Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

SEVENTH DIVISION

BLUE ROCK AGGREGATES CA-G.R. SP No. 158796

CORPORATION, KENDRICK
S. YU, YU KOK SEE, Members:
CARMELITA L. SEE,
CLARENCE S. YU, GARCIA, R. R.,
CHARMAINE YU WANG and Chairperson
CASEY KEANE S. YU, SINGH, M.F. D., and
Petitioners, PASCUA, B. S., JJ.

-versus-

HON. BEATRICE A. CAUNAN-

MEDINA, in her capacity as
PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT –
BRANCH 75, SAN MATEO,
RIZAL and CESAR O.
REODICA, doing business Promulgated:
under the name and style C.O.R.
TRADING,
Respondents. __________________________
x================================================x
DECISION

Pascua, J.:

The instant case was forwarded to this Division and assigned to

the undersigned Ponente as part of his initial caseload per Office
Order No. 107-20-RSF dated 16 March 2020 of Presiding Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 2 of 14
Decision

THE CASE

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Resolution 2 dated 21 May 2018
of public respondent Hon. Beatrice A. Caunan-Medina, in her
capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
75, San Mateo, Rizal, which admitted private respondent Cesar O.
Reodica's Most Respectful Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence with Notice of Change of Address; and the Resolution3 dated 26
October 2018 which denied the motion for reconsideration4 thereof.

THE FACTS

On 10 July 2014, private respondent Cesar O. Reodica, doing

business under the name and style C.O.R. Trading filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo Rizal the instant Complaint
for Sum of Money against petitioners Blue Rock Aggregates
Corporation and its stockholders Kendrick S. Yu, Anton Yu, Yu Kok
See, Carmelita L. See, Clarence S. Yu, Charmaine Yu Wang, and
Casey Keane S. Yu.5

Petitioners and respondent actively participated during the

proceedings before the court a quo.6 On 31 August 2017, private
respondent terminated the presentation of his evidence. 7 Thereafter,
he moved to be granted fifteen (15) days, or until 15 September 2017,
to file his formal offer of evidence. 8 The motion was granted in an
Order dated 31 August 20179. A copy of the order of the court was

1
Rollo, pp. 3-28.
2
Resolution penned by Presiding Judge Beatrice A. Caunan-Medina, Rollo, pp. 31-34
3
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
4
Rollo, pp. 158-168.
5
Rollo, p. 33.
6
Rollo, p. 33.
7
Rollo, p. 7.
8
Ibid.
9
Rollo, p. 8.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 3 of 14
Decision

sent to the lawyer of private respondent, however, the same was

returned unserved for the reason that the addressee had moved out.
The court a quo issued another Order dated 26 October 2017 which
moved the hearing scheduled on even date to 25 January 2018. The
copy of the order sent to private respondent was likewise returned
unserved for the same reason that the addressee had moved out.10

On 25 January 2018, private respondent filed his Most Respectful

Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence with Notice of Change
of Address11 where he alleged that due to inadvertence brought about
by heavy pressure of work and preparation of equally important
pleadings, his lawyer was unable to file the formal offer of evidence
on the date requested in his motion. It was further averred that his
counsel, Galicia Sison Law Partnership, transferred its office to B1 Lot
20, Grand Cypress, Tungkong Mangga, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
In the process of relocation, the pieces of documentary evidence of
private respondent were misplaced and it took a considerable
amount of time to search for the same. The original copies of the
documents, however, were not recovered. Private respondent argued
that no substantial right of any party would be prejudiced by the
belated filing of the formal offer of evidence and that the same was
not caused by any intention to delay the proceedings in the court a
quo.

In petitioners' Comment-Opposition with Motion to Declare

Plaintiff's Waiver of the Offer of Evidence 12, it was asseverated that
private respondent's motion to admit formal offer of evidence should
be denied because he is guilty of inexcusable negligence. More than
four (4) months had passed since the court a quo ordered him to
submit his formal offer of evidence. Inexcusable failure to comply
with the order of the court may be a ground for the dismissal of the

10
Rollo, p. 33.
11
Rollo, pp. 36-A – 38.
12
Rollo, pp. 145-157.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 4 of 14
Decision

complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Also,

the reason cited by private respondent for his failure to comply with
the order of the court was insufficient to justify the relaxation of the
procedural rules. Heavy workload does not excuse a lawyer from
complying with his obligation to timely file the pleadings required
by the court. Hence, petitioners prayed that the Motion to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence be denied and that private
respondent be declared to have waived his offer of evidence.

