Russia in Korea Peace Process

Chapter 8
Russia and the Korean Peace Process

Seung-Ho Joo
In the winter of 2002-03, a major crisis is looming large over the Korean peninsula
as the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North
Korea) are seemingly on a collision course over North Korea’s nuclear issue. In
contrast to his predecessor, Bush’s North Korea policy has been hostile and un-
compromising. Upon his presidential inauguration in 2001, Bush refused to re-
sume Clinton’s efforts at missile negotiations and the normalization of relations
with North Korea. He also expressed his doubts about the sunshine policy of the
Kim Dae-jung government of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). In his
State of Union address in January 2002, Bush put three regimes – North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq – together as an ‘axis of evil’.1 By including North Korea in this
category, he indicated that the U.S. intended to destroy North Korea or force it to
change its behavior. Following Bush’s special envoy James Kelly’s visit to Py-
ongyang in early October 2002, U.S.-North Korea relations even further deterio-
rated. During his visit, Kelly presented evidence that North Korea was engaged in
a secrete nuclear weapons program using enriched uranium, and North Korean
leaders allegedly admitted such program.2 Subsequently, the U.S. suspended the
supply of heavy oil to North Korea. After announcing the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work null and void, North Korea resumed its nuclear program in defiance of U.S.
warnings. North Korea’s nuclear issue may once again lead to a major crisis on the
Korean peninsula. At the time of this writing, dark clouds of war are ominously
approaching the Korean peninsula.
As a major power bordering on the Korean peninsula, Russia has inherent
interest in Korea’s future. A second Korean war will inevitably affect the security
of the Russian Far East, and for this reason Russia wants peace and stability on the
Korean peninsula. In the past, Russia was embroiled directly or indirectly in two
major wars over the Korean peninsula – the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and
the Korean War (1950-1953) – and, by doing so, directly affected the fate of the
1
David E. Sanger, ‘The State of the Union Address: The Overview’, New York Times,
January 30, 2002, p. 1.
2
‘Kelly Presents Evidence to North of Its Nuclear Program’, Yonhap, October 2, 2002, in
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (DR), EAS (2002-1018).
142 The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers
Korean people. In the future, Russia is likely to play a major role in the Korean
peace and unification process. What roles will Russia play for Korean peace and
unification? This is the central question guiding this research. This chapter raises
the following questions and seeks to answer them: what are Russia’s interests in
Korea?; how can Russia contribute to the Korean peace process?; and what are
Russia’s attitudes and policy toward Korean unification?
Russian Interests in Korea: A Historical Perspective
Russia’s attitudes and policy toward the Korean peace and unification process will
be largely determined by Russia’s interests in the Korean peninsula. It is, however,
noteworthy that Korea in its own right has never taken up a central position in
Russian foreign policy considerations, and Russia’s Korea policy was mostly a by-
product of Russian relations with other major powers in Northeast Asia (China,
Japan, and the U.S.). To put it differently, Russian policy toward the Korean pen-
insula was derivative in nature.3 Russian relations with the two Koreas were im-
portant primarily because of their effect on its relations with major powers. It is
therefore important to examine Russian interests in Korea in the broad context of
Russia’s overall policy goals and orientations as well as its regional commitments
and concerns in Northeast Asia.
Before looking into Russia’s current attitudes and policy on Korean peace and
unification, a brief survey of Russia’s past interests in the Korean peninsula is in
order. Knowledge of the past should provide a balanced perspective of the present.
Historically, Russia’s involvement in Korea derived from geo-strategic, ideologi-
cal, and economic interests.
Geo-Strategic Interests
Examples of Russia’s interest in Korea for geo-strategic reasons abound, and Ko-
rea’s geo-strategic importance indeed is the oldest and most enduring factor affect-
ing Russia’s Korea policy.
Imperial Russia’s interest in Korea derived from Korea’s geo-strategic impor-
tance. Russia’s primary goal in East Asia in the late nineteenth century was to
3
Korea’s secondary importance in Soviet foreign policy becomes obvious by the fact that
the Soviet press, books, and periodicals rarely treated the two Koreas. Peter Berton, ‘The
Soviet Union and Korea: Perceptions, Scholarship, Propaganda’, Journal of Northeast Asian
Studies (Spring 1986), p. 25. Despite his pivotal role in bringing about revolutionary
changes in Soviet-Korean relations, Mikhail Gorbachev devoted only a brief paragraph to
Korea in his memoirs. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
Boris Yeltsin wrote three memoirs and none of them even discussed Korean issues. See
Against the Grain (New York: Summit Books, 1990); The Struggle for Russia (New York:
Times Books, 1994); Midnight Diaries (New York: Public Affairs, 2000).
Russia and the Korean Peace Process 143
consolidate the newly acquired territory in the Far East. Tsarist Russia reached the
Pacific Ocean by the 1860s through territorial acquisition in East Siberia and the
Far East. Through the Aigun Treaty of 1858, it seized the territory north of the
Amur and Ussuri Rivers from China. Russia came to share a common border with
Korea for the first time in 1860 when it acquired the Maritime Province from
China in the Peking Treaty.
This vast newly acquired territory was extremely vulnerable to external threat.
By 1880 the Russian population of the Far East was still less than 100,000 and the
combined immigration of Chinese, Tungus, and Koreans exceeded that of
Russians.4 In order to secure this newly acquired territory, Russia established de
facto control of Manchuria.5 In 1896, Russia obtained from Peking the right to
build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok. In 1898, it
obtained the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula for 25 years and the right to build the
South Manchurian railway connecting the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur
and Dairen on the southern tip of the peninsula. In order to secure Manchuria,
Russia in turn sought a dominant power position in Korea. Initially, between the
1850s and the 1890s, Russia showed little interest in Korea. After Korea was
forced to open its door to Japan in 1879, Russia established a diplomatic relation-
ship with Korea in 1884 and a Russian diplomatic mission opened in Seoul in
1885. At least until the 1890s, the Russians were not interested in carving out
spheres of influence in Korea.
In this context, Russia’s political objectives in Korea came to be defined. Tsar-
ist Russia came to be involved in Korea from a preventive point of view – Korea
must not become a source of threat to Manchuria.6 Thus, Russia’s political aim in
Korea from 1895-1904, when Russo-Japanese competition over Korea intensified,
was not so much the attainment of an exclusively superior position for itself as to
deny military advantage to Japan. Japan could not overlook Russia’s southward
advance. Japan called on Russia to withdraw its far eastern armies stationed in
Manchuria and demanded Russia’s recognition of Japan’s paramount interest in
Korea. Upon Russian refusal to meet these demands, Japan declared war on Russia.
In the war Japan was victorious and gained the dominant position in Korea and
southern Manchuria. Tsarist Russian interest in Korea was also linked to its quest
for warm-water ports. The search for warm-water ports is a recurring theme in
Russian foreign policy. Although its territory was spread over one-sixth of the land
surface of the globe, Russia did not have adequate access to the sea, and such land-
locked geographic nature constantly prompted her to advance in the direction of
warm-water ports and open seas. Imperial Russia before the 1917 Bolshevik revo-
4
See John Fairbank, E. Reishauer, and A. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 624.
5
Ibid., p. 555. See also Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 69-92.
6
Sung-hwan Chang, ‘Russian Designs on the Far East’, in Taras Hunszak, ed., Russian
Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1974), p. 303.
lution expanded its empire in the direction of the Indian and Pacific oceans to gain
access to warm water ports and open seas.
The naval port of Vladivostok is not ice-free the year round. Tsarist Russia did
not have an adequate access to the Pacific Ocean. Korea attracted Russian interest
because of its warm-water ports that remained ice-free in the winter. In a marginal
note dated March 25-April 6, 1895, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia wrote: ‘It is abso-
lutely necessary that Russia should have a port which is free and open during the
entire year. This port must be on the mainland (south-eastern Korea) and must be
connected with our existing possessions by a strip of land’.7 In 1900, Russia at-
tempted to lease land in Masan on which to construct a naval base, a site that
would serve as a midway point in a sea link between Vladivostok and Port Arthur.8
Russia’s southward movement in Korea, however, was foiled effectively by the
concerted efforts of Britain and Japan.
After World War II, the Soviet Union returned to the Korean peninsula and
became deeply involved in Korean affairs against the backdrop of the Cold War,
and Korea’s geo-strategic importance again was the prime motivator. In accor-
dance with the secret agreement at the Yalta conference, on August 8, 1945, the
Soviet Union declared war against Japan, and on August 12, the first Soviet troops
arrived in Korea. When Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 15, the
Soviet Red Army was already operating on the northern part of Korea and ad-
vanced to the south rapidly, whereas the American armed forces were more than
1,000 miles south from the Korean peninsula (U.S. armed forces did not land in
Korea until September 8). In order to stop Soviet occupation of the whole of Korea,
a hasty decision was made in Washington to draw a line of demarcation dividing
the Korean peninsula into respective zones of occupation by Soviet and American
forces.9
On August 15, Truman proposed to Stalin the division of Korea along the 38th
parallel and on August 16, Stalin acquiesced to the idea. Stalin probably did not
wish to alienate the United States by occupying the entire peninsula. He may have
hoped that the United States, in return, would permit the Soviet Union to occupy
the northern half of the northernmost major Japanese island, Hokkaido. Stalin’s
7
Krasnyi Arkhiv, 52 (1932), cited from Robert M. Slusser, ‘Soviet Far Eastern Policy,
1945-50: Stalin’s Goals in Korea’, in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The Origins of
the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), p. 143.
8
Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, trans. E. W. Wagner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1984), p. 306.
9
The division of Korea along the 38th parallel resulted from an extemporaneous policy
decision by the U.S. John J. McCloy of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC) directed two young colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel, to withdraw
to an adjoining room and find a place to divide Korea. It was around midnight on August
10-11. Given 30 minutes to do so, Rusk and Bonesteel looked at a map and chose the 38th
parallel because it ‘would place the capital city in the American zone’. See Library of
Congress, North Korea–A Country Study (Washington, D.C., 1990) on the Internet at <http:
//lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0023>.
acceptance of Truman’s proposal indicates that Japan was his primary concern and
Korea was of secondary importance.
The geo-strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the security of the
Soviet Far East led the Soviet Union to prevent any of the major powers in the
region from gaining dominant influence in the Korean peninsula and to maintain
friendly ties with North Korea. Strategically, the importance of Korea lies in the
fact that the port of Vladivostok is situated 70 miles from the Korean border and a
Great Power in control of Korea would be in a position to attack this key base.
The Soviets were interested primarily in the creation of a ‘friendly’ state in
Korea. Colonel General Terentii F. Shtykov, top Soviet representative for the U.S.-
Soviet Joint Commission organized to establish a provisional Korean government,
reiterated Soviet interest in establishing a friendly state in Korea in his statement at
the first conference of the Joint Commission on March 20, 1946: ‘The Soviet
Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent coun-
try, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for
an attack on the Soviet Union’.10 These two Soviet aims contained some contradic-
tions. ‘A government independent in its decisions need not necessarily and at all
times be ‘friendly’ to the Soviet Union; if, on the other hand, it is compelled to be
‘friendly’, it cannot be truly independent.11 Shtykov candidly informed Lieutenant
General John R. Hodge, the U.S. representative on the commission, that the Soviet
Union could not risk individuals hostile to the Soviet Union coming to power in
Korea; it wanted a government that would be ‘loyal’ to the Soviet Union.12 It is
noteworthy that a democratic country in Soviet communist jargon means a ‘social-
ist country strongly oriented to and dependent on the USSR’.13 With the onset of
the Cold War, two Korean states on the Korean peninsula became a reality, and the
DPRK constituted part of the Soviet Union’s outer empire and served as a buffer
for the Soviet Union, first against a potential U.S.-Japanese threat and later against
China.
Ideological Interests
With the initiation of the Cold War and the establishment of a Socialist country in
the northern Korean peninsula, ideological ties with Pyongyang became a crucial
concern in Soviet East Asian policy. After the DPRK was established in Septem-
ber 1948 under the auspices of the Soviet Union, the survival of the Socialist re-
10
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. 8 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 653.
11
David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1948), p. 293.
12
Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957),
p. 69.
13
Vladimir B. Yakubovsky, ‘Key Pages of the History of Russian-Korean Relations: An
Attempt at a New Reading’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 13, no. 2 (Winter
1996), p. 322.
gime in North Korea became a great concern of the world Socialist movement.
Soviet ideological interest dictated the protection of North Korea. Between 1948
and 1991, fraternal links existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Un-
ion (CPSU) and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). Soviet Russia considered
North Korea to be a ‘truly Socialist’ state, a member of the ‘world Socialist com-
munity’ and a bulwark against ‘American imperialism and Japanese militarism’.
These attitudes toward North Korea determined the Moscow approach to Pyongy-
ang and Seoul during the Cold War. Although the role and function of the Soviet
state was originally designed to be instrumental for world revolution and that of
the CPSU more or less permanent, over the years their respective positions were
virtually reversed. Whenever the situation called for a choice between the survival
of the Soviet state and the cause of communist revolution, Soviet leaders chose
national interests over ideology. Ideological unity certainly bound the two Com-
munist neighbours closely. Even at the height of the Cold War, national interests,
not ideological interests, largely determined Soviet policy toward the Korean pen-
insula.
Prior to Gorbachev, Soviet foreign policy toward the two Koreas unequivocally
tilted toward the North. Moscow maintained friendly and cooperative relations
with Pyongyang based on identical ideological interests and complementary strate-
gic interests, and continued to express hostile attitudes toward Seoul. Ideological
ties between these two Socialist countries adversely affected Soviet relations with
South Korea and were the major obstacle to normalizing relations with Seoul. In
the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the CPSU, ideo-
logical ties became obsolete and no longer relevant in bilateral relations. Under
Yeltsin’s presidency, Communist ideology became a crucial source of an irrecon-
cilable schism between Russia and the DPRK.
Economic Interests
Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiatives toward South Korea were driven primarily by

economic considerations.14 With Seoul’s help, he hoped to achieve overall eco-
nomic development in the Far East and Siberia by integrating the Soviet economy
into the structure of the rapidly developing Asia Pacific community. Gorbachev
intended to channel South Korea’s investment to increase consumer goods produc-
tion, create a social-economic infrastructure, and develop natural resources in the
Far East and Siberia.
Under Gorbachev, the first priority was domestic reform while foreign policy
was secondary; domestic needs took precedence over foreign policy considerations.
Gorbachev wanted the Soviet Union to become a new full-fledged member of East
Asia and share its prosperity with the help of South Korea. At the time of Seoul-
Moscow normalization in September 1990, the two countries were expected to
14
For Gorbachev’s Korea policy, see Seung-Ho Joo, Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy Toward
the Korean Peninsula, 1985-1991 (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellon, 2000).
expand their economic ties rapidly and to intensify bilateral economic cooperation
based on shared political goals and complementary economic structures. Bilateral
economic relations, however, fell short of initial expectations. With the ousting of
Gorbachev and the break-up of the USSR, ‘new political thinking’ passed into
history, but the policies it yielded continued to be developed by Boris Yeltsin and
Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation.
Yeltsin’s policy toward the Korean peninsula was also determined largely by
economic interests. Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin focused on domestic economic de-
velopment in his dealings with South Korea. In 1992-1995, Yeltsin’s Korea policy
was unequivocally tilted toward South Korea – Moscow further cultivated coop-
erative partnership with Seoul and allowed its relations with Pyongyang to remain
distant. Yeltsin intended to improve Russia’s ailing economy with South Korea’s
financial assistance and cooperation. Yeltsin focused on economic development of
Siberia and the Far East, believing that they held the key to the success of Russia’s
overall economic development. At the same time, Yeltsin ignored and alienated
North Korea, considering it to be an anachronistic regime with no future. Begin-
ning in 1996, Moscow began to pursue a ‘balanced’ relationship with the two
Koreas in earnest. Russia was ‘gradually overcoming a stage of romanticism’, and
entering a stage of balanced development in relations with both the DPRK and the
ROK.15
During the last years of Gorbachev’s reign and throughout Yeltsin’s rule, ide-
ology became increasingly irrelevant and anachronistic, and geo-strategic calcula-
tions became of secondary importance in Moscow’s Korea policy. Economic inter-
ests, instead, became the prime consideration driving Russia’s relations with the
two Koreas.16
The DPRK-Russia Rapprochement
Putin’s Korea policy is driven by Korea’s geo-strategic importance and practical

economic considerations. Ideology is no longer a factor in Russia’s Korea policy.
During the Cold War, Communist ideology bound Moscow and Pyongyang to-
gether. Under Yeltsin, Russia cultivated friendly ties with Seoul and distanced
itself from Communist North Korea for ideological reasons. Yeltsin was too re-
pulsed by the Stalinist Pyongyang regime to have normal ties with it. Yeltsin’s
anti-Communist attitudes along with his idealistic expectations from South Korea
led to Russia’s one-sided policy in favor of Seoul.
15
V. I. Denisov, ‘Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification’, in Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed.,
The Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press,
1997), p. 38.
16
For Moscow-Seoul economic relations during this period, see Seung-Ho Joo, ‘Economic
Relations between South Korea and Russia’, in Judith Thorton and Charles Ziegler, eds.,
Russia’s Far East: A Region at Risk (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002),
pp. 441-470.
Under Putin, Russia’s Korea policy is finally rid of ideological influence.

