1. Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No.

L-18799, March 31, 1964

Are the rules on the preparation, filing, and service of applications, motions, and other papers in
civil actions applicable in special proceedings cases? YES.

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS

On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed before the court for probate of the will
of his deceased wife Digna. He was named therein as the universal heir and executor. On
September, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina (Siblings of deceased) filed opposition to the probate
of the will on the ground that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.

The court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased, for
the reason that: all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and
his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the
Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla,
exclusively, that shall be administered by the special administrator.

On February 8, 1960, the court denied the probate of the will as it was not duly signed. On
February 17, 1960, the siblings filed a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of
Asuncion) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will,
having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.

On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and
record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will,
likewise, appealed from said decision.

On February 25, 1960, The siblings filed with the court a petition for the removal of respondent
as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment
and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of
Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the
Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been
submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.

On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise,
filed a similar petition February 29.

After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.

Maravilla filed with CA petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of appointment of
Lopez as special co administrator. The CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

The siblings filed with CA petition to certify the case to the SC on ground that the principal
amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000 and writs prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the CA since the probate case is not on appeal before it. Maravilla filed
petition and contends that the amount in controversy is less that P200,000 and the decision of
the probate is under appeal before the CA, hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

CA granted the writs and declared the appointment of eliezar as special co-administrator null
and void.

ISSUE

Does the CA has jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction?

Does the probate case on appeal before the CA? It was raised on appeal but rendered
immaterial.

HELD

NONE. CA has no jurisdiction.

The proceedings that appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental
to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased which is on appeal before the CA where
petitioners” motion to elevate the same to the SC on the ground that the amount involved is
within the SC’s exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. The Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the
properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special
administrator.

Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated
in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal
estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate.

Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment
of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing
respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate
and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in
controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more
than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in
question.

Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary
civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are
not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a
special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is
not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been
held that the term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680,
N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on
ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with,
or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings.
Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.

While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc.
No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of
Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all
cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of
interests and costs", and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as
if it had originally been brought before it".
 2. Hilado, et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

Do the Petitioners have the personality to intervene in the case? None

TINGA, J.:

FACTS

Well known sugar magnate Benedicto died intestate on May 15, 2000. At time of death, there
were pending civil cases against him involving the petitioners with Bacolod RTC. First case was
against petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs, and second case against petitioner
therein is Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corp.

Julita Benedicto filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favour. The
petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5Million “net of liabilities”.
The Manila RTC appoint Julita as administrator. She submitted Inventory of the Estate, lists of
properties and liabilities. In the liabilities, Julita included the two pending claims being litigated.
She stated that the liability amounts to ₱136,045,772.50 for the first case and ₱35,198,697.40
for the second case. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.

Petitioners filed with Manila RTC Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundati Cautela praying that they be
furnished with copies of processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Julita
opposed the motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband.

Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation, the petitioners filed an omnibus motion
praying that the court set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required
inventory of the decedent’s estate. Also, petitioners alleged lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

Manila RTC denied the manifestation/motion on ground that petitioners are not interested
parties to intervene in the intestate proceedings.

Petitioners argued that they had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

CA dismissed petition and stating that allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,

according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The CA cited
the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant,
as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. Petitioners
support their argument not the rule on intervention but rather on other provisions of Rules on
Special Proceedings.

ISSUE

Do the Petitioners have the personality to intervene in the case?

HELD

NONE.

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not
literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[iw]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to
special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent
claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC,
and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it
were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice
to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for
damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against
the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?

Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned
that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have
already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests
can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would
be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to
complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes
and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of
merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all
court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
 3. Zayco & Hinlo, etc. v. Hinlo, Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008

Is an order appointing an administrator appealable? Yes

Is a record on appeal in special proceedings cases required? Yes

What is the period to appeal in special proceedings cases? The notice of appeal and the record
on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final
order.

CORONA, J.:

FACTS

Enrique Hinlo died intestate; hence, his heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his
estate in the RTC. Ceferina, widow, was initially appointed as administratrix. On Dec. 23, 1991,
petitioners Zayco and Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of their mother who was
sickly and could no longer perform her duties as administratrix.

