BAR

OPERATIONS 1

SUBMISSION # 1

Submitted by: Ysabelle M. Cardona

LLB – IV
Palawan State University – School of Law
S.Y 2020 – 2021

Submitted to: Atty. Allan Carlos

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148. CHAILESE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., REPRESENTED
BY MA. TERESA M. CHUNG, Petitioner, v. MONICO DIZON
G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018

Facts: Petitioner alleged that it is a corporation duly organized under

Philippine laws and is the registered owner of several parcels of land, all
situated at Barangay Malabo, Floridablanca, Pampanga with an
aggregate area of 148 hectares more or less (hereinafter referred to as
subject landholdings). The subject landholdings are then allegedly being
illegally occupied by the defendants.

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Horacio Morales, Jr.

issued a Resolution ordering that the subject landholdings be converted
for commercial and light industrial uses. Petitioner averred that it is,
however, unable to introduce developments into the properties as a
portion of the lots were being illegally occupied by respondents who
refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands.

In their Answer respondents submitted that the lower court has no

jurisdiction over the case as the allegations of the complaint involve the
application of the Agrarian Reform Law. According to the respondents,
prior to being transferred in the name of the petitioner, they are tenants
of the subject landholdings which are then a hacienda devoted to
agricultural production. That without their knowledge and consent, the
property was transferred to the petitioner, who in order to avoid the
compulsory distribution of the subject landholdings under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), filed a "bogus" petition for
conversion. The petition was initially denied in 1998, but granted on
reconsideration.

Amendments introduced by R.A. 9700 is the addition of Section 50-A

which vests upon the DAR the exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance
upon cases involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and mandates the automatic referral of cases
to the DAR by the judge or prosecutor upon allegation of any of the
parties that the controversy is an agrarian dispute.

Issue: Whether or not the petition should be referred to the DAR?

Held: No. It is a basic rule in procedure that the jurisdiction of the Court
over the subject matter as well as the concomitant nature of an action is
determined by law and the allegations of the complaint, and is
unaffected by the pleas or theories raised by the defendant in his answer
or motion to dismiss.

The jurisdiction of the DAR is laid down in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the CARL.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR Adjudication Board

(DARAB) was designated to assume the powers and functions of the
DAR with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases, and
matters relating to the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian
laws. The exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian cases was
further amplified by the amendment introduced by Section 19 of R.A.
9700 to Section 50.

In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of

petitioner that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be
applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of
the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely
highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian
cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of
cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated
149. ARMANDO LAGON v. HON. DENNIS A. VELASCO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES OF KORONADAL, SOUTH COTABATO, AND GABRIEL DIZON
G.R. No. 208424, February 14, 2018

Facts: Lagon obtained a cash loan from private respondent Dizon, in the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 300,000.00). In
payment thereof, Lagon issued post-dated PCIBank Check No.
0064914, in an equal amount. However, when Dizon presented the
check for payment, it was dishonored for being Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds.

Dizon field a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's

Fees against Lagon. Lagon filed his Answer asserting that he has paid
the loan. Meanwhile, during the preliminary conference, the parties were
directed to file their respective pre-trial briefs within five (5) days from
receipt of the trial court's order.

Judge Velasco issued a Pre-Trial Conference Order.9

At the initial trial, neither of the parties submitted their judicial affidavits
or those of their witnesses. Hence, Judge Velasco issued the assailed
Order requiring the parties to submit their respective judicial affidavits
five (5) days before the trial.

Lagon filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. In his Motion, Lagon

requested that he be allowed to submit the judicial affidavit of his
witnesses after the plaintiff shall have adduced his evidence. Lagon
claimed that Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which mandates the
submission by both parties of their judicial affidavits before the pre-trial
conference is violative of his right to due process, hence
unconstitutional.

Issue: whether or not Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which

requires a defendant to adduce his testimony and that of his witnesses
by judicial affidavits, and submit his documentary evidence before the
pre-trial or preliminary conference, offends his right to due process of
law.

Held: Despite the noble purpose of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, Lagon
comes to this Court bewailing the same procedural regulation as
violative of his right to due process of law, in that it "forces" him to
present evidence even before the plaintiff has rested his case,
apparently in violation of the rule on demurrer to evidence.

There is nothing in the provisions of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which

prohibits a defendant from filing a demurrer to evidence, if he truly
believes that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is insufficient.
Besides, in the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, only the evidence
presented by the plaintiff shall be considered and weighed by the Court.

