SSS vs Soriano GR L-18081 04-30-1963
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
Francisco vs. House of Representative
(GR NO. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003)
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same for
being insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complait was filed
with the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings
from the coverage of judicial review.
HELD:
No. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches
of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the
court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions,
this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
technical terms are employed.
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin.
It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705.
June 26, 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with
respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the following
specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall
be effective for 4 years.
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set
in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the
respondent.
The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a
foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued
as party-defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that
petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis
the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.
HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or
not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of
the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic
mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with
private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment
of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a
sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent.
The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Service and
Bureau of Customs
G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966
Facts:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad
consigned to herein petitioner. It was discharged to the custody of
the Customs Arrastre Service, unit of the Bureau of Customs,
handling arrastre operations. The former delivered to the broker of
the consignee only three cases of the shipment. Petitioner then filed
a suit against the Customs Arrastre and BOC to recover the value
undelivered. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on ground that not
being persons under the law, cannot be sued. The Court of First
Instance ruled for the defendants. The appellant contends that
defendants discharge proprietary functions and can be sued by
private individuals.
Issue/s:
a. Whether or not defendants are immune from suit.
Held:
a. Yes, BOC and Customs Arrastre are imunne from
suit. The fact that a non-corporate government entity
performs proprietary functions in nature does not
necessarily result in it being suable. The Bureau of
Customs is part of the Department of Finance, being a
part of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, and with this, arrastre service is a
necessary incident of the function of the Bureau.
Waving state immunity from suit are strictly construed
and that waiver being in derogation of sovereignty, will
not be lightly inferred.
Petition dismissed.
Republic of the Philippines VS. Villasor
G.R. No. L-30671 (November 28, 1973)
Facts:
-Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor rendered the decision in favor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International
Construction Corporation final and executory.
-The writ of execution was issued by the respondent, Honorable
Guillermo Villasor. The sheriffs of Rizal Province, Manila and Quezon
city were then tasked to execute the decision made by the
respondent. The sheriffs of Rizal province served notices of
Garnishment to several banks, especially to PNB and Philippine
Veteran's Bank.
-The funds of the Armed forces of the Philippines are deposited in
PNB and Philippine Veteran's Bank. These funds are duly allocated
for retirees payments, military and civil personnel allowances as well
as for the AFP operations.
-On certiorari, the petitioner filed prohibitions proceedings with
regards to respondent's action in excess of jurisdiction with the grave
abuse of discretion for granting the Writ of Execution against the
funds and properties of AFP. For this reason, the notices and
garnishment were said to be null and void.
Issue:
The validity of the Writ of execution issued by the respondent, Judge
Villasor.
Held/Ruling:
The respondent's action/decision towards the case doesn't conform
with the injunctions of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate
of constitutionalism which flows from the justifiable concept of
sovereignty that the state and government has immunity from suit
unless it gives consent. The sovereign (authority) is exempted from
suit because of practical and logical grounds with regards to no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the rights
are dependent. Before the State can be sued, there must be a
consent. The judgement against the state can't be enforced by
execution because of the universal rule there were limited “only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the state of execution” and
that the power of the Courts ends when the judgement is rendered,
since the garnishment of the funds and properties of the government
may not be seized under the Writ of Execution and garnishment just
to satisfy the judgement of the respondent. The functions and public
services of the State can't be disrupted by any form of diversion as
they are subjected to legitimacy and policies as appropriated by the
law and the constitution itself.
Terminology:
certiorari- writ or order by which the higher court reviews the decision
made by the lower court
writ- a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal
authority to act (ex. Subpoena, warrant, court order)
postulate- something that's suggested as true and factual as a basis
of reasoning.
Wylie vs. Rarang
GR No. 74135, May 28 1992, 209 SCRA 357
FACTS:
Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while
petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the
U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.
Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of
the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard.
Wylie vs. Rarang
M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the
U.S. Naval Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day"
(POD) which was published daily by the US Naval Base station.
The POD featured important announcements, necessary
precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel.
Wylie vs. Rarang
One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry."
On February 3, 1978, the POD made a publication, under the
"NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain
person named “Auring” who is described as a disgrace to her division
and to the Office of the Provost Marshal.
Wylie vs. Rarang
The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in
the Office of the Provost Marshal and was subsequently proven that
it was her being referred to when petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a
letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.
The private respondent the filed an action for damages alleging that
the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and
libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing
her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was
published and circulated in the English language and read by almost
all the U. S. Naval Base personnel.
Wylie vs. Rarang
The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss
based on the grounds that the defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt.
James Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as
officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from
suit; and the United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US
government which cannot be sued without its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are
immune from suit.
HELD:
The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978
mentions a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to
the Office of the Provost Marshal."
Wylie vs. Rarang
The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and
appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and
foodstuffs.
There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the
private respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of the
Provost Marshal.
Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was
investigated by her supervisor.
Wylie vs. Rarang
Before the article came out, the private respondent had been the
recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the
performance of her duties.
It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding
officer of the naval base is far removed in the chain of command from
the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him
responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
This may be true as a general rule.
Wylie vs. Rarang
In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive
publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he
approved it.
The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the
records.
The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual
respect for the findings of the trial court and the respondent court
should be withheld in this particular case and why their decisions
should be reversed.
Wylie vs. Rarang
Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages
caused by a person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence,
to wit:
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional or voluntary or negligent."
Wylie vs. Rarang
Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral
damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation.
In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to
receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings
and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February
3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the
private respondent.
Wylie vs. Rarang
Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost
Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if
the article were published.
The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their
direction they issued the publication without deleting the name
"Auring."
Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty.
It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.
As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to
the record, suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was
baseless and false.
The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the
damages they caused the private respondent.
USA VS. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645, May 22, 1985
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of
bids for certain naval projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the
company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In
June 1972, the company received a letter which said that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The
company then sued the United States of America and individual
petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the
projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from entering into
contracts with third parties concerning the project.
ISSUE:
1. Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary
functions?
2. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to
governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the
projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function
of the government. As such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts of
the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US
government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. IAC, GR No. 70547, 1993-
01-22
Facts:
a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine
National Railways, (PNR)... and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit,
Inc... upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan... g... ot stalled and was hit by defendant's
express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers,
eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three
(53) others suffered physical injuries.
Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive
engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy
intersection without any bars,... semaphores, signal lights, flagman or
switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass
through the crossing
The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of
the Complaint and as... affirmative defense alleged that the collision
was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of
plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference... on a partial stipulation of facts and
issues
1. That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission engaged in
the business of transportation and operating public utility
buses for the public
2. That defendant Philippine National Railways is a purely
government owned and controlled corporation duly
registered and existing by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
741, with capacity to sue and be sued, and is likewise
engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by...
trains and buses
Issues:
whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys immunity from suit
Ruling:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as amended by Republic Act No.
6366:
"SEC. 4. General Powers -- The Philippine National Railways shall
have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under
the Corporation law."... in conjunction with Section 2(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 741:
"(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines, trucklines,
subways, and other kinds of land transportation, vessels, and
pipelines, for the purpose of transporting for consideration,
passengers, mail and property between any points in the
Philippines;"
Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of implied powers
announced in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, Sr. and
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to the effect that the
power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact
private... business. At any rate, respondent court characterized the
railroad company as a private entity created not to discharge a
governmental function but, among other things, to operate a
transport service which is essentially a business concern, and thus
barred from invoking immunity... from suit.
respondent court agreed with the conclusion reached by the trial
court that the absence of a crossing bar, signal light, flagman or
switchman to warn the public of an approaching train constitutes
negligence per the pronouncement of this Court in Lilius vs. Manila
Railroad Company (59 Phil 758 [1934]).
Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an
employer in the selection and supervision of its employees,
respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on this
score since it allowed Honorio Cabardo, who finished only primary
education and became an... engineer only through sheer experience,
to operate the locomotive, not to mention the fact that such plea in
avoidance was not asserted in the answer and was thus belatedly
raised on appeal.
"The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a
common carrier, was not immune from suit under Act No. 1510, its
charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, provides that the
PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership
during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the
President of the
Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 provides:
'SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - The Philippine National
Railways, being a factor for socio-economic development and
growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure program of the
government and as such shall remain in and under government
ownership during its... corporate existence. The Philippine National
Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests
of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while
aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation
must be ensured so that... service can be rendered at the minimum
passenger and freight prices possible.'
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends'
The correct rule is that 'not all government entities, whether corporate
or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial
business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other private corporation... cited in Manila Hotel Employees
Association vs.
Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel
case also relied on the following rulings:
`By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the
rules of law governing private corporations.'
'When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is amenable to all
the rules of law which bind private individuals.'
'There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject,
but when the sovereign engages in business and the conduct of
business enterprises, and contracts with individuals, whenever the
contract in any form comes before the courts, the rights and
obligation of the... contracting parties must be adjusted upon the
same principles as if both contracting parties were private persons.
Both stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is
merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor'
NIA vs Ventura GR 73919
Traders Royal Bank vs Jesus De Vega GR L-66321
Mayor Yulo vs CSC GR 94125
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ANTONIO
CAMPOS RUEDA. G.R. No. L-13250. October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the
deceased Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a Spanish national, by reason
of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier,
Morocco up to her death. At the time of her demise she left, among
others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The CIR
then issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes of
P369,383.96. Rueda filed an amended return stating that intangible
personal properties worth P396,308.90 should be exempted from
taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of
Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 (now Section 104) of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda. The CTA
stated that the foreign country mentioned in Section 122 "refers to a
government of that foreign power which, although not an international
person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or
death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing
therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It
is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been
recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the
exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."
