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9.1 Introduction
There are three major approaches used in the literature to measure the effect of
environmental regulations on the production efficiency of firms:
1. Adjusting the output of the plant to account for the marginal benefit or cost of the
emission reduction or the shadow prices of pollutants (Pittman, 1981, 1983; Färe
et al., 1993; Hetemaki, 1996; Coggins and Swinton, 1996; Repetto et al., 1996;
Kumar, 1999; Murty and Kumar, 2002)
2. Accounting for the effect of pollution abatement costs on the total factor
productivity (Gollop and Roberts, 1983; Barbara and McConnell, 1990; Gray
and Shadbegian, 1995) and the plant cost function (Morgenstern et al., 1997)
3. Directly measuring efficiency and computing the changes in inputs and outputs
if pollution levels or abatement expenditures were not constrained (Färe et al.,
1986, 1989; Boyd and McClelland, 1999)
All of these studies can be further classified in to two types, the first type using
conventional approaches, such as production, cost, or profit functions, while a
second category employs the theory of distance functions. Here the analysis is
carried out using the distance functions approach.
Although the theoretical framework on which the distance functions are based
has been known for a long time (Shephard, 1953) it is only recently that their
usefulness in empirical applications has come to be appreciated. In particular, the
work of Färe and others (Färe et al., 1986, 1989, 1993, 1994; Färe and Primont,
1995) has been influential in popularizing the use of distance functions. Most of the
existing applications of distance functions are either nonparametric studies or based
on the parametric linear programming approach. It appears that only a few econo-
metric distance functions studies have been carried out (Lovell et al., 1994;
Grosskopf and Hayes, 1993; Hetemaki, 1996; Kumar, 1999). Probably the most
important reason for the paucity of econometric applications is the fact that the
stochastic estimation of distance functions is more involved than the application of
linear programming models or the estimation of production, cost, and profit func-
tions without considering the joint production of good output and bad outputs
(pollution loads). This results in a potentially misleading comparison of the pro-
ductive efficiency of firms producing significant amounts of undesirable outputs,
such as water and air pollution. When firms divert resources for reducing undesir-
able outputs, the input/output ratios of the firm are higher and the productivity of the
plant appears lower. An output efficiency measure, which is the amount by which
desirable output can be increased while maintaining the level of inputs usage, will
label the plant as less inefficient than it would be in the absence of this diversion of
resources. An input efficiency measure, which is the amount by which the usage of
conventional inputs and undesirable outputs can be decreased while maintaining the
level of desirable outputs, will similarly label the plant less inefficient than it would
be in the absence of this diversion of resources. It is understood that the constraints
imposed by environmental regulation on the decisions of the firm will be subsumed
within an overall measure of efficiency.
The linear programming approach to compute distance functions is deterministic
in that random errors are absent. It is rather a limitation of this approach. Of course,
9.2 Methodology for Testing Porter Hypothesis 159
in some cases it may turn out that the random errors are of negligible importance for
the final results, but even in these cases, this is usually not known a priori.
Consequently, it is important to be able to estimate distance functions stochastically
so that random errors are accounted for. As it turns out, the estimation of distance
functions is not as straightforward as the estimation of conventional cost, produc-
tion, or profit functions. Indeed, this may be the reason for the paucity of econo-
metric distance function studies. In the present study the output distance function
and the cause and effect relationship between technical inefficiency and environ-
mental regulation are simultaneously estimated employing the framework proposed
by Battese and Coelli (1995b) in a production function setting.
The conventional production function defines the maximum output that can be
produced from an exogenously given input vector, while the cost function defines
the minimum cost to produce the exogenously given output. The output and input
distance functions generalize these notions to a multioutput case (Färe et al., 1994a;
Färe and Primont, 1995). The output distance function describes “how far” an
output vector is from the boundary of the representative output set, given the
fixed input vector. The output distance function is defined as
Equation (9.2) characterizes the output possibility set by the maximum equipropor-
tional expansion of all outputs consistent with the technology set (9.1). The output
distance functions can be used to measure the Debreu–Farrell technical efficiency
(DF) (Debreu, 1951; Farrell, 1957). For example, in terms of the above output set,
the Debreu–Farrell measure can be defined as DFðy; xÞ ¼ maxfl : ly 2 PðxÞg; and
in terms of the output distance function DFðy; xÞ ¼ 1=D0 ðx; yÞ. Thus, the DF
measure is the reciprocal of the value of the distance function and it gives the
factor by which all output could be expanded proportionately if the production units
were operating on the frontier. It is clear that D0 ðx; yÞ 1. If D0 ðx; yÞ ¼ 1, the firm
can be regarded as 100% efficient and y is on the boundary of feasible production
set. For D0 ðx; yÞ 1; y is in the interior of feasible production set and could be
characterized as 100 D0 percent efficient. One should also keep in mind that the
output distance function is the dual of the revenue function.
