LOCAL OFFICIALS
matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;[83] and (b) the
Doctrine of Condonation
1. MORALES vs CA and JEJOMAR BINAY SR.
 petition for certiorari and prohibition
 assailing: (a) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay,
Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against the implementation of the Joint Order of the Ombudsman
in preventively suspending him and several other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6)
months without pay; and (b) the Resolution dated March 20, 2015
of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
 On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty.
Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of
the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building (Makati Parking Building).
 As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved
in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of
Makati:
 Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of
the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since:
(a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor
of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his
first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against
him moot and academic.[61] In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that
the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that
the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining
that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.
 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to
grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,
[82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no
injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's
investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject
CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be
subjected to contempt proceedings
ISSUE: the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation
doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from
administrative liability.
RULING:
 The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of
complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein
elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of
Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
 this Court has now uncovered that there is really no
established weight of authority in the United States (US)
favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of
Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right
to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior
term
 , the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous
cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms.
 since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has
radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided
under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not
reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in
setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for
Pascual's judicious re-examination.
 What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the
basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and
still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was
lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply
supported by their own state laws
 , Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it
was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which
was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the
nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the
1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public
 office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of
the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment
of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service
 Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited
legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
 To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and
the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there
is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction
to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
 Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said
official to still run for re-election
 , nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local
official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of
re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
 In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude
that election automatically implies condonation.
 In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were
all relied upon by the CA.
2. ABUNDO vs COMELEC
 Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo,
Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the Resolution of the
Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and (2) the
May 10, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc affirming that
division’s disposition The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55
declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to
run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit
as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
 For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004,
2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
 In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed
as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor.
 In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May
9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or
for a period of a little over one year and one month.
 Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres
again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run,
the corresponding petition
 the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor
o To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a
complete and full service of Abundo’s second term as
mayor
 the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the
strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired
portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an
election protest is considered as service for one full term within the
contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three
consecutive terms
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected
official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an
election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
RULING:
the petition meritorious
 The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s
three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken
during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title
to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to
which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have
been the rightful choice of the electorate.
 To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office
pursuant to the Three-term-limit rule constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
 the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only
consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.
 There has to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of
the official after his or her third term.
 Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these
events or causes:
1. succession or assumption of office by operation of law,
2. preventive suspension- the period during which a local elected
official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an
interruption of the continuity of his service.
- temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of
an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an
effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss
of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office;
the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
3. declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election
contest,
4. declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest,
5. proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall
election- The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall
election, is no longer covered
6. removal of the official by operation of law, and
7. other analogous causes.
 the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an
interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service.
 the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of
terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and
the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules
on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot
be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the
official runs again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an
involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive
terms and who did not seek the elective position for what
could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election,
had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service.
For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo
and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion
of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt
the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the
elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although
he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during
this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption
need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part
of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the
continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said
decision becomes final after said official had served the full
term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve
the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits
because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
 Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the
individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in
the election protest and each declared loser during the elections,
Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was
declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post.
 Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.
 the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the
two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as
mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit
rule.
 Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain
his victory in his election protest against Torres and his
consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the
first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule
based on the three-term limit that the official has been
elected is satisfied.
 it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the
entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
 In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,
or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly
claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor
as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor
serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is
simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged
to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
 Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local
elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo
fully served the term 2004-2007.
 An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.67
 It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service
which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term
limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it
was interrupted.
 while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat
for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially
reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres).
Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full
2004-2007 term.
3. ALBANIA vs COMELEC
 petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure is the Resolution[1] dated August 24,
2016 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which
upheld the Resolution[2] dated April 22, 2016 of the COMELEC
Second Division dismissing the petition to deny due course to or to
cancel respondent Edgardo A. Tallado's Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for being filed out of time.
 In the 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A.
Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for the position
of Governor in Camarines Norte.
 After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed
as the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by
filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest
error.
 The Petition was decided[3] in respondent's favor on March 5,
2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor of
Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end
of the 2007-2010 term.
 Respondent ran again in the 2010[4] and 2013[5] National and
Local Elections where he won and served as Governor of
Camarines Norte respectively.
 On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of
Candidacy[6] as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May 9, 2016
National and Local elections.
 On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter of Poblacion
Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition[7] for respondent's
disqualification from running as Governor based on Rule 25 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523[8] on two grounds: (1) he violated
the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC);
and (2) respondent's suspension from office for one year without
pay, together with its accessory penalties, after he was found
guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in the
Ombudsman's Order[9] dated October 2, 2015.
 he denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully
serve three consecutive terms since he only served as Governor
for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.
 the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed
out of time. It ruled that a violation of the three-term limit rule
and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case
are not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law;
that the alleged violation of three-term limit rule is a ground for
ineligibility which constituted false material representation under
Section 78 of the OEC; and such petition must be filed within 25
 days from the time of filing of the COC, which respondent failed to service as Governor.[26] As he had not fully served the 2007-2010
do. term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as
 Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on the Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when
grounds that he allegedly violated the three-term limit rule he ran again in the 2016 elections.
provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he was  The Supreme Court has ruled in several occasions that in order for
suspended from office as a result of an administrative case. the ineligibility under the "three-term limit rule" to apply, two
Notably, however, a reading of the grounds enumerated under the conditions must concur: first, that the official concerned has been
above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Thus, the post; and second, that he has fully served three consecutive
COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found that the terms.
petition was not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as  since Respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term, it cannot
enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term
 While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a threshold. Consequently, Respondent cannot be said to have
ground for a petition for disqualification, however, the COMELEC continuously served as Governor for three consecutive terms prior
Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which is a proper to the 2016 elections.
ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence
considered the petition as such.
 Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy, such petition must be filed within
25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the
COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The
COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal.
 As the petition filed is indeed a petition under Section 78 of the
OEC, the filing of the same must comply with the period prescribed
therein, i.e., the filing of the same must be made not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy
 We held that two conditions must concur for the application of the
disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term
limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms
 while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007
elections, he did not win as such. It was only after he filed a
petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as
the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post and served the
unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June
30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term
of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such
period of time that respondent served as Governor did not
constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when
he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his