In the assailed Resolution13 dated 21 May 2018, the court a quo

granted private respondent's Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence. It ratiocinated that the ends of justice will not be served if it
strictly adheres with the rules of procedure. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would
subvert the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting
justice. The court a quo noted that the parties have been actively
participating in the proceedings of the case. It was only in filing the
formal offer of evidence that private respondent faltered in the
prosecution of his case. Private respondent explained in his motion
that the delay was due to his counsel's transfer of office. While
private respondent's counsel may have been negligent, such
negligence does not warrant the waiver of the right to file a formal
offer of evidence. The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution
dated 21 May 2018 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff's

Most Respectful Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer
of Evidence is hereby GRANTED and defendants' Motion
to Declare Plaintiff's Waiver of the Offer of Evidence is
DENIED. Accordingly, plaintiff's Formal Offer of Evidence
is admitted.

Counsel for defendants is hereby given a period of

fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to file his
Comment/Opposition to plaintiff's Formal Offer of

13
Supra, at Note 2.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 5 of 14
Decision

Evidence and thereafter, the latter pleading shall be

deemed submitted for ruling of this Court.

Set the presentation of defendants' evidence on July

19, 2018 at 8:30 A.M.

SO ORDERED.14

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 15 thereof was denied in

the Resolution16 dated 26 October 2018.

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari which raised the

following grounds17 for its allowance:

I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE CAUNAN-
MEDINA SHOULD NOT HAVE ADMITTED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOST RESPECTFUL
MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED FORMAL OFFER
OF EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO PROVE
COMPELLING REASONS TO JUSTIFY THE
RELAXATION/LIBERAL APPLICATION OF THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE; AND

II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE CAUNAN-
MEDINA SHOULD HAVE DECLARED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO HAVE WAIVED HIS OFFER OF
EVIDENCE.

THE ISSUE

The only issue that has to be resolved in the instant petition is

whether the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in granting
private respondent's Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

14
Rollo, p. 34.
15
Rollo, pp. 158-168.
16
Supra, at Note 3.
17
Rollo, p. 10.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 6 of 14
Decision

THE RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners essentially argue that the court a quo committed

grave abuse of discretion in allowing the relaxation of the rules of
procedure despite the failure of private respondent to justify the
liberal application thereof. The liberal application of the rules of
procedure may only be done in proper cases with demonstrable
merit. The reasons cited by private respondent in his motion to admit
formal offer of evidence do not fall within the purview of the
compelling reasons cited in jurisprudence that justify the relaxation
prayed for. The loss of private respondent's documentary evidence
during the transfer of his counsel's office is due to the fault or
negligence of the latter. Given that private respondent failed, for a
period of more than four (4) months, to file his offer of evidence, the
court a quo should have declared him to have waived the same.

We are not persuaded.

Foremost, it must be stressed that the instant petition is a

special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which is intended only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 18
Grave abuse of discretion connotes an act performed in a capricious
manner or a whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.19 The abuse must be of such degree as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. 20 Consequently,

18
Bugaoisan v. Owi Group Manila and Morris Corporation, G.R. No. 226208, February 07, 2018; and
Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank, et al., G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008.
19
People of the Philippines v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 240621, July 24, 2019; and Ace
Navigation Company, et al. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 207804, June 17, 2015.
20
Ibid.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 7 of 14
Decision

when seeking the corrective writ of certiorari, a clear showing of

caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.21

After a careful perusal of the records of the instant case as well

as the law and jurisprudence pertinent to the matter at hand, this
Court is fully convinced that the court a quo acted within the sound
exercise of its discretion when it admitted private respondent's
Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

The Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal
offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered at the time a
witness is called to testify. Documentary and object evidence, on the
other hand, are offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial
evidence. Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done
orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer
of evidence. The general rule is that evidence not formally offered
during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. The
failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time
shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. This is because it will deny the
other parties their right to rebut the evidence not formally offered.22

The foregoing notwithstanding, jurisprudence is replete that

litigation is not a game of technicalities and the discretion to strictly
or liberally apply procedural rules must be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into consideration the
circumstances of each case. Accordingly, even evidence not formally
offered may still be admitted in evidence as long as the following
requisites are met, to wit: (a) the evidence must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded; and (b) the evidence must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.23

21
Bibiana Farms and Mills, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154284, October 27,
2006.
22
Republic of the Philippines v. Gimenez, et al., G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016.
23
Spouses Bautista v. Del Valle, G.R. No. 209621, March 12, 2018; and Cabrera v. Spouses Clarin, G.R.
No. 215640, [November 28, 2016], 801 PHIL 141-159.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 8 of 14
Decision

