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Sextus Empiricus
First published Fri Jan 17, 2014; substantive revision Fri Jul 12, 2019
Sextus Empiricus was a Pyrrhonian Skeptic living probably in the second or third century
CE, many of whose works survive, including the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, the best and
fullest account we have of Pyrrhonian skepticism (a kind of skepticism named for Pyrrho
(see entry on Ancient Skepticism)). Pyrrhonian skepticism involves having no beliefs
about philosophical, scientific, or theoretical matters—and according to some
interpreters, no beliefs at all, period. Whereas modern skepticism questions the possibility
of knowledge, Pyrrhonian skepticism questions the rationality of belief: the Pyrrhonian
skeptic has the skill of finding for every argument an equal and opposing argument, a
skill whose employment will bring about suspension of judgment on any issue which is
considered by the skeptic, and ultimately, tranquillity.

 1. Life
 2. Works
o 2.1 Surviving Works
  2.1.1 Outlines of
Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhoniae
Hypotyposes)
 2.1.2 Against the
Mathematicians (Adversus
Mathematicos)
o 2.2 Lost Works
 3. The nature of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism (PH I)
o 3.1 What do Skeptics do, and where do
they get their name?
o 3.2 What is the Skeptical ability or
skill?
o 3.3 Tranquillity
o 3.4 Does the Skeptic have any beliefs?
 3.4.1 Yes, the Skeptic has beliefs
 3.4.2 No, the Skeptic doesn’t
have beliefs
 3.4.3 Yes again.
 3.4.4 An assessment
o 3.5 Modes
 3.5.1 The Ten Modes (PH I 35–
163)
 3.5.2 The Five Modes (PH I
164–77)
 3.5.3 The Two Modes (PH I
178–9)
 3.5.4 The Eight Modes (PH I
180–86)
o 3.6 The Skeptical Phrases (PH I 187–
209)
o 3.7 Difference between Pyrrhonism and
other schools (PH I 210–41)
 4. PH II and III; M VII–XI
o 4.1 The criterion of truth
o 4.2 Negative dogmatism in M VII–XI?
 5. M I–VI
  6. References for the later history of Sextus’
writings
 Bibliography
o Primary Texts
o Secondary Literature
 Academic Tools
 Other Internet Resources
 Related Entries

1. Life
Sextus Empiricus was a Pyrrhonian Skeptic living probably in the second or third century
CE, many of whose works survive, including the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which is the
best and fullest account we have of Pyrrhonian skepticism. (Book I of that work consists
of Sextus’ codification of the nature of Pyrrhonian skepticism, which he contrasts with
the outlooks of other schools of philosophy.) Fittingly, we know little or nothing about the
life of Sextus Empiricus, including when and where he lived. Best estimates put him
anywhere between 100 CE and the first half of the third century CE (House 1980), but it
has been suggested that he was already well known by the end of the second century
(Barnes 2000: xii). Sextus is called ‘Empiricus’ because he belonged to the Empirical
School of Medicine (Deichgräber 1965: 40–1). There were three main schools of
medicine, the Rationalists, the Empiricists, and the Methodists. Confusingly, even though
Sextus was an Empiricist, he actually states in Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 236 that while
Pyrrhonism is very similar to the Empirical School of Medicine, Pyrrhonists ‘might rather
adopt’ Methodism. This is a standing puzzle for interpreters of Sextus (see section
3.7 below).