Respondent Jesus Hinlo, grandson of Enrique and heir to the estate, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in his favour and the removal of the petitioners as co-
administrators.

Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.

On July 23, 2002, RTC issued an order revoking the appointment of the petitioners and directed
the appointment of respondent Jesus as the administrator on a P50,000 bond.

Petitioner received copy of the order on Aug 2, 2002 and moved for MR which the RTC denied
on July 23, 2003.

Petitioner received the copy of the order on July 31, 2003 and filed notice of appeal on the same
day. They submitted a record on appeal on August 29, 2003.

In an order dated January 5, 2004, the RTC denied the notice of appeal and record on appeal. It
ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders
were interlocutory and not subject to appeal. Even assuming that appeal was the proper
remedy, it was filed late: The 30 days reglementary period to file an appeal in special
proceedings started to run on August 2, 2002 when [the] former [co-]administrators received the
order of this Court and stopped to run when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration and
started to run again [on] July 31, 2003 when they received the order denying their Motion for
Reconsideration until they filed their Record on Appeal on August 29, 2003. Thus, from August
2, 2002 to August 9, 2002, [the] former [co-]administrators already consumed a period of 7 days
and from July 31, 2003 to August 29, 2003, a period of 29 days[,] or a total of 36 days. x x
x (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners appealed the RTC order with CA. CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the notice of appeal and record on
appeal were in fact filed beyond the prescribed period.

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the CA denied it.

ISSUE

Do the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were appealable? Yes

Does the notice of appeal and record on appeal were filed on time by the petitioners? Yes

HELD

An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of

the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of
the decedent's estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable.

In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the
record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or
final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record
on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.

From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion for
reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30 days or until August
30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003.
Thus, the appeal was made on time.
 4. Republic of the Philippines v. Nisaida Sumera Nishina, etc., G.R. No. 186053, Nov.
15, 2010

Is a record on appeal in special proceedings cases required? It is required, but not in this case.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS

Respondent Nisaida Nishina, represented by her mother Zenaida filed before RTC a verified
petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos.
She alleged that she was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos to her Filipino mother Zenaida
and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who were married on Feb. 18, 1987. Her father later died.
On 1989, her mother married another Japanese Hakamada.

They could not find any record of her birth at Malolos civil registry, Zenaida caused the late
registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mother’s second husband
“Hakamada”. Her mother and Hakamada got divorced.

Her mother later marries another Japanese and adopted Nisaida by which a decree was issued
by the Court of Japan on 2001. It was recorded in Manila on 2006.

In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry
under the name "Nisaida Sumera Nishina," hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition
praying that her second birth certificate bearing the surname "Hakamada," issued through late
registration in 1993, be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname
"Nishina" in the original birth certificate be changed to "Watanabe."

On Oct. 8, 2007, the RTC ordered the granting of respondent’s petition and directed the Malolos
civil registry to cancel the 2nd birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993 and to
change the surname from Nishina to Watanabe.

A copy of the October 8, 2007 Order was received on December 13, 2007 by the OSG which
filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode
of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41
(appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading.

Petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where multiple
appeals may arise a situation not obtaining in the present case.

CA dismissed the appeal of the petitioner stating that the respondent petition before the RTC is
classified as special proceeding; hence, petitioner should file both notice of appeal and record
on appeal.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of December 22, 2008,
petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE

Does the filing of record on appeal necessary in this case? NO

HELD

Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in
special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz:

SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person
may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person,
or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or
the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights
of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special

proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the notice of appeal – is thus required to be
filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of
the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and
held to be final.

In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter
remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed
order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in
the civil registry.

NOTE!

In Zayco, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the
proceedings before the trial court involved the administration, management and settlement of
the decedent’s estate– matters covered by Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals
could, and did in that case, call for them.
 5. Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013

Can decisions in summary proceedings cases be appealed?