The fact that the defendant is mandated to submit his judicial affidavit
prior to the trial and before the plaintiff has rested his case is not a
cumbersome requirement or a circumvention of due process. On the
contrary, this is necessary for the orderly administration of the
proceeding before the courts. It must be remembered that in as early as
the pre-trial conference, the defendant is already required to submit a
pre-trial brief, where he is then tasked to state the number and names of
his witnesses, as well as the substance of their testimonies; the issues to
be tried and resolved; and the documents or exhibits to be presented
and the purpose thereof.40 Thus, the defendant is already required in
this early stage of the proceedings to formulate his defense and plan his
strategy to counter the plaintiffs complaint. There is nothing too tedious
or burdensome in requiring the submission of the judicial affidavit. In
fact, this would even help the defendant in preparing his opposing
arguments against the plaintiff.
150. REPUBLIC VS VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY
G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018

FACTS: In a petition, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his

birth certificate. Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his birth
certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office
(NSO). Both copies reflect his gender as "FEMALE" and his first name
as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in the local
civil registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate
indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976. Virgel alleged that these
entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth certificate as
follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name,
from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to
"FEBRUARY 25, 1976."

The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case
proceeded to trial. Aside from his own personal testimony, Virgel's
mother, Susan L. Tipay, testified that she gave birth to a son on
February 25, 1976, who was baptized as "Virgel." The Certificate of
Baptism, including other documentary evidence such as a medical
certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically male, were also presented
to the trial court.

There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC granted
Virgel's petition. From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of
Appeal, which was given due course by the trial court. The Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the change
of Virgel's name from Virgie should have been made through a
proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This
argument was premised on the assumption that the summary procedure
under Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical or innocuous
errors, which excludes one's name or date of birth. Since the petition
lodged with the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, the Republic asserted that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.

The CA denied the Republic's appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's ruling that
Virgie's name and sex in his birth certificate may be changed through
Rule 108?

Held: Yes. R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a

mistake committed in. the performance of clerical work, which is
harmless and immediately obvious to the understanding.29 It was further
amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 1017230 was passed to expand the
authority of local civil registrars and the Consul General to make
changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the
recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a
typographical error or mistake in the entry.

Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with
the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to
correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth certificate,
the proper remedy was to commence the appropriate adversarial
proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The changes in the entries pertaining to the gender and date of birth are
indisputably substantial corrections, outside the contemplation of a
clerical or typographical error that may be corrected administratively.

The records of this case show that Virgel complied with the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He impleaded the
local civil registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, the Solicitor
General, and the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao Oriental as parties to
his petition for correction of entries. The RTC then issued an order,
which set the case for hearing on July 10, 2009. In compliance with Rule
108, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the order was published for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Davao Oriental. Additionally, the local civil registrar and the
OSG were notified of the petition through registered mail.

The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Mati, Davao City for purposes of the
proceedings before the RTC. Accordingly, the prosecutor assigned to
the case was present during the hearing but opted not to cross-examine
Virgel or his mother after their respective testimonies. There was also no
opposition filed against the petition of Virgel before the RTC.

A hearing was scheduled for the presentation of Virgel's testimonial and

documentary evidence, during which time, the deputized prosecutor of
the OSG was present, and allowed to participate in the proceedings.
While none of the parties questioned the veracity of Virgel's allegations,
much less present any controverting evidence before the trial court,37
the RTC proceedings were clearly adversarial in nature. It dutifully
complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Notably, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings before
the trial court were adversarial, but merely insists on the erroneous
premise that a Rule 108 proceeding is limited to the correction of
harmless, clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry. Having
established that the proper recourse for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the Court
cannot sustain the Republic's assertion on this matter. The Court has
long settled in Republic v. Olaybar that as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial corrections and
changes in the civil registry, such as those involving the entries on sex
and date of birth, may already be effected.

Since the Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even

cite a specific rule of procedure that Virgel failed to follow, the Court has
no reason to depart from the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence refuting Virgel's
assertion that he is indeed phenotypically male, the correction of the
entry on Virgel's sex in his birth certificate, from "FEMALE" to "MALE,"
was correctly granted.

With respect to the change of his name to "Virgel" the Court does not
agree with the CA that the requirements under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court may be substituted with that of Rule 108. These remedies are
distinct and separate from one another, and compliance with one rule
cannot serve as a fulfillment of the requisites prescribed by the other.41
Nonetheless, the Court has settled in Republic v. Mercadera42 that
changes in one's name are not necessarily confined to a petition filed
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court include "changes of name" in the enumeration of entries in the
civil register that may be cancelled or corrected. Thus, the name "Virgie"
may be corrected to "Virgel" as a necessary consequence of the
substantial correction on Virgel's gender, and to allow the record to
conform to the truth.
151. PATRICIA CABRIETO DELA TORRE, REPRESENTED BY
BENIGNO T. CABRIETO, JR. v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,
INC.
G.R. No. 221932, February 14, 2018

Facts: Respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. is primarily engaged

in holding, owning and developing real estate. Among its projects are the
Century Citadel Inn, Makati, Makati Prime Century Tower and Makati
Prime City. It, likewise, expanded its real estate business in Cebu City
where it constructed two (2) condotel projects. However, the ascent of
respondent was arrested and its shares were brought down by the Asian
financial crisis in 1997. It experienced financial difficulties due to the
devaluation of the Philippine peso, the increase in interest rates and lack
of access to adequate credit. Thus, in 2003, respondent filed a petition
for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments and
actions with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, and was
raffled off to Branch 138. On August 15, 2003, the rehabilitation court
issued a Stay Order.