2. Works
2.1 Surviving Works
The surviving works are grouped under two headings.
2.1.1 Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes)
(This is usually referred to by the abbreviation PH.) Works of Classical literature were
normally divided into ‘books’ (Plato’s Republic is in ten books, Aristotle’s Physics is in
eight, etc.); PH is in three books. They are not given separate titles by scholars, and are
just referred to as PH I, II, and III. PH I is a complete description of Pyrrhonian
Skepticism, stating what it is that makes one qualify as a Pyrrhonian skeptic (the
possession of a certain skill) and what the pay-off for being a Skeptic is (tranquillity),
detailing the various ‘Modes’ of argumentation that the Skeptic deploys (mastery of
which constitutes the skill which defines the skeptic) and the various phrases the Skeptic
uses to indicate his characteristic state of mind, namely epochê or ‘suspension of
judgment’, and differentiating Pyrrhonian Skepticism from other philosophical schools
with which it might seem to have affinities. In PH II and III, Sextus lays out the positions
of Dogmatic philosophers on issues of logic (PH II), and physics and ethics (PH III),
complete with Skeptical counterarguments to those positions: essentially, we see Sextus
in PH II and III exercising the Skeptical skill which he had described in PH I. (With
Sextus’ description of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, compare that in DL (Diogenes Laërtius) IX
61–116; for discussion of the differences, see the papers in Vogt 2015.)
2.1.2 Against the Mathematicians (Adversus Mathematicos)
(This is usually referred to by the abbreviation M.) The work is in eleven books, referred
to as M I, II, III, etc. These books have separate titles:
M I:
Against the Grammarians
M II:
Against the Rhetoricians
M III:
Against the Geometers
M IV:
Against the Arithmeticians
M V:
Against the Astrologers
M
Against the Musicians

Against the Logicians

Against the Physicists

Against the Ethicists

The word in th
‘learned’ (think
translate the tit
‘Against the Pr
suggests ‘Agai
‘Against Those
target of M III
title Against th
two works. As
constitute a com
title Against th
books, M VII–
contents of PH
as appropriate
that M VII–XI
of all the parts
of that work w
that the larger w
order of compo
after PH; again
n. 57.) The loss
since much of
skepticism com
this entry conc
same work as M
eleven books a
(When scholar
book number a
book one of PH

2.2 Lost W
The ancients do
Often, Sextus r
descriptions. F
that sound is no
commentaries
Dogmatists,
which is pretty
that time is not
(en tois Pyrrhô
which is either
1887: 319–20)
explained this w
writings in way
have (in additio

1. M VII 202:
the same as
2. M VI 55, ‘t
the soul’.

3. The n
(PH I)
3.1 What
get their n
When you inve
discover somet
not-P outweigh
is possible to d
for believing th
other out, and s
philosophers th
‘Academic’ sk
carry on invest
this last claim,
why Skeptics g
and so skeptiko
investigate’, ‘in
If Pyrrhonian S
no distinctive s
things Platonis
are Forms (and
question ‘what
Aristotelians b
living body as
into the questio
is partially con
Skeptics have n
still investigati
a set of beliefs
do. Yet there m
Skeptics. What
or skill (I 8), no
Sextus presents
not by the cont
attitude to philo
Morison 2011:

3.2 What
Scepticism is a
and are though
equipollence in
suspension of j
Sextus tells us
enables its poss
of judgment en
‘fortuitously’—
this is one whe
any other as be
‘equipollent’).
any given argu
(i.e., one whos
with P—call it
This connects w
investigates wh
favour of P, an
whose conclus
the basis of we
more weight:
You pursue an
problem it addr
the different so
order to pick o
Note then that
not merely mea
if P is a propos
true that x neith
neither believe
isn’t, but he is
To count as sus
at least necessa
Barnes 2000: x
x is sceptical w
considered whe
(iii) x does not
Note further th
assembles argu
favour of a neg
another. Ἐποχή
towards the pro
This means tha
consider both s
arguments in fa
generally, of so
enough, for ins
reject that argu
neither believin
way), one wou
would not yet h
condition will b
Skepticism—se

