1. HONASAN vs.

THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS

G.R.No. 159747 /  April 13,2004

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman (consti),
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)

FACTS:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano  filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:

- July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat  was committed by military personnel who occupied
Oakwood and Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II

- On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a
house located in San Juan, Metro Manila

- Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels
occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal
of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

- June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to
hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve
the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a
blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he
said “Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang
magtataksil.”

- July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala,
Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a
press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel.  He saw that the letter "I" on the arm
bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound. 

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in
relation to his public office  by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be
handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the
DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted
Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

ISSUES:

1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman
should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.

2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was
not published

1
3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the
petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

HELD:

1.      No.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on
the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors.
Circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the
Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All
recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law
agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is
derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the
preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However,
the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2.       No.

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the
rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of
the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the
office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the
conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3.       No.

Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition
so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

2. GATBONTON v. NLRC

2
G.R. NO. 146779 / January 23, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Publication must be in full, Preventive suspension, damages

FACTS:

November 1998: A civil engineering student of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT) filed
a letter-complaint against Renato S. Gatbonton,  an associate professor of the Faculty of Civil
Engineering for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an
academician.

Pending investigating, MIT, through its committee on Decorum and Investigation placed him under a
30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999.

The committee believed that his continued stay during the investigation will affect his performance
as a faculty member, as well as the student’s learning and that the suspension will allow petitioner to
“prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influence to other members of the
community.

He filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees. He
questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the RTC in a petition for certiorari but
was terminated since MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations
implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) and disregard the previous administrative
proceedings

Labor Arbiter: 30-day preventive suspension is illegal and directed MIT to pay his wages during the
said period. NLRC: set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision. CA on special civil action for certiorari:
affirming the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether Mapua’s Rules and Regulations is effective as of January 11, 1999 when it was published
only on February 23, 1999 (persons)

HELD:

NO.

R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules and
regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees,
through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of
sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.

Taňada vs. Tuvera:

- All statutes, including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity is fixed by the legislative.(especially penal laws)

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws.

Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is

3
to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application. Mapua Rules Section 3
Rule IV (Administrative Provisions) states that it shall take effect 15 days after publication by the
committee.

Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer
may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a
serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. However,
when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension,
the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension.

Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Ominibus Rules, there is no valid justification . Does not show that
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school head is morally convinced that petitioner’s
continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations
of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other
members of the educational community.

While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically
mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages. No showing of bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner.

Petition is partially granted. CA, NLRC set aside and Labors Arbiter reinstated.

3. MARCOS vs. JUDGE PAMINTUAN

A.M. RTJ-07-2062, January 18, 2011

Lessons Applicable: Ignorance of the Law

FACTS:

Judge Reyes in an order on May 30, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R due to forum shopping and
ordered that that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be immediately released to the
children of the late Rogelio Roxas in trust for the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas. RTC denied the
separate motions for reconsideration by the parties.

Judge Pamintuan in an order dated May 9, 2006 set the case for hearing on June 29, 2006
purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos was one
of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case. Buddha Statuette or Buddha
replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica
shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon
the appointment of his estate’s administrator. Also ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a
fake one.

November 15, 2006: Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross
Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting
Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled “Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as
the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v.
Jose D. Roxas, et al. Pamintuan Commented that Marcos should have filed a motion for
reconsideration instead of filing an administrative complaint. Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, cited
Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal.

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the
service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification
from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled

4
corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts – which may
normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory before, or without
exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to modification.

Judge Pamintuan was placed under preventive suspension pending resolution of the administrative
case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for
reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and
to Submit the Case for Decision. Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and
benefits covering the period of his preventive suspension - denied for being premature and for lack
of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law

HELD:

YES.

Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan is DISMISSED from the service. Judge Pamintuan should have realized
that the trial court did not rule on that point that the Golden Buddha is fake in its May 30, 1996
Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order). Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as
to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit:

to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist.

Notably, this is NOT Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case. Judge Pamintuan was
charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused,
Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for 1 year. Having been
previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate
administrative penalty − dismissal from service.

4. PEOPLE vs. QUIACHON

G. R. No. 170236 / August 31, 2006

FACTS:

Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed against her
eight-year-old deaf-mute daughter in 2001. Key witnesses for the prosecution were the victim and
her 11-year-old brother; for the defense, it was appellant’s mere bare denial. The victim’s testimony
was supported by medico-legal findings indicating rape. The trial court found the appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death plus payment of damages. On automatic appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision and also imposed civil indemnity. Notably, Republic Act 9346 was enacted on
June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.

ISSUES:

5
1. Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape based on the evidence presented

2. Whether or not death was still the proper penalty imposed in view of RA 9346, considering that
the crime was committed before the law’s enactment

3. Whether or not in case death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, is civil indemnity still
proper

HELD:

1. YES.

The Court finds the accused guilty. In rape cases, the credibility of complainant's testimony is the
primordial consideration in determining if accused is guilty, and the trial court is in a better position
to determine such, having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' behavior. The
victim’s testimony was "simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and
unflawed by inconsistency or contradiction." It was further corroborated by the medico-legal report.
From this damning evidence, appellant's simple denial of the charge against him must fail.

2. NO.

Reclusion perpetua, not death penalty, is the proper penalty in this case in view of RA 9346. Although
the crime was committed before the law was enacted, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda,
or penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. (Article 22, Revised Penal
Code) But appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of RA 9346 provides that "persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

3. YES.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in RA 9346, civil
indemnity is still proper because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. The award of civil indemnity shows "not only a reaction to
the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also
the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

5. JARILLIO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164435 / June 29, 2010

DOCTRINE: He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

FACTS:

On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with
Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999.

On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment
of marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage
against Alocillo in 2000.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their

6
marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage
license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as
1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 and
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy
when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to
Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption
is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were
celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as
1978.

In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of
nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of
bigamy despite the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

HELD:

NO.

Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage,
even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

6. ATTY. FERRER vs. SPOUSES DIAZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. 165300 / April 23, 2010

FACTS:

Allegedly, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him a loan of
P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second mortgage
over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note payable within six months or up to
November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner post-dated checks to secure payment of
said loan.

7
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable
consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above mentioned secured loan,
executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided), and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents
Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said
waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at the
back of the TCT.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were
dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused
to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante. At the
Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for
a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s
daughter Comandante. However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed
by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. As affirmative defense,
the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot
impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is
anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property considering that it is null
and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the
parents are still living is valid

HELD:

NO.

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into
upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be
considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A
contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s
properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two
requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s
waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon
their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary
in nature.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the
former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor. The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner is not

8
valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for
being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

7. DIAZ vs. ENCANTO

GR No. 171303 / January 20, 2016

FACTS:

Elizabeth L. Diaz has been in the service of U.P. since 1963. During the second semester for Academic
Year 1987-1988, she was a full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to
3 weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23, 1987 until March 1, 1988. She
returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for Duty Form.

On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s Office of the President for
sabbatical leave with pay for one year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and
study." Cecilia Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, who initially recommended to CMC Dean
Encanto that Diaz's sabbatical application be granted, recommended instead that Diaz be granted
any leave of absence she may be qualified for. On July 4, 1988, Tabujara recommended that Diaz be
granted a leave without pay in order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute.

On November 8, 1988, Abad, then as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid
Encanto's reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz
of her lack of service during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence, she is not entitled to be paid
and asked her to clarify her status of being on leave without pay.

While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim
her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form. She received her salaries for June to
July 15, 1989, but could no longer claim her salary after July 15, 1989, when Encanto reminded the
University Cashier, in a letter dated July 26, 1989, that Diaz had to "accomplish the Report for Duty
Form to entitle her to salaries and make official her return to the service of the University." Diaz's
name was subsequently included in the payroll starting July 1990, when she submitted a Report for
Duty after her return from compulsory summer leave.

She claimed, among others, that respondents conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not paying
her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period
when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned from teaching
in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara
and Abad with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila praying that the latter be adjudged,
jointly and severally to pay her damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved petitioner Diaz's application
for sabbatical leave and withheld her salaries.

HELD:

NO.

Petitioner Diaz's complaint[29] for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged bad
faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code.

9
Articles 19 and 20 read as follows:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof." Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when
the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind
which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature
of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

There is no dispute, and both the RTC and the Court of Appeals agree, that the grant of a sabbatical
leave is not a matter of right, but a privilege. Moreover, the issue of whether or not the respondents
acted in bad faith when they denied petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave has been
answered several times, in separate jurisdictions.

The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this Court, have already established
that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant. It does
not matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her application, as the approving
authorities found that such reason was enough. Moreover, not only the Court of Appeals but also the
Ombudsman, and this Court, have ruled that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner
Diaz's sabbatical leave application was denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be given
great weight in the case at bar.

While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical leave, it is
important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the unreasonable and
unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application, and not its denial per se.

"It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the... burden of
proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same."

Petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents. There is nothing in the
records to show that the respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her application to
prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of six months in resolving a
sabbatical leave application has never happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that
occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave did not follow the
usual procedure; hence, the processing of said application took time.

No Payment of Other Damages

Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for any
damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been appropriately denominated
damnum absque injuria." Similarly, the Court cannot grant petitioner Diaz's claim for attorney's fees

10
as no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. "Even when a claimant is compelled to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where
there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

8. CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIÑONES

G.R. No. 175822 / October 23, 2013

Doctrine: The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise
of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent
to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

FACTS:

On July 25, 2001, Shirley G. Quiñones (“Shirley”), a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in
Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson's Department
Store (Robinson's) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided
to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00. Shirley allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a
receipt issued by the store. While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson's and
Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and
informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and
showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested that they talk about it at
the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the
Guess employees as agreed upon.

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black
jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by
another argument. Shirley, thereafter, went home.

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the
same took place while respondent was off duty. Another letter was allegedly prepared and was
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson's, but the latter again refused to receive it.
Shirley also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson's was furnished said
letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent's
Robinson's credit card. Shirley further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.

Guess claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer leading to
the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a
cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was
missing. They, thus, concluded that it was Shirley who failed to make such payment. It was,
therefore, within their right to verify from Shirley whether she indeed paid or not and collect from
her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or
they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for damages based on abuse of rights principle under Article 19 of the Civil

11
Code may prosper against Guess

HELD:

YES.

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking Shirley whether she paid or not. The Guess
employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well,
but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. Considering, however, that
Shirley was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of
payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis
of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper
forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
Shirley to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners
even sent a demand letter to Shirley's employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of
payment and the item purchased, Shirley "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store."

Petitioners accused Shirley that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she
deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment.
These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the
item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that Shirley had the intention to evade payment.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, Shirley was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is
evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they
realized the supposed non-payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to Shirley's employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
Shirley's reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign Shirley without substantial evidence and
despite the latter's possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself
to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners obviously abused
their rights.

9. ARDIENTE vs. SPOUSES PASTORFIDE

GR. NO. 161921 / July 17, 2013

FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold, conveyed, and
transferred all their rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It has been
agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999,
Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without notice. She complained to the Cagayan De Oro
Water District (COWD) and she found out that the account has become delinquent. She paid the
three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to explain why her water
supply was cut without notice.

The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who
requested the disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against
Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground
that the defendants committed abuse of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with
modification on the award of the amount for damages.Hence this petition before the SC.

12
ISSUE:

Whether or not Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district abused their rights when they
cut off the water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed
ownership of property to Pastorfide.

HELD:

YES.

Petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of
having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at
least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in the enshrined
Article 19 of the civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.

The principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was violated. It provides that
"every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless become the source
of illegality (Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a manner that does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes damage to another. The
person exercising an abuse of right is thus liable for damages caused to another. The herein
petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent without
giving notice about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for damages by
disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting
the water supply even when the respondent already paid the delinquent account.

10. NIKKO HOTEL vs. REYES

G.R. No. 154259 / February 28, 2005

FACTS:

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the
latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to
be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr.Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the
plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if Dr. Filart

13
did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She
wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t
want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that
the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely
with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when she approached
him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”.
Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she
was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ruled that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests.
CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an entertainment artist.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:

NO.

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.

Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is
an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him.
The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct. Considering the
closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made
such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there

14
could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees.

11. SPOUSES HING vs. CHOACHUY

G.R. No. 179736 / June 26, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Basak,
City of Mandaue, Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
located adjacent to the property of petitioners; that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec); that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
5125; that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid
permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property; that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction
for failure to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property; that respondents, through their
employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going
construction; and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy. Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from
conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners construction.
They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO. Respondents moved
for a reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its Order dated February 6, 2006. Aggrieved,
respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to
show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the
controversy is not used as a residence. The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of
the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. Thus, they are not the proper parties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy

2. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit

HELD:

Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy

15
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the right of an individual
"to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in
matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right
to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse
of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No
one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and provides
a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied
or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively
into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."The phrase "prying into the privacy
of anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore,
erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is a
violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.

16
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
anothers residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a
crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order.
The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does
not only focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in
his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then
the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be
made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of
the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be
interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.Here, there is no
indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not
entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

REMEDEIAL LAW: A real party defendant

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized
by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.During the hearing

17
of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed
the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to
care,and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a
Complaint against respondents before the RTC.He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has
already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of
their respective properties.With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents
are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners
of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection.
The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered
all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are
removed and transferred.Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo
seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

12. DE ZUZUARREGUI vs. VILLAROSA

G.R. No. 183788 / April 5, 2010

FACTS:

Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary, the sister of petitioner’s late father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her mother, Bella, before the
RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner initially opposed Rosemary’s petition, but they eventually reached an
amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to the RTC for
approval. RTC approved the compromise agreement.

Subsequently, two of Rosemary’s alleged siblings, Peter and Catherine, filed with the CA a Petition to
Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement. Peter and Catherine claimed that they are also
biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the settlement of the latter’s
estate. Later, private respondent Fannie, who likewise claimed to be a biological child of the late
Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition-in-intervention in the action for
annulment of judgment.

Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number of discussions
pertaining to the settlement of the latter’s estate. Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care
of the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided
by law. However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a
disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached and
as far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bella’s estate. They were not
aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that a
judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely
averred that aside from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In
petitioner’s opposition, it was likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of
Bella. The subsequent compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not disclosed
that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bella’s heirs. It was only sometime in June 2004 that they
came to know of the decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC.

18
Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers to the petition for annulment of judgment and the
petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie
were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three were literally purchased from third persons
who represented to Bella and the latter’s common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were
abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three and brought them up as their own.
This was known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in
order to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However, Alejandro
and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the rights of legitimate
children.

While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a
complaint for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner
and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City that the late Bella had only two heirs, namely the two of them. Petitioner and Rosemary
forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending
prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals. They argued that the issue of whether Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending before
the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable cause
against petitioner and Rosemary for two counts each of falsification of public documents.  The
prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise
agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner
and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the opposition to
the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed before
the RTC of Pasig City.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ and a motion to defer proceedings before the
MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also, petitioner and Rosemary filed with
the MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. However,
petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the DOJ, while her motions before the MeTC were denied by
the said court. The MeTC agreed with the prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in
the action for annulment of judgment is the validity of the compromise agreement while the criminal
case involves their liability for falsification of public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Makati City, which
denied the petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not
act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC
held that there was no prejudicial question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for
annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence required in the criminal action for
falsification of public documents. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Petitioner assailed the orders of the RTC before the CA but was dismissed on the ground that the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioner’s counsel and not by petitioner
herself. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a prejudicial question

HELD:

YES.

Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be
suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit:

19
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case," the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are
so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil
case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222
pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the
compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and
Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the
determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing
pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in
the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the
civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a
share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against
petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been
judicially settled.

13. PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 172060 / September 13, 2010

DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in
a criminal case for parricide.

FACTS:

20
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE:

Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

HELD:

NO.

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the

21
marriage

between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned.”

14. TOMLIN II vs. ATTY. MOYA II

A.C. # 6971 / February 23, 2006

FACTS:

Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial
payment forthe P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter. When Tomlin realized that all
the said checkswere dishonoured by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still
refused to pay hisdebt. Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 to theMunicipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for
disbarment against Moya.In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner noted thatrespondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper
despite several requests for extension, indisregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was
observed that the pending criminal action againstrespondent does not pose a prejudicial question
to the resolution of the issues in the presentadministrative case. Hence, it was recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of lawfor one year.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the administrative case for the respondent’s disbarment should be dismissed for
violation of the rule on non-forum shopping

2. Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD:

1. NO.

The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping. Forum
shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.
Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal cases of the respondent’s violation of BP Blg. 22
is different from the administrative case at hand. The former refers to the issuance of bouncing
checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of his debts.

2. YES.

Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
refusal to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable

22
cause, despite acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to comply with the
expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings – be it in their professional or private affairs.
What is more, his failure to file his answer and verified position paper despite extensions of time is a
manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his acts, he was then sentenced to be
suspended from practice for two years.

15. GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-16439 / July 20, 1961

FACTS:

Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After
her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later,
Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her
husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued
petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as
attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an unborn child is covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury,
his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child

HELD:

NO.

Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course,
essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having
possessed legal personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents
or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality.

It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil
Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead
when separated from its mother’s womb.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased child.

16. CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP. vs. MONTANO

G.R. No. 182836 / October 13, 2009

23
FACTS:

Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy but
unfortunately the fetus died. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for parental
leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance. Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. The appointed
Voluntary Arbitrator , Atty. Montano, ruled in favor of Hortillano and that the 3 elements for the
entitlement of bereavement leave(death,dependent, legitimate) and 4 elements for the death and
accident insurance(death, dependent, legitimate, legal document) are present. However, the
Continental Steel persistently argued that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so the literal meaning
of death should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employee should be granted of bereavement leave and other benefits consisting
of death and accident insurance considering his child died without juridical personality and the CBA
did not specifically mention this qualification to be entitled with such.

HELD:

YES.

Hortillano is entitled to those benefits. The SC said that in this case, the issue of civil personality is not
relevant. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death. Also, life is not synonymous with civil
personality. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.

The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been
born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification,
then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother’s womb.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and
CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.

24