3. The Importance of the Scientific Attitude Many thinkers have tied to kdentify what i special about scence based on is allegedly unique methodology. This approach hasbeen crt because ita been shown that many scentiss do not actually follow the steps that Philosophers of science have used to justify their work.' This does not mean that there is nothing important about what scientists do that might have sgeat bearing on science privileged epistemic status Iti just thatperhaps we Should be looking essat the method by which science justified and more at the attitude that its practitioners have in mind while they are doing it As we saw In chapter 1, thee is no recipe for doing scence. Likewise, there may be no logical means of distinguishing between the type of rea, soning that scientists use to think about the empirical world and that which Is used elsewhere Nonscientist can certainly be nigorous and care ful in their consideration of evidence, and scientists can occasionally rely fon subjective, socal, and other criteria to decide between theories, There Is, however, an important feature ofscientiflc work that is seldom talked about in philosophical circles, whichis the ate that guldes scientific ingury. Even if scientists cannot always rely on ase of rule to follow, it is clear from the history of science that they must rely on something. An ethos A spin of inquiry. A belief system that tells them thatthe answer to empirical questions wil be found not in deference to authority of deolog- «al commitment—or sometimes even in reason—but in the evidence they anther about the subject matter under investigation. Such a cred, I main- ini, Is the best way of understanding what is special about science. 1 will cal this the scenic tit. ~The scientific attitude can be summed up in a commitment to two principles:°F (1) We care about empirical evidence. { 2) Weare willing to change our theories in light of new evidence. This, of course, does not rule out the idea that other factors may sometimes weigh in, As Thomas Kuhn's work demonstrates, even when we care about evidence it can underdetermine theory choice, which opens the door to extra- ¥ ( empirical considerations/ What must be ruled out, however, is wishful think- ing and dishonesty. In the pithiest version of his ongoing attempt to capture what is distinctive about science, Richard Feynman tell us that “science is what we do to keep from lying to ourselves.”® Perhaps there is no better rendering of the proper mindset behind the scientific attitude than this. Such talk about the attitudes and values of science may be dismissed by ‘some as too vague and unrigorous to be helpful, so let me now be more spe- is approach might entail. What does it mean to care about evidence? Maybe the best way to think about this is to examine what It means not to care about evidence. If one does not care about evidence, Cone is resistant to new ideas. One is dogmatic. Such a person might hold onto their beliefs no matter what the evidence shows. When the scientific attitude says that we must “care about evidence” the idea is that we must be ‘earnestly willing to seek out and consider evidence that may have a bearing on the _srounds for our beliefs 1 some cases this will improve our justification, but in others it may undermine it. Scientists must be open to either. 4 / Tocate about evidence is to be willing to test our theory against a realty that might refute it. It is to commit to hold a belief not because it makes us feel good, seems right, or even coheres with other things that we believe, but because it fits with the data of our experience. While there is a vast titerature in the philosophy of science that shows just how difficult itis some- ‘times to decide between theories on this basis—necessitating all sorts of other considerations such as simplicity, fruitfulness, and coherence—this does not change the underlying creed of science: where its availabe, evidence should dtive scientific theory choice.” ‘Of course, with some topics, we might not care about evidence because itis irelevant. Ifthe subject is math of logic, then evidence will not make a difference because anything at issue can be resolved through reason. But when an empirical subject is under investigation, this kind of rejection of evidence is anathema to rigorous inquiry. In science, we seek know edge from experience in order to see what the world is like. Caring about BRESTRS ESHER RR 82 | |The Sclentifc Attitude -nce is fundamental because it is the only way to shape our knowledge closer and closer to the reality that we seek to know. One might imagine here alist of traits. The person with a good scientific stitude is humble, earnest, open-minded, intellectually honest, curious, and self-critical. The danger here, however, is that we cannot simply make the sc ‘entific attitude a matter of individual psychology, nor can we leave it to the ‘jedgment of the individual whether he or she possesses these traits. For one ‘what to do about the denialist or pseudoscientist, who might say that ‘are about evidence—or even actually believe it—when it is obvious the rest of us that they do not? Such a person may simply be lying to us, they may also be lying to themselves, Ifthe scientific attitude were just matter of how one feels about whether one cares about evidence, it would ot be possible to differentiate between the genuinely earnest person who searching for a way to test their beliefs against experience versus the ideo- “opues who are deluded into thinking that they care about evidence merely they cherry pick facts that confirm their prior beliefs. Instead /the Sentifcatitude must be measured by our actions, and these actions are best ged not by the individual, but by the larger community of scientists, who the scientific atitude asa guiding ethos.