Symposium On Culture

Cultural Identity
and
Modernization in Asian Countries:
Proceedings of Kokugakuin University
Centennial Symposium
Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics

Kokugakuin University
1983
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CONTENTS
Foreword
YOSHIKAWA Yasuo
Introduction
INOUE Nobutaka
Keynote paper for the symposium
Committee for KUCS
OPEN LECTURES
Cultural identity and Asian modernization
Robert N. BELLAH
Secularity: West and East
Peter L. BERGER
SESSION A: RELIGION AND SECULARIZATION
The search for a definition of secularization: Toward a general theory
IKADO Fujio
Islam, secularity and modernization: With special reference to Indonesia
Arifin BEY *
Religion and secularization in the Philippines and other Asian countries
René E. MENDOZA
Secularity and profanation in Japanese religion
SONODA Minoru
Summary of the discussions: Session A
INOUE Nobutaka
SESSION B: TRADITIONALIZM AND MODERNIZATION
Language policy and nation-building in a multi-ethnic society: The case of Singapore model
Eddie C. Y. KUO
Modernization and traditional culture in contemporary Korea
ITO Abito
Traditional cultures and modernization: Several problems in the case of Japan
HIRAI Naofusa
Summary of discussions: Session B
NAGAFUJI Takeshi
SESSION C: THE HUMANITIES AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Cultural identity and modernization in Asian countries
Triloki N. MADAN *
Some notes on the humanities and national identity
Pinit RATANAKUL
The humanities and national identity: The case of Korea
RYU Tongshik
Early modern KOKUGAKU (National studies) and new KOKUGAKU: Their growth and significance
UCHINO Goro
Summary of discussions: Session C
SAKAMOTO Koremaru
Some reflections on the Symposium
SONODA Minoru
Copyright © 1983, 1999 Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University. All rights reserved.
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Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries
FOREWORD
YOSHIKAWA Yasuo
Kokugakuin University celebrated the centennial anniversary of its foundation on Nov. 4, 1982. The Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics held an international symposium
entitled "Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries" between Jan. 9 and 13. 1983. This symposium sought to develop a new program out of kokugaku or national
learning -- the fundamental spirit in the establishment of Kokugakuin University --, and at the same time increase academic and cultural exchange with other Asian countries.
When our university was founded in 1882, Japan was in the midst of social and cultural change caused by contacts with Western countries. Most Japanese were anxious to
modernize the country, so much so that some ignored studies of our traditions and culture. Recently, however, we see more efforts to restore kokugaku in order to reflect on the cultural
identity of the nation.
The Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, which started in 1955 as a research center of our university, aims to contribute to the above purpose, and has produced several
fruitful results. We hope that this symposium will enlarge the perspective of the problem of cultural identity in those Asian countries presently confronting modernization. I would like to
express my gratitude to all the participants and supporters of this symposium. Their gracious help alone has made it possible to publish these proceedings, as well, of course, to hold a
successful symposium.
[Table of Contents] [Next]
INTRODUCTION
INOUE Nobutaka
This symposium was one of a series of events held to commemorate the centennial anniversary of the foundation of Kokugaku in University. It was sponsored by the Institute for
Japanese Culture and Classics, and one of its basic aims was to foster relations with research institutes overseas.
The symposium was specifically designed with the following objectives in mind:
1. To promote personal and organizational exchange among Asian countries;

2. To consider the concept of Kokugaku or National Studies, and to debate its applicability in other Asian countries;
3. To compare and contrast processes of cultural transformation in Asia, especially in the area of religion.
The theme of the symposium was based on the results of various individual projects conducted by members of the Institute staff, as well as the comprehensive, collaborative results
of their research.
The executive committee was organized in the autumn of 1981. It was composed of 18 members from several universities:
ABE Yoshiya; ASOYA Masahiko; FUJITA Tomio; HIRAI Naofusa; INOUE Nobutaka: MIYAZAKI Michio; NAGAFUJI Takeshi; ODAGIRI Hiroko; David REID;
SAKAMOTO Koremaru; SAKO Kazumitsu; SONODA Minoru; Jan SWYNGEDOUW; TAKEUCHI Issei; TODA Yoshio; UCHINO Goro; UEDA Kenji; and
YANAGAWA Keiichi.
Two "pre-symposiums" were held during this period of preparation: one on " The Modernization of Japan and Kokugaku" in June of 1982, and one on "The problem of
Secularization in Asia" in November of the same year.
It was through the course of these two years of preparation that the outline for the symposium was determined, entitled "Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries."
The symposium was held from January 9 to 13, 1983. Open lectures were held at Meiji Jingu Hall on January 9. Professor Ballah and Professor Berger were invited as keynote
speakers. The audience of over a thousand gave their undivided attention to the opening speeches which laid the groundwork for the sessions to follow.
The following sessions were held from January 11 to 13 at the International House:
Session A, "Religion and Secularization" (January 11)

Speakers: IKADO Fujio; SONODA Minoru; Arifin BEY; René MENZODA.
Commentators: Peter BERGER; YANAGAWA Keiichi.
Chairperson: ABE Yoshiya; Co-chairperson: INOUE Nobutaka.
Session B, "Traditionalism and Modernization" (January 12)
Speakers: HIRAI Naofusa; ITO Abito, KUO Edi.
Commentators: Robert BELLAH; NAKANE Chie; CHAN Jukon.
Chairperson: Jan SWYNGEDOUW; Co-chairperson: ASOYA Masahiko.
Session C, "The Humanities and National Identity" (January 13)
Speakers: UCHINO Goro; RYU Tongshik; T. MADAN; Ratanakul PINIT.
Commentators: SUZUKI Mitsuo; UEDA Kenji.
Chairperson: FUJITA Tomio; Co-chairperson: David REID.
The schedule and format was the same each day. In the morning, from 10:00 to 12:00, the speakers gave supplementary explanations on the papers which had been submitted and
distributed to the participants; this was followed by remarks from the commentators. In the afternoon, from 2:00 to 5:00, the speakers first responded to questions raised by the
commentators, and then the discussion was opened to all participants over a scholars from such diverse fields as religion, sociology, anthropology, history, and folklore attended the
sessions. At times their interests were so diverse that the process of discussion was difficult. But it was due to the high degree of interest in the general theme of the symposium that so
many of the participants felt motivated to express their opinions, and it is only to be regretted that there was not more time for freer discussion.
The keynote lectures by Professor Bellah and Professor Berger are presented here, together with the papers submitted for presentation at the three sessions and a synopsis of the
discussions that took place on those discussions have made every effort to outline the basic remarks made by the commentators and the course of the discussion which followed.
It is hoped that this symposium will serve to further comparative research in the cultural identity and tradition of Asian countries, particularly the recent developments in aspects of
thought.
TOWARDS CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MODERNIZATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Committee for Kokugaku in University Centennial Symposium
The aim of the symposium on cultural identity and modernization in Asian countries is to deepen mutual comprehension between peoples by drawing attention to efforts made by
Asian countries in the course of their modernization to rediscover their burgeoning cultural identities and seek a better tomorrow for their nations or peoples.
For Japan, modernization once meant Westernization. But behavior, the Japanese were determined to maintain their national independence, deeply rooted in their traditional culture.
The double thrust of this determination was symbolized by the slogan, Kokugaku, or national learning is none other than the unearthing of the Japanese ethnic identity through the study
of Japan's cultural heritage. It has played a constant role in modernization by defending the Japanese spirit of self determination.
The task we now face as kokugaku scholars is to critically examine the path of modernization to the present, and to defined our place in international society in the light of that path.
Our scientific investigations must reestablish kokugaku on an open basis leading to the rediscovery of our cultural identity from a new perspective of international cooperation.
In our opinion, it is imperative for Japanese kokugaku scholars to learn from the research taking place in other Asian countries and to share the results of their research with other
Asian scholars.
The themes we have chosen for the symposium are aimed at facilitating such activities. On the first day, we will deal with Religion and Secularization, on the second day,
Traditionalism and Modernization, and on the third day, the Humanities and National Identity.
We hope first to reexamine the position and role of religion in the modernization of Asian countries against the commonly held view that the modernization of traditional societies
is accompanied by secularization of the religion and sacred values that uphold culture. Next we will discuss the directions taken by the interrelated progress of tradition and
modernization, focusing primarily on the mechanisms by which contacts between traditional culture (including religion) and modernization policies adopt synthetic configurations or
encounter conflicting aspects today. Third, on the basis of these discussions, we hope to reveal the characteristics of research by Asian countries into their own cultures and to explore
the contribution scholarship can make to the discovery of national identity. Finally we will consider the possibility of discovering a common basis for the work being conducted
separately throughout Asia.
Our approach to the three themes is defined below.
Session A: Religion and Secularization

One of our primary concerns is the changes that occur in religions due to modernization together with the role religion plays in such modernization.
These questions were widely considered in the West during the debate on secularization, particularly in the 1960s. Different positions were taken, one view being that the functions
of religion are gradually contracting, while the opposite being that religion, even while changing its modes of expression in line with social changes, still continues to play an important
role in people's daily lives: finally there was the view that secularization itself represented a stage in the evolution of Christianity, which spurred modernization in the West.
In Asia, religions exist in great variety, and the place they occupy in society does not always correspond to that occupied by religion in Western society. As a result, the relationship
between religions and democracy, socialism, Marxism, and other doctrines introduced in the process of modernization take forms unknown in the West. The secularization debate
occurring in Western academic circles nonetheless offers many suggestions which stimulate religious thought in Asian countries today.
Thus in our discussion of the first theme we do not wish to adhere too rigidly to the established meaning of the word secularization but rather, in a broader sense, consider religions
and secularity in Asian in terms of the impact of religion and sacred values on modernization and the reactions of religion to the challenges of morenization.
Session B: Traditionalism and Modernization

Modernization, with its roots in Western culture and science has forced Asian countries, for better or worse, to consider how they are to respond to Western culture. The
combination of modernization and Westernization cannot fail to cause friction with traditional culture, rooted as it is in the unique history of each nation. Asia general rule,
Westernization elicits the following three responses:
1. Attempts to suppress or eliminate, if possible, traditional culture, which is viewed as an impediment to modernization.
2. Bitter resistance to modernization, which is considered a threat to the traditional culture.
3. Efforts to accommodate and develop both modernization and the traditional culture without destroying the latter, in the recognition that modernization is historically inevitable or
otherwise indispensable to national independence.
In reality, of course, these three attitudes are complexly intertwined, and it is inconceivable for any one to be present alone. The difficulties encountered in pitting the third
alternative into practice are not hard to imagine. Although it appears with the tradition from "wakon-kansai" (Japanese spirit, Chinese learnings ) to "wakon-yosai" that Japan succeeded,
albeit somewhat painfully, in putting the third alternative into practice, it is undeniable that, in the process, many problems have been left to the modern age.
Nor must we assume that a traditional culture itself is an independent, recognizable entity. On the contrary, in the conflict with modernization, the problem of the existence of a
traditional culture is posed anew, through its association with the spirit of the nation and its people. In this session we hope to discuss the value given in current modernization to Asian
traditions in the areas of religion, art and scholarship, and the trends apparent in their conservation and development.
Session C: The Humanities and National Identity

Each of the people and ethnic groups in Asia possess their own unique and varied cultural traditions which form the basis for their social life. In fully evolved societies, what forms
of national culture is able to act as a nucleus of cultural identity, capable of holding its own against the sudden and politically motivated influx of the Western world's completely alien
institutions?
In this session we will use the findings and conclusions from Sessions A and B to reassess the traditional and the new, the native and the foreign, in the cultures of various peoples.
We will then consider potential methods for the discovery and creation of "new national cultures."
We are anxious to receive materials on these topics which report on the history and present situation of each country and which compare and contrast differences and similarities in
each country with a view to discovering fresh alternatives. The following types of presentations are sought:
1. Reports which deal with the history, current situation and future trends of folk culture movements in different Asian countries and research by Asians into their own culture and
religion.
2. Reports analyzing such movements and research with regard to chanes or developments in academic theories or organizational policies as modernization progresses in the
respective nations.
3. Introductions to outstanding achievements, chronologies, bibliographies, and other basic materials written by or about the scholars, thinkers, religious figures, and leaders involved
in the above movements and scholarship.
Kokugaku, which has played a large role in the rediscovery of Japanese folk culture in pre-modern times, and its academic evolution are in the process of being reexamined with the
aim of creating a new form of Japanese culture. We believe that accurate assessment and comparison with the history and current situation of similar scholarly disciplines and cultural
movements in Asia will contribute to the sound development of cultural identities, not only in Japan, but everywhere.
Cultural Identity and Asian Modernization

Robert M. BELLAH
The problem posed by this symposium to commemorate the Centennial of Kokugakuin University is a central one for Japan, Asia and, indeed, for the whole world. How to
reconcile cultural identity and modernization is a question that every nation and every people has to face today. I am interested that the document "Towards Cultural Identity and
Modernization in Asian Countries" poses this question from the point of view of kokugaku (national learning) which is of course central to the very existence of Kokugakuin
University. "kokugaku" has an indelibly Japanese sound and, of course, means a specifically Japanese tradition. Yet the document seems to hint that there might be a more generic or
universal meaning for kokugaku in the sense that every nation has a national learning, a kokugaku (Amerika no kokugaku), that is, American cultural identity, and particularly the place
of religion in that cultural identity. Whether this transformation is my own life as a scholar is due to some kind of influence from Japan, kokugaku or Shinto, I cannot say. What the
document seems to be calling for is an interchange between the various kokugaku of the Asian countries to see whether they might learn from one another, whether the study of one's
own particular cultural identity might not be enhanced by a knowledge of how others are struggling with the same problems. This seems to me a very interesting way of putting the
question and to pose a good balance between the particular and the general or universal aspects of the study of cultural identity.
The issue is posed very sharply in the document's discussion of Session B: Traditionalism and Modernization. The push for modernization an Westernization elicits three responses:
1) the attempt to eliminate tradition as an obstacle to modernization; 2) bitter resistance to modernization considered as a threat to tradition; and 3) various efforts to accommodate the
two. When the issue is posed so sharply it is easy to see why any effort to deal with tradition, or even cultural identity, might seem reactionary. Various terms which attempt to state the
issue, such as kokuminsei (national character), kokusui (national essence), kokutai (national structure), and even kokugaku have a vaguely right-wing, conservative or reactionary
overtone in this context because they seem opposes to modernity. On the other hand, "modernization" (kindaika) has for a long time in Japan and increasingly in other countries had a
doubtful, a far from entirely positive, overtone. Perhaps this symposium marks a moment when we can begin to look at these questions without ideological rancor.
It seems to me a step in the right direction that the document on the whole eliminates the word "nation" (koku) and speaks instead of cultural identity ( whether minzoku bunka and
"cultural identity" are the same thing could be discussed). The problem with the word "nation" is that is contains a profound ambiguity. On the one hand, it designates a people with a
shared history and a shared identity. On the other hand, it designates a modern nation-state. In the former sense cultural memory, continuity and integrity is of the essence. In the latter
sense the economic, political and military power of the nation-state is of the essence. The "nation" in the latter sense has often subordinated, manipulated and exploited the "nation" in
the former sense. "Nationalism" is a correspondingly ambiguous term, for it is often not clear whether it means pride in one's history and cultural identity or pride in the power of one's
nation-state. It is worth remembering that the term "kokugaku" pre-dates the emergence of Japanese nation-state and that the "koku" of "kokugaku" refers to national history, national
literature and national identity but not to national state power. Indeed Yanagita Kunio and other 20th century inheritors of the Tokugawa kokugaku tradition were profoundly uneasy and
at times bitterly critical of the modern Japanese state when it exploited traditional culture, folk belief and Shinto for its own ulterior ends. Modern nation-states in the West and in Asia
have from time to time cloaked themselves in the mantle of national cultural identity at the very moment that they were destroying genuine traditional culture in the effort to centralize
and enhance state power. In this sense modern nationalism has often been more an enemy to a genuine cultural identity than an expression of it.
"Tradition" as a category of sociological analysis has been used most frequently as a simple contrast term to "modernity" and as such has taken on almost a pejorative meaning.
Even the greatest of all comparative sociologists, Max Weber, tended to use the term "tradition" in a quite restricted and largely negative way. Traditionalism for Weber and for much of
modern social science refers to a situation where one takes the past uncritically as a model for unimaginative imitation. Nothing new arises from tradition. Only when tradition is broken
through by rationality or charisma is change possible.
But there is reason to believe that that is a singularly narrow and unhelpful conception of traditional which is only marginally applicable to pre-modern societies. Even non-literate
societies are seldom stagnant in the way that the term "traditional society" usually implies. Here "cultural identity" is a useful synonym for tradition, especially since "identity" does not
have the pejorative implication in modern social science that tradition does. "Identity" is a term most often used in psychology. To say that a person has a strong sense of identity is to
say that that person has integrity, coherence and continuity so that he or she is able to maintain a consistent life pattern with overall purposes and meanings. " Identity confusion," on the
other hand, refers to a person who lacks such coherence, continuity and purpose.
Modernization is not a substitute for tradition in this respect, although it sometimes claims to be. Modernization is concerned with what Weber called rationalization, that is the
increase in the effectiveness of means, but not with ends. Modernization is concerned with the increase of wealth and power which are the chief means necessary to achieve human
purposes. It is one of the pathological possibilities of modern societies that they can take the accumulation of wealth and power as an end, thus turning what is inherently a means into an
end. Most of the destructive potentiality of modern society arises from this error. It is one of the major functions of tradition in such societies to point out this error and insist on the
importance of those ends that are genuinely good in themselves, with which all the great religions and philosophies of mankind have been concerned.
Ideally the relation between tradition and modernization should be a dialectical and ultimately a harmonious one. A viable tradition should continue to guide individuals and
societies in their quest for what is truly good, and modernization should simply supply more effective means for that quest. The slogan "wakon-yosai" (Japanese spirit, Western sciences)
suggests such a harmonious solution. But, unfortunately, neither in the West nor in Asia do we find much more than a semblance of that harmony. Often there has been overt conflict
between tradition and modernization and often when there seems to be harmony something else is going on beneath the surface. I will argue then that a right relation between tradition
and modernization is difficult to attain, precarious when attained, and in today's world is largely a hope rather than a reality. If we would attempt to think about a right relationship
between tradition and modernization we might begin by looking at some of the kinds of relationship that have actually occurred in history.
In the 19th century in several Asian countries (earlier than that in several Western countries ) we do actually see "bitter resistance to modernization" coming from defenders of
traditional culture. In China through much of the 19th century and well into the 20th there was an oscillation between accommodation and compromise on the one hand and bitter
resistance on the other. In Korea an almost complete hostility to modernization persisted for a long time and contributed to the vulnerability of the society to outside intervention. Japan
was of course the great exception where modernization began under traditional auspices. But even there we find more that a few examples of bitter resistance. The picture of an
embittered kokugakusha, disillusioned with the new society for which he had so ardently worked, in Shimazaki Toson's Yoakemae, is one of the most poignant moments in modern
Japanese literature. Once we would have dismissed all these bitter resisters out of hand as hopeless reactionaries. Now we may want to ask whether they did not see certain things about
modernity that the compromisers overlooked.
The next kind of relationship between tradition and modernization that I want to discuss is one I have already alluded to in my remarks about nationalism. This type of relation is
one which uses one or more aspects of tradition to build the power of a modern nation-state. In China we can detect some rather inept efforts in that direction during the late 19th
century. The most obvious Chinese example, however, is Chiang Kai-shek's effort to use a conservative Confucianism, what we might call state Confucianism, to build his Kuomintang
(Kokuminto) regime in the 1930s and later. A certain kind of Confucianism had long been an instrument of state power in East Asia and so it was natural that modernizers would again
attempt to use it in that way. While Confucianism was less central in Japan than in China, Japanese modernizers used a kind of state Confucian ideology in building the Meiji emperor
system and then in more extreme from during the 1930s and 1940s. Shinto in the from of state Shinto was also mobilized for the purpose of state building during the same period.
Finally we might mention that Park Chung-hee more recently in the 1960s and early 1970s used a conservative Confucianism to provide ideological support for centralized and
autocratic state power. In all of these examples we may say that an outer respect for tradition was belied by exploiting tradition for the ulterior motive of building state power. This is not
to say that building a strong state was not important under modern conditions, though the tendencies of strong states to become not merely the defenders of national independence but
oppressive within and expansive without must also be noted. But whether the end was good or bad is finally beside the point. When tradition becomes a means to an end it is subverted
whether the end is good or not. The core of all the great traditions is religious -- I would include Confucianism in that generalization. Confucianism finally based its concern with moral
virtue on the pattern of heaven. But when religious tradition is used for ulterior ends, as Japanese Buddhism was by the Tokugawa Shogunate in the effort to control thought and
eliminate Christianity then the religious end is subverted and the tradition is deformed. East Asian Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto all suffered from this kind of deformation at
some point in modern history. It is worth noting that the People's Republic of China may not be entirely an exception to this generalization. It has seemed bitterly anti-traditional yet in
some degree it has used rather explicitly the tradition of Legalism (hôka) and, indeed, while openly attacking Confucianism, it has often relied on attitudes that seem directly inherited
from state Confucianism.
But we have seen more recently in Japan and several countries on the " Asian rim" a rather new phenomenon that requires analysis. In these societies the early modern authoritarian
state has been either eliminated or greatly mitigated and tradition has been freed from direct state manipulation. The various East Asian traditions, far from withering away, have
flourished in the atmosphere of greater freedom. The new religions in Japan are only among the more obvious examples. Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto, as well as, in some cases,
Christianity, have found receptive audiences and maintained a vitality that some theorists of modernization might find surprising.
Even more interesting is the fact that these now relatively autonomous tradition seem to provide some of the moral stimulus to the amazingly successful economic modernization
which has characterized Japan and the Asian rim for some time now. The spirit of the people, their work ethic, their social discipline, their ability to cooperate, have been important in
the stunning economic success of the region and all are more or less rooted in one or another aspect of the tradition. Indeed one might now go so far as to speak of "bourgeois
Confucianism" rather than state Confucianism. The loyalty, devotion and hard work inculcated by Confucian ethics, and more or less seconded by the other traditions, including folk
religion, are now turned from the support of military authoritarianism to entrepreneurial expansion. We seem to have an ideal situation where tradition and modernization are supporting
each other while maintaining a harmonious and stable society. Since most other advanced industrial areas of the world are experiencing severe difficulties, this phenomenon has attracted
more and more attention. The United States used to be admired, by Alexis de Tocquevillere for example, for maintaining a balance between religiously based mores and economic
success, but more recently that balance doesn't seem to be working so well. So more and more Japan has replaced the United States as the most exemplary modern nation, as, in a word,
Number One.
We may ask, however, whether the present happy relation between tradition and modernization in East Asia does not have some problems of its own and whether we may expect
the present success to last indefinitely. There is, of course, the obvious fact that Japan and the Asian rim countries are perhaps more dependent on international trade than any other
nations in the world and so very vulnerable in a period of world-wide depression such as we now seem to be entering. A period of extended depression would itself test the vitality of the
relation between tradition and modernization presently existing. But even without so dramatic a test we may ask a few questions. To what extent have the newly autonomous "bourgeois"
Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto really freed themselves from the fact that they are being used as means to ulterior ends? Do the traditions really set the agenda and provide the
major social vision in Japan and the Asian rim, or does economics still dominate? Is the purpose of society to provide a context within which to lead a virtuous life as defined by
Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto, or is the purpose of society to provide a constantly accelerating GNP? And is a constantly accelerating GNP compatible with the traditional
understanding of the ends of life?
Rather than deal directly with those very difficult questions (I will return to them briefly at the end of this paper ), I would like to ask another question and consider its answer. Does
the rapidly accelerating economic modernization undermine the very traditions that have provided moral and religious motivation for its success? This question was asked long ago
about Protestant Ethic by Max Weber. He asked whether the very success of the Protestant Ethic would not eventually destroy a genuine Protestant religiosity and replace it with
"mechanized petrification" and an "iron cage." Let us take the example of the Japanese salaryman over the past several decades and ask whether the newly prosperous life he enjoys does
not threaten his hold over tradition.
We must note at once the very real advantages: the greater variety of goods, the opportunity for travel, the improved medical care, and so forth. But we can also see that certain
traditional patterns of life are threatened. The family home, however small, was traditionally a work of art. It contained a garden, however tiny, and involved a way of life, far more than
Western domestic architecture, that allowed for a participation in the seasonal round of life that was deeply ingrained into the Japanese spirit. It is simply impossible to reproduce that
way of life in an apartment building. The rooms are almost all Western style with permanent walls. There is no garden, though perhaps there is a balcony with a flower box. The flow of
life between night and day is quite different from that in a Japanese style house. Children are apt to have their own private rooms where they must study night and day. Television
dominates the living room. There is apt not to be a family shrine, so that children do not grow up in familiarity with the practice of ancestor veneration. Furthermore, apartment dwellers,
as in the West, are apt to be strangers. Neighbors may be hostile when small children make noise. The neighborhood atmosphere of the old Japanese city and town is attenuated or
entirely destroyed. Finally the husband and father is even more a stranger than was traditionally the case, for now he must work late and travel long distances between home and work.
Under these conditions it is hard to see how the traditions that have made the parents hard workers and cooperative citizens can be handed down intact. Children will learn, as they do in
the United States, that the accumulation of things and the expression of one's own feelings are the meaning of life. One wonders how long the vaunted work ethic and social discipline
will the survive.
Further, it is unlikely that the older pattern of living can ever again be reproduced on a large scale. The cost of land in Tokyo and other metropolitan areas has increased
astronomically. Middle class families cannot any longer look forward to the old style of life. They will spend their days in apartments, condominiums (mansions) or other such
dwellings. Of course many things can survive under these conditions, but I still think it is worth considering how heavy the toll on traditional values will be. Needless to say that the tie
to the countryside, which has been so important to Japanese until just a generation ago, it fast disappearing. There is no longer any "home village" (furusato) for most Japanese. This
greatly weakens the hold of Shinto, which is so closely linked to particular geographical location. The situation is worsened when we remember that urban shrines no longer have the old
linkage to their neighborhood. A transient population does not feel the same ties as the old urban residents.
We have long been told how the Japanese work-group has been able to transfer the old loyalties of family and local group to the new industrial situation. But if the old loyalties are
collapsing what is there to be transferred? As yet the signs of weakening are few. But we can hardly look to the future with complacency.
I do not wish to imply that nothing has filled the widening gap. The new religions have tried to adapt to the new urban conditions with more that a little success, as Fujio Ikado and
other sociologists of religion have pointed out. Perhaps this is the way of the future. Still, the new religions are subject to their own strains and attrition. Too often they have based their
appeal largely on the promise of success and prosperity. In a society where success turns out to be ironic, and its cost very high, the new religions too may be trouble.
In closing I would like to point out that the East Asian traditions are very old and very deep. They contain some of the profoundest reflections on the human condition known to
man. Perhaps they still have much to say to us about the ends of life, Perhaps the period when they can be used as means for modernization is coming to an end. Both the successes and
the failures of modernization raise fundamental questions about the meaning of life. Perhaps we are approaching the day when the traditions can set the end and modernization can be
reduced to providing the means, and, where it undermines the ends, modernization itself might to be brought under control.
SECULARITY: WEST AND EAST

