ee ee UE ee ee eee ne Volume 1: Kampfgruppe Peiper. Stoumont, Te Cetree } oS \ oeDuel in the mist The Leibstandarte during the Ardennes offensive. Volume 1: Kampfgruppe Peiper. Stoumont, December 19th, 1944. Stefan De Meyer, Timm Haasler, Roddy MacDougall, Simon Vosters, Hans Webermodeller publications Published! by AFV Modeller td 76 Newbridge Street Newcastle upon Tyne NEI 2TE Unwed Kingdom Tek Q191 209 1107 ‘emul: info@afvmodellereom www atvmedellercom All sights reserved. No part of this book may he reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electionic or mechanical including photocopying, scaning, recording or by any information age and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the authors. ‘The authors bave tried to ensure that in every case permission 10 use copyrighted material was obtained, Any reader who requires further information regactling this is invited to contact the authors Cover at Ron Volstad Design: Simon Vasters Typeset in Tp Garsmond Painted by Regal Printing Hid. ia Hong Kong, China ISBN: 978-0-9555413.0.8 Copyright © 2007 AFV Modeller Led., De Meyer, Haasler, MacDougall, Vosters, Webery Table Introduction . Chapter 1: Prelude to the battle 26.6.0. ee es Chapter 2: First contact in the dark Chapter 3: Panzer Yoram! ... Chapter 4: Duel in the mist. Chapter 5: Breakthrough Chapter 6: Retreat! 6.0... Chapter 7: Towards Stoumont station Chapter 8: The Americans reorganize Chapter 9: The end of the road... Chapter 10; Stalemate of ContentsChapter 11: Consolidating the line Chapter 12: Counterattack Chapter 13: The search for gas... Chapter 14: The Germans withdraw Chapter 15: Towards La Gleize .... Appendix 1: $S-Panzerregiment 1 between Normandy and Ardennes Appendix 2; War crimes committed by Kampfgruppe Peiper at Stoumont Appendix 3: Order of Battle 2./ SS-Panzerregiment 1 during the Ardennes offensive Appendix 4: Camouflage Patterns and Markings Bibliography 193 251 270 273‘a ne Wee Eva A Pe Foreword by Major General Michael Reynolds CB Author of The Devil's Adjutant, Men of Steel and Sons of the Reich Hitlers law offensive in the West in December 1944 became lenown as the Battle of the Bulge. It developed! into the laggest land battle ever fought by the US Army. His plan cae for tier Armies under Generlfedmarschall Model, break theough the American front in the Ardennes, coss the MELSE tiver and then exploit 10 the great port of ANTWERP. This, it was hoped, ‘would cut off the Batish 2ist Army Group and the US 9th Army fiom the 1est of the allied front, causing mass siurenders, Filer sa fs the basis for another "Dunkirk Ss-Ohersruppentiiser Sepp DietieNs Gh Panzer Army on the right flatk ofthe attack was destined to gain the major honours sn the forheoming campaign. ‘The detailed plan called for $5- Oberfahrer Wilhelm Mohnke's Ist SS Panzer Division Lelbstandaite Adolf Hitler and SS Standartenfoeer Hugo Kraas's 1h 8S Panzer Division Fitleugend w take the lee ad form an allpowerful wave which would sunge (o and across the MEUSE, fiver south of LIEGE In the éth Panzer Army oder, these divisions were ordered to effer “ruthless anc! raped penetration And! to bypass opposition whenever possible. For this ask exch division Formed four Kampfagruppen (KG), but the main stent +vas concentrated in one armovred Kamplgrappe - KG Peiper ia the Case of the Leibstandae une! KG Kuhlmann i that of the Pitleriagend “Three days afer the stan ofthe offensive KG Kuhlmann hac! been Iuked after an advance of only some 6 iam and akhousdt KG, Peiper had adsanced over 60 kr, its supply lines were cut, it was desperately sho of fel and ir was ata faction oF is original Strenggh = twenty-four tans as opposed to the 117 with whicd i had started, Surpisingly, only a few of those tanks missing when, the KG reached the village of STOUMONT on the fourth day of the offensive had been knocked out, he others had esther Dbroken down or were cutoff from the vane. Tihs book describes the actions of KU Voiper over a. 24 hour period - 4 period that saw the KG's attempt to pula stil fardher {o the west through the village of STOUMONT, reach ss high, ‘water mark only 6 km later and finally be Forced to wit in the face of overwhelming srengsh and lack of resources, ‘This account is writen ip astounding deal - over 36,000 words, ling copious reference notes, and many previously "unpublished photographs ane movie stl. Jn order fo understand the depth of research this has involved, Whe reader should compare i¢ with the 5,000 words I wrote in my own book, Zhe Deoits Adusant, wn descnbing the sane actions ip the Same period. Del in the mist” is not only an important reer bool, ut it isa fine cute co che soldees of boah sides, Pew books have named so many of those who paricipated in one particular bathe, comonerd tc all Uiove intrested in SOW, the Bathe of the Bulge ana in aricular KG Peiper Major General Michael Reyaolds CB, January 2007The team "The publication of this book has only been made possible by the very close coopenition of 4 team of enthusiasts. The team members have each made a unique contribution 10 this project that has allowed it to become a remarkable sum of pats that is a “fist” for a serious study of history. It is only fair Co each of the individual team members to include « brief summary of theis coniibutions which have allowed this book to he what itis and would have been impossible for one person to achieve on their own, Stefan De Meyer has buted! unique photographs from his extensive photo collection gathered over decacles. bas spent many hours ensuring that the finished results within these pages are of the highest quality possible, Timm Hassler ane Hans Weber were responsible for the vast majority of the text. They were able 10 use their extensive connections with veterans fron both Germany and the United States to piece together a story that has been told many times before bur never before with such attention 10 detail and accuracy. Simon Vosters was heavily involved in the research of both US and German records for the project. He also did all of the layout and the remarkable arcwork for the colour profiles, Roddy MacDougall successfully identified the relationship between assembly plants anc! camoullage pers ‘which resulted in appendix 4 and was responsible for the vast majority of the captions. He also played a major role in creating the colour profiles. This book has always been a team Project und could never be the Work of one person, each of the team members has conibuted specialist knowledge or skill without which this book could aot be what i i, We encourige our readers to contact us at bookteam@afvmodellercom if you have additional information on this subject. We strongly believe that information not shared could bbe lost forever Every piece of information has its own value and while appearing to he insignificant, it could be the key fo solving some of the unanswered questions in this book. We would urge you to contact us and rest assured chat your help and support will he rewarded and acknowledged Stefin De Meyer (Belgium), Timm Haasler (Germany) Roddy MacDougall (Scotland), Simon Vosters (Belgium), Hans Weber (Switzerland) February 2007Acknowledgments December 9th, 1944 was 2 cold and gloomy winter's day ln the Belglan anSeanes, Three days before, on Dec. 6th, 1944 Nazi Germany: bad launched. ts last-major offensive on the Wee Front, The brunt af this auack io the nlary sense 935 borne by the Americans, who later refered to ft as "The Rare of the Dulge’, Belgians jn this region prefer the expression LOtfensive de son Rundsted” while the Germans simply sy ‘Tie Andennenofensive™. The war wasn" Won oF lst om this day nor wis the outcome of the whole campaign decided. Is lamportance in historical and miliary terms is debatable ane the subject mater was chosen mote by coincidence than by design But people ded on this day that would have lived on i Hier anc hs Generals hadnt set in motion theie war machine in their vain uempt i tepeochice the highly successful manceuce that het wan the West 1 Germany in 1940. This book ts dedicated 10 those people who lost their lives ancl to their loved ones, thet death in each and every case fs 2 personal tragedy regardless of theie navionality ‘Today, the Botle of the Bulge has become a popular subject for people interested in historical mucters for variots neasons, be it historians, lary rosearchows, wees, modellers and veterans, If you hold this book in your hands now, you way well fll into ‘one ofthese categories and frankly these are the people we hid in mind suring itn che fist place After moce than 60 years, the men and women who have lived through these dreary days however have become fess. But the interest of the general public in subjects of Weed War I emiins ‘uniltering zn! has not diminished through time, as the countess publications, documentaries, lectures ew ates. On the other side ff the coin, you might also think that yet another book about Kamplgruppe Peiper during the Balle of the Bulge is an ‘exiniple of how c@ beat a subject eenain death. However we think that the aurhorative story of the Leibscandare and is Aled ‘opponents during the Ardernes offensive has not been wot so Fue. We are no s9 sn as to think thar this will be any liferent ‘when we have told eur story, of which this Fist volume is only a chaptet, We have really tied to make the difference this time by combining many different aspects inte one complete story that ‘ill please ot ust the historian bot also the bobby’ researcher, the military modeller as well as those wie are simply interested in military history. Ths was our goal and also the reason five ccothuslasts ftom four differeat counts set ahour this project as tea, each of them with specific sills, knowledge and areas of finerest. We have £0 admi€ that the timely arrival of the world swide web has also helped a lot Based! on primary sources from various archives in the United. States and Germany we added the personal recollections of veterans from both sides involved in the Bate of SIOUMONT oa, Decemiser 19th, 1944, We tried to back up the stony with numerous original pictures that had been taken ducing and afer the bate. To our real surprise these picures ‘question and disprove many inaccuracses spre! by many authors ‘over and over again dusing the lat 60 years. The maps should haelp to understand how the battle was fought and schich Forceswere in fact engaged. Accunite colour profiles help to ilusrate the difference between the vaious fighting machines as well as feiing the reader a eal impression on how tanks and other combat vehicles looked during the Bale of the Bulge Publishing a book s eaely « one-person undertaking and daring the process, we me: muany people along the path that deserve to bbe mentioned for theie contnibution. We are very indebxed for their belp and assistance First of all wd like to thank David Thomson who lkindly and ‘unselfishly offered his belp when needed. Danny 5. Parke, a eal specialist when it comes to the Leibseancarte an! its role in the Bale of the Bulge, needs to be thanked for his oustanding contributions Danny provided so many unknowa files fom the Malmedy ial and bejped us to identity the enews of the 2nd ompany of the S-Panzerogiment 1. We ales have to thank Wolf Dell Mauder for providing so much informacion on the fate of the crews and the tanks of the 2nd Company. Ir has been more than 60 years since the Rare of STOUMONT. aod this book wold aot have been writen withott the Suppodt of many German and Ainesican veterans who were very helprl in providing us wich dewailed satements on the whereabouts of ibeie respective units during and before the Bate of the Bulge. Theis accounts foun a unique and incredible amount of Information We would hike 10 thank the following German ser. Amt Fischer, Rol Reiser, ans Fiennecke, Daniel Mayer, Walter Schiénzen, Georg Bunda, Wilhied Hole, Hans-Geoge Holes, Walter Ropetct, Wemer Ackermann, Ono Fischer, Heinz Neck, Walter Sele, Manfred ‘Thorn, Weener Koscelst, Karl Westen (all S+Panzerregiment D, Reeman Staite (SS-Panzensenadirregiment 2), Rudk Jannke oS-Panseranllerieginent 1, Wilhelm Diewich’ (SS Panzetnachrichienabreflung 1), Werner Wendt Gehwere $5 Panaerabteilang 501) and Beano Kanfeldt (Panzenegiment 16) On the American side We ate very grateful 1 have received ‘information frome Alber A. Darago, Harey Lane anid Leon E. Kent (GIL 1434 AAA Gua Bo), Camis A Mavtll and Jolin E, Lovell both 1191 Inf Reb. veterans for their assist For the use of their photos we would like 40 thank: Fredkly Lemate, Genird Gregoire, Lee Archer and Bill Auedbach, Bruno Renoult, Rudi Huber, the Bundesarchiv Filmaschiv Berlin, Ullstein Bild, MNZS and Daniéle Guerlain Grom Transit Fil, Although noe part of the core teem we couldn’ do withott the acuve hardware and software suppott of Kon Wolstad, Thomas Jen, Hilay 1. Doyle, john P. Meore and Woady Vondrucel (Our thanks ako go to Marin Bleck, Thomas Fischer Lukas Feed), Jom Hintichs, Inge Junker, Sebastian Klann, Hans Pealen, Aled Schulte, Peter Tagliem, Jens Wesiemeier, Sieve Zalogg and especially Waeron Wasson, Lonnie R. Speer and Dave Spitz for providing information, sources or helping 10 establish contact Foner veterans, Christoph Weber and Jen Jenkins for proofreading the smanuscript “Thank you Missing tyme and Feldgra Last but aot feast our heat thanks 10 our families for hel Uunvalligg supp and undersanding that we "ast had ta do i Febuary 2007 Stefan De Meyer, Timm Haasler, Roddy MacDougall ‘Sinon Vosters, Hans WeberIntroduction What bad bappened before? When the Ardennes offensive finally sane at 0530 on Dec. 16th, 1944, Kampfigruppe Peiper was already lined up along, ‘the foud R61 waiting for the signal to start their engines and io fmuve into the direction of dheie main objective, the bridges ofthe MEUSE River sn the area of LIEGE. However frustration ws slowly sing because the two GrenadierRegiments of 12. Vollsgrenadier Division tasked with opening dhe Amer lines for the Kampignuppe had run into massive opposition at BUCHHOLZ STATION aed in font of LOSHEIMERGRABEN, 1 was only in the aftemeon that tho: Kampfgaippe saned to move west and when ic had reached LOSHEIM, darkoess 3s already falling. (soon became clear that 12.” Volksgrenadier Division sill badn’ cleared LOSHEIMERGRABEN and. the railroad-brdge leacling north from LOSHEIM was also destroyed preventing the Kamplgruppe from moving along their designated Toute. AI LOSHEIM, Osiulia Peiper learned that the 3, Fallschiemjiger-Division, attacking 