
Yearboo
1991, p. 107.
Lairson
andSkidmore,International
Political
Economy,
pp.284-288.Seealso
156. MilesKahler,
Politics
andInternational
Debt,Explaining
theCrisis,
in Stiles
andAkaha,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.83-108.
ThecaseofMexicowastypical.
By1982,itsbudgetdecitwas16percent
ofits
GNP;ination
wasat30percent;prices
ofitsoilexports
haddropped 25percent
inoneyear
while
thecost
ofitsimports
hadincreased
fourfold;
higher
interest
rates
hadincreased
debtservice
chargesby50percent. WilliamS.Cline,
Mexicos
157. Crisis,
theWorldsPeril,Foreign
Policy,
p. 49.(Winter
1982-1983),
107-120.
Spero,
Politics
of International
EconomicRelations,
p.79.In 1970,totalThird
158. World
debt
owed
toNorthern
banks
andgovernments
andinternational
lending
institutions
(IMF,
World
Bank,
etc.)amounted
to$70billion.
By1979,
thathad
risen
to$400
billion,
andby1989
tomore
than$1.3trillion,
or50percent
of
totalThirdWorldGNP.Edward
R. FriedandPaulH. Trezise,
ThirdWorld
Debt:TheNextPhase
(Washington,
DC:BrookingsInstitution,
1989),
p.5.
EdwardL. Morse,
AftertheFall:ThePolitics
of Oil, Foreign
Affairs,
64
159. (Spring 1986).
160. Richard
E.Feinberg,
LDCDebtandthePublicSector
Rescue,
in Frieden
and
Lake,
International
Political
Economy,
p.395.
AlanS.Blinder
favors
continuing
161. theIMFbutthinks
itsmodusoperandi
mustchangebecause
in thepastit has
sometimes
aggravated
crises
instead
ofmitigating
them.
Fiscal
austerity
programs
162.
helped
inLatin
America
in1980,
buthurtSoutheast
Asia
in1997.
Eight
Steps
to
a NewFinancialOrder,Foreign
Affairs,78(September/October
1999),
58-59.
Lake,International
EconomicStructures, p.395.
163.
Ibid.,pp.396-401;LairsonandSkidmore, International
Political
Economy,
pp.276,293-295;Gilpin,PoliticalEconomy,
pp.317-325.
164.
Feinberg,LDC Debt, p. 396.
Ibid., pp. 396-401.
Lairson
andSkidmore,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.293-295.
165.
Ibid.,pp.295-297.
Lairson
Gilpin,Political
andSkidmore,
Economy,
International
pp.325-326.
Political
Economy,pp.299-304.
Quoted
498 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

167. See United Nations Centre for Disarmament, The Relationship Between
Disarmament
andDevelopment (NewYork:UnitedNations,1982);Saadet
and
SomnathSen, Disarmament,Development and Military Expenditure,"
Disarmament
(aperiodicreviewbytheUnitedNations),13(3)(1990).
168. SeeWilliam C. Olson and David S. McLellan, Population, Hunger and
Poverty,
in thebooktheycoedited
withFredA. Sondermann,
TheTheory
and
Practice
of International
Relations,
6thed.(Englewood
Cliffs,NJ:Prentice
Hall,
1983), p. 270.
169. Mahbubul Haq, The Third Worldand the InternationalEconomicOrder,
Development
PaperNo. 22 (Washington,
DC: OverseasDevelopmentCouncil,
1976).Reprintedin Olsen,McLellan,and Sondermann,eds.,Theoryand
Practice, pp. 325--326.
170. ChrisBrown,InternationalRelationsTheory:New NormativeApproaches
(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1992),pp. 159-165,182-188.
171. A full compendium
of NIEOproposals
overa 30-yearperiodwascompiled by
AlfredGeorgeMoasandHarryN. M. Winton,librariansof theUnitedNations
Institutefor Trainingand Research(UNITAR):A New InternationalEconomic
Order. SelectedDocuments. 1945-1975, 2 vols. (New York: United Nations,
1977).Seealso JagdishN. Bhaghwati,ed., The New Internationaland
Economic Order: The North-South Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1977);
Karl P. Sauvantand Hajo Hasenpflug,eds., The NIEO: Confrontation or
Cooperation BetweenNorth andSouth(Boulder, CO:Westview Press,1977);
J. S.Singh,A NewInternationalEconomicOrder(NewYork:Praeger, 1977);
D. C. Smyth,The GlobalEconomy andtheThirdWorld:Coalitionor Cleav-
age?WorldPolitics,29 (April1977);RobertL. Rothstein,
GlobalBargaining:
UNCTADandtheQuestfor a NewInternational Economic Order(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton University
Press,
1979);EdwinReuben, ed.,TheChallengeof the
New International Economic Order (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1981);
JeffreyA. Hart, TheNew InternationalEconomicOrder:Cooperation and
Conict in North-SouthEconomicRelations(NewYork: St. MartinsPress,
1983);CraigN. Murphy,WhattheThirdWorldWants:An Interpretation of
the Development and Meaningof the New InternationalEconomicOrder
Ideology,International
StudiesQuarterly,27 (March1983);andStephen
D.
Krasner,StructuralConict: The Third World AgainstGlobal Liberalism
(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1985).
172. Stilesand Akaha,InternationalPolitical Economy,pp. 383-384, in their intro-
ductionto Robert&#39;Rothstein,
Global Bargaining:UNCTAD andthe Questfor a
New International Economic Order, in ibid., pp. 385-396.
173. JohanGaltung,TheNewInternational
OrderandtheBasicNeedsApproach,
in StilesandAkaha,InternationalPoliticalEconomy,pp. 287-307.
174. Stephen
D. Krasner,Transforming
InternationalRegimes:
What the Third
World WantsandWhy, InternationalStudiesQuarterly,25 (March 1981).For
additional discussionsof North-South economic relations and the obstaclesto
achieving
theNIEO,seeRogerD. Hansen,
BeyondtheNorth-South
Stalemate,
for the Council on ForeignRelations(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979);John
GeraldRuggie,ed.,TheAntinomiesof Interdependence
(NewYork:Columbia
University
Press,
1983);RobertO. Keohane,AfterHegemony:
Cooperation
and
Discord in the World Political Economy(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press,
1984).;
andDavidA Lake,PowerandtheThirdWorld:Towarda Realist
 31(June1987),pp.217-234.
175.
See
Commission
onTransnational
Corporations,
Supplementary
Materia
on
theIssue
ofDening
Transnational
Corporations,
United
Nations
Econo
March
23,1979,
pp.8 and11;Commission
onTrans
Re-examination
(NewYork:
United
Nations,
1981),
p.286.
176.
177.
Lairson
and
Skidmore,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.251-254.
Gilpin,Political
Economy,
pp.232-233.
178.
United
Nations
Centre
onTransnational
Corporations,
Transnation
Cor-
porations inWorld Development:
Third
Survey
(NewYork:
United
Nation
179.
1983), p.46. Cited
inFrieden
and
Lake,
International
Political
Economy,
p.170
Raymond Vernon,International
Investment
and
International
Trade
inthe
Product Cycle,
pp. 174-186.
in Frieden
andLake,
International
Political
Econo
180.
Gilpin,
Political
Economy,
pp.236-240.
Ontheroleoftheknowledge-i
industries
andR&D,see
Lynn
Krieger
Mytelka,
Knowledge-Intensiv
Product
and
theChanging
Internationalization
Strategies
ofMultinational
Firms,
inStile
andAkaha,
International
Political
Economy,
pp.
249-265.Mytelka
points
out
that
Third
Worldcountries
withastrong
scientic
and engineering
basesuchas
Argentina,
Brazil,
India,
Korea
andTaiwanare
utilized
bythe
leading
MNCs in
the
global
oligopoly
ofknowledge-intensive
industries,
atermwhich
includes
not
only
R8cDbutalso
design,
engineering,
advertising,
marketing,
managem
banking,
data
processing,
andallother
processes
ininternational
operations
that
181.
lend
themselves
tocomputerization.
Ibid.,
pp.249-50,
263.
Gilpin,Political
Economy,
p.231.
182. Ibid., pp. 241-245.
183.
Joan
Edelman
Spero
has
concluded
that
more
than
95percent
ofrecorded
direct
foreign
investment
owsfromcountries
that
aremembersoftheOrganizati
of
Economic
Cooperation
and Development
(OECD)andthat
aboutthree
quarte
ofthis
total
isinvested
inother
OECDcountries.
The Politics
ofInternatio
Economic
Relations,
3rded.
(New
York:St.Martins
Press,
1985),p.134.
John
R.Onealand
Frances
H.Oneal,
after
comparing
therates
ofinvestment
return
intwogroups
ofcountriesLDCs
andindustrialized-.-conclud
that
depen
dence
results
in systematic
exploitation.
jHegemony,
Imperialism
andthe
Protability
1988), 373.
ofForeign
Investments,
International
Organization,
42(Sprin
184.
John
R.Oneal,
Foreign
Investment
inLess
Developed
Regions,
Politica
Science
Quarterly,
103(Spring,
1988),
137-138.
185.
WorldBank,WorldDevelopment
Report1990(Oxford, England: Oxford
University
Press,
1990),
pp.182-183.
186.
Among theearlier
assessments
ofthepros
andcons
ofMNCs, see
Samue
Huntington,
Transnational
Organizations
inWorld
Politics,
WorldPolitics
25(April
1973),
JohnDiebold,
Multinational
Corporations:
Why BeScared
of
Them? Foreign
Policy,
(12)
(Fall
1973);
Raymond
Vernon,
Sovereignty
atBay
(New York:
Basic
Books,1971);
andRobert
Gilpin,
Three Models
ofthe
Future,
International
Organization,
29(Winter
1979).
Forlater
assessment
of
theimpact
ofMNCsonThirdWorld
countries,
see
Spero,
Politics
ofEconomi
Relations,
chap.
8;andThomasD.Lairson
andDavid
Skidmore,
Internation
500

187.

INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Political
Economy:TheStruggle
forPower
and
Wealth
(New
York:
Harcourt
Press,
1993),pp.256-264.
Foran account
ofhow theThird
World
countries
have
adjusted,
see
Spero,
Politics
ofEconomic
Relations,
pp.
285-287.
EdithPenrose
has
argued
that
the
188. presence
ofMNCs
inThird
World
countries
islikely
tostrengthen
the
govern
ments
ofthose
countries
politically
and
toimprove
their
capabilities
over time
to
control
the
foreign
corporations.
TheState
andMultinational
Enterprise
in
Less-Developed
Countries,
inJeffrey
A.Frieden
and
DavidA.Lake,
eds.,
International
Political
Economy:
Perspectives
onGlobal
Power
andWealth
(New
York:
St.Martins
See
Gilpin
on hePress,
what 1987).
calls
thenewmultinationalism,
Political
Econom
189. pp.
252-262;
Albert
T.Kudrle,
Corporation:
Political
The
Reaction
and
Several
Policy
Faces
ofthe
Response,
inW.
Multinati
Ladd
Hollist
and
190.
F.Lamond Hollist,eds.,
AnInternational
Political
Economy(Boulde
191. CO: Westview, 1985);
Lorraine
Eden
and Evan Potter,
eds.,
Multinatio
Corporations intheGlobal
Political
Economy(NewYork:
St.Martins
Press
192. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty
atBay
(New
York:Basic
Books,
1971).
1993).

Charles Kindleberger,
AmericanBusiness
Abroad (New
Haven:
YaleUnivers
Press,1969),p.209.
193. Robert Keohane and
Joseph
Nye,
Power
andInterdependence:
WorldPolitics
in
Transition (Boston:
Little
Brown,
1977),
cited
inCrane
andAmawi,
Theoret
Evolution, p. 13.
Susan Strange, TheRetreat
ofthe
State:
The Diffusion
ofPower
inthe
World
194. Economy, CambridgeStudies
inInternational
Relations
(Cambridge,
Englan
Cambridge
University
Press,
1996),
p.4.
195. Hendrik
Spruyt,
The
Sovereign
State
Ibid., pp. 4-12.
and
ItsCompetitors:
AnAnalysi
of
Systems
Change,
Princeton
Studies
inHistory
and
Politics
(Princeto
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press,
1994),
p.192.
Ibid.,
pp.192-194.
Spruyt
notes
that
even
without
Europe
state
interests
can
pose
obstacles
toregional
integration,
asbecame
evident
intheeffort
tocreate
a
single
market
by1992.
After
Spruyt
published,
there
werefurther
signs
ofna-
196. tional
intentions,
especially
bythe
United
Kingdom
and
Belgium,
tooptoutof
certain
provisions
inthe
Maastricht
andAmsterdam
Treaties,
including
thos
pertaining
to thesingle
currency.
Louis
W.Pauly
and Simon
Reich,
National
Structures
andMulti-Nat
197. Corporate
Behavior:
Enduring
Differences
intheAge
ofGlobalizat
in
Benjamin
J.Cohen
andCharles
Lipson,
eds.,
Issues
and
Agents
inInternat
Political
Economy
(Cambridge,
MA:MITPress,
1999),
p.155.
Peter
Evans,
TheEclipse
oftheState?
Reections
onStateness
inanEra
of
Globalization,
Foreign
Affairs,
50(October
1997),
65.Evans
here
isquotin
Susan
Strange,
TheDefective
State,
Daedalus,
124(Spring
1995),
56.See
201.

202.

203.
NOTES 5Q]

204. Ibid.,p.36.Forhertreatment
of MITI,seepp.16-17,32-33,52-53,74-77,
196-198.Concerning
equivalents
in Koreaand Germany,
seepp.52-53 and
130-136, respectively.
205.
Ibid., p. 212.
Gilpin, Political Economy,pp. 394-402 and 406-408. Seealso the surveyby
206.
Clive Crook, The WorldEconomy:The Futureof the State, The Economist,
September 20, 1997,pp. 5-48.
Lairsonand Skidmore,
InternationalPoliticalEconomy,
p. 67, citingRobert
Pastor, Congressand the Politics of Foreign Economic Policy (Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress,1980),pp. 96-98.
The GATT norms are summarizedfrom Frieden and Lake, International
PoliticalEconomy,pp. 337-338.
The theory was namedby Robert O. Keohanein The Theory of Hegemonic
Stabilityand Changesin InternationalEconomicRegimesin Ole R. Holsti et
al., eds.,Changesin the InternationalSystem(Boulder,CO: Westview,1980),
pp. 131-162.Accordingto Gilpin, Keohanes viewson the necessityof a hege-
monic power becamemorenegativein 1984. Gilpin, Political Economy,p. 75.
BenjaminJ. Cohen discusses the debateamong Conybeare,Lake, Keohane,
Kindleberger,Gilpin, and Krasnerin his reviewarticle, The PoliticalEconomy
of International Trade, International Organization, 44 (Spring 1990),
207.
261-281. SeealsoBethV. Yarbroughand RobertM. Yarbrough,Cooperation
in the Liberalization of International Trade: After Hegemony,What?
208.
InternationalOrganization,41 (Winter1987),13-36.For two differentviewsof
American hegemony,see Samuel Huntington, The Lonely Superpower,
209. ForeignAffairs, 78 (MarchApril 1999),35-49, and GarryWills, Bully of the
FreeWorld, ibid., 50-59.
Benjamin Cohen, A Brief History of International Monetary Relations, in
210.
FriedenandLake,InternationalPolitical Economy,pp. 337-338.
Regimetheory,usuallyassociated
with StephenD. Krasner,DuncanSnidal,John
Gerard Ruggie, and Oran Young, is discussedin Chapter 10 of this text.
Seepage 444 and Note 101 in this chapter.
Spero,Politics of InternationalEconomicRelations,pp. 112-117, 251-253;
StephenD. Krasner, The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects
for Stabilityin the GlobalTradingSystem,The InternationalStudiesQuarterly,
211. 23 (December1979); Gilpin, Political Economy, 195-199. Seealso Kyle Bagwell
212. and Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, American Economic
Review, 89 (March 1999), 215-248.
Lairsonand Skidmore,InternationalPoliticalEconomy,pp. 152-154.
Ibid., p. 152; Joan Spero, International Trade and Domestic Politics, The
213. Politics of International Economic Relations, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1990, reprinted in Goddard et al., International Political Economy,
502

INTERNATIONALPOLITICALECONOMY
216.
Economy
of theWorld
Trading
System:
FromGATT
to WTO(NewYork:
Oxford UniversityPress,1996).
AlanFriedman,
ClashOverFarmSubsidies
CloudsWTO Agenda,
International
Herald
Tribune,
October
27,1999;
AnneSwardson,
StormAwaits
World
Trade
Talks,
ibid.,November
3,1999;
EricEckholm
andDavid
Sanger,
China
Agrees
to OpenItsMarkets
asStep
intoWTO,ibid.,November 3,
217. 1999;
Reginald
Dale,BigBets
OverChinas
WTO Entry,
ibid.,
November 23,
1999;
Frances
Williams,
U.S.andEurope
TrytoHealFarm Rifts,Financial
Times,November30, 1999.
Frances
Williams,
MarkSugman,
andGuydeJonquieres,
Protesters
Throw
WTO Meeting
intoDisarray,
Financial
Times,
December
1,1999.
Most
ofthe
protesters
wantedto1mposetheirownsocial
agendas
ontheWTOobjective
thatwerenotpartof thepurpose
ofWTO,whichwasto promote
freetrade.
GuydeJonquireres,
SystemThreatened
byItsOwnSuccess,
World
Trade
Survey,
Financial
Times,
November
29,1999.
David
E.Sanger
andJoseph
Kahn,
Protests
Tossa Wrench
intoWTOWorks,International
HeraldTribune,
December
2, 1999;
BrianKnowlton,
RiotsCastCloudOverWTOTalks,
International
HeraldTribune,
December
2, 1999.Forthebackground
of orga-
218. nized
labors
protests
againstWTOat Seattle,
andwhatsomeregard
asthe
darksideof globalization,
seeJayMazur.
Labors
Newlnternationalism,
219. Foreign
Affairs,79.(January-February
2000),79-93.
Andrew
Linklater,
Beyond
Realism
andMarxism:
Critical
Theory
andInternationa
Relations
(NewYork:St.Martins
Press,
1990),
esp.
pp.1-34,165-172.
See,
for example,
Frieden
andLake,International
Political
Economy,
esp.
pp.1-17;
Paul
R.ViottiandMarkV.Kauppi,
International
Relations
Theory
Realism,
Pluralism,
Globalism
(NewYork:Macmillan,
1987);
Kenneth
Waltz,
Theory
ofInternational
Relations
(Reading,
MA:Addison-Wesley,
1979);
and
theworks
byStephen
Krasner,
Immanuel Wallerstein,
Christopher
Chase-Dun
Michael
W.Doyle,
andothers
citedinthischapter.
Rajan Menon
andjohnR.
Oneal
havereviewed
thedebate
aboutimperialism
in termsofsocialist
andcapi-
talisttheories,
realist
theories,
andthetheory
ofimperialism
asaresult
oflateral
development
220. pressure,
asexpounded byNazliChoucri
andRobert North
(treated
in Chapter
8); Explaining
Imperialism:
TheStateof theArt as
Reected
in ThreeTheories,Polity(Winter1987),169-193.
Spero,
Politics
ofInternational
Economic
Relations,
pp.8-12.
221.
Stephen
C.Neff,Friends
butNoAllies:
Economic
Liberalism
andtheLawof
Nations
(NewYork:Columbia
University
Press,
1990),
pp.11-20.
222. Robert
Kuttner,
Managed TradeandEconomic Sovereignty,
in FrankJ.
Macchiarola,
ed.,International
Trade:
TheChanging RoleoftheUnited
States
Proceedings
oftheAmerican Academy
ofPolitical
Science,
37(4)(1990),
37-53,
esp.
37-44.
Foracomparison
offoreign
tradeanddomestic
economic
policies
of
japan
andtheUnited
States,
whichcasts
lightonwhyeach
country
considers
it-
selfanadvocate
of freetradeandtheothera proponent
of managed
trade,see
Samuel
Kernell,
ed.,Parallel
Politics:
Economic
Policymalaing
injapanandthe
United
States
(Washington,
DC:Brookings
Institution,
1991).
SeealsoCletus
C.
Coughlin
etal.,Protectionist
TradePolicies:
ASurvey
ofTheory,
Evidence
and
Rationale,
Robert
Baldwin,
TheNewProtectionism:
A Response
to Shifts
in
 NOTES 503
223. Kapstein,
Governing
theGlobal
Economy,
p. 182.
224. Strange,
Protectionism
andWorld
Politics,
p.138.
225.
Charles
R.Beitz,
International
Liberalism
andDistributive
Justice:
ASurvey
of
Recent
Thought,
World
Politics,
51(January
1999),
269-296,
cited
at270.
In
hisreview,
Beitz
devotes
agooddeal
ofattention
toJohn
Rawls,
ATheory
of
justice
(Cambridge,
MA:Harvard
University
Press,
1971)
andtocommenta
by others on Rawls.
226.
Michael
Nicholson,
International
Relations:
AConcise
Introduction
(NewYork
NewYorkUniversity
Press,
1998),
p.123.
227.
Frommid-1997
onward
through
the
nexttwoyears,
virtually
everybiweekly
issu
ofIMFSurvey
featured
articles
aboutthenancial
crisis.
SeealsoCarlGewir
AsianCrisis:
Catalyst
forChange
orDisaster?
International
HeraldTribun
August
17,1998;
Asian
Leaders
UrgeTokyotoFixEconomy,ibid.,
June
17,
1998;
Stephen
R.Weisman,
AReal Crisis
Encounters
RealInertia
inJapan
ibid.,
September
7,1998;
David
E.Sanger,
Uneasy
Split
Developing
withJapan
The
New York
Times,
September
7,1998;Russia
toAllow RubletoFall
by34%
toSurvive
Cash
Crisis,
International
Herald
Tribune,
August
18,1998;
David
Hoffman,
Russia
Tries
toAvert
aRun onItsBanks,ibid.,
August
21,1998;Pau
Blustein,
RussiaattheBrink:Another
Bailout?ibid.,
August22-23,1998
Richard
Waters,
FearofFalling,Financial
Times,August29,1998;
Celesti
Bohlen,
RussiaSmolders
asWorldWaits, The
New YorkTimes,
Septemb 2,
1998;
Russia
toAllowHalfofItsBanks
toFail,
International
Herald
Tribun
ibid., November13, 1998.
228.
Westernanalysts
whocriticized
thecronycapitalismthesis
included
John
Plender,
WesternCrony
Capitalism,
Financial
Times,October
4,1998;
Tom
Plate,
NoMoreEconomic BlameGames against
Asia,International
Herald
Tribune,
January
15,1999;
DavidE.Sanger
andMarkLandler,
Crisis
Appea
Over,
butAsias
IllsLinger,
TheNewYorla
Times,
July13,1999.
Asian
business
leaders,
often
lectured
byU.S.ofcials
forbailing
outsinking
banks
instead
of
allowing
them
tofail,accused
theUnited
States
ofdoing
thesame
thing
when
theFederal
Reserve
Bank ofNewYork
urged
private
bankstopump
$3.5
billion
intorescuing
a U.S.hedge
fund.MarkLandler,
ForAsians,
U.S.Bailout
of
229.
Fund
IsInconsistent,
International
Herald
Tribune,
September
29,1998.
Paul
Blustein
detected
signs
thatthecrisis
shaking
theworlds,
nancial
markets
coulddeala historic
setback
to theadvance
of Western-style
capitalism
Financial
Crises MayStallCap1talisms
Global
March,
WashingtonPost,
September6, 1998.
230. AlanFriedman,
World
Bank
Rewrites
thePrescription
forAsia,
Internationa
HeraldTribune,September
30,1998.
231. German
Chancellor
Helmut
Kohlwarned:
It isoftheutmost
importance
that
theonly
world
power
fullyliveuptoitsduties.
I only
hope
the[political]
turbu-
lence
inWashington
canbeputtorestasquickly
aspossible.
TheChancello
wasreferring
toPresident
Cl1ntons
personal
problems,
whichwere
leadingto
impeachment
proceedings
intheCongress.
Robert
Chote,
Wakeup Callfor
Greenspan,
Financial
Times,
September
15,1998.
232. Clinton
Calls
forUrgent
World
Meeting
toFace
Biggest
Financial
Challenge
International
HeraldTribune,
September
15,1998.
233. Clinton
Calls
forFundtoFight
World Crises,
ibid.,October
3-4,1998.
234. Robert
Chote,Struggle
isontot thepieces
together
again,
FinancialTimes
Survey,
October
2, 1998;AlanFriedmanandJonathan Gage,
G-7sGlobal
504 INTERNATIONAL
POLlTlCAL
ECONOMY
ne,October30,1998;
Remedy
Seen
as
insubstantial,
International
Herald
Tribu
ibid.,October30-31,
Tom
Buerkle,
G-7Nations
Unveil
Financial
Blueprint,
" Financial Times,
1998;
Robert
Chote,
Differences
emerge
over
reform,
235.
Alan Friedman
February1999.
System" and Jonathan
InternationalHerald Gage,AFebruary
Proposal
Tribune, 1,toMonitor
1999.See World
also Financ
Tietmey
Proposal: Financial
Supervision ofGlobalStabilityForum
Markets,IMFconvened
Survey,toPromote
March Cooperat
8,1999, pp.
6-70.and
The
Council ofForeign Relations
appointed
its
merit own Task
officials
andForceofdistinguishe
academicstostudyexecu
thecrisis
and propose
tives,
remedies.
fundmanagers,
SeeThe
former
Future
govern
oftheInternational
Financial
Architec
AReport, Foreign Affairs,
78 (November/December
1999),169-184.
International
Herald
236.
David S.
Tribune, Broder,
January On
11, World
2000. Stage,
Afew U.S.
months IsUnrivaled,"
earlier,
Alan Friedmanhad written
The
creditlast
year
crunch of
and the twentieth
aglobal century
recession.began
But theamid
cyclewidespread
isnow fears
turning. of
The agloba
worst has
been avoided,
markets have the troubledAsianregionhasbegunbouncing
stabilized,
and the
new consensus
among back,
economic nancia
forecas is
that the
Swings world
from isheaded
Crisis forsolid
toRecovery, growth
ibid., and recovery.
September
25-26, Global
1999.SeeEcono
alsoPete
ght Expertsby Surprise,
ibid.,Decembe 29,
1999. Gosselin
G.-Gosselin,
chided Yale
U.S.BoomCau
historian
PaulKennedy
decline forthe
aspessimisti
asgracefully great quest
Britain?One
heposed adecade earlier:
Canwe
can gather
from this
how perilous
itcan betomakegrand predictions
ertheless, inintern
torememberthatthe
tional
Dow political
Jones economy.
industrial Itremains
average sobering,
continued nev
torise
higherthanitwasinDecem
ned about irra-
1996,
tionalwhen Federal
exuberance Reserve
inthe Chairman
markets.
On Alan
the Greenspan
eveofthe war
millenniumRober J.
veboom isthatmostpeopledonot
Samuelsonwrote: The essence
ofaspeculati d behavedifferently.
believe
that
IllOmens itis
for aspeculative
the Great boom.
Boom, Iftheydid,
they
International woul
Herald Tribune,
Decemb 29,
1999.

237.
William
Worries
thatOnce Again 1tsEating
Drozdiak,
Falling
Behind:
Europe nuary24,2000;
Americas
Dust,
WashingtonPost
NationalWeeklyEdition,
bilityorRenewed
Ja
Recession,
International
Clay
Chandler,
Japan Faces Possi
Herald
Tribune,
February7,2000.
238.
JosephKahn, U.S.Seeks
HelpfromG-7 Allies
onTrade
Deficit,
ibid.,
Janu
239.
According
20 percentto
22-23, 2000.
JimHoagland,
consumed66 UN
times
thefigures
indicate
material
and that
the
worlds
resources
of
the wealt
worldspoor
fth.InNew Millennium,
theWorld IsConfronted
byaTable of
Contradictions,
Double Edge, ibid.,
January
ibid.,
January3,
2000;
4,200 Robert
J.
; &#39;Samuelson,
dman Globaliz
reports
that
more tha
&#39;
anannualforumin
Davos,
half
of Switzerland,
thetop fearthat
corporate theInternet
executives
o will
widen
the
wealthgapbetw
Chapter 10
Theories of

Internatio

Cooperat

and
Integrat
COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
506 THEOR.ESOF INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONAND INTEGRATION

international
regimes,
denedasagreed
rules,regulations,
norms,anddecision-
makingprocedures,
withinwhichstatesseekto resolve
issues
andaround
whichactorexpectations
converge.
Latersections
ofthischapter
aredevoted
to
a discussion
of international
regimes.Howandwhystatesdenetheirinterests
in termsthatincludeparticipation
in international
institutions
or aspartof in-
ternational
regimes, Coalitions
andalliancesprovidea majorarenafor theory.
To whatextentdo actorsshapetheinstitutionalarrangements thataredevel-
opedfor cooperative
purposes?
Bythesame
token,howdo theinstitutions
themselves
affectthe interactivebehavioralpatternsof their members?
These
questions
aretheobjectof ongoing
debates
between
proponents
of neorealist
andneoliberal
theory,aswehavenotedin Chapters
2 and3.
Cooperation
mayariseeitherfroma commitment
onthepartof theindi-
vidual to the welfareof the collectivityor asa resultof perceivedself-interest.
Theclassical
modelfor understanding
the basisfor cooperative
behaviorin
pursuitof self-interest
is foundin thePrisoners
Dilemma game, discussed
in
Chapter 11,in whichthetwoprisoners,eachheldin isolation
fromtheother,
haveanincentive eitherto cooperate
or defect.If theycooperate,
in thesense
that neitherconfessesto thecrime,bothmaybefreedfor lackof evidence. If
oneconfesses in the hopeof a pleabargain,the otherwill receivea heavier
sentencethan the onewho confesses.
Underwhat conditions,therefore,does
eachhaveanincentive
to cooperate
with theotherin pursuitof self-interest?
Bythesame
token,JeanJacques
Rousseaus
gameof StagHuntsetsfortha
modelin whichthestagis mostlikelyto becapturedif all participants
in the
chase worktogether in pursuitof theircommon goal.4If oneor morepartici-
pantsdefect,sayto chase arabbit,thestagismorelikelyto escape. Thus,with
cooperativebehavior,thestagwill besubdued, andallwill benetin theform
of a goodmeal.In boththePrisoners Dilemma andtheStagHunt,thekeyto
cooperativebehavior liesin theextentto whicheachperson believes
thatthe
otherswill cooperate. In theabsence of suchan assumption aboutothers,
noneof theparticipants is likelyto doso.Thus,thecentralissue for a theory
of cooperation
based onself-interestistheextentto whichthemutualrewards
arisingfromcooperation cansupplant a conceptionof interest
based onuni-
lateralactionandcompetition.
Theproblemmaybeillustratedbyreference
to
the casein which two statesmaintaininternationaltrade barriers.If both re-
movesuchobstacles, eachwill benet.If onenationgetsrid of traderestric-
tionsunilaterally,
theotherhasanincentive to enterthenewmarketsthereby
provided
whilekeeping
itsowndomestic
market
closed
to imports.
Again,the
issueis how to developa theoryof cooperation
in situations,as Robert
Axelrodsuggests,
in whichself-interest
is pursued
in theabsence
of a central
authority
capable
of enforcing
cooperative
behavior.5
Because
international
cooperation
necessarily
takesplacein a decentral-
izedsetting
lacking
effective
institutions
andnormsbetween
or among
cultur-
ally differentiated
andgeographically
separated
units,the needto overcome
problemsof inadequate
informationaboutthemotivations
andintentionsof
thevarious
parties
is substantial.
Of centralimportance
for a theoryof coop-
eration is the extent to which the incentives for, or benets from, cooperation
 COOPERATION
AND
INTERNATIONAL
INTEGRATIO
507

whichsuch
cooperative
patterns
canberealized
represent
ingredients
inathe
oryofcooperation
based
onself-interest
inananarchic
international
syste
The
theoretical
discussion
ofinternational
cooperation
encompass
rela
tionships
between
twostates
orrelationships
among
larger
numbers
ofunit
known
asmultilateralism.
Although
cooperative
arrangements
emerge
fre
quently
between
twostates,
amajor
focus
ofinternational
cooperatio
has
been
multilateral.
According
toJohn
Gerard
Ruggie,
multilateralism
isdene
asaninstitutional
formthatcoordinates
relations
among
threeormore
states
onthebasis
ofgeneralized
principles
ofconduct.
7Thus
theterm
multi

ternational
organizations,
international
regimes,
and
less
concrete
phenom
termed
international
orders,
such
astheopen
trading
order
ofthelatenine
teenth
century
ortheglobal
economy
oftheearly
twentyrst
centu
Accordingly,
bebased
multilateralism,
onabroad
range
cooperation
ofitems
among
three
oronspecic
or
more
issues.
actors,
may
Cooperative
actio
may
take
place
within
aninstitutional
setting
that
ismore
orless
forma
withgreater
orlesser
numbers ofagreedrules,
accepted
norms,
orcomm
decision-making
procedures.
Toreturntoaprincipal
theme ofthischapter,
theories
ofcooperativ
be-
haviorhave
asacentralpremise
theneedtounderstand
and
todevelop
politi
calconsensus
about thebasis
fortheinstitutional
arrangements
within
which
suchbehavior
emergesandevolves.
Beyondthemultilateralism
ofinternatio
organizations,
international
regimes,
and international
actors
lies
the
conce
ofpolitical
communityandtheprocess
ofintegration
bywhich
suchentities
are
created.
What were
thefactors
leading
totheformation
ofthenation-sta
Whatconditions
andcircumstances
contribute
tothebuilding
oflarger
inte-
grated
entities
beyond
thenation-state
attheregional
orglobal
levels?
Hereitis

from
thecommunity
ordoesit come
from
ahigher
cosmopolitan
imperati
based,
forexample,
onuniversal
principles
that
lead
peoples
into
increasin
cooperative
associations
andintegrated
communities?

Cosmopolitanismlcommunitarianism
Having
addressed
theutopianrealist
controversy,
together
withitsmore
re-
cent
manifestation
intheform
ofneoliberal
and
neorealist
theories
inChap-
ter2,it isappropriate
here
toconsider
thecosmopolitan
andcommunitari
distinction.
Utopian
and
realist
theory
stand
insharp
contrast
toeach
other
508 Tl-IEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION

among
otherreasons,
because
oftheirdiffering
approaches
totheorigins
ofin
stitutions
andpoliticalbehaviorgenerally.
Theutopianestablishes normsor
standards,derivedfromsome highersource,asabasis forpoliticsandthuslies
withintheframework of cosmopolitantheory.
Therealistholdsthatpolitical
behavior stemsfroma particular
setting andthereforefallswithincommuni-
tariantheory.
Totherealist,ethicsis a functionof politics.Fortheutopian,
politics
isafunction
of ethics.
Fortherealist,
universal
moralprinciples
can-
notbeapplied tospecic
situations;
instead
political
action
mustbejudgedac-
cording totheextent
towhichit achieves
itsbasicobjective,
securing
thena-
tionalinterest,
whichmeans
ultimately
survival
of thestate.Fortheutopian,
universal
moralstandards
providea basisfor evaluating
statebehavior.
Suchcontrasting
approaches
leaddirectlyto a discussion
of cosmopoli
tanism/communitarianism.
Tracingits originsfrom the ancientworld, cos-
mopolitan
theory
holds
thatvalues
andpolitical
behavior
come
fromauniver-
sal source.The ancientStoics,from whichcosmopolitan
theoryitself
originates,
believed
thattheywere
citizens
ofthecosmos,
oruniverse,
rather
thanbelonging
onlytoaspecicpolitical
unit,orpolzs.
Although
theindivid-
ualresides
in a particular
political
unit,thisisnotthesource
of allpolitical
standards
andvalues,whichinsteadcomefromthecosmos.
Thecosmos
con-
tainsvalues,
including
divinelawandhuman
nature,
thatareuniversally
ap-
plicable.
In otherwords,
humankind
ispartof a universal
city.Inthissense,
political
behavior
isderived
fromthecosmos,
asthesource
ofpolitical
stan-
dardsandvalues.
AsChrisBrownpointsout,thereis nonecessary
connection
between
cosmopolitanism
andworldgovernment;
thereis onlytheassump-
tionthatexisting
political
structures
arenotthesource
ofultimate
values.
Insteadanotherbasisfor politicalbehavioris to befoundin thecosmos.
Standing
insharp
contrast
iscommunitarian
theory.
Thebasis
forpolitical
behaviorlieswithinthecommunity,
or thepolls.Politicalvaluesor normative
standards
develop
outoftheirspecic
setting.
Individuals
maydevelop
loyalties
to largerentities,
including
thepoliticalunitin whichtheyexist.Communitie
arebased onhistory andculture
andevolve overtimeinresponse totheirrespec-
tivecircumstances.
Somearecreated
asaresultof warandconquest;
othersarise
asaresult
ofvoluntary
association
among theirmembers.
Thus,theevolution
of
Europe
overmanycenturies
proceeded
withinavariety
ofpolitical
unitsleading
to a series
of nationsand/orstates,
eachwith itsparticulartraditions,language,
andnationalcustoms. Tothecommunitarianthenationstateprovides theessen-
tialbuilding
blocks
fortheEuropeanUnionandforotherEuropean institutions
Communitarianism is generally
denedasthecreation of theconditions
andattitudesrequired
forbuilding
inclusivecommunities. Accordingto Henry
Tam,contemporary communitarianism is based on an intellectual
tradition
thatcanbedivided intofourphases.9In thefirstphase,
communitarian ideas
canbetracedasfar backasthefourthcenturyB.C.At thattime,Aristotlesug-
gested
thatlifeastheindividual
experiences
liferepresents
theessential
basis
forpolitical
institutions.
Aristotle
rejected
theideaof knowledge beyond
the
grasp
ofthepopulation.Inotherwords,
political
orotherelites
have
noinher-
entclaimto wisdomandgovernance
separable
fromthemasses
of people
 COOPERATION
ANDINTERNATIONAL
INTEGRATION
509
Knowledge
about
political,
social,
oreconomic
issues
arises
fromtheexperi
ence
ofthecommunity
rather
than
fromuniversal
claims.
Initssecond
phase
communitarianism
was inuencedby FrancisBacon,who contended
that
knowledge
based
onauthoritative
claims
isworthless
unless
itsaccuracy
can
beshown
byexperimentation.
Knowledgeadvances
byinclusive
ideas
orhy-
potheses
that can be subjected
to testingin accordancewith the scientic
method(discussed
in Chapter1).ThusBacons contributionto communitari-
anism
liesin anegation
of claims
to superior
knowledge
onthepartof groups
in politicalpowerwithouttheparticipationof otherpeoplecapableof con-
tributingto thepolicyprocess.
According
to Tam,thisspecically
includes
thosewho will conductexperiments,
developaxioms,checkfor conrma-
tionsor negations,
andgraduallyexpandthe rangeof knowledgeon which
humankind canrelyto improvethequalityof life.1°
The third phaseinto which Tam dividesthe evolutionof communitarian-
ism occurredin themid-nineteenthcentury.Theterm communitarianism came
into useto characterize
thecommunity-based
societyadvocated
or endorsed
by RobertOwen,Joseph
Proudhon,
andJohnStuartMill. Sucha society
couldbebased
ongreater
autonomy
for localgroups,
encouragement
to peo-
pleto buildcooperative
associations,
andimprovededucation
for all citizens.
In otherwords,
participatory
democracy
wasessential
to thepromotion
of
representative
government
based
on equalityof opportunity
andhopefully
alsoasfull equalityof participation
aspossible.
Thefourthphaseleadinginto contemporary communitarianism
occurred
fromthelatenineteenth
century
intotheearlytwentieth
century.
According
to
HenryTam,its principalguresincludedtheBritishphilosophers
Thomas
Hill
Greenand LeonardTrelawneyHobhouse,the FrenchsociologistEmile
Durkhem,andthe American educationalist
andphilosopher JohnDewey.
Together,
theysetforthideasbased ontheassumption thatindividual
rights
cannot
beseenin isolationfromtheindividuals
relationship
withthebroader
community.
Theyrejected theconceptof theunbridled
marketandanyother
forcesthatpreventindividuals
fromjoiningtogetherin inclusive
communities.
Fortheearlytwenty-rst
century,
communitarianism represents
a quest
for al-
ternatives
bothto authoritarianism
in thepoliticalsetting
andaneconomicsys-
temdrivenexclusively
bymarketforces.In sum,communitarianism astheterm
is mostwidelyusedin thetwenty-rstcenturyis basedon theneedto build
communitiesin whichall peoplecanachieve
fulllmentonthebasisof equality.
Muchof international
relations
theorycanbecategorized
oranalyzed
with
reference
to cosmopolitanor communitarian
thought.
As ChrisBrownsug-
gests,thesetwo approaches,takentogether, do offera fairlycomprehensive
frameworkwithin whichthoughton international relationscanbe situated
and,indeed,for muchof thelastcenturywassosituated.11 Eachfurnishes a
basisfor addressingfundamentallyimportantquestionsandhypotheses about
the sourceof politicalbehaviorandthevaluesthat informpoliticalrelation-
ships.Eachcontains numerouslinkages
with thebasictheories of international
relations,
notablyrealist/neorealist
andutopian/neoliberaltheories, alongwith
theoriesof integration
andconict.Thuswe mayconceive of integrationasa
510 THEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATiON
ANDINTEGRATION
result
ofpolitical
community,
orasaphenomenon
thatiscommunitari
Alternately,
wemay think
ofintegration
asaresult
ofstandards
ornorms
in-
herent
inthecosmos
oruniverse.
A theory
ofintegration
could
contain
cos-
mopolitan
and communitarian
elements.
Itsprinciples
couldbebasedonideas
considered
to beuniversal
suchastheinalienable
rightto freedom,
asex-
pressed
intheAmerican
Declaration
ofIndependence,
andthecommunita
idea
thattherepresentative
government,
asexpressed
intheU.S.
Constitution
is based
ontheconsent
of thegoverned.

IntegrationDenitions
Asweconsider
integration
theory,
it isnecessary
attheoutset
toaddress
the
problem
ofdenition.
For
the
most
part,
integration
theorists
have
emphas
theintegrative
process
attheinternational
level
asprimarily
consensua
or
communitarian,
based
principally
onthedevelopment
ofshared
norms,
values
interests,
orgoals.Although
political
units
constituting
theinternational
sys-
temwithin
whichintegration
takes
place
mayhave
been formedbyconques
theevolution
ofpeaceful
integration
beyond
thenation-state
issaid
todepen
onperceived
shared
needs.
Ifwebegin
from
thebasic
assumption
that
globa
conquest
asabasis
forworld
order
hasproven
impossible,
itfollows
that
the
unitsof theinternational
system
willmove
toward
cooperative
arrangemen
asthebasis
forregional
orglobal
political
community.
Theterm
community
it-
self
iswidely
discussed
inintegration
literature
and,
asmight
beexpected
in
communitarian
writings.
There
arecommunities
ofideas,
orepistemic
commu
nities,
aswediscussed
inChapter
4,inaddition
tocommunities
ofpeople
From
acommunitarian
perspective,
according
toAmatai
Etzioni,
acommun
isa shared
setofsocial
bonds orasocial
web,asdistinct
fromonetoone
bonds.
These
bonds,which
areinandofthemselves
usually
neutral,
carry
aset
ofshared
moral
andsocial
values.12
InEtzionis
view,
again
inkeeping
with
thecommunitarian
approach,
thevalues
held
bycommunities
cannotbeim-
posedfromtheoutside,
butarise
instead
fromthemembers
ofthecommun
ininteraction
witheach
other.
Thesurvey
oftheories
ofintegration,
subse
quently
inthis
chapter,
generally
accords
withthis
perspective,
especially
aswe
discuss
theevolution
oftheEUandother
European
integration
efforts
base
heavilyonthenation-states
ofEurope
withtheir
diversehistories
andculture
Althoughintegration
hasbeendened asaprocess
leadingtoaform ofpo-
litical
community,
there
arenumerous
denitionstowhich weturnbriey for
illustrative
purposes.
Ernst
Haasdenes integration
asaprocess whereby po-
litical
actors
inseveral
distinct
national
settings
arepersuadedtoshifttheir
loy-
alties,
expectations,
and
political
activities
towardanew center,
whose institu
tions possess
ordemandjurisdiction
over thepreexisting
nationalstates
Another integration
theorist
whosework isdiscussed
inthischapter,
KarlW.
Deutsch, referred
topolitical
integration
asaprocess
thatmay lead
toacond
tioninwhich agroup
ofpeople
hasattained
within
aterritoryasenseofcom
munity andofinstitutions
andpractices
strong
enough toassure,foralong
time,
dependable
expectations
ofpeaceful
change
among
itspopulation.
 COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 511

Theoriesof internationalcooperationand integrationpurport to explain

behaviorin a decentralized
settingin which statesfaceproblemsfor which so-
lutionsbeyondthestatearerequired.Thisincludesspecicfunctionalsec-
tors suchas trade policy in which the needfor cooperativebehavioris be-
lieved to exist. Such functions are said to transcendthe capacity of the
nation-stateto achievesatisfactorysolutionsby unilateralmeans.Accordingly,
stateshavean interestin cooperativerelationshipsleadingto mutually ac-
ceptablesolutions to common problems.In addition to trade policy, the
agendaof issuescallingfor cooperativeactionincludes,for example,the envi-
ronment,telecommunications, migration, health, investment,monetarypol-
icy,and airline safety.In contrastto issuesof political and military security,or
what is termed high politics, of principal concern as we have seento realist
theory, this other agendaof issuesis said to constitute low politics. Instead of
focusingon the natureof conflictin an anarchicsociety,emphasisis placedon
the circumstancesin which statesengagein cooperation in specific functional
issuesin which they havecommonintereststhat cannot be addressed by the
nation-stateactingaloneif all are to benefit.In other wordsthe mutual gains
from cooperativebehavior are held to outweigh the benets from acting
alone.
Integrationtheoristsgenerallysharea commoninterestin understanding
the processby which loyalty or attention is shifted from one point of focus to
another,from the local unit to a broader or larger political entity, from the tribe
to thenation,or from thenationto supranationalunit. Theyhavean interestin
patterns of communications and transactions within units to be integrated as
indicators of interaction, itself deemedessentialfor integration. Severalintegra-
tion theoristshold that integrativebehavioris adoptedbecause of expectations
of joint rewardsfor doingso or penaltiesfor failing to do so.Initially, suchex-
pectationsare likely to developamongelite groups,both in the governmental
and the private sectors. For example, governmentsmay cooperate with each
other to enhancetheir security.Private sector groups may join together across
nationalfrontiersbecause
of theprospectof commongain,asin thecaseof cor-
porations merging with their foreign counterparts or businesselites favoring
the EU. Successfulintegration dependson peoplesability to internalize the inte-
grativeprocessandtherebyto becomefully committedto it. Someintegration
theorists emphasizethe effect of successfulintegration in one sector on the abil-
ity of participating units to integrate in other sectors.Finally, it is broadly as-
sumedthat integrationis a multidimensionalpolitical, societal,cultural, and
economicphenomenon.The integrativeprocessleadsto a senseof common
identity and community.Integrationarisesas a resultof supportfrom within
the unit that is being integrated, as in the EU.

Functionalism and International Cooperation

Functionalismprovidesan essential
basisfor understanding integrationandco-
operationtheory.The functionalistwritings of David Mitrany (1888-1975)
greatly inuencedsubsequentefforts to developintegrationtheory.Born in
512 TI-IEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION
Romania,
Mitrany
spent
most
ofhislifeinEngland,
where
hepublished
in1943
whatbecame
hismost
important
theoretical
contribution,
A Working
Peace
System.According
toMitrany,
theworldofthetwentieth
century
wascharac
terized
bygrowingnumbersoftechnical
issues
thatcouldberesolved
only
by
cooperative
action
acrossstateboundaries.
Such issues,
whetherwithin
or
amongstates,
could
best
beaddressedbyhighlytrained
specialists,
rather
than
bypoliticians
who,
bytheir
professional
backgrounds,
generally
lacked
techni-
calskills.
Mitrany
believedthattheemergence ofissues
requiring
detailed
knowledgeandspecial
skills
would lead
totheneed forcollaborative
action
de-
voidofapolitical
orconictual
content
and therefore
assignable
totechnical
ex-
perts
whose preferred
solutions
wouldbebased onconsiderations
clearly
sepa-
rable
from thepolitical-military,
highpolitics
issues
ofstate-to-state
relations
AccordingtoMitrany,such
pressingproblems
could beaddressedout-
side
thepoliticized
context
ofideology
ornationalism.
Byemphasizingcoop-
eration
tondsolutions according
to a specic
need orfunction, thebasis
would becreated
forathickeningwebofcooperationleading
totheforma-
tionandstrengthening
ofinternational
regimes
andinstitutions.
Themore
successful
cooperation
wasinone functional
setting,
thegreater
would bethe
incentive
forcollaboration
inotherelds.AccordingtoMitrany,
it wasboth
essential
andpossible,
through
acooperative
learningprocess,
toreplace mu-
tualsuspicion
withgrowing
trust
thatwould
extend
tosectorsbeyond
thatin
whichintegration
was already
taking
place.
Thus,functionalism
containe
thebasis
forwhatMitrany termed
ramication.
In thissense,
hewascon-
vinced
thattheprocess
bywhich such
cooperation
came about
asaresult
of
perceived
need inonefunctional
task
wouldinitself
contribute,
orramify,
to
achangeinattitudes
infavorofevengreater
cooperationover
awidenin
spectrum
ofissues.
Such
aprocess
would
notonly
broaden
and
deepen
the
sectors
ofcooperation,
butalsodiminish
prospects
for,andeventually
elimi-
nate,
warbytransforming
attitudes
andcreating
norms ofpeaceful
rathe
than
warlike
behavior.
From functional
cooperation
would come
theessenti
basis
forinstitutions
intheformofinternational
organizations
andregime
based
onmultilateralism
thatwould
ultimately
diminish
theimportance
and
relevance
of thenation-state.

Neofunctionalism
Astheintellectual
descendant
of functionalism,
neofunctionalism
builds
on
Mitranys
work.Itsprincipal
contribution
liesintheelaboration,
modica
tion,and
testing
ofhypotheses
about
integration.
Muchofthefocus
ofneo
functionalist
theoryistheEuropean
Union
(EU)
and,
inparticular,
theproces
bywhich
itsinstitutions
have
been
developed.
Major
emphasis
isplaced
on
therole
ofpolitical
parties
and
interest
groups
and
theextent
towhich
politi
calelitesin theunitsto beintegrated
support
or oppose
integratio
Neofunctionalist
theory,
withinitsEUcontext,
attaches
majorimportance
to
anintegrative
process
thatinitially
includes
specicfunctional
tasks
buthas
thepotential
toexpand
intoother
sectors
possibly
leading
toapolitical
unio
 COOPERATION
AND INTERNATIONALINTEGRATION g .

of some
kind.Neofunctionalist
writings
include
worksbyErnstHaas
Philippe
Schmitter,
LeonLindberg,
Joseph
Nye,RobertKeohane,
am;
Lawrence
Scheineman,
manybutnotall of whicharebased
ontheEuropean
integration experience.
Writingaboutthe earlypostWorldWar II effort to integrateWestern
Europe,ErnstHaas,for example,examinedthe EuropeanCoal and Steel
Community (ECSC). He postulatedthatthedecision
to proceed with integra-
tion,or to oppose
it, dependedontheexpectationsof gainor lossheldby ma-
jor groupswithin the unit to be integrated.Ratherthan relyingupon a
schemeof integrationwhich posits altruisticmotivesas the conditionersof
conduct,it seemsmore reasonableto focus on the interestsand valuesde-
fended
bythemasfartoocomplex
to bedescribed
in suchsimple
termsasthe
desirefor Franco-German
peace
or thewill to a UnitedEurope.19Haasas-
sumedthat integrationproceedsasa resultof thework of relevantelitesin the
governmental
andprivatesectors,
who supportintegration
for essentially
pragmaticreasons,suchas the expectationthat the removalof trade barriers
will increase
markets
andprots.Elitesanticipating
thattheywill gainfrom
activitywithin a supranationalorganizationalframeworkarelikely to seek
out similarlymindedeliteswith whomto cooperate acrossnationalfrontiers.
Actorscometo the realizationthat their interestsare bestservedby a
commitment to a largerorganization
suchastheECSCin placeof, or in addi-
tion to, thenationstate.Conceptionsof interestareredenedwithina larger
context.Haasadvances
the corollary:Integrativelessonslearnedin onefunc-
tionalcontextwill beappliedin others,thuseventually
supplanting
interna-
tionalpolitics.2°
Crucialto integration
is thegradualpoliticization
of the
actorspurposeswhich wereinitially consideredtechnicalor noncontrover-
sial.21Theactors
becomepoliticized,
Haasasserts,
because,
in response
to
initial technical
purposes,
theyagreeto consider
thespectrum
of means
con-
sideredappropriateto attain them.
To the functionalist proposition that a welfare orientation is achieved
mostreadilyby leavingthe work of internationalintegrationto expertor
technicalgroups,Haasofferedtwo qualications: (1)thatsuchgroupsfroma
regionalsetting,suchasWestern Europe,aremorelikelyto achieve integra-
tion thanan organization with representatives
from all overthe world;and
(2)thatexpertsresponsibleto no oneat thenationallevelmaynd thattheir
recommendations areignored.Therefore, he suggested that expertmanagers
of functionallyspecicnationalbureaucracies,joinedtogetherto meeta spe-
cic need,arelikelyto bethemosteffective carriersof integration.
Regional
integration,at leastin Europe,hasmovedforward in the decades
sinceHaas
andotherswroteaboutintegration theory.In thisprocess
theelitesandspe-
cialiststo whomHaasreferred,buildingon Mitranyswork,playedanindis-
pensablealthoughnot exclusiverole. Beyondsuchelites,outsidethe various
governments,were the ofcial leadersthemselves,who in somecasessup-
portedandat othertimesopposed
Europeanintegration.
Therelationshipbe-
tweenthesepublicandprivate-sector
groupsin theintegrative
process
is dis-
cussedlater in this chapter.
514 TIIEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

Spillover and the Integrative Process

Centralto Haass
workis theconceptof spillor/er,whichbuildsconceptually
on what Mitrany called the doctrine of ramication. In his examination of
the ECSC,Haasfoundthat amongEuropean elitesdirectlyconcerned
with
coalandsteel,relativelyfew persons
wereinitially strongECSCsupporters
Only afterit had beenin operationfor severalyearsdid the bulk of leadersin
tradeunionsandpoliticalpartiesbecome activeproponentsof thecommunity.
Moreover,and illustrativeof the ramicationor spilloverprocess,such
groups,asa resultof gainsthattheyexperienced fromtheECSC,placedthem-
selves
in thevanguard of othereffortsfor European integration,
includingthe
EuropeanCommonMarket.Thus,therewasa markedtendencyfor those
who had experienced
gainsfrom supranationalinstitutionsin onesectorto fa-
vor integration
in othersectors.
AsHaasstatedit: Earlierdecisions spill-over
into newfunctionalcontexts,involvemoreandmorepeople,call for more
andmoreinterbureaucratic contactandconsultations,meetingthenewprob-
lemswhichgrowoutof theearliercompromises.23 Thustherewasanexpan-
sivelogicthatcontributedto spilloverfromonesectorto another. Theprocess
is onewhereby thenationsupgrade theirnationalinterests
in a largerintegra-
tive settingto achievecollectivegains.
Theintegration experienceof WesternEuropein thedecades immediately
afterthe foundingof theEuropean CommunityledHaasandotherintegra-
tion theoriststo refinethespilloverconcept.For example, PhilippeSchmitter
suggested that spillovercan be setforth in a typologyof strategicoptions
availableto actors.Theseinclude,besides spillover,spillaroundthatis, an
increase in the scopeof functionsperformedby an integrativeorganization
but not a corresponding growthin authority;a buildupan increase in deci-
sionalautonomyandauthorityof an integrative organization, withoutentry
into newissueareas;retrenchmentincreases in thelevelof joint arbitration
whilereducingtheauthorityof anintegrative organization; andspillbacIea
retreatbothin scopeof functionsandauthorityof anintegrative organization
to a previoussituation.Schmitter hypothesizesthat successive spilloversor
package dealsencompassing newissues, alongwith lessconspicuous forms
of spillaround,mayprovidethebasisfor majorstridestowardpoliticalinte-
gration.Thusinternational
organizations
suchastheEUmayexperience
pe-
riodsof development basedon deepening cooperation
withinanexistingsec-
tor suchastradepolicy,whiletheremayalsobetemporarysetbacks beforea
resumption of forwardmomentum in thetradesector,followedor accompa-
niedby spilloverinto othersectorssuchasmonetarypolicyanda common
currencyashasgenerallyhappenedin the EU case.
However, not surprisingly,Haasalsofoundthat interestbasedon prag-
maticconsiderations-for example,expectationsof economicgain<:ouldbe
ephemeral,if it is not reinforcedwith deepideological
or philosophical
commitment, such as that found at the level of the nation-state with the in-
tensenationalism
andsenseof nationalidentitythatmaymotivateor galvinize
masspopulations,regardless
of economic consequences.A politicalprocess
 ]OSEPHNYEANDNEOFUNCTIONALISM 515

thatisbuiltandprojected
frompragmatic
interests,
therefore,
isbound
tobe
afrailprocess,
susceptible
toreversal.
If it proves
possible
tosatisfy
pragmat
icallybased
expectations
withmodest
advances
in integration,
support
for
dramatic
integrative
steps
willbelacking,
asmight
beexpected.
Clearly,
this
represents
a majorlimitationto pragmatically
based
expectations
of gainasa
basis
byitselfforenduring
integration.
Along-term
integrative
process nec-
essarily
containselements
extending
beyond
simply
gaining
access
to larger
marketsor labor pools.

JOSEPHNYE AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM

Theworkof Haas,andof Mitranybefore
him,wasfollowed
byaneffortto
reneneofunctionalist
theories
of integration.
Aidingin this_
effortisJoseph
Nye,whosecontributionliesin developing
a neofunctionalist
modelbasedon
process
mechanisms andintegrativepotential.Nyesetfortha theoretical
framework
for analyzing
theconditions
for integration,
drawnspecically
fromEuropean andnon-Westernexperiences
thatmodiedgreatly thenotions
of politicization
andspillover
foundin thewritingsof MitranyandHaas.
Because of theextentto whichthisrepresentsa renementof neofunctionalist
theory,wesetforth1tSprincipalcomponents in somedetail.
Nye suggested that neofunctionalist
literaturecontainssevenprocess
mechanisms, aroundwhichhe reconceptualizes andreformulatesneofunc-
tionalist theory.
1. Functionalist
linkageof tasks,or theconceptof spilloi/erNyeholds
that this mechanism
hasbeenapplied,wronglyin his opinion,to in-
cludeanysignof increased
cooperation,
arising,
for example,
from
linkages,or relationships,amongproblemsbecause of their inherent
technicalcharacteristics,or because
of actualeffortsby integrationist
elitesto cultivatespillover.
Nyehypothesizesthat imbalances created
by thefunctionalinterdependence or inherentlinkagesof taskscanbe
a force pressingpolitical actors to redene their common tasks.
However,suchredenitionof tasksdoesnot necessarily leadto an
upgradingof commontasks.Theexperience canalsobenegative.27
Thus,if the linkageof taskscancausespillover,it canalsoproduce
spillback,asotherneofunctionalisttheoristshavealsosuggested,for
example, whereelitesandinterestgroupsthat benetedin theearlier
stagesof integrationlaterbecame
reluctantto takeadditionalintegra-
tivesteps
whengrowthratesdropped
off.Whengrowthratesdeclined
asa resultof theenergycrisisof the1970s,nationalprotectionist
sen-
timentaredup,andgovernments hesitated
to upgradecommoninter-
estsif theyfearedadverseeffectson employment, ination,payments,
and monetaryproblems.
2. RisingtransactionsAsnotedelsewhere
in this chapter,integration
is hypothesized
to be accompanied
by an increasein «transactions,
516 THEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION

including
trade,
capital
movement,communications,
andexchange
of
people
andideas.According
to Nye,Rising
transactions
need
not
leadto asignicant
widening
ofthescope
(range
oftasks)
of integra-
tion,buttointensifying
ofthecentral
institutional
capacity
tohandle
a particular
task.28
. Deliberate
linkages
andcoalition
formationHere,
Nyefocuses
once
again
onspillover,
orwhatheterms
accentuated
spillover,
inwhich
problems
aredeliberately
linked
together
intopackage
deals,
notbe-
cause
oftechnological
necessity,
butbecause
ofpolitical
andideologi-
calprojections
andpolitical
feasibilities.29
Drawing
heavily
onthe
experience
oftheEU,Nyepoints totheefforts
ofpoliticians,
interna-
tionalbureaucrats,
andinterest
groups to create
coalitions
basedon
linkedissues.
Althoughsucheffortsmaypromote integration,
they
may
have
anegative
effect
if,forexample,
thepolitical
fortunes
ofa
group
supporting
integration,
oranissue
identied
withintegration
decline.
Theextentto whichintegration
canbebroadened
in appeal
is
a functionof theextentto whicha coalitionin favorof integration
en-
joyswidespread publicsupport.
. ElitesocializationNye
citesnumerous
examples
of thegrowthof
supportforintegration
arising
fromelites
whohave
participated
ac-
tively
inanintegrative
scheme.
Theextenttowhich
national
bureau
cratsbecome
participants
in regional
integration
will determine
the
levelof theirsocializationdeemed importantbecausenationalbu-
reaucratsaresaidto bewaryof integration
because
ofthepossible
loss
of national
control.However,if theotherprocess
mechanismsconsid-
ered
byNyedonotfacilitate
integration,
thesocialization
ofelites,
es-
pecially
bureaucratic
groups,
infavorofregional
integration
mayserve
to isolate
theelitesfromthemainstream
of attitudes
andof policyin
their home countries.
. Regional
group
formatz&#39;on-Regional
integration
issaidto stimulat
the creation,
bothformallyandinformally,
of nongovernme
groups
ortransnational
associations.
Viewedinthecontext
ofboth
the
EUandothersettings,
suchasCentralAmerica
andAfrica,Nyeas-
serts,
suchassociations
remain
weak.
Onlythemoregeneral
interest
areaggregated
bysuch
groups
attheregional
level,
whereas
themore
specic
interests
remain
withinthepurview
ofnational-level
interes
groups.
. Ideological
andidentitive
appealThe
establishment
of a sense
of
identity
represents
a powerful
forcein supportof regional
integra
tion.According
to Nye,Thestronger
thesenseof permanenceand
thegreatertheidentitive
appeal,
the lesswillingareoppositio
groups
toattack
anintegration
scheme
frontally.31
Under
such
con-
ditions,
members
aremorelikelythanotherwise
to tolerate
short
termlosses,
andbusinesses
aremorelikelyto investin theexpecta
tionthattheywillbenet,
onacontinuing
basis,
fromthepresence
of
a largemarket.
 JOSEPH
NYEANDNEOFUNCTIONALISM
517

7. Involvement
of external
actorsin theprocessToa greater
extent
than earlierneofunctionalisttheory,Nye positsthe importanceof ex-
ternal actors and their active involvementin his neofunctionalist
modelasa partof theprocess
mechanism.
Henotestheimportance
of
outsidegovernments andinternational
organizations,
andof non-
governmental
actors,
ascatalysts
inregional
integration
schemes.
Centralto Nyesneofunctionalist
modelis whathe termsintegrative
potentialthat
is,theintegrative
conditions
stimulated
bytheprocess
mecha-
nism.Here,hesetsforthfourconditions
thathecontends
inuence boththe
nature
oftheoriginalcommitment
andthesubsequent
evolution
of anintegra-
tive scheme.