Putin’s Korea policy is predicated upon the principles of realism, pragmatism, and
balanced relations with the two Koreas, and is driven by Russia’s geo-strategic and
economic interests. From 1996 Russia sought to re-establish friendly ties with
North Korea for political, security, and economic reasons, but bilateral normaliza-
tion occurred only after Putin became the new Russian leader in 2000.
In the mid-1990s, Russian leaders realized that the U.S. was expanding its
influence over the entire Korean peninsula at the expense of Russia’s legitimate
security interests and that Russia was no longer considered a major player in
Korean affairs because it lost influence over North Korea. Russian leaders calcu-
lated that Russia could regain its lost influence on the Korean peninsula by restor-
ing friendly ties with Pyongyang while maintaining cooperative ties with Seoul.
They also calculated that normalizing relations with Pyongyang would be benefi-
cial to its own security and economy. Fearing that North Korea’s sudden collapse
or another Korean War would seriously endanger the security of its Far Eastern
region, Russia sought active involvement in Korean affairs and tried to create
favorable conditions for inter-Korean reconciliation and reduction of tensions in
and around the Korean peninsula. Resumption of economic cooperation and trade
with North Korea would also bring about mutual economic benefits.
In 2000, Russia restored normal relationship with North Korea and embarked
on diplomatic initiatives on the Korean question. DPRK-Russian rapprochement
resulted when Putin’s pragmatism intersected with Kim Jong-il’s new diplomatic
manoeuvres. Putin’s unilateral diplomatic gestures toward Kim Jong-il alone
would not have been sufficient. Since 2000, Moscow and Pyongyang have re-
established cordial relationship and have been forging cooperative ties in various
areas.
In 2000, after years of reclusion, Kim Jong-il took unprecedented diplomatic
overtures toward the outside world. Kim seems to have concluded that involve-
ment with, rather than isolation from, the outside world was the best way to turn
his poverty-stricken country into a strong and prosperous one.17
Kim’s diplomatic offensive began with his visit to the PRC (People’s Republic
of China) in late May 2000. This trip led to a thaw of bilateral relations that had
been chilled and uncomfortable since the early 1990s. Kim Jong-il held an historic
summit with President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea in June, which laid the foun-
dation for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. 18 Kim Jong-il also took
17
For Kim Jong-il’s foreign relations, see Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, eds., North
Korea after Kim Il Sung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Samuel Kim, ed., North
Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1998); and Selig S. Harrison, ‘Time to Leave Korea?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2
(March/April 2001), pp. 62-78.
18
For the inter-Korean summit, see Cameron W. Barr and Lienne R. Prusher, ‘The Last
Cold-War Frontier Shaws’, Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 2000; Howard W. French,
‘Two Koreas Reach Agreement to Ease Cold War Tensions’, New York Times, June 14,
2000.
important steps to improve relations with the U.S. and Japan. In October, Kim sent
Jo Myeong-nok to Washington as his special envoy to convey his personal mes-
sage to President Clinton. Jo’s visit resulted in the October 12 joint communiqué,
which expressed the resolution to improve bilateral relations. Subsequently, on
October 23, Secretary of State Madeline Albright became the highest-ranking U.S.
official to visit Pyongyang and hold talks with Kim Jong-il. North Korea and Ja-
pan agreed in principle to normalize bilateral relations, but failed to reach a diplo-
matic breakthrough. In addition, North Korea normalized relations with Italy,
Australia, the Philippines and several other countries. North Korea has sought
memberships and involvement in regional and international organizations. In June,
North Korea joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – the only political secu-
rity consultative body in the Asia Pacific region – and by doing so, secured a foot-
hold for multilateral diplomacy.
In 2000, the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation
between Russia and the DPRK was signed and went into effect.19 The new treaty,
which was to replace the 1961 alliance treaty, provided the legal ground for bilat-
eral relations. The new treaty does not include an automatic military intervention
clause, nor does it include support for DPRK’s confederate unification formula.
Instead, it contains the ‘mutual contact’ clause.20 The exact meaning of this clause
in a crisis situation may be subject to different interpretations since the treaty does
not clarify what ‘contact’ means and what measures may (or may not) be taken
after ‘contact’. During the negotiations, the ‘contact’ clause was included at Rus-
sia’s insistence.21 By including this clause, Russia wanted to increase its influence
over North Korea without directly jeopardizing its security. By leaving the inter-
pretation of this clause open, Russia would retain the right to intervene (or not to
intervene) militarily or otherwise in a conflict situation on the Korean peninsula.
Russia’s intervention would depend on its own interpretation of the clause in a
specific conflict situation.22
In July 2000, Putin visited Pyongyang for summit talks with Kim Jong-il.23
This visit was part of his East Asian tour that took him to Beijing, Pyongyang, and
Okinawa. During Putin’s Pyongyang trip, the DPRK and Russia signed the 11-
19
For a detailed analysis of the new friendship treaty, see Seung-Ho Joo, ‘The New Friend-
ship Treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang ‘, Comparative Strategy, vol. 20, no. 5 (Win-
ter 2001), pp. 467-482.
20
The Russo-Vietnamese friendship treaty also contains a similar clause that calls for ‘mu-
tual contact’ in case of a security crisis. Russia initially proposed to the ROK that their basic
treaty include a similar clause, but dropped the demand after the ROK opposed it.
21
Author’s interview with Choi Ihl-Song, Political Councilor of the ROK Embassy in
Moscow, on June 3, 2002 in Moscow.
22
In January 1993, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kunadze unilaterally notified North
Koreans that Russia would assist North Korea militarily only when the latter was the victim
of an unprovoked attack. The new treaty would allow Russia even more latitude than the
proposed reinterpretation of the old treaty in its intervention in Korean affairs.
23
None of the Soviet or Russian leaders had ever visited North Korea before Putin.
point joint declaration. 24 This document was similar to the new DPRK-Russian
treaty signed on February 9, and some of the statements contained in the treaty
were repeated in the joint declaration. 25 Putin’s Pyongyang trip amply demon-
strated Russia’s eagerness to become an important player on the Korean peninsula.
This trip was significant in three ways. First, it symbolized the beginning of a new
era in Moscow-Pyongyang relations as normal neighbours. His visit marked the
formal closure of uncomfortable relations and the onset of a new relationship. This
trip sent a clear message that Russia wished to forge new ties with North Korea
from a clean slate. Second, it was part of Russia’s diplomatic strategy designed to
enhance its influence and prestige in Korea and Northeast Asia. Following the July
summit, Russia has sought with renewed energy and persistence to cultivate its
image as an honest broker (or facilitator) for peace and stability in the Korean
peninsula. Third, Putin used the occasion to push for economic cooperation with
the two Koreas in both bilateral and multilateral settings. During this trip, Putin
expressed a strong interest in trilateral economic cooperation with both Koreas. He
stated that Russia was ready to modernize DPRK plants and power stations with
ROK’s capital. He also discussed multilateral economic projects, including the
proposal to link the inter-Korean railway to the Trans-Siberian railroad.26
Kim Jong-il held his second summit meeting with Putin in Moscow during his
24-day journey (July 26–August 18, 2001) to Russia. Russia became the second
country Kim visited in the capacity of North Korean leader. 27 Moscow and
Pyongyang laid a legal groundwork for the development of bilateral relations by
signing agreements on a wide range of bilateral issues. The summit talks certainly
helped Moscow and Pyongyang forge new, cooperative ties but did not result in
any breakthroughs or surprises. On August, 4, Kim and Putin issued the 8-point
Moscow declaration at the end of their talks,28 which was similar in contents to the
joint declaration the two leaders adopted after the first summit talks.
In 2002, Kim Jong-il frequently met in Pyongyang with representatives of the
Russian leadership. He met twice with the Far Eastern Federal District Konstantin
Pulikovski, received St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev, and frequently
24
For the full text of the joint declaration, see KCNA (Pyongyang), July 20, 2000.
25
Point 2 of the declaration was identical with Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty, and Point 4
was indistinguishable from Article 3.
26
For recent developments in DPRK-Russian relations, see Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan
Kwak, ‘Military Relations between Russia and North Korea’, The Journal of East Asian
Affairs (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 297-323; Seung-Ho Joo, ‘Russia and Korea: The Summit
and After’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 13, no. 1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 103-
127.
27
Kim Jong-il traveled to China in May 2000, which marked his first trip abroad after
assuming power. The last time Kim visited Russia was in 1959 when he accompanied his
father, Kim Il-sung, as a teenager.
28
The full text of the Moscow declaration is available on the Internet at <http://www.korea-
np.co.jr/pk/116th_issue/2001080701.htm>.
met with Russian Ambassador to North Korea Andrei Karpov.29 Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov visited Pyongyang in July and held talks with Kim Jong-il.
The frequent visits were a good indication that bilateral relations were improving
rapidly in the wake of Putin-Kim Jong-il summit meetings. Kim Jong-il made an
unofficial visit to the Russian Far East on August 20-24, 2002. His itinerary in-
cluded Komsomolsk na Amure, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. Towards the end of
his trip, Kim held talks with Putin in Vladivostok. The main focus of the talks was
the project of linking the trans-Korean railway to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway,
and the two leaders reconfirmed their agreement to push for the railroad project.30
The main reason for this four-day trip was for Kim Jong-il to observe with his own
eyes economic reform policies being implemented in the Russian Far East and to
promote cooperation between the Russian Far East and North Korea.
Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy calls for continuing cooperative ties with
South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung’s state visit to Moscow on May 27-30, 1999,
offered an opportunity for the two countries to restore cordial relations that had
been strained in the wake of the 1998 spy scandal.31 He became the second South
Korean President to visit Russia after Kim Young-sam in 1994. Kim Dae-jung’s
main goal was to elicit Russia’s support for his ‘sunshine policy’ (constructive
engagement policy) toward North Korea. Yeltsin expressed support for Seoul’s
engagement policy toward Pyongyang and promised to play a constructive role in
improving inter-Korean ties. Moscow was most interested in enhancing bilateral
economic cooperation and trade with Seoul. Primarily, Moscow wanted Seoul to
implement the South Korean industrial complex project as early as possible. In
September 2000, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Putin met on the sidelines of the
UN Millennium Summit. Economic cooperation and inter-Korean relations were
on top of the agenda. They agreed that improved inter-Korean relations would
provide more opportunities for economic cooperation between North and South
Korea, and Russia. Putin welcomed reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and
pledged Russia’s support for the Korean peace process.
29
‘Kim Jong-il Comments on Improvement of Russia-North Korea Ties’, Itar-Tass, July 28,
2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-0728).
30
Leonid Vinogradov, ‘Russian Foreign Policy Expert Says Kim Wants to Improve Re-
gional Cooperation’, Itar-Tass, August 19, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-0819).
31
In July 1998, Cho Sung-Woo, a political counselor at South Korea’s Moscow embassy,
was expelled from Russia on espionage charges. In retaliation, Seoul expelled Oleg Abram-
kin, a Russian councilor in Seoul. The mutual expulsion of diplomats was a result of mount-
ing tensions between Russian and ROK intelligence agencies over covert intelligence gath-
ering activities. The expelled diplomats were career intelligence officers operating under
diplomatic cover. In the wake of this incident, the two countries experienced the worst
diplomatic crisis in the history of their relationship. The fact that a spy scandal quickly
escalated into a diplomatic crisis testified to a widening gap in perception and interests
between the two countries.
Putin made his first visit to Seoul on February 26-28, 2001.32 At the summit
meeting, President Kim Dae-jung’s primary concern was to elicit Russia’s support
for his sunshine policy toward North Korea, whereas Putin’s main goal was to
enlist South Korea in crusade against the U.S. national missile defense (NMD)
program. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the summit, Putin pledged to
make concerted efforts to resolve North Korean nuclear and missile issues and
expressed Moscow’s ‘readiness and willingness to continuously contribute to
easing tension and securing peace on the Korean peninsula’. In return, Kim Dae-
jung sided with Russia’s position regarding NMD when he agreed that ‘the ABM
[Antiballistic Missile] treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability and an important
foundation for international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation’.33
The joint communiqué did not mention NMD per se, but clearly indicated
Seoul’s opposition to the plan. 34 Seoul does not support NMD because it may
escalate an arms race in Northeast Asia and deteriorate inter-Korean relations. Kim
Dae-jung’s foreign policies hinge on the ‘sunshine policy’ and he does not want to
jeopardize improved inter-Korean ties over NMD issue. Seoul’s support for NMD,
which is designed to contain nuclear threats from North Korea and other rogue
states, would certainly invoke Pyongyang’s anger and thus undermine Kim’s sun-
shine policy. In this context, ROK’s support for the ABM treaty is not so much
Russia’s diplomatic victory over the U.S. as a reflection of shared interests of the
ROK and Russia.35
ROK-Russian military cooperation36 in the forms of exchange visits and con-
sultations continues. In September 1999, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev
paid an official visit to Seoul. Sergeyev and his ROK counterpart agreed to con-
duct the first joint search and rescue exercises at sea in 2000. They also agreed on
regular mutual visits of Defense Ministers and Chairmen of Joint Chiefs of Staff
32
At this time, Putin characterized Moscow-Seoul relationship as a ‘mature partnership’
(Itar-Tass, February 28, 2001). Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Putin held summit talks twice
in 2000. They met during the UN Millennium summit in New York in September and again
during the APEC meeting in Brunei in November.
33
‘Putin Pledges Efforts for Korean Peace’, UPI, February 27, 2001.
34
During his talks with President Bush in March 2001, Kim Dae-Jung stated that the joint
communiqué should not be interpreted as Seoul’s opposition to NMD. Seoul has been
deliberately ambivalent toward NMD and maintained that is still reviewing its position on
the issue. See Don Kirk, ‘Now Pulls Back from Russia on Missile Shield’, New York Times,
March 2, 2001, p. 6.
35
Seoul has tried to maintain independence between the U.S. and Russia. ROK Foreign
Minister Lee Joung-Binn revealed at a seminar that Seoul rejected Moscow’s request for
U.S. troop withdrawal during Putin’s Seoul trip and refused Washington’s demand for
Seoul’s express support for NMD. ‘Seoul Resisted US Pressure to Support NMD: Foreign
Minister’, Agence France Presse, March 23, 2001.
36
For ROK-Russian military cooperation, see Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, ‘Mili-
tary Cooperation Between Russia and South Korea’, International Journal of Korean Unifi-
cation Studies, vol. 8 (1999), pp. 147-177.
and annual joint defense policy consultations. 37 In May 2000, South Korean
Defense Minister Jo Song-tae paid a return visit to Russia. Jo and Sergeyev agreed
to establish a telephone hotline between the two ministries, to exchange visits of
warships, and to increase the number of South Korean military personnel studying
at Russian military educational institutions.38 In October, the Russian and South
Korean navies held joint exercises about 50 miles from Vladivostok.39
In relative terms, South Korea is by far more important than North Korea as
Russia’s partner for military and economic cooperation. Trade turnover between
the ROK and Russia in 2001 amounted to $3.3 billion, whereas trade turnover
between the DPRK and Russia in the same year reached $115 million.40 In De-
cember 2002, the ROK agreed to accept $534 million-worth of Russian weaponry
as part of Moscow’s loan repayment plan. The agreement stipulated that the ROK
would purchase by 2006 six types of Russian weapons, including the METIS-M
antitank guided missiles, BMP-3 armored vehicles, T-80U tanks, MURENA air
cushion landing boats, IL-103 airplanes for training and Ka-32A search helicopters.
Half of the costs would come from the money Moscow owes to Seoul, and the rest
would be paid to Russia in cash. Russia’s unpaid loans to the ROK amounted to
$1.95 billion at the end of 2002.41 ROK-Russian military cooperation in the form
of exchange visits, military education, and consultation continues.
Russia’s Role for the Korean Peace Process
Russian policy-makers believe that North Korean leadership is genuinely inter-