Peter L. BERGER
There now exists a body of thought in the historical and social sciences that has, quite accurately, been called secularization theory. This theory, of course, has not been without its
critics, but even for them it has served as a useful foil for various explorations of the fate of religion in the contemporary world. Most broadly, secularization theory proposes a positive
relationship between modernity and secularity, in the sense that modernization has brought about a decline in the importance of religion both on the level of institutions and on the level
of individual consciousness. In other words, secularization theory proposes a certain view of the way in which modernity has acted upon religion. It is important to point out, however,
that there is another aspect of secularization theory, which deals not with the effects but with the roots of modernity. This version of secularization theory proposes that modern
secularity, however inimical it might now to toward religion, has religious roots itself. In other words, it is here proposed that religion has served as a causal factor in the genesis of
modernity. This proposition (which, incidentally, has had an interesting career within recent Christian theology) refers specifically to the allegedly secularizing consequences of the
Judaeo-Christian tradition. It is paradoxical, even ironic view of western history, the alleged secularizing consequences, of course, are deemed to have been unintended and
unanticipated. In any case, these two aspects of the problem of modern secularity, though distinct, are very much related, indeed intertwined. This interrelation of the two aspects
becomes particularly clear as one moves from West to East in one's thinking, as I will try to show in what follows.
Secularization theory, of course, originated in the context of Western scholarship, and this provenance has inevitably affected the way in which the theory has been applied to
Eastern cultures. This is not at all to attribute ethnocentrism or cultural arrogance to the Western scholars in question; in most instances such a suggestion would be grossly unfair. Also,
no agreement is implied here with the currently widespread notion that cultures can only be properly studied by insiders; on the contrary, the outsider often perceives things that the
insider overlooked. All the same, one must ask whether the application of secularization theory to Eastern cultures has not resulted in distorted or misleading perceptions because these
cultures, and the religious traditions pertaining to them, were observed through, as it were, Western eyeglasses.
These considerations apply to the view of Western historians and social scientists of any number of non-Western cultures (thus there has been a vigorous controversy in recent years
concerning the view of the Islamic world in Western scholarship ). It seems to me that a particularly important issue in this connection is the view of the relation of modernity and
religion in the cultures of Eastern Asia. The reason for saying this is simple but far-reaching: Eastern Asia, I believe, is the only region in the non-Western world in which a new, fully
developed and distinctive modernity is taking shape. Putting it concisely: Until very recently, when one tried to understand modernity, there was only one case to deal with -- the West
and its effects on the rest of the world. Or, if one prefers: Modernization and Westernization were virtually identical processes. This is no longer so. One now has, at any rate, two cases
to deal with -- Western (and Western-style) modernity on the one hand, and the new modernity of Eastern Asia on the other. Science thrives on comparison. In this as in other areas of
analysis, therefore, testing Western-derived theories against the realities of Eastern Asia is likely to be a productive undertaking.
The undertaking should be of interest to many people who are not very much concerned with religious issues per se. Eastern Asia is a region of rapidly increasing importance in the
contemporary world. The main reason for this, of course, is what can aptly be called the East-Asian economic miracle. Its hub is Japan, which remains to date the only non-Western
country to have joined the ranks of advanced industrial societies (and which, quite possibly, may soon lead those ranks economically and technologically). But Japan is no longer alone
in the religion's economic dynamism. There are the booming societies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore, together constituting the most dramatic success stories (at least
economically speaking) in the Third World. There are indications that the same dynamism is at work in several Southeast Asian societies beyond Singapore, though, for a number of
reasons, it is as yet somewhat premature to speak of success stories. There remains the vast question of the future relation of the People's Republic of China to the economic dynamism
on it doorsteps. In any case, even if one limits oneself to Japan and the aforementioned four societies, the question of the distinctive features of their economic development is of very
great importance. The question must necessarily touch on cultural factors, and among these religion and religiously derived morality. The present topic, then, is not just for specialists in
the field of religion.
Needless to say, the topic is highly complex. It is necessary to say that I can claim no expertise on the cultures and religious traditions of Eastern Asia. I do feel qualified, however,
to raise questions in this area, even if I must leave it to others to suggest answers.
Anyone dealing with the problem of the religious roots of modernity soon finds himself in the giant shadow of Max Weber. Incomplete though the Weberian opus may be (Karl
Jaspers used the phrase "gigantic ruins" in describing it -- hardly a pejorative description, since no individual scholar, however brilliant, could complete the task Weber had set himself),
it is impossible to deal with these matters without taking Weber's views into account. Let me, then, state briefly my own understanding of this. I have been persuaded for a long time that
Weber was correct, at any rate in broad outline, in his contention that Western modernity, including its component of secularity, has some deep roots in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
Not only do I accept, again in broad outline, Weber's germinal insights into the relation between modern capitalism and certain unintended consequences of the Protestant Reformation,
but I also accept Weber's view of the rootage of all of modern rationality (not just in its economic aspects) in distinctive features of the religious revolution of ancient Israel. There is, in
other words, a direct historical line between the worldview first expressed in the Hebrew Bible and the "rationalization" (in Weber's sense of the word) that lies at the heart of the
modernization process. The irony here, of course, is that modern secularity too can be traced back to embryonic beginnings in the rupture between the faith of Israel and the magical-
mystical world of the ancient Near East (that rupture called a "leap in being" by Eric Voegelin) -- modern this-worldliness then coming to be seen as the paradoxical offspring of the
Israelite "disenchantment of the world." More generally, I also believe that Weber makes credible the proposition that what is today called economic development requires and ethic of
discipline and self-denial -- precisely the sort of ethic that Weber called "inner-worldly asceticism."
Where Weber is much less persuasive is in his understanding of the relation of Asian religions to "rationalization," though even here Weber's ideas serve as a very useful starting
point. It is fair to say, I think, that with the exception of his understanding of Confucianism (of which more in a moment), Weber had a too undifferentiated view of what he designated as
the "enchanted garden of Asian religiosity." To be sure, nowhere in Asia do we find "rationalization" of the Western type, nor can it be denied that modernity was imported into Asia
from the West. But the subsumption of the entire Hindu-Buddhist universe of religious discourse under the category of "enchantment," and thus its perception as anti-rationalizing in its
socio-economic consequences, was rather clearly an oversimplification. Specially, it is Weber's understanding of Buddhism that must be criticized (his approach to Hinduism need not
concern us here). A close reading of his writing on this subject discloses a bias in favor of Theravada, as the allegedly more authentic form of Buddhism, which bias necessarily distorted
Weber's perception of eastern Asia. This bias, to be sure, was not originated by Weber, but was taken over by him from the Western Buddhologists on whom he necessarily relied. This
bias led him to perceive Mahayana as, in the main, a great compromise with magical-mystical folk religion -- a very one-sided perception indeed, which precluded insight into the
"rationalizing" potential of Mahayana in Eastern Asia. Also, Weber had very little to say about Shinto, despite the fact that the meteoric rise of Japan to the status of a regional power
took place under the aegis of a renascent Shintoism in his own lifetime.
Weber's essay on the Chinese literary bureaucrats and their ethos continues to be a masterpiece of socio-historical analysis. I, for one, think that Weber was quite right in arguing
that this type of Confucianism, despite its intense this-worldliness (secularity, if you will), was much too conservative to engender a "rationalizing" development. But Weber was talking
about Confucianism as the ideology of the imperial Chinese state. He was not talking (and, to be fair, could not possibly have been talking) about Confucianism as an everyday ethic of
ordinary people far removed from the reach of imperial authority. In other words, Weber's argument about the socio-economic effects of Confucianism pertain to magistrates in imperial
Peking -- not to entrepreneurs in Taipei or Singapore (or, for that matter, in Manila or Bangkok). Put differently again: Weber was very probably right about the counter-modernizing role
of Confucianism as a state ideology; he could not foresee the modernizing role of Confucianism as a work ethic for people liberated from the conservative weight of the Chinese state. In
this perspective, paradoxically, it is Maoism that that represents that conservative weight today, with a new class of mandarins impeding economic dynamism and legitimating their
political power with another economically counter-productive ideology. The old mandarins painted classical texts on silk; the new ones chant incantations at public ceremonies; both
may be seen as crucial obstacles to the productive genius of Chinese culture.
The foregoing considerations now allow one to formulate a basic question: Is there a distinctive East-Asian form of secularity, long antedating the advent of modernity, but, given
certain favorable conditions (such as the removal of political constraints), providing a receptive cultural context for modernization once that process is introduced from the outside? In
Weberian terms, one would then further ask to what extent this secularity is allied to an economic ethic of "inner-wordly asceticism" and, more generally, to a "rationalizing" attitude
toward the empirical world. Finally, of course, one would want to assess the relative importance of these cultural factors in the economic development of Eastern Asia.
It will be amply clear that, in the present state of knowledge, no definitive answers to this basic question and its corollary questions are likely. The best one can hope for is
intuitions, fertile hypotheses and partial answers serving as building blocks for a comprehensive interpretation to be undertaken in the future (perhaps by Max Weber redividus teaching
at the National University of Singapore), But even before the attempt is made here to spell out the question a little more, a word of methodological caution is in order. In the current
literature on Eastern Asia one may distinguish between two overall tendencies -- one "institutionalist," emphasizing specific economic and political arrangements within the societies at
issue -- the other "culturalist," emphasizing the sort of factors discussed in this paper. The former tendency is particularly favored by economists (who often mention in a footnote that
cultural factors ought to be taken into account, presumably by someone else, but who then go on to discuss economies as if there existed in a Platonic heaven of rational motives
sovereignly independent of such messy realities as religion, morality or the patterns of family life); the tendency may also be found in the writings of non-economists (for example, Ezra
Vogel, whose enormously insightful work on Japan suggests that the basic institutions of that society could be detached from the cultural context to a considerable degree). The
"culturalist" tendency, by contrast, is to suggest that only in a particular cultural context can be institutions and policies in question be successful; historians, anthropologists and other
area specialists are prone to this approach (if only because of their professional interest in arguing that no one else can possibly understand "their" area of expertise; one may mention
here the writings of some Sinologists, who seem to think of the Chinese as a mutation of the species home sapiens, utterly different from other human beings and totally
incomprehensible -- except, of course, as interpreted by Sinologists.)
I should think that it is reasonable to look on "institutionalist" and "culturalist" interpretations as complementary rather than contradictory. I, for one, would take it for granted that
culture, social institutions and specific policies are interacting variables, with none having the status of invariant determination. I would stress, therefore, that no one-sidedly "culturalist"
theory is implied in this paper. The question is not whether everything that happens in Eastern Asia can be explained in terms of East-Asian culture. Rather, the question is, more
moderately, to what extent cultural factors must be taken into account in the assessment of East-Asian development. More narrowly here, it is to what extent a specifically East-Asian
secularity could be such a factor.
What phenomena are relevant to an exploration of this problem? I will suggest six: the distinctive religious pluralism of Eastern Asia; the distinctive character of East-Asian
Buddhism; the "naturalism" Shinto and of Japanese religious consciousness in general; the role of the Confucian ethic; the pragmatism of East-Asia folk religion; and finally, at least in
some of the countries of the region, the role of Christianity.
The traditional pluralism of Eastern Asia has often been remarked upon (and, indeed, often contrasted favorably with the absolutist character of Western monotheism). All over the
region, different worldviews, religious traditions and even schools of moral thought have existed side by side quite amicably, and individuals have often utilized different traditions,
simultaneously or at different stages of life, in a manner that seems illogical or irreverent to a Western observer. I will only refer to the work of Hajime Nakamura, who interpreted this
pluralism as a central component of the Asian philosophical mind. This kind of pluralism, to be sure, is not unique to Eastern Asia. Very similar attitudes are found in traditional India
and, for that matter, in the classical Mediterranean world; to cite a well-known passage by Edward Gibbon: "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all
considered by the people as equally true; by the philosophers as equally false; and by the magistrates as equally useful. And thus toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but
even religious concord." Be this as it may, Western modernity did not arise in such a milieu of metaphysical tolerance, but out of (seem through Asian eyes) the monomaniac and
absolutist culture of Christendom.
This is important for at least one reason: One of the great shocks of modernization to Western religion has been that of relativity. In other words, modernity, both on the level of
social praxis and of theoretical reflection, challenged the absolutist claims of Christianity. Modern society pluralizes the social worlds of individuals, forcing them to rub elbows with the
adherents of all sorts of cognitively dissonant world views; this social pluralism, inevitably, leads to cognitive relativization (I, for one, have argued for many years that pluralism and
secularization have been twin phenomena in the modern history of Western civilization). This constitutes the great challenge of relativity, with which Western thought in general and
Christian theology in particular have struggled for the last two hundred years or so. Now, it can be argued that this is one particular shock, at any rate, which the East-Asian mind is
spared in its encounter with modernity -- precisely because pluralism and relativity are already well-established in the religious and moral culture of East-Asian civilization. If so, then
the pre-modern pluralism of Chinese, Japanese and Korean cultures could then be seem as a facilitation factor in the process of modernization. And if so, the sharpest contrast in the
contemporary Third World would be provided by its Muslim areas.
Nakamura emphasizes both the relativistic and the immanentist character of Asian worldviews -- the latter adjective referring to the conception of the sacred or the supernatural as
dwelling within the empirical universe rather than as confronting it from a transcendent beyond. The point is particularly relevant to the question of the distinctive character of Buddhism
in Eastern Asia. When Max Weber stressed the radical other-worldliness of Buddhism and the concomitant depreciation of all worldly activity (including, of course, economic activity),
his aforementioned Theravada bias was very much in play. I would incline to the view that the phrase "radical other-worldiness" is correctly applied both to what can reasonably be
reconstructed as the original message of the Buddha (those committed to Mahayana will, of course, deny this) and also the mainstream of the Theravada tradition. I'm persuaded that the
phrase does not apply to most of Mahayana Buddhism, as that tradition has been shaped in Eastern Asia.
Put simply, it can be argued that it was the genius of the Chinese mind that transformed the world-denying massage of Indian Buddhism into an essentially world-affirming
doctrine, and that it did so by developing a number of themes already implicit in Indian Mahayana. It was, of course, this Sinified Buddhism that penetrated Korea and Japan. East-Asian
Mahayana can then be seen as having engendered a very distinctive form of secularity, blending in with with-worldly attitudes and patterns to thought already indigenous to the cultures
of Eastern Asia. Mahayana themes relevant to this secularity are the central ideal of the Bodhisattva (an "incarnationist" theme, giving religious dignity to the world), the frequently
recurring notion that nirvana and samsara are ultimately one and the same (thus making the "beyond" accessible in this life and within the empirical world), and the idea of the "Buddha
nature" lying dormant within each man. This last idea is particularly interesting in connection with Weber's view that Buddhism has been unable to generate lay religiosity (the only fully
qualified Buddhist having to be a monk or a nun) -- a view that, possibly, applies to Theravada, but manifestly fails to account for the vigorous lay movements in Mahayana (a
particularly important phenomenon in Japan). The development of Zen in China and Japan is especially interesting in terms of the "secularizing" themes of the oneness of reality and the
"Buddha nature" of all men, while the Pure Land schools illustrate the secular importance of the Bodhisattva ideal. (On the former development let me only refer to the work of Daisetsu
Suzuki and Heinrich Dumoulin, on the latter to the work of Joseph Kitagawa).
The Benedictine motto of "orare et laborare" expressed an ideal of unity between religious meditation and worldly labor in the Western monastic tradition. Weber believed that the
ascetic and potentially world-transforming energy of this ideal, long contained within monasteries and convents, burst forth with cataclysmic force when the Reformation broke down
the walls of these institutions. Could it be that a similar energy was "stored up" within the walls of Mahayana monasticism -- and that, first in Japan and now in other parts of Eastern
Asia, this released energy (ascetic and this-worldly) has been at least one of the motivating forces in modernization? At least in Japan, the historical relations between Zen Buddhism and
the classes serving as the "carriers" of modernization suggest that the question is not too far-fetched.
Reference has already been made to the blending between the this-worldly themes within Mahayana Buddhism and similar themes already present in East-Asian cultures before the
coming of Buddhism. In the case of China, such as affinity has been argued as between Buddhism and Taoism. In view of the importance of Shinto in the modernization of Japan, it
would seem that an exploration of the "secularizing" potential of various themes in that religious tradition would be particularly fruitful. I must, regretfully, confess to much greater
ignorance with regard to Shinto than with regard to Buddhism. Yet it seems to me that the most plausible Shinto element to explore is that of "naturalism" -- that is, the immanentist
orientation implied in the Shinto attitude toward nature, and possibly the "inner-worldly" ethical consequences of this orientation. Speaking of early Shinto, Kitagawa asserts that "the
early Japanese did not draw a line of demarcation between the sacred and the profane dimensions of life, or between matsuri (religious rituals) and matsuri-goto (political
administration), both of which were ultimately under the authority of the Emperor who himself was directed by the divine will" (in his Religion in Japanese History). The key Shinto
category, denoting this divine unity of being, of course is that of kami, To be sure, Shinto Japan is not alone in such a view of continuity between mankind, nature and the gods; on the
contrary, it is typical of what Eric Voegelin has called "cosmological civilizations." I can only raise the question here whether there may not be distinctive features of Shinto
"naturalism," which, especially in conjunction with Buddhist themes, may have fostered a receptive attitude toward modernity.
One is on firmer ground when looks at the so-called New Religions of contemporary Japan. There constitute a number of fascinating syntheses of Buddhism, Shinto, Christianity
and folk religion. Yet, as several analysts have pointed out, one of their most notable characteristics is their pragmatic, at times even technical, this-worldliness. For example, to quote
from a work on Soka Gakkai by James Dator: "The Soka Gakkai, while based on the Nichiren Shoshu tradition of Japanese Buddhism, interprets its scriptures rather loosely and
allegorically. Its teachings are a syncretic blending of traditional dogma and modern science... Its organization and meetings... are businesslike and rational... It...encourages its members
to succeed within current Japanese society. Hence, it is wholly this-woldly, virtually lacking any form of eschatology." Apart from the issue of eschatology, very much the same has been
said of the other New Religions. These movements, of course, did not antedate modernization but must be seen as a response to it. Yet it is reasonable to ask whether these highly
rational and practical syntheses do not presuppose such themes in the pre-modern culture of Japan.
Of all the phenomena of East-Asian culture that may be relevant to modernization, the one that has attracted most attention of late is Confucianism -- or, more specifically, the
Confucian ethic. This ethical tradition has been given much credit for the productivity of East-Asian societies in writings emanating from the Hudson Institute and the British magazine
The Economist. One not insignificant individual who, apparently, has been successfully persuaded of this is Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, where his government has
launched a program to inculcate Confucian morality through the public schools. As indicated above, the Confucianism intended here is not, of course, that of the literary scholars and
imperial bureaucrats discussed by Max Weber. Rather it is a "vulgar Confucianism," a set of beliefs and values motivatiing the man-in-the-street. Foremost among these are a deep sense
of hierarchy, a quasi-total commitment to one's family (on behalf of which the individual must work hard and save), and overall norms of discipline, frugality and benevolence to one's
own. These beliefs and values form a common heritage of East-Asian cultured (Confucianism, of course, greatly influenced Korea and Japan -- and, not so incidentally, Vietnam -- over
and beyond its immense impact on Chinese civilization); they are supposed to have resulted in a work ethic of very high productivity. Also, it has been maintained that the Confucian
norms of solidarity have been successfully transposed from traditional institutions (such as the family and the hierarchical state) to modern institutions (such as the corporation or the
factory). These matters have been extensively discussed in connection with Japanese management methods, but they are equally relevant to Chinese and Korean entrepreneurship
throughout the religion.
Again, I must plead incompetence when one must come down on one or the other side of the debate over this. It is very hard for me to believe that Confucianism, with its immense
impact on these societies, should not have influenced their economic ethos. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Confucianism has been credited too much and that the norms at
issue are much more widely diffused, indeed that Confucianism is really a secondary and theoretical reflection of these norms (this is suggested by Roy Hofheinz and Kent Calder in
their recent The Eastasia Edge). Be this as it may, scholars have always emphasized the cool rationality, the pragmatism and the secularity of Confucianism. If there is a special East-
Asian secularity, then Confucian morality, whether as causal agent or as theoretical legitimator, must be considered an important part of it.
The objection of Hofheinz and Calder to the "Confucian ethic thesis" draws one's attention to the phenomenon of folk religion. My knowledge of this is very limited, but I feel sure
that it cannot be dismissed as nothing but a magical substratum beneath the "great traditions" and, as such, relevant to modernization only in negative terms -- as superstition,
irrationality and what Western scholars used to call "resistances to development." Rather, I suspect that here too there are themes of pragmatism, rationality and, indeed, secularity, which
may be relevant in a positive way to the modernization of Eastern Asia.
I cannot resist the temptation of a personal anecdote here. A few months ago I was discussing the "Confucian ethic thesis" with an anthropologist at the Academia Sinica in Taipei.
He expressed great skepticism about the thesis, suggesting that one should look instead at the work ethic implicit in Chinese folk religion. I was vividly reminded of this conversation a
few weeks later, when I visited a Chinese spirit temple (actually, a little shrine set up in the living room of a medium) in Singapore. The medium, a very matter-of-fact young man, was
explaining the shrine, which consisted of some thirty statuettes of gods, spirits and demons set up on several levels of a wooden bookcase. The most important figure in this mini-
pantheon (also, evidently, a do-it-yourself pantheon) was Kuan-yin, the goddess of mercy -- the largest statuette of all, set up in the middle of the top shelf. Her position, it seemed, was
unassailable. Much of the medium's explanations, though, had to do with recent promotions and demotions of the lesser characters: This spirit had delivered very good results and,
therefore, had just been moved up from level three to level two; but this fellow had done very poorly, had just been moved to the lowest shelf and, if he did not shape up, would soon
find himself thrown out of the shrine altogether; and so on. There can be no question about the religious character of this particular worldview; it was, as it were, reeking with
supernaturalism (after his explanations of the shrine the medium took us out into the little garden behind his house and told us hair-raising stories about a Malay-speaking demon who
lived in a tree there). But what light-years removed is this religiosity from the mysterium tremendum of the monotheistic traditions! In its pragmatism, its "naturalism" -- and, yes, it
secularity!
I can only mention, finally, the question of the role of Christianity. It is not equally important in all countries of the region, probably it is most important in Korea (and, significantly,
it is Protestantism, not Catholicism, which has had most influence there). Christianity, of course, was at best a minor factor in the pre-modern history of Eastern Asia. One must ask,
however, whether important influences did not come from Christian sources in its modern history and whether some of the unintended consequences may not have been secularizing in
character. In this connection I will also mention the recent upsurge of conversions to Christianity among ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, a phenomenon very likely related to the social
and political pressures of modernization.
Is there a religiously rooted "spirit of Asian capitalism"? I don't know; I do know that the question is important and ought to be explored further (and I have shown my filial piety to
Max Weber by using this phrase as the name of a seminar I'm currently organizing for the Council on Religion and International Affairs). Is there a distinctively East-Asian form of
modernity in the making? I'm quite sure there is, although its contours are only beginning to come into clear view. In any case, the preceding considerations should have revealed a
different angle on the other problems mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the problem of the effects of modernity on religion (if you will, the problem of secularization proper).
This problem can now be reformulated: Could it be that Eastern Asia has been undergoing a different type of secularization, because of a pre-modern secularity not known in the West?
If so, then the (admittedly uneven and conflicting) data on religious beliefs and practices in the region may not mean what similar data would mean in Western countries. The
largest body of data, as one would expect, comes from Japan. At first glance, it seems contradictory -- high participation in religious activities, and high expression of religious unbelief.
Thus, for example, in a large survey of religious attitudes in Japan made in the 1960's by F. M. Basabe, 82% of the respondents claimed to have no religious beliefs at all, and even
higher percentages denied belief in God or in life after death. Other surveys have come up with similar results. This would put Japan right in with the Scandinavian countries as being in
the vanguard of secularization. But how is one to reconcile this data with the high participation of Japanese in religious rituals and their propensity to join religious movements of every
description? The possible explanation, of course, would be that this participation is superficial, merely external, and it not motivated by religious sentiments at all -- like atheists
celebrating Christmas or (if they are politicians) supporting a movement to have prayer in public schools. There is also, though, another explanation, which is that Japanese mean
something quite different from Swedes when they disclaim belief in God.
The societies of Eastern Asia under consideration here impress one with their immense energy, their driven quality (the slogan of Datsun commercials could will be written in the
sky over the entire region), their "materialism" -- precisely, if you will, their security. It is possible that this impression is accurate. A distinguished British economist, who is also a
devout Christian, said the other day that what impressed him most about contemporary Japan was its "spiritual emptiness" and that, therefore, he found it difficult to believe in the
durability of its economic success. It seems that Lee Kuan Yew is haunted by similar doubts about the future of the "Singapore miracle." If so, the problem could be put once again in
Weberian terms: A society thus deprived of religious values will run into increasing problem of legitimation, because it will lack a "theodicy" that can give meaning to sacrifice, self-
denial and inequalities of fortune. But it is also possible that economists and even prime ministers are not the best judges of these matters. It could be that, underneath the "materialistic"
hustle of these societies, quite different forces of spirituality continue to be in play and that, consequently, seeing them as undergoing secularization in the Western mode is a highly
distortive perception.
Needless to say, all of this points to a research agenda of daunting scope, one clearly beyond the capacity of any individual, and one that cannot be expected to reach conclusive
results in the near future. One will find such an agenda inviting to the extent that one finds these problems intellectually compelling. It should also be stressed, however, that this is more
than only an intellectual or scholarly agenda.
It is very likely indeed that Eastern Asia will continue to be a crucially important part of the world. Its economic, social and cultural dynamics will then be of increasing importance
world-wide. And if its economic development continues on its present course, the question of its "inner secrets" will become ever more urgent. Put simply: How exportable this model of
development? It is not only in American and European business circles that such questions are being asked. Political leaders in Southeast Asia have urged their peoples to emulate Japan.
Government agencies in the Arab Middle East have sent missions to South Korea to find out its economic success formulas. And not long ago, a Western journalist reported seeing a
wall poster in Shanghai (presumably put up by local authorities) with the text "Learn from Taiwan!" What is there to learn? If the "institutionalists" are right, the model is highly
exportable; in other words, there are specific institutions and policies to be learned from, perhaps to be copied outright. If, on the other hand, the "culturalists" are closer to the truth, then
one might be sanguine about Shanghai adopting the model, but hardly sanguine about Saudi Arabia (not to mention troubled American corporations).
How secular is Eastern Asia? If it is, then it stands out glaringly from the general picture of the non-Western world today -- in stark contrast to the seething religious turbulence of
Islam, of South Asia and of Africa (and, if one wants to group that continent with the Third World rather than the West, in contrast to Latin America as well). If it is not, then
secularization, in the usual sense, remains a Western phenomenon and, perhaps, a distinctive Western weakness. The question is not just an intellectual one; it has far-reaching practical
and political implications.
THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION OF SECULARIZATION: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY

IKADO Fujio
Arguments regarding secularization greatly depend upon the protagonists' definitions of religion itself. As a starting point for discussion, let me first of all put forward my
operational hypothesis about religion.
Religion, as well as other cultural and social phenomena such as politics, economics, and education, is one of the essential elements of a cultural environment, created by human
beings in order to accommodate themselves to nature and to survive. Although all such elements are, so to speak, apparatuses for human existence, religion characteristically is a system
of symbols which brings the cosmological framework of a given cultural environment into existence, maintains it, and stabilizes the view of values or the meaningful order in the
environment. In that process, it is a means of transmitting to the cultural environment, in some form or another, those expression, namely "transcendence, or value standards which do
not exist within human experience."
Thus religion is an attempt on the part of human beings to approach the transcendent, an attempt which produces authorities and gives birth to the legitimation system which makes
the cultural society a cosmos. The transcendent always conceals itself from human beings. It is an authority which on the one hand gives closure to a cosmos, in other words, gives an
absolute order to the cosmos, but on the other hand, it relativizes and diversifies a number of separate universes. According to the relation between religion and the transcendent,
therefore, the latter becomes an authority, and occasionally relativizes a given cultural society, thus harboring the potential for becoming a motive force toward social change.
From this point of view, former arguments about secularization appear doubtful. Is it certain that secularization means a general decline of religion in all its dimensions? If so, who
do religious customs or rites such as shichi-go-san (shrine pilgrimage on a child's 3rd, 5th and 7th birthdays), hatsu-mode (first pilgrimage of the new year), and funerals flourish,
and why is it that the expansion of new religious groups continually become the topic of news in Japan, while statistically, the number of Japanese who claim to have no religious belief
is increasing?
In European countries where parish churches have broken down, and even funeral rites are being secularized, why are new fundamentalist sects constantly coming to life, and why
do private religious rituals, such as the spiritual exercises of Zen, flourish in spite of the decrease of social attendance at churches?
The assertion that secularization means religious decline seems to be based on statistical and apparent phenomena such as decrease of the number of members of particular religious
groups (religious communities and religious voluntary associations), or the disappearance of certain religious customs. The view of religion implicit in that argument is that of a
primitive or peasant society where the society itself is a religious community, not yet functionally differentiated from law and politics.
Thus secularization might be explained more accurately as being a process of the functional differentiation of other social elements, such as politics, law, economics, and education,
from religion, as the result of social changes in the society where religion was once the dominant norm. From the Parsonian point of view, when "hardware" turns out to be functionally
differentiated, gigantic and complicated in order to gain greater application capacity, "software" should be more generalized to keep the cybernetic balance as a whole. This can be
explained as follows:
(a) While the religious world view becomes more abstract and more distant from the world of the masses, each individual as one internal mechanism of the hardware system, tends
to participate in more familiar sub-world programs, that is, decline of established religions on the one hand, and the flourishing of new religions or political groups as references groups
on the other hand.
(b) As Fenn analyzed excellently, this "functional differentiation" means the process whereby "natural actors," who were in harmony with the society and its religious view of the
universe, change into "corporate actors," who belong to diverse sub-ideology system and compete with each other as a result of the diffusion or weakening of that religious world view.
In this process, a society changes in character from a natural integrity system to the state, which as a control system depends on the agreement of "corporate actors." Therefore, in
modern society, the state, as a source of social integrating power, often conflicts with corporations or associations which serve to give a core of identity to the individual person. Rather
than being a source of total social power, religion is more often a symbol used by persons or groups who protest against society in the name of the transcendent.
(c) Under these situations, religion, once the integrity symbol of the whole society, differentiates itself functionally and works separately in other secular domains. For example, (1)
religious symbols which could not cope with more transcendent and abstract programs have become "customs" such as initiation rituals or funeral ceremonies performed by established
religions, working covertly among secular domains such as politics, law, and ethics; (2) it becomes the ideology of such diverse reference groups as religious organizations or political
parties, and a symbol of goal-attainment behavior; (3) most remarkably, it becomes a modern myth in the form of science fiction or poetry, which helps the formation of individual
identity. Or it is used as a mass medium to sell a diffused world view to the individual consumer, serving as a secular means of maintaining a latent cultural framework.
I regard this as a process of differentiation of religion from other social domains. In this process, the religious function of integrating the cosmos or challenging established norms,
diffuses itself into other social domains. It is not called religion any longer, but it remains religious functionally. The aspect mentioned in (1) above, I call culture religion, or institutional
religion. The aspect described in (2), organization religion with the function of goal attainment. And the aspect of (3), private religion, or "invisible religion," according to Luckmann.
I think it is only from this point of view possible to solve the contradictory situation obtaining between the decline of religion and the concurrent maintenance of religious customs
in modern societies. On the surface of society, however, conflict between state and other "corporate powers" or individuals over the issues of authority and identity can often be
observed, making the endless effort of society towards integration stand out. This is the process of Rousseau's "political religion" attempting to extend its influence. When one
substitutes Ballah's "civil religion" for "political religion," the following conditions should be taken into account: first, a state admits the coexistence of various religions and politics as
sub-systems of ideology under the name of "transcendence," whose meaning has already been weakened even on the symbolic level; and second, the authority of civil religion should be
established only after obtaining a national consensus. If one describes secularization in this way, then as Ikado and Vernon pointed out in the 1960's, while religion itself continues to be
functionally differentiated (in other word, former religious functions are turned over to other social phenomena), it still performs its original cultural function, and in that sense it is
aligned on a par with politics, economics, etc. In this way it is still active as a cultural product inevitably brought about in the course of the human struggle for existence.
In surveys of political consciousness, while many respondents note that they have no interests in political matters, they nonetheless constitute a political powerful "indifference
group." Similarly, many people who express a superficial indifference to religious matters actively participate in religious functions.
As pointed out earlier by Swanson and Margaret Mead, ontological theology, which gave authority to past experiences in the name of God, declined after the Reformation in the
West, and in its place arose epistemological theology. Epistemological theology proclaimed the god of eschatological hope, the hope for a yet unreachable utopian goal which appeared
in the context of the dialectical development of human experience, namely the contradictory, conflicting nature of experience (and as Skinner has pointed out, to the degree that it was
utopia, it was no different from a transcendental existence). From theologian Patric Masterson's viewpoint, it is possible to define the philosophers from Marx to Ernst Bloch as "modern
religious men" on the same plane as Martin Buber.
Such Copernican change in theological matters may be one aspect of secularization, and if so, the first characteristic of secularization may be the "functional differentiation of
society, and the functional differentiation of religion in response," and the second, "the process whereby transcendental sources of value come to be expressed by the use of future-
oriented symbol systems, such as `hope'."
In this sense, Duvos, the author of A God Within, or Erich Fromm may be considered representative of modern theologians, and similar examples of modern-type religious groups
in Japan might be the Yomagishi-kai and Itto1-en, groups which aim at the realization of Buddhist communal society.
ISLAM, SECULARITY AND MODERNIZATION:

With Special Reference to Indonesia
Arifin BEY
1. Cultural Identity
WEBSTER'S defines "identity" as used within the context of this paper as "the distinguishing character or personality of and individual." When one speaks of "cultural identity," it
means then the distinguishing value of an individual, a tribe or nation. When then is the distinguishing character of a culture? It is the sum total of its value system, or the standard norm
with which community distinguishes between good and bad, the desirable and the detested.
Eugen Erhlich, an Austro-Hungarian sociologist of law, points out, as follows:
(A community) never has law without norms. These norms are determined instead not by any particular facts given inductively by observation but by what he termed `the
inner order' of all the facts. This means that there is never a legal, political or economic society except when all the facts of that society are ordered by certain common
normative or, in other words, ideological principles. Law and its political institutions, and one may add also economics and its business institutions, are effective only as
they correspond, and express this ideological or normative inner order... This normative inner order of any society or nation is called its `living law' (F. S. C. Northrop, The
Taming of the Nations, Macmillan, NY, 1953, pp.4-5)
U Nu, one of the founding fathers of Burma and who was later to become the country's Prime Minister, expressed Erhlich's thesis in concrete words. U Nu was stressing the fact
that Burma's cultural identity was Buddhism and nation building must conform to this long tradition.
Buddhism... passed on to us by out forebears, has now become our national heritage. It is our way of life. We prefer it to any other way of life on this earth. We do not say
that it cannot be improved, or that it cannot be adapted to suit modern conditions, but we do not wish to change its bases. We are not prepared to exchange it for any other
way of life. This is not a matter of conceit. We do not claim that our way of life is better than that of other people. We merely say that it is different, that it suits us better...
(U Nu, cited by Clauded A. Buss, South Asia and the World, Princeton, New York, 1959, p.151)
Other Asian leaders have been stressing the same basic thinking, namely the need to be true to one's cultural identity, if nation building is to succeed. This has been stressed by Sun
Yat-sen in his "Three Principles of Nationhood," by Sukarno in his "Pancasila," by Ayub Khan of Pakistan in his "Basic Democracy," by Iran's Islamic way of life. In fact, Japan itself
carried out "modernization" on the basis of "wa-kon yôosai." The Koreans called it "Tongdoo soki" (Eastern way, western instrument). To borrow the words of Prof. S. J. K. S. Hahn of
Korea University, Seoul: "Asians...philosophize that the universe consists of visible things, just as human beings lead spiritual and physical lives. The relationship between the two is
equated with the relationship between cause and effect (inga), fundamental and detail (honmatsu) and value and utility (taiyô)." (Paper submitted to "The Tenth International Conference
on the Unity of the Sciences," Seoul, Korea, November 9-13,1981). The process of modernization, to borrow the words of U Nu again, must be carried out within the context of "the
basis" of the cultural identity. A vital thread of continuity bind the two!
For the Asian eye, then, "modernization," as expressed in the Western experience, was a fundamental break from the spiritual.
2. Modernization
"Modernization" has been discussed so often that is would be redundant to repeat it here. Many books have been published on this subject, in Japan and abroad. Personally, I have
discussed this phenomenon in two books, one in English and one in Japanese. The first one is entitled Emerging Asia: The Role of Japan (Riverfield, Inc., Tokyo, 1981). The second is
Kindaika to Islam (Mekong Publishing House, Tokyo, 1981).
My major complaint about books on modernization is expressed in the introduction of the first book. "Often people talk about modernization as if it had a universal meaning and as
if its connotation has the same ring everywhere, no matter which cultural or religious persuasion they are addressing." (p. 3) My other complaint is that theories on modernization
introduced by the scholars of industrialized societies concern themselves only with the peripheral manifestations in the political and economic sectors of life. Most of them overlook the
core problem, namely the cultural matrix.
These scholars appear to be of the view that if non-Western societies desire to modernize, then for them, there is no other way than to follow into the footsteps of the West, which
may even require the nagation of their "outdated" cultures. In fact, the very "modernization" of the West was the product of the nagation of the past. As aptly pointed out by an
Indonesian scholar:
Western culture is the product of a series of nagations of tradition while the culture of the East is the continuous preservation of tradition. (S. T. Alisyahbana, "Cultureel
Niews Indonesie, "No. 16, 1952, p. 133)
Speaking about the European experience, Max Weber explained that "modernization" equals "secularization," a unique European experience. May I pointed out that ideationally
speaking, secularization as the product of "modernism" -- the ideational origin of modernization -- can be traced back to the "Idea of Progress," where man, which up to that time was
perceived as "a religious animal endowed with reason," proclaimed his independence from "religious bondage" and came to rely solely on reason only! "I think, therefore, I am!"
Western "modernization" cannot be discussed separate from the role of Religion, spelled with a capital R! Because Western "modernization" took the form of the decapitazation of the
cultural matrix -- religion -- it has developed inner contradictions and has demonstrated its shortcomings.
Prof. Hahn, quoted above, mentioned at least three such shortcomings. His views may be paraphrased into:
First: It is oriented to empiricism, concentrating only on the sensory culture. It deal with the utilitarian, ignoring the core issue.
Second: It is enthno-centric, believing that the Western experience is universal.
Third: It places the meaning of life within the domain of the means of life, while it should be the other way round. It is interesting to note that Ian Ilich, in a discussion on
modern society with a Japanese scholar, also pointed out that if in pre-modern days, economy was part of the objective of life, today economics has won out as the
paradigm of life. (See Ekonomisto.)
Within this context, it is proper to take up the view of a Western scholar about the product of "modernization" which, in his view, has brought cultural value into total confrontation
with the "law of economics." Richard L. Rubenstein stresses:
Modernization is a process whereby the organization of both the economy and society have been progressively rationalized. It is process involving the methodical attainment
of a definitely given and practical end by an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means, that is... rationalization. In a fully rationalized economy, impersonal
calculation of profit and loss would eliminate all ethical (and religious) considerations. Where economic values are in conflict with religious or social values, the economic
values will in the long run overwhelm all others. (Emerging Asia, op. cit., p. 7)
How does Islam look at such a world view?
3. Islam
Charles J. Adams writes in Encyclopaedia Americana about the resurgence of Islam as follows:
Muslims have turned again to the glories of their past to seek identification and guidance in the trying circumstances of the modern world. After several centuries in which it
seemed to lose vitality, Islam is once more on the rise. The Muslims, who form one seventh or more of the world's population, are daily increasing in number, wealth and
importance.
Adams further points out that, "perhaps the most remarkable thing is the sheer devotion to Islam which 20th century Muslims exhibit at a time when religion generally has
declined."
Why the resurgence of Islam? The following reasons may be given.
a. The disintegration of the social fabric of "modernized" societies, in the West as well as East.
b. The disenchantment with the West among the new elite of the Muslim world.
c. The upsurge of the "silent majority," up to now, the guardian of the society's living law, namely Islam.
I refrain here from presenting an outline of Islam. I assume that the audience is familiar with the problem. However, in order to provide a basis for discussions, allow me to
introduce some basic tenets of this world view or way of life.
(1) Islam is an all-embodying system of civilization (H. A. R. Gibb) underlined by a system of law (Iwamura Shinobu). The system of law is composed of (a) The Quraan; (b) The
Hidith; and (c) The system of Ijma. Ijma is the pronouncement of legal scholars-in-assembly when dispensing of new problems.
(2) Quraanic verses, the paramount source of Islamic law, are divided into "usuul" and "furuq." The first category deals with matters of "faith" and "morality." In other words, those
matters which fall within the scope of the relations between God and man and the duties emanating therefrom.
(3) Islamic law is divided into five categories.
a. Matters which fall under absolute duties.

b. Matters which do not fall within absolute duty, but when not performed are looked at with lenience.
c. Matters which preferably are avoided, but when performed do not meet reproach.
d. Matters which are undesirable but when performed do not meet with punishment.
e. Matters which must be avoided at all cost and when performed meet with punishment.
(4) Islam does not distinguish between the "scared" and the "secular." Islam looks at man as
an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam, God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not a citizen of a profane
world to be renounced in the interest of a world spirit situated somewhere else. To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time. (Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction
of Religious Thought in Islam, Oxford U. P., London, 1934, p.170)
(5) Islam stands for Unity of Faith and Reason. I will dispense with quoting from the Quraan pertaining to Faith. As to the encouragement of the use of reason, the following verses
may be quoted.
a. Study nature and find its laws! (Chapter III, Verse 190). Study archaelogical remains!(III, 137)
b. Knowledge is superior to unknowing. (Ch. 2, V. 30)
c. Conditions for Ruler: wisdom and health (Ch. 2, V.247) and many more such verses.
(6) Unity of Worship and Work and Pleasure
a. Beautify places of worship, and eat and drink and be not extravagant. (VII, 29)
b. God desires ease for you and he does not desire for you difficulty. (II, 185)
c. Without his own efforts, God will not change his fate for the good. (V, 10)
d. Do not break the covenant after you have confirmed it. (XVI,91)
e. And say: "Work"! (IX, 106)
f. Read in the name of your Lord who created. (XCVI, 1-5)
Muhammad said that "Wisdom is the lost property of the believer, take it wherever you find it."
4. Islam and Modernization in Indonesia

If the encounter with "Rangaku" provided Japan with a foundation for modernization in the technological sectors, Dutch colonialism over Indonesia curtailed its growth in the field
of education and social-economic development. Modernization has been possible by the self-sacrificing efforts of Indonesian Muslim elite.
The work of modernization has been carried out through two approaches.
a. Propagating western learning among those who have only been exposed to "religious education." This work was carried out by the chain of schools and social institutions
established by Muhammadyian and its woman's counterpart, Aisyah. (History of Muhammadyianh movement will be explained during discussions.)
b. Propagating Islamic principles among those who have been educated in Dutch institutions, at home as well as in Holland. This work was carried out by the Jong Islamieten Bond.
(History of this body will be discussed during the discussions.)
The revitalization of Islam among Indonesians during the Dutch period also meant to purify it from pre-Islamic influences. Prior to the arrival of Islam, Indonesia was already under
the influences of adat (traditional customary law system) and Hinduism or Buddhism or both. This is a heavy task, because adat and pre-Islamic religions have penetrated deep into the
life style of Indonesians. Hence a kind of syncretism or co-existence came to take place.
But the results are in complete contrast.
a. Syncretism with Hindu practices has helped to deemphasize the democratic tenets in Islam. In such areas, "leader worship" appears to be strong.
b. Co-existence with adat has helped to emphasize the democratic tenets of Islam.
Consequently, in Indonesia, it was Islamic education, rather than "Dutch learning" which had helped to contribute to the process of modernization in the sensory sectors. In the
meantime, Islam has succeeded in preserving the "inner law" of the population, namely Islam, although in many ways influenced by pre-Islamic religions and adat.
5. Dilemma and Challenge: Conclusion
The developing countries are seeking to establish states capable of using modern means of life. On the other hand, they also seek to maintain their cultural identity. Obtaining the
modern means of state building requires studying from and in the industrialized and secularized countries, such as Europe, the United States and Japan. This process has often produced
a "split personality" among the elite of the developing countries. In serious cases, they become elite uprooted from the cultural matrix.
The problem for the developing countries is to formulate patterns of modernization suitable for their respective nation building. In the past and up to the present, developed
countries take it for granted that those in the developing areas seek to establish a way of life similar to their own. Anyone who claims he does not want to be "Westernized" is accused of
blasphemy. Or, as a communist!
Of late, there is a tendency towards self-reflection and a willingness to accept -- although reluctantly -- that third world nations are entitled to a pattern of modernization within their
respective cultural identities. Countries like Japan should go further. Scholars may interest themselves into a comprehensive research, trying to formulate what type of modernization is
most suitable for a certain type of cultural matrix. Such an endeavor would of course entail a rethinking of the concept and manner of accepting foreign students -- especially from the
third world -- into Japanese educational institutions. For interest in "learning from Japan" as well as the implementation of a "Look East Policy."
The role of Japan in helping to modernize those countries is to help make them into first-rate citizens of their nations, not second-rate imitations of Japanese. As Iqbal aptly points
out: "The flame of life cannot be borrowed from others; it must be kindled in the temple of one's own soul!"
RELIGION AND SECULARIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

René E. Mendoza
The Philippines is probably one of the most dramatic examples, if not the most dramatic example, of a modernizing Asian country seeking to rediscover its cultural identity. In
asking basic questions as to what would be a better future for the nation, or whether such is even possible, the Philippine case appears to be an interesting study of how religion is used in
imperialistic designs over less developed countries. (LDCs).
In the Philippine case, modernization could hardly be divorced from Westernization since its colonial history indeed propelled the very notion of nationhood and then of national
independence from its colonial masters as a component or prerequisite of modernization. It is the common colonial exploitation and subservience that tied together the once disunited
and unorganized clusters of semi-independent settlements that had then no particular consciousness of a common Philippine nationhood. The Philippines, in fact, acquired its name and
its contemporary majority religion as a result of the actual occupation and colonization of the islands in the latter part of the 16th century.
The arrival in Philippine waters of Ferdinand Magellan on 17 March 1521 is traditionally dated as the beginning of the Spanish period. The Spanish intrusion in this part of Asia
was a result of the rivalry between the Portuguese and the Spaniards in exploration of the non-European world. Between them, the world was divided by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 with
the issuance of Inter caetera (a papal bull) drawing a demarcation line so that all lands lying one hundred leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands were to belong to Spain,
and those east, to Portugal. Since the Pope, Alejandro Borja, was a Spaniard and expected to favor the Spaniards, the papal bull was somehow suspect to the Portuguese. The Treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494 between the two powers thus moved the demarcation line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. In 1529 the Treaty of Zaragoza extended the demarcation line
and defined it in the Pacific at 297 1/2 leagues east of the Moluccas, with Spain gaining the right of ownership and settlement over lands east of this line. Interestingly, the Philippines
even lay unquestionably within the Portuguese side of the demarcation line. Moreover, its acquisition was facilitated by the proceeds of the sale of whatever right Spain may have had
over the Moluccas, except that the Moluccas actually lay within the Portuguese sphere of influence.
This pattern of deceit and religious-political intrigue become the leitmotif of the Spanish occupation and its imperialistic exploitation of the Filipinos. Religious interventions in
political matters were justified by the principle of union of church and state which previously laid the foundation or rationale of the Spanish conquista -- that of "civilizing and
Christianizing" such pagan lands initially assigned by fiat of the Pope. This led to encroachments by the ambitious and avaricious friars of the Catholic Church on jurisdictions of the
civil government. Due to the short tenure of civil officials and the clergy's relative advantage of actual presence and knowledge of the local languages and possession of the technology
of colonization, the Spanish friars became virtually the most visible element of stability and continuity of Spanish sovereignty in the rest of the Philippines outside of Manila. The civil
officials, moreover, tended to be concentrated in Manila alone.
The friars' systematic exploitation and interference in the political, economic, and social life of the people made their domination so pervasive and oppressive that Filipino
propagandists and reformists demanded their explusion from the Philippines. The contrary principle of separation of church and state thus became one of the constitutional principles
that survived the Malolos Congress which was convened on 15 September 1898 to draft a Constitution for the First Philippine Republic. Even the subsequent war with the United States,
and the defeat of the First Republic, did not change that historic commitment. In the Philippine context, "secularization" meant merely "nationalizing" the Catholic Church by replacing
the friars with native secular priests. This was a reaction to the Spanish friars who were perceived as obstacles to education, progress, and freedom. The Filipino rebels against the
Spanish actually had to fight two battles -- one against the Spanish, and the other against the Americans, who had initially led them to believe they were allies against Spain.
The American colonial period, which followed after some three centuries of Spanish rule, is officially dated as starting on 1 May 1898 with one-sided naval battle resulting in the
destruction of Admiral Patricio Montojo's fleet of Spanish ships in Manila Bay by then Commodore George Dewey. Dewey, who was maneuvered into position as the American Asiatic
Squadron by then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., was even promoted to Rear Admiral for this naval victory.
The taking of Manila, however, involved more deceit and treachery. A mock battle was staged to save Castillian face or honor, while at the same time excluding the Filipino rebels
from participating in the "liberation" of Manila. This colonial phrase of the Philippines was thus no better than the preceding one, in that design, deceit, and division were the same
techniques used in dominating and exploiting the Philippine population in the name of their own brand of Christianity, in the case of the Americans, the various Protestant varieties.
That the American soldier used education as an enticement -- education having been virtually denied the Filipinos by the Spanish friars -- was a master stroke of colonial
innovation. This had the consequence of having certain ideas and norms infused in the culture and values of the Filipinos even up to the present day. This is often the contemporary
"demon" denounced and demanded to be "exorcised" by the present-day radicals in their analysis of what they call the "neo-colonial" aspect of Philippine culture, including the so-called
"miseducation" of the Filipinos.
The apocryphal story of President William McKinley's having been told by God to "take the Philippines", and the assignment by General Arthur MacArthur of chaplains and non-
commissioned officers to teach even before civil government was established, illustrate once more the role of religion in colonization. Emphasized here were the virtues enshrined in the
Protestant ethic, so basic to the development of capitalism, while at the same time avoiding the establishment of a state church which is anathema to most Protestant sects. The
establishment of a secularized public school system and the use of English as a medium of instruction and communication laid the foundations of a continuing Westernized direction to
Philippine modernization, and an insidious acceptance of American values and models of development, notwithstanding gross differences in history, culture and resource bases.
Secularization, taken in its broadest sense, means the increase in the worldly, the temporal, or non-church functions or activities. Thus, it is only an added "political" dimension
stressing greater participation where the original "religious" dimension was confounded with an authoritarian, exclusivistic, and special interest group characteristic. Figure 1 is a
schematic representation of the combination of these "political" and "religious" dimensions, resulting in a single "circular continuum," where secularization is merely an alternative to
the church-state relation: (1) union, typical of less modern nations (at least, as defined by the West); and (2) separation of church and state, said to be typical of modern and modernizing
states (at least, insofar as Christianity is concerned).
In the non-Christian part of the Philippines, and in the rest of Asia, religion is not of the exclusivist and intolerant variety. It occurs in many forms -- there are the essentially
metaphysical or "other-worldly" religions; there are the religions that so pervade the very life of the people, or which provide the inner discipline of the individual to provide him with a
strong moral foundation; or even the pantheistic or the animist varieties; or any combination of these. It is not uncommon to see these religious strains mixed, not only with one another,
but even with social and political doctrines, with the resulting combinations confusing to Westerners. Ironically, Christianity, although Asian in origin, became so Westernized that it had
difficulty being diffused in Asia as its other great religions. Its penetration of the Asian world appears limited at the rim, the Philippines being on the eastern side, from which Catholic
and Protestant missions were often launched into the heartland of Asia.
Although safeguarding the principle of separation of church and state in the Philippines and preserving the secular outlook of education, the American colonial administration
virtually obliterated native ideas, customs and traditions, and even the national cultural identity of the Filipinos. "Modernization" hence continued to mean "Westernization", just as
"civilization" under the Spaniards meant "Christianization." The contemporary search, therefore, for a national cultural identity of the Filipino has often been therefore branded as "anti-
clerical" or "anti-Spanish," "anti-American" or "anti-colonial," depending on what political or historical "demon" the ideologist or ideologue may wish to "exorcise" from the system.
Even secularization is no defense against the monastic influence that still pervades the social and cultural life of the people.
Even though officially Christian, even Catholic Filipinos actually continue to practice paganistic rituals not only in rural but in urban areas as well. Paganization of Catholic
devotions has even been commercialized as tourist attractions, so that the evolution of a "folk Christianity," often proscribed from the pulpit, generally persists despite incessant
evangelization efforts of Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Of course, as long as the West defines modernization in its own image, such syncretic combinations will be regarded as
"pre-modern," and their excoriation demanded as a "price" for modernization.
Conceptually, religion can mean not only the organized doctrine, ritual and practice in or by a collective, but also the unorganized set of values, beliefs, and norms that are accepted
on faith by an individual. It may include or involve a faith in, and/or worship of, a deity or deities, and it could mean a devotedness or dedication to a holy life, no matter how defined. In
this case, the issue of religions and secularity in Asia is hard put to be resolved on the issue of modernization. Religion and the religious influence are so pervasive in Asia that
secularization often means not a rejection, but a repudiation of a decadent clergy who have become exploitative, rigidly formalist, and standing in the way of genuine spiritual
development. This was the experience of the Philippines, both in the failure of some nationalist native clergy to form a Philippine national church and in the conversion of only a small
percentage of Filipinos to Protestantism by the American missionaries. It was materialism, which perhaps reflects the American colonial heritage much more, and the acceptance of the
Western models of modernization that make it difficult for the contemporary Filipino who is interested in rediscovering his national cultural identity.
The "essence" of modernization should not be confused with its "accidents," one of which is its Western location or identification by Western culture-bound writers. But if
"modernization" is defined as "a dynamic form of social and technological innovation resulting from the knowledge explosion in recent times," or as " the process by which historically-
evolved institutions adapt to the rapidly changing environments, taking on new and growing functions that are consequences of unprecedented increases in man's knowledge, permitting
control in turn, over these same environments," one can avoid the mistake of equating it with "Westernization." "Westernization" could be one form, but not the only form of
modernization.
The complexity and interrelatedness of all aspects of the modernization process is perhaps better appreciated in a holistic and syncretic manner, rather than in the mutually
exclusivistic perspective of the West and its religions. The line between religions and secularization is not quite that clearly drawn in Asian societies. For in the experience of some
Asian nations, both have been instruments for "modernization," although under colonial ventures both have been eschewed as unacceptable. Thus, the search for rediscovering one's
national cultural identity has to involve an analysis of the impact of religion and sacred values on modernization as well as the reactions of religion to the challenges of modernization. It
is this holistic syncretic and eclectic approach, which is typical of Asia, that can satisfy the Kukugaku-type scholars in their search for national self-determination in pursuit of
modernization. In the Philippines, we at the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines have taken on the task of establishing stronger linkages with our Asian neighbors, relating
to our own rediscovery of our cultural identity from a perspective of international cooperation.
SECULARITY AND PROFANATION IN JAPANESE RELIGION