1. Symmetry
oreconomicequality
ofum&#39;tsA
relationship
issaidtoex-
istamong
trade,integration,
andlevelof development,
measuredby
percapita
income.
Thesize
ofpotential
participants,
measured
intotal
GNP,seems
to be of relativelygreaterimportance
in integrative
schemes
among
lessdeveloped
states
thaninthecase
ofhighlyindus-
trializedcountries.
Nyehypothesizes,
It almostlooksasif thelower
thepercapita
income
ofthearea,
thegreater
thehomogeneity
in size
of economy
mustbe.37&#39;
2. ElitevaluecomplementarityThehigherthelevelofelitecomplemen
tarity,themorelikelytheprospects
forsustained
impetus toward
re-
gional
integration.
However,
heholds
also
thatelites
thathave
worked
together
effectively
onatransnational
basis
maysubsequently
embrace
divergent
policies
thatarenotconducive
to integration.
3. Existence
of pluralismFunctionally,
specicdiverse
groups
aresaid
to enhance
thelikelihoodof integration.
Here,Nyepointsto a major
difference
between
theWestEuropean experienceandthat of the
ThirdWorld,wheresuchgroupsarerelatively
absent.
According to
Nye,Thegreater
thepluralism
in allmember
states,
thebetter
the
conditions
for anintegrative
response
to thefeedback
fromtheprocess
mechanisms.33
4. Capacity
ofmember
states
toadapt
andrespondThe
higher
thelevel
ofdomestic
stability
andthegreater
thecapacity
ofkeydecision
mak-
erstorespond
todemands
withintheirrespective
political
units,
the
more
likelytheyaretobeabletoparticipate
effectively
inalarger
inte-
grativeunit.
Next,Nyesets
forththree
perceptual
conditions
thatareaffected
bythe
integrative
process.
Theyinclude
(1)theperceived
equity
ofdistribution
of
benetswith
thehypothesis
thatthehigher
theperceived
equitable
distri-
bution
in allcountries,
thebetter
theconditions
forfurther
integration;3
(2)perceived
external
cogencythat
is,theperceptions
ofdecision
maker
concerning
theirexternal
problems,
including
dependence
onexports,
threats
fromlarger
powers,
andtheloss
ofstatus
inachanging
international
system
and(3)low(orexportable)
visible
coststheextent
towhichintegration
can
 518 TI-IEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION

bemadeto beperceived asrelatively

costfree,
especially
in its initialphases
Nyepointsoutthatthisnal concept
iscentral
to neofunctionalisttheoryand
strategy.
Finally,
fourconditions
arelikelyto characterize
theintegration
process
over time: (1) politicizationthe meansby which problemsare resolvedand
competing interests are reconciled, or the extent to which the resultant bene-
ts aresufciently
widespread to ensurebroadening
anddeepeningsupport;
(2)redistribution,
withthecrucialissuebeingthephasing
of thechanges
in
status,power,andeconomic benetsamonggroupswithintheintegrating unit
(centralto theintegrative
processis theextentto whichredistribution,benet-
ingsomeregionsmorethanothers,is compensated bygrowthto thebenetof
theunit asa whole);(3)redistributionof alternatii/esthe
extentto which,as
theintegrativeprocessproceeds,decision makersfacepressures to increase
the
levelandthescope
ofintegration
andconclude
thatthealternatives
to integra-
tion are lesssatisfactory;and (4) externalizationthe extentto which mem-
bersof anintegrating
unitnd it necessary
to develop
a common
positionon
issues
in orderto dealwith nonmembers, ashashappened with theEUin its
varioussetsof negotiations
with outsideparties,includingtheUnitedStates.
Nyehypothesizes
thatthefurtherintegration
proceeds,
themorelikelythird
partieswill beto reactto it, eitherin supportor with hostility.35
A neofunctionalist modelsuchasthatdeveloped byNyeprovidesa frame-
workfor comparing
integrative
processes
in moredeveloped
andlessdevel-
opedregionsof the world, and for assessing
the extentto whichmicrore-
gional,or functionally
specic,economic
organizations
holdpotentialfor
furtherdevelopment
towardfederations.
Morelikely,neofunctionalist
model
building
canprovide,
andhasprovided,
moreexplicittheoretical
propositions
essential
to understanding
thelimits,andthepotentialof thissegment
of the-
ory,bothin explaining
integration
andin providing
a strategy
for advancing
an integrative process.
Analyzing
theroles,respectively,
of macroregional
politicalorganizations
suchastheOrganization
ofAmerican
States
(OAS),
theOrganization
ofAfrican
Unity(OAU),andtheArabLeagueand themicrolevel
economic
organiza-
tionsincluding the EuropeanUnion (EU), the CentralAmericanCommon
Market(CACM),
andtheEastAfricanCommunity
(EAC)Nyedrewseveral
tentative
conclusions
withrespect
to neofunctionalism.
Microregional
economic
organizations
areunlikelyto develop
intonewunitsthatencroach
greatly
on,or
supersede,
the existingnation-states.
However,microregional
economic
and
macroregional
politicalorganizations
havecontributed
to thedevelopment of
islands
of peace
in theworld,andtheircosts
forworldpeacein termsof con-
ict creationhavebeenlessthantheir modestbenetto theworld in conict di-
version.36
Given
thelimited
results
oftheregional
organizations
studied,
the
growthof multinational
enterprises
maybea moreimportanttrendin interna-
tional organizations.
Althoughtheimpactof technology
onexisting
politicalunitsissuchasto re-
ducetheautonomy ofthenation-state,
onlyaportionof itsnational
powersare
redistributed
attheregional
level.In summary,
microregionaleconomicorgani-
 TRANSACTIONS
ANDCOMMUNICATIONS
519
zations
have
strengthened
functional
links
thatinturnhave
improved
relatio
ships
among
members.
Macroregional
political
organizations
have
played
acon
structive
roleincontrolling
interstate
conictamong members,
although
suc
organizations
were
unsuccessful
incases
ofprimarily
internal
conicta
serious
limitation,
Nyeadmits,
inlight
ofthe
importance
ofsuch
conict
inand
beyo
thelate
twentieth
century.37
Indeed,
thepoint
canbemade,
andhas
been,
that
in
many
countries
oftheworld,
themore
immediate
challenge
tonationalist
senti
ment
inrecent
decades,
andespecially
since
theend
oftheCold
War,
comes
from
centrifugal
subnational
forces
infavor
oflocal
autonomy,
secession,
expulsio
of
anunwanted
group
from
thenational
domain,
andthesubstitution
ofthedomi
nation
ofoneethnic,
linguistic,
orreligious
group
forthatofanother.

TRANSACTIONS ANDCOMMUNICATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FORSECURITY COMMUNITIES
Amongthemajor
contributors
tointegration
wasKarlDeutsch,
whostudied
the
process
bywhich
political
communities
areformed,
withmajor
emphasis
inhis
workonthedevelopment
ofindicators
based
oncommunication
patterns
and
transaction
ows.Deutsch
drewonthemathematician
Norbert
Wieners
writ-
ings
onCybernetics
andonTalcott
Parsons
workongeneral
systems
discussed
in
Chapter
&#39;3.
Deutsch
quoted
withapproval
thefollowing
passage
from
Wiene
The
existence
ofsocial
science
isbased
ontheability
totreat
asocial
group
asan
organization
andnotasanagglomeration.
Communication
is thecement
that
makes
organizations.
Communication
alone
enables
agroup
tothinktogethe
tosee
together
andtoacttogether.
Allsociology
requires
theunderstandin
of
communication.

Communications
amongpeople
canproduce
either
friendship
orhostility
depending
ontheextent
towhich
thememories
ofcommunications
areassoci
ated
withmore
orless
favorable
emotions.
Nevertheless,
inDeutschs
schem
political
systems
endure
asaresultoftheirabilityto abstract
andtocode
in-
coming
information
intoappropriate
symbols,
tostore
coded
symbols,
todis-
associate
certain
important
information
fromtherest,to recallstored
infor-
mationwhenneeded,
andto recombinestored
informationentered asan
inputintothesystem.
Thebuilding
ofpolitical
unitsdepends.on
theowof
communications
withintheunitandbetween
theunitandtheoutside
world.
Deutschs
major
substantive
contribution
tointegration
theory
isfound
in
workpublished
in1957,
thefocus
ofwhich
was
political
community
inthe
NorthAtlantic
area.
Deutsch
andhiscollaborators
examined
tencases
ofin-
tegration
anddisintegration
atthenational
level.Because
these
cases
areex-
amples
ofbuildingnational
political
communities,
theimplicit
assumptionof
thisworkisthatgeneralizations
derived
fromthese
comparative
studies
are
relevant
tounderstanding
integration
attheinternational
levelthat
there
are
similarities
between
theprocess
ofcommunity
building
atthenational
level
anddoingsobeyond
thenation-state.
Deutsch
andhisassociates
setforth
520 THEORIES
OFINTER_NATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION

twokindsof security
communities:
amalgamated, in whichpreviously
inde-
pendent
politicalunitshadformeda singleunit with a commongovern-
ment;andpluralistic,in whichseparate
governments
retainedlegalindepen-
dence. The nation-stateswhose formation Deutsch and his associates
studiedareexamplesof an amalgamatedsecuritycommunity, andtherela-
tionshipbetweenthe UnitedStatesand Canadaor Franceand Germany
sinceWorldWarII, whichwereincludedin thestudy,areillustrativeof plu-
ralistic securitycommunities.
Forthecreationof anamalgamated
securitycommunity
in thecases
that
werestudied,several
conditionswerefoundto benecessary:mutualcompati-
bilityof majorvalues;
a distinctive
wayof life;expectations
of jointrewards
timedsoasto comebeforetheimposition of burdensfromamalgamation a
markedincrease in politicalandadministrative
capabilities
of at leastsome
participatingunits;superioreconomicgrowthon the part of someof the
members,and the developmentof so-calledcore areasaround which are
groupedcomparativelyweakerunits; unbrokenlinks of social communica-
tion, both geographicallybetweenterritories and betweendifferent social
strata;a broadening
of thepoliticalelite;increasing
mobilityof persons;
anda
multiplicityof communications and transactions. Althoughthe North
Atlanticarea,encompassing
in thisstudyforthemostparttheterritoryof the
NATOmembers, hadnot become an amalgamated security
community, its
members nevertheless
haddeveloped a conception
of a security
community in
whichthereis a realassurance thatmembers of thatcommunity will not
ght eachotherphysically,
butwill settletheirdisputesin someotherway.42
Thiswastruewith theexception of tensions
andrisinghostilityat various
timesbetween
Greece
andTurkey,bothmembers
of NATO.In theabsence
of
NATO,it mayplausibly
beargued,
Greece
andTurkeymightwellhavegone
to waryvitheachother.In anyevent,NATOrepresents,
in Deutschs
formula-
tion,a largepluralistic
security
community.
Hereit couldbeadded
that,asa
community
of stateswith democratic
politicalsystems,
NATOmembers
have
developed
practices
andnormative
standards
placinga highpremium
onthe
settlement
of internationaldisputesby peacefulmeans.As we haveseenin
Chapter
7,withitsdiscussion
of democratic
peace
theory,
suchpatterns
char-
acterizerelationshipsbetweendemocracies.
Becausethe North Atlantic area
containsthelargestaggregation
of theworldsdemocracies,
it shouldnot be
surprising
thatthisregionts Deutschsconception
of a pluralistic
security
community.
For the formationof pluralisticsecuritycommunities,
threeconditions
werefoundessential:
compatibility
of values
amongdecision makers,
mutual
predictability
of behavior
amongdecision makers
of unitsto beintegrated,
andmutualresponsivenessthe
abilityto workclosely
together
in timely
fashionto addresspressingissues.
Deutschand his collaboratorsalso examinedhistoric casessuch as the
Austro-Hungarian
Empire,the Anglo-IrishUnion,and the union between
NorwayandSweden, in whichpoliticalcommunities
disintegrated.
Several
tentative
conclusions
emerged
aboutconditions
conducive
to disintegration
 TRANSACTIONS
ANDCOMMUNICATIONS
521

(1)extended
militarycommitments
onthepartof theunit;(2)anincrease
in
political
participation
byapreviously
passive
group;
(3)thegrowth
ofethnic
or linguistic
differentiation;
(4)prolonged
economic
decline
or stagnatio
(5)relative
closure
of political
elites
to newgroupsseeking
greater
political
power andparticipation;
(6)excessive
delayin social,
economic,
or political
reforms;
and(7)failureof a formerly
privileged
groupto adjustto itslossof
dominance.
Hadhewrittenin the1990s, of course,
Deutsch couldhavestud-
iedseveral
additional
cases.
Theycouldhaveincluded
thecollapse
of such
statesastheSovietUnionandYugoslavia.
Theintegrativeprocessthatwasstudiedwasfoundnot to beunilinearin
nature.As Deutschnoted,theessential
backgroundconditionsdo not come
into existence
simultaneously;nor aretheyestablished
in anyspecialse-
quence.Ratherit appears
to usfromourcasesthattheymaybeassembledin
almostanysequence, solongasall of themcomeinto beingandtakeef-
fect.44
In otherwords,
theremayberisinglevels
of economic
transaction
suchastrade,labormovement,
andinvestment
alongside,
before,
or evenaf-
ter other stepstoward integrationoccur.
On thebasisof ndingsconcerning
thebuilding-
anddisintegration
of
nationstates
withintheNorthAtlantic
area,
Deutsch
andhisassociates
sug-
gested
thattheNorthAtlanticareaasa whole,although
it is far frominte-
grated,
seemsalready
to havemoved a longwaytowardbecoming so.45An-
essential conditionfor greaterintegration
in theNorth Atlanticareawassaid
to lie in thedevelopment amongcountries of a greatervolumeof transactions
andcommunications,
especially
thoseassociated
withexpectations
of gain
andactualbenets
in theformof economic
growth.However,
therewasno
clear
indication
oftheoverall
levelofsuch
interaction
deemed
tobenecessar
forsuchintegration
orwhentheregionencompassed bythestudywouldactu-
allyachieve
ahigherlevelof integration.
Conceivably,
thefactthatNATOnot
only remainedin existence
for the remainingthreedecades
afterDeutschs
workbutsubsequently
embarkedonatransforming
process
afterthecollapse
oftheSoviet
Union
illustrates
theessential
validity
ofDeutschs
ndings.Had
NATOrepresented
nothing
morethana traditional
militaryalliance,
it would
expectto havebeencast asidewhen the basicreasonfor its formationthe
Soviet
Unionnolongerexisted.Instead,
NATOnotonlywasadapted, but
otherEuroAtlantic
institutions,
suchastheOrganization"
for Security
and
Cooperation
in EuropeandtheEU,werestrengthened
andbroadened.
All of
thiswasdoneto enable
thestates
comprising
thepluralistic
security
commu-
nity, to which Deutschreferred,to addresscommontasksandissues.

IntegrationTheory:Fromthe SingleEuropean
Actto the Treaty
on European Union and Beyond
JustasthepostWorld
WarII development
of regional
integration,
especially
in Europe,
hadgivenimpetusto theorybuilding
effortsandprovidedthebasis
for studies
in whichvariousintegration
theories
couldbedeveloped,
tested,
andmodied,thefurtherevolution of theEuropean EconomicCommunity
522 TI-IEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

from the SingleEuropeanAct (SEA)of 1986to theTreatyon EuropeanUnion

(TEU) signedin Maastricht,The Netherlands,in 1991, and the Amsterdam
Treatyof 1998hasprovidedthe basisfor theory extendingbeyondneofunc-
tionalism. TheSEAsetasa goal,sinceattained,the endof 1992asthe date
for completingthe internal market, or the removalof barriersto commerce
within the EU.The TEU, which cameinto operationin 1993,extendedquali-
ed majorityvotingproceduresin the Councilof Ministersandestablishedthe
frameworkfor a commonforeignand securitypolicy,togetherwith a phased
movementtoward a monetaryunion.Nevertheless, the TEU remainedlargely
unfullled in the 1990s, and there were serious challengesto its provisions in
the form of referendaagainstit in Denmarkand narrowly for it in France,
deepeningdebatesand reservationsin the United Kingdom, and legal chal-
lenges
in Germany
andtheUnitedKingdom.Hereagain,wehaveexamples
of
thespillover,spill~around,andspill-backphenomena
to which Haasandother
neofunctionalists referred.
Takentogether,thesefactorshaveprovidedthe settingfor a debateabout
the adequacyof existingintegrationtheory and an effort to developalterna-
tive explanationsaboutthe presentand emergingcourseof Europeanintegra-
tion. Studiesof the SEAandTEU in the 1990sgenerallyconcludedthat, while
integrationtheory developedin the previoustwo generationsmay hold ele-
mentsof truth, it was consideredto be inadequatein itself to accountfor the
most recentphase.While neofunctionalisttheory emphasizes the expansive
logic (spillover)of sectorintegrationleadingto supranationalinstitutions,the
newertheoreticalapproachesattachgreat importanceto policy convergence
amongmajorgovernments,
notablytheFederal
Republicof Germany,
France,
and the ,UnitedKingdom.This emphasisis understandable
becausethe focal
pointof debateaboutEuropean
integration
hadbeenbetween
theproponents
of a supranationalEuropeand the supportersof Europeanintegrationbuilt
uponthe foundationsof the nationstateand,in particular,intergovernmental
cooperation.
Theleadingproponentof thesupranational
approach
hadbeen
JeanMonnet, who playeda seminalrole in the institutional architecturefor
the ECSCand the EU. The intergovernmental approachwascloselyidentified
with the policiesof PresidentCharlesde Gaulleof Franceand PrimeMinister
MargaretThatcherof the UnitedKingdom.
Throughouttheevolutionof European integration,
whateverthe roleof
supranational
institutions,,the
supportof nationalgovernments
hasbeenin-
dispensable.Those governmentsof greatestimportancehave includedthe
FederalRepublicof Germany,
France,andthe UnitedKingdomakind of
core area, asDeutschmight havestatedit. Why,it is asked,did the interests
of suchstatescoincideat this time (the 19805into the 1990s)to producethe
intergovernmentalconsensus necessary for the SEAand TEU? Accordingto
RobertO. KeohaneandStanleyHoffmann,the answerliesin a conjunctionof
events, including the expansion of EU membership; agreementon the contri-
butions by the United Kingdomto the EU budget(an issuethat had proven
deeplydivisivein the late 1980s);the growingeconomicpressures
on Western
Europefrom theworld economy,leadingto impetusfor deregulation,transna-
 TRANSACTIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS 523

tionalmergers,
andincreased
access
to internal
European
markets;
andpoliti-
cal trendswithin memberstates,includingthe decisionof the FrenchSocialists
underPresidentFrancoisMitterrand in the 19803to jettisonmuchof their sta-
tist ideological
baggage
in favorof a marketeconomy."Asa result,theEU
hasnot evolvedin accordancewith the neofunctionalistor federalisttransfer
of powerto supranational
institutions.
Instead,
theEUrepresents
apoolingor
sharingof sovereignty,in which the nationalgovernmentsretain a dominant
decisionmakingrole. Accordingto Keohaneand Hoffmann, The Commun-
ity hasa highly complexpolicymakingprocessin which formal and informal
institutions at different levels in the formal structureif in the formal struc-
tureat allare linkedbya varietyof networks.48
Examining the SEAin separatecasestudies,Andrew Moravcsik and Daniel
Cameronsuggestthat neofunctionalisttheory alone cannot accountfor the
SEA.Instead,the political consensusthat led to the SEA was basedon a combi-
nation of factors,includingthe internallygeneratedmomentumwithin the in-
ternationalinstitutionsof the EU andthebroadersupportandimpetuspro-
videdbynationalgovernments anddomestic
politics.According
to Moravcsik,
the SEAwas at leastas muchthe work of PresidentMitterfand, while France
heldthe rotatingpresidencyof the EuropeanCouncilin 1984,asit wasthe ini-
tiativeof EU CommissionPresident JacquesDelors.49 Thus,theneofunctional-
ist theorythat integrationis theresultof supranationaland transnationalcoali-
tionsthatlargelybypass-national
governments
is foundto beinadequate.
Moravcsiksuggests insteadthat the SEAprovidesevidenceof an integra-
tive processbasedon intergovernmental institutionalism.In this model,the in-
tegrativeprocessis characterizedrst by intergovernmental initiativesagreed
on by the headsof governmentof EU states,basedon negotiationsand com-
promisesreectingthe domesticconstraints,pressures, and intereststhat each
headof governmentbringsto the table.Furthermore,accordingto Moravcsik,
the FederalRepublicof Germany,France,and the United Kingdom,as the
largestof theEUmembers,
havesuchgreatinuencein thebargaining
process
that the resultingagreementrepresents their minimumcommonground,with
the exceptionof situationsin which two of the largestmembersthreatento
excludethe third. In Moravcsiksview,the memberstates,far from becoming
peripheralto the supranationalevolutionof the institutions,placeexplicitlim-
its on thetransferof sovereignty
to theEU.Suchpatternsof intergovernmen-
tal behaviorare saidto explainthe developmentof theSEA,includingthe ef-
forts of a few memberstatessincethe early 1990sto blockthe development of
a commonmonetarypolicy that,wouldincludean unacceptable diminutionof
national sovereigntyfollowed,of course,by the decisionto phasein the euro
asa commoncurrency,beginningin 1999,without the UnitedKingdomasan
initial participant.
Closelyrelatedis the study of the SEAby David Cameron,inwhich he
contendsthat neofunctionalismand intergovernmentalism eachprovide the
basisfor synthesisaboutthe integrationprocess.In keepingwith neofunction-
alist theory,he observedsubstantialeffortson the part of domesticgroups,es-
peciallybusiness, to lobby at the supranationallevel(to go directlyto the EU
524 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

Commission),bypassingnationalgovernments. At the sametime the intergov-

ernmentaldimensionof the neorealiststateasactorwaspresentin the form of
nationalinterests,perspectives,
andpreferencesthat werereectedin the inte-
grative process.According to Cameron, the SEA initiative came before the ef-
forts by FrenchPresidentMitterrand describedby Moravcsik.Cameronsas-
sertionthat the EuropeanCouncilin 1981requestedfrom the Commissiona
draft report,submittedin 1982,that formedan importantbasisfor the devel-
opmentof the internal market and itself building on a consensus,the origins
of which canbetracedto the late 1960s.Cameronemphasizes the importance
of the EuropeanCouncilas an extra-treatymanifestationof institutionalized
intergovernmentalism.5°
ThustheEuropean
Council,theintergovernmenta
institutional manifestationof the EuropeanCommunity,becamea political
executivemaking it possiblefor memberstatesto act collectivelynot only
to acceleratebut also to control economicintegration and supranational
institutionbuilding. 51
Theoreticalexplanationsof the integrativeprocessin Europesincethe
SEAhaveencompassed effortsto relateinternationalstructuralchangesto the
domesticpolitical settingof Europeanmemberstates.Accordingto Wayne
SandholtzandJohn Zysman,just asthe postWorldWar II integrationmove-
ment was the outgrowth of international structural changes,shifts in the
global economysincethe 1970sheightenedthe needfor further Europeanin-
tegrationreectedin theSEAandMaastrichtTreaty. In response
to trans-
formedinternationaleconomicstructures,
Europeanelites,business groups
suchas multinationalcorporations(MNCs) and transnationalmergers,and
marketoriented
politicalpartiessupported
andstrengthened
effortsbytheEU
Commissionto renewthe drive for completingeconomicintegration.As a
process,economicintegrationproceedsasa result of a hierarchyof bargains,
in which domesticpolitical elites reachagreementon basic objectives,fol-
lowed by subsidiarybargains,designedto achievethe agreedgoals.The SEA,
togetherwith subsequent integrativeeffortssetforth in the MaastrichtTreaty,
represented the institutional manifestationof suchbargains.The impetusto-
ward a unifiedmarketin Europecamefrom essentiallyfour groups:individual
elites, large corporations,governments,and the EU institutions. Although
elitesexertedinuenceon nationalgovernments and on EU institutions,in the
nal analysis,it wasthe nationalgovernments that agreedto weightedmajor-
ity voting in place.ofthe singlestateveto systemat the EU level.Britain has
beenthemostvigorousopponent
to furtherexpanding
theareasfor weighted
majority decisionmaking.
The integrationprocess,in its Europeansetting,hasexperienced
what has
beendescribed
asa stopand-go
pattern.Accordingto classical
realisttheory
and neorealisttheory,the prospectsfor internationalintegrationare limited
by divergingstateinterestsin the anarchicalselfhelpsystem.Contrastedis
the utopianneoliberalassumptionthat integrationbecomesincreasinglyfea-
sible, if not even necessary,in a world of increasinginterdependence.
However, according to Gerard Schneiderand LarsErik Cederman,the
EuropeanUnionhasexperienced
both achievements
and setbacks
in what
 TRANSACTIONS
ANDCOMMUNICATIONS 525

theydescribe asits rockyhistory.53To focuson whathasbeenaccom-

plished
or to emphasizethefailures
isto address
theintegrative
process
in in-
completefashion.
Theproblems
encountered
in establishing
theeconomic
andmonetary
union(EMU),theEuropean CentralBank,andthesinglecurrency (euro)il-
lustratequitewell the uncertainties
that besetthe integrative process.
Member states
hadto demonstrate
thattheywereeligiblefor entrybymeet-
ing convergence
criteria ontotal indebtedness,&#39;annual
budgetdecits,and
lowinterest
rates.France,
Italy,Spain,
andPortugal werecompelledto adopt
austerity
programs and/orresortto a bit of statistical
fudgingto keep
their 1998budgetdecitsbelow3 percent.Sincea majorityof theGermans,
always
nervous
aboutination,wereunhappy
at theprospect
of tradingthe
deutschmarkfor an untried euro, the Bundesbankhad insistedon a stabil-
ity pact that wouldpenalize
governments
for exceeding
thebudgetlimit in
thefuture.Thefearwasthat softercurrency
countries
suchasItalyand
Spain,onceadmitted,wouldrelaxtheir scal disciplineto reducetheir un-
employment levelsthroughincreased publicspending. Opponents of mone-
taryunionarguedthatthestabilitypactwouldtie thehandsof nationalgov-
ernmentsin futureeconomicdownturns,therebycompounding the crises.
Greece couldnot qualifyeconomically for entryinto EMUfor severalyears.
Greece qualiedin 2000.Britain,Denmark,andSweden wouldprobablybe
eligible,but preferredto opt out as rst wave applicantsfor a varietyof
reasons:doubts that the single currency was neededor would work as
planned;thefactthat Britainsbusiness
cyclewasout of phasewith thoseon
theContinent;anda concernthat suchsinglecurrencychampions asformer
ChancellorHelmut Kohl and former EuropeanCommissionpresident
Jacques
Delorsamongothersenvisaged monetaryunion asan irreversible
steptoward federalpolitical union.-54
TheBritishcontended that thenextmajorstepin EU integrationshould
beto widenbeforedeepening. Thatmeantbringingin thenewdemocratic
countriesto the eastbeforeadoptinga singlecurrency,because monetary
unionwouldmakeit harderfor the Central-East European statesto qualify
for membership if theyhadto meetsinglecurrencystandards.TheBritishhad
a point, but manyon the Continentwerein no hurry to enlargeeastward,
whichin anyeventcouldnot occuruntil several difficultandpainfulreforms
had beencarriedout with regardto EUsCommonAgriculturalPolicy,re-
gionalfunding,anddecision-making procedures.
ThusLondons positionwas
seenas a typical British delayingtactic. Paradoxically,Britain fought a rear-
guardactionto obstructsomeof theveryreformsdeemed
essential
prerequi-
sitesto enlargement.
During 1998,the EU invited ve of the nascenteastern
democracies (Poland,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Slovenia,andEstonia),plus
thedividedislandof Cyprus,to beginentrynegotiations,
whichwerelikelyto
last well beyond 2003. Five other aspirants(Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia,
Romania,and Bulgaria)were put on a slowertrack to membership.Turkey
had appliedfor entry decadesearlierciting its recordas a loyal NATO ally,
but severalfactorshad held up a positiveresponse;At the turn into the new
526 TI-IEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
AND&#39;N&#39;"EGRATIO

millennium,
however,
Greek-Turkish
relations
wereimproving,
andtheEUfi-
nally
offered
toaccept
Turkey
asamember
atafuture
unspecied
date.
In May1998, theEuropean
Commission
announced
that11candidates
wouldqualify
for EMUentryAustria,
Belgium,
Finland,
France,
Germany,
Ireland,
Italy,
Luxembourg,
Netherlands,
Portugal,
andSpain.
Despite
theglobal
financial
crisis(See
Chapter
9) anda postscandal
shakeup
in theEuropean
Commission,
theeurowaslaunched
onJanuary1, 1999,asa strongcurrency,
butinviewofEuropeslagging
economic
performance
compared
withthatofthe
UnitedStates,
itsvalue
haddeclined
against
thedollar
byabout
24percentinsev-
enteen
months.PrimeMinisterTonyBlair,morepro-European
thanhis
Conservative
predecessors,preferredtoremain onthefence untilafterthenext
parliamentary
election,
which must takeplace byMay2002. Hisgovernment an-
nouncedthatit willstartpreparingintensively forapossible
decision tobring
thepound intotheeurozone aftera triplelocktestareferendum, avotein
thenextParliament, andagreement bytheCabinet.57 Thisisessentiallyawait
andseeattitude,which does notreduce uncertainty about
thefuture oftheeuro.
Thedevelopment oftheEUhastaken placeinasettinginwhich amajority
seeking
increasesin integrationhasconfronted a laggardstate
threatening to
leave
if itsdemands
werenotmet.Totheextent
thatsucha stateposes
itsexit
threatunderconditions
of uncertainty,
based
onimperfect
information,
thein-
tegrationist
majority
cannot
becertain
ofthelaggards
actual
intentions.
If this
isthecase,
thelaggard
state
canpush
itsthreat
togainthemostfavorableterms
possible
fromthose
membersseeking
topreservetheintegrated
entity.
In the caseof the EU, as Schneider
and Cedermansuggest,France,
GreatBritain,andDenmark
haveusedthreats
thatoftenincluded
full or
partialexitto attaintheirgoals.
Theintegrationist
members,
confronting
uncertainty,
based
onimperfect
information,
findthemselves
at a bargain-
ingdisadvantage
towardthelaggards.
Makinguseofrational-choice
model-
ingandgametheory
to studybargaining
withintheEU,forward
momen-
tumandthreatened
withdrawals
areexamined
asintegralelements
of the
integration
process.
Thelaggardsabilityto achieve
bargaining
goalsis
strengthened
totheextent
thattheintegrationist
majority
prefers
asolution
thatkeeps
theobstructionist
member withintheorganization
rather
than
onethat excludes
it. Sucha bargainingapproachmaycharacterizenegotia-
tionsaboutthetermsof membership for a statejoiningtheEUandthecon-
ditionsunderwhichit remains
amember.
Forexample,
a potential
member
canstrengthen
itsbargaining
position
if theintegrationist
majority
isuncer-
tain aboutits levelof domesticsupport.The threatthat the British
Parliament
wouldnotapprove theMaastrichtTreatyif objectionable
provi-
sionson socialpolicywereincludedgaveBritishnegotiators bargaining
leveragein the negotiations.
Thus,information
uncertainty
aboutdomestic
support
oropposition,
in-
cluding
thepossibility
thata government
evenlesscommitted
to integration
maycometo office,enhances the laggardstates
negotiatingposition.
Although
uncertainty
intheformofimperfect
information
maybeexploited
bylaggards,
theeffect
maybetostalltheintegrative
process,
oratleast
to
 TRANSACTIONS
ANDCOMMUNICATIONS 527

slow its momentum.How much the developmentof integration can be

slowed,of course,dependsalsoon the availabilityof informationby the inte-
grationistmajority about the laggardand its commitmentto its position. Is
the laggard prepared to exit the integrative processif its demandsare not met?
If not, the bargaining
advantage
obviouslylieswith the integrationist
major-
ity. The ability to usemodelsand gamingtechniques,basedon varyinglevels
of informationavailableto both sidesabouttheir respectivebargaininggoals
and strategies, represents
a potentialcontributionto integrationtheory.

International Regimes
According to John Ruggie, who introduced the concept in 1975, an interna-
tional regimeis a setof mutual expectations,rulesand regulations,plans,or-
ganizationalentities,and nancial commitmentsthat havebeenacceptedby a
groupof states.Suchregimes
arecharacterized
by varyinglevelsof institu-
tional development. According to Duncan Snidal, different types of regimes
mayyielddifferentsolutions
to thesameproblems.Forexample,
statesmay
nd it more difcult in more integrated institutional regimes to embark on
more cooperativeactionsfor short-termbenet, while lessformal structures
may give greaterexibility to states.The result is differencesin cooperative
outcomes, depending on the nature of the institutional structure that consti-
tutes the international regime. International regimesencompassissue areasas
diverseas defense,trade, monetarypolicy,law, and food policy.Suchentities
aresaidto representeffortswithin the internationalsystemto developcollab-
orative arrangements,by eitherformal or informal means.The conceptruns
the gamutfrom the World Health Organizationto the EU.
Subsequently, international regimes have been defined as principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expecta-
tionsconverge
in a givenissuearea. Furthermore,
regimes
maybecatego>
rizedaccordingto function, on a continuumextendingfrom specicor single
issuesto a diffuse,multiissuelevel. As StephenD. Krasnersuggests,
interna-
tional regimeshavebeensaidto consistof interveningvariablesstandingbe-
tween basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the»
other.Accordingto Krasner,principlesrepresentbeliefs of fact, causation,
and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior dened in terms of rights
and obligations.Rulesare specicprescriptionsor proscriptionsfor action.
Decisionmakz&#39;ng
proceduresare prevailingpracticesfor making and imple-
mentingcollective
choice.62
Accordingto Oran R. Young,regimesconsistof socialinstitutionsgov-
erning the actionsof thoseinterestedin speciableactivities(or meaningful
setsof activities),with the core elementof regimeslying in a collectionof
rights and rulesthat are more or lessextensiveor formally articulated.Some
suchinstitutional arrangements will structurethe opportunitiesof the actors
interestedin a givenactivity,andthat exactcontentwill be a matterof intense
interestto theseactors. Includedin the idea of internationalregimesis the
decision-making processwith respectto a particular form of activity.Within
528 THEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION
thisprocess,
actors
may
experience
cognitive
change
orlearning
based
onnew
information
thatmay
enhance
ordiminish
theability
ofactors
toachieve
their
respective
goals.
Learning
maylead
actors
toalter
themeans
used
toachieve
a
desired
end,
orlearning
may even
result
inchanged
objectives.
Thus,
the
regime
concept
encompasses
both
structural
and
process
elements.
Stated
dif-
ferently,
inquiry
focuses
onquestions
associated
withhowand
whyregimes
areestablished
andwhatorganizational
orstructural
formtheytake,
along
withtheprocess
bywhich
decisions
are
made
within
them
and
theresulting
outputs,
together
withthechanges
ininternational
behavior
thatregimes
may
initiateor helpto achieve.
Regimes
maybeformal
innature,
ortheymayconsist
ofinforma
arrangements.
Formal
regimes
maybetheresult
oflegislation
byinternation
organizations.
Suchregimes
maypossess
governing
councils
and bureaucra
structures.
Informal
regimes
may
bebased
simply
onaconsensus
ofobjective
andmutual
interests
among
participants,
resulting
in adhocagreement
Regimes
maybebased
onaconception
ofcommoninterest
inwhich
collabo
ration
represents
anoptimal
strategy
forparticipants.
Attheminimum,
col-
laboration
entails
agreed
rules
toworktogether
forcertain
goals
andtoab-
stain
fromcertain
actions.
However,
justasregimes
maybebased
oncommon
interest,
theymay
also
betheproduct
ofwhat
Ernst
Haas
hastermed
common
aversion.
Insuch
regimes,
theactors
donotagree
onajointly
preferred
out-
come,
butthey
doagree
ontheoutcome
allwish
toavoid;
such
regime
merely
require
policy
coordination,
notcollaboration.
Regimes
may
result
fromvoluntary
collaboration
orcooperation.
Theymay
bebased
ontheim-
posed
willofadominant
power.
Thus,
wemay
speak
ofcolonial
orimperi
regimes,
oracommodity
agreement
which
weaker
states
must
sign
toqualify
for othereconomicbenets.
OranYoung distinguishes
between
negotiated
regimes
characterize
by
explicit
consent
onthepart
oftheparticipants
and
imposed
regimes
that
are
deliberately
established
bydominant
actors
who succeed
ingetting
others
to
conform
totherequirements
ofthose
orders
through
some
combination
ofco-
hesion,
cooperation,
andmanipulation
ofincentives.57
Regimes
maycome
intoexistence
asaresult
ofanagreement
oracontract
among
thepartici-
pants.
Alternatively,
regimes
maybecreated
either
inevolutionary
fashion
or
bydramatic
unilateral
action
byone
party
that
isaccepted
byothers.
Finally
actors
whohave
formedoneregime
mayengage inwhatOran Youngde-
scribes
asaprocess
oftaskexpansion
orspillover
thatwilllead
over
timeto
theemergence
ofamore
comprehensive
andcoherent
regime.
Inthisre-
spect,
there
exists
aprocess
similar
tothat
described
inneofunctiona
inte-
grationliterature.
Inthisconcept,
regimes
may betheresult
ofthedirect
imposition
ofinsti-
tutional
arrangements
onsubordinate
elementscoerced
intocomplian
Imperial
andfeudal
systems
aresaid
tobeillustrative
ofsuch
regimes.
Inan
alternative
conception,
adominantpowermay exertleadership
intheforma
tionand
preservation
ofregimes
thatserve
itsinterests
butarealso
widely
ac-
cepted
intheinternational
system.
ThusRobert Keohane
develops
aregim
 TRANSACTIONS
AND COMMUNICATIONS 529

concept based on hegemonic stability, cooperation, and collaboration.

Focusingon the world political economyof the two generationsafter World
War II, Keohanedeneshegemonyaspossession of a preponderanceof mate-
rial resourcesraw materials,sourcesof capital,control overmarkets,and a
competitivelyadvantageous position in the productionof goodsin great de-
mand.59
Centralto Keohanes
conceptis what he termscooperation
after
hegemony7°
at a timewhenthehegemonic powerhasdeclined
in powerand
inuence.
A largenumberof internationalregimeswereformedunderthe leadership
of the United States in the decadesafter World War II. What happens, it is
asked,to suchregimeswhen a hegemonicpower losesits preponderantposi-
tion? How and why do regimesthat wereformedaspart of a relationshipbe-
tweena dominantpower and lesserunits endureafter the hegemonicpower
hasceasedto play a determinantrole?Accordingto Keohane,the answerlies
in the fact that regimesare more easilypreservedthan created.In his words,
Cooperationis possibleafterhegemonynot only because sharedinterestscan
leadto the creationof regimes,but also becausethe conditionsfor maintain-
ing existing regimesare less demandingthan those required for creating
them.71Moreover,whetheror not thereexistsa hegemonicpower,interna-
tional regimes,in Keohanesformulation, dependfor their existenceon per-
ceivedintereststhat are commonor complementaryin nature.As the hege-
monicpowersposition1Sdiminished,a growth in interactionamongat leasta
few of the units of the regimemay serveasa replacementor supplementlead-
ing to posthegemonic cooperation.Internationalregimesarisefrom sharedin-
terests.The greaterthe incentivesto cooperation,the more likely it is that
suchregimeswill survivethe declineof a hegemonicpower.
Keohanedrawsa distinctionbetweencooperationand harmonyasthe in-
dispensable basisfor the internationalregimesthat he describes.Harmonyis
illustratedby the situation in which the pursuit of self-interestby all actors
leadsautomaticallyto the achievement of all the participantsgoalsmuch as
in the caseof the harmony-of-interest conceptdiscussed in utopiantheory(see
Chapter2). Internationalregimes,especiallythoselacking formal structures,
may bebasedsimplyon harmony,aswith the marketcompetitionof the invis-
ible hand of a classical economicsmodel. However, cooperation representsa
conditionin which actor participantstakestepsto adapttheir behaviorto the
needsof othersby meansof a processof policy coordination.
Harmonymay existevenin the absence of communicationamongactors;
cooperationis politicalin naturebecauseit requires
adjustment
onthepartof
participants
to theneedsandinterests of eachother.Hence,cooperation
does
not assurethat conict is absentfrom the relationship.Instead,cooperation
forms eithera reactionto existingconict or part of an effort to avoid future
conict. Accordingto Keohane,the international-regimeconceptenhances
our abilitybothto describe
andto accountfor patternsof cooperation
andto
understand the basisfor discord. Suchanalysisleads Keohaneto view interna-
tionalregimes
asreectingpatternsof cooperation
anddiscordovera period
of time. Within the international-regime
concept,suchrelationshipscan be
530 THEORIES
OF
INTERNATEONAL
COOPERATION
AND
INTEGRATION
treated
aslonger-term
patterns
ofbehavior
rather
than
asisolated
actors
or
events.
According
toKeohane,
Byinvestigating
theevolution
ofthenorms
and
rules
ofaregime
over
time,
wecan
use
theconcept
ofinternation
regime
both
toexplore
continuity
and
toinvestigate
change
inthe
world
polit-
icaleconorny.72
Thus
theregime,
inkeeping
also
withtheconcept
articulated
byKrasner
earlier
inthis
chapter,
can
behypothesized
asaset
ofintermediate
factors,
orin-
tervening
variables,
that
standbetween
the
landscape
ofinternational
politics
including
especially
the
distribution
ofpower,
onthe
onehand,
andthe
actua
behavior
ofthe
basic
entities,
bethey
state
ornonstate
actors,
ontheother.
To
theextent
that
such
actors,
inahorizontally
organized,
decentralized
interna
tional
system,
seek
toevolve
solutions
toproblems
ofdisparate
kinds,
they
form
various
types
ofinternational
regimes.
Thus,
the
emphasis
ofregime
analysis
is
thestate
actor,
inasmuch
asregimes
evolve
within
aninternational
system
in
which
powerisdiffused
orconcentrated.
Regimes
arefound
ininternatio
systems
inwhich
there
isabroadly
based
distribution
ofcapabilitiesa
balanc
ofpoweramong
alargenumber
ofstates.
Regimes
exist,
ithas
already
been
noted,
ininternational
systems
inwhich,
aswasthe
casewithBritain
inthe
nineteenth
century
(Pax
Britannica)
ortheUnited
States
beginning
inthe
twen-
tieth
century
and
extending
atleast
intotheearly
decades
ofthenewcentur
(Pax
Americana),
there
isahegemonic
state.
Tothe
extent
that
suchpowers
cre-
ate
abasis
forpeace
andstability
whilefurnishing
rewards
forcooperativ
be-
havior,
theycontribute
totheformation
ofinternational
regimes.
Totheextent
thatitsfocus
isstatecentric,
theregime
concept
draws
on
andcontributes
toneorealist
theory
(see
Chapter2).Aswehavenoted
else-
where,
classical
realismholds
that
international
behavior
isbased
principa
oninterests
andpower,andthat
worldpolitics
isanarchic.
Theregime
con-
cept
represents
aneffortnotnecessarily
toreject
such anassumption
but
in-
stead
tomodify
it.Intheoriginal
realist
formulation,
states
withcompet
interests
may
resort
toconflict
andultimately
wartoachieve
aresolut
compatible
with
perceived
needs.
While
realist
theory
didnot
reject
the
poss
bility
ofaccommodation
asameans
ofresolving
differences,
the
regime
con
cept
adds
anexplicit
andextended
analysis
ofnational
interest
and
politics
in
which
competitive
elements
produce
cooperative
behavior.
Intheregime
con-
cept,
national
interest
isbased
onacalculus
ofbenets
andcosts,
ofperce
gains
andrisks
inherent
incomplying
with
orviolating
theprovision
rule
andprocedures
setforthinagiven
international
regime.
AsOran
Young
points
out,likeother
social
institutions,
.internati
regimes
areproducts
ofhuman interactions
andtheconvergence
ofexpec
tions
amonggroups
ofinterested
actors.73
Thus,theregime
concept
may be
viewed
inpart
asanattempt
torefine
therealist
ideaofnational
interest
toen-
compass
the
notion
that,
asKeohanesuggests,
cooperation
isexplicabl
eve
onnarrowly
self-interested,
egoistic
assumptions
about
the
actors
inworld
pol
itics.74
Totheextent
that
contributors
totheliterature
ofregimes
attribute
the
behavioral
characteristics
ofmembers
ofregimestothedistribution
ofpow
among
them
(e.g.,
the
study
ofhegemonic
regimes),
they
adopt
astructu
 TRANSACTIONS
ANDCOMMUNICATIONS
531.
realist
perspective.
Bythesame
token,
totheextent
thatsuch
theorists
attempt
to
account
forthepersistence
ofregimes
created
during
theperiod
ofahegemoni
power,theysearch
for alternative
explanations
for thebehavior
of regimes.
If regime
analysis
draws
ontherealist
tradition,
it hasequally
important
intellectual
antecedents
andlinksto theliterature
of systems
andintegration
at theinternational
level.According
to ErnstHaas,regimesaresupposedto
helpsolve
problems,
buttheproblem
itselfisafunction
ofhowonemanages
thesystemin whichsomething problematical
istakingplace.75
Although
they
arein needof clarication
111
theregime
literature,
thereexistsuchconcepts
andterms(familiarto systems theory)astypeof regimestructure,equilib-
rium, causation,adaptation,and learning.How do regimes,like systems,
comeinto existence,adaptto changingenvironing circumstances,andengage
in patternsof growth,preservation,
anddecline? Asin thecaseof systemsthe-
ory,suchquestions areposedin regimeliterature.Regimesaresaidto ariseas
expectationsconvergeon a new focal point that, in turn, furnishesthe basis
for newinstitutionalarrangements-aprocessfamiliar to studentsof &#39;neofu
tionalistintegration
theory,described earlierin thischapter.Deeplyembedded
in theregimeconcept, asin systems andintegration theory,is theideaof inter-
dependence amongthe entitiesconstitutingthe regime.Thegreaterthe level
andrangeof interdependence, it hasbeenhypothesized, the moreextensive
will bethesharedinterestin cooperation or collaboration,andhencetheneed
to useexistingregimesor to createnewones.Moreover, international regimes,
in keeping with muchof integrationtheory,arelikelyto enhance theprospects
for increasing transnationalows, althoughthe internationalregimeitself
mayarisefrom theprior existence of suchows ratherthanbeingin itselfa
determiningfactor in their creation.
If the internationalsystemwithin which regimesare formedis state-
centric,in therealisttradition,theregimes
themselves
maybesaidto represent
nonstate actors,betheysecuritysystems suchasNATOandtheOAS,or eco-
nomic arrangements
suchas the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) or the
EU.Althoughsuchentitiesarecreations
of thestatesystem,
regimes existas
actorsin themselves.
According
toKrasner,
regimesmayassume a life of their
own, a life independentof the basiccausalfactorsthat led to their creationin
therst place.76
Because
regimes
function
asintervening
variables,
achange
in
the relativepowerof statesmaynot alwaysbereectedin outcomes.This is to
suggestthat onceregimesare created,they may themselves
alter the distribu-
tion of poweramongtheentitiesthat originallyformedthemor changes in
thepowerbalance maynot immediately bereectedin thestructure andoper-
ation of the regime.Moreover,regimesmaycontributeto strengthening or
weakening thecapabilities
of theirmembersforexample, bytransferringre-
sources fromoneunit to another. Asnonstate actorsandentitiesfurnishinga
frameworkfor cooperative or collaborative
behavior, regimeshaveattracted
the interestof studentsof integrationat the international
level.In sum,the
regimeconceptrepresentsnot only an attemptedrenementof realisttheory
but also an effort to addressthe basisfor international collaborative structures
andprocesses
of immediate
relevance
to integration
theory.
532 THEORIESOF INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONAND INTEGRATION

To what extent,it hasbeenasked,doesthe conceptof regimesrepre-

sentan extensionof thefrontier of theory?Is it simplya reformulationof
existingapproaches?
Doesit furnisha long-term contribution
to knowl-
edgeor instead
forma fad that is likelyto becastasideby an emerging
generation
of scholars,
justasitsprogenitors
haverejected
certain
earlier
approaches?
Accordingto SusanStrange,
regimeanalysis
contains
several
serious
flaws,includinganextensive
emphasis
onthestatesandaninade-
quateappreciation
of thedynamic
element
of change
at theinternational
level.Its normativepreoccupation
is allegedto lie with the basisfor order,
or for thestatusquo,ratherthanwithconcepts suchasjustice.ThereISthe
criterion,familiarto realisttheoryaswell,thatthestate-centric
modelis
inadequateforthestudyofthecomplex andrapidlychanging
international
systemoftheearlytwenty-first century,
even though theanalysis
ofregimes
represents
in itselfaneffortto grapple
withsuchphenomena. Theconcept
of regimeshasbeen faultedaswellfor itsalleged
lackof sufficient
defini-
tionalprecision.
Regimehasbeenusedto describe
explicitlyagreed
arrange-
ments,decisionmakingprocedures,
international
frameworks basedonin-
stitutions,
formsof cooperation
lackingsuchinstitutional
frameworks, and
distributionsof powerwith resultingformsof cooperation
or collaboration
amongstates
relatively
equalin capabilities
between
hegemonic
andlesser
powers.77

ALLIANCES
In theself-help
systems
described by classical
realistandneorealist
theory,
states
cooperate
witheachotherin formalandinformalarrangementsinal-
liancesor coalitionsto enhancetheir securityagainstactors perceivedto
poseathreat.Such
cooperative
relationships
extend
to otherlevels
of analysis.
At both the internationaland the domesticlevels,groupsareformedto enable
their members
to achievea sharedobjective.Because
suchgroupsare dis-
bandedwhenthe objectivefor whichtheywerecreatedhasbeenattained,
theyarefar lessenduring
thanthepoliticalcommunities,
theformation
and
structureof whichareof concernto writerswhosework hasbeendiscussed
earlierin thischapter.
Alliances
aredesigned
to facilitate
theattainment
of
goalsby,asRobertL. Rothstein
hassuggested,
introducing
into thesituationa speciccommitment
to pursuethem;to a certain
extent,
it legitimizes
thatpursuitbyinscribing
it in a treaty;andit increases
the
probabilitythatthegoalswill bepursued
because thealliancecreates
a newstatus
whichmakesit moredifcult for thepartiesto renege
oneachother,not onlybe-
cause
theywouldbedishonoring
theircommitment,
andearning
areputation
for
perdy,butalsobecause
theirnewstatususually
creates
aresponse
intheexternal
world,suchasa countervailing
alliance,
whichwouldtendto strengthen
the
bondsin theoriginalalliance.It mayalsostabilizea situationby forcingenemy
decision-makers
to throwanotherweightintotheopposing scales.78
 ALLIANCES 533

According
toRobert
E.Osgood,
analliance
isalatent
warcommun
based
ongeneral
cooperation
thatgoes
beyond
formal
provisions
and
thatthe
signatories
mustcontinually
estimate
inorder
topreserve
mutual
condenc
ineach
others
delity
tospecied
obligations.
79
Thus,
alliances
have
usual
been formed
ininternational
contexts
inwhich
conict,
orthethreat
ofcon-
ict,ispresent.8°
Because
ofthehistoric
importance
ofalliances
intheinter-
national
system,
and
theWidespread
use
ofcoalitions
bypolitical
groups
in-
tentonattaining
elective
ofce,
suchcollaborative
efforts
have
beentheobjec
of scholarly
investigation,
especially
bythepolitical
realists
examined
in
Chapter
2,81
butalso
bywriters
concerned
more
specically
withthedynam
ics and the operationof alliances.
Among thetheories
ofalliance
behavior,
weturnrsttoGeorgeLiska
and
William
Riker.
Intheirtheoretical
frameworks,
LiskaandRiker
aresimilar
in
several
respects.
First,
they
agree
thatalliances
orcoalitions
disband
once
they
have
achieved
their
objective,
because
theyareformed
essentially
against
andonlyderivatively
for,someone
orsomething.32Although
asense
ofcom-
munity
mayreinforcealliances
orcoalitions,
it seldom
brings
them
intoexis-
tence.
Informing
alliances
toachieve
some
desired
objective,
decision
makers
weigh
thecosts
andrewards
ofalignment.
A decision
tojoinanalliance
is
based
onperception
ofrewards
inexcess
ofcosts.
Eachcountry
considers
the
marginal
utilityfromalliance
membership,
ascontrasted
withunilateral
ac-
tion.Ultimately,
thecohesiveness
ofanalliance
rests
ontherelationship
be-
tween
internal
andexternal
pressures,
bearing
ontheratioofgains
toliabili-
tiesforindividual
allies.83
Once
costs
exceedrewards,
thedecision
torealign
ismade. According
toLiska,
nations
joinalliances
forsecurity,
stability,
and
status.
In Liskas
theory,
aprimaryprerequisite
for alliance
cohesion
isthede-
velopment
ofanalliance
ideology.
Thefunction
ofalliance
ideology
istopro-
vide
arationalization
foralliance.
Inperforming
thisfunction,
ideology
feeds
onselective
memory
of thepastandoutlines
a program
for thefuture.84
Periodic
consultation,
especially
between
aleading
member anditsallies,
both
onprocedural
andsubstantive
issues,
contributes
to thedevelopment and
preservation
of allianceideologyandthusalliancecohesion.
Aftervictory,
rst,thesizeofthealliance
orcoalition
mustbereduced
if
additional
gains
aretoaccrue
totheremaining
participants.
Second,
alliances
orcoalitions
arecrucial
toattaining
abalance
ofpower.
InRikers
framework
theformation
ofonecoalition
contributes
totheformation
ofanopposin
coalition.
When
onecoalition
isontheverge
ofvictory,
neutral
actors
often
jointheweaker
ofthecoalitions
toprevent
thestronger
fromattaining
hege-
mony.
If neutral
members
donotalign
themselves
withtheweaker
side,
some
members
of theleading
coalition
mustshiftto theweaker
of thetwocoali-
tionsif thesystemistoregain
equilibrium.
Equilibrium
isthelikelyresult
of
theexistenceoftwoquasipermanent blocking
coalitions,
orthepresence
of
suchcoalitionsthatplaytheroleofbalancerif atemporary
winning coali-
tionsets thestakes
toohigh.85Inestablishing
hisownrulesforequilibrium
Rikerdraws on those setby Kaplanin hisbalance-of-power
system.
534 THEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION
Moreover,
inrelating
alliances
orcoalitions
tobalance
ofpower,
Liska
and
Riker
incorporate
intotheir
theories
ideas found
inrealist
internation
relations theory.

TheOptimumSizeof Alliances
Liska
andRiker
suggest
thatalliance
builders,
iftheyacteconomically,
donot
form
alliances
haphazardly
withallavailable
allies.
Instead,
Liska
consider
themarginal utility
ofthelast
unitofcommitment
toaparticular
allyand
thelastunitofcost
inimplementing
commitn1ents.87
Rikerstresses
thesize
principle,
accordingtowhich
participants
create
coalitions
thatare
nolarger
thannecessary
toachieve
their
commonly
sharedobjective.
If actors
have
per-
fectinformation,
theywillforma coalition
of exactly
theminimum size
needed
towin.Without
completeinformation,
membersofawinning
coali-
tionbuild
alarger
coalition
thannecessary
toachieve
their
objectives;
theless
complete
theinformation,
thelarger
thecoalition.
Thisfact,
which
Rikerob-
served
atboth thenational
andtheinternational
levels,
contributes
tothe
shortlifespanof alliances
or coalitions.
Liska
andRiker
address
themselves
tothequestion
ofrewards
fromjoin-
inganalliance
orcoalition.
According
toLiska,
the
gains
andliabilities
assoc
ated
withalignment
canbegrouped
intopairs.
Forexample,thepairpeculia
tosecurity
isprotection
andprovocationthe firsttobederived
fromapar-
ticular
alliance
andthesecond
producingcounteraction
andcounterallian
Burdens
and gains,
alongwithpotential
forstatus
enhancement
and possibl
losses
incapacity
forindependent
action,mustbebalanced.
Liska
contend
thatinorder
toassessaparticularalignment
allthese
factors
mustbecom-
paredwithhypothetical
gains
and liabilities
ofotheralignments,
withnon-
alignment,
oratleastwithadifferentimplementation
ofanunavoidab al-
liance.88
Bycontrast,
inRikers
theory, actors
joinalliances
orcoalitions
for
several
reasons:
toavoidreprisal
if theyrefuse
toalignthemselves,
toreceiv
payments
ofonekindoranother,toobtainpromisesaboutpolicy
orsubse
quent
decisions,
ortogainemotional
satisfaction.
Alliances
usually
encompass
bothsmall
andgreat
powers.
Small
states
joinalliances
because
theymust
relyfundamentallyand
toanextent
greate
than
large
stateson
other
states.
Great
powers
seek
alignment
withsma
states,
both forthepolitical
andmilitary
gains
afforded
and also
torestra
thelatter
fromcertain
actions.However,
smaller
powers,
Robert Rothste
notes,
may prefer
toalign
themselves
withaless
powerful
stateorwithacom
binationoflesser
states,
rather
thanwitha great
power.Smallpoweral-
liances,
however,
aresaid
toprovide
ineffective
instruments
if astatps
goal
is
toincrease
itsmilitary
strength.
Theirprincipal
potential
value
liesinmain-
taining
alocal
orregional
status
quo,
orinresolving
grievances
among
sma
powers
without
outside
greatpower
intervention.
Provided
small
powers can
maintain
agreement
among
themselves,
they
canmake
it difcultforagrea
power
tointervene
intheirregion.
 ALLIANCES 535

With its emphasis

on international
anarchyand competition
among
states,neorealisttheory attachesmajor importanceto alliances.The condi-
tionsunderwhichalliances
areformed,theissueof whoallieswithwhom,
and how this ratio of benefitsand costsis calculated,is directlyrelatedto the
structure of the international system.Therefore, alliance formation in a multi-
polarsystemdifferssubstantially
from whattakesplacein a bipolarsystem.
Accordingto Glenn H. Snyder,multipolar systems,encompassing three or
more actorsof approximatelyequalmilitary power,havingparallel or com-
mon interestsbut in possession
of incompleteinformation about eachother,
have an incentive to come to the assistanceof each other in the event of an at-
tackby an outsideparty. Thissituationarisesfrom thelikelihoodthat free
riding or passingthe buckmayresultin a powerimbalanceif oneof the states
is defeatedand a hegemonicstateemerges with evengreaterpower.
The logic of neorealisttheoryleadsto the conclusionthat statesform al-
liancesasa resultof perceivedbenetsgreaterthan the assumed costs.The re-
lationshipbetween
benetsandcostswill bedetermined
by the relationship
betweenone statescapabilitiesand thoseof its most likely opponents.The
greaterthe gapbetweensuchresources on the part of onestatecomparedwith
its anticipatedenemies,the greateris the incentiveto join an alliance.Once
statesjoin an alliance,thereis an extensiveand continuingbargainingprocess
designedto maximizesharedinterestand to cope with securitychallenges
posedby the enemy.Allieshavethe twin fearsof defectionandrealignment,or
what has beentermedabandonmentand entrapment.This alliancesecurity
dilemmaleadsstatesto becomeapprehensive that they will be abandonedin
time of needby alliesor that, asa resultof actiontakenby an ally,theywill be
entrappedinto fullling their alliancecommitmentsunderconditionsdeemed
to be peripheralto their security.GlennSnydersuggeststhat there is a per-
ceivedtrade-offbetweenentrapmentand abandonmentin which alliesseekto
maintain an optimal balance.The lessthe dependence of a state on the al-
liancefor its security,the greateris the stateslikelihoodof havingexibility of
action and bargaining strength within the alliance.
In bipolar systems,allianceformation becomesa simplerprocessbecause
the structureof the systemprovideslittle incentivefor defection.In contrastto
the multipolar system,alliancesunderconditionsof bipolarity are established
with a clearunderstandingof who is the adversary.Thus the structureof the
systemprovides little or no opportunity for statesto defect. Allies of one su-
perpowerare not likely to switch alliancesto ally with the opposingsuper-
power, just as the two superpowershave no prospectof allying with each
other. Although the fear of abandonment is low, there remains the contradic-
tory apprehension about the possibilityof abandonmentand entrapment.In
NATO Europeduring the Cold War, for example,allies worried that, far
from abandoningthem,the UnitedStatesmight resortto nuclearweaponsre-
sulting in their destructionor that U.S.Soviethostility outsideEuropemight
somehowspill over into Europe.Paradoxically,however,Europeanssome-
timesworried that the United Statesmight reduceits nuclearcommitmentto
536 THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
AND
INTEGRATION
the
extent
that
they
would
beabandoned
orthat
theU.S.
extended-se
guarantee,
or
nuclear
Under umbrella,
conditions would
beremoved.
ofbipolarity,
moreover,
allies
could
assume
diverse
strategies
and policiestoward thecommonadversary.
This
included,
asGlenn
Snyder points out, détente withthe Soviet
Union onthepart ofNATO
European allies
atatime, inthe1980s,
whentheUnited
States
and theSovie
Union were engaged inamore confrontational
stance
towardeachother.
The
structurallogicofbipolarity leads
toasituation
inwhich
NATO Europea
states,
whatever theirexibilityindealing
withtheSoviet
Union,remaineul-
timately dependent onthe United
States
fortheir
security,
whiletheUnited
Statescould not afford toabandonitsallies.
Therefore,
the
potential
forfrac-
turing theallianceisfar lowerunder
conditions
ofbipolarity,
giventhedepen
dency relationshipsand theabsence
ofalignment
alternatives,
thaninsitua
The recognition, set
tions of multipolarity.
forth
inclassical-realist
and
neorealist
theoryandin
work specifically
onalliance systems,
that
states
choose
either
toremain neu-
tralortojoin
alliances
toachieve
security
inaself-help
system
leaves
unan-
sweredthebasic
question
ofwhen
andwhythey
choose
one
course
ofaction
orthe other.
Aneffort
has
been
made
toaddress
this
issue
inmultipolar
sys-
tems.
Inwhat theycall
strategies
ofbuck passing
and chaingangin
Thomas].Christensen
and Jack
Snyder
suggest
that,
underconditions
ofmul-
tipolarity,
the dilemmas
ofchain ganging
andbuckpassing
becomeevide
Therelative
equality
ofalliance
partners
inamultipolar
systemleadseachto
conclude
thatitssecurity
isinextricably
intertwined
withthat
ofitsallianc
partners.
Therefore,
likethe members
ofachaingang,
eachalliance
partne
marches
towar with
anallywhosedefeat
wouldgreatly
diminish
itsown se-
curity.
Inotherwords,
tothe extent
that
thepowerbalance
deemedvital
toan
allys
own security
will
be upset
bythedefeat
ofanally,
thetendency
willbe
toengage
inchain-gang-like
behavior.
Thus,whenAustria
andRussiawent to
war,
Germany hadtofollowitsally
Austria
forfear
thatAustrias
defea in
World
War I would
have
destroyed
theEuropean
balance
ofpower.
The
same
authors
acknowledge
that
some
states
engage
also
inbuck
pass
ing,
tofailed
gain
France
ato
free
ride
onother
confront
states
I-Iitlers
balancing
Germany
efforts.
until
Thus
itbecame
Britain
and
apparent
in1939
that
Russia
andGermany
would
notbalance
each
other.
Instead,
Naz
Germany
and
theSoviet
Union
signed
anonaggression
treaty,
the
Moloto
Ribbentrop
pact
inAugust
1939,
which
was quickly
followed
byHitlers
inva
sion
ofPoland
and
Soviet
occupation
oftheBaltic
states.
Accordin
to
Christensen
andSnyder,
the
explanation
forchain
ganging
and buck
pass
lies
inthe extent
towhich
states
perceive
themselves
tobevulnerableThe
greater
and
thevulnerability,
todefendanally
the
that
greater
the
isattacked.
propensity
Bythesame
toalign
token,
uncondi
the
less
the vulne
bility
ofthestate,
the
greater
isthe
likelihood
that
itwill
pass
the
buck.Whe
states
concluded
thatthey
werevulnerable
tothe
offensive
capabilities
ofthe
enemies,
they
wereprepared
toengageinchain-ganging
behavior.
Iftheycon
cluded
thatthey
enjoyed
adefensive
advantage,
theypreferred
astrateg of
 ALLIANCES 537

buck passing.If they had a choice, they opted to allow other statesto assume
the costs of balancing. When the offensive advantagesavailable to other states
wereseento increasevulnerabilitythat could resultin defeatin a short war,
chain ganging was chosenover buck passing.
In a critique of this explanationand in an effort further to understand
whenandwhy states]oin alliances,it is suggestedthat securitypolicy is based
on alliances and armaments. According to James D. Morrow, the choice de-
pendson the relativemarginalcostof eachoption. Underthe assumption
that the marginalcost of eachnew sourceof securityincreasesas additional
securityis achievedthrough eitherarmamentsor alliances,stateswill opt for
the meansthat is marginallycheaper.For example,the economicand political
costs of increasesin military capabilities may be such as to make more attrac-
tive the sharingof securityburdenswith allies.Alternatively,the commitments
undertakenin alliancesto defendalliesmay exceedthe cost of relying solely
on onesown military resourcesfor national security. How nations make the
necessary
costeffectivetrade-offbetweenarmsand alliesis relatedto a com-
bination of domestic costs and external benets. Thus, it is suggestedthat a
theoryof alliancebehaviormustcombinefactorswithin the state,notablydo-
mesticpolitical supportand resourceavailability,with considerations
framed
by the internationalsystemwithin Wll1Ch
alliancesareformed.