On October 15, 2004, petitioner Patricia Cabrieto dela Torre filed a

Motion for Leave to Intervene seeking judicial order for specific
performance, i.e., for respondent to execute in her favor a deed of sale
covering Unit 3306, Makati Prime Citadel Condominium which she
bought from the former as she had allegedly fully paid the purchase
price. Respondent opposed the motion arguing that it was filed out of
time considering that the Stay Order was issued on August 15, 2003 and
under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Interim Rules), any claimants and creditors shall file their claim before
the rehabilitation court not later than ten (10) days before the date of the
initial hearing; and that since the Stay Order was issued on August 15,
2003 and the publication thereof was done in September 2003 with the
initial hearing on the petition set on September 24 2003, the motion for
intervention should have been filed on or before September 14, 2003.

On August 24, 2011, the RTC issued an Order granting petitioner's

motion for intervention. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that intervenor is still liable to pay P1,902,210.48 as unpaid
interest and penalty charges; and it is the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has exclusive and original jurisdiction
over the controversies involving condominium units and not the RTC.

The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, respondent

filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, which reversed the RTC's
decision.

Issue: Whether or not Dela Torre's motion for intervention seeking

judicial order for specific performance is not covered by the Stay Order
issued by the Rehabilitation Court?

Held: No. In this case, respondent filed a petition for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments with the RTC which issued a Stay Order on
August 15, 2003. The initial hearing was set on September 24, 2003;
thus, any comment or opposition to the petition should have been filed
10 days before the initial hearing but petitioner did not file any and
already barred from participating in the proceedings. However, petitioner
filed a motion for leave to intervene on October 15, 2004, one year after,
praying that respondent be ordered to execute in her favor a deed of
absolute sale over Unit 3306 of the Makati Prime Citadel Condominium,
subject matter of their earlier contract to sell. It bears stressing that
intervention is prohibited under Section 1,14 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules.
Hence, the RTC should not have entertained the petition for intervention
at all.

Clearly, while respondent is undergoing rehabilitation, the enforcement

of all claims against it is stayed. Rule 2, Section 1 of the Interim Rules
defines a claim as referring to all claims or demands of whatever nature
or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or
otherwise. The definition is all-encompassing as it refers to all actions
whether for money or otherwise. There are no distinctions or
exemptions.18

Petitioner's prayer in intervention for respondent to execute the deed of

sale in her favor for the condominium unit is a claim as defined under the
Interim Rules which is already stayed as early as August 15, 2003. In
fact, the same order also prohibited respondent from selling,
encumbering, transferring or disposing in any manner of any of its
properties, except in the ordinary course of business. The RTC's Order
granting petitioner's intervention and directing respondent to execute a
deed of sale in her favor and to deliver the copy of the owner's duplicate
copy of the condominium certificate, with all the pertinent documents
needed to effect registration of the deed of sale and issuance of a new
title in petitioner's name, is a violation of the law. And the RTC gave
undue preference to petitioner over respondent's other creditors and
claimants. The CA correctly found that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its Orders dated August 24, 2011 and April 16,
2012.
152. Jasper Gonzalez y Dolendo Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 225709. February 14, 2018

Facts: The prosecution alleged that in the early morning of February 23,
2012, an operative of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID), Special
Operation Task Group (SOTG), Valenzuela City, was informed of the
rampant selling of illegal drugs at a wake in Tamaraw Hills, Barangay
Marulas, Valenzuela City, which thus led to the conduct of an anti-illegal
drug operation. At about 3:30 a.m., certain Police Officer (PO) 2 Lim,
PO2 Recto, and PO1 Raya, together with PO1 Julius R. Congson (PO1
Congson), proceeded to surveil the area near No. 75 Tamaraw Hills
Street. While in the area, PO2 Recto and PO1 Congson saw a person
coming out of an alley about four (4) meters away, with a fan knife in his
right hand. Since there was a ban issued by the Commission on
Elections14 (COMELEC) on the carrying of deadly weapons at that time,
PO2 Recto and PO1 Congson approached the person and introduced
themselves as police officers. The person, who they later identified as
Gonzalez, immediately ran away, prompting the police officers to chase
and eventually, arrest him. PO1 Congson recovered the knife from
Gonzalez, frisked the latter, and ordered him to bring out the contents of
his pocket, which revealed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing what PO1 Congson believed to be shabu. PO1 Congson
further recovered another heat-sealed transparent plastic pack, labeled
"Calypso", containing several plastic sachets. Thereafter, Gonzalez
started shouting, causing several persons from the wake (including
Gonzalez' mother) to approach him. The police officers then decided to
bring Gonzalez to the nearby barangay hall, where the seized items
were inventoried15 and turned over. After duly receiving the submitted
specimen, the forensic chemist examined17 the same which tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The RTC found Gonzalez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of

