EN BANC representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately
preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
G.R. No. 189466               February 11, 2010
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,  confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization
vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C.
LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,  House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA,
JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES
and JOSELITO USTAREZ,Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups
that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo
party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it
did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon
herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged
to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of
An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as
having lost a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally
attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the
involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat
Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against
Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner
Abayon.1 The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on
September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil
action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-
list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr.,
Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-
list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quowarranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner
Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it
was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership
in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee.
Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal
concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group,
not before the HRET.
Page 1 of 70
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against
Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list
group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act.
HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s
qualifications.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a
resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this
petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the
Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or
organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already
upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan,
Bantay’s personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its
nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay
without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, 5 identifies who the "members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x
who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list
representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These
representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the
Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments.
They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative
districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a
maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list
nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Underscoring supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,6 a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House
of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party,
such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the
Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
Page 2 of 70
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.1avvphi1
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent."7
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order
dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-
041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23,
2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—
the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list
organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and
Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated
him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization
that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had
chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the
power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list
organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and
has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution 9 provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the

Page 3 of 70
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 206952               October 22, 2013
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD, Petitioner,  further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by (Abang Lingkod Party-List ABANG LINGKOD) assailing the Resolution 1 dated
May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections COMELEC) En Bane in SPP No. 12-
238 PLM}, which, alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a
party-list group.
The Facts
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant
fanners and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22,
2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes
needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to
participate in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia required previously registered party-list groups
that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary
hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.4
Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the
summary evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC
scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 -for the summary
hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its
continuing qualification under the party-list system.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9,
2012 Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing
compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November 7 2012,
cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a partylist group. The COMELEC En Bane
pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the
cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of
some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed
at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to
represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition 5 for certiorari alleging that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list
system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by fifty-one
(51) other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were denied
registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG
LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from this Court.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 6 laid down
new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or
associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in
party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the ''marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
Page 4 of 70
 marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have
at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list
groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified
under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and,
in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, 7 which, inter alia
affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system.
The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary
hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the COMELEC held
that:
The Commission maintains its position in the previous en bane ruling cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough that the party-list
organization claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. It is but reasonable to require from groups
and organizations consistent participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to
represent, and not just seasonal and sporadic programs which are unrelated to its sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical
Mission on 11 November 2010, Disaster Management Training on 21 October 2011,
Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1 December 2011.
And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to have been
edited to show in the banners that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the activities. ABANG
LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed on some banners to feign participation in
the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group s registration may be cancelled for declaring
unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not
occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the
Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD s registration. 8
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC s
Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew
the motion for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the
instant petition9 with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the
COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the
election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.
In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration sans a summary
evidentiary hearing for that purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it
to present evidence to prove its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to Atong
Paglaum. It claims that there was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its
registration considering that it complied with the six-point parameters m screening
party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum.
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for
utter lack of merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the
COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its registration since it was given every reasonable
opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion
when it cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration on the ground that it failed to establish
a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Further, the
COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may not be passed upon by this Court as the
same is supported by substantial evidence.
The Issues
In sum, the issues presented for the Court s resolution are the following: first whether
ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation
of its registration under the patiy-list system sans any summary evidentiary hearing; and
second whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Due Process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
Page 5 of 70
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.10
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court
finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present
evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through
Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That
ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent
documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its
claim that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary
hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum.
ABANG LINGKOD’s Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish
its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus,
conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining
ABANG LINGKOD s qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum
would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD’s claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically
require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of
determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters
for screening party-list groups. The dispositive portion of Atong Paglaum reads:
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the
names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the
party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been
granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The
Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD,
were remanded to the COMELEC so that it may reassess, based on the evidence already
submitted by the former, whether they are qualified to participate in the party-list
system pursuant to the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Court did not
require the COMELEC to conduct a hearing de novo in reassessing the qualifications of
said party-list groups. Nevertheless, the Court gave the COMELEC the option to conduct
further summary evidentiary hearing should it deem appropriate to do so.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that
it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.12
Second Issue: Cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD’s Registration
However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against
the new parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum the Court
finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of
ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground
that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in
the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered
photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was
cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-
list groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future
performance.13 As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to
participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities
undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization
or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later
than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral
party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
Page 6 of 70
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. (Emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to
submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only
imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove
through their, inter alia track record that they truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, thus:
xxx
In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled
from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political pat1y, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Secdon 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
(Emphasis ours)
Track record is not the same as the submission or presentation of "constitution, by-laws,
platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant
information as may be required by the COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of
documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern.
The said documentary evidence presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations seek to achieve.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track
record has certain consequences in a group's bid for registration under the party-list
system. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-
list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely
required to attach to their verified petitions their "constitution, by-laws, platform of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may
be required by the COMELEC."
In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines
on who may register under the party-list system and the representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list
system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors
stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-
list elections are still required to present a track record, viz:
x x x In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
xxxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies'' include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG
LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals
represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
Dissenting, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties
or organizations intending to register under the party-list system are still required to
present a track record notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum
that the track record that would have to be presented would only differ as to the nature
of their group/organization. He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links
with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional parties or
organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization.
To submit to the dissent's insistence on varying track records, which are required of
those intending to register under the party-list system, depending on the nature of their
group, would result into an absurd and unjust situation. Under the varying track record
requirement, sectoral organizations must present evidence showing their track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented, i.e. actual activities conducted by
Page 7 of 70
them to further uplift the cause of the sector/s they represent. On the other hand,
national and regional parties or organizations need only prove that they exist as bona
fide organizations which, as the dissent suggests, may be done through the submission of
their constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement,
and other relevant information required by the COMELEC.
However, submission of a group's constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC,
as explained earlier, is not synonymous with the track record requirement. In such case,
only sectoral organizations would be required to present a track record (actual activities
conducted by them to further the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented);
while national and regional organizations need not present their track record as they are
only required to submit documentary evidence showing that they are bona fide
organizations.
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional
parties or organizations as regards their bid for registration under the party-list system.
The varying track record requirement suggested by the dissent would unnecessarily put
a premium on groups intending to register as national and regional parties or
organizations as against those intending to register as sectoral organizations The
imposition of an additional burden on sectoral organizations, i.e. submission of their
track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves under the party-list system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in ng Bagong Bayani in
tong Paglaum does not mean that groups intending to register under the party-list
system are still required to submit a track record. The track record of groups intending
to register under the party-list system was required under the first guideline of Ang
Bagong Bayani for a very specific purpose to show that the national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations that would be allowed to participate in the party-list
elections are truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors It
was necessary-then to require groups seeking registration under the party-list system
since representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, as understood in the
context of Ang Bagong Bayani is easy to claim and feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list
system to submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum not all
groups are required to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and,
accordingly, there is no longer any incentive in merely feigning representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track
record since there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional
party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of
registration under the party-list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of
sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record requirement.
Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration
thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into
its qualification as a party-list group since it seriously puts in question the existence of
ABANG LINGKOD as a group per se and the genuineness of its representation of the
farmers and fisherfolk.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD s registration solely on
the ground of the lack of its track record -that it falsely represented, by submitting
digitally altered photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. The existence of ABANG LINGKOD
as a party-list group per se and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and
fisherfolks were never raised in the proceedings before the COMELEC. It would thus be
the height of injustice in the Court, in this certiorari action, would scrutinize the
legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and the genuineness of its
representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of its
registration, when the issue is limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in
fact it participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a
sufficient number of votes in the May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in the
House of Representatives. These are circumstances, which clearly indicate that ABANG
LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to
the May 13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722
131 votes that were cast for the party-list, 14thus entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives. This is indicative of the fact that a considerable portion of the electorate
considers ABANG LINGKOD as truly representative of peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and
medical missions, which are activities it conducted. Suffice it to state, however, that said
activities do not specifically or directly pertain to the interest or advocacy espoused by
ABANG LINGKOD. As such, the misrepresentation committed by ABANG LINGKOD with
regard to said activities would not necessarily militate against its representation of the
farmers and fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG
LINGKOD in connection with its bid for continued registration under the party-list
system. That ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track record, submitted photographs that
Page 8 of 70
were edited to make it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the
plight of the sectors it represents is a factual finding by the COMELEC, which the Court,
considering that it is supported by substantial evidence, will not disturb. The Court does
not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD s resort to chicanery and its shabby treatment of the
requirements for registration under the party-list system.
Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s
misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its
registration -it is no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In
this case, ABANG LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be
considered material to its qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in
part, reads:
Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The COMELEC may, motu propio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other
document pertinent to the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system,
as a ground for the refusal or cancellation of registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No.
7941, is akin to material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy filed by an
individual candidate under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Both provisions
disallow prospective candidates from participating in an election for declaring false
statements in their eligibility requirements. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
reads:
Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election.
Elucidating on what constitutes material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court, in Lluz v. Commission on
Elections,15 explained that:
From these two cases several conclusions follow. First a misrepresentation in a
certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and
affects the candidate s eligibility. x x x Third a misrepresentation of a non-material fact,
or a non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate s certificate of
candidacy to be denied due course or canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented
must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by the candidate. 16 (Emphasis ours)
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,17 the Court further clarified that a false
representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to
deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. Thus:
The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention
must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is
emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a
material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she
can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that
refer to a candidate s qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and
residence. The candidate's status as a registered voter similarly falls under this
classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be
reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will
work for and represent the local government under which he is running.
Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for
public office.18 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under
Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation
of registration under the party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party,
organization or coalition under the party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation
or refusal of registration of a group, there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group disqualified from
participating in the party-list elections.
The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its
continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as
already discussed, is no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid down in
Atong Paglaum Simply put, they do not affect the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a
party-list group and, hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its registration under
the party-list system. Further, the Court notes that the COMELEC, in its Resolution dated
November 7 2012, asserted that ABANG LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would
show the track record of its five nominees, composed of a non-government organization
worker, an employee and three farmers, in uplifting the cause of the sector that the
group represents.1âwphi1 The COMELEC opined that the failure of ABANG LINGKOD to
Page 9 of 70
present a track record of its nominees justified the cancellation of its registration as a
party-list group.
The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as
opined by the COMELEC, indeed do not have track records showing their participation in
activities aimed at improving the conditions of the sector that the group represents, the
same would not affect the registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out that [t]he nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or that
represent those who lack 'well-defined political constituencies,' either must belong to
their respective sectors or must have a track record o advocacy for their respective
sectors. Stated otherwise, the nominee of a party-list groups may either be: first one who
actually belongs to the sector which the party-list group represents, in which case the
track record requirement does not apply; or second one who does not actually belong to
the sector which the party-list group represents but has a track record showing the
nominee's active participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the sector
which the group represents."
In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are
farmers and, thus, are not required to present a track record showing their active
participation in activities aimed to promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD
represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees
do not actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would not result in
the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is clear
from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in tong Paglaum which states that
"national, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified nominees, being
farmers by occupation.
The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In this
regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG
LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record is no
longer required pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum
Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding
that it was able to obtain sufficient number of votes for a legislative seat, would serve no
purpose other than to subvert the will of the electorate who voted to give ABANG
LINGKOD the privilege to represent them in the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections in
SPP Case No. 12-238 (PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s
registration and disallowed it to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one
of the winning party-list groups during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of
seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said
elections.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party-list group should
not automatically result in the disqualification of the group. 1avvphi1 Otherwise it would
accord the nominees the same significance, which the law holds for the party-list groups;
it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is
material to consider. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as
failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the
qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect. The party-list group must be
treated as separate and distinct from its nominees such that qualifications of the latter
must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the former.

In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its

misrepresentation is a conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in tong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
would merit the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system.

Page 10 of 70

EN BANC
G.R. No. 189600               June 29, 2010
MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,  15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of
May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office
of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list
organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives, and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto 1 seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner
alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to
be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates
of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30
pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to
the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under
Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have
entered a general denial pursuant to public respondent’s Rules.2
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009, 3 dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list
organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one
seat in the House of Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed on
October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondent’s proclamation.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No.
7941, public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998,
unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated
August 6, 2009,4 petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari. 5
Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in
the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject
provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC
Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list
organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10,
2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of
Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.
In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not
substantiated her claims of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that
he became a member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the
2007 elections.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May,
2007 elections will expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot
and academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical
value.7
The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed
unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its
counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules 8 from the issuance of
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
Page 11 of 70
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in
the May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations, 9 it was by no measure
a proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen.  Party-list representatives shall
be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective
parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said
list.
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC 10 after revisiting the formula
for allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private
respondent’s proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules
on the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner’s challenge goes into private respondent’s
qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged.11
On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age
requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-
list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9
applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application.12
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least
be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not
qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941,
the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no
reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under
this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or
two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and
could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the
third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998,
Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish.13
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual
support for public respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private
respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list
affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect.  Any elected party-list representative who
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his
seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party orsectoral affiliation  within six (6)
months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and
sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral
party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system.
Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected
at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
Page 12 of 70
interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim
index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention. 14

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the
youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007
elections.

The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in
May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. 15 Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent
itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector only on March 17, 2007.161avvphi1

That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is
of no moment. A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.

It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a
party-list representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep
the compensation and emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly
declared ineligible to hold the same.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution
No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are
SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member
of the House of Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.

SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 70

EN BANC
G.R. No. 190582               April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, Petitioner,  lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others
may make different choices – choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may
disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are
not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree
and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our
Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for,
diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions
and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned,
harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies
the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet
at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better
than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse
viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang
Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for
registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated
by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 6 Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
Page 14 of 70
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of
the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the
natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men
working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their
error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of
brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84)
"He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s
par. 6F: ‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already
of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000
(Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code
are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any
act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x
(3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art
1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and
void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows’ as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.
— The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand
pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any
form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the
establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,
exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or
condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4)
tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are
contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture
or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth
to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a
famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing
homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the
State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth
from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the
First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and
Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Page 15 of 70
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his
Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even
assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it
cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list
system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to
represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for
the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the
nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify
that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence,
courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special
class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution
discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated,
there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they
will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all
citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious
practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on
Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing,
such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society
and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land.
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those
who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It
penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows."
"Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its
Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any
act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its
Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead
of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be
given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a
Comment in support of petitioner’s application. 13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the
opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. 14 The
COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010. 15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining
order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’spetition on moral grounds
Page 16 of 70
violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion
was granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties’ Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment
of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioner’s application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of
speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had
been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated
with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was
shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country." 21
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner
was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution.
At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due
process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization
with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
§ Abra Gay Association
§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan
§ Albay Gay Association
§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija
§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila
§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila
Page 17 of 70
§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City
§ Circle of Friends
§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte
§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro
Manila
§ Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila
§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte
§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City
§ Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur
§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
§ LUMINA – Baguio City
§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila
§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila
§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City
§ ONE BACARDI
§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila
§ PUP LAKAN
§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR
§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila
§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan
§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal
§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila
§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal
§ The Link – Davao City
§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon
§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila
§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City 23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it
is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In
fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon
City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s
moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has
the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-
list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang
Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack
thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious
matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as
the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate
may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on
Page 18 of 70
grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious
beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would
require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or
non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. 1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed
in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly,
moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged
in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human
mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of
LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring
down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence. 28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult
to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are committing immoral
acts."30 The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different
gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts.
There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases
against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the
law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the
rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all
value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
"any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Page 19 of 70
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of
any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our
equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle,
"consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction,
the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational
basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason
to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate
has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here – that
is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest that is
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other
political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other
law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this
effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt
to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It
is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be
distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the
public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration,
and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate
the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion
shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the
public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining
which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority
rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public
deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median
groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the
limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,
however small – not only for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the
majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to
those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated,
the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not
illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality
Page 20 of 70
and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming
public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify
criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have
ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general
privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent
that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we
face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while
not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence
on the Court’s analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions
must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law
or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the
changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. 46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On
the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor
that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.
However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious
or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal,
reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt
nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.
[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of
petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be
hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right
which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the
denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not
outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public
life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to
bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms
Page 21 of 70
are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems
so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation."48Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No.
25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take
part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to
have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force,
the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it
protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective
office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any
restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable
on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for
election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should
suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy.
States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any
group or category of persons from elective office. 50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility
of giving effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s
invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares
to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international
law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 52 Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
Page 22 of 70
We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society –
wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human
intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much
of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges
states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and
is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no
longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a

declaration formulated by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege
ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case
are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious
communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is
resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s
application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