ISSUE: Whether the exemption is valid.
RULING:
YES.
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of
the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall
be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or
death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of
the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time
of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property
owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country." 
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified
with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a
politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of  law. A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a
government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its
commands. 
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international
personality, the CIR has not successfully made out a case. The Court
did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, like
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall
under this exempt category. 
Bacani vs NACOCO
[G.R. No. L-9657]
29 November 1956
Facts:
Plaintiffs Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto are both court
stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No.2293 of the said court,
entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Federico
Alikpala, the counsel for the defendant, requested said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request
and delivered the needed transcript containing 714 pages and
thereafter submitted to Counsel Alikpala their bills for the payment of
their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of
P564 to Bacani, and P150 to Matoto for the said transcript at the rate
of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of the corporation by the Auditor General,
the payment of the said fees was disallowed and recovery of the
amounts paid was sought. On the 19th of January 1953, the Auditor
General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice, wherein it was
expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt
from the payment of the fees in question.
Bacani et al counter the deduction of the said fees from their salaries
and that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The defendants set up as
a defense that the NACOCO i9s a government entity within the
purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, and
therefore, exempting NACOCO from paying the stenographers’ fees
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) may be
considered as a government entity.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the National Coconut Corporation
does not acquire the status of being part of the “Government”
because they do not come under the classification of municipal or
public corporation. Although the said corporation was organized with
the purpose of promoting the coconut industry, it was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from that of our government,
for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned. It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other
private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.
BINAY v. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991
FACTS: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending
financial assistance to a bereaved family whose gross income does
not exceed P2000  a month. The resolution was referred to
respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA
disapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement
of funds for the implementation thereof. COA's objection is of the
position that there is no perceptible connection or relation between
the objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the
alleged public safety, general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of
Makati. COA's also argued that. "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to
the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a
public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the
majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit
of only a few individuals as in the present case."
ISSUES:
(1) WON the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
(2) WON the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of  the
equal protection clause in the constitution.
HELD:
(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public
purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits
a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation
geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services
(Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare
(Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human
dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of
the common good.
(2) No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in
classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the
tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor,
etc.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD G.R. No. 166494  June
29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH,
DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically tasked to monitor the
drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing
rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and
prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257
otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to
the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive
use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial
services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation   of private
property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant
the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5%
to 10% on branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a
scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the
discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it
has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.
It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by
the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will
suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the
alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no
basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business,
because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and
come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to
show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works
greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they
will incur losses. However,petitioner’s computation is clearly flawed.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the
discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income
derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which
will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a
per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income
statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses,
and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately
reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any
financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that
they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In
addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption
that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the
32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the
discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must
accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000)
FACTS:
Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in
Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions in the
contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential
purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning
ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area
as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the
subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a
petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed
car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas &
Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he
sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered
prior to its effectivity.
HELD:
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may
be given effect over any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.
RATIO:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern
certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and
may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to
those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested
rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be
read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,  the Supreme Court already upheld subject
ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
[328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner
herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to
open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The
said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City.
This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the
same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition
of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining
order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so
and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the
authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an
agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street
to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to
exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the
National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and
not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot
exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is
not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does
not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio
G.R. No. 118127 – 455 SCRA 308 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Police Power
FACT:
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and
hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in
the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is
to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC
noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-
reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and
is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and
for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100152, March
31, 2000
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for
a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and
the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent
City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following
conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an
optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It  cannot examine
and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients,
because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell
reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first
been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical
clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a
prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise
optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and
similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only
upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist
Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging
that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business
permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such
permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of
Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said
date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.
Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special
conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of
business permits
Ratio: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It
is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-
raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city
mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond
cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business
permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with
utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and
equal protection of the law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by
respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several
conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals
that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing
such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the
law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI
are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well
within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police
power.
The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or
city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved
upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or
permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State
within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code.
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit
to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not
purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The
objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's
business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in
petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as
optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the
City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the
practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive
domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law
to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations
Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED: and the
respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's
business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Doctrine: The scope of police power has been held to be so
comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the
health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community.  Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the
power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a
regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this
power.
 Requisites
1 -    LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of
the police power
2 -    LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals
Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30
September 1982]
Facts:
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of
Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City
of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular
traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are
two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee
of such certificate of public convenience.
On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated
taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol
Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above
BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing
the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT,
all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for
registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of
model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model
1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model
1974, in 1981.
On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case
80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation;
to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years
of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which
were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners
filed before the BOT a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion”, praying for
an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February
1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board
a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main
Petition” praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than
10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of
their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1
January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made
personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the
records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the
present Petition was instituted.
The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the
petition; without costs.
1. Rationale behind exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The
State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
Velasco vs Villegas
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners
of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners challenge the
constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila,
which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber
shop. They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
their means of livelihood without due process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an
improper exercise of police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed
out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power
measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance
4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on
the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a
1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated,
this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities
and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case
been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”
Ermita-Malate Hotel And Motel Operators Asso. Vs. Mayor Of Manila
[20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with
one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president
and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for
prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent
Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of
the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution
and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by
both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was
alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by
the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After
which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in
detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision
cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence
of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential
to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here.
The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.
Republic Vs. PLDT
[26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969]
 
Facts:
 
The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising
government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of
Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service
corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a
telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own
government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and
other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the
govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the
RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby
BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local
residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the
condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only
for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons
or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT.
Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the
court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract
with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of
PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such
conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered
judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such
agreement. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such
agreement.
 
Held:
Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities
to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no
reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services
in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.
Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No. L-
12792, February 28, 1961
The Power of Eminent Domain
To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction
with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc,
Manila.
The petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines through
the Office of the Solicitor General; and the respondent is La Orden
de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation
that owns the San Beda College.
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda
Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now
Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa
Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a
portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel
belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not having been able
to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government
instituted an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial
court valued the property in question at P270,000.00 and authorized
appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said
amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of
Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the
Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property
aforesaid.
In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated
is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to
expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposed
expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a
property dedicated to education.
The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was
not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of
the Power of Eminent Domain.
Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be
expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation;
that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public
character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into
the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the
proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order
to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question
of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very
liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not
appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of
evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to
present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that
might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of
fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga
street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the
present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.
City of Manila Vs. Chinese Community
[40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation
of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of
Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not
necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed
that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in
the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not
necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein
assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the
necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the
necessity of the expropriation.
Held:
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent
domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity
is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have
the right to inquire to.
Republic Vs. Castelvi
[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-
year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956,
the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Issue:
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947
or 1959.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as
of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private
property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3)
it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must
be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public
use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castelvi
property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be
paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the
contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can
give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a
lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land
in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however,
did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of
the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because
in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law
independent of contract.
People Vs. Fajardo
[104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]
Facts:
The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others
that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the
plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the
expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of
land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway
and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants
reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor
turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a
place of residence very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the
ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
 
Held:
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the
view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character.
To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
EPZA Vs. Dulay
[148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where
the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to
be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining
just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree
may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
SUMULONG vs GUERRERO G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987
Fact: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA)
filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including
the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-
Balaoing.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they
had been deprived of the possession of their property without due
process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and
assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended.
Petitioners argue that:
 
Issue: Whether  “socialized housing” as defined in Pres. Decree No.
1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is
not “public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people, bereft of
public character?
 
Held: No, “socialized housing” fans within the confines of “public
use”. It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of
Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities inextricably linked with low-
cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum
improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project.  The use
to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the
requisites of “public use”. The lands in question are being
expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon
Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried
government employees.
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs.
COMELEC
[289 SCRA 337; G.R. No. 132922; 21 Apr 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without
legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not
able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a
result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand,
had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which
provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires
COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines
with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to
suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require
these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and,
in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime
time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just compensation.
Held:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether
radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to
assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of
the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television
stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and
supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and
magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the
broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry
to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the
industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves,
no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air
time to the COMELEC.
National Power Corp. Vs. Gutierrez
[193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of
Respondents for the construction of transmission lines. Petitioner
was adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the
transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right
of way.
Issue:
Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking"
and such the case will be entitled just compensation.
Held:
The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually
deprives Respondents of their proprietary rights. No plant higher than
three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of
high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger
to life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is
entitled to just compensation.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. EDU
G.R. No. L- 41383, August 15, 1988
FACTS:
The Philippine Airlines (PAL) is a corporation engaged in the air
transportation business under a legislative franchise, Act No. 42739.
Under its franchise, PAL is exempt from the payment of taxes.
Sometime in 1971, however, Land Transportation Commissioner
Romeo F. Elevate (Elevate) issued a regulation pursuant to Section
8, Republic Act 4136, otherwise known as the Land and
Transportation and Traffic Code, requiring all tax exempt entities,
among them PAL to pay motor vehicle registration fees.
Despite PAL's protestations, Elevate refused to register PAL's motor
vehicles unless the amounts imposed under Republic Act 4136 were
paid. PAL thus paid, under protest, registration fees of its motor
vehicles. After paying under protest, PAL through counsel, wrote a
letter dated May 19,1971, to Land Transportation Commissioner
Romeo Edu (Edu) demanding a refund of the amounts paid. Edu
denied the request for refund. Hence, PAL filed a complaint against
Edu and National Treasurer Ubaldo Carbonell (Carbonell).
