11.

) Tobias vs Abalos

Facts:

-  Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of

Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

- Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the
same legislative district.

- A plebiscite was held in accordance with the LGC – asking whether the
electorates agree to convert Mandaluyong into HUC. The result was in the
affirmative (18k votes).

Petitioners contention:

- The petitioners contended that the Section 49, Article VIII of RA 7675 is
unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution.

1.) First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the
conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional
district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district.

2.) Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which

provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The
division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by
the Constitution.

3.) Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners
stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.

ISSUE/S:

1.) W/N the RA 7675 violates the one subject one bill rule?
2.) W/N the Act violates the Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit
of number of rep?
3.) W/N the inexistence of mention of census in the law shows a lack of
constitutional requirement?
Held:

1.) No, RA 7675 does not violate the one subject one bill rule

The SC ruled that the creation of a separate congressional district for

Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a
HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by
this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

2.) No, it does not violate the Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit
of number of rep

The SC ruled that the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law”. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment.Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

3.) No, the inexistence of mention of census in the law does not show a lack of
constitutional requirement

The SC ruled that  the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through
the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative district The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
12.) Binay vs Domingo

Facts:

- The Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500

burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not
exceed P2,000.00 a month.

- Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its
expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA
disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds
for the implementation thereof

- Petitioner’s Contention: Binay sent a letter to COA contending that the

intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power and parens
patriae 

- Respondent’s Contention: COA later answers that no perceptible connection or

relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s.
1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants
of Makati

ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of Police Power?

HELD: Yes, it is a valid exercise of Police Power

SC provides that Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations .

Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent
powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation;
and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair
intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the
powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have
been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life
and desirable for the safety of the people. 

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto,
but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any
definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

In this case, COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. We ruled that police
power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a

limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state
policies to provide adequate social services. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

13.) US vs Salvatierra (1918)

- Cannot find full case

14.) OSG vs Ayala Land Corp

Facts:

- The respondents are Ayala Land, Robinsons, SM Prime and Shangri-la

- The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities
for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall
buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for
use as parking spaces.

- Respondents expend maintenance and security and in exchange, they charge

parking fees.

-  the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights question the legalities of parking rates of the said shopping malls. 

-  The Committees argues that the collection of parking fees by shopping

malls is contrary to the National Building Code, that the reasonable and
logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces should be free.

- Additionally, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines)

provides that "it is the policy of the State to protect the interest of the
consumers, promote the general welfare and establish standards of
conduct for business and industry."

- SM instituted a Petition for Declaratory Relief in RTC

ISSUE: W/N respondents are obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the
use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge.

RTC: NO, respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the
use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge.

The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations do not impose that parking spaces shall be provided by the mall owners
free of charge. Absent such directive, Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-la and SM Prime
are under no obligation to provide them for free.

Additionally, Art.1158 of Civil Code Provides that “Obligations derived from law are not
presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them;
and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book”   

CA: Affirmed the lower court ruling

SC: OSG’s contention on his appeal: respondents are mandated to provide free
parking by Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR.

[For reference lang ni. Di kelangan basahon kay gi dismiss man gihapon sa SC iyang
argument]

Section 803 states

(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction, and
height of the building and the use, area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to
the provisions of the local zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary.

RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirements shall be observed:

1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for
specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:

1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by
5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for
parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of
3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total
number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether or not parking
accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking
requirements).]]

The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together with
Section 102 of the National Building Code, which declares that the State to
safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles
of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the
purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of
minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site,
design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
 The Supreme Court finds NO merit in the present Petition.

Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be

given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since
Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention
parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the
same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New
Civil Code.

The OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for
parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such
parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not
covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved
in favor of the basic law.

15.) Republic vs Gonzales

Facts:

- The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in
Tañong Malabon, Metro Manila and designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR-
1018-D. Lot I which adjoins F. Sevilla Boulevard has an area of 605 square
meters; Lot 2, an interior lot abutting F. Sevilla Boulevard only on its northern
portion,

- This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof,
among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it. 

- On 14 April 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144,

entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain
Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation.
 - The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed Resolutions 2 authorizing the filing
of ejectment cases against appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could be
implemented.

- Appellant’s answer against the Municipality of Malabon: (1) that Lot 2 was
covered by a lease application, and later a miscellaneous sales application, filed
before the Bureau of Lands;

- (2) that he had a municipal permit to construct a building as well as a business

license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and

- (3) that the lot occupied by him was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in
the widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard. The defenses interposed by Augusto Josue
were substantially similar to those raised by Policarpio Gonzales.

ISSUE: W/N Proclamation No. 144 is valid

HELD:

Appellant’s Contention: Proclamation No. 144 is not in accordance with Section 83

of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and therefore, invalid. They
contend that the setting aside of the lots occupied by them for parking space
purposes does not redound to the public benefit as required under Section 83 of
the Public Land Act. They claim that only certain privileged individuals, i.e., those
who have cars, can avail of the parking facility without any advantage accruing to
the general public.