10 the left (south) of 12, Volksgrenadier Division, had taken LANZERATH aginst heavy resistance at dusk) Using a secondary road via MERLSCHEID, the smell hamlet of LANZERATH as reschod before midnight. Realizing that the paratroopers had stopped their advance after ceaing LANZERATH, frustaion again Was Within Peiper. He intended %9 continue moving on through the night ard therefore requested one bavalion of paratroopers Fit the commander of Fallschinmiiger Regiment 9 in order (0 protec his tanks in the woods henween LANZERATEL and HONSTELD, his rhext goal In the very early hoary of Dee. 17h, 1944 the Kampigeuppe was moving agin afier the 1. SSPanaerkomps had authorized the stachment of the paratrooper batalion, Passing RUCHNOLE STATION without meeting any resistance to speak of, the fist, elements ofthe Kamplgruppe waclied HONSFELD before cistn Here they surprised the sill sleeping American gasrison, Patrols were sent out along the designated route, URey sepoed that the read to the west was impassable, Therefore Uke Kamplruppe ‘maseal noth tomas BCLLINGEN. At the sane time, elements of the Kampfgrippe were atacked by American Forces tll holding their ground in HONSTELD. Casualties were incured on both sides At BULLINGEN the weak American defense lines were quickly oxenwtietmed cisng the easly maming hours snd the capture of 2 small fel depot allowed the Kamptiguppe 10 replenish dhe alveady dovindling Fuel stocks, Kampfgruppe Peiper hl finaly broken shrough she fiss Amesican front ines an] savas mo wonder it now quickly covered ground to the west reaching, TMIRIMONT via MORSCHILECK - MODEASCHEID - SCHOPEEN ONDENVAL around noun. While the Speasheadl Conipany wet! 10 use a dit trick direeily running. from THIRIMONT to, LIGNEUVILLE the bulk of the Kamptaruppe with the badly depleted Armored Spearhead Group in the feud used the rod leading noni in order 10 reach the N23, the main highway inning ftom MALMEDY via LIGNEUVILL to St. VITUL at che ceroxsreids called BAUGNEZ. At the same time Battery B, 285th Field Anillery Observation Batalion was leaving MALMEDY, diving south along the N.24 i the direction of ST. VITH in order to support the 7h Armd Div Reaching the crosstoads at BAUGNEZ, the colin came under Fine of the Spitze Carmored speasheakh of Kamplgruppe PeperThe Americans stood no chance against the German eanks and, were quickly overwhelmed. While the German dewchment ‘wasted ao time with the American PoW's and moved on tomsaeds TIGNELWILLE, the Americans POWs were gathered in fell next to the crossroads and later killed in cold blood by elements ofthe Kampfgrappe. Upon reaching LIGNEUVILLE, the Karapfgcuppe had to overcome imino American resistance before moved in the direction ol STAVELOT in the afternoon, The ovtskirs of STAVELOT were ached at cisie small roudblock manned by a group of American combat engineess sopped the. Karmpfemuppe. whieh trad failed to gauge ve true strength of the American defenders, in and around STAVELOT, Ostubat. Peiper intended to proceed his advance early in the nex morning hy seizing he bridge SIAVELOY with the bulk of his Kampfgruppe whule a second up of his Rampéenuppe sas orclered 10 seize the bridges in "TROIS-PONTS via WANNE. During the ely hours of Dec, 18, 181 the Panzergrenadkers of the Kampfuppe sated to infieare imo the southern part of STAVELOT. Heve they experienced, ssrong resistance hy the now reinforced American defenders. A the crack of dawn the tankes stared to descend along the roud from VAU-RICHARD into STAVELOT coming under fire from Ametican antitans guns Iocied on the northern bank of the River AMBIEVE, Sal the Kampfznippe made steady progress Aller the bridge over the ANBLEVE was capnared inact, the “American defense collapsed and fell hick to the non, Instead of Iopping tp the lown and -holiing sf, the Karaptenppe continued its advance on the aorhem hank of the AMBLEVE towards TROS-PONTS. “TROIS. PONTS was reached belons noon, bur ere the American combat engineers managed to blow the Irie in time. Also the attack of the Kampfgruppe’s olier group vis WANNE ended Without success, Whereds Ostubat. Peiper could continue his advice north aloag the AMBLEVE Valloy, the second group was forced to retutn to STAVELOT in order t0 follow the bulk of the Kamplgrappe hy crossing te AMBLEVE bridge. Running out of 818 fear WANNE, only a small portion of this gop managed 0 lini up sith the Kampfgruppe later, the rest had to stay behind, aC WANNE alter STAVELOT had been recaprured bythe Amencans during the allemoon of Dec. Lh, ID, Reaching LA GLEIZE by noon the Kamplgruppe crossed the AMIBLEVE again ncar CHENEUX. Now heading into the direction of WERBOMONT, 1 as sukldenily attacked by American fig bombers for several hours. altiough the kxses infliced were ply of minor Importance for the Kampfgreppe, te loss in time now played a crucial factor Because it gave the Americaa combat enginee's the chance tw prepare the LENNE Bridge at RECFMOULN for demolition, When che Kampigruppe Hinally attved at the bridge at chs, the engineers blew up the bride tunder the eyes of the weary Germans.Prelude to the battle Developments in the evening of the 18th 4, The weather ‘The weither On Tuesday, December 19, 1944 favoured the (German attackers: low cloud ceiling and fog prevented Allied alter fom intervening, Temperatures remained above zero all day which led to the roads deteriorating rapidly. After the ‘motaing fog had cleared, the visibly below cloud cover during the clayight hours was good ur sith heavy’ fg creeping in before dusie The 119th Inf Rar remarked upon the weather a= cloudy and togay. with visibility being poor 2. The German preparation ‘Oswibat Joachim Peiper wgether with Stabal, Wesner Poetschise na Hstut Jose! Diefendhal prepared the anacle on STOUMONT: chuning the night of December 18 -19 while saying ia the estate building east of Chiteaw FROIDECOUR * Peiper planned t take STOUMONT fins and then continie aloag the N33 towards TARGNON and STOUMONT station. further 13 km down the road, at NAZA (called HAUTE by the Americans, the Freneh word forthe neathy rallway stop), minor oad crossed the AMBLEVE tothe west and continued south tonatds WERHOMONT, Peipers ‘eat goal The attack was scheduled to bogin at dawn hur was delayed de to supply problems: a small convey reached the division in the erly moming. This supply column did not move by way of STAVFLOT, hur ststed at KAISERBARACKE, moved east via RECHT - LOGBIERME to WANNE reaching AISSOMONT Nonth of this vllage, a bridge ever the PETIT SPAT 0a the § 23 hetarcen STAY MBLEVE, was located at OF and TROISPONTS ‘When the divisional Haison officer, Hstul, Gethardl Niske, arrived ut the este, he had 19 form Peace about 2 serious situations STAVELOT was buck in American hands, Thus Peiper had noe ‘only lest contact wth his division, but his supply lines wens alsa cout. Reopening, the roule via STAVELOT was therefore an Important goal. Dunng the aight of December the Ish, elements ‘of Kamipgnuppe Krittel reached Kampfgrippe Peiper in LA GLEIZE. Tall ikeihowd, Peiper suguested to the division to use this force to zecapture STAVELOT and re-open his supply route. Permission to send Kampigruppe Knitel back 1 STAVELOT was, finally granted! co Peiper just before noon on Decesnber 19.4 Although imporant elements of the Sampferuppe liad been blocked at STAVELOT by dhe 117th Inf Ry, 3th Inf Division, i sss sll able o fleld one Tiger Tf, edghteen Panubers, ve Paneer IV sand one Hlakpanger IV CWwirbelwind) in the LA GLEIZE seetor To this can be added a substantial number of Schiveeapanzerwagen (SPW, Nor inched in the aforementioned numbers ate Four Tiger I from 2/ S8S-P2.Aht S01 Curset aumbers 204, Hsu, Ruclolf Mobius; 213, Oseha. Paul Klose: 221, Ustil Georg Hanisch ang 223, Ustuf Frang Haha disabled near LA GLEIZE) (One Tiger Il from 1/ 5S8-Pa.Abt. 501 {most ikelyturet nuanber 103, Ost lige Westel-Oscha. Josef Franzed(One Flakpanzer Wirbelwind ftoen 10, SS-Pz-Rgy 1 (Uscha. Ka ‘Worunann, whieh was stil on the way buck fom the LENNE, sector alone with che for Tiger Ms = One Panzer TV (turret number unkaown, Hstuf, Oskar ‘lingelhdfer), which was stil athe move from SEAVELOT to LA, Gurize ‘One Panther (urret number 111, Rot Bahnes), still stranded feat PETIT SPAL with engine uouble; ‘One Panther at CHENEUN which was already destroyed (urret number 131, Osehsa, Adolf Thoraas)? Only the flowing tanks sssembled for the atek on STOUMONT: < Two Befeilapunther (luret_ aumbers 002, former mount of Hitt. Gruble, stall SS-Pe Ret. Land 151, Stubat. Poctschke, sath Pz Ret 1, = One Flakpanzer Wurelwind from 10,Fla $8 P2.Rgt. 1, eleven Panthers trom the 2 SS-P2.Rgl 1 Panther 201: Ostuf Predsich Chaise, CO 2nd company Panther 202: Uscha. Hans Friedrich, company coop leader Panaher 211: Ustuf- Hubert Kaufmann, plateon leader 1 DPaniber 214 Uscha. Rech Papther 215: Uscha. Kriges Panther 221+ Hscha, Heinz Knappich, platoon leader It Parthes 222. Oscha. Waler Ropetcr Panshey 225: Rou Fru Palm Panther 231: Ustuf, Helmuth Koch, platoon leader 1) Danes 232. Uscha, Herbert Drschke Parsher 234 Uscha. Herzog! “Tyee to five Panzer IV's f00 the 6 SS-PA Ret. 1 Panzer G01 or 602: Ostuf. Benoni Junker, CO Gth company Uscha, Walter Wabetz, company troop leader Panzer Bll: Usni Hans Steiniger, platoon lead | Panzer 62S, Qscha. uber Haber Paruer 631: (unknown), fornier tank of Oscha, August Wien platoon Teader i, who bia been killed st BULLINGEN on yra2198 Panzer 64: Rou. Georg eherhardt For the attack on STOLMONT, the 2, SS-P2.Rgt. 1 100k over the role as point company from the 1/"SS-P2.Rge 1 forthe fist time since the offeasive started, The company was commanded by ‘Ossul, Friedrich Chis, a former member c-the Ist Company: He fad been wounded during the Normanéy Campaiga and lator that autumn, he had commanded one of the divisional Reserve “Tank Companies. Ne was not familiar with miich of his new ‘command because he had spent only four weeks wiih his men. Fis outfit wus rated second 20 the 1st Company and this 25, reilected ia the original marching order of the Kamplruppe, ‘where Christ had to bring up the feat of the Beaver Regsinent” ‘hus after the first suemvous days and he invelvernent in the breakthrough at STAVELOT the st Company was finally to have Sime respite anc gether with the Tiger M oF 3. PaGrenet, 2, 94Pi.)/ SSPzRat 1 and the partoopers were given ones ta close in-on STOUMONT through the wooded slopes of che river valley a force composed of paratroopers Ws also ordered to move along the north flank and 16 head for ROW, thus trapping the American Forces in STOUMONT Acconling to a member from 13.0GY SS-Fz.Gren kat. 2 there INere no targets assigned tthe s. IG Kompanie and ts Grille ‘Gel propelted iafanty gans) chat morning due to poor visi Vowever, the batteries of 1/ SSP2AMREE 1 ace sald to have supported! the attack wl indiect fre. 3. The 30th Infantry Division moves to block the German advance ‘0m December 17th, 1944 at 1115, dhe 30h Inf Div under Maj Gen Leland Hobbs was slened © immediate movemien! 10 the uth amo the Sector of V Corps, Ist US Army. Meanltile theix former livisional zone between JOLICHT and ALTDORE bal been taken ‘over by the 29th Inf Division. The fist elements of the division had assembled near HALSET, noth of EUPEN, by midnight of the th. ‘These included the ch Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), the 119h Regimental Combat Team CL19h RCT) eat EYNATTEN and the 823ed Tank Destroyer Batalion. Further ‘orders received from the Ist US Army were to immediately send ‘one regiment south towards MALMEDY. The 117th RCT of the eh Inf Div, which was initially following the L1Sth laf Kg, drew this assignment and movored on ¢o this kecton, During the night dive, orders for dhe regiment were again ‘changed while en route to MAEMEDY. 1st Bp, 117th Inf Ree was finally tasked to seize and hold STAVELOT and the 24d Ibn would reintoyee the defence of MALMEDY, The 2nd Ba sas inset in herwecn oth barons, protecting thei Hanks and holding the line along the AMBLEVE River The 1200 taf Ket was last 10 pul ‘out fiem the orkginal positions as halo continue to defend them until relieved by elements of the 17h Cavalry Reconnatssnce Squadion. This outit had been attached to the Regiment for some time and was now taking aver responsibility For the defence ar the whole sector Atachmen: was subsequent ‘changed tthe 25:0 Inf Division, During ss march, 30¢h In Div reuutked upon ap extremely aetive Luftwaffe with am unknown, umber of planes bombing nd) rating. their convoys. and slropping 2 linge namber of fares. Hewsever, the only knoe less incurred by this enemy activity was time3.1 The deployment of the 119th Regimental ‘Combat Team ‘The Combat Team (GT) formed usdet Co) Edwin M, Sutherland consisted of the following wats 1294h Iofanny Regiment 197 Feld Arillery Baraion Company "A", S23rd Tank Destioyer Battalion Company “B". 103th Engineer (C) Barton ‘Company °A", 105th Meslical Battalion! On December Lh, Col Sutherkind was ordered fist ro proceed fiom dhe assembly area near EYNATTEN vis FUPEN, VERVIERS to THECX ancl to ait therefor furher orders, The Americans ket EYNATTEN shorly after 1300, The situation was unclear. The 1st US Amy feaced the enemy column which had zpypeated! the night before at STAVELOT would move north toacands S04, where the Ammy HQ was located. By the time CT 119 had reached THEUS, this threat hac subsided. Repons of the 117th af Rg inecated that the situation in STAVELOT had stabilized Indeed, ‘Kampfgruppe Peiper hid no intention of roving noah to SPA, but continued west along the N33 (he main route along the AMBLFVE) cowards the MELSE, “This move however now pat IGE and its bridges over the MUSE in dangee of bein taker by dhe Germans. CT 118 therefore deployed to cover the southern approaches into the ey, Alter amiving at REMOUCHAMPS, Gol Sutherland split his reglibent into two groups, The stronger one, consisting of Ist and Sd Bhs, was sent along the northern bank ol the AMBLEVE Rives, to flow the N23 Cinain raid and to actively search for the enemy 26 far 2 TROIS-PONTS, as to block him theve on bis mon dltert approach. 