SONODA Minoru
Prologue
Any attempt to discuss cultural identity and modernization in Asian countries should begin with the question of the role of religion in social modernization. The religions of Asia
have given fundamental support to the traditional culture which is seen to foster ethnic consciousness among the people. I believe one efficient method of comparative analysis of
religion and modernization in Asian nations is to employ the key concept of "secularization" in the sense of institutionalization or "secularity" in the sense of value, prefaced, of course,
by a discussion of its applicability.
The value of applying this concept of "secularization" has been established through extensive interdisciplinary use in discussions of western-European modernization and religious
institutions. I think it is also an appropriate key to understanding the role of religion in Asian societies encountering the historical realities of modernization, which is closely identitied
with "Westernization."
It is my hope that this session will serve as a forum for the pursuit of the questions of the incidence of religious change in Asia that might be called "secularization"; how the
implication (evaluation) of "secularity" in the religious world might function or change in the process of modernization; and how such cases in Asia might compare with European
history. The important point to make here is to avoid beginning a conceptual investigation before inspecting the facts, but to begin with some heuristic effort to find our real epitomes in
terms of such expression. Even if we are hampered by some discrepancies in our references, we should not hesitate to keep examining these differences in results, for those very
differences can lead us to a better understanding of the structural relationship between religion, or sacred values, and modernization.
The purpose of this session is not to develop a theory of secularization. Its true purpose is first of all to clarify changes in religion and sacred values and their place in Asian society,
as a premise for examining the possibility of cultivating a viable national identity which will enable us to deal successfully with today's process of modernization in Asia.
To further this purpose, I have chosen to approach the basic structure of Japanese religion as a "religion of communities" in heuristic terms. I will focus on two main reasons for its
continuity: (1) the Japanese Buddhist interpretation of "secularity" and (2) the nature of the "profane" as opposed to the "sacred" in Japanese community life as well as in tradition
communities maintaining religio-political autonomy. In conclusion, I will attempt to apply the concept of "profanation" to interpret the process of the weathering of the Japanese
traditional community in modern Japan, which structure can yet be seen in the numerous new religious and secular organizations.
1 Religion of communities
Japanese religion can be viewed basically as a "religion of communities" throughout pre-modern history. By "community," I mean a collectivity founded on certain principles of
kinship and neighborhood. In ancient times, it was a religion of clan groups (uji and hara). In the middle ages, the religious integrity of collective settlements (mura) gradually replaced
the clan group. Nevertheless, the tradition of the kinship system was still alive on the symbolic community level. For example, ujigami , a generic name for clan gods, was still used to
refer in general to the guardian gods of local communities as well as to the ancestral deities of extended families. Throughout Japan's pre-modern history, political power was always
based on confederations of clans. Aristocrats and warriors showed rather strong tendencies to clan society, while the structure of the lower classes revealed a strong principle of
neighborhood.
Therefore, only religious traditions born from the womb of these communities, or those of foreign origin approved by these communities, could take root in this country. Robert
Redfield's theory regarding the formation of national culture in archaic agricultural communities proposes complementary configuration of "great tradition" and "little tradition." I
believe this theory might be applied gainfully to an inquiry into the formation of national culture in general as well as the basic features of cultural developments in pre-modern Japan. In
a broad sense, we can find several cases in cultural history revealing a refined orthodoxy at the political center as a "great tradition," around which many local cultures coexist as "little
traditions," all enjoying mutual exchange. The advanced culture of mainland China and Korea was introduced into this central "great tradition" of clan society in Japan. It then went
through a process of transformation as it was diffused throughout the "little traditions" which characterized each local community.
The same was true of religion. Shinto originated in the complementary exchange of myth and ritual between the "great" and "little" traditions, that is to say, between the clan cults,
centering around the imperial court, and the community cults, based on kinship by proximity. In order for Buddhism to be accepted in Japan, it had to be adapted to the ancestral cults for
the dead of the local community, going beyond the status of institutionalized religion for the protection of the state. The harmonious fusion of Shinto and Buddhism, called shin-butsu
shugo, was nothing but a two-storied structure for assimilating Buddhism, with its concept of honji-suijaku (the prime entity and its manifestations), into community religion. A few
Buddhist sects once thrived outside communities in the middle ages, but they soon ceased their aggressive activities, partly suppressed by military powers and partly weakened by their
own institutionalization. Some were absorbed into the "great tradition," but most became part of the "little tradition" of local community religion.
Pre-modern Japan as viewed in this light might thus be characterized by a continuing religion of communities, but no enduring example of a community of religion is found to
remain.
In my opinion, there are two reasons for this: (1) Japanese Buddhism never insisted on the type of strict distinctions between secular and sacred demanded, for example, by
Christianity; (2) it was the nature of the traditional community in Japan to maintain religio-political autonomy throughout the country's pre-modern history.
2 The implication of "secularity" in Buddhism

The Japanese word seken is used to refer to the concept of secularity. For instance, Prince Shotoku (573-621), one of ancient Japan's great scholars and statesmen, said of this
duality, "The world (seken) is false; the Buddha alone is true." This aphorism is noteworthy as the first expression of the idea of world negation in Japan. Shusseken literally means
leaving the word to enter monastic life; its precise equivalent is shukke, which means to leave one's home in order to become a yosutebito, a person who has renounced the world.
Needless to say, all these terms originated in the Buddhist idea of world negation. That is to say, Buddhism brought to Japan a worldview that despised social life as a secular and false
life. The Pure Land sects which thrived in the middle ages, from the 9th through the 17th century, advocated loathing for this impure world and reliance on a pure land (onri-edo or
gongu-jodo). This world was viewed as impure (edo), corrupt (dakuse) and miserable (ukiyo). The literature of the middle ages frequently likens the mundane life (hito no yo) to an
empty dream or short-lived foam in a stream, emphasizing its uncertainty.
It is doubtful, however, that this negative view of the secular world permeated the thought of the Japanese people to a very great extent in that period. Saburo Iyenaga, a leading
historian of Japanese thought, points out that the idea of negation developed from simple world negation to negation of world-negation, that is, nothing less than the absolute affirmation
of the world. The essential principle of the Tendai(Tien-tai) school, which supplied the basic philosophy common to all sects of Japanese Buddhism, is that the Buddha Nature is in all
things (issai-shujo shitsu-u busso). In this sense, the secular world as such can be reaffirmed as a world of Buddha Mind. Strictly speaking, of course, such absolute affirmation should
hold to a specific state of mind unique to Buddhist practices; but once outside the monastery, it was popularized and reduced to a simple affirmation of secularity. And so we see a
change, around the 18th century, in the characters for the word ukiyo, from the compound meaning "miserable world" to a homonym meaning "easygoing world"
Although I have no substantial proof, it is my impression that the Buddhist view of this world as a transient one bred a seemingly inconsistent attitude wherein Japanese tended to
resign without reluctance from their attachment to life in spite of their realistic way of life. But many individuals, it seems, adopt such an attitude of world negation only provided that
they can be confident either of their honorable sacrifice for the sake of their beloved community or at least that their doing so brings no harm to it.
Thus I conclude that the secular world known in Japan as seken is not quite the same as the one which is held in clear opposition to a religious world.
3 "The Profane" in community life
Failing to discover any conspicuous "secularity" in the worldview of Japanese Buddhism, we must then turn to investigate the nature of the profane aspect of community religion.
Such an investigation should also clarify the previously mentioned continuous nature of community throughout Japanese religion, that is, to indicate a structure of religio-political
autonomy characterizing the whole traditional community in pre-modern Japan.
Needless to day, archaic clan groups feature a clan head, who assume the supreme authority of religion and policy. In ancient Japan, religious ritual (matsuri ) was almost equal to
administration (matsurigoto). It originated in the kingship of Yamato clan society ; but even after the political power of the aristocracy was seized by the warrior class, there was in fact
little change, although the aristocratic clan system became rather symbolic and that of the warrior class more realistic. Even seemingly secularized political power retained its religio-
political autonomy because it depended on the integrated system of clan groups. No militarist government such as the Shogunate in pre-modern Japan ever hesitated to intervene in any
religious authority or movement that threatened its autonomy. Every powerful clan to occupy the seat of political power divinized its own ancestors in order to legitimize its position
with sacred authority. Secular power itself perpetuated that sacred character. The Tenno system enabled the maintenance of a sacred king symbolically entrusting his sovereignty to
powerful clans. Ruling clan groups made free use of both religious authority and political power, as if they were indivisible, in order to keep all religious groups and movements under
control. The Tokugawa Shoguns (1603-1867), after their bitter experience dealing with the religious revolts of the Ikko-shu (a Pure Land sect), completely repressed Christianity (which
hesitated to go beyond their authority); at the same time, they made use of other Buddhist sects for religio-political control over every class and unit of kinship. Buddhism may appear to
have became a state religion as a result, but in fact only kinship aspects of community religion, such as ancestral cult worship, were affected by Buddhist rituals; the religious autonomy
of the village community, based on both principles of kinship and neighborhood, never came under control of Buddhist institutions. On the contrary, Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines
co-existed in every local community, village or town. Both were accepted insofar as they contributed to community welfare and security within the framework of "little traditions."
In Japan, no single religious organization ever managed to maintain any substantial power on a local basis; rather it was, so to speak, taken to pieces and digested by the community
religion. The traditional Japanese community created its own religious complex according to is own autonomous principles. Shinto and Buddhism were synthesized into shin-butsu
toriawase no shukyo to harmonize with the dual dimensions of the sacred and the profane, the bases of the community's religious life. It is noteworthy that these dual categories were
never clearly distinguished except for temporary turns. At one time, the dualism of hare and ke was very clear and vivid in Japanese community life. A hare day was a special holiday
for public ritual, open to all community members; ke referred to the daily mundane working routine. The community is profane on a ke day, being the world of daily life; but when the
day is hare, it takes on a sacred character. The temporal ke renders the inside of the special community profane and the outside sacred; on the contrary, the temporal hare renders the
inside sacred while the outside becomes profane. It should be noted here that, in this Japanese dualism, the concept of sacredness rests on the two elements of purity and impurity. In
other words, the community on a ke day would live in the profane dimension of daily life in which sacré pure and sacré impure were confused; on a hare day it would make a conscious
attempt to keep these two elements separate. Only on such an occasion could such lively festivals be held where a solemn ritual would be followed by some masquerade theatrical event
representing the sacred chaos, daring to confuse the two elements. It is my present opinion, however, that so-called hierophanies of spiritual beings visiting the community are most
likely to occur in the marginal area between the inside and the outside of the community.
The most important point to be emphasized here is the fact that any traditional community by itself could live an autonomous life in both dimensions of the sacred and the profane,
mostly the profane. It follows that the function of such a religion of community must be above all to solicit the safety and welfare of its own. That is to say, the community turns to the
sacred dimension to invite both Shinto and Buddhist deities to enrich and ensure the daily, profane dimension of community life.
Secularlity in community religion, then, is nothing other than the daily life of the community; and the welfare of secular life at the community level is the central object for which to
pray and express gratitude in this religion. Thus we may conclude that such secularity refers to the profane dimension in the community which will aid in its prosperiry; and further, we
may say that it seems to positively affirm the people's daily activities of production. Daily productive work is pursued for the purpose of prosperity in order that the profane might
embody the sacred in the coming rituals. In other words, the realization of social welfare and economic prosperity in the community's secular life is the very proof of the sacredness of its
religion.
Epilogue: Modernization and Profanation
Modernization in the Meiji period (1868-1912) included the introduction of both modern science and institutions from Western societies, and the traditional character of the
community in relation to both religion and society in Japan underwent profound changes. The Meiji government succeeded in establishing a so-called "family-state" which in fact
adapted the religio-political autonomy of the clan community to the national level. It accomplished this by reviving the archaic concept of kingship with its strong legitimation power,
which made it possible to organize the unified bureaucracy for efficient control over the people. In this process, local community cults were absorbed into the unified order of state cults,
and all Buddhist sects that had been deprived of any governmental status assumed religious autonomy as independent institutions, on an equal footing with other religious groups such as
Christian sects and new religions. The traditional structure of community religion survived only in the form of state cults at the national level, at least in terms of national law. All other
forms of traditional religion (except for shrine Shinto, which was unified into the order of a state cult), were by force of state law dissociated at once from their social bases at the local
community level.
The interaction of the sacred and the profane, once unique to community religion, was thus emphasized on a unified scale and applied to the nation as a whole, and as a result, the
characteristic system of interaction of sacred and profane within each local community almost disappeared, absorbed into the new national order of shrine observances. But one new and
striking phenomenon of this sacralization did emerge: that of the sacred national war. In every international struggle from the conflict with Ch'ing China to the Second World War,
Japan's very national entity became sacralized, and all aspects of daily life became parts of the "holy war" in this abnormal state up religiosity.
But needless to say, the most disastrous blow to strike this dual national structure of sacred and profane was the defeat in 1945. Whereas previous victories had tended to strengthen
that structure, Japan's ultimate defeat exposed the fallacy of the "Great Festival." The memory of the shock of that profanation of the sacred state is still vivid in the minds of many
Japanese today. Voices insisting on the sacredness of Japan's national body now have very little influence, in stark contrast to prewar nationalism. We might well say that it has been
more completely secularized in the Western sense than the West, in that it has no transcendent authority such as the Judaeo-Christian God to legitimize its entity. And it is shrine Shinto
which has suffered the most serious blow. The social foundation for community religion, which had been gradually weakening since the Meiji period, dissolved almost completely, at
least for the first ten years or so after the end of the war. The extensive urbanization and drastic social mobility since the sixties has also hindered attempts to revive the traditional
character of the local community.
In this sense, the traditional religiosity of the local community, that is to say, the religious structure of the interaction of the sacred and the profane, has already been so weakened
that I believe it might be more appropriate to speak of profanation rather than secularization in reference to developments in modern Japan.
Summary of Discussions: SESSION A

INOUE Nobutaka
1. Supplementary Explanatory Comments by the Speakers
There were four speakers for this session. They spoke in the order of Mr. Fujio Ikado, Mr. Arifin Bey, Mr. René Mendoza, and Mr. Minoru Sonoda. Because of time restrictions for
each of the speakers, they were able to do no more that read from their papers, whether in their entirety or from selections. While Mr. Ikado spoke on a general theory of secularization,
the remaining three dealt in concrete terms with the cases of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan.
Mr. Ikado used the terms, software the hardware, as metaphors to argue that religion is the software of societies; and that although secularization might proceed, the decline of
religion is an impossibility. He argued that secularization should be understood using the concept of differentiation.
Mr. Arifun Bey argued against previous Western-centered modernization theory and he displayed a dissatisfaction with the view that modernization is tantamount to Westernization.
He also emphasized the role of Islam in Indonesia. Islam, which does not distinguish between the sacred and the secular, has contributed to the modernization of the spirit and of the
senses.
Mr. Mendoza pointed out that cultural identity in the Philippines arose as a movement against Spain and America. For the Filipinos, secularization meant the replacement of
Spanish Catholic friars with native secular priests.
The final speaker, Mr. Sonoda, argued that the concept of a "religion of communities" (kyôdoôtai no shûkyô) is useful in considering the basic structure of Japanese religion; and he
introduced the concept of the profanation of the community. In other words, in Japan, the notion of the secular as opposed to the religious did not arise. Rather, it is important to note that
the community itself was at times sacred while at other times profane. Moreover, profanation of the community has progressed since the Meiji period.
Excepting Mr. Ikado's presentation, which took an extremely macro-scale approach, the presentations drew upon concrete examples and were of great interest. Common to these
three speakers was an emphasis? perhaps best thought of as an antithesis to westernized theories of secularization and modernization? upon the historical particularities of each of their
countries.
2. Comments by the Commentators

There were comments by Mr. Yanagawa Keiichi and Mr. Petere Berger on the presentations of the four speakers. First, Mr. Yanagawa, while a nothing that the presentations of the
four speakers were of great interest, indicated that because of time limitations he would only point out problematical areas. The following are the questions which he addressed to each
of the speakers.
A) To Mr. Ikado: Is the differentiation into culture religion, organizational religion, and private religion to which Mr. Ikado refers appropriate in considering other countries of
Asia? Also, the differentiation explanation, which argues that secularization is the process of the differentiation of religion from the other elements of society? namely, the polity, the
economy, education, etc.?arose from the 1960's. Is this explanation still useful today?
B) To Mr. Sonoda: In the paper, it is argued that the religion of communities has almost totally broken down. If that is the case, then what are the characteristics of contemporary
Shinto ? Also, is the economic development of Japan which took place during the Meiji period and following the War, unrelated to the religious tradition? Even the secularization
concept alone has many meanings. Is it really necessary to further complicate the problem by introducing the concept or profanation?
C) To Mr. Mendoza: The situation in the Philippines has been made clear. However, if the Filipinos are constantly "anti-something," whether anti-Spanish, anti-American, or anti-
colonial, what is the tradition that the Filipinos must actively preserve and rely upon?
D) To Mr. Bey: If secularization is the independence of Reason from the fetters of Religion, how should one evaluate Weber's argument that Christianity promoted the
modernization of the West? If, as was explained, there is a fusion of the sacred and the secular in Islam, why did differentiation not take place?
Mr. Berger followed with his comments. He prefaced his remarks by nothing that since he had little knowledge of Asia it was not possible for him to comment on all of the
presentations. Instead, he hoped to sharpen the focus of the discussions. Mr. Berger began by maintaining that there are two aspects of secularization: (1) a primary interest in this-
worldly matters; (2) a loss of confidence in ideas related to other-worldly or supernatural matters. Furthermore, while in the West these two aspects are intimately related, he proposed to
consider the possibility that in the East these two aspects are related in a different manner. He also addressed short comments to each of the speakers.
A) To Mr. Sonoda: Isn't what Mr. Sonoda calls profanation, the second aspect of secularization? If this is so, is not Japan similar to the West?
B) To Mr. Ikado: This is an extremely functionalist explanation. However, isn't there a side to religion which cannot be explained in this way?
C) To Mr. Mendoza: This is also type of functionalist explanation. Mr. Mendoza did not refer to Malay culture. How is Malay culture related to modernization in the Philippines?
Also, since contact with America, what have been the effects of Protestant rigorism?
3. Responses of the Speakers

There were responses from each of the speakers to the above comments.
First, Mr. Ikado in responding to both Mr. Yanagawa and Mr. Berger emphasized again the usefulness of the concept of differentiation in considering the problems of secularization
and modernization in Asia.
Mr. Mendoza acknowledged that to a certain extent, as pointed out by Mr. Yanagawa, there is always and "anti-something" tendency and a lack of what is uniquely Filipino. This is
a point on which Japan differs greatly. He observed that before the coming of the Spanish there was no Philippines; and this historical background is a great obstacle when pursuing a
national identity for the Philippines. He also noted the necessity of understanding the religious history and religious geography of the Philippines in considering the relations between
politics and religion. There was also the relations between politics and religion. There was also the observation that the Protestantism presented by America was Catholicized by the
Filipinos.
Mr. Bey took the critical position that the concept of "modernization" may itself be a type of religion. He started that he did not feel any current need for a Westernized
modernization in Islamic society; and he displayed a dissatisfaction with the argument that a Western?style modernization is unavoidable.
The above were the questions and responses; however, the discussions did not necessarily proceed in a developmental fashion. Mr. Yanagawa directed attention to the problem of
comparing each of the presentation within the Asian context. However, the task of comparing each of the Asian countries must be premised by the mutual building up, by scholars, of a
certain level of knowledge concerning the countries to which one's own is to be compared. Therefore, this is a matter which is more likely to be a task for the future.
Mr. Berger, in dealing with the problem of secularization in Asia, seemed to be concerned with how this secularization differed from and how it could be treated as equal to that of
the West. Mr. Berger steered the discussion, insofar as possible, toward a selection and organization of problems; in this sense he prevented the discussion from digressing into minor
issues.
4. Discussion
After the above discussions between the speakers and the commentators, there was an exchange of views centering on questions from the floor.
The question were not necessarily all relevant: some did not fit into the flow of the discussion. In particular, there were two or three such questions in the second half. However,
there were also several which added to the discussion. A selection of these is introduced in the following.
Mr. Ishii Yoneo, taking off on the "anti-something" tendency in the Philippines introduced the relevant problem of Thai monasteries. In Thailand, which did not experience
colonialism, the democratization movement began in the 1970s. It is important to observe that under these circumstances there was quite strong criticism of monks even while the
criticisms against the Sangha system itself were few. Nevertheless, he explained that this ought to be construed as showing that the Sangha itself is not able to adjust to modernization.
Also, while giving the examples of Muslims in India and Pakistan, Mr. Madan argued that in the Islamic world secularization does not mean the decline or the death of religion.
Further, he argued that it is important to distinguish between Islam for the community and Islam for the individual.
Mr. Noriaki Akaike, addressing his question in particular to Mr. Mendoza, asked if it is not necessary to consider kinship when dealing with the question of politics and religion in
the Philippines. He also asked if it is appropriate to consider folk Catholicism as secularized Catholicism.
These questions and comments put the difficulty of the session into relief. While recognizing the inescapability of the fact that the terms secularization and modernization will be
used with a multiplicity of meanings, a major task would seem to be to consider how it will be possible to overcome the extreme complication of the problem which arises as a result of
the diversity in the religious conditions of each country. In other words, a productive method would seem to be first to adequately understand the modern religious histories of each of
the countries; then to determine what common ways of examining these countries are possible.
LANGUAGE POLICY AND NATION-BUILDING IN A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY:

The Case Singapore Model
Eddie C. Y. KUO
Most developing countries in South and Southeast Asia are constantly confronted with the problems of ethnic and cultural diversity. The presence of competing ethnic and cultural
groups in these states generally means that the establishment of new nationhood requires the cultivation of a new national identity. This emergent national identity can be achieved either
through an expansion and elevation of an indigenous ethnic/cultural identity imposing upon other "less" indigenous and usually minority groups, or through the development of a new
supra-ethic identity treating various ethnic groups on an equal standing. In either case, it is expected that the emergence of a new national identity is no likely to be natural or
spontaneous. The crucial problem faced by these new multi-ethnic states is thus the potential conflict between loyalty to one's ethnic community and loyalty to the wider national
community. The essential question is how the two can be reconciled rapidly and smoothly to facilitate the process of nation-building.
The problem is further complicated as the different ethnic groups often speak different languages and demonstrate loyalty to their respective linguistic tradition. Linguistic diversity
thus tends to lead to a low level of communicative integration, making modernization a long and difficult process in these countries.
Singapore is one of such multiethnic countries in Southeast Asia, with about 77% Chinese, 15% Malays, 6% Indians and 2% of other smaller ethnic groups. The complexity of the
sociolinguistic situation in Singapore is reflected in the existence of four official languages in this island state of 2.4 million population. (For a detailed analysis of the sociolinguistic
situation in Singapore, see Kuo, 1980).
At the time of Independence, the leaders of Singapore decided that there would be four official languages in the Republic. Malay, Chinese (Mandarin), and Tamil were selected to
represent three ethnic-cultural traditions in Singapore, and English because of its international status and Singapore's colonial background.
Of the four official languages, Malay is designated the national language, reflection both the historical and national position of the island-state. The role of the national language,
however, is almost exclusively symbolic at the official level, used in the National Anthem and military commands. As a national language, Malay is however not taught as a compulsory
subject in school for the non-Malays, and a person need not pass a national language test to become a naturalized citizen of Singapore.
English, as the non-ethnic and thus neutral official language, has over the year evolved to become the de facto dominant working language in Singapore. It is the high language for
all formal official functions and the only language taught in all schools at all levels. As more and more of the younger generation Singaporeans are going through the formal educational
system, the trend toward the increasing use of English in all domains seems sure to continue.
The other official language, Tamil, as the language chosen to represent the Indian population in Singapore, is in a rather weak position. The Indian community in Singapore is not
only small but also diversified in language and religion. As more and more Indian families are shifting to using English as the home language, the position of Tamil appears to be
weakening.
Chinese Mandarin is not the mother tongue for the majority of the Chinese. Yet historically,, the national language of China has long been accepted by the Chinese in Singapore
(and indeed Southeast Asia) as the language to officially represent the ethnic Chinese. It is the language taught and used as the medium of instruction in Chinese schools. It is also used
among the Chinese-educated as the high language for official and formal functions. For the informal occasions, Hokkien, the mother tongue of the major Chinese dialect group, has long
been the lingua franca, highly functional in many social domains.
From the above discussion, it is clear that Singapore society is characterized with the co-existence of several competitive cultural traditions. There is at the same time the lack of a
strong indigenous host culture and host language. It is quite unlikely therefore that there can be rapid cultural and linguistic assimilation, with the Singapore society as the "melting pot,"
among the heterogeneous population. Cultural and linguistic pluralism is adopted by the leadership and accepted by the majority of the population as the guiding policy option in this
multiethnic society. According to Stewart, language planning policies of new states generally fall into two types of strategies: (1) the eventual elimination, by education or decree, of all
but one language, which is to remain as the national language; (2) the recognition and preservation of important languages within the national territory, supplemented by the adoption of
one or more languages for official purposes and for communication across language boundaries within the nation (Stewart,1968: 540)
Of these two strategies, the first one clearly aims at eliminating linguistic diversity, and is usually part of a more general policy of eventually assimilating all ethnic minorities into a
"national" culture. The second approach is more tolerant of cultural diversity, and usually reflects an official policy of cultural pluralism. The second approach is clearly the policy being
adopted in Singapore today.
In the cases of the latter strategy, the underlying policy rationalizations are most clearly presented by Nayar:
This policy...partakes of a general strategy which seeks to establish a national loyalty and identity without destroying subnational ties, the strategy of "unity in diversity."
Such a strategy endeavors to build a national loyalty over and above local loyalties, moderating and domesticating the latter but not eliminating them...It endeavors, in good
measure, to build and sustain national loyalty on the part of citizen, indirectly, through providing gratification to the diverse groups. (1969: 10)
Kelman (1971) analyses the problem from a socio-psychological point of view. He points out that sentimental society pose a potential barrier to participation in the national system
and to the development of a national identity. However, he believes that so long as the existing socio-political structure is effective enough to satisfy the basic needs of the individual and
his ethnic/language community, the resultant instrumental attachments may eventually lead to sentimental attachments to the new state and then to the emergence of a new national
identity.
Accordingly, in such new states, language policies ought to be based entirely on functional considerations:
That is, in selecting languages for various purposes... central authorities ought to be concerned primarily with two issues: (1) how to establish and facilitate patterns of
communication... that would enable its socio-economic institutions to function most effectively and equitably in meeting the needs and interests of the population; and (2)
how to assure that different groups within the society... have equal access to the system and opportunities to participate in it. (Kelman, 1971:40)
In the light of the above discussion, it becomes easier to understand the general strategy of the language policy being adopted in Singapore in relation to nation-building and
national development.
The general language policy of Singapore can best be described as multi-lingualism or linguistic pluralism, which prescribes that all four official languages should be treated as
equal. In actual practice, however, few would argue seriously that all the four official languages can be treated exactly equal. Among the four, English has evolved to become a de facto
working language, functioning as a unifying working language at the national level. This is a policy that satisfies both "issues" suggested by Kelman. On the one hand, the use of English
promotes economic progress for both society as a whole and its individual speakers. It is in other words, the language of modernization. On the other hand, English is a non-native
language in which none of the major ethnic groups is at an advantage over the others. The use of this "neutral" language helps rule out any substantial inter-ethnic conflict based on the
language issue in Singapore.
The status and function of English in Singapore are most clearly delineated in relation to economic development and modernization. It is often pointed out that Singapore lives by
trade and that the language of that trade is English. The use of English in Singapore thus greatly aids the attraction of overseas capital, trade and industrial investment. As a dominant
international language, English is also believed to provide access to the vast range of technical and organizational knowledge of the West.
English, which is not an ethnic mother tongue, is also promoted in Singapore as the lingua franca of inter-ethnic communication. In fact, many researchers have found that the
learning of English is associated with a loyalty to Singapore that can facilitate the emergence of a supra-ethnic Singapore identity. Yet this stronger feeling of Singapore identity and
presumably a lower level of ethnocentrism are achieved at the cost of a more superficial association with the ethnic culture. It seems that only when one is free from sentimental
attachments to his own ethnic tradition can be progressively look forward and develop a new identity at the supra-ethnic level. The dilemma is that, while it is desirable to maintain
certain sentimental attachments to one's own ethnic-cultural tradition, this may hinder the development of a new identity, which can best be built initially only on an instrumental basis.
As an international language, English not only opens the door to modern technology and skills, but also makes available to its speakers the mass culture of the West, which often
conflicts with traditional cultural values. The danger is, as the Prime Minister Mr. Lee Kuan Yew pointed out several years ago, that too much emphasis on English may lead to the
"detrimental effects of deculturalization," of producing "anaemic, uprooted floating citizens without the social cohesiveness and the cultural impetus that give the people the drive and
the will to succeed as a group" (quoted in Josey, 1971:346).
Confronted with the dilemma, Singapore's answer to the problem is the provision of bilingual education. The practice of bilingualism prescribes that all pupils must learn two
languages from Primary One onward. The two languages are English and one of the ethnic languages. Subjects such as mathematics and science are taught in English, the language of
modernization; while history and civics (moral education) are taught in the respective ethnic language. It is believed that the learning of the ethnic language can lead to an appreciation
and hence retention of ethnic cultural values and traditions. It also satisfies the need for sentimental attachments to the ethnic culture.
The role of language policy in Singapore in relation to nation-building is therefore to cultivate instrumental attachments by maintaining a high level of economic development,
presumably through the use and spread of English. At the same time, traditional values are retained through the continues use of ethnic language. Hopefully, the process should lead
eventually to sentimental attachments to the new state, to a higher level of cultural integration, and perhaps to the emergence of a supra-ethinic national identity.
References
Deutsch, Karl W.
1966 Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Josey, Alex
1971 Lee Kuan Yew, rev ed., Singapore, Asia Pacific Press.
Kelman, Helbert C.
1971 "Language as an Aid and Barrier to Involvement in the National System", Can Language Be Planned? eds. Joan Rubin and Bjorn H. Jernudd, Honolulu: University Press of
Hawaii.
Kuo, Eddie C. Y.
1980 "The Sociolingustic Situation in Singapore," in Language and Society in Singapore, eds. E. Afendras and K. Kuo, Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Nayar, Balder Raj
1969 National Communication and Language Policy in India, New York, Praeger.
Stewert, William A.
1968 "An outline Sociolingustic Typology for Describing National Multi-lingualism," in Readings in the Sociology of Language, ed. J. A, Fishman, the Hague: Mouton.
MODERNIZATION AND TRADITIONAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA

ITO Abito
The Republic of Korea (R.O.K) has made remarkable economic progress in recent years through highly organized industrialization. In this connection an important question has
arisen: What kind of cultural identity can best serve to integrate the Korean people socially identity can best serve to integrate the Korea people socially in the years to come?
Shortly after its liberation from Japanese rule, the R.O.K experienced national division and internal disturbance. At this juncture it had to find a way to achieve rapid technological
and economic development apart from social integration of the nation in terms of its traditional culture. As a result, though the R.O.K has come to play a leading role among
economically developing nations, the problem of social integration in the nation as a whole, remaining to be settled, has given rise to considerable tension and disharmony. On the one
hand, rapid urbanization and industrialization, accompanied by emphasis on technology and economic efficiency, have led to the appearance of a new life-orientation that finds
expression in a new social stratum. In particular, the adherents of Christianity, who live mainly in the cities. Who tend to belong to this stratum, and who presently constitute about thirty
percent of the population, exercise considerable influence in social, economic, and political dimensions. On the other hand, the traditional life-orientation represented by Confusian
ethics and folk culture is in a critical situation even in rural areas, and symptoms of threat to social integration are evident throughout the nation.
This paper will consider, therefore, the three following matters: (1) the new life-orientation and social stratum, (2) the critical situation in and new awareness of traditional culture,
and (3) the search for and prospect of a synthesis of the first two.
1. The new life-orientation and social stratum

Among those who may be considered bearers of the economic development of Korea in recent years, those who come from rural areas and from a comparatively young generation
play and important role. The majority received their education in the rural situation and in recent years have established residences in downtown urban areas or in industrial area
apartment complexes. This group consists of unskilled and skill-developing factory workers, shop employees, and service industry workers, most of its members being second or third
sons of nuclear families. For the most part they are "commoners" who have no direct connection with the Confucian life-orientation or with yangban culture. In addition they are people
who, by moving to the city, have separated themselves from traditional communities with their patterns of everyday culture and folk religion, people who lack, therefore, a sense of
cultural identity. It is this stratum that has contributed greatly to the success of Christian evangelistic activities in recent years. Their lives, based on family and individual ability, show
increasing evidence of Christian influence while, on the other hand, they show decreasing evidence of influence form Confucianism and related traditions.
Another example of a new social influence is that of the while collar stratum, made up of highly educated urban, middle and upper class office workers and executives, civil
servants, educators, and the like. Here too Christian influence is strong. Most of these people live in Western style houses or apartments in exclusive residential districts; both they and
their children tend to have received university-level education either in Korea of abroad. They are proud of belonging to an elite group and of living a modern life, manifest rather clear-
cut attitudes toward Korean culture as a whole, and exhibit confidence and optimism with regard to the future of the R.O.K. Like the ordinary people mentioned above, they have few
ties with traditional culture, many rejecting it categorically. Thus they affirm Christianity and Buddhism as "genuine" religion, view Confucian ancestral rites with indifference as a
matter of "custom," and deny folk religions such as shamanism and community festivals, labeling them "superstition."
Still another example is that of the elite socioeconomic stratum oriented to the economy, technology, and short-range benefits. This stratum is doubtless most closely connected with
the military.
The new life-orientation, then, is taking root not only in the new elite stratum which is based in the city and in industry and which is close to the centers of economic and political
power, but also in the stratum of ordinary people caught up in the pressures of daily life. The spread of this orientation signifies a separation from traditional culture.
2. The critical situation in, and new awareness of, traditional culture
The R.O.K. has yet to undertake a serious critique of Confucianism. It is perhaps distinctive in that it maintains its deep-rooted Confucian traditional while at the same time
promoting urbanization and intensive industrialization. As mentioned above, however, the Confucian life-orientation has become increasingly erratic in the urban situation, thus giving
rise to a growing bifurcation between urban and rural life. Among elderly people of the former yangban class, the sense of crisis is pronounced, but no longer do they seek, on the basis
of Confucianism, to play the active role they did during the period of Japanese dominion. One phenomenon worthy of mention is isshinkyo, a group that emphasizes indigenization as a
way of coping with this crisis, thus calling for a revision of the Confucian way.
In addition to the fact that Confucian scholars have tended to ignore or disparage folk culture apart from Confucianism, members of the new elite stratum of recent years have
tended to deny them as obstacles to modernization. Particularly in connection with the promotion of economic development in the Semaeull movement, cultural phenomena such as
village festivals and shamanistic rites have sometimes come under attack.
The role played by folklorists, who regarded this social climate as a crisis for folk culture and who sought to develop a new appreciation of folk culture and to work for its
modernization, is particularly to be mentioned. As a result of efforts by the Korean Anthropological Society and the Korean Ethnographic Society, a ethnological museum was
established, a national survey of folk customs was undertaken, intangible cultural treasure were sought out and identified, a ethnology convention was held, etc. In such ways a new
awareness of folk culture was promoted, and in the late 1970s this developed into a veritable ethnological boom. Folk entertainments have been a taken up into middle schools and high
schools as extracurricular activities, and originally agricultural music and dance in particular, as a symbol of folk culture, is speading throughout the nation. Again, the study and practice
of masked drama, beginning at Seoul University, rapidly spread to other universities as well, arousing a new spirit among student bodies as a symbol of social solidarity -- at times
issuing in large assemblies and demonstrations. Yet even though activities carried on in relation to ethnology, folk art conventions, and educational institutions have given rise to a new
awareness of, and a new symbolization for, the folk culture legacy, in actual life, community festivals and shamanistic practices, together with many other customs, are rapidly
disappearing. It appears that the folk culture boom continues even as folk culture encounters serious decline.
In addition, some new religious groups propose a positive revaluation of traditional folk beliefs or make use of them in symbolic form. Among such groups, the organizations in the
dankun stream in particular have taken up the cause of ethnic identity and become newly active since the mid-1960s. Several bodies, such as the Dankun Sunenkai, the Kankun Subokai,
the Society for the Commemoration of 4300 Years, the Kenseikai and others, aim at the enhancement of cultural identity through the propagation of dankun faith and the erection of
dankun shrines, but their efforts often fail because of the lack of solidarity among the various groups.
3. The search for the prospect of a synthesis

Traditional Korean society manifested, as Takashi Akiba long ago pointed out, a rather sharp cleavage between the life-orientation of the upper-class yangban and that of ordinary
commoners. The yangban, absolutizing Confucianism, looked down on or ignored folk religion, but the coexistence of the two strata was made possible by their division into two social
ranks. The new life-orientation developed in the cities in connection with the rapid social change of recent years, however, has exercised a profound influence even on agricultural
village society through the Semaeull movement and other media. Members of the rural elite, quick to respond to the modernization and industrialization policy of the central
government, played a leading role in abolishing or discontinuing traditional belief and practice, some in token of symbolic support for modernization, others in token of loyalty to the
Semaeull movement. This resulted, on the one hand, in the diffusion of the Semaeull movement throughout the country as a new spiritual movement and, on the other, in the rapid
destruction of the basis for cultural identity that existed in the traditional culture.
In the Christian world, discussions of indigenization assumed importance beginning in the 1960s, and the some attempts were made to reinterpret the dankun myth and thus to
incorporate it in a positive way. Even today this myth is widely elaborated in a new religious movements, particularly in the Christian stream. Moreover, as may be seen in urban
industrial-mission evangelistic activities and in its grappling with concrete social problems, Korean Christianity has taken on a character of its own; in addition some churches, because,
of the highly nonconformist activities of their pastors, have developed fanatical followers. All in all, Korean Christianity is a phenomenon with many faces.
As for new religious organizations, many advocate the political reunification of northern and southern Korea, the integration of religious world views, the idea of cultural
independence, and a reappraisal and utilization of the dankun myth.
With regard to political leadership, policies such as enhancement of the spirit of the great general (General Yi), reestablishment of the hwarange spirit and the organization of youth,
the Semaeull movement and the like also aim at the integration of the nation. The dankun element is also noteworthy in that under former President Park there was once a plan to erect a
dankun statue in Seoul's Nanzan Park, but because of opposition the plan came to naught.
As for the world of scholarship, attention should be drawn to Korean culture studies (Kankokugaku) that seek the principle of cultural integration in traditional culture. Here the
Institute for the Study of Culture and Spirit is coming to play a central role.
Christianity has played an important part in the rapid social change of recent years and has come to be recognized as a powerful social influence. To neglect it in considering the
social integration of the nation would be quite impossible. At the same time, however, Christianity is undeniably and imported religion. Not only does it lack a foundation in traditional
Korean culture, there is also a wide gap between its life-orientation and that of Confucianism as well as of folk culture. The fissures in the life-orientation of traditional society, because
of urbanization, industrialization, and the spread of Christianity, manifest new gaps and elements of instability. The possibility of synthesizing the two through the development of
effective cultural symbols seems increasingly unlikely. Cultural integration, rather than being based on cultural identity, is more easily achievable on the basis of externally oriental
political symbols such as anti-Communism and anti-Japan, and this background in turn tend to render the long-range cultural-studies approach ineffectual.
TRADITIONAL CULTURES AND MODERNIZATION:

Several Problems in the Case of Japan
HIRAI Naofusa
It is known that modernization, as far as technology and science are concerned, emerged after the Industrial Revolution, which was triggered by the invention of spinning
machinery in England during the late eighteen century. In Japan as well as in other Asian countries modernization has often been confused with Westernization. This is because
modernization, when it occurred in these countries, quite often meant accepting Western culture and resulted in great changes of everyday life. However, Prof. Hideo Kishimoto once
pointed out the difference between modernization and Westernization in the following way.
Westernization would mean that a certain indigenous cultural element of the traditional East is replaced by the penetrating Western element, and the functional role of the
former is taken over by the latter.
Modernization, on the other hand, basically means to remold a cultural system into a new mode.
In the case of Japan, the adoption of Western clothes, food, hair styles and houses can be regarded as a part of Westernization. Although these things gave Japanese people some
convenience and a smell of new culture, the functions they performed were almost the same as those which indigenous substitutes had fulfilled in earlier times. On the other hand, the
introduction of telephones, TV, airplanes, mass communication, bureaucratic institutions, computer control systems and so forth can be considered to be a part of modernization because
they contain the potential for enlarging the spheres of life and broadening one's outlook, and furthermore transform ways of thinking, patterns of behavior and world views. It definitely
means remolding a cultural system into a new form.
This remolding will not always produce good effects such as a dignified style of life and social stability, although it is necessary and indispensable for improving the living
standards of each citizen. This is because introducing western elements into non-Western countries may sometimes cause serious friction and tension with the traditional cultures.
In 1960, scholars from Japan, U.S.A. and other countries gathered at Hakone in Kanagawa Prefecture, and held a conference dealing with various aspects of modern Japan. At the
conference one of the topics was how to define modernization as such. Prof. John W. Hall later pointed out seven characteristics as follows:
1. A comparatively high concentration of population in cities and the increasingly urban-centeredness of the total society.
2. A relatively high degree of use of inanimate energy, the widespread circulation of commodities, and the growth of service facilities.
3. Extensive spatial interaction of members of a society and the widespread participation of such members in economic and political affairs.
4. Widespread literacy accompanied by the spread of secular, and increasingly scientific, orientation of the individual to his environment.
5. An extensive and penetrative network of mass communication.
6. The existence of large-scale social institutions such as government, business, industry and the increasingly bureaucratic organization of such institutions.
7. Increased unification of large bodies of population under one control (nations) and the growing interaction of such units (international relations). *1
Although this list simply enumerates the characteristics, most of them can be applied to Japan's modernization. Following Kiyomi Morioka's views, *2 I myself would like to
understand modernization on three dimensions which are related to each other: (1) technological and economic dimension, i.e., the development of scientific technology, and stable
economic systems which structurally make the development possible; (2) social and political dimension, i.e., the gravitation of the population into large cities, the appearance of
centralized government which facilitates modernization in a more effective way, the increase of governmental activities, such as public investments, and the permeation of bureaucratic
systems as organization principles; (3) the dimension of value-system, i.e., the penetration of the idea of development among the people, rationalism, a strong consciousness of
belonging to a unified nation, and the predominance of universalism emphasizing performance rather than ascription. This ideational dimension is deeply concerned with religious
problems such as the meaning of life and the will to work as well as with secular values.
Traditional culture, if understood in a broad sense, indicates all human activities such as religion, philosophy, moral standards, laws, politics, economic, society, history, literature
and art, such as have been preserved, learned and transmitted in a given community or group over a long period of time. In this paper I shall confine my attention mainly to the religious
traditions of Japan. Focusing upon this point, I shall mention several factors which have supported modernization in Japan, and also try to point out some of the adverse effects brought
about by that same modernization.
Peripherality is probably one of the traits which have contributed to Japan's modernization. Japan is geographically located on the periphery of culturally developed countries such
as China, and has become accustomed to accepting foreign developed cultures. Japanese people have maintained a great interest and curiosity in imported things, including religion and
science. This is why Japanese people never felt any strong resistance against the introduction of Western culture, both spiritual and material.
Emphasis on this-worldliness rather than other-worldliness also worked in favor of modernization in Japan. This emphasis actually means the value-worldly values rather than to
other-worldly ones, and their ideals have to be realized in this world. It is obvious that this value-orientation is dominant in the Shinto tradition, but a more thorough examination is
necessary to determine its origins. In Japanese mythology there is scarcely an account explaining the other world, although some people say that there is one exception. That is the tale of
izanagi-no-mikoto 's visit to Yomi (Hades). This tale, however, concludes with promises of development and prosperity in this world. Shinto does not have any eschatology as such.
Shinto's view of history is a "cyclical type," if we may use Prof. Eliade's terminology. In the Shinto worldview, history permanently repeats itself in a cyclical manner similar to the
agricultural calendar. In Shinto mythology everything is thought to be immature and imperfect at the beginning, and then to become gradually better and better as long as men's
endeavors and the protection of the gods continue. We may call it an optimistic worldview. This tendency did not change even in later periods of Japanese history. According to Mr.
Kunio Yanagita , the hope of common people in Japan after they die is to stay on in this world, to keep spiritual contact with their offspring, and to give them blessings.*3
From the early modern period until the end of World War II, religion and national unity had been maintained quite successfully in Japan. This is represented by the fact that a
tremendous number of Shinto rites and festivals based on the solidarity of natural groups were performed everywhere in Japan. This tradition still exists culturally in the present day, but
it is different in one way or another from pre-war times. Such rites and festivals were performed publicly in pre-war times and in the Meiji period by regional public bodies, whereas this
is not the case nowadays. Thus, the manner in which rites and festivals were performed in pre-war times was traditional in the sense that it had been handed down for many years. In
ancient times there was the Jingi Seido (whereby the nation itself performs rites for gods who protect the people and the nation), and the bakufu and daimyo in the Edo period gave their
support to Shinto festivals. The imperial system has held a central position in Japan since prehistoric times, and has been quite effective in integrating Japanese people in the process of
modernization. Emperors have been not despots and exploiters but figures who mainly controlled the balance of power among competing leaders. Japanese people have not always
maintained as emperor-centered orientation throughout their history. However, without the emperor system and the leadership of Emperor Meiji, Japan would not have been successful
in becoming a modernized country in the Meiji era. Prof. Josefa M. Saniel is quite right in this point. According to Prof. Saniel, modernization in the Meiji period was so sweeping that
large revolts would have occurred in the case of another country. Without the emphasis on chu (loyalty to lords) and ko (final piety) peculiar to the emperor system and family system,
such acute changes in political, such acute changes in political, social and economic systems could not have occurred even in Japan.*4
The high level of education in pre-modern Japan also contributed to rapid modernization. Catholic fathers who came to Japan in the sixteenth century for missionary purposes held
the intellectual ability of the Japanese in great esteem. The philological study of Confucianism was advanced by Sorai Ogyû (1666-1728) earlier than that of the Ch'ing Dynasty
around that time in China. The study of Buddhism by Nakamoto Tominaga (1715-1746) and the study of the Manyô-shû by Keichu (1640-1701) also attained a high level of
scholarship. Tadataka Inô (1745-1818) took measurements for the whold of Japan and made a map of it without using any advanced instruments. The accuracy of his map was confirmed
by the Americans who came to Japan with M. C. Perry in 1853. They carried out their own measurements of the Tokyo Bay with more advanced instruments, the results of which
showed little difference to Inô's map. Through Hirado and Nagasaki, Japan continues to receive various kinds of stimulation of from China and Western countries even during her policy
of seclusion in the Edo period. These factors actually contributed to maintaining a high standard of scholarship in the Edo period, and thus made it possible to translate many Western
technical terms into Japanese in the early Meiji period. The publication of school textbooks in Japanese and the quick growth in the rate of school attendance among the Japanese
contributed immensely to spreading foreign culture and scientific knowledge in Japan. Elementary schools first started in 1872. The percentage of school attendance in 1873 was 28.1%,
and then it rose very quickly to 81.5% in 1900 and 99.0% in 1920. Since 1955 it has remained at 99.9%.
When discussing national identity in indigenous cultures, we must remember that Japanese people have always made a choice or selection among incoming things, and have
maintained a strong stability against the excessive influx of foreign elements, although it is a historical fact that Japanese people have been positive toward accepting foreign cultures.
Japanese classics such as the Kojiki and Nihonshoki probably started to be compiled in the reign of Emperor Tenmu (672-686). This coincides with the time when Japan was
strongly reacting against the introduction of Chinese culture since the Taika Reformation (645). Even when the Japanese adopted the ancient Chinese law system (ritsuryo-sei), they
neither took it as it was nor simply imitated it. In addition to the original system, they introduced elements such as the establishment of the Bureau of Shinto (Jingikan ) and the
prohibition of eating the flesh of animals in case of festivals. According to Prof. Ichiro Ishida, the dividing line in the history of Japanese culture is seen in the middle ages. Prior to the
middle ages, Japanese culture had been fostered and formed by stimulation from foreign cultures. However later probably after the Mongolian invasions (1274 and 1281), the autonomy
of Japanese culture became stronger, although foreign cultural elements were used as a means of expression. It was in the middle ages that new stream of expression. It was in the middle
ages that new stream of Buddhism such as Shin Buddhism and Nichiren Buddhism developed. Genuine Japanese arts such as noh, renga, tea ceremony and flower arrangement
developed, too. In regard to the teachings of Shinto, it was in the middle ages that authentic teachings first appeared in the middle ages that authentic teachings first appeared in the
Shinto tradition. Moreover, it was in the middle of the Edo period (1603-1867) that Kokugaku (National Learning) started. Kokugaku aimed at rejecting the Buddhist and Confucian
bias in Shinto teachings and returning to the spirit of ancient Shinto. In the early Meiji period, there was excessive Westernization and modernization such as represented by the
Rokumeikan. However, after the middle of the Meiji period, a sort of self-modification occurred as a result of a strong sense of balance in Japanese culture, even though it was
accompanied by nationalistic movements. This kind of sense of balance still exists at the bottom of Japanese society even in the post-war period.
Japan rushed her modernization because she had to protect herself from possible colonization by Western countries, and to amend unequal treaties with foreign nations. After the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), namely after the above urgent problems were solved, Japan regrettably started to colonize other countries by limitating Western nations. Japan did it
partly because she had to feed her overflow of population. Yet we must admit the fact that Japan's policy turned out to force neighboring countries to have a hard time. After Manchurian
Incident (1931), national Shinto was quite often manipulated in order to unify the mind of the people. Soon after World War II, the Shinto Directive was issued by the Occupation Army.
It required Japan to initiate a policy of church?state separation. The demand was so severe that there was no parallel even in Western countries. Along with other new policies such as the
reformation of the family system and land system, the Shinto Directive had serious influence upon the promotion of moral education as well as upon Shinto itself. Confucianism
probably suffered more damage than Shinto did. As time went on, however, something traditional gradually revived. This is not because conservative and reactionist groups have
manipulated this change but probably because the people have tried to revise the lines along which modernization went too far.
Modernization as such is said to be an everlasting process without any terminal point. However we should question what Japanese people have actually acquired from the
modernization which started at the end of the Edo era. Certainly our lives have become much more affluent, convenient and comfortable than ever before. On the other hand, material
fulfillment and the expediency of life have invited the alienation of man. Moreover, world-wide problems such as economic gaps among nations, overpopulation, starvation, draining of
resources, nuclear armament, human rights, and environmental pollution have emerged. Many advanced counties including Japan must bear some responsibility for this in one way or
another. A group of scholars consisting mainly of members of the Club of Rome, maintains that man must change the quality of his life style in order to survive; otherwise human beings
will inevitably cease to exist. There are several requirements for surviving in the future. (1) Reducing the accelerating increase of production and consumption, (2) replacing the logic of
growing and developing by a logic of stability and harmony, and (3) halting the search for material abundance and seeking a life style by which man can be satisfied with things mental
and spiritual.
With the rapid development of scientific civilization we are faced with several problems common to all human races. How can all nations establish coexistence and coprosperity?
How can man maintain harmony with nature and how can man protect his dignity? We should tackle these problems together by going beyond ethnic and national backgrounds, because
the problems are related to the whole earth itself rather than to only individual nations. Man must try to solve them by uniting all nations into one spiritual community with a common
destiny. Whereas development as such should be carried out only in developing countries, it is the responsibility of the developed nations to change the quality of life. This endeavor
should be always accompanied by the quest of how human beings can be human. At the same time each country should review its own traditions and discover new meanings in the
traditional ways of life. People formerly led simple and humble lives, following their faith and conscience. It is in this sphere that traditional culture will be able to contribute to the
modernization process of each nation.
Like other cultural traditions in the East, Japanese traditional culture has placed great value upon the harmonious coexistence of man and nature. Looking at present Japan, however
it is clear that all Japanese at present do not necessarily preserve the traditional worldview. Moreover, we have many instances of environmental pollution in Japan. We should seriously
consider why this has happened. When we Japanese aim at forming a new spiritual and cultural world community, we need new ethnical standards appropriate for this. For example, we
need to transform "ingroup-counsciousness," which is said to be one of the characteristics of the Japanese people. That is to say, we need new social ethics by which we care not only for
the people within a limited group but also for all others as well. Otherwise it will be impossible for the Japanese to be seriously engaged in solving global issues. In order to do this, the
most expedient way will be to educate the people in that direction.
It is said that man is a child of history, society and culture. Even if modernization is necessary to improve human life, it will be indispensable for Eastern nations to maintain their
traditional cultures too. Traditional cultures need neither to reject modernization nor to be absorbed in the streams of modernization. These two must harmonize and complement each
other. Now is the time for each nation to seek its own individual and unique way of modernization.
Notes:
*1 John W. Hall, `Changing Conception of the Modernization of Japan,'ed. Marius B. Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization, 1965, Princeton Univ. Press,
p.19.
*2 Kiyomi Morioka, `Industrialization and Shinto,' ed. Organizing Committee of the Second International Conference for Shinto, Continuity and Change in Shinto, 1968, Institute
for Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin Univ.
*3 Kunio Yanaghita, Senzo no Hanashi (The Tales of Ancestors), in The Collected Works of Yanaghita Kunio, vol. 19, 1962, Chikuma-Shobo, Tokyo.
*4 Josefa M. Saniel, `The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the Modernization of Japan,' ed. Robert Bellah, Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, 1965, Free Press, New York.
Summary of Discussions: SESSION B