Page 23 of 70

EN BANC
G.R. No. 190793               June 19, 2012
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, Petitioner,  x x x           x x x          x x x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, 1 in relation to Rules 64 and 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolutions dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January
2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No. 09-073 (PP). 2
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a
regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in
the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.3 In the Petition, MAGDALO was
represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary
General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo). 4 The Petition was docketed as SPP No.
09-073 (PP) and raffled to the Second Division of the COMELEC (COMELEC–Second
Division).5
In its Order dated 24 August 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division directed MAGDALO to
cause the publication of the Petition for Registration and the said Order in three daily
newspapers of general circulation, and set the hearing thereof on 3 September 2009. 6 In
compliance therewith, MAGDALO caused the publication of both documents in HATAW!
No. 1 sa Balita, Saksi sa Balita and BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan). 7
On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which MAGDALO (a) established its
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented Acedillo as its witness;
and (c) marked its documentary evidence in support of its Petition for Registration. The
following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. 8
On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division issued its Resolution denying the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO.9 The relevant portions of the assailed
Resolution read:
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C,
Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and
Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-
over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003,
wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that
they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process
defying the laws of organized societies. x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
On 3 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated
to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution.11
Meanwhile, on 27 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections
(Manifestation of Intent), in which it stated that its membership includes "[f]ormer
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Anti-Corruption Advocates,
Reform-minded citizens."12 Thereafter, on 30 November 2009, it filed its Amended
Manifestation, which bore the following footnote: 13
With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO
("MAGDALO") manifests that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex
abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only and subject to the
outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Magdalo in SPP No.
09-073 (PP) from the Resolution dated 26 October 2009 of the Second Division of the
Page 24 of 70
Honorable Commission denying its Petition for Registration/Accreditation as a Political
Party based in the National Capital Region [NCR], which motion is still pending the (sic)
Honorable Commission En Banc. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of
the Honorable Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Party’s
participation in the Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that their
Petition is approved.
Thereafter, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23
December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections as a party-list group. 14
In its assailed Resolution dated 4 January 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.15
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that (a) the COMELEC Resolutions were not
based on the record or evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions preempted the decision
of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in which several members of the military
are being tried for their involvement in the siege of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
(Oakwood); and (c) it has expressly renounced the use of force, violence and other forms
of unlawful means to achieve its goals. Thus, MAGDALO prays for this Court to: (a)
reverse and set aside the 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 COMELEC Resolutions;
(b) grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to issue a Certificate of
Registration.16 The Petition likewise includes a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Injunctive
Relief to direct the COMELEC to allow MAGDALO to participate in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.17 However, this Court denied the issuance of a TRO in its
Resolution dated 2 February 2010.18
To support the grant of reliefs prayed for, MAGDALO puts forward the following
arguments:
The findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are
based on pure speculation. The Resolutions speculated as to the alleged motives and/or
intentions of the founders of petitioner Magdalo, which claims are not based on evidence
but on mere conjecture and pure baseless presuppositions;
The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject
Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo
"committed mutiny", "held innocent civilian personnel as hostage", "employed violence"
and "use[d] unlawful means" and "in the process defied the laws of organized society"
purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court trying their case,
[Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City], Branch 148, has not
yet decided the case against them;
– and –
The Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders
of the Magdalo and their basic right of to [sic] due process of law. 19
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility
of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party. 20 It contends that this
determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force,
would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a
petition for certiorari.21
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the
authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the latter
nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on pure
conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.22
Preliminary to the examination of the substantive issues, it must be discussed whether
this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it specifically asked for
accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections. 23
Moreover, even assuming that the registration was only for the 10 May 2010 National
and Local Elections, this case nevertheless comes under the exceptions to the rules on
mootness, as explained in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: 24
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
[the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant
action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the
use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party
registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join
subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the
Page 25 of 70
case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal
questions once and for all.
Having established that this Court can exercise its power of judicial review, the issue for
resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve
its goals through violent or unlawful means. This Court rules in the negative, but without
prejudice to MAGDALO’s filing anew of a Petition for Registration.
The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of
parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the
1987 Constitution read:
ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Echoing these constitutional provisions, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP 881), otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 60. Political party. – "Political party" or "party," when used in this Act, means an
organized group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideals or platforms of
government and includes its branches and divisions. To acquire juridical personality,
qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and to entitle it to the rights and privileges herein
granted to political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the
Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to
obtain at least ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and
supported a candidate or candidates in the election next following its registration shall,
after notice and hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registered political
party in such constituency.
Sec. 61. Registration. – Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a national
or regional political party may file with the Commission a verified petition attaching
thereto its constitution and by-laws, platforms or program of government and such other
relevant information as may be required by the Commission. The Commission shall after
due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within ten days from the date it is submitted
for decision. No religious sect shall be registered as a political party and no political party
which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
reads in part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
Page 26 of 70
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step
process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v.
COMELEC:26
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our
election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or
coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the
next natural step to follow.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the
eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent
question now is whether its exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as
to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the
time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not commit
grave abuse of discretion.
A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the
Oakwood incident.
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have
denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on
mere speculation and conjectures.28 This argument cannot be given any merit.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of "public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration." 29 Further, Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers
administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly
acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable
facts.30 Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,31 this Court explained as follows:
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been
explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable
among reasonable men."32
This Court has, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the factual
circumstances surrounding the Oakwood standoff. 33 The incident involved over 300
heavily armed military officers and enlisted men – led by the founding members of
MAGDALO – who surreptitiously took over Oakwood in the wee hours of 27 July 2003.
They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building
and within its vicinity. They aired their grievances against the administration of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), withdrew their support
from the government, and called for her resignation, as well as that of her cabinet
members and of the top officials of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). After the ensuing negotiations for these military agents
to lay down their weapons, defuse the explosives and return to the barracks, the debacle
came to a close at 11:00 p.m. on the same day. 34 That the Oakwood incident was widely
known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice.
Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts
as public knowledge,35 and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction
and reception of evidence thereon.
B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses
violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took
over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its
members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single
shot was fired during the incident.36 These arguments present a very narrow
interpretation of the concepts of violence and unlawful means, and downplays the threat
of violence displayed by the soldiers during the takeover.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be
denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which
provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment
of vehemence, outrage or fury.37 It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised;
abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and
against public liberty.38 On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law
and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it
to exist.39
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As
publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to
express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo, and to
divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies
of the state.40 Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top
officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. 41 To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to
Page 27 of 70
seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with
ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which
MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support
from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired 42 do
not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood.
Neither does its express renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful
means in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government 43 obscure the actual
circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military power,
which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use
of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the very least,
the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of
discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of
MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful
means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals
through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt
for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-
2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence.44 This argument cannot be
sustained.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP
881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. 45 In exercising this
authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or
unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail
any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo 46 is
nonetheless analogously applicable:
An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the
disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the
latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts. The most that we can read
from the finding of liability is that the respondents have been found to be
administratively guilty by substantial evidence – the quantum of proof required in an
administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure…that the proposed witness should not appear to be the "most guilty" is
obviously in line with the character and purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much
stricter standards observed in these cases. They are standards entirely different from
those applicable in administrative proceedings. 47(Emphasis supplied.)
Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required
for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:
As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand
is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring
moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of
substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, applies.48 (Emphasis omitted.)
In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its
administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political
parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In
finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its organizational
objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of
petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that
determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether
MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for
registration as a political party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had
to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion.
On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of
MAGDALO with coup d’état following the events that took place during the Oakwood
siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore,
although the registration case before the COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial
court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve
entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds. The
COMELEC correctly ruled thus:
It is at once apparent that that [sic] the proceedings in and the consequent findings of the
Commission (Second Division) in the subject resolution did not pre-empt the trial and
decision of the court hearing the cases of the Magdalo members. These are two different
processes. The proceedings in the Commission is [sic] a petition for registration of
Magdalo as a political party and the Commission is empowered to ascertain facts and
circumstances relative to this case. It is not criminal in nature unlike the court case of the
Magdalo founders. Thus, the Second Division did not violate the right of the Magdalo
founders to be presumed innocent until proven guilty when it promulgated the
questioned resolution. There is likewise no violation of due process. Accreditation as a
political party is not a right but only a privilege given to groups who have qualified and
met the requirements provided by law.49
It is unmistakable from the above reasons that the ruling of the COMELEC denying the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO has not, as respondent could not have,
preempted Criminal Case No. 03-2784 or violated the right of petitioner’s members to a
presumption of innocence.
Page 28 of 70
Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel involved in the Oakwood
standoff
It must be clarified that the foregoing discussion finding the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC is based on the facts available to it at the time it
issued the assailed 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions. It is crucial to make
this qualification, as this Court recognizes the occurrence of supervening events that
could have altered the COMELEC’s evaluation of the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO. The assessment of the COMELEC could have changed, had these incidents
taken place before the opportunity to deny the Petition arose. In the same manner that
this Court takes cognizance of the facts surrounding the Oakwood incident, it also takes
judicial notice of the grant of amnesty in favor of the soldiers who figured in this standoff.
This Court, in People v. Patriarca,50 explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x" 51 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution, 52 President Benigno S. Aquino III
issued on 24 November 2010 Proclamation No. 75,53 which reads in part:
GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO
MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE
ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY,
THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT
WHEREAS, it is recognized that certain active and former personnel of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and their supporters have
or may have committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of
War and other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003
Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007
Manila Pen Incident;
WHEREAS, there is a clamor from certain sectors of society urging the President to
extend amnesty to said AFP personnel and their supporters;
WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution expressly vests the President the
power to grant amnesty;
WHEREAS, the grant of amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel of the
AFP and PNP and their supporters will promote an atmosphere conducive to the
attainment of a just, comprehensive and enduring peace and is in line with the
Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by Section 19, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution, do
hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:
SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all active and former
personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their supporters who have or may have
committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other
laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula Incident
who shall apply therefor; Provided that amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of torture,
crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.
x x x           x x x          x x x
SECTION 4. Effects. – (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish any
criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related to the July 27,
2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29,
2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice to the grantee’s civil liability for
injuries or damages caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration
of civil and political rights or entitlement of grantees that may have been
suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of any executive, administrative
or criminal action or proceedings against the grantee in connection with the
subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic) any form, if any.
(c) All enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank
of up to Technical Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of up to
Senior Police Officer 3, whose applications for amnesty would be approved
shall be entitled to reintegration or reinstatement, subject to existing laws and
regulations. However, they shall not be entitled to back pay during the time
Page 29 of 70
 they have been discharged or suspended from service or unable to perform
their military or police duties.
(d) Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers of the AFP with the rank of
Master Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of at least Senior
Police Officer 4 whose application for amnesty will be approved shall not be
entitled to remain in the service, reintegration or reinstatement into the service
nor back pay.
(e) All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not reintegrated or
reinstated shall be entitled to retirement and separation benefits, if qualified
under existing laws and regulation, as of the time [of] separation, unless they
have forfeited such retirement benefits for reasons other than the acts covered
by this Proclamation. Those reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to their
retirement and separation benefit[s] upon their actual retirement. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thereafter, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted Concurrent Resolution
No. 4 on 13 and 14 December 2010, respectively. 54 Relevant portions of the Resolution
partly read:
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION CONCURRING WITH PROCLAMATION NO. 75 OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2010
ENTITLED "GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA
MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT
WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall
have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of Congress;
x x x           x x x          x x x
WHEREAS, both Houses of Congress share the view of the President that in order to
promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and
enduing peace and in line with the Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives,
there is a need to declare amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel of the
AFP and PNP and their supporters;
WHEREAS, it is the sense of both House of Congress that it is imperative that an amnesty
partaking the nature proclaimed by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, is
necessary for the general interest of the Philippines; xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its
members in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful
means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not be
in accord with the express intention of both the Executive and the Legislative branches,
in granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in
line with the government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as
regards the use of violence.1awp++i1Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another
Petition for Registration, its officers must individually execute affidavits renouncing the
use of violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives of their organization.
Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include
military officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run
counter to the express provisions of the Constitution:
ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold
and defend this Constitution.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its
members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from
partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political
activity, except to vote.1âwphi1
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed
or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent
amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during
the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of
the disqualifications from party registration.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January
2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.
SO ORDERED.
Page 30 of 70

EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 177179 : June 5, 2009]
V.C. CADANGEN and ALLIANCE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, INC., Petitioners, v. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed under Rules 64 and 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the March 26, 2007 Resolution 1 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPP Case No. 06-040 (PL). In the questioned resolution,
the COMELEC en banc denied petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the February
13, 2007 Resolution2 of the COMELEC Second Division.
The relevant antecedent facts and proceedings follow.
On September 13, 2006, petitioner Alliance of Civil Servants, Inc. (Civil Servants),
represented by its then president, Atty. Sherwin R. Lopez, filed a petition for registration
as a sectoral organization under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 3 or the Party-List System
Act. It claimed, among others, that it had been in existence since December 2004 and it
sought to represent past and present government employees in the party-list system. 4
The COMELEC Second Division, on December 11, 2006, issued an Order 5 requiring Civil
Servants to file a memorandum that would prove its presence or existence nationwide,
track record, financial capability to wage a nationwide campaign, platform of
government, officers and membership, and compliance with the provisions of the Party-
List System Act and the eight-point guideline laid down by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 6
Civil Servants consequently filed the required memorandum attaching thereto the
following documents: (1) copies of its letters to the respective election
directors/officers/registrars of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Second District of
Quezon City, and the cities of Iloilo, Cotabato, Urdaneta and Dagupan, informing them of
the names and addresses of its members in the said localities; (2) revised list of its
members as of November 30, 2006; (3) list of its incorporators with brief descriptions of
their credentials, including their designations/appointments in government offices; (4)
printed screen shot of the Internet homepage of its on-line forum; (5) summary of its
major activities and accomplishments since its inception; (6) financial statement
showing its net asset of P399,927.00; (7) platform of government; and (8) list of its
current officers with a summary of their credentials. 7 Ï‚ηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ
With its petition for registration pending, Civil Servants also filed on February 8, 2007 a
Manifestation8 of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.
On February 13, 2007, however, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution9 denying Civil Servants' petition for registration. We quote the relevant
portions of the resolution, thus'
Owing its mandate to the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, the party list system of
elections is an important component of the Filipino people's participation in the
legislative process. Members of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors now
have a chance to be veritable law makers themselves through their representatives.
Given the importance of the role they play in legislation, not all sectors who claim to be
representative of the marginalized and underrepresented can be granted the
opportunity to participate in the party list elections. Thus, the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections
enunciating the eight (8) point (sic) guideline must be complied with by those who seek
to participate, x x x.
xxx
Likewise, R.A. 7941 laid down the definitive sectors covered by the system which include
the following: labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals.
Page 31 of 70
Thus, in determining whether or not a party can participate in the party list elections, the
Commission (Second Division) is not only bound to verify the veracity of every petition,
but also to see to it that members of these organizations belong to the marginalized and
the underrepresented. Also put to test here is every petitioner's capacity to represent
and voice out the sentiments and needs of the sector it represents. The eight-point
guideline also requires that the party or organization seeking registration should lack a
well-defined political constituency but could, nonetheless, contribute to the formulation
of appropriate legislation to benefit the nation as a whole. Thus, guided by the provisions
of R.A. 7941 and the eight point (sic) guideline enunciated in the Ang Bagong Bayani
case, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves the following petitions for
registration.
xxx
CIVIL SERVANTS is an alliance of government employees aimed at advancing the
economic and social welfare of government employees, upholding the fundamental
rights of civil servants and safeguarding the professional interest of government
workers, among others. In its platform of government, CIVIL SERVANTS espouses the
principles of efficient civil service, economic and social welfare, upholding the
fundamental rights and the professional development of civil servants.
CIVIL SERVANTS likewise claims national constituency and that it has membership
throughout the different regions in the country. In support thereof, petitioner presented
a picture of their website where they discuss different issues confronting government
employees. In relation thereto, petitioner asserts that it had divided itself to (sic)
different working committees to address several issues the report of which is to be
submitted in an annual meeting to be held on March 2007.
On the issue of petitioner's constituency which it claims to be nationwide, this cannot be
established by mere letters to the Commission's Election Officers and providing them
with a copy of the list of officers and members. To establish the extent of the
constituencies of the different parties and organizations as claimed by them, the
Commission directed its Election Officers to verify the existence of petitioner's chapters
allegedly present in the NCR and the different regions. The verification report shows that
CIVIL SERVANTS exists only in Parañaque City's (1st and 2nd Districts) and in Quezon
City's (4th District), contrary to petitioner's claim of national constituency in its
memorandum. For having failed to prove its existence nationwide and for having
declared an untruthful statement in its memorandum, We resolve to DENY the instant
petition.10
Aggrieved, Civil Servants moved for reconsideration, 11 arguing in the main that the law
does not require a sectoral organization to have a nationwide presence or existence for it
to be registered under the party-list system. It posited that the COMELEC Second
Division, in imposing such an additional requirement, went beyond the bounds of the
law.
Not persuaded by Civil Servants' arguments, the COMELEC en banc, in the assailed March
26, 2007 Resolution,12 denied the motion. It ruled that Civil Servants' failure to assail the
COMELEC Second Division's order requiring proof of existence or presence nationwide,
and the subsequent submission of its compliance therewith, which was later found to be
insufficient, effectively barred the organization from subsequently questioning the
legality of the aforementioned order.13 The COMELEC en banc further ratiocinated that -
Incidentally, the requirement of presence or existence in majority of the regions,
provinces, municipalities or cities, as the case may be, is not based on mere whims or
caprices of the Commission. It was made a necessity to serve as a gauge in assessing the
capacity of the applicant to conduct a campaign and as a proof that it is not just a fly-by-
night organization but one which truly represents a particular marginalized and
underrepresented sector. It must be remembered that Republic Act 7941 empowers the
Commission to ask the applicant to provide other information, which it may deem
relevant, in deciding an application for registration of a party, organization or coalitions.
It is under this provision that the Commission has required the petitioner to show its
existence in the areas it claimed to have members.
At any rate, the Second Division was correct in rejecting the application for registration
of the herein petitioner. And with no additional evidence to back the petitioner's claim of
existence all over the country, the Commission En Banc cannot do otherwise but to
likewise reject this motion for reconsideration. 14
Left with no other recourse, petitioner filed the instant case praying for the issuance of a
writ of certiorarito nullify the resolutions of respondent, and a writ of mandamus to
command the latter to register the former as a sectoral organization. 15
We dismiss the petition.
Incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show that the COMELEC, in denying the petition
for registration, gravely abused its discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or
despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. 16 Here, petitioner failed to
demonstrate, and neither do we find, that the COMELEC, through the questioned
issuances, gravely abused its discretion.
We note that in the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941,
the COMELEC may require the submission of any relevant information; and it may refuse,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof,
among which is that the organization has declared untruthful statements in its
petition.17 The COMELEC, after evaluating the documents submitted by petitioner, denied
the latter's plea for registration as a sectoral party, not on the basis of its failure to prove
Page 32 of 70
its nationwide presence, but for its failure to show that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Further, the COMELEC found that petitioner
made an untruthful statement in the pleadings and documents it submitted.

The Court emphasizes that the sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and it does not include a review of the
tribunal's evaluation of the evidence.18 The findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by
any other administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of
competence, are binding on the Court.19 The Court is not a trier of facts;20 it is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations. 21 The Court's
function, as mandated by Section 1,22 Article VIII of the Constitution, is merely to check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court will
have no occasion to exercise its corrective power. It has no authority to inquire into what
it thinks is apparent error.23

Thus, in this case, the Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as a
sectoral party, because to do so will entail an evaluation of the evidence to determine
whether indeed petitioner qualifies as a party-list organization and whether it has made
untruthful statements in its application for registration.

The dismissal of this petition, however, shall not be taken to mean a preclusion on the
part of the petitioner from re-filing an application for registration compliant with the
requirements of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and mandamus is

DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 33 of 70

EN BANC
G.R. No. 177271             May 4, 2007
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,
Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS.
MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners,  participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG
NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA),
ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA
MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON
SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT
REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!),
ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG
KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO),
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT
NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT,
KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED
MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP),
ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND
PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED
TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC),
BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD),
AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS),
KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION
OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS),Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 177314             May 4, 2007
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to
nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the
various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System
Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution
07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating
party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, 1 the
petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33
private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply
with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 2]" and,
Page 34 of 70
2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from
participating in the May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public
and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7)
private respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group4 mentioned in G.R. No.
177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the
private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and
thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14,
2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission
of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with
the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely:
(1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA;
(6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG
KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to
be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the
Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor
and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a
letter5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec’s Law
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Another letter 6 of the same tenor
dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig
the particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner
Rosales’ requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the
front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", 7 with the
following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their
own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter 8 to the Comelec
formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for
information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the
same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for
the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either
confirming or denying … the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman
Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the
issuance of Comelec en bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’
basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-
list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on
election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to
the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007
Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part
of the "Order empowering the Law Department to ‘implement this resolution and reply
to all letters … inquiring on the party-list nominees’ is apparently a fool-proof
bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 … is the final answer to the two formal requests …
of Petitioners".10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition
on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the
accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in
their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not
appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -
xxx committed grave abuse of discretion … when it granted the assailed accreditations
even without simultaneouslydetermining whether the nominees of herein private
respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in
accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable
Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party
or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted
accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of
Page 35 of 70
the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself.
(Words in bracket added; italization in the original) 12
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such
course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral
groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of
special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to
decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on
record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence.14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-
026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the
nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No.
7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by
private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the
Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding
Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election"
of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates
and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and
they may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information
and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to
the public the names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of
the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while
commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-
list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the
names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60)
days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to
participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for
posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall
not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees
away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report
appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release
the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to
participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14
mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. … said he and [the other five COMELEC]
Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 …, the people are to vote for sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale
therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory 15 Section 7, Article III
of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Page 36 of 70
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public,
or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental
lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that
right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. 16 Without a
government’s acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by
the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the
exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. 17 And
since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be
informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion
right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the
people’s right to know is limited to " matters of public concern" and is further subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is
confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets
or those affecting national security.19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But
both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the
day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of
interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons
employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely
the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest
public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec
under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on
election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the
law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No.
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums
other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar
to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the
Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7
of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is
valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance
which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does,
on a fundamental right to information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a
vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons
behind the Comelec’s disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to
be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis
of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the
Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of
official acts of government officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to
be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be
achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of
the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has consistently
made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder
in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So it must be here
for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the
herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks
to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections,
the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the
Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
Page 37 of 70
No pronouncement as to cost. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
SO ORDERED. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA
C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and
mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing
rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list
nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.

Common Antecedents

The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly
registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with
its manifestation of intent to participate, 2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be
chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in
the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29,
2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3)
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’
certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC.
The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The
Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32               June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC),Petitioner,  Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180443
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7,
2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted
Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than
81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of
CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and
proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had
signified his desire to focus on his family life.

Page 38 of 70
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of
Lokin as its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of
Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No.
26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all
relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat
and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC
members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a
petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list
of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set
the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The
case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc,  sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 11 to
partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under
the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action
Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of
the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of
their respective cases.
The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July
18, 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and
Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the
nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the
final resolution of their respective cases.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los
Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno,
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC
Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request
of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig
had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the
withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as
second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty.
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third
nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
SO ORDERED.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the
president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that
the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and
direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's
manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its
certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC
had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his
actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done
without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or
at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given paramount
consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second
nominee of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007. 15
Precís of the Consolidated Cases
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel
respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on
January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-
054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as
Page 39 of 70
 CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-
Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees
under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. 18the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby
implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate
recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her
assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court
has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for
mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to
have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Issues
The issues are the following:
(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and
violates the Party-List System Act; and
(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the
nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of
CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in
ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
Ruling
The petitions are granted.
A Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization
has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under
the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a
special civil action for quo warranto  in the HRET,  not in a special civil action for
certiorari in this Court.
We do not agree.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a
contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained
the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by
a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the
preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter
may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive
for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be
unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto,  for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated
as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available
to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to
determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a
particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same
party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto  lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of
the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to
seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance
with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and
assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented
by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the
judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As
Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule
65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the
mandamus against the COMELEC.
B 
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping
Page 40 of 70
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining
a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a
party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits
appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a
party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to
obtain the writ from another court.19
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not
is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different
courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. 20
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act
constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling
with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct
that degrades the administration of justice.21
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed
involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. 22 The
actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 23 Elsewise
stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as
the second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72
(announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives),
and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No.
07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance
until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the
ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the
COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the
proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the
second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section
13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of
Lokin’s nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari
and the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the
actions involved the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action
and the reliefs they sought were different.
C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature
cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional.
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other
authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated. 25
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such
delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or
primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy
is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected
instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits,
although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large
measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a
law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be.26
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to
effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in
character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and
promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function
of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that
the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative
rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 27
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites
to be valid:28
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
Page 41 of 70
 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum,
and a recall.29 In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and
administers.30
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. 31 Hence, the COMELEC met the
first requisite.
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the
basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the
challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means
that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to
modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or
restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft
additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature. 33
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.- Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of
any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC
except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who
are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once
the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free
from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is
conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.
Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some
other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes
of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which
the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.35Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may
not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and
unambiguous.36
The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the
nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the
deliberations of the Congress, viz:
MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I
do not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating
party to change the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees.
Is the implication correct that at any time after submission the names could still be
changed or the listing altered?
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished
Gentleman from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein.
The sponsoring committee will gladly consider the same.
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to
the COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of
listing.
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular
nominee has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the
nominee changed his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer
qualified to be included in the party list and the political party has a perfect right to
change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation.
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be
the exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies,
then there has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last
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part of the list so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely
affected.37
The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC
except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or
becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list"  – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative
intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever,
be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to
completely refrain from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in
the law itself, like in this case.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its
nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in
the list of its nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the
list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern
itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list
organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in
newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list
organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they
still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization
are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general
circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and
informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees
through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after
the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency.
The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of
such circumvention.
D 
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has
been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not
falling under any of the three exceptions.
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule,
the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute
with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the
courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception
excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the
rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and
justice.391avvphi1
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the
scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning
of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies
the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to
the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general
provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will
seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the
statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded 
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states :
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated
to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these
cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the
fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the
three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election,40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to
the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose
should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant,
Page 43 of 70
or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out.41
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government
under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The
law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.42
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,43because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory
provision’s phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to
phrase anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word
or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the
provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to
withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated
by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as
the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated).
The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling
under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list
organizations.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of
developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success
of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the
party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by
guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and
informed choices of their party-list representatives.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance
of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure
the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for
which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be
struck down.45
F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law. 46 In case of conflict between the law and
the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not
adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of
law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right,
obligation, or power.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC –
was invalid, CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its
substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear
enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds
expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of
CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s
substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck
down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having
relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054
approving Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations
of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and
fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C.
Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-
Gonzales as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption in the House of Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.
as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the
House of Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 44 of 70

EN BANC
G.R. No. 190529               April 29, 2010
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-
General GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,  organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for
certiorari1 and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009
insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s
motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC
delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
BACKGROUND
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-
List System – which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the
party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of
the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the
COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or
organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
that:
(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly
situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party,
organization and coalition already registered with the Commission to no longer
register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, not
later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation
Page 45 of 70
 seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the
required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether
or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;
(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections
– cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu
of the cited case is removed from PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was
afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly
affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of
Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v.
COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of
the equal protection of the laws;
(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended
and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to
notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941. 2
The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of
R.A. 7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a
party or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not
arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and
apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from
registering anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes
in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution
No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their
opposition.
As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the
motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for
accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after
the deadline.
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the
COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections
(Minero);4 we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly
applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the
Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not
participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty
bound to certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other
arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the
evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA
7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive
of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following
excerpts from the Records of the Senate:
Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5
– there are actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case
under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered"
In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the
party-list system in either of the last two preceding elections, Mr. President,
Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.
Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.
Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.]
PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it
failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this
is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2)
preceding elections.
Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the
court’s docket.
THE ISSUES
Page 46 of 70
We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b)
whether PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
OUR RULING
We find the petition partly impressed with merit.
a. The Minero Ruling
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to
participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. 6 The word "or" is a disjunctive
term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA
7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the
non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to
garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list
organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than
2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given
the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two
scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and
separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of
the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. 8
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association
for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC 9 (Banat) where we partly
invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that
the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections
should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or
organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in
the allocation of additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list
group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now
validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two
elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be
contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list
organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is
less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for
a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting;
these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections
should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a
party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We
do so under our authority to state what the law is, 10 and as an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 11 The
doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions, thus:
Page 47 of 70
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.12
process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for
complaint on due process grounds.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL
COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is
concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion for
reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list
group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant
in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. 13

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it
was clearly an erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of
stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary
violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case
law.

We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed to
garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the
preceding election – is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From
this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary
authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle
of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this
concern to the legislature’s notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process
was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x
x.14 We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due

Page 48 of 70
 BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for certiorari, 1 with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or status quo ante order, challenging the May 10, 2013 omnibus resolution issued
by the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC) in In the Matter of the Compliance of the
Commission on Elections En Banc with the Directives of the Supreme Court in Atong
Paglaum, et al. v. Commission on Elections –COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc.2

Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an

organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector,
particularly the coconut farmers and producers. 3 On May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested
with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and
submitted the names of only two nominees – Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee)
and Atty. Domingo P. Espina.4

On August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513,5to determine whether COCOFED, among several party-list groups
that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections,
had continuously complied with the legal requirements.

In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and
accreditation as a party-list organization on several grounds. 6 Notably, the Concurring
Opinion of Commissioner Christian Lim cited, as additional ground, that since COCOFED
submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 79417 that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five
nominees.

On December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted the names of Charles R. Avila, in substitution

of Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and Efren V. Villaseñor as its third nominee. 8

COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELEC’s cancellation of its

registration and accreditation before this Court, with a prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. By reason of the status quo
ante order issued by the Court, COCOFED’s name was included in the printing of the
official ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.

EN BANC On April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum, Inc., etc., et al. v.
Commission on Elections.9The Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to
determine their compliance with the new parameters and guidelines set by the Court in
G.R. No. 207026               August 6, 2013 that case. In Atong Paglaum, the Court ruled:

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,  Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
vs. participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. shall adhere to the following parameters:

Page 49 of 70
 xxxx
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier
ruling cancelling COCOFED’s registration and accreditation for its failure to comply with
the requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, i.e., to submit a list of not less than five
nominees.
The COMELEC noted that all existing party-list groups or organizations were on notice as
early as February 8, 2012 (when Resolution No. 9359 was promulgated) that upon
submission of their respective manifestations of intent to participate, they also needed to
submit a list of five nominees.10 During the hearing on August 23, 2012, the COMELEC
pointed out to COCOFED that it had only two nominees.
WHEREFORE, the Commission En banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or organizations:
xxxx
(3) x x x – COCOFED – Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list groups and
organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a
candidate for the Party-List System of Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and
subsequent elections thereafter.11 (emphases ours)
COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later. Instead, on May
20, 2013, COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional
Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: (i) Felino M. Gutierrez and (ii) Rodolfo T. de
Asis.12
On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation of
COCOFED’s accreditation final and executory.
THE PETITION
COCOFED argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
resolution on the following grounds:
First, the COMELEC’s issuance of the assailed resolution violated its right to due process
because the COMELEC did not even conduct a summary hearing, as ordered by the Court
in Atong Paglaum, to give it an opportunity to explain and comply with the requirement.
COCOFED submits that the requirement of submitting the names of at least five nominees
should not be strictly applied "in light of the nature of party-list representation" which
"looks to the party, and not to the nominees per se." 13
Second, its failure to submit the required number of nominees was based on the good
faith belief that its submission was sufficient for purposes of the elections and that it
could still be remedied since COCOFED could simply submit the names of its additional
two nominees. COCOFED adds that the number of nominees becomes significant only
"when a party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient number of votes which would
qualify it for a seat in the House of Representatives." 14
Third, the COMELEC violated its right to equal protection of the laws since at least two
other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM Phils.) which failed to submit five nominees
were included in the official list of party-list groups.
COCOFED prays for the following:
2. After giving due course to the instant Petition and after a consideration of the issues,
judgment be rendered:
a. ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the COMELEC’s assailed resolution;
b. DECLARING petitioner COCOFED x x x to be eligible to participate in the Party-List
System of Representation in the 2013 Elections; and
c. ORDERING the COMELEC x x x to COUNT and TALLY the votes garnered by petitioner
COCOFED.15
RESPONDENT’S COMMENT
The petition is already moot and academic. Despite the issuance of the assailed
resolution three days before the elections, COCOFED remained in the ballot and its votes
were counted and tallied. As of 8:26:02 a.m. of May 29, 2013, the official results showed
that it only received 80,397 votes or 0.36% of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list elections. With the reliefs prayed for already performed, nothing more
remained for COCOFED to ask.
At any rate, the COMELEC claims that it did not abuse, much less gravely abuse its
discretion, when it maintained its earlier ruling cancelling COCOFED’s registration and
accreditation; it merely applied the clear requirement of Section 8, in relation to Section
6, of RA No. 7941. The importance of a complete list of five nominees cannot be
overemphasized. Based on this list, the COMELEC checks a party’s compliance with the
Page 50 of 70
other legal requirements, namely: (i) that a person is nominated in only one list; and (ii)
that the list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has
lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.
Additionally, the submission of a complete list is mandatory under the terms of Section 8
of RA No. 7941. As we held in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 16 the submission of a
complete list goes into the right of the voters to know and make intelligent and informed
choice.
Lastly, it is not mandatory for the COMELEC to conduct summary evidentiary hearings
under the ruling in Atong Paglaum.
COURT’S RULING
We DISMISS the petition.
The petition is not moot
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy because
of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.17
In the present case, while the COMELEC counted and tallied the votes in favor of
COCOFED showing that it failed to obtain the required number of votes, participation in
the 2013 elections was merely one of the reliefs COCOFED prayed for. The validity of the
COMELEC’s resolution, canceling COCOFED’s registration, remains a very live issue that
is not dependent on the outcome of the elections.
Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered "need not register
anew" for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to file a manifestation of
intent to participate with the COMELEC. These two acts are different from each other.
Under Section 5 of RA No. 7941, an applicant for registration has to file with the
COMELEC, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a verified petition stating
its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.
The applicant is required to submit its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require. Aside from these, the law requires the publication of the
applicant’s petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The
COMELEC then resolves the petition, determining whether the applicant has complied
with all the necessary requirements.
Under this legal reality, the fact that COCOFED did not obtain sufficient number of votes
in the elections does not affect the issue of the validity of the COMELEC’s registration. A
finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling COCOFED’s
registration would entitle it, if it is so minded, to participate in subsequent elections
without need of undergoing registration proceedings anew.
This brings us to the issue of whether the COMELEC indeed gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the assailed resolution. We hold that it did not.
Failure to submit the list of five
nominees before the election
warrants the cancellation of its
registration
The law expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least five qualified
nominees. Section 8 of RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. [emphases and underscores
ours; italics supplied]
As early as February 8, 2012, the COMELEC had informed, through Resolution No.
9359,18 all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list
elections that they "shall file with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate
in the part-list election together with its list of at least five (5) nominees, no later than
May 31, 2012."
Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However,
not every kind of violation automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group’s
registration. Since a reading of the entire Section 6 shows that all the grounds for
cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations
violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily
imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member
or its nominee.
COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so
before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA No.
7941.
Page 51 of 70
First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in
connection with the requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory
term in conjunction with the number of names to be submitted that is couched
negatively, i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms together is a plain indication of
legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the party to
undertake.19 With the date and manner of submission20 of the list having been
determined by law – a condition precedent for the registration of new party-list groups
or for participation in the party-list elections in case of previously registered party-list
groups,21 and was in fact reiterated by the COMELEC through its resolutions – COCOFED
cannot now claim good faith, much less dictate its own terms of compliance.
Pursuant to the terms of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, the Court cannot leave to the party the
discretion to determine the number of nominees it would submit. A contrary view
overlooks the fact that the requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is
primarily a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the
submission of this list is part of a registered party’s continuing compliance with the law
to maintain its registration. A party-list group’s previous registration with the COMELEC
confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a
party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued
possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the
basic requirements of the law.
Second, while COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of nominees may not have
been among the grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier canceling its registration, this
is not sufficient to support a finding of grave abuse of discretion. Apart from the clear
letter of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 and the COMELEC resolutions issued more or less a
year before the 2013 elections, COCOFED’s belated submission of a Manifestation with
Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees several days after the elections betrays
the emptiness of COCOFED’s formalistic plea for prior notice.
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 requires the COMELEC to afford "due notice and hearing"
before refusing or cancelling the registration of a partylist group as a matter of
procedural due process. The Court would have demanded an exacting compliance with
this requirement if the registration or continuing compliance proceeding were strictly in
the nature of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. 22 In several cases, however, the
Court had already ruled that the registration of party-list groups involves the exercise of
the COMELEC’s administrative power, particularly its power to enforce and administer
all laws related to elections.23
While COCOFED could have complied after the elections (as it in fact did), it should have,
at the very least, submitted an explanation justifying its inability to comply prior to the
elections. However, COCOFED simply chose to ignore the law; this, to us, is a plain
disregard of the administrative requirement warranting the cancellation of its
registration.
Third, the fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress,
regardless of the number of votes it may garner, 24 does not render Section 8 of RA No.
7941 permissive in nature.
On February 21, 2012, the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9366, 25 again apprised
registered party-list groups that its Manifestation of Intent to Participate shall be
accompanied by a list of at least five (5) nominees. Under Section 9, Rule 5 of this
resolution, the Education and
Information Department of the COMELEC shall cause the immediate publication of this
list in two national newspapers of general circulation.
The publication of the list of nominees does not only serve as the reckoning period of
certain remedies and procedures under the resolution. Most importantly, the required
publication satisfies the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern.27 The need for submission of the complete list required by law 28becomes all the
more important in a party-list election to apprise the electorate of the individuals behind
the party they are voting for. If only to give meaning to the right of the people to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment, then the party-list group
must submit a complete list of five nominees because the identity of these five nominees
carries critical bearing on the electorate’s choice. 29 A post-election completion of the list
of nominees defeats this constitutional purpose.
Even if a party-list group can only have a maximum of three seats, the requirement of
additional two nominees actually addresses the contingencies that may happen during
the term of these party-list representatives. Section 16 of RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list
representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from
the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party,
organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted,
the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
While the law allows the submission of additional nominees once the list is exhausted,
the exhaustion of the list presupposes prior compliance with the requirement of Section
8 of RA No. 7941. Since the exhaustion of the list is an event that can rarely happen under
this interpretation, then the law effectively upholds the people’s right to make informed
electoral judgments. Again, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that the provisions
of the law must not be read in isolation but as a whole, as the law must not be read in
truncated parts; its provisions in relation to the whole law and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.30
Moreover, after the submission of a list of nominees to the COMELEC, the party itself has
no discretion to change the names or to alter the order of nomination in the list it
submitted.31 While there are instances when a change of name or alteration of the order
Page 52 of 70
is allowed, these circumstances focus on the nominee himself, whether voluntary (the other words, the Court in no way authorized a party-list group's inexcusable failure, if
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination) or involuntary (the nominee dies or not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the submission of at
becomes incapacitated). To allow COCOFED to complete the list of its nominees beyond least five nominees.
the deadline set by the law would allow the party itself to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.32 In sum, all these reasons negate a finding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in cancelling COCOFED's registration.37
Fourth, we cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply with
the statutory requirement.1âwphi1The party-list system is a constitutional innovation WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to those who cannot hope to
win in the legislative district elections, but who may generate votes nationwide
equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district election would garner. 33 In short, SO ORDERED.
the party-list system operates on the theoretical assumption that a party-list group has
national constituency whose interests, concerns, or ideologies call for representation in
the House of Representatives. We quote with approval the COMELEC’s observation:

If the party cannot even come up with a complete list of five names out of a purported
more than one million members, then it is highly doubtful that COCOFED will meet this
expectation to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that is
beneficial for the nation as a whole; and if it cannot even name at least three more people
who belongs to, or with sufficient advocacy for, the sector sought to be represented then
as a sectoral party or organization, it has already forsaken what it seeks to represent. 34

Given this driving idea, a party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing
"not less than five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part. Aside
from colliding with the plain text of the law, this interpretation is not in harmony with
the statutory policy of enhancing the party-list-groups’ chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and therefore does not serve as incentive to Filipino citizens
belonging to these groups to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation.35

Fifth, while under the 6th parameter in Atong Paglaum, the Court said that the
disqualification of some of the nominees shall not result in the disqualification of the
party-list group "provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified,"
the Court largely considered that –

petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.