3.3 Tranq
How does it co
offers an answe
are seeking tran
Barnes’ transla
(2012: 282)) ar
take away this
‘tranquillity’ is
more literally m
that one might
offers, such as
thought to be s
Sarmatians tatt
both the impres
those who pay
them they shou
finding the ans
questions induc
could come to
mindedness the
intense scrutiny
is that anyone w
will lead the sc
speaking to bot
convincingness
(For a slightly
Cooper 2012, w
skeptic predece
skeptical skill a
worriers to ava
primarily offer
became the firs
account of how
skeptic.)
So if we are sm
freedom from t
contradictions
25–30 that ‘the
26). But where
tranquillity by
29), they found
investigating a
Skeptical skill)
discovered—to
They did not fi
Skeptical skill
tranquillity did
about Apelles t
he was painting
the horse’s mo
sponge on whic
flung it at the p
representation
You search for
expecting. Mor
suspension of j
image, cf. DL I
that tranquillity
the thing you w
the investigatio
discover wheth
suspending jud
still follows. St
tranquillity can
Will being a Py
advertises? Tw
(1) Striker (199
obviously does
respecting Pyrr
view). But then
being tranquill
Such is the pen
a goal of life […
(Striker 1990a:
Striker’s charg
himself as susp
of life (rather t
she points to st
there is a psych
from the Pyrrh
easily get all th
because of cou
good or bad, an
advantage over
people, that Py
shed the additio
hunger, thirst, e
its nature. (PH
This prompted
The Pyrrhonist
competition fo
epistemology.
Perhaps, thoug
be intellectual
an unanswered
from your back
(2) Myles Burn
Skeptic will fin
ataraxia is hard
that no answers
(1980: 56)
In other words,
Skeptic must h
produce an ans
one. However,
the possibility
impossibility o
‘are still invest
truth ‘cannot b
unavailability o
general worry t
him from belie
this question th
Skeptic can ha
produce an ans
might be able t
3.6).

3.4 Does
Since Skeptics
on their beliefs
natural questio
beliefs—if so,
dogmatists. Th
have beliefs. F
positions of the
Skeptic argues
endorsing the c
arguments. But
something, say
conclusion  C  a
with conclusion
to an argument
doing the secon
arisen (for mor
Skeptics might
everyday lives
avoiding oncom
act in this way
was a common
antiquity (see V
Sextus turns to
very famous—
Barnes’ transla
When we say t
sense in which
something; for
appearances—
think I am not
beliefs in the se
object of inves
anything uncle
The question o
question of wh
contemporary s
instance the pa
Barnes 2007; P
3.4.1 Yes, the
In 1979, Micha
the sceptics tho
least suspended
suspend judgm
enough, at any
Frede took him
interpretation o
view or beliefs
Sextus distingu
‘belief’; and on
So confident is
there can be no
Pyrrhonean ske
The question fo
when he charac
skeptics can ha
accepts the jud
verdict; if it say
(Phantasia her
impressions of
to ‘the feelings
this as follows:
of phantasia’.)
which represen
upon the Skept
turn have a cer
which he does
emphasize that
that impression
e.g., I 19:
we do not over
in accordance w
or I 193:
we do yield to
assent’ (my em
The second kin
cannot have, is
an assumption
inquiry ’ (18).
rational weighi
Sextus’) charac
nonevident obj
is beliefs with
but in fact Fred
As far as the se
sceptic may no
ones which dep
Thus,
[a]ny belief, w
conversely, eve
Roughly speak
kinds of belief
a difference in
formed ‘on rea
considerations
of simply think
marshalled the
cannot have, an
the marshalling
person who for
the Skeptic can
interpretation c
document Inter
Examples of th
interpretation,
1. (a) The beli
immediatel
Contrast: so
performing
relative to t
contrast som
through an
appears rig
day.
(b) The bel
striking you
result of run
2. The belief t
formed imm
someone, a
something
the pros ou
3. The belief t
from accult
and who th
philosopher
running thr
of this sort
4. The belief t
formed from
simply follo
that the way
make the ta
way it has s
account of
other way,
this way ac
These example
sources of appe
24, which Fred
Skeptic, provid
By nature’s gu
By the necessit
drink. By the h
everyday point
kinds of expert
24)
Frede’s interpr
charge levelled
be able to lead
judgment on al
beliefs, but jus
view,’ as he sa
arguments and
scientists do.
Many other tex
does have belie