ested in reforms at home but its paranoid sense of insecurity and isolation com-
bined with mounting international pressures force North Korea to retrench. Re-
newed friendship and trust between Russia and North Korea, they argue, will help
Pyongyang regain self-confidence, and self-confident North Korea will be better
able to engage South Korea in a constructive way. Georgi Toloraya, Deputy Direc-
tor-General, First Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, states
that providing security to North Korea is the shortcut to peace and security in
Korea:
. . . helping North Korea survive and providing it with both security guarantees and the
minimal subsistence level for its population is the key to stability in Korea. . . . A se-
cure and self-assured, not cornered and desperate North Korea is a more reliable and
37
Yonhap, September 2, 1999, in FBIS, DR/EAS (1999-0902).
38
Pavel Koryashkin, ‘Russia, ROK Agree on Defense Ministries Phone Hotline’, Itar-Tass,
May 16, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0516).
39
Interfax, October 14, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1014).
40
‘Russian-North Korean Trade Viewed’, Interfax, August 19, 2002, in FBIS, RD/SOV
(2002-0819).
41
‘ROKG To Procure $534 Million Worth of Russian Weaponry as Loan Payment’, Korea
Times, December 13, 2002, in FBIS, EAS/DR (2002-1213).
forthcoming dialogue partner and this is a minimum condition for socio-economic pro-
gress of this closed society. In the long run a North Korea sure of its future would lead
to more predictability, sustained inter-Korean dialogue and eventual reconciliation on
the basis of peaceful coexistence as a preparatory stage for reunification.42
He also emphasizes that what North Korea needs now are international guarantees
for its economic security as well as military and political security.
Russian policy-makers focus on the international aspect of the Korean question.
Given Korea’s geo-strategic importance, the major powers (the U.S., China, Japan,
and Russia) have inherent interests in the future of Korea. Therefore, cooperation
and coordination among the major powers is a prerequisite for a lasting peace and
security on the Korean peninsula. Based on this rationale, Russia has long advo-
cated a multinational dialogue to deal with the Korean question. Toloraya illumi-
nates on this point:
Any set-up in Korea and around it would be unstable if it does not take into account the
lawful interests of the countries concerned. Therefore multilateral efforts for building up
confidence and mutual trust in the area are as important as the inter-Korean dialogue it-
self for the final solution. The alternative is great power rivalry and competition, which
has so many times in history become the root cause for Korean people’s troubles. The
idea of multilateral dialogue on these issues, long promoted by Russia, might be the
adequate answer to this challenge.43
The two Koreas, Russians point out, should play the leading role in Korean peace
process, and the major powers should play a complementary role: ‘The role of the
“big four” as well as other countries is also important for fostering conditions for a
fruitful inter-Korean dialogue and providing guarantees for the implementation of
the agreements reached in its course’.44
Russia favors a gradual process to Korean unification, and its position may be
summarized as follows: the two Koreas should pursue a long-term peaceful coexis-
tence before they achieve unification; South Korea or the U.S. should not attempt
to change North Korea’s behavior or seek North Korea’s collapse; Korean unifica-
tion should be achieved through peaceful means; and the two Koreas should nego-
tiate for peaceful unification on an equal footing.
Russia is willing to contribute to the Korean peace process through its service
as a disinterested broker and facilitator for peace and security in and around Korea,
as a champion for a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, and by
pushing for multilateral economic cooperation projects, most notably the iron silk
road plan linking the Trans Siberian railroad to Trans Korean railroads.
42
G.Toloraya, ‘Security and Confidence Building in Korean Peninsula: A Russian Point of
View’, LNCV-Korean Peninsula: Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue, June 1-2,
2000, Roma, on the Internet at <http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/corea/proc/043.pdf>.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
Honest Broker and Facilitator for Korean Peace
After Putin’s Pyongyang visit in 2000, Russia doubled its efforts to portray its
image as an honest broker for inter-Korean dialogue and Korean peace. Russia
spoke up on behalf of the DPRK in international gatherings, offered good offices
between the two Koreas and between North Korea and Japan/the U.S., and
suggested compromise solutions to the DPRK and the U.S. Russia’s role in this
regard has been quite visible and fairly positive but failed to lead to a breakthrough
in the deadlocked relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK. The key to Korean
peace is still in the hands of North Korea and the U.S.
Putin introduced Kim Jong-il to the world community with favorable remarks.
Immediately after his Pyongyang trip, Putin stated that he had a good impression
of Kim Jong-il: ‘I discovered for myself that the North Korean leader is a totally
modern man whose assessment of the situation in the world is objective’. He fur-
ther added that he found Kim Jong-il ‘well-informed’.45 Putin also conveyed Kim
Jong-il’s messages to world leaders. At the Okinawa G-8 summit that was held on
the heels of his Pyongyang trip, Putin made a pitch for North Korea by saying that
North Korea’s missile program has ‘peaceful purposes’ and that ‘General Secre-
tary Kim Jong-il is a man whom we can negotiate with’. During the summit, Putin
conveyed Kim Jong-il’s message to other world leaders that North Korea was
ready to give up its current missile program if it could launch one or two peaceful
satellites a year from the territory of other states with their assistance.46
Moscow promotes promoting friendly ties with Pyongyang and at the same
time offers its service as an honest broker/facilitator for Korean peace process.
Russian officials repeatedly stated Russia’s willingness and capability to promote
peace on the Korean peninsula. In this context, Alexander Losyukov, Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of East Asia states: ‘We are prepared to make
such steps [necessary for Korean peace] and we have instruments no other country
has - our rather strong contacts with the North Korean leadership’.47
Russia does not seek to play a leading, active role in resolving Korean conflicts.
Russia instead assumes an indirect, non-intrusive role for Korean peace. Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, commenting on the results of his simultaneous visit
to the two Koreas in July 2002, stated that Russia’s role ‘is not so much in media-
tion, as in the creation of favorable conditions for a direct dialogue between
45
Itar-Tass, July 20, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0720).
46
Itar-Tass, July 22, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0722). In response to South Korean
media reports that Kim Jong-il’s proposal to cancel his missile program in exchange for
commercial launches of Pyongyang’s satellites by other countries was a joke, Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov stated: ‘our new contacts with the North
Korean side left no impression that it was a joke’. Kim Jong-il made the proposal during the
July meeting in Pyongyang with President Putin. Itar-Tass, September 11, 2000, in FBIS,
DR/SOV (2000-0911).
47
‘Russia prepared to help ease tensions over North Korean problem’, Interfax, December
17, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-1217).
Pyongyang and Seoul and for the abatement of international concern in connection
with military-and-political problems in the region’.48
In addition, Russia has supported North Korea’s participation in international
organizations and forums. For example, Russia supported President Kim Dae-
jung’s idea that Pyongyang should join APEC as a ‘guest’. Russian statesmen have
offered good services. Russian State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov expressed
Russia’s willingness to initiate a meeting between parliament members of North
and South Koreas to help solve the problems of the Korean unification.49 Seoul has
repeatedly asked Moscow to persuade Pyongyang to adopt reforms and resume
inter-Korean dialogues. In January 2002, South Korean officials asked Russia to
mediate in the efforts to resume inter-Korean talks and the dialog between
Pyongyang and Washington.50
Russia often criticizes the Bush administration’s hard line approach toward
North Korea and urges the U.S. to solve North Korean conflicts through peaceful
means. In regards to the U.S.-North Korean confrontation over Pyongyang’s re-
sumption of its nuclear program in November 2002, Russian Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs Losyukov accused the U.S. attempt to put pressure upon the
DPRK to solve the problem. He stressed that pressure would worsen the situation
by getting on the nerves of the DPRK. He further stated that ‘it is necessary to
understand the root cause of the issue related to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile
program and the motive for the action of Koreans’. Seleznyov, speaker of the state
Duma blamed the U.S. for DPRK’s resumption of nuclear program, pointing out
that the U.S. failed to fulfill its promise to build nuclear reactors for the DPRK and
that the U.S. included North Korea as part of an ‘axis of evil’.51 Russia provided
good offices between the DPRK and Japan. Japan reportedly requested Russia’s
help in resuming dialogue with North Korea,52 and Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov spoke in July 2002 following his talks with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang,
‘Pyongyang is ready for a constructive dialogue with the U.S. and Japan without
any preliminary conditions’.53 Moscow stressed that the success summit meeting
between Kim Jong-il and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in Pyongy-
ang in September 2002 was largely a result of Russia’s mediation policy, and
48
‘Russia Welcomes Inter-Korean Accords on Railway’, Itar-Tass, August 31, 2002, in
FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-0831).
49
Itar-Tass, September 1, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0901).
50
Vladimir Kutakov, ‘South Korea Asks Russia to Assist US-North Korea Contacts’, Itar-
Tass, January 30, 2002.
51
‘DPRK’s KCNA: Russian Political Figures Denounce U.S. Attempt To Put Pressure
Upon DPRK’, KCNA, December 26, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-1226).
52
‘Japan Reportedly Asked Russia to ‘Assist’ in ‘Resuming Dialogue’ With DPRK’, Joon-
gang Ilbo, July 19, 2002, in FBIS, EAS/DR (2002-0719).
53
‘Russian Foreign Minister Says N Korea Ready for Dialogue with US, Japan’, Itar-Tass,
July 29, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-0729).
Koizumi expressed his appreciation to Putin for his role in establishing Japan-
North Korea dialogue.54
As tensions between the U.S. and the DPRK mounted in January 2003, Russia
once again attempted to ameliorate the situation by suggesting a package deal.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov flew to Pyongyang on
January 20 and delivered Putin’s message to Kim Jong-il on how to resolve the
nuclear crisis. The package proposal included a nuclear-free status on the Korean
peninsula, security guarantee for the DPRK, and resumption of humanitarian assis-
tance and economic aid to the DPRK.55
Peace through a Multilateral Security Mechanism
Russia prefers a multinational arrangement for Korean peace and security. Russia
welcomes inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation and supports the idea that Ko-
rean questions should be resolved, first of all, by Koreans themselves. Russia does
not oppose other channels of talks, including U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks and
the four-way talks (the U.S., China, North and South Korea). Russia, however,
maintains that the U.S. alone cannot untie the ‘Korean knot’. It favors a multilat-
eral approach to creating a lasting peace and security in Korea and Northeast Asia:
We could begin with promoting the idea of establishing a multilateral structure of con-
sultations on security and cooperation in Northeast Asia to take up issues with an em-
phasis on the general concerns of the region. We think it is expedient to move then to-
wards a multilateral dialogue, where the task of Korean settlement would be considered
in direct linkage with the regional problems of strengthening security and stability in
Northeast Asia.56
Russia has reiterated its call for a multinational mechanism to create peace and
security in Korea and Northeast Asia. Moscow’s proposal for an Asia Pacific
region multinational conference dates back to the Brezhnev era; in 1969, the So-
viet Union called for the creation of an Asian collective security system. Gorba-