NAGAFUJI Takeshi
The countries of Asia have traditional cultures with long histories in religion, arts, and scholarship. How are these cultures to be evaluated within the context of modernization and
how are they being continued and developed? This session, which was to focus on a concrete discussion of these issues, opened with some explanatory comments by the three speakers.
In general, these comments were comprehensive in scope, suggesting the issues to be considered rather than adding details to the papers.
First, Mr. E. Kuo reported on the attempts to harmonize tradition and modernization in the pluralistic Singaporean society, Singapore is a society of immigrants, pluralistic in terms
of ethnicity (Chinese, Malay, Indian, etc.), religion (Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, etc. -- Confucianism is excluded since it is bourgeosified and is noted a Confucianism of the
national establishment), and language (four national languages and many ethnic languages). It is also a city-state with high population density.
Economically, a strong propensity towards secularization is conducive to modernization. At the same time, the weakening of traditional roots has fostered spiritual nihilism and
epicureanism; the response has been as expansion of religious and moral education. In the schools it is necessary to choose a course in one of the world religions for study -- Buddhism,
Islam, Hindu, or Christianity -- and Confucianism is also systematically included as part of the curriculum. This is a revitalization of traditional culture and religion in the interests of
social and political unification; as such it is a highly significant experiment in which it should be possible to gauge the ability of a pluralistic city-state to arrive at a reconciliation of the
tradition/modernization dilemma.
Next, Mr. Abito Ito discussed the case of Korea, a country which differs from Singapore and which is a rarity among the countries of the world in being ethnically homogeneous
and in maintaining an intimate tie between political unification and the traditional value system. Korea's traditional culture is unique in having a two-layered structure. The "little-
tradition" has consisted of native folk beliefs while the "great-traditions" of Buddhism and Confucianism have been actively and continuously introduced. In addition, Confucianism has
yet to face a telling criticism, and social relations based on blood-ties are still a firmly entrenched principle. Since the 1960's, however, because of industrialization and urbanization,
characterized by the movement of people from the villages to the great cities, there has been a conspicuous tendency for the masses to be cut off from both the traditions of
Confucianism and folk belief. At present, Christianity is witnessing rapid growth, and some hold the optimistic belief that Christianity can alleviate the estrangement from tradition and
stem the moral decline. However, it is problematic whether something without cultural roots can be an adequate substitute, and the weakening of the two traditional cultures is in itself a
grave problem.
Third, Mr. Naofusa Hirai proposed to discuss the situation in Japan. He approached the subject of modernization from three levels -- technology, society and polity, and ideas -- and
listed the main factors conducive to Japan's modernization: peripherality, this-worldly centeredness, the high degree of national integration, the spread of education, and cultural
independence. After outlining the failure of colonial policy, the damage to traditional culture and moral views caused by defeat in the Second World War, and economic recovery, all of
which followed the achievement of a certain degree of modernization, he proposed that the issue for today do not concern Japan alone, but are global problems centering on the
advanced nations, In short, he emphasized the importance of transforming the quality of life towards spiritual fulfillment, the coexistence and co-prosperity of mankind, harmonious
existence with nature, the overcoming of in-groupness, and the preservation of the dignity of humanity.
The remarks of the commentators, following those of the panelists, were for the most part directed to the contents of the speaker's papers.
First, Mr. R. Bellah, while affirming Max Weber's thesis that the core concept in modernization is rationality, addressed Mr. Hirai's paper. He pointed out that one of the problems
facing Asia is how to distinguish between modernization and Westernization. Modernization as the pursuit of rationality certainly did not begin in the 19th century, but is as old as the
history of humankind. In the West, modernization has introduced many new things, but at the same time it has come to destroy Western culture itself. For Asia if it is necessary to choose
between Westernization and modernization, Westernization probably has a richer potential in human terms. Indeed, the most brilliant products of Japanese cultural history -- the
literature of Natsume Soseki, the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, and the revival of Shinran's teachings -- appeared when the effects of the inclusion of Western culture were felt in their
most pure form. Thus, the integration of Western culture led to the further development of Japanese culture.
With regard to Mr. Ito's paper, Mr. Bellah expressed an interest in the recent popularity of folk culture in Korea, but he wondered whether this was not a museumification of culture;
whether a culture living in the real everyday world was being treasured or whether it was just in the books of scholars.
With regard to Mr. Kuo's paper, Mr, Bellah expressed an interest in the possibility of the continued coexistence of the official language, English, and the traditional indigenous
languages.
Next, Ms. Chie Nakane considered the characteristics of the three countries dealt with in the papers from the point of view that they are all societies in the Chinese cultural sphere
of East Asia. All three countries are societies which are this-worldly centered, have not traditionally experienced the infusion of a strong religion into the center of society, and have a
strong bureaucratic tradition. Of course there are differences among these nations, but the similarities are remarkable. In this regard also, in the case of Singapore, where the Chinese
ethnic group comprises two-thirds of the population, there is some reason to question the low estimation of the traditional Chinese element in Singaporean culture just because there was
no migration of the elite stratum. Culture should be considered as a whole, and it is not possible to distinguish between the elites and the lower strata. Further, it is necessary to consider
that culture also has a dimension which is not on a conscious level; on this level, there is no need to be concerned that culture has weakened or has been lost. In this way, she raised the
issue of the cultural level dealt with in the three papers.
The final commentator, Mr. Chang Chukeun focused his comments on his doubts concerning Mr. Ito's paper and recent trends in Korea. He felt that Mr. Ito's views overemphasized
the sense of crisis concerning the discontinuity of traditional culture. This may seem to be the case when compared with the extremely simple religious situation in Japan (non-
antagonistic coexistence of Shinto and Buddhism and an insignificant number of Christians), but the actual circumstances in Korea differ greatly. There is great diversity with Buddhism,
Confucianism, and Christianity on an equal level, and a complicated mixture of folk beliefs. Thus it is not possible to speak in sweeping terms about the weakening of traditional culture.
Especially since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a reconsideration of the new movements of the 1970s and the policies for rapid economic growth. Out of this has arisen a
significant movement which recognizes traditional culture anew and which aims for the development of both modernization and tradition. An institute for the promotion of culture and
the arts has been established and there is a vigorous national trend to preserve and study folk culture. He thus suggested that the discontinuity of traditional culture is not going to be such
a major problem.
The responses of the speakers to these comments were extremely concrete.
Mr. Kuo stated that the parallel existence of English and the ethnic languages in Singapore was a political policy and that the question of levels would be maintained in the future.
Also, though it is true that the influence of Chinese culture is great, so is that of Malay, and simplification is not possible. Moreover, he counterargued that these ought to be considered
"little traditions."
Mr. Ito emphasized that while it is certainly true that the non-conscious level of a cultural tradition is important, in Korea the symbols unifying the level of political consciousness
are great. The dimension which raises to consciousness and conceptualizes this political consciousness, causes the fear of the destruction of tradition. He asserted that while this may be
the view from Japan, optimism and anxiety are two corresponding aspects which are inherently unstable.
Mr. Hirai raised the issue of value standards with regard to the evaluation which determines that the most fruitful products of Japanese cultural history were spawned by
Westernization. He added that a cultural tradition should not be considered only on the conscious level; it is necessary to consider what has been lost, what remains, and what has
changed on various levels.
Following this, there were questions from the floor and responses. Mr. Noriyoshi Tamaru introduced the issue of using the categories of particularism and universalism in dealing
with the theme of tradition and modernization. Mr. Minoru Sonoda raised question of whether the Korean government's policy of preserving folk culture might not actually have the
effect of stifling the ability and efforts at self-support by the local communities, and whether this might invite the skeletonization of culture. However, the limitations of time precluded a
through discussion.
This was due to the fact that in the second half, when the individual reports for the respective countries had opened up the possibility of a comparative inquiry, the chairperson,
hoping to move further in this direction, appropriated time for Mr. Berger to propose some special issues.
Mr. Berger made two proposals. Although modernization without tradition is meaningless, to continue tradition in its entirety is impossible. The issue common to each country is
thus, how to mix these two in an appropriate manner. Therefore, (1) in concrete terms, what elements of tradition should be selected, supported and recovered? And (2) for this purpose,
how is institutionalization to be carried out and who is to take responsibility?
In response, Mr. Hirai answered that for Japan, it is plausible to conceive of a Japanese "great tradition," a system of values based on Shinto and a Japanized Buddhism and
Confucianism. This base ought to be maintained and developed. As for the contents of this value system, one can mention, for example, an initimacy with nature, an association with
groups, a view that there is a plurality of truths, a true heart, a sincere heart, etc. As for the question of institutionalization, it is proper that the masses be the actors; but from the
principles of democracy it would be unnatural if the government did not participate.
Mr. Chang Chukeun stated that as a folklorist he would tend to stress folk culture. However, the majority of the Korean people probably wish to preserve what they consider to be
the fine and good customs of Confucianism. He felt that his view that is was necessary to recreate Confucian ethics in order to bring out the potential of folk tradition, was that of a
minority. As to who would assume charge of institutionalization, he maintained that no generalizations could be made.
Mr. Madan of India stated that the question itself was one that had been asked for over 2000 years without ever having achieved a clear answer. Thus a ready and simple answer is
not possible. It is only possible to contemplate the words of one Sri Lankan: "The only possible to contemplate the words of one responsibility, a critical spirit consistent with self-
awareness, and the courage to accept."
Mr. Pinit of Thailand emphasized Buddhist values and those cultural values which overlap in some ways with but are not necessarily identical to Buddhist values; that is, the value
of freedom. The value of individualism, the maintenance of a harmonious attitude toward nature, the idea of respect for the elderly, and the importance of activism. In order to realize
these values, all of the people of the nation must take part together.
The remarks of Mr. Mendoza of the Philippines were less a response to the question than a comment upon the nature of the question itself. He stated that this sort of question
disregards the fact that we may not even be alive in twenty years and asks what we will be doing at that time. It is only possible to respond by indicating what values are being sought in
the Philippines today and what direction we are striving toward.
Mr. Kuo's reaction was similar. In the first place, is it really possible for us to select particular elements from tradition; and even if so will we be successful? As a social scientist I
cannot help but feel a great uneasiness in responding to this question.
Finally, Mr. Bellah pointed out that it was unrealistic to conceive of the culture of a country as unique and then only to attempt to select and institutionalize certain elements from
within that culture. The current age is one in which all cultural traditions are being threatened. It is precisely now that we must ask what it means to live as true human beings. He argued
that for this purpose it is necessary to consider how to control nuclear weapons and the mechanisms of the industrial economy, as represented by the appearance of robots which alienate
and tend to dominate.
The question posed by Mr. Berger moved a step beyond abstract discussion. Perhaps it should be considered as having encouraged the resolute proclamation, in concrete terms, of
the sort of selective action which should be taken from the standpoint of the people of the respective countries today. But the responses of the representatives of the respective Asian
countries were not necessarily simple and clear. This was perhaps a matter of course; and the expression of doubt concerning the question itself, puts into relief the extreme difficulty of
selective action for those who live within traditional cultures today. In this regard, the further recognition that this problem is not to be handled simply within the theoretical framework
of tradition and modernity, but it is a question which bears directly on life itself, is of great significance.
CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MODERNIZATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES:

Some Indian Questions Soliciting Japanese Answers
Triloki N. MADAN
I would like to begin by asking way this question about cultural identity in the context of modernization arises at all. One answer is that it arises from the manner in which we
characterize "modernization" -- or the core of the process of modernization -- as use of science and technology to solve problems of everyday life. To achieve this successfully, we also
need to formalize work and to cultivate modern value orientations, leading to the emergence of a new kind of person -- the `modern man'. The transfer of scientific and technological
know-how from the West to other parts of the world is considered to be more or less successful to the extent to which appropriate cultural changes -- that is institutional and value
changes -- have occurred in the "recipient" country. Whether we like it or not, modernization has been a secondary process in the non-Western world -- it has been the effort to reenact
the history of Europe in other parts of the world -- it has been, in effect, Westernization. Failure to modernize and breakdown of the process of modernization process have been
attributed to adverse cultural milieus. This was, indeed, how the British explained the poverty and economic backwardness of their Indian Empire which made them so rich. India was
said to be poor and backward because of other-worldly religions, stagnant village communities, a rigid caste system, the joint family, irrational attitudes to cattle, and so on. The paradox
though is that modern Indian culture is in some ways more Westernized than modern Japanese culture; and Japan is, in Ezra Vogel's words, "Number One."
The Japanese experience in indeed very instructive, because you have become a front rank industrial nation, pushing back England, the original home of the industrial revolution,
and other leading industrial nations, and you have done so without abandoning your cultural heritage, including many institutions, attitudes, and values. The earlier Western puzzlement
about Japanese traditional methods of decision-making about matomari and ringo-shi have given place to expressions of serious interest and respect for them. In fact, Japan gave a big
and deadly blow to the smugness of the tradition-versus-modernity view of the contemporary world. The Indian observer marvels at how comfortably you live in two cultural world --
that of traditional Japan and that of modern science and technology.
Now, how came this difference between Japan and India? It is said that a battle in the plains of Bengal in 1757, called the Battle of Plassey, laid the foundations of British imperium
in India. It has also been said that better-made buns and better-sold textiles enabled the British to capture Indian militarily and economically. I would like to suggest that for India the
battle was lost when in 1606 a Jesuit missionary, Roberto de Nobili, moved around in the ancient Hindu city of Madurai, dressed as a Brahman (Hindu priest), possessing knowledge of
Hindu culture, but preaching Christianity. We lost our souls well before our territory or markets. Ultimately, all the processes were unified.
India modernized under the aegis of colonialism. The compulsion to modernize was external. The British did whatever they did to serve their interests first and only then, if at all,
the interests of Indians. The railways and industry, in which Karl Marx put such enormous faith, arrived in India, but the nuts and bolts came from England. It was, however, the
educational system which the British introduced in the country, to produce loyal, admiring the efficient servants of the empire, which influenced the worst cultural wounds. Before this
educational system came to flower, highly gifted and self-educated Indians gave expression to the shizophrenia which British rule and the cultural impact of the West had produced. On
the one hand, they admired the achievement of Western civilization; on the other, they resented the ignorance and arrogance that characterized the dismissal by the British of the cultural
heritage of India -- particularly the Hindu and Buddhist elements in it. Consequently, admiration of the contemporary Western civilization was combined with an idealization of the past.
Indian nationalism was grounded in both Western political philosophy and Indian history. Feelings of inferiority and defeat were sought to be removed by accepting the challenge of
modernization. In the process a split occurred in the consciousness of these early modern Indian intellectuals: in a sense its authenticity and the authenticity of a response to the impact of
the West was damaged.
If I may now turn again to Japan -- and I must apologize for my presumptuousness, for I know so very little -- what strikes me as the most outstanding feature of Japanese encounter
with the West is the consciousness that characterized the choices that were made. The West did not invade or conquer Japan; it was, as it were, invited to Japan. Your choices regarding
what to borrow and what to emulate point to practical rather than philosophical or civilizational concerns. The model for the navy was British; the model for the army was first French
and then German; the model for the educational system was American; and so on. The eclecticism is striking, and far beyond anything such attempted or achieved in India. There were
evaluations made, judgements about superiority and inferiority, but there was no sense of defeat or of being overwhelmed as in India. Your tradition of absorbing from foreign lands was,
of course, a thousand years old: Chinese knowledge had found expression in Japanese applications since the 8th century A.D. Erwin Baelz, a German doctor who worked in the Tokyo
Medical School, and who was one of the first European scholars to give detailed impressions of Japan in its early years of modernization, wrote in the ninth year of Meiji (1876) that the
cultured Japanese were ashamed of their past. He recorded being told: " We have no history; our history beings today." What is important is, it seems to me, that this was a Japanese
judgement about Japan? not comparable to the British judgement of Indian cultural traditions. It follows that your enthusiasm for the West and for the products of western culture,
though almost total, was of a fundamentally different character from that of modern Indians, for we felt ourselves on the defensive and thus being pushed in contrary directions, viz.
modernism and traditionalism. It may also be noted that I have used the expression "products of Western culture": this is important. The value-orientation and the reference groups
remained Japanese.
All this is true and, as a contrast to India, instructive. But you too have had the strongest misgivings about the impact of the West. The reaction was, however, aesthetic and moral,
not religious and political as in India -- or so it seems to us in India. Modernization was indeed seen by its Japanese critics as destructive of a whole way of life. This critical judgement
was perhaps best expressed, though not internationally, by the manner in which you ignored European languages. This seems very important to me and deserves close attention. What I
am suggesting is, whether it is likely that you shut out European categories of thought by continuing to live in the thought and value worlds of the Japanese tongue?
Your literary and artistic expressions of the critical attitude toward Western culture have been persistent. I am reminded here of the minor English classic, The Book of Tea, by
Kakuzo Okakura, published in 1906, the late 19th century aesthetician. To an Indian it appears to be a veiled and poignant critique of modernization through an exposition of the tea
ceremony as an expression of the Japanese tradition which is held out to the West as something to admire. The emphasis is no the positive ideal of aethetic tranquility -- a quality in the
Eastern traditions which the West found deplorable. Remember all that rigmarole about Eastern mysticism and quietism, about other-worldliness and lack of achievement. He wrote; "In
religion the future is behind us. In art the present is the eternal." Kindly note that he said nothing about the future, that is about modernization, except the fundamental criticism of it
which is so subtly concealed in the observation about "art" and "the present."
I might also mention here Inazo Nitobe's work Bushido, the Soul of Japan, published in 1905, which eulogized the samurai way of life, the samurai ethic. It is a book which has
continued to sell in thousands of copies in Japan since it first came out. The copy of the book I personally possess is form the 79th edition (1979) and I find that 13 editions had been put
out in the previous ten years. What I am trying to convey here is that your attachment to a medieval value system, which is regarded as the quintessence of the Japanese world view, in
the midst of your very impressive achievements as a modern industrial nation of the front rank -- this attachment is not nostalgia -- it is not empty romanticism or escapism -- it perhaps
gives expression to something that animates contemporary Japan and is unaffected by modernization. The Kyoko historian Aida Yuji has spoken -- not wistfully but confidently and
joyously -- of the ever-strengthening regression of the present-day Japanese into Japanese-ness.
The confidence and the joy I just mentioned are perhaps more characteristic of the older generation than of the younger. There are young intellectuals who have, perhaps, their
doubts and anxieties, their second thoughts, about the present state of Japanese society and culture. Two best-sellers in Japan in the late 1970s were, I was told during a visit to Tokyo in
1979, Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One, and -- kindly mark this -- John Kenneth Galbraith's Age of Uncertainty. I wish we could find out more about the readership of these two
books. Is there a split in the consciousness? Of whom exactly? Of how many? Is the cultural schizophrenia, which I said afflicted the Indian intellectuals in the late 19th century, making
its appearance in Japan?
You are, it seems to me, opening yourselves increasingly to foreign influences in areas of life that had earlier remained relatively protected. Simultaneously, you are seeking a new
place of honor and influence in world politics. The products of Japanese industry are known and admired all over the world but you yourselves are still relatively less known than, say,
the Americans. Since 1974 when the Japanese Government allowed Japanese tourists to go abroad freely, the Japanese presence has, however, become visible more than before.
What seems equally important to me is what is happening in Japanese scholarly circles. You are seeking closer ties with scholars elsewhere and, as a means to this, you are speaking
and writing in English and, to a lesser extent, in other languages. A young Japanese social scientist specializing on South Asia, told me in 1979 that he had written a review of a major
work on India, by a senior Japanese scholar, in which he had criticized the senior colleague for writing his magnum opus in Japanese and not in English. Now, this must be very unusual
-- I mean both the nature of the criticism and the manner of its expression. I am reminded of a conversation in1972 with a distinguished Japanese scholar, also a specialist on India; I
complained to him that his excellent work was not available to us Indians because he wrote in Japanese. His gentle reply -- it was also a rebuke -- was that he wrote for those who read
Japanese. But attitudes seem to be changing. And my question is: Will this drive or decision to have an impact abroad, to communicate better, to cultivate intercultural dialogues, to write
in English and other foreign languages -- will all this weaken Japneseness? Is there a cultural identity crisis in the making for you? Or, is another scenario in the process of preparation?
Writing in Asahi Shimbun recently, a Japanese commentator, Toshio Aoki, pointed out that Japanese was increasingly being spoken in the foreign offices and shopping centers of
Western countries. He then cautioned that when a "local" language becomes an "international medium," the risk of "big-power mentality" taking shape is also present.
Now in India, we have had the crisis about cultural identity with us for centuries; but it acquired a new form and content following the encounter with the West. It is in this context
that the dilemmas of a man like Jawaharlal Nehru appear poignant and the challenge hurled at the Western civilization by Mahatma Gandhi becomes a major historical event. It is not the
content of this challenge which is so important as the intention -- a repudiation of the basic premises of the industrial civilization -- and the mode of expression. A Japanese historian,
Minoru Kasai, in his published lecture on Gandhi and the contemporary world, has pointed out that Gandhi is as relevant to Japan in her present predicament as he has been and
continues to be India in hers. In fact, Kasai emphasizes the universal import of Gandhi's vision.
I may conclude by referring to a wise book, Japanese Culture, by the Japanese anthropologist, Eiichiro Ishida, published in 1974, in which he cautions against any oversimplified
notions about intercultural understanding. He says that there would always be a residue of Japanese culture that would remain inaccessible to the Europeans, and vice versa. The same
would apply to an Indo-Japanese cultural dialogue also. Will you ever quite get at the roots of our preoccupation with religion? And will we ever get hold of the mainsprings of your
pragmatism? But India also said that, though difficult, intercultural understanding is worth striving for. The common element in the Japanese and Indian experience of the last hundred
years or so has been our encounter with the West. Maybe we have significant things to tell each other about this experience -- about the agonies of refashioning cultural identity. Hence
the great importance of the theme of this symposium.
SOME NOTES ON THE HUMANITIES AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Pinit RATANAKUL
Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia which has never been under imperialistic Western power, and has been a nation with its own unique language and culture for more
than 700 years. Thus, until recently the problem of national-culturral identity, which has been found among decolonized Third World countries in Asia and Africa, was not its principal
concern. Thai consciousness of its national identity has been recently awakened as a result of being threatened by the increasingly pervasive and intrusive materialistic (technological)
values brought about by modern mass media, by modernization, which the Thai government has enthusiastically undertaken, and by the introduction of Western technical and economic
organization into Thai traditional society. * In the West, traditional and cultural values are, paradoxically, less vulnerable to the materialism of contemporary economic organization,
partly because of the very gradual emergence of the modern economic system from the matrix of the cultures of Western society. There has been time for an adaptment and an
accommodation of traditional cultures within the modern framework. On the contrary, in developing countries like Thailand, traditional cultures have existed in continuity with modern
economic values and the associated behavior patterns, and they are, in consequence, more vulnerable. The spread of social change renders an adjustment of traditional cultures even
more precarious. Thus, at the present time in Thailand there is an urgency to cultivate amore acute awareness of our distinctive cultural values as a counterbalance to the undesirable
result of the materialistic values which have emerged as a consequence of economic development.
For Thailand, national-cultural identity is neither cultural uniformity nor the affirmation of the culture of the majority over that of the minority. Individual cultures are considered as
belonging to a definable collectivity or the nation. Thus, in the Thai context, to be concerned with national identity means to be concerned with the pluralistic indigenous cultures of
different groups within Thai society. The knowledge of these cultures is necessary to foster a sense of national identity as well as to facilitate modernization in the country. After a period
of trial and error it is now recognized that the traditional cultures of a people have an important bearings on social development, individual motivation and economic attitudes and
performance. They condition people's receptivity to new ideas, to social planning, to medical programs and civic and public behavior. An understanding of the traditional cultures of
economic planning, for the implementation of projects in medicine and public health, and for the maintenance and improvement of public welfare. There is little point in making large
expenditures on social and medical planning intended to produce social welfare, if, in the process, people become distressed by the disruption caused to the way of life by the planners
who are insensitive to the cultural aspects of everyday life.
As a result of this awareness, more emphasis is now being placed on study and research of the traditional cultures of different groups, particularly those in the rural areas.
At this time, Thailand is deeply concerned to tap its own cultural resources to domesticate modernization and to nurture national resilience. In this connection the humanities are
called upon to help. The turn to the humanities seems inarguably necessary. After all, which among all the professions is more directly concerned with the human cultural heritage than
the humanities? Though the study of these humanistic disciplines, students are made aware of the existence of cultural pluralism and can appreciate and identify themselves with their
own unique cultural heritage. Thai universities have been the highest transmitters of Western culture in Thai society. In order for the universities to produce valuable graduates who are
not entirely intellectual imitators and disciples of the West, alienated from their own cultural heritage, Thai universities, which were based on one or more Western models, must
reexamine their humanities programs, the contents of their courses, and permit indigenous cultures in Thai society to penetrate more into the universities curricula. Only in this way can
the humanities be the preservers and transmittors of national culture. The emphasis on indigenous cultures, however, does not mean that Western cultures should be completely
disregarded. Western culture and other civilizations (eg. Chinese, Indian and Islamic) are to be studied as one part of the total human heritage. We can learn much more from these
pluralistic cultures. In a sense, every culture can be, in some degree, an illuminating critique of our own life, and lead to greater and more creative self-understanding. However, in
keeping Western culture as an ingredient of the humanities, every effort must be made not to create a kind of cultural dependency at the universities as well as to prevent the students
from being uncritical, imitative and passive consumers of Western knowledge.
As preservers and transmitters of national culture, many colleges and universities in Thailand have been including Thai pluralistic indigenous cultures in their programs of study
and research with the belief that this systematic, objective and ethnically neutral study of these cultures will enable one to acquire a serious understanding of one's own culture. Folk
cultures and folk crafts have become an important part of the humanities curricula. At the same time, Thai dance and music are given a new legitimacy in many colleges. This adds a
new richness to Thai aesthetic experience. In addition, cultural exhibitions and the sending of local dancing troupes to promote interest in local indigenous cultures are usual activities of
many colleges in the province. This endeavor helps to deepen the life experience of folk communities in rural areas. The promotion of traditional arts and crafts, and the folkways of
different groups, enhances the worth and identity of local indigenous cultures, the best of Thai national culture. To enable students to make use of the vital resources of the past for the
clarification of the present, the teaching of national history is now being reemphasized in the humanities program at all colleges. The students are encouraged to be proud of their
ancestors and to be aware of their own traditional and national characteristics. The study of the past helps one to realize the capacity of the people to survive even in a rapidly changing
world. Some colleges have begun the teaching of oral literature. Further progress can be made including more effective utilization of the oral literature, duly transcribed as an
introduction to the pre-literary creativity of Thai society.
Since language is one of the main cultural factors that fosters a sense of national identity, the humanities will not properly preserve and transmit national culture unless it is
concerned with the study and research in the national languages. In Thailand the chief national language is Thai. This language has been the primary medium of instruction at all schools,
colleges and universities. In spite of this fact, many Thai university graduates are not quite competent in using their native language to make effective communication. It is now thought
that Thai should be studied at an advanced level by all undergraduates ---regardless of the field -- so that they are able to use this language to cope with a wide range of intellectual
discourse. It is also recognized that as a part of Thai culture, the language of Thai Muslims should also receive acknowledgement in the educational syllabi of schools, colleges and
universities alongside the Thai language.
All these linguistic and cultural studies help to promote considerably more interest in Thai indigenous cultures by devoting themselves to the promotion of Thai culture. The
colleges cease to be the high priests of Western civilization and instead become the transmitters of the wealth of the past and the focus of the regeneration of the traditional values. This
helps to balance the weight of the impact of Western values on Thai culture, and therefore fosters a greater sense of national-cultural identity. The emphasis on the study of the
indigenous cultures allows the particular creativity of these groups to find expression and appreciation with in the context national culture.
Apart from preserving and transmitting national cultures, the humanities in Thailand are involved with the formation of personal character and values in accordance with national
ideals. Morality and ethics have always been the concern of the humanities. Hence in the period of the reconstruction of the nation, the humanities are essential in fostering national
ideals and aspiration. Desired Thai national characteristics such as tolerance, freedom, flexibility, receptivity, integrity, loyalty to communal goals and commitment to national purposes
are exalted, while rugged individualism and irresponsibility in personal behavior are condemned.
In Thailand, the humanities are not only important in the preservation of cultural heritage but also play a significant role in the re-interpretation and criticism of the national culture.
These two functions of the humanities are necessary if we want the humanities to be more than a mere reservoir of the cultural past. There are many ways in which the humanities can
make themselves vital and creative resources for coping with the new challenges of modernity. A culture is dynamic and needs re-interpretation whenever a new historical situation
arises. The humanities should therefore re-interpret cultural resources in the light of new situations. Only by this way can we make creative use of traditional cultures and can these
cultures survive in the face of new challenges and the stress and strain that accompany them.
It is now well recognized in Thailand that the interaction of culture and a new situation engenders a need for new interpretation of that culture. This is in the case of the tension
between religion and modernization. In Thailand, for example, there is an apparent conflict between Buddhist values, which are the badge of national-cultural identity of the country, and
the secular values, which have accompanied modernization. For example, detachment and other-worldliness as opposed to engagement and this-worldliness, contentment (non-
acquisition or satisfaction with what one possesses or obtains) and the enjoyment of non-compulsive or non-acquisitive life as opposed to the materialism of aggressive restless (and
never satisfied) acquisitiveness. In order for Buddhism to remain a powerful and cultural force in the formation of Thai national identity, the tradition must re-fashion itself but in ways
which are characteristically Buddhist. This is happening in present-day Thailand. Buddhist scholars are placing emphasis on the this-worldly concern of the tradition. The Buddhist ideal
of detachment is translated into disinterestedness (unselfish public concern and services) and a dispassionate mode of action that will provide unemotional but not indifferent solutions to
political and social problems. Non-violence is reinterpreted to imply less exploitation and destructiveness as far as the environment and natural resources are concerned as well as non-
aggressiveness and tolerance in personal relations. All these re-interpretations are efforts to enable traditional cultures to give meaning to man in a new situation.
The critical function of the humanities distinguishes them from other disciplines. Unlike other fields, the humanities are self-critical. They can help to cultivate a critical habit of
thought in the students. In regard to the very concept of national-cultural identity, the humanities can bring clarification and therefore be able to select what from the past is essential and
viable to preserve and transmit to the future. Thanks to the critical spirit of the humanities, Thai traditional cultural values are now being re-examined and assessed much more than in
the past. For example, Thai individualism is not the rugged individualism that is found in many societies, for it is not completely divorced from a sense of collective responsibility. Many
studies of this characteristic have shown that it is combined with the pattern of cooperation in the necessary task of the village life which is pragmatic, workable and reliable.
Similarly, the content of the humanities in developing countries cannot exclude entirely the cultural values of the West. But the humanities can assimilate them through their critical
function, in a selective and constructive manner. This selective assimilation of Western cultural values in keeping with the central core of belief and precept of a country will do more to
protect against the uncritical massive appropriation of them than will the complete rejection that had been tried in some Third World countries. Here a distinction must be made between
the value of the modernization and the Western context in which many of them first originated. We do not want to have a Westernized Thai who keeps up with the latest fashion and
other superficial aspects of Western life, parroting his Western peers but picking up not the best from the West but its trash. We want to have a Thai who can live with personal integrity
and unalienated from his cultural roots but in the world where the forces of modernity and communication between people are more and more creating an international community and
culture. The clock cannot be turned back: science, technology, industrialization, economic interdependence and cultural exchange cannot be stopped.
Despite their importance, the significance of the humanities are often unappreciated by many of the young people in Thailand. Many of these people choose the sciences and related
subjects over the humanities. This preference rests on the fact that this choice will provide access to more prestigious and well-paying occupations. This habit of mind which shrinks
from the humanities is in conformity with a general attitude that has long prevailed in the West, the impact of an uncritical acceptance of scientific reason and technological values. Apart
from this, one may also argue that the question of relevance of the humanities to young people arises today because so many professors of humanities do not really believe in the value
of the humanities they are teaching. They do not believe that they are teaching an absolutely important subject. If one really believes that the humanities are significant, it is easy to show
young people that the humanities are indeed so. The students then will have little problem in understanding and accepting the humanities as such. One should not be much concerned
with the number of the students who study the humanities. History has shown that it only takes a small group to have an enormous effect on social and cultural change. If we could have
a certain number of good teachers and students who are the true believers in the humanities, these disciplines could once again reclaimed their prestigious place in the academic world.
Where can these truly dedicated teachers of high calibre and good concerned students be found? That is the problem to be solved only by the academic world today.
Note:
*The impact of technological values on Thai culture has been considerable. In a land where non-killing had been one of the highest values, the use of pesticides is increasing in
agriculture for economic advantages. Mass education using Western model system is widespread. It has introduced the idea that education is primarily for the purpose of employment
which immediately follows schooling. The list of areas in which Western cultural values have effected Thai culture is extensive. In addition to these lists it includes housing, methods of
transport, communication, administration, food patterns, games, clothing, music, agriculture and the family.
THE HUMANITIES AND NATIONALIDENTITY:

The Case of Korea
RYU Tongshik
Introduction
Efforts to establish a sense of national identity received new urgency under the pressures created by modernization and the influx of Western culture. Movements to foster national
culture and research related to national culture have come about as a result of such efforts. In the case of Korea the movement for national culture did not arise simply from the clash
with Western civilization alone. More directly, it came as a reaction to the intrusion of stronger powers -- in particular, the imperialistic invasion of Japan. Japan attempted not merely to
colonize but to Japanize Korea, and in so doing to wipe away all aspects of our own culture. With this in the background, it thus came about that research related to the national culture
of Korea had its beginning in connection with the movement for independence from Japan.
The first direct contacts with Western civilization took place about one hundred years ago. And in looking at the flow of events since then we can discern three major periods with
respect to Korean cultural studies: the last years of the Yi Dynasty around the end of the nineteenth century, the period of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945), and the post-Liberation
period (1945 to the present). My intention is to present a brief overview of characteristics of the movement for the national culture and cultural studies during three periods.
1. The Last Years of the Yi Dynasty

The first introduction of Western civilization to Korea came about through efforts of the Roman Catholic Church in the eighteenth century. However, the neo-Confucianism of the
Chu Hsi School which was the religious ideology of the Yi Dynasty ruling class effectively prevented widespread acceptance of the new ideas. The real impact of Western ideas upon
Korean society did not begin to be felt until the closing years of the nineteenth century, following the 1876 treaty with Japan and subsequent treaties with Western nations. This opening
of Korea through the establishment of international relations provided a good opportunity to learn about Western culture on the one hand, but on the other, it also paved the way for
imperialist aggression.
The wave of new activity by foreign powers in Korea led not only to a situation of political instability, but also to one in which the traditional culture was in danger of being
destroyed. In this unsettling context Koreans sought to affirm their sense of national identity by maintaining the old traditions. We can identify three major responses.
First, "refute the heterodoxy and guard the orthodoxy. " This phrase refers to the rejection of the Roman Catholic (Western) ideas that were seen as heretical in the context of the
prevailing Confucian orthodoxy. The best way to deal with the threat posed by the intruding ideas was to refute them and hold fast to the orthodox Confucian view. Yi Hang-no (1792-
1868) and his followers were the main advocates of this position. They held that religion was the central element of culture and looked to the Chu Hsi School of neo-Confucianism as the
religious ideology to be protected because it provided the very foundation for the existence of Korean culture and the structure of the value system as well. Their way of thinking
continued into the period of Japanese colonialism and played a fundamental role in shaping the ideology of the resistance movement.
The second major response was a movement for reform of Confucian ideas as advocated by Pak Un-shik (1859-1925). Like the followers of Yi Hang-no, advocates for reform also
looked to Confucianism as the basis of traditional Korean culture and national identity, but on the other hand they saw the need for reform in order to adjust to the changing
circumstances in which Korea now found itself. They believed it would be possible to preserve the nation and maintain the national culture through accepting Western thought but in the
framework of a reformed Confucianism which would be the property of the whole people, not just the religion of the elite ruling class. Those who held this point of view could be
compared to the Protestant reformers of sixteenth century Europe.
The third major response was the Eastern Learning (Tonghak) movement led by Choi Che-woo (1824-1860), which spread as a religious movement for national culture directly in
opposition -- as its name suggests -- to Western (Roman Catholic) learning. Followers of the Tonghak movement saw that from the outside Korea was being threatened by imperialistic
aggression on the part of Japan and powerful Western nations, while within the country the oppression of the people by a corrupt government was becoming unbearable. They believed
that in this kind of situation the only way the nation could be saved was through religion. But the traditional religions, Confucianism and Buddhism, had lost their strength and the new
Western religion was also one of the weapons of the foreign invaders. Therefore, they thought, the only hope for national salvation lay in the appearance of a new "Korean style"
religion. Claiming the authority of divine revelation, Choi Che-woo proclaimed that Tonghak was this new religion so badly needed, but as a result he was executed by the government
just three years later. The movement continued after Choi's death, however, and through the missionary efforts organized by his followers it grew over the next thirty years to become the
largest religious group in Korea. Its culmination came in the Tonghak Revolution of 1894 under the slogan, "Save the nation and bring peace to the people by getting rid of government
tyranny and keeping out Western and Japanese influence."
2. The Period of Japanese Colonialism

The second major period of the movement for national culture in Korea can be characterized in various ways. Extending from 1910 to 1945 it was of course the period of Japanese
colonialism, but from the Korean viewpoint could be called the period of the Independence Movement. It was also a period of research.
From the time of the takeover in 1910 Japan's attempt to colonize Korea was carried out under a policy designed to eradicate Korean culture by gradually replacing it with Japanese
culture. As I have said, it was an attempt not merely to colonize but to Japanize Korea, and this could only be done by eliminating everything Korean. They began with language and
history, by prohibiting education and research related to the Korean language and Korean history. Then in the later part of the 1930s it became illegal to even speak Korean in Korea and
Korean people were forced to worship at Japanese Shinto shrines. Striking at the heart of personal as well as cultural identity, the greatest indignity was that finally Korean people were
not allowed to use their own names but were forced to take Japanese names instead.
Paradoxically, research into Korean culture during this period was initiated by Japanese scholars. Their purpose, however, was not to preserve or to foster the development of
Korean culture but to provide justification for their colonial policy. Thus the field of Korean studies had its beginning as a servant of Japanese colonial policy. Some of the works
produced by the Japanese during this period are as follows:
A Study on Korean Society (1910), Japanese Military Police Headquarters in Korea;

History of Korean Religions (1911), Aoyagi;
Folk Customs of Korea (1914), Imamura;
A Dictionary of Korean (1920), Japanese Government-General;
The Spirits of Korea (1929), Japanese Government-General;
Geomancy in Korea (1931), Japanese Government-General;
Divination and Prophecy in Korea (1933), Japanese Government-General.
Also, in 1922 the Japanese Government-General established an editorial committee for research on Korean history. The work of this committee, however, reflected a particular view
of history designed to justify colonial policy.
While Japanese scholars were pursuing colonialist aims in research on Korea culture, Korean scholars on the other hand began their own research in order to discover in the
traditional culture the spiritual basis for the independence movement against Japan. In contrast to the Japanese, who held what could be called a colonialist view of history, these scholars
held a nationalistic view. For the most part they were traditional Korean scholars of the old school who were also independence fighters and had been living in exile in China since the
fall of Korea to Japan in 1910. Some of their representative works are as follows:
Pak Un-shik (1859-1925):
The Painful History of Korea,
The Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement,
A Study of Old Korea
Shin Chai-ho (1880-1936):
History of Ancient Korea,
A Study of Korean History,
Life and Thought of Yi Sun-shin;,
Chung In-bo (1893-1936):
A Study of Korean History,
A Selection of Korean Studies;
Choi Nam-sun (1890-1957):
Early Korea,
A Study of Tangun,
The Korean Independence Movement.
Along with such works as these which were produced in the traditional Korean pattern of scholarship, from the 1930s there were also works on Korean culture by scholars who
followed Western methods of research. For example, the Korean Language Society was established in 1931 and began publishing a journal called Hangul that carried scholarly articles
on the Korean language. This society also undertook the compilation of a Korean dictionary. Likewise, the Chindan Society founded in 1934 engaged in historical research on scientific
principles. Their journal, the Children Hakbo, carried articles dealing with such areas as politics, art, the history of Korean thought, folk traditions and so on. Some of the representative
works based on Western methods of scholarship produced during the period are as follows:
Socioeconomic History of Korea (1933), Paik Nam-un;

History of Korean Novels (1933), Kim Tae-jun;
History of Korean Drama (1933), Kim Jai-chol;
Thought of Korean Poetry (1937), Cho Yun-jai;
Ancient Songs of Korea (1943), Yang Ju-dong.
In addition, there were also Korean scholars in this period who were concerned with religion and folklore in relation to national culture. A few examples are:
Yi Neung-hwa (1869-1943):
A General History of Korean Buddhism,
A Study on Korean Shamanism,
A History of Korean Taoism;
Son Jin-tai (1900-1950):
A Study on Korean National Culture;
Song Suk-ha (1904-1948):
A Study on Korean Folk Culture.
3. The Post-Liberation Period
With the surrender of Japan in 1945 Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism and again became an independent nation. However, the division of the nation into two parts and
the tragic war between north and south that followed in 1950 temporarily stopped cultural activities and resulted in the loss of many valuable research materials. It was not until the
1960s that cultural research could be resumed on a normal basis, so that was when the modern period had its real beginning. By then the number of scholars had increased greatly
because after Liberation it was easier to go abroad for advanced study and research and many who did so were returning to engage in their work at home. Also, although there have been
a number of social problems along the way, the economic development beginning in the 1960s has provided more leeway for cultural activities.
If we say that the decade of the 1950s was a time of struggle for political stability and the 1960s one of struggle for economic stability, then the 1970s became the decade of search
for cultural identity -- and we have believed that cultural identity is the cornerstone of national independence.
Beginning in the 1960s, a number of research institutes for the study of Korean culture have been established. Among them there are some independent organizations such as the
Korean Research Center, but for the most part these institutes were set up within university structures. There were sixteen such institutes by the end of the 1960s, then twenty-two by the
end of the 1970s. Also in 1978 the government established its own institute, the Academy of Korean Culture.
According to figures compiled by the Academy, at the end of 1978 there were 942 scholars in Korea engaged in various fields related to Korean studies. Historians (172) and
linguists (149) comprised the two largest groups, and about seventy per cent of the total were young scholars still under the age of forty. Also, most of the research articles in the post-
liberation period have been published since 1966. For example, 215 articles dealing with historical studies appeared in this period before 1966, while 816 have been published since
then. The situation of other areas is similar. For studies on the Korean language the figures are 234 as opposed to 1,301, for literature 73 in contrast to 435, and for folklore studies 43 as
against 254. This increase since 1966 shows the degree of activity among the younger scholars in the 1970s.
The first task of those engaged in Korean studies from the 1960s onward was the excavation of aspects of the culture that had been buried during the Japanese colonial period.
Language and literature, for example, which the Japanese had tried to obliterate, had to be rehabilitated, and folk culture rediscovered. Next was the task of getting rid of the poison of
colonialist ideology. Distorted interpretations of history created by the Japanese for their own purposes had to be corrected, for instance, so that the cultural heritage of Korea could be
seen in its true light. As these tasks are being carried out the trend in research today is to adopt a scientific approach, shaking off the subjectivism that characterized both the colonialist
studies and the nationalist studies of the previous period and replacing it with an objective viewpoint.
This, then, is the first task before us today: to completely get rid of the subjective orientation of the past and firmly establish a scientific approach to academic research. Scholarship
must not be the servant of ideology, whether of the colonialist or of the nationalist variety. The second task before us is that we must shift our attention to the future. Previously we
looked to our past and sought from it to understand our present. But that is not enough. The field of Korean studies encompasses all of Korea, and this includes the Korea of the future as
well as the past and the present. Here, for example, we must face the problem of a divided nation and seek ways to contribute to the unity and harmony of our future national culture.
Finally, the third task before us today is that we must broaden the scope of our interests to include concern for the rest of the world. No longer can any nation live apart, isolating itself
from the rest of humanity. In studying the unique qualities of a particular national culture, then, we are also under obligation to consider the question of harmony between the uniqueness
of a people on the one hand and the universality of all peoples on the other.
EARLY MODERN KOKUGAKU (NATIONAL STUDIES) AND NEW KOKUGAKU:

Their Growth and Significance
UCHINO Goro
1. Early Modern and Modern in Japanese Cultural History -- Historical Circumstances of Kokugaku
(1) Periodization of History (in the case of cultural history and literature-art history)
It was not until the Early Modern period that the significance of historical studies came to be realized in Japan, and only after the Meiji period, when the European philosophy of
history and methodology of learning were first introduced, did the problems of historical views of culture and the periodization of history begin to be discussed. This does not mean,
however, that there was no awareness of the value of historical studies before the Early Modern period in Japan. For example, in the Middle Ages, a historical view based on Buddhist
and Shinto faith can be found in JIEN's Gukanshô and in KITABATAKE 's Jinnoô-shôtôki . In the Early Modern period, under the influence of Confucianism, a naturalistic
historical view began to appear. Indications of this awareness can also be found in the three-period doctrine or three-generation thought in the Buddhistic historical view. Even more
definite thought about periodization can be found in ARAI Hakuseki's Dokushi yoron.
In the field of literature/art, we can find periodization as early as FUJIWARA Shunzei's Korai-futai-shô in the Middle Ages. He uses the divisions kami (upper) for the Man'yôshu
period, naka-mukashi (middle ancient) for the Kokinshû and Gosenshô, and shimo (lower) for the Shuishû and Goshuishû.
In the Early Modern period, a three-period division of ancient waka poetry can be found in KAMO Mabuchi's introduction to his Man'yô-kô, and even more specific periodization
can be found in the Riku unben by FUJITANI Nariakira and his son Mitsue . Their six periods continued to be applied to later studies in the history of waka.
But this traditional periodization is no longer used in cultural or literary/art history. The periodization now in use is based on an imported European philosophy of history.
(2) Early Modern in Japan and Modern in the West
Periodization in European cultural history has tended toward a trichotomy since the end of the 17th century, when the division was first made by Christoph Cellarius into "Historia
antiqua" (1686), "Historia medii" (1688) and "Historia nova" (1696).
The concept of trichotomy in European historical studies seems to focus on the present age, viewing it as a revival of an ancient golden age which passed into long decline in the
preceding middle ages.
This follows the ancient view that history repeats itself: the first period is the glorious past, the second is a period of decline, and the third is the present revival of the good old days.
In European history, the Renaissance was believed to be the revival of ancient culture and the harbinger of a good modern period. In religion, the divine right laws were believed to
have been revived in the modern period through the Reformation, which was first a struggle against medieval restrictions. In short, the modern period in Europe was thought to start
from some point during the Renaissance, between the 14th and 16th centuries.
Etymologically, "modern" is derived from "mode," and it originally means the present age of the same mode, that is, that of the same society, the same way of existence to which
people belong. Accordingly, in Europe there was no distinction between Modern and Early Modern as found in Japan.
In contrast with this European three-part periodization, Japanese periodization puts Early Modern between the Middle and Modern periods as the third period.
(3) The Problems of Imported Culture and National Isolation
Japanese culture includes imported culture. In earlier times, Japan concentrated on importing Chinese culture, and in recent times, European culture, always attempting to catch up
and surpass others. Japanese cultural history might be characterized as a history of the formation of a "complex-culture," the process of introducing and assimilating foreign cultures.
This inevitably gives rise to such problems as how to distinguish the national culture from the imported foreign cultures and how to decompose Japanese culture into national and
foreign elements, as well as the question of when medieval culture ends and early modern culture starts.
We should note again that the Early Modern period in Japanese cultural history is not equivalent to the European Modern. Why did this unique concept of Early Modern come about
in Japan? Because of the Tokugawa policy of national isolation for nearly two hundred years. This happened just when European modernization was starting and East-West contact was
beginning. This is one fact we must consider in any analysis of modernization in Japan.
Gunpowder (ca.1300), the compass (1302), and movable type (1445) are said to be the three great inventions of the modern West. The invention of gunpowder altered the art of
warfare. The invention of the compass enabled navigation of the vast oceans and brought East and West together. Columbus discovered America in 1492; Vasco da Gama made his first
voyage over the Indian Ocean in the years 1497 to 1499; Magellan of Portugal circled the globe in 1519. In 1541, the first Portuguese ship drifted ashore at Bungo; two years later,
another Portuguese ship arrived at Tanegashima, bringing guns.
In 1403, Huss of Germany lit the fire of religious revolution. Martin Luther's religious revolt began in 1517. The Calvinist movement began in 1541. The missionary Francis Xavier
landed at Kagoshima in 1549. This is the beginning of the propagation of Christianity in Japan. In 1560, the current bakufu (military government) granted Gasper Vilela and others
permission to preach. That was the year ODA Nobunaga defeated IMAGAWA Yoshimoto at Okehazama; Japan was still in the midst of civil warfare. But the modern West was
gradually making headway into Japan.
Although ODA Nobunaga had tolerated Christian missionaries, his successor, TOYOTOMI Hideyoshi, issued a prohibition on their activities in 1587. TOKUGAWA Ieyasu became
Seii-Taishôgun, or Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force Against the Barbarians, in 1603, signaling the official inauguration of the Tokugawa bakufu. Ieyasu encouraged
foreign trade, but continued to prohibit Christianity.
The Shimabara revolt occurred in Kyushu in 1637. It was suppressed early the following year, and the bakufu issued another edict against Christianity later in 1638. The official
policy of isolation was adopted in 1639, and all trade was banned except for that with China and Holland. The doors to the country remained closed until the ratification of the amity
treaties with the U.S., Britain, and Russia in 1854. For 215 years there was virtually no interaction with the West.
This is why Japan's modernization was delayed for so long, resulting in the drastic "modernizing-is-westernizing" of the Meiji Era. This is the age in which early modern Kokugaku
was born and developed and the way was paved for the formation of New Kokugaku.
2. From Early Modern Kokugaku to Modern Kokugaku (Preconditions for the Development of New Kokugaku)
(1) The Essence of Early Modern Kokugaku and Its Development
The period when early modern Kokugaku was born and developed ranges over 250 years, from 1640, the year when Keichu was born, to the early years of the Meiji Era. It, in
fact, covers the whole period of the early modern during which Japan was, as a result of that isolation policy, excluded from any contact with the West except the Dutch. During this
period there appeared so many Kokugaku scholars, some distinguished and some obscure, that we cannot treat each of their achievements here. I will mention just a few of the most
distinguished scholars and some representative schools.
A. KEICHU (1640-1701) and his methodology

(Philological study of Japanese classics -- Interpretative study of classical language and of Man'yôshû)
B. KADA no Azumamaro (1669-1736) and his methodology
(Theological study of ancient teachings and faiths--Shinto studies, study on ancient court and military practices, interpretative study of classics)
C. KAMO no Mabuchi (1697-1769) and his school
(Interpretative study of waka (poetry) -- Interpretative study of classical language, Man'yôshû, study on ancient morality)
D. MOTOORI Norinaga (1730-1801) and his school
(Philological study of ancient morality -- literary criticism of Genji monogatari, study of ancient morality centered on Kojiki , Shinto studies, study of Japanese language)
E. KATO Chikage (1735-1808) and his school
(Study on literature and arts -- literary review of Man'yôshû, critical study of literature and arts, artistic production)
F. HIRATA Atsutane (1776-1843) and his school
(Political study of Shinto -- Shinto studies, the doctrine of "national character," study of ancienthistory and morality, faith in reikon (holy spirits))
It is difficult to describe the features of each school in a limited space, but we may at least suggest the main trends in early modern Kokugaku. These six scholars are listed in
chronological order, but gaps of some thirty to forty years may be noticed. Nor does their order indicate any sort of lineage of a particular school of thought.
Direct relationships may be found between (B) and (C) and between (C) and (E). (C) and (D) met once, and MOTOORI even went so far as to apply to KAMO's school, but their
ultimate relationship was solely through written correspondence. In terms of influence, (C) integrated the thought of (A) and (B) to form the mainstream of early modern Kokugaku, and
passed that integrated system of thought on to (D) and (E). Direct disciples of (C) included (E) and his Edo school, but it was rather (D) who carried on the mainstream tradition. After
that point, Kokugaku split into two branches, the Edo school and the Hirata school ((E) and (F)).
The fields of Kokugaku may be broadly classified as studies in the ancient Shinto Way (religion and thought) and cultural studies in literature and the arts. I refer to the former as
classical Kokugaku scholarship and to the latter as aesthetic Kokugaku criticism (or cultural Kokugaku studies). Together, they form the essence of traditional Kokugaku. In this
essential early modern Kokugaku we can distinguish three academic features:
1. classical - cultural studies of the historical ethnicgroup;

2. spiritual - studies of faith in the religious Shinto Way;
and
3. syncretic - comprehensive research methodology.
The classical scholarship is represented by (B), (C), (D), and (F); the aesthetic criticism, by (A), (C), (D), and (E). (C) and (D) combined both aspects and can rightfully be called
scholars of the essential mainstream Kokugaku, although (C) tended more toward the classics and (D) more toward aesthetic criticism. It was (C) who influenced the later Edo school
(E), while the influence of (D) is stronger with the Hirata school (F).
(2) Division of Kokugaku into the Edo School and the Hirata School (Two Traditional Schools of Kokugaku)
Among other Kokugaku schools, the Edo school and the Hirata school, which were both formed at the end of early modern Kokugaku's development, are most distinguished by
striking contrasts.
The Edo school, represented by KATO Chikage and MURATA Harumi , developed in the social and cultural circle of Edo's shitamachi (downtown), the most typical commercial
town in Japan's period of isolation. This community was characterized by an artistic, petibourgeois flavor. The Edo school which developed in these circumstances naturally put more
stress on applying scientific methods to the study of modern culture, instead of an interpretative approach to classical studies.
The Hirata school on the other hand, was based in the Yamanote (uptown) section of Edo, which was the residential area of the samurai class. Their interests ranged from ancient
history and morality to Confucianism and Buddhism. They also emphasized the superiority of the Empire of Japan. This consciousness of foreign culture was a factor in the development
of New Kokugaku.
(3) Modernization in the Early Meiji Era and Germination of New Kokugaku
The new government of Meiji attempted to put the teachings of Kokugaku in the center of its education policy and to abolish the old institutions of the Tokugawa regime which
emphasized Confucianism and Buddhism. This attempt ultimately failed due to various kinds of resistance and internal struggles between the Kokugaku schools, but it gave a stimulus to
the movement of Westernization-modernization The early years of Meiji saw the rapid and abundant importation of Western cultures into Japan, which, in fact, stimulated the people to
reflect and reconsider their own national culture and the revival of the Kokugaku movement. A Course of Classics was established at Tokyo University, as well as the Institute of Royal
Classics, Kokugakuin University , and the Jingu-Kogakkan School . The foundation of these institutions marked the first step toward the establishment of New Kokugaku Studies
focusing on the national culture.
3. Formation of New Kokugaku and the Significance of Studies of National Culture (The Future of New Kokugaku)
(1) New Kokugaku as a Form of Folklore (Yanagita Studies and Origuchi Studies)
The germination of New Kokugaku as a systematic study can be found in HAGA's introduction of German "philologie" and advocation of Japanese philology (study of Japanese
literature). In the later years of Meiji and early years of Taisho, the discipline of kokubungaku (study of Japanese literature) and its name were basically settled; its method was a
combination of the old Kokugaku (early modern Kokugaku) and German "philologie," giving birth to New Kokugaku in its broader sense.
In the narrower or proper sense, however, New Kokugaku is the folkloristic New Kokugaku advocated by both YANAGITA Kunio and ORIGUCHI Shinobu. This new type of
Kokugaku is a new movement to breathe new spirit into the early modern Kokugaku and to declare a new method of learning.
YANAGITA first began to develop his theory of a New Kokugaku around 1935, but the first formal use of the term was in the postwar publication of his three-part Talks on New
Kokugaku. When we attempt to compare and contrast Old (Early Modern) Kokugaku and New Kokugaku, we find that Old Kokugaku is a discipline that developed in Japan's period of
isolation from the international scene; it was pursued without conscious recognition of foreign influence. Its scholars therefore concentrated on the revival of studies of the indigenous
Shinto faith; it is a pure study of ancient Japanese culture. Its methodology is based on primary sources to illuminate the historical study of that one faith. Folklore, on the other hand, is a
modern Western science, a discipline which seeks to discover the fundamental folk culture in modern daily life. It is the study of folk culture, and its methodology includes the treatment
of popular legend as primary data.
Thus we might say that Old Kokugaku is more ethnocentric, with more emphasis on archaic sources, while New Kokugaku takes a more modern, comparative, folklorist approach.
(2) Shinto came close to extinction after the Second World War.
According to the Occupation Forces' decree concerning Shinto, both State Shinto and Shrine Shinto were banned, and not only chairs in Shinto studies at Tokyo University but all
public institutions associated with Shinto, such as the Institute of Royal Classics and the Jingu-Kogakkan School, were closed. Kokugakuin survived only because it was a private
institution for academic research in Shinto as a religion. But professors of Shinto studies were purged from their positions, and thus with no staff, the continued existence of the
department was severely threatened.
It was YANAGITA and ORIGUCHI and their new discipline of Shinto studies, New Kokugaku, that provided the academic and theoretical support for the maintenance of Shrine
Shinto and the rebuilding of the Department of Shinto Studies at Kokugakuin. They were virtually the only two educators involved either in statements outside or lectures within the
circle of Kokugakuin classes or Shinto shrines. Their New Kokugaku might well be called New Shinto Studies. From around 1950 to around 1965, YANAGITA lectured on theoretical
Shinto studies at the graduate school of Kokugakuin. Needless to say, this was at ORIGUCHI's recommendation.
ORIGUCHI had begun lectures on such topics as "New Kokugaku," "Survey of Kokugaku," and "Survey of Shinto" as early as 1938. After the war, his lectures were broadcast on
radio shows. Advocating Shinto as a religion, he became a professor in the Department of Shinto Studies to aid in its revival; he also invited YANAGITA to help save Shinto studies
from isolation.
After ORIGUCHI's death, YANAGITA continued to direct his energy along the same channels, and in his last years was a great source of inspiration in the early days of the
founding of the Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics.
(3) The Future of New Kokugaku as a Study of National Culture
In YANAGITA's later years, as studies in the folklore of one country often develop into comparative folklore, so his methodology, too, found close connections with ethnology. His
theory of New Kokugaku went beyond new national studies or studies in folk Shinto and developed into comparative cultural studies focusing on one particular country. This is
especially clear from the academic foundations of the Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, into which he poured so much energy in his later years.
Summary of Discussions: SESSION C