* To care about evidence is thus actin accordance witha well-vetted set of practices that have been sanctioned by scientific community because they have historically led to wel justified belie. This is not to say that the process of science is perfect, Even when we ‘embrace it, the scientific attitude probably cannot eliminate all of the lists and pseudoscientiss who say that they have it, even when they not. Whether they are fooling themselves or others, itis sometimes hard ell Likewise, there may be scientific researchers who sometimes get too to their own theories and refuse to believe what the data tell them.* 1s the line between these two camps? Even ifthe scientific attitude ot draw a firm logical or methodological division between science and imposters, it can at least expose a basic lacuna in values that are illumi- d by how we behave in the face of contravening evidence. ‘What is evidence? It is probably impossible to define all of the different gs that may count as scientific evidence. Statistical, qualitative, or even orical evidence may exist across different empirical endeav data we get from experience that affects our rational degree of belief in ‘theory. Sometimes this data is quantitative and can be measured directly. times it is diffuse and must be interpreted. Either way, scientists{ Chapter 3 Should agree that evidence Is cruclal in choosing or mouliying a sclentiic theory There are, however, many competing theories of what it means for sclen- sts to se evidence ina rational way. As Peter Achinstin writes Scientists fequenydsagie about whether, oo what exten, some set of data or observational els constite evidence fora scent hypohess Daca ments may be over empl mates, suchas wheter the dae een nee ‘sls are comet, or whether ote relevant empital novation bay lore. But conics also arse becaute sents are employing mmenerene ‘concepts of evidence.” Entire books have been writen about these ferent concepts of evidence, and ther various strengths and weaknesses in explaining how the ane ay experience either door donot lend support toa scenic theory) might shock those outside the philosophy of probebilty and statist to ee that there are competing accounts of what iis appropriate to infec nan one an the same piece of evidence. There are furious debates for nance over the “subjectivist” approach to probability favored by Bayesian ver Sus the “frequentist” approach offered by Deborah Mayo and others.’ The Scientific attitude may be thought of as compatible with many afferent concepts of evidence: No matter your theory ofthe proper way to use cou dence, the scenic atitude toward evidence sone where you are connie ted tothe idea that evidence s paramount in making up your mind ate Whether a theory is worthy of belie. % (Of course, the best way to appreciate the importance of the scientific attitude Is to see it in action, and I'l soon give few examples. First, how. vet, | would like to address two possible misconceptions. Fist, the scientific attitude Is not meant to be a solution to the problem of demarcation." The 80al of the demarcation project isto find a logical criterion by which one can sort all and only science into one camp, and everything else in the ‘ther. That isa tall order and, as we have seen, virtually every attempt to do {his has falled. This leaves science open to misunderstanding and criticism by those who do not fully appreciate what itis about. The goal of identity. ing the scientific attitude as an essential feature of science is not to wal it off from other disciplines but to show that unless those who make empl cal claims are willing to follow the rigorous standards that define scientific reasoning, they will fall short of the best way the human mind has ever devised of coming to know the empirical world.Chapter 3 lifying a scientific jt means for scien- n writes: nt, some set of data ypothesis. Disagree ata or observational formation is being pying incompatible cepts of evidence, g how the facts of heory. Yt might statistics to learn jate to infer from ates, for instance, by Bayesians ver- and others. The h many different er way to use evi- you are commit. your mind about of the scientific nples. First, how- rst, the scientific emarcation."” The on by which one thing else in the ery attempt to do jing and criticism > goal of identify- e is not to wall it sho make empiti- t define scientific n mind has ever The Scientific Attitude ‘A second possible misconception may involve my intentions. | am not here attempting to give a descriptive account of what scientists actually do because, in any given lab on any given d tific attitude may be in flux. Scientists may occasionally violate the norms of science and then later, one hopes, come back into line." Insteady| offer the scientific attitude as a normative ideal, by which we may judge whether some individual scientist or entire field of inquiry is living up to the values Of science. As we've seen, science is not based on some formula, as the scien- tific method promised. Neither is it strictly a matter of some