The trial court dismissed PAL's complaint. PAL appealed to the Court
of Appeals which in turn certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
            Whether or not motor vehicle registration fees are considered
as taxes.
RULING:
Yes. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one
of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly
called a tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees. The
motor vehicle registration fees are actually taxes intended for
additional revenues of the government even if one fifth or less of the
amount collected is set aside for the operating expenses of the
agency administering the program.  bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by
Tio Vs. Videogram Regulatory Board
[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram
operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the
amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless
of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales
tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of
Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,
the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale,
lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any
motion picture or audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue
to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the
municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie
houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%)
and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's
specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial
losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million
per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and
these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry.
Issue:
Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of
police power.
Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .
Held:
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation
of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in
pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and
void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at
rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing
public brought about by the availability of unclassified and
unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with
brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due
to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere
payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to
engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
CALTEX (PHIL) vs Commissioner IR GR l20462
Francisco I. Chavez vs. Jaime B. Ongpin and Fidelina Cruz,
G.R. No. 76778. June 6, 1990
FACTS:
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 464 provides that
every five years starting calendar year 1978, there shall be a
provincial or city general revision of real property assessments. The
revised assessment shall be the basis for the computation of real
property taxes for the five succeeding years.
On the strength of the aforementioned law, the general
revision of assessments was completed in 1984. However,
Executive Order No. 1019 was issued, which deferred the collection
of real property taxes based on the 1984 values to January 1, 1988
instead of January 1, 1985.
On November 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive order No. 73. It states that beginning January 1, 1987, the
1984 assessments shall be the basis of the real property collection.
Thus, it effectively repealed Executive Order No. 1019.
Francisco Chavez, a taxpayer and a land-owner,
questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 73. He
alleges that it will bring unreasonable increase in real property taxes.
In fact, according to him, the application of the assailed order will
cause an excessive increase in real property taxes by 100% to 400%
on improvements and up to 100% on land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order no. 73 imposes
unreasonable increase in real property taxes, thus, should be
declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
The attack on Executive Order No. 73 has no legal basis
as the general revision of assessments is a continuing process
mandated by Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 464. If at all, it is
Presidential Decree No. 464 which should be challenged as
constitutionally infirm. However, Chavez failed to raise any objection
against said decree.
Without Executive Order No. 73, the basis for collection of
real property taxes will still be the 1978 revision of property values.
Certainly, to continue collecting real property taxes based on
valuations arrived at several years ago, in disregard of the increases
in the value of real properties that have occurred since then, is not in
consonance with a sound tax system. Fiscal adequacy, which is one
of the characteristics of a sound tax system, requires that sources of
revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and
their variations.
Roxas v CTA
GR No L-25043, April 26, 1968
FACTS:
Antonio, Eduardo and Jose Roxas, brothers and at the same time
partners of the Roxas y Compania, inherited from their grandparents
several properties which included farmlands. The tenants expressed
their desire to purchase the farmland. The tenants, however, did not
have enough funds, so the Roxases agreed to a purchase by
installment. Subsequently, the CIR demanded from the brothers the
payment of deficiency income taxes resulting from the sale, 100% of
the profits derived therefrom was taxed. The brothers protested the
assessment but the same was denied. On appeal, the Court of Tax
Appeals sustained the assessment. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Roxas liable?
RULING:
No. It should be borne in mind that the sale of the farmlands to the
very farmers who tilled them for generations was not only in
consonance with, but more in obedience to the request and pursuant
to the policy of our Government to allocate lands to the landless.
In order to maintain the general public’s trust and confidence in the
Government this power must be used justly and not treacherously. It
does not conform with the sense of justice for the Government to
persuade the taxpayer to lend it a helping hand and later on penalize
him for duly answering the urgent call.
In fine, Roxas cannot be considered a real estate dealer and is not
liable for 100% of the sale. Pursuant to Section 34 of the Tax Code,
the lands sold to the farmers are capital assets and the gain derived
from the sale thereof is capital gain, taxable only to the extent of
50%.  whether by business enterprises, resident individuals are
Pascual Vs. Sec. Of Public Works
[110 Phil 331; G.R. No.L-10405; 29 Dec 1960]
Facts:
Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for
declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act
appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is
owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of
the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads
to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the
council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the
roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street.
However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to
write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of
RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the
letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private
property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the
appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab
initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the
alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court
dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds
stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional.
Held:
The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The
taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the
money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals.
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads
depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property
when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective.
The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a
private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure
the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a
said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality
of the said appropriation.
The decision appealed from is reversed.