SERENO, CJ.:

FACTS

Respondent Robert Narceda married Marina on July 22, 1987, which the latter was only 17
years and 4 months old. Respondent alleged that Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994
and never returned. No communication between them and Robert tried to look for her but to no
avail. Someone in their town saw his wife living with a Singaporean husband.

In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, respondent filed with RTC a petition for
declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.

RTC granted the petition declaring the presumptive death of Marina.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA alleging that the respondent failed to conduct a
search for his wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a “well-founded”
belief that she was dead.

CA dismissed the appeal stating that the declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding under the Family Code and provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary
court proceedings shall be immediately final and executory; hence, the judgment of the RTC is
not appealable.

The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through the CA’s 29
April 2008 Resolution.

ISSUE

Does the RTC judgment on the declaration of the presumptive death of Marina, a summary
proceeding lodged under the Family Code, appealable? NO

HELD

We agree with the CA.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not

an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit:

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.

When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As
a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was
not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned.
Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded
belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.
 6. Garcia v. Fule, 74 SCRA 189 [1976]

MARTIN, J.:

FACTS

Virginia Fule filed with CFI Calamba, Laguna a petition for letters of administration. She alleged
that on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Also, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar (CFI) granted the motion.

On May 8, 1973, Preciosa Garcia moved for MR contending that:

- the appointing of Virginia as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since
no notice of petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate.

- that there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment
of a regular administrator, as the surviving spouse of Amado, and she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix.

- Virginia Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado

- [Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was
improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.]

Garcia prayed for her appointment as special administratrix and as a regular administratrix of
the estate after due hearing and moved for the removal of Fule.

Garcia received a supplemental appointment (Regular) filed by Fule the SP modified the original
petition alleging that Amado’s last place of residence was as Calamba Laguna as he was
elected as Constitutional Delegate for First District of Laguna; deletion of names of heirs of
Amado; that one Carolina Carpio listed as heir in the original petition is the surviving spouse of
Amado and she renounced her preferential right to the administration of estate in favour of Fule;
and Fule to be appointed as administratrix.

SP was opposed by Garcia alleging that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the CFI Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

Judge Malvar: ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July
2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule
and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his
death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as
special and regular administratrix of the estate.

Fule presented the death certificate of Amado showing that his residence at the time of death
was Quezon City. Garcia presented residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that
3 months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule testified that Amado was
residing in Laguna at time of his death.

CA ruled that CFI Laguna has no jurisdiction over the special proceeding.

ISSUE

Is venue jurisdictional in judicial settlement of estate cases?

What is the meaning of the word “resides” for purposes of judicial settlement of estate cases?

Is the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator equally apply in the
appointment of special administrator?

HELD

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death x x x. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."

Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should
allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the
existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of
the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. X x
x.

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes.  It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed
and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered
or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall
be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential
to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In
plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over
all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the
existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place
of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly
considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 

What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." In
the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 

The SC ruled that the last place of residence of Amado was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.  The death certificate presented by
Fule herself and also by Garcia shows the last place of residence of Amado. Also, the
deceased’s residence certificate obtained 3 months before his death; the Marketing Agreement
and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two
parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.;
the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land
in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence
was at Quezon City.

Thus, the venue for Fule’s petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to
waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." Garcia did not necessarily waive her
objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will,
the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed.  Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the
basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator not lies in the
probate court.  Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in
the estate of the decedent.  Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect
rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property.

The SC ruled that Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. The
issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in
the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one
to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of
the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. The preference of Garcia is
based on the Donation Inter Vivos executed by deceased Amado which indicated therein that
he is married with Preciosa Garcia. Moreso, that the certificate of his candidacy indicated
therein that Preciosa is his spouse.
 7. Benatiro v. Heirs of Cuyos, G.R. No. 161220, July 20, 2008

Should the compromise agreement be nullified on the ground that other compulsory heirs did
not participate in the supposed compromise agreement conference? YES

Would the supposed inaction of the other heirs after publication of the settlement amount to
waiver of their right to their aliquot shares? NO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS

Spouses Evaristo and Agatona Cuyos had 9 children, herein respondents. August 28, 1966
Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Cebu under the name of Agatona Arrogante.

