G.R. No.
L-18799 March 31, 1964 On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a petition for
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, ASUNCION
MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-
R) wherein, over their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took
cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence
thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of
the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla
who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir
and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased
Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was
not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and
Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the
deceased, for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late wife, Digna
Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of
the property subject of the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the
special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse
interest in the property subject of the Will, the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any
person other than the petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered,
for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the
surviving spouse of the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed
on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their
interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.
Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for
postponement, because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not
present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez,
and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed
from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the
removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his
appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules
of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of
Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him,
before said petition for his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët
appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar
petition February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix,
and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected
to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds that (a) the law allows only
one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from appointing Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4
of the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d)
a deadlock between two special administrators would ruin the management of the property, including
those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1)
Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions
of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order dictated
open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the
removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case
exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition,
respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and
the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case
does not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition)
prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over
the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00
more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla)
which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This
theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla
presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to
elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's
exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are
valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the
deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had
left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda.
de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was
taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount
or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31,
1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having
appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the
amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case,
which are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or value
involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's interest or
the value of the entire estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the
entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the amount or value of the
assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this
ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No.
27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4
thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the
inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than
P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special
administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or
value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value
of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original
jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or less",
as the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But
this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the estate, nor to an order
denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a
fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the
United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the
stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than
$5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts
decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases,
are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil
action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121
Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special
proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are
not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special
proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.
(See Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and not the
combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to,
the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or value
involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the
rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the
whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of
the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also
inapplicable, because unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977,
CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes
immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all cases which may be
erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court,
which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with
respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-
administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary
and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be
unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator,
another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the
community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in the event that the
disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all.
(Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy, it is
suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the
probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act on the
matter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one entered
also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by
his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the
plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said
petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2
August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate
of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private
respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of
the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two
cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7
Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for
the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also
filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in
her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified,
incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a
petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners
had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant
in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the
appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that
the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still
pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the
right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of
procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they
prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court
as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that
the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with
respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual
and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily
comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the
rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule
72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19
does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before
us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners
have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of
the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to
the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons
interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of
"any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest
in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which
requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to
persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties
of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for
an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either
satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then
they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued
by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto
were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of
the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the
records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully
impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this
Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they
were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are
granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what
extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with
guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action
for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same
trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property
years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of
her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil
case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the
intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered
the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close
the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of
the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their
desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings
and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is
justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does
not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close
interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings
pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying
the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general
jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to
close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is
but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be
part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if
we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs
x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a
few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the
effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision
on their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests
nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any
person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-
delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their
favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the
judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but
instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we
deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the
prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality
under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three
prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with
the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no
questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running
account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such
as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed,
embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their
ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the
Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then
anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished
such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that
would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate,
much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would
ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect
to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in
the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by
the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of
the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came
to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were
"interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and
appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears
legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they
have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons"
under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in
accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather
than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
"interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances
when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the
time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of
Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission
by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of
Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to
compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek
the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to
who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the
estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or
good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have
explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings
as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested
in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
G.R. No. 170243 April 16, 2008
NANCY H. ZAYCO and REMO HINLO in their capacity as judicial co-administrators of the Estate of
Enrique Hinlo, petitioners,
vs. ATTY. JESUS V. HINLO, JR.,** respondent.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the June 27, 2005 decision2 and October 27, 2005 resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82129.
After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his heirs filed a petition for letters of
administration of his estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Silay City, Branch
40. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special administratrix of Enrique's estate.
On December 23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators
in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties
as special administratrix.
On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and heir to his estate by
virtue of representation,3 filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an
urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique's estate.4 Petitioners opposed
both the petition and the motion.
In an order dated July 23, 2002,5 the RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners as co-administrators of
the estate of Enrique and directed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent on a
P50,000 bond. Respondent posted the required bond, took his oath as administrator and was issued letters
of administration.
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on August 2, 2002 and moved for its reconsideration
on August 9, 2002. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated July 23, 2003.6
Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2003 order on July 31, 2003 and filed a notice of appeal the
same day. They submitted a record on appeal on August 29, 2003.
In an order dated January 5, 2004,7 the RTC denied the notice of appeal and record on appeal. It ruled that
petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were interlocutory
and not subject to appeal. Even assuming that appeal was the proper remedy, it was filed late:
Granting [a]rguendo, that the Orders dated July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 maybe the subject of appeal,
the Notice of Appeal and the Record on Appeal were already filed out of time. Records will show that the
Order of this Court dated July 23, 2002 removing the former co-administrators were received by them on
August 2, 2002. Subsequently, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 9[, 2002] which was
denied by this Court in its Order dated July 23, 2003 and was received by them on July 31, 2003. A Notice
of Appeal was filed on July 31, 2003 but a Record on Appeal was only filed on August 29, 2003. The 30
days reglementary period to file an appeal in special proceedings started to run on August 2, 2002 when
[the] former [co-]administrators received the order of this Court and stopped to run when they filed their
Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again [on] July 31, 2003 when they received the order
denying their Motion for Reconsideration until they filed their Record on Appeal on August 29, 2003.