TIU V. CA (1999) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
G.R. No. 127410, 37 SCRA 99, January 28, 1971
DOCTRINES:
1. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among
residents. It is enough that all persons under like
circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges
and required to follow the same obligations.
2. The classification based on a valid and reasonable
standard does not violate the equal protection clause.
FACTS:
1. RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military
reservations into other productive uses. Section 12 thereof
created the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ),
which includes the City of Olongapo, Municipality of Subic
and the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and
granted special privileges.
2. Thereafter, EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of
the incentives provided by RA 7227. Sec. 1 of EO
97 provides for the tax and duty-free importations shall only
be applied raw materials, capital goods and equipment
brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except
for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ,
subject to the taxes and duties under Philippine laws. The
exportation or removal of tax and duty free goods from the
territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippines shall
be subject to duties and taxes under Philippine laws.
3. Section 1.1 thereof grants the enjoyment of the tax and
duty incentives to the business and enterprises and
residents within the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base only. It excludes the the first two component cities as
provided for by Sec. 12 of RA 7227.
ISSUES:
Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the laws?
RULING:
  No, EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection of the
laws.
 The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
 Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3)
not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.
 RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of
military reservations into productive uses.
 The Government provides enticements as to persuade and
attract investors to pour in capital with the said military
bases. Among such enticements are: (1) a separate
customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free
importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business
enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange
control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance,
and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and
of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers.
 The purpose of the law is to convert former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.
Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the tax
incentives in RA 7227.
G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007  PHARMACEUTICAL AND
HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH
UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR.
MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR.
JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR.
MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR.
NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,
Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed
impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the
legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to
2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence,
it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of
the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued
herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health
(DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES
under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements
under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must
be established that such rule is being followed by states because
they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law.
 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of
the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that
can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs Zamora GR No 141284 15
August 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and Philippine
National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President
declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign
are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor
General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail
constitutionality of calling the AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion?
Decision: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.  Apart
from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of
its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit
standing. However, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the
issue now.
People v. Lagman
GR L-45892, L-45893; 66 Phil 13 [July 13, 1938]
Facts. Respondents Lagman and de Sosa are charged with violation
of the National Defense Law which establishes compulsory military
service. Both refused to register to military service. Lagman avers he
has a father to support, has no military leanings and does not wish to
kill or be killed. Sosa reasons he is fatherless, and has a mother and
an 8 year-old brother to support. Respondents question the
constitutionality of said law.
Issue. Is the National Defense Law unconstitutional?
Held. No. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against Art II, sec 2 (now
sec 4) of the Constitution but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the govt to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make
this duty of the govt excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the govt to require compulsory
military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State.
CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934,
204957, 205003, 205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491,
205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, 207563)
*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law
is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom
since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)
* HELD AND RATIO:
A.
1. NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question
of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not
be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to
refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of
the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient  (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State
has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
“primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2. NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH
Law because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in
the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH
Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral
contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under
RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and
distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-
licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With
RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH
must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it
will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a)
is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according
to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
a.) NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow
religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
b.) YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section
29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause,
whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of
religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure
compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over
the effective implementation of the law. 
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors
(under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection
clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health
officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to
believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this
freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state
interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There
is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the
limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The
Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the
right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The
Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta  of
Women).
c.) NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses
to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding
and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government.
The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods
to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free
to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of
the State.
4. YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this
mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage
and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority
or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is
invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in
life-threatening procedures.
5. NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section
14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of
the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is
superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of  several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen
in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public
health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health
care service provider.”
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and
that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe
the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law
only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8. NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and
non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours
of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude,
for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued
with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono  service.
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should
they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long
as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro
bono  or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services
and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA
Act of 2009).
C. NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction
of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH
Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of
the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.
GR No. 187167
Prof. Merlin Magallona et al vs. Eduardo Ermita et al
FACTS:
Original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of RA 9522 adjusting the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline as “island regime” of nearby
territories.
ANTECEDENTS:
That on March 2009, congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA
9255. The change prompted by the need of Ra 3046 to be compliant
on the terms of UNCLOS. Complying with the requirements of
UNCLOS, RA 9255:
1. Shortened one baseline;
2. Optimized the location of some base points around the
Philippines archipelago;
3. Classified Kalayaan Island Group as an “island regime”.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality on the grounds that:
1. RA 9255 reduces the Philippine territory in violation of
article 1 of the Philippine constitution;
2. RA 9255, opens the Philippine waters landwards of the
vase lines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircraft,
undermining the Philippine sovereignty.