chev reintroduced the idea of a collective security system in Asia, variously re-
ferred to as ‘an all-embracing system of international security’, ‘a Helsinki-like
Pacific conference’, or the ‘All Asian Forum’. During his visit to Seoul in Novem-
ber 1992, President Yeltsin proposed a mechanism of multinational negotiations
beginning with expert-level consultations on security issues in the potentially
conflict-prone sub-region of Northeast Asia. And he also called for a crisis regula-
54
‘Russia Stresses Role in Mediating Between Japan, North Korea’, Itar-Tass, October 11,
2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-1011).
55
Zhao Jiaming, ‘DPRK Leader Meets with Russian Envoy’, People’s Daily, January 21,
2003, p. 3.
56
Evgeny V. Afanasiev ‘Vladimir Putin’s New Foreign Policy and Russian Views of the
Situation on the Korean Peninsula’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 12, no. 2
(Winter 2000), p. 13.
tion system, including the creation of conflict prevention and strategic studies
centers in the region. Yeltsin’s multinational negotiation mechanism particularly
emphasized military issues such as nuclear and missile non-proliferation.57
On March 24, 1994, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed an eight-party
multilateral conference that included South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., Russia,
China, Japan, the IAEA, and the UN Secretary-General, as a forum to deal with
the nuclear problem. 58 Russia intended to use a multilateral conference on the
Korean question as a vehicle for developing a comprehensive collective security
system in Asia and the Pacific. Russia wants to create an Asian version of the
Helsinki Conference where Russia can play a leading role and earn recognition as
a major actor in the Asia Pacific.
Valentin Moiseev, then Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the
Russian Foreign Ministry, published an article in the May-June, 1997 issue of
International Affairs (the journal published by the Russian Foreign Ministry) that,
for the first time, included concrete details of the Russian proposal.59 The Russian
proposal may be summarized as follows:
1. All interested nations and organizations, including the DPRK, the ROK,
the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, the U.S., the
PRC, France, and Britain), Japan, the UN Secretary General, and the Gen-
eral Director of the IAEA, are invited to the conference.
2. Cross-recognition will precede the conference. The U.S. and Japan will
accord diplomatic recognition to North Korea on the day before the con-
ference is summoned, and North Korea will reciprocate.
3. During the conference, working groups that deal with specific issue areas
will be organized. The group focusing on improving inter-Korean relations
will discuss ways to implement the December 1991 basic agreement be-
tween the two Koreas and will arrive at a compromise unification formula.
Other participants will approve this group’s agreements and become guar-
antors for their implementation. The group responsible for replacing the
cease-fire agreement with a peaceful structure will consist of representa-
57
Nikolai Solovyev, ‘Siberia and the APR’, International Affairs (Moscow) (April 1993),
p. 26.
58
Denisov, ‘Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification’, in Tae-Hwan Kwak (ed.), The
Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies, p. 42.
59
Valentin Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43,
no. 3 (1997), pp. 68-72. At the time, Moiseev was head of the Korean desk at the Russian
Foreign Ministry. An almost identical description of the proposal is found in Evgeni Baja-
nov, ‘A Russian Perspective on Korean Peace and Security’, Northeast Peace and Security
Network Special Report (July 28, 1997) (http://www.nautilus,org/napsnet// special_reports/).
Bajanov is the Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Problems in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
tives of the signatories of the 1953 truce and of the Supervisory Commis-
sion of Neutral Nations. It will discuss replacing U.S. troops in the Demili-
tarized Zone (DMZ) with troops from neutral countries as an interim
measure to create a new peaceful structure on the Korean peninsula. The
group focusing on adopting confidence-building measures on the Korean
peninsula will deal with the implementation of those measures in the mili-
tary area and arms control on the Korean peninsula. It will discuss the is-
sue of U.S. troop reduction. The group focusing on ensuring the non-
nuclear status of the Korean peninsula and the creation of a zone free from
all forms of weapons of mass destruction will provide assistance in the fol-
lowing areas: the implementation of the joint declaration of North and
South Korea on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the implementa-
tion of the limited agreement between the DPRK and the U.S., the provi-
sion of guarantees of the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula by the
nuclear powers, support of the Korean Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) activities, the utilization of refined fuel, and in the shipment of
diesel fuel. It will review matters connected with the ban on chemical and
biological weapons and long-range missiles and will assist North and
South Korea to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The
group responsible for the normalization of relations will be concerned with
the complete normalization of relations between the DPRK and the U.S.
and between the DPRK and Japan.
4. The working groups will operate under one ‘roof’, i.e., the international
conference. Several working groups may hold joint sessions to discuss
matters of common concern and to search for compromises involving
many plans. The recommendations from the working groups will be sub-
mitted for approval to the sessions of the conference at the ministerial level.
The above proposal contains the most detailed description of the goals, format, and
procedures of the multinational conference. Nonetheless, Russia does not necessar-
ily insist on this particular type of multinational conference and is willing to mod-
ify its proposal.
In October 2002, Moscow renewed its call for six-party talks in Northeast Asia.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov stated that the ‘talk is
going on about a possibility of organizing six-party process’ that would include
North and South Koreas, Russia, the U.S., China, and Japan. He further elaborated
that the six-party format is not designed to resolve the Korean problem but for
creating an atmosphere favorable for inter-Korean dialogue. He stated the six-party
talks may deal with a wide range of issues: ‘Not only the Korean problem could be
discussed, there are also fishing matters, economic projects, ecological safety, and
it would be right to include in the agenda the fight against terrorism’.60
Russia’s call for an international conference has fallen on deaf ears so far.
Other members of the UN Security Council, particularly the U.S., have shown no
interest in the proposal at all because they prefer utilizing current channels of
communication (four-way peace talks-U.S.-North Korea, North and South Korea,
IAEA-North Korea, UN-North Korea) to deal with North Korea. Moreover, Py-
ongyang’s primary concern is to improve relations with Washington. South Korea
still sees Russia’s role mostly in terms of a guarantor (along with the U.S., China,
and Japan) in the Korean peace process. North Korea is ambiguous about Russia’s
role in inter-Korean relations, and still considers Russia mainly as a source of
military-technological assistance and as a counterbalance to U.S. military threat.
The Bush administration now wants to handle North Korea’s nuclear issue in a
multinational setting that includes North and South Korea, China, Russia, Japan,
and the U.S., whereas North Korea insists on handling the issue through bilateral
talks with the U.S. Bush’s sudden insistence on multilateral talks seems to an
excuse to avoid serious and sincere talks with North Korea.
Peace through Multilateral Economic Cooperation
Multilateral economic projects such as the iron silk road project and the Irkutsk
gas pipeline project may serve as vehicles for inter-Korean cooperation and recon-
ciliation. As the remnants of the cold war on the Korean peninsula would be dis-
mantled through multilateral economic cooperation, Russia’s chances to play a
constructive role in the Korean peace process would further increase.
Russia has been pushing for trilateral economic cooperation combining Rus-
sia’s technical facilities, DPRK’s labor, and ROK’s capital. North Korean factories
built with the support of the Soviet Union, including the Kimchaek steel plant,
Seungri chemical plant, Ryongsong bearing plant, and Anju textile plant, need
repairs and upgrading. Russia proposes to modernize these industrial facilities with
ROK’s capital. During the third meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission for
Economic, Trade, and Science-technological Cooperation held in Pyongyang on
October 17-21, 2000, Russia and North Korea deliberated the prospects for trilat-
eral economic cooperation involving Russia, the DPRK, and the ROK. Russian
Education Minister Vladimir Filipov who led the Russian delegation emphasized
the need for South Korea’s financial investment in such projects.61 South Korea,
however, is not interested in pouring money into such investment. For one thing,
commodities produced by these plants will not competitive on the international
60
Vladimir Kutakhov, ‘Russia Offers Six-party Discussion Format in Northeast Asia’, Itar-
Tass, October, 1, 2002.
61
Debt repayment issue was also discussed during this meeting. Filippov stated that North
Korea’s debt to Russia should be restructured before Russian investments into North Korean
economy resume (Itar-Tass, October 17, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1017).
market. For another, South Koreans are well aware that North Korean plants and
industrial facilities, built with Soviet assistance in the past, will have to be com-
pletely overhauled if Korea is unified on South Korean terms.
Putin has a keen interest in the ‘iron silk road’ project of linking the Trans
Siberian railways to Trans Korean railways for economic and security reasons. The
railway project would contribute to the development of Russia’s Far Eastern Re-
gions and help reduce tensions in Korea and Northeast Asia. Following the Korean
summit talks, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed to re-link an inter-Korean railway
severed by the division of the nation. If the inter-Korean railway (the Gyeongui
line linking Seoul and North Korea’s Shinuiju near the Chinese border) is restored,
the Trans-Siberian railroad (TSR) is likely to be linked with the inter-Korean rail-
road. Should this happen, trilateral economic cooperation including Russia, the
ROK, and the DPRK would gain a new momentum. Russia is keen on these ‘iron
silk roads’ projects. Putin broached the ‘iron silk roads’ plan when he met with
Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, and Kim reportedly responded favorably. Putin contin-
ued to promote ‘iron silk roads’ and triangular economic cooperation when he met
with President Kim Dae-jung while attending the UN Millennium Summit in Sep-
tember 2000. At this meeting, the two leaders agreed to connect an inter-Korean
Korean railroad with TSR.62 At the time of the second summit between Kim Jong-
il and Putin in Moscow in July 2001, the two leaders confirmed their will to pursue
the railway project.
Putin is energetically pushing for this railway project. Moscow already decided
to upgrade 240-kilometer-long section from Ussuriysk to Khasan by October
2003.63 The DPRK decided against building the southern section of the railway
between Pyongyang-Wonsan, and chose the route to the eastern coast (Geumgang-
san-Anbyon section).64 In December 2002, a working group of Russian railway
ministry experts completed a thorough examination of the 101.2 km-long Wonsan-
Geumgangsan stretch of the future Trans-Korean Railway. A feasibility study is
expected to be carried out for the reconstruction of the railway tracks that run from
the border with Russia via North Korea to the Demarcation line.65
Without doubt, ‘iron silk roads’ will help begin a relatively cheap and express
transport of goods from Asia-Pacific countries to Europe. Shipping over the rail-
way line linking the Gyeongui Line to TSR will cut shipping charges and shorten
transportation time, in comparison with sea transportation. The trans-Siberian line
will shorten the duration of freightage from 40 to 15 days and will reduce the cost
62
Yonhap, September 8, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0908).
63
Andrei Urban, ‘Russia Proposes International Consortium To Lay Trans-Korean Rail-
way’, Itar-Tass, September 25, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-0925).
64
Denis Dubrovin, ‘Russia, North Korea to Discuss Building Trans-continental Railway’,
Itar-Tass, October 29, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-1029).
65
‘Russian Specialists Complete Examination of Section of Trans-Korean Railway, Itar-