Thus, from August 2, 2002 to August 9, 2002, [the] former [co-]administrators already consumed a period
of 7 days and from July 31, 2003 to August 29, 2003, a period of 29 days[,] or a total of 36 days. x x x8
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioners challenged the January 5, 2004 RTC order in the CA by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. In a decision dated June 27, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition.9 It ruled that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the notice of appeal and record on appeal were in fact
filed beyond the prescribed period.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were
not appealable. They also claim that their notice of appeal and record on appeal were filed on time.
We agree.
An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of
the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate.10 It
is a final order and, hence, appealable.11
In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the record on
appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order.12
Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,13 the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be
reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion for reconsideration of the
July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30 days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of
appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 27, 2005 decision and October 27, 2005
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82129 affirming the January 5, 2004 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Silay City, Branch 40 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial court is hereby directed to approve the notice of appeal and record on appeal and, thereafter, to
forward the same to the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 186053 November 15, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA, represented by ZENAIDA SUMERA WATANABE, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe (Zenaida),
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of
birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 106-M-2007.1
In her petition, respondent alleged the following:
She was born on October 31, 19872 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese
father Koichi Nishina who were married on February 18, 1987.3 Her father later died.4 On July 19, 1989,
her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.5
As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondent’s mother caused the
late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mother’s second husband, "Hakamada."6
Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced.7
On May 29, 1996, her mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe,8 who later adopted her by a
decree9 issued by the Tokyo Family Court of Japan on January 25, 2001. The adoption decree was filed
and recorded in the civil registry of Manila in 2006.10
In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the
name "Nisaida Sumera Nishina,"11 hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her
second birth certificate bearing the surname "Hakamada," issued through late registration in 1993, be
cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname "Nishina" in the original birth certificate
be changed to "Watanabe."12
After hearing the petition, Branch 83 of the RTC, by Order13 of October 8, 2007, granted respondent’s
petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos "to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida
Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993 [bearing] Registry No. 93-06684 and to change it [in its stead] Registry
No. 87-04983, particularly the surname of [respondent] from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to
NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE."14
A copy of the October 8, 2007 Order was received on December 13, 2007 by the OSG which filed, on
behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.15
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss16 the appeal, alleging that petitioner
adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3,
Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No
record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. (A.M. No. 01-1-03- SC, June 19, 2001)
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis,
underscoring and italics supplied)
xxxx
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – x x x.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
xxxx
Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where
multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case.17
By Resolution18 of September 2, 2008, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s appeal, holding that
since respondent’s petition before the RTC "is classified as a special proceeding," petitioner should have
filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007
Order granting respondent’s petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner "never perfected" its
appeal.19
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution20 of December 22, 2008, petitioner filed
the present petition for review on certiorari.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special
proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz:
SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may appeal
in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to
which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any
claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A
record on appeal – in addition to the notice of appeal – is thus required to be filed as the original records of
the case should remain with the trial court21 to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.22
In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be
heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for
cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.1avvphil
The appellate court’s reliance on Zayco v. Hinlo, Jr.23 in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
is misplaced. In Zayco which was a petition for letters of administration of a deceased person’s estate, the
decedent’s children appealed the trial court’s order appointing the grandson of the decedent as
administrator of the estate. Their notice of appeal and record on appeal were denied due course by the trial
court on the ground that the appealed order is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. But even if the
appeal were proper, it was belatedly filed. On certiorari by the decedent’s children, the appellate court
sustained the trial court. On petition for review, this Court reversed the appellate court, holding that "[a]n
order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the
parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate," hence,
the order is "final" and "appealable."24 The Court also held that the appeal was filed on time.
In Zayco, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the proceedings before
the trial court involved the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate– matters
covered by Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals could, and did in that case, call for them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 2008 and
December 22, 2008 in CA G.R. CV No. 90346 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appeal of
petitioners before the appellate court is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROBERT P. NARCEDA, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ.:
The present case stems from a Petition for Review1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
praying for the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 14 November 2007 and its
subsequent Resolution3 dated 29 April 2008. The CA dismissed the appeal of petitioner, because it
supposedly lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter. It held that the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
of Balaoan, La Union (RTC) declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda (Marina) was
immediately final and executory, "because by express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not
appealable."5
Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract6 he
presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old.
According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since.7 There
was never any communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several
years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him
that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.8
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry,9 respondent filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a
Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.10
The RTC granted respondent’s Petition in a Decision11 dated 5 May 2005, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH of MARINA B. NARCEDA for all legal intents and purposes of law as provided for in Rule 131,
Sec. 3(w-4), Rules of Court, without prejudice to the effect of re-appearance of the absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence
required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-founded" belief that she was dead.13
The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death
is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI thereof.14 Article 247
of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be
immediately final and executory. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT on the
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION, and this Court hereby reiterates the fact that the RTC
Decision is immediately final and executory because by express provision of law, the judgment of the
RTC is not appealable.
SO ORDERED.15
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through the CA’s 29 April 2008
Resolution.16
Petitioner now comes to this Court, through Rule 45, alleging as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.17
2. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead.18
The OSG insists that the CA had jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, because respondent had failed to
establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse was dead.19 The OSG cites Republic v. CA
(Jomoc),20 in which this Court ruled:
By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a
valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following
above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
xxxx
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding
under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls
for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed. (Emphasis in the original)21
The CA points out, however, that because the resolution of a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural rules to be followed are those enumerated in Title XI
of the Family Code. Articles 238, 247, and 253 thereof read:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply
as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents
involving parental authority.
xxxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
xxxx
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
The appellate court argues that there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code, because the judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Article 247, are immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.22 In
support of its stance, it cited Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino (Bermudez-Lorino),23 in which this Court
held:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the
RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case
to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive
death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7,
2001.24
We agree with the CA.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
This Court has already declared in Republic v. Granda25 that Jomoc cannot be interpreted as having
superseded our pronouncements in Bermudez-Lorino, because Jomoc does not expound on the
characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code; Bermudez-Lorino, however, squarely
touches upon the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning a trial court’s decision in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.26
As explained in Republic v. Tango,27 the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an
ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit:
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court
of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain
cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy.1âwphi1 As a
result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled.
Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently,
petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee
spouse is dead28 may no longer be entertained by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007 Decision of the Court Appeals
and its subsequent 29 April 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 85704, dismissing the appeal of the
Republic of the Philippines are AFFIRMED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union in Special Proceeding No. 622 dated 5
May 2005 declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda is hereby declared FINAL and
EXECUTORY.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided
over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge
Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of
the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and
as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was
obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has
adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as
officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule
with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the
Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado
G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is
the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for
the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for
letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only
on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May
18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado
G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is
a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased
Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the
motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court,
1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties
subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association
should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous
order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal
effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered
to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like
"married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of
residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B.
Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to
be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her
motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B.
Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed
for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the
estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November
28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a)
legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment,
qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion
for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts
and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate;
another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably
belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of
title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia
G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his
death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent
for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule
also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he
was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the
matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B.
Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate
estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment
as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa
B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the
proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her
willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final,
it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa
B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had
been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is
still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting
Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were
for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the
reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section
2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy,
where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if
the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure
is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather,
it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the
place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April
26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in
other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado
G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible
to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado
G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia,
shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside
from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of
his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the
Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the
long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to
the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere
practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another
issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1
of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new
Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all,
the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G.
Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever
with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional
rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of
special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but
temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not
determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration.
The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of
Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado
G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of
Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case
was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's
estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject
matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502
and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their heirs,
namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C.
BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano
Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners
seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution2
dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely:
Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28,
1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona
Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor
Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP)
No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus
Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared.
Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on
even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the
undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of
Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond of
₱1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate
hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their
respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel, manifested that the parties had come
to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties
and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from
December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in
Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an
agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend;
that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that
since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the
scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one
of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having
been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos
Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco
Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of
₱40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the
properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos
(₱4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of
₱4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those
present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody present
agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of the Report
was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some consultations on
what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter
of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was
amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the
estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's
hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order10 dated December 16, 1976, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being
not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby
approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale covering all the
properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum of
₱36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of
the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of ₱5,570.00, as the same had been
allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of
the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was
already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early termination of the
proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 over the six parcels of land
constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the
sum of ₱36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-
Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos
(respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and
000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax
Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were
issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo
Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred
to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively,
of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that
they subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation16 of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos,
namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the
Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no
effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such
report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate; that
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that
no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and
that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the
report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the
Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report
was a falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in
favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order
did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in
custodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder
of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes;
that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the
appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in
the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to
a denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud
caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated
December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel
in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy
so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of four (4)
years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was
sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the
issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having
received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing
the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the
Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer of these
Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness
of the Commissioner’s Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order.