2nd Bn was ondered! to move further south AYWAILLE, WERBOMONI' 10 BASSE-BODECX, 4 km west of TROIS-PONTS, where the route leaving the AMBLEVE valley and leatting west towards WERBOMONT offered the posiility of an Approseh fiom the souil vit AYWAINIE, there owtfnking the 0 other hutfalions. Successful execution of both manoeuvres stoad « good chance of containing the enemy column in the AMBLEVE River valley.” Su Bo, 19th Inf Rr under Lt Col Roy G. Fitgerall Jt. elosed into STOUMONT at 2100, HC detmucked “and took up defensive positions." Following as wegimental eseeve was AS Bn, 19M Int Ret under Col Robert E. Hesiong. According tothe daily report mace by Col Hassenfelt, G-3, 30h Inf Div, the hatalion had reached the rally underpass Wese of TARGNON af 2220, established s rest Dlock there and secured a line west oF the vile of TAGNON thal extendes some say up the wooded slope inte the BOIS DE LASORETE © The regimental Command Pax (CP) self was installed on a farm ‘bear the small aly station LORCE-CHEVRON, next to vide crossing the AMBLEVE, The Americans also calle this place TIALTE, the Frenchy word for railway stop. The Word was ‘ertinly painted on he smal sition builling there, Today, the location i ealled NAZE and consists of ast three buiklings. There js no Tonger any allway stop. The place was of tictical Importance, because it was here that the bridge Peiper intended) to use for his next move crossed the ANBLEVE, Other than the lnidge at Pont de TARGNON near STOUNONT station, this one Jed behind the LIENNE, the iver chat tad pmved such an folsticie 10 Peiper's forces in the closing hours of the Dec 19th. The regiment close! into the new Command Post (CP) at 2045, For th Unit Journal of aM HALTE tp. 29). Ho location of the regimental CP sec 119M nf Reeth G5 Periodical Report for postions of Ist Bo tn the fear. SFOEMONT 5 Pertodical Report 1ay are the same, too Keeping i nid that be atta sat report froma the 1V0Ub tof Ret fox the 18th ‘arrived at the Div HQ only at 0800 the next morning, the ide by ts 0 fuls Ca C. Istoftcer Ls Me. Donakt wivo bad arrived 2095 at the Ahtsional HQ. At 2220, tho Bxecutioe Oper of 1S1D bn Res, Col Brow established telephone contact sits the division cond gave the facatton of the ruiblock manned by Ist Bu as tbe railway underpass near Punt de TARGNON and STOUMONT station as the forward CP of the regiment The regiment stated 1 its Unit Report that the Ist Bn was putting up road blocks in the etcinte ofthe regimental CP The Unit Journal of Ist Br stmpky bas the injormaiton thet the battalion set up defence positions te bold 87 (probably RB) at “LOKCE-CHINRON" fu then lids that Company © was put under regimental contend joo security reasons dite to the futd situation. The road function whic Dad to be defended for the safety of AYWAULLE ats certainly HALTE. I offered the possibilty for Pelper 10 wet ont of the narrose valley and of approaching AYWAIILE ria the relatively open bigh §round from the souls But also the crossing at Pont de TIRGNON tas wari securing. thus the stron road Block at the railway underpass mentioned above Cas A and B ‘were M1 sis axed and bolting the Hine as described t the G5 Periodical Report Co C was detached to protect he mar al WALTE. This leeds 0 aonuiber interesting tstght When the attach on STOUMONT start, the regiment dul ot reinforce 3nd fin with the tae forward compantes instead, it opted for a more cautious ‘approcch and plied them ack 10 the spot tat later became the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) betuve STOUMONT station cand HALTE. placed then: ta defend ibe regimental CP and the vital rad junction This berated oC firm its security dures at HALTE aid explains 10 some «stent ithy the rescue effort was nutber tate and cexwcaed with only one company As stated inthe Ferriss Report, Co © seems to have moved! out trucks att around 1000 (29) Thks version fs at ‘ouds to the message the rextment sent to the division at 0725 the next morning-"Our Ist bn te being nied up t ruinforce our 3rd’. We think the former account fs what ‘actucily happened Flements of dhe 110th und 43rd AAA Gun Bis that happened 1 be ip the same area acted as am emengency antitank sereca for lhe Ist US Anny. Armed sith the powerful 99mm AntiAirral CW gun, they were deployee! immediately t0 suppor the postions OF the 3rd Bia and to cover the roads in the vicinity of the regimens CH 4. American Anti-aircraft Artillery acting as Tank Destroyers The use ofthese Stim AA guns st a great impact on rhe tactical butcome of che bute. & closer look at these mission isin eden, 4.1 The 110th AAA Gun Br (On the morning of the Devermber 17th, 1944 the L10th AAA Gun Bn received orders from Col CG, Patterson, AA Offices, Ist US, Anny to deploy twe Sonim AA guns per battery In the ground, role to defend the northeastern six! the southeastern approaches 1OSPA, Each Mim AA gun wus aecompanied by an M31 Multiple Stvcal MG carrigze (a quadruple AA MG turret on a four-wheel trailer} to provide local security, The remainder of the battalion continued ip the antiauerafi mle AL approximately 2130 the 630th AAA AW Bn was artached! to the batalion, Seven ML 4Onat ‘AA gues anc five MSI's ofthis unit were taetclly deplayed along the read N32 south of SUA. “This anti-tank defence was pulled sat dawn, Dee 18h, al the eight Somm AA guns fecumned 10 their erginal antaneraft pesitions. Ar 1100, the battalion was alerted -prepite far an Inlet fire mission with STOUMONT as probable target. This engagement was subsoquently cancelled at 1425, Battery C having fired a single round. This is lardlly sueptising considering there were no Gernkin unis in STOUMONT at this. point However around noon, Battery D was assigned to-a new antitani hnission at the roud junction just east of STOUNONT station, where the road branches of towards Pont de TARGNON,1-2 The 90mm Ml AA gun is mounted fn a single bogie mount and sas oniginally designed against high-flying heavy bombardment aviation, Developed to provide longer range, seater muzzle velocity and a larger ffecuie shell bust area than the ale 3+ inch guns it rapidly hecame the most success al widely used heavy AA. gun fn Werld Wat IL ‘The YOmm MT AA gun shoule be mace fhe center of an organized stoegpoint supported by infantry and the covering fire of AT of TD guns, Failure edo this Jeaves the gun position open for reduction by enemy foot woops or armour! scout cars, With he battery broken down to single gun fie units, does mot have sufficient personne! or ‘organic equipment 1 defene! ts pesiions in the face of an infantry attack. Where posse, hulldazers should be supplied to dig in $0mm gun positions to reduce the high silhovete Depending on tem it would generally take. abot eight 10 twebe bous to completely dig the gun imo position whenever it moved: to a new lowstion While ground fire bas always been a secondiry mission of the AA, ‘never before was employed on suc a lange scale as during the Battle of the Bulge While their amor piercing ammunition could do aa elective ob against lightly armoured vehicles at fairly long, Ting, they needed well-placed shots at close range to knock out tanks. Generally the AA guaners depended on HE ammunition to keep tanks buttoned up all dhe while, uying to put the acks oat fF action or (6 get shots through the apertures. In face the AA weapons and AT ‘guns proved te be s good partnership i most oF these ground fire missions. Atypical gun crew comisted of thistecr to sixteen men, Some operated dais nel levers oa the gun, cxhers loaded and fred it, and sill otters carted the big shells from a Sorage area esiabiished several meters away. Note that the crew was normally armed with the MI carbine Fron his rank and age the unknown salt Segeant on the lower photo was mast probably the gua section leader. ‘The presence ofa thick layer ef snow and the cover over the gun's muzzle put these photos in the later par af the Ardennes Cffensive. At the time these pictares were taken in the viciniy of MACMEDY, there sas no longer any immediate danger 10 the town frow a ground attack, (2 x Stefin De sever) 4 The Simm MLAA Gan was mounted fon a steel ecruciorm with te af the outrigger folding up for wavel, The gun ‘was towed on its single asl, dual-wheel trage with a divinctive perfored firing platform. Once the crew arrived at their destinaion, the gun would be hacked into position a the crew woul then pull the eursiggers out to the sides and then lower the gun on 1 the mouatiog pads at exch end of the ‘cruciform. They would then level the gun with and operated jacks tha were mounted at the ends of the outriggers, This whole operation could be accomplished! hy. the crew in seven ‘This paricular gun sas pieured on the {Banal December 1943 by Lz Daniel ip the vicinity of MALMEDY (LS Ofte)The coordinates given in the After Action Report (AAR) are wrong: K-608039 ittstead af K-808039. Battery D sent two 90mm guns, two M51’s and fifty men, half of them from 639th AAA AW Bn. These guns were in place and ready to fire by 1700. Gun 2 was commanded by Sgt Joseph Eckenrode and gun 3 commanded by Sgt Lloyd Noteboom. Lt Henry F. Klein was in charge of the whole team. 4AR gives 1430 as the time bere & the Unit Journal notes that Battery D did not i > until 1445. As will be shown later one of these guns played a part stopping the advance of KG Peipe $08 a belt not at ibe that due to the relocations ordered by the 17 December 18th, the coordinates of the din the AAR. gun commanders see Lonitie R. Speer tf0th AAA positions went Miu eF For the Driving Hitler's Crawlin' Coff His account ts bowever mistaken in that be pil r two guns of Battery D at LA REID /CHEFNA instead of AU ROSTER. a, pp At about 1415, two more anti-tank teams were formed from Batteries A and B, each again consisting of two 90mm AA guns, two M51’s and approximately fifty men. Battery A also took up position in the AMBLEVE Valley on the N.33, but further downstream at FOND DE QUAREUX, as did Battery B, another two kilometres downstream at NONCEVEUX. These gun positions were ready to fire at 1730. The three antitank teams were now attached to the 11th AAA Group at AYWAILLE and used to cover the N.33 to fend off the approaching enemy column. Finally, the 110th AAA Gun Bn was attached to the Ist US Army Security Section to deploy the remaining six 90mm AA guns, six M51's and all necessary men to defend SPA. At about 2100 hours these teams were formed following the standard formula of two 90mm guns and two M51's. Inf Ret in ibe night of 4zain, the time in the AAR differs substantially from that i tbe De given is the one found in the in the Unit Report ax ly Raid Report. The time aiter fwo sources, which pla 2s the event roughly 4 bours later The batteries left for their anti-tank positions shortly after midnight. The remainder of Battery A (two guns) took up positions near the crossroads at CHEFNA. This team will feature prominently in the following account of the combat for STOUMONT. Battery B (two guns) deployed near MALCHAMPS on the highway SPA-FRANCORCHAMPS, while Battery D’s two guns, reinforced with two additional M51’s from Battery D, 639th AAA AW Bn, went into position at AU ROSIER, north of ANDRIMONT, where they arrived at about 0400. They reinforced a road block manned by the Security Section of Ist US Army covering a huge gasoline dump just behind them in the woods south of SPA. On December 18th at 1500, these men under Ist Lt Walter E. Butts watched three P-47 Thunderbolts attacking KG Peiper in the AMBLEVE Valley. Two aircraft were shot down by German anti-aircraft fire?! About one hour later, at 1600, the battalion CP near SPA was nearly hit by a bomb and Battery B's position was strafed by friendly aircraft, causing damage to a gun and radar. The seven 40mm guns and remaining five M51’s of 639th AAA AW Bn were again deployed in a ground role along the N.32 by this time. Thus, only Battery C remained in an anti-aircraft role. During the night it fired on three German transport aircraft. Also on December 18th, the battalion was assigned to Task Force Hansen as Field Artillery Support. 1st Lt Israel Chanock, the battalion's communication officer, was despatched as liaison officer to STAVELOT. He managed to obtain two-way radio communication with troops there and a liaison plane to assist in the Field Artillery work.?2 Apparently the same liaison plane was put to good use on the December 19th by the Baitation Curren bimself.4.2 The 143rd AAA Gun Bn The 143rd AAA Gun Bn was stationed at LIEGE and commanded by Maj Myron T. Flemming. Just prior to the offensive, preparations were made to move the battalion into the HOHES ~ VENN to put up an air-defence screen against the numerous V-1 missiles being launched at LIEGE. This deployment commenced on December 14th when reconnaissance parties of each battery moved up front to secretly survey the battery and radar positions in the area of MONSCHAU. This mission was cancelled two days later under the duress of the sudden German attack and all advance parties from the batteries returned to their previous anti- aircraft positions around LIEGE. On December 18th, the commanding officer of the 11th AAA Group having just arrived at AYWAILLE from SPA, briefed the Battalion on an urgent anti-tank mission to the south of LIEGE. In the afternoon, Headquarters left for WERBOMONT to establish an advanced CP there. The battalion was supported by 563rd AAA AW Bn. During the night contact was made with the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division to arrive in the area. Battery A rolled south along the road N.15 first to MANHAY, then turned to the east and continued a bit further up along the route to TROIS-PONTS. It deployed at SNAMONT near BRA and was ready to fire at 2300. Battery B, also moving on the N.15, failed to make contact with its reconnaissance party and had to close into an emergency assembly area on the N.23 east of WERBOMONT. The positions they originally intended to occupy east of the River LIENNE were already in enemy hands. The Battery CO, Capt Lemuel Browne and three enlisted men of the reconnaissance party were ambushed beyond the LIENNE when they ran into KG Peiper. Only one enlisted man returned. The guns were placed astride the N.23 and were ready to fire by 2330. This was about one and a half hours after 2nd Bn, 119th Inf Regt, had met with reconnaissance elements of KG Peiper only a few hundred meters down the road. Battery D was deployed in the vicinity of AYWAILLE, adding to the anti-tank defence set up by the 11th AAA Group together with elements of the 110th AAA Bn. Battery C under Capt Leon E. Kent was sent to the STOUMONT area. During its move there, it followed a unknown 40mm AA gun battalion and was delayed when its commander refused to move on and later even turned around his unit for fear of enemy contact. The battery later caught up with Lt Mc Guire and his reconnaissance party at the forward Command Post of 119th Inf Rgt at STOUMONT station. There Col Sutherland took the Opportunity to integrate the AA guns into his defences. He ordered two guns back to HALTE (the railway stop at NAZE). Both were ready to fire at 2335 and covered the road junction and bridge there. Guns 1 and 4 were sent to STOUMONT to bolster the defence of 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Regt, but only arrived there at 0330. The reason given in the history of the 143rd AAA Bn for the late deployment is “delayed by necessity of borrowing prime mover.” Lt Kent remained with the regimental CP.23 5. The Americans close in on Peiper 5.1 Night Skirmish at the Neufmoulin Bridge, 2nd Bn 119th Inf Ret We return now to the 119th Inf Ret. Its 2nd Bn under Major Hal D. McCown had reached the vicinity of WERBOMONT, where it de-trucked. Attached to it was a platoon of self-propelled tank destroyers (four M10’s of A-2, 823rd TD Bn, commanded by Lt Art Cunningham) and - at least on paper - all of Co C, 743rd Tk Bn (all M4 Shermans). Orders were later changed to the effect that only the Shermans of C-3 Ge. the 3rd Platoon) arrived around 0400, the other two platoons were now on their way to 3rd Bn at STOUMONT. Also in support were the regimental cannon company and a platoon of the regimental anti-tank company.?