Alliance Cohesion and Disintegration

Centralto an understandingof internationalpolitics is the questionof how
statesrespondto threatsand the role of alliancesin their calculusof security
needs.
Do theyattemptto nd alliesin aneffortto achieve
a balance
against
the party threateningthem?Alternatively,do threatenedstatesseekan accom-
modation with the power that posesthe threat?Accordingto StephenM.
Walt, the questfor a balanceto achievesecurityfrom a threateningstateis far
more likely than a movementtoward accommodation.The former he calls
balancing,whileherefersto thelatterasbandwagoning.94A statethat
engagesin a balancingpolicy allies itself with othersagainstthe prevailing
threat; a state that embracesa bandwagoningpolicy aligns itself with the
sourceof danger.According
to Walt,sucha distinctionis crucialbecause
of
the uncertaintythat hasoftenexistedin the mindsof scholarsandpolicymak-
ersalike concerningthe responseof statesto the threatsfacingthem.
In this respect,
Walt,in discussing
the raisondétrefor theformationof
alliances,placeshimselfin fundamentalagreementwith traditional balance-
of-powertheory.Fora stateto alignitselfwith thehegemonic
powerwouldbe
tantamount.to placing its trust in the benevolenceof the dominant state.
Instead,
statesarelikelyto formalliances
or alignments
with otherthreatened
statesto assuretheir survival.Walt contendsthat not only is balancingmore
commonthanbandwagoning,
but alsothatthestrongerthestate,thegreater
is likely to beits tendencyto balance,or to ally, itselfwith otherstatesto cope
with thethreatposedby thepoliticallydominantpower.Conversely,accord-
ingto Walt,theweakerthestate,themorelikelyit is to bandwagon
insteadof
538 Tl-IEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION
balancing.
Such acondition
isattributed
tothefactthatweakstates
can con-
tribute
littletothestrengthofadefensive
coalition.
Becausethey
cannot affect
theoutcome inanyevent,suchstates
are
likely
tochoosethedominant
side. A
decision
tojointheweaker groupinaquest forbalance,
contrastedwith
bandwagoning, willbetakenif astate
perceives
thatsuchaction
willturna
losing
coalition into
one that
has theprospect
ofwinning.Totheextentthat
a
state,
bysuch adecision,
actually
contributes
tothevictoryofanotherwis
losing
coalition,
itsinuence
iscommensurately
enhanced.
InWaltsformulation,
thefocusiswhatistermeda balance
ofthreat
rather
than
abalance ofpowerasthebasis
fortheformation
ofalliances
at
theinternational
level.
States
jointogether
inalliances
inresponse
tothreats,
notallofwhich
maybebased
onthepower
oftheopposing
state.
Thus
Walt
places
emphasis
more onintention
orambition
rather
thansimply
onpower
itself
asthebasis
forthreat
andthus
fortheresponse
takenbybalancing
or
bandwagoning
states.
Hencearises
hispreference
forwhat
istermedthebal-
anceofthreat
inplaceofthebalance
ofpowerasthebasic
reason
foralliance
oralignment.
Becausethreat
perception
strongly
inuences
adecision
toalign
asabasis
forbalancing,
such
apolicy
islikely
tocharacterize
behavior
in
peacetime,
when
thefocus
isdeterrence,
orintheearly
stages
ofaconflic
whentheobject
isdefeat
ofthepower
posingthegreatest
threat.
Astheout-
comebecomes
morecertain,
lesser
states
arelikely
todefect
fromthelosing
side
andthus
tomovetowardapolicy
ofbandwagoning
withthevictoriou
alliance.
Withtheachievement
ofvictory,
thegrouping
thathas
defeated
the
wouldbe
hegemonic
power
isitselflikelytodisintegrate.
Towhat
extent,
Waltalso
asks,
isideology
likely
toconstitute
abasis
for
alliance
formation?
States
withsimilar
political
systems
have
often
aligne
witheach
other.
According
toWalt,
thesignicance
ofideology
asaunifying
factor
inalliances
diminishes
asthreat
increases.
Confronted
withaseriou
challenge
totheir
survival,
states
arelikely
toalign
witheachother,
withlittle
regardforideological
differences.
Insuchcircumstances,
pragmatic
interes
prevail
overconsiderations
ofideology.
Thus
themoresecure
astate
percei
itself
tobeintheinternational
setting
inwhich
itnds
itself,
thegreater
willbe
itsquest
forideologically
similar
orcompatible
postures
inalliance
choices
By
thesametoken,states
thataredomestically
unstable
haveatendencytoalign
themselves
withideologically
similar
states
tobolster
their
internal
legitima
Intheir
continuingquestforsecurity,
states
aresaidtomake choices
be-
tweenalliances
andarmaments. According
toMichaelF.Altfeld,such
deci
sions
arebasedonacalculusofcostnamely,whatthedecision
makersmus
sacrice
inmaking thenecessary
choices.Totheextent
thatalliances
perm
abroader
sharingofthecostofsecurity
amongseveral
parties,
theburden to
any
one
state
islikely
tobelower
than
what
itwould
betopay
forsecurit
in
theabsence
ofanalliance.
Because
themeansavailable
tostates
arenite,
the
purchase
ofarmaments,
tothe
extent
that
itreduces
total
resources
inthecivi
ianeconomy,
represents
acost
factor
tobecalculated
inthedecision
toesta
lishortojoinanalliance.
Moreover,
alliance
membership
can
beexpecte
to
carrywithitareduction
intheautonomy
ofastate
asaresult
oftheprom
 ALLIANCES 539

byeachsidecontained
in thealliance
to takespecicactions
in theeventof
speciccontingencies.
Thus,several
variablesenterinto thecalculation
with
respect
to alliance
membership,
based
ontheextentto whichsecurity
canbe
achieved
bya mix between
greateror lesserlevelsof alignment
or armaments.
Altfeldpostulates
conditions
underwhichagovernment
will bein equilib-
riumwith respect
to security,
wealth,andautonomy.
Of centralimportance
is
themarginal
utilityof alliance
membership
to themarginal
utilityof auton-
omy.Clearlyrelatedis themarginalutility of armaments
to themarginalutil-
ity of domestic
wealth.Stated
simply,
decision
makers
arelikelyto weighthe
valueof allianceagainstthat of additionalarmaments,
andto relatebothal-
liancemembershipand armamentsto the costwith referenceto the lost auton-
omy,or independence
of action,at theinternational
levelandthepriceof ad-
ditionalarmaments
to thedomestic
economy.
Similarly,
in Altfelds
analysis,
the dissolution
of alliances
canbe expected
to occurin anyof ve circum-
stances:an increasein the marginalproduct of armaments;an increasein the
marginalutility [of] autonomy;a declinein the marginalutility of civilian
wealth;a declinein the marginalproductivityof alliances;or a decrease
in the
marginalutility of security.97
Alliances
represent
formalexpressions
of commitment
asa basisfor coop-
eration. How alliances, once formed, are maintained and terminated has im-
portantimplications for thestabilityof theinternational
system.
Thefailureof
onepartyto fulll its agreementto cometo theaidof anattacked partyis il-
lustrative. Therefore, whether and to what extent allies can be relied on to live
up to their treatycommitmentsis crucialto understanding
the utility of al-
liancesat the levelof systemic
stabilityandmoreimmediately for member
statesthemselves.
Addressingthe questionof when and underwhat circum-
stances
do alliances
bindstatestogether,
CharlesW. Kegley,
]r., andGregory
A. Raymondanalyzealliancesaspromissoryobligationsin which stateseither
honorcommitments
or fail to do so whenchangedcircumstances
render
treatycompliancecontraryto their nationalinterestsin an anarchicalinterna-
tionalsetting.Promissory
obligations
contained
in alliances
maystrengthen
or contributeto the development of normativepremises in supportof the
bindingnatureof alliances. Accordingto KegleyandRaymond, the greater
theconcentration of militarycapabilities,
or polarity,within aninternational
system,thegreaterthesupportfor whattheytermbindingpromissory obliga-
tions.Theyalsoconclude that thegreaterthesupportfor bindingpromissory
obligations,
thelessis likelyto bethefrequency, scope,andintensityof inter-
national conicts.
Addressingthe questionof what happensto allianceswhen interestsdi-
vergeand the possibilityof alliancedisintegrationincreases,
they suggestthat
sucha conditiontendsto arisein the aftermathof major wars or in periods
whentheinternational
distributionof powerundergoes
fundamental
change.
In suchperiods,statesweightheir interestsand valuesagainstthe normative
pressuresunderlying the alliance commitment. To the extent that normative
standardssupportingthe.sanctityof treatiesoutweighpressures for nonfulfill-
mentof obligationsor alliancetermination,the resultwill be&#39;the
strengthening
540 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

of what is calleda culture of trust. The expectationthat agreements

will be
observed
diminishestheprospectthat potentialaggressors will resortto war.
According
to KegleyandRaymond, A diplomatic culturethatcondones bro-
kenpromisesandthebreachof treatiesis a culturelikelyto experience armed
conict. Thus alliances,to the extentthat they produceor reflectnormative
standardsbasedon commitmentand cooperation,providean importantbasis
for internationalpeaceand stability.
Otherexplanations
for alliances
lie in ideological
commitment
or ideolog-
icalcompatibility
amongentities.
In otherwords,democracies
tendto ally
with other democracies. For the most part NATO membershavesharedthe
valuesof Westerncivilization,includingpolitical systemsbasedon representa-
tivegovernment.
Bythesame
token,theSoviet
Unionformedalliances
with
other communiststates.Whenthe SovietUnion collapsed,so did the Warsaw
TreatyOrganization
because
theWarsaw
Pact,liketheSoviet
Unionitself,de
pendeduponcoercionratherthanconsent.
TheWorldWarII AxisPowers-
NaziGermany,
Italy,andjapanwere alliedwith eachotheruntil Italywith-
drew in 1943 and Germanyand Japanwere defeatedin 1945. The
democratization
of the CzechRepublic,Hungary,and Polandwasa necessary
prerequisite
for theiradmission
in 1999to NATO,whichtheyfreelychoseto
join,unliketheirforcedentryintotheWarsaw
Pact.Howgroups
of nations,
like othercollectivities
developtheir respectiveidentitiesis not only funda-
mentalto integration, but specicallyto alliances
that includean ideological
basis.To judgeby theseexamples, alliances
basedon agreement andconsen-
susstemming from democratic principlesendurewithoutthe enforced cohe-
sivenessprovidedby totalitarianideologies. Statesthat sharea similardemo-
craticidentityendure,in the wordsof ThomasRisse-Kappen, because they
externalizetheirinternalnormswhencooperating with eachother.99 Such
anapproach bearssimilarityto whatKarlDeutsch termeda pluralisticsecu-
rity community,discussed earlierin thischapter.

NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR

For studiesof alliancetheory,NATO offersan examplethat transcends
the
Cold War and enduresinto the tvventyrstcentury.It containsinstancesin
whichmembers havedisagreedabouthowto sharethedefense burdenor how
to minimizefreeriding.Thoseissuesare exempliedby the effortsof the
UnitedStatesovertheyearsto pressits alliesto domorefor theirowndefense
andby fearsonthepartof alliesthatif theyfurtherreduced theirdependence
on the United States,the Americansecuritycommitmentwould be reduced
withdetrimental
overall
effects
onEuropean
security.
Atvarious
times
NATO
Europeanallieshavebeenapprehensive
that the UnitedStatesmighteither
abandonthemor entrapthemin conicts,especially
outsideEurope,beyond
the Alliance perimeteror, as they are termed, out of area issues.As an
Alliance NATO gainedthree new members,the CzechRepublic,Hungary,
and Poland,in 1999 as it -commemorated
its ftieth anniversary
with a
 NATO
AFTER
THEcorn WAR 541
Summit
Meeting
inWashington,
D.C.Since
theendoftheCold
War,
NATO
has
retained
itsArticle
5collective
defense
role,
while
increasingly
assum
major
newresponsibilities
incrisis
management
andpeace
enforcement,
asin
Southeastern
Europe
since
theDaytonPeace
Accords
in1995
andOperatio
AlliedForce,
astheNATO aircampaign
against
Serbia
in 1999
wascalled.
TheAlliancehasnotonlyadmitted
three
newmembers,butalso
it hasbefore
it theapplications
ofadditional
states,
including
former
republics
oftheSoviet
Union,
asinthecase
ofEstonia,
Latvia,
andLithuania,
andothers
in Central
or Southeastern
Europe,
suchasSlovakia,
Slovenia,
Bulgaria,
andRomania
Themotivations
ofrecententrants
andwouldbemembers
arenumerous:
to
becomemore
fullyapartoftheEuro-Atlantic
community
(the
pluralistic
secu-
ritycommunity
discussed
earlier
inthischapter);
tohedge
against
thepossibil
ity of a revival
of Russian
militarypowerandaggressiveness;
andto assure
stabilitythatisconducive
tothedevelopment
ofmarket
economies.
Suchmo-
tivations
represent
perhaps
acombination
ofbandwagoningjoining
agroup
ofadvanced
democracies
withprosperous
market
economiesand
balancin
against
apotentially
resurgent
Russia.
At thesame
timethatNATOhasadded
newmembers,
it hasdeveloped
newinstitutions
withinitsPartnership
for
Peace
to provide
for extensive
cooperation
withstates
thatarenotfull mem-
bers,
including
Russia
itself.
TheAlliance
has
undergone
anextensive
proces
ofinternal
adaptation
thatincludes
changes
in itsintegrated
command
struc-
turedesigned
to facilitate
itsabilityto undertake
newtasks.
Thedecision
toenlarge
NATO
toinclude
itsthree
newest
members
gave
riseto substantial
discussion
anddebate.
Those
opposed
questioned
themili-
tarynecessity,
politicalwisdom,
andpotential
consequences
of NATOs
east-
wardexpansion.
Theyarguedthat,nowthattheWest nolonger
regarded
Russia
asanenemy,NATO enlargement
woulddrawanewdividinglinein
Europe,
aggravate
xenophobic
nationalist
sentiment
inRussia,
possibly
defail
thatcountrys
transition
to democracy,
revive
orhelpto perpetuate
a Cold
Warmindset,
andleadeventually
toanotherroundofcostly
competition
in
weapons
technology.
SomeAmerican
policymakers
werealsoconcerned
about
extending
aformaldefense
commitment toaregion
(Central
Eastern
Europe)
notheretofore
considered
vitaltoU.S.
national
security
interests,
despite
emo-
tional
tieslinking
many
U.S.citizens
tocountries
inthatarea
anddoing
soata
timewhentheUnitedStates
wasreducing
theoverallsizeof its armed
forces
andgiving
themnewassignments,
asin Southeastern
Europe,
thePersian
Gulf, and elsewhere.
Advocates
of NATOs expansion
countered
withseveralarguments.The
twoworldwarsof thetwentiethcenturybothbegan in CentralEastern
Europe.European
strategists
feared
thattheBalkanspowderkegin thepost-
Titoeraremained
a source
of dangerous
instability
withimplications
tran-
scending
Yugoslavia,
implications
thatEurope
asa wholeandNATOcould
notignore.Inaddition,
CentralEastern
Europe,
partofthelarger
Western
civ-
ilization,
ismoving
slowly butsteadily
towardtheprocess
ofpolitical
andeco-
nomicintegration
in theEU.JustasNATOs
protective
deterrent
hadprovided
a safeenvironment
for thestrengthening
of democracy
andtheprosperous
542 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

growth of marketeconomiesin the West,so it could now do the samefor the

former satellite states of the Soviet Union. Severalof these remained wary of
theirgiantneighbors
long-termaims.Theywarnedthat,eventhoughRussia
underYeltsinhad becomebenignand cooperative,its expansionisttendencies
datingbackto the tsarsmight survivethe demiseof communism.
The NATO allieswereat painsto minimizean adversereactionto expan-
sion with Russia.They soughtto assureRussianleadersthat NATO had no
intention,no plans,and no reasonto deploynuclearweaponsor substantial
numbersof troops and conventionalarmamentson the territory of new al-
liancemembersPoland,the CzechRepublic,andHungarybeingthe first. To
giveRussiatimeto adjust,NATO adopteda prudent,measuredapproach,
postponing
enlargementtowardmoresensitive
borderareassuchastheBaltic
states.To reduceany possibleimpressionthat Moscow was beingmarginal-
ized,NATO admittedRussiato a consultativerole that would enableit to ex-
pressits viewson NATOpolicyactionswithoutbeingableto vetothemin
what is calledthe Permanentjoint Council,formedin 1997with Russiaas a
full member.
Whenthe U.S.Congressand someWestEuropeanparliamentsobjected
to the possiblecostsof NATO enlargement,they were usually assuredthat
most of the expendituresfor new military equipmentwould haveto be bud-
getedby the new membersthemselves. In the final analysis,it seemedwiser,
cheaper,and lessrisky to carry out NATO enlargementduring a period in
which there were fewer,rather than more, areasof disputewith Russiain
the hope that such NATO enlargementwould make a future threat less
likely, rather than waiting for a crisis to arise later. At such a time the
NATO responsewould haveto be more urgent,more costly,more provoca-
tive, and possiblymore dangerous.Ironically, the three newestmembersof
NATO, havingjust enteredthe alliancewith the hopeof enhancingtheir se-
curity, suddenlyfound themselvesconfrontedwith an unexpectedcrisis in
Kosovo. Hungary in particular, having a common border with Serbia,
which containeda large Hungarian minority just acrossthat frontier, was
much lessenthusiasticin its support of the war than other NATO members
fartheraway.1°°

INTEGRATION THEORY: PROBLEMS OF

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT
As a theoryof cooperation,integrationlacksboth a commonlyacceptedde-
nition and a seriesof agreedindicatorsas a basisfor measurement. As noted
earlier,integrationtheoristshavedisagreedabout the relativeimportanceof
suchphenomena assupranationalelites,internationalstructures,intergovern-
mentalaction,anddomesticpolitical factorsascatalystsfor integration.In the
absenceof basicdenitional and conceptualconsensus, it is hardly surprising
to nd discordiabout the indicatorsbywhichintegrationcould be measured.
At what stage,for example,is the EU in the early twenty-rst centurywithin
 INTEGRATIONTHEORY 543

theintegration
process?
At whatpoint,andin whatsequence,
dothevarious
phenomena associated
withintegration
assert
themselves
to produce
anaccel-
eration,
orslowing,oftheintegrative
momentum?Howimportant
issuprana
tionalinstitutionalism,
contrasted
withintergovernmentallevel
support,
in
thepromotionof integration?1°1
FromtheEuropean experience
on which
muchof integration
theoryis based,
it seems
evident
thatintergovernmen
support
is essential,
whileat thesupranational
levelsuccessful
experience
can
buildor solidifysupportat theintergovernmental
levelfor furtherinitiatives.
Somewriters,aswehaveseen,emphasize transactionows suchastrade
andcommunications asindicators
of integration.
Yetthequestion remains
whether arisein transactions
precedes,
reinforces,
results
from,orcausesinte-
gration.According to Haas,thequestionof whentheseconditions
arepre-
sentISvitalwhenwetry to devise
arigoroustheoretical
framework to explain
thecauses
of integration.
Especially
in thecaseof indicatorsbasedon social
communication
wemustknowwhether
thetransactions
measured
among
the
elitesto beintegrated
preceded
theintegrative
process
or whether
theyare
presentasa resultof events
thatcharacterizedtheregionafterintegration
has
occurredfor several
years.In thelattercase,wehavemerelydenedanexist-
ingcommunity
in termsof communications
theory,
butwehavenotexplored
thenecessary stepsfor arrivingthere.1°2
It is not surprisingthatintegration
studies,
usingsuchindicators
asa basis
for measurement,havereached
differing
conclusionsaboutthestatusof, and
prospects
for,integration,
especially
in Europe.
In themid-1960s, Deutsch,
us-
ingtransaction
owsasoneof hisindicators
to assessthelevelof Europeanin-
tegration,concluded
that Europeanintegrationhasslowedsincethe mid-
1950s
andit hasstopped
or reached
a plateau
since1957-1958.
In part,he
based
thisconclusion
onthefactthatsincethen,therehadbeennoincreases
in
transaction
owsbeyond whatonewouldexpect frommere
random probabil-
ity andincrease
in prosperity
in thecountries
concerned.1O3
In support
of his
conclusion,
Deutschmarshaled
otherevidence,
includingeliteinterviews
and
contentanalysisof selectedkeynewspapers
in France andGermany. Thus,-in
additionto transaction
ows,statistical
analysis
of opinions
expressed byelites
andattention accordedin themediaaresaidto formindicators
of integration.
Inlightofthedevelopment oftheEUin subsequent
decades
intothetwenty-first
century,
sucha conclusion
wasobviously
inaccurate
for thelongerterm,andit
didnot providea full explanation
of whatwashappening
in Europe
in the
1960s.AlthoughPresident
deGaulleof France,
aswehavenotedearlierin this
chapter,
insisted
on anintergovernmental
consensus
asthebasisfor building
Europe,therewasmarkedprogress towarda common market(atdeGaullesin-
sistence)
in agriculture,
andtherewererisinglevelsof tradeandotherexchanges
that,«atthe veryleast,reinforcedsupportfor integration.In the 1960s,the
United
Kingdom
applied
forEUmembership
andtwicewasrejected,
butnally
succeeded
in joiningin 1971,thusrepresenting
animportantenlargement
of the
EU,despite
theperiodicdifferencesthat persisted
between
Londonandother
EUmembers overmanyissues. As WesternEuropes economies
expanded,so
did their trade,capitalmovement,andotherinteractionswith eachother.
544 THEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
AND
INTEGRATION
LIMITATIONS
OFFUNCTIONALISM
ANDNEOFUNCTIONALISM
Functionalist
theory
has
been
theobject
ofseveral
kinds
ofcriticisms
and
modications,
especially
byneofunctionalists
surveyed
inthischapter.
Among
itsalleged
deciencies
are
the
following:
(1)that
itisdifficult,
ifnotimposs
ble,
toseparate
the
economic
and
social
tasks
fromthepolitical;
(2)that
gov-
ernments
have
often
shown
themselves
unwilling
tohand
over
tointerna-
tional
authority
tasksthatencroachontheir
political
prerogatives;
(3)that
certain
economic
and social
tasksdonotnecessarily
spill
overintothepoliti-
calsector;
and
(4)thattheroadtointegration
lies
through
bold
actsofpoliti-
calwillbased
onideological
oremotional
commitment,
rather
thansimply
throughfunctional
integration
ineconomic
and social
sectors.
Research
con-
ducted
thusfarhasnotproduced agreementabout
spillover
orabout the
other
catalysts
thatmay initiate
andsustain
theintegrative
process.
The extent
towhich
thereisacausal
relationship
orpositive
learning
experience
betwee
integration
inonesector
andspillover
toanother
sector
(the
expansive
logic
ofsector
integration)
remains
tobeseen.
Nevertheless,
inthecase
ofEurope
wehave
witnessed
numerous
examples
ofsuccessful
integration
inonesector
being
followed
bycomparable
efforts
inother
sectors.
After
all,the
ECSC
was
thesuccessful
forerunner
oftheTreaties
ofRome
thatledtotheEU.
The
com-
pletion
ofacommon
market
forgoods
and
services
inthe
EUwas
followe
and
insome
cases
accompanied,
byprogress
toward
monetary
union,
includ
ingtheintroduction
oftheeuro
asacommon currency.
Withadvances de-
lays,
andsetbacks,
theEUhasbeen
bothbroadened
infunctions
and
memb
shipanddeepened
inintegrative
development.
Institutional
changes
inthe EU
since
theSEA cannot
beexplained
solely,
orevenlargely,
byspillover.
How
rapidly
orextensively
spillover
fromthe
intergovernmental
bargain
that gave
impetusto-
theSEAandTEAwillspill
overtoother
sectors
isstillanopen
question,
although
spillover
isclearly
part
ofthe
integration
process.1
Also
unresolved
iswhether
themembers
oftheEUwillcreate
aEuropean
Securi
and
Defense
Identity
capable
ofelding
military
forces
could
assume
military
tasks
nowwithin
theperimeter
ofNATO.
This
would
require
further
momen
tumtowardpolitical
integration,
including
greateragreement
onforeign
pol-
icy,
military
doctrines,
thecommand
ofmilitary
forces,
andinstitutions
toen-
sure
thatthey
were under
democratic
controls.
If such
anentity
weretobe
created,
itwouldrepresent
animportant
example ofspillover
from
theeco
nomicto thepoliticalsector.
Inanother
critique
offunctionalism,
Charles
Pentland
concluded
that,
at
least inlight
oftheWestern
European
experience
sinceWorldWar11,
there
is
littleevidence
tosuggest
thattechnology
andeconomicgrowth,
inashrinki
world, bythemselves
willproduce
integration
through
functional
coopera
The relation
between
functional
needandstructural
adaptation,
central
tothe
theory, isnecessary
onlyinthesense
ofbeing
anidealornorm,
notinthe
sense ofpredetermining
thedirection
ofchange.1°5Infact,
tobuildon
Pentlands
statement,
technology
andeconomic
growth
mayleadto move
 THEDEVELOPMENT
OFTHEORIES
OFINTEGRATION
ANDCOOPERATION
545

mentsdesigned to reassert
ethnic,religious,or nationalidentity,asin the
Islamicfundamentalismof recent
decades. In Europewehavetheparadoxica
situationof states
suchastheUnitedKingdom, Belgium, France,
Italy,and
Spainin whichsubnational groups
seeking to reassert
theirownidentityhave
challengedtheauthorityof centralgovernments. Clearly,howto reconcile the
forcesleadingtowardgreaterintegration andthoseseeking to assurelocalcon-
trol remains
a majorchallenge bothfor theoryandthepolicycommunity in the
earlytvventyrstcentury.It bringsagaininto sharpfocusthecosmopolitan-
communitarian debate anddiscussionsetforthat thebeginning of thisChapter.
In anyevent,politicalinuences andpressures haveprovento beof majorim-
portancein shapingthe integrativeprocessin WesternEuropeand wherever
elseit hasoccurred,mostobviouslyat the nationallevel.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF INTEGRATION

AND COOPERATION
Although functionalismand neofunctionalismhaveprovideddominanttheo-
ries that haveshapedintegrationstudies,more recentwork, as noted in this
chapter,hasemphasized the interplaybetweensupranationalinstitutionalism
and intergovernmentalinstitutionalism.Although entitiesbeyondthe nation-
statein theformof international
regimes,
suchastheEU,shapeintergovern-
mentalpolicies,statesremaintheprincipalactorsof theinternational
system.
Therefore, bargains
between statesfoundedon conceptions of convergent
na-
tional interestprovidethe indispensable
basisfor buildingsupranationalinsti-
tutions, basednot so muchon thetransferof sovereigntyto a new centralau-
thority ason its poolingor sharingby governments that remainpowerfully
engaged in the management of supranationalinstitutions.Convergent na-
tionalinterestformsthebasisfor interstate
bargains.
In supportof thispropo-
sition, it is suggestedthat the EU has developeda supranationaldecision-
makingprocessthat is the resultof agreements, or bargains,reachedat the in-
tergovernmentallevel. Thus, the focus on integration in its supranational,
neofunctionaldimensionhasoften contendedwith an emphasison an inter-
governmental,neorealistperspective. The experienceof the SEA,reectedin
the mostrecentintegrationliterature,providesevidenceof the need,asin the
neoliberaland neorealistdebatenotedelsewherein this volume,to achievea
synthesis.If both arepresentaspart of a comprehensive theoryof integration,
the questionbecomesthe synergismbetweenthe supranationaland the inter-
governmental. How doesoneshapethe other,and in what sequence?
In other respectsas well, integrationis a multidimensionalphenomenon.
Accordingto JosephNye, thereis a needfor integrationto be brokendown
into economic,political,and legalcomponents, which in turn might bedivided
into subtypes,eachof which could be measured.Rather than allowingus to
talk aboutintegrationin generaland confusingterms,this disaggregation will
tendto forceus to makemorequalified,and morereadilyfalsied,generaliza-
tions with the ceterisparibusclauseslled in, so to speak,and thus pavethe
546 THEORIES
OFINTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
ANDINTEGRATION

wayformoremeaningful
comparative
analysis
thanthatprovided
bythegen-
eralschemes
usedsofar.1°5Theresult,it is to behoped,wouldbea theory
thatbrings
together
incomprehensive
fashion
thekeyassumptions andfactors
thatshape
theintegrative
process
leading
topolitical
community. Such
atheory
wouldcastlightonhow,why,andwhen groupsareformed tocreate
enduring
communities,immediate
coalitions,
andlonger-lasting
alliances
such
asNATO
and,asaresult,wouldformabasisforcooperative
strategies
andsolutions
to
commonproblems.

NOTES
1. Thisliterature
includes
Joseph
Grieco,
Cooperation
AmongNations
(Ithaca,
NY:
Cornell
University
Press,1990);
PeterHaas,
Saving
theMediterranean
(NewYork:
ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1990);Kenneth
A. Oye,ed.,Cooperation
Under
Anarchy
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,1986);Duncan Smdal,
Cooperation
Versus
Prisoners
Dilemma,
AmericanPolitical
Science
Review,
79
(December
1985)
932-42;
Nicholas
Bayne,
Hanging
Together,
2nded.(Cambridg
MA: HarvardUniversity
Press,1987);MichaelTaylor,ThePossibility
of
Cooperation
(Cambridge,
England:Cambridge
University
Press, 1987);
Oran
Young,
International
Cooperation
(Ithaca,
NY:Cornell
University
Press,
1989);
Harrison
Wagner,
TheTheory of Games andtheProblemof Internationa
Cooperation,
AmericanPolitical
Science
Review,
70 (June1983),330-346;
Joanne
Gowa,Anarchy,
Egoism,
andThirdImages:
TheEvolution
ofCooperatio
andInternational
Relations,International
Organization, 40 (Winter1986),174.
2. Fora discussion
of denitionsandrecentliteratureon theoriesof cooperation,
seeHelenMilner,InternationalTheories of CooperationAmongNations:
StrengthsandWeaknesses, WorldPolitia,44(April1992),
esp.467-470.
3. See,for example,
A. J. R. Groom,TheSetting in WorldSociety,
in A. J. R.
GroomandP.Taylor, eds.,Frameworkfor International
Cooperation(London:
Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 3.
4. Foranextensive
discussion
of theStagHuntandPrisoners
Dilemmamodels,
see
Robert
Jervis,
Cooperation
undertheSecurity
Dilemma,
WorldPolitics,
30(2)
(January1978),167-214.
5. Robert
Axelrod,
TheEvolution
of Cooperation
(NewYork:Basic
Books,
1984),
pp.6-7.SeealsoDavidKreps
eral.,Rational
Cooperationin theFinitely
Repeated
Prisoners
Dilemma,
fournal
ofEconomicTheory,
27(August 1982),
245-252;andMichaelTaylor,ThePossibility
of Cooperation
(NewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1987).
6. See,
forexample,
Geoffrey
Garnett,
Intemational
Cooperation
andInstitution
Choice:
TheEuropean
Communitys
Internal
Market,International
Organizatio
46(2)
(Spring
1992),
533-557;
Stephen
D.Krasner,
Global
Communications
and
NationalPower:Life on the ParetoFrontier,WorldPolitics,43 (April 1991),
336-366.
7. JohnGerard
Ruggie,
Multilateralism:
TheAnatomy
ofanInstitution,
inJohn
Gerard
Ruggie,
ed.,Multilateralism
Matters:
TheTheoryandPraxis of an
Institutional
Form(NewYork:Columbia
University
Press,
1993),p. 11.
10.

11. NOTES 547

ChrisBrown,International
Relations
Theory:NewNormative
Approache
(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1992),p. 24.
12. HenryTam,Communitarianism:
A NewAgenda
for Politicsand Citizenship
(NewYork: New York UniversityPress,1998),pp. 18-24.
Ibid., p. 20.
ChrisBrown,International
Relations
Theory:
NewNormative
Approache
(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1992),pp. 75-76.
13. Amitai Etzioni, Old Chestnutsand New Spurs, in Amitai Etzioni (ed.),New
Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and Communities
14.
(Charlottesvilleand London:Universityof Virginia Press,1995),p. 17.
ErnstB.Haas,TheUniting
of Europe
(Stanford,
CA:Stanford
University
Press,
15. 1958), p. 16.
Karl W. Deutschet al., PoliticalCommunityand the North AtlanticArea
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1957), p. 5.
See,for example, A. J. R. Groom and Dominic Powell, From World Politics to
16. Global Governance-AThemein Need of a Focus, in A. J. R. Groom and
Margot Ligat, eds.,Contemporary International
Relations:A Guideto Theory
(London:PinterPublishers,1994),pp. 81-87.
17. DavidMitrany,A Working Peace System (London:RoyalInstituteof International
Affairs,1943).OtherworksincludeDavidMitrany,TheProgress of International
Commitment(New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press,1933).
For a succinctanalysisof Mitranyswork, seePaulTaylor,Functionalism:The
Approachof DavidMitrany, in A. J. R. GroomandPaulTaylor,eds.,Framework
for International
Cooperation (London:PinterPublishers,1990),pp. 125-138.
SeealsoDavidMitrany,A PoliticalTheoryfor a NewSociety,in A. J. R. Groom
and PaulTaylor,Functionalism: Theoryand Practicein International
Relations
(London:Universityof LondonPress,1975),pp.25-37; J. P.Sewell,Function-
18. alismand World Politics(London:Oxford UniversityPress,1966);PaulTaylor
and A. J. R. Groom, Global Issuesin the United Nations Framework(London:
Macmillan, 1989).
19. R. J. Harrison, Neo-Functionalism,in A. J. R. Groom and PaulTaylor,eds.,
Frameworkfor InternationalCooperation, 2nd ed. (London: Pinter, 1994),
pp. 138-150.
Haas,Unitingof Europe,p. 13. For an analysisof expectations
of Britishofcial
20. andnonofcial elitegroupsfrom Europeanintegration,seeRobertL. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr., Britain FacesEurope, 1957-1967 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1969).
21.Pfaltzgraff,
BritainFacesEurope,p. 48.
Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, Economics and Differential Patterns
of PoliticalIntegration:ProjectionsaboutUnity in Latin America, International
548

23.

24.

25.

26.

28.
27.

29.

30.
 47.

NOTES 549

48.
Beyond: AStudy oftheWiderImplications
oftheSingle
European
Act(New
York: Routledge,1992).
49. Robert O.Keohane
the1980s,in Robert
and
O.Keohane
Stanley
andStanley
Hoffmann,
Institutional
Hoffmann,
eds.,
TheNew
Change
inEurope
in
European
Community:
Decisionmalzing
andInstitutional
Change
(Boulder,
CO:
WestviewPress,1991),pp. 24-25.
Ibid., p. 13.

50. Andrew
Hoffmann,
Moravcsik,
NewEuropean
DavidCameron,
Negotiating
Community.
theSingle
The 1992Initiative:
Causes
European
Act,in Keohane
andConsequences,
in Alberta
and

Sbragia,
ed.,
Euro-Politics:
Institutions
andPolicymalzing
intheNew Europea
Community
(Washington,
DC:Brookings
Institution,
1992),
p.63.
51. Ibid., p. 65.
52. Wayne
Sandholtz
andJohn
Zysman,
1992:Recasting
theEuropean
Bargain
WorldPolitics,XLII(1)(October1989),95-128.
53. Gerard
Schneider
andLars-Erik
Cederman,
TheChange
of Tidein Political
Cooperation:
A Limited
Information
Modelof European
Integration
International
Organization,
48(4)(Autumn
1994),
633-662.
54. JamesE. Dougherty,
ThePolitics
of European
Monetary
Union,Current
History,
96(March
1997);EMU:AnAwfullyBigAdventure,
Survey
in The
Economist,April 11, 1998.
55. Conditional
EU Bid to Turkey, International
HeraldTribune,
Decembe
11-12, 1999.
56. EdmundAndrews, NoRescue inSight
asEuroSlides
toNewLow,NewYork
Times,
May3,2000.OtherEuropean Central
Bankofcialshave
arguedthat
theeurowill growstronger
in thelongtermbecause
of thehugeU.S.trade
decitandincreasing Europeanexports.
BruceBarnard,Whatrolewill
57.
Europes
single
currency
playinworld
markets?
Europe,
387(June
1999),
10.
Warren
Hoge,BritainDelays
EarlyEntryintotheEuro,New YorkTimes.
October
27,1997;
Andrew
Parker,
Opposition
grows
to governments
stance
oneuro,Financial
Times,
March1,1999;
JohnVinocur,
BritainandtheEuro:
Difdent
BlairBides
HisTime, International
Herald
Tribune,
January
20,
2000;
TomBuerkle,British
Debate
Intensies
onJoining
Euro
Zone,
ibid.,
February29, 2000.
58. JohnGerard
Ruggie,
International
Responses
to Technology:
Concepts
and
Trends,
International
Organization,
29(3)(Summer
1975),
570.
59. Duncan
Snidal,
Coordination
Versus
Prisoners
Dilemma:
Implications
for
International
Cooperation
and Regimes,
The American PoliticalScience
Review,
79(December
1985),
923-924.
SeealsoArthurA. Stein,
Coordination
andCollaboration:
Regimes
inanAnarchic
World,International
Organizatio
36(2)(Spring
1992),
299-324;
Joseph
S.Nye,_Ir.,
Nuclear
Learning
andU.S.-
SovietSecurity
Regimes,
International
Organization,
41(3)(Summer
1987),
371-402.
60. Stephen
D.Krasner,
Structural
Causes
andRegime
Consequences:
Regimes
as
550

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.
83.

84.
85.

86.

87.

88. Communities.
Fora dyadicstudy(theUnitedStates
NOTES

andItaly),seeValentine
Belglio, Alliances (Lexington, MA: Ginn Press,1986).
J.
551

Politics (Boston: Allyn SCBacon, 1970); and Beer,Alliances: Latent War

Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 175.

552 TI-IEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

New Rolesin InternationalSecurity(Washington,

DC: UnitedStatesInstituteof
PeacePress,1998);MichaelMandelbaum,TheDawn of Peacein Europe(New
York: The TwentiethCenturyFundPress,1996);KennethW. Thompson(ed.),
NATO and the ChangingWorld Order: An Appraisalby Scholarsand
Policymakers
(Lanham,
MD: University
Press
of America,1996);RobDeWiik,
NATO on theBrink of theNew Millennium:TheBattlefor Consensus
(London:
Brasseys
Limited,1997);James
M. Goldgeier,
Not Whether
But When:TheU.S.
Decisionto EnlargeNATO (Washington, DC: TheBrookingsInstitution, 1999);
Todd Sandlerand Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO: Past,
Present,and into the 215 Century (New York: CambridgeU11lVCISI1&#39;y
Press,
1999).
101. See,for example,JosephS. Nye, Jr., Comparative Regional Integration:
Concept
andMeasurement,
International
Organization,
XXII (Autumn1968),
857. For a collectionof contemporarywritings on integrationat the interna-
tional level,see,by the sameauthor,InternationalRegionalism:
Readings
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).
102. ErnstB. Haas,The Challengeof Regionalism,InternationalOrganization,XII
(Autumn 1958), 445.
103. Karl W. Deutsch,France, Germanyand the WesternAlliance (New York;
Scribners,1967),pp.218-220.Deutschbaseshis ndings on the Relative
AcceptanceIndex,whichpurportsto separate
the actualresultsof preferential
behavior
andstructuralintegration
fromthemereeffects
of theS126andprosper-
ity of thecountry.
104. RobertO. Keohaneand StanleyHoffmann,Institutional Changein Europein
the 1980s, in Keohaneand Hoffmann, The New European Community,
pp. 18-20.
105. CharlesPentland,InternationalTheoryand EuropeanIntegration(London:
Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 98.
106. Joseph
S.Nye,Jr.,Comparative
Regional
Integration:
ConceptandMeasure-
ment, InternationalOrganization,XXII (Autumn 1968),858.
Chapter11
Decision-Makin

Theories:
Choice
and the Unit Level Actor

DECISION-MAKING ANALYSIS:
ITS NATURE AND ORIGINS
Decisions
are,inDavidEastons
terminology,
theoutputs
ofthepolitical
sys-
tem,bywhichvalues
areauthoritatively
allocated
withinasociety.
Thecon-
ceptof decision
makinghadlongbeen implicit
in someof theolderap-
proaches
to diplomatic
history
andthestudyofpolitical
institutions.
The
study
ofhowdecisions,
orchoices,
aremaderstbecame thesubject
ofsys-
tematic
investigation
inother
elds
outsideofpolitical
science.
Psycholog
wereinterested
in themotives
underlying
anindividuals
decisions
andwhy
somepersons
hadgreater
difficulty
thanothersin making
decisions
Economists
focused
onthedecisions
ofproducers,
consumers;
investors,
and
others
whosechoices
affected
theeconomy.
Business-administration
theorists
sought
toanalyze
andincrease
theefficiency
ofexecutive
decision
making.
In
government
andespecially
in defenseplanning
in the1960s,
techniqu
known
generally
ascosteffectiveness
wereused
in thedecision-mak
process,
such
asinregard
totheacquisition
ofnew weaponssystems.
Decisio
makinghaslongbeen
afocal
point
forpolitical
scientists
interested
inanalyz
ingthedecisional
behavior
ofvoters,
legislators,
executive
officials,
politi-
cians,
leaders
ofinterest
groups,
andother
actorsinthepolitical
arena.1
Thus,
thestudy
offoreign-policy
decision
making
hasconcentrated
ononesegmen
ofamore
general
phenomenon
ofinterest
tothesocial
sciences
andtopolicy-
makers.
Because
many analysts
haveconcerned
themselves
withdecision
mak-
554 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES:CHOICEAND THE UNIT LEVELACTOR

valuesshouldserveascriteriafor rankingthevariousalternativesfrom mostto

least preferred. There are controversies both over the nature of the decision-
makingprocessandoverthe appropriateparadigmsfor its study.However,de-
cisionmakinghasbeenstudiednot onlyasmereabstractchoiceamongpossi-
blemaximum-utilityalternativesto decisionmakingbut alsoasan incremental
processcontainingpartial choicesandcompromises amongcompetingorgani-
zationalinterestsand bureaucraticpressures.

APPROACHES TO DECISION-MAKING THEORY

Thedecision-making approach to anunderstanding
of international
politicsis
not novel.Twenty-fourcenturiesago,theGreekhistorianThucydides, in his
Peloponnesian War,examined thefactorsthatledtheleadersof city-states
to
decidethe issuesof war andpeaceandof allianceandempirewith asgreat
precisionas they did under the circumstances
confrontingthem.He focused
not onlyon theconscious reasons
for stateleaders
choices
andtheirpercep-
tionsof thesystemicenvironmentbothof whicharereectedin thespeeches
he attributesto thembut alsoon the deeperpsychological
forcesof fear,
honor,and interestthat in varyingcombinationsmotivatedthem asindividu--
alsandsettheprevailingtoneof theirparticularsocieties.
Thus,Thucydides
wasindeedanearlystudentof decisionmaking(seeNote22 in Chapter1).
Decision-making(DM) theory identies a largenumberof relevantvari-
ables,andit suggests possibleinterrelationships
amongthesevariables.DM
theory(aswereferto it here)marksa signicantshiftfromtraditionalpoliti-
calanalysisin whichwriterssometimes havebeenproneto reifyor personify
nation-statesasthe basicactorswithin theinternational
system. DM theory
directsattentionnotto statesasmetaphysicalabstractions,
or to governments,
or evento suchbroadly labeledinstitutionsas the executive,but instead
seeksto highlightthe behaviorof the specichumandecisionmakerswho ac-
tually shapegovernmental
policy.As RichardSnyder,H. W. Bruck,and
Burton Sapinput it, It is one of our basicmethodologicalchoicesto dene
thestateasits ofcial decision-makersthose
whoseauthoritative
actsare,to
all intentsand purposes,the actsof the state.Stateaction is the actiontaken
bythoseactingin thenameof thestate.7&#39;
Bynarrowingthesubjectof investi-
gatiDI1
froma largercollectivityto a smallerunitof persons
responsible
for de-
cisions,DM theoristshopeto makethelocusof politicalanalysis morecon-
creteand more preciseand thus more amenableto systematic analysis.
Nevertheless,
it is assumedthat decisionmakersactwithin a total perceived
environmentthatincludesinternallytheirnationalpoliticalsystemandexter-
nally the internationalsystemasa whole.
Perceptionis assigneda centralplacein DM theory.Whendealingwith
thedenitionof thesituation,mostDM theoristsregardtheworld asviewed
by decisionmakersto be at leastas importantas objectivereality.Robert
Jervisobserved
thatthetendency towardegocentric perceptionmakesleaders
 APPROACHES
TO DECISION-MAKINGTHEORY 555

interprettheir own decisions

asresponses
to objectiveconditions,
whileat-
tributingtheactions
of foreignrivalsto a hostiledisposition.3
Theythereby
acceptthedistinctiondrawnbyHaroldandMargaretSproutbetween thepsy-
chomilieuandtheoperationalmilieu(discussed
in Chapter4).Joseph
Frankel,
however,arguesthat DM theorymusttakethe objectiveenvironmentinto ac-
count,for eventhoughfactorsnot presentin the mindsof policymakerscan-
not influence
theirchoices,
suchfactorsmaybeimportantinsofarastheyset
limits to the outcomeof their decisions.4Similarly,Michael Brecherinsists
that the operational environment affects the results or outcomes of decisions
directly but inuencesthe choiceamongpolicy options,that is,thedecisions
themselves, only as it is ltered through the imagesof decisionmakers.5
As
wediscuss
decision
making,weshouldalsorecalltheconstructivist\approac
discussed
in Chapter4. Decisions
arementallyshaped
by thesocialsettingor
the contextwithin which decisionmakersoperate.That is to say,decisionsare
sociallyconstructed.Jutta Weldesgoesso far asto suggestthat for choices,or
decisions,to be made,decisionmakersmust havean understandingof their
surroundingsand the natureof their foreignpolicy or nationalsecuritygoals.
In keepingwith the constructivistapproachdiscussed in Chapter4, decision
makersconstruct the national interest within this understandingof rela-
tions amongthe variousimportantstatesand other actors.6

The Decision Situation (or Occasion)

Braybrookeand Lindblomsuggestthat decisionmaking,althoughit cannotbe
fully identied with rational problemsolving,nevertheless
may be generally
equated with it.7Thequestion nowarisesasto howdecision
makersdefinethe
situationin relationto theproblemconfronting
them.How dotheyseeobjects,
conditions,other actors,and their intentions?How do they denethe goalsof
their own government? What valuesstrikethemasmostimportant,not in the
abstractbut insofarastheyappearto beat stakein this particularsituation?
Snyderobserves that somesituationsaremorehighly structuredthan oth-
ers.Someare readilygraspedin their meaning,whereasothersmay be more
uctuatingandambiguous.
Theurgency-of
situations,
or thepressure
to take
action,will alsovary widely.Whethera problemis consideredprimarily polit-
ical,economic,
military,social,or culturalwill normallyhaveimplications
for
how it is to be handledand by whom. But aswe shall see,decisionsoften in-
volveseveralfunctionalareas.It is difcult, out of the welterof opinionsfrom
professionaldiplomats,scholars,journalists,and others,to arrive at a rela-
tively accurateassessmentof the varioustrendsand forcesactivein a foreign
situation(andhereforeign-policydecisionmakingis probablymore complex
than is domestic,especiallyin timesof internationalcrisis,whenthe stakesare
higher and the decisionmakersspan of attention may be stretchedto the
limit). Analyzinganother statesintentions can be even more treacherous.
Decisionmakersin onestate,anticipating
a policyinitiativeby theircounter-
parts in another, may regard their own move to deter or preclude as a purely
556 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

defensiveresponse,but thesemeasuresmight seemoffensiveto their foreign

counterparts, as we noted in Chapter 7.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
The importanceof bureaucracies
haslong beenrecognizedby studentsof pol-
itics. Max Weber, without demeaning the notion of leadership, wrote, In a
modernstatethe actualruler is necessarily
and unavoidablythe bureaucracy,
sincepower is exercisedneitherthrough parliamentaryspeeches nor monar-
chicalenunciations
but throughthe routinesof administration.8
Although
leadersdecidewhat is to bedone,bureaucracies
decidehow to do it. Deciding
how to do it, in turn, may shapewhat is to be done. Thus bureaucraciesare of
greatimportancein the study of decisionmaking.EventhoughWeberwrote
about the era-beforethe 1920s, his work contains antecedentsfor understand-
ing bureaucraticstructuresand decisionmakingin the early twenty-rst cen-
tury. Theorists assumethat those who advise decision makers allow their con-
ceptionsof national interestto be colored by their perceptionsof what is
good for their own bureaucratic unit. This should not be taken to mean that
all individualsin a particularbureaucracythink alike. RichardK. Bettswarns
againstexcessive generalizationaboutpeoplesoutlook basedon their organi-
zationalculture,which he seesas a fault of thosewho theorizeabout epi-
stemiccommunities,groupsof like-mindedprofessionals.9
Accordingto Weber,in -alladvancedpolitical systems andeconomies, there
arisebureaucraticstructuresthat themselves shapeboth the decision-making
processandits outputsin theform of decisions.Modern leadersdependheav-
ily on advisers,departmentand agencyheads,andtheir bureaucraticstaffsfor
informationthat is vital to foreignpolicy.decisions.Moreover,differentpolicy-
makersoften disagreein their interpretationsof situations,and all bureaucra-
cies,like governmentsthemselves, especiallyin democraticpolitical systems,
constantlyfacebudgetaryconstraints.Therefore,advocates of varioustypesof
foreign-policyand defenseprogramsnd themselves in competitionfor the al-
locationof scarceresources. Foreign-policyanddefenseprogramscompetenot
only with domesticprograms»(education, health,socialsecurity,agriculture,
transportation, welfare, energy,construction, conservation, crime control, and
urban renewal),but alsowith eachother.Theseentitiesincludevarioustypes
of military andtechnologicalprogramsand armstransfers,forcedeployments,
alliancediplomacy,foreign developmentassistance, information and cultural
exchangeprograms,intelligenceactivities,supportfor internationalorganiza-
tions, and the-strengtheningof peacefulchangeprocesses. Differing interests
within andamongthedepartments andagenciesthat havea role in foreignpol-
icy andnationalsecurity,and differencesamongthe military services, areillus-
trativepf the bureaucratic-politics
dimensionof decisionmaking.
Thepoint canbeillustratedby contrastingthe viewsof theDepartments of
StateandDefenseon an issuethat arosein the secondReaganAdministration.
 BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS 557

Theissue
pertained
to theresearch,
development,
andtesting
of strategic
defense
technologies
amidstconictinginterpretations
of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile
(ABM)
Treatyof 1972.
Secretary
ofState
GeorgeShultz,
reecting
his
departments
sensitivity
todiplomatic
andpublicopinion
inEurope,
urged
cau-
tionwithrespect
to existing
arms-control
treaties,
lesttheEuropean
NATOal-
liesfearthatrenewed
ColdWartensions
woulddash
fragile
détente
prospects
Secretary
of Defense
CasparWeinberger,
ontheotherhand,preferred
whathe
calleda broadinterpretation
overShultzs
narrowinterpretation
of the
ABM Treatyon the groundsthat strategicdefense
wasessential
to U.S.na-
tionalsecurity,
whichshouldtakepriorityovertheopinionof allies.1°
In this
case,theStateDepartment
viewprevailed.
MortonH. Halperinandothershaveshownhowthewayin whichof-
cialsfocus
onissues
oftendepends
ontheirbureaucratic
position
andperspec
tive,meaning
thatthedomestic
objectives
of bureaucrats
maybemoresigni-
cantthantheinternational
objectives
of governments.
Theyconcluded
that
actionsor proposalsby one governmentto inuencethe behaviorof another
government
areusuallybasedonthesimplemodelof two individuals
commu-
nicating
accurately
witheachother,whenin facttheyhaveprobably
emerged
froma complex
bureaucratic
process
ofpullingandhauling
thatisnotfully
understood
bythose
whomustcarryoutthedecision.
Theresponse
of thefor-
eigngovernment
is likelyto betheresultof a similarprocess.
FrancisRourkelong ago cited the law of bureaucraticinertia: Bureau-
cracies
atresttendto stayatrest,andbureaucracies
in motiontendto stayin
motion.12Recentpresidents havebeenexasperated
onoccasionattheslow-
nesswith whichbureaucracies
at restrespond to theirorders,but Rourkeob-
serves
that thismightsavea politicalleaderfromthe«consequences of a rash
decision.
Conversely,
executive
agencies
thathavebeenstimulatedto develop
certaincapabilities,
whetherfor waging
combat, exploringspace,
negotiating
arms-control
agreements,
or selling
armsor grainabroad,mayfeelcompelled
to provetheirusefulness
throughactivitythat justiesexpandedbudgets.
Oncebureaucraciesgainmomentum,theyaredifcult to slowdown.Rourke
concludes
that bureaucracies
canshapetheviewsof politicalleadersandthe
publiconforeign-policy
issues.
In addition,
theyoftenpossess
technical
capa-
bilitiesthat enablethemto inuencetheow of events;nevertheless, bureau-
craticagencies compose onlyonepart of a democratic
politicalsystem.
Their
powerultimatelydepends on the willingness
of othersfor example,Con-
gressandthe presidenttosupportthem,accepttheir advice,or legitimize
their activitiesby goingalongwith them.
AlexanderL. Georgecalledattentionto the fact that the executive,instead
of usingcentralized
management
practices
to neutralize
intrabureaucratic
dis-
agreements
over policy,can usea multiple advocacymodela mixed system
combiningelements of centralized
management with certainfeaturesof plu-
ralisticparticipatory
modelsto harness
diversityof viewsandinterestsfor the
sakeof enhancing rationalpolicymaking.Oneof the dangersof bureau-
cratic politics againstwhich the executivewishesto guard is the possibility
558 DECISION-MAKING THEORZES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

that organizational subunits might restrict competition with each other and
work out compromises amongthemselves beforethe policy issuesareairedat
the highestlevel,sothat the nal decisionis likely to be basedon the preferred
option that resultsfrom the internal bargainingprocess.Under thesecondi-
tions, of course,policy options that might be viable but are unpopularwith
the bureaucracyarerenderedunavailableas a resultof unfavorablepresenta-
tion or inadequateinformation. Georgewarns the executiveagainstover-
centralizingandoverbureaucratizing the earlysearchandevaluationphasesof
policy analysis,prior to choice.In an overcentralizedsystem,the executive
might receivetoo narrow a rangeof orthodox options,basedon cuestrans-
mitted, whether intentional or not, from the top down.
Margaret G. and Charles F. Hermann recognize that there are numerous
decision units that change with time and issue.The unit capable of commit-
ting the necessary
resourcesand makingan authoritativedecisionnot readily
reversible by any other unit is what they call the legitimate decision unit.
This may be a predominant leader (such as Castro), a single group in face-to-
face interaction (a Politburo or the National Security Council), or multiple au-
tonomousactors(asin theU.S.constitutional
or a parliamentary
system).15
According to George,much dependson the cognitive, informationneeds
dening, and decisionmakingstylesof the chief executive,who should en-
courage competition among bureaucratic units while reserving the power to
evaluate, judge, and choose among the various policy options articulated by
the advocates.He has also dealt with the constraints imposed on the policy-
maker by value complexity (the presenceof multiple competing values and in-
terestsembeddedin a single issue)and uncertainty (the lack of adequateinfor-
mation and of available knowledge required to assessthe situation and
possible
outcomes)Theproblems
posedby theseconstraints
areaddressed
subsequentlyin the section, The Decision-Making Process. Becausethe ad-
vocates compete with each other only for the executivesattention, this is a
systemof perfectcompetition,highly preferableto the imperfectcompetition
that prevails in the bureaucratic bargainingandcompromisemodel.
Although the bureaucraticpolitics model has been popular among theo-
rists since the early 1960s (seethe subsequentsection on Graham Allisons
treatment of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and more recent analysesof this work,
it has not won universal acclaim. Edward Rhodeshas recently expressedskep-
ticism of the view that states are not rational actors, but rather bureaucratic
structures, the ofcial acts of which result from a processof myopic bargain-
ing or pulling and hauling among the parochial priorities of government agen-
cies.He doesnot doubt the existenceof bureaucraticpolitics,yet he questions
whether they matter, whether they help us to understand state behavior, and
whether knowledge of the bureaucratic processenablesus to predict state ac-
tions any better than, or even as well as, knowledge of the ideas and beliefs
that compete within governments for intellectual hegemony.Those ideas and
beliefs may differ considerably between the domains of foreign and domestic
policy issues.
 THEDECISION-MAKING
PROCESS 559

MOTIVATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

OF DECISION MAKERS
Snyder
andhiscolleagues
drewauseful
distinction
between
twotypes
ofmo-
tivation:1norder-to
motivesandbecauseof
motives.Theformerarecon-
scious
andarticulable:
Thedecision
makers
aretakingthisparticular
decision
in orderto accomplish
suchandsuchanobjective of thestatethatthey
serve.Forexample,theadministration
of President
Johnson sought the
Nonproliferation
Treaty
in orderto promoteinternational
stability
byre-
stricting
thenumber of states
thatmightindependently
optfor theinitiation
of nuclearhostilities,
justastheClintonAdministration
pushed for itsinde-
niteextension
whenthetreatycameup for renewal
in 1995.Similarly
President
Reagan
chosehisStrategic
Defense
Initiativeasa meansof eventu-
ally rendering
nuclearweapons
impotentand obsolete,
whilePresident
Clinton
came
totheconclusion
thattheUnited
States
needed
todevelop
de-
fense
against
missiles
inthepossession
ofrogue
states.
Because-of
motives,
on
theother
hand,
areunconscious
orsemiconscious
motives
orimpulses
arising
out of previouslife experience
or innervalues,interests,
or drivesof thedeci-
sionmaker.Aswehaveseenin Chapter6, however, politicaltheoriststendto
bewaryof psychohistory
asa means
of explaining
thedecisions
andactions
of political leaders.
Most decisionmaking theorists,
like mostpoliticalhistorians,
would
agreethatbiographical knowledge aboutpolicymakersincluding their.edu-
cation,religion,
criticallifeexperiences,
professional
training,foreigntravel,
mental
andphysical
health,
andprevious
political
activitiesmight
helpto
castlightonthedeepest
motives
andvalues
of thosewhomakespecicdeci-
sions.
A political
leader
whofought
orlostaloved
oneinacostly
warmaybe
loathor eager
to optfor warin a certainsituation.
However,littleis known
abouttherelationship
betweenthetotalinnerpsychic experienceof individu-
alsandtheirovertpolicychoices
in anorganizational
context.
It isonething
to acknowledge
thatanindividuals background
is signicant,
especiallyin
caseswherethereareunusualbehavioral aberrations
from whatwouldnor-
mally be expected
on the basisof the analysis.
of knownsocialrolesand
processes.
It is quite anotherthing, however,to draw a denite causallink be-.
tweenthepreviouspsychic event(perhaps
decades
earlier)
andthepresent
de-
viantaction.Oneof thedifficulties
withpsychohistorical
explanation
isthatit
canlenditselftooeasily
to theworkings
of anoveractive
dramatic
imagina-
tion asa substitutefor rigorousanalysisof real evidence.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

DavidEastonhasdenedpoliticsasthe authoritative
allocationof valuesfor
a society.
19This,in essence,
iswhatpolitical
decision
making
is allabout.
However,
DMtheorists
arenotin general
agreement
asto whether
theprocess
560 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

of political decisionmakingis fundamentallythe sameasthe processof non-

public or private decision making. As political scientists, the authors of this
book arestronglyinclinedto agreewith thosewho postulateimportantdiffer-
encesamongdecisionsin a family, in a university,in a businesscorporation,
andin a government
department.Eventhoughprivateandpublicdecision
making are both characterizedby variousmixesof individual and collective
processes, nevertheless the framesof referenceand the rules of the gameex-
hibit ratherspecicproperties.
Because economistsand studentsof businessadministrationmadesigni-
cant early inputs to DM theory,the theory as originally developedreected
many of the assumptionsof the Enlightenmentand of the Benthamite
Utilitarians,with their emphasison reasonandeducationin the makingof hu-
man socialchoices.It assumeda rational personwho is clearly awareof all
the availablealternativesand who is capableof both calculatingthe respective
outcomesof eachalternativeand then freelychoosingaccordingto the order
of valuepreferences. Suchassumptionshavebeenseriouslyquestionedin re-
cent decades.
Accordingto the classicmodelof decisionmaking,policymakersmakea
calculationin two basicdimensions-utility and probabilityand, assuming
that they are rational, they will attemptto maximizethe expectedutility. In
other words, after all the availablealternativeshave beensurveyedand the
productof weightedvaluesand assessed probabilitieshasbeenobtained,deci-
sionmakerscanchoose
theiroptimalcourse.21
Snyderpointsout that deci-
sion-makersmaybeassumed to act in termsof clear-cutpreferences,but that
thesepreferences,
insteadof beingentirelyindividual,derivefrom the rulesof
the organizationalsystem,sharedorganizationalexperienceover a period of
time,informationavailableto the decisionalunit, and biographiesof individu-
als.22
Snyder,
however,
refrainedfromsubscribing
fully to theclassicexplana-
tory formulaof maximizationof expectedutility, which had alreadybeensub-
jectto question
beforehewrotehisprincipalessay
onthesubject.23
For manydecades, the Westernintellectualsfaith in the essentialrational-
ity of humanbehavior(inheritedfrom the Enlightenment) hassteadilydisinte-
grated.Freudvirtually completedthe erosionprocesswith his discoveries con-
cerning the powerful role played in life by the unconscious.Nevertheless,
political-scienceand international-relations students tend to assumethat there
are importantrational elementsin the political process,insofar as individuals
setforth in explicitfashiontheir goal prioritiesand devisecategoriesof means
for attainingthem.Moreover,evenif our knowledgeof the individualprompts
us to postulateirrationality at times,the demandsof socialorganizationre-
quireusto gropein the directionof rationalityandto employthe criteriaof ra-
tionality to identify and understandthe irrational.The assumptionof rational
behavior has always been deemedto be central to the bulk of international-
relationstheory.24
However,DM theory doesnot necessarily assumethe rationality of deci-
sionmakers.Neitherdoesgametheory,which is closelyrelatedto DM theory.
We shallexaminein the next sectionof this chapterhow both individualsand
 THE DECISION-MAKINGPROCESS 561

governments
of states
mayapproach
DM withintheframeworkof game the-
ory.Rationality
isanelement
to bevalidated
byempirical
analysis
ratherthan
to beassumed.
Forexample,
Snyderandhisassociates
do not differsubstan-
tiallyfromothermodern
theorists
of governmental
decision
making
whohave
been
inuenced
byMaxWebers
concept
of bureaucracy,
whichdevelops
ac-
cordingto a rationalplan.Thetheoryharbors anassumptionof purposeful
behaviorandexplicitmotivation;
behavior isseen
notasmerelyrandomactiv-
ity.Thedecisionmaking process
is saidto combine
rationalelements;
value
considerations
in whichtherationalmaybesynthesizedwiththenonrational,
theirrational,or thesuprarational;
andsuchirrationalor nonrational
factors
asthepsychic
complexes
of thepolicymakers.
J.DavidSinger,
amongothers,
pointed
outthatunderconditions
of stress
andanxiety,
decision
makers
may
not actaccordingto standardsof utility that couldbecalledrational, and
Martin Patchensuggested the needfor greaterattentionto the presence of
nonrationaland partly consciousfactorsin the personalitiesof thosewho
makedecisions.
Afterexamining
bothnonrational
andrationalmodels
of
decisionmaking,SidneyVerbaconcluded that it maybeusefulundercertain
circumstancesto assumethat governments makedecisionsasif theywere
followingthe rulesof meansendsrationalityandchoosethe alternative
thatenablesthembestto attaintheendsor promotethevaluesof thedecision
makers.
It must
beobvious
bynowtothestudent
thatthedichotomy
be-
tweenassumptions
of rationality and irrationality in the behaviorof individu-
als,groups,andgovernments is oneof themostpersistent
andtroublesomedi-
mensionsin theeld of internationalrelations
theory.
Braybrooke and.-Lindblom rejectedasunsatisfactory
for mostimportant
decisions(i.e.,thosethat affectsignicantchangesin the externalsocial
world)the synopticconceptionof decision makingby whichpolicymakers
are presumedto spread out before them all their available alternatives and to
measure,
againsttheirscaleof preferred
values,all theprobableconsequences
of the socialchangesimplicit in the variouscoursesof actionunderconsidera-
tion.Thissynopticschema, in theirview,simplydoesnot conformto reality.It
presupposes omniscience anda kindof comprehensive analysis
thatis prohib-
itivelycostlyandthat timepressures normallydo not permit.Everysolution,
theyasserted, mustbe limitedby severalfactors,includingthe individuals
problem-solvingcapacities,theamountof informationavailable, the costof
analysis(inpersonnel,resources,andtime),andthepracticalinseparabilityof
fact and value.
No onechallenged the classicmodelof rationaldecisionmakingmore
fundamentally,
whileyetremaining withina rationalframework,
thantheem-
inenteconomist and theoristof administrationHerbertSimon,who postu-
lateda worldof boundedrationality.Fortheclassicconcept
of maximizing
or optimizing behavior,he substitutedthe notion of satiscing behavior.
Thispresupposes
that thepolicymakers
do not reallydesignfor themselves
a
matrix that showsall availablealternatives,the valuepros and consof each,
and the probability assessments of expectedconsequences. Instead,Simon
suggested,
decision-making
unitsexaminealternatives
sequentially
until they
562 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

come upon one that meetstheir minimum standardsof acceptability. In

otherwords,peoplekeeprejectingunsatisfactorysolutionsuntil theynd one
that theycanagreeis sufficientlysatisfactoryto enablethemto act. (It wasfor
this theorythat Simonwon the 1978NobelPrizefor Economics.)Braybrooke
and Lindblom,who are partial both to Simonssatiscingmodeland to Karl
Poppersidea of piecemealengineering,suggested that pragmaticexperi-
mentalism embodiesa strategy of disjointed incrementalism. Put in its sim-
plestform, this meansthat policymakers,especiallyin democraticstates,pre-
fer to separatetheir decisionmaking
problemsinto smallsegments that enable
themto makeincrementalor marginalratherthan farreaching,profound,or
irreversible choices. We turn now to a brief discussionof the basic elements
of gametheoryand its overallrelationshipto decisionmaking.