 we accept (
is good and
 we accept (
 in line with
(λέγων) tha
and reveren
 But in fact
smoke, a pr
heart, and o
3.4.2 No, the
Frede’s propos
who argued tha
rejecting all be
the skeptic who
kind of skeptic
to have beliefs
who think Sext
of dogma that t
belief. Accordi
in accordance w
that this is inde
1980: 43); but
or class of prop
distinct from m
appear cannot b
the true, if ther
association trad
philosophy. (30
Hence the pron
do not represen
record how thin
Jonathan Barne
pronouncemen
distance and it
may utter the s
thereby expres
certain πάθος (
What is the Sk
is avowing som
it is plain that a
be speech acts
His avowals ‘e
pronouncemen
one’s belief tha
expresses one’
Barnes and Bu
Skeptic makes
having any bel
the ‘feelings fo
having a belief
is a way of hav
Burnyeat do no
they have an ar
interpret I 13 in
4.1), since it tu
criterion of trut
What do Barne
How can the S
recognisably h
attempts an int
observances of
whatsoever: hu
other man or an
Teaching a ma
to impart a pow
(83)
the Skeptic ‘dr
believes that it
Many texts in S
Here are some.

 The chief c
account an
come to ho
 in uttering t
what is app
 holding opi
(PH I 15).
 we say all t
actions, list
(PH I 24).
3.4.3 Yes aga
Finally, it is wo
when Skeptics
quite simply do
to him to be’ (P
does indeed ha
that things app
be true, and Ba
skeptic incurs w
me’, by talking
exactly the beli
seems sweet to
this instance, th
note that the be
like the beliefs
position allows
outside’, ‘I am
interpreters und
‘it seems to be
close at 6.00 p.
Some texts in S
(in the Annas a
When we inves
grant (δίδομεν)
apparent but w
investigating w
sweetens (we c
a perceptual wa
3.4.4 An asse
Here is PH I 13
When we say t
sense in which
something; for
appearances—
think I am not
beliefs in the se
object of inves
anything uncle
[See the supple
The way to ma
in (3.4.1)–(3.4.
assent to the fe
‘feelings’ in qu
of phantasia pu
way (so when m
in which P, I a
When X is in th
question which
feeling, i.e., thi
to this feeling i
represents it as
upon one by ap
Barnes and Bu
acknowledging
gets acknowled
the content of t
an acknowledg
acknowledgme
agree with Bar
are in a certain
but Fine and Pe
believes somet
belief is the on
In deciding this
2000: 81). One
of dogma whic
one is in a certa
is, etc.); the oth
called a belief,
points is a matt
interpretational
kind of dogma,
the word ‘belie
perceptual exp
appears to me t
is a tree outside
according to B
these acknowle
a much weaker
which it is suff
behaves in a ce
Hence she is in
whether we wa
words, given th
thinks it is a m
But what we ar
means to have
So who is right
about the interp
forced upon the
understand the
claims:
“assenting to su
is affected in th
thereby flatly d
Unfortunately,
reason is not ha
deliberately ca
assent to the im
To accept or gi
the proposition
1983: 153)
The issue is tho
instance, Sandb
The man may s
apple’.
(For the same d
The point is tha
philosophical u
impression tha
Specifically, no
judging that on
philosophical u
does, requires u
(Note that this
word dogma, s
philosophical p
for the Stoics.)
the reading tha
different view
which arrives a
In I 13, Sextus
(δογματίζειν),
the word ‘belie
other. So the fi
intends this to
to anything, an
things (‘some u
that the Skeptic
show that the S
us which thing
upon him by ap
Skeptics don’t 
investigation in
impressions is
about assent to
proposition. It
the type of thin
thing he doesn’
Indeed, it may
Burnyeat, Perin
impressions, bu
does describe t
psychological t
‘unclear object
put this in term
of dogma invol
should the imp
the sciences be
obvious: any im
investigation w
some other con
not carry with
another equal a
impressions is
responding, pa
of the appearan
in such cases, o
commitments o
a reason for as
Verdict: the Sk
namely those th
When he assen
the correct one
that reason for
I 13 Sextus dre
the message th
of belief the Sk
would end up w
believing now
impression tha
countermanded
all of its own to
the texts which
Thus, the weig
(although some
to suspend judg
interpretations)

3.5 Mode
By far the long
Skepticism (I 3
Striker 1993; H
Woodruff 2010
announced as b
judgment (I 35
suspension of j
other, by assem
The Skeptic ne
modes divide i
Modes, and the
methods other
For extended a
Castagnoli 201
3.5.1 The Ten
This charming
unnamed ‘olde
century BCE; s
treatment of all

1. The mode d
2. The mode d
3. The mode d
91–99);
4. The mode d
5. The mode d
6. The mode d
7. The mode d
(I 129–34);
8. The mode d
9. The mode d
10. The mode d
myths and d
The point of th
against dogmat
 world is. They
undermine thes
each supply us
(situation) S, an
another situatio
representative

 perfume ap
and bees (fi
 the same ho
(fourth mod
 the same to
square (fift
 the poets re
homosexua
mode, PH I
What does the
application of t
propounds to h
There are oppo

x appears F in S

x appears F* in S*
but the appeara

we cannot prefer S to S* or vice versa;

Hence we arriv

we can neither affirm nor deny that x is

really F or really F*.
(For similar sto
interpretation a
forbidden kind
the logical sens
and opposing a
suppose that th
opposing argum
the two opposi
 In the case of t
arguments:

Honey is perceived to be sweet by healthy

people
Therefore, honey is sweet

Honey is perceived to be bitter by jaundiced

people
Therefore, honey is bitter
Arguments (1)
(1) in argumen
The second arg
perceived, so d
Suspension of
because the arg
argument given
dogmatist’s att
3.5.2 The Fiv
Sextus’ presen
the most intere
that the modes
complete text o
[164] The more
dispute; second
mode; fifth, the
about the matte
either to choos
infinite regress
such source, w
anything, and s
object appears
judgment on w
back ad infinitu
of a concession
needs to be ma
other, we suspe
The reference i
all Ten Modes
the Ten Modes
confusion; Ann
Modes is an um
generating equ
perceived in th
The Mode of D
the authority of
Of those who h
there is not (am
we suspend jud
Sextus imagine
of the fact that
standard, since
ongoing fight w
(For a different
It is the three re
the dogmatist p
—an infinite re
grounds, Q, an
infinite regress
gives grounds, 
are two possibi
those two cases
own ground. T
axioms, perhap
possibilities fo
argument, or o
The usual inter
Sextus’ condem
Modes to date,
(1990a: 43). To
says Barnes (ib
establish anyth
argument for th
tomorrow on th
hardly makes y
If the only cons
must suspend j
Barnes points o
that argument
argument is all
more on this ph
Thus Barnes th
regressive argu
analysis to the
‘bad argument
reciprocal argu
we should neith
If the only thin
not establish or
Barnes’ interpr
unlikely that Se
the type of dog
Dogmatist give
strictures that B
assembles argu
arguments exac
proposition tha
Condemning a
another way, S
an opposing ar
—for this distin
and says that re
say that infinite
begin to establi
regressive argu
There are sever
of the Five Mo
and weren’t ori
types of argum
these three type
forms: Sextus’
a way of showi
(Striker 2004: 1
Another option
modes function
opposing argum
latter approach
Dogmatists’ us
conclusions (P
Sextus himself
to these modes
and doesn’t tak
forms of hypot
3.5.3 The Tw
The Two Mode
system compou
Barnes finds th
importance to t
Modes only in
philosophical p
3.5.4 The Eig
For these, see H
They are mode
explanations—
These modes s
attempt to disc
according to th
enabling them
The idea here i
an equally goo
(PH I 185), and

3.6 The S
As a Skeptic, w
counterargume

1. ‘No more’
which of th
256–77);
2. ‘Perhaps’, ‘
3. ‘I suspend j
should find
4. ‘I determin
any of the t
5. ‘Everything
considered
conflicts w
6. ‘Everything
because of
7. ‘I have no a
8. ‘Opposed t
purports to
establish so
Sextus makes c
192–3; see Sto
when the Skep
about them, wh
Skeptic, since i
and not just tha
sense of ‘appea
Frede is right a
(I 200). If this
on either side,
judgment, rathe
the possibility
tranquillity (se

3.7 Differ
Sextus differen
Cyrenaics (215
Striker 1981, 2
particularly pu
align Pyrrhonia
Empirical scho
of theory-laden
more to the fou
Allen suggests
repudiation of
seem:
the medical per
medical school

4. PH II
PH I is like a m
contrast, PH II
accompanied b
The contents o
relevant passag
passages in M 
passages in M 
here is the list o

 PH II 1–12
 PH II 13: W
 PH II 14–1
 PH II 18–2
 PH II 22–4
 PH II 48–6
 PH II 70–7
 PH II 80–8
 PH II 85–9
 PH II 97–1
 PH II 104–
 PH II 134–
 PH II 144–
 PH II 193–
 PH II 204:
 PH II 205–
 PH II 213:
 PH II 214:
 PH II 215–
 PH II 219–
 PH II 228:
 PH II 229–
 PH III 1: T
 PH III 2–12
 PH III 13–1
 PH III 17–2
 PH III 30–3
 PH III 38–5
 PH III 56–6
 PH III 63: M
 PH III 64–8
 PH III 82–4
 PH III 85–9
 PH III 97: T
 PH III 98–1
 PH III 102–
 PH III 109–
 PH III 115–
 PH III 119–
 PH III 136–
 PH III 151–
 PH III 168:
 PH III 169–
 PH III 179–
 PH III 239–
 PH III 250–
 PH III 252:
 PH III 253–
 PH III 259–
 PH III 265–
 PH III 273–
 PH III 280–
Notice the divi
(PH II), Physic

4.1 The c
The most impo
of truth (see es
crucial role in t
The notion of a
The problem o
find in order to
The Epicurean
Epicurus’ crite
(Striker 1990b:
these are the tr
work out the tr
impressions, so
speaking, they
used to work o
were christened
‘prodelic’ deriv
conception of t
whereas the ‘pr
Brunschwig sh
that this confla
Some of the fla
[74] Nor can w
of the senses ar
are like the sen
clear to it not th
someone who d
so the intellect,
of the senses ar
Roughly speak
deliverance of
are faithful to t
discern which o
when it comes
misunderstandi
At the end of S
there are criteri
You must reali
the Dogmatists
arguments in o
contrary side, b
those produced
How does Sext
Skeptic has any
criterion as a m
there are two m
to the second o
of dogma is rou
to the debate h
The question is
first kind of do
way. Clearly, a
what attitude d
hard’, ‘The wa
If we are conce
us; yet of them
Both Barnes an
the dogmata in
needs a criterio
often at some l
discussion. (Bu
Barnes puts it a
we cannot affir
water affects u
But the thesis t
scientific tenet
Ordinary belief
possession of o
(ibid) (Cf. Burn
Barnes’ argum
summarised he
supposed to be
for conferring k
whether there i
of perception a
to bring it abou
criterion of trut
truth, there is n
for forming im
the job. Barnes
The Pyrrhonian
judge that p (19
In short, Barne
that for the Pyr

4.2 Negat
Another pressi
(‘Against the E
counterargume
gives. This len
frequently emp
1973: 808), or
191–2; X 168 (
sight, to bring i
that one should
surprise that ‘M
expect by way
the skeptic sho

 the freedom
his thinking
 ‘when reaso
disturbance
 ‘It will only
avoidance o
emphasis).
The way to avo
must believe th
his sleeve that
disturbance and

5. M I–V
 The six books
The most impo
dogmatism, i.e
existence of gr
traces of a prev
over-arching p
take these appa
(Blank 1998: l,

M I 1–40 is a highly general introduction to all

six works, and then Against the
Grammarians starts properly at I 41. For this
work, see Blank 1998. Against the
Grammarians is much the longest of the six
books, standing at 320 sections. There is
discussion of the question ‘What is Grammar?’
(57–89), an attack on the ‘expert’ part of
grammar, i.e., the part concerned with letters,
parts of speech, etc. (99–247), and an attack on
the part of grammar which concerns poets and
prose-writers (270–320), i.e., the part which
deals with the interpretation of poetry, and
which Sextus argues is useless because it
makes no contribution to human flourishing.

Against the Rhetoricians is shorter, at only 113

sections. It considers various definitions of
what rhetoric is, what benefit rhetoric is to
individuals or to cities, what the goal of
rhetoric is, and what the parts of rhetoric are,
all with a view to attacking its status as an art.

Against the Geometers stands at 116 sections.

It takes geometers to task for their employment
of hypotheses in establishing theorems, and
then attacks the hypotheses themselves, such as
the definitions of body, point, line (particularly
the definition of the line as ‘length without
breadth’), and angle. For this work, see Dye
and Vitrac 2009.

Against the Arithmeticians has a mere 34

sections. This work outlines the extraordinary
views of the Pythagoreans concerning the
power of numbers, and then seeks to
undermine them by arguing that Platonic
notion of a monad or unit (‘the One’) is
‘inconceivable’ (17), adding as an aside that
the notion of a dyad doesn’t fare much better
(21–22), and by attacking the principles of
addition and subtraction (23–33). ‘But if
number is conceived as subsisting through
addition, as I said, and subtraction, and we
have shown that neither of these exists, one
must declare that number is nothing’ (34). The
work thus has a clear structure: presentation of
arguments in favour of the existence of
numbers (from the Pythagoreans), followed by
presentation of arguments against the existence
of numbers.

Against the Astrologers, in 106 sections. Sextus

attacks not astronomy (1), which is one thing
the term ‘astrology’ referred to in classical
times, but ‘the casting of nativities’ (Bury’s
translation of the term γενεθλιαλογία in section
2) and horoscopes. The first half of the work
involves Sextus laying out the basics of the
Chaldean theory of prognostication, and the
second half contains his counterarguments,
including fascinating observations about the
difficulty of establishing when someone is
conceived, the difficulty of establishing when
they are born (‘is it when the child begins to
emerge into the cold air, or when it has
emerged a little, or when it is deposited on the
ground?’, M V 65), and the difficulty of using
accurate time-keeping devices to detect which
astronomical phenomena are occurring at what
time.

Against the Musicians is in 68 sections. For

this work, see Greaves 1986; Bett 2013. Sextus
attacks the standing of music as a science, by
questioning whether it is useful for happiness
(7–37) and by questioning whether it is a
science at all (38–68), just as he did in the case
of grammar (a comparison Sextus himself
makes at section 4). In the first part, Sextus
assembles arguments in favour of music being
useful for happiness (7–18) and arguments
against (19–37); the second part consists
wholly of the arguments against the existence
of music as a suitable subject for theoretical
discourse, with Sextus leaving unstated the
arguments in favour.

6. Refere
For the fascina

Bibliogr
Primary T
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 –––, 2018
 Blank, D.,
 Bury, R.G
 Greaves, D
 Mates, B.,

Secondar
 Allen, J., 2
 Annas, J.
 Barnes, J.,
58–91 (pa
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21(2): 53–
 –––, 1990
 –––, 1990
204–224.
 –––, 2000
 –––, 2007
322–34.
 Barney, R
 Bett, R. (e
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 Brennan, T
 Brochard,
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‘Eclecticis
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Philosoph
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Philosoph
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 Frede, M.,
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Skinner, P
Frede 199
 –––, 1987
 Hankinson
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 House, D.
 Ierodiakon
 Ioppolo, A
 Janacek, K
Diogenes
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Cambridg
 Palmer, J.
 Perin, C.,
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 Sandbach,
 Schofield,
Philosoph
 Schwab, W
 Stough, C
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 Strawson,
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English in
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in Striker
 –––, 1981
(page refe
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Press, 143
 –––, 1993
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 –––, 2001
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University
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 Vogt, K. M
 –––, 2010
 ––– (ed.),
 Woodruff

Academ

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