all-or-nothing Judgment about logic or methodology. Science is defined by a set of prac- tices that are embedded in the values upheld by the people who perform it This is not to say that science is solely justified (or not) by what it does. Practice is important but it is not the only thing that matters in judging science. I say this because one strain of argument against the methodologi- cal approach to the philosophy of science over the last few decades has been that, because science does not always follow the precepts that the logic of science would dictate, science must be no better or worse than any other form of inquiry. I believe this conclusion to be misguided. Although myself eschew a methodological defense of science, my approach too is rooted in the idea of rational justification. I may not agree with the tradi- tional idea that in order to defend science one must draw a rigid distinction between facts and values, but I do not believe that science is hopelessly sub- jective either. Although objectivity is important, values play a role by guid- ing our practice and keeping us on track. This isto say that even though the practice of science may sometimes fall short, it is still possible to justify science as a whole based on the goals of its aspiration. ‘To recognize the role of practice in understanding science does not diminish the importance of its ideals. Though some may cheat or do sloppy work, this does not mean that science is unjustifiable. Just as it does not undermine the logic of science to say that individual scientists are some- times irrational, it does not undermine the values of science to point out that some practitioners have occasionally betrayed the scientific attitude. Indeed /this is why itis important to champion the role of group scrutiny in judging scientific work. The standards of science are upheld not just by the individual, but by the community of scientists, who have developed a set of tools to keep it honest. This is why the scientific attitude is a norma- tive rather than a descriptive thesis. Humans sometimes cheat on an ideal y, One's commitment to the scien- x ) ?™ os me lee as os ma = = me or = = oe = =e = os ot = st wa =e Chapter 3 tion. And thisis exactly what the scientific attitude allows one to do, What Makes sclence distinctive isnot merely what it does, but what it sims to do. Despite any mistakes made by the individual, itis the ethos ot science that affords it such great epistemic authority.” | eae when they believe init. In such a case, its up to others to offer corec- ‘Two Examples of the Scientific Attitude Given that, Iwill now pursue | sconces a example from chemistry (coldfusion), which demonstrates what can happen when the scientific attitude is compromised," For this strategy to be credible, attitude. I think this is not an unrea: l instance, turn to Newton's theory of gravty or, beter ye, to Einstein’s gen- eral theory of relativity. Given the head start we have from Popper's reliance Given the unquestionably scientific status of modern ‘medicine, itis hard to believe that more than two hundred years after the start of the scientific ‘evolution in the seventeenth century, medical care was still in the dark |" 482s. AS late as 1840, medical care still had not enjoyed the discovery of by medica ‘Were the 1 students a students to with childbChapter 3 offer correc- 0 do. What ‘aims to do. cience that st about sci- 0 promised astronomy. rtues of the 1" example ppen when lief that it ‘of physics e scientific could, for stein’s gen- r’srellance having the the reader attitude of nples from is example mpel, who the virtues ns to high- icattitude, ch Hempel about how 6. e itishard e scientific n the dark scovery of ‘The Scientific Attitude anesthesia (1846), the germ theory of disease (1850), or antiseptic surgery (1867). One problem is that even when discoveries were made, there were fer agreed-upon routes for disseminating the information or overcoming the objections of skeptcs."/Experimental methods took a back seat to intu- ition and tradition. This makes it all the more remarkable that in 1846, at the Vienna General Hospital, we see one of the greatest examples of the Scientific attitude in full flower. Ignaz Semmelweis was a lowly assistant physiclan in the world's largest ‘maternity clinic, which was divided into two wards. In Ward 1, childbed fever (also known as puerperal fever) was rampant and the mortality rate as s high as 29 percent; in the adjacent Ward 2, the rate was only 3 per scent. Another piece of relevant information was that women who deliv. fred their babies at home or even on the way to the hospital in a “street Birth” had a much lower incidence of childbed fever/What was so differ. fnt about Ward 1? Various hypotheses were offered. One was that Ward 1 was overcrowded. When Semmelweis counted up the patients, however, fhe noted that the overcrowding was in fact much worse in Ward 2 (per. haps because ofall those women avoiding the nototious Ward 1). It was then noted that, because of the physical layout in Ward 1, the priest who Jas summoned to give last rites to women who were dying of childbed ever was required to pass by many other beds—all while ringing a bell hich might put great fear into the other women and pethaps increase heir chances of contracting childbed fever, In Ward 2, the priest had direet ‘cess to the sickroom. Semmelwels decided to try an experiment in which Hpeasked