2 OB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. fa right to terminate a periodic tenancy, we would have thought it plain that one of two joint lessees cannot, in the absence of express words or authority, surrender the rights held jointly. If property or rights are held jointly, prima facie a transfer must be by or under the authority of all interested. The answer suggested to this is the principle laid down in Doe d. Aslin v. Summersett.* That case, for reasons which we have given, is not in our view an exception to the rule we have just stated. It is an illustration, in a highly technical field, of the general principle that if a joint enterprise is due to terminate on a particular day, all concerned must agree if it is to be renewed or continued beyond that day. To use Lord Tenterden’s phrase, it will only be continued if “all “ shall please.” For these reasons we think the conclusion of the county court judge was right, though it is clear that the argument was con- siderably developed in the hearing before us. ‘The appeal will therefore be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors: J. B. Lickfold & Sons, for Rollason, Olift & Holmes, Birmingham; Saunders, Sobell & Co., for Stanley A. Coleman, Birmingham, A. W. G. 1418. & Ad. 136. PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN v. BOOTS CASH CHEMISTS (SOUTHERN) LD. [1951 P. No. 1413.] Poisons—Sale of poisons—Self-service system—Selection of articles by customer from shelves—Payment in presence of qualified pharmacist —Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933 (23 & 24 Geo. 5, ¢. 25), 3. 18 (1) (a) (iii). Contract—Offer and acceptance—Sale of goods—Selj-service—Time of sale. The defendants’ shop at Edgware consisted of a single room adapted to the ‘‘self-service'’ system. In that room was a “‘chemist’s department,” under the control of a registered pharma- cist, in which various drugs and proprietary medicines, included, or containing substances included, in Part I of the Poisons List compiled under section 17 (1) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 795, CAL 1952 ‘Leek AND ‘Moortanps Bone Soorsry % CrarK. 1958 July 16. Lord Goddard ca796 1952 Puansa- CEUTIOAL Soctery or Gnear ‘Burrane v. Boors Casn Cuamisrs (Sourserx) ‘Lo. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1952] 1933, but not in Schedule I to the Poisons Rules, 1949, were displayed on shelves in packages or other containers with the price marked on each. A customer on entering the room was given a basket and then selected the articles that he wished to buy from the shelves, put them in the basket and took them to the cashier’s desk at one of the two exits. The cashier scrutinized the articles, stated the total price and received the money: and the pharmacist in the control of the department supervised that part of every transaction involving the sale of a drug which took place at the cash desk and was authorized to prevent the removal of any drug from the premises. In an action brought by the plaintiffs alleging that the provi- sions of section 18 of the Act requiring the sale of poisons included in Part I of the Poisons List to be effected by or under the super- vision of a registered pharmacist were infringed by the defendants :— Held, that the display of the articles on the shelves, though coupled with an invitation to the customer to solect and take any that he wished to buy from the shelves, did not amount to an offer by the defendants to soll, but merely to an invitation to the customer to make an offer to buy: and that offer was made and accepted at the cashier's desk and the sale was therefore effected under the supervision of a registered pharmacist, as required by the Act. Semble, that even if it could be said that the sale was effected by the customer taking the article from the shelf, as the pharma- cist could prevent its removal from the premises, the sale was still effected under his supervision. Specta case stated by the parties under R.8.C. Ord. 34, r. 1. The defendants carried on a business comprising the retail sale of drugs at their premises at Edgware, which were entered in the register of premises kept pursuant to section 12 of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1988, from which they regularly sold drugs by retail. ‘The premises comprised a single room so adapted that customers might serve themselves and the business there was described by a printed notice at the entrance as ‘* Boot's “' Solf-Service.’” On entry each customer passed a barrier where a wire basket was obtained. Beyond the barrier the principal part of the room, which contained accommodation for 60 cus- tomers, contained shelves around the wall and on an island fixture in the centre, on which articles were displayed. One part of the room was described by a printed notice as the ‘‘ Toilet Dept.,” and another part as the ‘ Chemists’ Dept.” On the shelves in the chemists’ department drugs, including proprietary medicines, were severally displayed in individual packages or containers with a conspicuous indication of the retail price of each. ‘The drugs and proprietary medicines covered a wide range and one section of2 QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. the shelves in the chemists’ department was devoted exclusively to drugs which were included in or which contained substances included in Part I of the Poisons List referred to in section 17 (1) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933; no such drugs were displayed on any shelves outside the section to which a shutter was fitted so that at any time all the articles in that section could be securely inclosed and excluded from display. None of the drugs in that section came within the First Schedule to the Poisons Rules, 1949 (S.I. 1949, No. 589). The staff employed by the defendants at the premises com- prised a manager, a registered pharmacist, three assistants and two cashiers, and during the time that the premises were open for the sale of drugs the manager, the registered pharmacist, and ‘one or more of the assistants were present in the room. Each customer selected from the shelves the article that he wished to buy and placed it in the wire basket; in order to leave the premises the customer had to pass by one of two exits at each of which was a cash desk where a cashier was stationed who scrutinized the articles selected by the customer, assessed the value and accepted payment. The chemists’ department was under the personal control of the registered pharmacist, who carried out all his duties at the premises subject to the directions of a super- intendent appointed by the defendants in accordance with the provisions of section 9 of the Act. The pharmacist was stationed near the poisons section, where his certificate of registration was conspicuously displayed and was in view of the cash desks. In every case involving the sale of a drug the pharmacist supervised that part of the transaction which took place at the cash desk and was authorized by the defendants to prevent at that stage of the transaction, if he thought fit, any customer from removing any drug from the premises. No steps were taken by the defen- dants to inform customers before they selected any article which they wished to purchase of the pharmacist’s authorization. On April'13, 1951, at the defendants’ premises, two customers, following the procedure outlined above, respectively purchased a bottle containing a medicine known as compound syrup of hypo- phosphites, containing 0.01 % W/V strychnine, and a bottle containing medicine known as famel syrup, containing 0.023 % W/V codeine, both of which substances are poisons included in Part I of the Poisons List, but, owing to the small percentages of strychnine and codeine respectively, hypophosphites and famel syrup do not come within the First Schedule to the Poisons Rules, 1949. Vor. IT, 1952. 2 197 1952 Prana: cEUTICAL Soorry oF GREAT ‘Barrain v Boors Case Cuemists (SoureRN) Lo.798 QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. (1952) 3080 The question for the opinion of the court was whether the Pasnwa. Sales instanced on April 18, 1951, were effected by or under gromcal. the supervision of a registered pharmacist in accordance with the or Gnear Provisions of section 18 (1) (a) (iii) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Buran Act, 1983.1 Bors’ Casit Cuemisrs H. V. Lloyd-Jones Q.C. and T. Dewar for the Pharmaceutical (SourHeey) ; . : z ‘i. Society. This case tums on the construction of section 18 (1) — (a) (iii) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1983, but the real question at issue is whether under the self-service system of trading the sale in fact takes place at the point where the customer takes from the shelves the article that he wishes to buy or whether it takes place at the point where the money is paid and the pharmacist is stationed. The self-service system of trading inherently invites the customer to purchase; the price is fully displayed on the articles which are offered for sale and the taking of an article by a customer is an acceptance of the offer. Even if it be the law that a customer has no right to demand goods merely because they are displayed in a shop window the position is different where goods are displayed for sale inside a self-service shop. There are indications to that effect in Wiles v. Maddison.? Tt is submitted that the contract is nade and the property passes at the moment a customer takes an article. [Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contracts, Ist ed., p. 21, and Timothy v, Simpson ® referred to.] The sales in question, therefore, were not contracts or sales made under the supervision of the pharmacist. [Lorp Gopparp C.J. referred to Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,*] What takes place under the self-service system is an innova- tion; it is a completely new system of trading and is a variant of an automatic sale. Regard must be had to section 22 of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933; the legislature thought proper to make provisions for the supervision of sales of poison, to which 1 Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933, [1943] 1 All E.R. 315. «18: "() - it shall not be lawful 3 (1834) 6 C. & P. 499. (a) for a person to sell any poison 4 [1893] 1 Q.B. 256. ‘included in Part I of the Poisons — * Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1983, List, unlese—G) he is an authorized s. 22: “It shall not be lawful for a seller of poisons; and (ii) the aalo is“ poison to be exposed for sale in, or “effected on premises duly registered “to be offered for sale by moans of, “under Part I of this Act; and (iii) ‘* an automatic machine.’ “the sale is effected by, or under the “supervision of, a registered phar- * macist.""2 QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. importance was plainly attached, and it was intended that poisons should not be sold without supervision. What is important is whether or not the pharmacist can intervene at the crucial moment. [Lorp Gopparp C.J. referred to the Sale of Goods Act, 1898.] _ By section 17 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the property passes when it is intended to pass, The circumstances in this case plainly point to an intention that the sale should take place at the particular spot where the customer takes the article. [Lor Gopparp C.J. In a bookshop, where books are lying about, people often look at the books and a customer will frequently pick up a book he wants to buy and take it to the bookseller. ] The legislature intended to interpose the possibility of guidance or veto on the part of the pharmacist when a customer is selecting poisons, and in this ease, even though the time of payment is postponed until the cashier is reached so that payment takes place in the presence of the pharmacist, it is submitted that the sales in question were not effected in accordance with the provisions of the section. Glyn-Jones Q.C. and G. D. Hverington for the defendants. The other statutory provisions with regard to poisons are proper material to assist in the construction of section 18 of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. There are elaborate rules for the packing and sale of poisons and the regulations impose on different classes of poisons precautions of varying degrees of stringency. Poisons such as those in question are subject to very little control apart frora that contained in section 18, and when it is remembered that they are of great variety and of very little danger it can be appreciated that the legislature relaxed the precautions. The construction of section 18, therefore, should not be considered in relation to poisons generally. The statement that the self-service method of trading is an innovation is challenged. It may be a novelty of a kind, but for the last 50 years at least shopkeepers—particularly ironmongers and shopkeepers in market towns—have been in the habit of displaying goods, clearly marked with the price, in their shops and even in the street outside, and it has been the custom for a purchaser to pick up the article he wished to buy, take it to the assistant inside the shop and pay the money, but the purchase was not complete until the money was paid. To display goods marked with their price has been a method of shopkeeping ever since shops first existed. Under the self-service system the 799 1959 ‘PaaRMa- OBUTICAL Soomrr or GREAT ‘Barray ®. Boors Casa Cuemisrs (Sourmeex) Lp.800 1952 ‘PHARMA ‘OBUTIOAL. Soorry or Gear ‘Barra v. Boots Casi CaEMists (Sourneny) Lp. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1952] principle is the same; the mere fact that the customer picks up the article himself off a shelf instead of it being, perhaps, fetched by an assistant, makes no difference. The only difference is that the shopkeeper economizes by not providing assistants to take the goods off the shelves. It is submitted that it would have made no difference if the dress in Timothy v. Simpson * had been hanging on a nail outside the shop. In essence the display of goods marked with their price is no more than an invitation ; if it were otherwise their display in a position out of the customer's reach would amount to an invitation, whereas if they were within the customer’s reach and he could and did take them, that would be a contract. An invitation to a customer to select the goods he wishes to buy cannot have the legal effect of a transaction of sale merely because the customer takes them; if so a customer might not, if he wished, be able to put the article back, or he could take it and leave