In Benares v. Lim24, the Supreme Court relaxed the rule on

formal offer of evidence despite the delay on the part of the
prosecution to formally offer its evidence. Heeding the motion of the
prosecution that there was difficulty in securing documents which
were marked during the trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
therein admitted the belated formal offer of evidence. The MeTC was
affirmed by the RTC, Court of Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court.
It was ratiocinated that the totality of the circumstances excused the
delay occasioned by the late filing of the prosecution's offer of
evidence. Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time
involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it. The
following factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The
prosecution's delay therein in filing its formal offer of evidence
cannot be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. There
was a justifiable reason for the prosecution's failure to formally offer
its evidence on time, i.e., the documents which were previously
marked in court were misplaced.

Similarly, in Spouses Bautista v. Del Valle, et al.25 the respondent

therein belatedly filed the formal offer of evidence but the trial court
nevertheless took into consideration the documentary evidence
presented by the respondent. The High Court explained that while
the petitioners therein obstinately asserted that respondent's
belated formal offer should have been denied by the RTC, they failed
to controvert the exception to the rule that a late formal offer of
evidence may still be accepted by the court. Petitioners had been
aware of the pieces of documentary evidence because these were
adduced before the answer was filed and during the former's
application for the issuance of the temporary restraining order (TRO)
24
G.R. No. 173421, [December 14, 2006], 540 PHIL 120-130)
25
G.R. No. 209621, March 12, 2018.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 9 of 14
Decision

and writ of preliminary injunction. They cannot claim that they were
not able to rebut these documents because they had all the
opportunity to do so during the trial. Therefore, the trial court did
not err in admitting the pieces of documentary evidence described in
respondent's belatedly filed formal offer.

Taking into consideration the foregoing jurisprudential

pronouncement and the express provision of Section 6 26, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court that the rules of procedure shall be liberally construed
in order to promote the objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, the court a
quo correctly admitted private respondent's Motion to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence. Far from having gravely abused its
discretion, the court a quo correctly prioritized substantial justice over
the rigid and stringent application of procedural rules. This, by all
means, is not a case of grave abuse of discretion calling for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari.

Notably, the court a quo was cognizant that formal offer of

evidence is not a trivial matter and failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it. This notwithstanding, it nevertheless prudently took into
consideration the totality of the incidents present in the case and
applied the well-entrenched principle in our jurisprudence that a
strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objective of enhancing fair trial
and expedite justice. Particularly, the trial court gave due regard to
the circumstances that private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings a quo; that it was only with the filing of the formal offer
of evidence that he faltered in the prosecution of his case; that the
reason for the tardy formal offer was sufficiently explained in the
26
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (2a)
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 10 of 14
Decision

Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence; and that the motion
was made before private respondent was declared by the trial court
to have waived his offer of evidence and before petitioners filed a
motion to declare such waiver. All these factors were carefully
weighed by the court a quo before granting private respondent's
motion, as may be gleaned from the following portions of the
assailed Resolution dated 21 May 2018, viz:

xxx

After careful review of the records of this case, this

Court finds that although plaintiff has readily admitted the
belated filing of his Formal Offer of Evidence, such delay,
albeit considerable, does warrant the waiver of his right to
offer his evidence. Under the circumstances, this Court
holds that the ends of justice will not be served if it shall
strictly adhere with the rules of procedure.

This Court is not mindful though of the ruling of

the Supreme Court that the rule on formal offer of
evidence is not a trivial matter and failure to make a
formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be
deemed a waiver to submit it. (Heirs of Pasag, et. al. vs.
Sps. Parocha, et. al., G.R. No. 155483, 27 April 2007).

Yet still, this Court is inclined to apply in this case

the Supreme Court's ruling in Peoso vs. Dona (G.R. No.
154018, 3 April 2007 xxx which states:

xxx

Records show that this case was filed on July 10,

2014 and, records also show that both parties have been
actively participating in the proceedings thereof. It was
only in the filing of his Formal Offer of Evidence that
plaintiff faltered in the prosecution of his case and this he
explained in the instant motion and in the
Comment/Opposition he filed thereafter.