The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in
the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate sworn statements, the
compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among
them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit:
(1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged
conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names of those who were present were
equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also
failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign
the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there
was lack or absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed
properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the
respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and
Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the
other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since
what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise
agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal
effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no
legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured
fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement which
served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of ₱36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he
received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so,
such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial court’s order for the
administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-
Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of ₱36,000.00; that said sum of money shall
remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall
have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was
said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998
issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and that the last
Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate;
thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of
Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the
compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot
be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them
at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one
of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the
scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the
aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they
failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of
regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which
is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of
affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos21 and respondent Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits, the
affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of
the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had
already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also
earlier executed an Affidavit23 dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to
Columba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition,
Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties,
that he had already received ₱4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused
to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition
with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated
December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged compromise
agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character25 and will not so easily and readily
lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict
conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order
of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence
recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing
party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.28 Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it
should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty.
Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due
process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to
prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon
Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioner’s Report, Atty.
Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante
Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was
also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found,
the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the
conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the
return of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by
telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact,
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as
she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998
attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any
meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver
and Desistance31 regarding this case, it was only for the reason that the subject estate properties had been
bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding share of the
purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not
called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting
held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an
agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their
attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged
agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and
conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement
over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the
conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no
separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it
was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was
indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that,
under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with
the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be
overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the
names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the
Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the
conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch
Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioner’s Report were sent to all
the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the Notice
found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and
bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however,
that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound
thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs
of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case
confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified
before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were
notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the
Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs
showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of
the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be
heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16,
1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in
the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs
and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case amicably, they
manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir
in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in
the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial
administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors
whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976
approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties’ lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on
December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of
Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by
counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of
such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a
motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time,
but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys. Yray and
Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other
heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Gloria’s counsel
when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Francisco’s lawyer when he
filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix
Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not
represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only
sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of land,
which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax
Declarations were issued in Columba’s name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued
in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at
all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to
appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be
deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-
existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended
by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any
purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is,
ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are
themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation
is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the
same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches.41 Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be declared null and
void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the
lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.44
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the
petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the
paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the
nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.45
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of
Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said
Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by
the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated
November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu
and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the
settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
G.R. No. 166393 June 18, 2009
CRISTINA F. REILLO, LEONOR F. PUSO, ADELIA F. ROCAMORA, SOFRONIO S.J. FERNANDO,
EFREN S.J. FERNANDO, ZOSIMO S.J. FERNANDO, JR., and MA. TERESA F. PIÑON, Petitioners,
vs. GALICANO E.S. SAN JOSE, represented by his Attorneys-in-Fact, ANNALISA S.J. RUIZ and
RODELIO S. SAN JOSE, VICTORIA S.J. REDONGO, CATALINA S.J. DEL ROSARIO and
MARIBETH S.J. CORTEZ, collectively known as the HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated August 31, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69261 which affirmed the Order dated May 9, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and
the motion to dismiss counter petition for partition filed by respondents in Civil Case No. 99-1148-M.
Also questioned is the CA Resolution2 dated December 14, 2004 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Spouses Quiterio San Jose (Quiterio) and Antonina Espiritu Santo (Antonina) were the original registered
owners of a parcel of land located in E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Teresa, Rizal covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 458396 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The said parcel of land is now
registered in the name of Ma. Teresa F. Piñon (Teresa) under TCT No. M-94400.
Quiterio and Antonina had five children, namely, Virginia, Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria and Catalina.
Antonina died on July 1, 1970, while Quiterio died on October 19, 1976. Virginia and Virgilio are also
now deceased. Virginia was survived by her husband Zosimo Fernando, Sr. (Zosimo Sr.) and their seven
children, while Virgilio was survived by his wife Julita Gonzales and children, among whom is Maribeth
S.J. Cortez (Maribeth).
On October 26, 1999, Galicano, represented by his children and attorneys-in-fact, Annalisa S.J. Ruiz and
Rodegelio San Jose, Victoria, Catalina, and Maribeth (respondents) filed with the RTC a Complaint3 for
annulment of title, annulment of deed of extra-judicial settlement, partition and damages against Zosimo
Sr. and his children Cristina F. Reillo, Leonor F. Puso, Adelia F. Rocamora, Sofronio S.J. Fernando, Efren
S.J. Fernando, Zosimo S.J. Fernando, Jr. and Ma. Teresa (petitioners) and the Register of Deeds of
Morong, Rizal. The complaint alleged among other things:
6. Under date of January 23, 1998, defendants FERNANDO et al, without the knowledge and consent of
all the other surviving heirs of the deceased spouses QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU
SANTO, including herein plaintiffs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs
with Waiver of Rights making it appear therein that they are the "legitimate descendants and sole heirs of
QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO"; and adjudicating among themselves, the
subject parcel of land.
6.1 In the same document, defendants ZOSIMO SR., CRISTINA, LEONOR, ADELIA, SOFRONIO,
EFREN and ZOSIMO JR., waived all their rights, participation and interests over the subject parcel of
land in favor of their co-defendant MA. TERESA F. PIÑON (a.k.a MA. TERESA S.J. FERNANDO).
xxxx
7. On the strength of the said falsified Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, defendant MA.
TERESA PIÑON (a.k.a MA. TERESA S.J. FERNANDO) succeeded in causing the cancellation of TCT
No. 458396 in the name of SPS. QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO and the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in her name only, to the extreme prejudice of all the other
heirs of the deceased SPS. QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO, specifically, the
herein plaintiffs who were deprived of their lawful participation over the subject parcel of land.