Tass, December 19, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-1219).
of freightage by two to three times.66 The reduced shipping costs and travel time
will facilitate South Korean trade with Russia and Europe. The rail link will also
contribute to inter-Korean trade and economic cooperation projects. This iron-silk
road project, however, will be made possible when inter-Korean reconciliation
continues and DPRK-U.S. relations improve. The successful implementation of the
railway plan will also depend on how to finance the costs of the $3 billion project.
The Siberian gas development plan is another multilateral economic project
that may contribute to economic cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas,
and in doing so, to peace and security in Korea. The Kovykt gas-condensate field,
located in the Irkutsk region, contains an estimated 870 billion cubic meters of gas
and 400 million barrels of condensate. The ROK consortium conducted a prelimi-
nary feasibility study on the Kovykt gas fields for eight months starting in Decem-
ber 1996. The study proved that its development would be economically profitable
to South Korea.67 In December 1997, Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and Mongolia
agreed to advance the development of natural gas fields in Siberia. In February
1999, Russia Petroleum and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
signed a general agreement on carrying out a feasibility study of the Kovykt gas
development project. In November 1999, KOGAS joined the basic agreement
between Russia and China on feasibility studies on the Kovykt gas pipeline project.
The Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) already completed a preliminary feasibility
study on the gas project and KOGAS representatives, as well as representatives
from Russia, Mongolia, China and Japan, will jointly conduct a major feasibility
study.
If it proves feasible for development, then the development of the gas fields
and construction of a gas pipeline (4,100 km) will take about 5-6 years. As inter-
Korean relations improve, the pipeline may reach South Korea through North
Korea. When completed, the gas field will be able to provide a total of 20 million
tons of natural gas to China, Russia, and Korea annually for 30 years beginning in
2006. It then will provide 7 million tons of gas annually to Korea, satisfying a third
of its total gas demands. With the pipeline’s construction, Korea will be able to
acquire natural gas at a price 22 to 25 percent lower than the import price of the
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
Multinational economic endeavors involving the ‘iron silk road’ project and the
Irkutsk gas program are most likely to involve two Koreas and Russia. These
projects are likely to facilitate economic cooperation and exchanges, lead to eco-
nomic development of the Russian Far East, and contribute to reconciliation be-
tween the two Koreas. Russia’s primary motivation behind these projects is eco-
66
South Korea exported 468,270 TEUs (twenty foot equivalent unit container) to Europe in
1999, of which 17,791 TEUs (3.8 per cent), were transported to Europe through the Vosto-
chiny port and TSR (Yonhap, September 18, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0918).
67
KOGAS, ‘The Irkutsk Natural Gas Project’, January 2000, on the Internet at <http://
ww w.kogas.or.kr/homepage/news.htm/>.
nomic, but the same projects will inevitably have political and security repercus-
sions for Korean peace and security.68
Russian Attitudes and Policy on Korean Unification
Does Russia want a unified Korea? During the Cold War years, Moscow’s main
concern was stability and security in the Far East, and therefore preferred the status
quo in Korea to a unified Korea which might disrupt the delicate strategic equation
in Korea and Northeast Asia. The Russian Federation no longer has the same stake
in a divided Korea that the Soviet Union used to have.
Moscow’s rapprochement with Pyongyang in 2000 marked the shift from de
facto ‘one-Korea’ policy to ‘two-Korea’ policy. Shortly after the collapse of the
Soviet empire, Russian policy-makers expected that the North Korean regime
would face the same fate as that of the Soviet Union and Eastern European coun-
tries that had disappeared into the ‘dustbin of history’. They predicted that Korean
unification would occur in the near future and on South Korean terms. At the time
it seemed logical that Russia should cultivate a cooperative partnership with Seoul,
while disregarding Pyongyang. Pyongyang still survives, however, and it does
not show signs of imminent collapse. Given the situation, the Kremlin reconsid-
ered its policy toward the Korean peninsula, and moved to re-establish a normal
state-to-state relationship with Pyongyang in the mid-1990s.
Russians maintain that Korean unification should be accomplished peacefully
and by Koreans themselves. Russia does not want to see Korean unification
achieved by forceful means since another Korean war would inevitably disrupt its
efforts to develop the Far East and implement reforms at home. Furthermore, the
destruction of Korean nuclear reactors and the influx of Korean refugees into
Russia in the course of another Korean war would directly threaten the security of
the Russian Far East.69
Because of Korea’s geo-strategic importance, Russia does not want to see
any country, particularly Japan or China, achieve a predominant position in Korea:
‘Russia will continue to have a strategic interest in the Korean peninsula, because
it is a possible base for attack and because it shares with Japan control of the Tsu-
shima Strait and the coastline of the East Sea (Sea of Japan). Thus they will
endeavor to minimize Chinese or Japanese influence over Korea’. 70 Continued
military presence on unified Korean soil will be a cause for concern to Russia, if
Russia still considers the U.S. a potential military threat or rival at the time. If
68
For the implications of the iron silk road project for Korean unification, see Nodari A.
Simonia, ‘TKR-TSR Linkage and Its Impact on ROK-DPRK-Russia Relationship’, The
Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 199-202.
69
See Vadim P. Tkachenko, ‘A Russian View on Korean Security after the North-South
Summit’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 12, no. 2 (Winter 2000), p. 28.
70
Donald S. Macdonald, ‘The Role of the Major Powers in the Reunification of Korea’, The
Washington Quarterly (Summer 1992), p. 145.
Koreans lead the unification process without direct foreign intervention, unified
Korea would be less vulnerable to foreign influence and intervention.
Russian leaders often say that only Russia supports Korean unification while
other major powers (the U.S., China, and Japan) prefer divided Korea, and point
out that Russia and Korea have never been at war. Russia, however, would not
blindly support Korean unification; it would support unified Korea only if it would
be willing to accommodate Russia’s interests. Most Russian leaders believe that a
neutral and unified Korea would be in Russia’s interests. 71 Russia is willing to
support Korean unification to as long as unified Korea is either friendly or not-
hostile to Russia. Russia prefers to play a dominant role in the Korean unification
process to ensure unified Korea’s friendship, or alternatively to participate in the
Korean unification process with other powers as an equal to ensure unified Ko-
rea’s neutrality (or non-hostility). It is conceivable that Russia views unified Korea
as a counterbalance against a potential threat from Japan or China.
Russia has reasons to oppose Korean unification. A unified and assertive Korea
might prompt Japan’s rapid rearmament. Given the traditional animosity and occa-
sional friction between Seoul and Tokyo, the emergence of a unified Korea across
the East Sea (the Sea of Japan) might be a cause for alarm for Japan and might
lead to a rapid increase in Japan’s military capability, including nuclear armament.
This possibility is a nightmare to Russian policy-makers because a militarily resur-
gent Japan would pose a direct threat to the security of the Russia’s Far East which
is vulnerable to external threat. On the other hand, a unified Korea friendly to
Russia might serve as counterbalance against Japan’s military resurgence.
Russia has no reason to oppose U.S. military presence in Korea as long as
inter-Korean relations remain precarious and U.S.-Russian relations are manage-
able. Russia prefers to concentrate on reforms and economic development at home
for the time being, without being entangled in a Korean conflict. For now, U.S.
military presence in South Korea does not pose a threat to Russia because it is no
longer aimed at Russian targets. American troops in Korea have served as a stabi-
lizer in Northeast Asia and a deterrent against another Korean war. An abrupt and
reckless withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea might lead to heightened
tensions in Korea and intensify an inter-Korean arms race. Furthermore, U.S. troop
withdrawal from South Korea and Japan may lead to Japan’s remilitarization and
precipitate a dangerous spiral of arms race in Northeast Asia. Russia, however, is
likely to oppose U.S. military presence in Korea and U.S.-Korea alliance after
Korean unification. Unified Korea as a military ally of the U.S. would mean for
Russia an ‘Asian version of NATO’s eastward expansion’ or a ‘forward military
base on Russia’s doorstep’.72 However, Russia’s attitudes and policy toward U.S.
71
See Vadim P. Tkachenko, Koreiskii Poluostrov i Interesy Rossii [The Korean Peninsula
and Russian Interests] (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 2000); Vladimir F. Li, Rossiia i
Koreia v geopolitike evraziiskogo Vostoka [Russia and Korea in the Eurasian Geopolitics]
(Moscow: Nauchnaia Kniga, 2000).
72
Vadim Tkachenko, ‘A Russian View on Korean Security after the North-South Summit’,
p. 31.
military presence in Korea and U.S.-Korean alliance after Korean unification will
to a large extent depend on the nature of U.S.-Russia relations and Northeast Asian
regional system that will take shape in the future.
What kind of security cooperation will a unified Korea and Russia maintain? If
the U.S. follows an isolationist foreign policy and disengages from East Asia com-
pletely (including abrogating its military alliances with Japan and Korea), unified
Korea will no longer be able to depend on it for security. Will Russia, then, replace
the U.S. as Korea’s principal ally? Should Japan emerge as the major military
threat to Korea, Korea could form a military alliance with Russia. Both Korea and
Russia have territorial disputes over the Tokdo (or Takeshima) islets and the Ku-
rile islands (or Northern Territories), respectively and have reason to fear Japan’s
military resurgence. In the event of Japan’s military resurgence, Korea and Russia
would share a common interest of countering Japan’s threat. Russia, a military
superpower, would have the military capability to protect Korea.
Would Russia then have the intention to guarantee Korea’s security and inde-
pendence? In the 1890s, King Gojong of the Joseon Dynasty briefly flirted with
Russia seeing it as the protector against Japan, but at the time Russia proved to
have neither the intention nor the capability. Russia made unsuccessful attempts to
secretly negotiate with Japan to divide the Korean peninsula for separate spheres
of influence along the 38th or 39th parallels, and demonstrated its inferior military
capability when it was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.73 Russia
has traditionally served as protector of Armenia and Mongolia and has upheld their
security and independence against external threat. Would Russia have the intention
and capability to assume a similar role for unified Korea? Two factors render such
scenario unlikely. First, unified Korea is not likely to have a clear-cut enemy,
whereas Armenia and Mongolia had Turkey and China, respectively, as their per-
petual and imminent threat and Russia was a traditional or potential rival of Turkey
and China. Second, the Korean question situation is much more complicated and
internationalized since Korea is surrounded by four major powers, all of whom
have an inherent interest in the fate of Korea and are willing to intervene in Korean
affairs to uphold their interests.
It is conceivable that Korea and the four major powers – the U.S., Russia,
China and Japan – conclude an international guarantee of a unified Korea’s inde-
pendence and integrity. In the guarantee, the signatories would pledge themselves,
either severally or collectively, to respect Korea’s territorial integrity and punish
violators. This type of arrangement, however, is effective as long as the balance of
power among the guarantors is maintained and a potential violator is not more
powerful than the united pressure of law-abiding guarantors.74 Currently the U.S.
73
On several occasions between 1896 and 1903, Russia and Japan negotiated on the divi-
sion of Korea into two zones of influence along the 38th and 39th parallel, but could not
reach an agreement.
74
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 300-301.
exercises predominant influence in Northeast Asia and as long as the current