GAME THEORY AND DECISION MAKING

Gametheoryis basedon an abstractform of reasoning,arisingfrom a combi-
nation of mathematicsand logic. The theory of games,as a branchof pure
mathematics,setsforth mathematicalpostulatesfrom which mathematical
conclusionsare derived.In the socialsciences,
gametheory (usingmathemat-
ics) specieswhat would happenin a situation in which actorseachwith
strategies,
goals,andpreferredoutcomesengagein interactionin the form of
a game.Nearlyall gametheoristsagreethatthetheorywith whichtheydeal
is addressed
to what is rationally correctbehaviorin situationsin which the
participants are trying to winto maximize gain or minimize lossrather
than to the way they actually may behave in such situations. For the sake of
theoreticalanalysis,gametheoristsassumerational behavior,simply because
theynd this assumptionmoreprotable for theorybuildingthan the obverse
of it. If we wereto assumethat all humanbehavioris fundamentallyabsurd,
neurotic,or psychotic,thentherecould beno theory,eitherof gamesor of any
othersocialphenomena.Gametheorists,then,say:If peoplein a certainsitua-
tion wishtowinthat is, to accomplishan objectivethat the otherparty seeks
to denythemwe cansort out the intellectualprocesses by which theycalcu-
late or reachdecisionsconcerningwhat kind of actionis most likely to be ad-
vantageous to them,assumingthat they believetheir opponentsalsoto be ra-
tional calculatorslike themselves,equallyinterestedin second-guessing and
trying to outwit the opponent.
Everygameis characterizedby the following elements:playerswho pre-
sumablyaretrying to win (optimizeoutcomes);payoffsthat may meanvari-
ous things to different players,dependingon their value systems;a set of
groundrulesappropriateto the game;informationconditionsthat determine
the quantity,quality,and immediacy(i.e.,immediatelyavailableor delayed)of
the knowledgeeachplayerhasof the environmentand of the choicesmadeby
the other player(s);a strategyon the part of eachof the players,designedto
relate meansto ends;the total environmentin which the gameis played,
whetherfully perceived
by theplayersor not; andtheinteractionof compet-
 GAME
THEORY
ANDDECISION
MAKING 563
mgmoves,inwhicheach
successive
choice
byaplayer
mayprompttheother
player(s)
to modifysubsequent
choices.
According
towriters
suchasDuncanSnidal,
Steven
J,Bramsand D.
Marc Kilgour,
gametheory,
based
ontheuse ofgamemodels,
holdsimpor
tantpotential
tocontribute
toauniedtheory
ofinternational
relations.
It
issuggested
thatgame
theory
cancontribute
torigorous
thought
andanalys
ofcritical
security
problems
extending
from
deterrence
tocrisis
manage
andarmscontrol.
Thestronger
theassumption
ofrationality,
themore
app1
cable
game
theory
maybetothedevelopment
ofinternational-relatio
the-
ory.Rationality
encompasses
howanactor
views
itsshort-term
versus
longer
range
advantages
andgoals.
Towhatextent,
for example,
is theactor
prepared
tosacrice
immediate
gainforlongerterm
benet?
Moreover,
ratio.
nality
includes
oneactors
calculations
ofhowother
actors
willbehave.
Indc-
termining
howto act,rational
actors
takeintoaccount
theanticipated
re-
sponse
byotheractors
in determining
theirownbehavior.
Gametheory
does
notdeal
withgames
ofpurechance
inwhich
human
choices
playnopart,in-
cluding
dice,gambling
wheels,
andmostcardgames.
Game modelsaresaidto beapplicable
across
a broadspectrum
encom-
passing
political,military,andeconomic
issues
thatareoftentreatedasfunda-
mentally
different
fromeachother.
According
to Snidal,
theapplication
of
game
theory
tointernational
relations
gives
risetoalarge
number
ofimpor-
tantempiricalquestions.
Whoaretherelevantactors,whataretherulesof the
game,andwhatchoices andpayoffsareavailable
to eachof theactors?Game
theory
issaidtoprovide
adeductive
basis
fortesting
empirically
itsanalytic
assumptions
about rational behavior.Gamemodelssuch as Prisoners
Dilemma,
described
subsequently,
canhelpilluminate
important
substantiv
issuesof international
politics,including
howandWhyactorsevolvetheir
strategies,
basedongoalsandanticipatedbenets
in negotiations,
whether
for
alliance
formation,
armscontrol,
tradeagreements,
deterrence,
or wardi-
verseinternational
issuesthat canbehandledwithin a commontheoretical
framework.

Zero-Sum Games

Themostcommonly
drawn
preliminary
distinction
ingame
theory
isthatbe-
tweena zero-sum
game(ZSG)anda nonzerosum
game(NZSG),with varia-
tions
ofeach.
InaZSG
between
AandB,whatAwins,
Bloses.
Chess,
check-
ers,twoperson
poker,or blackjackallof theseareZSGs.Examples
of
real-lifesituations
that containaspects
of ZSGSincludean electoralracebe-
tweentwo candidates for a congressional
seat;mostmilitarytacticalsitua-
tionsin whichthemilitaryobjective thatonesideseizes
is thereby
lostto the
other;andaninternational crisisfromwhichonestatemaygainprestige and
another loseface.It shouldbenotedthatthereisa singlepayoff,buttheCOTL
tending
parties
mayspend
widely
varying
sums
intheeffort
towin.Writers
gametheorydistinguish
theoutcome
of a game(win,lose,or draw)from;
payoff(thevalueattached
byaplayerto anoutcome).35 l
564 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIESL
Cl-lOlCE
ANDTHE
LlN&#39;T
LEVEL
ACTOR
Inatwo-personZSG,arational
strategy
isbasedontheminimax princi-
ple:
Each
player
should
seektomaximize
theminimum
gain
that
can
beas-
sured
ortominimizethemaximum loss
thatneedstobesustained.
If both
parties
dothis,
their
strategies
may convergeatasaddle
point,andtheywill
tend
tobalance
wins orlosses
inthelongrun.If one
doesthisandtheother
plays
hunches,
theformershouldwinoveralarge number
ofplays.
Strategic
theorists,
militarycommanders,newcarbuyers bargaining
withsalespeople,
stockmarket speculators,
labormanagementnegotiators
employees
seeking
araiseorapromotion,and diplomats
bargaining
overan
international
treaty
allhave
anintuitive
understanding
ofthisminimax
prin-
ciple,
withitsupper
and
lower
boundaries.
Put
most
simply:
When you
hold
theright
cards,
press
youradvantage
asfaraspossible;
when luckturns
against
you,
cutyour
losses.
Strictly
speaking,
theutility
oftheminimax
strategy
can
bevalidated
onlyinanextended
series
ofplays,
notinaone-
shot game.
Theminimax
strategy
isacautious
strategy.
It applies
onlytoZSGs.It is
useful
andnormative
onlyagainst
anopponent
whoispresumed tobeplaying
arational
game.
Iftheadversary
isstupid,
prone
tomake
blunders,
orusually
motivated
byemotional
factors
(which
might
incline
theperson
toplay
hunches),
then
theminimax
strategy
isnotnecessarily
theoptimum
oneto
pursue.
It isarather
unexciting,
no-fun
strategy,
butit may
beadvisab
Shubik
says
zero-sum
games
are
ofextremely
limited
interest
inthe
behavior
sciences
in general.

Non-Zero Sum Games

Anonzero
sumgame
(NZSG)
isnotexclusively
competitive,
inthesense
that
whatone
gains,another
must
lose.
Thesumofgains
andlosses
need
notadd
uptozero.
NZSGS mayinvolve
only
twooralarger
numberofplayers.
There
isroom
inthistype
ofgameforelements
ofboth
conflict
andcooperation;
on
someplays,
both orsome
parties
might
win,
andattheendofthegame,
both
orsomeparties
might
beahead
byvarying
amounts.
InanNZSG,
there
are
often
several
different
payoffs,
some very
good
orvery
bad,
some
marginal
good
orbad.
Thepayoffs
depend
onwhether
the
players
cooperate
with
each
other,
cuteach
others
throats,
ormixtheir
strategies
ofconict
andcoopera
tion in varyingcombinations.
Agame
might
beaZSGunder
some
circumstances
and
anNZSGunde
others,
depending
ontheoutcome.
Such
isthegame
ofChicken,
similar
to
that
popularized
manyyears
agoinaHollywood
lm,inwhich
twoyouth
drive
towardeach other
intheirparentsautomobiles
at80miles anhour,
eachwithhisleftsetofwheels
onthehighway dividing
line.If neither
one
swerves
totheright,they
willbothbekilled
inthecrash.
Thisisaminus-su
gameinwhich
bothplayers
lose
asheavily
aspossible.
If onestays
onthe
course
and
theother
veers,
onegains
esteem,
andtheother
loses
intheeyes
of
thepeer
group.
Thelatter
ischicken.
Thus
ifeither
driverswerves
andthe
other
holds
longer
tothecourse,
thegame
turns
outtobezero-sum.
If both
 GAMETHEORY
ANDDECISION
MAKING 565

veerto therightsimultaneously,
eachsuffersdishonorin theeyesof thepeer
group,butbecause thereputation
for beingchicken
is sharedbetween them,
no invidious comparisonscan be drawn.
Thegame
of Chicken,
played
withhuman
lifeatstake,
isentered
intoonly
by irrationalplayers,oneor bothof whommaybecome
rationalenoughdur-
ing the courseof the gameto savetheir lives.
Two-person
NZGSScanbe playedeithercooperatively
or noncoopera-
tively.In a cooperativegame,the playersare permittedto communicatewith
eachotherdirectlyandto exchange informationin advance concerning their
intendedchoices.In a noncooperative
game,overtcommunication is»notper-
mitted,but the choiceof eachbecomes obviousto the otherafterthe play.
Thereis, however, a slightambiguityin this terminology.
Evenif a gameis
noncooperative, insofarasthe rulesprohibit overtor directcommunication,it
is possiblefor the playersto cooperatetacitly through inferred communica-
tion, by which one player interpretsthe othersintentionsfrom the kinds of
choices
madein a longseriesof plays.Thisis particularlyappropriate
in inter-
nationalrelationswhenthe playerscanbecome fairly well acquaintedwith
oneanotherspreferredmodeof actingovera long periodof time.

The Prisoner&#39;s
Dilemma Game
The best-knownexampleof a two-personNZSGis Prisoners
Dilemma.As we
notedin Chapter10,two individualsaretakeninto policecustodyandac-
cusedof a crime.Because
theyareinterrogated
separately,
neitherknowswhat
the otherwill tell the district attorney.Eachis awarethat if both remainsilent
or denyall allegations,the worst they can expectis a sentenceof 60 daysin
the countyjail for vagrancy.If oneturnsstatesevidenceandthe otherremains
silent,the formerwill receivea one-yearcommutedsentence andthe otherwill
be sentto the statepenitentiaryfor ten years.If both confess,both will receive
from five to eight yearsin prison, with a parole possibleat the end of ve.
Their optimum strategyis a tacit agreementto remainsilent, but in theab-
senceof communication,neithercantrust the other.Eachmakesthe following
assessment of the situation:If I remainsilent,I will get either60 daysor ten
years,dependingon whethermy partnerconfesses. If I confess,I will receivea
commutedsentence of eitheroneor ve to eightyears,dependingon whether
he confesses. In eithercase,I can assuremyselfof a lighter sentenceby con-
fessing.Because my partneris undoubtedlymakingthe samesort of calcula-
tion, the chancesare that my partnerwill confess,and henceI would befool-
ish to remainsilent and count on the slim chancethat my partnerwould do
likewise.Thus, each,by choosingwhat seemsto be the safercourse,con-
tributes to an outcomehighly disadvantageous to botha sentenceof ve
yearsinsteadof 60days.37
As Arthur A. Stein suggests,the state of nature describedin political the-
ory by Hobbes and others-is a condition, stated in game-theory terminology,
in which individualshave a dominant strategyof defeatingfrom common
actionin favorof pursuingtheirowncompetitive
andconictualacts.33
The
566 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIESI
CHOICE
AND"THE
UNITLEVEL
ACTOR

resultisa situation
thatisrecognized
to bea dilemma
forall actors.
Although
some
individuals
maywishto cooperate
under
these
circumstances,
theyface
theprospect
thatothers
willtakeadvantage
ofthem
byaccepting
theircoop-
eration
move
without
reciprocating
in kind,orbecoming
freeriders.
In other
words,
some actors
canderiveimmediate
benetbycheatingevenif theyagree
inprinciple
tocooperate
withother
actors.
Forthisreason,
Stein
suggests,in-
dividuals
jointogether
toformastate
thathas
theauthority
tocoerce allofits
members,tomake surethatnoindividual
cantakeadvantageofanothersco-
operative
behavior
bydefectingorgetting
afreeride.Stein
goesontosuggest
thatinternational
regimes,
discussed
inChapter 10,areformedtohelprecon-
cilethecompeting
interests
oftheindividual
actorwiththoseofthecollectiv-
ity.Hecontends
that,liketheformation
ofthestate,
international
regimes
in
ananarchic
society,
arecreated
todealwiththecollective
suboptimality
that
canemerge
fromindividual
behavior.
39
According
tothePrisoners
Dilemma
game,
each
oftheplayers,
taking
only
into account
its owninterest,
receives
a higherpayofffromdefecting
rather
thancooperating.
If bothdefect,
however,
bothareworse
offthantheywould
have
been
if bothhadcooperated.
According
to Robert
Axelrod
(discussed
in
Chapter
10),
whomakes
extensive
useofthePrisoners
Dilemma
game,4°
de-
spite
theindividual
disincentive
tocooperate,
players
aredrawn
toward
coop-
erative
behavior
bytheprospect
thattheywill meeteachotheragain.
It ispreferable
tocooperate
todaywithsomeone
whoislikelytorecipro-
cateinthefuture.
Theprospect
forachieving
ongoing
mutualcooperation
de-
pends
ontheextent
towhich
there
islikely
tobecontinuing
interaction
be-
tweenthe two players.
If individuals
develop
a stakein theirfuture
interaction,
Axelrod
concludes,
cooperation
between
larger
entities
canevolve
fromsmallgroups
of individuals
whocooperate
onthebasisof reciprocity
Cooperation,
afterit hasbeenestablished
asaresult
ofinteractive
reciprocity
cangainamomentum thathelps
protect
it against
less
cooperative
strategie
Axelrod
suggests
thatPrisoners Dilemmaisapplicable
tothedevelopmen of
cooperative
strategiestoaddress
abroadspectrumofsituations
fromindivid-
ualchoice
tothebusiness
setting
totheinternational
arena.
Theinternationa
arenaincludes
armsraces,
nuclearproliferation,
crisisbargaining,
escalation
anddeescalation.
Heassertsthatanunderstanding of theprocess
bywhich
cooperation
emerges,
based
onthePrisoners
Dilemma,
willcontribute
tothe
evolution of cooperation.
Twogeneral
points
should
beemphasized.
First,there
isanimportant
dif-
ference
between
gametheory,
whichis based
onmathematical andlogical
analysis
andwhich purports
toshow whatkindofstrategy
arational player
shouldplay(whentheopponentispresumed
toberational),
andexperimen
gaming,whichisdesigned
tofurnish
empirical
evidence
ofhowindividuals
ac-
tuallybebave
ingame situations.
Second,
thereisanimportantdifference
be-
tween
one-shot
games
andgames
thatareplayed
overaseries
ofrunsbythe
same
players,
who,asaresult
ofexperience,
acquire
insight
intothestrategi
thoughtprocesses
of eachother.
 GAME
THEORY
ANDDECISION
MAKING 567
Games
(both
Prisoners
DilemmaandChicken)
have
been
devised
tode-
termine
whether
genderdifferences
inuence
thechoice
forcooperative
or
competitive
behavior.
The
results
would
berelevant
tofeminist
theory,
excep
thatthey
have
been
somewhat
inconclusive,
whether
subjects
play
again
programmed
opponents
(whohave
been
instructed
astotheir
choice)
orplay
against
each
other(inmixed-gender
andsamegender
pairs).41
Theresults
have
been
less
ambiguous
forPrisoners
Dilemma
thanforChicken.
Three
PDGexperimenters
allfoundthatmales
opposing
males
tendtobemore
co-
operative
thanfemales
opposing
females.
Another
concluded
thatfemale
aremore
rational
(i.e.,
capable
ofearning
more
money)
inaone-shot
game
whereas
males
earn
more
inaseries,
whenoptimal
strategy
requires
alonge
time
horizon.
Conrath,
after
research
ongames
ofChicken,
finds
theexpla
nations
ofgenderrole
behavior
ingames
thusfarinadequate.
If differences
do
exist,
thewhyisimportant.
It isnotlikely
thatthebiological
aspect
. . . is
thedetermining
factor,
butrather
thesocial
andeducational
roles
which
dis-
tinguish the sexes.44
Prisoners
Dilemma
hasbecome
astaple
item
intheliterature
ofgames,
a
fullbibliography
ofwhich
nowruns
intoscores
ofarticles,
bookchapters,
and
other
studies.
Thejournal
of Conict
Resolution,
Thejournal
of Socia
Psychology,
The
journal
ofPersonality
andSocial
Psychology,
TheAmerican
Political
Science
Review,
World Politics,
andInternational
StudiesQuarter
haveconsistently
carried
articles
onthesubject
formanyyears. Oneauthorit
on games
hasnotedthatresearchin bargaining
utilizingthePrisoners
Dilemma
paradigm
has becomeless
concerned
withquestions
ofcooperati
competition,
andthebargaining
process,
andmore
concerned
withstudying
thePrisoners
Dilemma
paradigm
itself.
45However,
Schlenker
andBonoma
defend
thepreoccupation
withtheparadigm
asbeing
necessary
tounder-
stand
thelimits
anddimensions
ofthelaboratory
world
before
useful
experi-
ments can be conducted.45

N-Person Games

Thisbrings
ustoN-person
NZSGS,
involving
three
ormoreplayers,
allof
whom areassumed
tobeindependent
decision-making
units
andtoposses
some
methodforevaluating
theworthofoutcomes.
Asmightbeexpected
much
less
isknownaboutthese
thanabout
two-person
games,
because
the
number
ofpermutations
orinteracting
strategies
increases
atanexponentia
ratewiththenumber
ofplayers.
Physicists
havenever
foundamathematica
solution
tothethree-body
problem.
Hence
it isnotsurprising
thatnosingle
theory
hasyetbeendeveloped
forN-person
games.
Probablythemost
fruitful
avenue
ofinquiry
todate
hasbeen
inthearea
ofcoalition
formation.
(Foran
examinationofliterature
onalliances
andcoalitions,
seeChapter
10.)When
several
playersarein a game,it becomes
quitenatural
for twoor moreto
formacoalitionagainst
theothers,inwhichcase
theothers
areinduced
todo
likewise
to ensuretheirsurvival
andmaximizetheirgains.
If twocoalitions
568 DECISION-MAKING
Tl-IEORIESZ
CHOICE
AND
THE
UNIT
LEVEL
ACTOR
emerge,
forcing
allplayers
tochoose
one
orthe
other,
the
gameineffect
isre-
duced
toatwo-person
ZSG.Itisconceivable,
however,
thatataparticula
stage
ofthe
ally
nd game,
there
itself
undermight
be three
pressure
to coalitions,
coalesce
with one
ofof
one which
the would
other
two.eventu
The
cru-
cial
question
then
istowork
outtothe
satisfaction
ofallthe
allies
arationa
division
ofthespoils.

INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
ASAGAME
Whathas
this
alltodowith
international
relations?
First,
itshould
bemade
clear
that
international
relations-or
the
operation
ofthe internation
sys-
tem-cannot
be
fullycomprehended
merely
within
theanalytical
framew
ofagame.
often Nonetheless,
manifest the
certain patterns
gamelikeand
processes
ofinternationa
characteristics.
Because game relatio
theory
and
gaming
are
tohave
closely
some
related
to
relevance
decision
tothe
making
study
and
bargaining,
ofinternational
they
are
boun
relations,
aeldin
whichwecommonlyspeak
ofmaking
moveson
thediplomatic
chessb
blufng,
upping
oroutwit
the
the ante,
opponent.
using
Game
bargaining
theory
can
chips,
and trying
therefore
aid
tosecond-
inimproving
our
un-
derstanding
ofthe subject,
provided
that
itisemployed
as oneamong
sever
International
relations
useful tools. canbebestconceptualized
asanN-person
NZSG
inwhich
ties.gains
The bysome
parties
more-advanced arenotnecessarily
industrialized at
countries the
need expense
not of
sufferother
aloss par-
intheir
absolute
orrelative
Indeed,
economiceconomic
position
expansion
in asless-developed
less-developed economies
countries
often advan
leads
toanin-
tensication
oftrade,
aid,
and
investmentrelations
withwealthier
countr
Several
writers
who pioneered
intheeffort
toapply
gametheory
tothesocia
sciences
(e.g.,
Oskar
Morgenstern,
Thomas C.Schelling,
and
MartinShub
had
economic
nomic training
orconducted
competition.
Competitionextensive
between research
economic
rmsinto
problems
can
be of
eithereco
aZSG
oran
NZSG.Economic
alternative
because analysts
both
rms seethe
stand latter
togain,as
atthepreferable,
least
inthe more
shorterration
run,
ifthe
mutual
woundsofexcessive
competition
can
beavoided.
Most social
phe
nomena,
writesMartin
Shubik,
. . .arebestrepresented
bynoncon
sum
games.
Inother
words,
the
fates
and
fortunes
ofthe
parties
involve
ma
easily
rise
orfall
Inthe
view
together.
There
ofyour
isno
authors,
pure
division
into
total
international
relations
can
be
opposi
best
unders
within
the
gametheoretical
framework
asinvolving
acomplex
andfluctua
mixture
oftendencies
toward
zero-sumness
andnon-zero-sumn
Weagre
with
Joseph
GermanyFrankel,
who
developedsuggests,
from for
example,
azero-sum
game that
intheFrench
earlyrelation
post\Worwith
War
II
period,
when
the
French
wished~and
hoped
tobeableto
keep
theGerm
down,
into
achanged
variablesum
cooperationgame
the within
the
[European]
competitive Communit
character
ofthe
game
andinwhi
rapidl
in-
 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
ASAGAME 56¢
creasedthepayofffor bothsides.5° JohnW.Burtonhasproposed a method
of resolving
suchconictsastheonebetween GreeksandTurksoverCyprus
by inducingthepartiesto viewthesituationasonenot with a fixedsum out-
comethatrequires a compromisecuttingof thecake,but with outcomes from
whichbothsidescangainthroughfunctionalcooperation thatwill producea
largercake. Theremaybea circularityin thereasoning that prescribes re-
solvinga politicalconictof passionatenationalismby transforming it into a
processof mutuallybenecialcooperation. Yetthatis whatwasaccomplished
in theFranco-German rapprochement in thedecades afterWorldWarII. That
is whatmanyhopeto seeachieved in theIsraeli-Palestinian
relationship under
the Osloandsubsequent agreements, in NorthernIreland,andin othercon~
ict situationsbesetby enormousdifficulties.
AnatolRapoporthasappliedthePrisoners
Dilemmamodelto theprob-
lem of internationaldisarmamentand found that, althoughideally both par-
tiesto an armsracemightpreferto beneteconomically from an armscut,
neithercanbesureof thelongrange
intentionsof theother,andthusconsider
it moreprudentto maintaina costlycompetition
of armaments.
Critical
ColdWar confrontationsbetweenthe nuclearsuperpowers,
suchasthe Cuban
MissileCrisis(October1962)andtheMideastWar(October1973)wereof-
ten likenedto the gameof Chicken. (Thebureaucratic decisionmaking
structuresof moderngovernments, however,are vastlymorerationalthan
thoseof teenagerswith a distortedsetof values.)R. HarrisonWagnerhas
usedgametheoryto investigate
therelationbetween
thenumber
of players
andthestabilityof the system,
concluding
that systems
with anynumberof
actorsfromtwothroughfivecanbemoreor lessstableandthata system
with
three is the most stable.
Theconductof international
politicsis morestableandrestrained
when
thepoliticalleaders
of allmajorpowers
areconvinced
thatit isanNZSG,asit
usually
isformostplayers. In every
age,however,
theremaybesome political-
strategicadversaries
whoviewtheirconfrontation
with eachotherasa two-
personZSG.If elitesandgroups
in onecountrycharacterize
thebilateral
rela-
tionshipas a ZSG,theircounterpartsin the second
countrywill almost
inevitablydo likewise.It sometimes
seemsharderto changedominantna-
tionalperceptions
fromtheZSGto theNZSGmodethanto change
themin
theopposite
direction.
Kenneth
A.Oye,drawing
examples
fromthegames
of
Prisoners
Dilemma,StagHunt, andChicken,hassoughtto identifystrate-
giesstatescan adoptto fostercooperation,
for example,
by procuring
weapons
thatappear
moredefensive
thanoffensive.
States,
hesays,
should
consider
thelongshadowof thefuturein whichtheymustexpectto continue
dealing
witheachother.Everydefection
for thesakeof immediate
one-time
gainreduces
theprospects
for cooperation;
concernfor repeated
interaction
in thefutureincreases
thoseprospects.
In its assumption
thatactors
actrationally
in pursuitof dened
goals
basedoninterests,
gametheoryissimilarto realisttheory.
Thereforeit canbe
usedto testkeypropositions
underlying realistneorealist
theory,asRobert
Jervis
suggests,
to ascertain
howstates
cancooperate
underconditions
of
570 DECISION-MAKING THEORZES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

anarchy
evenwhentheyhaveconicting interests.57
Assurancesof a desire
to
cooperate
andthreatsof defection
areintermingled
in all negotiations
be-
tweenor amongstates.RobertPowellhasusedgamemodelsto examine
structural realist and neoliberalinstitutionalisttheoriesof the international
system,andfoundthat boththeoriessharecommonground;bothhold that
economiccostconstraints
nudgegovernments awayfromtheuseof forceand
towardcooperation.
Duncan
Snidal
hasalsoemployed
game
theoretic
mod-
elsto showthattherelative-gainsassumptioncontained in realisttheorydoes
not necessarily
precludecooperationbetweentwostatesin anessentially anar-
chicsystem, that cooperation
is feasibleandlikely (accordingto theNZSG
model)to produceabsolutegainsfor both sides,and that multipolarityis
moreconductive to cooperation
thanbipolarity.
Closelyrelatedto gametheoryis the theoryof bargainingandnegotia-
tion, developedfrom the seminalwork of ThomasC. Schelling, who com-
binedsocial-psychological
andlogicalstrategic
approaches to thestudyof hu-
man conict. Schellingtakes conict for granted,but alsoassumes common
interestbetweenadversaries. . . [and] focuseson the fact that eachpartici-
pants
best
choice
ofaction
dependsonwhatheexpects
theotherto do.5°
His mainwork, TheStrategy
of Conict,dealsprimarilywith threatsrather
than the actual useof force, with maintainingcredibledeterrence,blufng,
signaling,
limitingconict,anddevisingformalor tacit arms-controlpolicies
benecialto bothsides.Optingfor warcouldbetheheightof folly in thenu-
clearage,but posinga controlledthreator risk of war mightbethestrategi-
callycorrectmoveunderthecircumstances. Oneshouldalwaysstriveto bera-
tional,butit is notalways
desirable
to appear rational.Heis intrigued
by
thetheoryof precarious partnership
or . . . incompleteantagonism,62 per-
tainingto situationsin whichadversaries
perceivesomeminimal,mutualin-
terest(suchastheavoidance of reciprocal
annihilation).
Evenwhentheycan-
not carry on direct or covertcommunication with eachother,they can
neverthelesstacitlycoordinatetheir movesby convergingon certainsalient
pointsof converging expectation,
suchasfollowingprecedents setin earlier
formalor tacitcompromises. Whenthreatsaremade,however, theymustbe
madeis sucha waythattheadversary shouldnot betemptedto thinkthatit is
a bluff that could be called.
Accordingto GeorgeW. Downsand DavidM. Rocke,who build on
Schellings
work,tacitbargaining
occurswhenever a stateattemptsto inu-
encethepolicychoices
of anotherstatethroughbehavior,
ratherthanby rely-
ingonformalor informaldiplomatic
exchanges.64
Whatdifferentiates
tacit
bargainingfromnegotiations is thefactthat in tacitbargaining, communica-
tionsarebasedon actionsratherthanon words.As DownsandRockepoint
out,examples of tacitbargaining aboundin thehistoryof international state-
craft.Theyencompass retaliatoryactionssuchastheimpositionof tariffsor
quotasin response to a statethatrefusesto liberalizetraderelationships. Tacit
bargainingalsoincludes, asin theKoreanconict,decisions to refrainfrom
usingcertainkindsof weapons or to exemptoneor morecategories of targets
from military action.
 ALLlSONS
THREEMODELS 571

Themeansbywhich international
agreements
between
adversarie
are
maintained
after
they
arenegotiated
andratied
depends
vitally
ontacitbar-
gaining,
whichitself
isclosely
related
todeterrence.
Parties
seeking
toupho
anexisting
treaty
needtodeter
arival
nation
from
violations.
Whether
asig-
natory
chooses
toadhere
toorviolate
atreaty
depends
ontherelationshi
be-
tween
compliance
advantages
andpotential
gains
tobederived
frommeasur
such
ascircumvention
orabrogation.
Attempting
withconsiderable
success
to
combine
therigor
offormal
modeling
withtherealism
ofhistorical
experie
and
example,
Downsand
Rocke
conclude
thatunder
most
circumstan
it
ispossible
toassume
thatbothofthenations
thathave
achieved
atacitorfor-
malarms
agreement
wouldprefer
thattheagreement
survive
than
thatit be
replaced
byanintense
arms
race.
65We
return
nowtodecisionmakin
theo
ries,
beginning
withthethree
models
developed
byGraham
Allison.

ALLISONS THREE MODELS

Three
decades
ago,
Graham
T.Allison
wrote
thatmost
foreign
policy
analys
think
about
governmental
behavior
interms
ofconceptual
models
thatlargel
shape
their
thought.
Mostofthem,
hesaid,
implicitly
orexplicitly
favor
the
classical
rational
actor
model,
which
assumes
that
unitary
states
are
thekey
players
andthattheyactrationally,
calculating
costs
andbenets
ofvarious
policy
choices
intheir
quest
fortheone
thatmaximizes
their
utility.Allisons
purpose
atthattimewas
todraw
attention
totwoother
conceptual
models:
the
organizational
andthebureaucratic
politics
model,
to whichweshallreturn
presently.
Inanewedition
ofhiswork,
written
withPhilip
Zelikow
andpub-
lished
in1999,
thethree
models
arereafrmed
withminor
modications.
The
twoauthors
start
withtherational
actor
model(RAM),citing
Morgentha
Schelling,
Kennan,
Waltz,
Kissinger,
Bueno
deMesquita,
Lalman,andother
classical
realists
andneorealists
(structural
realists)
aspresupposing
some
form
ofthismodel.67
In1971,Allison
appeared
almosttobeleaning
toward
the
camp
of liberals
andpluralists
whobelieved
thattheRAMhadoutlived
its
time:
AlthoughtheRational
ActorModelhasproved
useful
formany pur-
poses,
thereispowerful
evidence
thatit mustbesupplemented,
if notsup-
planted,
byframes
ofreference
thatfocusonthegovernmental
machine, but
inthe1999edition,
thephrase
if notsupplanted
isomitted,
andsuch
in-
ternational
institutionalists
asKeohane, along
withliberal
democratic
peace
theorists
such
asDoyle,
areviewed
asproceeding
fromthecorerational
actor
model.69
Thetwoalternative
frames
ofreference
arethesame
inbotheditions,
with
appropriate
subtle
modications
based
oninsights
fromupdated
sources.
The
organizational-process
model,nowrenamed the organizational
behavior
model,
takeswhatModelI (RAM)analysts
regardasactsorchoices
and
envisages
themlessasdeliberate
choices
andmoreasoutputs
oflarge
organi-
zations,
functioning
according
tostandard
patterns
ofbehavior.
7°Each
orga-
nizational
unitof thegovernment
hasspecial
functional
responsibilitie
572 DEClSlONMAKINCx TI-IEORIES. CHO.CE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

usually,
however,nosingleunithasexclusiveauthorityto dealwith anyimpor-
tantpolicyissue.
Thevariousdepartments andagencies requirecoordinationat
the top. Government leaderscansubstantially
disturb,but rarelyprecisely
control,thebehaviorof theseorganizations,
whichis determined primarilyby
routineoperatingprocedures,with seldommorethangradual,incremental de-
viations
except
whena majordisaster
occurs.Organizations
seekto avoid
uncertaintyand operateto solveproblemsof immediate
urgencywithin a
frameworkof familiar rules and routines;they do not developstrategiesfor
copingwith rapid,novel,andfundamental
changes
in theenvironment.
Allisonsthird model GovernmentalPolitics,72builds on the organiza-
tional behaviormodel, but insteadof assumingcontrol or coordinationby
leadersat the top, hypothesizes intensivecompetitionamongthe decision
makingunits,andtheformulationof foreignpoliciesastheresultof bargain-
ingamongthecomponents of a bureaucracy.
Theplayersareguidedbyno sin-
gleunitaryactorandno consistent strategic
masterplan,but ratherby diverse
conceptionsof national,organizational,andpersonal goals.Reasonable peo-
plemaydisagree aboutforeignpolicyproblems. Players feelobligedto point
out the ramicationsof an issuefor their specicdomainsand what they see
asimportant.Sometimes onegroupprevailsoverothers.Often,however, dif-
ferentgroupspullingandhaulingin differentdirections
producea resultantor
decisionalmix that is distinctfrom that intendedby an individual or any sin-
glegroup.Theoutcome depends
notontherationaljusticationfor thepolicy
or onroutineorganizationalprocedures,butontherelativepowerandskill of
thebargainers.Sucha conception of foreignpolicymakingis an uncomfort-
ableone andfosterssuspicions that ofcialsare playingpoliticswith na-
tional security.73
Herewe havedealt only with Allisonsthreedecision-
makingmodels,andtheseonly in a sketchywaythat cannotdo justiceto a
wealthof illustrativeexamples
anddetailedanalysis.Furtheron we shallsee
how AllisonandZelikowapplythemodelsto the CubanMissileCrisis,the
main subjectof their book.
Allisons three models as set forth in the rst edition of Essence of
Decision,
according
to Jonathan BendorandThomasH. Hammond, exerteda
considerable
impacton researchandteachingwith regardto bureaucracy.
It
stimulated
a generation
of students
to thinkseriously
abouthowforeignpolicy
decisionsaremade.74
However,BendorandHammondfault Allison for misin-
terpretingthe literatureof rational-choice
theory,organization theory,and
bureaucratic-politics
theory,onwhichhedrewfor hispioneering work.In par-
ticular,Allisonfailedto distinguish
adequately between ModelII (organiza-
tionalprocess) andModelIII (bureaucraticpolitics);theytendto overlapeach
other(asmanyreaders hadnoted).75 Moreover,Allisonoversimplied ModelI
(rationalactor).Thestatecannotbeconsidered merelyasa single,rationalac-
tor, actingwith complete informationin pursuitof a singlegoal.Bendorand
Hammond nd suchanassumption odd indeed,76 andsuggest thatAllison
wassettingup Model I asa strawmanto beknockeddown.
Furthermore,Bendorand Hammondnoted, decisionmakersin govern-
ment bureaucracies
are not alwaysnecessarily
in pursuit of conicting goals,
 ALLISONS
THREE
MODELS573
asAllison
and
other
theorists
ofbureaucracy
seemed
toassume.
Bytakin
intoaccount
thefourbasic
variables(
1)single
ormultiple
decision
make
(2)acting
towardthesame
orconicting
goals
(3)withperfect
orimperfe
rationality;
and(4)withcomplete
orincomplete
informationBendand
Hammond comeupwith12logically
possible
models
ortypologies
ofpolicy
making.77
Theyconcede
thatsome
ofAllisons
errors
areduetoadvance
in
knowledge
since
hiswriting;
butsome
werethere
from
thebeginnin
Essence ofDecision
richly
deserves
itsreputation,
butitscontinued
use
is
. . .likely
tolead
tothewidespread
perpetuation
ofmajormisundersta
about thenature
ofbureaucracy
andgovernmental
policymaking.73
Inanother
recent
critique
ofAllisons
models,
David
A.Welch
conclude
that
theorganizational-process
andbureaucratic-politics
models
contain
propo
sitions
thatdonotaccord
withthefacts
oftheCubanMissile
Crisis.79
Accord
ingtoWelch,
theexistence
oforganizational
routines
wasnotsufficient
toex-
plain
thebehavior
ofthedecisionmakers
charged
withtheformidable
(and
dangerous)
task
ofdefusing
thiscrisis
situation.
Totheextent
thatthey
deeme
necessary,
President
Kennedyand ll1S
advisors
developed
responses
without
pri-
maryconcern
fortheroutines
setforthin theprocedures
asspecied
in the
organizational-process
model.
Acknowledging
thatorganizational
routines
can
restrict
therange
ofperceived
options
before
adecision
isalready
made,
espe
cially
ifthetime
foraction
isextremely
short
and therequired
response
isbased
onaseriesofcomplex
factors,
Welch
observes
thateven
inmilitary
organiza
tions
notnoted
forpeacetime
strategic
innovation,
dramatic
shifts
instandard
operating
procedures
have
often
taken
place
intheheat
ofbattle.
Similarly,
in
theCuban
Missile
Crisis
(which
weshall
treat
laterin thechapter),
the
Executive
Committee
(ExComm),
headed
byPresident
Kennedy,
frequent
overrode,
circumvented,
or modied
organizational
routines
to facilitate
the
decision-making
process.
Nevertheless,
organizational
routines
oftendocon-
tribute
totheeffectiveness
ofdecisions
bysetting
forthnecessary
procedure
Therefore,
Welch
suggests,
ineachcase,
it should
beasked
whether
prevailin
organizational
routines
were
moreofahelporahindrance
totheachievemen
ofgoals
setforth
bythedecision
makers.
Ontheone
hand,
organizational
rou-
tines,
including
thecollection
andanalysis
ofintelligence,
wereessential
tothe
discovery
thattheSoviet
Union
wasplacing
missiles
in Cuba.
Ontheother
hand,
theprospects
forsuccessful
resolution
ofthecrisis
mayhave
been
en-
hanced
bytheability
andwillingness
ofdecision
makerstoreach
beyond
such
routines
intheirquest
forade-escalatory
strategy
thatserved
national
interests.
Similarly,
Welch
ndsthebureaucratic-politics
model decient
in posit-
ingthattheaffiliation
ofdecision
makersisareliable
guide
tounderstand
howthey willact(orthatwhere
yousitinthebureaucracy
necessarily
deter-
mines
where
youstand
ontheissue.)
Hecitesotherstudies
thathavefound
norelationship
betweenbureaucratic
position
andpolicy
preferences.
Aside
fromthefactthataspecic
bureaucraticofcemaynothave anidentiable
position
onevery policy
issue,
it isnotnecessarily
inevitable
thatrepresenta
tives
ofaparticular
bureaucracy
willbeguided
primarily
bysuch aperspec-
tive even if it exists.
574: DECISION-MAKING THEORIES CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

Accordingto Welch,there is evidencein supportof the propositionthat

professional
military ofcers (especially
sincethe VietnamWar) havenot
beenas willing as their civilian counterpartsto advocatethe useof military
powerasaninstrument
of nationalpolicyasmighthavebeenexpected
froma
bureaucraticpolitics
model. After the civilian leadershiphas decidedon the
useof force,however,Welchsuggests that military ofcers usuallyseekto em-
ploygreaterlevelsof forcethantheirciviliancounterparts.
Althoughthereare
numerousexamples of bureaucraticpolitics,suchasinterservice
rivalrieswith
the Army, Navy,and Air Forcecompetingfor limited budgetaryresources,in
other instancesonesplace in a bureaucraticorganizationalchart has little
bearingon decision
making.In the CubanMissileCrisis,the positionstaken
by ExCommmembers hadlessto do with theirbureaucraticafliation than
with other factors,includingthe attitudes,dispositions,and valuesthat they
brought to the table.
In sum,Welchscritique of Allisonsmodelsis designednot to denigrate
theimportance of suchparadigms,
but insteadto suggesttheneedfor greater
analyticalrenementandperhapsthedevelopment of alternative
conceptual
frameworks.In this light, the rational actor modelshouldnot be abandoned
because
of its advantages
in clarity,parsimony,
and operationalization.80
Nevertheless,
rationality in the caseof the CubanMissile Crisis, as Allison
pointedout, waslimitedby organizational and bureaucratic considerations
andby communications failures.In theirrecentedition,AllisonandZelikow
do not deal directly with the criticisms leveled by Welsh, Bendor, and
Hammondat Allisonsfirst edition exceptto say they listenedto the critics
and maderevisions.Theyreiteratethat the rational actor modelby itself does
not provide a completeexplanationand needssupplementaryperspectives,
but theydo not devalueit as Allisonappeared
to do threedecades
earlier.
Rather,theyseeeachof the threemodelsasaskingdifferentquestionsandpre-
sentingdifferentinterpretationsof evidencein waysthat complementonean-
other. In the final analysis,the complexityof decisionmaking,especiallyin
foreign-policy/national-security
situations,arguesfor an effort to view the
processthrougha seriesof differentanalyticparadigms,eachof whichmay
helpshedlight on how andwhy decisionmakersthoughtandactedasthey
did. The questionthat remainsunresolvedrelatesto the extentto which deci-
sionsreect international-systems
variablesor national-levelvariables.Here
we comebackto the structureagentquestiondiscussed in Chapters2 and 3.
How do structures at the international level and within the actors, or agents,
shapethe decisionmaking
process?

THE REFINEMENTS OF SNYDER AND DIESING

In keepingwith the emphasis
of decisionmaking
literatureon international
crises,GlennH. SnyderandPaulDiesinghavetestedempiricallythreeDM the-
oriesin 21 casesof crisis.8?
Theyincluded:(1)utility maximization(theclassical
rational theory), (2) boundedrationality (borrowedfrom Simonssatisficing
 THEREFINEMENTS
OFSNYDER
ANDDIESING 575

model), and(3)bureaucratic
politics
(based
onWeber andonAllison
inthelat-
tersfirstedition).
Theirrationalactormodel,
likeAllisons,
is based
onthe
choice
ofonealternative,
outofallthose
available,
thatmaximizes
expecte
utility.Theboundedrationality
tradition
suggests
thatif achoice
mustbemade
between twodifferent
values
(e.g.,
peaceandnational
security),
there
isnora-
tional
wayofcalculating
howmuch
ofone
should
besacrificed
toobtain
agiven
amount
of theother.
Decision
makers
cannot
maximize;
theyoperate
under
constraints
andsearch
foranacceptable
course.
Snyder
andDiesing
argue
plau-
siblythatmaximizing
andbounded
rationality
arenotirreconcilable
explana
tionsbutmaybecombined
bytakingeithertheoryasbasicandtheotheras
supplementary.
Theyalsomake
thesensible
suggestion
thatthebureaucratic
politicstheorysupplements
ratherthancompetes
withtheothertwotheories.
It focuses
ontheinternal
political
imperatives
ofmaintaining
andincreasin
inuenceand
powerrather
thanonthepurely
intellectual
problems
ofchoosin
a strategy
to dealwithanexternal
opportunity
or threat.33
Theproblem-
solving
theories
apply
best
tosomecases;
thebureaucratic-politics
theory,to
others.
Theformer
aremost
applicable
whenonlyoneortwopeople
arein-
volved
inthedecision.
Whenthree
ormore
people
areinvolved,
asinacommit-
teeoracabinet,
thebureaucratic-politics
modelwhich
Snyder
andDiesing
see
asaprocess
of forming
a dominant
coalitionissaidto applybest.84
Snyder
andDiesingdrawanimportantdistinctionbetweenrationaland
irrational
bargainers
inacrisis.
Rational
bargainers
donotpretend
toknowat
theverybeginning
of a crisiswhattheprecise
situation
is,orwhattherelative
interests,
power
relations,
andmainalternatives
are.Theyrecognize
thattheir
initialjudgment
maybemistaken,
buttheyareable
tocorrect
initialmisjudg-
mentandperceive
theoutlines
ofthedeveloping
bargaining
situation
in time
todeal
withit effectively.85
Theymake
tentative
guesses
astheygoalong,
and
theyconstantly
modifytheirassessments
asnewinformationis received.
Irrational
bargainers,
ontheother
hand,
proceed
fromarigidbelief
system.
They
arecertain
about
theadversarys
ultimate
aims,
bargaining
style,
prefer-
ences,
andinternal
problems.
Theyreceive
advice
(which
theyseek
especially
fromthose
whose
opinions
theyvalue)
butmaketheirowndecisions.
Theysee
themselves
asthearchitects
oftheone.strategy
thathasachance
ofsucceedin
andtheyrmlyadhere
to thatstrategy
in spiteof alldifficulties,
regardless
of
newincoming
information.
If theirinitialstrategy
wascorrect,irrational
bar-
gainers
canbehighlysuccessful;
if not,theyareunlikely
to realizetheirmistake
intimetoavert
defeat
ordisaster.86
Deception
isalways
aproblem
in bargain-
ing.Rational
bargainers
areopento beingdeceived
bytheopponent;
irrational
bargainers,
bythemselves.
In solving
theinformationprocessing
problem,
a
rigidimageof theadversaryastotallyuntrustworthy maybeasmucha hin-
dranceasarigidimage oftheadversaryastotallytrustworthy.
Theories
of thedecisionmakingprocessencounter conceptual
difculties.
MiriamSteiner, afteranalyzingcomparatively the worksof Snyderand
Allison,concluded
thateachcontainscontradictions.Snyder
claims
to puthu-
manplansandpurposes
at thecenterof hisconceptual
frameworkbut does
not followthroughconsistently.
Whenin theinterests
of objectivity,
he
576 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES:
CHOICE
ANDTHEUNIT
LEVEL
ACTOR
attempts
tooutthimself
withahardmethodology,
heinadvertently
reduces
hisresponsible
decision-makers
to organizationally
programmed
automa-
tons.88
Allison,
ontheother
hand,
insists
forthesake
ofaccuracy
thatevents
beexplained
notteleologically
interms
ofgoals
andpurposes,
butscienticall
interms
ofcausal
determinants
thataresubject
toinvestigation.
However,
into
hisintegrated
explanation,
heunwittingly
introduces
goals
andpurposes
as
theessence
ofdecision.
89Thus,
neither
Snyder
norAllison,
inSteiners
view,
succeeds
inproviding
anapproach
thatachieves
objectives
consonant
withits
owndistinctive
methodology.
Instead,
each
begins
atanopposite
poleand
moves
inthedirection
oftheother.
Perhaps
thisisinevitable.

THE_CYBERNETIC
THEORY
OFDECISION
MAKING
Wehave
seen
thattheclassical
utilitarian
theory
ofdecision
making,
based
onthe
assumption
ofarational
weighing
ofvalue
costs
andvalue
outcomes,
has
come
under
increasing
criticism
inrecent
decades.
Asanalternative
tothetraditiona
analytic
paradigm,
John D.Steinbruner
has
set
forth
thecybernetic
paradigm
asa
foundation
fortheories
andmodels
ofdecision
making,
because
theoldpara-
digm,
hecontends,
does
notexplain
allthe
observed
phenomena ofdecision
mak-
ing.
Hedoubtsthat
human beingsnormally
trytoanalyzecomplex
problems
by
breaking
themdown
intoalloftheir
logical
components(which
rational
theory
requires
themtodo),
orthattheyhave access
toalloftheinformation
andper-
formallofthecalculations,
especially
withregard
tovalue
trade-offs
(which
the
classical
theorypresupposes).
Steinbruner,
moreover,
expresses
dissatisfact
withmostoftheefforts
theanalytic
school
has
madethus
fartoapply
tocollec-
tive
decisions
concepts
originally
developed
toexplain decisions
byindividual
Steinbruner
offers
aspotentially
more fruitful
thantheanalytic
paradigm
acybernetic
one,
bywhichhighly
successful
oradaptivebehavior
mightbeex-
plained
without
resort
toelaborate
decision-making mechanisms.
Hebegin
bydescribing
afewmore
orless
familiar
instances
ofsimple
cybernetic
deci-
sions.
Practiced
tennis
players
arecybernetic
decision
makers.
Eachtime
they
move
tomeet
theballwiththeirrackets,
theyselect
onepattern
ofpsychome
torresponses
outofthousands
ofpossible
patterns,
andthey doit without
makingmathematical
calculations
ofthespeed
and
trajectory
oftheoncomin
ball,
their
precise
pointofinterception,
thestroke
theywillusetohitit,and
their
target
point
intheopposite
court.
Steinbruner
drawsadditional
analo
gies
pertaining
tocybernetic
servomechanisms
inthethermostat,
whichkeep
temperature
within
desired
bounds,
the
watt
governor
that
regulates
thespee
ofanengine,radar
homing devices,
thecatthatchangesposition
nearthe
hearthastheregrowshotterordimmer,theretail-store
managerwhoad-
justs
item prices
according
tovolumeofsales,
andthecook whofollows
a
recipe
and keeps
tasting
whenperforming
asequenceofculinary
operatio
withouthaving
aclear,
rational
conceptof~the
nalproduct.
The cybernetic
decision
maker,
inother words,
deals
withsituations
that
wecallsimple,butthatnevertheless
haveacomplexity
oftheirown,by
 THE CYBERNETICTHEORYOF DECISIONMAKING 577

eliminatingvariety, ignoring elaboratecalculationsconcerningthe environ-

ment, and tracking a few simplefeedbackvariablesthat trigger a behavioral
adjustment.Cyberneticdecisionmakers,believingthe decisionprocessto bea
simpleone, strive to minimizethe calculationsthey must perform, whether
they be mathematical or valuerelated. They monitor a small set of critical
variables,and their principal valueis to reduceuncertaintyby keepingthese
variables within tolerable ranges.They seeno need for a careful calculation of
probableoutcomes,which they are not likely to make in any case.The se-
quenceof decisionalbehaviorsis relatedlessto an intellectualanalysisof the
problemat handthan to pastexperience, from which thereemerges an almost
intuitional approachto problemsolving.
It is relativelyeasy,of course,
to acceptthecybernetic
paradigm
asapplied
to thetennisplayer,thecook,or theretailstoremanager,eachof whomfacesa
smallnumberof simplechoiceson eachsequence. The questionis whetherthe
validity of the cyberneticparadigmis affectedby the muchgreatercomplexity
of decisionsand heterogeneity of the actorsin the foreignpolicy and defense
fields.Steinbruneris convincedthat thecyberneticmodelis applicableto highly
complexdecisions, which he definesasdecisionsaffectingtwo or morevalues,
in which there is a tradeoff relationship betweenthe values, in which there is
uncertainty, and in which the decisionmaking power is dispersedover a num-
ber of individualactorsand/ororganizationalunits. He concedes that greater
complexityentailsgreatervarietyandthat under conditionsof complexitythe
decision-maker musthavea moreelaborateresponse repertoryif heis to retain
adaptive
capacity.92
Theproblemis solvedby increasing
thenumberof deci-
sion makers within a collectivity. Complex problems are not analyzedcompre-
hensivelyby all the membersof the decision-making group.Instead,they are
broken down into a largenumberof limiteddimensionproblems,eachcon-
frontedby a separatedecisionmakeror unit. This is thenaturalcyberneticex-
planationfor theriseof massbureaucracy.
93
To sum up, Steinbruner relies on theories of organizational behavior to ex-
tend the cyberneticparadigmfrom individual decisionmaking in relatively
simplesituationsto collectivedecisionmakingdesignedto copewith a highly
complex environment. The higher levels of organizational hierarchy do not
perform the integratingcalculationscalled for by the analytic paradigm.
Drawing on the work of Cyert and March, Steinbruner summarizesas follows:

Top management,in their view, focusesin sequential order on the decision issues
raised by separatesubunits and does not integrate across subunits in its delibera-
tions.Decisionsaremadesolelywithin the contextof the subunitraisingthe issue.
Complex problems are thus fragmented by organizations into separate compo-
nentshavingto do with subunitorganization,andthedecisionprocessat thehigh-
estlevelspreserves
the fragmentation.

Organizationaltheory alone is not enough,however.Steinbrunercom-

binesit with highly intricatemoderntheoriesof cognitiveprocesses,
including
thosedevelopedby Noam Chomsky,Ulric Neisser,Leon Festinger,Robert P.
Abelson, and others. He calls attention to the consensusamong cognitive
578 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES:
CHOICE
AND
THE
UNIT
LEVEL
ACTOR
theorists
that
agreat
deal
ofinformation
processing
isconducted
apparent
priortoandcertainly
independentlyofconscious
direction
and thatinthis
activity
themind routinelyperformslogicaloperations
ofconsidera
power.95Steinbruner
surveysthendingsofmany studies
relating
topercep-
tion,learning,
memory,inference,
consistency,
belief,
andthewaysinwhich
thehuman mindeither
controlsorcopeswithuncertainty,
andheconclude
thatcognitive
theory
providesananalysis
ofthe effects
ofuncertainty
onthe
decision
process
thatisfundamentallydifferent
fromthat
oftheanalytic
and
cybernetic
paradigms.
Thus, heusescognitive
theory
tomodify
the cyberne
paradigm,especially
with regardtothesubjective
resolution
ofuncertain
and tointroduce
intohistreatment
ofpolitical
andorganizational
phenomen
the concepts
ofgroovedthinking,
inwhichthedecision
maker
rather
simplis
tically
categorizes
theproblemsintoasmall
number ofbasic
types:
uncomm
tedthinking,
inwhich thedecision
makerwho doesnotknowwhattothink
abouttheproblem
oscillates
between
groups
ofadvisers
and mayadoptdiffer-
entbelief
patterns
atdifferent
times
onthesame decision
problem;
and theo-
retical
thinking,
inwhich thedecision
makeriscommitted
toabstract
beliefs
usuallyorganized
aroundasingle
value
inpatterns
that
areinternally
consis
tentand stable
overtime,
evenunder
conditions
ofuncertainty.95
Steinbrun
appliedhis
modeltoasingle
case
ofgovernmental
decision
making.
Clearly,
Steinbruner
doesnotregard
thecybernetic-cognitive
paradigmas
intrinsically
superior
totheanalytic
one.Rather
hesuggests
thatthetwopara-
digms
operate
assubstitutes
forone
another
inprocessing
complex
problem
and
they
produce
different
types
ofdecisions.
Inoureffort
tounderstand
gov-
ernmental
decision
making
under
conditions
ofcomplexity
and
uncertainty
the
cybernetic-cognitive
approach
mayprovide
acoherent
explanation
ofbehavi
that,
inananalytic
framework,
appears
tobestupid,
absurd,
incompeten
or
incomprehensible,
without
inany
way
implying
approval
ofsuchanoutcom
Zeev
Maozobserved
thatpersons
withlong
tenure
inoffice
areless
disposed
to
analytic
choice
behavior
(based
onrational
expected
utility)
andmore
incline
toward
cybernetic
decision
making.
Robert
E.Coulam
conrmed
the
applica
bility
ofcybernetic
theory
inhis
study
ofthe
F-111
procurement
decision.
DECISIONMAKINGIN CRISES
Inthepast
twogenerations
orso,several
studies
have
focused
onspeci
foreign-policy
decisions,
including
crisis
decisions?
Until
the1970s,
muchof
thisliterature
was intheformofcase
studies
ofdecisions
telescoped
intime

Theterm
crisis
dates
back
toancient
Greek
medical
practice,
inwhich
itmeant
alife-or-d
turning
point,
either
toward
recovery
ortoward
further
physical
deterioration
resulting
ultimat
indeath.
Thucydides
applied
the
termtokey
points
inthe
changing
relations
ofpeoples
and
states.
Ininternational
relations,
crisis
represents
aturning
point,
inthis
case
between
peace
and
war.
Theconict
that
produced
thecrisis
iseither
resolved
orescalated
togreater
intensity
and
then war.
 DECISION MAKING IN CRISES 579

and circumscribedasto the numberof decisionmakers.Sincethat time, there

hasbeenanincreasing
effortto studycrisesona comparative
basisto develop
a databaseacrosstime and crisesand to build a theory,or theories,drawn
fromsuchanalysis.
Beforethe1970s,thefocusof crisisliteraturewasthecre-
ationof conceptual
frameworksandhypothesesthatwereapplied to thestudy
of oneand,in someinstances,
morethanonecasestudy.The19605, more-
over,marked thebeginning
of aneffortbothto setforthalternativemodels
andto delineate
propositions
for theanalysis
of international
crisisbehavior.
Mostnotablewasthework of CharlesF.HermannandLindaP.Brady,fol-
lowed
bythatofJonathan
Wilkenfeld,
Michael
Brecher,
andSheila
Moser.1°
Thework of thisearlierperiodincludes
thedecisions
that ledto theout-
breakof WorldWarI, theUnitedStates
intervention
in Korea,Britishinter-
ventionin the Suezcrisis,andUnitedStatesresponses
to crisesin or over
Berlin,
Quemoy,
theBayof Pigs,andtheemplacement
of Soviet
missiles
in
Cuba.1°2
Thestudyof international
crisishasincluded
examination
of the
roleplayed bythirdparties
suchastheUnitedNationsandothermediating
organizations
orgroups.1°3
Somestudies
ofdecisionshavebeencharacteriz
bylonger timeframesandcomplex
groups
ofactors,including
legislative
bod-
ies,political
parties,
andgovernments.
Such
decisions,
whichmaybeofhistor-
icalsignicance eventhough
theywerenotcrisis
decisions
inthesenseused
here,
mightpertaintosuch
events astheFrench
scuttling
oftheplantocreate
aEuropeanmilitary
capability
based ontheEuropeanDefenseCommunityin
1954,Britains
questovermorethana decade for entryintotheEuropean
EconomicCommunity,andU.S.decision makingconcerning arms-contro
agreements
withtheSoviet
Union.
These
decisions
extend
tosuchpolicies
as
howvigorously
inthe19905
tosupport
thepostcommunist
reform
process
in
RussiaandtheU.S.decision
to admitthe CzechRepublic,
Hungary,
and
Polandto NATO.ThesethreestatesjoinedNATOin 1999.
Thistypeofstudy
isoften
more
difficult
thanthecrisis
typecastinthe
moldof precise
decisionmaking
analysis
becauseit involves
a harder-to
research
cumulative
process
thattakesplacein a sprawling
bureaucrat
labyrinth
andamore
comprehensive
political
arena
encompassing
plural
gov-
ernments
in a moreor lessroutineprocess
overa longertimeperiod.In this
respect,
theyarelikelyto differsubstantially
fromcrisis
decision
making
in
suchfactorsasthelevelof thepolicystructure
at whichdecisions
aremade
andthetimeavailable
to doso.Letuslookat threewellknown casestudies.

The U.S. Decision to Intervene in Korea

Onestudy,
consciously
designed
forthepurpose
ofapplying
atheoretical
DM
model,
wasGlenn
D.Paiges
accountofseven
daysofUnited
States
nationa
decision
making
in response
to theKorean
crisis.
Paige
reects
anawarenes
oftheproblem
ofapplying
toasingle
case
theSnyder-Bruck-Sapin
model
and
oftrying
toverify
anyhypotheses
merely
onthebasis
oftheKoreandecisio
Heacknowledges
thatthesingle
case
produces
lessons
thatcanlead
onlytoa
relatively
lowlevel
of abstraction.1°4
Paige
isessentially
faithful
to the
580 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

Snyder-BruckSapin
model,with its emphasison suchconceptsas spheresof
competence,motivation, communicationand information, feedback,
and the path of action.
The Koreandecision,Paigecontended,can be viewedeither as a unied
phenomenonor as a developmentalsequence
of choices(of which most deci-
sion makers were aware) that contributed to a stage-like progression toward
an analyticallydenedoutcomea sequence in whichpolicymakerswereap-
parentlyaffectedby positivereinforcementin the form of supportingUN mil-
itary action, favorable editorial opinion, congressionaland international ex-
pressions
of approval,andevidence
of a temperate
Sovietresponse.1°5
Many
of Paigesconclusionsare stated as hypothesesthat postulaterelationships
amongthe natureof the decisionmakinggroup, the perceivedthreat to val-
ues,the role of leadership,the questfor information,the frameworkof past
responses, the sharedwillingnessto makea positiveresponse,the effort to se-
cure internationalsupport,and so forth. Someof the propositionsare novel
and interesting, and some might strike contemporary decision-making theo-
rists as slightly tedious conrmations of what might otherwise be deducedlog-
ically.It shouldberemembered,
however,that thevalidationof apparentlyob-
vious truths, basedon solid data, is essentialto the scientic method and thus
to the development of social-sciencetheories. As the rst and fullest applica-
tion of the SnyderDM model, Paigesstudy has recently won high praise as a
landmarkanalysis
in thepolicysciences.1°5

Perception and Decision Making: The Outbreak of World War I

The use of content analysis with a stimulusresponsemodel representsa quite
different methodological approach to the study of decision making. In their
studies of the outbreak of World War I and of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ole R.
Holsti, RobertC. North, andRichardA. Brodyhaveattemptedto measurethe
messages
exchanged
duringcrisissituations.1°7
Suchanapproach
focuses
not
on interaction within, but rather on interaction between the decisional units.
The model used related perceptions to behavior (Sr:s-R).The symbol S is
the stimulus or input behavior; it is a physical event or a verbal act. The sym-
bol R representsthe responseaction. Both S and R are nonevaluative and non-
affective; r is the decision makers perception of the stimulus (S), and s is the
expressionof intentionsor attitude. Both 1&#39;
and 5 includefactorssuchasper-
sonality, role, organization, and systemthat affect perceptual variables.
The authors of the study undertook correlational analysesbetweenthe per-
ceptiondata and varioustypesof hard (action)data,because they recognized
that the value of content analysisdependson the relationshipbetweenthe
statements and the actual decisions made by state leaders. Thus, they at-
tempted to nd correlations betweenthe results of the content analysis and
such actions asmobilization, troop movements,and the breaking of diplomatic
relations. Other actions, such as nancial indicators like gold movementsand
the price of securities,which are sensitiveto international tension levels, were
 DECISION
MAKINGIN CRISES 581

examined.Correlatingthe 1914perceptiondatawith the spiralof military mo-

bilizations,
theauthorsconcluded,
not surprisingly,
that a risein hostilitypre-
cededactsof mobilization.Stateddifferently,decisionmakersrespondedto
verbalthreatsanddiplomaticmoves,
ratherthantroopmovements.1°8
Among the hypothesestestedwas the notion that in a situation of low in-
volvement,policyresponse (R)will tendto beat a lowerlevelof violencethanthe
input action(S),whereasin a highinvolvementsituation,thepolicyresponse (R)
will tendto beata higherlevelof violence
thantheinputaction(S).1°9
Because
the action variables,S and R, alone failed to accountfor the escalationof war, the
interveningperceptualvariables,r and s, were analyzed.No signicant difference
was found betweenthe two coalitionsin the sR step.In both low- and high-
involvement cases,the responseaction (R) was at a higher level of violencethan
was suggestedby their leadersstatementsof intent (5).Moreover, in the rs link,
therewasagainlittle differencebetweentheTripleEntenteandtheDualAlliance:
In both groupingsof nations,the levelof hostilitywas perceivedto be consis-
tently greaterin the otherspolicy (r) than in their own statementsof intent (5).
However,a signicantdifferenceappearedin the S-1step,which couldac-
count for the escalation. In the low-involvement situation, r tended to be at a
lower levelthan S, whereasin the high-involvementsituation,r tendedto be
higher than S. Decisionmakersin the highly involvedDual Allianceconsis-
tently overperceived the level of violenceof the threatsof the Triple Entente,
and they overreactedto the threats.The leadersof the lessdeeplyinvolved
Triple Ententeunderperceived the actionsof the Dual Alliance.Moreover,in
the later stagesof the crisis,after both allianceshad becomehighly involved,
there was lessdifferencebetweenthe two coalitionsin the way actions(S)
wereperceived(r). The authorsconcluded,therefore,that interveningpercep-
tions may performan acceleratingor a decelerating function.In this case,the
Sr link serveda magnifyingfunction. This differencein perceivingthe envi-
ronment(theS-1link)is consistentwith the pronouncedtendencyof the Dual
Allianceto respondat a higherlevelof violencethantheTripleEntente.11°
L. L. Farrar,]r., adoptsa different interpretationof the 1914 crisis.Fol-
lowing TheodoreAbel and BruceM. Russett,he suggests that oneshouldnot
seekcausesbut analyzeprocesses, beginningwith the backgroundfrom which
the decisionsof governments emerge.Thefinal decisionfor war is not reached
on the spur of the momentand is not triggeredby the irrational motivations
and emotionalelementsoften associatedwith decisionmakingunder condi-
tions of stress.Rather,it is basedon a seriesof rational calculationsthat may
antedatethe crisisby severalyears.The crisisitself may bethe resultof precri-
sis decisionsinvolving an assessment over a long period of time concerning
severalalternativewaysof actingundera varietyof circumstances. Although
leadersmay experience stressduring the crisis,the crisisis duenot to psycho-
logicaltensionsbut to previousdecisions,which aremoreimportantthan per-
sonalitycharacteristids. Farrar presentsthe 1914crisisasthe logicalresultof
rational policy considerations,given the assumptionsunderlying the state
system.1
582 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES.
CHOICEANDTHEUNiTLEVELACTOR

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The1962superpower confrontation
isgenerally
regardedasthemostdanger-
ouscrisisin historybecause
it couldhaveescalated
to nuclear
warbetween
theUnitedStatesandthe SovietUnion.It hascertainlybeenthe mostthor-
oughly
studiedandanalyzed,
witharemarkable
variety
ofndings
andinter-
pretations.
Earlier
studies2
depended
almost
entirely
oninformation
from
theAmerican
side;postCold
Warrevelations
fromsources
onbothsides,
in-
cludingtheKennedy
Tapes3assumingtheirreliability,
haveadded
toourde-
tailedknowledge
of events
withoutalwaysdeepening ourunderstanding
of
them.Tothecontrary,
theyhavesometimes
compounded
theambiguities
and
confusion.114
Graham T.AllisonandPhilipZelikowapplyeachof thethreepreviously
discussed
decisionmaking models
to thecrisis.
Therational
actoranalyst
seeks
to explainthecrisisin termsof strategic
choices
by thetwo superpowers
Duringandafterthecrisis,several
different
motives
wereattributed
to
Moscow
in itsdecision
to deploylandbased
nuclear
missiles
for thefirsttime
beyond
Soviet
borders-dangerously
close
totheUnited
States:
(1)toachieve
a
strategic
quick
x thatwould
redress
themilitary
imbalance5
resulting
from
U.S.advances
in invulnerable intercontinental
ballisticmissiles(ICBMS)and
submarinelaunchedballisticmissiles(SLBMs) by substantiallyincreasing
the
numberof nuclearwarheads thatcouldbedelivered onthecontinental United
States;
(2)to protect
Cuba(newest
member
of thesocialist
camp)fromanin-
vasionthat woulddestroyCastros revolutionanddamage Moscows reputa-
tion asleaderof theworld socialistcamp;116
(3) to preparefor a showdown
(President
Kennedys interpretation)
overBerlin,butin thepostCold
Warera,
SovietForeignMinisterAndreiGromyko andothersdenied sucha connec-
tion;117
and(4)toachieveasituation
symmetricalwiththatofU.S.Jupiter
mis-
silesin Turkey,
close
to Soviet
borders
(theviewofDefense
Secretary
Robert
McNamara,
whodismissed
themotiveof tryingto redress
theinequality
in
missile
capabilities).118
Mostanalysts
nowlookonKhrushchevs
useof the
Turkishmissiles
issuemoreasjustifyingpropaganda
thanasan actualmotive
fordeployment.
Was Khrushchevs
decision
todeploy
Soviet
missiles
areckless
adventurist
gambit(asMaolatercalledit) or a carefully
calculated
strategic
move?Khrushchev
himselfadmittedin his memoirsthat he got the ideaof
sending
strategic
missiles
asearlyasMay1962.Hediscussed
it fullywith
members
of thePresidium
andovercame
theobjections
of two advisers
bestin-
formedaboutAmerican
politics,Gromyko
andAnastas
Mikoyan,bothof
whomwarnedof thedangers
involved.Khrushchev
wasdetermined
to carry
outthedeployment
quickly
andsecretly,
before
theU.S.midterm
congressio
electionsin November.119
AllisonandZelikow,afterreviewing
Khrushchevs
obsessive
preoccupatio
withhisobjective
of forcing
theWest outofBerlin,
conclude
thatthemissile
powerandBerlin
hypotheses offerthemostsatisfactory
explanation
of Sovie
motives.12°
Kennedy
sawhischoice
asanearlynuclear
crisisoverCuba(where
 DECISION MAKING IN CRISES 583

theUnitedStatesheldthecards)or a lateroneoverBerlin(with theSovietUnion

in a stronger
strategic
position).121
Theorganizational
behavior
modelfocuses
on
suchfactorsasstandingordersto NATO eld commanders in Turkeyon thecon-
ditionsandauthorizationfor ring nuclearweapons,andon theorganizationre-
quiredto movemorethan 100 shiploadsfor medium-range and intermediate-
rangeballisticmissiles(MRBMSand IRBMs),IL-28 beaglemediumbombers,
cruisemissiles,surfaceto-air
missiles,MIG-28 interceptoraircraft,and 40,000
Soviet
troopsandtechnical
personnel
to Cuba.122
American
experts
werepuzzled
that theSoviets,
whocouldnot haveexpected theirmissilesites
in Cubato escape
detectionby U-2s,failedto completetheirradarsystemandSAM networkprior
to installing the MRBMs, and then made no attempt to camouage the missiles
until aftertheUnitedStatespubliclydisclosed
whattheSovietsweredoing.123
Someanomaliesmust be traced to errors and blunders by individuals; oth-
ers might bestbe explainedsimply by assumingthat large organizationsdo
what theyknow how to do andoftenlack informationaboutthe operationsof
other governmentalorganizations. SAM sitesand missile siteswere constructed
in Cubajust astheyhad beenin the SovietUnion,without eithercamouageor
hardening.Other constructionand phasinganomaliescan be similarly ex-
plainedby the characteristicproblemsthat typicallybesetlargeorganizations:
lack of a strategicoverview,poor coordination,delaysin communicationand
implementation
of directives,
andcumbersome
operating
procedures.124
On the American side, the precise timing of the Cuban Missile Crisis
was a function of the organizationalroutinesand standardoperatingproce-
duresof the U.S.intelligencecommunity,for thesefactorsdeterminedwhen
the crucial information reachedthe President.Many reports and isolated
itemsof information had to be piecedtogetherand analyzedbeforeU-2 sur-
veillanceights over Cubawere ordered,and then severalmore dayspassed
while the State Department urged a less risky alternative and the Air Force
and CIA carried on a jurisdictional dispute over who should y the U-2.
When a surgicalair strike was beingconsideredas a possiblecourseof ac-
tion, there was a vast discrepancy between what thatterm meant to Pres-
ident Kennedy and his White House advisers (who would have restricted it
to the missile sites) and what it meant to the military (who added the missile
sites to the existing contingency plan for an air strike against all Cuban stor-
age depots, airports, and artillery batteries opposite the U.S. naval base at
Guantanamo). A hastily formulated and probably erroneous military esti-
matethat an air strike could be only 90 percentbut not 100 percenteffective
against the missiles, of which a small number might be launched rst,
prompted the political leaders to eliminate the airstrike option and to con-
centrate on the naval blockade.125
Allison and Zelikow concedethat it is difcult to analyzeSovietdecision
making in the Cuban Missile Crisis in terms of the governmental process(or
bureaucraticpolitics) model, but the documentation for applying this model
to the U. S. action is abundant. After the Bay of Pigs asco, Kennedy was un-
der heavy pressure from public opinion and from critics in Congress to
584 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

prevent the Soviet Union from converting Cuba into an offensive base. In
September1962,when reportsof the Sovietmilitary buildup beganreaching
the United Statesand Khrushchevclaimed it was purely defensive,the
Presidentdistinguishedbetweendefensiveand offensivepreparations,and he
gave public assurancethat the latter would not be tolerated. Administration
gures deniedthe presenceof Sovietoffensivemissiles,discountedthe suspi-
cions of CIA Director John McCone, and elicited from the United States
IntelligenceBoardon September19 an estimateto the effectthat the emplace-
ment of Sovietoffensivemissilesin Cuba was highly unlikely. Early in
September,a U-2 had beenshot down over mainland China. Fear that another
U-2 might be lost contributed to a ten-day delay after a decision was made on
October 4 to carry out photograph reconnaissanceights.
Confrontedwith the evidence,the Presidentwasangeredby Khrushchevs
duplicity: He cant do that to me! Given the political environment, with
congressional
electionsonly threeweeksaway,earlieranalystsassumedthat
Kennedy wished to avoid signs of weaknessand to take rm, effective action,
but the ExCommtranscriptsappearto containno evidenceto substantiatethe
view that the Presidents
decisionswerebasedon domesticpolitical considera-
tions.125
It is nowtakenfor grantedthat thehackneyed
distinctionbetween
hawks and doves datesfrom this period.127 Recommendationsfrom
Kennedysadvisersvaried from doing nothing or taking a diplomatic ap-
proachto an air strikeor invadingthe islandor both beforethe Sovietmissiles
becameoperational.McGeorgeBundy,SpecialAssistantto the Presidentfor
National SecurityAffairs,and severalothermembersof ExCommkept chang-
ing their minds about what should be done. Allison and Zelikow credit
Attorney GeneralRobert Kennedywith working out a near consensus on a
compromisebetweeninactionand potentiallyunlimitedactionthe carefully
calibrated
response
of a graduallytighteningnavalblockade.128
Theblockade
alone did not lead to the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. That was
accomplished
only after a highly ambiguousploya conciliatoryoffer to give
a U. S. assuranceagainst an invasion of Cuba combined with a threat of
overwhelmingretaliatory action unlessthe Presidentreceivedimmediate
notice that the missiles would be withdrawn.129 Whether the ultimatum
backed by a credible threat of invasion causedthe withdrawal, as the rational
actormodelwould argue,or whetherthe languageof threatwasa public pos-
turing .designedto screena private deal offered by PresidentKennedyto
PremierKhrushchevwithdrawalof Sovietmissilesin Cubain exchangefor a
pledgenot to invadeCubaand withdrawal of U. S. missilesin Turkey (some-
thing that Kennedyhad orderedbeforethe CubanMissile Crisis developed
and that was actually carried out a few months afterward)must be left in the
realm of unansweredquestions.It now appearsthat Kennedywas willing to
makethe trade-offofthe missilesin Turkeyif necessary to avoid*militaryac-
tion, despiteadversepolitical repercussions
within TurkeyandNATO.13°
Most studiesof theCuban Missile Crisishavebeenhistorically descrip-
tive rather than theoretical. They have focused on who within the ExComm
 TOWARD A THEORY OF CRISIS BEHAVIOR 585

werehawksandwhoweredoves,whoadvocated
this or that approach,
how Soviet motives and Khrushchevsmoods were interpreted,and how
close to or far away from the brink of war the world came in the view of
various participants. The Cuban missile crisis decision group included for-
mer U.S. Ambassadorto Moscow Llewellyn Thompson,the only member
with extensiveknowledgeof the SovietUnion. There is still disagreement
over whether Soviet nuclear warheads were shipped and delivered to
Cuba.131
It is now suspected
that the polarizationbetweenhawksand
doves, featured in early speculative accounts, was overdrawn; all the mem-
bersof ExCommstatedtheir positionsas part of a dialecticprocessof seek-
ing an optimum resolution of the crisis. Irving Janis has suggestedthat in
this instance,PresidentKennedy,by absentinghimselfperiodicallyfrom the
ExComm deliberations,was able to elicit a spectrumof advisoryopinions
for his own decision making and to avoid the kind of groupthink that had
earliercontributedto the Bayof Pigsasco.132
Still othershavequestioned
whether we gain much signicant new, reliable knowledge from the sort of
crisisrevisited conferences that took place after the end of the Cold War,
given the well-known tendency of participants to engage in personally or
politically self-servingreminiscence.133

TOWARD A THEORY OF CRISIS BEHAVIOR

JamesA. Robinson has assertedthat there is no theory of crisis.134
Nevertheless,severalinternational-relations analystshave devoted many years
of effort to acquirea betterunderstanding
of crisisbehavior,to gaindeeperin-
sights into why somecriseslead to war while others lend themselvesto nonvi-
olent resolution, and to ascertain why certain crisesare short and others pro-
tractedin duration.135
Others,as notedin this chapter,haveattempted
to
develop a theory of crisis behavior that might yield systematicknowledge for
the study of crisis and for crisis management and resolution. According to
Michael P. Sullivan, crisis had become by the mid-1970s 1970s the most
widelyresearched
situationalvariableof all occasions
for decision.136
Crisis
managementremainswidelystudiedin thepostGoldWarera.137
CharlesA. McClellandhas notedthat analystsof international-crisisbe-
havior havefocusedon ve approaches:
(1) denition of crisis;(2) classica-
tions of types of crisis; (3) the study of ends, goals, and objectives in crises;
(4) decision making under conditions of crisis stress; and (5) crisis manage-
ment.138
An earlier,widelyaccepted
denitionof crisisdeveloped
byRobinson
and Hermannhad postulatedthreeelements:(1) threat to highpriority goals
of the decision-making
unit, (2) restrictedamount of time availablefor re-
sponse,and (3) surprise.139
Later studiesdid not deemsurpriseessential.
Accordingto GilbertR: Winham,a crisiscanarisein situationsrangingfrom
a fundamentalmilitary challengeto the balanceof power to an insignicant
borderdisputethatescalates
into a majorconfrontation.14°
586 DECISION-MAKING TI-IEORIES. CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

The criteria for dening crisis underwent subsequentmodication.

Michael Brecherand Jonathan Wilkenfeld offered the following characteristics:
a situationderivingfrom changein a statesinternalor externalenvironment
which givesriseto decisionmakersperceptionsof threatto basicvalues,finite
timefor response,
andthelikelihoodof involvement
in militaryhostilities.141
They substitutednite time for short time, includedintrastatechangesas po-
tential triggers,andintroducedthe likelihoodof military hostilitiesasa key el-
ement.Theneedfor surprisewaseliminatedbecause threatsituationscanoften
be anticipated.Much dependson the quality of national intelligenceand
whetherearlywarningindicatorsareproperlyroutedthroughthe bureaucracy
and evaluated in a timely manner. Many critical developments,however, can-
not be foreseen.Drafting a wide range of contingencyplans provides no guar-
anteeagainstsurprise,for suchplansoftencannotanticipateall possiblesitua-
tions that may arise,especiallyif the other party placesa premium on the
strategicvalueof surprise.Intelligencedoesnot alwayssucceed; somefailures
of predictionareinevitable.142
Accordingto GlennSnyder,crisishasalwaysbeencentralto international
politicsa momentof truth in which severallatent elementssuch as power
congurations,interests,images,and alignmentstendto bemoresharplyclar-
ied, to be activatedandfocusedon a singlewell-denedissue.l43During
the Cold War, crises between the United States and the Soviet Union were
looked on as surrogatesfor war, rather than merelydangerousepisodesthat
were the preludeto war and that, before the advent of nuclear weapons,
might haveescalatedto war. Thus, the effectof nuclearweaponsin the pos-
sessionof the two superpowershad the effectof channelingtheir competition
awayfrom the ultimate(nuclear)confrontationto crisismanagement at levels
below the nuclear threshold. Their systemicfunction is to resolve without vi-
olence,or with only minimalviolence,thoseconicts that aretoo severeto be
settledby ordinary diplomacyand that in earliertimeswould havebeenset-
tledby war.144
Accordingto OranR. Young,an international
crisisconsists
of a set of
rapidly unfoldingeventswhich raisesthe impactof destabilizingforcesin the
generalinternationalsystemor any of its subsystems
substantiallyabovenor-
mal [average]levels, and increasesthe likelihood of violence occurring in the
system.145
In turn,theseevents
produce
responses
thathavetheeffectof lead-
ing the originatorsof demandsto additionalactivities;hencethereis feedback.
Callingcrisisinternational
politicsin microcosm,145
GlennSnyderheldthat
elementslying at the coreof the internationalpoliticscomefully into focusin
crises,They include, in addition to conict itself, bargaining,negotiations, force
and the threat to use force, escalationand deescalation,deterrence,alternative
power congurations,interests,values,perceptions,
the use(or nonuse)of in-
ternationallaw andorganization,diplomacy,anddecisionmaking.
Richard Ned Lebow called attention to the familiar differentiation be-
tween underlying long-term causesand the more immediate causesof war.
Theimmediate
causes
maycomeinto playduringthetenseperiodknownas
 TOWARD A THEORY OF CRISIS BEHAVIOR 587

crisis,whicheitherleadsto war or to a turningawayfromhostilitiesandan

easingof the situation.He acknowledged
that individualcasestudiesof crisis
havegeneratedsomevaluableinsights,but he notedtheir limitations:From a
single
case
history,
onecannot
determine
whichaspects
aretypical(orgeneral)
andwhichareunique.Followingthe broaderapproach
of George and
Smokel47
andofSnyder
andDiesing,148
Lebow
made
acomparative
studyof
26 historicalcrisessince1898.149
He focused
on theoriginsandoutcomes
of
crises
andhowthecrises
affected
thesubsequent
relations
between
theprotag-
onists,intensifyingor amelioratingthe conicts.
Lebowdistinguishedamongcrisesthat are manufactured
to justify an
alreadymade
decisionfor war (suchasNaziGermanyvs.Poland,1939);spin-
off crisesfrom primary conflicts,which provokeconfrontationswith a third
party (suchas Germanys1917 policy of unrestrictedsubmarinewarfaredid
with regardto the UnitedStates);and brinkmanshipcrises,in which one state
challenges
anotherto compelit to withdrawfrom an importantcommitment
(suchastheSovietblockade
of Berlinin 1948-1949).
He Concluded thatacute
internationalcrisescanbedecisivein the choicesfor war or peace;that immedi-
atecauses,
therefore,
canbeasimportantasunderlying
causes
(andmayaffect
more than just the timing of wars outbreak); and that the outcomeof a crisiscan
improveor worsen
adversary
relations
afterwarhasbeenaverted.
A moresignif-
icant conclusionis that successful
crisismanagement dependsnot only on the
commitmentof policymakers to avoidwar, but alsoon an open decisi0n-mak-
ingenvironment,
a cohesive
politicalelite. . . [and]cultural,organizational
and
personalbehavioralpatternsestablished long beforethe onsetof anycrisis.15°
In the crisis-management literature,an effort is madeto relatecrisis be-
havior to suchvariablesasthe structureof the internationalsystem.Thus,nu-
merouspointsof linkageconnect(a)theoretical constraints
relatedto polarity
andstructuralrealismand(b)internationalcrisis,asdescribedsubsequentlyin
this chapter.Thebehaviorof statesin a crisisis saidto be affectedby the
structureof thesystem(bipolaror multipolar)andby thenatureof military
technology.In this perspective,
the rivalry of the United Statesand the Soviet
Union was ordainedmore by structure(their power preponderance over all
others)than by ideology.Snyderand Diesingagreewith KennethN. Waltzs
hypothesisthat a bipolar systemis morelikely than a multipolar oneto besta-
ble. Suchanalysisaccordswith ndings from the work of Michael Brecher,
JonathanWilkenfeld,and SheilaMoser,discussed later in this chapter.In the
bipolarsystem,
alignments areclear,andrealignments
donot alterthebalance
of powersignificantly.
In themultipolarsystem,alignmentsmaybeunclear,
and shifts may be important. Becauseof their greaterambiguity,multipolar
systemsaremoreproneto changesin the perceptionof interests,to gambling
or risk taking,andto miscalculations
that makecrisesmoredangerous.
The
tensionbetweenbargainingamongalliesand bargainingbetweenadversaries
(or betweenrestrainingthe ally and deterringthe opponent)is more difficult
to managein a multipolarsystemcrisis.151
By the sametoken,however,
crisesthat breakout betweentwo actors,or betweentwo blocsof actors,in a
588 DECISION-MAKING THEORIESI CHOICE AND THE UNIT &#39;..F.VEL
ACTOR

bipolar systemarelikely to hold the potentialfor escalationto generalwar, or

to be systemdominant,rather than conned to one of the regionalsubsys-
tems. A crisis can break out, however, in which superpowersare drawn into a
confrontationby clientstates,astheywerein the 1973Yom Kippur War.
Nuclear-Weapons technologyhas had a considerableeffect on interna-
tional crises by widening enormously the gap between the value of the inter-
estsin conict and the possiblecost of war for the holdersof suchweapons.
Nuclear pqwers strive to protect, and indeed to advance, their interests, but
they are said to be motivated by the disasteravoidanceconstraint to be more
cautious and prudent in crisis managementand to raise, as if by tacit consent,
the provocationthresholdof war, therebyincreasingthe rangefor maneuver-
ingin crises.152
Thenuclearpowershavesubstituted
for waritselfpsychologi-
calforcein theformof carefullymanaged
risksof war.153
Crisismanagement
including the use of a variety of instruments of statecraft and the threat, real
or perceived, to use force, has become a surrogate for the actual use of mili-
tary capabilities,includingnuclearweapons.Hereinliesa linkagebetweencri-
sis decisionmakingand deterrencetheory,which, as discussedin Chapter8,
encompassesboth the threat of escalation and escalation itself. The state that
can demonstrateto its opponentthe capacityto punish at a higher level of
conict-or a higher rung on the escalatoryladderholds the potential for
deterring in a crisis situation or for escalation dominance.
Crisis management,it may be inferred, is the ability of one of the parties,
by crediblythreateningescalation,to deterits adversaryfrom escalationand
to produce a crisis deescalation outcome in accord with its interests. This
doesnot mean,however,that a crisisendsonly whenoneadversaryparty ca-
pitulatesor backsaway. A crisis may also be resolvedthrough a processin
which both contestantsexerciserestraintand seeka face-savingpath of mu-
tual retreator a compromisethat transformsthe situationwithout beingin-
compatible with the irreducible interests of either. Nor does it mean that there
is universal agreementamong theorists concernedwith crisis behavior about
the dual relationshipbetweenmilitary power and escalationdominance,or
betweendeterrence capabilitiesand crisismanagement.
Accordingto Lebow,motivation is a key elementin crisis behavior.His
analysis of 20 crisessince 1898 led him to conclude, To the extent that lead-
ersperceivethe needto act, they becomeinsensitiveto the interestsand com-
mitmentsof othersthat standin the way of the success of their policy. By the
sametoken, Lebow suggeststhat leadersmay be unwilling to commit re-
sourcesat their disposalto policiesthat do not servewhat they regardasim-
portant interests.In short, increasedcapabilitiesmay not inevitablytranslate
into policiesof confrontation.As a result,leadersmay discardor discountin-
formation that runs counterto the courseof action on which they haveem-
barkedin supportof their established goals.In the absence of compellingdo-
mestic and strategicneedsmost leadersmay be reluctant or unwilling to
pursueconfrontatoryforeignpoliciesevenwhenthey seemto hold out an ex-
cellentprospectof success.154
 THESYSTEMATIC
STUDY
OFINTERNATIONAL
CRISIS
BEHAVIOR
589

THE SYSTEMATICSTUDYOF INTERNATIONAL

CRISIS BEHAVIOR
Inaneffort
tocontribute
tothedevelopment
ofacomprehensive
theory
ofcri-
sisbehavior,
Michael
Brecher,
Jonathan
Wilkenfeld,.and
Sheila
Moserassem
bleddataabout
278international
crises
forthe50-year
period
between1929
and1979.Theirobjective,
intheInternational
Crisis
Behavior
Project,
wasto
examine
onacomparative
basis,
withtheuseofquantitative
research,
alarge
number
ofcrises
displaying
various
anddiffering
characteristics.
They
sough
togeneratesystematic
knowledge
aboutcrises
on_aglobalbasis.
Theproject
hadasits focuscrises
between
majorpowers,betweenmajorpowersand
smaller
powers,andbetween smaller
powers themselves.
Theirgoalwasto il-
luminate
suchdimensions
of international
crisisastheimages
andbehavior of
majorpowers,
thebehavioral
patterns
ofweakactors,
theroleofdeterrenc
thebargaining
between
adversaries,
theroleof alliance
partners
in crisisman-
agement,
thecatalysts
ortriggering
factors
thatproduce
crises,
theprocesse
andcausative
factorsbywhichcrises
areresolvedin alternative
typesof out-
comes,
and,nally,theconsequences
of crises
forthepower,status,
andsubse-
quentperceptionsof participantstates.155
Theauthorsexamine
crisisbehaviorat boththemacroandthemicrolev-
els.Atthemacro
level,
theyaddress
crisis
behavior
between
or_
among
actors.
An international
crisishasasits deningcharacteristic
disruptive
interac-
tionsbetween
twoor moreadversaries,
accompanied
,.bytheprobability
of
militaryhostilities
or,if warhasalready
brokenout,thepotential
for anad-
versechangein the militarybalance.
Furthermore,
an international
crisisis
saidtopose
achallenge
totheexisting
structure
oftheinternational
system
or
thesubsystem
withinwhichit takesplace.
According to Brecher,
Wilkenfeld,
andMoser, moreover,
it is necessaryto
address
crisisbehavior
atthemicrolevel,
fromtheperspective
of theindividual
actors
andtheirforeignpolicies.
Therefore,
theydeneaforeign-policycrisisas
havingtwonecessary
andsufcient
conditions
thatarederived
fromachange
in thestates
internal
orexternal
environment.
Theseareperceptions
heldby
thehighest decisionmakers thatthereis (1)a threatto basicvalues,together
withanawareness ofnitetimeforresponse to thethreat,and(2)ahighprob-
abilitythatmilitaryhostilities
will ensue.
In short,at»
thelevelof theinterna-
tionalsystemstandtheinteractive patternsbetween or among thecrisispartic-
ipants.Foreachof thestates thatareparties,thereisa foreign-policy
crisis.In
the studyof crisismanagement,
it is possible
to focuson the macrolevel-
interaction
between
andamong
crisisparticipantsor
to address
theforeign-
policy behaviorof individualstatesat the micro level.The InternationalCrisis
BehaviorProjectwasdesigned
to encompass
both levels
of analysis.
In this
conceptualization,
thereis an inextricablelink betweenthe macroand micro
levels.A decision
madeor anactiontakenby onestateelicitsa response
from
anotherstate,generating
an interactive
process
that in itselfmakesthecrisis
international.
590 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES:
CHOICE
ANDTHEUNITLEVEL.
ACTOR

Withinthe50-year
periodaddressed
bytheproject,
it wasfoundthat
crises
occurin diverse
geographical
andstrategic
environments,
withvarying
levels
ofparticipation
bymajorpowers.156Crises
mayeruptwithoutleading
toactual
military
hostilities,
ortheymaybetheprelude
towar.Inothercases,
crises
werefoundto takeplaceaspartof anongoing conictor war.Theau-
thorsfoundthatcrises
weremorefrequent in Asiain theperiodbetween1929
and1979
thaninanyotherpartoftheworld;such
crises
were
longer,
propor-
tionately,
thancrises
thattookplace
in other
regions.
Incontrast
tothe69
crises
thatbrokeoutin Asia,theAmericas werethelocusof 33 crises,
the
smallest
number of anyregion.Europeranked behind
Asia,with57crises
be-
tween1929and1979.Thecrisesthattookplacein Europetendedto be
multiactorcrises;thosethat actuallyled to war occurredbefore1945.
Ranking
alsobehind
Europe
wastheMiddle East,
with55crises
duringthe
50-year
period
ofthestudy.
MorethanhalfoftheMiddle
Eastcrises
hadat
leastsixactors.
Mostof thecrises
in theregioncameafterWorldWarII and
hadvaryinglevelsof U.S.andSovietinvolvement.
Africa,
theregion
containing
theyoungest
states,
mostofwhichgained
in-
dependence
inthe1960s,
provided
thesetting
for64crises,
justbehind
Asia.
Morethanhalfof these
crises
formedpartof protractedconicts.In Africa,
nonstate
entities
accountedfor thelargest
number of triggering
factors.The
UnitedStates
played
anactiverole,principally
politicalandeconomic,
in
nearlyhalfofthepost-World
WarII African
crises.
TheSovietUniontook
partin slightly
fewer
crises
thantheUnitedStates
in Africa,
although
its
military-related
activity
wasgreater
thanthatoftheUnited
States.
In theInternational
CrisisBehavior
Project,
theglobalsystem
wasdivided
intofourpolarityperiods:
multipolar
(1929-1939),
WorldWarII (1939-
1945),
bipolar
(1945-1962),
andagain
multipolar
(1963-1969).
According
to
theirndings,
whichmaybereadin thecontext
of ourdiscussion
oftheim-
pactofinternational
systemic
structure
onconict
(seeChapters2,3,and7),
themultipolar
systemoftheperiod
after1963
wassaidtobelessstable
than
thepreceding
bipolar
system.Multipolarity,
withitsdiffusion
of decisiona
centers
reecting
theemergence of a largenumber of additional
actors,
re-
sulted
in asharpincrease
in crises
havingviolentbreakpoints.In theearlier
multipolar
decadebefore
WorldWarII, nearlyallofthecriseshadthemajor
powers
asdirect
participants.
This
period
ranked
highest
intheuse
ofpacic
techniques
to achieve
crisisterminationa
preoccupation
withappeaseme
as a meansof war-avoidance.
In the subsequent
period,WorldWar II, in
nearly
allcases,
thecrisis-management
techniques
usedwereforthemostpart
violentin nature.
In thebipolarperiodthatfollowed,
therewasa decline
in
theovertuseof violence,
andespecially
full-scale
war,asa crisismanagemen
technique.
Inkeeping
withtheireffort
todiscuss
crisis
atthemacro
andmicro
levels
Brecher,
Wilkenfeld,
andMoser
suggest
afurther
delineation
withintheinterna-
tionalsystem
itself.
Theirconceptualization
provides
fora categorizatio
of
crises
withinthedominantsystem,
suchasEurope before1945or betweenEast-
Westblocssincethat time,contrasted
with the severalregionalsubsystems
 THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR 591

Crisesthat break out in a subsystemsuch as the Middle East or Africa, with the
direct participantsbeingin the subsystem,
can escalateinto the dominantsys-
tem.Similarly,asthe authorsfound,crisesthat beginin a dominantsystemcan
spilloverinto a subsystem.
Amongtheirndings,theyconclude
thatall but64
criseshada subsystem,
ratherthan a dominantsystem,astheir context.
Dominant-systemcrisestendedto be longer in duration than crisesat
other systemlevels.Dominant-system criseswere more threatening,danger-
ous,anddestabilizingthansubsystemic
crisesbecause of thegreatercapacity
of majorpowersfor violence.
Theoccurrenceof violencein dominant-system
criseswas morelikely to be markedby fullscalewar, while seriousor minor
clasheswere more frequentin subsystemcrises.Furthermore,crisesat the
dominantsystem levelhada greaterpropensitythanthoseat otherlevelsto
providedenitiveoutcomes,suchasvictoryor defeat,ratherthanstalemate
or compromise. The effectiveness
of internationalorganizations,
especially
the UnitedNations,wasgreaterat the subsystem
levelthan within the domi-
nant system.
Amongthephenomena
studiedwerethetypesof crisis-conictenviron-
ment. Brecher,Wilkenfeld,and Moser differentiatedamongsettingsthat in-
cluded(1) longtermhostilitybetween adversaries overmultipleissues,lead-
ingto periodicviolence
resultingin protracted conict;(2)extendedwarsthat
form part of a protractedconict; and (3) crisesthat arenot setwithin the
contextof anyprotractedconict. Theyfoundthat crisesweremorelikely
than not to occurwithin oneor the otherprotractedconict setting.Themost
threatening
anddestabilizing
crisesoccurredwithin a prolonged
violentcon-
ict. In suchsituations,asmight be expected,crisisactorsweremoreproneto
resort to violencethan were their counterpartsin other conict situations.
Moreover,the authorsconcluded
that, wherepowerdiscrepancies
between
adversaries
werelow, therewasa greaterlikelihoodof violent breakpointsor
triggersin theoutbreakandescalation
of thecrisis.It is suggested
thatstrong
statesfacingweakadversaries
findresortto violence to belessnecessarythan
stateswith fewor nomajorpowerdisparitieswith theirenemies. Stateddiffer-
ently,themostfrequent
typeoftriggering
factorin crises
characterized
bysub-
stantialgapsin capabilities
between
protagonists
wasnonviolentin nature.
In their discussion
of actorattributesor characteristics,
Brecher, Wilkenfeld,
andMoserconcluded that in all crises,actorsoptedfor smallerratherthanlarger
decisionmaking units.The higherthe levelof superpower involvement,the
greateris thefrequencyof theheadof governmentto betheprincipalcommuni-
cator.Furthermore,thelongera statehadexisted,
thegreaterwasthelikelihood
that its crisis decisionmakingunit would contain more than ten persons.
However, thebasicdecisional unitconsistedof fourpersons
or fewerin 51per-
centof all actorcases,andin only22.percent wastheunitlargerthantenper-
sons.It wasalsofoundthatnegotiation andothernonviolent techniques were
morefrequently employed by olderstatesin crisismanagement.Themorean-
thoritariantheregime, it wasfound,thegreater wasthepossibility
thatit would
resortto violentcrisistriggers.According
to thedataanalyzed, thedemocratic
politicalsystems
hadanalmost
equaltendency
to usesmall,medium,
or large
592 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

decisionalunitsin a crisis.In contrast,authoritarianpoliticalsystems,

asmightbe
expected,
opted
forasmall
decisional
unit,composed
ofonetofourpersons.15

PSYCHOLOGY AND DECISION MAKING

How decisionmakersdene situationsabout which they must makechoices
leadingto actionhasimportantimplications
for how theyperceive
such
choices.Decisionmakersbasedecisionson imagesof reality that are shaped
by cognition,or howdecision
makersthinkabouta particulardecisionalsitu-
ation.Imagesaregenerallydenedascognitiveconstructionsor mentalrepre-
sentations
of situations,
includingperceptions
of otheractors,andasthealter-
nativechoicesthat may be availablein light of the goalsestablishedby
decisionmakers.Psychologists
generally
agreethat theprocess by whichim-
agesaredeveloped
andtherelationship
between
images
andcognitionbe-
tweenthe stimuli that enterthe brain and how the cognitiveprocessshapes,
andisshaped
by,such
stimuli,
converting
themintoresponseis
complex.15
How decision
makersperceive realityis not easilystudiedbecause
whatdeci-
sionmakersseein anyspecicsituationis anempiricalquestion.
As Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller suggest,it is essen-
tial to ascertain
empirically
howdecision
makersmentallyrepresent
thesitu-
ation,understand
stimuliandprocess
theirchoices.159
In otherwords,the
causalrelationships
that areformedwithin the cognitiveprocess
consistof
manyelements.
These
mayinclude
thedecision
makers
philosophical
beliefs
aboutworldpolitics,thenatureandmagnitude
of thethreatposedby anen-
emy,the perceivedpowerof suchan adversary,and judgmentsaboutthe
norms of behavior of other actors. The actions of decision makers are the re-
sult of a combination of such factors as how the decisional unit is structured,
how informationis received
andprocessed, whatadvicethedecisionmakers
receive
fromtheirkeyadvisers,whatarethepersonality characteristics
of de-
cisionmakers,whattypeof politicalcoalitiontheyform,andwhattypesof
domesticsupportand oppositiontheyface.
Suchlargenumbersof causalvariables, HerrmannandFischerkeller as-
sert,makedifcult anunderstanding or predictionof precisely
whichpercep-
tionsfromthislistwill prevail.In theirownwork,theseauthorssuggest a the-
ory of imagesbasedon ve differentkindsof strategicperception. These
includerst, an enemyimage, the view of anotheractor as threatening,as
setforth in theclassical
securitydilemmadescribed
in Chapter2. Theireffort
to describea spectrumof imagesleadsthemto develop
a secondstrategic
per-
ception,whichthey call a fdegenerate image,in which anotherstateis
viewedasprovidinganopportunityto beexploitedby anactorclaimingcul-
tural superiority.
For example,AdolphHitler viewedGreatBritain,France,
andtheUnitedStatesasbeingculturallyinferior to Nazi Germany.A third im-
ageis termedthe colonyimage,in whichthe targetis deemed to be both
weakerandculturallyinferior.This accordswith theWesternperceptionof
otherregionsduringtheeraof European colonialism.
Thefourthimagedevel-
 PSYCHOLOGY
ANDDECISION
MAKING 593

oped
byHerrmann
andFischerkeller
istheimperialist
image,
which
stands
insharp
contrast
tothecolony
image.
Intheimperialist
image,
asubject
per-
ceives
athreat fromastatethatismore
powerful
butnotculturally
superio
Finally,
thereistheallyimage,
inwhichonestate
actor
perceivesthatthe
prospects
formutualgainfromincreasing
alignmentandcooperation
out-
weighotherfactors,
whether
theybedisparities
in poweror in culture.
Applying
thistheoryto anexamination
of conicts
in thePersian
Gulf
from1977to 1992,
theauthors seek
to understand
morefullySaddam
Husseins
motives
byasking
if hisimageryresembled
enemy,
imperialist,
or
degenerate
stereotypes
oftheUnited
States,
Iran,ortheArabgulfstates.
The
rsttwowould
beconsistent
withadefensive
andperceived-threat
interpret
tion,thelastwithamoredefensive
andopportunity-based
interpretation.1
Howactors respond
to situations
in theformofstrategies
dependsonwhich
ofthefiveimages
forms
thebasis
fortheirdecisions.
Theauthors
suggest
that
thelogicoftheirimages
leads,inthecase
ofthetarget
inthedegenerate
cate-
gory,toalikelydecision
toinitiate
adirect
attack.
Bythesametoken,
if anac-
tor viewsthetargetasanallyandwilling,therefore,
to cooperatefor mutual
gain,it will setforthpolicies
based
ondecisions
intendedto increasethein-
centive
fortheallyto reciprocate.
In sum,thisworkrepresents
aneffortto
disaggregate
arange ofimagesassociated
withnational
security
asabasis
for
understanding
empirically
andtheoretically
thecognitive
dimension
of deci-
sionmaking.
Oneof themostinteresting
aspects
of crisisdecision
making
pertains
to
theelement
of choice
underpressure
of time.OleR.Holstihasasked
whether
decision
makers,
under
thestress
ofcrisis
thatmayrequire
around-the-cloc
watch,canbeexpected
to beefficient
in identifying
majoralternative
courses
ofaction,
estimating
theprobable
costs
andgains
ofeach
option,
discriminat
ingbetween
relevant
andirrelevant
information,
andresisting
premature
cog-
nitiveclosure
andaction.161
Analysts
arenotin agreement
onwhether
moder-
atestress
improveshumanperformance
orinterferes
withproblem
solving.
Martha L. Cottam
reviewed
some
ofthemajorcognitive
approaches
em-
ployed
bycertain
political
scientists
whohave
written
ondecision
making:
Alexander
George,
NathanLeites,
OleHolsti,andothers.152
Thefocusof her
workwasontheeffectsof cognitive
processes
onpolitical
decision
makers,
theeffects
ofcognitive
patterns
onpolicymakers
images
oftheoutside
world,
andtheirabilityto adaptto changes
in thepoliticalenvironment.
Cottam
agreed
with Robert]ervissViewthatDM studiesoftenfail to buildon earlier
works,
uselittlepsychology,
anddonotlinkpsychology
tobehavior.163
Citing
Jervis
asanexception whoiscareful
nottothrowallthepsychological
theo-
riesintoonegrabbag fromwhichhedrawsa psychological
model,Cottam
criticizes
politicalscientists
whodonotseparate
beliefs
andcognition
or dis-
tinguishbetween beliefsandmotivationalHerwarnirig
against
theuncriti-
calborrowing
ofpsychological
theory
bypolitical
scientists
bears
repeating:
Psychology
cannot
beblindly
applied
topolitical
analysis.
Thecontrols
ofthepsy-
chological
laboratory
will neverbeavailable
for politicalanalysis.
. . . What
594 DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES.
CHOICE
ANDTHEUNITLEVEL
ACTOR

psychology
does
have
toofferareverygeneral
guidelines
forarguments
about
howpeople
make
political
decisions.55
Cottams
particular
focus
wasonthebasic
level
categories
used bydeci-
sionmakers
to dividethepoliticalworld~categories
thatfacilitate
theprocess
ofincoming
information
withmaximum
efciency
andminimum
effort.
She
identied
seven
suchimagesorcategories
typical
ofU.S.policymakers,
based
notonideology,
issue
positions,
orgeography,
butrather
onsuchcharacteris
tic attributes
of states
asmilitarycapability,
domestic
policy,economic
struc-
ture,culture,
supportiveness,
flexibility,
andgoals.
Theseven
types
bywhich
policymakers
categorize
foreign
states
were found
to beenemy,
hegemonis
dependent
allyoftheenemy,
neutral,
ally,
U.S.
dependent,
and
puppet.155
RichardNedLebowsuggests
theimportance
of cognitive
andmotiva-
tionalprocesses
asanecessary
basis
foranalyzing
decision-making
behavior
undercrisisconditions.
Yettherelativeexplanatory powerof cognitive and
motivationalmodelsin thestudyof crisisdecisions
is noteasilydetermined.
Lebowsexamination of international
crisesledto theconclusion thatthey
provide
competing
explanations
formany
ofthesame
phenomena,
andno-
tablyforinformation
distortion.
Forexample,
according
tocognitive
theory,
decision
makers
seek
to achieve
cognitive
consistencythat
isto say,theyare
likelytointerpret,
incorporate,
ordiscard
information
thatisreceived
asacri-
sisproceeds,in accordance
withtheirexisting
assumptions,
predispositio
andperceptions.Especially
underconditions
ofextreme
timeconstraints,
the
reluctance
to reconsider
a decision
thathasalready
beenmadeis likelyto be
proportionate
tothedifculty
experienced
inmaking
it inthefirstplace.
Such
wastheproblem,
according
toLebow,
confronting
Austria
andother
ma)
orpowers
intheweeksleading
totheoutbreak
ofWorldWarI after
thecrisis
hadbegun.
Aside
fromthepressure
oftime,
there
islikely
tobeareluctance,
of-
tenbutnotalways
based
ontimeconstraints,
undercrisis
conditions,
toseek
al-
ternative
sources
of information.
In thecase
oftheUnited
States,
whichin 1950
downplayedthelikelihood
ofChinesemilitary
intervention
intheKoreanWar,
political
andmilitary
leaders
hadnodesiretochallenge
advisors
whotoldthem
whattheywished tohear.
157Intelligence
estimates
andofcial
policy
analyse
maybedistortedasaresult
ofcognitive
closure.
Oncecommittedtoapolicy
of
confrontation
orofhigh-stakes
blufng
inacrisis,
leaders
tended
todisregard
in-
formation
thatchallenged
theirassumptions
andexpectations
aboutsuccess.
By
thesametoken,
When initiators
recognized
andcorrectedforinitialmisjudg-
ments,
theyusually
succeededinaverting
war,although
thisoftenrequired
ama-
jorcooperative
effort,
asintheFashoda
and
Cuban
missile
crises.168
Similarly,
motivational
theory,
whichexplains
misperception
byreferenc
to theemotional
needs
of theactors,
issaidto offerinsights
that,according
to
Lebow,
servetoreinforce
andcomplement
ndingsfromthecognitive
model
Lebowsuggests
thattheneed
onthepartofdecision
makersto believe
that
thepolicy
onwhichtheyhave
embarked
willsucceed
helps
toaccountforre-
luctance
orunwillingness
to makechanges in spiteof evidence
to thecontrary.
Thismotivational
needmayitselfplayanimportant rolein shapingcognitive
 PSYCHOLOGY AND DECISION MAKING 595

choices. The quest for cognitive consistency is said to be related to motiva-

tional need. Thus Lebow, in his discussionof the U.S. decision to discount the
prospect of Chinese military intervention into the Korean War, asks, Did
Americanmilitary intelligencein Tokyo,for example,underestimate
the num-
ber of Chinesein Korea becausethis conformedto their expectationsor be-
causeit satisedtheir needs?A good casecan be madefor either explana-
tion.159It canbesaidthat all crisisdecisions
giveriseto situations
of threat
and counterthreat that produce tension within the participants, whether in the
form of excitement,fear,anxiety,frustration,dissonance,
or someother psy-
chologicalstate.A knowledgeof how conditionsof stressaffectthe solidarity
and problemsolvingability of smallgroupsmay castlight on the way leaders
behaveat crucial decision-making junctures.
JonathanM. Robertshas discussedsomewhatanecdotallythe implica-
tions for political decision making in crisis of such biological factors as men-
tal illness (cerebralarteriosclerosis,schizophrenia,paranoia, hypomania,
and depression);age; impaired speech,vision, and hearing; nutritional disor-
ders; alcoholism; lapse of memory; sleeplessnessand extreme fatigue; and
the effectsof drugssuchasstimulants.17°
It shouldbenoted,however,
that
it is almost impossible to acquire accurate and reliable empirical data con-
cerning the total health picture of key policymakers during times of interna-
tional crisis. Much (but not all) researchin biopolitics remainsspeculative
and dependent on persuasive logical inference more than on strict scientic
evidence.
Psychologistshave designedexperimentsto test the effectsof stresson
group integrationand the problem-solvingefficiencyof groups.It has been
found, as one might expect,that individualsin groupsreact differently to
stress.We know that for both individualsand groups,increasedstressmay
lead to aggression,withdrawal or escape-seekingbehavior, regression,or vari-
ous neurotic symptoms.John T. Lanzetta has furnished the following descrip-
tion of his experimentswith groups:

It was found that as stress increased there was a decrease in behaviors associated
with friction in the group;a decrease
in the numberof disagreements,arguments,
aggressions, deations,andothernegativesocial-emotional behaviors,aswell asa
decrease
in self-oriented
behaviors.
Concomitant
with this decrease
wasan in-
crease in behaviors which would tend to result in decreased friétion and better
integration of the group; an increasein collaborating,mediating,cooperating
behaviors.171

Lanzettasuggests
that thereasonfor thisphenomenon
is to befoundin
the tendencyof groupmembers,facedwith conditionsthat producestressand
anxiety,to seekpsychologicalsecurityin the group through cooperativebe-
havior.However,the hypothesisof groupintegrationunderstressseemsto be
valid only up to a point. It may be that group membersprovidemutual rein-
forcementfor eachotheronly while theyexpectto beableto find a solutionto
theircommonproblem.RobertL. Hamblindesigned
an experiment
that led
him to suggestthat group integrationduring a crisiswill beginto decrease
if
596 DECISIONMAKING THEORIES. CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

no likelysolutionappears
to beavailable.
Cooperation is likelywhileit is po-
tentiallyprotable,butwhenthemembers of thegroupmeetonefailureafter
anotherno matterwhat theydo, theyexperience
a frustrationthat leadsto an-
tagonismagainstoneanother.In somecases,individualsattemptto resolve
thecrisisproblemfor themselves
by withdrawingandleavingtheothermem-
bers to work out their own solution if they cana process tantamount to
groupdisintegration.172
ZeevMaozfoundthat decisionmakersdo betterat
moderatethanat highor low levelsof stress.173
Jonathan
M. Robertsreached
a similar conclusion,addingthat a high degreeof stresscan improveperfor-
mancefor a limited time, but that the quality of decisionsis likely eventually
to deteriorate.174
Hamblins ndingsmayproverelevantfor understanding thebehaviorof
leadership groupsin international conictwhentheyperceive that thetideis
beginning to turnagainstthem,regardless of whichstrategyor tacticstheypur-
sue.Here,however, a caveatis in order:Thebehavior of nationalor otherpo-
liticalleadership
groupsis a morecomplexphenomenon thanthebehavior of a
smallad hocgroupplayingan experimental game.Thestressconditionsen-
counteredduringthe courseof a strugglethat lastsfor weeks,months,or even
yearsaremuchmoreintricatepsychologically
thanthoseexperienced in a two-
hourgame.Theinternalandexternalsettingsareinnitelyricherin variety,as
arethevalues,perceptions,crosspressures,
information, andpoliticalandcul-
turalguidelines
thatimpingeonthedecisionmakers.In a largerscale
andmore
prolongedcrisis,thetimefactormaypermitvarioussubtleadjustment mecha-
nismsto comeinto play that canneveroperatein a brief experiment.
Onecannotdeny,however,that thereis somerelationshipbetweenstress
andproblem-solving
efciency.
DeanG.Pruitt,synthesizing
thendingsof sev-
eral writersin the eld, concludesthat the relationshipis probablycurvilinear,
with somestressbeingnecessary to motivateactivity,but too muchstresscaus-
inga reduction
in efciency.175 Crisisinevitablybringsin its wakea foreshort-
enedperspective,a difculty in thinkingaheadandcalculating consequences
anda tendencyto selectfor considerationonlyanarrowrangeof alternatives
thosethatoccurmostreadilyto thedecision makers.176 Naturally,if moretime
wereavailable,a widerspectrum of choicescouldbeevaluated, but thepre-
ciousness
of time is built into the denition of crisis.Contingencyplanningcan
help,but thecrisisthat comesis invariablysomewhat
different,at leastin its
details,from thecrisisthat wasabstractlyanticipatedin contingencyplans.
Holsti lists other effects of stress uncovered as a result of empirical re-
search:increasedrandombehavior,increasedrate of error,regressionto sim-
pler andmoreprimitivemodesof response, problem-solvingrigidity,dimin-
ishedfocusof attention,and a reductionin tolerancefor ambiguity.177He
notesthat the commonuseduring crisis of suchtechniquesas ultimatums
and threatswith built-in deadlinesis likely to increasethe stressunderwhich
therecipientmustoperatebecause
theyheighten
thesalience
ofthe timeele-
ment and increasethe dangerof xation on the single,familiar approachre-
gardless
of its effectiveness
in thepresentsituation.178
MichaelBrecher,
in his
ambitiousstudytestinga crisisescalationmodelbasedon evidencefrom 388
 PSYCHOLOGY
ANDDECISION
MAKING 597

international
crises(1918to 1988),
including
tenin-depth
casestudies,
de-
tected
a pattern
of copingwithhighstress
thatwaswidelyshared
across
a
diversity
of crisis
attributes.179
Otheranalysts
havefoundthatdiplomat
communications
transmittedduring internationalcrisesthat were settled
peacefully
(Morocco,1911;Berlin,1948-1949; Cuba,1962)werecharacter
izedbygreater
exibilityandsubtlety
of distinctions
andbymoreextensive
information
search
andusage,
thanwerecommunications
duringcrises
that
ledto WorldWarI in 1914andto theKorean conictin 1950.180 In connec-
tionwiththetimevariable,
it shouldbenotedthatif in thepast,internationa
crises
wereoftenmarked byinsufcientinformation,in recent
decades, tech-
nological
conditions,
combinedwiththedesire
ofbureaucrats
togenerate
and
transmit
vastamounts
ofinformation
during
crises,
create
theopposite
dange
of overloading
thecircuitsof thedecision-making system.
It hasbeenfound
thattheintegrative
complexity of politicalleaders
statementsisrelated
to the
presenceof disruptive
stressduringa crisis.181 MichaelD. Wallace, Peter
Suedfeld,
andKimberley
Thachuk
have
shown
thatthecomplexity
ofleaders
utterances
decrease
duringtheonsetof a crisisandimmediately
beforewar
breaks
out.Doves issue
morecomplex
statements
thanhawks. Theaggresso
speaks
publicly
withlesscomplexity
thanthepotential
victimof aggressio
andallies.
Leaders
ofnations
withlowstakes
speak
withgreater
complexi
thancounterparts
in nationswith highstakes.
Militarywinnersenunciate
moreelaborately
thanlosers,becausewinnersfeellessstressandlosersmore.
Duringtheearlyperiodof thePersian
Gulfcrisis,President
Bush.sstatements
weremorecomplex
thantoughbecausehehadto appeal
to manydifferent
audiences
with competinginterests.182
Otherscholars
haveattempted
to develop,
asa measure
of crisisdecision-
making
behavior,
whatiscalled
voice-stress
analysis.183
Suchworkrepre-
sents
ananalysis
of stress
levels
derived
frompublicstatements
of U.S.presi-
dents
fromKennedy
to Nixonduringinternational
crises
in theirvrespect
administrations.
It is suggested
that muchof crisisbehaviorconsists
of com-
munications
betweenopposingdecisionmakersat the highestlevel.
Statements
fromsuchleaders,
eventhoseaddressed
primarilyto theirown
publics
or theoutside
world,contain
symbols
andnuances
thatconvey
mes-
sagesto their oppositenumberand furnishdatafor scholarlyanalysis.
Psycholinguistics
providesthebasisfor researchintothecognitivebasisfor
languagebehaviorandthusfor effortsto developa measure
of stress
in deci-
sionmakersundercrisisconditions
byreferenceto changesiin
speech patterns.
Stress
is denedasthenegative affect,anxiety,
fearand/orbiophysiological
change
whichdevelops
astheinternalresponse
of anindividualto anexternal
loadplaced
onhimorherbyaninternationalcrisis(pathogenic
agent stressor)
whichisperceived
to poseasevere
threatto oneormorevalues of thepolitical
decision-maker.184
Byexaminingmultipledocuments suchasspeeches and
pressconferences
fromthe 1961Berlin,1965Dominican
Republic,and1970
Cambodia
crises,
it waspossible
to chartlevels
ofstress
onthepartofthepres-
identaseachcrisisunfolded.Althoughtheycallfor additionalresearchdevel-
opmentto advance voicestress
analysis,
the authorsconclude that prepared
598 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

statements manifestedthe higheststresslevels.Conceivably,

this indicatesthat,
at timesof greatestcrisisintensityand stress,decisionmakersaremore prone
than otherwiseto resortto prepared,ratherthan extemporaneous, materials.
Lastbutnotleast,thestudyof crisisor otherdecisionmaking behaviorby
theuseof politicalpsychophysiologyis regarded
asa subarea of biopolitics,it-
selfthe useof biologicalindicatorsin the analysisof politicalbehavior.To
whatextent,it is asked,do thephysicalandpsychological conditionsof deci-
sion makers contribute to, or detract from, their ability to manage crises or
otherwiseshapetheir behavioralcharacteristics?
Accordingto Thomas
Wiegele,
a truly profound
understanding
of humannaturemustultimately
includebothbiologicalandnonbiologicalconsiderations.185
Groupsthatmakethemostcrucialdecisions in nationalsecuritycases
are
usuallylimitedin sizeperhaps12 to 20 persons. IrvingJanishasanalyzed
whathecallsgroupthinkandhasdescribed its characteristics.
Themembers
of a smallgroupof decision makersoftenshareanillusionof invulnerability
thatmayencourage themto takeextremerisks.Theirselfcondence is mutu-
allyreinforcing,
to theextentthattheymaydiscountwarningsor information
that runs counterto their own assumptions.They often have a stereotyped
andsimpliedviewof theenemyandanunquestioned
beliefin theirownin-
herentmorality.They are quick to censureand drive out of circulationview-
pointsthatdonotconformto thedominantassessments andjudgments of the
group,andtheytakethe silenceof dissenting or doubtfulmembers to mean
that thereexistsvirtualunanimityin thethinkingof thegroup.186
It should
not betakenfor grantedthatgroupthinkis necessarily
bad.Thedominantele-
ment within the group may well be correctin its assessment
of the situation
and in its views on the proper courseto be pursued.Furthermore,the ten-
dencyof a groupto imposea dominantviewon all its membersanaturalso-
cial phenomenonmay producemoreadverse consequencesin an ideologi-
cally monolithicsocietythan in a democraticone and more adverse
consequences at lowerbureaucratic
echelons, whereindividualsarelessinde-
pendentandoutspoken, thanat top levels,wheremorepowerfulpersonalities
areusuallypresentto speaktheir minds.