The transfer of office of plaintiff's counsel for which

he attributes the loss of most of his documentary evidence
is supported by records as the Order of this Court dated
August 31, 2018 directing the submission of Formal Offer
of Evidence and the Order of the Court dated October 26,
2017 transferring the hearing on said date to January 25,
2018 had, in fact, been returned to this Court for the reason
that addressee had moved out.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 11 of 14
Decision

This Court notes that plaintiff's counsel could have

properly notified this Court of his transfer of office
location or he could have filed the necessary pleading to
defer the filing of his Formal Offer of Evidence on pending
the search of the pieces of evidence allegedly lost.

Nonetheless, this Court finds that the above

negligence does not warrant the waiver of plaintiff's right
to formal offer of evidence especially so that plaintiff has
already filed the same before this Court could make such
declaration or before defendants filed their motion praying
for such declaration.

The foregoing disquisition is in consonance with the

aforementioned pronouncement in Benares v. Lim27 where the
Supreme Court excused the delay occasioned by the late filing of
therein respondent's offer of evidence after taking into consideration
the totality of the circumstances of the case. Just like in Benares, the
court a quo did not simply take into isolation the fault on the part of
private respondent in filing a tardy formal offer of evidence. Rather,
it took into account and weighed the attendant circumstances before
arriving at a decision to grant the motion to admit the formal offer of
evidence.

There is likewise no showing that petitioners or the court were

prejudiced by private respondent's failure to file an offer of evidence
for a period of four (4) months. In fact, petitioners were lax in calling
the attention of the court a quo anent the delay in private respondent's
offer of evidence as they have not even filed a motion to declare the
waiver of the offer of evidence on the part of private respondent. The
only conclusion that can be drawn from such laxity is that petitioners
were not prejudiced by the delay.28 Additionally, the records are
bereft of any showing that the failure of private respondent to timely
file his formal offer of evidence manifests any malicious intent to
delay the proceedings in the court a quo. To reiterate, the tardy formal
27
G.R. No. 173421, [December 14, 2006], 540 PHIL 120-130).
28
Vide: Indiana Aerospace University v. Commissioner on Higher Education (CHED), G.R. No. 139371,
April 4, 2001; and Capitol City Rural Bank of Trece Martires, Inc. v. DCCD Engineering Corporation
Provident Plan, et al., G.R. No. 193830, March 13, 2017.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 12 of 14
Decision

offer of evidence is the only instance that private respondent faltered

in his duty to prosecute the case, thereby negating any scheme to
delay.

Another reason that strongly militates against petitioners is

their failure to show that the instant case does not fall within the
exceptions to the rule on formal offer of evidence. As previously
discussed, evidence not formally offered may still be admitted as
long as it has been identified by testimony duly recorded, and the
evidence has been incorporated in the records of the case. 29 Here, the
only portions of the records of the proceedings a quo that petitioners
submitted to support their petition are the assailed resolutions, the
Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence and its attachments,
petitioners' Comment-Opposition thereto, petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21 May 2018, private
respondent's Comment/Opposition thereto, and petitioners' Reply to the
comment.

Regrettably, however, petitioners did not include in their

petition a copy of the complaint, the responsive pleading and the
portions of the records that pertain to the presentation of private
respondent's evidence. The submitted pleadings and the respective
annexes thereof are insufficient to adequately inform this Court as to
the presence or absence of the circumstances that would warrant the
application of the said exceptions. Notably, petitioners do not even
claim that the instant case does not fall under the aforementioned
exceptions. There is thus here, an absence of a clear showing that
public respondent's grant of the Motion to Admit Attached Formal Offer
of Evidence was a mere product of caprice, whim and arbitrariness.

At this juncture, it is well to emphasize that the Rules of Court

was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the

29
Cabrera v. Spouses Clarin, G.R. No. 215640, [November 28, 2016], 801 PHIL 141-159.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 13 of 14
Decision

dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. This is precisely why
courts, in rendering justice, have always been, conscientiously guided
by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to
substantive rights, and not the other way around. 30 In this case, the
court a quo, conscientiously and judiciously took into consideration
the opposing claims of the parties, weighed them carefully and
finally resolved to give way to liberality in order to afford the parties
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
their cause. Far from being abusive, capricious or oppressive, the
court a quo indubitably exercised its sound discretion.

In fine this Court finds no reason, cause or justification for the

issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for

Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

BONIFACIO S. PASCUA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RAMON R. GARCIA MARIA FILOMENA D. SINGH

Associate Justice Associate Justice

30
Guyamin, et al. v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017.
CA G.R. SP. No. 158796 Page 14 of 14
Decision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court. (Sec. 5, Rule 8, RIRCA [a]).

RAMON R. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Seventh Division