Section 261 (q) of the OEC,22 holding that all the necessary elements
thereof have been proven, namely: (1) Gonzalez was found holding the
fan knife with his right hand; (2) such possession occurred during the
prohibited period; and (3) he was carrying the knife while casually
walking towards Tamaraw Hills Street from an alley - a public place.23
The RTC gave no credence to Gonzalez' version of his arrest in light of
his positive identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of
regularity accorded to the police officers in the performance of their
duties.24 It also brushed aside the testimonies of Gonzalez' three (3)
witnesses for their failure to actually see what had transpired
immediately preceding his arrest.25

As regard the charge of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, the RTC

found Gonzalez not guilty due to insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: whether or not Gonzalez' conviction for violation of Section 261

(q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166, should be
upheld?

Held: No. In order to secure a conviction of an accused based on these

provisions, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the person is bearing,
carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; (b) such
possession occurs during the election period; and (c) the weapon is
carried in a public place. Notably, it is essential that possession of the
deadly weapon in a public place be established beyond reasonable
doubt. In his petition, Gonzalez prayed for his acquittal in view of the
serious doubts on the prosecution's evidence. Particularly, he claims that
PO1 Congson's narration of events was uncorroborated and in fact
contradicted by the physical evidence submitted in court, as well as by
the testimonies of his witnesses, corroborating his version of the events,
which thereby puts into question PO1 Congson's credibility.39

The Court agrees, as the prosecution failed to dispel all reasonable

doubts surrounding Gonzalez' arrest.

In particular, the prosecution failed to establish its allegation that,

immediately before and at the time of his arrest, Gonzalez was holding a
knife in a public place - the critical elements of the crime of violation of
Section 261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166.
Records show that aside from the testimony of PO1 Congson, the
prosecution did not present any other evidence that would corroborate
his version leading to Gonzalez' arrest. PO1 Congson claimed that at
around 4:00 a.m., he and the other police officers saw Gonzalez holding
a fan knife in his right hand as he was walking out of an alley where they
eventually arrested him after a chase.40 Gonzalez, on the other hand,
presented three (3) witnesses41 - neighbors who lived below and across
his house where he was arrested and who were there at the time of his
arrest. All these witnesses corroborated Gonzalez' version, particularly
on five (5) critical points, namely: (a) Gonzalez and his child were
brought downstairs from his house located at the second floor by the
arresting persons; (b) his hands were tied behind his back as he was
being dragged downstairs; (c) his photograph was taken soon after the
arrest took place at around 3:00 a.m.; and (d) there were a total of four
(4) male persons who conducted the arrest.42 One of the witnesses
even confirmed that Gonzalez' hands were tied by a brassiere.43 In
other words, all three (3) witnesses rendered more credible the
defense's claim that Gonzalez was arrested at his home; at the very
least, their testimonies rendered doubtful the prosecution's claim that
police officers arrested Gonzalez on the street in the regular
performance of their duties. Unfortunately, the RTC simply brushed
these aside, thus leading to the erroneous conclusion that "[n]o one
actually saw the factual circumstances immediately preceding his
arrest."44

Moreover, while the information and the physical evidence45 presented

before the lower court both revealed a kitchen knife, PO1 Congson
categorically testified that he saw a fan knife.46 A fan knife, locally
known as "balisong"47 or "Batangas",48 is a folding pocket knife with
two handles counter-rotating around the tang so that, when the knife is
closed, the blade resides concealed inside the grooved handles.49 In
contrast, a kitchen knife has one handle that does not fold, with its blade
clearly visible. Obviously, a fan knife is far from being the same as a
kitchen knife. To the Court's mind, there is doubt as to whether PO1
Congson had actually seen Gonzalez come out of an alley holding a fan
knife.