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
We saw earlierthat the minutesof the ExCommmeetingsduring the Cuban
MissileCrisisproduced
no evidence
that decisions
wereinuencedby consid-
erationsof domesticpolitics.It is possible,of course,that because
all involved
were membersor supportersof the KennedyAdministration,there was no
needto articulatethoughtsthat might havebeenon severalminds.During the
1990s,theoristsemphasized
therequirementfor a morecarefulintegrationof
thinkingaboutforeign-policy
decisionmakinganddomestic politics.Robert
Putnamportrayedpoliticalleadersaspositionedbetweenthe two tablesof
(1) internationalnegotiation,whether in crisis or noncrisissituations,and
 CONCLUSION 599

(2)thepressures
ofdomestic
political
forces.
Thediplomatic
course
tobepur-
suedhastobetailored
both
towhat other
states
arelikely
tondacceptab
andtowhatdomestic
constituencies
canbepersuaded
toratify.187
Suchanapproach
represents
a deviation
fromthatof Kenneth
N. Waltz
andotherstructural
realists
who,asshown
in Chapter
2,make
theinterna-
tional
system
rather
than
theinternal
processes
ofthestate
itself
theprimary
determinant
of a states
international
behavior.
Andrew
Moravcsik
hascon-
tended
thatit isnotsufcient
to givepriority
tointernational
explanatio
andemploytheories
of domestic
politics
onlyasneededto explain
anom-
alies.188
Pure
international
theories,
heheld,
areattractive
inprinciple,
but
theytendto degenerate
under
thecollective
weight
of empirical
anomalies
andtheoretical
limitations
tothepointwhere
thesingle
level
ofanalysis
(in-
ternational)
mustgivewayto theintegration
of twolevels(international
and
domestic).189
Peter
B.Evans
hasfound
that(a)thelogicoftheinternationa
system
andtheautonomy
of theexecutive
aremorepronounced
in cases
in-
volving
national
security,
whereas
constituency
pressures
become moresalient
in matters
affecting
thedomestic
economy andforeign
trade;(b)therelative
autonomyof leaders
decreases
substantially
thelonger
negotiations
last;and
(c)hawkish
leaders
have
less
autonomy
thandovish
leaders
because
theyim-
pose
greater
potential
costs
onbothdomestic
andforeign
groups.19°
Finally,
James
G.Richter
hasargued
thatbothU.S.
andSoviet
leaders
whosought
to
ameliorateColdWarbehavior
hadto overcome notsimply
theentrenched
image of anaggressive
enemy
existing
in theothersuperpower,
butalsothe
rootsofasimilar
ColdWarmythology
intheirowndomestic
systems,
which
helped
toperpetuate
ColdWarattitudes
even
afterupheavals
hadbegun
to
change
theinternational
system.191

CONCLUSION

Thefieldofdecision
making
isabroad
one,
extending
farbeyond
international
relations
theory,
andwedonotpretend
to beableto coverit all.Thedecision-
making
process
isafunction
ofmany
different
factors
relating
tothebehavior
ofindividuals
andoflarge
organizational
structures.
TheDMroleisshaped
by
boththesystem andtheindividuals
interpretation
of it, andtheinuenceof
personality
incomparison withsocial
ideology
varymarkedly fromonesystem
toanother.
It islikely,
asAlexMintzsuggests,
thatforeign policydecisions
are
best
explained
astheamalgam
ofamixture
oftheories,
including
rational
actor,
cybernetic,
cognitive,
andothers discussedin thischapter.192
Democratic
and
totalitarian
states
make foreignpolicyin verydifferent
ways.Mostdecision-
making theories
developedin theUnitedStates have,quiteunderstandably,
fo-
cusedontheAmerican political
experienceon theroleofpublic
opinion,
the
stateof executive
andcongressional
relations,thenatureof the bureaucratic
competition
in theannual
battleof thebudget
in Washington,
andsoon.There
is aninevitable
tendency
onthepartof social
scientists,
unless
theyguard
againstit, to generalize
from particularsandto assume
that at leastcertain
600 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES. CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

aspectsof a phenomenonstudiedin oneculturalandpoliticalcontextcanbe

mutatismutandisgivena moregeneralized
application.
Thus,thereis a danger
that whenAmericansthink aboutsuchbasicconceptsasrationalityin decision
making,risk taking,bureaucraticcompetition
for scarceresources,or action
andreactionprocesseseitherin prolonged
armsracesor in acutecrisis,lessons
drawnfrom an observationof the behaviorof Americandecisionmakerscanbe
inappropriately
carried
overto thebehavior
of decision
makers
in vastlydiffer-
entenvironmentsMoscow,
Beijing,Tokyo,NewDelhi,or Baghdad.
We must admit that we do not know a great deal about foreign-policy
decisionmakingin non-Western
capitals,particularlythosefar removed
fromanyconstitutional
democratic
experience.
Of evengreater
magnitude
aretheproblems
inherent
in understanding
thedecision-making
processes
of
thevarioustypesof actorsotherthanstatesthat increasingly arepart of the
earlytwenty-rstcenturyglobalsystem. EvenamongtheWestern democratic
stateswith whichAmericanpoliticalscientists
aregenerally mostfamiliar-
Britain,France,Italy, and the FederalRepublicof Germanyconsiderable
differencesexistin the organization
of governmentsfor the conductof for-
eignaffairsandin thewaysthatelitestypicallyconceive
of theirnational
in-
terests.Thedifficultiesof extrapolating
fromAmerican
experience
to foreign
decision-making processes becomeevenmorepronouncedwhenwearedeal-
ingwithgovernments
andcountries
thatarepolitically,
ideologically,
socio-
economically,
andculturallyvery differentfrom thoseof the West.During
the 1970sand1980s,signicantstridesweremadein thecomparative study
of leadership,
bureaucracy, valueorientationsof elites,anddecisionmaking
in communist,socialist,andThird Worldcountries. Thestudentshouldbe-
comeacquainted with thecomparative studyof foreign-policydecisionmak-
ing in Westernandnon-Western societies.
Theeld of comparative foreign
policies
is distinctfromthatof international-relations
theoryandspecically
from theoriesof decisionmakingin theinternational
system, but theformer
hasmuchto contributeto thelatterby wayof concrete dataandperhapsof
insightsleadingto usefulnewtheoreticalapproaches
in theinternational
re-
lations dimension.Last but not least,the study of decisionmaking is an es-
sentialelement in anyeffortto understand unit-levelbehavior.Thisincludes
how,from the perspective of the decisionmaker,the variablesrepresented
by internationalstructure(e.g.,bipolaror unipolar)or domesticvariables
(e.g.,politicalparties,the electronicmedia,interestgroups,electoralblocs)
shapedecisions. Thus,decision-making studieswithin the broaderlevelsof
analysis,includingstructure-agent relationships,
havemuchto contributeto
international-relations theory.

NOTES

1. SeePaul Wassermanand Fred 8. Silander,Decision-Making:An Annotated

Bibliography(Ithaca, NY: GraduateSchool of Businessand Public
Administration, Cornell University, 1958).
 NOTES 601

Richard
C.Snyder,
H.W.Bruck,
andBurton
Sapin,
Decision-Making
asan
Approach
to theStudyof International
Politics,
in thebooktheyedited,
Foreign
PolicyDecision-Making
(NewYork:Free Press,1963),
p.65;seealso
pp. 85-86.
. Robert
Jervis,
Perception
andMisperception
inInternational
Politics
(Princeto
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1976),pp.66-76,343-355.
Joseph
Frankel,
The Making
ofForeign
Policy:
AnAnalysis
ofDecision-Mak
(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,
1963),p. 4.
Michael
Brecher,
TheForeign
Policy
System
of Israel:
Setting,
Images,
Process
(NewHaven,
CT:YaleUniversity
Press,
1972),
p.4. Fora thorough
discussion
of objective
environment
anddecision
makers
perception,
seeHyam
Gold,
Foreign
Policy
Decision-Making
andtheEnvironment:
TheClaims
ofSnyder
Brecher
andtheSprouts,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
22(December
1978),
569-586.
Forotherearlystudies
in thiseld,seeHaroldLasswell,
TheDecision
Process:
Seven
Categories
of Functional
Analysis
(College
Park:University
of
Maryland
Press,
1956).
SeealsoJamesA.Robinson
andR.Roger
Majak,The
Theory
of Decision-Making,
inJames
C.Charlesworth,
ed.,Contempor
Political
Analysis
(NewYork:Free
Press,1967),
pp.178-181,including
biblio-
graphical
references;
JohnP.Lovell,Foreign
Policyin Perspective:
Strategy
Adaptation,
Decision-Making
(NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,
1970),
esp.pp.205-261.
Brecher
makes
theeliteimage
thedecisive
inputof a foreign-
policysystem;
Foreign
PolicySystem,p. 11.
JuttaWeldes,
Constructing
NationalInterests:
TheUnitedStates
andtheCuban
Missile
Crisis
(Minneapolis,
andLondon:
University
ofMinnesota
Press,
1999)
9
pp. 12-14.
DavidBraybrooke
andCharles
E.Lindblom,
A Strategy
ofDecision
(NewYork:
FreePress,1963),p. 40.
. MaxWeber,
EconomyandSociety:
An Outcome of Interpretative
Analogy,
edited
byGuenther
RothandClaus
Wittich,
Vol.2. (Berkeley:
University
of
California
Press,
1978),p. 1393.ForWebersbrilliantpioneering
viewson
charismatic
leadership
andlegal-rational
bureaucracy,seechaps. X, X11,and
XIIIin Reinhard
Bendix,
MaxWeber: AnIntellectual
Portrait(Garden
City,NY:
Doubleday,1960;AnchorBooks,1962).
RichardK. Betts,Soldiers,
Statesmen,andtheColdWarCrisis(NewYork:
ColumbiaUniversityPress,1991).SeealsoPeterM. Haas,Introduction:
Epistemic
Communities andInternational
PolicyCoordination,International
Organization,
46(Winter 1992),1-36.WilliamT.Gormley,Jr.,argues
that,de-
spitewhathecallsthepathologies
of theclassical
Weberian bureaucracy,im-
provedmanagerial
techniques
since
Webers timemakeit possible
to controlbu-
reaucracy.
Tamingthe Bureaucracy:Muscles,Prayers and OtherStrategies
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1989).
10. James A.NathanandJamesK. Oliver,ForeignPolicyMaking
andtheAmerican
Political
System,2nded.(Boston:Little,Brown,1987),
pp.10-11.Seealsothe
casestudyof theSDIprojectviewed in termsof bureaucratic
politicsin Lou
Cannon,President
Reagan:The Roleof a Lifetime(NewYork: Simonand
Schuster,
1991),pp. 319-333.
11. MortonH. Halperin,
withtheassistance
of Priscilla
ClappandArnoldKanter,
Bureaucratic
Politicsand ForeignPolicy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution,1974).SeealsoMorton H. Halperinand Arnold Kanter,The
Bureaucratic
Perspective
in thebooktheyedited,
Readings
in Foreign
Policy:
A
602

DECISION-MAKING THEORIES. CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

Bureaucratic
Perspective
(Boston:
Little,Brown,1973);DavidC. Kozak,The
BureaucraticPoliticsApproach:The Evolutionof the Paradigm,in David C.
KozakandJames M. Keagle,eds.,Bureaucratic
PoliticsandNationalSecurity
12. TheoryandPractice
(Boulder,
CO:LynneRiemer, 1988),pp.3-15;andJames C.
Gaston,ed.,GrandStrategyand theDecision-Making
Process(Washington,
DC:
National DefenseUniversity, 1997).
13. FrancisE. Rourke, Bureaucracyand ForeignPolicy (Baltimore,MD: Johns
HopkinsUniversity
Press,
1972),pp.49-50.SeeRourkes
laterwork, Bureaucratic
14. Powerin NationalPolicyMaking,4th ed.(Boston:Little, Brown,1986).
Ibid., pp.62-65.Seealsochaps.7 and8 on advocacy of interestgroupsand
competing elitesin Brecher,
ForeignPolicySystem
of Israel.
15. AlexanderL. George,The Casefor Multiple Advocacyin Making Foreign
Policy, AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,LXVI (September
1972),751-785,
quoted at 758.
16. MargaretG. HermannandCharlesF.Hermann,Who MakesForeignPolicy
DecisionsandHow: An EmpiricalInquiry, InternationalStudiesQuarterly,33
(December1989), 361-387.
AlexanderL. George,Presidential
Decisionmaking in ForeignPolicy:The
EffectiveUseof Informationand Advice(Boulder,CO: Westview,1980),
pp.25-27,145-148.For a morerecentanalysisof conditions
underwhichan
agency mayhaveconsiderable
autonomyor virtuallyno autonomy,
seeThomas
H. Hammondand J. H. Knott, Who Controlsthe Bureaucracy?
Presidential
17. Power, CongressionalDominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic
Autonomyin a Modelof Multi-Institutional
PolicyMaking, journal of Law,
Economicsand Organization,1 (April 1996),119-166.
Edward Rhodes, Do BureaucraticPolitics Matter? World Politics, 47
(October1994),1-41, esp.pp.1 and 39-41.SeealsoRobertJervis,Joshua
Goldstein,and RobertKeohane,Ideas and ForeignPolicy:Beliefs,Institutions
andPoliticalChange, PoliticalScienceQuarterly,109 (Winter1995),907-909.
BruceM. Russett,S.K. Murray, and J. A. Cowdenhaveidentied suchforeign
policyattitudinaldifferences
asmilitantinternationalism
andcooperative
inter-
18.American
nationalismas irrelevant in domesticpolicy disputes.The Convergenceof
Elites Domestic Beliefs with their Foreign Policy Beliefs,
International Interactions, 25(2) (1999), 153-180.
19.David
Snyderet al., ForeignPolicyDecision-Making,p. 144.
Easton,ThePoliticalSystem(NewYork: Knopf, 1953),p. 129.
20. PaulDiesingattributes
a distinctive
rationalityto economic,
social,technical,
le-
gal,and_
political
decisions;
Reason
in Society:
FiveTypes
ofDecisions
andTheir
SocialConditions(Urbana:Universityof Illinois Press,1962).Others,too, in-
cludingR. C.WoodandWilliamL. C.Wheaton, havecautioned
againstextrap-
olatingfrom privateto publicdecisionbehavior.
Cf. RobinsonandMajakin
Charlesworth,ContemporaryPolitical Analysispp. 177-178.Anthony Downs,
on the otherhand,is thoughtto equateprivatewith public decisionmaking,in
Charlesworth,ibid., 178.However,evenhe differentiatessharplybetweenindi-
vidual and organizationaldecisionmaking.SeeDowns,Inside Bureaucracy, A
RAND Corporation Research Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967),
pp. 178-179.
 22. NOTES 603

Bruce
M.Russett,
TheCalculus
ofDeterrence,
Journal
ofConict
Resolution
VII (June 1963), 97-109.
Snyder
etal.,Foreign
Policy
Decision-Making,
p.176.
Snyderemphasizes
that
23.
theexplanation
of decision-making
motivation
implies
a concept
ofmultiple
membership
of theindividual
(a)in a culture
andsociety,
(b)in suchsocial
groupings
astheprofession
andclass,
(c)in thetotalpoliticalinstitutional
struc-
ture,and(cl)in thedecisional
unit;ibid.,p. 172.
24.
Snyder
hadearlier
accepted
thenotion
ofmaximization
ofexpected
utility.
See
hisGame
Theory
andtheAnalysis
ofPolitical
Behavior,inResearch
Frontiers
andGovernment
(Washington,
DC:Brookings
Institution,
1955),
pp.73-74.
Aswehave
noted
inChapter
8,most
theorists
ofdeterrence
appeared
toaccept
MaxWebers
notion
thatmodern
governmental
bureaucracies
actaccording
to
rational
procedures
in pursuing
stateinterests.
Manyagreed
implicitly
with
BruceBueno
deMesquitas
expected-utility
modelin arrivingat howdecision
makers
order
theirpolicy
priorities.
Seesection
onBueno
deMesquitas
theory
andNotes173-184
in Chapter
7.Bueno
deMesquita
andDavidLalman
added
25.
theroleofdomestic
politics
totheirexpected-utility
models; thedomestic
factor,
26.
combinedwithmisperception,
mayinducestatesmistakenly
to shunwarandto
choose
a negotiated
compromise;
WarandReason:DomesticandInternational
27.
Imperatives
(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversity
Press,1992),
pp.267-269.
Singer,Inter-nationInuence, 428-430.
MartinPatchen,
Decision
Theory
intheStudy
ofNational
Action,
journalof
ConictResolution,
LVII(June1963),165-169.
28.Sidney
Verba,
Assumptions
ofRationality
andNonrationality
inModels
ofthe
International
System, in JamesN. Rosenau,
ed.,International
Politicsand
Foreign
Policy,
rev.ed.(NewYork:FreePress,
1969),p.231.
29.Braybrooke
See
andLindblom,
Herbert
A.Simon,
Strategy
ofDecision,
Administrative
chap.
Behavior
4.
(NewYork:Macmillan, 1958);
A BehavioralModelof Rational
Choice,
Quarterly
journalof Economics,
LXIX(February1955
),99-118;
andA Behavioral
ModelofRationalChoice,
in Simon,
ed.,Models
of Man:Social
andRational(NewYork:Wiley, 1957),
pp.241-260.
Simonsubsequently
renedhisnotion
ofboundedrationalityin
Modelsof Bounded Rationality
(Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1982)and
Human NatureinPolitics:
TheDialogue
ofPsychology
withPolitical
Science,
American
PoliticalScience
Review,
79(June1985),293-304.
30.
Braybrooke
andLindblom,
Strategy
of Decision,
pp.71-79andchap.5.
Jonathan
Bendorhaslamented
thefateof Braybrooke
andLindbloms
notionof
incrementalism,
whichneverdiedbutjustseemed
to fadeaway.
Bendor
sees
value
intheirclaimthatmaking
small
policy
changes
isoften
superior
tomak-
ingradical
ones.A Modelof Muddling
Through,
American
Political
Science
Review,89 (December
1995),819.
31. Foranextensive
discussion
ofgame
theory,
seeMichael
Nicholson,
Rationality
andtheAnalysis
of International
Conict,Cambridge
Studies
in International
Relations,
Vol.19(Cambridge,
England:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1992),
pp.57-103;Steven
J.Brams
andD.MarcKilgour,
Game
Theory
andNational
Security
(NewYork:Basil
Blackwell,
1988);
Robert
Axelrod,
TheEvolution
of
Cooperation
(NewYork:Basic
Books,
1984);
Steven
J.Brams,
BiblicalGames:
604 DECISlO&#39;.\IMAKING
TI-IEORIES
CHO.CEANDTHEUNITLEVELACTOR

Shubik,GameTheoryin the SocialSciences:Concepts and Solutions

(Cambridge,
MA:MITPress,1982).
Thepioneerworkin theeld wasJohnVon
Neumann andOscarMorgenstern,
Theoryof GamesandEconomic Behavior
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1944,3rded.,1953).
32. AsAnatolRapoport
hasasserted
quitecogently,
a theoryisacollection
of theo-
rems,
anda theorem
is a proposition
whichisa strictlogical
consequence
of
an
certaindenitionsandotherpropositions;VariousMeanings
of Theory,
AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,LII (December
1958),973.
33. Duncan
Snidal,The Game Theoryof International
Politics,WorldPolitics,
XXXVIII(1)(October
1985),2527; StevenJ. BramsandD. MarcKilgour,
GameTheory andInternational
Security
(NewYork:BasilBlackwell,1988),
pp.vii-viii;1-3.See alsoStephen
J.Mayeski
andShane Fricks,
Conict and
Cooperation in International
Relations,
journalof ConictResolution,
39(4)
(December
1995),622-645.
34. Duncan Snidal,
The Game Theoryof International
Politics,WorldPolitics,
XXXVIII(1)(October 1985),56.Seealso,in thesame
issueof WorldPolitics,
thefollowingarticles
on variousaspectsof gametheoryandinternational-
relations
theory:KennethA. Oye,ExplainingCooperation UnderAnarchy:
HypothesesandStrategies,
andThe Sterling-Dollar-Franc
Triangle:
Monetary
Diplomacy
19291937;
Robert
Jervis,
FromBalance
to Concert:
A Study
of
International
Security
Cooperation;
StephenVanEvera,Why Cooperation
Failedin 1914; GeorgeW. Downs,DavidM. Rocke,andRandolph M.
Siverson,
Arms Races andCooperation;
JohnConybeare, TradeWars:A
Comparative Studyof Anglo-Hanse,
Franco-Italian,
and Hawley-Smoot
Conicts; CharlesLipson,Bankers Dilemmas: PrivateCooperation
in
Rescheduling
Sovereign
Debts;andRobertAxelrodandRobertO. Keohane,
AchievingCooperation
UnderAnarchy:
Strategies
andInstitutions.
Forexam-
plesof otherapplications
of game
theory
to international
relations,
seePeter
Bennettand Malcolm Dando, Complex HypergameAnalysis:A Hypergame
Perspective
of theFallof France,
journalof Operational
Research
Society,
XXX(1)(January
1979),23-32;DinaJ.Zinnes,
J.V.Gillespie,
andG.S.Tahim,
A FormalAnalysis
of Some
Issuesin Balance
ofPowerTheories, International
Studies
Quarterly,
XXII (September 1978),323-353;CurtisS. Signorino,
Simulating
International
Cooperation
underUncertainty:
TheEffects
of
Symmetric
andAsymmetricNoise,Journal
of ConictResolution,
40(1)
(March 1996), 152-205.
35. MartinShubik,Games for Society,
BusinessandWar:Towards a Theoryof
Gaming(NewYork:Wiley,1964),pp.50and56.SeealsoMichael Nicholson,
Rationality
andtheAnalysis of International
Conict(NewYork:Cambridge
University
Press,1992),pp.89-103;MartinShubik,The Usesof Game
Theory,inJames C.Charlesworth,ed.,Contemporary
Political
Analysis(New
York:FreePress,1967),p.247;andGameTheoryandtheStudyof Social
Behavior:
An Introductory
Exposition,in MartinShubik,
ed.,GameTheory
andRelatedApproachesto SocialBehavior(NewYork:Wiley,1964),15--17.
SeealsoThomas C. Schelling,What Is GameTheory?in Charlesworth
Contemporary
PoliticalAnalysis.
36. Martin Shubik,The Usesof GameTheory, in Charlesworth,
Contemporary
PoliticalAnalysis,
p.248.SeealsoShubiksGames
for Society,
pp.93-97.
Social,«-political,
andeconomic
problems,
Shubik
notes,
almostalways
call
for a non-zero-sumformulation; ibid., pp. 97-98.
 NOTES 605

37. Manydescriptions
ofPrisoners
Dilemma
canbefound.
SeeA.W.Tucker
andP.

Wolfe,
eds.,
Contributions
to theTheory
of Games,
Vol.III, Annals
of
Mathematic
Studies,
No.30(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1957)
R.Duncan
LuceandHoward
Raiffa,
GamesandDecisions
(New
York:
Wiley
1957),
p.94ff;AnatolRapoport
andA. M. Chammah,
Prisoners
Dilemma:
A
Study
ofConict
andCooperation
(Ann
Arbor:Universityiof
Michigan
Press
1965);
Anatol
Rapoport,
Tu/oPerson
Game
Theory(Ann
Arbor:University
of
Michigan
Press,
1966);
andMartinShubik,
TheUses of GameTheory,in
38. Charlesworth,
Contemporary
Political
Analysis,
pp.264-268.
Theproblem
of
trustandsuspicion
between
players
in mixed-motive
games
hasbeen
dealtwith
39. byMorton
Deutsch,
TrustandSuspicion,
Journal
of Conict
Resolution,
VII
40. (September
1963),
570-579.
Twopsychologists
at KentState
University
con-
ducted
gaming
experiments
onavariation
ofPrisoners
Dilemma
inwhich
they
41. separated
temptation
(i.e.,thedesire
to obtain
thelargest
payoff
bybeing
the
onlydefector)
frommistrust
(i.e.,thefearthattheotherwouldliketo bethelone
defector)
andfoundthattemptation
isa more
likelysource
of noncoopera
behavior
thanismistrust;
V.EdwinBixenstine
andHazelBlundell,
Controlof
Choices
Exerted
byStructural
Factors
in Two-Person,
Non-Zero-Sum
Games,
journalof ConictResolution,
X (December1966),
esp.482.
ArthurA. Stein,Coordination
andCollaboration:Regimesin anAnarchic
42. World,International
Organization,
36(2)(Spring
1982),299-324.
Ibid., 307.
Robert
Axelrod,
TheEvolution
ofCooperation
(New York:Basic
Books,
1984),
pp. 3-27, 169-191.
DanielR.Lutzker,
SexRole,Cooperation andCompetition
in aTwo-Perso
43. Non-Zero-Sum
366-368.
Game, Journalof ConictResolution,
V (December
SeealsoPhilipS. Gallo,Jr., and Charles
Cooperative
andCompetitive Behavior
inMixed-Motive
1961),
G. McClintock
Games, journalof
ConictResolution,
IX (March 1965),
68-78;andJ.T.Tedeschi
etal.,Start
EffectandResponseBiasin thePrisoners
Dilemma Game, Psychonom
Science,11(4)(1968).
44.
David
W.Conrath,
SexRoleandCooperation
of ConictResolution,
intheGame
XVI (September
ofChicken,
1972),
Journal
433-443.
Foradditional
subtle
sex-related
differences,
see
William
B.Lacy,
Assumptions
ofHuman
Nature,
and
Initial Expectations
and Behavioras Mediatorsof SexEffectsin Prisoners
Dilemma
Research,
journalof ConictResolution,
22(June
1978),
269-281.
45. Conrath,SexRoleandCooperation,
Ibid., 442.
C.Nemeth,
A CriticalAnalysis
434.

of Research
UtilizingthePrisoners
Dilemma
608

91.

92.

93.
DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

Ibid., pp. 48-67. Steinbruneracknowledgesthat someof his own criticismsof

94. the analyticparadigmhad beenanticipatedin HerbertSimonssatiscingmodel,
but in his view,Simonhad not gonefar enough;ibid., p. 63. Simonssatiscing
model is lessintuitional then the cybernetic model.
Ibid., p. 68.
Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., p. 72. The reference
is to RichardM. CyertandJamesG. March,A
BehavioralTheory of the Firm (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1963),
chap.6&#39;.
It shouldbenotedthatSteinbruner
incorporates
intothecybernetic
par-
adigmtheworkof Charles Lindblom(especially
hisincrementalism)
andtheor-
95. ganizationprocessmodelof GrahamAllison(seeAllison,Essenceof Decision,
pp.77, 80).Steinbruner
fully agrees
with thosewho holdthat organizational
routines,onceestablished,
arevery difcult to alter.
96. Steinbruner,CyberneticTheory,p. 92. Cf. also Robert Jervis,Perceptionand
Misperceptionand International Politics, chap. 4. (Princeton,NJ: Princeton
University Press,1976.)
97. Steinbruner,CyberneticTheory, chap. 4. Accordingto Snyderand Diesing,
Steinbruners
theoreticalthinker is equivalentto their irrational bargainer;
Conict Among Nations, p. 337.
Steinbrunerdevotedthe major part of his work to applyinghis modied cyber-
netic and cognitiveparadigmto a singlecomplexpolicy decisionissuethe ef-
fort to sharecontrolof nuclearweaponswithin the Atlantic Alliancein the early
1960s.TheUnitedStateswascaughtin a valuetrade-offbetweenits generalpo-
liticalpurposes
in Europeandits antiproliferation
policy.Heconcluded
thatthe
ability of the U.S.StateDepartmentto generatemomentumfor the deployment
of a NATO Multilateral Force(MLF), to which the U.S.Secretaryof Defense,
mostU.S.military leaders,andEuropeanpolicymakersin generalwereopposed,
was a political anomalythat could bestbe understoodin termsof the cognitive
andcybernetic
processes
of bureaucratic
decision
makers
ratherthanin termsof
the analyticparadigm.In contrast,PresidentJohnsonsdecisionin December
98. 1964 to reversehis diplomatic advisersand kill the MLF, wrote Steinbruner,
can readily be understoodby analyticlogic. Steinbruner,CyberneticTheory,
chaps.6-9, andpp. 320-321.
99. Ibid., p. 70. Seealsochap.10, esp.p. 329.
ZeevMaoz,NationalChoicesandInternationalProcesses (Cambridge,England:
Cambridge University Press,1990), pp. 330-336.
100. Robert E. Coulam, The Illusion of Choice:The F-111 and the Problem of
 102.

NOTES 609
See,
forexample,
OleR.Holsti,
The1914
Case,American Political
Scienc
Review,
LIX(June
1965),
365-378;
OleR.Holsti,
RobertC.North,and
Richard
A.Brody,
Perception
andAction
in the1914Crisis,
inJ,David
Singer,
ed.,Quantitative
International
Politics
(NewYork:
Free
Press,
1968)
Glenn
D.Paige,
The
KoreanDecision,
]une
24-30,1950
(New
York:
Free
Press
195
8);Erskine
B.Childers,
TheRoad
toSuez
(London:
MacGibbon
andKee,
1962);
Charles
A.McClelland,
Access
to Berlin:
TheQuantity
andVariety
of
Events,1948-1963,
in Singer,Quantitative
International
Politics
pp.159-186;and Decisional
Opportunity
andPoliticalControversy:
The
Quemoy
Case,
journalofConictResolution,
VI (September
1962),
201-213
Graham T. Allison,Essence
of Decision:
Explaining
theCuban
MissileCrisis
(Boston:Little,Brown,1971);Herbert
S.Dinerstein,
TheMakingof a Missile
Crisis(Baltimore,
MD:Johns HopkinsPress,
1976);
RobertaWohlstetter,
Pearl
Harbor:
Warning
andDecision
(Stanford
CA:Stanford
University
Press,
1962);
MichaelBrecher
with Benjamin
Geist,Decisions
in Crisis:Israel1967and1973
(Berkeley
andLosAngeles:
University
of California
Press,
1980);
AlanDowty,
Middle
EastCrisis:
U.S.Decision-Making
in 195
8, 1970,
and1973(Berkele
andLosAngeles:
University
of California
Press,
1984);
Richard
G.Head,
Frisco
W. Short,andRobertC. McFarlane,
CrisisResolution:
Presidential
Decision-
Makingin theMayaguez
andKorean Confrontations
(Boulder,
CO:Westview
Press,1978);
Thomas
M. Cynkin,
Soviet
andAmerican Signaling
in thePolish
Crisis(London:
Macmillan,
1988);Robert
B.McCalla,Uncertain
Perceptions
U.S.ColdWarCrisis
Decision
Making
(AnnArbor:University
of Michigan
Press,
1992);
Thomas Parrish,
Berlinin theBalance:
TheBlockade,
theAirlift,
theFirstMajorBattleof theColdWar(Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley,
1998);
MarciaLynnWhicker, James P.Pffner,andRaymond A. Moore,eds.,The
Presidency
andthePersian
GulfWar(Westport,
CT,andLondon:
Praege
1993);RichardB.Frank,Downfall: TheEndof theImperial Japanese
Empire
(NewYork:Random House,
1999);
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr.,andJacquelyn
K.
Davis,eds.,NationalSecurity
Decisions:TheParticipantsSpeak(Lexington
MA/Toronto:Lexington Books,
1990);JohnLukacs, FiveDaysin London:
May
1940(NewHaven:YaleUniversity Press, 1999);James M. Goldgeier,
Not
WhetherBut When:TheU.S.Decision to Enlarge NATO(Washington, DC:
103.
BrookingsInstitution
Press,
1999);IgorLukesandEricGoldstein, eds.,The
MunichCrisis1938:Prelude to WorldWarII (London/Portland, OR:Frank
Cass,1999);andColeC. Kingseed, Eisenhower andtheSuezCrisisof 1956
(Baton
Rouge andLondon:LouisianaStateUniversity
Press,
1995).
See,for example,Oran R. Young,The Intermediaries:Third Partiesin
International
Crisis(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,1967);OranR.
104.
Young,
ThePolitics
ofForce:
Bargaining
DuringInternational
Crises
(Princeton
105.
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1968);
MarkW.Zacker,
International
Conicts
andCollective
Security,
1946-77(NewYork:Praeger,
1979).
Paige,KoreanDecision,p. 10.
106.
Ibid., pp. 276-279.
James A. Robinson,Landmark
Among
Decision-Making
andPolicyAnalyses
andTemplate
for Integrating
Alternative
Frames
of Reference:
GlennD. Paige,
The KoreanDecision,PolicySciences,
32 (1999),301-314.
107. OleR. Holstiet al., Perception
andActionin the1914Crisis,in Singer,
610

108.

DECISION-MAKING
THEORIESZ
CHOICE
ANDTHEUNITLEVEL
ACTOR

tensions
andconcludedthatsuchdataconstitute
onlya partialandindirect
109.
uments;
check
onthevalidity
seethesection,
ofcontent
datafromother
Perceptions
ofHostility
Crisis,in chap.3 of Crisis,Escalation,
sources,
such
andFinancial
War(Montreal:
asdiplomatic
Indices
in a
McGillQueens
doc-

UniversityPress,1972),pp. 51-70.
Holsti,
PerceptionsofHostility,
p.46.Thephenomenondescribed
here
issim-
ilartothehostility
tofriendliness
continuumandtheunstable
reaction
coef-
110. cients
1908-1914
studied
byLewis
and 1929-1939;
F.Richardson
in hisresearch
seeArmsand Insecurity
(Pittsburgh,
PA:
onthearmsracesof
Boxwood,
1960),
andStatistics
of Deadly
Quarrels
(Chicago:
Quadrangl
Books,1960),chap.8.

111. Holstietal.,Perception
Ibid., p. 157.
L.L.Farrar,
]r.,TheLimits
ofChoice:
andAction,p. 152.
July1914
Reconsidered,
journal
of
Conict
Resolution,
16(March
1972),
1-23.
Reprinted
inMelvin
Small
and].
DavidSinger,
eds.,
International
War:AnAnthology,
2nded.(Chicago:
Dorsey
Press,1989),pp. 264-287.
112. Accounts
oftheCuban missile
crisisinclude
HenryM.Pachter,
Collision
Course:
TheCubanMissileCrisisandCoexistence(NewYork:Praeger,
1963);OleR.
Holsti,
Richard
A.Brody,
andRobert
C.North,Measuring
Effect
andAction
intheInternational
Reaction
Models:
Empirical
Materials
fromthe1962Cuban
Crisis,
journalof Peace
Research
(1964);
ArthurM. Schlesinger,
Jr.,A
Thousand Days(NewYork:Fawcett,
1965),
pp.250-277;
TheodoreC.
Sorensen,
Kennedy
(New
York:
Harper
8CRow,
1965),pp.667-718;
ElieAbel,
TheMissile
Crisis
(Philadelphia:
]. B.Lippincott,
1966); Robert
F.Kennedy
Thirteen
Days:
A Memoir of theCuban Missile
Crisis(NewYork:Norton,
1969);
Allison,
Essence
ofDecision;
JamesA.Nathan,
ed.,TheCubanMissile
Crisis
Revisited
(NewYork:St.Martins
Press,
1992);
andJohnC.Ausland
Kennedy,
Krushcheu,
andtheBerlin-Cuban
crisis
1961-1964(Olso,
Stockholm
Copenhagen,
Boston:
Scandinavian
University
Press,
1996;
Laurence
Chang
and
Peter
Kornbluh
(eds.),
TheCuban
Missile
Crisis1962:A National
Security
ArchiveDocuments
Reader
(NewYork:TheNewPress,
1992;andRoger
Hilsman,
TheCuban
Missile
Crisis:
TheStruggle
overPolicy(Westport,
CT:
Praeger,1996).
113. Intheirnewedition
ofEssence
ofDecision,
Allison
andZelikow
relyheavily
on
thecollection
of quotations
fromthetranscriptions
of ExComm
meetings
con-
tained
inErnest
R.MayandPhilipD.Zelikow,
TheKennedy
Tapes:
Inside
the
WhiteHouseDuringtheCuban Missile
Crisis(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
UniversityPress,1997):
114. AllisonandZelikowconclude
that evenwith newevidence
fromex-Sovie
116.

117.

118.
119.

120.

121.

122.
123. NOTES

BruceJ. Allyn, JamesG. Blight, and David A. Welch, Essenceof Revision:

61 I

Moscow, Havana and the Cuban Missile Crisis, International Security,14

(Winter1989/1990),136-172,esp.138.Theauthorscite extensivereferences to
Sovietliteratureon the subject.Other signicantlater works in Englishinclude

124. Marc Trachtenberg,

Crisis,International
Joseph
ed.,White HouseTapesandMinutesof the CubanMissile
Security,
10 (Summer1985),171-194;JamesG.Blight,
S.Nye,Jr.,andDavidA. Welch,The CubanMissileCrisisRevisited,
612 DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL ACTOR

intelligenceknew that warheadswere en route, but that massivephoto recon-

naissancefound no evidencethat they ever reached Cuba; The Cuba Missile
Crisis, ForeignAffairs, 68 (Fall 1989), 191-192.AlllSOI&#39;l
and Zelikow, citing
ex-Sovietsources,reportthat nuclearweaponswerepresentin Cuba.Essence of
Decision, pp. 348-351.
132. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifin, 1972), cited
in Welchand Blight, Introduction to ExCommTranscriptsp. 25. Groupthink
is discussedlater in this chapter.Allison and Zelikow,Essence
of Decision,also
referto the conceptof groupthinkon pp. 283-284.
133. Mark Kramer, Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral
History? International Security, 15 (Summer 1990), 212-216. Seealso Eliot A.
Cohen, Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis, National
Interest, 2 (1986), 3-13; Richard Ned Lebow, The Cuban Missile Crisis:
ReadingtheLessons Correctly,PoliticalScience
Quarterly, 98 (1983),431-458.
134. JamesA. Robinson,An Appraisalof Conceptsand Theories, in Hermann,
International Crises,p. 27. Seealso JonathonM. Roberts,DecisionMaking
During InternationalCrises(New York: St. Martins Press,1988), esp.chaps.
1-4; AlexanderL. George,ed., Avoiding War:Problemsof CrisisManagement
(Boulder,CO: WestviewPress,1991),esp.pp. 1-31; and AlexanderL. George,
ForcefulPersuasion:CoerciveDiplomacyasan Alternativeto War(Washington,
DC: United StatesInstitute of PeacePress,1991).
135. In addition to the works cited previouslyon the CubanMissile Crisis, other
earlycontributionsto the subjectincludeHolsti, Crisis,Escalation,War,andthe
articlesin the March 1977 issueof InternationalStudiesQuarterly. Seealso
Thomas J. Price, Constraints on Foreign Policy Decision-Making,
International Studies Quarterly, 22 (September1978), 357-376; Michael
Brecher,StateBehaviorin InternationalCrisis,Journalof ConflictResolution,
23 (September1979), 446-480.
136. MichaelP.Sullivan,InternationalRelations:Theoriesand Evidence(Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1976),p. 82.
137. See,for example,Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayeswith Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, CoerciveInducementand the Containmentof International
Crises(Washington, DC: UnitedStatesInstituteof PeacePress,1999).
138. CharlesA. McClelland,Crisis and Threat in the InternationalSetting:Some
RelationalConcepts,unpublishedmemocited in MichaelBrecher,Toward a
Theory of InternationalCrisis Behavior, InternationalStudiesQuarterly,21
(March 1977), 39-40.
139. CharlesF.Hermann,InternationalCrisisasa Situational
Variable,in James
N. Rosenau,ed.,InternationalPoliticsandForeignPolicy:A Readerin Research
and Theory(NewYork: FreePress,1961),p. 414.
140. Gilbert R. Winham, ed., New Issues in International Crisis Management
(Boulder,CO, andLondon:WestviewPress,1988),p. 5.
141. Michael Brecherand Jonathan,Wilkenfeld, Crises in World Politics, World
Politics,35 (1982),383.GlennH. SnyderandPaulDiesinghadalsospeciedthe
perceptionof a dangerously high probabilityof war asa dening ingredientof
crisis; Conict Among Nations: Bargaining, DecisionMakingand System
Structurein International Crises(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press,
1977),p. 7. RichardNed Lebow includedin his criteria a perceivedthreat to
concretenationalinterests,the countrysbargainingreputation,and the ability
of its leadersto remainin power;theperceptionby leadersthat actiontakenmay
142.

143.

144.
145.

146.

147.
148. NOTES 613
149.
increase
the possibilityof war; and perceived
time constraints
for response;
BetweenPeaceand War: The Nature of InternationalCrisis (Baltimoreand
London: johns Hopkins Press,1981), pp. 9-12.
RichardK. Betts,Analysis,War and Decision:Why IntelligenceFailuresAre
150. Inevitable, World Politics, 31 (October 1978), 61-89.
SnyderandDiesing,Conict AmongNations,p. 4.
151. Ibid., p. 455.Althoughcrisesaredangerous,
than dysfunctional.
theyareseento bemorefunctional

Young, The Intermediaries, p. 10.

Snyder,Crisis Bargaining, p. 217.
Alexander
L. George
andRichardSmoke,
Deterrence
in American
Foreign
Policy:
152. TheoryandPractice(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1974),p. 697.
Snyder and Diesing, Conict Among Nations.
Lebow, Between Peaceand War. The discussionhere is based on Lebows own
summaryin the form of excerptsfrom his 1981book. Seehis DecisionMaking
in Crises,in Ralph K. White, ed., Psychologyand the Preventionof Nuclear
153. War: A Book of Readings(New York: New York University Press,1986),
pp. 397-410.
Ibid., pp. 407-408.
Snyder,Crisis Bargaining, p. 217.
Ibid., pp. 419-445.
154. Ibid., pp. 450-453.SeealsoSeanM. Lynn-Jones,
StevenE. Miller, and Stephen
Van Evera,eds.,NuclearDiplomacyand CrisisManagement: An International
155. SecurityReader(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1990).
Richard Ned Lebow, BetweenPeaceand War: The Nature of International
Crisis(NewYork: FreePress,1981),p. 275.
156. Michael Brecher,Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and SheilaMoser, Crisesin the Twentieth

157.
Century:Handbookof InternationalCrises,Vol. I (Oxford, England:Pergamon
Press,1988), p. 1.
Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 171-201.
614

160.
161.

162.

163.

164.

165.
166.

167.

168.
169.
170.
DECISION-MAKING THEORIES: CHOICE AND THE UNIT LEVEL.ACTOR

171. Herrmann andFischerkeller,

BeyondEnemyImage,pp.426-427.
Holsti, Crisis,Escalation,War,p. 10; seealso ThomasC. Wiegele,The
Psychophysiology of Elite Stressin Five InternationalCrises, International
StudiesQuarterly,22 (December1978),467-512.
MarthaL. Cottam,ForeignPolicyDecision-Making:
TheInuenceof Cognition
172. (Boulder,CO: WestviewPress,1986).Theauthorssourcesaredrawnmorefrom
socialandcognitivepsychologythan from political science.
RobertJervis,Perception
andMzsperception in International
Politics(Princeton
NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press,
1976),p. 2; Cottam,ForeignPolicy,p. 1.
173. Cottam,ForeignPolicy,p. 22. The author explainsher dissatisfactionwith the
Operational
CodeandCognitiveMap approaches,
pp.8-21.
174. Ibid., pp. 23-29, 33-56.
Ibid.,pp.61-108.
Theseven
politicalcategories
aredescribed,
withsome
empir-
175. rcalevidence
(from51 U.S.policymakers
outof 500whoreceived
surveys).
Lebow,BetweenPeaceand War,p. 335
Ibid., p. 223.

176.
Ibid., p. 225.
JonathanM. Roberts,
Decision-Making
DuringInternationalCrises(NewYork:
St.MartinsPress,
1988),chap.9, GeneralHealthof Decision-Makers
During
InternationalCrises,pp. 181-226.
John T. Lanzetta,Group BehaviorUnderStress,HumanRelations,VIII
(1955);reprintedin J. David Singer,ed., Human Behaviorand International
Politics:
Contributions
fromtheSocial-Psychological
Sciences
(Chicago:
Rand
McNally,1965),216-217.SeeKurt Back,Decisions
UnderUncertainty,
177. AmericanBehavioralScientist,IV (February1961),14-19.
RobertL. Hamblin,GroupIntegration
(1958),in Singer,
Duringa Crisis,HumanRelations,
HumanBehaviorandInternational
XI
Politics,pp.226-228.See
WilbertS. Ray,Mild Stress
andProblem
Solving,American
journalof
183.

184.
NOTES 615

185.
Thomas
C.Wiegele,
Gordon
Hilton,KentLayne
Oots,andSusan
S.Kiesell,
Leaders
UnderStress:
A Psychophysiological
Analysis
of International
Crisis
(Durham,NC: Duke UniversityPress,1985).
Ibid., pp. 26--27.
ThomasC. Wiegele,Is a RevolutionBrewingin the SocialSciences?
in
Thomas
C. Wiegele,
ed.,Biology
andtheSocialSciences:
An Emerging
Revolution(Boulder,
CO: Westview
Press,1982),p. 6. SeealsoThomasC.
Wiegele,
Biopolitics:
Search
for a MoreHuman
Political
Science
(Boulder,
CO:
WestviewPress,1979); ThomasC. Wiegele,BehavioralMedicineand
Bureaucratic
Processes:Research
FociandIssueAreas,in Elliott Whiteand
186.
Joseph
Losco,eds.,BiologyandBureaucracy:
PublicAdministrationandPublic
PolicyfromthePerspective
of Genetic
andNeurobiological
Theory(Lanham,
MD: University
Press
of America,1986),pp.503-525.
IrvingL. Janis,Victims
of Groupthinle
(Boston:
Houghton
Mifin, 1972),and
Groupthink:Psychological
Studiesof PolicyDecisions
and Fiascoes,
rev.ed.
(Boston:HoughtonMifin, 1983).For recentassessments, seeCharlesF.
Hermannand others,BeyondGroupthink:PoliticalGroupDynamicsand
ForeignPolicy-Making,
AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,
93 (September
187.
1999),766-767;PaulHart,EricK. Stern,andBengtSundelius,
eds.,Beyond
Groupthink:
Political
GroupDynamics andForeignPolicy-Making
(AnnArbor:
Universityof MichiganPress,1997).Most contributorscite the weaknesses
in
188.
Janisstheory, but offer no alternative.
Robert
D.Putnam,
Diplomacy
andDomestic
Politics:
TheLogicof Two-Level
Games,
International
Organization,
42 (Summer
1988),427-460.
AndrewMoravcsik,Introduction:Integrating
International
and Domestic
Theories
of International
Bargaining,
in PeterB.Evans,HaroldK. Jacobson,
189.
and RobertD. Putnam,eds.,Double-Edged Diplomacy:International
Bargaining
andDomestic Politics
(Berkeley,
CA:University
of California
Press,
1993),pp. 1-42, quotedat p. 6.
190.
Ibid.
PeterB. Evans,Building an IntegrativeApproachto InternationalandDomestic
Politics:
Reections
andProjections,
in Evans,
Jacobson,
andPutnam,
eds.,
DoubleEdged
Diplomacy,pp.397-430,esp.pp.399-405.Seealso Susan
Peterson,
CrisisBargaining
andtheState(AnnArbor:University
of Michigan
Press,1996).Petersontendsto reducegametheory,cognitivepsychology, and
bureaucratic
politicsto oneor two variablesvirtuallyto thepoint of carica-
turebut warnsthat internationalpoliticscannotbehandledwith too few vari-
ables.
Shebringscognitive
andbureaucratictheorybackin asenriching
vari-
ables,
oncetheyareanalyzedin thecontext
ofdomesticpolitics.
Ibid.,p.93.
191. James G. Richter, Perpetuating the Cold War: Domestic Sources of
International
Patternsof Behavior,PoliticalScience
Quarterly,107 (Summer
1992), 271-301.
192. Alex Mintz, ForeignPolicyDecision-Making:
Bridgingthe GapBetween
the
CognitivePsychology
and RationalActor Models, in NehemiaGevaand Alex
Chapter 12
International Relations
Theory: Into the Third
Millennium

E. H. Carr hassuggested that when the humanmind beginsto exerciseitself

in someeld an initial stageoccursin which the elementof wish or purposeis
overwhelminglystrong,and the inclination to analyzefactsand meansweak
or nonexistent.Whatever
thevalidityof thisstatement
in thedevelopment
of other disciplines,it describesthe growth of internationalrelations,espe-
cially in its formativeyearsbetweenthe two world warsof the twentiethcen-
tury, although the theories that shaped twentieth-centuryinternational-
relationstheorycanbetracedfrom the ancientworld, andmanyarediscussed
in previouschapters
of thistext.2Thehistoryof international-relations
theory
containsampleevidenceof normativetheorybasedon wish or purpose,to-
getherwith effortsto analyzefacts and means.
By thelatetwentiethcentury,thestudyof internationalrelationshadpassed
through threemajor stages,which havebeentermedutopian,realist,and be-
havioral}andsubsequently
entered
a fourth,or postmodernist,
postbehavioral,
postpositivist,phasethat was more difcult to definein summaryfashion.Its
principalcharacteristic
hasbeendiversitythat includedparadigmaticdisagree-
mentand debatesevenaboutthe ability to producea cumulativetheory of in-
ternationalrelations.At the sametime, in its fourth phase,at the end of the
twentiethcentury,international-relations
theorywasbeingshapedby numerous
effortsfocusedon neorealist/structural-realist
theory,neoliberaltheory,and de-
bateabouttheagent-structure questionwithin thelevels-ofanalysis
contextand
the extent to which international-relationstheory should be state-centricor
transnational. In other words, theorists have askedwho are the actors, what is
their relativeimportance,andhow do theyrelateto, or interactwith, eachother.
Amongthe mostobviousfeaturesof its evolution,aswe haveseenin pre-
vious chapters,international-relations
theory hashad recurringand continu-
ing debatesaboutcontendingapproachesto theoreticaldevelopment.Instead
of one dominantparadigmbeingreplacedby anotheras the agreedbasisfor
the developmentof theory,we havewitnessedcompetingparadigmsandtheo-
ries.The debatesof oneera resurfacein a later period.The earliertwentieth-
century utopian-realistcontroversyreturnedin the form of the neoliberal-
616
 617

neorealistdebateof the nal decadesof the century.Theoriesthat havebeen

castasideby somescholars arerefurbished,elaborated, andmodiedby oth-
ersandbroughtbackinto fashion,themostnotableexample beingrealismin
its morerecentform of neorealist/structural-realist
theoryand,in the early
twentyrstcentury,neoclassical
realisttheory.In fact,realisttheoryhasnu-
merousvariants,leadingto thequestionof whetherit is actuallya paradigm
within whichalternative
realisttheoriesstandin contention with eachother.
International-relations
theoryhasnot developedin linear fashion.We see
no clearlydelineatedparadigmaticchangelike the changethat markedthe dis-
coveryby Italianastronomer,
mathematician,
andphysicistGalileo,notedin
Chapter1, basedon telescopic
observationin theearlyseventeenth
century;that
is, contrary to the convention of the day, Galileo found that the sun, not the
earth, lies at the center of the solar system.Instead, the state of international-
relations theory at the beginning of the twenty-first century remains that of
interparadigmatic debate.
Thepresentphaseof international-relations theorycontainsextendeddiscus-
sionof themeaningof therealityon whichwe basetheory.Doesreality,asin the
physicalsciences, existoutsideour theoriesaboutthephenomena that we study?
Alternatively,is reality,in the socialsciences
generallyandin internationalrela-
tions in particular,formedby the humanbeingswho comprisethe phenomena
thatwe areobserving andtheorizingaboutat anygiventime?In theearlytwenty-
rst century,international-relations theoryin its diversityconsistsof contrasting
paradigms,theories,methodologies, ongoingdebates, andparalleleffortsacross
a broadspectrum
of work,suchasthatsetforthin previous
chapters.4
Ourchal-
lengeis to nd broadlyacceptable
criteriafor evaluating-the
worth of alternative
theoreticalapproaches.Thismaynot proveeasyin a world of growingdiversity.
At the sametime, it is difficult to evaluatethe practical<utility of theories in the
abstract.Instead,the utility of onetheoryor anothervarieswith the extentto
whichit helpsto explainor understand phenomena of interestat anygiventime.
Thepresentdebateincludesdiscussion abouttheunitsthat compose thepar-
adigm, which encompasses
not only statesbut also actors other-than statesbut
alsothe meaningandutility of the stateitselfasa delineatingconcept.Thestate
remains at the very least an important unit of analysis,although the extentto
which it is adequateas a basisfor the developmentof international-relationsthe-
ory has beenquestioned.Yale H. Fergusonand Richard W. Mansbach go so far
as to assertthat the denitions of the Word state are so numerousthat they ob-
scureallmeaning.5
Thestateissaidto represent
aconception
of normative
order,
anethnoculturalunit, a functionalunit, a centerof monopolyoverlegitimatevio-
lence,the embodimentof a ruling class,a decision-makingprocessbasedon bu-
reaucraticpolitics,an executiveauthorityin theform of a leadersuchasa presi-
dent or monarch or political system,and a sovereignunit amongother suchunits.
As a result of such conceptual and semantic confusion, the state is said to
have little substanceas an empirical concept and virtually no utility as an an-
alytic concept;it obscuresfar morethan it clarifies.5Accordingly,the stateis
said to be a failed conceptand, at the sametime, we are in an era of failed
618 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY:
INTOTHE
THIRD
MILLENNIUM
states,
thebreakdown
andbreakup
ofexisting
states,
andtheemergence
of
newentities.
Theauthority
patterns
onwhichpolitical
legitimacy
isbased
sometimes
transcend
andsupersede
thestate.
Valuesareauthoritatively
al-
located
byavariety ofinstitutionspolitical.
religious,
economic,cultural,
socialother thangovernments,
many ofwhich
aretransnational,
withlittle
regard
forformal state
structures
orboundaries.
Thus,theability
ofthestate,
howeverit isdened,toexercise
fullsovereignty
initsdomestic
affairs
with-
outregard forexternal
inuences
isdoubtful
and
islikely
tofaceincreasin
challenges
intheyearsahead.
Therefore,
astate-centric
modeldoes notade-
quately
describethecontemporary
global
system.7
Althoughthere
has beenan
extensive
literature,
theauthors
ofwhichhave
sought
toexamine
linkages
be-
tween
national
andinternational
systems
and
tostudypenetrated
systems,
the
extent
towhich thedomestic
andtheinternational
arelinked
inaseamles
webhasyettobefullydetermined
if it ever
canbe.3
Wehaveclearly
movedbeyond
theclassical
paradigmatic
assumption
that
international
relationshipsbeyond
thestates
frontiers-are
separable
from
domestic
politics
in someimpermeable
fashion.
Thequestion
beforeusis
whether
whatwecallinternational-relations
theory
issimply
partofabroader
theoretical
setting
thatsomehow
transcends
thedomesticinternationa
sepa-
ration.
Towhatextent,
asJames
N.Rosenau
hassuggested,
have weentere
aneraof cascadinginterdependence,
withlarger
numbers
of groupsen-
gagedinaquestforrecognition,
status,
andindependence
contributing
not
onlytothebreakdownofexisting
units,
butalso
togreater
volumesofinter-
actionsaccelerated
bytheimpact oftechnology
inglobal relationshipsIf
thereisnoclearseparationbetweeninternational
anddomestic politics,
how
can there
beadifferentiation
between international
theoryand other theories
If suchdistinctions
arenotreadily
evident,
thebasis
fortheoryliesinaneffort
tocutacrosstheboundaries ofthevarioussubelds,
such asinternationa
re-
lationsandcomparativepolitics,
thatcomprise
political
science.
Under such
circumstances,
if Rosenau
iscorrect,thebehavior
ofgroups, whether they
be
termed
states
orother
units,
existing
in alternative
patterns
of relationshi
witheach
other
orwithother
entities,
would (orshould)
become theobject
oftheory
building
atamore
general
level
than
simply
international-rel
theory.
The
quest
fortheory
iscomplicated
bythefact
that
weare
inthemidst
ofa
transformation
instructures,
alongside
anunprecedented
acceleration
inthe
volume
of interactions
among
groups
other
thanstates,
among
states
them-
selves,
andbetweenstates
andnonstate
actors.
Theaccelerating
andturbulen
change
thatisshaping
theworld
atthebeginning
ofthethirdmillennium
en-
compasses
avariety
ofactorsinwhatRosenau
callsanera
ofpostinternat
politics.9
The
turbulencetowhichRosenau
refers
includes
abnormalitie
com
parable
tothose
that,inclimatic
terms,
exist
during ahurricane
ortornad
whenuncertainty
andunpredictability
abound.
If wehaveonlylimited
ability
to
predict
thepath
thatahurricane
ortornado
willfollow,
how canwedevelo
predictive
theories
about-political
behavior?
Events suchashurricanes
and tor-
 as
nadoes,
Rosenau
pointsout,arecomparable
torevolutionary
change
inpolitical
relationships,
a deningcharacteristicof the latetwentieth-century
world. &
At the beginningof the twenty-firstcentury,asnotedelsewhere in this text
theinternational
system
contains
asmany
as185members
oftheUnited
Nations:
contrastedwith 51 at the time of its founding.Thus,in the secondhalf of the
twentiethcentury,therehademerged for the first time in historya globalsystem
not onlywith unprecedented
numbers
of states,
but alsogreaterdiversitythan
everbefore,contrasted
with thelargelyEurocentricinternationalsystemof earlier
decadesandcenturies.Of increasingimportanceareincreasing numbersof non-
governmental
organizations
havinglinks at the level of individualsand
in the transnationalarena.The diversityof actorsstateand other-than-state-
together
withvastasymmetries
anddisparities
in theirrespective
political,
mili-
tary,technological,
andeconomic capabilities,
represent
importantdeningchar-
acteristics
of theglobalsystemin aneraof postintemationalpolitics.Theoretical
questionsencompass thenatureof stability,basedontheories
of polarity,
align-
mentpatterns, integrative
forces,conict,fragmentation,andinterdependence
A new and largelyunexploredsetof dimensionshasbeenaddedto inter-
national relations,thereby lengtheningthe list of issuesto be reflectedin
emerging theory.Suchdimensionsincludetheriseof international
organiza-
tionsat theglobalandregionallevels,theincreasing
importance of globalfi-
nancial markets and multinational corporations (MNCs), instantaneousmass
communications,
andterrorist,revolutionary,
andtransnationalreligiousfun-
damentalist
movements. Sorapidandpervasive is thepaceof changethatthe
gapbetweentheoryandthephenomena thatarethebasisof theoretical
expla-
nationiswidening.
Howmuchofwhatweknowaboutthepastwill helpusto
developa theoretical
basisfor comprehending
thefuture?To whatextenthas
changereducedthe utility of generalizations
from the pastin assessing
emerg-
ing circumstances?To asksuchquestions is to inquireaboutthe extentto
whichtheorycantranscend timeandplaceandto inquireabouttheadequacy
of existingtheoryto explainthemostmomentous changeof our timehow
andwhytheColdWarendedasit did. As wesawin Chapter8, numerous
theoristshaveattempted,usuallyexpostfacto,to explainandunderstand)
the
endof the ColdWar,havingfor themostpartfailedto anticipate theevents
leadingto the collapseof the SovietUnion and its empire. 1
We havenotedthat political behaviorin an internationalcontext,it was
onceassumed, differsfundamentally from politicalbehaviorwithin the na-
tional unit. Whiledomesticpoliticalstructures werebasedon accepted au-
thority patterns,includihggovernments and laws,the internationalsetting
wasanarchical. Therefore, studiesof internationalpoliticscouldbeseparated
fromthe analysis of politicalactivitywithin thenationstate.Thedistinction
betweendomesticand international behavior stemmedprincipally from a
modelin whichdecision
makingwascentralized
in theformercaseanddecen-
tralizedin the latter instance.Governments
within statesheld a monopolyof
thecoercive
capabilities
oftheunits,in contrastto thedecentralization
of de-
cisionmakingandcoercive capabilities
in theinternational
system.
620 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORYINTOTHETHIRDMILLENNIUM

Increasingly,
aswehavenoted,
emphasis
hasbeen
placed
onsimilarities
ratherthandifferences
between
the politicalprocess
at the nationalandthe
international
levels,
although
thecentralization
anddecentralization
distinc-
tionsstillappear
relevant
indelineating
international
relations
andstudies
of
otherpolitical
phenomena.Students
ofinternational
relations
haveshownin-
terest
inpolitical
systems
inwhich triballoyalties
oftencompete
withmodern-
izingforcesandeffective
political
power remainsdecentralized;
suchstudy
hascontributed
to a reassessment
of oldernotions
abouttheuniqueness
of in-
ternational
political
processes,
ascontrasted
to thoseat otherlevels.
The
breakdown andbreakupof states
sincetheearly1990s,thegrowing numbers
of conictsbased
onethnicandsectarian cleavages,andtheinabilityof states
to assert
controlovertheirbordersor territoryprovides
furtherevidence of
theneedto transcend
thetraditional
distinction
between whatisdeemed to be
international
andwhatis saidto besubnational.Thesocalledanarchical in-
ternational
system
is usually
-more
peaceful
thancertain
states
or regions
of
theworld.If weassume
thatthelocusof earlytwentyrstcenturyarmedcon-
ict is largely
withinratherthanbetweenstates,
it follows
thattheinterna-
tionalsystem asawholeislessanarchic
thanthesituation
withinsomeofits
state members.
Centraltothepresentparadigmaticdebateremains
theperceived
need to
identifyandcategorize
nonstate
actors andto analyze
theirrespective
rolesin
theemerging international
system.
RichardW.Mansbach andJohnA.Vasquez
callforthereplacement
ofthestatecentric
paradigmbyonethatisbasedonis-
sues, withpolitics
beingdenedastheauthoritative allocation
of values
through theresolution
ofissues;
i.e.,throughtheacceptance
andimplementa
tionofaproposal(s)todispose
ofthestakes thatcomposetheissue
undercon-
tention. Theactorsof international
politicsaresaidto encompass
individu-
alsoperating
on theirownbehalfandlargecollectivities
havingcommon
strategies
andgoals
andworking
in collaborative
fashion
andlinkedincreas-
inglyonaglobal
basis.
According
tothejournalist
ThomasFriedman,weare
in theopening
scene
of a worldbased
onglobalizationwithoutdirectprece-
dent.Earlytwenty-rst
centuryglobalizationis based
onfallingtelecommu-
nicationscostsasa resultof evergreaterandcheaper
microchips,
satellites,
beroptics,
andof course,
theInternet.
Theworldisbeing
interconnected
in
waysthatcanonlyaccelerate
assuchtechnologies
becomeevermorewidely
available.
Suchtechnologies
arechanging
thepatterns
of worldtrade.These
world»
producers
ofrawmaterials
canbecome
producers
ofnished
goods
and
services
because telecommunications technologies
makeit possible
for corpora-
tionsto locatetheir.facilitiesfor research,
marketing,
andproductionvirtually
anywhere. Theyarethenlinkedtogether byelectronic
means.
Of directinterest
istheprocess
bywhichissues aredened,
addressed,and
resolved
withinandamong themanifold
entitiesstate
andnonstate.
In this
respect,
Mansbach
andVasquez
citeandecho
thecallofJohnW.Burton
fora
newparadigm
in»whichthestudyof international
relations
wouldbesuper-
seded
bythestudyof worldsociety.
In Burtons
perspective,
theconcept
of
worldsociety
canbestbeseen
if wewereto mapit, withoutreference
to polit-
 621

ical boundaries,
andindeedwithoutreference
to anyphysicalboundaries.13
Richard
K.Ashley
goes
sofarasto ask,in critique
of thestate-centric,pa
digm,howareactions
coordinated,
energies
concerted,
resistance
tamed,
and
boundariesof conductimposedsuchthat it becomes possibleandsensiblesim-
ply to representa multiplicity of domesticsocieties,eachunderstoodas a co-
herentidentitysubordinate
to the gazeof a singleinterpretative
centre,the
sovereign
state?14
In thisperspective,
sucha paradigm
isclearlyinadequate
at a time of vasttransnationalinteractionon the part of a varietyof nonstate
actors.
Internationalrelations research,as hasbeennotedthroughoutthis book,
hasbeenguidedby a varietyof concepts,theories,models,andparadigms.One
widelycitedauthorityon thehistoryof science, ThomasS.Kuhn,hassuggested
that in the natural sciences,periodsof scientic revolution havealternated
with erasof normal science.Onesetof conceptshasfurnishedthebasisfor
cumulativeknowledgeonly eventuallyto be discardedand superseded by yet
anotherparadigm.Science advances in sucha fashionthat onedominantpara-
digmis replacedby another,with eachin turn furnishinga newframeworkfor
intellectualinquiry,settingthe researchagenda,andprovidingthe basisfor the
cumulativegrowthof scienticknowledgeandtheory.He denesscienticrev-
olutions as noncumulativedevelopmental episodesin which an older para-
digmisreplaced
in wholeor in partbyanincompatible
newohe.15
Accordingto Arend Lijphart, the studyof internationalrelationshasfol-
lowedsucha patternof development.
Thetraditionalparadigm,basedon
conceptionsof statesovereigntyand internationalanarchy,waschallenged,as
notedpreviously,eventhougha largebody of theoryaboutinternationalrela-
tions had evolved,datingfrom antiquity and furnishinga basis for a coher-
enttraditionof research.17
Thescienticrevolutionembodied
in thequanti-
tative and behavioralphasewas basedon a largenumberof new approaches
and methodologies. It was believedthat Kuhnscharacterizationof paradig-
matic changein the natural scienceswassimilarly applicablein the socialsci-
ences.In turn, the paradigmthat eventuallyemergedin the study of interna-
tional relations, it was assumed,would form the basis for broad theoretical
advancesbasedon the widespreadapplicationof agreedmethodologies to im-
portant researchquestions.It is this assumptionthat hasbeenquestioned,and
often rejected,by the advocatesof postbehavioral,postpositivist,and post-
modernistapproaches to international-relationstheory.In this interpretation,
howevervalid the applicabilityof Kuhnsunderstandingof paradigmaticde-
velopment for the physical sciences,it does not provide an adequateexplana-
tion of the evolutionof international-relations
theory.In retrospect,the be-
havioralist phasewas focused more on researchmethods, or methodology, as
a basisoftheory,ratherthan on the developmentof a new paradigmor other
theoretical basisfor building theory.
As we haveseen,the paradigmaticdebateof the latetwentiethcenturyhad
numerous dimensions.Sincethe 1970s, as K. J. Holsti and others have pointed
out, thestate-centric
paradigmhasfacedchallenges beyondthoseresultingfrom
the emergence of nonstateactorsin a globalsystem.Thestate-centric
paradigm
622 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

hasas its focalpoint a concernwith peace,war, and order, Whileoneof its

principalcompetitors,dependency theory (discussed
in Chapter9), is preoccu-
pied with issuesof inequality, exploitation, and equality.The empirical connec-
tion between
warandinequality
remains
problematic.l8
Thepresent
paradig-
matic disagreement
includesissuesrelatedto the high-priorityproblemsto be
addressedin the eld, asWell as fundamentally different ideasabout the appro-
priate units of analysis,the important processes,
and the kind of context in
whichactionsandprocesses
takeplace.19
According
to PhilippeBraillard,the
studyof internationalrelationsis fragmentedto suchan extentthat it is char
acterizedby theabsence of a paradigmandby thefactthat thereareseveralgen-
eral explanatorymodelspitted againstone another,severalconceptionsof its
object, a situationthat is saidto be characteristicof thewholeeld of investi-
gationcovered
bythesocialsciences."2°
As we have noted, other critics question whether the scientific progres-
sion set forth by Thomas Kuhn and widely acceptedduring the quantitative-
behavioral phase even describesaccurately the processof theory building in
the social sciences,contrasted with natural science.In Kuhns perspective, it
has been suggested,the replacement of one paradigm by another occurs as a
result of the inability of the then-existing dominant paradigm to account for
important phenomena.
However,the evolutionof theory,following the rejec-
tion of an existing paradigm, depends in Kuhns frame of reference on the
ability of the communityof scholarsto reachagreement
on a newparadigmas
the basisfor future inquiry. Conceivably,the presentperiod of dissensusrepre-
sents a necessaryprelude to the emergenceof an eventual paradigmatic con-
sensuson which the researchagenda of the early twenty-rst century can be
built. From the vantagepoint of the present, however,it may be equally plau-
sible to suggestthat the fragmentation of international-relations theory simply
mirrors the heterogeneousglobal system of the early twenty-first century, in-
cluding the growth of a scholarly community that is politically, ideologically,
intellectually, methodologically, and geographically more diverse and diffuse
than in any previous era. If such is the case,the prospectsfor the formation of
an agreedparadigmon which scholarlyinquiry can be basedmay havere-
ceded. The problem of theory building is further complicated by the fact
that existing theory is largely that of the Western world. If theory is the prod-
uct of the socialcontextinawhichit is developed,how would theoriesfrom
other culturesand civilizationsdiffer from Westerntheory?To what extentis
international-relationstheory developedin a Westerncontextrelevantto the
heterogeneousworld of the early tvventyrst century?What, in turn, doesthis
mean for paradigmatic consensusas a basisfor theoretical advances?
The heterogeneityof the international system is reected not only in the
difculty of developingan agreed paradigmbut alsoin the diverseapproaches
to the study of internationalrelationsrepresented by the theoreticaldiversity
of the earlytwenty-rst century.If internationalrelationsconstitutesan inter-
discipline,its scopeis global. The rise of new actorsin many parts of the
world will continue to heighten the globalization of the study of international
relationsits transformation from a literature that has been heavily inu-
 MAJORFOCALPOINTSOFCONTEMPORARY
THEORY 623

encedby thescholarship
of Western
EuropeandtheUnitedStates
to a much
broader
globalfocus.
Asa resultof suchchange,
theprospect
for anyone
comprehensive, agreed
paradigm or unifyingtheoryis likelyto diminish
ratherthanto bestrengthened
in theyearsahead.Forexample, Hayward R.
Alker,]r., andThomas].
Bierstekersuggest
theneedto encompass suchdiver-
sity by considering
international
relationsasthe intersection
andunionof
behavioral-scientic,
dialectical
Marxist
andtraditional
approaches.21
Partly
because
ofthedeeplypolitical
divisions
oftheworld,nosingle
research
ap-
proachhasmanaged to gainworldwide
acceptance
in, or impose
a globally
shared
intellectual
interpretation
on,thiscenturyof disorder.22
Theirpro-
posalhasbeensuperseded
bya lengthening
list of approaches,
at leastsomeof
whichcanbeexpected
to generate
theirownparadigms,
research
programs,
and criteria for evaluatingthe theoreticalresults.