# The 197th FA Bn, closing into an assembly area at NONCEVEUX at 1800, was ordered to take up positions near WERBOMONT toi Pfe P. Snow and Pfe John J. Deckaushar, standing in a Sd.Kfz. 251/9 “Kanonenwagen” they have just “acquired”. They have painted a crude star on the machine and are using it against its former owners. The original caption claims, that this gun was picked up with two others miles behind Allied lines as the Germans were trying to take a position on an important road junction. (US Official via Mirko Bayerl)support the 2nd Battalion. The location given is Trou, probably TROU DE BOSSON, north of WERBOMONT. The 197th FA Br was ordered to # t0 NONCEVEUX at 1000 the next hard-pressed 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Ret, see 197th EA Bru ABR. day to aid the Leading the way was Company F under Lt Edward C. Arn. The men marched out in the dark due east towards CHEVRON. Arriving at LA PLATTE, they took a wrong turn and continued on the main road southeast towards HABIEMONT. The locality was reached at approximately 2200 on December 18th. Co F found the NEUFMOULIN Bridge of the LIENNE River already blown up by the Ist US Army Engineers. The company had just started digging in when a German reconnaissance patrol approached, moving along the west side of the River LIENNE. Reaching NEUFMOULIN, the German column turned to the west, taking the route towards WERBOMONT. During the ensuing short fire fight, the Germans lost five halftracks and approximately fifteen men to an ambush and retreated. The Americans took one prisoner. The soldier was from 10./ SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 2, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. The Americans finally realized whom they were up against. During the early morning hours, the first elements of 82nd AB Div closed into the WERBOMONT area, making contact with McCown's battalion.?5 5.2 In the Ambléve Valley Being a regular US Infantry battalion, 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt under Lt Col Fitzgerald was composed of three Infantry Rifle Companies (Co's I, K, L) and a Heavy Weapons Company (Co M). One Rifle Company consisted of a Headquarters (HQ), a Weapons Platoon and three Rifle Platoons, which in turn consisted of three Rifle Squads and a Platoon HQ, The ippical US squad at this time consisted of 12 men, armed with at least ten M-1.30 cal Garand rifles and a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). This array was complemented with a .45 cal Thompson submachine gun, a MI Carbine (both i leader weapons} . tbe BAR wes too LMG's of .30 cal) epare Platoon. One tec Machine Gisit 30 caf HMG wes ¢ was a Mortar Section thy attached to the Platoon HO. The lbree M2 GOniun nie Weapons Plat three bazooka tean rockel launcher: tec of a HO, two FM il Vortar COWS tr water cooled .30 ce machine Buns cal grachine euis}, a Simm Platoon (six Simm tmiortars) and six additional bazooka 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt was substantially under strength. Officers and enlisted men present for duty on December 17th were: Co | - 145, CoK - 137, Co L -105. The established strength of a US Infantry company stood at 193.26 Lt Col Fitzgerald had taken command of the 3rd Bn in the wake of the advance to the ROER River. It was his first combat assignment.” Supporting the battalion were two platoons of the 823rd TD Bn with a total of eight towed 76mm TD guns, the two 90mm AA guns of 143rd AAA Bn mentioned before, ten Shermans from Co C, 743rd Tk Bn and the 400th FA Bn (armoured) equipped with M7 HMC’s (Howitzer Motor Carriage). This self-propelled 105mm Howitzer was also known as “Priest”. The battalion was organized into three batteries with six tubes each. The two platoons of tank destroyers (A-1 and A-3) arrived with the earliest elements at STOUMONT and were in firing positions at 2100. Both platoons were equipped with four towed M5 3-inch TD guns. The battalion IQ had remained in REMOUCHAMPS, which had been reached at 1800. The third platoon (A-2, equipped with four self-propelled M10 tank destroyers) was kept in reserve at REMOUCHAMPS. As mentioned above, it was latersent to 2nd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt. The company commander Capt Bruce A. Crissinger and Maj Hal McCown, 2nd Bn, met each other at REMOUCHAMPS and decided on the attachment. At STOUMONT, A-1 was led by Lt Thomas Springfield, the commanding officer of A-3 is not known, it might have been under the direct command of Capt Crissinger who was present at STOUMONT. The main approach into the town along the N.33 going east to LA GLEIZE was secured by the leading company, Co I, which established a road block reinforced by four 76mm TD guns. Co K was next, covering STOUMONT from the south and southwest. Further to the northeast on a hill flank lies the area of the town called ROUA. The remaining company, Co L, took up positions there, facing east. This company was reinforced by the battalion's anti-tank platoon (three M1 57mm AT guns). Battalion HQ was set up in the middle of the town in the boy's school.2? The CO of Company L, Lt David F. Knox wrote into his diary: “T went back and moved the company up to our area, It was dark by then and must bave been at least 2200. We set up without much trouble. The anti-tank weapons were also set up in our area. I went back to battalion to tell them our situation and to see if they bad any more information. Kirby went with me again. Major Rogerson was silting in the corner He had the story that the tanks we could bear moving around were stuck down near the river No one seemed to be concerned about the situation. Capt Del Bene, the S-3, said “If they try to come after us in the morning, we'll sure give them bell!” 30 At 2215, the divisional HQ Chief of Staff, Col Stephens, called Col Johnson, CO 117th Inf Rgt, and informed him on the situation with the 119th RCT and the sighting of 30 enemy tanks. ‘There was some talk about moving CT 117 into the area, but Div HQ reminded Col Johnson that holding STAVELOT still held priority. Ray Haserodt was T/5 in HQ Co., 3rd Bn., 119th Inf. Rgt. He remembers the following: “We then turned east and by evening bad gone up a hill and were entering the town of STOUMONT, Belgium. We still bad no knowledge of what was going on. We were then billeted in a house in that small town. I pulled my radio jeep and trailer alongside the house. We bad maintained radio silence during the move and did not start radio communications that night. We understood that the line companies bad been deployed near the crest of a series of bills surrounding STOUMONT to the south and east but no reconnaissance patrols bad been sent beyond the company areas. It was quite a sight to see the quartermaster trucks racing from the area and speeding down the long bill out of STOUMONT: The comment was “They knew something we didn't”? 31 Already at 2130, a security patrol from Co I had established the presence of 30 to 40 armoured vehicles approximately 500 metres to the southeast of STOUMONT. The coordinates given for these elements of Kampfgruppe Peiper “stuck down near the river” point to a location just at the AMBLEVE River next to a very steep and wooded ridge beneath Chateau FROIDECOUR.#2 It is likely that this and not the village of LA GLEIZE was the bivouac area for a larger sectioin of the Kampfgruppe. A member of 2nd Platoon, 11./ SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 2, stated that he had spent the night in CHENEUX, later taking the road to LA GLEIZE and continuing further to STOUMONT in the morning.** Other elements of the same company however moved on via LA GLEIZE to Chateau FROIDECOUR where they dismounted and advanced towards STOUMONT as early as 0200 but returned to mount their SPW’s at about 0830.34 The battalion staff of 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt was not overly concerned by the presence of enemy armour.3> Neither were the Germans intent on hiding their presence. During the night they could repeatedly be heard shouting at each other and were seen smoking cigarettes.3° With the enemy finally located, the battalion dug in. Co’s | and L laid out a hasty minefield and secured all the approaches into thetown. Because it was already dark when the battalion arrived at STOUMONT, there were problems organizing a proper defence perimeter. Fire sectors could not be established and sighting of the heavy guns was impossible. The 81mm mortars of Co M were set up late in the night, but also here problems seem to have occurred, since later they were not able to support the hard- pressed battalion until well into the next morning after the arrival of forward observers within the line companies.* The defensive positions taken up as noted down in the G-3 Journal of the division are given in Map 1. The location of the observation post north of ROUA is based on the following statement of Bob Hall, HQ Co, 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Ret: “That night 1 was ordered with two other men to go up to the top of a bill and set up an observation post.At daybreak we observed German tanks and infantry coming towards us.My buddies took Off to the rear, bul I waited a few minutes longer and ran about 300 yards to a bouse. Surrounded, I could nol go any further and Joined about 30 other 30th men in the cellar Shortly afterwards T looked out of the broken window pane and a German soldier was right outside - be was less than a foot from me without Rnowing it.I immediately went to another part of the cellar, but was captured.” sx This proved to be a serious setback, given that the other artillery unit tasked for indirect fire support, the 400th FA Bn (armoured) only reached its firing positions in the morning and still had to establish contact with the battalion while the atack was already underway. To make matters worse, there was no immediate tank support available. What had happened to the armour? The tanks of Co C. while still in MALMEDY, were attached to CT 119 and requested to move to the divisional CP at FRANCORCHAMPS. From there, Maj Phillips, acting as liaison officer, led them during the night via FRANCORCHAMPS, SPA and THEUX to REMOUCHAMPS: the original mission was in support of the 2nd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt. The convoy incurred delays on the narrow, winding road. Arriving at REMOUCHAMPS, only 3rd Platoon was attached to 2nd Bn, 119th Inf Ret, and this platoon marched on to CHEVRON. In reaction to the German armour presenting itself in front of STOUMONT, the two remaining platoons totalling ten M4 Sherman medium tanks were redirected to this area and arrived at approximately 0500 at STOUMONT station, There they bivouacked and were briefed on the situation by Col Sutherland in person. Due to the German attack commencing, they were sent to STOUMONT at 0615. They reached the town about three quarters of an hour later. 5.3 The armoured artillery: action of the 400th FA Bn 400th FA Bn (armoured) had been attached to 30th Inf Div Artillery at 1100 on December 18th. At 1830, the CO 400th Armd FA Bn reported to Div Arty HQ at PRANCORCHAMPS and was informed of his attachment to Cl’ 119 and of his mission to provide reinforcing fire for the 197th FA Bn.«! The battalion was in turn tasked with the support of 3rd Bn. It was assigned fire positions south of the AMBLEVE at CHESSION opposite of TARGNON. The battalion began to close in on this area from 0500 onwards. At 0700 it was alerted by the 119th Inf. Ret to an imminent tank attack. The men were told to grab their bazookas. The battalion's Battery C was ready’ to fire first at 0735. Liaison officers were sent to 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Ret. and to the 197th FA Bn. The commanding officer himself set out to the regimental CP, 119th Inf Rgt, at 0830. There were however no forward observers with the 3rd Bn at STOUMONT. Because of this, it was only at 0910 that Battery C fired its first volley into STOUMONT - unobserved. Five minutes later, the first elements of Batteries A and B arrived. At 0930, thebattalion CO reached the CP of 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt at STOUMONT. Ten minutes later he announced on air that he would now have to destroy his radio and retire on foot. At 1015, the battalion drew in all its radio posts and sent them to the reserve positions, and at 1040 began to withdraw. At 1100 the order was changed to the effect that eleven M7 HMC’s would remain in a tank hunter role atop the hill near CHESSION to support Ist Bn, 119th Inf Rgt. The remaining seven M7 TMC's took up new positions near NONCEVEUX-REMOUCHAMPS, the same new sector also assigned to the 197th FA Bn. The battalion only reached its positions at 1930 and was on interdiction fire missions during the whole night. Two ad hoc batteries of M7 HMC’s were used for this task, the first equipped with eight and the second with ten M7 HM Fire missions noted down for December 19th were five harassing missions (400 rounds) and one mission of defensive fire expending 168 rounds.