In fact, almost all of the petitioners in A tong Paglaum were disqualified on the ground
that the nominees failed to "qualify," as this word was interpreted by the COMELEC. 36 In

Page 53 of 70

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 206844-45               July 23, 2013
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206982
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of
Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list
organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR
CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization’s
incumbent representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be
hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G.
Datol, Jr., the organization’s erstwhile third nominee. This group shall be hereinafter
referred to as the Datol Group.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for
the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO])1 filed in the name of SENIOR
CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol, Jr. For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol
Group’s petition.
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 2 filed on behalf of
SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep. Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the Arquiza Group’s petition.
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 64 3 in relation to Rule 654 of the Rules of
Court, both assailing the Omnibus Resolution5 dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). Said
Resolution disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May 13, 2013
elections and ordered the cancellation of its registration and accreditation as a party-list
organization.
Page 54 of 70
 THE ANTECEDENTS 4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing
at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list as the FOURTH PARTY;
organization in a Resolution6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization 150 Don Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San Fernando, Pampanga City (sic)
failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. 7 Thereafter, SENIOR hereinafter referred to as the FIFTH PARTY;
CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. 8 In accordance xxxx
with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the
party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, ARTICLE III
then the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the House of THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
Representatives.
We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST and in the
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 following order shall be:
elections.

On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Name CTC No. Issued at Issued on
Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which we quote: 1. Godofredo V. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#2615256 Manila 04-02-04

IRREVOCABLE COVENANT 2. David L. Kho 16836192 Quezon City 03-15-09

3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. 27633197 Quezon City 02-10-10

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT
4. Remedios D. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#50696 Quezon City 01-02-07
We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby covenant and agree as 5. Linda Gaddi David CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga 01-04-10
follows:

ARTICLE I ARTICLE IV
PARTIES AND PERSONS SHARING OF POWER

1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and
residing at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and
representing the Senior Citizens Party-list in my capacity as President
with our General Headquarters at Room 404 West Trade Center, 132
West Avenue, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY;
The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well
as the legal privileges and rights of the respective party-list offices, under the following
circumstances and events:
ELECTION RESULTS

2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at
35 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the
SECOND PARTY;
3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and
residing at North Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St., Novaliches,
Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the THIRD PARTY;
Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the
Office of Party-list Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and
shall relinquish his seat in Congress by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume
said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013;
In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for
three (3) years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for one-and-a-half years.

Page 55 of 70
In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for
three years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the second Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Remedios D. Arquiza
seat to No. 4 nominee, who will then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third CTC#16836192 Iss. at S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
seat for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year to Quezon City on 03-15-09 Quezon City on 01-02-07
Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.

(Signed)
In Fine:
Linda Gaddi David
CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss. at
If only one (1) seat is won If three (3) seats are won: San Fernando, Pampanga on 01-04-
No. 1 nominee = 2 years 109
No. 2 nominee = 1 year No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 2 years
If two (2) seats are won No. 3 nominee = 2 years After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among
No. 1 nominee = 3 years No. 4 nominee = 1 year all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives.
No. 2 nominee = 1½ years No. 5 nominee = 1 year The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given
No. 3 nominee = 1½ years to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
All beginning July 1, 2010
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to
SHARING OF RIGHTS the Datol Group’s petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza
to his constituents."10 Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of
Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or more is elected and CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the
qualified shall observe proper sharing of certain benefits by virtue of his position as such, organization’s Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of
to include among others, appointment of persons in his office, projects which may events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were
redound to the benefits and privileges that may be possible under the law. allied with Rep. Arquiza.11

The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this COVENANT. Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as
both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this MAY 05 2010 in
QUEZON CITY. The Resignation of Rep. Kho

On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
(Signed) (Signed) Brillantes, Jr. in a letter12 dated December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR
CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December
Godofredo V. Arquiza David L. Kho 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position
S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila CTC#16836192 Iss. at in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the third nominee, Francisco
on 04-02-04 Quezon City on 03-15-09 G. Datol, Jr.

The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition 13 dated December 14,
(Signed) (Signed) 2011 in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and
approval of the replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G.

Page 56 of 70
Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of her assumption into the
office."14 Before the COMELEC, the petition was docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter 15 of Rep. Kho, which was addressed to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The letter stated thus:
Gentlemen/Ladies:
It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my decision to resign
as the party-list nominee for the House of Representatives this 15th Congress for
personal reason already conveyed to you.

THE HONORABLE SPEAKER Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear country.
House of Representatives
Congress Very truly yours,
Republic of the Philippines
Quezon City
(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO17
Sir:
In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No.
I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of the Senior 936618 was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof
Citizens Party-list in the House of Representatives, effective December 31, 2011 in the provided that:
event that only two (2) seats are won by our party-list group; and will resign on June 30,
2012 in case three seats are won.
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement
among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc. shall nominate my successor pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep.
Arquiza issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012, which pertinently stated thus:
Please accept my esteem and respect.
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012
Truly yours, Series of 2012

(Signed) A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN RESOLUTION NO. 11-
Rep. David L. Kho 0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO
Party-list Congressman CONTINUE REPRESENTING THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN
Copy furnished: CONDITIONS ON HIM TO BE PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;
The Board of Trustees 
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. 16 WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his resignation as
representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list effective December 31, 2011, x x x;
According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31,
2011, notifying them of his resignation in this wise: WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a resolution
signed unanimously, in view of the nature of his resignation, and in view of his
December 31, 2011 determination to resign and return to private life, x x x;

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed his mind
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC. and requested the Board of Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for he also
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building reconsidered his resignation, and requested to continue his term;
132 West Avenue, Quezon City