MAJOR FOCAL POINTS OF CONTEMPORARYTHEORY

In additionto variousislandsof theory,theory-building
effortshaveevenin-
cludedseveral
macrotheories,
or grandtheories.
Forexample,
realisttheory
and neorealist/structural-realist
theorymay be viewedas grandtheories.
Realisttheoryis based
onaneffortto isolatea keyvariablenamely,
power
to explainand predicta broadrangeof internationalbehavior.In addition to
its focuson powerascruciallyimportant,realisttheoryattemptsto explain
behaviorby referenceto the internationalsystem(macrotheory) and at the
levelof theunit-actor,
or agent.In otherwords,for realisttheory,thesource
of behaviorcouldbefoundbothatthe levelof systemic structureandat the
levelof the unit, state,or agent.
In contrast,wehavenotedin Chapter2, neorealist
theoryplacesprincipal
emphasis on theinternational
systemicstructurewithinwhichpolitical~inter-
actiontakesplace.Neorealist
literatureemphasizesboththeenduringimpor-
tanceof powerandtheimpactof structurewhatHedleyBull andKenneth
Waltz, amongothers,termedan anarchicalsystemon the latitude available
to actorsin shapingtheir policiesand actions.In its broadestdimension,neo-
realisttheoryrepresentsan attemptto derivefrom the realisttradition a theo-
reticalapproachbasedon an understanding
of the constraints
imposedon
state behavior by the structure of the world in which statesexist. As we have
seenin the neorealist
vs.neoliberaldebatesetforth in Chapter2, neorealist
andneoliberal theoristssharecommongroundon,for example, theexistence
of anarchyat theinternational
level,differingprincipallyonits extentandsig-
nicance.If anarchyis a delineatingcharacteristicandenduringfocalpoint
for international-relations
theorizinginto thetwenty-rstcentury,our taskis
to answerquestionsrelatedto its extentand meaning.By the.sametoken,the
debateabout the relationshipbetweenpolitical behaviorand structurethat
haspreoccupiedolderand morerecenttheoreticaldiscussions needsto be ad-
dressedmore extensively.To what extent do structuresat the international
systemicand at the national (or other) levelsshapethe perceivedoptionsor
624 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY:
INTOTHE
THIRD
MILEENNIUM
behavioral
characteristics
ofactors
(theagent-structure
problem
noted
invari-
ouschapters ofthistext)?
Inthesame vein,theneorealist-neolibera
debate
aboutinstitutions
needstobeaddressedinawaythatcontributes
to agreater
understandingoftheways andcircumstances inwhich,
forexample, the
UnitedNations orNATO simplyreectanexisting structure
(neorealist)
or
actually
change orotherwiseshapethebehavioroftheunits
oragents(neolib-
eral).
Inshort, what isthebasis
foranagreed synthesis
thatmight
contribut
toacomprehensive theoryofinternational
relations?
Suchquestionsforma
basis
foranagenda fortheorydevelopmentinthetwenty-rst
century.
Many ofthetheorizingefforts
ofthepast generation
andbefore,wehave
noted,representislandsoftheorythattheoristshave
hopedcouldbelinked
onedayintoagrand theory
ofinternationalrelations,
although,
aswehave
seen,
consensus islackingabouttheappropriateparadigm,
orthemethodol
gies,
foramacrolevel orgrandtheoryofinternational
relations.
Such agree-
ment, if_iteventually
comesabout,islikelytobetheresult
ofaconceptu
breakthrough
thatpoints
thewaytoward
thetheoretical
integration
ofexist-
ingislands
oftheory
andofsetting
agreed
priorities
forfuture
research
and
dataanalysis.
Howsuch
linking
might
takeplace,
whether
byenlarging
exist-
ingislands
orbycreating
newislands
oftheory,
orbyamajoradvance
toward
macrotheory
within
which
middle-range
theories
could
belinked,
hasbeen
an
object
ofdebate
among
social
scientists,
especially
during
thequantitativ
behavioral
phase.
Theemphasis
ofthe1970s
onthenarrow
theory-build
efforts
intheso-called
islands
oftheory
produced,
inturn,aconcern
thatthe
larger.
dimensions
oftheory
atthemacrolevelthe
linking
oftheislands
ina
grand
theorywould
beneglected.
Whatever
theapprehension,
itquickly
was
overshadowed
in thenalgeneration
of thetwentieth
century
bytheeven
broader
debate
about theadequacy
ofexisting
paradigms
oftheglobal
system
thatwehave
described.
Such
issues
arelikely
toremain
unresolved
foratleast
some time to come.
Expectations
ofmajor
theoretical
breakthroughs
characteristic
ofthe
quantitative-behavioral
erahave
proven
premature
if notmisplaced,
andthe
results
oftheory-building
efforts
based
onsocial-science
methodologies
have
been
slimindeed.
Thebehavioral
revolution
didnotresult
inacumulative
the-
oryofinternational
relations
thatfullledearlier
expectations.
Perhaps
for
thisreason,
a broader
andless
ambitiousconception
ofthenature
ofthe
growthofknowledge
andtheoryemergedinthepostbehavioral,
postpos
tivist,postmodernist
phase.
Thisincludes
thesuggestion
thatthereconcept
alizationof existing
theoriesthe
development
of a variety
of comparati
methodologies
anddatabases
andtheconstant
quest
forknowledge
byre-
search
atmorethanonelevelofanalysisrepresents
initselfacontribution
to
cumulative
theory.
Asaproponent ofthisbroader
conception,BruceRusset
contends
thatagreater
effortshould
bemadetolinkandexpand
various
is-
lands
oftheorythrough
detailed
incremental
research
onspecific
problems.
At
thesametime,
however,
it isdoubtful,
asRussett
suggests,
thatanarrow
and
exclusive
application
of thecumulativemodel
would produce
marginal
re-
 MAJORFOCALPOINTSOF CONTEMPORARY
THEORY 625

turnscomparable
to thoseto beexpected
frommaintaining,
alongwith it, a
more broad-based
attack on internationalrelationstheory and substance.23
If theprospects
for cumulative
theoryarelimitedbythelackof paradigmatic
consensus andtheepistemologicallimitationsof scienticmethodappliedto so-
cialscience,whatcriteriashouldbeusedto assess internationalrelations
theory?
What makesonetheorybetterthananyothertheory?Is thequestfor truth more
a process
thananendstate?JohnA. Vasquez
suggests
theneedto movebeyonda
postmodern relativism that limits the role of the theorist to the deconstruction
andcriticismof existingtheories,leadingto therelativistassumption
thatany
theoryis asgood(or asbad)asanyothertheory.Instead,morewidelyaccepted
criteriaby whichto determinetruth areneeded.Thenatureof scienticmethod,
aswe havediscussed, is to furnishsuchcriteria,althoughwe acquireknowledge
by other means,includingintuition and reason.Without embracingthe post-
modernistidea of relativism,we may nevertheless acceptthe propositionthat
theoryboth arisesfrom a socialcontextandis formulatedby dominantgroups,
or elites,of thetimein whichit is created.As we havealreadynotedin thischap-
ter, the basisfor the development of internationalrelations
theoryin the years
aheadliesin agreement on criteriaby which to separate goodfrom badtheory.
We seektheorythat helpsto explainrelationshipsamongthe phenomena that
constituteinternationalpolitics.Evenif we acknowledge that theoryarisesfrom
a particular social context, there must neverthelessbe standardsthat transcend
time and place,which are designedat leastto approximatetruth. To assertother-
wise is to deny the essentialbasisfor any theory and knowledge.
In its presentphase,the theoreticaland substantiveinterestsof a large,
growing,andincreasinglydiversecommunityseta complexagendafor the de-
velopmentof international-relationstheory in the early twentyrst century.
Suchwork proceedswithin a seriesof trends that, beyond the aforementioned
paradigmatic debates,includes the following:

1. Not only will theorists continue the effort to delineate the nature and
scopeof international relations, or postinternationalrelations, but
also,theywill attemptto establishinternationalrelationsmore rmly
as an autonomous eld of study, although the viability of such a claim
to autonomy is weakened, if not destroyed, if the state basedon legal
sovereigntylacks substanceas an empirical concept or utility as an an-
alytic construct. Even though numerous problems of scope,denition,
and conceptualization remain largely unresolved, such issues have
been supersededby a renewed emphasison substantive, in contrast to
methodological, debatesof the quantitativebehavioral phase.
2. The kinds of theorizing that will be appropriate for building theories
with greater explanatory capacity, encompassa realization that quan-
titative and qualitativeanalysesare indispensable
to any sucheffort.
Although the prospectsfor theory that is cumulative and therefore en-
during may be uncertain,the increasingand complexissuesof behav-
ior betweenlegallyconstitutedunits calledstates, betweensuchen-
626 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

titles and nonstateactors,and amonggroupsother than states,pro-

videsa rich agendafor theorizingand for research
that will only
lengthenandbroadenin theincreasinglycomplexandheterogeneous
world of the twenty-rst century.
3. Theoristswill try to developmoreprecise
linkages amongvariouslev-
elsof analysis(or actors)alongthecontinuumfromthe microcosmic
(theindividualperson)to the macrocosmic (theinternational
system)
andto resolvethe agent-structure problemin international-relations
theorybylocating
withinandamong
thevarious
levels
of analysis
the
sourceof behaviorbeingstudied.Sucha research
focuswill enhance
theprospectsfor linkinglevelsof analysis
andfor bridging
theideals
of theoryrepresentedbytheneoliberal-institutionalist
andneorealistl
structural-realist traditions.

In summary, theparadigmatic,
theoretical,
methodological,
andsubstan-
tivediversityof international
relationsat thebeginning
of thetwenty-rstcen-
turyenhances
theneedto continue
to drawonthenumerous
disciplines
that
havefocusedon problems of centralinterestto international
relations,which
remainsan interdiscipline,
drawingnecessarily from a multiplicityof disci-
plines.
Amongothers, these
disciplines
include
anthropology,
economics,
his-
tory,politicalscience,
psychology
(especially
socialpsychology),
law,public
administration,
andsociology.Asaninterdisciplinary eld addressing multi-
disciplinary
issues,
international
relationswill continuenecessarilyto incorpo-
rate,buildon, andsynthesizeinsightsfrom most,if not all, of thesocialsci
encesand,whereappropriate, from the naturalandphysicalsciences in the
twenty-rstcentury.Thegreaterthecomplexityandquantityof issues that
havean internationalor globaldimension, thegreaterwill bethe needfor a
multidisciplinary
focus(drawingon relevantacademic disciplines)to produce
interdisciplinary
answers (basedon the integrationof approaches, ndings,
and insightsfrom otherdisciplines).

EMERGING SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS

Several
specicsubstantive
interests
arelikelyto shapeinternational-relations
theory-building
effortsin theearlytwenty-rst
century.
In lightof theraison
détreof internationalrelationsfrom its early years,togetherwith the large
numberof conict-laden issuesandthewidespreadavailabilityof weapons of
unprecedented
lethalityto a growingnumberof stateandnonstate actors,the
problems
ofwarandpeace
willnecessarily
continue
toattract
principal
atten-
tion bothamongscholars andpolicymakers.
Suchstudies will forma partof a
discipline,
theglobalfocusof whichencompasses otherissues andpriorities,
unprecedented in their numberand diversity,transcending the stateas the
only,eventheprincipal,
actor.Some
of thesubject
areas
likelyto betheobject
of research
for the&#39;orybuilding
purposesareelaborated
on briey in the fol-
lowingsection.28
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS627
TheLongPeace,
theCollapse
of theSovietUnion,theEnd
of the Cold War, and System Transformation
Thetwoworldwarshadamajorimpact
onthedevelopment
ofinternationa
relations
theory.
Thetheories
of thetwogenerations
followingWorldWar11
wereshaped bytheColdWar,justastheissues
thatformed thebasis
for the-
ory in thetwo decades
from 1919to 1939arosefromtheinternational
con-
textof thetime.If utopian
theorywasanoutgrowth
of WorldWarI, andre-
alisttheorywasa productof the experience
leadingto andarisingfrom
World War II, what are the comparable
postColdWar theoreticalcon-
structs?
Thecollapse
oftheSoviet
Union,
theendof,theColdWar,andthe
ongoingtransformation
of the internationalsystempresentinternational-
relations
theorywith questions
at leastasnumerous
andcomplex
asthose
that framedtheseearlierfocalpointsof inquiry.Will thesemomentous
events
haveas profoundan effecton international-relations
theoryin the early
twenty-first
century
astheearliertransformations
hadin theirday?
Thetheoretical
issues
posedby thecollapseof theSovietUnion,theend
of theColdWar,andtheemergence
of a greatlychanged
international
sys-
tem encompass,
first, the questionof why the Cold War endedwithout the
SovietUnionhavingbeenmilitarilydefeated in armedconict,or why
armedrivalrydidnotleadto a ThirdWorldWar.Whatwasresponsible for
theexistence
of a conditionthat,in retrospect,
is calledthelongpeace?
Insteadof resortingto massive
militarypowerasits politicalandeconomic
system
disintegrated,
theSoviet
leadership
optedinstead
to surrender
power,
granting to the West concessions,in the form of Germanunication and
withdrawalfrom EasternEurope,that seemed
impossible
evento contem-
plateduringthetwo generations
before1989,whentheWestconfronteda
seemingly
strong,resolute,
tenacious,
andexpansionist
Sovietleadership.
Closely
related,
whatwerethestrengths
"andweaknesses
of existing
theories
of internationalrelationsin predictingthe endof theColdWar or in ex-
plaining why and how it endedas it did?What were.therolesof Sovietlead-
ers, and, if Mikhail Gorbachevand BorisYeltsinhad not beenpresent,
wouldthecollapse
of theSoviet
Unionhavebeenpostponed
or averted?
In
otherwords,whatis theplaceof individualstheidiosyncratic
variablein
great events,contrastedwith the forcesof history in situationssuchas the
endof theColdWar?TowhatextentwereGorbachev
andYeltsinsweptup
in eventsbeyondtheir controleventsthat they did not, and couldnot,
foresee? In itself,thequestfor answers
to suchquestions
providesan exten-
sive,if not impossiblyambitious,agendafor international-relations
theory
in the years ahead.
Although much remainsto be done,the effort to nd answersto such
questionshasbegun.Theliteraturethat hasbeen producedthusfar is sur-
veyedin Chapter8. It wouldbeunusualif sucha questdoesnot exertanin-
creasing
impactontheemerging international-relations
theoryagenda.Justas
the endof the ColdWar,howeverunexpected andunprecedented,wasnot
markedby widespread popularcelebration,
it hasyetto produceanupheaval
628 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY
INTO
THE
THIRD
MILLENNIUM
in internationalrelations
theory
comparable
to those
thataccompanied
the
twoworld
wars.
AsJohn
Lewis
Gaddis
suggests,
theimmense
signicance
of
theendoftheColdWarshould
have
been
sufficient
toallowatleastonema-
jortheory
oranother
tohave
predicted
orforecast
itscoming.
That
none
of
thetheories
didsoshould
lead
toquestions
abouttheadequacyofthetheories
andmethodswithwhich
wehave
studied
international
politics.
If thethenex-
isting
theories
could
notexplain
orpredict
the
end
oftheCold
War,
how
help-
fulcan
they
beinthetransformed
post-Cold
Warera?
Totheextent
thatour
theories
ofinternational
relations
have
hadasanobjective
anunderstandin
offorces
shaping
thefuture,
theywere
surely
decient,
even
bytheir
ownstan-
dards,
inanticipating
theendoftheColdWar.
What remains,
therefore,
isyetanother
extensive
agenda
forpost~Cold
Warinternationalrelations
theory.
Thisincludes
aneffortto locatethe
sources
ofSoviet
collapse
within
andamongthevarious
levels
ofanalysis
and
tounderstand
howandwhyfundamentalchange
ininternational
relation-
ships
takes
place.
How and
why dostructures
change?
Whatleads
totheend
ofabipolar
structure
andtheemergence
ofastructure
that
isunipolar
ormul-
tipolar?
Inturn,
if thepresent
structure
isdeemed
tobeunipolar-with
the
United
States
astheworlds
soleremaining
superpower-is
thisatemporary
condition
oronethatislikely
tolastwellintothetwentyrst
century?
On
thisissue,
aswehave
noted
inearlier
chapters,
there
islittleargument.
The
mostobvious
contending
explanations
encompass
hypotheses
about
therela-
tionship
between
nuclear
bipolarity
and
theabsence
ofsuperpower
war.Did
theColdWarendwithout
warbetween
theUnited
States
andtheSoviet
Unionbecause
ofthedeterrence
provided
bynuclear
weapons,
which
created
unacceptable
risks
thatovershadowed
anyconceivable
gain?Inwhat ways
were
alliances,
especially
NATO,stabilizing
contributions
tothelongpeace?
Were
negotiations
leading
to armscontrol
agreements,
andarmscontr
treaties
themselves,
important
oronlymarginal
contributing
factors?
Didthe
armaments
strategies
andpolicies
oftheUnited
States
anditsallies
lead
tosta-
bility
and
ultimately
tothecollapse
oftheSoviet
Unionwithout
war?
Why did
thenumerousEastWest
international
crises
notresult
inWorld
WarIII?32
Although
there
was
nonuclear
war
between
thetwomajor
possessors
ofsuch
weapons,
theColdWarpolitical
mapcontained
scores
ofconventional
wars
andengaged
theUnited
States,
inparticular,
inmajor
regional
conicts
in
Korea
andVietnam.
Ifnuclear
weapons
helped
tosustain
thelong
peace
ofthe
Cold
Waratthesuperpower
level,
ortochannel
U.S.Soviet
political
competi
tionaway
from
theactual
useoftheir
huge
military
capabilities
againsteach
other,
whatarethelessons
ofthisexperience
forpostCold
Warstability
ina
worldinwhich
there
arelikelytobeadditional
possessors
ofweapons
ofmass
destruction,
someofwhich may beactors
other
than
states?
Thisquestion
al-
ready
gains
attention
inlight
oftrends
toward
theincreasing
availability
and
proliferation
ofweapons
ofmass
destruction.
Existing
theories
ofinternational
relations
provide
contending
explana
tions
forchange
such
astheonethataccompanied
theendoftheCold
War
and
kept
thepeace,
such
asitwas,
during
that
era.
Theinternational
system
of
 EMERGINGSUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS 629

superpowernuclear
bipolarity,
according to structural-realist
theory,
waspri-
marilyresponsible
fortherelativestabilitythatprevailed.
A contrasting
expla-
nation is to be found at the unit/actorlevel,to the effectthat the SovietUnion
collapsed
notsomuchbecause
it couldnotmatchtheUnitedStates
militarily
but insteadbecause of the inevitableinabilityof the communistcommand
economyand the Sovietpoliticalsystem,with its corrosivecorruption,to
compete with democratic andcapitalistsystems.Western containmentstrat-
egy,asoriginallysetforth by GeorgeKennan,asa prominent post-warrealist,
had as a centralpremisethe needto denythe SovietUnion externalvictories
to compelits concentrationon domesticcommunistcontradictions.Whether
theSovietUnionwouldhaveimplodedonitselfin theabsence
of thepolitical
andmilitarycontainment
providedby theWestandledbytheUnitedStates is
a questionof great interestas the theoreticalimplicationsof the end of the
Cold War are identied and assessed.
To asksucha questionis to placein thiscontextthestructure-agentissue
that wehavediscussed elsewherein thistext.Conceivably,theanswerliesin
anexplanation thatlocates
thesources of change leadingto Sovietcollapseat
eachof thelevelsof analysis.
Thedemands madeon the Sovieteconomyby
massivemilitaryexpenditures
detracted fromits alreadygreatlylimitedability
to competein post-industrial-age
technologieswith the far more innovative
and dynamiccapitalisteconomiesof the West,and particularlywith the
UnitedStates.
In otherwords,theinternational
systemicstructureof bipolar-
ity imposed demands on the Soviet Union that it could not sustain in Cold
Warcompetition.Whatever theexplanation,
theneedclearlyexiststo identify
the sources
of Sovietcollapseandspecifically
to nd answers to suchques-
tionsaswhetherit wasnuclearweapons that wereprimarilyresponsiblefor
U.S.-Soviet
stabilityand deterrence
or whetherthe SovietUnionfell apart
largelybecause of its own internalcontradictionsandweaknesses.
As an alternativeexplanation,it may be assertedthat the source of
changelies in the units or agentswhateverthey may bestate or nonstate
actors.As the actorschange,so doesthe structureof the internationalsys-
tem, which itself is definedby the numbersand typesof actorsand the inter-
activepatternsamongthem. Thus, the growth of democracies with market
economiesproducesunits with characteristicnormativestandardsand inter-
activepatternssubstantiallydiffering from units with political systemsthat
aretotalitarian and economies that are stateowned.In this case,a post-Cold
War world of greaternumbersof democraticstateswith market economies
would be expectedto be morepeacefulif democracies do not go to war with
other democracies. If, however,the explanationfor internationalchangeis
usuallyfound in morethan one of the levelsof analysis,the issueis the rela-
tionship betweenalternative explanationsfor the collapseof the Soviet
Union. What wasthe link betweenthe eventsleadingto the endof the Soviet
Union (andits empire)and Westernmilitary power,technologicalsuperiority,
democracy,religions,political freedom,market economies,the political ide-
ology representedby individual rights groundedin natural law, and superior
economic growth?
630 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY:INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

Closelyrelated
arequestions
associated
withtheemergence,sincethecol-
lapse
of theSoviet
Union,of some25newstates;
some of them,of course,
are
within the boundariesof the former SovietUnion. The fact that the state-
centricmapof theworldhasbeensodramatically
transformed
bytheendof
the ColdWarleadsto numerous questionsof majortheoretical
importance.
What,for example,
arethe implicationsfor international
systemic
structure
resultingfromthenumbers andtypesof unitsthatarecreated? Suchunits
compose thenewinternational systemic structure.
How,why,andwhendo
existing
politicalunits,or states,
fall apart,or whataretheessentialcondi-
tionsfor politicaldisintegration
asthereverse sideof integration?
Whatare
theprecise effects
of international
systemicstructure,
including change,
onex-
istingandemergent units,andhowdothey,in turn,shape theinteractive
pat-
ternsthatcharacterize
international
systemic
structure?
Whatwill betheinter-
nationalsystemic
structure
aswemovefartherintothetwenty-rst
century?
To what extentwasthe Cold War structurein fact bipolar,and what wereits
multipolarelements?If thestructure
contributedto strategic
stabilitybetween
the.superpowers
themselves, whyweretheresomanyarmed conictsin other
partsof thesystem?Debate isemerging
aboutthenewsystemic structurethat
will shapetheearlytwenty-rst century.34
In themidstof sucha transforma-
tion sincetheearly1990s,with substantial
numbers of theoriespurportingto
address suchquestions,thereis an amplebasisfor theoreticalinvestigation
andanalysis, andthusfor research
agendasfor theyearsahead.

Conict
Thereremainsa relativedearthof knowledgeconcerningthe relationshipbe-
tweeninternational
andintrasocietal
aggression,
andthosestudies,especially
quantitative
in nature,completedsincetheearly1970s, havefailedto yield
denitiveinsights.
Thecausesof conictaresaidto liewithinandamong each
of thelevelsof analysis:
thestructureof theinternationalsystem,
thestates
and the domesticstructures,
nonstateactors,andthe individualswho ulti-
matelyformthelargerpoliticalentities.
Thequestions
thatremainto beade-
quatelyansweredarethosethathavelongbeenof centralimportance. To
whatextent,for example, arethecauses of conicttraceable
to thestructural,
institutional,andotherenvironing circumstances? In whatsense,by contrast,
is conicta manifestation
of politicaldifferencesthat,onceresolved,
leadto a
diminution in tensionsand the end of conict? What is the relationshipbe-
tweensystemic
structure
andconict?Wasa bipolarstructure
lessstablebe-
fore the adventof nuclearweaponsandmorestableas a resultof nuclear
weapons
astheessential
basisfor deterrence?
Towhatextentdoesthespread
of democracy
diminishthe prospects
for war,at leastamongstateshaving
democratic
politicalsystems
assetforthin democratic
peace
theorydiscussed
in Chapter7?How rapidlywill democracy
spreadin thetwenty-rstcentury,
and with what consequences
for globalor regionalstability?
Overthepastgeneration,
intrasocietal
conict hasrisenin manystates,
including,
asnotedelsewhere
in thistext,someof thosemostpoliticallyand
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS
631
industrially
advanced.
The
emergence
oflarge
numbers
ofnewentities
and
other
groups
into
the
political
process,
together
with
the
increased
availab
and
lethality
ofweaponry
asaresult
ofadvances
intechnology,
willundou
edly
accelerate
andexacerbate
conict
atdiffering
levels
ofintensity.
Wha
are
theimplications
ofvarious
modes
andlevels
ofsocioeconom
devel
ment
forthe
incidence
oftensions,
conict,
andviolence
and forstability
or
instability
within
andamongthe
units
that
compose
the
international
syste
This question
isoflongstanding
interest
tothose
scholars
whohave
studie
conict,andespecially
revolution,
asnoted
inChapter
8.Intrasocieta
con
ictisrelevant
tointernationalrelat1ons
research
notonlybecause
itgive
risetoalarge
numberofthenonstate
actors
intheearly
twenty-rst
cen

Finally,
what part
dotheelectronic
media,
global
communications
and the
information
revolution
play
inmolding
attitudes
with
respect
toissues
ofinter-
national
cooperation
andconict
withinstates
andattheinternationa
level
andinestablishing
andaccelerating
international
anddomestic
linkages?
Such
questions
need
tobeaddressed
in thecaseofsocieties
(suchastheUnited
States)
having
pluralistic
political
systems
and high
levels
oftechnologicde-
velopment,
with
citizens
whoare
linkedbyinstantaneous
communicati in-
cluding
global
access
toinformation
bytheInternet
and other
computer-
networks.
These
questions
also
need tobeconsidered
insocieties
thattradi-
tionally
havebeen
lessopenstates
withauthoritarian
regimes,
thepower of
which has included
and other inuences.
the
ability
tocontrol
access
tooutside
information,
ideas
Such
questions
have
been
theobject
ofincreasing
interest
since
thelate
twentieth
century,
although
analysis
that
includes
theimplications
ofgloba
communications
forshaping
public
opinion
orforeign
policy
remains
initsin-
fancy.
We areintheunprecedented
situation
inwhich
information
once
avail-
able
only
toofficial
decision
makers
nowreaches
the
entire
society
atthesame
time
that
itarrives
ingovernment
ofces.
Official
policymakers
atthehighes
level
sometimes
receive
important
information
viatelevision
atthesame
time
asthemass
public.
The time
available
forreaching
important
decisions
isthus
greatly
reduced,
withconsequences
thatmayshape
behavior
andthus
ourthe-
ories
ofinternational
relations
oratleast
ourtheorists
offoreign
policy
deci-
sionmaking.

Integration
andtheBasisfor PoliticalCommunities
The
study
ofintegration
andhowpolitical
communities
are
formedof
long-
standing
concern
tostudents
ofinternational
relations,
especially
sincethe
workofDavid
Mitrany
intheperiod
between
thetwoworld
warscontinue
toattract
attention.
TheSingle
European
Act(SEA),
theTreaty
onEuropean
Union
(TEU),
andthedebate
about
thedeepening
andwidening
ofthe
632 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

European
Union(EU)in the1990sgaverenewed
impetusto thestudyof inte-
gration.An eraof failedstates,
politicalfragmentation,
andungovernability
coincideswith a largenumberof integrativeforces.
In thegeneration
after
WorldWarII, thecreationof international
organizations
at theglobalandre-
gionallevels
notonlycontributedto risinginterest
in thestudyof integration,
but alsoprovidedan importantsourceof datafor scholarly investigation.
Similarly,
morerecent
trendsof thepostCold Wareraprovidea newagenda
for integration
studies.
Suchquestions,
aswenotedin Chapter10,encompass
whyandhowpoliticalentities
cooperate
witheachotherandtheframeworks
in the form of institutions,organizations,
andregimes
theydevelopfor this
purpose.
Thegrowing
importance
of theglobalcorporation,
in a globalecon-
omy,together
withtheemergence
of a multiplicity
of nonstate
actors,
added
yetotherobjects
of studyofinternational
relations.
In turn,thiscoincided
withthepublication
of numerous
booksandotherstudies
based
in particular
on neofunctionalist
propositions
andanalyzing transnational
relationships
be-
tweenandamongnongovernmental entitiesin a worldhypothesized
to bein-
creasingly
interdependent,
witha vastgrowthin thenumbers
of relationships
acrossstateboundariesbetweenofcial and nongovernmental
units.
Theconceptualizationof interdependence,
andits relationshipto concepts
of integrationandof power,attractedtheinterestof scholarsin the1970sand
19805.Especially aftertheColdWarwith theUnitedStates asthesolesuper-
poweror hegemon,
attention
cameto befocused
on theroleof hegemonic
statesin shapingregimesat theinternational
level,withinwhichcooperative
relationships
aredeveloped and sustained(seeChapters3 and 10).Regime
analysishasbeena focalpoint of academic attentionasa basisfor studying
and understanding the frameworks,norms, decisionalprocedures,and
processes
in suchissue
areas
asdiplomacy,
defense,
economics,
andlawwithin
which collaborativepatternsevolvein responseto internationalneeds.
Regimesare said to form the basisfor more integratedstructuresand
processes.
In thissense,
regime
analysis
focuses
onthestudyof relationships
that arethe resultof mutualneedand interest,leadingto higherlevelsof inte-
gration.It alsofurnishesa basisfor analyzing
andevaluating thebehavioror
performance of internationalorganizationsand their variousinstitutional
frameworks.As a result,it hasbeensuggested,
suchstudy has becomemore
theoretical,
morerigorousin a socialscience
sense
andhasgenerated
a better
understanding
of thegeneral
phenomenon
of international
cooperation.3
The end of the Cold War producedan extensivefocuson the role to be
playedby the UnitedNationsand otherinternationalinstitutionssuchas
NATO,theEU,andtheOSCE,in thenumerous conictsthat havebeenpart
of theglobalsetting.Thisincludesinstitutionaldevelopment for conictpre-
vention,peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peaceenforcement in accordance
with Chapters6 and7 of the UnitedNationsCharter.It encompasses situa-
tions of conict, as in Bosnia,and examplesof humanitarianactivities,as in
Somalia.ThispostColdWaragendais basedalsoon theneedto assess
the
roleof alliances,notablyNATO, and otherregionalsecurityarrangements,
in
a transformed global structure.
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS633
Numerous
questions
oftheoretical
importance
arise.
Theyinclude
theef-
fects
ofglobal
systemic
structure
onthelatitude
available
tointernationa
or-
ganizations
andtheimplications
ofchanging
globalstructures
forthetransna
tionaltasks
thatsuch
organizations
arelikelyto becalledonto address
Before
1989,
theUnited
Nations
hadbeen
engaged
infewerthan
25peace
keeping
operations.
Inthesix-year
period
after
theendoftheCold
War,
the
United
Nations wascalled
ontoundertakemore than25such operation
NATO, whichwasneverengaged
in actualmilitary
operations
during
the
ColdWar,undertook
numerous
combat missions
inBosniabeginning
in1994
andsubsequently
conducted
33,000airsorties
against
Serbia
over
theissue
of
Kosovoin1999.Questions
aboutglobalsystems
structure,
international
orga-
nizations,
therelationship
between
institutions
andtheregional
security
set-
ting,andthewaysin whichglobal
andregional
organizations
relate
to each
otherandtheirmembers
compose
anextensive
theoretical
agenda
forthe
early
twentyrst
century.
Towhat
extent
doexisting
theories
ofintegratio
provide
a useful
basis
forfurther
theoretical
development?
Functionalist
and
neofunctionalist
theory
emphasized
theexpansive
logic
ofsector
integratio
More
recent
theory,
related
totheimplementation
oftheSEA
andtheTEU,
hasbuiltonandrevised
functionalist
andneofunctionalist
theory.
Existingtheories
of politicalintegration
owea considerable
intellectual
debttoearlier
studies
ofnationalismtocybernetics
andsystems
theory.
The
studyofthenormative
conditions
forpolitical
community,
especially
charac-
teristic
of international
relations
in itsrststage,
gave
wayto specic
case
studies
andcomparative
analyses
ofintegration,
atboththeglobal
andthere-
gional
levels,
although
scholars
concerned
withthedevelopment
ofempiri-
cally
based
theory
have
usually
hadastrong
interest
inthenormative
impli-
cations
of integration.
Theearlier
work,especially
of KarlDeutsch,
on
transactions
asindicators
ofintegration
ledtofurther
suchefforts,
especiall
in the1970s.
Such
studies,
discussed
in Chapter
10,examined
andin some
cases
refined
relationships
amongtransactions,
such
asexchanges
ofpeople
andtradeows,communication
patterns,
andmemberships
andvoting
be-
haviorin international
organizations.
Towhatextent,
andunderwhatcondi-
tions,
aresuch
types
oftransactions
likelytotransform
theglobal
system
of
theearlytwenty-first
century?
Towhatextentaresuchforcesat workin the
EUandelsewhere
in theearlytwenty-first
century
aspartof thephenomena
calledglobalization?
Integration
theoryhasalsoincluded efforts
toconceptualize
morefully
thelinkages
among institutional
growth,intergovernmental
cooperation,
and
eliteandmassattitudesthatis,to consider
integration
asa phenomeno
having
institutional
andattitudinal
dimensions.
At thesame time,aneedre-
mains
forgreaterdenitional
andconceptual
clarityin theintegration
litera-
ture.Thisis a taskthathasattracted
attention,
including
theneofunctionalist
renement of propositionswithrespect
to spillover.
Effortsto modifyor revise
existing
integration
*theory
byreference
to
theSEAandtheevolution
of theEUsince theearly1990s
isindicative
of such
aninterest.
Theachievement of greater
agreementamong writersaboutthe
634 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

natureof integration,its necessarycomponents,and the stagesand transfor-

mation rulesby which it is achieved,if suchprogressis indeedpossible,might
contribute to major breakthroughsin knowledgeabout the building and
disintegrationof political communities.The needexiststo developa theory,
or theories,of integrationencompassing interactionbetweenand amongof
cial elites(governmentaldecisionmakers),nonofcial elites(important non-
governmentalgroupsand actors),and the masslevel,astook placeat the end
of the 19805 when German unication was propelled forward by mass
demonstrationsthat far outpacedgovernments,which failed to understand
what was occurringto alter dramaticallythe internationalsystem.
To what extenthasintegrationtakenplace,or at leastbeenpressed forward
decisively,by nongovernmental elitesand by larger,broaderpublics?At what
level,and at what stagein an integrativeprocess,is supportat eachof theselev-
elsindispensable to success?Moreover,a theoryof integrationadequateto the
needsof the futureshouldprobablybe basedon conceptualization, includinga
processmodel:how andwhendoestheintegrativeprocessleadfrom a condition
of separateness to a conditiondenedaspoliticalcommunity,andwhat arethe
stagesand relevantindicatorsthat are presentduring the integrativeprocess?
Whatevermay be the answerto suchquestions,integrationas a processis dy-
namicby its verynatureandthereforewhat is considered to bean endstateto-
dayis but the continuationof a processthat mayyieldgreateror lesserintegra-
tion. What is lessintegratedtodaymay becomemoreintegratedtomorrow,iust
asthereverseprocess, diminishingintegrationor disintegration,
maytakeplace.

Subnational Forces

If a major thrust of scholarlyliteratureand thoughtin internationalrelations

theory has beento build political units beyondthe nationstate,there is evi-
denceof the needto place greateremphasison centrifugalor fragmenting
forces within the existing national units. Neither developednations nor devel-
oping stateshavebeenimmunefrom the riseof linguisticand ethnicnational-
ism. Even units such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States,
wherethe literatureof political science,in its conventionalwisdom,oncedis~
missed forces making for separatenessin favor of assumptionsabout the ho-
mogeneityof populationand in the caseof the United States,the melting
pothave faceddisintegrativeforces.Leavingasidethe collapseof the Soviet
Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, other states,including, for exam-
ple, Canada,Cyprus,Belgium,Nigeria,India, Pakistan,Sri Lanka,and Zaire,
have beenbesetwith separatistmovementsthat sometimeshaveresultedin
communal strife and, in some cases,even secessionand civil war, which have
sometimesraisedquestionsabout the political future of thesestates.If the
decadefollowing World War II was characterized by a movementtoward re-
gional organization,as reectedin the literatureof internationalrelations,it
wasfollowed by a periodof growing dissatisfactionby peoplesin manyparts
of the world with the political units in which theylive, andthis dissatisfaction
hasyet to run its course.The riseto political consciousness of largernumbers
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
iN1&#39;Ei2Iisr§
of previously
quiescentgroupsin.theyears
aheadislikelyto ..i_~:._
ll
problems
confronting
politicalentities
in manypartsof theworld.
notedelsewhere
inthischapter,
oneoftheprincipal
forces
shaping the;
systematthebeginningofthetwenty-first
century
isthequest oflarge-&#3
bersofgroupsinallparts
oftheworldforgreater
status,
power, recognitio
and participation. _
Althoughthecauses
of thisfermentarecomplex,
thosewhohaveex.
presseddissatisfactionwith the statusquo aspireto such goalsin order to
(1) gain a greatervoicein the decisionmaking
processof existingunits,
(2) achievein somecasesgreaterdecentralizationof power,or (3) replaceex-
isting units with wholly new structures.The early twenty-firstcenturyis an
era of oppositionto the bignessof units that reect impersonalforcesof bu-
reaucracyand technology-anera that hasspawnedliteratureon technology
and societyand,in particular,the effectsof technologyon political, social,and
economic
structures.37
Wefaceseveral
conictingforces,someof which,such
as technology, give impetus to larger political units; others contribute to the
perpetuationof existingpolitical units; and still othersenhancethe prospects
for the fragmentationof presentunits. The studyof suchforcesis a task that
will confront scholarsof internationalrelationsand policymakerswell into
the twentyrst century.In addition,both scholarsand policymakerswill con-
sider how to devisepolitical forms that reconcilethe needfor bignesswith
peoplesdesirefor local empowerment and freedom from centralized controls.
At the very least,however,an understandingof the natureof integrationand
the conditionsfor cooperationand political communitycould yield insights
into the processby which existingunits arefragmentedand into the necessary
conditions for integration.

Comparative International Studies and Decision Making

The effort to examine linkages betweenthe international systemand domestic
politics and to understand the domestic and international determinants of for-
eign policy reects the growth of interest in comparative international studies.
In the 1970s, increasedemphasiswas placed on the comparative study of for-
eign policy, although such interest was by no meansnew to international rela-
tions. Indicative of such interest are the quest for theoretical frameworks for
decision making and notably the conceptualization and research more than
two generationsagoof RichardC. Snyder38
andhis associates,
alongwith
sucheffortsas thoseof WolframF. Hanriederand JamesN. Rosenau.39
Events data analysis, together with the study of decision making, especially
under crisis conditions, is illustrative of an interest in the comparative study of
foreign policy, although the study of foreign policy on a comparative basishas
not been of any notable proportions. The end of the Cold War, together with
the emergence
of additionalstatesand the presumptionthat the world would
contain larger numbers of democracies,brought to the forefront the question
of the relationship between democracies and peaceful foreign policies.
Examined in Chapter 8, the large number of hypothesesgenerated by such
636 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY
INTO
THE.
THIRD
MILLENNIUM
literature
creates
anextensive
basis
forresearch
and
theory
building.
Towhat
extent,
and under
whatconditions,
dostates
with
representative
political
in-
stitutions
develop
similar
foreign
policies
andnational-security
approache
Forexample,
NATO,
which has
been
inaprocess
oftransforming
itself
since
theendoftheCold
War,iscomprised
ofmost
oftheworlds
mostadvance
democracies.
Suchstates
have
formed,
inNATO,analliance
thatisunprece-
dented
inthelevels
andtypes
ofcooperation
among
itsmembers.
Asinotherareas,
such
asconflict
andintegration,
numerous
propositions
about
decisionmaking
behavior
(see
Chapter
1])havebeen
generated
and
tested,
withvarious
results.
IntheCold
War
era,
theimportance
ofinterna-
tional
crises
ledtoafocus
ondecision
making
undercrisis
conditions.
The
po-
tential
linkage
between
theory
andpolicy
incrisis
decisionmaking
studies
con-
tributed
toa.growing
interest
incrisis
indicators
that
couldbemadeavailable
toofficial
policymakers.
Acapability
fortheanalysis
ofintelligence
andother
relevant
datawiththeuse
ofcrisis
indicators
would
haveobvious
implication
bothforcrisis
management
and decision
making
andforthedevelopmen
of
more
adequate
theories
ofcrisis
management,
escalation,
deescalation,
com-
munications,
andotherphenomenarelated
topatterns
ofinteraction
within,
between,
and
among decisionmaking
units.
With
theendoftheCold
War,the
need
remains
forcrisis
indicators,
especially
inaworld
inwhichthere
arelikely
tobegreater
numbers
ofconicts
withcrisis
potential.
TheoryandSecurityStudies
Closely
related
tocrisis
management
istheneed
forconceptualizatio
inthe
eldofsecurity
studies
thattakes
asfullaccount
aspossible
oftherapidly
changing
global
setting
andtherevolution
inmilitary
affairsthe
adaptatio
ofinformationage
technologies
towarfarein
order
tounderstand
both
the
meaning
ofsecurity
anditsrequirements.
The
study
ofsecurity
asacentra
component
ofinternational-relations
theory
isitself
interdisciplinary,
foriten-
compasses
thehistorical,
economic,
cultural,
andpsychological
dimensio
together
with
the
military,
political,
legal,
andtechnological
compone
Thestudyofmilitary
strategy
andthedevelopment
oftheories
ofsecurit
haveconcerned
boththescholarly
community
andthemilitary
toanunprece
dented
level
since
WorldWar 11,
although
thecauses
ofwar,theroleofmili-
tarypower,
thelegal
normsfortheuseofforce,
andtheconditions
under
whichalliances
areformedanddissolved
have
longbeen thefocal
point
of
muchof internationalrelations
theorizing.
Just
astheadventofnuclear
weapons andtheonset
oftheColdWar
framed
security
studies
formuch
ofthelatter
half
ofthe
twentieth
century,
the
collapse
oftheSoviet
Unionand
theemergence
ofnewissues
havehadama-
jorimpact
ontheeld,
whichcan
beexpected
tocontinue
well
intothenew
millennium.
Stephen
M.Walt
traces
what
hecalls
therenaissance
ofsecurit
studies
fromthemid-1970s
intothe19903.41
Among thetopics
thathave
sparked
theoretical
interest
are
theimpact
ofoffensive
anddefensive
advan
tages
onstrategy;
theeffects
ofdomestic
politics
onwar(are
democraci
less
 EMERGING SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS 637

warlike than nondemocracies?);the causesand consequencesof arms races

(under what conditions do arms races lead to war, and when and how do ar-
mamentscontributeto peace?); the sourcesand implicationsof military inno-
vation; the requirementsfor extendeddeterrence;the prospectsfor security
cooperation;and the role of military forcesin operationsother than war, in-
cludingpeacekeeping. In a major projectandpublicationthat assessed the im-
pact of the end of the Cold War on securitystudies,Richard Shultz,Roy
Godson,and Ted Greenwood,togetherwith severalother scholarsand secu-
rity studiesspecialists,
setforth an extensiveagendaof topicsthat includethe
relationshipbetweenmilitary capabilitiesand other forms of power;weapons
of massdestruction,proliferation,and deterrence; armscontrol; conventional
forces;the environmentand security;regionalsecuritysystems;low-intensity
conict; the defensedecision-making process;andthe role of ethicsandvalues
in nationalsecurity.
Thedevelopment of nuclearweapons,
togetherwith theemergence
of the
United Statesas a global superpowerin the aftermathof World War II, to an
unprecedented
extentattracted
scholars
to thestudyof security.
Theresultwas
seminaltheoreticalanalyses,the purposeof which was to createa strategic
frameworkwithin which nuclearweaponscould be integratedinto the other
meansof statecraftandnational-securitypolicy.This work producedan abun-
dant literatureon the natureof, and conditionsfor, the deterrenceof war be-
tweenthepossessorsof nuclearweapons. Its focus,asnotedelsewherein this
text, wasescalation,
forcesurvivability,
nuclearretaliation,risk taking,crisis
management, andassureddestruction
asa basisfor preventing theoutbreakof
atomic warfare.Yet, existingtheoriesremaininadequatein severalrespects.
First,thedeterrence theoryof thenuclearagewasbased, for themostpart,on
strategic-nuclear bipolarity.ThepostColdWarsecuritysettingis character-
izedincreasingly bylargernumbers of statesandactorsotherthanstatescapa-
bleof acquiringnuclearweapons andothertypesof weapons of massdestruc-
tion (WMD)namely, biologicalandchemical capabilities.
Statedin practical
andspecificterms,whataretheconditions, includingtheforcelevels,neces-
saryfor deterrence in a worldof several, or many,possessors of suchcapabili-
ties?Alternatively,it hasbeenhypothesized thatnuclearmultipolarityreduces
therisksof nuclearconfrontation by makingit impossible for anysinglenu-
clearpowerto destroytheretaliatorycapabilityof allnotperhaps evenseveral
other nuclearpowers.Amongthe questionsthat shouldbe addressed is
whetherandto whatextent,if at all, nuclearmultipolaritywill enhance the
prospects for stabledeterrence,or whetherandunderwhatcircumstances
nuclearproliferation, ipsofacto,is undesirable, asis generallyassumed.
A second probleminherentin deterrence theoryis ambiguityin themean-
ingof rationalitytheassumption of a calculus between potentialriskandpo-
tentialgain.American strategictheoryhascontained sucha calculusderived
largelyfrom a projectionto adversaries of whatfor theUnitedStateswould
constitute
unacceptable
damage
in a nuclear
exchange.
Arecalculations
made
in America,
or in anyotherstatein fact,accurate
in a postColdWarworldin
whichpeopleshavewidelydifferingvaluesystems, cultures,conceptions
of
638 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY:INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

national
security,
andinternationalobiectives?
In a worldof additional
WMD
possessors,
aboutwhosepoliticalandculturalvalues
littlemaybeknown,to
what extent will deterrenceneed to be customized?What might deter a
Saddam
Husseinmightbedifferentfromwhatwouldbeeffective
againstan-
otheractor.Closely
related
arebasicdifferences
between
states,
assuggested
in
Chapter
8,in strategicmilitary
doctrines
andconceptions
of theadequacy
of
forcelevelsfor attainingtheir respective
objectives.
Suchissuesenhance
the
needfor a greater
emphasis,in security
studies,
onthecomparative
studyof
militarystrategy
andpolicyandonforcelevels andtheircomposition
within
thecontextof valuesandcultureasthenumberof diverse
possessors
of such
capabilities
grows.
Such
comparative
research
mightyieldinsights
intosuch
is-
suesasthepurposes of strategy
andits relationshipto forcelevels,political
goals,andthenonmilitary dimensions
of security;
thedecisionmaking process
withrespect to strategicmilitary
capabilities
andotherelements of statecraft;
thepropensity of states
to invokevariousformsof militarypowerto achieve
politicalobjectives;
andthehistorical,
doctrinal,andpsychological factorsthat
shape thepropensitiesof diverse
groupsto resortto violenceor to threatento
do so on behalf of their respectiveinterests.
Until the 1980s,the focal point of nucleardeterrence was offense
dominancetheabilityof a stateto inict unacceptable
levelsof devastation
onits adversary
asa basisfor deterring
theuseof forcebyeithersideunder
conditionsin whichbothwouldbedestroyed.
President
Reagans
March23,
1983,address,
whichposed
thequestion
of whethernuclear
weapons couldbe
madeimpotent
andobsolete
bythecreationof themeans
of strategic
defense,
formedthebasisnot onlyfor research
on suchtechnologies,
but alsofor the
development of a deterrenceparadigm based on defense.Totheextentthat
technologies leading to thedeployment of missile
defenseemergein theyears
justahead, asin thedecades of deterrence based onoffensedominance, there
is likelyto bea burgeoning literaturedesigned to buildandanalyze a para-
digmthatincludes anappropriate offense (retaliation)/defense
(denial) mix.
Thecreationof defensively
basedtheoreticaldeterrence
constructs
wouldin
themselves
represent
animportant
contribution
to strategic
theory.
In the
1990s,
thediscussion
of missile
defense
wasfueledbythethreatof prolifera-
tion, leadingto possessors
of nuclearandotherWMD capabilities
in regions
such as Southwest and Northeast Asia.
Amongthe otherfocalpointsof securitystudiesthat attractedinterest
in the 19805,and that can be expectedto endureis the ethicalbasisfor
conflict,spurred,
of course,
bythedilemmas of nuclear
deterrence.Suchin-
quirybuiltonthejust-wartradition.Its purposewasto effecta reconcilia-
tion,if possible,
between therequirements for deterrence
andtheethicsof
Westernsocietiesunder conditions of unprecedented
weaponsdestructive-
ness.The resultwasan effort to makeexplicitthe assumptions
on which
alternative schoolsof deterrencewere basedand to assessthe meansand
endsrelationships-orwhatcouldbetermedthe ethicof intentionandthe
ethicof consequence inherentin thethreatto usenuclearweapons,ascon-
trastedto their actualuse.Thegrowthin lethalityof nuclearweapons,and
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS 639

in othermeans
ofdestruction,
together
withwhatever
potential
emerges for
defensively
based
deterrence
in theyears
ahead,
canbeexpected
to givein-
creased
importance
to thestudyof ethicalissuesassociated
with deterrence
and security.
To a largeextent,theacademic
studyof security,
asreectedin its litera-
ture,hasbeenanAmerican preoccupation.
Thedangerinherentin sucha con-
dition,asColinGrayhassuggested,
isthattheUnitedStates
is onlyonecul-
ture,andfor a eldof inquiryascriticalto thehumanfutureasstrategic
studies
toberooted insonarrow andunique asetofpredispositions
canonly
impoverish
its capacity
to accommodate
thetruediversity
of strategic
styles
thatexists
worldwide.44
Because
thearmed
conicts
ofthefutureencompas
as directparticipants
a hostof actorsotherthantheUnitedStatesor other
Western nations,theneedwill beapparent
for anunderstanding
of diverse
cul-
tures,historical
factors,
differing
valuesystems,
andgeostrategic
relationships
In short,security
studiescanbeseparatedfromareaandcountrystudies only
atgraveperilbecausethestrategic
culture
withinwhichconictunfoldsrepre-
sentsa necessary
pointof departure
for understanding
thecauses
of war,the
conditions
for deterrence,
thewaysin whichforcewill beused,andthebasis
forconictresolution.
Thegrowthof interest
in thestudyof low-intensity
con-
ict andethnicandsectarian conict pointsup the needfor suchan under-
standing of thevariousstatesandregionsasthesettingfor suchwars.
In recentyears,thefocusof securitystudies,to a certainextentreecting
the multidimensional natureof conict in a heterogeneous globalinterna-
tionalsystem,
hasbroadened to takegreater
account of thepervasive
impact
of technology
onstrategy
andto giveincreasedplaceto theemergence
of new
typesof conictandactors.
Thisincludesinterest
in thedomesticandpsycho-
logical variablesassociatedwith deterrence;the examinationof deterrence
and war in nonnuclear
situations;greaterattentionto historyto assess
its
lessons
for contemporary
andfuturearmedconict;andtherelationships
amongeconomicfactors,military power,and conict.
Thisfocusalsoencompasses
thestudyof theimplications
of rapidtechno-
logical changefor the conductof warfare,or what has beenidentied as the
revolutionin militaryaffairs.If wehaveenteredaneraof postinternational
re-
lations,asa resultof phenomena associated
withpostindustrial
societies,
it be-
comesessentialto understandthe resultingramicationsfor armedconict.
In U.S.military literature,thereis increasingdiscussion
of what is termed
informationagewarfare.Technologies of unprecedented
sophisticationconfer
unparalleledcapacityto collect,analyze,and distributeinformationto render
thebattlespacetransparent andto deliverprecisionrepowerto targets.What
is termedthedigitizedbattleeld,it is suggested,
separates theconductof fu-
turewarsfromthepastasgreatlyasWorldWarII blitzkriegdifferedfromthe
trenchwarfareof WorldWarI. By thesametoken,themeaningof strategic
warfaremaybetransformed by theabilityof stateandnonstate actorsto dis-
ablebankingtransfers, stockexchanges, andvital communications systems,
usingthetoolsavailableto thecomputer hacker.In short,theagendaof secu-
rity studiesis increasedby the impact of technologiesthat havean effecton
640 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY:
INTOTHETHIRDMILLENNIUM

strategy,
deterrence,
andmilitary
operations»
-onthetheory
andpractice
of
postmdustrial
warfare.
Thatimpact
needs
tobediscussed,
and,inrecent
years,
it hasbecome
theobjectof investigation
withintheeldof security
studies.
If traditional
concepts
ofsecurity
hadastheirfocus
state-to-state
conict,
thegrowing numbersofwarsinwhichoneormoreactors
werenotstates
has
beenreectedin theliteratureof theeld. MartinvanCreveldhasreferredto
a classical,
trinitarian
paradigm
based
onthestate,
itsmilitarycapabilities,
anditspopulation.
Totheextent
thatwehave
entered
aneraofpolitical
fragmentation
thatincludes
agrowthinungovernability
atthestate
level,
it
followsthat civil wars,ethnicconicts,andreligiouswarsform a growing
partof security
studies.
Interstate
warhasbeena deningcharacteristic
of theinternational
system
based
ontheprimacyof stateactors.
If postmternational
politicsgivespromi-
nence
to nonstate
actors,theemphasis of security
studies
will bechanged as
well.Although
clearly
apartofapostinternational
politics
paradigm,
civilcon-
ict antedates
theinternationalsystem.
In thissense,
patterns
ofwarfare before
theformationof thestatesystemmayprovideinsights
intothetypesof armed
conictthatwill characterize
thefuture.47
AsEdward
Kolodziej
suggests,
thesecurity
environment
described
in the
seventeenth
century
byThomas Hobbes wasbasedonthedestructive
impulses
unleashed
bytheEnglish
civilwar,notthestate
systemofEurope,
whichwas
onlyintheprocess
offormation
withtheTreaty
ofWestphalia
of1648,
with
whichtheinternal
conictin England
coincided
in time/&#39;8
Ofcourse,
thestate
system
itselfhasbeen
thelocus
of numerous
internal
wars,including
the
American
andFrench
revolutions
of theeighteenth
centuryandtherevolu-
tionsthatswept
Russia
andChina
inthetwentieth
century
andotherregions
fromAfricato Asia.Certainof theserevolutions
andotherpoliticalmove-
ments
spawned
totalitarian
regimes
thatinicted
brutalrepression
ontheirin-
habitants.
Themillionswhohavediedin theconcentration
campsandprisons
ofsuchsocieties
bringanewdimension
tothemeaning
ofsecurity,
dened
in
itsbasicelement
asfreedom
frompoliticaloppression.
In aneraof postCold
Warethniccleansing
interritories
oftheformer
Yugoslavia,
weneednotlook
farto ndspoignant
examples of suchproblems
ofsecurity.
Theyinclude
ac-
tionsbysuccessor
states
to eliminate
undesired
ethnic
groups.
Theyencom-
pass
violence
against
theKurdish
andShiite
populations
ofIraqbySaddam
Hussein.
Violence
bystates
andnonstate
actors
against
weaker groups
canbe
expected
toincrease
inscopeandintensity
inaneraofpolitical
fragmentatio
Theemergingconict
mapwillbebasedonachangingsecurity
setting
that
hasbeendescribed
extensively,
if notcompletely,bycontributions
to postCold
Warinternational-relations
theoryliterature.
In itssecurity
dimensions,accord-
ingtoRichard
Shultz,
RoyGodson,
andGeorge
Quester,
weconfront
what
theyterma bifurcated
environment
thatcontains
botha state-centric
anda
trans-state
paradigm. Thisincludes
state
actors
driven
byradicalforms
ofna-
tionalismandfundamentalism,
andpossiblyarmedwith WMD. Suchstates
willoftenbeprepared
tosupport
terrorism
asaninstrument
ofsecurity
policy.
Thus,asin Southwest
andNortheast
Asia,thespecter
ofmajorregional
con-
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS

flictswillcontinue
tobepresent
intheforrn
ofstatetostate
warfare.
Thepm;
liferation
ofWMDandthewideravailability
ofadvanced
conventional
capa-.
bilitieswill shapetheemerging securitylandscape.
At thesametime,thetrans-
stateparadigm, theseauthorssuggest,will bebasedon a process
of political
fragmentation, in whichstatesdisintegrate
andloseboththeauthorityandthe
powerto govern.This paradigmhighlightsthe development
of largernumbers
of substate
andtransnationalactors,whichincluderadicalethnicgroups,Se-
cessionist
movements,religiousmilitants,criminalorganizations,
terrorists,
and insurgents.Takentogether,they will be major sourcesof instability,dis-
ruption, and armedconict. Largegeographicalareaswill becomelessgov-
ernable, or even ungovernable, at least by existing states. As a result of the
greater numbers and types of such state and trans-state actors, the conict
spectrumwill broadenand with it the denition and scopeof securityand
thus the agendafor the study of securityand the developmentof theories
about security.
As a result, there is a need for continued theory-building efforts focused
on the enduringquestionof the causesof war; the deterrenceparadigmwith
respectto offenseand defensedominance;the impactof new technologiesin
deterrence, conict, and war; the cultural dimensions of conict; national-
security decision making in crisis and noncrisis situations, especially in com-
plex organizational contexts; the nexus, to the extent that it exists, between
deterrencestability (offensivelyor defensivelybased)and armscontrol; prolif-
eration and counterproliferation related.to weapons of mass destruction and
conventional weapons;the impact of domestic politics (especiallyin pluralistic
societies)on nationalsecuritypolicy; conceptsof securityin their military,
economic, and political dimensions under conditions of regional and global
interdependence;the basis for conventional deterrenceif nuclear-baseddeter-
rent relationshipsdiminish;the causes,varieties,strategies,and effectsof ter-
rorism; the role of military forces in operations other than war such as peace-
keeping, peaceenforcement,and humanitarian activities; and the implications
of ungovernabilityin existingand fragmentingstatesfor conict. Last but not
least information warfare in the form of efforts to disable the vital infrastruc-
ture, including central banking systemsand transportation nodes of advanced
societies
havealreadybecomean importantobjectof studyand analysis.
Thus,thereis an abundantagendafor securitystudies,
in both the buildingof
theory and inevitably the generation of policy options having relevance in a
conict-laden world.