Commenting on the petition, respondents raised the issues:
1. Requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’
alleged lack of locus standi;
2. The propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9255. The respondents
defended constitutionality of RA 9255 as the country’s
compliance to UNCLOS, preserving the Philippine territory
over KIG/ Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA
9255 doesn’t undermine the country’s security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines’ claim to Sabah.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit
and whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the
proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9255;
2. On the merits, whether RA 9255 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. Petitioners possess locus standi to bring these suits as
citizens. Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion
of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the
petition alleges neither legislative prerogative nor misuse of
public funds. Citizens with constitutionality sufficient
interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which
undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
 necessitating urgent resolution. The peculiar nature of RA
9255, it is difficult to find other litigants possessing “more
direct and specific interest” to bring the suit, thus satisfying
one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of statutes.
2. RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional RA 9522 is a Statutory
Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate
Philippine Territory.
Petitioners submit RA 9255 “dismembers a large portion of the
national territory” because it discards pre-UNCLOS demarcation of
the Philippine territory under treaty of Paris, among others.
Petitioners’ theory failed to persuade the court.
UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It
is a multilateral treaty regulating sea use over maritime zone.
Base line laws such as RA 9255 enacted by UNCLOS states parties
to mark out specific base line points along their coast.
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9255 for its failure to
textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9255 di not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the base lines of Sabah.
UNCLOS and RA 9255 is not incompatible with the constitution’s
delineation of internal waters.
As petitioners’ final argument against the validity of RA 9255,
petitioners’ contend the law unconstitutionally “converts” internal
waters” into “archipelagic waters” hence subject to the right of
innocent passage under UNCLOS including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights indutably expose Philippines’
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard in violation of
the constitution.
Whether refered to as Philippine “internal waters” under article 1 of
the Philippine constitution or “archipelagic water” under UNCLOS the
Philippine exercises sovereignty over the body of waters underlying
landward of the base lines, including the air space over it.
THE PETITION WAS DENIED.
Espina vs. Zamora (G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010)
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000 expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail
trade business.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional
mandate for the development of a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
HELD: Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of
economic nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them
competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.
The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are
given preference in all areas of development.
Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance
between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
investments and services.
The Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful
business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos
continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
RULING: As the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has
contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced
that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien
control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered
any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself
has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization
has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small and medium
enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
Philippine Telegraph v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 118978, 23 May 1997
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired
Grace de Guzman specifically as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went
on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods. De
Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee.
She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
few months earlier.
When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain
the discrepancy including a reminder about the company’s policy of
not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed
from the company and Labor Arbiter handed down a decision
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed de Guzman, who had
already gained the status of a regular employee. It was apparent that
she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
RULING:
No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her
status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as in bad faith
as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she
wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could
not be a ground to terminate her services.
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a
female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against
discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and
by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s
ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136
of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it
likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a
woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The
kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and
ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be
prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for
order but also imperatively required. However, SC nevertheless ruled
that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be
sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the
dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Union BFAR vs COA
GR 169815,
August 13, 2008
Facts: The BFAR Employees Union issued a resolution requesting
the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its
request on the high cost of living which makes it hard to sustain even
the four basic needs. On post-audit, COA disallowed the grant of
Food Basket Allowance. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and
prayed for the lifting of the disallowance for being unconstitutional as
it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined
under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Issue: Is the disallowance in question unconstitutional?
Held: The court denied the petition. Social justice provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and
policies giving guidelines for legislation and that they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Oposa v. Factoran
GR 101083, 224 SCRA 792 [July 30, 1993]
Facts. Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country,
petitioners, all minors represented by their parents, instituted a civil
complaint as a taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth.” They pray for the cancellation of all existing
timber license agreements (TLA) in the country and to order the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cease
and desist from approving new TLAs. On motion of then DENR Sec.
Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of
action. Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an issue political
(whether or not logging should be permitted) which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to
“represent their generation as well as the generation yet unborn”,
allege their fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology
was violated by the granting of said TLAs.
Issues.
Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth”?
Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?
Held.
Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
xxx Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the
said right.43
Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest to all citizens of the
Philippines and the petitioners are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for filing of a valid class suit 44 are present.
We find no difficulty in ruling
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)
GR No. 171947-48
18 December 2008
TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint
alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to
clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the
defendant-government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila
Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the
RTC in toto.  Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
RULING:
Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs.
The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional
on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the
men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to
future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay
clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not
only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal
system cannot be characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to
public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the
conclusion that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter
of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation
of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform
these duties.
The petition is DENIED.
JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120095 – 260 SCRA 319 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations.
This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to
screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant
to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step
plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which
a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity
of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing
contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights.
JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court
ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a
valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the
assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that
the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said
order,  particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the
public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The
welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to
“”high risk”” destinations, a measure which would only drive
recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be
gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation
by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Tañada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines
acceding to the World Trade Organization for being violative of
provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers
and economy and on the ground that it infringes legislative and
judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored
nation” and national treatment, require that nationals and other
member countries are placed in the same footing in terms of
products and services. However, the Court brushed off these
contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and
12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in
relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also,
Section 10 is self-executing only to “rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony” but not
every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing provisions
in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement.