Given the difference in the prosecution and defense's versions of

Gonzalez' arrest, including the variance regarding the physical evidence
presented in court, it behooved the lower court to examine and calibrate
more carefully the evidence presented by both sides. As it was, the
defense's evidence weighed more than the prosecution's evidence. At
the very least, their evidence were evenly balanced such that the
appreciation of such evidence called for the tilting of the scales in favor
of Gonzalez.50 After all, the burden is on the prosecution to overcome
the presumption of innocence of the accused.51
153. People of the Philippines Vs. Cristhian Kevin Guib y Butay
G.R. No. 233100. February 14, 2018

Facts: The prosecution alleged that at around 11:30 in the morning of

September 28, 2013 and upon the report of an informant, the Provincial
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (PAIDSOTG) of the
Provincial Police Office of Ilocos Norte organized a buy-bust team
operation with the objective of apprehending Guieb, who was verified to
be number four (4) in PAIDSOTG, as well as in the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency's lists of drug personalities. Upon arrival at the
carinderia where the buy-bust was to be held, the poseur-buyer, Police
Officer 2 Richard Rarangol (PO2 Rarangol), and the informant were
approached by Guieb. After some preliminaries, PO2 Rarangol gave the
marked money to Guieb, who in turn, gave the former a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance. When the transaction was
consummated, PO2 Rarangol performed the pre-arranged signal,
prompting backups Police Officer 2 Jay Arr Agtang and Police Officer 1
Hayden Waga (PO1 Waga) to rush to the scene and arrest Guieb. Upon
frisking Guieb, PO1 Waga recovered another sachet containing white
crystalline substance, which he gave to PO2 Rarangol. The buy-bust
team then brought Guieb and the seized items to the Municipal Police
Station of San Nicolas.10

Thereat, PO2 Rarangol conducted the marking, inventory, and

photography of the seized items in the presence of Guieb and Barangay
Captain Francisco Bagay, Sr. (Brgy. Capt. Bagay). Thereafter, PO2
Rarangol brought the seized sachets to the crime laboratory where a
qualitative examination ofthe contents revealed11 that the same were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.12

In his defense, Guieb denied the allegations against him. He maintained

that at around noon of the day when he was arrested, he and his
daughter went to a neighbor's house to invite the latter to his child's
baptism. After talking to said neighbor, Guieb sought out his daughter
who was then playing in front of the carinderia where he was arrested.13
He further maintained that he and his daughter were about to go home
when two (2) policemen arrested him and took him to the police station
for allegedly running away with the money of another policeman. At the
police station, he was made to sit in front of the table where PO2
Rarangol brought out two (2) sachets appearing to contain shabu, and
placed it on top of the table. PO2 Rarangol also took out a piece of
paper with the word "inventory" therein and started filling out the same.
Thereafter, PO2 Rarangol asked Brgy. Capt. Bagay to sign the paper,
but the latter refused as he did not see how Guieb was arrested.

The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections
5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." The CA affirmed his
conviction.

Issue: whether or not the CA correctly upheld Guieb's conviction for the
crimes charged.

Held: No. After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the
police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary
value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Guieb.

First, records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography
of the confiscated drugs were indeed conducted, a reading of the
Certificate of Inventory42 shows that only an elected official, i. e., Brgy.
Capt. Bagay, was present and that there were no representatives from
the DOJ and the media.

To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible

explanation as to why there was a complete absence of an elected
official and a representative from the DOJ and the media in order for the
saving clause to apply. To reiterate, the law requires the presence of the
enumerated witnesses — namely, an elected official, as well as a
representative from the DOJ and the media - to ensure the
establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Thus, considering the
police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drugs are seriously put into question.

Verily, the procedural lapse committed by the police officers, which was
unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militates
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused,
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.45 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165, is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as
an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.46 As such,
since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as well as its IRR,
Guieb's acquittal is perforce in order.

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the
positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section
21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the
initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the
fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the
same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would
not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the
procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons
exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused,
and perforce, overturn a conviction.
154. People of the Philippines Vs. Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, et al.
G.R. No. 226494. February 14, 2018

Facts: According to the victim, AAA, she was fifteen (15) years old and
the President of a youth group when the incident happened on February
29, 2004. Around 11 o'clock in the evening of that same day, AAA was
about to go home when she passed by the basketball court. She saw a
group composed of the nine accused/appellants.

Appellant Roberto called AAA and asked her to approach them because
they wanted to ask her about the organization that they recently joined.
AAA agreed and discussed with them the mission and vision of the
organization. Thereafter, AAA told the group that she wanted to go
home, but the latter asked her to stay longer as they were about to have
a drinking spree. AAA told them that she could not stay longer because
her mother would get angry at her and that she had to go to school the
following day. The group insisted that she stay long and finally, AAA told
them that she could stay but only until 11:30 in the evening. The group
then told AAA to go with them at the apartment of Ranil's aunt which is
just a street away from where they were. When they were on the way to
the apartment, the group suddenly ran. AAA inquired why they ran and
they replied that a certain Pita was there and that they didn't want the
latter to go with them because he was unruly and noisy. Pita was known
in their place as "sinto sinto" or "kulang-kulang sa pag-iisip" (mentally
deranged). AAA had known Pita for a long time including Ranil, who was
a friend of her bother, BBB and who regularly went to their house
attending social affairs. Pita eventually joined the group.