the shop without paying for it, saying that the property had passed to him when he picked it up. ‘‘ Sale” in the statute must mean the transaction whereby the physical property passes; the transaction in the present case is not unconditional and it is not completed, nor does the property pass, until payment. In Sutton and Shannon on Contracts, 4th ed., at p. 24, it is said: ‘‘ Generally speaking, a trader’s price list is not an offer to ‘sell the goods comprised in it at the stated prices, nor does tho “mere placing of priced goods in a shop window amount to an “ offer to sell at the named price, or to sell at all. In both cases “it is the intending purchaser who makes the offer.” That statoment is adopted and, it is submitted, supplies the real answer in the present case. H. V. Lloyd-Jonea Q.C. replied. Lord Gopparp C.J. This is a special case stated under Ord. 84, r. 1, by agreement between the parties concerning the application of section 18 of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. [His Lordship stated the facts substantially as set out above and continued:] ‘The question which I have to decide is whether the sale is completed before or after the intending purchaser has passed the scrutiny of the pharmacist and paid his money, or, to put it in another way, whether the offer which initiates the negotiations is an offer by the shopkeeper or an offer by the buyer. In the well-known case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.? the company offered compensation to anybody who, having used ©6C. & P, 499. 1 [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.2 QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, a carbolic smoke ball for a certain length of time in a prescribed manner, contracted influenza, One of, the inducements held out to people to buy the carbolic smoke ball was the representation that it was a specific against influenza. ‘The plaintiff, who used it according to the prescription which was given, nevertheless, as might have been expected, contracted influenza. She then sued the Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. for, and recovered, the compensa- tion. In the Court of Appeal Bowen L.J. said*: ‘* There can be “no doubt that where a person in an offer made by him to another “‘ person, expressly or impliedly intimates a particular mode of “acceptance as sufficient to make the bargain binding, it is only “necessary for the other person to whom such offer is made to ‘follow the indicated method of acceptance; and if the person “‘raaking the offer, expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer “that it will be sufficient to dct on the proposal without com- “municating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the “condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification.’’ Mr. Lloyd-Jones has said that in this case the defendants invite the public to come into their shop and say: “ Help yourself “‘ to any of these articles, all of which are priced,”’ and that that is an offer by the defendants to sell to any person who comes into the shop any of the articles so priced, which is accepted by any person who helps himself to any one of those articles, Mr. Glyn- Jones, on the other hand, contends that there is nothing revolu- tionary in this kind of trading, and that it amounts to no more than the exposure of goods which a shopkeeper sometimes makes either outside or inside his premises, while at the same time he leaves some goods behind the counter. J think that it is a well- established principle that the mere exposure of goods for sale by a shopkeeper indicates to the public that he is willing to treat but does not amount to an offer to sell. I do not think I ought to hold that that principle is completely reversed merely because there is a self-service scheme, such as this, in operation. In my opinion it comes to no more than that the customer is informed that he may himself pick up an article and bring it to the shop- keeper with a view to buying it, and if, but only if, the shopkeeper then expresses his willingness to sell, the contract for sale is completed. In fact, the offer is an offer to buy, and there is no offer to sell; the customer brings the goods to the shopkeeper to see whether he will sell or not. In 99 cases out of a 100 he will sell and, if so, he accepts the customer's offer, but he need not 8 [1893] 1 Q.B. 256, 269. 801 1952 ‘PHARMA cEDTIOAL ‘Soorery or Great ‘BRITAIN w Boors Casu Camaisrs (Soureey) Lp. Lord Goddard cs.802 1958 PHARMA- ‘ORUTICAL SoorTy or Great Baran v Boore Case. Cxumists (Souraers) Lp. Lord Goddard ca. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. [1952] do so. The very fact that the supervising pharmacist is at the place where the money has to be paid is an indication to the purchaser that the shopkeeper may not be willing to complete a contract with anybody who may bring the goods to him. Ordinary principles of common sense and of commerce must be applied in this matter, and to hold that in the case of self- service shops the exposure of an article is an offer to sell, and that 2 person can accept the offer by picking up the article, would be contrary to those principles and might entail serious results. On the customer picking up the article the property would forthwith pass to him and he would be able to insist upon the shopkeeper allowing him to take it away, though in some particular cases the shopkeeper might think that very undesirable. On the other hand, if a customer had picked up an article, he would never be able to change his mind and to put it back; the shopkeeper could say, ‘Oh no, the property has passed and you must pay the ** price.” It seems to me, therefore, that the transaction is in no way different from the normal transaction in a shop in which there is no self-service scheme. I am quite satisfied it would be wrong to say that the shopkeeper is making an offer to sell every article in the shop to any person who might come in and that that person can insist on buying any article by saying ‘‘ I accept your offer.” I agree with the illustration put forward during the case of a person who might go into a shop where books are displayed. In most book-shops customers are invited to go in and pick up books and look at them even if they do not actually buy them. There is no contract by the shopkeeper to sell until the customer has taken the book to the shopkeeper or his assistant and said “I “* want to buy this book "’ and the shopkeeper says ‘* Yes.” That would not prevent the shopkeeper, seeing the book picked up, saying: ‘' I am sorry I cannot let you have that book; it is the “* only copy I have got and I have already promised it to another “customer.” Therefore, in my opinion, the mere fact that a customer picks up a bottle of medicine from the shelves in this case does nob amount to an acceptance of an offer to sell. It is an offer by the customer to buy and there is no sale effected until the buyer’s offer to buy is accepted by the acceptance of the price. ‘The offer, the acceptance of the price, and therefore the sale, take place under the supervision of the pharmacist. That is sufficient to satisty the requirements of the section, for by using the words ‘the sale is effected by, or under the supervision of, a registered “pharmacist "’ the Act envisages that the sale may be effected2 QB. QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION. 803 by someone not a pharmacist. I think, too, thatthe sale is 1952 effected under his supervision if he is in a position to say “You ~ paanwa. “* must not have that; that contains poison,’’ so that in any case, CEUTICAL even if I were wrong in the view that I have taken on the question S°G77", as to when the sale was completed, and it was completed when the Barrarw customer took the article from the shelf, it would still be effected poors Cast under the supervision of the pharmacist within the meaning of Caemsts section 18. (Souza) ‘There must therefore be judgment for the defendants. = Judgment for the defendants. Solicitors: A. C. Castle; Masons. FL RAWLANCE v. CROYDON CORPORATION. oe [Plaint No. H. 524.) Jae. 9, 25. Housing—House in some respects unfit for human habitation—Notice from local authority to do specified repairs—Service on landlord— Tenant liable to do indoor repairs—Premises rent controlled— “Person having control of house”—‘ Person who receives the “rack-rent . .. or who would so receive it if the house were let at a “qack-rent shall be deemed to be the person having control of the “house” —"‘ Rack-rent’ means rent which is not less than two- “thirds of the full net annual value of the house”—Housing Act, 1936 (26 Geo. 5 d: 1 Edw. 8, c. 51), s. 9 (4). By section 9 (1) of the Housing Act, 1936, local authorities are empowered to serve upon the person having control of a house which is officially reported to be in any respect unfit for human habitation, a notice requiring him to execute such works, specified in the notice, as will render the house fit for human habitation. By subsection (4) the person who receives the rack-rent of the house or who would receive it if the house were let at a rack-rent, shall be deemed to be the person having control of the house, and the expres- sion “‘rack-rent ” means rent not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the house. In ascertaining the full net annual value the fact that the rent of the house is controlled by the Rent Restric- tion Acts is to be taken into consideration, for they restrict the value of the house to the landlord, and since the standard rent of such a house, plus statutory increases, is the full amount which the Jandlord can receive from the tenant, that rent is the full net annual value of the house within the meaning of subsection (4).