the priest to take adiferent, silent, route to the sickroom in Ward 1, Dut the mortality rate from childbed fever stayed the same, Other tests involving whether the women lay on their sides or their Packs while giving birth were similarly frutless/Finally it was noted that ‘one of the main differences was that in Ward 1 the deliveries were handled Sby medical students, whereas in Ward 2 they were performed by midwives Jere the medical students giving rougher examinations? After the medical Students and the midwives changed places, the mortality ates followed the ‘Medical students, but still no one knew why. After instructing the medical Students to use gentler techniques, the mortality rate still did not improve Eventually, enlightenment came in 1847 when one of Semmelweis’s ‘colleagues received a puncture wound during an autopsy on a woman Frith childbed fever, and died of an illness that appeared to have the samecu ow a a > = * = = = > ~ = = - 2 = = - =< , ut also {or why “street births” saw such a low incidence of ‘hildbed fever. Eventu- Ally, Semmelweis was forced to broaden his hypothesis to include the idea ue by one. When a hypothesis flamed out, he moved on to the next one, {caving himself open to learning new information along the way. Finally, When he found the answer—and later broadened ithe changed his ideas based on the new data Did he “care about empirical evidence”? Clearly he did. By controlling the circumstances and testing is ideas against actual experience, Semmel- se of childbed fever could not be “willing to change his theory based on he sence”? Again the answer is yes. Not only did Semmelweis his hypothesis each time one was ref bat the correlation was undeniable. Semmelweis hed Shown that “lack of cleanliness” was responsible for childbed feverTe Scientific Attitude 35 credibly, this idea was resisted and ignored for decades. Despte Sem > “refutable” theories retain thei refutablty ‘Bis Intellectual autobiography, Popper reflects on how he first came to ‘dea of falsification and draws a connection between the critical atti. ‘and the scientific attitude: hat Impressed me most was Elnstein’s own clear statement that he would Sszesd his theory as untenable if t should fa in certain tests, Thus he wrote, 4Sr example: “Ifthe redshift of spectral lines due tothe gravitational potent Should not exist, then the general theory of relativity will be untenable.” Here snes an attitude utterly diferent from the dogmatic attitude of Marx, Freud, Ader, Zod even more so that oftheir followers. Einstein was looking fr crucial exper, ‘ments whose agreement with his predictions would by no means establist his Secory while a dsagreement, as he was the fst to stress, would show his theory fobe untenable. This, felt, was the true scientific attitude t was utterly dfferest from the dogmatic atitude which constantly claimed to find “veriications" for 4s favourite theories. Thus I arrived, by the end of 1919, a the conclusion that the scientific attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look or verfieations; 7 = 7 “ a a = = > oe ~ = = = - - = = = = Chapter 3 but for ucla tet; tests which could refute the theory tested, although they could never establish it. | applaud this account. There is an important aspect of the scientific attl- (tude that ts captured in Popper's insight about falsificationism,/| disagree ‘with Popper, however, that the best way to capture this critical atitude is to reduce it toa methodological principle that serves as a criterion of demarca. fon. As Popper recognizes, there is something special about the attitude that Scientists have toward the power of empirical evidence. But need this be a ‘matter of logic? %/- Kuhn also recognized the ‘importance of the scientific attitude. This fact is offen overlooked, owing to the enamored response that Kuhn's account of science received at the hands of the “Strong Programme” of sociology of science, which argued that all scientific theories—both true and false Could be explained by sociological rather than evidential factors, and were thus in some sense relative to human interests. Kuhn, however, was dis. ‘mayed by this interpretation of his work and resisted the idea that nature didn't matter to scientists. As one commentator writes: Kuhn «was deeply troubled by the developments in the sociology of science ink tiated by the Strong Programme... Kuhn was concemed thatthe proponents of {he Strong Programme misunderstood the role that values playin scence... He Complained that the Strong Programme's studies of science “leave out the tole of {nara Kuhn, though, Insists that nature pays a significant role in shaping scents’ beliefs “1 While Kuhn took seriously the idea that theories must be compared to \ one another, they must also be tested against empirical evidence. Kuhn writes: {he word isnot inthe las respectful of an observers wishes and desires; quite ‘apsble of providing decisive evidence against invented hypotheses which fil to ‘match its behavior. “(Unite Popper Kuhn may not have framed this as an “attitude” that stood behind the methodology of science, but Kuhn nonetheless recognized the | important role that empirical evidence could play in helping scientists to Gscide between theories and saw that commitment to the value of empiri. \. cal evidence was necessary for science to go forward. One is thus left with the question of why neither Popper nor Kuhn went ‘0 far as to make the values of science—either the critical attitude or respect.ee Scientific Atitude 59 Ss she idea that nature could overrule our wishes and desiresthe basis SS Sstungulshing between science and nonscience.