*2 5.4 Closing down STOUMONT was not a town that had been deserted by its population. During the night, the inhabitants and refugees from evacuated towns on the frontline took shelter in the available cellars. The Sanatorium ST. EDOUARD is known to have sheltered about 300 civilians, mostly children and young women from the institution itself and refugees from ELSENBORN. There was another group of people in the church community house and the basement in “Maison Robinson” at the entrance to the town sheltered another thirty people. It was near 0100 when Gen Hobbs was informed of the presence of 82nd AB Div with 119th RCT and that contact had been established between the paratroopers and 2nd Bn, 119th Inf Ret. A few minutes later, both Gen Hobbs and Gen Gavin, the famed commander of the 82nd AB Div, spoke to each other on the phone. Gavin mentioned just having talked to Maj Hal McCown, CO 2nd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt, specifically about his intention to tie in the artillery of both units. Gen Hobbs asked Gen Gavin to send him an overlay or possibly a liaison officer (LO) in order to get a better idea about the situation. Gen Gavin promised to send the requested LO as soon as he had consolidated his positions.” Footnotes 1. Danny S. Parker: Battle of the Bulge, p. 192 f; Ralf Tiemann: Dic Leibstandarte, Vol. 1V/2, p. 101; 400th FA Bn, S-3 Journal; 119th Inf Regt. Unit Report; 110th AAA Gun Bn (Mb), $-3 Periodic Report. 2. Hans Hillig, Affidavit 15.031946, Patrick Agte: Peiper, p.328. 3. Jean Paul Pallud: Battle of the Bulge, p.151 f. 4. Patrick Agte: Peiper, p. 328. Around 1100, Peiper was seen back in LA GLEIZE talking to Knittel and briefing him on this new assignment, Anton Motzheim, statement dated 28th Feb. 1946. 5. Hstuf Oskar Klingelhéfer's tank, turret number 701, was damaged and later recovered at WANNE. Klingelhdfer took over another Panzer IV of his company with which he followed the Kampfgruppe, Malmedy Trial, Lt Schweitzer, screening results 15th to 24th Nov. 1945. Undated letter from Rolf Ehrhardt to Gerd Cuppens; various letters from Werner Wendt to Timm Haasler, 1999-2004; Hubert Laby: Ardennes 44 - Stavelot, p.229 f; letter from Karl Wortmann to Timm Haasler, dated 23.11.1999; Ralf Tiemann: Die Leibstandarte, Vol. IV/2, p.90. 6. The 2./ SS-Pz. Rgt. 1 had already six Panthers less from the total of seventeen it had started with on the Dec. 16th. Four had developed mechanical troubles and two had been knocked out on Dec. 17th near HONSFELD. By coincidence, the losses for cach platoon were equally two tanks, so each platoon could field only three tanks for the attack. 7. Undated interrogation report of Friedrich Christ taken prior to the Malmedy Trial. 8. Statement of Otto Fischer, interviewed by Timm Haasler on 01.05.2005. 9, Various sworn statements of members of 3./ SS-Pz.Pi.Btl. 1 during the Malmedy Trial. The paratroopers fighting along with Peiper at STOUMONT are usually considered to be from 3. Fallschirm-Jaéger- Division. The story of how Peiper commandeered paratroopers to guide him through the forest from LANZERATH to HONSFELD in the morning of December 17th is well known and gives a plausible explanation for the fact that men in paratroop uniforms and helmets are on pictorial record. It is harder to establish the number of paratrooper that actually accompanied KG Peiper. Sources vary between “almost a Bn", among them 14.(Pz,Jg.)/ FSJ Rgt 9 and that there was a detailed agreement between Oberst H. von Hoffmann and Peiper on which platoon- and company-sized units would mount the tanks (Fritz Roppelt, Der Vergangenheit auf der Spur, p. 434) and “only a company” that had notrecieved the order by the CO of IL/ FS} Rgt. 9, Maj. Taubert. to stay behind as Taubert refused to attach his men to the Kampfgruppe (Peiper, testimony during Malmedy trial). Probably this shouldn't concern us too much, because we believe the paratroopers at STOUMONT were not from 3. FS] Division anyway: A close examination of the G-2 records reveals the rather startling fact that the only soldier from 3. Fallschirm-Jager-Division processed through the prisoner of war cage of the 30th Inf Div during the relevant period told his captors that he was a straggler from Fs.Jg.Rgt. 8!! The other paratroopers captured at STOUMONT and at LA GLEIZE (amounting to 20 men) gave as denomination Fallschirm-Jiger Rgt. z.b.V. and paybooks to this effect were found on them, One IPW report made by the 119th Inf Rgt mentions that the 12./ FS] Rgt z.b.V. was attached to the German force in STOUMONT. In the light of this evidence, the paratrooper seen in STOUMONT were almost certainly from Pz. Brigade 150. 10. 82nd US AB, G-2 Report 151 22nd, Dec. 44; 30th US Inf.Div. G-2 Report 186, 20th Dec ; 30th US Inf.Div. G-2 Report 188, 22nd Dee, 44; 30th US Inf.Div. G-2 Report 190, 24th Dec.44; Thomas Fischer: Von Berlin nach Caen, p.185 f. 11. Heinz Friedrichs, Affidavit 21st March 1946. 12. Rolf Ritzer, Erwin Szyperski, Arnold Mikolaschek, Heinz Hofmann, Erich Werner, Affidavits from the Malmedy Trial; Patrick Agtc: Pciper, p. 328: Michacl Reynolds, The Devil's Adjutant, p.143. 13. Gérard Grégoire, Les Panzers face a I'US Army, p.12. 14. Statement of Hermann Staritz, interviewed by Timm Haasler on 20.10.2001; Ralf ‘Tiemann: Die Leibstandarte, Vol. IV/2, p.102. 15. 30th Inf Div, G-3 ABR, Dec. 1944. 16. 119th Inf Rgt, AAR, Dec. 1944. 17. 30th Inf Div, G-3 ABR; Dec. 1944; 119th Inf Rgt, AAR, Dec. 1944; Ferriss Report, p.2; Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes, Battle of the Bulge, p.330. 18. 3rd Bn 119th Inf Rgt, Combat Journal. 19. G-3 30th Inf Div, Periodical Report for 18th till 2400 hrs. 20. 119th Inf Rgt, Unit Report 18th Dec. 1944; 30th Inf Div, G-3 ABR. 21, The 365th Fighter Group lost one plane shot down, one bellied in at base and seven were severely damaged, Danny S$. Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, p. 185 22. 110th AAA Gun Bn (Mbb, AAR Dec. 1944, Unit Journal and S-3 Periodic Report. 23. History of the 143rd AAA Bn, Dec. 1944; Battery C of the 143rd AAA Gun Bn in the Bate of the Bulge, report by Capt Leon E. Kent. 24, 119th Inf Ret, AAR, Dec. 1944; 743rd Tk Bn, AAR Dec. 1944. 25. °F" Co, 119th at Neufmoulin's Bridge 18-19 Dec. 1944, by Ist Lt Edward C. Arn; 119th Inf Rgt, AAR, Dec. 1944; 119th Inf Regt, $-2 Report 19th Dec. 1944; Ferriss Report, p. 24; Testimony of Harold McCown, Malmedy Trial. 26. Ferriss Report, p.27. 27. Ferriss Report, Footnote 12, 28. 823rd ‘TD Bn, ABR Dec. 1944; Ferriss Report. iii. 29, Ferriss Report, p. 26a; Michacl Reynolds, The Devil's Adjutant, p.139. 30. Lt David F. Knox, L. Co, 119th Inf Regt, Diary, p.37. 31, Stoumont then La Gleize and finally some turkey, published in 30th Div News, early winter edition 2003. 32. 119th Inf Ret, Unit Report 18th Dec. 1944. 33. Herbert Stock, Affidavit 15. 03.1946. 34. Strm Heinz Friedrichs, Affidavit 21.03. 1946. Friedrichs was member of the 4th heavy platoon [LV. (schw.) Zug]. 11./ SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 2. 35. Lt David F. Knox, L. Co, 119th Inf Regt, op.cit. 36. 119th Inf Regt, S-2 Report 19th Dec. 1944. 37. Ferriss Report, p. 27. Lt David F. Knox, L. Co, 119th Inf Regt, Diary, p.38. 38. Lonnie R. Speer, 110th AAA: Driving Hitler's Crawlin' Coffin, p.194. 39, 400th PA Bn (Armd), $-2 Journal, 5-3 Situation Report, Dec. 1944. 40. 743rd ‘Tk Bn, AAR Dec. 1944. 41. 30th Inf Div Arty, Unit Report No 187 to 189, Unit Jnl. 42. 400th FA Bn (Armd), $-2 Journal, S-3 Situation Report, Dec. 1944. 43. Gérard Grégoire, Les Panzers de Peiper face 4 'US Army, p. 29. 44, 30th Inf Div, G-3 Jnl, Summary of TC.Map 1: First contact in the dark eid)First contact in the dark The first six hours from midnight till 0600 The German presence made itself felt well before the main attack 0145 - 1 enemy tank ran over mine at began. German armoured vehicles were within the lines of Co I (633027) = burned. by 0400. At 0415 the crew of the first 76mm TD Gun, Co A, 823rd TD Bn, had to withdraw, since its position had been overrun by 119th Inf Rgt, Unit Jnl the enemy. The hasty mine field laid by Co I had proven useless. 0450 ~ TD Oiticer from the 823rd TD Bn Three quarters of an hour later, at 0500, the withdrawal of the reported enemy tanks had overrun his second 76mm TD Gun crew was recorded at the battalion CP. An gun position and forced one gun crew t unnamed officer of the Tank Destroyer Battalion gave enemy to withdraw. machine guns fired from tanks as the reason. None of the TD 0500 - Above officer reported enemy iG guns had fired a shot in anger.* fire from tanks, forcing 2nd gun crew ae to withdraw. The Fe fog, a tank coli 1, escribes t ss Report, an crept by the fir #7 the early morning st two TD guns and the of the lea 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Rgt, Unit Jnl vrews lost sight was fired on ine, knocked oud it vetsivs. fourth 1D gun was overrus the dry sumiumary of an action At 0145 a German tracked reconnaissance vehicle, probably a Schiitzenpanzerwagen (SPW), ran over one of Co I’s mines and exploded into flames.! f seem to bave beer of oulside and eas: JUMONT, covert mentioned before (location on by , 1 ate . ; 0togn 'c evidence) and the second baif-s n at the It is noteworthy that this vebicle did not reconnoitre along Photographic et GN, GINE, LE SE COTE. DEY Bae Uae entrance to the village, next to the “Robinst HOUSE the N33 but approximately 200 m north of it along a field track running east to west which joins the N33 opposite the church (coordinates according to 119th Inf Unit JnD this incident must undoubtedly be been seen in (ocation confirmed). Due to heavy fog and darkness, the visibility was so bad that the Germans were able to close on top of the first positions almost unseen. With tanks appearing out of the fog, it is not very likely that the crews managed to hook up their towed pieces and bring them back safely, although according to the log, the battalion connection with the reconnaissance mission of the 11,/ SS- Pz.Gren.Rgt. 2, starting around 0200 (see statement of Heinz Friedrich in Chapter 1)didn't report the loss of the TD guns to the regiment. No major action developed, the TD gun crews and what infantry that had accompanied them simply faded away back to the village, chased by sporadic fire from small arms and machine guns as the German tank column outflanked the first line of defence, probably ignoring the threat they had just bypassed, it cdi miy at O715 that eniries i nal fits mention the lo fa TD gun o enemy infantry, but this is the ibe regimental and belou: The 76nim TD gun seen on the © #8 10st probably one of these tivo early It is likely that the German infantry progressed further to probe the village, with the tanks lying in wait on the N.33, ready to give fire support. In so doing, the Germans approached the major roadblock of Co 1 at the entrance to the village on the N.33. It must be noted that the terrain here is such that the N.33 rounds a slight rise to the right and then descends into STOUMONT, the village being built along the road descending gently into the valley of the AMBLEVE River. Thus, the southern part is situated above most of STOUMONT. The village entrance offers a perfect location for an ambush from a reverse slope position and is the key to the village. Once the entrance is lost, there is not much favourable ground left for the defenders to fight over. The Americans clearly seized on the importance of the spot. The group of houses at the village entrance were turned into strong points, among them the “Robinson House”, which with its unique wood and_ stone structure became a landmark in the German movie filmed by war correspondents during the action, and still looks the same sixty years later. The other two 76mm TD guns in support of Co I were situated here at the crossroads of the N.33 and the “Rue du Village”. One gun was positioned alongside the “Robinson House”, the other across the intersection in the shadow of the eastern wall of the village church. SS The two 90mm AA guns of the 143rd AAA Bn were first set up in unfavourable positions and efforts were made to improve the situation before dawn. Gun No 4, towed by a M4 high-speed tractor, was moved up to the church, possibly to back up the first pair of 76mm TD guns. At this time, German small arms fire could already be heard and the crew's anxiety added to both the gun and tractor slipping into a ditch next to the road. Lt Leon E. Kent who had gotten word of what acutally happened early the next day, remembers the following: “They had put a winch on and pulled it out of the mud, which is the standard procedure. Everything went fine. They pulled it oul, re-attacbed and everything. When they started up again they had forgotten, they were all so damned excited, they had forgotien to disengage the winch. The winch was still running when they started the motor of the prime mover, the gun went up and jammed in the thing so bard that no way they could do anything with it. So that is how the gun was lost.’4 After coming under fire, the material had to be abandoned. Tracer ammunition ignited gasoline in the M4 tractor, which in turn caused the 90mm ammunition to explode, destroying the gun.> The crew of the abandoned gun joined with the infantry. Gun No 2 managed to set up in a yard behind the “Robinson House”, beneath the church and to the west of it, covering the crossroads.® Footnotes 1. Ferriss report, p. 27, gives “about 0300” as time for this action. 2. 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Ret, Unit Jn, also see above. 3. Maj Martin $. Hayden, AAA units in Ardennes Battle. 4. Leon Kent Collection (AFC/2001/001/7607), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress. 5. Extract from AA Notes, HQ ETO, 24. January 1945, Nr. 14 regarding Anti-Tank Action by the 143rd AAA Gun Bn. 6. Maj Martin S$. Hayden, AAA units in Ardennes Battle.gun No 4, © Ranery Me AAA Gun Ba panicked when they ted to deploy theit 50mm MIL AA gun to the exst of STOUMONT'S church, coming under Fre, the material had to be ‘ammunition set of inthe Sevactor, which in commonly used vehiele for towing these Soma AA guns, II was armed with a pulpit mounted “50 ca Browning heavy ‘machine gun on a skate ring mounted towards the rear of the cab roof cae ructor also came equipped wil font mounted high-powereé winch The cals was divided into ro comparinents wit seating room for the dever and two men. inthe front _comparment and double seats accommodating eight additional men in the rear compartment. Ammo shell nicks for up to 54 rounds were located in a comparment behind the crew, where other equipment belonging tothe ere were also stove (Collection Freddy Lemaire - AMC) Garry Lane vt Saton Vosiers)Map 2: Approach towards StoumontPanzer Voran! The time from 0600 until 0800 0600 = tremy Zoxming on road to zront, intantry on the lezt of road end approximately 15 tanka lined ap (aecsage trom 5rd 3m). 