SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

155336, November 25, 2004 COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MARCIAL A.
SANCHEZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of
personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees'
Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision[1] dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions[2] dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and
reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the
disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the
resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner.

The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.
These special provisions state:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and

within the limits of their respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices, to fix
and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services
itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new
positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted
retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall
be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.

2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing
and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information materials; (b)
 repair, maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices, facilities and
equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary
expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual employees; (e)
payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation
and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and employees as
may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied)

On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P.
Navarette-Reciña and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P.
Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting
an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission, to wit:

WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided special
provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on
organizational structures and authorizes the same to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices to fix and determine the salaries,
allowances and other benefits of their personnel and whenever public interest so requires,
make adjustments in the personnel services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That
officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws,
which shall be payable from any unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices;

Whereas, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional Fiscal

Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution
No. 49 adopting internal rules implementing the special provisions heretoforth mentioned;

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and
authorizes the upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from
savings under Personal Services to support the implementation of this resolution effective
Calendar Year 1998;

Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary Notice of
Salary Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement this resolution; . . . .[3]
(Emphasis supplied)

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one
Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with
Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
Commissioners. [4]

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055[5] providing for the upgrading or raising of
salary grades of the following positions in the Commission:
 Number Position Salary Grade Total Salary
of Title Requirements
Positions
From To From To

12 Attorney VI (InDirector IV 26 28 P229,104.00

the Regional
Field Offices)
4 Director III Director IV 27 28 38,928.00
1 Financial &Director IV 24 28 36,744.00
Management
Officer II
1 Budget OfficerBudget Officer18 24 51,756.00
III IV
1 Accountant III Chief 18 24 51,756.00
Accountant
1 Cashier III Cashier V 18 24 51,756.00
1 Information Director IV 24 28 36,744.00[6]
Officer V

It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following positions:

A. Creation

Number of Positions Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Requirements
4 Security Officer II15 684,780.00
(Coterminous)

B. Upgrading

Number ofPosition Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Positions Requirements
From To From To
1 Attorney V Director IV 25 28 P28,092.00
2 Security OfficerSecurity Officer11 15 57,456.00
I II
------------------
Total 3 P 85,548.00[7]

To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant
positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the
positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator
I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II.[8]

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for
its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following
justification:

Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it effectively
involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.

The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26
to Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level
even higher than the one previously denied.

The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in
the Central Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions.

In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate
the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we reiterate
our previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to
Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO) and three (3)
Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the Central Office.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated
10 December 1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the
CHR both Central and Regional Offices to implement the Philippine Decade Plan on Human
Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY
1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided
by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a
Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation.

Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the

Compensation Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed
to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the
government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the National
Government.

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification
and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
 Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the
matter.[9] (Emphases supplied)

In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-
Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the
plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the
CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority
mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as
creation of positions.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and
reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
The decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones,

George Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.[10]

CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 09 June
2000.

Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on
the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of
Appeals decision provides:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and the
questioned Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16, 1999 as
well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.[11]

Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court contending that:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CONSTRUCTION

 OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8522 (THE
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1998) DESPITE ITS BEING
IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE ITSELF.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

VALIDITY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NOS. 992800 AND
001354 AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN
STATING THAT THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES THE
ACTION TAKEN BY IT IN COLLAPSING, UPGRADING AND RECLASSIFICATION OF
POSITIONS THEREIN.[12]

The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the Commission on Human
Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in
sanctioning the CHR's alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch
as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the
CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as
financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of
positions therein.

Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no
official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its
employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has
the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading,
reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM because it
enjoys fiscal autonomy.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous scrutiny of the
records in the case at bar, it is the Court's opinion that the present petition is imbued with merit.

On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one
who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained
of.[13] Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the
Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the
injury test. Indeed, the CHR's upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commission's savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took
cognizance of the CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital
Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it
passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern.
Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[14]

We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a condition precedent
to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
CHR.

Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary
Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the
DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
Thus:

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal
pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences
in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining
rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector
for comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is
hereby directed to establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated
by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided
shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or
hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and government financial institutions.