Gloria filed for letters of administration to which Francisco opposed. However, both manifested
to come into an agreement to settle their case. In this effect, CFI appointed Atty. Taneo as
Commissioner; thus, issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on Feb 28 and 29 for conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement. Out of
the nine heirs, only respondent Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend as they could
not be located in their given addresses. They decided to go ahead of the meeting.

According to Atty. Taneo report, the heirs agreed:

- To consider all motions filed in the proceedings but instead agreed to first sell for 40,000
subject on the condition that should any heirs would be in a position to buy the
properties, the rest will just receive on P4,000 each

- Further stated therein, that Columba, desired to buy the properties which the others
agreed to.

On December 16, 1976, CFI render its decision based on the compromise agreement of the
heirs.

Sometime in February 1998, the respondent heirs allegedly learned that the Tax declarations
which were all under the name of their late mother Agatona were cancelled and new Tax
declarations were issued under Columba’s name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles
covering the estate of Evaristo were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of
land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M.
Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which
transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued.

To this effect, respondent heirs filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the Order issued
by the CFI. They alleged that the said order was null and void and not effect as the same being
based on Commissioner’s Report which was patently false and irregular; that such report
practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share on the estate. They alleged
further that no meeting ever took place; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance
with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of
law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.

The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal
existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground. The CA then concluded
that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise
agreement did not stand on a firm ground.

The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held
accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who
were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the
names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the
names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to
the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent
as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of
physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly
notified about the scheduled conference.

ISSUE

Did CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976,
which approved the Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement
entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos?

HELD

No.

The CA is correctly annulled the CFI Order on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack
of due process.

It was found that Atty Taneo, Commissioner, did not state the names of those present but only
those who failed to attend. More so, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the
alleged subpoenae were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as
among those absent, had executed an affidavit attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a
meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. Thus, the veracity
of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.

Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of
arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to
sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's
Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the
alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise
agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs
embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to
prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the
agreement stated in the Report.

In Cua v. Vargas, in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of
and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we
held:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened
in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records
of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned (Emphasis
supplied)

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the
statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively
depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a
void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
 8. Reillo v. San Jose, G.R. No. 166393, June 18, 2009

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS

Spouses Quitero and Antonia were originally registered owners of a parcel of land located in
Rizal. It is now registered in the name of Teresa Pinon. Spouses had five children.

On October 26, 1999, Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of title,
annulment of deed of extra judicial settlement, partition and damages against Petitioners. The
complaint alleged that:

- On 1998 defendants Fernando et al without the knowledge and consent of all other
surviving heirs of the deceased spouses Quitero and Antonina, including plaintiffs,
executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate among Heirs and Waiver of
rights making it appear therein that they are the "legitimate descendants and sole heirs
of QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO"; and adjudicating among
themselves, the subject parcel of land.

- Defendants Zosimo et all waived their rights, participation and interests over the subject
parcel of land in favour of their co-defendant Teresa Pinon

- On the strength of the said falsified Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, defendant
Teresa succeeded in causing the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Spouses and
the issuance of new TXT in her name only, to the extreme prejudice of all other heirs of
the deceased Spouses, specifically the herein plaintiffs who were deprived of their lawful
participation over the subject parcel of land.

Petitioner filed their Answer with Counter-Petition and Compulsory Counterclaim denying the
falsity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights;
admitted the spouses had five children.

On January 18, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings alleging that:
(1) the denials made by petitioners in their answer were in the form of negative pregnant; (2)
petitioners failed to state the basis that the questioned document was not falsified; (3) they
failed to specifically deny the allegations in the complaint that petitioners committed
misrepresentations by stating that they are the sole heirs and legitimate descendants of Quiterio
and Antonina; and (4) by making reference to their allegations in their counter-petition for
partition to support their denials, petitioners impliedly admitted that they are not the sole heirs of
Quiterio and Antonina.

