Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176278               June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate

ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting
Congress’ role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’
confirmation of nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s
lack of capacity to sue and mootness, 2 we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring
for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the
writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative
to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that
time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner
grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes
that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus,
respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA
officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition.

 First, they question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public
respondents) argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests
him with standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner
remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does
not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds.
 Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this
suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for
the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated
retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career
appointees such as respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and
mootness.

First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring
this suit.

We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues
of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.

Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and
resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised –

 the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy,

1
  a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and
 the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.

None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a
petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of
government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that
a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not
devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career
ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold
interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in
ensuring enforcement of the law.

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are
claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. 7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the
funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in
the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office
under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to
draw salary,8 negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds." 9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience." Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

2
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL

BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of
Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.

This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

After sometimes Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's  En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath
of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation
period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago
granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for
Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

ISSUE: W/N Mr. Argosino can take the lawyer’s oath and consequently enter in the practice of law?

W/N Mr. Argosino has a satisfied the requirement of good moral character in order to
practice law?

HELD: No.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high   personal privilege limited to citizens of  good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

3
In Re Farmer:  xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the

applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which
he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

3
 xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney
at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis

359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise
in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant
for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause
a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment
of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment
and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair
to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed
to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant
is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the
trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both
those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral

4
 character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if
the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great
calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission
to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears
that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that
in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to
show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish
his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life
and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed
trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death
like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence
that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar.

His evidence may consist, inter alia, of the following

 sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student
to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large.
 Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.

5
Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984

CARMEN E. BACARRO, complainant,
vs.
RUBEN M. PINATACAN, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

This case is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro charging
Ruben M. Pinatacan a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack
of proper character required of a member of the Bar.

In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love and became
engaged while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; that when she
became pregnant as a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his
promise to marry her; that on December 4, 1971, she gave birth to a baby girl; that because of
respondent's betrayal, complainant, her daughter and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral
distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the
Bar.

Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit admitted that complainant had
been his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of
complainant's child. He claimed that his relationship with complainant started to cool down in
January of 1971 when, over her vigorous objection and opposition, he applied for a direct
commission with the Philippine Constabulary. He returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater
part of March, 1971, for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in June
of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again returned to
Cagayan de Oro City. On the other hand, as far as he knew, complainant was working from 1970-
1971 in Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent likewise denied that he ever promised marriage to
complainant and that he ever cohabited with her. 2

On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial Investigator for investigation, report
and recommendation. 3 Subsequently, however, upon complainant's request prompted by financial
difficulties on her part, she was allowed on July 27, 1976 to present her evidence before the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City. 4 Respondent failed to attend the hearings conducted by the City
Fiscal on August 30 and September 27, 1976 during which complainant presented her evidence,
both oral and documentary. 5

In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following facts:

After about a year of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while
they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual
intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to
Cebu City where they stayed for about a week.

They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his parents in his
hometown and make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came
back in May, 1971, but only to inform complainant that they could not get married because of his
parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that she was pregnant, he told her to have
an abortion.

Complainant refused and they had a quarrel Thereafter, she did not see or hear from respondent
until after the birth of their baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971.
Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a relationship with
respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with her to see respondent in Cavite City and the
latter promised to support the child. However, respondent did not make good his promise of support
so complainant went to see him again, and once more respondent made several promises, all of
which were never fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of Annie
Sarabillo. 6

Forming part of the records, aside from complainant's testimony, are the birth certificate of her child,
numerous letters written by respondent covering the period from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971
professing his everlasting love for complaint with assurances of his sincerity and loyalty, a letter
dated January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie whom complaint Identified as the sister of respondent,
and pictures of the child Maria Rochie with said Margie Pinatacan. 7

6
In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977, 8 respondent argued that based on the evidence
adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out
to bar him from taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, agreed with
respondent in a Report dated February 24, 1977, stating that "the intimacy between the parties in
this case is neither so corrupt or so immoral as to warrant the respondent's permanent exclusion
from the Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath. 9

On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating among others that he is to
recognize and give support or financial assistance to complaint 's child Maria Rochie although he
cannot make assurance that he could give such support or financial assistance immediately since he
is without a source of income. 10

Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, complainant submitted a sworn
statement expressing her adamant stand that respondent "is unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a
word of honor, not only for what he has done to me, but on several occasion in the past he had
made the same promise to support our child ..., he did not even give something to the child to buy a
candy during our several meetings ... when I tried to see him every now and then for the fulfillment of
his promise." Moreover, according to complainant, respondent's insistence that the child be aborted
proves his "utter disregard of moral values and (C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit or unsuitable
for the legal profession. Complainant stressed that she was notmotivated by revenge, for she was
aware that whatever fortunes respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as an heir,
but that after a serious and profound consideration of the matter, she was of the opinion that
"respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession." 11

By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity and
good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the
local civil registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and send the original thereof to
the complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court within ten (10) days after notice hereof. 12 On
October 19, 1979, respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the above Resolution. 13

From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there clearly appears no question that
the complainant and respondent had been sweethearts for several years, that during the said period
they have been sexually intimate with each other, and that the child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan
is the result of such pre-marital relations. Respondent, however, maintains that even admitting the
truth of complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other do not
justify his disqualification from the practice of law.

One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be
of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards
and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess
good moral character. 15 "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community,
looked up to as a model citizen" 16 He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect
for the law, but also for his clean living. 17 Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through
a law course and passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a
member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to
pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that
he has measured up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen
vocation.

In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan 18 against successful 1971
Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite
morality for admission to the Bar"for violating the honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with
both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor.

As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high
moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically
submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and brought her to
another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion When complainant
refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child
born out of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent merely
made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all these, respondent had the
audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by
complaint.

These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are
indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of
being a lawyer were truly well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment
and retribution enough. Moreover, considering that respondent has legally recognized and

7
acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has
undertaken to give financial support to the said child, 19 We hold that he has realized the
wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. Likewise, We
reiterate what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro 20 that "in offenses of this character, the
blame hardly belongs to the man alone."

In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission
to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance
with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

8
December 7, 1928

In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

Felipe del Rosario in his own behalf.

City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing
with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and action. It is
recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of
attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report
has been permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the
setting aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore ordered by the court.

Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925.
He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain
the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of
his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting
in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being
conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged
in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and
Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del
Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.

The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The
court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public
documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself
demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit
Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional
purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of
the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas
[1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex
parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.)1awphi1.net

The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved,
and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney's
certificate to the clerk of this court.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

9
B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE

2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with

the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

10
 It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required
by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn
or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District
in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission
of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the

11
 Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service
therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,
but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard
would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet
that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found
the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions

upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

12
G.R. No. 585 December 14, 1979

EMILIA E. ANDRES, petitioner,
vs.
STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a successful
bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from membership in the Bar is
pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required to show cause why he should not be
cited and punished for contempt of court.

The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the
persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's
admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of
respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite,
courteous and civil language.

The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres,
Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral
character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of
being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing
baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.

It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate the
administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the respondent, against one,
Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region
IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the
charge even as the records of two relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at
the hearing, notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed
the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public documents, and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the investigator.

Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera wherein Atty.
Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language used by respondent, as
shown in the following excerpts:

9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the
product of moronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and
unauthorized document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent
search tor the aforesaid document when according to the moronic excuse of the
Chief of the said office which took over the functions of the defunct WCC considering
that it is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of cases before conducting a
diligent search unless both are morons with regards to their public office ...
(emphasis supplied).

10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr.,
Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal
conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis
supplied).

... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured
evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of
her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed
to affix her signature to further aggravate matters said manufactured evidence
was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and
Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to
the discharge of public functions ... (emphasis supplied)

The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the criminal cases
against the petitioner such as the following:

13
 Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator

another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public

functions moronically failed to affix her signature

said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by

respondents

idiotic receiving clerk of CAR

unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent

On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to disqualify him
from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-taking be held in abeyance
until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's
Office against the petitioner but he claims that his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to
the simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable
motives pursuant to respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from
being absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that "Atty.
Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public functions by
complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."

The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and February 22, 1978
for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11, 1978 addressed to then Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very words "some semblance of justice from the
Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August
17, 1978 making reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and
inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court
does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus — "A victim of the Court's inhuman and
cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."

We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for investigation,
report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting on said report, the Court
resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and
has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on
September 3, 1979 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to
reinvestigate the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before
the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion.

On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court, praying the
Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court, alleging that her false
and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and obnoxious acts during the investigation
impeded, obstructed and degraded the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion,
he states:

2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is
a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of
legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J.
Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is
authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the
transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of
the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of
law; (emphasis supplied).

We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's previous Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:

4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a
degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal
foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla,
whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by
his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of
this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and neutral
impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of law: (emphasis
supplied).

14
We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language used by him in
praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment commensurate to the
humiliation and vomitting injustice undersigned respondent-movant suffered and still suffering from
this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres' wanton dishonesty."

It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the Court's
admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative language before the
Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, 1979 to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979 wherein he tried
to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous
and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October
16, 1979.

Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 and
answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner:

3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27,
1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent
charges that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the
administration of justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority.
nor to scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, but was
an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration out of respondent's
inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation at the
illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator
Victor Sevilla, both members of the Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of
the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearings conducted by
Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted; (emphasis supplied).

We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to the use of
polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and on his solemn word
of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the)
Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity, dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such
apology and disavowal appear to be in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth
contends that his statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of respondent's inability
to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation of the illegalities perpetrated
by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla."

Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold
thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law
already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to
the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is
likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath
solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client.

The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits at law as
well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary to maintain respect
for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. Under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the
reason is that respect for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such
guaranty, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority.

Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the very words,
phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They speak for themselves in
their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's direct reference to the Court on
the ..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily
bestowed" upon him, that "the Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the
Court's inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering

15
"humiliation and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are
false, sham and unfounded.

'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution deferring
oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful insolent
language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the
dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed contempt
of this Court.

WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby sentenced
to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of fifty (50) days.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

16
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner, 

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of
the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are
given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978,    the vote
1

being unanimous with the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it
"is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion."  2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not
be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29.
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ...
Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On
March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for
hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in
Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.  4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.   It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case
5

before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973.   The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was
6

that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become
an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 
7

17
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered,
there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would
be denied. So it turned out.   It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic
8

juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since
respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance
arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was
more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible.   The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
9

invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former
clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years
had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and
paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,   the power to discipline,
10

especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. 
11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

18
 [G.R. No. 37386. September 19, 1933.]
ANDRES JAYME, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BUALAN, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Cornelio Reta and Romualdo C. Quimpo, for Appellants.
Jayme & Jayme, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 29 APPLIED;

COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS. — When the relationship of attorney and client is
evidenced by a written contract for services, it should ordinarily control the amount of
the recovery by the lawyer if found by the courts not be unconscionable or
unreasonable. This is so when an attorney is one party to a contract stipulating the
amount of the compensation he is to receive, and a client of ordinary intelligence and
business acumen is the other party agreeing to this amount; under such circumstances,
the courts should give effect to the contract, and if the attorney has performed the task
assigned to him, should determine his compensation on the basis of the contract. But
the situation is not the same when on one side there is an attorney with professional
knowledge of his rights and of the technicalities of the law, and on the other side an
ignorant non-Christian of whose rights the law takes tender care.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a
lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally:
(1) The importance of the subject matter of the controversy, (2) the extent of the
services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the legal profession is
a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-making trade. (Code of
Legal Ethics, Canon No. 12.)

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT CASE. — Bagobos employed an attorney to recover

possession of their land from two previous attorneys of the Bagobos, and to accomplish
the same the attorney drafted and filed a complaint and brought the suit to an amicable
conclusion, thus securing the return of property worth approximately P100,000 to the
Bagobos, it being further shown that the attorney has exercised the duties of his
profession since 1908. The attorney having received P7,020 from the Bagobos, it is held
that the latter should not be condemned to pay anything more.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:

This case furnishes eloquent proof of how clients, in this instance ignorant Bagobos, can
be passed on from lawyer to lawyer in a seemingly endless treadmill of litigation
without ever reaching finality and a vindication of legal rights. The particular judgment
appealed from by the Bagobos purported to award their former attorney P15,000 for
professional services.

In 1921, Bagobo Bualan and companions secured Attorneys Juan A. Sarenas and
Domingo Braganza to represent them in a case against one Ciriaco Lizada for the
possession of land. The action was successfully maintained in the Court of First
Instance and in the Supreme Court. 1 Nevertheless the attorneys appear to have taken
over control of the land presumably to protect their attorney’s fees. In view of this
situation Bagobo Bualan and others engaged the services of Attorney Andres Jayme to
institute another action to recover possession of their land and confirmed this in
writing. Issues were joined, but an amicable settlement was entered into by Attorney
Jayme and Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, whereby the Bagobos were to be given
the land, they to pay to Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza the sum of P6,000, and this
agreement was judicially confirmed. In this connection it should be stated that the
amount of P6,000 was apparently received from Japanese tenants to cancel the

19
indebtedness of Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, but for reasons known to the
attorney for the Bagobos, the major part of this money went into his pocket instead,
thus necessitating the execution of a mortgage in order to cancel this claim. As a
matter of fact, Attorney Jayme received P1,270 as proved by the receipt Exhibit 3 and
P5,750 as proved by the receipt Exhibit 4, or a total of P7,020. About the same time,
Bagobo Bualan signed by a mark a promissory note in the amount of P15,000 in favor
of Attorney Jayme. As related to the foregoing facts, it is the contention of the
appellants that the services of the attorney are only worth P1,270 which he had
received, and that he should be ordered to return to them the sum of P5,750 which he
secured as a loan and not in payment of his fees.

The relationship of attorney and client is here evidenced by a written contract for
services which, in accordance with section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should
ordinarily control the amount of the recovery by the lawyer if found by the courts not to
be unconscionable or unreasonable. With an attorney as one party to a contract
stipulating the amount of the compensation he is to receive, and a client of ordinary
intelligence and business acumen as the other party agreeing to this amount, the courts
should give effect to the contract and if the attorney has performed the task assigned
to him, should determine his compensation on the basis of the contract. But the
situation is not the same when on one side there is an attorney with professional
knowledge of his rights and of the technicalities of the law and on the other side an
ignorant non-Christian of whose rights the law takes tender care. In this instance, to do
justice to Attorney Jayme, it should be explained that he does not rely entirely on the
contract between him and the Bagobos, but is considerate enough to ask for the
valuation of his services on the basis of quantum meruit.

The elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services

rendered by a lawyer are generally: (1) The importance of the subject matter of the
controversy,(2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing
of the lawyer. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 29; Code of Legal Ethics, Canon No. 12;
Delgado v. De la Rama [1922], 43 Phil., 419.) Speaking to these elements, there is
evident a wide difference of opinion as to the value of the property involved in the case
which Attorney Jayme handled, the attorney claiming that it is worth P200,000 and this
being the finding of the trial judge, and the appellants claiming that the land is worth
something like P30,000. All facts considered, probably a happy medium, or
approximately P100,000, would be a fair approximation of the total value of the land
and its improvements. As to the services rendered by Attorney Jayme, they consisted in
drafting and filing a complaint and bringing the suit to an amicable conclusion and in
drafting and acknowledging a mortgage, although this latter document may have been
unnecessary. Finally, except that it was alleged in the complaint and not denied that
Attorney Jayme has exercised the duties of his profession since 1908, and is an
attorney with sufficient business to be known to the courts, we have no other data like
expert testimony to go on. All elements considered, and it being admitted that the
attorney has already received P7,020, although the proper application of P5,750 is
challenged by appellants, we think that Attorney Jayme has been sufficiently
compensated by the receipt of these P7,020, and that the Bagobos should not be made
to pay anything more. Before concluding, may we be permitted to express the hope
that present counsel for the Bagobos, Messrs. Reta and Quimpo, will not follow in the
devious path of their predecessors, necessitating further litigation to settle their fees,
and that as counselled in the Code of Legal Ethics, "in fixing fees it should never be
forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-making trade."
cralaw virtua1aw library

In consonance with the foregoing pronouncements, the judgment of the trial court will
be reversed, and the plaintiff will take nothing on his complaint and the defendants will
take nothing on their counterclaim, neither party to recover costs from the other. So
ordered.

Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull and Imperial, JJ., concur.

20
A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao)  had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
— which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but
he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to
a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his
army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary
to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 
1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the
Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..

21
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY.

PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by complainant Patrick A.

Caronan (complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly
assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the
required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the
practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio 2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A.
Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975,
while complainant was born on August 5, 1976. 3 Both of them completed their
secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in
19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in
1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. 7 In 2001, he married
Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters. 8 Through the years, complainant
rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11
Store in Muntinlupa.9 chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan

ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992. 10 In 1993, he was discharged from the
PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he
moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children. 11 Since
then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree. 12 chanrobleslaw

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that
the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya. 13 Subsequently, in 2004, their
mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he
used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at
St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse
consequences to him.15 chanrobleslaw

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity
when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar
displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City. 16 Nevertheless, complainant did not
confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to
support.17 chanrobleslaw

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant
was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon
arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting
his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving
respondent who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud

22
and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to
identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's
records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of
Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of
Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph
under the name "Patrick A. Caronan." 19 Complainant later learned that the reason why
he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for
qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding. 20 chanrobleslaw

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit
unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is
the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with
complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent. 22 On the other hand, a fellow church-
member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives. 23 Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in
Taguig City when in fact, he was not. 24 Further, he learned that respondent was
arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang  (BP) 22.25 cralawredchanrobleslaw

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan,"
complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. 26 He also became the
subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign
from his job at PSC. 27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of
law.28
chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res
judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an
issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which
case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her
spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against
them before the Ombudsman.33 chanrobleslaw

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where
both parties failed to appear. 34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April
20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order 36 directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37 chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera

(Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation, 38 finding
respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and
academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. 40 On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."41 chanrobleslaw

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when
he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.43 chanrobleslaw

23
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012
shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that
respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor
of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar;
and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to
institute appropriate actions against respondent. 47 chanrobleslaw

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-
607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A.
Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and

overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent,
whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity,
and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a
law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings
when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo. 49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 52 Meanwhile, complainant
submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan,"
among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55 chanrobleslaw

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used
complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since
complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A.
Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6.  Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the
course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political
science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

24
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled
at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged
in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-
law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his
college education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false
assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit
for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it is a privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification
of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court
explained the essence of good moral character:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by
the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own
brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear
for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is imperative in the nature
of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as
well as between him and the court.62 chanrobleslaw

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his
alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and
dignity.63 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"

(respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and
take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any

representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in

the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED;
and  cralawlawlibrary

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in

the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine
Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated

25
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno C.J. Carpio,Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, and  Reyes, JJ., on official leave.

B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of
his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
1 

a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
2 

profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice. 3

It cannot be overstressed that:

26
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.  It is so delicately affected with public
1âwphi1

interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents
in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE
Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended
that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the

condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

1 

contrary notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

27
 Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE

2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with

the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

28
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required
by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks

29
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn
or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District
in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission
of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service
therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,
but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard
would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet
that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found
the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions

upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

30
A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where
the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a
retired member of the Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court
of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct. 1

After an answer  and a reply  were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its
2 3

Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice
Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent,
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the
contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of
attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent
facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his
disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:

Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City,
while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti
Crime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced
Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo
Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil
wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977,
when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila,

31
 was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then,
respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After
the wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception
over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8,
Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time,
she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with
insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such
caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number".
What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point
when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto
ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it
burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave
in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and
respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her
expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for
what happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the
complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible
Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A.
Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news,
complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6,
1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against

respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").

Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was
offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a
marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as
SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and
indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also
presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");
Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and
Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her
(complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant
on January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in
fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge
Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher,
Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his
marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with
Librada Peña, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of
such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was
not yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peña
having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect
was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding
respect and dignity.  He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the
4

decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained
finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman,
Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that
his previous marriage had been annulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his
actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes
and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety
and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary
lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with
all the necessary legal requisites.
5

32
On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice
Purisima which we quote with approval:

That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a
Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to
solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he
could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law
and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage
under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who
must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer;
authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a
"sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent,
he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of
immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I
do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were
present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by
law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to
contract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of
argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the
marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to
non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance,
alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage
between complainant and respondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage
with Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took
Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle
of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second
marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña was subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not
respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a
crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the
Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with
complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible
conclusion is — that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a
member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the
immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against
her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in
resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge.
Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong
cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said
administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.
complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery
thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the
sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the
defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7,
1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability
for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness
for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition

33
precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.  Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
6

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct
during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably
ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of
commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty
in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a
punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral
conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING
that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense
hereafter.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban
and Torres, Jr., J.J., concur.

B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989

EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
B.M. No. 59 February 10, 1989
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 624 February 10, 1989
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, complainants,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Alberto Concha for Eufrosina Yap Tan.
Nelbert Poculan for respondent.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending
administrative complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath. He then
filed a Petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Rollo of Attorneys.
The complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan, Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D.
Agnis, opposed the Petition on several grounds.

In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983, respondent's petition was

denied, the Court finding, inter alia, that:

... the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While
respondent's infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR
Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in
CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the opposing counsel had
objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit "A-l"). He called
himself "attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar.
Oppositors evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an
"attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors.
Respondent cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily
asked for rectification. ... Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings
wherein witnesses testified as to respondent's being their lawyer and their
compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9"). It may be that in the
Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). If respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he
did, however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station
Commander of Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients." when he could not
but have known that he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument

34
 that the term "client" is "dependent or person under the protection of another and not
a person who engages in the profession" is puerile. (126 SCRA 60, at 67 & 68)

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was filed by respondent on 23 January
1984, which was opposed by Complainants, who stated that the "span of time was so short to
determine with sufficient definiteness whether or not respondent has reformed;" that "the
testimonials are self-serving obviously prepared by respondent himself and had them signed by the
signatories who could not refuse him." In its Resolution of 8 May 1984 the Court denied
reconsideration.

On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his prayer to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which was again opposed by Complainants, and which was denied
by the Court on 16 July 1985, with the Court stating that no other Motions of this kind would be
entertained.

Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed another Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal
for Mercy and Forgiveness, which the Court simply NOTED in its Resolution of 7 January 1986.

In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent's children echoed his appeal to the Court to allow him
to take the lawyer's oath, which the Court noted without action on 7 July 1987.

On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
Complainants were required to comment but they have not done so to date.

In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this
Court, respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given
a chance to be a member of the Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer's oath and
conduct himself in an upright manner.

Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the
sound discretion of the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character, fit and proper to practice law.

In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following criteria
were considered: the person appreciates the insignificance of his dereliction and he has assured the
Court that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is
worthy to be restored to the practice of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97
SCRA 1); the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement, his
good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in civic,
educational, and religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the
favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government
officials and citizens of his community (In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of
his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29, 1984, 127 SCRA 802).

The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent's case. After the lapse of ten (10)
years from the time respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar Examination, he has shown contrition
and willingness to reform. He has also submitted several testimonials, including one from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath, with
the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language,
meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

35
 THIRD DIVISION 

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to

terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

36
 On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January
25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, " Free Postage
- PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"  in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
3

Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,  Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
5

comment thereon.  He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
6

confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his

37
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.  He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
7

he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);  and 8

as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."   He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
10

and friend.   He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
11

completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated;   He says Alawi somehow got his
12

GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.  13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he
does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.  14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his)
rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.  15

38
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)  inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service.   Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all
16

times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."   More than once has this
17

Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
the public for the judiciary." 
18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to
be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone;
in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."   Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
19

downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to
a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.   As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights
20

of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts.   While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
21

one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,   the record contains
22

no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.

39
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154207             April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure
questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137,
which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705; 1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5,
2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court
En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts
as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was
with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear
as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,

40
does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule
is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent
and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a
Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that
the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted
de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner
argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And
last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the
appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even
without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner
filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of
the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a
Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had
already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE
PETITIONER HAVING ESTABLISHED THE NECESSITY OF GRANTING THE WRIT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF

THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and
WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S). 4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5

41
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice
and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of
his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation
in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to
"In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus: 8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied) which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6,
Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
the petitioner’s appearance.

42
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not possible. It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the
RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not
provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor
appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The
basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the
civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats
is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully
intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public
prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19450             May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

43
 The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend
to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits. 1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation
of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

44
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 6788               August 23, 2007

(Formerly, CBD 382)

DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Complaint

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in
filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. 2 She gave
respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only. 3

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He
would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her
₱350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked
to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact
employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5

Respondent's Defense

45
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very
start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the
complainant's daughter.6

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent,
he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who
was a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was
unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. 10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal,
the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that
she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while
she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. 11

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of
her daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
1992.13

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. 14 A few months later or in September 1994,
the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he
was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was
unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant. 15

Recommendation of the IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November
22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. 16

The CBD noted that the receipt 17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the
PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and
that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have
accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's
claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. 19 It found respondent guilty of
violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's
fees other than their salaries. 20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered
him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the
receipt.21

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated
Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the
CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional
suspension of six months.22

The Court's Ruling

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. 23 More specifically, lawyers
in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject
to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.24

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

46
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function. 25

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15,
1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship.26 Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant
and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the
complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was
still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for
the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. 27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. 28

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this
was inconsistent with the office's mission. 29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting
legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. 30 This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's
cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from
acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it
appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for
hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath
not to do any falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high

47
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. 32
1avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant
but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such
as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the
client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not
entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them. 35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal
rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

48