* For Kuhn, the enses Spsshops easier: although he fel that scence was special, and took great B fo come to terms with how science actually worked, he did not wish ‘himself to any formal criterion of demarcation.2 Popper, on the other overtly dd wish to do this, soit is perhaps more of alive question Bedid not make more ofan attempt to find within the critical attitude an explanation for what is distinctive about it. One could argue, that he did precisely this through his acount of falsification. Yer Hevel this fas to come to grips with Popper’ strategy of drawing a jon between the way that science operates versus how philosophers > justify it, juxtaposed aguins his deep ambivalence over how te deat the fact that practical considerations could sometimes threaten the ‘of his logical account of demarcation. Even within one of his clearest ts that falsification isa logical solution to the problem of demance, Popper writes: “what isto be called a ‘science’ and who is to be called g Y must always remain a matter of convention or decision.” Clearly Be understood the importance of flexibility, having a critical atitade, eccasional deference to practical matters. Stil, he yearned to have an ely lagical bass for drawing a distinction between what was scence Pehat was not. I think that this distracted him from recognizing the fall Sof something lke the scentifc attitude, which may not have seemed a enough to satisfy his mandate fo logical demarcation, Af. even deeper root ofthe scientific attitude may be found at the very ing Of when philosophers started to think about the methodology of Although he is primarily remembered today for his work on score method, the idea that there are special “virtues” that attach to scientific ty can be found in Francis Bacon’s 1620 masterpiece The New Organon. Sx he offers virtues like honesty and openness as inextricab the good practice of science, Bacon asserts tha but it must be embedded within the appropriate va Rose Mary Sargent has maintained that the modern quest fo objec bin the defense of science—where one attemps to bifurcate fats rom ‘Tepresents a perversion of Bacon’s ideas.”? It ‘may seem ironic that the ‘most often associated withthe idea of scientific method would ales dt the dea that scientific practice must be pursued with the appropdateChapter3 attitude, but one has only to read the preface and first fifty aphorisms of The ‘New Organon to confirm Bacon's intention. X/ _Imhis subsequent work The New Atlantis (1627), Bacon also pushed for { the idea that these scientific virtues must be expressed not only by individ- ual practitioners, but also by the community of scientists who would judge and uphold them. In her paper “A Bouquet of Scientific Values,” Noretta Koertge recounts the communal nature of Bacon's vision for science. She writes, “Bacon's dream of a new science comprised not only a new meth- odology but also a community decicated to the task.” Thus we see that a fairly robust account of the scientific attitude has been there all along, practically since the birth of talk about “scientific method.” (Finally, the roots of the scientific attitude may perhaps be appreciated by analogy with another philosophical field that can trace its origins all the way back to Aristotle. In Alasdair Macintyre’s classic After Virtue, he asks us to consider the merits of his “community practice” approach to normative ethics by way of a chilling thought experiment about science: Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series ‘of environmental disasters ae blamed by the general public onthe scientists. Wide- spread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and. instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning, and executing the remaining scientiss. Later still there isa reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it vas. But all that they possess are fragments: ‘a knowledge of experiments cetache¢ from any knowledge ofthe theoretical con- text which gave them significance; prts of theories unrelated either to the other bits and pleces of theory which they possess or to experiment; instruments whose use has been forgotten; haf-chapters from books, single pages from articles, not always fully legible because torn and charred. Nonetheless all these fragments are reembodied in a set of practices which go under the revived names of physics, chemistry and biology. Adults argue with each other about the respective merits of relativity theory, evolutionary theory and phlogiston theory, although they possess only a very partial knowledge ofeach. Children learn by heart the survi {ng portions ofthe periodic table and recite a incantations some of the theorems of Euclid. Nobody, or almost nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural science in any proper sense at all." ' 2 m = fe a a = = = ~ 2 cal = Ss = = 3 J In such a world, what would be missing? Precisely the thing that makes sci- ence so special. Even if we had all of the content, knowledge, theories—and even the methods—of science, none of this would make sense without theThe Scientific Attitude = to occur in the frst place. Here the analogy between virtue ethics and scence fs made explicit." In. ES sat cthical debate that has come