RTC ruled that petitioners misrepresented themselves when they alleged in the Deed of
Extrajudicial settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights that they are the sole heirs
of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina; thus, a ground to annul the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and the title.
CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision; that the deed is null and void on such ground since respondents
were deprived of their rightful share in the subject property and petitioners cannot transfer the
property in favor of Ma. Teresa without respondents’ consent.

Petitioner’s argument: Faulted RTC decision which the CA affirmed.

- RTC decided the case on the basis alone of respondent’s complaint; that the Answer
stated that the deed was not a falsified document and was made and implemented in
accordance with law, thus, it was sufficient enough to tender an issue and was very far
from admitting the material allegations of respondents’ complaint.

ISSUE

Is the judgment on the pleadings in the case valid? YES.

Is the extrajudicial settlement of estate with waiver of rights valid and binding upon the other
heirs who had not participated therein? NO.

HELD

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.

Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there
are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is
no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an
issue. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings
by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.

In this case, respondents’ principal action was for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and annulment
of title on the ground that petitioners stated in the said Deed that they are the legitimate
descendants and sole heirs of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. Although petitioners denied
in their Answer that the Deed was falsified, they, however, admitted respondents’ allegation that
spouses Quiterio and Antonina had 5 children, thus, supporting respondents’ claim that
petitioners are not the sole heirs of the deceased spouses. Petitioners’ denial/admission in his
Answer to the complaint should be considered in its entirety and not truncated parts.
Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents Galicano, Victoria, Catalina and
Maribeth are the children and grandchild, respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina,
who were the original registered owners of the subject property, and thus excluding respondents
from the deed of settlement of the subject property, there is no more genuine issue between the
parties generated by the pleadings, thus, the RTC committed no reversible error in rendering
the judgment on the pleadings.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. The deed of settlement made
by petitioners was invalid because it excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares in
the subject property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Thus, the RTC correctly
annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights
dated January 23, 1998 and TCT No. M-94400 in the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando issued
pursuant to such deed.
 9. Cruz, et. al. v. Cruz, et. al., G.R. No. 21153, February 28, 2018

Did the action for the annulment of the deed of extra-judicial settlement prescribe? The deed of
extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not
prescribe as it was a total nullity.

Should the EJS, which is written in a language not understood by one of the co-heirs
(Conception), be annulled? The issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that Concepcion was
effectively deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS

Respondents alleged in an Amended complaint that: (filed on April 6, 1999)

- they – together with their siblings petitioner inherited a 940 sq meter parcel of land from
their late parents. The parties executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate
covering the property, on the agreement that each heir was to receive an equal portion
of the subject property.

- In 1998, when the subject property was being subdivided, they discovered that petitioner
Antonia (petitioner) was allocated two lots, as against one each for the respondents. The
allocation contravened the agreement among heirs.

- Petitioner Amparo and Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing
Concepcion, an illiterate, to sign the Deed of EJS of estate which was written in the
English language, without reading and explaining the contents thereof. (Antonia pass
away left as heirs herein petitioners Halili)

Hence, prayed for the declaration of the annulment of EJS executed by the parties on July 31,
1986.

In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the EJS was executed voluntarily and freely by the
parties and the respondents’ cause of action has prescribed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (Petitioner: EJS sustained; no fraud)

The alleged fraud was discovered on May 12, 1986 when subdivision was conducted. The
petition was filed only on August 14, 1998 or more than 10 years from the date of execution or
date of discovery of alleged fraud. (ART. 1144 CC Actionable document prescribes in 10 years)
However, if a property is allegedly acquired thru fraud or mistake, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered an implied trustee for the benefit of the person deprived of it, in which
case the action based thereon is 10 years from date of registration of the extra-judicial
settlement or issuance of new certificate of title (Art. 1456 Civil Codex x x). Hence, this petition
is not barred by prescription. As the period is not too long nor short, laches has not yet set in.
Concepcion is only grade 3 and could hardly understand English as what is written in the EJS,
but it appears that she can absolutely read and write, and understand English albeit not fully;
and she is deeply interested in her inheritance share, she is aware of the import and
consequences of what she executed and signed. For the past 10 years, there is no way she
could feign ignorance of the alleged fraud and make passive reactions or complaint thereof.
Being adversely interested in the property, her apprehensions were purely in the state of her
mind, if not unilateral and afterthought.