The group arrived at the apartment and upon entering, Ranil lit a candle
and Adonis closed the door. Ranil then opened a bottle of Emperador
Brandy and took a glass from which each of them had their "tagay"
(shots). AAA sat beside Jomar and since she was not used to drinking
liquor, she forced herself to swallow, the same slowly and by covering
her nose. At 11:30 p.m., AAA told the group that she must go home. Pita
also told AAA that it's time for them to go home. Since Pita insisted that
he and AAA should both go home, he was forced to go home alone
because the group started to hurt him by striking him in the nape
("binabatuk-batukan"). AAA also tried to leave the apartment but
appellants Jomar and Adonis blocked her way. Adonis even proceeded
to guard the door of the apartment. AAA was then threatened by the
group that they would hurt her older brother ("Kuya"), BBB, if she
insisted on leaving, thus, she decided to return to her seat. While this
was happening, the others were conversing with each other. Shortly, the
group opened a second bottle of Emperador Brandy and resumed
drinking. AAA had a shot of the liquor that was poured by Ranil and was
given to her by Jomar. After five to ten minutes from drinking the liquor,
AAA felt her legs and body turning numb, her vision turning blurry and
she started feeling dizzy. As she was closing her eyes, AAA felt that she
was being carried by Jomar. AAA was familiar with the voice of Jomar
and it was the latter who said, "Dito na, dito na." AAA was then placed in
a "papag" where Jomar proceeded to lower her shorts. AAA tried to
resist by bringing up her shorts but to no avail due to her weakness.
After successfully lowering AAA's shorts, Jomar went on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina causing her pain. After performing the
deed, Jomar invited the others to take their turns by saying, "Sino ang
susunod?" A person of heavier weight went on top of AAA and it was
then that the latter lost her consciousness. When AAA regained her
consciousness, she felt that somebody was putting on her dress and
heard shouts that he was coming ("Si BBB, si BBB andyan na?"). She
then heard footsteps and a commotion ensuing. When she awakened,
AAA was already inside a mobile unit with her brother and her mother on
their way to a clinic in Camp Crame. From Camp Crame, they
proceeded to the Municipal Hall of x x x, Rizal and were brought to the
Office of the Prosecutor at around 1 o'clock of March 1, 2004.
Thereafter, BBB was told to identify the suspects and pointed at five (5)
persons, namely, appellants Adonis, Jomar, Luis, Mark and Roberto.
During her identification of the suspects, the parents of the accused;
AAA's mother and brother, and the fiscal were present.

Thus, the following nine (9) Informations were filed against the
appellants and their other companions for qualified rape.

Issue: Whether or not the CA properly affirmed the RTC decision

convicting the nine accused of nine counts of qualified rape.

Held. Yes with qualificaton.

The elements of rape committed under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, are: (a) that the offender, who must be a man,
had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (b) that such act is accomplished
by using force or intimidation.[5]

In this case, all the elements of the crime of rape have been properly
established by the prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and
the CA. Through the testimony of AAA, it was clearly proven that the
appellants committed the crime and, as such, an attack on her credibility
is futile.

The prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime of
rape. First, [AAA] testified that Jomar went on top of her and, against her
will, inserted his penis in her vagina. After having carnal knowledge with
[AAA], Jomar told the others "sino ang susunod?" Thus, another man of
heavier weight went on top of [AAA] and inserted his penis in her vagina.
[AAA] identified that it was Jomar who carried him to another room and
placed her in a "papag" because she heard him say, "dito na, dito na." It
should be emphasized that [AAA] testified that she was familiar with
Jomar's voice because she knew him and the other appellants since
childhood. [AAA] used to invite these appellants in their house whenever
there were occasions and sometimes in going to videoke. Hence, this
Court agrees with the findings of the court a quo as regards [AAA]'s
positive identification of Jomar, through his voice, as one of the persons
who raped her.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide
to commi.t it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,
would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof
of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances.[14] It is apparent, therefore, that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime and the CA did not err finding such.