down tous since Aristotle, some have cts right is not their adherence to some norma Moral theory that purports to delineate our duties based on how well ‘makes moral behavior moral is the virtue of the People who perform Bsople with good moral character behave morally, ‘morality is what moral sean mila: move now be made inthe debate over science? I do not epeite 50 simple to say that science is simply what sclentise a Bete debate over ethics, we have also to consider the nature ony origin deity n,n how they are implemented and judged by the wider nn nips Nonethcles, the analogy s intriguing: maybe we nects focus ‘on demarcating scientific from nonscientitic theories « Ais work is just beginning in the field of virtue epistemology, which ds by analogy with virtue ethics: if we want to know. whether a belief Pstifed, perhaps we would do well to focus at least sonre of our attention She character, norms, and values ofthe people whe hold it. The appli- Of this to problems in the philosophy of science 1s ‘there has already been some excellent work in applying the insights of pistemology to such thomy problems as lunderdetermination and sory choice in the philosophy of science.* Thope itis clear by now that I do not seek to make a Priority claim for stentific attitude. This idea has a long history that goes back through, Spper and Kuhn, at least to Francis Bacon, and arguably to Aristotle, a OPE t0 emphasize is thatthe sclentific attitude has bees woefully. mpicted in the philosophy of science. t can nonetheless lay a crucial in understanding and defending science by illuminating an essential ure that has been missing from many contemporary accounts. If we Ss &cusively on method, we may miss what scence i mos essentially= o = - aa a 7 = ‘a = Ct - = 2 = = ~ os ca = = ws = Conclusion In previous accounts, some philosophers of science have felt that the best ‘way to defend science is to come up with a logical justification of its method, rather than look at how science is actually done. When this resulted in a cri terion of demarcation that purported to sort all and only science to one side of the ledger—and all and only that which was not science to the other— trouble ensued. For this reason, it seems a virtue of the scientific attitude that it is flexible enough to capture why scientific explanation fs distinc- tive, yet robust enough to ensure that even without a decision procedure, ‘we can still tell whether inqulry Is scientific. Having a scientific “attitude” toward evidence may seem soft, yet it captures the essence of what it means to be scientific. Whether this is an observation about the context of discov- ‘ery (how science actually works) or the context of justification (a rational reconstruction after the fact) matters litte. For I think that the greatest threat to science’s credibility comes not from some philosophical distine- tion between the way that scientists do their work and the method we use to justify it, but instead from the improper introduction of ideological com- mitments into the scientific process. And the scientific attitude is a bulwark against precisely this sort of ideological infection.” ‘The idea behind the scientific attitude is simple to formulate but difficult to measure. It nonetheless plays a crucial role both in explaining how sci- cence operates and in justifying the uniqueness of science as a way of know: baa pees {s successful precisely because itembraces an honest and critical attitude toward evidence (and has created a set of practices like peer review, publication, and reproducibility to institutionalize this attitude). Of course, science is not always successful. One can have the scientific attitude and still offer a flawed theory. But the power of caring about empirical evidence is that we (and others) may critique our theory and offer a better one, When wwe are trying to lea about the empirical world, evidence must overrule other considerations." The evidence may not always be definitive, but it cannot be ignored, for the check that it gives us against reality is the best ‘means of discovering (or at least working toward) the truth about the world, ‘This highlights again the tentative nature of any scientific theory. /The scientific attitude is fully consonant with the idea that we can never be sure that we have the truth: all theories are provisional. But this is as it should be, for what is distinctive about science isn't the truth of Newtonian orThe Scientific Attitude kinstinian theory, but the proces by which those theories came tobe war- ranted. Scientific theories are believable not merely because they fit with the data of our experience, but because they are bull through a proces that respects sensory evidence and the Idea that our untutored hypotheses can pe improved by a clash with the searching criticism of other sclentists who have sen the same data, We are reminded again ofthe fragility f science, for it depends on the walingnes ofits practitioners to embrace the scientific attitude. No matter how reliable our method, science could not work without the forthright and cooperative spit of scientists/if we want tobe scientist, our commit ment cannot be to any given theory (even Our own) oF any Ideology, but ust be tothe scentific attitude itselt. Other factors may count, but in the nd they ae and always shouldbe trumped by evidence. While this may Sound meager, it the heart of what is distinctive about science.