RTC: The defendants are ordered to vacate the Lot.  Proclamation No. 144 was
issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed
by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, which had become particularly aware of the
increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard

CA: Reversed and set aside the RTC decision?

SC: We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.

Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and
2 shall be subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of
Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales applications over
the lots respectively occupied by them.

Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he

had acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by
him. Although not expressly stated, Augusto Josue must be deemed to have similarly
admitted that ownership by the National Government since he filed a miscellaneous
sales application with the Bureau of Lands, an agency of the Government, an
application which can only be filed in respect of tracts of public land, not private land.

16.) LTO vs City of Butuan

Facts:

- The Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) of Butuan on August 16, 1992 passed an

ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles for hire,
providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit,
and imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other purposes.”

- The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees,
fees for registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for
the driving thereof. The City of Butuan asserts that Sec. 129 and Sec.133 of
the Local Government Code is their basis for said ordinance and that, said
provisions authorize LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its
view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving
of tricycles.

- Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the
national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units
is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the
authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of
licenses to drive such vehicles.

- Respondent’s contention: Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the

salient provisions introduced by the Local Government Code is in the area of
local taxation which allows LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along
with, in its view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for
the driving of tricycles.
Issue: W/N the City of Butuan may issue license and permit and collect fees for the
operation of tricycle

Held: NO, the City of Butuan cannot issue license and permit and collect fees for the
operation of tricycle since the power is vested upon the LTO

RTC: the grant of the corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers' license,
and the collection of fees therefor had all been vested in the Local Government Units
("LGUs").

CA: Sustained the ruling of RTC

SC: The registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO (pursuant to Art. 3
Sec. 4(d) [1], 10 of RA 4136-Land Transportation and Traffic Code) while
franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB (Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board; pursuant to EO # 202). Under the
Local Government Code (specifically Sec. 458 (8)(3)(VI)), the Local Government Units
now have the power to REGULATE (to fix, establish or control, to adjust by rule,
method or establish mode to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing
principles or laws) the operation of tricycles for hire and grant franchises thereof but
they are still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC (Department of
Transportation and Communications; under Article 458(a) [3-VI] of the RA 7160).

17.) Tan Toco vs Municipal Council of Iloilo

Facts:

-The widow of Tan Toco had sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of
P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa
consisting of 592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59
square meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street.

- The Court of First Instance of Iloilo: sentenced the said municipality to pay the
plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the said judgment was on appeal
affirmed by this court

- The municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, thus the plaintiff
attached the following properties: two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one
police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and
Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used as
markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.
-Provincial fiscal of Iloilo: filed a motion which the Court of First Instance praying that
the attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared
null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the defendant municipality.

- Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion but the court, by order of August 12,
1925, declared the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the
defendant municipality null and void

ISSUE: whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from execution.

HELD:
SC: YES

The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the
commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so
long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.

It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used for a
public purpose but for quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a judgment
against the municipality, and may be sold. This rule applies to shares of stock owned by
a municipal corporation, and the like. But the mere fact that corporate property held for
public uses is being temporarily used for private purposes does not make it subject
execution.  But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely
because it is temporarily used for private purposes, although if the public use is wholly
abandoned it becomes subject to execution

18.) City of Quezon vs Lexber Incorporated ( Sensya guys naglisod kog basa ani
huhu)

Facts:
LEXBER INC. owned a parcel of land of 26,010 sq.m. located in Antipolo. It was
offered and persuaded to have it used as a garbage dumping site by Quezon City and
other Metro Manila Cities or municipalities authorized by the latter for 5 years from
Jan.1991 to Dec. 1995.

August 27, 1990 a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn among Quezon City, represented
by Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., Lexber Inc. and Mun. of Antipolo. Part of the Agreement
was that Lexber Inc. shall be hired as the exclusive supplier of manpower, heavy
equipment and engineering services for the dumpsite and shall also have the right of
furst refusal for con tracting such services.

September 10, 1990 – first negotiated contract between Quezon City

represented by Mayor Simon and Lexber Inc. for Lexber to construct the necessary
infrastructure at the dumpsite, designated as the Q.C. Sanitary Landfill for a contract
price of P4,381,069.00. Construction of said infrastructure was completed on
November 25, 1991 and contract price was paid by Q.C.

November 8, 1990, second negotiated contract was entered into between Lexber
and Q.C. where it was agreed that Lexber shall provided maintenance services in the
form of manpower, equipment and engineering operations for the dumpsite for
P1,536,796.00 monthly. It was also agreed that Q.C. shall pay Lebster a reduced fee of
50% of the monthly con tract price or P768,493 if Q,C. fails to dump the agreed volume
of 54,000 cu.m. of garbage fcor any given month.

December 11, 1991 – Lexber was notified to commence maintenance and

dumping operations at the site starting on Dec. 15, 1991 by Q.C. thru the City Engineer
Alfredo Macapugay, Proj. Manager Rene Lazaro, and Mayor Simon.