0715 = One 2D gun bus been overrun by eeny ingantry: sporadic snail azns Zire; eneny tanks and infantry slowly moving ioreard (message fron 3rd Bn} 119th Ing Ret, Unit Ind 0730. = ~—s-attalion —_zaceived xeipforcenents oi ten medium tanks 0745 ~ uneny rorce estimated at about 30 to 40 tanks and several hundred inzantry eger concerted attac: on our positions. Attack continued, Aoreing Companies I and & back slowly: 5rd Un, 129th Inz Ret, Init Jn 0520 a build up of approxinately 15 Yanks anc a snall force oz inzantry wag obsrsved on main road Just zast of Stounont. Jn eneny attack Jumped otf at about 0700 ané by O715 one friendly 40 had been knocked out. Unit Report, Sq2, 229th Int Mgt "Do you think they have overrun any part of the 5rd Eattalion? - tot vets they have overvun one TD gun.” Col Brown, FQ 129%h Inf Rgt, on @ question by Capt Powers, HO 30th Int Biv, at 0750 on the i9th, G=3 Ini 1k was 0600 when Sr Bin finally annowoced a sizeable German force readying itself in front of the positions of Coll Approxinarely 15 tanks were seen lined up on the NAS with infancry tthe left (oc of the road). Ie as sil dark a this te, The remaining TD guns had failed to Cobtsin permission from the infantry 0 fire flares.” Whethor this would have helped matters with the heavy fog stil prevailing is ‘questionable. The regiment now alarmed the Ist ia and at about 10615, the ten Shermans from Ist und 2nd Platoon, Go C, 74 Tk Tin, felt thelr ivouae aren at STOUMONT station alter having ‘ene hour there and moved up froat to suppor 3rd Ar 0645 hours, « weak preparitory bombardment by the Germans ‘commenced, The American sources mention only a few mortar rounds. AL O7IX) hours, when st was just begin to yet Hgbt (German infamy amicked the roadblock at the village entranceBattery, 13nd AAA Gun Br managed 10 set up its gun No 2 in tho yard behind the “Robinson House’, beneath the chureh sod, to the west of it, covering the cemvsrouds of the N33 with che ‘Rue du Village’. The gu opened fie om the leacng Panther ( ‘of Rou. Pranz Prabin which was only few meters ssvay. A lucky hit sheared of the gun bare), 1s foreing Prahim’s crew to bail out. Only the final rune acwally pierced the armour of the Panther Hans Weber) Li This photograph gives us 2 glance at the church's eastern fenince where the last TD of & Company, 825d TO. fn was phiced. When Pralim's Panther oniinued to round the ber into the town it entered the sights of this 76mm TD gun. The reaction of the American crew was quick as the gun registered four hits on the Panthers frontal gacs, all of which sicochcted. (stefan De Meyer)12 Panther 225, communes by Renter Franz Pralim, was the lead vehicle in the attack on Jit approached American defenders in po to the left of the road. The fist shoe pamesed the eet re the crew & wth fares that freed then vehicle. The gui Hubler had started to triverse fesemy postions in this area under fire, (Collection Fredy Lemaire = ANC) 13 Over the years only: minor have been made to the ture. While femeved, the outlook of the village tll looks remackably sear iefan De Meyer)In this phoxograph we ean see the remnants of the “Classic Factory Pattera” on she turret rear with large areas blackened nal cording a8 2 cesult of the fire, We ean also see one of the many dfere way thatthe Ist Company’ ane 2nd Company applied tactical ruiekings to their vehicles. In the top left hanc! side of the eurret the vehicles tactical nvimhor 225 has been repeated using a Smaller version of the stacy LAM tet numbers (Collection Fredy Lemstise = AMC)[he sappy fe wits prolly the [/ SS-Pz- Ar Ral. Thiel sas engaged with ss Istand 2nd Mattery between LA GLEIZE and STOLMONT. Accoming 10 Uselit Yack, coamangler of gun i the Ist Baers, they were deployed in @ meadaw in the mist. The fnumiier of avsuale guns varies constorahly herween fou ana fine and there sve also 90 Geran statements (0 the elfect tat, the Ly SSP Am Rel 1 ss equipped with selE- propel Howitzer (espe), hot geal wadsy tere $6 90. prOE OF this Ammwaition was sparse. A POW front Ist Battery seared that his sgn had only been issued 35 conds of peceussionfused shells, rho smoke, gas ar caer spect shells» Again dhe tank destroyers were unlucky, shostly before O700 the fi TD gun near the “Robinson House” is sak 10 have been destroyed by an armoured vesicle, which ad! moved past the fint few houses, knocking out the gun and then reteating® AID gun Was inde! noted as ha-ving heen oxesrun by enesay infantry 4 O7157 fe is ely that this was the gun in queswion, German fnfantry ancl tanks were now alvancing len. ehe tanks fin theie guas in support of their infantry. American sources speak of two sal Geer infanuy stacks which were repulsed.” swever fi more hkely that the German infantry was bent 00 | taking out sighted antitank gun posibons ard removing mines prepare for rhe tank arack. They must have been quite effective since all bet one of the four MD gons were neutralized before the tanks rolled i for dhe kil anc dae bisuly placed mine fics mde fo imnpression at all, Heinz Fierichs speaks of how bs ua ewan fo Fenny agains he silage to ment shee SPW ae to ready thenrselues for the miechnized push into STOUMONT® Asstated before, round U7 30 the First battery of M7 HSCs of the ‘kth FA Ba wats in positon and ready to fire, However, dhete was ao artillery observer with the beleaguered Sed tin and th 10 arillery supgor available. Impressed by the attack aon uacler (Col Sutherland suggested tov HQ t0 have his 2nd Ba selievee by the Rad AB, Div and moved aoith to seein the reviment. The division 325 also informed retding the Is Bn ara he tanks front 74840 Tk in being wep sere Uke il The kak sive a STOUSONT at ahout the same time ths information was passed ter Div HQ, Nut so the Lx fn! tp the nwantine, the German tanks and infantry ad slowly: aehsineed long the N34 ane reached! the outses of the town With the time now approaching 0730 hous, the Panzes geared lap ter fone the issues Av the point of dhe eolum, the three remaining tanks of 2nd Platoon solled with Panther 225 (Ror Praha taking the Tel. Direety behind followed the platoon leader, HSC, Roappich, in Pane 221 aad hen Oscha, Repeter (aniber 222), Ustul Koehis 3rd Platoon was nest, eonsicing of Panther 242 CUschu, Bravschke), Noel hitaselF Paneer 231) ate Uscha. Herzog (253. Then came a command echelon consisting bf the coinpany commincles, Osta Chit fy Panuher 201 ane probably slko StubalPoetsehke in Panther 151, Following them ‘Sere the Ist Platoon with Purtaer 214 (sch, Rech), Panther 2L1 (Us. Kautmann) and Panwher 205 (Usch, Krigen. The teat as bronight up by the leer of the corapany troop, Usha. Priednch in Panther 202. icailable statements and testimonies of the Gen Fatiowed bebind its leader thie te turn alecays Wid a east Ie was sveprisinely quiet at this moment, Prahm's gunner, Stem, Hubler, only noticed sill aims fre cong fen the fist house fm the left side of the oud, Pralan ordered te radio upertor fire the bow MG inlo the howe. ‘we Geman infiarynien estetes the house and allegedly took out an American squid. “The tank eoatioued 0 sun the end into the town and thos coteted the sights of the lase TD gun eemalning with Co. The American reaction was quick and the gua eegstered four hits on the Paenhers Func utes, all of which each!25 This "topby” snapshot takes by a US Serviceman shortly ater the recapture of STOUMONT shows io GI's posing at the front of Panther 225 The damage to the gun banel as well as at least two hits fon the ghicis plate cin ceaty be seen. ‘The “ull owl, nase up atte of the Panther is caused by the weakened rear suspeasion collapsing and the lick of ‘weight on the front suspension as & est bf the missing gun barrel. We can also see the divers hateh hus beon jettioned unl is lying on the hull roo This feature was innreduced in August 1944 10 allow che crew © escape when the turret was traversed and was overhanging the fateh stopping it ftom opening. in the normal (Source unknown) 16 This Panther is from the September onwards production run with Lost Erkeanungs-ateln (poison gan identification panels) becoming stance fone of which can be acen on the upper fedge of the turet atthe bend in the armour plate towaes the reat, Most ofits wool sowage is. still in place and imeresungly i appoas to have been sssved with the jack suppor block from a Panther Ausf. A. As was common in Panthers that have safered an interior fire while still carrying fuel and ammunition, the torsion bar suspension his collapsed leaving the vehicle siting very low over the toad wheels, ‘This is the only known photograph of Panther 225 taken thal shows the vehicle's sight hand side and considering st was taken under combat conditions it hs stil revealed a wealth of detail with indications that this Panther received standardised factory applied camouTage scheme. There is a faint line of Nght colour stating from just in Front of the poison gas identification panel down 10 the bottors interlock on the tet front This s commonly seen on Panthers rnanufactured at both Daimler-Benz and MAN 1P In this pleture we em see how ciferent light conditions and exposure the clements has affected Panther 225 the digits on the cures sear are no longer visti, To the tear ofthe veil the light fs just catching the exhausts armour which bas the same contour asthe inetal sinvaud above. This keds us 10 conclude thar #15 a casting and that Panther 225 ‘was manufactured by Daimler-Bene. The vehicles Kampfraumleizung is alsa clearly visible in tis shot as fs he tral absence of Zimment @ x Stefan De Meyer)‘The Panther conrinued and thus eotcred the sights of te oman ‘AA gun, Commanded by Set Samowsk, the gun opened fire. The fist sbot hic the vicinity oF the let Front sprocket. The second shoe hic the 7.5em gun barrel close tothe guia mantle, shearing i off Fave more shots fred in quick succession made the erew bail out (One more shot was fired “for goed measure” and this proved (0 be the only round that actually piereed the armour * HUler bad ‘no chance 10 fre the main gun and so Panther 225 never acwally fired a shot in anger during its short caeet Conary io American sources, aot all of the German crew sere Kulled. Gunter Stem. Haar-Georg Hubler survived, as oid is loader, Sum. Werner Zanker, HUbler's description oF the events a5 follows In this dramatie cine sil we German Fallschirmjiger_ protecting 3 wounded soldier from American sia arms five corang rom accent uiklings The soklier is slmost certainly the Panzer crewman mentioned by Hans-Georg Hubler who was wounded while ahaocioning Ins camagec! Panther whieh ccm be seen buming flercely. inthe background. Three of the Fallschirmiiger are looking at something off camera t0 the right, this is prohably the rest of Panther 2255 crew including Her Hubler, who were pinned down in a drainage ditch on the other side of the road (Transit Fils) F ted bard to at for a comer of a ouse at the entrance 10 the village, becuse 1 suspected ars enemy position there. The ‘amb rolled at slow speed it the driver pushed the pedal down fe tte bit too much. The Pantber's body tus rose up an J lost ‘ny avn for short time. At the suave moment the lane ws bit ‘and tho turret traverse blocked. Again and agate [tried to free Ube turret, but when more ronmds bit the tant, the whole crear bad to bait out using the rear escape Datel Ws the turret At this lime the Panuber started to smoke, but it wasn't burning yet We {got to a ditch fed with water on the right she of te road Land fo08 cover there The tanks was sul tabing fre, and 50 were te in the ditch. remember a wounded erew menber Iying on the tect bebind the turret I can't tell it was Roitf Prati, obo later died of bis woes in TA GIEIZE or the driver teh tost a eg to an AT round while baiting out When we realized that the Americans were zeroing ts on our position, we made w run for it towards she east Running witb our beuds dawn amd followet Dy small arms fire. F reached our tines togetber witl, Serm Zander and reported that there eas silta wounded man bebin the tani We were ten sent to Ube recr in Ube direction of LA GLEIZE. As fo the test barre, Because my gun never fired a shot ‘or combat a round stuck in the barrel can be riled out. Since we didnt bow the barrel, tt ean omy have been sboered eff by’ 4 lucky hit or ater by the Americans ‘Av the sae time, *Chutie" Company of 78rd Tk Bo Het ave at STOUMONT, led by Lt Macht. Four Shermans from Ist Platoon turned up within the perimeter of the hatckpeessed Co_T five ‘migutes liter” Another four Sheanans wete ordered to Go a ROUA and the evo remaining Sheamans remained as 2 reserve in he mide ofthe vile andl later moved upto sappon CoE The ‘anes must have arnved there oaly minutes before the German, tank attack stated. They were tok! by theie officers that the {enemy push was to he expected at 0730. The German tanks progressing along the N.33 came under heavy fire once inside the vilige limits. AT the same time, flanking fie fom the woods e the right anc! fui ROUA (Co L) was noted Hscha, Knappich's Panther tried to bypass the wrecked tank, was shot at in tara, and polled buck. Hseha. Koappicl immediatelycoxdered his ruko operator to contact his company commander, ‘Ost Chis. The 2nd Platoon continue! on the sod, but when LUseha.lruuschke saw Pralim's Panther knocked oxi by antianis, fire, he stopped the tank at once. When he sa the Pamther cael Tre, he ordered the driver ins reverse and hacked off 2 fer yard Ibshind the curve at the village entrance 0 Footnotes 4 119th inf Rat, Unit J 2. 823nd TD Bn ABR No VIL, p. 8, Tased Tk Bo, AAR 18-19 Dee, pt 4. Feniss Repost, p27 5. Hans Neugebauer a ments given in T. Fischer: Son Becin nach Caen, p. 186 f S2nd_ LS: Asborne Disison, G2 Report 154, 25.1241 and sikh US Ina. 22.12.45, G2 Repo 168 6.Maj Martin §. Hayden, AAA Unis in the Ardennes Ratle 7.110th Unf Rgt Jl, 30th Inf Dix, G3 Jol 1 Femsiss Repon, p27, 9. Heinz ried, Affidavit 21.08.1916, 1. 