Being consensual, EJS is deemed perfected once mutual consent is manifested.

Other than simply alleging that her sisters Amparo Cruz and Antonia Cruz prepared the extra-
judicial settlement, and made a house-to-house visit to have it signed by their brothers and
sisters including plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-Enriquez, no other independent facts aliunde has
[sic] been adduced to substantiate or the least corroborate actual fraud. Fraud cannot be
presumed. It must be proven. Mere allegation is not evidence. Rather, if ever both defendants
were eager to have it signed, their motive appears to be solely to reduce in writing their
imperfect title over a thing already pre-owned.

Peremptorily, following the tenet "allegata et non probata," he who alleges has the burden of
proof. Thus, the burden of proof lies on the pleader. He cannot be allowed to draw
preponderance of evidence on the weakness of the respondent. Otherwise, the relief being
sought must necessarily fail x x x Hence, this case must be dismissed.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (Respondent: EJS Annulled)

Although the action commenced by appellants before the trial court was a declaration of nullity
of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, the case was clearly an action to annul the
same. A distinction between an action for annulment and one for declaration of nullity of an
agreement is called for.

An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated by lack of legal
capacity of one of the contracting parties, or by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence
or fraud. By its very nature, annulment contemplates a contract which is voidable, that is, valid
until annulled. Such contract is binding on all the contracting parties until annulled and set aside
by a court of law. It may be ratified. An action for annulment of contract has a four year
prescriptive period.

On the other hand, an action tor declaration of nullity of contract presupposes a void contract or
one where a1l of the requisites prescribed by law for contracts are present but the cause, object
or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, prohibited by
law or declared by law to be void. Such contract as a rule produces no legal and binding effect
even if it is not set aside by direct legal action. Neither may it be ratified. An action for the
declaration of nullity of contract is imprescriptible.

The appellants' pleading was for declaration of nullity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate. However, this did not necessarily mean that appellants' action was dismissible.
Granting that the action filed by appellants was incompatible with their allegations, it is not the
caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the action. The court
should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed
for. In this case, the allegations in the pleading and the evidence adduced point to no other
remedy but to annul the extrajudicial settlement of estate because of vitiated consent.

The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the
parties on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must
extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.

To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free; and (c) it should be
spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or
undue influence; and spontaneity by fraud.

Here, appellant Concepcion clearly denied any knowledge of the import and implication of the
subject document she signed, the subject extra-judicial settlement. She asserted that she does
not understand English, the language in which the terms of the subject document she signed
was written. It cannot be presumed that appellant Concepcion knew the contents of the extra-
judicial settlement. Article 1332 of the Civil Code is applicable in these circumstances.

In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of appellant Concepcion was not
sufficiently rebutted by appellees. Appellees failed to offer any evidence to prove that the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language known to the appellant
Concepcion. Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling, having
remained unrebutted by appellees. The evidence proving that the document was not fully
explained to appellant Concepcion in a language known to her, given her low educational
attainment, remained uncontradicted by appellees x x x the consent of petitioner was invalidated
by a substantial mistake or error, rendering the agreement voidable. The deed of extrajudicial
settlement between appellants and appellees should therefore be annulled and set aside on the
ground of mistake.

Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of
extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud.

ISSUE

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that the respondents' cause of action for annulment
has not prescribed, and that it ignored contemporaneous and subsequent acts of respondents
indicating the absence of fraud or vitiation of consent in the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz.

HELD

The Court denies the Petition.

This is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession, where co-heirs were effectively deprived
of their rightful share to the estate of their parents who died without a will - by virtue of a
defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to one of the
heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of
discovering and knowing its contents.

Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares." In this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced
their shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-heirs, in
equal shares as well.