Q.C. immediately commenced dumping garbage on the landfill site continuously

from December 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, it ceased to dump garbage on the site
without notice to Lexber. Lexber claimed that even if the dumpsite remain unused, it
was entitled to payment for its services as stipulated in the second negotiated contract.

December 12, 1992 – Lexber’s counsel sent a demand letter to Q.C. demanding
payment of at least 50% of its services under the said contact amounting to
P9,989,174.00. Because of the idle state of the dumpsite for more than a year, Lexber
also sought a clarification from Q.C. regarding its intention on the dumpsite project,
considering the waste of equipment and manpower in the meantime, and its loss of
opportunity for the property.

`This time, Q.C. is acting thru Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. who succeeded Mayor
Simon in the interim, denied any liability under the contract on the ground that it was
invalid and unenforceable. Accordidng to Mayor Mathay, the contract was signed only
by Mayor Simon and was not approved nor ratified by the City Council and it lacked the
required budget appropriation.

Feb. 21, 1994, Lexber filed a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance or Rescission of Contract and Damages against Q.C. at the Q.C. RTC

Jan. 26, 1998 RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lexber ordering Q.C . to pay
P768,493 per month starting Dec. 15, 1991 until Dec. 15, 1995 with legal interest
starting Dec. 16, 1992 until Q.C. finally pays the entire amount. and ordering defendant
Q.C. to pay costs of suit.

Q.C. appealed to the C.A. but it affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Its Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied.

Jan. 26, 2000 –Q.C. petitioned the Supreme Court for review on certiorari
assailing the Oct. 18, 1999 decision of the C.A.
ISSUES :

1. Was the second negotiated contract null and void ab initio because its execution
was done in violation of existing laws, more particularly Sections 85, 86 and 87 of
P.D. 1445 and Section 177(b) of B.P. 337?

2. Do subsequent acts of Q.C. petitioner constituted a ratification of the subject

negotiated contract notwithstanding the lack of appropriation?

RULING :

1. The very same P.D. 1445 which is the cornerstone of petitioner’s arguments
does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a
contract entered into by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of the
statute specifically provides: Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public
treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other
specific statutory authority. (underscoring ours)

Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an

appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other specific authority, i.e., section
84 of PD 1445. Thus, when a contract is entered into by a city mayor pursuant to
specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the disbursement of
funds from any public treasury or depository therefor. It can thus be plainly seen
that the law invoked by petitioner QUEZON City itself provides that an
appropriation law is not the only authority upon which public funds shall be
disbursed.

Furthermore, then Mayor Simon did not enter into the subject contract without
legal authority. He was so authorized under BP 337, the Local Government
Code of 1993. We note that while the subsequent Local government Code of
1991, which took effect after the execution of the subject contract, provides that
the mayuaor’s representation must be “upon authority of the sangguniang
panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance,” there was no such qualification
under the old code. `

Therefore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this regard. It is clear that the second
negotiated contract was entered in to Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. pursuant to law or
specific statutory authority as required by P.D. No. 1445.

There is also no merit in petitioner’s claim that there was no appropriation

therefor, for it is evident that even as early as April 4, 1991, funds which were
certified to as available had been allocated for use in the first few months
operation of the sanitary landfill. The problem arose only because the new
administration unjustifiably refused to abide by the stipulations in the second
 negotiated contract. hence, petitioner’s arguments on this issue fail to convince
this Court that the second negotiated contract was null and void ab initio for lack
of prior appropriation or authority on the part of Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.

2. When appellant City government after the construction by the appellee of the
dumpsite structure in accordance with the contract plans and specifications
started to dump garbage collected in the City and consequently paid the appellee
for the services rendered, such acts produce and constitute a ratification and
approval of the negotiated contract and necessarily should imply its waiver of the
right to assail the contract’s enforceability.

Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that there was constructive ratification on

the part of petitioner.

The records also reveal that petitioner issued Disbursement Vouchers of various
amounts covering the period between March 1, 1992 to April 30, 1992 for the
services rendered by the Mud Regal Group Inc. to haul garbage to the sanitary
landfill. The said disbursement vouchers were passed in audit and duly
approved and paid by petitioner. These are facts and circumstances on record
which led the trial court, the appellate court and this Court to affirm the
conclusion that petitioner had actually ratified the subject contract.

19.) Frivaldo vs COMELEC (1989)

Facts:
- Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time.

- The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States.

-  In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had
sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.

-  He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in
the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be
dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten
days from his proclamation

-RESPONDENT’s Contention: Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. The
OSG additionally alleged that his election did not cure this defect because the electorate
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the
Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and
election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.

-Frivaldo’s Contention: Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because
his naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness."

ISSUE: W/N Frivaldo is a Filipino Citizen at the time of his election

HELD: NO
SC : His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine

citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his
adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what
might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he
became a stateless individual.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be

possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to
marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the
challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation
and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
20.) Labo vs COMELEC

Facts:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo
is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after
he married an Australian.  Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make
him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even
if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such
citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for
being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his
lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty
race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him.
He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian
that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath
of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an
Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that
when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his
Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship
should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio
could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government
Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have
voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit
a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding,
that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because
Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election