119% Jaf Rt, Unit Jal 11 S01b In Div, G3 J 12, Amol Mikoluschel, Erwin Szyperski, Rolf Rltzes, Brie ‘Werner, Heinz Hofinana, Walter Kobles, Georg Bunda. Affidavits forthe Malmedy ‘ral. Horst Voprecht, sketch to his statement at Sehwabisch Hal 13 Hans-Geoy. Hubler, injeviewest by Tin Hasler, 05-and 7.052004 and Affcivt Hans-Georg Hubs, B05-1945, 14, The 82ird TD Bin claimed one Tiger tank destroyed in this engagement, B2jrd TD Bin, ABR a0 VHh,p. 6; Unit Report 182200- 192200, The report is probsbly rlerring ths engagement, 38 the ‘ther four TD guns with Co K were not doing any beter These fre no facts {0 uphold this cai, 15 Maj Monin S. Hayuen, AAA Units in Ardennes Battle. 16, Hast-Georg. Mubler interview by Timm flsasler 05. and C20, 1, SB, 119th Inf Rg, Comba Journal AAR, (19h Inf Rg, Jan 45 p2 18 74340 Tk Ba, AAR, p21 19, 117th Inf Rat, 53 Journal; Feniss Report, p27; 1/5 Harold oserberg, sce D-Day Nommandy website 2 Mfvit Heing Hollen, gunner tank 221, dated 15.03.1946; Alfcasit Erich Were, diver lank 221, dated 4.5.1946, Aliant Arnold Mikolaschek, radio opessior tank 221, dated 03.04.1946, ‘Adavit Walter Kober, loader tank 221, dted 04.10.1946 and, BADR 1955, Affidavit Fron Sayperlé, diver tanke 252, dated GS.08.19%6, Affidavit Rolf River, rado ‘operator tank 242, dated TADSING,Duel in the mist The time from 0800 until 0900 0810 ~ 2 eneny tank knocked out wy our tanks; one of our tanss nit twice but unhurt (message from 743ra % Bn). 219th Inr Het, Unit sal 0610 ~ "4 ~ wnat ve would like to do is pull that battalion out and pull it back North to get Sutherland the full force of nis team.” ha} Gon Hobbs to aj Gen Garon, telephone conversation, 30th Int Div, G-3 Jnl 0820 = "I~ We have just got another zeport that there are a lot of tanke rolling his ay. ¢ = Ne hus a lot oz ote and io start, ara can get cet then up and knock Hel] out of then." aj Gen Hobbs to liaj Gon Gerow, telephone conversation, 30th Inf Div, G-3 dri For almost a quarter of an hour, ne movement was recorded as the Panshers paused, aleited by the loss of tank 225, Ost. Chis ‘ordered the 2nd Poon to drive Forwanl, but Hscha. Kaappich replied on his wireless that he hal been hit and that fist Of al the antitank cannon supposedly somewhere in the field to thee Fight lad to he destrayed The attack stalled, Stibal Poetschke Inud to force the atackers to coatinve and Peiper bimself said that he dh so by leaving his tans aking 2 Panzerfaust and going over to every tank, threatening every cuomiander tha be wok! shoo hin deen at once i he ee ‘Osu, Christ put pressure om his platoon leaders 1 et the atiack, ‘olling again, The plan was © cxtank the troublesome position ‘ear the church by going ctoss country, Hscis, Kaappich sent of Oscha. Ropeter with the mission to move towards KOUA and then back imo the vilkge behind the Aneriean posions. He was followed by Uscha, Brauschke, Ustul. Koch and Uscha, Herzog advanced on their right lank, cresting the salle and taking Up covering Fie postions. Hcha. Krappich's eank ret) on the church steeple and engage! Me neaehy Tomm TD Gan and the Infancy positions atthe easter) obtskins of the town. Final, the remaining TD Gun next to the church was neutralized. The erew were wounded! with one an killed” In the meantime, Ropeter and Brauschke bad Masked he American read block and progressed non, paralleling the N38 To theie right but staying isthe reas, Koch and Herzog prowideet covering fire A shot dlstance behind them, Ostaf, Chris tok back-up positon to oversce the attack, Bul these five Panthers were engaged! at once by the Shermans of Ist and 2nd Plo, ‘3rd Tk Bn with Co Tand 1 respectively. afer near a hundredMap 3: Duel in the fogmetres, dhe roe of the te Panthers om she ler lank was cut by A field track that tamed into a sunken kane before joining the N.35, ‘oppoie the chum “The Germans were somewhat unsettled by this feature a8 they later seferred to cas an antitank dich, Ropeter veered 0 the el ane! reeenteved he town pot fit from the ehureh, When ie dit 8, he speed an Aniericit) tank behind # house and ordered is super, Uscha. Scheaten, 1 fre at i, In te heat of the hate, Uscha, Schusten got entansled jin the cables of the on-baaid communication sper and as mabe 10 ait properly missing the tank by a hairs breath. Ropeter thea took ewer the gun bat lis shell suck dhe ground showt of the tank. The Sherman backed off ar ence and disappcated Hscha. Knappich, Ustut, Koch and Ostef, Christ remained in the eld, giving fire Suppor. ‘hen the apposition from ROUA Tse ceased, dey tures! back tb the N33, passing. Prabra!s Iuuming Tank Hicha. Knappicl was fst, folloned by Ostul Chris an then Ustuf. Koch. They pushed along the main road together wit some SPW's, moving Up 10 the middle of the town Where they aught up with Ropeter and Brauschke«Prahun's burting Panther vas pushed of towed ext to the “Wilkins House’. The fie spread to the house, going eon the aks of It Pltoon & i Kowa that Uischa, Res (26) advice far into te field an! beyond the sunken lane, en gains targets in ROU. Later this tank also tuened! hack 10 the 8.33 and mevest along the “Kaw sh) Villyge” Rech tmuse have been preceded by Uscha Kruger and Use, Koufttann at some earlier refilled. He must have fllnved Iv the wake of stat Kearney (211) teva ln taken the sare rote but ata teller tnt in tine fe as chi donsy the task of the fst Plot nse the Ree dt Vite” tigh STOEMONT as sche, Ketger (215) teas nso Pictured using he sa rote but eartor than Uscha. Rec AE OSI, the Amesean tankers reported one enetay kil tthe sth (nF gl. AE the same tine they reported Now a hk Suecmisn feud survived o> neue misses Due tothe Song, Doppestion experienced, the Panthers stayed in the open feles vox! conterted themselves wil finn imo KOUA. They duelied ‘Sith the four Shermuns of 2nd Plateon, led by: £1 Clyde Thorne supporting Co L Lt Thocnell was wounded by shrapnel in is back during the momning of December 16th but remained ‘sith his tans Acconing te Iz Daviel F Knox, CD of Co 1, the siuation was initially stabiized wih the help of the Shera ‘About O80 tankes or haifiracks began to come aver the rise in fons frant The takers with 1s wasted me time with them, Tero tere knodked ort sandr more tried $0 come aver We realized eacerer that thers were probably plenay bebiud We koew tbis Decatise ey kept throwing dive! jie rounds tito our Brads At the sane time we could bear a bell ofa fight going on to-our right in the area defended by Compantes T and °K" About this lime I Rarramore called sme om the sound powered phone and Ui me tat these tw companies were getting pstbed back Thar ash’? good because our flanke woud soon be very ulnerabte immediately checked wil the battalion. Dey told me that there bud een some ire, bur thas everybig tad be OK Leeda bear the other company commanders on the radio occastortall Discussion wus held on abe use of Powell's stuff ubieh meant Lartilery The ansiser seemed fo be that it world be available if {0e eosild Wold xe an hour Dw 81 mine Mortars were set up and ott fie. LF Conway the mortar observe arrived at our CP ‘abou that tine, He wets nine aoa 1910."10) 20 An unknowa “Kiiegsberichiersia: ter", who found cover bebind one of the abandoned. 26mm ‘TD guns of the 8231 "TD Ban, immortalized this Panther ducing the anack towards ROUA, We have not Deen able to identify this Panther vet oe sho or what ison the engine deck. In the background we can make out two other Parahers providing eavering fire 1 One of the Panthers involved in the ick on ROUA was the mount of Use ech (2140, His Panther ean be seen to the left of the photograph, with part of the unidentified Panther stil visible oa the night, When the American resisance in ROUA collapsed, Rech's Panther zetuened to the entrance of STOUMONT and continued 19 advance west using the “Rue du Village”. Some of the key features in identifying this Panther were the dangling Schurze on the left bull side as well as the jenry can stowed on the furets por side, These festites will be easly seen sa the cioe sills taken of Panther 214 in the ceatre of STOUMONT ‘ee Chapter 5) 2 The unknown Kriegsberichterstatter continued (0 fla the German aac om ROU. tn the fuckgroune we can make ‘out Uscha. Rech’ Panther 214 advancing towards ROUA, which is 96W latpely Iden by a smoke sercen, x Transie Filan Odher than the kill recorded y the 119th Inf gt ante y he Tye ar a and desetbed above, no further German tank losses hel heen mitered by the Amenican side up 1 0900. The lows of another tee Puschens stoning this engagement ean be ruled tut ow eve ie mPa feuidence for sich a ekaim. On the German site, a couple of halftacks were knocked out, whicl will be described later The Impression is that the Shermans suck the well-armoured Panthers and possibly knocked out at leas two SPW's, but other than stopping the German push on ROUA, they did not infict, much more damase Aor the remainder of 2nd and Jed Platoon had moved cif the N33 to the right and into the fields, the remaining tanks, possibly the Ist Platoon wih Uselat Krager C218) and Ustuf. Kaufmann LD bur without Uscha. Rech G14) and reinforced by a couple of Panzer IV's drew up on the N33 and prepated for a direct, push int the village centre, They were preceded by Paratroopers find) Panzengrenadiers who exerted heavy pressure on’ the ‘American road bbloc st the "Maison Robinson’. When s moar sell ht the batfeaels caning the ammuniuon ony 5 meters from to the 90min gun position ankl the aramunition began 1 explo Sgr Sarmowskt destoyed the gun with a rifle grenade and ordered his men to continue as infantry ® 1 was probably during this phase that Pfe Albert A. Darago ard Pet Roland £ Seaman digingushed themselves with 4 daringly ‘love combat action against the Panzer. Both were crewmembers fof one of the 90rim AA guns of aed AAA. Br, mos Hkely gum No 4, whieh had previously been mired ip the road del, hen an infantry Lieutenant asked for men to take on two Geman tanks stationed near the road junction atthe “Maison Robinson’ they volunteered, ‘They had nor been tines! im dhe use of the Liseooks before, but received shor instructions fom the Lieutenant on the spot. They were erediter) with the destruction ‘of two Panzer IV's and received the Distinguished Service Cross These are the words of Albert A. Darago: “On the morning of December ibe 19th an infantry Li came up, ‘and asked for ten volunteers ta siop tro tanks Seaman and foluntecred. Wie didn't knone bow to use a bazooka brit the Lt told us what 10 do-and where to bit the tant. te also sai to tur our bess carom the flas of the Shell as it was fired as to not burt ower eves I can candy teil yon soba | dat to tbe best of may memory The Lt Toaded the bazooka. eraicled up to the edge and rested the bazooka on the beilge. kneeled on one knee to balance myst my surprise there wore fur tans two Tigers ancl wi Panthers There were two soldiers Standing bebind one of the tanks. It looked like the Germans were getting ready for a big pusb.f fired and beard a loud explosion Then all bet! broke Crawling back to the [tI wus snuler beary cross ‘machine gun jive. The Lt asked me howe I made out and {oud im 1 gota divect bit He toad the bazoekea aid Sat ta go bce and finch 1 off F crawled buck and found tbat two of the tans bad taken off fred and nit the tank agatn Then | erated back I reported to rmy Som prsitian My gun bad been ‘Dut out of action, $0 Iran down to tbe otber gien that twas fring at te tanks belive that those tanks were the we that bad left The gun crew sad they didn't need ‘me 80 1 rato the Lt wise asked about the second sbot ‘anu told bio got a second bit At that momont a shell Dit the huliding we were held and the Ft fel tothe agrond ith a strange took om his face. He ted ins ‘band and bis stomatc was coming out! pushed it back in and tarned (0 call a medic and before I coud say ‘anything the medic wes there He put a nag around the Les stomach and asked me to give iim a band putting the Lt om the back of a balftsh, We pst bin weross toe back and the medic asked me to stay on the back aru bro bt We drove down the road about balfa mile and on the right side of the road were two hrttses with the doors ‘off and wore being used for the wounded men. 1 was labora to tae the Lt off the bualftracl but the nacePhe Alben A, Dara AAAGun Bn feceiverd the Distingubhed Service Cress for his re in the batle for SIOUMONT. {Albert A. Darago vie Simon Vosters) This marvellous landkcape played key role in the hatte tor STOUMONT. In onder to oatlank the troublesome position near the church, Osta, Christ command bis Panthers cross country, Aier nearly hundred ‘metres, the route of the vehicles on the fet flank was cat by 2 Fok tick that rurped ine a sunlcen ane helore joining te N38 oppesie the church. The Germans were somewhat unsetled by this featare as they later fefented 10M sa ant tank clieh, To the lefi we cin see & saoup of houses tat fosed the pat Of town called ROUA, Also note the presence of the described! Held eck rupning through the terrain. The American resiptance was Strong and ‘ores! the Panthers 0 stay in the open fields. It David Knox's Go L wita sus response for the defense of ROUA got the welcome suppor of four Shermans fof G2 743rd Th Bo. This particular photogaph was taken at edge oF ROUA and makes it possible 10 ilemify us with the American defenders (@ x tlans weber 1x Rudi Hubeobbe would take over and tere were men thereto take ofthat and sbosild go back to my unt | turned around and sew my ouspt ‘cumin down the billAL thew point there was gunfire coming from te trees on the lef e all began to ru. Seva satel the TE ‘was tn a wheelchair at the DSC ceremony Aso, you asted me bow 1 felt was scared but 1 did what needed to be dane"? The first autoentc documentation of these kis 18a” nary fin the Combat Journal of the L131 Inf Ret ond was noted duxen at 1050. Given that Besides to Hgbt tak (st) three Panrtbers avers clined at the sane time by the L43rd AAA Bn, tis is clearly from a: announcement sunning, up the combat acitoe at thew snomest Ht was about this ‘ime tat tast elements of the AAA Br under 11 Kent had token off fron thetr position at SIOUMONT station and unrated further down the veley nut 1 is tety thal the message ‘seas transinitied orally by a liaison officer porting to the regimental 11 at HALTE. The Cinit Report (Of 11% Inf Ret already further identifies the ight tars las Marke IVS. To thts day; tere ts no plutigraplc evidence ‘conpirining the las of tne Panzer IVs at STOUMONT The ‘const taksn by the $2, 11900 Inf Ret om December 24th on lost German equipment mentions one Mark IV near STOUMONT andl ste at LA GLEIZE. Al! sts tanks at LA GLEIZE are confirmed and identified. The Mark 1V at STOUMONT t moxt probably the Wirbeletnd Flakpya {at the Sancortam ST EDQUARD, matuated