The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled
does not prescribe.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - x x x

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof. x x x

Thus, while the CA was correct in ruling in favour of Concepcion and setting aside the subject
deed of extrajudicial settlement, it erred in appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud -
thus applying the four-year prescriptive period - when it should have simply held that the action
for the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe,
under the circumstances, given that the same was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is
relevant to the extent that Concepcion was effectively deprived of her true inheritance, and not
so much that she was defrauded.
 10. Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 42108, Dec. 29, 1989

What is the extent of jurisdiction of probate courts?

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS

Private respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her brother Oscar (Petitioner) 5k and 9k in
connection with her business transaction involving the recovery of a parcel of land in Malabon.
As security for the said loan, Adelaida executed in favour of the petitioners 2 Deeds of
consolidated sale of her rights, shares, interests and participation over the parcel of land
registered in the name of their parents (Lot No. 4033) and property (Lot No. 4221) located at
Tarlac under the names of Socorro, Joefina and Adelaida.

Upon the failure of said private respondent as vendor a retro to exercise her right of repurchase
within the redemption period, aforenamed petitioner filed a petition for consolidation and
approval of the conditional sale of Lot No. 4033 in Special Proceedings No. 5174, entitled
"Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Denoga,"  and a petition for approval of the pacto de retro
sale of Lot No. 4221 in the former Court of First Instance of Tarlac acting as a cadastral court. 

On January 22, 1960, the said probate court issued an order conveying to Spouses Oscar by
way of pacto de retro sale of whatever rights and interest that Adelaida may have in Lot No.
4033.

The Cadastral Court also issued a similar order dated April 18, 1960, ordering the consolidation
of ownership and dominion in petitioners-spouses Oscar Ramos over the rights, shares and
interests of Adelaida over the Lot 4221.

Private respondents had been and remained in possession of these properties until sometime in
1964 when petitioner took possession thereof.

On February 28, 1968, private respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of orders;
alleging that the orders issued by probate court and cadastral court, were null and void for lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner opposed: within lower court’s jurisdiction.

RTC ruled in favour of Respondent. CA affirmed.

ISSUE

Are the orders issued by probate court and cadastral court null and void for lack of jurisdiction?

HELD

For probate court’s order, not necessarily void.

A reading of the order of the probate court will show that it is merely an approval of the deed of
conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 executed by petitioner Adelaida Ramos in favor of
petitioners. There is nothing in said order providing for the consolidation of ownership over the
lots allegedly sold to petitioners nor was the issue of the validity of said contract discussed or
resolved therein. "To give approval" means in its essential and most obvious meaning, to
confirm, ratify, sanction or consent to some act or thing done by another.  The approval of the
probate court of the conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic
validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the right of private respondent Adelaida Ramos
as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her inheritance even before partition.  As
held in Duran, et al., vs. Duran  the approval by the settlement court of the assignment
pendente lite, made by one heir in favor of the other during the course of the settlement
proceedings, is not deemed final until the estate is closed and said order can still be vacated,
hence the assigning heir remains an interested person in the proceeding even after said
approval.

Moreover, the probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the present regional trial
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of
deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians
and trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in this case, the law does not extend the
jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceeding. The parties concerned may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of
convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence.  Obviously, the approval by the
probate court of the conditional sale was without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for
consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument in the proper court within the
statutory period of prescription.

The same jurisdictional flaw obtains in the order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court.
The court of first instance or the regional trial court, acting as cadastral court, acts with limited
competence. It has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for consolidation of
ownership, much less to issue an order to that effect, such action must have been filed in the
former court of first instance, now in the regional trial court, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. That remedy, and the procedure therefor, is now governed by Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court as a special civil action cognizable by the regional trial court in the exercise of original
general jurisdiction.

The questioned order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court, being void for lack of
jurisdiction, is in contemplation of law non-existent and may be wholly disregarded. Such
judgment may be assailed any time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action
or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked.  It is not
necessary to take any step to vacate or avoid a void judgment; it may simply be ignored.