9.2 Methodology for Testing Porter Hypothesis 161
From (9.2)
Equation (9.6) can be converted into a stochastic frontier model for D0 and
introducing the composed error term:
where k = 1, 2, . . . , K denotes kth plant, v refers to random shocks and noise, and
u represents the production inefficiency. It is assumed that vk is IID as Nð0; s2v Þ; and
u is assumed to be distributed independently of v and to satisfy vk 0: After having
estimated (9.7), Ehuk jvk þ uk i is calculated for each plant from which plant-specific
measures are computed as
X X 1XX
ln Dðx; yÞ ¼ a0 þ bn ln xn þ am ln ym þ bnn0 ðln xn Þðln xn0 Þ
2
1 X X X X
þ amm0 ðln ym Þðln ym0 Þ þ gnm ðln xn Þðln ym Þ;
2
ð9:10Þ
where x and y are, respectively, N 1 and M 1 vectors of inputs and outputs. The
PM PM PM
homogeneity conditions, i.e., m¼1 am ¼ 1; m0 ¼1 amm0 ¼ m¼1 gnm ¼ 0; m =
1, 2, . . ., M; n = 1, 2, . . ., N; and symmetry conditions, amm0 ¼ am0 m ; bnn0 ¼ bn0 n are
imposed.
Detailed questionnaires seeking information about the production and pollution
abatement activities were sent to 1,500 water-polluting firms belonging to 18
categories of industries declared as water-polluting industries by the Central Pollu-
tion Control Board in India. The panel data during the period 1996–1999 for 92
firms for which full information is available are used in this study. The data consist
of sales values, BOD, COD, and SS load as outputs and conventional inputs such as
wage bill, capital stock, and materials. For a calculation of the relationship between
the technical inefficiency and environmental regulation, the intensity of environ-
mental regulation is measured by the two new variables, regulation index (RI), and
water conservation index (CI). The RI variable is constructed by making use of
effluent concentrations of BOD, COD, and SS for all the firms. To begin, an index
of compliance of firms with respect to a given pollutant is constructed by scaling
down each observation of effluent concentration by its maximum value (the value
for the firm with least compliance) among 276 observations. Then the regulation
index is defined as the geometric mean of the three compliance indices of BOD,
COD, and SS. The range of this index is from zero to one. It takes the value one for
the firm with the least compliance and approaches zero for the firm with the
maximum compliance or zero pollution. The water conservation index is defined
as the ratio of wastewater to turnover. The lower is this ratio; the higher is the
conservation effort of the firm. Similar types of indices had been used earlier by
Gollop and Roberts (1983) and Hetemaki (1996).
Table 9.1 lists the descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation of
translog output distance function. In most instances, the standard deviation is higher
than the mean values for almost all the variables. This could be attributed to the fact
that the firms in the sample belong to 12 categories of water-polluting industries
with widely varying characteristics with respect to pollution and the size of the firm.
9.4 Results
The parameters of estimated output distance function are given in Table 9.2. Most
of these parameters are significant either at the 1% level or at the 5% level. The log-
likelihood ratio test is also significant at the 1% level with the number of restrictions
equal to five. The value of the distance function computed for each observation
164 9 Win–Win Opportunities and Environmental Regulation
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics of the data used in the study and estimates of technical efficiency
Variable (unit) Mean SD Max Min
Efficiency 0.511 0.098 0.620 0.087
Turnover (Rs. million) 1,911 3,291 25,190 0
BOD effluent load (kg) 50,634 106,941 813,262 2
COD effluent load (kg) 344,605 830,895 5,635,000 21
SS effluent load (kg) 99,471 252,681 1,481,200 4
Materials (Rs. million) 774 1,382 11,143 0
Wage bill (Rs. million) 169 794 10,080 0
Capital stock (Rs. million) 2,323 7,811 74,538.092 0
Regulation intensity (RI) 0.028 0.097 0.7866671 6.33192 105
Wastewater/turnover (ton) (CI) 1,676 4,403 37,172 0
Source: Primary Survey
gives a measure of technical efficiency at a plant level. Table 9.1 reports the
descriptive statistics of technical efficiency for the sample. The mean value of
technical efficiency for the firms in the sample is 0.51, meaning that the water-
polluting industry in India is 49% inefficient. The effect of environmental regula-
tion on the technical efficiency of firms is studied by estimating a relationship
between technical inefficiency and the indices of environmental regulation, water
conservation, and time – simultaneously with the output distance function.