power structure persists, international guarantee of Korea’s independence and
integrity is unlikely.
Historically, major powers turned strategically important countries into neutral
states to eliminate a source of conflict among them. Contending powers often
applied the neutralization formula ‘to remove minor states from arenas of destruc-
tive regional and global competition’.75 Turning the Korean peninsula into a neu-
tralized state serves the interests of the major powers and Korea – the major pow-
ers surrounding the Korean peninsula can avoid a war over Korea, and Korea can
preserve its independence and territorial integrity. A neutralized Korea is condu-
cive to peace, security and lasting prosperity in Northeast Asia since it will elimi-
nate a major reason for conflict in the region. A non-nuclear, neutral state seems
to be the best formula for unified Korea. The major powers may easily accept this
formula since it would eliminate the need for them to repeatedly intervene in Ko-
rean affairs to safeguard their interests.
Conclusion
Since 2000, Moscow-Pyongyang relations have been progressing dynamically. In

the span of two years, the two neighbors normalized relations, had three summit
meetings, and intensified personal contacts and exchanges at the high level. The
relationship is indeed warming up rapidly. Such dramatic improvement of Mos-
cow-Pyongyang relations is attributable, first of all, to warm personal ties between
Putin and Kim Jong-il. During their summit meetings, Kim Jong-il and Putin de-
veloped favorable feelings and trust toward each other, and the two leaders main-
tain close contacts and frequent consultations on a wide rage of issues. Pulikovski,
President Putin’s personal representative in the Far Eastern District who escorted
Kim Jong-il during his 24-day visit to Russia in 2001 and met with Kim in Py-
ongyang twice in 2002, pointed out that strong personal ties between Putin and
Kim Jong-il are a powerful driving force behind the dynamic progress of Moscow-
Pyongyang relations:
He [Kim Jong-il] was particularly struck by one meeting. When we came back to Mos-
cow from St Petersburg [during Kim’s travel to Russia in 2001] there was no meeting
planned with Putin. But the president suddenly invited Kim to visit him unofficially.
They spent two hours together and had lunch. This invitation was seen by him as a mark
of very great trust. In the East the role played by a leader’s personality is important.
Kim later told me that Russia was lucky to have found a strong personality. And he said
75
Cyril E. Black et al., Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1968), p. vi.
that he wanted to restore good relations with Russia because it has a leader like Putin.
And that if Putin had not been there, he would not have restored relations.76
Bush’s hard-line policy toward Pyongyang is another important factor driving