SAKAMOTO Koremaru
This session was held on the last day of the symposium and discussions were supposed to be based on the contents and results of the issues and discussions carried out in Session A,
"Religion and Secularization," and Session B, "Traditional Culture and Modernization." However, there was little discussion referring directly to Session A. Rather, the comments tended
to focus on defining "traditional culture" as national culture or the distinctive culture of each nation, and on assessing how it would be possible to objectify or identify and revivify this
culture within the context of modernization.
Before opening the session, the chairperson, Mr. Tomio Fujita, indicated that he would like to proceed with the following two points in mind: (1) It would be desirable to proceed
with discussions utilizing the concept of cultural identity -- a suggestion made in the keynote address by Mr. Bellah. This is because the word "national" contains many concepts and
would invite confusion; (2) It would be desirable to engage in concrete discussions on the question posed by Mr. Berger. Among the various elements of traditional culture, what should
be systematized and institutionalized?
1. Supplementary Explanatory Comments by the Speakers

The four speakers for this session, Mr. T.N. Madan, Mr. Pinit Ratanakul, Mr. Tongshik Ryu, and Mr. Goro Uchino, in that order, made supplementary explanatory comments to their
previously distributed papers. While Mr. Madan's theme was a comparison of modernization and the resulting crisis in cultural unity in Japan and India, the remaining three speakers
spoke in considerable detail on the history, present conditions, and research into the cultures of their own countries.
First, Mr. Madan who spoke on "Modernization and Cultural Identity in the Countries of Asia," focused on two countries, Japan and India, and indicated the major points of
difference in their modernization. In short, Japan succeeded in its modernization while that of India was frustrated. The reason for this was that Japan's modernization or Westernization
was completed without being opposed to traditional culture. In India, on the other hand, the soul of the Indian was emasculated by the preachings of Roberto de Nubili in 1606, and
following that, Indian intellectuals fell into a schizophrenic condition because of acute conflicts under English colonialism. These factors precluded the possibility of advancing
modernization.
However, Mr. Madan did not truly wish to concentrate on this particular question. Rather, he emphasized that the significance of this symposium was that it inquired into the
possibilities for Japan and India of reconstituting their respective cultural unities while in the process of borrowing from the West and of modernizing. Also, the symposium was
significant for attempting to promote a mutual understanding of the distresses involved in this endeavor.
Mr. Pinit followed with a consideration of national and cultural unity in Thailand. He began by pointing out that modernization was a necessity even in Thailand, a non-colonialized
country, and that this modernization had produced various values which threatened the traditional and distinctive cultures of each of the ethnic groups. In order to resolve this
oppositional state of affairs, it is necessary to search for a new national identity while recognizing the distinctive ethnic cultures of the groups which make up Thai culture: the Thai, the
Chinese, and the Muslim. To achieve this end, it is in turn necessary to spread the humanistic sciences which will study the traditional and distinctive culture of Thailand--starting with
what may be considered the core of Thai culture, Buddhism--and to critically reinterpret and discriminate this culture in order to foster a living culture for the future. Mr. Pinit's
advocacy of the necessity of the "secularization" of Buddhism and of a secularistic interpretation of Buddhism was especially thought provoking.
Mr. Ryu spoke from the standpoint of a people which had experienced Japanese Imperialism over a long period of time, on the various difficulties of such a people or nation in its
search for a cultural identity.He divided the progress of Korean studies of Korean culture into three periods. He explained that the lingering aftereffects of the second period--during
which there was a great loss of cultural identity as a result of the Japanese colonial policy of creating Imperial subjects--are extremely significant even today. As a result, even at present,
when national cultural studies have developed to a certain degree, there are calls for sweeping away that which smacks of Japaneseness. This is due to the establishment of Korean
studies, which has had three objectives: (1) scientific research, (2) contributing to cultural development in the future, (3) contributing to both the discovery of the particularity of a
culture and to the development of world culture.
Finally, Mr. Uchino discussed early-modern (kinsei) national studies (kokugaku ) as a form of Japanese research into Japanese culture. He also referred to the new national studies
(shin kokugaku ), which inherited the earlier national studies and deveroped from it in a critical fashion. He pointed out that interest in national studies research has witnessed a
precipitous decline in the post-war period; and that in order to truly establish Japanese cultural studies it is necessary to develop the national studies as suggested and carried out by such
persons as YANAGITA Kunio and ORIGUCHI Shinobu. Also, it is necessary to study not only Japan but to make comparative studies with cultural studies of other foreign countries.
This will make Japanese cultural studies even richer. His suggestion that the kinsei period was unique to Japan and that this period served as the first step toward the modern era, was of
great interest.
2. Remarks by the Commentators

Mr. Mitsuo Suzuki and Mr. Kenji Ueda commented on the remarks of the speakers.
Mr. Suzuki remarked that after listening to the panelists he felt that an interesting contrast could be made between the formerly colonialized countries of India and Korea, and the
non-colonialized countries of Japan and Thailand.
(1) In India, under English colonial rule, there was both an adulation of the various systems of civilization of the West and a strong continuation of a nostalgia for India's past
civilization. These two cultures came into such severe confrontation that intellectuals were driven into a "schizophrenic" situation. On the other hand, in Korean even during the period
of Japanese colonial rule, there was little of this sort of English/Indian confrontation since the foundations of Japanese and Korean cultures had much in common. It is precisely for this
reason that a theory of Japanese and Korean common ancestorship could appear, why a great tragedy could come about, and why this theory could serve as the basis for a huge problem.
(2) Thailand and Japan share the fact of not having been colonialized. Yet the former has managed to allow the various ethnic groups to retain their cultural identities while
simultaneously maintaining a national identity. There has thus been a peaceful coexistence between culture and nation. This is a situation which is difficult to understand, for Japan is an
ethnically homogenous nation in which cultural identity and national identity exist on the same level. In this regard, I would like to know how the difficulty in the Thai case is being
resolved. In other words, what are the elements of this national identity?
Next, the commentator turned to Japan and expressed his own opinions on "Japan's modernization", an issue touched upon by Mr. Madan. He pointed out that there were four cycles
in Japan's modernization: (1) the early-modern (kinsei) preparatory cycle; (2) from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the War; (3) from post-war economic recovery to the present; (4)
the future, when true "Japaneseness" will be sought as a result of economic setbacks. Needless to say, the commentator emphasized (4). During this period, the Japanese people, having
worked to exhaustion for economic development, will try to reconsider and reinstitute that which has been lost as a result of modernization. He asserted that the Emperor-system and
Imperial-culture will form the core of this attempt.
3. Responses by the Speakers to Suzuki's Comments

There were responses by Mr. Madan, Mr. Pinit, and Mr. Ryu to the comments by Mr. Suzuki.
Mr. Madan: (1) Mr. Suzuki has said that India, like Korea, tried to establish an identity during the period of colonialism. However, Indian culture and civilization is old and a sense
of identify existed before the colonial period. Thus his statement is off the mark. I cannot identity precisely what that identity is, but Hinduism probably forms the core. Also, the concept
of national identity is important. That of India is multiple, yet there is a unity of Indians.
(2) Mr. Suzuki has stated that the Emperor-system and Imperial-culture plays an important role in the unification of Japanese politics and culture. However, is it not true that interest
in the Emperor is only declining?
Mr. Ryu: (1) Cultural commonality is in itself an important matter. However, to link this up with a theory of Korean and Japanese shared ancestry is scientifically false and
untenable.
(2) Mr. Suzuki has stated that because there is cultural commonality, it is difficult to exclude that which smacks of Japaneseness. But it is precisely for this reason that there has
been a conscious movement of elimination, and an attempt to cast off a spiritually and culturally colonialized slave mentality.
Mr. Pinit: As Mr. Suzuki has pointed out, there are three ethnic groups in Thailand, each with its own language, customs, and tradition. These groups cooperate mutually and are not
isolated. Also, the Imperial Household performs an extremely important role in the unification of these ethnic groups into a nation. In particular, the king goes on a procession through
the Muslim areas of the south for several months. The effects are significant.
Mr. Kenji Ueda followed with his comments. Before commenting on the remarks of the individual speakers, he spoke from the standpoint of a Shinto specialist in trying to broadly
reconsider the concept of the distinctive culture of a nation, such as that represented by Shinto. He argued that even if culture is imported from abroad, if this culture takes root and is
traditionalized, it should be considered as culture distinctive to a nation. He continued with individual comments on the remarks of Mr. Madan, Mr. Pinit, Mr. Ryu, and Mr. Uchino.
To Mr. Madan: Mr. Madan has taken up only the negative aspects of modernization; yet is it not true that it is precisely modernization or economic development which provides a
foundation upon which spiritual and cultural fulfillment can be based? Especially in the case of a country like India, is not economic sufficiency based on modernization really the matter
of first priority?
To Mr. Pinit: It is true that cultural identity is Buddhist. But the idea that a Buddhism poisoned by modernization can be resuscitated by a reinterpretation through the humanistic
disciplines is tantamount to a secularization of Buddhism itself. Does this not lead to a denial of the traditional culture of Buddhism?
To Mr. Ryu: there is at present a rising interest in the distinctive cultures of nations, but at the same time it is not possible to ignore the strength of the spread of Christianity, which,
in contrast, points to the universality of culture. Has a tense relationship developed between these two different types of culture?
To Mr. Uchino:Is there really a compelling reason to terminologically distinguish between "national studies" and "new national studies"? Though the historical periods and the
objects of research may differ, there is a consistency in that the objective is a search for the distinctive culture of Japan. Thus, is it not allowable to call the scholarship of Yanagita and
Origuchi, "national studies"?
4. Responses by the Speakers to Ueda's Comments

Mr. Madan: The secularization of Christianity gave birth to "modernity," but the modernization which developed this "modernity" has given birth to grave and fundamental
problems, even in Japan. I have indicated these problems in my paper also. The important issue here is to determine how to overcome the vices of materialism and economism that this
modernization has brought forth.
Mr. Pinit: It is the responsibility of the humanities to reinterpret our distinctive traditional culture, as represented by Buddhism, and to make it intelligible to the youth. To interpret
Buddhism through the humanistic disciplines is not necessarily to transgress the boundaries of Mahayana Buddhism. Rather, the current age is one in which it is necessary to reflect
upon the fact that only the sacred side of Buddhism has been stressed and to emphasize the importance of the secular aspect.
Mr. Ryu: In present day Korea, a situation characterized by the rapid destruction of national culture continues. It is necessary to salvage this culture and to revitalize it. Also,
Christianity has spread in Korea and since the possibility of its becoming a Korean Christianity is strong, I do not believe that a tense relationship will develop between traditional
culture and Christian culture.
Mr. Uchino: I do not mean to be overly insistent on using the terms ''national studies'' and ''new national studies.'' However, there are many differences between the "new national
studies" and the "national studies" of the early-modern period. At the least, since Yanagita and Origuchi have called their work "new national studies," it does not seem unreasonable to
use the term.
The above exchange of opinions between the speakers and the commentators was less of a discussion of the central theme, "the discovery of national culture," than a discussion
along the lines of the previous day's theme. This was a preliminary question which asked how the distinctive traditional culture of each people or nation is related to modernization; and
also inquired into the current situation concerning this relationship. In this regard there was an unexpectedly large gap between Mr. Madan's radical questioning of "modernization" and
an acceptance modernization as a given.
5. Discussion
Next, there were questions from the floor and an exchange of questions and responses. The following is a selection of some of the main points.
First, Mr. Mendoza stated that the terms national and cultural should not be confused. He emphasized that especially in the case of the Philippines, a multi-ethnic nation, the term,
national, is difficult to use; and that the term cultural, should be used instead. This was a criticism of the fact that these two terms had not necessarily been distinguished during this
session.
Mr. Minoru Kasai stated that the issue raised by Mr. Madan was in fact an admonition to look closely at the culture of a nation; and that in this regard, Mr. Berger's suggestion to
select and institutionalize elements of a culture reflects a lack of knowledge about other cultural traditions. There was no special response from Mr. Berger to this comment. Since this
remark touched upon the initial suggestions of the moderator and was basic to the development of the session, a somewhat deeper delving into the issue was probably necessary.
Mr. Abito Ito commented in general terms; in other words, he evaluated the entire session in the following way. Culture and society form a whole, and this whole must be grasped
in structural terms if culture itself is to be understood. It is meaningless to simply talk about a culture's elements or functions. This was also a criticism, like that of Mr. Kasai, of Mr.
Berger' s proposal to "determine which elements of a culture ought to be selected and institutionalized."
Mr. Michael Ashkenazi criticized the contents of the foregoing discussions for being overly limited by personal concerns. He argued that it was unclear who was to be the object of
the cultural or national identity being discussed.
Mr. Nobutaka Inoue argued that material culture takes the form of development, of automatic development, as it were. But spiritual development does not necessarily take the form
of development or progress. In a sense, it is precisely because culture can be buried or destroyed that the theme, "the discovery of culture," is plausible. This being the case, he wondered
if there was some special law for the developmental process of spiritual culture. He thus raised the very fundamental issue of how to view culture itself. However, Mr. Madan, who spoke
as the representative in response to this question, avoided discussing this question directly and went only so far as to point out the limitations of material culture.
As is clear from the comments above, there was little discussion of the fundamental issue of discovering together, and of determining how to protect and nurture the distinctive
cultures of peoples or nations. However, to begin with even a little greater and a more accurate mutual understanding of one another's cultural circumstances is certainly a first step in
this direction. Indeed, based upon the issues and discussions raised in this session, it can be said that a path has, for the first time, been cleared for the true "discovery of national
culture."
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SYMPOSIUM

SONODA Minoru
How are the people of Asia dealing with questions of cultural identity in the face of their common experience of historical change due to modernization? The objective of this
symposium, as conceived by the organizing committee, was to debate the significance and potential of academic attempts, applying the concept of comparative kokugaku , in order to
discover such an identity in traditional Asian culture.
As our first theme, we took up the question of religion and secularization in Asia. We considered the possibility of discovering a positive role or direction for successful
modernization. We took the theory of secularization from the field of the sociology of religion as a key to understanding the past form and circumstances of various religions responding
to modernization. We then proceeded to debate how those religions found positive meaning in the secularization and secular values forming the basis of modernization.
Prof. Berger, who gave one of the keynote addresses on the opening day, "Secularity -- East and West," first pointed out how the Asian rim, including Japan, is the only non-
Western area of the world to have succeeded in economic modernization. He introduced his theory concerning the reasons for that success, based on analysis of the role of the positive
evaluation of secularization affirmed in Confucian, Buddhist, and Shinto thought.
This theory was, however, questioned by several panelists in Session A on the second day of the symposium. Doubts were based on the socio-historical character of religions in
countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan, but the discussion procedure did not allow sufficient comparison of models. Needless to say any discussion of such a problem
requires considerable mutual understanding on the part of participants from various religious backgrounds. It became clear that valid comparisons of social implications of different
religions in different societies depend on cooperative field research on an international basis.
The third day of discussions on "Traditionalism and modernization" (Session B) was more fruitful. There was a more direct connection between the subject and the theme of the
symposium; it was also valuable as a theoretical preface to Session C on "The Humanities and National Identity." The three speakers discussed the characteristic features of
modernization in Singapore, Korea, and Japan by way of explanations of how problems of national, cultural identity relate to questions of traditional religion, language, and worldview.
After an exchange of opinions with the two commentators, the afternoon discussion developed a wide range of opinions concerning the specific selection of aspects of traditional culture
and policies toward their institutionalization. It is interesting to note the comparatively smooth progress of the discussion, despite the fact that the chairpersons were prepared to
intervene to insure that the exchange of opinions was based as much as possible on concrete examples. The dominant opinion was that, even when speaking from an academic point of
view, people may base their debates on only certain selected aspects of traditional ethnic culture to be institutionalized in modern society, but they themselves are limited in their views
by their membership to a restricted traditional society of a certain generation, and as such their actions cannot be condoned.
But looking back on that discussion, Prof. Berger, who submitted the proposal, ventured the theory that this may have been no more than a sociologist's deep but personal
impression of social change. According to his research, sociology, as one of the modern sciences, cannot help but relativize values and therefore sociologists must atone for the crime of
one-sidedly weakening the strength of the traditional culture which should serve to control modernization. And in order to atone for that crime, the sociologists must take the
responsibility to select aspects of traditional culture to retain and carefully strengthen its social value. When you consider the modern character of the humanities, it seems that anyone
concerned with modern academics, including kokugaku, must take that personal responsibility and have the courage to choose what aspects of traditional culture to transmit.
The open discussion at length concluded that the universal contemporary question, how to control the process of modernization in order to avoid the destruction of the human race,
is a problem not only for Asia but a global theme stemming from the crisis in traditional culture.
Prof. Bellah, in his keynote address on the first day of the symposium, touched this point in his observations on the theme of the event. He mentioned how Christianity in the West,
while contributing to economic modernization, is now paradoxically losing its social influence. He suggested that bourgeois Confucianism and Shinto likewise have contributed to
economic modernization in East Asia, but that likewise these religious traditions are also beginning to lose their power to give meaning to people's lives.
Indeed, it is our responsibility to make every effort as scholars to be aware of this crisis, to rediscover human culture in the wide sense of the dimension of ethnic tradition, and to
restore the balance between tradition and modernization. As Prof. Bellah stated in his keynote address, if the rediscovery of ethnic culture is the purpose of kokugaku, surely its efforts
will result in international recognition of its significance.
Session C, held on the fourth day of the symposium, was devoted to deliberations considering the potential of kokugaku, from an international perspective.
The three speakers introduced the question of cultural identity and outlined the history of research in ethnic culture in four countries -- Japan, India, Korea, and Thailand -- by way
of the process of modernization at the level of the state. Since India and Korea represent former colonies, whereas Thailand and Japan have always maintained independence, this
contrast pointed up the differences in problems of cultural identity in different countries.
The question of cultural identity in India was described as revolving around the fact of the country's colonization by Britain -- the spiritual dilemma of the people's admiration for
Western culture conflicting with their consciousness of their own indigenous spiritual culture. Japan may be said to have skillfully combined Western and traditional culture and to have
succeeded in economic modernization, but it was suggested that the Japanese face instead a major crisis of spiritual culture, shadowed by material prosperity. Korean identity was
described as being born from the people's resistance to colonization by Japan. The motivation to recover a sense of culture is seen at work in research in ethnic studies; while there is said
to have been a tendency toward subjectivity, more objective research is expected to follow.
Thailand and Japan both maintained national independence throughout the course of modernization. The role of the imperial system was noted as contributing to the preservation of
national identity, but the discussion focused rather on the question of cultural studies. It was pointed out that in Thailand, the role of the humanities in higher education is emphasized as
a method of handling the harmful influences of tendencies toward materialism and superficial Westernization which accompany the process of modernization. It was emphasized that it
was possible to use the educational system's reinterpretation of Buddhism, Islam, and other aspects of ethnic culture to indoctrinate the young people of Thailand with specific features
of traditional culture. The Thai speaker's statement that comparative studies in the humanities could lead to a secularization of Buddhism, that is to say a rediscovery of the secular
content of early Buddhism, was particularly noteworthy. In the discussion on Japan, the differences between pre- and post-Meiji kokugaku, especially the academic character of "New
Kokugaku," were pointed out. Emphasis was placed on the necessity, since kokugaku has reemerged from its temporary repression after the war, for exchange and comparison in major
fields of research in ethnic studies overseas. As Prof. Bellah pointed out in his keynote address, kokugaku developed before Japan modernized. We must remember that it was already
considering the question of the cultural identity of the Japanese people from the beginning, and thus was able to maintain a position for the internal comparative study of the
modernization which followed.
Finally, in the open discussion that followed, there was an exchange of opinions that might be called reflections on the whole symposium. (1) One participant commented that the
function of the humanities to rediscover ethnic culture depends on the spontaneous efforts of those involved, the bearers of that culture, and that therefore traditional culture is not the
kind of matter to be simply selected out on some theoretical basis. (2) Another was critical of debates on actual culture which do not take into account its connection with society. (3)
Another participant questioned the basis for criticizing modern materialistic culture and favoring the spiritual culture of the past; this person expressed doubts concerning the logic of the
judgment of the superiority of such a past culture.
It was my role, as representative of the sponsors of the symposium, to give a few closing remarks and express our gratitude to all the participants. I focused my remarks on two
points. The first was the theoretical problems encountered by scholars of ethnic culture, problems which came to mind in evaluating the success of the symposium. The second was a
justification for the sponsors' decision, which may strike one at first as odd, to invite Western scholars to give keynote addresses to preface discussions on cultural and academic
problems in Asian society.
First, our basic motivation in planning this symposium was an interest in comparative kokugaku. Our central concern was for limitations in the value of the humanities due to a lack
of awareness on the part of scholars of their own cultural and generational biases. Scholars of the humanities, prior to becoming scholars, are each born into their respective ethnic
cultures in their respective generations. It is a fact that human culture has never been universal. It has always been particular and relative. It is only natural that, even if scholars of the
humanities aim for universal relevance, ideas and treatment of problems are bound to occur among scholars from different cultures and generations. Especially a field like kokugaku,
which aims at the subjective rediscovery of ethnic culture, demands mutual respect in the comparison of subjective interpretations of culture conducted by humanities scholars East and
West, to further the development of that universal relevance. In that sense, this symposium was valuable as a forum for the exchange of ideas on the historical existence and value of the
humanities.
I then proceeded to explain by way of reference to my concept of religions of communities, the rationale behind the sponsors' plan for this symposium. The structure underlying the
religion of the community in Japan, that invisible religion, is based on the festival to summon a god, a marebito , or guest from outside the community when facing a crisis threatening
the existence of the community. The group of kokugaku scholars sponsoring this symposium, likewise sensing a crisis in Asian ethnic culture, especially Japanese ethnic culture,
organized this festival and invited marebito from the West with the power of their ways to revitalize our traditional ethnic culture. In the words of a participant in Session B, Japan is a
country of commercialists, and the guest, or customer, is god, and at this international symposium, we welcomed scholars in Asian studies from the West as we welcome a god to one of
our festivals. These were the words I spoke at the closing of the four-day symposium.
The symposium was followed by a three-day study tour, attended by eight scholars from overseas and five members of the executive committee. The group visited the Ise Shrine ,
Tenrikyô Headquarters, and the Taisekiji of the Nichiren Shôshû (Sôka Gakkai) as a way of gaining some insight into the status of religions in Japan. A day after returning to Tokyo was
devoted to the open exchange of opinions between the visitors and members of the committee.
It was our great fortune to receive such positive cooperation from individuals in such a wide range of fields who contributed to the success of every event in the program. One point
in particular received favorable recognition from all quarters: that was the value of a forum allowing discussion and the exchange of research information on such an international level.
We were urged to continue to plan such opportunities in the future. The need was also keenly felt for more concrete research, cooperative research on an international level, on the basis
of this central theme.
We at the Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, the sponsors of this symposium commemorating the centennial of the founding of Kokugakuin University, encouraged by our
supporters' invaluable advice, express our fervent hope that we may continue to make further contributions to this endeavor.
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Cultural Identity

Modernization in Asian Countries:

Proceedings of Kokugakuin University

Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics

1. To promote personal and organizational exchange among Asian countries;

Session A, "Religion and Secularization" (January 11)

TOWARDS CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MODERNIZATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Session A: Religion and Secularization

Session B: Traditionalism and Modernization

Session C: The Humanities and National Identity

Cultural Identity and Asian Modernization

SECULARITY: WEST AND EAST

THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION OF SECULARIZATION: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY

ISLAM, SECULARITY AND MODERNIZATION:

How does Islam look at such a world view?

a. Matters which fall under absolute duties.

(6) Unity of Worship and Work and Pleasure

4. Islam and Modernization in Indonesia

RELIGION AND SECULARIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

SECULARITY AND PROFANATION IN JAPANESE RELIGION

2 The implication of "secularity" in Buddhism

Summary of Discussions: SESSION A

2. Comments by the Commentators

3. Responses of the Speakers

LANGUAGE POLICY AND NATION-BUILDING IN A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY:

MODERNIZATION AND TRADITIONAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA

1. The new life-orientation and social stratum

3. The search for the prospect of a synthesis

TRADITIONAL CULTURES AND MODERNIZATION:

Summary of Discussions: SESSION B

CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MODERNIZATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES:

SOME NOTES ON THE HUMANITIES AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

THE HUMANITIES AND NATIONALIDENTITY:

1. The Last Years of the Yi Dynasty

2. The Period of Japanese Colonialism

A Study on Korean Society (1910), Japanese Military Police Headquarters in Korea;

Socioeconomic History of Korea (1933), Paik Nam-un;

EARLY MODERN KOKUGAKU (NATIONAL STUDIES) AND NEW KOKUGAKU:

(2) Early Modern in Japan and Modern in the West

(3) The Problems of Imported Culture and National Isolation

A. KEICHU (1640-1701) and his methodology

1. classical - cultural studies of the historical ethnicgroup;

(3) The Future of New Kokugaku as a Study of National Culture

Summary of Discussions: SESSION C

1. Supplementary Explanatory Comments by the Speakers

2. Remarks by the Commentators

3. Responses by the Speakers to Suzuki's Comments

4. Responses by the Speakers to Ueda's Comments

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SYMPOSIUM

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