However, based on the testimony of AAA, that she recognized appellant

Jomar as the first person who raped her followed by another person of
heavier built before she passed out, it is more appropriate to convict the
appellants with just two (2) instead of nine (9) counts of rape as earlier
ruled by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
48. Mary Jane D. Yuchengco vs. Atty. Anathalia B. Angare
A.C No. 11892, June 22, 2020
FACTS: A verified complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent allegedly notarized a falsified and defective “Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Late Dandal, Sr. With Absolute
Sale” (Deed) series of 2016. The Deed suffers from the following
defects: (1) it was not dated; (2) it lacked the names and signatures of
the required witnesses; (3) it lacked details of the required competent
identification cards of the parties thereto; (4) it was notarized without the
presence of the parties and without verifying whether their signatures
were genuine; and (5) while the respondent was commissioned as
Notary for the period 2016 to 2017, another certification was identified as
Series of 2014 with the same docket number. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner ruled that the respondent did not appreciate the
formalities required by the notarial rules or was careless in observing
them or both.
ISSUE: Whether respondent may be disbarred by being careless of the
notarial rules.
RULING: In the case at bar, respondent act of being careless served as
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely. It was held that the Respondent was guilty
of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice because two different
documents cannot bear the same notarial details. (entry number and
page number).
49. IN RE: Petition for the Disbarment of Atty. Estrella O. Laysa
Patricia Maglaya Ollada vs. Atty. Estrella O. Laysa
A.C No. 7936, June 30, 2020
FACTS: An administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Patricia M.
Ollada against Atty. Laysa. Complainant, a senior citizen needed legal
services for a problem she had against her lessor and she was introduce
to Atty. Laysa, who then agreed to prepare the demand letter.
Displeased with the response letter, complainant asked Atty. Laysa to
file a case and issued check to Atty. Laysa. After having the check
encashed, Atty. Laysa did not respond or communicate anymore with
the complainant. When the complainant lost interest to pursue her case
demanded from Atty. Laysa the return of the balance through letter.
Despite receipt of the demand letter, still she did not return the money.
Hence, a Petition for disbarment was filed against Atty. Laysa. But Atty.
Laysa did not file her comment. The copy of the resolution was returned
to sender-moved, left no address. There being no compliance to make a
comment to the petition, the court referred Atty. Laysa’s case to the IBP
investigation, report and recommendation. IBP recommended that Atty.
Laysa be disbarred from the practice of law for her act of abandoning a
client’s cause, and for her continuous evasion of her responsibility to the
bar.
ISSUE: Whether the recommendation of the IBP to penalized Atty.
Laysa for evading her duty to the bar is correct.
RULING: No. The court ruled that the penalty of suspension or
disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
In the case at bar, Atty. Laysa had shown propensity to disregard and
disrespect the legal profession. More than just abandonment of
complainant's cause and failure to return her money, Atty. Laysa had
continuously evaded her responsibilities to the bar. She had not paid her
dues to the IBP and has not complied with her 2 nd to the 5th MCLE
compliance period.

50. Ismael G. Lomarda and Crispina Raso, Vs. Engr. Elmer Fudalan
(Respondent), Bohol 1 Electric Cooperative Inc. BOHECO 1
(Defendant)
G.R No. 246012, June 17, 2020
FACTS: Respondent applied for electric service from BOHECO 1 to
illuminate their farmhouse. At the pre-membership fee seminar,
respondent paid the membership fee and was advised to employ
electrician from BOHECO 1. The authorized electrician advised
respondent to procure certification from Petitioner Raso, the Barangay
Power Association (BAPA) Chairperson. Due to the unavailability of
Raso, respondent consented to the tapping of his electrical line to that of
BAPA. However, Raso got mad and vowed to never issue said
certification and eventually reported the matter to BOHECO 1 for
disconnection. Feeling aggrieved, respondent went to BOHECO 1 to
complain about Raso’s malicious actuations. But Raso still refused to
issue the certification on the premise that respondent’s farmhouse
already had electricity. Thereafter, Raso promised to issue certificate
provided that respondent would pay the amount of Php1,700.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages. RTC found petitioners liable
for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. CA affirmed with the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: whether or not CA correctly upheld the award of damages under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
RULING: Yes. Petitioners were found liable by both RTC and CA for
abuse of rights under Article 19, in relation to Article 21, of the Civil
Code. Article 19 referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. When the right
is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms in
Article 19, and results damages to another, a legal wrong is hereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. It is clear
that petitioners should ne held liable for damages under Article 19, in
relation to Article 21 of the civil code.

