William James and Jakob von Uexkiill: pragmatism, pluralism and the outline of a philosophy of organism Arthur Araujo! Abstract This study aims to bring together the pragmatist and pluralistic notions of meaning of William James and Jakob von Uexkill, respectively, to develop the outline of a philosophy of organism. Combining elements of pragmatism and pluralism, [will sketch the outlines of a philosophy of organism in that meaning is to be understood as process rather than an objective content of thought or a perennial entity Introduction ‘Our paper addresses several works by two contemporary authors: the American philosopher William James and the Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexkiill! In a previous paper (Araujo 2012), which is supported by Sharov (2001), 1 identified a particular form of pragmatism in Uexkull’s theory of meaning: meaning corresponds to a functional relationship between organism and world, If something is meaningful for an organism, it is because of the particular way in which it perceives and acts in the world. The theory of meaning corresponds to Part If of Uexkiill's theory of Umwelt and it is not a theory of object representation. For Uexkill, meaning has nothing do with representation. These ideas presented in Uexsill’s theory of Umwelt seem to match Key features of William James's pragmatic conception of meaning and his pluralism. For James ([1907] 2000, 25), the term ‘pragmatism’ derives from the Greek word ‘pragma’ and it means ‘action’: to develop the meaning of a thought implies our understanding of sts pratical consequences. For James, this is the pragmatism of Peirce. According to James, pragmatism is a method that makes clear the meaning of thought following a test of tracing sts practical consequences. Considering the pragmatic method, the practical consequences of a thought are all that it means to us Additionally, pluralism is @ distinctive characteristic of James's metaphysics of the experience. Following the general hypothesis of the radical empiricism’ [1904], in The Pluralistic Universe (1909), what James designates as the ‘each-form’ of reality appears in distinct and countless * Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo (Brazt34 Arthur Araujo forms of meaning and outside the possibility of an absolute or ultimate form, (all-form). In comparison with Uexkail’s theory, meaning is not separate from, all possible and distinct forms of Umwelt.” ‘Aiming at a philosophical convergence between James and Uexkiill, this chapter seeks to articulate elements of pragmatism and pluralism, Brom these two perspectives, a common thread can be traced: meaning is activity Accordingly, as for the analysis of meaning, the articulation between pragmatism and pluralism indicates that meaning is an activity rather than an. objective content of thought or @ perennial entity. From the articulation between pragmatism and pluralism, consequently, it is possible to emphasize a characteristic of the “common sense” as anticipated by James ((1907] 2000, 74), Regarding a pragmatic conception of common sense, meaning is not independent from the practical consequences of the action of thought, Such a view of common sense also seems to be present in Uexkill’s theory insofar as meaning emerges from the organism's action in the world, Indeed, for Uexkull, Umwelt is a dynamic unity constituted by perception and action of an organism. In addition, it is only inside an organism's Umwelt that something can be meaningful. As noted by Sharov (2001, 212), each organism has his/her own theory of the world or Umwelt. Accordingly, meaning is not a perennial entity and it can only be grasped in the activities of an organism's Umwelt, Activity means here ‘process’ and it evokes Whitehead’ philosophy of organism. Briefly, following James and Uexkill’s conceptions of meaning, I will try to combine elements of pragmatism and pluralism for sketching the outlines of a philosophy of organism in that meaning is to be understood as process 2. Pragmatism and pluralism ‘The work of Uexkill has received different interpretations. In addition to being quoted and commented on by many philosophers, such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Ortega y Gasset, and Cassirer, throughout the 20th century, Uexktll has been a frequent reference for different scientific fields (Sukhdeo and Sukhdeo 2009; Berthoz and Christen 2009; Berthoz Petit et al. 2006; Sharov 1998, Riting 2004). For Uexkull, in addition to the physical and evolutionary traits, each organism has a specific mode of perceiving and of acting in the world, LJ everything that a subject signifies becomes his world-of- perception, and what he performs, his world-of-action. World-of- perception and world-of-action constitute one single unit —the subject's Umwelt, (Vexktil (1954] 1957, 6)William James and Jakob von Uexkiill 35 ‘The Umwelt is the central idea of Uexkull’s work For him, the primary question consists of understanding how organisms perceive their external environments and how this perception determines their behaviour ‘This litle monograph does not claim to point the way to a new science. Perhaps it should be called a stroll through into unfamiliar worlds; worlds strange to us but known to other creatures, manifold and varied as the animals themselves |...) the world as it appears co animals themselves, not as it appears to us. This we may call the phenomenal world or the Umwelt of the animal, (Vexkill (1954) 1957, 5) In contemporary epistemology, the observer is considered to be a central problem, Insofar as for Uexkill an organism is a ‘subject, he redefines the notion of ‘observer’ as it relates to the process of investigating the animal behaviour and abandons the realist perspective that a reality exists and it is independent from observation, Following Uexkil’s eriticism of the realist perspective, an approximation between James and him can expand a pragmatic conception of meaning: the practical conception of an object is all that it means, From this pragmatic, conception of meaning stems a pluralistic worldview. Incidentally, a pluralistic perspective was already anticipated by James Pluralism lots things really exist in the eachform or distributively, [..] the absolute sum-total things may never be actually experienced or realized in that shape at all, and that a disseminated, distributed, or incompletely unified appearance is the only form that reality may yet have achieved. (ames [1909] 2000, 44) Instead of the idea of oneness of the world, the facts regarding experience emonstrate that in actuality what exist are always additional meanings. In this particular form of empiricism, new and different meanings are added infinitely by experience. That is, for James, instead of a form of universal meaning (all-form), the world appears as different forms (each-form) in experience. James's empiricism distances itself from realism, in effect, meaning is always the result of a particular form of experience. Such a pluralistic view of meaning also seems to emerge in Uexkiil's theory of Umwelt. Although Uexkiil [1954] 2010, 45) makes use of the monadic metaphor of the soap bubble for describing the organism's Umwelt, that does not mean that an organism is an isolated entity from the world, One can only see an organism as part of a web of relationships in the world. The plurality of organisms makes up a monadic community whose meaning is ‘web of relationships. As a whole, therefore, the web of relationships is the activity of a complex community in constant process of becoming36 Arthur Araujo In exkil’s theory of Umwelt ((1954) 2010, 42-5), itis important to point out here that if one breaks off with the stimulus-response mechanist schema of explanation, one can see organism and world as parts of a process of becoming. In the organism's Umwelt, organism and world are continuous: the world is always of or for an organism. That is what I call the premise of continuity in Uexkall's theory. It must also be noted that the process has no one single point of view, that is, it is countless and dynamic. This second point is what I call the premise of pluralism in Uexkal’s theory of meaning, Indeed, continuity and pluralism are central notions in James's metaphysics of the experience. Following his Principles of Psychology [1890], James holds a conception of reality as experienced and that in experience, for instance, the transition between two moments are continuous Yames [1909] 1977, 292; 2000, 315; 318), According to the premises of continuity and pluralism, the comparison of different forms of experiences demonstrates that meaning can only be captured by the reference to different Umwelts, Thus, meaning is not in reduction to a viewpoint exterior according to the so-called epistemological principle of the ‘independent observer’. Additionally, compared with Nagel's idea of the ‘point of view’ (Nagel 1974), the interpretation of the relationship between experience and reality is always incomplete and fulfilled by innumerable different viewpoints and not by one viewpoint, which is what Nagel (1986) refers to as the ‘view from nowhere’. Nagel's metaphor llustrates well the type of pluralism of James and Uexkill regarding meaning as a possibility from the countless viewpoints of the world, 3. Common Sense and Umwelt In the Lecture V of his texts on Pragmatism ((1907] 2000), James traces the pragmatic meaning of the common sense. Unlike the realistic perspective of the philosophical tradition of the common sense, James understands common, sense as an attitude or as a disposition of action of thought and not as a mirroring the world, By definition, pragmatism is a philosophy of action rather than of representation, James's notion of common sense and the pragmatic sense of Uexkill’s theory of Umwelt can be summarised here as follows. Firstly, for Uexkill, the organism's Umwelt constitutes an active process of meaning. In comparison, for James, ‘common sense’ characterises a particular intellectual form Were we lobsters, of bees, it might be that our organization ‘would have led to our using quite different modes from these of, apprehending our experiences, (James [1909] 2000, 76)William James and Jakob von Uexkiill a7 ‘This quotation of James fits as a glove with Uexkill's conception of Umwelt ‘The world is certainly unique. However, as a sort of metastructure, the world is meant from distinct and countless ways (e.g., human beings, lobsters, bees, bats and ticks) that overlap. So, the world consists more of processes of meaning than of independently existing reality, Such a metaphysical worldview surely breaks away from a realistic ontological commitment Secondly, as a pragmatic trait of Uexkill's theory of Umwelt, one can understand meaning as a form of action (and not of representation of the world) from a plurality of contexts. Among the different aspects of the world, not all are meaningful to the organism: some aspects are completely irrelevant for the organism and other ones are not. Thus, meaning is determined by a criterion of relevance in the organism's life, Although James and Uexkiill most likely do not understand meaning in the strict linguistic sense, both authors seem to understand meaning as a form of use, However, surely, the idea of meaning as ‘use’ does not indicate a linguistic signification as understood by Wittgenstein (PI, 43). In Theoretical Biology (1926), which is a previous reference to Uexkill's theory of Umwelt, it might illustrate the idea chat meaning corresponds to subjective use All reality is subjective appearance [...] It is utterly vain to go through the world for causes that are independent of the Subject; we always come up against objects; which owe their construction to the subject (...], When we admit that the objects owe their construction to the subject, we tread on firm and ancient ground, especially prepared by Kant, [lle] set the Subject, man, over against the objects, and discovered the fundamental principles according to which objects are built up by our mind. (Uexkiill 1926, xv) Despite the reference to Kant and his influence on Uexkill, what can be remarked here is that the subjective apprehension of reality is a pragmatic process of meaning in that something becomes significant, 4, Meaning and aboutness For Uexkilll, organisms are not simply mechanical things. Instead, they are subjects that apprehend reality using different forms of organisation ‘This is indeed the position of all mechanist theorists [ We no longer regard animals as mere machines, but as subjects whose essential activity consists of perceiving and acting (Wexkull [1954] 1957, 6) In the article Are we automata? (1879), comparatively, James critically develops an analysis of what he calls the ‘Conscious-Automaton Theory’38 Arthur Araujo ‘The theory maintains that in everything outward we are pure material machines. Feeling is a mere collateral product of ut nervous processes, unable to react upon them any more than a shadow reacts on the steps of the traveller whom it accompanies. Inert, uninfluential, a simple passenger in the voyage of life, itis allowed to remain on board, but not to touch the heim or handle the rigging James 1879, 1)? From a metaphysical perspective, one can claim that both Uexkill and James do not engage themselves with epiphenomenalism, For them, respectively, the organism's Umwelt and consciousness are real phenomena of being directed upon something. That is, they have aboutness: the property of being about something in the word according to the philosophy of mind jargon. Im the preface to The Meaning of Truth ((1909] 2000, 135), James states that ‘truth’ is a ‘relationship’ that can be obtained between an ‘idea’ (opinion, belief. statement or not’) and an “object ‘the ‘truth’ is a property of certain ideas of ours’. Thus, regarding true and false ideas, the difference between such ideas is practical, 1c., whether an idea influences our conduct oF not However, itis also possible to establish a cognitive relation between idea and object when a given knowledge is conceptual or representational. Although there is immediate knowledge of objects, e.g. ‘as the white paper before your eyes’ in this moment, the tigers in India, for example, are only known to us conceptually or representatively But, ‘exactly what do we mean by saying that we here know the tigers in India?’ James questions ((1909] 2000, 142). Although the tigers in India are not physically present, they are present in our thoughts. This statement is an example of Brentano's canonical definition of the ‘intentional inexistence of an object’ ({1874] 2005). The target of James's criticisms is exactly the so- called ‘presence in absence’ as a type of explanation for a particular type of existence or the ‘intentional inexistence’ of the tigers in our mind, For James, to know the Indian tigers means the mental direction over them or aboutness.* However, James ((1909] 2000, 142-3) wonders if ‘the pointing known-as’ of our ideas means the Brentanian self-transcendence of the tigers in our minds. The answer is no. The cognitive relations between ideas and objects or ‘pointing known-as’ faboutenss) are extemal and accidental operations and do not mean internal mental events of a mysterious sort {A stone in one field may ‘fi’, we say, a hole in another field But, the relation of ‘fitting’, so long as no one carries the stone to the hole and drops stm, 1s only one name for the fact that such an act may happen. Similarly with the knowing of the tigers here and now. James [1909] 2000, 136) Following James, the relation of fitting between idea and object promotes @ certain economy of the Brentanian conception of intentional inexistenceWilliam James and Jakob von Uexkiill 39 Accordingly, in The Tigers in india ((1 909) 2000), James presents the essential elements of a pragmatic conception of the aboutness. Thus, the expression ‘ugers in India’ is solely a ‘name’ of a relation of fitting between idea and object. Such an expression does not mean ‘self-transcendence’ or ‘presence in absence’ of the mental content as an explanation of a particular type of existence, James's pragmatic conception of the aboutness displays the characteristics of a deflationary understanding of the mental content, He anticipates the criticism of the traditional view of the aboutness (or intentionality) as an intrinsic property of ours ideas (or mental states), For him, the mind is not a sort of container and our ideas are not unchanging entities. Once more, just like in his Principle of Psychology, James sees mind as a process and he is among the first to use the term ‘process’ in relation to conscious life (MeDermott 197, xxv) Unequivocally, immediate or intuitive knowledge is also an illustrative example that there is no ‘presence in absence’, As demonstrated by the example of the white paper before our eyes, both the object and the idea are indistinguishable. So, according to James {1909} 2000, 144), contrary to representational knowledge, in the immediate or intuitive knowledge, ‘the object seen’ and “to see the object’ are only two ‘names’ for a single ‘indivisible fact’ that is designated ‘datum, phenomenon or experience’: To know immediately, then, or intuitively. is for mental content and abject to be identical James [1909] 2000, 144-5). Subsequently, considering James's conception of the immediate or intuitive knowledge, we can identify mental content and object in that we are not concerned with a relationship of two locations. Such a conception of knowledge represents a form of adverbialism.? In fact, for example, the ‘object seen’ and ‘to see the object’ of an experience could be formed in the same way that pain is formed, That is, pain is not distinct from the experience of pain nor it is a distinct property of experience. In principle, the phenomenon of pain does not have a reference to a transcendental object. Accordingly, an adverbialist conception of mental content involves a two-fold aspect of experience and not the relation between (wo locations. The paradigmatic case of an adverbialist conception of the mental content of experience is qualia. Indeed, qualia illustrates well James's conception of the immediate or intuitive knowledge in that mental content and object are identified. Additionally, in “Does consciousness exist?” [1912], one of the Essays on Radical Empiricism, James affirms that experience does not have an internal duplicity and that consciousness is a function: experience flows and, from tt, conscious states emerge. Accordingly, as a function of experience, consciousness is a relation or conjunction between terms (such as subject and40 Arthur Araujo object). The first term corresponds to the role of knowing and the second to the role of what is known, Consciousness is function-like, not substantial or entity-like, From James's perspective, as a function, consciousness means a relationship between terms and it does not involve internal duplicity between, thought and object. If consciousness means something or is intentional. it does not follow that it has an internal duplication of the mental content In comparison, considering the organism's Umwelt, it is undoubtedly an Intentional structure: the world is of and for the organism. In the organism's Umwelt, the aboutness indicates a particular form of perceiving and acting and it is not a representation or internal duplicity of contents, Just like in James's pragmatic conception of fitting between idea and object, Uexkill’s notion of Umwelt also displays the characteristics of a deflationary view on the aboutness. Surely, it is possible to find between James and Uexkull a pragmatic conception of aboutness if this conception means to deflate the internal duplicity of contents. Besides, according to Peirce and James, there is no non-relational idea. $0, regarding a conception of meaning, James has an externalist view. And as a cognition is always inferred from a previous cognition (Peirce [1868] 1966, 36), meaning is externally determined. Equally, Uexkill has an externalist view on meaning. Although the organism is a sort of monadic entity, it is not isolated from the world due to the fact that Umwelt is necessarily a coupling between organism and world, Therefore, according to Uexkiil’s theory of Umwelt, meaning is not an internal representation of the world, As a form of acting on the world, meaning can just be determined externally. The idea here is that there is meaning without representation.* 5. Pragmatism and pluralism: an outline of a philosophy of organism Although James's conception of truth has been a target of criti a stimulating theory of meaning. Insofar as James attributes a functional property to truth, a statement is true if it enables an effective interaction with the world. Thus, something is true means that it ‘works’ or ‘performs’ a “marriage function’ of interaction with the world (ames [1907] 2000, 33) James states that if an idea is true it means that it ts productive in our lives and it is good: “an idea is “true” so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives, That itis good, for as much as it profits, you will gladly admit’ James, (1907) 2000, 37) Considering that the meaning of sruth is always a dynamic relation between idea and world, James states that the cruth is not a stagnant ism, it revealsWilliam James and Jakob von Uexkiill a property, This is the ‘pragmatist thesis’ of the meaning of truth that is advocated by James ‘Truth happens to an idea It becomes true, is made true by ‘events, Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation. James ([1907] 2000, 88) Interestingly, James breaks with the substantialist notion of truth and claims that truth is an event of process. Similarly, Whitehead ([1927-1928) 1978) affirms a ‘process philosophy’ or ‘organic philosophy’. He replaces the traditional notion of ‘substance’ or ‘being’ as an invariable and static reality with a dynamic worldview, Whitehead views reality as process, In effect, from, the perspective of process or organic philosophy, the world is a composition of levels that overlap dynamically. Instead of ‘being’, process or organic philosophy aims to ‘becoming’. James anticipates such a view in his ‘empiricism in that reality is viewed as changing James [1909] 1977, 301) ‘Thus, process or organic philosophy displays the characteristics of a pluralistic worldview as anticipated by James in his empiricism and his conception of truth as process. After establishing James's pragmatist thesis regarding the meaning of truth, las event or process, it is important to emphasize what it means to argue about the process of verification of an idea. If an idea is true, itis true because the idea has practical consequences and agrees so to speak with reality Surely, the notion of ‘agreement’ does not involve a realist interpretation of the relationship between idea and reality as an objective content of thought From James's pragmatist perspective, ‘to agree” means ‘to conduct’, and if an idea has practical consequences, it conducts our thought. The verification of an idea is a function of conduct: “This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification’ (James [1907] 2000, 89). In comparison, it is important to note here that considering Uexkull’s theory of Umwelt, if an object is significant, it is because it has practical consequences for the organism. That is, the object means something that agrees with the organism’s Umwelt and, consequently, its meaning can be verified ‘According to James, ideas correspond to or copy reality. However, this, statement does not mean that ideas are representations as argued by the traditional correspondence theories, Accordingly, sf an idea copies reality, it does not follow that it is a representation of reality. As an epistemological alternative (o realism and idealism, for James, sf an idea copies reality, it conducts us to what is “useful” James [1907] 2000, 94). Equally, for Uexkall, if ‘an object is meaningful, itis useful and it conducts the organism's action. For that reason, Uexkill’s theory of meaning has nothing to do with the idea of object representation. The object means what has practical consequence for the organism and itis all that it can mean.2 Arthur Araujo ‘Thus, considering James’s concept of the meaning of truth as process, if an idea is true, it becomes something useful in life ‘Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification: process, Just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth Strength are made, in the course of experience. ames [1907] 2000, 96) From the pragmatic conception of truth redefined as process, i follows a pluralistic view of meaning. Incidentally, as James emphasises ((2000] 1909, 7), empiricism favours a pluralistic view in the sense that it seeks to explain the whole by means of the parts. That is, there is only one world of experiences and the meaning of the world follows from countless parts. Each. part is a form of perception and action as claimed by Uexkill and the world. as whole is a process of meaning, In sum, James and Uexkail’s conceptions of meaning can be understood as an outline of a philosophy of organism in the sense that the organism's activities means process. Incidentally, ‘process’ means what James designates the ‘immediate flow of life’ or ‘pure experience’, Thus, the world is a process In which life and experience overlap. In the The Thing and its relations, James argues as follows adopted in a general way the common-sense belief that the one and same world is cognized by our different minds [...] The usual given reason for its being absurd is that it assumes one object (Lo wit, the world) to stand in two relations at once, to my mind, namely. and again to yours; whereas a term taken in a second relation cannot logically be the same which it was at first James [1909] 2000, 355-4) Similarly, Uexkiil’s theory of Umwelt favours a pluralistic worldview in that the one and same world can be cognized by different organisms. That is, in. accordance with the premises of continuity and pluralism in Uexkill’s theory of Umwelt, as I called them previously, organism and world are continuous and parts of a process and all process has no one single point of view. In concluston, according to James and Uexkill’s conceptions of meaning, | presented a combination of elements of pragmatism and pluralism for sketching the outlines of a philosophy of organism in that meaning is to be understood as process.William James and Jakob von Uexkiill 4a Bibliography Araijo, Arthur, “Qualia © Umwelt (Qualia and Umwelt)" Revista de Filosofia Aurora, Curitiba, Vol. 22, 30 Janijun, 41-68, 2010 (hutp.d/www2.puepr briteollindex. phpiRF?dd = 258). Araiijo, Arthur. “Significacao sem representacao: a Teoria da Significacao de Jakob von Uexkall [Meaning without representation. Jakob von Uexkil’s Theory of Meaning)” Ciéncia e Cognigdo — revista interdisciphinar de estudos da cogniedo, Rio de Janeito, Vol. 17, n. 2, 98-114, 2012 (hutp:/iwww.cienciasecognicao.orgirevistalindex.php! ceclarticlelview!796), Berthoz Alain and Petit, Jean-Luc, Phénoménologie et Physiologie de I'Action Paris. Odile Jacob, 2006 Berthoz Alain and Christen, Yves. Neurobiology of Umwelt: how living beings perceive the world Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009. Brentano, Franz, Psychology from an empirical point of view. Translation by Antos C. Rancurello, D, B. Terrell and Linda McAlister. New York: Routledge, 2005, James, William. The Wrintings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. Edited by John J. McDermott, Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1977. James, William’ Pragmatism and other writings. New York: Penguin Books, 2000, James, William. A Pluralistic Universe. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1909. James, William. “Are we automata ?" [Mind, 4, 1-22, 1879] Green, Christopher D, Classics in the History of Psychology. New York: 2003 (hutp.tfpsychelassics yorku.caljamesiautomata htt) MeDermott, John J, “Introduction.” In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1977 Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a bat 7” The Philosophical Review 82: 435-450, 1974. Nagel, Thomas, The view from nowhere, Oxford (USA): Oxford University Press, 1986. Peirce, Charles S. Selected Writings. New York Dover Publication, 1966. Rating, Torsten, “History and significance of Jakob von Uexkulll and of his institute in Hamburg.” Sign Systems Studies 32.1/2, 2004 Sharov, Alexei, "Towards the semiotic paradigm in biology.” Semiotica 1998, Issue’ 120, 405-419 Sharov, Alexei, "Umwelt theory and pragmatism." Semiotica 2001, 134: 211- 228 Sprigge, Timothy 1. "James, aboutness and his British critics.” In: The Cambridge Companion to William James, Edited by Anna Putnam, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1997 Sukhdeo Michael VK and Sukhdeo, S.C Trematode behaviours and the perceptual worlds of parasites, (htup:/)www nrcresearchpress.com Hdoifabs!10,1 139/203-2124 UISHZZI50w8)44 Arthur Araujo Uexkill, Jakob von, Theoretical Biology. New York: Harcourt, Brace & ‘Company, Inc., 1926. Uexkall, Jakob von. "A stroll through the worlds of animal and men.” In Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept. Edited by Claire H. Schiller. New York: International Universities Press, 1957. Whitehead, Alfred N. Process and Reality. An essay in cosmology. New York: The Free Press, 1978. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical investigations (PD. Translated by G. E. M Ascombe. Oxford (UK): Basil Black, 1958. Notes * An earlier version of this chapter was published in Cognitio-Estudos: Sdo Paulo, vol. 11, n. 2, 2014 faxpifrevistas pucsp brlindex.php/cogaitio! articlelview/t7208). 1 am grateful to the Cognitio's Editors for the permission to use that publication here 2 The notion of Umwelt implicitely defines ‘organism’ as an active being that is constituted by a world of perception and a world of action. > The article of James can be updated here as a critique of physicalism and functionalism in philosophy of the mind that deny the existence of the consciousness and its causal power respectively. ‘Nothing is commoner than to hear them speak of conscious events as something so essentially vague and shadowy as even doubtfully to exist at all | have heard a most intelligent [_.] biologist say: “It is high time for scientific men to protest against the recognition of any such thing as consciouness in a scientific investigation.” In a word, feeling constitutes the “unscientific” half of existence, and any one who enjoys calling himself a “scientist” will be too happy to purchase an untrammeled homogeneity of terms in the studies of his predilection, at the slight cost of admitting @ dualism which, int the same breath that it allows to mind an independent status of being banishes it to a limbo of causal inertness, from whence no intrusion or interruption on its part need ever be feared’ James 1897. 2). “On James and aboutness, see Sprigge 1997. © It is a type of adverbialism that appears among the new realists of the beginning of the 20th Century. That is, the conscious is not a relation between two locations or a duplication between the content of the mind and the content of the object. As I see. adverbialism becomes part of James's monism regarding the so-called mind-brain problem © on meaning without representation in Uexkull's theory of Umwelt, see Araujo 2012,