Moscow and Pyongyang into close ties. As the threat from the U.S. mounts, North
Korea increases its contacts and consultations with Russia. Clearly Pyongyang
wants to enlist Moscow’s support as it braces itself for a possible showdown with
the U.S. Such circumstances offer an opportunity for Russia to play a constructive
role for Korean peace process.
Putin wants to enhance Russia’s influence and create favorable conditions for
domestic reforms by seeking a pragmatic foreign policy toward the Korean penin-
sula. Given the almost identical milieu in which Russian foreign policy has to
operate, a complete and immediate departure from the past would be impossible.
Unresolved problems at home (economic and political) continue to constrain
Putin’s foreign policy choices and undermine his efforts to enhance Russia’s stat-
ure on the world stage. Even though Moscow-Pyongyang relations are developing
rapidly, Russia’s impact on the Korean peace process is mostly indirect and insig-
nificant, and its diplomatic efforts for Korean peace have been overshadowed by
the U.S. As long as the U.S. insists on unilateralism and pushes for its own agenda
on the Korean peninsula and North Korea focuses on direct dialogue with the U.S.,
Russia’s influence in resolving Korean conflicts will remain marginal.
Russia tries to contribute to the Korean peace process by serving as an honest
broker, leading a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, and facilitat-
ing trilateral (South Korea, North Korea, and Russia) economic projects. Russia’s
neutral stance, consistency, and sincerity earned itself prestige. Russia’s influence
in the Korean peace process, however, is still marginal. Russia’s influence over
North Korea is limited to the power of persuasion, and Russia does not have lever-
age to force North Korea. The only way Moscow could increase its leverage over
Pyongyang is through large provisions of economic and military aid to its former
ally, which is presently impossible because Moscow has neither the will nor the
economic capability to do so. Besides, Moscow will not risk its relations with
South Korea and the U.S. by upgrading its military and security ties with Pyongy-
ang, and Pyongyang fully understands the reality. Russia’s best chance for con-
tributing to Korean peace and security is through economic projects. As Russia
and the two Koreas jointly pursue multilateral economic projects such as the ‘iron
silk road’ project and the Irkutsk gas project, inter-Korean contacts and coopera-
tion will increase, which in turn will contribute to Korean peace and security.
76
Petr Akopov, ‘Konstantin Pulikovskiy: Making Friends on President’s Instructions–
Interview with Konstantin Pulikovskiy’, Izvestiya, April 25, 2002, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2002-
0425). Andrei Karlov, Russian Ambassador to Pyongyang, also stated: ‘The dynamic pro-
gress of Russian-North-Korean ties has been made possible by the warm personal contacts
that presidents Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-il have established’. See ‘Ambassador Upbeat
About Current Russian-Korean Ties’, Itar-Tass, February 7, 2002, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2002-
0207).
Russia does not have a clear and immutable design on the Korean peninsula
and Korean unification. Russia’s Korea policy is still in a state of flux. Neverthe-
less, a few generalizations may be made regarding Russia’s Korea policy. First,
Russia’s Korea policy will largely be circumscribed by the dynamics of Russo-
American relations and the structure and dependent on the nature of the emerging
Northeast Asian power structure. Second, Russia’s fundament interest lies in a
unified Korea that is friendly (not-hostile) to Russia. Russia would be willing to
interfere with or obstruct Korean unification if it would consider a unified Korean
government would be unfriendly to it. Russia does not want to see unified Korea
being used as a springboard for aggression against the Russian Far East which is
vulnerable to external threat. Without a guarantee that a unified Korea would not
pose a military threat to the Russian Far East, Russia would not cooperate for
Korean unification. Thirds, Russia’s security policy toward unified Korea is defen-
sive since it is predicated on the notion that a unified Korea should not be used to
threaten the security of the Far East. U.S. military presence at the doorstep of
Vladivostok on the soil of unified Korea would certainly be considered a threat to
its security. Russia would like to see a unified Korean government adopt a neutral
foreign and security policy posture.

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Russia in Korea Peace Process

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Chapter 8

Russia and the Korean Peace Process

Russian Interests in Korea: A Historical Perspective

Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiatives toward South Korea were driven primarily by

The DPRK-Russia Rapprochement

Putin’s Korea policy is driven by Korea’s geo-strategic importance and practical

Under Putin, Russia’s Korea policy is finally rid of ideological influence.

Russia’s Role for the Korean Peace Process

Russian policy-makers believe that North Korean leadership is genuinely inter-

Honest Broker and Facilitator for Korean Peace

Peace through a Multilateral Security Mechanism

Peace through Multilateral Economic Cooperation

Russian Attitudes and Policy on Korean Unification

exercises predominant influence in Northeast Asia and as long as the current

Since 2000, Moscow-Pyongyang relations have been progressing dynamically. In

Bush’s hard-line policy toward Pyongyang is another important factor driving

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