The model shows that technical inefficiency is not a linear function of regulation
and water conservation indices and the time variable. In Table 9.2, the coefficients
of RI and CI are significant at the 1% level, but the coefficient of the time variable is
not significant even at the 10% level. The g parameter defined in Table 9.2 may be
interpreted as the amount of unexplained variation in the technical inefficiency by
its determinants (Coelli, 1995). This parameter varies between zero and one. If it is
zero, the determinants do not explain the variation in inefficiency and the model
reduces to the traditional mean response model. On the other hand, a high value for
this parameter shows that the determinants of inefficiency account for the bulk of
the variation in technical inefficiency. In the model specification, the absolute value
of this parameter is very low, i.e., 0.05 and it is statistically significant at the 1%
level.
The sign of di coefficients in Table 9.2 are of particular interest in the case of
testing the Porter hypothesis described in Section 9.1. A positive sign for the
estimated coefficients of RI and CI shows that the higher the compliance to
regulation (higher RI) and higher the conservation of water (higher CI) by a firm,
the higher is its technical efficiency. The signs of estimated coefficients of RI and
CI in the model are positive. In other words, the more the industry complies with the
regulation, the more efficient it becomes. This result supports the Porter hypothesis.
The positive (negative) sign of the coefficient of time implies an increase (decrease)
of technical inefficiency over time.
Water conservation results in the saving of costs to the industry and thus
contributes to an increase in productive efficiency. There may be potential com-
plementarities between production of conventional output and a reduction of
9.4 Results 165
Table 9.2 Parameter estimates of the output distance function (stochastic estimation)
Parameter Coefficient Standard error t-Ratio
b0 21.670 6.077 20.275
b1 1.024 0.171 5.973*
b2 20.111 0.339 20.328
b3 0.012 0.335 0.035
b4 0.352 0.249 0.014**
b5 20.224 0.265 20.843
b6 20.938 0.212 24.425*
b7 0.019 0.008 2.307***
b8 20.037 0.017 22.165***
b9 0.091 0.036 2.541***
b10 20.169 0.019 28.942*
b11 0.005 0.031 0.163
b12 20.040 0.012 23.253*
b13 20.008 0.026 20.305
b14 20.061 0.027 22.254***
b15 20.007 0.043 20.161
b16 0.092 0.035 2.629*
b17 0.166 0.041 4.054*
b18 20.367 0.039 20.946
b19 0.084 0.026 3.188*
b20 20.015 0.028 20.546
b21 20.076 0.019 23.981*
b22 0.022 0.053 0.410
b23 0.227 0.052 4.343
b24 20.150 0.040 23.761*
b25 20.099 0.053 21.877**
b26 20.128 0.053 22.428***
b27 0.145 0.045 3.183*
b28 0.522 0.269 0.194**
b29 20.629 0.251 22.506***
b30 20.103 0.181 20.572
b31 0.126 0.183 0.688
b32 20.692 0.197 23.520*
b33 0.164 0.198 0.825
b34 0.158 0.311 0.508
b35 0.291 0.196 0.149**
s-squared 0.183 0.015 11.901*
g 0.047 0.065 7.156*
d0 0.583 6.008 0.097
d1 2.203 0.433 5.088*
d2 0.0001 0.00001 5.373*
d3 20.012 0.032 0.368
Log-likelihood function 2,157.341
LR test of the one-sided error 42.319*
With number of restrictions 5
*Significant at 1% level, **significant at 10% level, ***significant at 5% level
Source: Estimation
166 9 Win–Win Opportunities and Environmental Regulation
9.5 Conclusion
The approach used in this chapter has the advantage of simultaneously measuring
efficiency and determining the factors affecting it. Many of the empirical studies
about the effect of environmental regulation on the productive efficiency of firms
show that the regulation makes the firms less efficient. However, there are a few
studies showing the opposite, the study reported in this chapter being one of them.
Environmental regulation could provide incentives to the firms for innovation
and resource conservation in environmental management. To study this problem we
require firm-specific panel data on the production and environmental management
practices of firms. This chapter uses firm-specific data for 3 years for a sample of 92
water-polluting firms in India. The Porter hypothesis about the possibility of win–
win opportunities for firms subjected to environmental regulation is tested for the
Indian water-polluting industry. This is done by estimating the output distance
function jointly with the equation explaining the relationship between technical
inefficiency and indices of environmental regulation and water conservation and the
time variable. The main empirical result is that the technical efficiency of firms
increases with the intensity of environmental regulation and water conservation
efforts. This result supports the Porter hypothesis about environmental regulation.
The win–win opportunities from environmental regulation could be found more
in some industries and less in others. Similar studies for specific industries could
help us to identify the industries with no such opportunities so that monitoring and
enforcement could be directed to those industries in which incentives are absent.
Given the very high monitoring and enforcement cost of environmental regulation,
this could result in the significant cost savings.