7.1 Thus, on July 6, 1999, Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-94400 was issued in the name of defendant
MA. TERESA S.J. FERNANDO.
xxxx
8. As a result, the herein plaintiffs and the other surviving heirs of the deceased spouses QUITERIO SAN
JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO, who are legally entitled to inherit from the latter’s respective
estates, in accordance with the laws of intestate succession, have been duly deprived of their respective
rights, interests and participation over the subject parcel of land.
8.1 Thus, there is sufficient ground to annul the subject Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among
Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January 23, 1998, and all other documents issued on the strength
thereof, particularly Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-94400.4
It was also alleged that respondents filed a complaint before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their Barangay
which issued the required certification to file action for failure of the parties to settle the matter amicably.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Counter-Petition and with Compulsory Counterclaim5 denying that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights which was the basis of the
issuance of TCT No. M-94400, was falsified and that the settlement was made and implemented in
accordance with law. They admitted that the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five children;
that the subject property was not the only property of spouses Quiterio and Antonina and submitted in
their counter-petition for partition the list of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio
and Antonina that petitioners alleged are in respondents’ possession and control.
On January 18, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings6 alleging that: (1) the
denials made by petitioners in their answer were in the form of negative pregnant; (2) petitioners failed to
state the basis that the questioned document was not falsified; (3) they failed to specifically deny the
allegations in the complaint that petitioners committed misrepresentations by stating that they are the sole
heirs and legitimate descendants of Quiterio and Antonina; and (4) by making reference to their
allegations in their counter-petition for partition to support their denials, petitioners impliedly admitted
that they are not the sole heirs of Quiterio and Antonina.
Respondents filed a Reply to Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim7 with a motion to dismiss the
counter-petition for partition on the ground that petitioners failed to pay the required docket fees for their
counter-petition for partition. Petitioners filed their Rejoinder8 without tackling the issue of non-payment
of docket fees.
On February 4, 2000, petitioners filed their Comment9 to respondents’ motion for judgment on the
pleading and prayed that the instant action be decided on the basis of the pleadings with the exception of
respondents’ unverified Reply. Petitioners also filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss the counter-
petition for partition.
On May 9, 2000, the RTC rendered its Order,10 the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights, dated January 23, 1998 and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-94400 in the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando are declared null and
void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch, is directed to cancel TCT No. 94400; and
3. The Heirs of Quiterio San Jose and Antonina Espiritu Santo is (sic) directed to partition the subject
parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-458396 in accordance with the law of intestate succession.11
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that, based on the allegations contained in the pleadings filed by the parties, petitioners
misrepresented themselves when they alleged in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among
Heirs with Waiver of Rights that they are the sole heirs of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina;
that petitioners prayed for a counter-petition for partition involving several parcels of land left by the
deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina which bolstered respondents’ claim that petitioners falsified the
Extrajudicial Settlement which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. M-94400 in Ma. Teresa’s
name; thus, a ground to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and the title.1awphi1 The RTC did not
consider as filed petitioners’ Counter-Petition for Partition since they did not pay the corresponding docket
fees.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order12 dated August 29,
2000.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. After the parties filed their respective briefs, the case
was submitted for decision.
On August 31, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the May 9, 2000 Order of the RTC.
The CA found that, while the subject matter of respondents’ complaint was the nullity of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate among Heirs with Waiver of Rights that resulted in the issuance of TCT
No. M-94400 in Ma. Teresa’s name, petitioners included in their Answer a Counter-Petition for Partition
involving 12 other parcels of land of spouses Quiterio and Antonina which was in the nature of a
permissive counterclaim; that petitioners, being the plaintiffs in the counter-petition for partition, must pay
the docket fees otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The CA ruled that
petitioners cannot pass the blame to the RTC for their omission to pay the docket fees.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment on the pleadings since petitioners admitted that the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five children which included herein plaintiffs; thus, petitioners
misrepresented themselves when they stated in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement that they are the
legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina; that the deed is null
and void on such ground since respondents were deprived of their rightful share in the subject property
and petitioners cannot transfer the property in favor of Ma. Teresa without respondents’ consent; that TCT
No. M-94400 must be cancelled for lack of basis. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Order of partition of the
subject property in accordance with the rules on intestate succession in the absence of a will.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE
DEFENDANTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) AND IN EVENTUALLY UPHOLDING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF ORIGIN, CONSIDERING THAT SUCH RULING WILL RESULT TO
MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES AND IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW & PROPERTY AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT VACATING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
PARTITIONING THE ESTATE WITHOUT PUBLICATION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 74 AND 76
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 13
Petitioners contend that in their Comment to respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, they
stated that they will not oppose the same provided that their Answer with Counter-Petition for Partition
and Rejoinder will be taken into consideration in deciding the case; however, the RTC decided the case on
the basis alone of respondents’ complaint; that the Answer stated that the deed was not a falsified
document and was made and implemented in accordance with law, thus, it was sufficient enough to tender
an issue and was very far from admitting the material allegations of respondents’ complaint.
Petitioners also fault the RTC for disregarding their claim for partition of the other parcels of land owned
by the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina for their failure to pay the court docket fees when the RTC
could have simply directed petitioners to pay the same; and that this error if not corrected will result to
multiplicity of suits.
Petitioners argue that the RTC erred in ordering the partition of the subject property as it violates the basic
law on intestate succession that the heirs should be named and qualified through a formal petition for
intestate succession whereby blood relationship should be established first by the claiming heirs before
they shall be entitled to receive from the estate of the deceased; that the order of partition was rendered
without jurisdiction for lack of publication as required under Rules 74 and 76 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for testate or intestate succession.
We find no merit in the petition.
The CA committed no reversible error in affirming the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the RTC.
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. x x x.
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues
generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at
all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue.14 The answer would fail to
tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting
to deal with them at all.15
In this case, respondents’ principal action was for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and annulment of title on the ground
that petitioners stated in the said Deed that they are the legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the
spouses Quiterio and Antonina. Although petitioners denied in their Answer that the Deed was falsified,
they, however, admitted respondents’ allegation that spouses Quiterio and Antonina had 5 children, thus,
supporting respondents’ claim that petitioners are not the sole heirs of the deceased spouses. Petitioners’
denial/admission in his Answer to the complaint should be considered in its entirety and not truncated
parts. Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents Galicano, Victoria, Catalina and
Maribeth are the children and grandchild, respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina, who were
the original registered owners of the subject property, and thus excluding respondents from the deed of
settlement of the subject property, there is no more genuine issue between the parties generated by the
pleadings, thus, the RTC committed no reversible error in rendering the judgment on the pleadings.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.16 The deed of settlement made by petitioners was
invalid because it excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares in the subject property. Under
the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.17 Thus, the RTC correctly annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January 23, 1998 and TCT No. M-94400 in the name of Ma.
Teresa S.J. Fernando issued pursuant to such deed.
Petitioners’ claim that had there been a trial, they could have presented testamentary and documentary
evidence that the subject land is the inheritance of their deceased mother from her deceased parents,
deserves scant consideration. A perusal of petitioners’ Answer, as well as their Rejoinder, never raised
such a defense. In fact, nowhere in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of
Rights executed by petitioners was there a statement that the subject property was inherited by petitioners’
mother Virginia from her deceased parents Quiterio and Antonina. Notably, petitioners never opposed
respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
We also find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the Counter-Petition for Partition in their Answer was
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which does not require the payment of docket fees.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.18 It may either
be permissive or compulsory. It is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.19 A permissive counterclaim is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction
or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.20 Unlike
permissive counterclaims, compulsory counterclaims should be set up in the same action; otherwise, they
would be barred forever.
Respondents’ action was for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, title and partition of
the property subject of the Deed. On the other hand, in the Counter-Petition filed by petitioners in their
Answer to respondents’ complaint, they were asking for the partition and accounting of the other 12
parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina, which are entirely different from the
subject matter of the respondents’ action. Petitioners’ claim does not arise out of or is necessarily
connected with the action for the Annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the property
covered by TCT No. 458396. Thus, payment of docket fees is necessary before the RTC could acquire
jurisdiction over petitioners’ petition for partition.1avvphi1
Petitioners, however, argue that the RTC could have simply issued a directive ordering them to pay the
docket fees, for its non-payment should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case.
We find apropos the disquisition of the CA on this matter, thus:
The rule regarding the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the initiatory pleading is not without
exception. It has been held that if the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
It is apparent from the arguments of the defendants-appellants that they are blaming the trial court for their
omission to pay the docket fees. It is, however, our opinion that the defendants-appellants cannot pass on
to the trial court the performance of a positive duty imposed upon them by the law. It should be noted that
their omission to file the docket fees was raised as one of the grounds to dismiss the counter petition for
partition. The defendants-appellants opposed the said motion without, however, offering an answer to the
said ground raised by the plaintiffs-appellees. In fact, during the period the motion was being heard by the
trial court, the defendants–appellants never paid the docket fees for their petition so that it could have at
least brought to the attention of the trial court their payment of the docket fees although belatedly done.
They did not even ask the trial court for time within which to pay the docket fees for their petition. When
the trial court ruled to dismiss the petition of the defendants-appellants, the latter did not, in their motion
for reconsideration, ask the trial court to reconsider the dismissal of their petition by paying the required
docket fees, neither did they ask for time within which to pay their docket fees. In other words, the trial
court could have issued an order allowing the defendants-appellants a period to pay the docket fees for
their petition if the defendants-appellants made such manifestation. What is apparent from the factual
circumstances of the case is that the defendants-appellants have been neglectful in complying with this WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 31, 2004 and the Resolution
positive duty imposed upon them by law as plaintiffs of the counter petition for partition. Because of their dated December 14, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69261, are AFFIRMED.
omission to comply with their duty, no grave error was committed by the trial court in dismissing the
defendants-appellants’ counter petition for partition. 21 G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018
AMPARO S. CRUZ; ERNESTO HALILI; ALICIA H. FLORENCIO; DONALD HALILI; EDITHA H.
Petitioners argue that with the dismissal of their Counter-Petition for Partition, the partition of the other RIVERA; ERNESTO HALILI, JR.; AND JULITO HALILI, Petitioners, v. ANGELITO S. CRUZ,
parcels of land owned by the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina will result to multiplicity of suits. CONCEPCION S. CRUZ, SERAFIN S. CRUZ, AND VICENTE S. CRUZ, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We are not persuaded.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the June 25, 2013 Decision2 and January 29,
Significantly, in petitioners’ Answer with Counter-Petition for Partition, they enumerated 12 other parcels
2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV. No. 96345 which, respectively, granted
of land owned by the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina. They alleged that some of these properties
herein respondents' appeal and reversed the June 1, 2010 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of San
had already been disposed of by respondents and some are still generating income under the control and
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM, and denied petitioners' motion for
administration of respondents, and these properties should be collated back by respondents to be
reconsideration thereto.
partitioned by all the heirs of the deceased spouses. It bears stressing that the action filed by respondents
in the RTC was an ordinary civil action for annulment of title, annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
Factual Antecedents
settlement and partition of a parcel of land now covered by TCT No. M-94400; hence, the authority of the
court is limited to the property described in the pleading. The RTC cannot order the collation and partition
In an Amended Complaint5 filed on April 6, 1999 and docketed with the RTC as Civil Case No. 1380-98
of the other properties which were not included in the partition that was the subject matter of the
SM, respondents Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S. Cruz. (Concepcion), and Serafin S. Cruz alleged that
respondents’ action for annulment. Thus, a separate proceeding is indeed proper for the partition of the
they - together with their siblings, petitioner Amparo S. Cruz (Amparo) and Antonia Cruz (Antonia)
estate of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina.
inherited a 940-square-meter parcel of land (the subject property) from their late parents, spouses Felix
and Felisa Cruz, which land was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. ON-658, that on July 31,
Finally, petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ordered the heirs of Quiterio and Antonina to
1986, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate covering the subject property, on the
partition the subject parcel of land covered by TCT No. 458396 in accordance with the laws of intestate
agreement that each heir was to receive an equal portion of the subject property as mandated by law; that
succession; that the RTC violated the requirement of publication under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 and
in 1998, when the subject property was being subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was shown to
Section 3 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two lots, as against one (1) each for the
respondents; that Antonia's allocation of two lots contravened the agreement among the heirs that they
We do not agree.
would receive equal shares in the subject property; that Amparo and Antonia were able to perpetrate the
fraud by inducing Concepcion - who was illiterate - to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate,
We find the ruling of the CA on the matter of the RTC’s order of partition of land subject of the annulled
which was written in the English language, without previously reading and explaining the contents thereof
deed of extrajudicial settlement worth quoting, thus:
to the latter; that Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of Concepcion's ignorance and mental
weakness, deceiving and cajoling her into signing the deed of extrajudicial settlement, to her damage and
Considering that the subject document and the corresponding title were canceled, the logical consequence
injury; and that Antonia passed away, but left as her heirs herein petitioners Ernesto Halili, Alicia H.
is that the property in dispute, which was the subject of the extrajudicial settlement, reverted back to the
Florencio, Donald Halili, Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto Halili, Jr. and Julito Halili, who are in possession of
estate of its original owners, the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina San Jose. Since, it was admitted
the two lots allocated to Antonia. Respondents thus prayed, as follows:
that all the parties to the instant suit are legal heirs of the deceased spouses, they owned the subject
property in common. It is a basic rule that any act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:
heirs or co-owners is deemed to be a partition. Therefore, there was no reversible error committed by the
trial court in ordering the partition of the subject property. We find nothing wrong with such ruling
1. Declaring null arid void the extra-judicial settlement executed by the parties on July 31, 1986;
considering that the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in accordance with the rules on
2. Declaring one of the lots adjudicated to defendant Antonia Cruz-Halili to the common fund;
intestate succession. The trial court found the property to be originally owned by the deceased spouses
3. For such other relief just and equitable under the circumstances;
Quiterio and Antonina San Jose and, in the absence of a will left by the deceased spouses, it must be
4. To pay the cost of this suit.6
partitioned in accordance with the rules on intestate succession.22
In their Answer,7 petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the July 31, 1986 deed of extrajudicial
As the RTC nullified the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights
settlement of estate had been voluntarily and freely executed by the parties, free from vitiated consent; that
executed by petitioners and the title issued in accordance therewith, the order of partition of the land
respondents' cause of action has prescribed; that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and that no
subject of the settlement in accordance with the laws on intestate succession is proper as respondents’
earnest efforts toward compromise have been made. By way of counterclaim petitioners prayed for an
action filed in the RTC and respondents’ prayer in their complaint asked for the partition of the subject
award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
property in accordance with intestate succession. The applicable law is Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, which deals with action for partition, to wit:
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 1, 2010, pronouncing as follows:
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining
From the foregoing, the main issue is whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is null and void on
as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
grounds of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or mistake.
