Kauffman vs.
National Bank, 42 Phil 182 Facts: The defendant bank, for a valuable
Case Summary:
Doctrine: To determine whether the interest
of a third person is a stipulation pour autrui or
merely an incidental interest, is to rely upon
the intention of the parties as disclosed by
their contract. If a third person claims an
enforceable interest in the contract the
question must be settled by determining
whether the contracting parties desired to
tender him such an interest.
In applying this test to a stipulation pour
autrui, it matters whether the stipulation is in
the nature of a gift or whether there is an
obligation owing from the promise to the third
person. That no such obligation exists may in
some degree assist in determining whether
the parties intended to benefit a third person,
whether they stipulated for him.
Florentino vs. Encarcacion, CA
Case Summary:
Doctrine: The second paragraph of Article
1311 above-quoted states the law on
stipulations pour autrui. Consent the nature
and purpose of the motion, held that said
stipulation is a station pour atrui
A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in
favor of a third person containing a clear and
deliberate favor upon him, and which
consideration paid by the Philippine Fiber
and Produce Company, agreed to cause a
sum of money to be paid by its
representation in New York to the plaintiff,
who was president of the fiber company.
Upon receiving the message, the bank’s
representative in New York cabled to
defendant the advisability of withholding this
money from Kauffman, in view of his
reluctance to accept certain bills of the fiber
company. Agreeing to this suggestion, the
defendant advised its representative in New
York to withhold payment to Kauffman. In
view of these facts, Kauffman instituted this
action to recover the amount due.
Ruling: The plaintiff’s right to maintain this
action is undeniable because the bank’s
promise to cause a definite sum of money to
be paid to him in New York is a stipulation
pour autrui. The plaintiff clearly signifies his
acceptance of this stipulation by demanding
payment. Although the defendant had
already directed its New York representative
to withhold payment when this demand was
made, the rights of the plaintiff cannot be
considered to have been prejudiced by that
fact. The word “revoked”, as used in Article
1311 of the Civil Code, must be understood
to imply revocation by the mutual consent of
the contracting parties, or at least by the
direction of the party to whom the promises
was made, in this case, the fiber company
On May 22, 1964, the petitioners-appellant
Florentino, et.al filed an action of which the
application are the common pro-indiviso
owners in the simple of the said land; that to
the best of their knowledge and belief, there
is no mortgage or whatsoever; that said
applicants had acquired the aforesaid land
thru and by inheritance from the
predecessors in interest, lately from Dona
Encarnacion Florentino, and for which the
said land was adjudicated to them by virtue
of the deed of extrajudicial dated August 24,
1941.
stipulation is merely a part of a contract
entered into by the parties, neither of whom
acted as agent of the third person, and such
third person and demand its fulfillment
provoked that he communicates his to the
obligor before it is revoked.

The requisites are:

1. That the stipulation in favor of a third
person should be a part, not the
whole, of the contract
2. That the favorable stipulation should
not be conditional or compensated by
any kind of obligation whatever;
3. Neither of the contracting bears the
legal representative or authorization of
third person

The third person becomes a party -- trilateral

contracts

Sanchez vs. Rigos Plaintiff Sanchez and Defendant Rigos

Case Summary:
Doctrine: Since there may be no valid
contracts without a cause or consideration,
the promisor is not bound by his promise and
may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending notice
of its withdrawal, his accepted promise
partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to
sell which, it accepted, results in a perfected
contract of sale.
Article 1324 and 1479
Article 1324 is modified by Art. 1479 of the
Civil Code, in effect, considers the latter as an
exception to the former, and exceptions are
not favored, unless the intention to the
contrary is clear, and it is not so insofar as
said articles are concerned. What is more, the
reference, in both the second paragraph Art.
1479 and Art. 1324, to an option or promise
supported by or founded upon
consideration, strongly suggest that the 2
provisions, intended to enforce or implement.
executed an instrument entitled “Option to
Purchaser”, whereby Mrs. Rigos “agreed,
promised and committed… to sell” to
Sanchez the sum of Php 1,510, a parcel of
land, within 2 years from said date with the
understanding that said option shall be
deemed “terminated and elapsed”, if
“Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy
the property”. Inasmuch as several tenders of
payment of the sum of Php 1,510, made by
Sanchez within said period, were rejected by
Mrs. Rigos.
Sanchez had offered the sum of Php 1,510
before any withdrawal form the contract has
been made by Rigos. Since Rigos’ offer sell
was accepted by Sanchez, before she could
withdraw her offer, a bilateral reciprocal
contract -- to sell and buy -- was generated
a

Article 1479
A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing
for a price certain is reciprocally, demandable.

 Earnest money -- forfeited; option

money
 Refusal of the contract does not mean
notification. No notification and had
sold such, damages incurred.

Republic vs. PLDT (Eminent Domain)

Case Summary:

Doctrine:

Cabague vs. Auxilio The defendants promised such marriage to

plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve
Case Summary: the defendants’ house and spend for the
wedding feast and the needs of the bride,
Doctrine: Under the law, it can be withdrawn that relying upon such promises plaintiffs
anytime as long as there is notice. However, made the improvement and spent Php 100
such consideration is love and consideration. and that without cause defendants refused to
Article 1403 (2)(c) horror their pledged word.

1. Agreement between Felipe Cabague

and the defendants in consideration
of the marriage of Socorro and
Geronimo
2. Agreement between the two lovers,
as “a mutual promise to marry”

For breach of marry mutual promise,

Geremino may sue Socorro for damages.
Such mutual promise is admissible.
However, Felipe Cabague’s action may not
prosper, because it is to on force an
agreement in consideration of marriage.

Saura vs. Sindico Saura and Sindico were contesting for

Case Summary:
Doctrine: Such rights may not, therefore be
bargained away curtailed with impurity for
they are conferred not for individual or private
benefit or advantage but for the public good
and interest.
A voter possessing all the requirements
required to fill an office may by, himself or
nomination as the official candidate. The
parties entered into a written agreement
where each aspirant shall respect the result
of the aforesaid conversation, i.e., no one of
us shall either run as rebel or independent
candidate after losing in said convention.
Saura was elected and proclaimed the
Party’s official congressional candidate for
then. Sindico, filed her certificate of
candidacy for the same office with COE, and
she openly and actively campaigned for her
election.
through a political party or group, present his
candidacy without further limitations than
those provided by law. The night of the voter
to vote at the general election for whom he
pleases cannot be limited.
The agreement is null and void, in that (1) the
subject matter of the contract being public is
not within the commence of man’s, and (2)
the “pledge” was in curtailment of the free
exercise of elective franchise and therefore
against public policy.

Liguez vs. Court of Appeals (Void Liguez filed against the widow and heroes off
Contracts) the late Salvador Lopez a parcel of land. The
donation was made of the desire of Salvador
Case Summary: Lopez, a man of mature years, to have
sexual relations with appellant with Liguez,
Doctrine: that Lopez had confessed to his love for
appellant to the instrumental witnesses, with
the remark that her parents would not allow
Lopez to live with her unless that he first
donated the land in question. After the
donation, Liguez and Salvador lived together
in the house that was built upon the latter’s
order. Until Lopez was killed. The donated
land originally belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Salvador and Maria. Widow
and Children was in possession and made
improvements and was tax rolls.

Daywalt vs. Corporation, 39 Phil 587, 600-

601

Case Summary:

Doctrine:

Babao v Perez Contracts which by their terms are not to be

performed within one year, may be taken out
of the statute through performance by one
party thereto. All that is required in such case
is complete performance within the year by
one party, however many tears may have to
elapse before the agreement is performed by
the other party. But nothing less than full
performance by one party will suffice, and it
has been held that, if anything remains to be
done after the expiration of the year besides
the mere payment of money, the statute will
apply." 1 (Emphasis supplied). It is not
therefore correct to state that Santiago
Babao has fully complied with his part within
the year from the alleged contract in
question.