The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and
the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments,
bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations,
centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed
forces. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions"
shall include all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National
Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or
proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as defined above,
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to "administer" is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the Court of
Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or
superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.[15]

The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L.
Buñag,[16] this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation,
allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite
approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court br/>

Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a
compensation and benefits scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the review of the
Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of the express powers granted to
PRA under its charter, the extent of the review authority of the Department of Budget and
Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of the Department of Budget and
Management is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government
agency or entity concerned and determine if the same complies with the prescribed policies
and guidelines issued in this regard. The role of the Department of Budget and Management
is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation,
benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the
policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws.

In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to
administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[18] the Court held that although the charter[19] of the Philippine
Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees
and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established
by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned:

It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the
compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can
dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter.
Rather, the DBM's function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors
complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC's compensation system
"conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758." (Emphasis
supplied.)

As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must
first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.
This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the
President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation,
execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in
the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation
of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. (Emphasis supplied.)
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and
creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof.
As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from
the DBM is a superfluity.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the
CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.[20]

Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs
to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain
terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged
as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:

Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant
of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be

independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29.Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the
Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority,
and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency. (Emphasis ours.)

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not
among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all
others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.[21]
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law,
and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.[22] In Blaquera v.
Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,[23] it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we explained:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office
of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.

...

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, [the] Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their
objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of
autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant,
not a tag obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the
heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special
provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage
to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special
Provision Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act of 1998
specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had categorically
authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement the organizational
structure of the Judiciary, to wit:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and

within the limits of their respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement organizational
 structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make
adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary; PROVIDED, That officers
and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing
law, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the
appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the
genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM
that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow
to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification
and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No.
8522 "that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws."[26]

Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly provided that
any form of adjustment in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of the Salary
Standardization Law.

The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic causes of
discontent of many civil servants.[27] For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power
to administer the Salary Standardization Law and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This
power is part of the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our government. The
DBM's exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the
paramount law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code.

In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of "providing
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions," the DBM, in the case
under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and
upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY
1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that
"no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or
directed by the President." Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR's proposal to
upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director
III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would
change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.

This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to implement and administer a unified
compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency,
which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,[28] we echoed the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.

To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nation's coffers, the Secretary of the
DBM, as the President's alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat
view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in
particular and in the entire government in general.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-
National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No.
A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution
No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and
Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Acting C.J.), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 36-50; Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.

[2]
Id. at 37.

[3]
Id. at 51-52.

[4]
Id. at 53-56.

[5]
Id. at 54.

[6]
Id.

[7]
Id. at 55.
[8]
Id. at 57.

[9]
Id. at 62-63.

[10]
Id. at 37.

[11]
Id. at 47.

[12]
Id. at 19-20.

[13]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law 243 (1996 ed.), citing Ex Parte Lewitt, 303 U.S. 633.

[14]
EASCO v. LTFRB, G.R. No. 149717, 07 October 2003, 413 SCRA 75.

[15]
Philippine Law Dictionary 21 (2nd ed.), citing Caw v. Benedicto, 63 OG 3393; 8 C.A.R. (2s) 814.

[16]
G.R. No. 143784, 05 February 2003, 397 SCRA 27, 35.

[17]
G.R. No. 119155, 30 January 1996, 252 SCRA599.

[18]
G.R. No. 131529, 30 April 1999, 306 SCRA 593, 609.

[19]
Rep. Act No. 7354 (1992).

[20]
Rollo, p. 46.

[21]
Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 388.

[22]
Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, 112056 and 119597, 11 September 1998,
295 SCRA 366.

[23]
Id.; Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133.

[24]
Id.

[25]
Rollo, p. 63.

[26]
Article XXXIII, Rep. Act No. 8522, Special Provisions Applicable to all Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.

[27]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 243 (1996 Ed).

[28]
G.R. No. 113079, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 30, citing Nestle v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738,
13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 504.
 This decision, and more, can be found at digest.ph/decisions/commission-on-human-rights-
employees-vs-commission-on-human-rights

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