on ibe Mark 1V ‘chassts Av caticie from “Stars and Sirpes published 0 February 26th, 1945 contains @ sketch locating tbe 160 destroyed tanks next to the “Robinson” bouse on the Xi Wf this were accurate, these two tanks should have shox Lup tn the original footage the Germans made during be attack "The fbn footage hanover des shone a Panzer IV reversing from the rod aind turning around in tbe fel. Finally, dere are no suc take losses mentioned in the affidavits Dy tho members of LSSAH obtained during the Matmedy tila These affidavits do covtatn valuable sketches and both fv the writen test os well as on these shewtehes, only Pratvm's Hasnber {8 menitoned. We do not question the boldness of he t00 mien ced Unt they scored bits, butt ts fainast beyond doubt that the claims of destroying the tanks are ot tal 10 ts also worth mentioning in this cones that Hansseorg Hubler (a enw member of Puruber 225) claimed i tis later statement Jrom 1948 ‘that the knocked ont Parber unty caught fir after being dit the motor compartment from tho fap. From the position of te tare ail the AA Gur, tt seine unlhely that this bit came from the AA gun, but it could bave come fiom dhe two bazookas It is not clear from te American sources when the action Imappened We put U1 ajter tho destruction of Prams Panter ane tbe loss ofthe second gun tn accordance wtih the official records of 145nt AAA Bou and the sowrves AA Notes, HQ ETO, regarating antitank action by the Hise {4A Gun Bre andl Loom B. Kent, Battery © of 13rd AAA Gum Bin in the Battle of the Bele This tat ks with the roport by Ma) Marten S Hayden, AAA Cnuts 01 Ardennes atte, ana probably abso with Darago's acco, placing it before tbe destruction of the second YOnnan AA eu, Pos, tue believe tat Dango and Seaman vant from gitn NO-410 gum No 2 and while there, volunteered for the tank bunt The description of the tu tanks destroyed range from ceverpibig from: ight tanks to Tigers, so ot mitch fatth ‘ca be putin the tdentification.A possible explanation for the difference in tanks 4s that the groups fred upton contained both Panthers and Panzer IVs and might thus dave been the remawuing tten Rantbers of Ist Platoon and tc Panzer IV's The tans engaged were indeed snost ike Marte IVs, as the fst mport mals muention of light tanks |r McGuire together with Cpls Davis and Guigar ane Pte Fideam {hes te! to bring an ahanwioned German AT gun to bear oa the ext German Panzer entering the village but were dispersed by enemy infanty fire and had to abandon the plan There were indeed « couple of captured German 75ers used by 23nd TD Bin a de course, oie suclv AT tasreported as bet lost in STOUMONT om this day (82504 7D Bin, ABR No. Vit p.5) The Pak 7 Sem was, according to tb mulevant 106 the Germ Pansergroncier and Fallchirmjiger companies engaged sat STOUMONE. The Rake 7.509 phoangraphed later et to) Pontber 254 furtner oven N33 tas prabably also from this captured stock Shorly after 0800, Maj Gen Hobbs was seeking permission fom V-coxps to get the 2nd Bh, 118 Int Rgt relieves by the 82nd AB Div as Col Sutherland had proposed. The repos feom the 119k Inf Rs made it lear thatthe main cnemy effort as now along the AMBLEVE towards LIEGE. He ressenee! chat a push farther south would actually mean a detour for the Germans. Maj Gen Gesow assured Hobbs that he would contact Na Gen James M ‘Gavin, Commanding General (CG) of the 82nd AB Div, on his Ipoh. Rarely 10/minutes ater, Gen elec) Hobbs an tod in that everything with the 82nd AB Div was aranged as they had previously discussed and sequested the 19h Inf Kgt 10 get hole ‘ofall fs men and wipe our the German threat ALOS25 the division inforwed the 119th In fgh about the release ‘of the 2nd Bn, However, there was ao imumediate result Eom this ‘on the hatlefeld. I was 1300 when the 505th Preht In Rgt finally relieved the 2nd Bn ftom sts postions overlooking the LIENNE, fiver, All the tached anilery, cane destroyers and! tanks had by hs ne alr move! to Une new positions." “The anillery was also attempting to get things going now, At (0830, Capt Race was sent a liaison officer to Ant Bio, 119th In Rat, and the CO himself went ct #0 contact minental HO. Footnotes 1 Tri testimony by Jochen Peiper. Tmerestinaly enough, each tank in the Panzer Rewinient Was issued 4 PancerTaust, See Ore Bewndere Anorlnuigen fur die Versorgung’ N29, Ib/TgbNeLOs844 v. 5.1244 geh” Whether oF ol this story is toue, 2 former member of the company clasmed that he saw hs Davlion “commander the fist time during the bade in STOUMONT when he was having out his company’ commander Ostul, Christ, for slowing down the advance of the entire ‘company. Sereening of Oskar Maurer, 10-19 12.1945 2. Fach Werner, AMidavit 01.04.1946, Erwin Sayperski, affidavit, 07.05.1086, Gees Hinds. Loader tank 281, Satement 22 12 1917 Terai analysis June 1991; Walter Kebler, Afidavit 01.10.16 sind 2806,1953; Horst Vollpecebt, ever tank 231, sketch, Perr Repoet p 2h, 3. Walter Ropeter, interviewed by Timm Hasler onthe 11.07.2008, 4. Geom Bunda, Sworn Statement 22.12.1947, Ono Lessa, Sworn Statement 05 0419%, 5. Gregoire, Les Panzers de Peiper face 2 1US Army, p12 6. 119Ah tof Ket, Uni Jo 7. David F Knox, Ist Lt, Co. 1, 116th Inf Rye: Journal, coumesy of ‘wueren Wason 3. Ma) Manin 8. Hayden, AAA Liuts in Ardennes Bane, According to Getmnan sources, Peiper later inspected the AA gon and noted that since only the optics were missing, tho gun Would sill be Functional 9, Albert A. Darago, Frail to Simon Vonters, 18.01.2006, 10, 4th Inf Div, G-5 Journal, T0810 and 0820, LI Rend AB Div, G3 Pesfodie,182400-192400, 12 400iN PA Bo, $2 JoBreakthrough 5 The time from 0900 until 1000 0900 = 1: What is the situation doun there this uerning? Hi This nozning dist thirg our Blue Sattalion of Orisis (3rd Sr, 119th Int Ret) was hit hard and cone elemente were overrun. Our Red Bn (ist Bn, 119th Ind Pet) nas used in there to assist it. Zelephone Conversation vetween Gen Thorsten, 6~3, let 03 Army and Col Rassengelt, HO 30th Div. 0805 Lereny half track knocked out by tanks. 0910 = Go at enureh in Stounont; enemy firing suoke on the 3ré Bots right flank = sight indicate a possible enc: Clement zon chet side. 0925 - (tanks) knocked out another aalitrack. 0920 ~ (tanks) Lnockea owt tuo ore vanie 1igin Ing Ret, Unit Ini 0952 = “Over in Stounont me are working then over, too. The last report we got wae they were beating the plsg out of them. We have enough Golaiers over there so thoy had better Fun out another divicion if they want to get through.” Dol Stephens, 30th Inf Tiv HQ, to ol Hill, ¥ Gorps "Q, telephone conversation, 30th Int Div, 6-3 Ini 0940 - cO radio abandoning his positions destroying radio, withdrawing on foot. 400th Fe Bn, GS-2 Ind 0955 = Sena 7 at once s+ 4 tanks to Regiment aigen Inz gt 7m,Ar 0900, It US Army contacted the 30h Inf Div. the ‘osision reponed on the 3d Bi, IS In Ret, being hi ha wah clements overnun. Probably die © the easier report by CT 119, it alse explained om the use of Ist En to assist St a, Here, che division ‘was unavare of he real situation. elements the Iss fn fighting fm STOU MONT! There were 00 For the defenders of STOUMONT, all the support that the regiment and the division tied to achninister came 100 late Peiper himself ongunizel he infantry ying in the ditch, including 9401) /SS Pe Rat For the decisive push in STOUMONT? The Panzergrenadiere and Panzerpionicee of the Kampfgnuppe took ‘out the remaining positions of Co T along the N33 ane dhs Ranked the Co K in the western pam of the vllage, The four ‘6mm ID guns located there were aot able to make their presence fell Cap Bruce A. Crissinges, CO of Ci, 23n0 TD Bi, lauer ante the faire of his suns to the fae that they were allowed guns, which exposed thelr erews ta small arts Fire and prevented them from manoeuvring so as to avoid being ‘outlankest.! [AT DP1d, Co I had been forced back to the church and was stil ‘withing. At the same time, C Batery, 40d EA Br Fred is First volley into STOUMONT without the aie of a forward observer. Twenty minutes later, the commanding offices af the anillery unt would leave the regimental PC and dnve 10 STOUMONT in an effort fis the bal situation in person, ‘The Germans now smoked the sight flank of 3ed Bo. The Americans drew the correct conclusion from this that there woul ‘soon be a flanking manoeuvre along the southern outskits ofthe village The N38 highway sphis atthe height of “Robinson House’. The nai road continies to the rsh of dhe church, On the lef the route descends in to the centre ofthe village, The marrow coud is called the village steer “Rue cu Vilage’. The German fm Footage deals with the pust along this stretch of road. Here the Panzengrenadiere were supported by the Punthers 215 (Uscha Kruger), 211 (Uso Kalinin and 214 sch. Rech) together with at least one Panzer IV, Use, Rech was driving down this fine later than che others and it seems that he was ne longer ‘engaged in aay combat activities hore. The tanks systematically fred isto the houses. John E.Lovell, 2 veteran fom Col, recollects the situation and what happened later: “After reporting to the company command post (in the centre of ‘he tow), we took ober the house across Ihe see! fos HAT tt Lup the Germans began to move into the tte. | ave been Foe ‘that they wore advancing wiih thirty Royal Tigers. The German faienory were following the tanks, nearing American nnifinens and white camouflage for we were in beau snow (note: Tere twas no beavy snow on the ground and no white camouftage tise! by the Germans as. far as we kone) This tas the first §S Panzer division, Hitler's personal dteision, with Adolf Hiiter turitten on the engison thetr uniform. We came under beaty fre from their infantry As their uanks would advance, dey would ppt one round jrom their 88's Into each house and building, Far Some reason they dtd not fre thto our house. We did take severa! ‘casualties from the small arms fre. Vbere was no way Jor us 0 $e oul wid crossing an open road 19 he Front OF an open ‘ita to the rear which would have given the Germans direct fre for us We retreated to the basenrent, boping to get ors later the Germans haul paced several soldiers on tho fst floor tnt wey did not check the basement We stayed there for two days. sleeping om a pite of coal. One of us woutd stir aware to keep the lotbers from snoring: here were approximately ter oF tele of ‘ust te basemnt Ahout this time one erillery aught ip wit tus andl beam shelling the tote. Gers tae stopped infront of the house. Tbe soldiers from tbe tank came in the house and ‘were surprised to find us, thinking the house bad been searched They turmed us over to ibe SS infantry and to the rear This was te SS, they were o tougls bunch! While searcbing 1 ome ofthe 88 fmopers sbought my overstes looked German and accused ‘me of taking them off « dead German soldier He put his rife 0 ‘my forebeadd I vemesnber that 07 the iste of my obershoes tas tive US Rubber Co.trudemark, | quickly persusded bint to fet me show it 19 birn. He was satisfted that they were not German”“The Americans slowly reteated to the batallon command postin the mille of the town, where dhe defence line again stabilized mainly becanse af the friendly rans suppor. Due to 4 message from the CO, 400h FA Io, who had aerived at STOUMONT a short while go, the tine at hich the battalion save up the CP can be established! AT 4940 he lett his postive, destroyed his radio and took 10 the friendly Ines on fer” The fi Tk Ba anaouriced the destruction of so halfvacks at 0305, snd 915 respectively and of ro futher sans at 0920, This Panther moving down the N33 nw STOUMONT village can be identified as having ‘been _-manufienited by the Daimler-Benz assembly plant by the placement of the Balkenkreuz on the port side rear stowage box. ‘The lack of a crew comparanent heater a0 helps narow down when the prodhicuon dare of this particular vehicle might be, elfectively limiting to September 1940 ‘There were relaively few Panthers involved in the bale for STOUMONT so the lack of a erew heater helps narrow denen che possibilities of which particular Panlher we cin see in this photo passing Rott Prahm’s Panther 225 which {Snow well alight, Given its production features and markings cin only! be one of three vehicles either Paather 202, 232 of 231, all of the other Panthers involved in he hatte either had crew healers or were meanufacianed by MAN. who used a eliferent placement for the rear Balkenkreuz. Through the trees on the fet (of the phoxe We can sve the “Robinson House’ Teast Files) Tagether with the claim already mentioned before tn the Unit Journal of 119% Inf Ret occurring at OST, bis leiuais exact the nnanber of destroyed armoured vebictes hut Pi at ROUA later pul fortes together with mary ‘enemy tnfantey advancing from the east I appears that only those bits were recorded. Te clas frome Ist Pin with Go 1 negarding, “vo enemy tartks and one baezcs and many enemy infrniry odtownctng from the south” fappairenty were not trie It remains sinclear wbetber we fare deating with incomplete records, problems with transmission (maybe only 2nd Pity cod mamnatns radio contact), tater additions or double kills. What can be ried fut however ts the act fase of einother fy 19 four nthers fn this phase There are only tur Karuber wrecks documented in STOUMONT, Panthers. 225 (Prati) and 2541 (Hers0) The lass of Herzoe’s Pansher two days later Is beyond the scope of the book ‘Two Sd.Kfe 2519 (Kanonemwagen) ftom 12 85-Pz Gren Ret: 2 ‘were indeed knocked ul. The Kanonen-Sehiizenpancerwigen GwK-SPW ~ armoured troop camer moueting a 7,Sem assault ‘wun uncle Rot, Eduard Moser was destroyed, killing Moser. The following KWK-SIW under Uscha. Anton Motzheim Was bil, 100 ‘The crew tale out unharmed: only the deiver, Siem Moser suffered from burns.* The use of KWI-SPWs by the attacking Forces is further confirmed by the statement of a cisn on ow his house at LA, ROCHIETTE (north of STOUMONT 0n the toad to CHEFNA) was, hit by the shell of an SPW The Ist assault gun platoon of 12/88 PaGren tet. 2 under the command of Oscha, Plalzer was likely suppoming the infant) on the eight flank of the attack. ba Anton Motzhrotm was the squat leader ofthe second Squel in Ist Plato of 12./ SSPz Gren Ret 2.After te loss of bis SPW he watted back with his crew toes LA GLELZE avd os te rou nestr EROIDECOUR mt Feipor Diefentbat and bis company contmander, Tete, who sat fat bis SPWAfler being duestioned about the suation aud the course of the combat, Feiper anened tm ct bis crew