Also, the Constitution doesn’t rule out foreign competition. States
waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into treaties.
Facts:
 This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines
being part of the World Trade Organization, particularly
when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of
Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
 Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a
conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global economy.
This led to the establishment of three great institutions:
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank), International Monetary Fund and
International Trade Organization.
 However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was
the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on
the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then
established.
 The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations,
including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
 Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified
Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
 It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and
“parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the
“Filipino First”  policy of the Constitution.  They allegedly
render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”
Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!
In seeking to nullify the Senate’s act as being unconstitutional, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. It becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute
Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene
Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987
Constitution? NO!
Petitioners’ Contentions:
 Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the
Constitution mandating “economic nationalism” are violated
by the so-called “parity provisions” and “national treatment”
clauses scattered in parts of WTO Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause
(MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related investment
measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of
intellectual property rights), Trade in Services,
and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o “shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national
origin”
 Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
 Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
 Sec. 12, Art XII:  The State shall promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.”
Ruling:
 These provisions are not self-executing
o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review
and in making laws.
  Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and
understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life
 The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of
Art. XII is self-executing or not.  Rather, the issue is
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions
in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.  And we
hold that there are.
 WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the
basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s
vote equal in weight.
 Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction – developed countries must
reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing 24%
in 10 years
o Domestic subsidy – developed countries must
reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing
countries at 13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6
years; developing countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10
years
 Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets
 The Court will not pass upon the advantages and
disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy.  It will only perform its constitutional duty of
determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion
Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or
impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress? NO!
 A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating
the Constitution.
 While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute
and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to
by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations.
 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute.  Certain restrictions enter
into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of
membership in the family of nations & limitations imposed
by treaty stipulations.
TANADA v. ANGARA
October 26, 2012  Constitution provides that each local govt unit shall have the power to
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question
the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one
that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was
taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate
in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically
part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international
agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality
be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial
relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the
“concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a
valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation,
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice
Basco v. PAGCOR
GR 91649, 197 SCRA 52 [May 14, 1991]
Facts. PAGCOR, under PD 1869, is exempt from paying any “tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or
levies or whatever nature xxx”. Basco et al. now seeks to annul
PAGCOR alleging, among others, that it intrudes into the local govt’s
(in the case at bar, the City of Manila) right to impose local taxes and
license fees, contravening therefore with the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy.
Issue. Is the tax exemption granted to PAGCOR a violation of the
principle of autonomy of local govts?
Held. No. The contention is without merit. Only the National Govt has
the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of gambling.
The local govts have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Govt such as PAGCOR. Otherwise, its operation might be subject to
control by a mere local govt; consequently, mere creatures of the
State can defeat National policies. This doctrine emanates from the
“supremacy” of the National Govt over local govt,. The principle of
local autonomy does not make imperium in imperio; it can only mean
a measure of decentralization of the function of govt. Art X of the
create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes xxx subject to
such xxx limitation as the Congress may provide
Therefore, the exemption clause founded in PD 1869
remains an exception to the herein referred power vested in the local
govt units.
The autonomy enjoyed by the autonomous governments of
Mindanao is merely a decentralization of administration. Hence, their
govts are subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts.
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
 petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
. any cause of action before the courts.
G.R. No. 129093
FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was
appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.  He
asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a
mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet.  This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.  The ground for said
denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued
on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial,
respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.  In
the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the
defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor
Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a
lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the
respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON  Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s
objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.  This is part of the local
government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that
of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise
contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and
should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress.  As held in Tatel
vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute
enacted by Congress.  The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated
in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
Pamatong v. COMELEC
GR 161872 [Apr 13, 2004]
Facts. Petitioner Pamatong filed his certificate of candidacy for
President but respondent COMELEC refused to give due course to
said certificate of candidacy. He was one of those declared as
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by
a registered political party with a national constituency. In this petition
for certiorari, Pamatong avers the denial of his certificate of
candidacy is a violation of his right to “equal access to opportunities
for public service” under Sec 26, Art II of the Constitution.
Issue. Is the denial of Pamatong’s candidacy violative of Art II, Sec
26 of the Constitution?
Held. No. There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. What is
recognized in Art II, Sec 26 is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. The [equal access clause] neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The
provisions under the “Declaration of Principles and State Policies”
Article (Art II) are generally considered not self-executing, and there
is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
"equal access" provision. Like the [most] of the policies enumerated
in Art II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR.
JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR,
et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6)
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim
Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set
up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in
the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari
and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power;
(c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties;
and (f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must
be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other

purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was

declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY
CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION
PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities

due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT
GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE
THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE
MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE,
LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.