Page 57 of 70
WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in view of the
forthcoming elections, the Board opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same, and
allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue his term;
WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however imposing
certain conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to recall the
acceptance of the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and
change of mind, hence allow him to continue his term subject to conditions stated
above.19
Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR
CITIZENS’ petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS
(Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Kho’s tender of resignation was made pursuant to
the agreement entered into by the organization’s nominees. 20 However, said counsel also
stated that the Board of Trustees of the organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep.
Kho’s resignation and the latter was, instead, to complete his term. 21 Also, from the
transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it
was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol Group and was not
acted upon by the COMELEC.22
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 23 in E.M. No. 12-040,
dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions
of the Resolution stated, thus:
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees’
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of his
nomination is one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC." While we can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to
the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are constrained however NOT to recognize
such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of petitioner’s nominees as
submitted to the Commission.
xxxx
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by
virtue of a prior agreement of the parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot
recognize such arrangement and accordingly we cannot approve the movement in the
order of nominees for being contrary to public policy. The term of office of public officials
cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is not a
commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement.
Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual
interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list
nominees, the Commission recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. – Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing
agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be
allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior
Citizen’s Party-List null and void. Any action committed by the parties in pursuit of such
term-sharing arrangement—including the resignation of Congressman David Kho—
cannot be recognized and be given effect. Thus, in so far as this Commission is concerned,
no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep. Kho and there can be no change in the
list and order of nominees of the petitioner party-list.
Second, the expulsion of Datol –
even if proven true – has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
xxxx
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this
Commission, is meant to be permanent. The legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941
clearly deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter
the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3)
enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in
writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
xxxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and
order of nominees of the Senior Citizen’s party-list remains the same in so far as we are
concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned above. Neither
does it have an automatic effect on the organization’s representative in the House of
Page 58 of 70
Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is "elected" into office and becomes a
member of the House, he is treated similarly and equally with the regular district
representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or suspended upon the concurrence
of the two-thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a party-list
organization.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the petitioner
organization, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The list and
order of nominees of petitioner hereby remains the same as it was submitted to us there
being no legally recognizable ground to cause any changes thereat. 24 (Citation omitted.)
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 25 of the above
resolution, but the same remained unresolved.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS’ Registration
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations
of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. 26 The Manifestation of the Datol Group
was docketed as SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191
(PLM).
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, 27 which, inter alia, set for
summary evidentiary hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of
existing party-list organizations, which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August
24, 2012 and they both submitted their respective evidence, which established their
continuing compliance with the requirements of accreditation as a party-list
organization.28
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 29 in SPP Nos. 12-157
(PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the
cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a
petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of
Replacement of Resigned PartyList Nominee" and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the
process of resolving the issues of said case, this Commission found that SENIOR
CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have
entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on
June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of
the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David
Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of
effectivity of Kho’s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho
as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which
is merely half of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription of the
Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, when
confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission
made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must be rejected.
xxxx
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a
ground for cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which
states:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may, motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to CANCEL the registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation.
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court
by filing their respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group
Page 59 of 70
was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed
as G.R. No. 204425.
On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said
petitions, directing the COMELEC to include the name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the
printing of official ballots for the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. Eventually, both
petitions were consolidated with the petition in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered
the remand to the COMELEC of the petitions that have been granted mandatory
injunctions to include the names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following
the parameters set forth in the Court’s Decision, the COMELEC was to determine whether
said petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, were qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections. For
this purpose, the Court stated that the COMELEC may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus
Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections], as well as the provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the Party-List System Act, and other pertinent election laws,
and after a careful and exhaustive reevaluation of the documents submitted by the
petitioners per their compliance with Resolution No. 9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the
Commission En Banc RESOLVES as follows:
I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) – SENIOR CITIZENS
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of petitioner Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, and regulations
relating to elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier finding in the
Resolution for SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) promulgated on 04 December
2012, in relation to the Resolution for E.M. No. 12-040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The
sole ground for which the petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because of the
term-sharing agreement between its nominees, which the Commission En Banc found to
be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is independent of the six
parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in that
case which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the Commission En Banc,
is a clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides
that Members of the House of Representatives, including party-list representatives, shall
be elected for a term of three years. A term, in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite
period of time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a
fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed one another. Thus, service of
the term is for the entire period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those who
are not entitled to hold the office.
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy
prohibiting it was promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366
("Res. No. 9366"), is of no moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when
the Constitution was ratified and as it was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was enacted into
law, the agreement was and is contrary to public policy because it subjects a
Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public elective office to contractual
bargaining and negotiation, and treats the same as though it were nothing more than a
contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept
this defense will not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more
importantly it will render inutile Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which prescribes the
procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the available seats for a party-list group or
organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens cannot hide behind the veil
of corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to achieve the
ends of justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment of ex
post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the Constitution because the guarantee
only the retrospectivity of penal laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in
character.
From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the
petitioner Senior Citizens is therefore in order, and consequently, the two Manifestations
of Intent to Participate filed with the Commission should be denied.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or organizations:
(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) – Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.;
xxxx
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list groups and
organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a
candidate for the Party-List System of Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and
subsequent elections thereafter.30 (Citations omitted.)
Page 60 of 70
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its
disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and its disqualification to
participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed
the instant petitions.
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very2 Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order, 31 alleging that the
COMELEC had ordered the stoppage of the counting of votes of the disqualified party-list
groups. The Datol Group urged the Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order
during the pendency of its petition.
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, 32 which
considered as final and executory its May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the
registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-
13,33 proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list organizations as initial winners in the party-list
elections of May 13, 2013.
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition for
Certiorari,"34 also reiterating its application for a TROand a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, 35 which
partially proclaimed the winning party-list organizations that filled up a total of fifty-
three (53) out of the available fifty-eight (58) seats for party-list organizations.
On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO, 36 which ordered the COMELEC to submit
a Comment on the instant petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming the
winners from among the party-list candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order
Directing Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite. 37
In a Resolution38 dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which directed the
COMELEC to refrain from implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10,
2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS
was concerned and to observe the status quo ante before the issuance of the assailed
COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise ordered the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s)
intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with the number of votes it garnered in
the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court, however, directed the COMELEC to hold in
abeyance the proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned until the instant
petitions are decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing
Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group was denied for
lack of merit.
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Comment39 on the instant petitions. In a Resolution 40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the
Arquiza Group filed its Reply41 to the Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol
Group and the Arquiza Group filed their separate memoranda. 42 On the other hand, the
OSG manifested43 that it was adopting its Comment as its memorandum in the instant
case.
THE ISSUES
The Datol Group’s memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
4.1
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED
ANOTHER GROUND (VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR CANCELLATION OF
REGISTRATION OF A PARTY–LIST GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7941.
4.2
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED
PETITIONER’S CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
4.3
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.
4.4
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED
THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION
GRANTED BY ITS DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
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THAT THE EN BANC CAN ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF
A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.44 (Citation omitted.)
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the
following arguments:
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is
invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued
pursuant to the directive of the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum.
Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY ISSUES arising therefrom are:
a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be
followed by respondent Comelec in determining which
partylist groups are qualified to participate in party-list
elections?
b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were these
adhered to by respondent Comelec?
(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between Senior
Citizens nominees -- a legal ground to cancel Senior Citizens’
Certificate of Registration?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is
invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in fact,
become final and executory?
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS’ (NBOC) RESOLUTION
No. 0006-13 of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having
been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis
thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec
been followed?
4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid
for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3, namely:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis
thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec
been followed?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on qualifications and
disqualifications of the candidates after the election where they have received
the winning number of votes?
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC
Resolutions of May 24 and 28, 2013 be annulled and set aside? 45
THE COURT’S RULING
After reviewing the parties’ pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached
thereto, we find merit in the petitioners’ contentions. 1âwphi1
SENIOR CITIZENS’ Right to Due Process
First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival groups of
SENIOR CITIZENS are actually one in asserting that the organization’s disqualification
and cancellation of its registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its right
to due process.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for
the cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its
nominees. The Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a
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single hearing date in the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELEC’s review
therein focused on the group’s programs, accomplishments, and other related matters.
The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not advised, before or during the
hearing, that the issue of the term-sharing agreement would constitute a basis for the
review of its registration and accreditation.
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that
it complied with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group
confirms that after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted
summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing SENIOR CITIZENS. The
Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Hearing Or To Be
Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013," but its counsel found that
SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other party-list groups were
heard by the COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd
Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted
upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it only found out after the elections that the
assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution was issued and the Arquiza Group was not
actually served a copy thereof.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 794146 provides for the procedure relative to the review of
the registration of party-list organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may, motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized
for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain
at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable
before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily
discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections 47 the concept of due process as applied
to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative
or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
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These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing
stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the
requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the
presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the
hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case
and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal
must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the
records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion,
reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a
quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process
rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a
court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component
of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to
enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered
in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the
decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. (Emphases ours, citations
omitted.)
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing
carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In
this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the
opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements
for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when
they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the
evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013
elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this
issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately
explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence,
accordingly, in support of their position.
In its Comment48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually
given the opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement
during the hearing on April 18, 2012.49 Said hearing was allegedly conducted to
determine petitioners’ continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list
organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival
groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement.
Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of
discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition
asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his
resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the
hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and
its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition.
Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions
of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications
brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a
proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the
issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was
neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not
sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be
considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and
accreditation.
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other
cases, the disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should
have still been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing
agreement, either through a hearing or through written memoranda. This was the proper
recourse considering that the COMELEC was about to arrive at a final determination as to
the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013
Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without
conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in Atong
Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal
issue of the instant cases: whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus
Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against term-
sharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for
under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only
on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to
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the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When
the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly
proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable
Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not
have been a ground for the cancellation of the organization’s registration and
accreditation because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually
transpired between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior
arrangements were made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did
not materialize given that the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of
Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually
implemented, the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to
have violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered
into in 2010 or two years prior to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21,
2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be applied retroactively, the Arquiza
Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it already earned a
vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 50 "the
general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that
do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v.
National Power Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest
by express terms or by necessary implication because the retroactive application of a law
usually divests rights that have already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim:
Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). (Citations omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive
effect. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group
that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list
organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections 52 teaches that "a public office is not a property
right. As the Constitution expressly states, a ‘Public office is a public trust.’ No one has a
vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a
public office." Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is
entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-
bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already
registered in order to ensure the latter’s continuous adherence to the requirements
prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications
and eligibility to participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its
retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in
cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-
sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This
fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing
conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group
manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep.
Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040,
the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was
created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no
indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza
Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his
term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the
COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties
thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly
and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be
disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from
carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground
to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are,
thus, left with no choice but to strike down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May
10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
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In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues
raised by the petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS, not being an issue raised here, should be threshed out in separate proceedings
before the proper tribunal having jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said
organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in
the recently concluded May 13, 2013 elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the
Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos.
206844-45 and the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No.
206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the
winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 20 13 elections with the
number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it
garnered during the said elections.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 179817 : June 27, 2008]
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioner, v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT - BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN
DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led
by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of
the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d etat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, " People v. Capt. Milo D.
Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, 2 threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests" 4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session,
and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings,
committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation,
caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines
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located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays
from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer
and the appropriate communications equipment ( i.e., a telephone line and internet
access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings
or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the
said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the
budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings,
briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists
(sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions
to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the
public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to
help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in
maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches
of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the
media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or
opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at
the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; andcralawlibrary
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the
Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July
2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City. 5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b),
(c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three. 7 The trial court just the same denied the
motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court,
and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate
staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with
him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the
Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and
official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of
the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons
and guests9 at the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy's Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice
Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines' Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin
Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña
(Obeña).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel 10 the day
before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against
the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had
ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be
without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case,
petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court. 11Petitioner did not, by way of
substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over
him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed
actions of the former custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF
STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH
THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D ETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A
POLITICAL OFFENSE;
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 C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING
ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIG'S
COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK
AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND -
IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF
DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI. 13
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner
chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that
he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still
in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral
turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and
corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioner's first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his
case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the
motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement
in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by  reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, 17 or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. 18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered
by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the
political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail 21 or imported from a
trial court's judgment of conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-
defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between
convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security;
and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement,
the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
Page 68 of 70
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 26 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that
confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears
noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court
recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results. 27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not
carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective
motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no
longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of
conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the
constitutional mandate ofpresumption of innocence prevails. 28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor
disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him
should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections. 29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a
flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be
proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when
on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and
proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account,
dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," 30 proves that petitioner's argument bites
the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the
cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in
ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of
bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be
denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. 32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway
because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who
was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, 34was able to rebut
the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court's pronouncement
therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the
proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face
the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses
were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong, 36 the Court noted the obvious reason
that "one who faces a probabledeath sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee."37 Petitioner's petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely
on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court's findings, Esperon did not
overrule Obeña's recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner
cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such request but
recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate
Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite
professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner's duties, flatly rejected all
his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office
inside a military installation owing to AFP's apolitical nature. 39
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid
objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of
the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide
guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same
manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to
serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator.
He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office,
depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people's will, repudiating the
people's choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.
Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that"a public official
can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." 42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature.
And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the Court categorically
held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
Page 69 of 70
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison."44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is opportune to wipe out
the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is
louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
Petitioner's position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone,
petitioner's case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslossuccinctly
expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. 51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted
a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.46 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention
prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President
Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to
perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners,

petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in
the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, 47 yet he at the same time,
gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. 48 That this discretion
was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of
candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-
elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist
the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-
around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending
concessions and blanket authorizations.

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