Power

Although it remainsa centralconceptespeciallyin realisttheory,power has

alwaysbeendifficult to measure,aswe haveindicatedin Chapters1 and2. As
a multifacetedphenomenon, the conceptof poweris inextricablylinked to al-
ternativestructuresof the internationalsystem,based,for example,on unipo-
larity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. Polarity as a structuralcharacteristicof
the internationalsystemconnotesnot only the numberand typesof actors,
642 INTERNATIONAL
RELAT
IONS
THEORY:
INTO
THE
THIRD
MILLENNIUM
but
also
the
distribution
ofcapabilities,
orpower,
among
them.
Hence,
aneces-
sary
prerequisite
structure
for thetounderstanding
behavioral the
patterns implications
ofactors inof
lies theinternationa
study system
ofpoweritself.
IfVite
may foresee
thegrowth
innumber ofinternational
actorsstate
and non-
state-into
thetwenty-rst
destructiveness
andnew century,
conflict together
issues, with
itfollows weapons
thatthe of
studyunpreced
ofpower inits
manydimensionsmilitary,
continue
toholdimportanteconomic,
interest.
The psychological,
study andideologic
ofproliferation
asacentral
issue
forearly
twentyrstcenturyinternationalpolitics
isinfactthestudyof the
spread
of power,
Equally especially
notable intheform of weapons
hasbeena lack of concern
ofmass
forthe destruction
analysis
ofthe tech
niques
ofstatecrafthow power has been actually
usedto &#39;
especie
achiev
havepointed out,emphasis
objectives.
within Instead,
asnumerous commentators
international-relations
literature,especially
sinceWorldWar II,has
been
placed
stead
ofthe onthestudy
of
instrumentsthepolicy
bywhich processhow
policy ismade andpolicy
the is
formulat
actual
outputs in-
ofthe
process.
To
according
tothe
extent
David that
studies
Baldwin,
theirofpower
emphasis have
has been
been comparativ
the in
comparisonofscop
actor
rather
than oftechniques.
InBaldwins perspective,
theneedexists
tofind
answers
tosuch questions
as what types ofinuence are
likely
tosuccee in
achieving
their
stated
objectives.
What techniques,
including
violent
and non
violent
means, together
orinisolationfrom one another,
canbeexpect to
succeed
ortofail?
Forexample,under what conditions
are economicemba
goes
likely
have
the tobemoreuseful
restrictions
inforeithan
311
military
trade and invasions?
the8rantin
How
Sof
and
forei towhat
8naid beeneffe
use
astechniques
ofstatecraft?

" &#39; &#39;

precise
understandi
of
nomic
instruments
and
theother
elements
of
power
and
inuence
ofsecurity
goals.
that
Such
are
available
afocus
can
to
be
and
are
actually
expected
employed
togrow
inpurs
inimportanc
Itnot
only
represents
alogical
extension
ofstudies
ofpower
butalso
isintegr
to
work
that
seeks
more
fully
tolinkeconomic
elements
asnecessary
comp
nents
ofinternational
politics.
Suchanintegral
relationship
issymbol by
the
older
term
political
economy
andisembodied
incontempora
writin
asnoted
elsewhere
inthis
text,
or,
forexample,
intheories
related
toregim
analysis
and hegemony.
Nevertheless,
powercan
be expected
toremain
anim
portant,
but
inadequately
understood,
variable,
ifonly
because
ofits
mult
eted
nature
and
asaresult
ofthe
fact
that
power
isrelational.
Whether
agiven
amount
ofpower
provides
ameans
toward
the
achie
mentofgoals
depends,
ofcourse,
onwhat
are
theobjectives
forwhich
pow
istobeemployed.
However,
power
consists
ofphysical
instrumen
such
as
military
forces
and
inthe
capabilities
exist high-tech
components
astrategic ofthe
context.
How
are information
they
tobe societ
Su
organize
orma
imized
forsome
purpose?
How
this
isdone
isthe
essence
ofstrategy
Thu
 EMERGING
SUBSTANTIVE
INTERESTS 643

Comparative
andTransnational
Research
Thelate-twentieth-century
tendency
toward
a more
comparative
focusin
international-relations
research
hasbeen
reected
inagrowth
ofinterest
ina
broad
range
ofsubnational
issues.52
They
include
fundamentalist
movemen
ethnic
conict,
thepolitical
values
ofelites,
political
fragmentation,
ungovern
ability,
violent
conict,
environmentalissues,
andthenature
ofpostindustr
industrial,
orindustrializing
societies.
Asinthepast,
wewillbefaced
with
both
toomuchandtoolittledata
fordevelopment
oftheories
aboutsuch
phe-
nomenaandtheir
relationship
toeachother.
Ontheone hand,
vastamount
ofdata
arebecoming
available
asaresult
ofthetechnologies
oftheinforma-
tionage.
Without
leaving
home
oroffice,
aresearcher
cangain
access
toli-
braries
and
other
data
sources
around
theworld.
Nevertheless,
manyofthe
mostimportant
kinds
ofinformation
relevant,
forexample,
tothestudy
of
foreignpolicy
decision
making
(including
health
records
andpsycholo
proles
ofdecision
makers)
are
noteasily
gathered
and,
infact,
may never
beavailable
tothescholar.
Much ofdecision-making
analysis
hasemphasi
international
crises,
which
are,asThomas
C.Wiegele
suggested,
stress-
inducing
situations,
the
effect
ofwhich
istoput
pressures
upon
the
foreig
policy
decision-maker.54
Itfollows
that,
asthe
author
concluded,
biologi
factors
such
asphysical
andmental
health,
fatigue,
age,
biological
rhythm
and
theuse
ofvarious
forms
ofmedication
should
beincluded
instudies
of
crisis
decision
making.
This
inturnpoints
uptheneed
forresearch
onthe
intersection
between
psychological
variables
and decision-making
variable
Informationage
technologies
nowmake it possible
tomakeavailab
greater
volumes
ofdata
from
governmental
sources
forthe
use
ofthe
schola
community.
The
diffusion
ofcomputer
technology
tooffice,
classroom
and
home
desktop
and
theacquisition
ofcomputer
skills
onamassive
scale
canbe
expected
toinuence
both
the
study
and
the
analysis
ofinternational
relation
in
ways
that
areunprecedented.
This
includes
the
instantaneous
transmis
of
datafrom
storage
systems,
including
bibliographic
arid
literature
surveys,
quan
titative
materials,
andother
information.
Thecumulative
effect
isalready
toen-
hancegreatly
the
humancapacity
forscholarly
research
and
analysis.
Clear
wehave entered
anera
inwhichtheability
tousecomputers
willcontinue
to
bevastly
enhanced
totheextent
that
complex problems
canbesolved at
speeds
unimaginable
computer-based
data
just
afewdecades
"sources
oreven
contributes
years
greatly
ago.
tothe
The creation
conduct
ofglob
ofresearch
inin-
ternational
relations
andother
social
sciences.
Data sources
arealready
asclos
tothe
researcher
as
thenearest
computer,
thusconferring
unparalleled
mean for
ascertaining
rapidly
theavailability
of,andforgaining
immediate
access
to,rele
vantsource
materials,
bothinthe
formofbibliography
andinformation
abou
thetopic.
Thediffusion
ofcomputerized
dataadquisition
and processin
cap
bilities,
and
theexpansion
ofcomputer
literacy,
hasalready
provided
unpre
dented
means
fortheconduct
ofresearch
and also
fordistance
learninor
Internet-mediated
instruction,
thus
creating
thepossibility
ofvirtual
univer
and
global
learning
programs
byexisting
educational
institutions.
644 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

POLICYMAKING AND INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS

THEORY
If we did not havetheoryboth for theconductandanalysisof policy,we would
haveto inventit. In point of fact, sincewe beganto think about policy,from
the ancientworld forward into the presentera,we havebeeninventingtheory.
How elsecouldwe makea semblance of senseaboutthephenomena that form
the basisfor policy?Theterm theory,in its mostbasicmeaning,asdiscussed in
Chapter1,is speculation
abouttherelationship
between
phenomena,
including
systematicreectiondesigned to explainandshowhow theyarerelatedto each
otherin a meaningful,intelligentpattern,insteadof beingmerelyrandomitems
in an incoherentuniverse.Thereare particularleadersor statesmen who have
themselves
embodied
theoriesthat standout. Oneexample
that immediately
comes to mind is Winston Churchill. In a 1936 address he declared:

Thosewho arepossessed of a denite bodyof doctrineand of deeply-rooted

con-
victionsupon it will be in a muchbetterpositionto dealwith the shifts and sur-
prisesof dailyaffairsthanthosewhoaremerelytakingshortviews,andindulging
their naturalimpulsesastheyareevokedby what theyreadfrom day to day.
Churchillhimselfhad a definite bodyof doctrine that we could describe
and evaluateboth astheoristsandpolicymakers. Anotherexampleis to be
foundin HenryKissinger, whosewritingsandpolicychoicesfurnisha rich
sourceof theoryfor theanalysis
of policy.Forexample,
at thebeginning
of his
work on greatpower diplomacyand the end of the Napoleonicwars,
Kissinger wrote:
Whenever
peace<:onceived
astheavoidance
of warhas beentheprimaryob-
jectiveof a poweror a group of powers,the internationalsystemhasbeenat the
mercyof the mostruthlessmemberof the internationalcommunity.Wheneverthe
internationalorderhasacknowledged that certainprinciplescouldnot becompro-
misedevenfor the sakeof peace,stabilitybasedon an equilibriumof forceswasat
least conceivable.57

Here is an exampleof principlesthat, accordingto Kissinger,form a basisfor

statecraft.Thispassage
alsohelpsto illuminateKissingers
own conception
and theoretical framework.
AsWethinkabouttherelationship between theoryandforeignpolicy,it is
importantalsoto recognize thelimitsof theory.As RichardSmokehassug-
gested,
policymakers havelittle interest,perse,in howoftena particularcom-
binationof variables
hasbeenpresent in a historicalcontext,unless,
of course,
that combinationis presentin a current situation of immediateinterest.
Therefore,it is by no meansaccidentalthat the scholarinterestedin basicre-
searchandtheoryandthepolicymakerconcernedwith the immediatehaveof-
ten had interestsseeminglyirrelevantto eachother.Much of international-
relationsresearch may seemnot only unintelligible,but alsoirrelevantto the
immediate
concernof thepolicymaker,
asperhaps
indeedit is. Althoughit is
difcult to assess
with precisionthe impactof international-relations
research
 POLICYMAKING
ANDINTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS
THEORY 645

on policymakers,nevertheless
the policy communityhasmadeextensiveuseof
academic
writings.In particular,aswehavealreadynoted,thedevelopment
in
internationalrelationsof a subeld in strategicaffairs or national or interna-
tionalsecurity
studies,
especially
deterrence
anddefense,
hasfurnished
a body
of literatureonwhichpolicymakers
havedrawnnot onlyinsights,butalsothe
theoreticalframeworkandthe explicitassumptions on which,for example,
UnitedStatesstrategic-nuclear
forceshavebeenbased.To an unprecedented
extent,thedevelopment andstudyof strategyand,morebroadly,militaryaf-
fairs,havepassedfromtheprofessionalmilitaryto thecivilianpolicyanalysts
and theorists.As we notedin Chapter11, gamingexercises designedto sensi
tize policymakers,includingthoseat the highestlevel,to the opportunitiesand
constraintsconfrontingthem, especiallyin hypotheticalinternationalcrises,
are widely usedin the official policy community.Suchmodelsboth draw on
and contribute to the academic literature in the eld of simulation.
Ideally,the longer-range
outcomeof theorybuildingand testingwould be
to producea bodyof knowledge
thatwouldexplainandperhaps
evenpredict
patternsof interactionamongpolitical variables.Sucha goal remainsunful-
lled, andit is unlikelysoonif everto comeabout,for epistemological
and
methodologicalreasonsdiscussedin this and variousother chapters.Never-
theless,it would beusefulat leastto be ableto specifywith a higherdegreeof
certaintythan now exists,for example,the conditionsessentialto political in-
tegrationwithin a nationalor internationalcontext,or to statewith a greater
degreeof precision,within carefullyspeciedparameters,the conditionsthat
giverise to particularforms of conict. If the study of international-relations
theory wereto reachthis stageof development,we would haveachievedan
understandingof thoseinternationalphenomenadeemedmost important to
scholars,
andwewouldhavedeveloped
a bodyof theoriesof importance
to
the policymaker.
Among the ultimate benefitsof our ability to developand test theories
aboutsuchphenomenaaspolitical integrationor internationalconict would
be a seriesof if-then propositionsrelevantto the needsof both scholarsand
policymakers.For example,a greaterknowledgeof the essentialconditions
for integrationor conict would makepossiblean understandingof alterna-
tive outcomesof variouspolicy choicesbecause certainkinds of policy choices
couldbeexpected
to producecertainkindsof outcomes.
A newlinkagebe-
tweeninternational-relations theory and policy formulationwould havebeen
forged,unless,of course,an understandingof the implicationsof alternative
policy outcomespermittedpolicymakersto alter the basicvariableson which
the theory was basedand thus to invalidatethe theory itself. Herein may lie
one of the fundamentaldifferencesbetweentheory building in the physical
and naturalsciences andtheorybuildingin the socialsciences:doesthe capac-
ity exist in the latter casefor the objectsof studyhuman beingsto effect
changesin their behavioras a result of knowledgegainedfrom a particular
theoryof behavior?In this respect,political andsocialphenomena, aswe have
notedelsewhere, differ fundamentallyfrom elementsin a testtube.
646 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

The literature of international relationstraditional and contemporary,

qualitativeand quantitative-containsassumptions and conclusionsthat may
haverelevanceto the policymaker.Policydecisionsare frequentlydictatedby
the underlyingassumptionsof the policymaker,eventhough theseassump-
tions may be only implicitly stated,or perhapsnot evenrecognizedas such.
One objectiveof the studyof internationalrelations,we noteparenthetically,
should be to sensitizeeach of us to the assumptions,or the propositions, con-
tainedin our respectivetheoriesof internationalrelations,or to help us and
policymakersto assessthe assumptionson which policy choicesare based.
Suchan understandingis indispensable, whetherwe are policymakersor ob-
serversof the political process.As Trevor Taylor has suggested, one of the
functions of international relations is the development of explicitly stated as-
sumptionsand propositionson which to baseresearchand policy, sinceall
analysesof a problemof internationalrelationsor foreignpolicy rest on hy-
potheses
of somekind.
For this reason,the needexiststo engagein a systematicexaminationof
the assumptions that guidepolicymakersin the formulationof major policies.
Policy statementscan be analyzedto understandthe assumptionsthat guide
policy choices.An attemptshouldbe madeto match,compare,and contrast
suchassumptions andpolicieswith assumptions andpoliciescontainedin the-
oreticallyorientedliteratureof internationalrelations,both asa meansof test-
ing theoriesandasan aid to policymaking.Suchan inventoryandmatchingof
major assumptions,theories,and ndings about internationalphenomena
from policy statementsand from the literature of international relations
would enhancethe relevanceof academic researchto the needsof the policy-
maker. An exercise of this kind could provide insights into the theories, ex-
plicit or implicit, that guidepolicymakers,and it would contributeto a better
understandingof thosetheoriesof internationalrelationsthat havehad the
greatestimpacton thoughtin the policy community.

THEORIZING ABOUT THE FUTURE

Althoughfor centuries,
effortshavebeenmadeto setforth conceptions
of thefu-
ture, the needfor more systematicforecasts(the developmentof statements
about the future to which is attached a higher or lower probability, as in a
weather forecast basedon, say,a 30 or 60 percent probability of rain or snow)
hasgrown with the rapidity of changeand the increasingcomplexityof issues
and urgentproblemsfacingpolicymakers. Theresulthasbeenthe emergence of
the futurologist,who seeksto inventthe futurethroughtechnologicalforecast-
ing. If suchmeans
couldclarifythechoices
available
by reducing
uncertainty
aboutthe future,it might becomepossibleto calculatemoreaccuratelythe lead
time andthe resources neededfor alternativepolicychoices.Forecasts
aboutfu-
turepatternsof interactionamongvariables,especiallyresources,
haveexistedat
leastsincethe writingsof ThomasMalthusin thelateeighteenth century.In the
late twentiethcentury,therewas renewedinterestin forecasting,includingthe
 THEORIZING ABOUT THE FUTURE 647

development
of a series
of neo-Malthusian
projections
intoa futureallegedly
characterized
bypopulation
pressure,
resource
scarcity,
environmental
degrada-
tion, andtechnological
change.Whateverelsecanbesaidabouttheworld of the
earlytwenty-rst century,
it will containburgeoning populations with likely
heightenedcompetitionforresourcesandatthesame timeanunprecedented dif-
fusionofeconomic andtechnologicalcapabilities
tonewactors onaglobalscale.
Therapidityof change,togetherwiththeurgency of problems facingpo-
liticalsystemspostindustrial,industrial,
andlessdevelopedtogether with
thequestfor asrelevanta eld of inquiryaspossible,
islikelyto giveincreas-
ing impetusandimportance
to the development
of futurology.Nonetheless,
straightline
projections
will benomoreadequate
in thefuturethantheywere
in thepast.Thequestionof courseis which,if any,of thetrendsthat canbe
discernedin a presentcontextwill be operativein a future time frame.What
newforces
will intervene
to shape
thefuture?
If projections
based
largelyon
extrapolating
thefuturefromthepresentareinadequatein themselves,
canal-
ternativehypothetical
futureinternational
systems,
or theirsubsystems,
bede-
veloped?
Suchan exercise
places
a highpremium
on creative
imagination
aboutthe futureand on the generation
of hypotheses
aboutvariablesand
aboutinteractionamong variables,
all of whichmayhavelittleor noplacein
todaysschemeof things.
Technologies thatcannotpresentlybeforeseenmay
transformthefuture,justastechnologiesthatwerenotimaginable a century
ago,or even50yearsago,haveprofoundlyalteredtheworldleadinginto the
twenty-rstcentury.Suchhypotheticalmodelsof international systems have
theiranalogyin deductive
theory,asdiscussedin Chapter.1.Theprojectionof
existingtrendsfromthepresentto thefuture,in turn,is analogous to induc-
tivetheory,considered
in thesamechapter.Hence,understanding theforces
shapingtheemerging worldliesin thecreativeinterminglingof inductiveand
deductiveapproaches to futurology.
This is not to suggestthat theoriesof internationalrelations can ever
achievea levelof predictabilityevenaboutexistingphenomenasufcientto
makepossiblea high degreeof specicityof alternativepolicychoices.To
holdsuchexpectations
of international-relations
theory,
giventhemanyvari-
ablesthat mustbeconsidered,
wouldbeto anticipatea levelof performance
thatliesbeyond
eventhetheories
in thephysical
sciences.
AsMortonKaplan
has suggested:

Moderntheoreticalphysicalsciencehasrearedits presentlofty ediceby setting

itselfproblems
thatit hasthetoolsor techniques
to solve.Whennecessary, it has
limitedruthlessly
thescope
of itsinquiry.
It hasnotattempted
to predict
thepath
a ippedchairwill take,thepathsof theindividual
-particles
of anexploded
grenade, or thepathsof theindividualmoleculesof gasin a chamber.
In thelat-
ter case,therearelawsdealingwith thebehaviorof gases undergivenconditions
of temperature andpressure,butthesedealwith theaggregate behaviorof gases
andnotthebehaviors of individualparticles.
Thephysicistdoesnotmakepredic-
tionswith respectto matterin generalbut only with respectto the aspects of
matterthat physicsdealswith; andthese,by denition,arethephysicalaspects
of matter.
648 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

Tocomplicate furthertheprospectsfor anexplanatory

andpredictivethe-
ory of international
relations,therehasbeenincreasing
discussion
of theim-
plications
of chaos
theoryfor suchtheoretical
development.
In thephysical
sciences,
according
to chaostheory,nearlyidenticalentities,suchasclouds,in
similar environmentscanbehaveradicallydifferentlyfrom eachother.Chaos,
or unpredictability,
appears in systemsthat arein theprocess of transforma-
tion and subjectto inuencesfrom within themselves and from their sur-
roundingenvironmental circumstances.If systems, or certaincategories
of sys-
tems,areinherentlychaotic,predictionwill fail. Are thereunderlyingcausal
lawsleadingto divergence amongvariablesthat producethe discontinuous
behaviorrepresented by chaos? To understand thenatureof suchlawsforms
the essence
of an understandingof chaostheory.If relativelysimplesystems
have discontinuitiesthat are largely unpredictable,it follows that the
prospects
for chaosgrowasthecomplexityof thesystemincreases.
If chaos
characterizesbehaviorwithin the physicalsciences,
it is saidto aboundin the
social sciences.To what extent are there categoriesof systemsthat display
chaoticbehavioror nonchaoticbehaviorin the physicalsciences? Canwe dis-
tinguishin thesocialsciences
between
chaoticandnonchaotic
systems?
Tore-
turn to an earlierdiscussionin this chapter,wasthe endof the Cold War illus-
trative of chaostheory in the form of a situationcharacterized
by large
numbersof variables,the behavioralpatternsof which were unpredictable
evento the directparticipants,and to thosewho observed the unfolding
eventsleadingto thecollapse
of theSovietUnionandits empire? Thus,chaos
theorycastsa longshadowovertheprospects for predictive
social-science
the-
ory unlesswecanseparate chaoticphenomena fromnonchaotic phenomena.
As we considerwhat the future will be like, we are dealingwith phe-
nomenaor unitsthat compriseindividualsor groupsof individuals,about
whosebehaviorwe havefar lessthan adequateinformation. Moreover,we
arelivingin a world of nonlinearity.
As TomCzerwinski suggests,theden-
ingfeaturesof linearityinclude. . . proportionality,additivity,replica-
tions,and demonstrability of causesand effects.53
By proportionality,he
meansthat smallinputs are likely to leadto smalloutputs,just asgreaterin-
putsproducelargerconsequences in an environment wherecausesand ef-
fectscan be measured with greatprecision.As in the linearmathematical
equation,thereis onlyonevalid answer.Czerwinski maintainsthat the lin-
earprincipleof additivityis basedon theassumption thatthewholeis equal
to the sumof its parts.If this is the case,it is possibleto engage
in reduc-
tionism. This meansthat a complicatedand large problem can be reduced,
or brokenup to createmoremanageable
pieces,assomanyof the theories
discussedin previouschaptersattempt to do. The variousconstituentparts
can be analyzed.
The assumption,of course,is that the cumulativeanalyticproduct representsa
valid derivativeof the original whole, faithful and complete.Replicationmeans
that the sameactionor experimentunderthe sameconditionswill comeout the
sameway; that resultsare repeatable,and therefore,independentlyveriable.
Finally,causeand effectare demonstrable. This canhappenin a numberof ways:
 THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE THEORY 649

observed, inferred, extrapolated, statistically validated, and so on. Therefore, the

nature of linear systemsis that if you know a little about their behavior, you
know a lot. You can extrapolate, changescales,and make projections with con-
dence. Unlike nonlinearity, in which 2+2 may yield oranges, in linearity you can
rely on the 4.64
Czerwinskithen denes nonlinearity as encompassing
suchconceptsas
chaos theory and complexity theory. By its very nature nonlinearity does not
conform to those qualities found in linearity. It lacks proportionality, additiv-
ity, or replicability.It is not easyto show causesand effects.Inputs and out-
puts are not likely to be proportional. The whole isnot equal to the sum of its
parts. Results cannot be assumedto be repeatable;the sameexperiment may
not come out exactly the sameway twice. A contributing causeto this condi-
tion is the phenomenon of nonlinear dynamics, whereby outcomes are arbi-
trarily sensitiveto tiny changesin initial conditions.As aresult,if you know a
little about a nonlinearsystem,you dont know a lot. We cannotextrapolate,
changescale,or project. The lack of predictabilityfrustratesplanning and
control, as we use the terms. Yet, the vastnessof the nonlinear world dwarfs
the linear. So we must learn to deal with it. 65
The fundamental question with which we are left as a resultof this analy-
sislinearity or nonlinearitywill the world of the early twentyrst century
display more of the features of nonlinearity than linearity? Given the growing
complexityandchaosthat we arelikely to facein somanyareas,the challenge
to theorybuildingwill continueto be formidable.
Nevertheless,theories examined in precedingchapters,to varying degrees,
have contained predictive statementsthat have enhanced,to a greater or lesser
extent,our understandingof a period after they wereformulated.For exam-
ple, Mackindersanalysisof the impactof the technologyof land mobility on
power relationshipsin Eurasia,as notedin Chapter4, is illustrativeof a ca-
pacity to makeuseof certainvariablesin combinationitoexaminethe future
with basic accuracy. Such variablesimplications of geography, resources,
andtechnologyfor nationalcapabilitiescan beusedin an analysisof the fac-
tors shapingthe world of the future.

THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE THEORY

Internationalrelationshas beenmarked by efforts to establishlinkagesbe-
tweennormativetheoryon the onehandand empiricaland analytictheoryon
the other. As we have noted in this and other chapters,the question of a value-
free study of politics is of longstandinginterest»
to studentsof politics, al-
thoughit is a matterof debatewhethersuchan objectiveis eitherdesirableor
attainable. Given the nature of the objects with which international relations
dealsand the enormouslyimportantquestionsassociated with war andpeace,
normativetheory can be expectedto remaincentralto this eld. One of the
leading proponentsof quantitatively basedscientic theory of the 19605,
RudolphRummel,writing in the mid-1970s,concludedthat humanbehavior
650 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY:INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

cannotbeunderstood by reference
to cause.
andeffectprocesses comparable
to thoseof physicalobjects.Because peopleare teleologically
guidedby
[their] future goals, Rummelmaintained,the future liesin [their] handsand
not in somecausative
features
of [their]environment
suchasdistance,
power,
geography,poverty,deprivation,and underdevelopment.66
Thus,Rummel
raised fundamentallyimportant questionsfor the conduct of scientic re-
searchaboutinternationalbehavior.Canthe humanbeingbestudiedscienti-
cally, for example,as one would study the interactionof elementsin a test
tube?If peopleareguidedin their politicalbehaviorby someobjective,is
thereaninherentandlogicalcontradictionin theideaof a value-free
studyof
politics?Doesthe veryselectionof the objector topic to bestudiedrepresenta
valuechoiceon the part of the studentor researcher? If theoryis a product of
socialConstructivism, as theoristsexaminedin Chapter4 suggest,the choice
of approaches, the issuesconsideredand the valueson which theory is based
arenecessarilythe productof who developsthe theory.
As international-relationstheory enteredltS postbehavioralphaseafter
the 1960s,therewasa growingbeliefthat if theoristsneglectednormativethe-
ory, they would have removed themselvesfrom an intellectual/ethical arena
that historicallyhadbeenof greatconcern.
Theywouldhaveignoredthetask
of deningthemeaning of goodandevil,thedesigning
of politicalstructures,
and the establishment of normative standards for humankind in a future
fraughtwith growingproblemsand dangersof unprecedented
dimensions.
The urgent issuescreatedby the impact of technologyon institutions, the
changes
in thepoliticalenvironment
resultingfrom ideologyandtechnology,
the proliferationof WMD, the breakupof existingpolitical units, ethniccon-
ict, and problemsresultingfrom ungovernabilitywill continueto contribute
to a major interestin normativetheoryin the earlytwenty-rst century.
In almost dialecticalreaction against the behavioralrevolution, there
was a new revolution of postbehavioralismthat pointed toward the post-
modernist critique of positivism that we have discussedelsewherein this
text. Accordingto David Easton,this resurgence of interestwas basedon the
following arguments:
(1) it is moreimportantto be relevantto contemporaryneedsthan to be method-
ologicallysophisticated;
(2) behavioral science
conceals an ideologybasedupon
empiricalconservatism;(3) behavioral research,
by its focusuponabstraction,
losestouchwith reality;(4) the politicalscientisthasthe obligationto make
knowledgeavailablefor the generalbenefitof society.57

Theemphasis in thiscritiquewasonquestionsof values,

goals,or preferences,
andthedevelopment of policychoices
for immediateproblems andthegener-
ationof objectives
andnormsof behaviorfor futureinternationalsystems.
As
Rosenauhassuggested, in the early 1970s,therehad emergedin international-
relationsstudiesa crisis of condence, togetherwith a lossof faith in the
slow,painstaking
methodsof science,as scholarssoughtto makethem-
selvesrelevant in waysthat but a few yearsagowe would havefound irre-
sponsibleand illusory.68
 THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE THEORY 651

That crisisremainedunresolvedinto and beyondthe 1990s,in part be-

causethe international
systemwasitselfin themidstof changesoprofound
and pervasivethat theoretical efforts, it appeared,could not keep pace.
Theoryitselffacedtheprospectof diminishing
relevance
if it couldnotpro-
vide explanationand understandingin a world in rapid transformation.
Nevertheless,
in keepingwith a renewed
emphasis
on normativetheorythat
accompaniedthe end of the Cold War and optimisticexpectationsof a new
world order,CharlesW. Kegley,Jr.,suggestedthe needfor a neo-idealistcon-
ception of world politics that would assurethat moral idealscanplay a
constructive role in the creation of a more stable world order.69 Such a for-
mulation would draw on a synthesisof the moral idealismof theliberal
creedwith the soberconservatism of the realistapproach.It would deriveits
Validationfrom empiricallyverifiedtheories.
The paradigmaticdebateof recentyearsand decades includesthe norma-
tive basisfor theory.Accordingto FergusonandMansbach,asWehavenoted,
thehistoryof theoryfromtheancientworldto thepresentfollowsthevalue
(normative)preferences
of the age.The theoreticalcontroversiesat any time
represent
debates
aboutnormativecommitments
andpoliticalpreferences.
In
this perspective,
schoolsof thoughtbasedon realismandidealism,on neoreal
ism and neoliberalism,form competingsetsof normsmore than they repre-
sent coherenttheoriesof internationalrelations.In the history of political
thought,it is possibleto delineatea seriesof centralconceptsnotably,anar-
chy and interdependence, communityand conict, war and peacethat form
the basisfor theory.Normativeargumentsand commitmentslie at the coreof
discussionsabout which concepts,actors, variables,or levels of analysis
should be studied.The objectschosenfor investigationare derived from
value-based
interests
andconcerns.
Research
agendas
basedon issues
suchas
conict and cooperationchangeas humanneedsare altered;that is to say,
internationalrelationsresearchand theory are contextuallyspecic, just as
the raison détre for the emergenceof internationalrelations in the early
decadesof the twentiethcenturylay in the questfor an understandingof the
meansnecessaryto eliminate war.
To assert,asFergusonand Mansbachdo, that theoreticalpreoccupations
derivefrom the normativetheoriesof the agefully asmuchasdo ideasin art
and literature is to suggestyet anotherlimitation to the emergenceof an
agreedparadigmand, of course,to indicatethe inherentinability completely
to separateresearchfrom values.To be sure,the researchpreferences
of those
whowork in thephysicalandbiologicalsciences
areshaped
bythenormative
issuesof the day, such as environmentalpollution or nding a cure for
dreadeddiseases.
However,what is saidto distinguishthephysicaland biolog-
ical sciences from international relations is thenumber of variables and their
variouscombinationsand permutationslikely to berelevantin the caseof in-
ternationalrelations.Of evengreaterimportance,
moreover,
is thefactthat,
unlike the physicaland biologicalsciences,wherewe seekpurposelyto isolate
the elementsfrom their environmentin, for example,a testtube,the studyof
internationalphenomena outsidetheir socialcontextor milieu is self-defeating
 652 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

andcounterproductive. Thatsucha separation hasoftenbeenconsciously at-

tempted,especially in quantitativeanalyses
devoidof historicalor societal
context,furtherdiminishesthevalueof suchresearch.ToquoteFerguson and
Mansbach again,Thereis a moreimportantsetof complexity that becomes
apparentin effortsto isolateandstudyspecicvariables;suchreductionism
isolates selectedfactors from their milieu when it is the milieu itself in which
we areinterested.7°In sum,the environingcircumstances
constitutethe nor-
mativecontextthat givesmeaning
to thedatathat areanalyzed.
Bythesame
token,in thisperspective,
fromthemilieuarederived
thenormative
issues
of
the ageandthetheoreticalinterests
that become
the focusof intellectualin-
quiry in internationalrelations.
Last but not least,in the field of internationalrelations,therehavealways
beengroupsof scholarswhoseprincipalinterestwasthe development and
analysis
of publicpolicy.In thesecond half of thetwentiethcentury,thispre-
- occupationwas evidentin the literatureof internationalrelations.In its
utopian and realist phases,moreover,internationalrelations study was
stronglyfocusedon policy.Theeffortsof quantitativebehavioral scholarsto
emphasize themethodological basisof inquiryhaverepresentedmorea sup-
pleinent
to, ratherthana replacement
of,a concern
for policyproblems.
Indeed,considerable emphasis hasbeenplacedon thecreationof morerigor-
oustechniques for theanalysis of publicpolicy,especially in the form of sys-
temsanalysis.72 Here,thegoalhasbeento devisecriteriato aid in choosing
andevaluating alternative policiesor strategies,
or mixesof policiesor strate-
gies,for theattainment of speciedobjectives. Theefforthasbeento nd op-
timalor at leastpreferable solutionsamonga seriesof alternatives, basedon
relativecostsandbenets,by usingsuchtechniques asmathematical models,
gametheory,gaming(e.g.,simulations), andthecanvassing of expertopinion.
Suchcostbenet studiesrepresent a reactionagainstpolicyrecommendations
basedonunstated assumptions, untested hypotheses, anduncertainty asto the
implications of alternative choices andoutcomes. Thedeciencies of systems
analysis in dealingwith suchfactorsascharisma andideology, or thepropen-
sityof actorsto adopthighriskor low-riskstrategies, andits inadequacies in
explicatingthevalueassumptions of analysisall serveto pointup theneedfor
additional.worktowarda policyscience eld, eitherwithininternational rela-
tionsor asa separate discipline,or interdiscipline.73
Giventhe likely increasein pressingpolitical problems,it is necessary
to
strikean acceptablebalance,
if possible,between empiricalandanalyticthe-
ory and«normativetheory,andbetween basicandappliedresearch. Normative
theoryis essential
asthebasisfor developingalternativegoalsandpreferences
Normativetheorycanalsoprovidepropositions for testing;empiricalandan-
alytictheorycanfurnishguidance asto thekindsof politicalbehaviorthatare
essentialfor attainingdesiredgoals.
In summary, ,justasthe studyof international
relationsmovedfrom the
extremepreoccupation with thenormativetheoryof the19205to theempiri-
calandanalytictheoryof the19603,morerecentgenerations of scholars
have
soughtto developtheoriesof internationalrelationsin a rapidlychanging
 NOTES 655

world.Attemptshavebeenmadeto nd broadlybased explanationsandto

developa predictive
capacity,
but perhaps
with a greater
realization
in the
earlytwenty-rstcenturythanin earlierdecades
of thedifcultiesinherentin
achieving
sucha goal.Pursuit
of thenormativeandanalytic
objectives
that
havebeensoughtbypreceding
generations
of international
relations
theory
continues.
Thispursuitisbased
onarecognitionoftheneed
forgreater
syn-
thesisamongthoseconcernsthathavebeen of principal
importance in eachof
thestages
through whichtheeldhaspassed since theearlyyears
of thetwen-
tiethcentury,
androotedin andderived fromantecedents datingfromthean-
cientworldof PlatoandAristotleto ourowndayandage.Thus,thesearch
foratheory,
ortheories,
adequate
totheneeds
ofanever-changing
worldcon-
tinuesin a newcenturyandmillennium.

NOTES

1. E.H. Carr,TheTwenty
Years
Crisis,1919-1939
(NewYork:Harper85Row
Torchbooks,
1964),p. 4. SeealsoRichardLittle,TheEvolutionof International
Relations
asaSocialScience,
inR.C.KentandG.P.Nielsson,
eds.,
TheStudy
andTeaching
ofInternational
Relations:
APerspective
onMid-Career
Education
(NewYork:Nichols
Publishing,
1980),
pp.5-7.Foranexamination
of theevo-
lutionofinternational
relations
organized
around
twooftheprincipal
unifying
themesoftheory,seeIanClark,Globalization
andFragmentation:
International
Relations
in theTwentieth
Century.(NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press,
1997).
2. SeeKenneth W.Thompson, PoliticalRealismandtheCrisisof WorldPolitics
(Princeton,
NJ: Princeton
University Press,1960);WilliamT. R. Fox,The
American Studyof InternationalRelations(Columbia:University
of South
Carolina
Press,
1968),pp.1-35;TorbjornL. Knutsen,
A Historyof
InternationalRelationsTheory (Manchester, England,and New York:
ManchesterUniversity
Press,
1992),esp.chaps.1-7.
3. Thisisnotto suggest
thattheconcernsof students
of international
relations
dur-
ingeachof these
stages
havebeen
mutually
exclusive.
Examples
of eachcanbe
foundat everystageof thedevelopment
of international
relations.
4. Foranexamination
of suchtrendsin politicalscience,
seeDavidEaston,
The
New Revolutionin PoliticalScience,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,
LXIII(4)(December
1969),1051-1061.Becausethestudyof international
rela-
tionshasbeen
linkedclosely
topoliticalscience,
themethodological,
conceptual,
andsubstantive
trendsof politicalscience
havebeenexpected
to inuencethede-
velopment
of international
relations.
5. YaleH. FergusonandRichardW.Mansbach,TheState,
Conceptual
Chaos,and
theFutureof International
Relations
Theory,
GSISMonograph
Series
in World
Affairs,theUniversity
of Denver (Boulder,
CO,and,London:
LynneRienner
Publishers,1989),pp. 41-80.
Ibid., p. 81.
.\.°"
SeeAndrewM. Scott,TheFunctioning
of theInternational
System
(NewYork:
Macmillan,1967),pp. 2-6.
8. See,for example,
JamesN. Rosenau, ed.,LinkagePolitics:Essays
on the
Convergenceof NationalandInternational
Systems
(NewYork:FreePress,
654

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

1969);Rosenau,Compatibility, Consensus,
and an EmergingPolitical Science
of Adaptation, American Political ScienceReview, LXI(3) (December 1967),
983-988; and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal
for the ConceptualLinkageof External and Internal Dimensionsof Foreign
10. Policy, AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,LXI(3) (December1967),971-982.
. JamesN. Rosenau,Turbulencein World Politics: A Theory of Changeand
Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1990), p. 6.
11. For an extendeddiscussion
of this issue,seeRobertJervis,The Futureof World
Politics: Will It Resémble the Past? International Security, 16(3) (Winter
12. 1991/1992), 39-73.
Richard W. Mansbachand John A. Vasquez,In Searchof Theory: A New Paradigm
13. for GlobalPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1981),pp. 68-69.
Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding
14. Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), pp. xvxv1.
John W. Burton, World Society(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1972), p. 42.
15. Richard K. Ashley,Untying the SovereignState: A Double Readingof the
AnarchyProblematique,Millennium: journal of InternationalStudies, 17(2)
16. (Summer 1988), 229.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientic Revolutions (Chicago: University of
17. Chicago Press,1970), p. 92.
Arend Lijphart, The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International
Relations, International StudiesQuarterly, 18(1) (March 1974), 41-73.
18.Ibid., 207.
K. J. Holsti, TheDividing Discipline:Hegemonyand Diversityin International
Theory (Boston: Allen 86 Unwin, 1987), p. 74.
19. Ibid., p. 11,SeealsoM. Banks,Inter-Paradigm
Debate,in M. Light andA. J. R.
Groom, eds., International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London:
FrancisPinter,1985),pp. 7-26; SeealsoMark Hoffman,Critical Theoryandthe
InterParadigmDebate, 231-249; Fred Halliday, State and Society in
International Relations: A Second Agenda, 215-230; SteveSmith, Paradigm
Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International
Relations as Social Science, 189-206; Ekkehart Krippendorf, The Dominance
of AmericanApproaches in InternationalRelations, 207-214;all in Millennium:
journal of InternationalStudies,16(2)(Summer, 1987).
20. Philippe Braillard, The Social Sciencesand the Study of International
Relations, International Social Sciencejournal, 36(4) (1984), 631.
21. Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Thomas J. Biersteker, The Dialectics of World
Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire,
InternationalStudiesQuarterly,28(1) (1984),121.
22. Ibid., 122.
23. BruceM. Russett,Apologia pro Vita Sua,.in James N. Rosenau,ed.,In Search
of GlobalPatterns
(NewYork:FreePress,
1976),p. 36.
24. JohnA. Vasquez,The Post-Positivist
Debate:Reconstructing
ScienticEnquiry
and International Relations Theory After EnlightenmentsFall, in Ken Booth
and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (University Park,
PA: PennsylvaniaStateUniversity Press,1995), pp. 216-240.
 NOTES 655

1995),pp.198-217;AlexanderE. Wendt,The Agent-StructureProblemin

International
RelationsTheory,InternationalOrganization,
41(3) (Summer
1987), 335-370.
26. Fora useful
effortto delineate
theboundaries
of international
relations,
seeE.
Raymond Platig,
International
Relations
Research:Problemsof Evaluation
and
Advancement(Santa Barbara,
CA:ClioPress,
for theCarnegieEndowment for
InternationalPeace,1967),esp.pp. 26-44.
27. Onestudent ofinternational
relations,
Johan Galtung,
hassuggested, Onemay
saythattherelationship
betweeninternational
relations
andpoliticalscienceis
thesame astherelationship
betweensociology
andpsychology:It is thetransi-
tionfromthemeticulous
studyofoneunitatthetimetothestudyoftheinterac-
tion structurebetweenthe units that characterizethe relationsbetweenthese
pairsof sciences.
JohanGaltung,SmallGroupTheoryandtheTheoryof
International
Relations,
in MortonA. Kaplan,ed.,NewApproaches to
International
Relations
(NewYork:St.Martins
Press,
1968),
p.271.
28. SeeWalterIsard,in association
withTonyE. Smith,PeterIsard,TzeHsiung
Tung,andMichaelDacey,GeneralTheory:Social,Political,Economic,and
Regional(Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press,1969).
29. Fora discussion
of thistopic,seeFredHalliday,TheEndof theColdWarand
International
Relations:
Some AnalyticandTheoretical
Conclusions,
in Ken
BoothandSteve Smith,eds.,International
Relations
TheoryToday(University
Park:Pennsylvania
StateUniversity
Press,
1995), pp.38-61.
30. JohnLewisGaddis,International
Relations
TheoryandtheEndof theCold
War,International
Security,
171(3) (Winter
1992/1993),6.See
alsoJohnLewis
Gaddis,
TheLongPeace: Inquiries
intotheHistoryoftheColdWar(NewYork:
OxfordUniversity
Press,1987),esp.pp.215-247. SeealsoJanice
GrossStein,
Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachevas Uncommitted Thinker and
MotivatedLearner;ThomasRisse-Kappen, IdeasDo Not FloatFreely:
Transnational
Coalitions,
DomesticStructures,
andtheEndof theColdWar;
Rey Koslowskiand FriedrichV. Kratochwil,Understanding
Changein
International Politics: The Soviet Empires Demise and the International
System,
all in International
Organization,
48(2)(Spring1994),155-249.
31. For contrastingexplanations,seeJohn Mueller, "The EssentialIrrelevanceof
NuclearWeapons:Stability
in thePostwarWorld,International
Security,
13(2)
(Fall1988),
55-79;RobertJervis,
ThePoliticalEffects
ofNuclear
Weapons: A
Comment, International
Security,13(2)(Fall1988),
80-90;Kenneth
M. Waltz,
NuclearMythsand PoliticalRealities,AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,
84(3)(September
1990),731-745;RichardNedLebow,The LongPeace, the
Endof theColdWar,andtheFailure
of Realism,
International
Organization,
48(2) (Spring 1994), 249-279.
32. Foranextended
discussion
of suchquestions
andrelatedissues,
seeCharles
W.
Kegley,
ed.,TheLongPostwar
Peace:
Contending
Explanations
andProjections
(NewYork: HarperCollins,1991),esp.pp. 1-25.
33. For a discussionof this topic, seeRichardLittle, InternationalRelationsand
theTriumphof Capitalism,in KenBoothandSteveSmith,eds.,International
Relations
Theory
Today(University
Park:Pennsylvania
StateUniversity
Press,
1995), pp. 63-89.
34. See,
for example,
HenryKissinger,
Diplomacy
(NewYork:Simon andSchuster,
1994),pp.804-835;
Christopher
Layne,TheUnipolarIllusion:WhyNew
Powers
Will Rise,International
Security,
17(4)(Spring1993),5-51.
656 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

35. See, for example, Richard W. Mansbach, Yale I-I. Ferguson, and Donald E.
Lampert, The Web of World Politics: NonstateActors in the Global System
(EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1976).
36. Philip Alston and Raul Pangalangan, Revitalizingthe Study of International
Organizations,Report of a Conferenceon Teaching About International
Organizationsfrom a Legal and Policy Perspective,October 28-31, 1987
(Medford,MA: FletcherSchoolof Law and Diplomacy,TuftsUniversity),25.
37. See,for example,ZbigniewBrzezinski,BetweenTwo Ages:AmericasRole in a
Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970); Victor Basiuk, Technology, World
Politics, and American Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977);
HansJ. Morgenthau,Science: Servantor Master?(NewYork: AmericanLibrary,
1972); Eugene B. Skolnikoff, International Imperatives of Technology:
TechnologicalDevelopmentand the InternationalPolitical System(Berkeley:
Universityof California InternationalStudies,1972);Hilary Roseand Steven
Rose,Scienceand Society(Baltimore,MD: Penguin,1970);Ira Spiegel-Rosing
and Derekde SollaPrice,eds.,Science,Technologyand Society(BeverlyHills,
CA: Sage,1977).
38. SeeRichard C. Snyder,H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin,eds.,ForeignPolicy
Decision Making (New York: FreePress,1963).
39. Hanrieder, Compatibility and Consensus;JamesN. Rosenau,External
Inuences on the Internal Behavior of States, in R. Barry Farrell, ed.,
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92; James N. Rosenau,
ComparativeForeignPolicyFad, Fantasy,or Field, paperpreparedfor pre-
sentationat the Conference Seminarof the Committeeon ComparativePolitics,
Universityof Michigan, 1967; Randolph C. Kent, Foreign Policy Analysis:
Searchfor Coherence in a MultifacetedField, in Kent andNielsson, Studyand
Teachingof InternationalRelations,pp. 90-110.
40. For analysesof international-securitystudiesas a eld, see,for example,Barry
Buzan,Peoples,Statesand Fear:TheNationalSecurityProblemin International
Relations (Brighton, England:WheatsheafBooks, 1983); Barry Buzan, An
Introduction to Strategic Studies, Military Technology,and International
Relations(NewYork: St.MartinsPress,1987);Colin Gray,StrategicStudies:A
Critical Assessment (Westport,CT: GreenwoodPress,1982); Robert Jervis,
JoshuaLederberg,Robert North, StephenRosen,John Steinbruner,and Dina
Zinnes, The Field of National Security Studies:Report to the National Research
Council (Washington, DC: 1986); Richard Smoke, National Security Affairs,
in Fred I. Greensteinand Nelson W. Polsby, eds.,Handbook of Political Science,
Vol. 8, International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975); Colin S.
Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1982); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. LynnJones, International
Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,
International Security, (Spring 1988), 5-27; Richard H. Ullman, Redefining
Security, International Security, 8(1) (1983), 129-153; A. J. R. Groom,
Strategy: The Evolution of the Field, in Kent and Nielsson, Study and
Teachingof InternationalRelations,pp. 47-59; HelgaHaftendorn,The State
of the Field: A German View, International Security, 13(2) (1988); Helga
Haftendorn, The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in
International Theory, International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), 3-17;
StephenvM.Walt, The Renaissanceof Security Studies, International Studies
 NOTES 657

Quarterly,
35(1991),
211-239;Edward
J.Kolodziej,
Renaissance
inSecurity
Studies:
CaveatLector!
International
Studies
Quarterly,
36(1992),
421-438;
DavidDewitt,
David
Haglund,
andJohnKirton,eds.,
Building
a NewGlobal
Order:
Emerging
Trends
inInternational
Security
(NewYork:
Oxford
University
41.
Press,
1993);
andPaul
B.Stares,
ed.,The
NewSecurity
Agenda:
AGlobal
Survey
(Tokyo/New
York:Japan
Center
for International
Exchange,
1998).
Seealso
Charles
W.Kegley,
]r.,andEugene
R.Wittkopf
(ed.),
TheGlobal
Agenda:
Issues
andPerspectives
(Boston,MA:McGraw-Hill,
1998). .\
Stephen
M. Walt,TheRenaissance
of Security
Studies,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
35(1991),
211-239;
DavidA. Baldwin,Security
Studies
andthe
42.
EndoftheColdWar,World
Politics,
48(1)(October
1995),
117-141.See
also
Barry
Buzan,
People,
States,
andFear:
AnAgenda
forInternational
Security
Studies
in thePostCold-War
Era,second
edition,
(Boulder,
CO:Lynne
Rienner
Publishers,1991).
43.
Richard
Shultz,
Jr.,RoyGodson,
andTedGreenwood,
eds.,
Security
Studies
for
the19905
(Washington,
DC:Brasseys
[US],
1993).
Seeespecially
theeditors
in-
troduction,pp. 1-13.
SeeGeoffrey
Kemp,RobertL. Pfaltzgraff,
]r., andUri Raanan,
The
Superpowers
inaMultinuclear
World(Lexington,
MA:D.C.Heath,
1974).
See
44.alsoRobert
L.Pfaltzgraff,
Jr.,TheEvolution
ofAmerican
Nuclear
Thought,
in B.Mitchell
Simpson,
III, ed.,War;
Strategy
andMaritime
Power
(New
Brunswick,
NJ:Rutgers
University
Press,
1977),
pp.280-282.
45.Gray,Strategic
Studies
andPublicPolicy,
194.
MartinvanCreveld,
TheTransformation
of War(New
York:Free
Press,
1991),
pp. 33-63.
46. See,
forexample,
Edward
A.Kolodziej,
Renaissancein
Security
Studies?
Caveat
Lector!International
Studies
Quarterly;
36(1992),
421-438.
47. VanCreveld,
Transformation
of Warpp.57-62.
48. Kolodziej,
Renaissance
in Security
Studies?
p.424.
49.
Richard
Shultz,
Jr.,"Roy
Godson,
andGeorge
Quester,
eds.,Security
Studies
for
theTwenty-First
Century
(Washington,
DC:Brasseys,
1996).
SeealsoRichard
H.Shultz,
]r.,RoyGodson,
andGeorge
Quester,
eds.,Security
Studies
forthe
Twenty-First
Century
(Washington,
DC:Brasseys,
1997).
50. See,
forexample,
oninformation
warfare,
Stuart].
D.Schwartzstein
(ed.),
The
Information
Revolution
andNationalSecurity:
Dimensions
andDirections
(Washington,
DC:Coalition
for Strategic
andInternational
Studies,
1996);
RobertL. Pfaltzgraff,
]r., and RichardH. Shultz,Jr. (eds.),Warin the
Information
Age:
NewChallenges
forU.S.
Security
Policy
(Washington/Lond
Brasseys,1997).
51. Foranextended
survey
of suchliterature,
together
withanimportant
effortto
dene,
categorize,
andanalyze
economic
policies
asinstruments
ofstatecraft,
see
David
A. Baldwin,
Economic
Statecraft
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1985),esp.chap.2. SeealsoRogerTooze,TheUnwritten
Preface:
International
Political
Economy
andEpistemology,
Millennium:
journalof
International
Studies,
17(2)(Summer
1988),288-293.
52. See,
forexample,
Robert
T.HoltandJohn.»
E.Turner,
TheMethodology
of
Comparative
Research
(NewYork:FreePress,
1970).
658 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. INTO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

Books,1969);HughL Etang,Lord Moran,Churchill:Takenfrom theDiaries

of Lord Moran,TheStrugglefor Survival,1940-1965(Boston:Houghton
Mifin, 1966).
54. Thomas C.Wiegele,Decision-Making in anInternational
Crisis:Some Biological
Factors, International StudiesQuarterly,17(2)(June1973),305. Seealso
ThomasC.Wiegele, ed.,BiologyandtheSocialSciences(Boulder,CO:Westview
Press,1982);Thomas C.Wiegele,
Biopolitics:
Search
for a MoreHumanPolitical
Science(Boulder,
CO:Westview Press,
1979);Thomas C.Wiegele, GordonHilton,
Kent LayneOots,andSusanV. Kisiel,LeadersUnderStress: A Psychophys-
iologicalAnalysisof International
Crises(Durham,NC: DukeUniversity Press,
1985);Thomas C.Wiegele, Modelsof Stress andDisturbancesin ElitePolitical
Behaviors:PsychologicalVariables
andPoliticalDecision-Making, in RobertS.
Robins,ed.,Psychopathology and PoliticalLeadership
(NewOrleans:Tulane
University,1977),pp.79-111;Kent LayneOots and ThomasC. Wiegele,
Terrorist and Victim: Psychiatricand PhysiologicalApproachesfrom a Social
SciencePerspective,Terrorism:An Internationaljournal, 8(11) (1985), 1-32;
James
M. Schubert,
Thomas
C.Wiegele,
andSamuel
M. Hines,AgeandPolitical
Behaviorin CollectiveDecision-Making,InternationalPoliticalScienceReview,
8(2) (1987),131-146;SamuelLong,ed., PoliticalBehaviorAnnual,Vol. 1
(Boulder,
CO:Westview Press,
1986);ThomasC. Wiegele,SignalLeakageand
the RemotePsychological
Assessment of ForeignPolicyElites, in LawrenceS.
Falkowski,ed., PsychologicalModels in InternationalPolitics (Boulder,CO:
WestviewPress,1979);ThomasC. Wiegele,The Psychophysiology of Elite Stress
in Five International Crises: A Preliminary Test of a Voice Measurement
Technique, InternationalStudiesQuarterly,22(4) (December1978),467-511;
Thomas C. Wiegele, The Life Sciencesand International Relations: A
Bibliographic
Essay,International
StudiesNotesof the International
Studies
Association, 11(2) (Winter 1984/1985), 1-7.
55. ThomasC. Wiegele,Modelsof Stressand Disturbances in Elite Political
Behaviors:
Psychological
Variables andPoliticalDecision-Making,
in RobertS.
Robins,ed.TulaneStudiesof PoliticalScience:
Psychopathology
andPolitical
Leadership,vol. XVI (New Orleans:Tulane University,1977), pp. 79-112.
Studiesin; see also, by the same author, PhysiologicallyBased Content
Analysis:
An Application
in PoliticalCommunication,
in BrentD. Rupin,ed.,
CommunicationYearbook2 (New Brunswick,NJ: TransactionBooks, 1978),
pp.423-436;HealthandStressDuringInternational
Crisis:NeglectedInput
Variables
in theForeignPolicyDecision-Making
Process,journal of Political
Science,III(2) (Spring 1976), 139-144.
56. Winston S. Churchill, The GatheringStorm (London: Cassell8C Co., Ltd.:
1948), p.165.
57. Henry A. Kissinger;
A World Restored:Metternich,Castlereagh,
and the
Problemsof Peace1812-1822(NewYork: GrossetandDunlap,1964),p. 1. See
also Henry Kissinger,Diplomacy (New York: Simon8: Schuster,1994), esp.
chaps. 1 and 31.
58. Richard Smoke,Theory for and About Policy, in Rosenau, In Searchof
Global Patterns, p. 191.
59. TrevorTaylor,Introduction:The Nature of InternationalRelations,in Trevor
Taylor,ed.,.Approaches
and Theoryin InternationalRelations(New York:
Longmans, 1978), p. 3.
 NOTES 659
60.
There
are
three
general
types
oftechnological
forecasts:
theexploratory
oppo
tunity,
and normative.
The exploratory
forecast
suggests
future
technolog
tha
islikely
ifthe
current
level
ofsupport
continues.
The
opportunity
forecas
de
picts
probable
effects
ofincreased
effort
inone
technological
problem
area
or
another.
The
normative
forecast
combines
desired
goals
and
technologic
poss
bilities,
using
thegoals
asaguide
fortheallocation
ofresources.
Numerous
techniques
have
been
used toobtain
such
forecasts.
Themost
fre-
quently
used
isstill
thetrend
correlation
inseveral
elds
and
growth
analog
A
new
technique
forobtaining
intuitive
rather
than
statistical
forecasts
isthe
Delphi
method,
anelaborate
polling
device
forobtaining
anexpert
consen
without
aconference
orpanel
discussion.
Systems
analysis,
such
asprogr
evaluation
and research
technique
(PERT),
originally
developed
bytheU.S
Navy,
has
been
especially
helpful
foropportunity
forecasting
andinresearch
and
development
(R&D)
administration.
Finally,
mathematical
modeling
and
the
feedback
concept
are
intended
toaidnormative
forecasting
incorrelatin
the
goals
ofgovernment
andindustry
withtechnological
capabilities.
Themost
comprehensive
general
treatment
oftechnological
forecast
is
Eric
Jantsch,
Technological
Forecasting
inPerspective
(Paris:
OECD Publica
1967).
Anexplanation
offorecasting
techniques
maybefound
inRobert
V.
Ayres,
Technological
Forecasting
andLong-Range
Planning
(NewYork
McGraw-Hill,
1969).
See
also
James
R.Bright,
Technological
Forecasti
for
Industry
andGovernment:
Methods
and
Applications
(Englewood
Cliffs,
NJ:
Prentice
Hall,
1968).
For
themore
literary
and
speculative
side
ofthe
movem
see
Bertrand
deJouvenel,
The
ArtofConjecture,
trans.
N.Lary (NewYork:
Basic
Books,1967);
Herman
KahnandA.J.Wiener,TheYear2000:
A
Framework
forSpeculation
(NewYork:
Macmillan,
1967);Dennis
Gabo
Inventing
theFuture
(New
York:
Knopf,
1964);
Daniel
Bell,
ed.,
Toward
the
Year
2000:
Work inProgress
(Boston:
Houghton
MifinandtheAmerica
Academy
ofArtsandSciences,
1968);
Neville
Brown, TheFuture
Globa
Challenge:
APredictive
Study
ofWorld
Security,
1977-1990
(New
York:
Crane
Russak,
1977);
andVolker
Bornschier
and Christopher
Chase-Dunn
(eds.)
The
Future
ofGlobal
Conict
(Thousand
Oaks,
CA:SAGE
Publications,
Ino.,
1999)
Foranother
recent,
and
outstanding,
effort
todevelop
aseries
ofalternative
fu-
tures
asabasis
forpolicy
plannirfg,
seeJacquelyn
K.Davis
andMichaelJ.
Sweeney,
Strategic
Paradigms
2025:
U.S.
Security
Planning
fora New
Era
(Herndon,
VA:
Brasseys,
1999.
Apublication
ofthe
Institute
forForeign
Policy
Analysis,
Cambridge,
MA,andWashington,
DC.).
61.
Morton
A.Kaplan,
Problems
ofTheory
Building
andTheory
Conrmationin
International
Politics,
inKlaus
Knorr
and
Sidney
Verba,
eds.,
The Internation
System:
Theoretical
Essays
(Princeton,
NJ:Princeton
University
Press,
1961),
p.7.
62.
See,
forexample,
HalGregersen
andLeeSailer,
ChaosTheoryandIts
Implications
forSocial
Science
Research,
HumanRelations,
46(7)
(1993)
777-801;
H.Mitchell
Waldrop,
Complexity:
The
Emerging
Science
atthe
Edge
ofOrder
andChaos
(New
York:
Simon
8C
Schuster,
1992),
esp.
pp.9-13,
140-143,
318-323,
330-335;
Laurent
Dobuzinskis,
Modernist
and
Postmodernist
Metaphors
ofthePolicy
Process:
Control
andStability
vs.Chaos
and
Reexive
Understanding,
Policy
Sciences,
25(1992),
355-380;
L.Dougla
Kiel
andEvel
W.Elliott,
eds.,
Chaos
Theory
intheSocial
Sciences:
Foundatio
and
Applications
(AnnArbor:
University
ofMichigan
Press,
1995);
Diana
660

63.

64.
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
THEORY:
INTOTHETHIRDMILLENNIUM

65.
Richards,
System,
A ChaoticModelof PowerConcentration
International
Studies
Tom Czerwinski,
Quarterly,
37(1993),
in theInternationa
55-72.
Copingwith the Bounds:Speculations
on Nonlinearityin
MilitaryAffairs(Washington,
DC:Institute
for National
Strategic
Studies,
NationalDefenseUniversity,1998),p. 8.

66. Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid., p. 10.
Rudolph
J.Rummel,
TheRoots
of Faith,in Rosenau,
In Search
of Global
Patterns, p. 30.
67. DavidEaston,
TheNewRevolution
in Political
Science,
American
Political
ScienceReview, LXIII(4)(December 1969),1052.Similarly, Eastonwasamong
the rst to discernthe behavioralrevolutionin politicalscience.
SeeDavid
Easton,
ThePolitical
System:
AnInquiryintotheState
ofPolitical
Science
(New
York:Knopf,1954),esp.pp.37-125;by thesameauthor,
A Framework for
PoliticalAnalysis
(Englewood
Cliffs,NJ:Prentice
Hall, 1965),pp.6-9.
68. JamesN. Rosenau,
Assessment
in International
Studies:
Ego Trip or
Feedback?
International
Studies
Quarterly,18(September
1974),346.
69. CharlesW Kegley, Jr., Neo-Idealism:
A Practical
Matter,Ethicsand
International
Affairs,2 (1988),195-196;
and Charles
W. Kegley,
Jr., and
Gregory
A. Raymond,
Normative
Constraints
ontheUseof Force
Shortof
War,fournalof PeaceResearch,23(3)(1986),213-227.Forotherrecentnor-
mativeanalyses,
seeMervyn Frost,TowardaNormative Theory
ofInternationa
Relations
(Cambridge, England:Cambridge UniversityPress,
1986);Hidemi
Suganami,A Normative Enquiryin International
Relations:
TheCaseof Pacta
SuntServanda, Reviewof International
Studies,
9(1)(1983),35-54;Robert
Cordis,ReligionandInternational
Responsibility,
in Kenneth
W.Thompson
ed.,MoralDimensions of American ForeignPolicy(NewBrunswick, NJ:
Transaction
Books,1984),33-52;RayMaghrooriandBennettRamberg,
eds.,
GlobalismVersusRealism:InternationalRelationsThird Debate(Boulder,CO:
Westview
Press,
1982);LouisRen,Reason
andRealpolitik
(Lexington,
MA:
Lexington
Books,1984);J. E. HareandCarney
B. Joynt,Ethicsand
International
Affairs(NewYork:St.Martins,1982);John A. Vasquez,
The
PowerPolitics:
A Critique(London:
Francis
Pinter,
1983);Stanley
Hoffmann,
The Political Ethics of InternationalRelations,SeventhMorgenthau
MemorialLectureonEthicsandForeignPolicy,CarnegieCouncilonEthicsand
International
Affairs,NewYork,1988;KennethKipnisandDianaT. Meyers,
eds.,PoliticalRealism
andInternational
Morality:Ethicsin theNuclear
Age
(Boulder,
CO,andLondon: Westview
Press,
1987);
TerryNardin,Law,Morality
and theRelations
of States(Princeton,
NJ: Princeton
UniversityPress,1983);
 NOTES 661

Nye,
]r.,ed.,Nuclear
Ethics
(New
York: Free
Press,
1986);
WilliamV.OBrien
andJohnLangan, eds.,
TheNuclearDilemma
andthejustWarTradition
(Lexington,
MA:LexingtonBooks,
1986);Robert
L.Pfaltzgraff,
]r.,National
Security:
Ethics,
Strategy,
andPolitics,
A Laymans
Primer
(Washington,
DC;
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