Riley Ponton

HST 296

12/1/2019

Deterrence Theory: Paper and Practice

The Cold War was a global standoff; two superpowers, harnessing the most destructive weapons

humanity has seen. There was more global tension during this period of time than any other in modern

history, and at the heart of it all: nuclear weapons. Atom bombs, nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles; all

of these propelled the Cold War for years, the power to level cities and kill thousands at the tips of their

fingertips, now more accessible than ever. The amount of times global, nuclear conflict was narrowly

avoided were numerous, which raises questions. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and many developing

countries quickly adapted to nuclear conflict, why didn’t humanity blow itself to bits, bringing about

nuclear winter? Any other instance of war technologies being developed in history was almost always

quickly followed by that technology being mass produced and mass implemented (tanks in WW1, rifled

barrels in the Civil War, jet propulsion in WW2, etc). Why the restraint on nuclear weaponry? There are

volumes of reasons, however one of the largest was a political and military theory far older than nuclear

weaponry: the theory of Deterrence. Deterrence Theory, now backed by atomic annihilation, put both the

East and West in a standoff during the Cold War. Why? Did this practice protect America during the Cold

War, even humanity as a whole? How does this theory transition onto the modern battlefield, where wars

are no longer fought between nations?  

Bernard Brodie explains the development of nuclear deterrence from traditional deterrence theory

in “The Development of Nuclear Strategy”, an article written for the National Conference, Inter-

University on Armed Forces and Society at the University of Chicago. Deterrence theory, put simply, is a

mindset of peace through fear. Refusal to attack for fear of stronger retaliation; as said, this theory is older
than nuclear weapons, however the threat of atomic bombardment added an entirely new layer to

traditional deterrence theory; suddenly, retaliation had to be certain, otherwise it could spell a

civilizations demise. This fear also fueled the idea of “mutually-assure destruction”, a mindset that no one

person could incite nuclear conflict (“pushing the button”), for if retaliation was certain, the whole planet

could suffer. This is further explained in the US Department of State’s article “Atomic Diplomacy”,

which goes in-depth on how atomic weaponry influenced foreign relations, and how these relations were

often built upon a basis of fear, which may have been the only thing that stopped many radical nations

from acting out of turn in the Cold War.

This paper will outline deterrence theory’s origins far before the Cold War (briefly), before

shifting toward its impact on how the Cold War was “fought”, as well as its controversial nature amongst

both American and Soviet populations throughout the arms race. Finally, this paper will take an objective

look at nuclear deterrence’s place in modern politics, after the SALT treaties both limiting the amount of

nuclear weapons any given country can have, as well as how the war on terrorism has affected deterrence

as a political practice in the modern age.

I will be citing a few secondary sources, here. One of which is “Atomic Diplomacy”, which is an

article written by the U.S. Department of Defense. This article is more informative than others in its

analysis of nuclear deterrence. It is a brief, yet descriptive history of nuclear strategy and the role of

nuclear weapons in international diplomacy during the Cold War. This will be used in my paper as a

reference point for when a phrase, name, event, etc needs clarification or context. However, when it

comes to actual stances on nuclear deterrence in politics and warfare, Cheryl Pellerin’s “Work: Strong

Nuclear Deterrence Is Critical to National Security”. This article works incredibly well as a secondary

source, because it takes an objective look at nuclear deterrence as a viable source of national defense, and

it takes a dive into its past and utility during the Cold War. I found this article interesting, because it takes

a stance that is often considered the minority towards nuclear deterrence (and nuclear weapons in

general), making a good argumentative piece to compare against more progressive pieces against nuclear
deterrence. I’m going to use this in my essay as a form of contrast between nuclear mentalities today

versus during the Cold War. For counter arguments, I look to two articles, with the first being “Nuclear

Deterrence: Hardest Argument in the World to Refute.” By Russ Wellen of the Huffington Post. This

article takes an objective look at nuclear deterrence as a failed philosophy. Citing many Cold War

authors, the article makes a point of blaming nuclear deterrence as the root cause of many of the nuclear

crises over the course of the Cold War, and the uselessness of it in the face of terrorism, where the enemy

is neither any given state or has access to nuclear weapons; it makes the idea of using nuclear weapons a

very complicated situation. I intend to use this article to contrast attitudes of nuclear deterrence towards

those in the Cold War, and the relevance of nuclear weapons in modern battlefields. Secondly, Ward

Wilson’s “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence”, from The Nonproliferation Review, takes a similar stance,

albeit a bit more radical. This is an anti-nuclear proliferation article whose central theme is that the idea of

nuclear deterrence is not only outdated for the conflicts of today, but also questioning the idea of if it ever

worked. This article hinges on the idea that any form of large-scale deterrence pre requires both sides to

have something to lose, or stakes held against the threat of nuclear attack. Modern conflicts are centered

around groups that define themselves based on ideological extremities, rather than a nation. Finally, “The

Countervailing Strategy” by Walter Slocombe. This essay, written with the assistance of the former

Assistant Secretary of Defense, takes an objective look at the very careful setup for nuclear deterrence to

work, and the odd game played by global, nuclear powers in order for nuclear deterrence to even be a

viable option. I intend to use this in my essay as something to be referenced when discussing how nuclear

deterrence came to be, and how it was able to maintain itself throughout the Cold War. I also would like

to find more sources like this in order to explore the fall of nuclear deterrence theory in regards to these

conditions required for deterrence to work, and how they fell apart, one by one, as the World exited the

nuclear age and entered the age of information.