51. Ramona Favis-Velasco and Elvira L. Yulo vs. Jaye Marjorie R.

Gonzales
GR No. 239090, June 17, 2020
FACTS: A complaint -affidavit was executed by petitioners against
respondent for 35 counts of Estafa by unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence and 35 counts of estafa by false pretense. The Office of the
City Prosecutor dismissed petitioners complaint finding no probable
cause to hold respondents liable for the offenses charged hence
dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. Petitioners filed a Petition for
Review with the DOJ Secretary who in turn modified the appealed
Resolution and directed the Prosecutor to file an informations for estafa
against respondent. DOJ Secretary found probable cause to indict
respondents.
Respondent asserted that DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when she
directed the filing of informations despite lack of probable cause.
Respondent assert tagt there was no evidence that the amounts
invested by the petitioners were not actually used in buying/selling
securities as to conclude the she misappropriated the money. As to the
false pretense, petitioners were already decided to invest their money
even before they met. The deceit should be prior to or simultaneous with
the transaction.
Issue: whether there is probable cause to indict the respondent of
Estafa.
Ruling. No. Finding of probable cause is an executive function. It is not a
power that rests in courts. Generally, courts do not disturb conclusions
made by public prosecutors. Probable cause has been defined as facts
as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty. In order to arrive at
probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.
There is no evidence that respondent received the petitioners monies in
trust or under any obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return
them and upon receiving the amount respondent misappropriated or
converted them. The checks were made payable to BA Securities and
these investments were not deposited in respondent account.

52. Elesio Mejares vs Hyatt Taxi Services Inc.

Gr No. 242364 & GR No. 242459
Facts: Petitioners applied as taxi driver of hyatt under boundary system.
At the end of the shift, Hyatt taxi drivers would remit their boundaries
including cash bonds. Also, hyatt started to deduct an amount to cover
the cost of two-way radio system. Hyatt also collected SSS premiums
but it was discovered that Hyatt failed to remit 46monthly contributions.
When no longer able to take the illegal deductions and favoritism to new
driver, petitioner left Hyatt. While Petitioner Mejares was denied access
to his assigned taxi unit without informing him when he could resume
work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
benefits, reimbursement for illegal deductions and damages against
Hyatt.
Labor Arbiter ruled that Petitioner Cayno voluntarily resigned and
Petitioner Mejares had been illegally dismissed. Mejares was denied
access to his assigned taxi unit without informing him when he could
resume work which amounted to constructive dismissal. NLRC reverse
LA ruling hence a petition for certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was constructive dismissed.
RULING: Yes. Constructive dismissal is a cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,
when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both, or when a
clear discrimination by employer becomes unbearable to the employee
Petitioner Cayno was prevented to drive his unit despite pleading to let
him drive his unit. The hostile treatment against Petitioner Mejares force
the latter to forego his employment with Hyatt. Petitioner Cayno on the
other hand voluntarily resigned.

54. People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Lignes Y Papillero

GR No. 229087, June 17, 2020
Facts: An information was filed against Accused-Appellant for Robbery
with Homicide. During arraignment he pleaded not guilty, thus, trial
ensued. The prosecution established that witnesses heard someone
shouting and moaning inside the house of the victim. They went near the
house of the victim and saw a man wearing black t-shirt carrying
backpack and another man wearing green shirt and carrying pair of
shoes. They immediately ran after them and accosted the two men.
Recovered from their possession was a backpack containing several
personal items owned by the victim. Victim’s laundrywoman also check
the victim and saw that she was killed and identified that the green shirt
worn by one of the accused belongs to victim. The trial court held that
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in convicting accused-appellant of
robbery with homicide based on circumstantial evidence.
RULING: Yes. Even there was no direct evidence to establish accused-
appellant's commission of the crime charges. It is settled rule that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and that
direct evidence is not always necessary. Due to inherent attempt to
conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence.
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which “goes to prove a
fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may
tend by inference to establish a fact in issue. Circumstantial evidence
may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately
lead to setting felons free.

55. Nippon Express Phils Corporation vs. Marie Jean Daguiso

G.R No. 217970, June 17, 2020
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation who hired respondent as
Corporate Human Resource Specialist. Respondent subordinate sent an
e-mail to all department heads without furnishing respondent a copy
thereof. Respondent allegedly lost her temper and shouted her
subordinate, and it led to a shouting match between the two. The
commotion stopped when the General Manager went out of his office
and intervened. Respondent sent an email to the Senior Manager
apologizing for what happened. But on the same day, Senior Manager
called respondent for a meeting and informed her of Petitioner’s decision
to terminate her employment. Respondent a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Petitioner and its officers. The ruling of the Labor
arbiter is that respondent was illegally dismissed. Respondent appealed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter, in not ordering her reinstatement,
before NLRC. NLRC ruled against the reinstatement of respondent due
to strained relation.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be reinstated
RULING: Yes. The full protection of labor and the security of tenure of
workers are guaranteed under our Constitution as well as in Labor Code
which assure the security of tenure of workers, particularly reinstatement
of an illegally dismissed employee. Under the law and jurisprudence, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of
right.
As reinstatement is the rule, for the exception of strained relations to
apply, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a
position where he/she enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer;
and that it is likely that if reinstated, and atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and
productivity of the employee concern. Strained relations must be of such
nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement.