51.

Chavez vs Comelec, 211 SCRA 315 (1992)

Facts:

On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued a resolution to delete the name of Melchor Chavez
from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez"
votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of
qualified candidates. Hence, this petition, praying among others, the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent from proclaiming 24th highest senatorial candidate.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case, considering the
petitioner’s contention that the respondent failed to implement its resolution on time.

Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over this case.

Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution provides in part, "(t)he Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . "

In this case, It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on
the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of
the Senate.

52. Garcia vs. HRET, G.R. No. 134792. August 12, 1999

Facts:

Petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry Angping. Questioning his eligibility to hold office
in the House of Representatives. However, the HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition for failure to pay the cash deposit required by its Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the instant petition for
certiorari considering the petitioners’ contention that the respondent HRET comitted grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition below upon a mere technicality.

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the instant petition for certiorari.

While the Constitution provides that, “the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members.” This does not, however, bar
the Supreme Court from entertaining petitions which charge the HRET with grave abuse of
discretion.

In this case, the Court may resolve whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse
of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and in refusing
to reinstate the same even after the payment of the required cash deposit.

53. Suanez vs. Chief Accountant, 81 PHIL 818 (1948)

Facts:

The Senate President approved the issuance to petitioner an appointment as Secretary to

Senator Diokno with compensation of P200 per month, consequently, the Chairman of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) issued an appointment to petitioner as Secretary to Senator
Diokno, as member of the SET, with compensation at the rate of P3,600 per annum. The
respondent refused to honor the latter salary rate and alleged that the salary of the petitioner is
fixed at the rate of P200 per month.

Issue:
 Whether or not the appointment by the Chairman of the SET prevails, considering the
petitioner’s contention that the Electoral Tribunals are distinct from and independent of the
Congress, considering further the respondent’s contention that the constitutional independence of
the Electoral Tribunals has reference only to their judicial functions, but not to the selection of
their personnel.

Ruling:

The appointment by the Chairman of the SET prevails.

in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, “that the Electoral Tribunals are
independent constitutional creations with specific powers and functions to execute and perform
…”

In this case, even the appropriation for the SET is included in the budget of the Senate, it
does not mean that the employees of the SET are also employees of the Senate, for both
institutions are separate and independent of each other under the Constitution.

57. Arroyo vs HRET, G.R. No. 118597, JULY 14, 1995

Facts:

Private respondent’s radical shift in his cause of action from the original and traditional
ballot revision process to his "innovative and non-traditional process", which he calls precinct-
level document-based anomalies, has no legal precedent. Petitioner then moved to dismiss the
protest but to no avail.

Issue:

Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion considering the petitioner’s
contention that it refused to dismiss the Case after private respondent, Syjuco had belatedly
changed the theory of his case and introduced new issues and, thereafter, when it proceeded with
the protest.

Ruling:

Yes, HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

 Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules provides in part, “[A]fter the expiration of the period
for filing of the protest… substantial amendments which broaden the scope of the action or
introduce an additional cause of action shall not be allowed…”

In this case, HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion after it resolved not to dismiss
the protest and to continue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record with
the new amendments of allegations were presented by the private respondent.

62. Advincula vs Commision on Appointments, 7 SCRA 1 (1963)

Facts:

Petitioners have extended ad-interim appointments by former President Garcia as Justices

of the Peace. Said appointments were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Three
days after, the Commission, on their reconsideration, the confirmation of petitioners'
appointments was withdrawn.

Issue:

Whether or not the reconsideration is valid, considering the petitioners’ contention that
under the Revised Rules of said body, reconsideration shall be made one day after its approval.

Ruling:

Yes, the reconsideration is valid.

Revised Rules of the Commission provides in part, “[R]esolution of the Commission on

any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1)
day after their approval. . .”

In this case, The Court cannot pass upon and determine the correctness of the
interpretation placed by a constitutional body, no less, on its own rules. Since, the Commission
ruled that the one-day provision in question refers to a working day, and Saturday not being one,
the filing of the motion made on the following Monday fulfills the requirement of the rule.
64. Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (1991)

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent committee from requiring the
petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
corporations.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition be granted, considering the petitioner’s contention that it is
violative of its constitutional right to require their attendance before the respondent’s inquiry.

Ruling:

Yes, the petition should be granted.

Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution provides in part “The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation…”

In this case, there is no intended legislation involved. it was conducted to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in
connection with the alleged sale.
73. Sanchez vs. Commission on Audit, 552 SCRA 471(2008)

Facts:

General Appropriations Act of 1992 provided an appropriation for the Department of

Interior and Local Government (DILG), including funds for their Capability Building Program.
From said funds, Petitioner, the Deputy Executive Secretary issued a memorandum for the
transfer and remittance to the Office of the President, the sum of P300,000.00 for the operational
expenses of Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy.

Issue:

Whether or not the transfer of funds from DILG to the Office of the President is allowed,
considering the petitioner’s contention that the transfer of funds was never repudiated by the
President, considering further the respondent’s contention, that the fund was meant to be
implemented by the Local Government Academy.

Ruling:

No, the transfer of fund is not allowed.

Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides in part, “[t]he President, the
President of the Senate, The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law…”

In this case, it was the Deputy Executive Secretary, not any of those mentioned in the
Constitution, who caused the transfer and the latter was not shown to have been authorized by
the President to do so.
74. Nazareth vs. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013

Facts:

Commission on Audit disallowed the payment of benefits to covered officials and

employees of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001
out of the savings of the DOST, approved by Petitioner, Regional Director, DOST - Zamboanga
City.

Issue:

Whether or not the disallowance of payment is valid, considering the petitioner’s

contention that payment of benefits was authorized and approved by the Executive Secretary,
considering further the respondent’s contention that the authorization was illegal.

Ruling:

Yes, the disallowance of payment is valid.

Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides in part, “[t]he PRESIDENT, x
x x may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

In this case, only the President has the power to augment savings from one item to
another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision.