North American Philosophical Publications

HUME ON BELIEVING THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE

Author(s): Annemarie Butler
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (JULY 2010), pp. 237-254
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications
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History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 27, Number 3, July 2010

HUME ON BELIEVING THE VULGARFICTION

OF CONTINUEDEXISTENCE

Annemarie Butler

Treatise 1.4.2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," David

In Hume proposes to examine the causes of our ordinary (vulgar) belief
in the existence of body. He sets aside the question of whether body
exists because "[t]hat is a point, which we must take for granted in all
our reasonings" (T 1.4.2.1, SBN 187).1 Hume explains that the vulgar
belief in the existence of body involves a "fiction" of continued existence.2
Interpreters disagree about how to interpret this "fiction" and whether it
violates Hume's copy principle. Various interpretations include appealing
to Hume's account of general ideas,3 inadequate ideas,4 or something
more Kantian.5

In this paper, I reject these interpretations because they fail to ac

commodate animal belief in body.Hume tells us that belief in body is
presupposed "in all our reasonings"?presumably this includes causal
reasoning aboutbodies. Earlier in Treatise 1.3.16, "Of the reason of
animals," Hume claims that one advantage of his account of belief and
causal inference is that it applies equally well to animals. Animals have
impressions and ideas, including memories; experience leads them to
associate certain ideas together; and they form beliefs from the effects
of custom on their imaginations (T 1.3.16.6-8, SBN 177-78). Hume
criticizes competing accounts in "that they suppose such a subtility
and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere
animals, but even of children and the common people in our own spe
cies" (T 1.3.16.3, SBN 177). Thus, ifhuman causal inference about bodies
presupposes belief in body, so does animal causal inference. Therefore,
Hume's psychological account of belief in body must draw on resources
accessible to animals as well
as humans.6 This places constraints on a
suitable interpretation of his account of the belief in body and a fortiori
the "fiction" of continued existence. Specifically, the account cannot de
pend on language,7 abstraction,8 or complicated reflective reasoning.9
In this paper, I offer such an interpretation.

237

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 238 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

There are other desiderata for an adequate account of the fiction of

continued existence. The continuant should be a particular object, not
just any token ofa general kind.When I believe thatmy table continues
to exist, I believe that this particular table continues to exist, not just
some table a lot like my own. Second, the account of the fiction should
make clear what is fictional about
it.Third, the idea should be consistent
with Hume's copy principle (that all simple ideas are ultimately caused
by and resemble antecedently experienced impressions). If it is incon
sistent with the copy principle, philosophical and textual explanations
are in order. How can Hume countenance such an exception? And where
does he indicate in the text that this "idea" violates the copyprinciple?
Finally, the fiction should be consistent with Hume's account of belief,
where belief is nothing more than "a lively idea related to or associated
with a present impression" (T 1.3.7.5, SBN 96).
In the first section, I examine Hume's discussion of how the fiction
of continued existence arises from the resemblances we experience in
constant but interrupted perceptions. In the second section, I argue that
Hume's fiction of continued existence does not violate the copy principle.
The charge stems from a misconception of the idea of continued exis
tence. In the third section, I show how we come to believe the fiction of
continued existence, and I argue that this belief does not require Hume
to abandon or modify his account of belief.

In Treatise1.4.2, Hume argues that the belief in body does not arise direct
ly from the data of the senses or reasoning about this data (T 1.4.2.3-14,
SBN 188-93). Therefore, he concludes, it depends on the operation of the
imagination. He observes two features of our sensory impressions that
give rise to the belief in body: constancy and coherence of our impres
sions. In this paper, I focus on the vulgar belief in body that arises from
constancy. Hume divides his discussion into four parts: the idea of identity,
the influence of resemblance, the generation of the fiction of continued
existence, and how this fiction becomes a belief. In what follows, I briefly
summarize the first two parts and concentrate on the third part. In the
third section of this paper, I turn to the fourth part.

Hume begins by describing the general idea of identity, so a brief

discussion of his account of general ideas is appropriate. According to
Hume, a general idea is not some idea in addition to particular ideas.
Instead, a particular idea acquires general signification (in addition to
its particular signification) when it is annexed to a term that indiffer
ently refers to other particular ideas that resemble the first idea in the
appropriate ways. For example, the general idea of dog would be the

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 239

idea of some particular dog, such as Lassie, annexed to the term dog,
which also refers to otherparticular dogs, includingFido, Toto, Rin Tin
Tin, and Spot. If I hastily generalize that all dogs are collies because
the particular idea I attend to is ofLassie, I could recall the idea ofToto
as a counterexample. Thinking about generalities thus requires the use
of general ideas, which requires the use of language. However, thinking
about related particulars does not require the use of general ideas, just
particular ideas that are associated together by some relation.

Although Hume introduces the general idea of identity, we should

not conclude that thinking of some particular thing as one and the same
thing over time requires general ideas. Instead, Hume aims to describe
in general the complex structure that any idea of a particular identi
cal objectwill exhibit.The idea of identityinvolves invariableness and
uninterruptedness (T 1.4.2.30, SBN 201). The complex idea of identity
is composed ofa single steadfast (unchanging) object that is conjoined
with a succession of objects. Thisconjunction of the succession gives rise
to the appearance of the steadfast object's having duration.10 This com
plex idea purports to represent a "medium betwixt unity and number,"
by representing each, depending on the point of emphasis (T 1.4.2.29,
SBN 201). Viewed from one perspective, it represents a unity. Specifi

cally, when we focus on the single steadfast object, we have the idea of
one and the same object, which is conjoined with different moments of
time. But ifwe focus on the different points in time at which the same
object exists, we arrive at the idea of number. The different moments of
time are numerically different, and to consider the object at each of those
moments in the same thought, Hume contends, we have tomultiply the
object "in order to be conceiv'd at once, as existent in these two different

points of time" (ibid.).

In the second part, Hume aims to explain how resemblance con
tributes to our identifying invariable but interrupted (and therefore
numerically distinct) impressions. Suppose that I stare at the table in
my office, blink, and then open my eyes to see a table again. The table

impressions that precede and follow the blink are qualitatively alike.
Because of their resemblance, the ideas copied from these impressions
become by my mind.
associated (This association is natural and does
not require the mediation of words.) Furthermore, the feeling to the
mind in perceiving the one is just like that in perceiving the other.
When I consider the ideas
successively, there is no change in the feeling
to mind. The mind easily moves from one idea to the next.11 But this
"smooth and uninterrupted progress of the imagination" is just like the
feeling of the mind when it considers a single invariable, uninterrupted
object (T 1.4.2.34, SBN 204).12 Hume introduces a general principle:
"whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar

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240 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

ones, are very apt to be confounded" (T 1.4.2.32, SBN 203). Thus, the

similarity in the feelings of (1) the invariable but interrupted series

and (2) the single, invariable, and uninterrupted objectmakes itvery
easy for the mind to confuse the one for the other.13 These resemblances
cause my imagination to identify the different table perceptions as the
same table existing at two different times (T 1.4.2.34-35 and n39, SBN
203-4 and 204-5nl).

Notice that this idea is an instance of one view of the idea of identity.
In the same thought, I think of two impressions, the preblink impression
and the postblink impression. I regard them as numerically the same,
but they occurred at different moments. Thus, they exemplify the idea
of identity with an emphasis on number.

While the imagination induces us to treat these interrupted, numeri

cally distinct impressions as numerically identical, the senses present
them as numerically distinct and interrupted. Hume observes, "The
perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a propension to
unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continu'd existence"
(T 1.4.2.36, SBN 205). The interpretative problem that this raises is
how to understand this "contradiction" and the evasion by the fiction of
continued existence.

What exactly is the "contradiction"? Does Hume think that we ordi

narily notice this "contradiction" and consciously evade it?14'15To begin,
the two opposed elements in the contradiction are the respective effects
of the senses and the imagination with regard to the same series of in
variable but interrupted impressions. The senses present the series as
interrupted. Since the series is interrupted, the pre- and postinterrup
tion impressions occur at different times and therefore are numerically
distinct. In contrast, the imagination latches onto the invariability and
ignores the interruption. The resemblance inclines the imagination to
regard the pre- and postinterruption impressions as numerically identi
cal. These two views of the same impressions cannot both be sustained
at the same time because they are contradictory: the same impressions
cannot be both identical and diverse. This opposition creates psycho
logical discomfort. To evade the contradiction, the mind has to alter the
perceptions somehow.

This contradiction usually escapes our notice because the imagination

is quick to act. However, with careful introspection, one can suspend the
imaginative invention and sustain the contradiction. Hume does this
and reports his experience. But we should not conclude from Hume's
description that the vulgar are aware of this "contradiction." The vulgar
ordinarily pass through this contradiction on theway to the belief in
the continued existence ofwhat they perceive.

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 241

Howsoever long the contradiction lasts, it produces a psychological

feeling of uneasiness from which the mind "seek[s] relief" (T 1.4.2.37,

SBN 206). The mind has to side eitherwith the senses or the imagina
tion.But which is to be preferred?The mind decides on the basis of
psychological feeling. The imagination's effect (identity) provides the
mind with "a sensible pleasure" because the passage of the mind along
the supposedly identical impressions of furniture is smooth and easy;
the senses' effect (invariable but interrupted impressions) makes the
mind uneasy, by requiring it tonotice the interruption(ibid.).The mind
prefers that which is psychologically most pleasurable, so the imagina
tion's effect is to be pursued. But we cannot rest here because, without
any modification to the ideas, we would land in the same contradiction
that we seek to escape.

To remove the tension, there must be some change in the parts of the
complex idea. Thus enters the fiction of continued existence. Instead of
distinguishing the pre- and postblink furniture, the imagination sup
poses the present impression of the furniture is a steadfast object.16
The imagination substitutes the single impression of furniture for the
succession of numerically different impressions.17 This eliminates the
interruption because the single impression is whole. The imagination
supposes that this impression endures, by conjoining this single impres
sion with the succession of previously experienced impressions, including
the impressions involved in the blink. This complex idea, then, is of the
selfsame furniture existing over time; it is a particular instance of the
idea of identity.This new complex idea differsfrom the complex idea
that induces "perplexity" because, in this case, one single impression
represents the furniture. This impression acquires duration by the
supposition that it "participates in" the succession of impressions that
the imagination conjoins with it.18Ordinarily, we fail to realize that our
idea is complex and instead suppose that the duration belongs to the
unchanging impression. Thus, the idea is fictional because it applies to
a single unchanging impression the idea of duration, which, properly
speaking, applies only to successions.19

There is a difference between the second and third parts with regard
to the idea of identity. The "contradiction" in the second part arises pre
cisely because the imagination's complex idea fits only one of the views
of the idea of identity,specifically the idea with emphasis on number. I
have different impressions of the table that occurred at different times
and are fixed to those times. I can easily think of the different moments
of the table's existence because I have different impressions for the dif
ferent moments. But this diversity of table impressions frustrates the
realization of the unitary view of identity, where there is one object that
exists over time. In the third part, with the fiction of continued existence,

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242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

theunitary view of identityis accommodated. The mind supposes that a

single object is conjoinedwith a duration.The duration is supplied by the
successive perceptions that I experience, including the table impressions
and my blinking. But rather than multiplying the table perceptions, the
imagination takes one single impression of sense or memory and treats
it as steadfast. This shift to emphasizing unity transforms the particular
idea of the identical table and thereby "remove [s]" the interruption (T
1.4.2.24, SBN 199) and a fortiori resolves the contradiction with the
data of the senses.

In the introduction to this paper, I claimed that a proper interpre

tation of the fiction of continued existence cannot appeal to language,
abstraction, or careful reflection. On my account, the contradiction
that the mind experiences is not usually noticed by perceivers. Instead,
the imagination unwittingly takes over to resolve the psychological
discomfort of opposed psychological propensities. Since perceivers need
not even notice the contradiction, the imagination's resolution does not
fundamentally depend on reflection, language, or abstraction. (This is
not to deny thatwe could not build on this foundationwith linguistic
norms for identifyingobjects; the point is that the foundation is non
linguistic.)

Furthermore, my account of the fiction of continued existence satisfies

other desiderata for an interpretation. On my account, the psychologi
cal propensities supply an idea of numerically the same table, not just
some table. This is because the very table I perceive is regarded as the
steadfast object. Furthermore, the reason the complex idea is fictional is
that this present impression is supposed to have existed at times when
itwas not experienced.

II

Some commentators have argued that the fiction of continued exis

tence is a violation ofHume's copy principle.20 Since we cannot observe
something's being unobserved, the idea of continued existence cannot
be derived fromexperience (directlyor by combining other ideas that
are derived directly from experience). In this section, first I explain
the charge. Then I argue that it rests on an improper understanding of
the idea of continued existence. The complex idea that Hume offers is
ultimately derived from impressions; therefore, the idea of continued
existence that Hume describes does not violate the copy principle.

Against Hume, Oliver Johnson argues that Hume's fiction of con

tinued existence has "no legitimate place in his philosophy" because it
violates the copy principle.21 If "continued existence" means "existing
unperceived," then it is true that we can have no idea of this because

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 243

we can have no impression of anything existing unperceived from which

the idea could be copied. Indeed, Hume acknowledges this in presenting
his case that the senses are not the source of the belief in continued
existence:

To begin with the senses, 'tis evident these faculties are incapable
of giving rise to the notion of the continued existence of their objects,
after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction
in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even
after they have ceas'd all manner of operation. (T 1.4.2.3, SBN 188;
cf.T 1.4.2.11, SBN 191)

Since we never can have a sense impression of something we do not

sense, we cannot have a sense impression of something existing un
perceived.

Timothy Costelloe makes this point even more forcefully, by claiming

that the fiction of continued existence is neither clear nor distinct, by
which he means that it violates the laws of logic.22 In making a similar
point, Robert Sokolowski claims that Hume thinks that "it is a contradic
tion to 'suppose a perception to exist without being present to the mind.'"23
But these charges lack philosophical and textual support. It is true that
Hume regards thevulgar belief in the continuedand distinct existence of
perceptions to be "contrary to the plainest experience" (T 1.4.2.44, SBN
210). He argues, by reflecting on perceptual relativity, that as a matter
of fact our perceptions do not have independent or continued existence
(T 1.4.2.45, SBN 210-11). But this is not to say that the notion of con
tinued existence is self-contradictory. Indeed, Hume considers this very
objection. In the passage that Sokolowski cites, Hume writes, "[I]t may
be doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contradiction,
and suppose a perception to exist without being present to the mind"
(T 1.4.2.37, SBN 206). Notice Hume's presentation: itmay be doubted.
This does not signal that his considered view is that such separation is a
"palpable contradiction." The passage occurs in the context where Hume
addresses the question of "How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing
a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated?"
(T 1.4.2.38, SBN 207). He replies:

As to the first question; we may observe, that what we call a mind,

is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united
together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsly, to be endow'd
with a perfect simplicity and identity. Now as every perception is
distinguishable from another, and may be consider'd as separately
existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating
any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking offall its
relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute
a thinking being. (T 1.4.2.39, SBN 207)

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244 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

In the next paragraph, Hume plainly states, "The supposition of the

continu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contra
diction" (T 1.4.2.40, SBN 208). The supposition that a perceptionmay
exist apart from a mind is contradictory only if one assumes a philo
sophical view of the mind that renders such separation contradictory.
As Hume's argument here makes clear, he does not think that it is an a
priori truth that perceptions must be perceived in order to exist; rather,
he thinks that it is a question of fact whether perceptions continue to
exist apart from minds that perceive them. And so the argument that
he offers to show the falsity of the vulgar belief is not a conceptual argu
ment about
the relationship between minds and ideas, but an argument
drawn from reflection on perceptual relativity.24 In sum, Hume thinks
the vulgar belief is false and erroneous, but not self-contradictory.25

Hume's presentation of the notion of continued existence and the

account that I have examined above should make us reconsider these
charges. Perhaps the notion of continued existence does not involve
thinking of an object as unperceived, but rather it involves thinking of
its existing when I happen not to have perceived it. Indeed, ifwe look
at Hume's descriptions of the notion, we find him emphasizing time:

[W]e attribute a continu'd existence to objects, even when they are

not present to the senses. . .. [I]f the objects of our senses continue
to exist, even when they are not perceiv'd, their existence is of course
independent of and distinct from the perception; and vice versa, if
their existence be independent of the perception and distinct from it,
they must continue to exist, even tho' they be not perceiv'd. (T 1.4.2.2,
SBN 188 [my emphasis];cf.T 1.4.2.3,20,46,48,50,56, SBN 188,197,
211,213,214,217)
This quotation and others like itmake clear thatHume thinks of the
notion of continued existence as
involving the thought of something's
existing when I happen not to perceive it. The component parts of the
notion of continued existence are existence, times when I perceive it,
and times when I happen not to perceive it. But I have these ideas. The
idea of something existing just is the idea of it (T 1.2.6.4, SBN 66). To
this idea, I append a sequence of perceptions to account for the duration
over which I conceive the thing's the times when I
existing?including
perceived it and the times when I did not perceive it.

This accords with Hume's earlier comments in Treatise 1.2.6, "Of

the idea of existence, and of external existence." Hume argues that "'tis
impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing
specifically different from ideas and impressions" (T 1.2.6.8, SBN 68). We
have no completely original ideas without first having a corresponding
impression or impressions. Once these ideas are acquired, the imagina

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 245

tion is free to separate simple ideas from complex ideas and combine
togetherdifferentsimple ideas to formthe complex idea of something
never before experienced. The imagination has "unlimited power of
mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the
varieties of fiction and vision" (EHU 5.10, SBN 47). But the component
simple ideas are all copied from impressions. Hume adds:

Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us

chace our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the
universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can
conceive of any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have
appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagina
tion, nor have we any idea but what is there produc'd.
The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects,
when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a
relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related
objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically
different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions
and durations. But of this more fully hereafter. (T 1.2.6.8-9, SBN
67-68)

The components of a relative idea would still involve ideas derived from
antecedently experienced impressions. So this is not to deny the copy
principle. But equally important for our purposes is that Hume claims
that "generally speaking" we do not employ relative ideas to think about
external objects; instead, we think of objects in terms of perceptions
and modify the "relations, connexions, and durations" of those percep
tions. So in thinking about my identical table that I presently perceive,
Imodify the duration of the present impression and suppose it to exist
even when I did not perceive it. On this account, the "fiction" of contin
ued existence is completely a combination of ideas that are copied from
previous experience.26

Ill
In the fourth part of his discussion, Hume explains how we come to be
lieve the fiction of continued existence. Given that he introduces a fiction,
one might wonder how we come to believe that the fiction is real. Again,
we are not accounting for our belief in general that bodies exist, but our
particular beliefs that particular bodies exist. So Hume aims to explain
how we come to believe in the continued existence of some particular
thing. My conclusion from the preceding section?that Hume's fiction
of continued existence does not violate the copy principle?is especially
important because, without an idea of something's continuing to exist, we
could not believe that something continues to exist?precisely because

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246 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

belief involves an enlivenedidea.27 In this section, I first summarize

Hume's accountof belief, illustrating it using causal inference. I then
explain how belief in continued existence conforms to the general ac
count of belief, even though Hume explicitly claims that the belief does
not arise from relation. I then consider a possible objection to Hume's
account of belief in continued existence, namely, that it violates his claim
that all belief in matters of fact not present to the senses or memory
depends on causal inference.

According toHume, belief is "a lively idea related to or associated with

a present impression" (T 1.3.7.5, SBN 96). In the case of causal inference,
for example, I have a present impression (for example, an impression of
smoke) that I have in the past observed tobe conjoined constantlywith
something else (for example, fire). From the present impression, I form
the idea of the related object because the customary association brings it
tomind. This relation causes a "smooth passage from the impression to
the idea, and even gives a propensity to that passage" (T 1.4.2.41, SBN
208). As we have seen before, when there is a smooth transition from
one perception to another, the mind "scarce perceives the change" (ibid.).
Thus, the vivacity from the impression "is convey'd to the related idea,
without any great diminution in the passage, by reason of the smooth
transition and the propensity of the imagination" (ibid.). So the relation
causes the propensity to call to mind the other idea, and the smooth
passage of the propensity causes the new idea to be enlivened.

The belief in the same thing's continued existence is similar to causal

inference in certain respects. Both beliefs fundamentally involve the
imagination's propensity to form an idea, and the idea becomes enliv
ened by the smooth transition to the idea. In each case, the imaginative
propensity enables the smooth transition. However, there is a difference.
In causal inference, the cause of the propensity is the relation (namely,
causation) between the impression and the related idea. In belief in
continued existence, the cause of the propensity is the resemblance not
only between the ideas but the resemblance in the feelings of the mind in
(1) surveying related objects and (2) perceiving one and the same object.
So the propensity arises not simply because of the relation between the
ideas. Howsoever the propensity arises, Hume observes, its effect is the
same: vivacity is conveyed to the resulting idea. With regard to belief in
continued existence, Hume writes:

Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of percep

tions perfectly resembling each other, that return at different distances
of time, and after considerable interruptions. This resemblance gives
us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same;
and also a propension to connect them by a continu'd existence, in
order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction, in which

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 247

the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems necessarily

to involve us. Here then we have a propensity to feign the continu'd
existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity arises from
some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that
fiction; or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd existence of
body. (T 1.4.2.42, SBN 208-9)
The resemblances that the mind experiences with invariable but
interruptedperceptions give rise to two propensities. The first is the
propensity to regard resembling perceptions as numerically the same.
The effect of this propensity is contradictory to the effect of sensation,
which presents the interruptions as well as the resembling perceptions.
The ease that attends the propensity and the undeniable invariability
of the perceptions pushes the imagination to a second propensity: to
regard the present impression as a single steadfast perception that
coexistswith a duration. The effectof this propensity is the idea of the
continued existence of the thing.The very process by which the idea
is formed enlivens the idea, whereby it becomes belief. Each of the
impressions?including the present
impression and the impressions of
memory?contributes to enlivening the belief. The vivacity of the pres
ent impression alone would not suffice because it captures only part of
the complex idea of continued existence. The present impression fails to
capture the other times at which the object is supposed tohave existed;
and duration is just as essential to the idea of continued existence as the
supposed continuant. Thus, the belief in continued existence differs in
an important respect from belief arising from causal inference; in belief
in continued existence, the vivacity from several impressions combine
together to enliven the resulting idea.28

Hume's contrast between belief arising from relation and belief aris
ing from the imaginative propensities involved in continued existence
may give rise to a question. Earlier in the Treatise, he had claimed that
all beliefs in matters of fact not present to the senses or memory arise
from cause and effect. Comparing the relation of causation to those of
resemblance and contiguity, he argues that only causation can "perswade
us of any real existence" (T 1.3.9.6, SBN 109). So does belief in continued
existence present an exception to this generalization?

Not exactly. When Hume says that only causation can "perswade us
of any real existence," he is discussing inferences from one impression
to another. The belief in continued existence is not an inference. In the
belief in continued existence, the past impressions are not regarded as
distinct entities from the continuant; rather they are supposed to be
previously observed stages of one and the same object. Furthermore, it
is not simply the resemblance between the previously observed impres
sions and the presently observed impression that generates the idea

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 248 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

of continued existence. Importantly, the feeling of the mind in perceiv

ing the invariable series seems just like perceiving one and the same
steadfast object. Thus, the imagination mistakes the succession for a
numerically identical object.
There remains one final objection to consider. In developing his ac
count of belief, Hume contrasts those ideas we believe with fictions of the
fancy. (See T 1.3.7.7, SBN 628-29; EHU 5.11-12, SBN 48-50.) Since the
idea of continued existence is a fiction?produced by the imagination?
why does it count as a belief, and not merely a fiction of the fancy? One
might point to a passage such as the following:

The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and
mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive [EHU
adds: fictitious] objects with all the circumstances of place and time.
It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours,
just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible, that that
faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, 'tis evident, that
belief consists not in the [EHU adds: peculiar] nature and order of
our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling
to the mind. (T 1.3.7.7, SBN 629, EHU 5.12, SBN 49)

The imagination may combine together ideas, including ideas of time

and place. Isn't this exactly what the imagination does in the fiction
of continued existence? So why does the fiction of continued existence
count as belief, whereas some other combination of an idea with a dura
tion does not?

The answer lies in the crucial

phrase "of itself": "it is impossible,
that of imagination
that faculty can ever, of itself, reach belief." The
mere composition of the ideas is not what generates belief in continued
existence. If I were whimsically to conjoin an idea?for example, ofmy
table?and a time?for example, the time that David Hume was writing
the Treatise?I would not thereby come to believe that my table existed in
the eighteenth century. The difference between this fictitious conception
and the conception of the continued existence ofmy table underscores
the significant role played by the impressions of memory. In the case
of belief in continued existence, my memories of previous impressions
ofmy table enliven the duration component of the complex idea of the
table's continued existence. In contrast, in the whimsical conception,
there are no memories (or any other appropriate impressions) that
would lead me to the enlivened idea of the table's existing at such a
time. So the imagination does not capriciously cobble together the ideas
of the fiction of continued existence; the combination is guided by the
impressions of the memory, whose vivacity is conveyed to the resulting
complex idea.29

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 249

IV

I began this paper with the observation that many interpretations of

the fiction of continued existence rely on mental processes that exceed
the capacity of infants and animals. Such accounts stand at odds with
Hume's claims that belief in the existence of body is presupposed in all
our reasonings and that animals and young children engage in causal
inference. In this paper, I have offered an interpretation of belief in the
fiction of continued existence that does not exceed the capacities of ani
mals.Like humans, other animals haveimpressions and ideas, including
memories. Through repeated observation, certain ideas become associ
ated together in the animal
imagination. This customary association
triggers causal inference and belief. On Hume's account, causal inference
and belief do not require reflection or awareness.

Belief in continued existence arises in a comparable manner, drawing

on similar psychological resources. The senses provide us with impres
sions and ideas, including memories. The imagination seizes on the
resemblances between perceptions and between feelings of the mind to
invent the fiction of the continued existence of particular objects. These
imaginative propensities operate even without our awareness or reflec
tion.Were we to reflect more carefully on the effects of these unreflective
processes?as philosophers do when thinking carefully about perceptual
relativity?we would find that the vulgar fiction of the continued exis
tence ofwhat we perceive is false (T 1.4.2.44, SBN 210).

Iowa State University

NOTES

My interpretation ofHume's account of the fiction of continued existence draws

significantly from the work ofDonald Baxter and Stefanie Rocknak, inwhich
I find much to agree. See Donald L. M. Baxter, Hume's Difficulty: Time and
Identity in theTreatise (London: Routledge, 2008); Donald L. M. Baxter, "Iden
tity,Continued Existence, and the External World," in The Blackwell Guide
toHume's Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (London: Blackwell, 2006), 114-32; and
Stefanie Rocknak, "The Vulgar Conception of Objects in 'Of Skepticism with
Regard to the Senses,'" Hume Studies 33, no. 1 (2007): 67-90. However, as I
indicate below, I find that Rocknak's interpretation does not fitHume's texts
perfectly, and Baxter's account omits certain important details.
Research for this project was made possible by the generous support of
a 2009 fellowship from Iowa State University's Center for Excellence in the

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250 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Arts and Humanities. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 2009
meeting of the Iowa Philosophical Society at The University of Iowa. Thanks
to the audience for their questions and suggestions. The editor of this journal,
Jeffrey Tlumak, also provided me with helpful recommendations to improve
this paper. Above all, I am deeply grateful to Travis Butler for careful discus
sion and encouragement.

1. References to Hume's works are given in parentheses in the text: "T"

followed by four numbers separated by periods indicate book number, part
number, section number, and universal paragraph number in the firstvolume
ofA Treatise ofHuman Nature, vols. 1-2, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J.
Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Following this, "SBN" refers to
A Treatise ofHuman Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., rev. PH. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
"EHU" followed by two numbers separated by a period indicate section
number and universal paragraph number inAn Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Following this, "SBN" refers to Enquiries concerning Human Understanding
and concerning thePrinciples ofMorals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed., rev. P.H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
2. By saying that something has "continued existence," Hume means that it
continues to exist when I do not perceive it. (See T 1.4.2.2, SBN 188.) Continued
existence and distinct existence (which includes independence of operation and
external situation) are the two essential components of external existence (ibid.).
Psychologically, belief in continued existence comes first and produces belief in
distinct existence (ibid., cf.T 1.4.2.23, 44, SBN 199, 210).

3. See Michael Costa, "Hume on the Very Idea ofRelation," Hume Studies
24, no. 1 (1998): 71-94, esp. 83-85; and "Hume and Belief in the Existence of an
External World," Philosophical Studies 32 (1988-90): 99-112, esp. 102ff.One
problem with doing so is that using a general idea does not provide us with the
thought of a particular. For example, when I look at my table, blink, and look
again, the continued existence that I suppose is of this particular table, not
just some table a lot like this one. Eric Steinberg emphasizes the need for the
idea of a particular in his argument against competing accounts of the belief
in continued existence arising from coherence ("Hume on Continued Existence
and the Identity of Changing Things," Hume Studies 7, no. 2 [1981]: 105-20).
4. See Martha Brandt Bolton, "Hume's Way of Ideas: Thinking of Things
without Ideas that Represent Them," presentation at the 36th Annual Hume
Conference, August 4,2009, Halifax, Nova Scotia. An example of an inadequate
idea is the idea of very large numbers, such as 1,000. Our idea need not have
exactly 1,000 parts, and so it inadequately represents 1,000. With the aid of
numerals and decimals, we are able to distinguish 999 from 1,000. See T 1.1.7.12
(SBN 22-23).
5. See Timothy M. Costelloe, "Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination,"
The Journal ofScottish Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2007): 31-45, esp. 37-38 and 42-43;

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 251

and JanWilbanks, Hume's Theory of Imagination (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1968), 80ff.
6. Of course, I allow (as does Hume) that humans may sometimes engage in
more sophisticated causal reasoning than animals do. (In this connection, see
the especially important footnote inEnquiry 9; EHU 107nl.) And language may
contribute to greater sophistication by introducing norms concerning correct
and incorrect identifications of objects (cf.David Owen and Donald Ainslie, "How
to Read Treatise 1.4.2," presentation at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver,
BC, October 17,2008). But Hume's question is how any of this gets started; the
basic explanandum is belief in the existence of particular bodies. Therefore, the
psychological mechanisms that produce that belief must be common to sophis
ticated thinkers, animals, children, and unreflective thinkers alike.

In writing this paper, Iworried about whether animals really identify objects
after lapses in observation. Hume claims that identity is a central element of
the account of how the belief in externally existing bodies arises. It certainly
seems tome that my pet identifies his bed, but perhaps he just smells his own
scent. Much to my delight, Tyler B?rge describes a number of experimental
psychological results that provide evidence of animals' ability to identify objects,
even after long interruptions ("Perceptual Objectivity," Philosophical Review
118, no. 3 (2009): 285-324, primarily 303ff. and esp. n40).
7. As far as I can tell,Hume does not explicitly say that animals are incapable
of language. But his account of general ideas draws significantly from George
Berkeley (and Hume acknowledges Berkeley in T 1.1.7.1n4 [SBN 17nl]). In
the eleventh paragraph of the introduction to the Principles, Berkeley writes,
"The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have
abstract general ideas, is that we observe in them no use ofwords or any other
general signs; which is built on this supposition, towit, that the making use of
words, implies the having general ideas" (ATreatise concerning thePrinciples of
Human Knowledge inThe Works ofGeorge Berkeley, Bishop ofCloyne, vol. 2, ed.
A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Nelson, 1949): 19-113, quotation at 31).
8. According to Hume, abstract ideas and general ideas depend on words.
If animals are incapable of language, they are incapable of abstract ideas or
general ideas. Therefore, a proper account of belief in body cannot require us
to identify the type of object we have observed in order to invent the token
continuant. (Compare to B?rge 2009, 305ff.)

9. See Rocknak 2007, 77 and 79-80. Surprisingly, H. H. Price objects that

Hume seems to require that the vulgar?"children and peasants"?undergo
"tortuous refinements of confusion and self-deceit" (Hume's Theory of theEx
ternal World [Oxford: Clarendon, 1940], 45, cf. 44ff.). The alternative that he
formulates forHume, however, involves Hume's account of general ideas, which
would exceed the capacity of prelinguistic children and animals.
10. See Baxter 2008, chaps. 3 and 4; and 2006, 120-24, for a discussion of
steadfast objects and identity.

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252 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

11. Rocknak (2007, 72) distinguishes these resemblances carefully. Baxter

(2006, 124) claims that Hume's account involves two applications of the gen
eral rule. The first application is tomistake each of the successive resembling
perceptions for each other because the disposition caused by each is similar.
The second application is to confuse that series with a single unchanging object
because the invariable dispositions are similar. Hume does not explicitly say
that there are two applications of the rule, and his account seems to require
only the second application.
12. This facility of the imagination is a phenomenon that is recognized in
contemporary psychology and described as "fluency" ofmental processes. Dif
ferent kinds of observed effects of fluency on judgments are described inAdam
L. Alter and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, "Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form
a Metacognitive Nation," Personality and Social Psychological Review 13, no.
3 (2009): 219-35.

13. The principle is symmetric, so it alone does not provide a reason for the
imagination to confuse the multiplicity for identity, rather than identity for
multiplicity. Indeed, in his examination of the idea of changeless duration,
Hume relies on this principle to generate the idea ofmultiplicity ofmoments
from a single moment (T 1.2.5.29, SBN 65; cf.Baxter 2008,67). So he recognizes
the symmetry of the principle. In this case, as the "contradiction" makes clear,
the "smooth and uninterrupted passage of the imagination" is psychologically
more pleasing than the disruption to the spirits in attending to each distinct
perception.

14. Rocknak (2007,77) claims that the vulgar "realize that it is a contradiction
to think of [invariable but interrupted impressions] as both interrupted and
uninterrupted" (my emphasis). And in the invention of the fiction of continued
existence, she claims that "the vulgar are not only engaged in reflexive thought,
but reflective thought as well" (79). To support her claim, she cites a passage
from T 1.4.6.6 (SBN 254), where Hume claims that "we correct ourselves by
reflection." The trouble forher interpretation is that Hume is there describing
a philosophical position (concerning substance) rather than the vulgar belief.
Philosophers slide back into the vulgar belief, even though they realize (from
reflecting on perceptual relativity) that impressions do not have continued
existence; so to avoid it, they introduce the new idea of substance that remains
invariable and uninterrupted over time and through change.
15. Barry Stroud complains that, for all that Hume makes of the "sensitive"
nature of belief, his description of the generation of the fiction of continued
existence has too "cognitive" a flavor (Hume [London: Routledge, 1978], 108-9;
see also John Cook, "Hume's Scepticism with Regard to the Senses," American
Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1968): 1-17, esp. 5ff). I claim that this ismerely
appearance. The "contradiction" is an opposition of two psychological tendencies'
treatment of the same impressions. The psychological discomfort that arises
from this opposition causes the imagination to introduce the fiction. Thus, I
agree with Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy ofDavid Hume (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1966), 478.

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 THE VULGAR FICTION OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE 253

16. For reasons of space, I restrict my attention to the case where I presently
observe the furniture. However, Imay also believe that my furniture continues
to exist even when I do not observe it. For example, before I enter my office, I
expect to see my table. So the steadfast idea of the continuing table would not
be a present impression, but a memory of the observed table. This would be
an inference from coherence, like Hume's inference about the existence of his
stairs after his porter appears (T 1.4.2.20; SBN 196-97).

17. Notice, pace H. H. Price (1940, 94ff; cf. 132-33), this generation of the
fiction of continued existence from constancy does not require the postulation
of unsensed sensibilia to fill in the "gaps" of a monotonous series of constant
impressions. Price explains that the postulation tacitly invokes Hume's account
of abstract ideas, because the postulation is an existential claim: 3x.(px, and (p
represents a universal. Fred Wilson follows Price as understanding this as a
"gap-filling" account drawing on abstract ideas ("Hume's Fictional Continuants,"
History ofPhilosophy Quarterly 6, no. 2 (1989): 171-88, esp. 185).
18. In describing the fiction involved in the idea of identity,Hume states,
"[T]he unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate of the changes of the co
existent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions" (T 1.4.2.29, SBN
200-201). The content of the supposition is that the unchangeable (steadfast)
object participates in the duration of the succession.
19. See Saul Traiger, "Impressions, Ideas and Fictions," Hume Studies 13, no.
2 (1987): 381-99, esp. 389.

20. Stroud 1978, 108; Costelloe 2007, 37; Wilbanks 1968, 154; and Oliver A.
Johnson, The Mind ofDavid Hume (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995),
260-62 and n26.
21. Johnson 1995,261. In contrast, Robert Fogelin contends that such concep
tual skepticism?that we cannot have any idea of external existence specifically
different from our perceptions?is not the entirety ofHume's position. Robert J.
Fogelin, Hume 'sSkepticism in theTreatise ofHuman Nature (London: Routledge,
1985), 67-68.

22. Costelloe 2007, 38, cf. 35.

23. Robert Sokolowski, "Fiction and Illusion inDavid Hume's Philosophy," The
Modern Schoolman 45, no. 3 (1968): 189-225, quotation at 201.
24. See Annemarie Butler, "Vulgar Habits and the Structure ofHume's Double
Vision Argument" (manuscript). I argue for an interpretation of the argument
from double vision that employs the premise "we do not attribute a continu'd
existence to both these perceptions" (T 1.4.2.45, SBN 210-11). I contend that
the argument seeks to locate an inconsistency in vulgar habits of attributing
(and withholding attribution of) continued existence.
25. Ruth Weintraub observes that Hume is at pains to show that the vulgar
belief is not self-contradictory because he holds that we cannot believe what we
cannot conceive and we cannot conceive the impossible. See Ruth Weintraub,
"Separability and Concept-Empiricism: Hume vs. Locke," British Journal for
theHistory ofPhilosophy 15, no. 4 (2007): 729-43, esp. 735nl3.

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254 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

26. The point that Imake here is that the vulgar idea of continued existence
is not conceptually incoherent. It is a further question?and it lies outside of
the scope of this paper?whether the philosophical application of the vulgar
idea of continued existence to objects is incoherent. The answer is complicated,
depending on how philosophers conceive of objects. If objects are simply a
"new set of perceptions" (T 1.4.2.56, SBN 218)?not specifically different from
perceptions?then there would be no incoherence. If objects are conceived to be
different from perceptions in specific ways, there may be incoherence.
27. Johnson (1995, 260-62), who thinks that the idea of continued existence
violates the copy principle, concludes that Hume's account of belief therefore
cannot accommodate belief in continued existence.

28. In his summary ofbelief in continued existence, David Fate Norton points
only to the vivacity from the present impression and omits the vivacity from
impressions ofmemory. See "Editor's Introduction," inDavid Hume, A Treatise
ofHuman Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J.Norton (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 141. In contrast, in his brief summary, Donald Baxter
(2006, 126-27) recognizes that the very formation of the idea of continued
existence enlivens it.
29. Michel Malherbe objects to Hume's account on the grounds that mere
resemblance among perceptions is insufficient to justify the change in status
from a mere conception to a real existent that continues to exist. See "Hume
on Belief in the External World," inA Companion toHume, ed. Elizabeth S.
Radcliffe (London: Blackwell, 2008): 126-39, esp. 134. From what I have said, it
is clear that it is not mere resemblance between the perceptions that grounds
Hume's psychological account. The resemblance between the feelings of the
mind in surveying an invariable succession and in perceiving a steadfast object
is also significant. In fact, it is so significant that Hume repeats the distinction
in a footnote. It is because of the combined effects of these resemblances that I
come to conceive of the object's existing even when I do not perceive it.

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