And, under this law, there is no requirement for publication.
xxxx

Besides, while the Extra-Judicial Settlement was executed and signed on July 13, 19868 x x x, and alleged
fraud was discovered on May 12, 1986 when subdivision survey was conducted x x x and defendants
started to build their houses x x x this petition was filed only on August 14, 1998 or more than 10 years
from date of execution or date of discovery of alleged fraud. Under Art. 1144 Civil Code, actionable
documents prescribes [sic] in 10 years. However, if a property is allegedly acquired thru fraud or mistake,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered an implied trustee for the benefit of the person
deprived of it, in which case the action based thereon is 10 years from date of registration of the extra-
judicial settlement or issuance of new certificate of title (Art. 1456 Civil Codex x x). Hence, this petition
is not barred by prescription. As the period is not too long nor short, laches has not yet set in.
Moreover, fraud, as basis of the Complaint, is not delineated therein with particularity. Under Sec. 5 Rule
8, fraud must be alleged specifically, not generally. Nonetheless, apart from such allegations, no clear and
convincing evidence was presented by plaintiffs. For one, while plaintiff Concepcion Cruz. Enriquez is
admittedly only grade 3 and could hardly understand English as what is written in the extra-judicial
settlement which was not even allegedly fully explained to her, it appears that she can absolutely read and
write, and understand English albeit not fully. And as she is deeply interested in her inheritance share, she
is aware of the import and consequences of what she executed and signed. For the past 10 years, there is
no way she could feign ignorance of the alleged fraud and make passive reactions or complaint thereof.
Being adversely interested in the property, her apprehensions were purely in the state of her mind, if not
unilateral and afterthought.
Secondly, just like any other contracts, parties in an extra-judicial settlement are given wide latitude to
stipulate terms and conditions they feel fair and convenient beneficial to one and prejudicial to the other.
By tradition and good customs, equality is relaxed if only to buy peace, or out of compassion or courtesy.
So long as not contrary to strict provisions of the law, the supremacy of contracts shall be respected.
Being consensual, extra-judicial settlement is deemed perfected once mutual consent is manifested.
Notarization being a mere formality, whatever its infirmity cannot invalidate a contract but at most,
merely ensue to administrative sanction on the part of their notary. Even so, unless a strong clear and
convincing evidence is shown, a document, one appeared notarized [sic], becomes a public document. As
between a public document and mere allegations of plaintiffs, the former prevails x x x.
Thirdly, for the past 10 years from 1996 [sic] when they forged an extra-judicial settlement and defendants
admittedly started constructing their house and even made a subdivision survey, plaintiffs also occupied
their allotted lots but never complain [sic] and even attended their reunions x x x. Other heirs also waived
or sold shares to Amparo and Antonia Cruz x x x. Parties were even unified and unanimous in
surrendering dominion of their parents' ancestral house in favor of Antonia Cruz alone x x x. As such, two
lots would necessarily accrue to Antonia Cruz, and only one lot each should belong to other heirs. If the
heirs are contented and unanimously conformable, it is quite absurd that only plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-
Enriquez was disagreeable and yet, after the lapse of 10 years. Her conduct then belies her present claim
of being defrauded and prejudiced x x x. And in the interpretation of stipulations, clarification may be had
from such subsequent acts of the parties x x x. Even so, in case of conflict or dual interpretations, its
validity shall be preferred x x x.
Fourthly, other than simply alleging that her sisters Amparo Cruz and Antonia Cruz prepared the extra-
judicial settlement, and made a house-to-house visit to have it signed by their brothers and sisters
including plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-Enriquez, no other independent facts aliunde has [sic] been adduced
to substantiate or the least corroborate actual fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be proven. Mere
allegation is not evidence. Rather, if ever both defendants were eager to have it signed, their motive
appears to be solely to reduce in writing their imperfect title over a thing already pre-owned.
Peremptorily, following the tenet "allegata et non probata," he who alleges has the burden of proof. Thus,
the burden of proof lies on the pleader. He cannot be allowed to draw preponderance of evidence on the
weakness of the respondent. Otherwise, the relief being sought must necessarily fail x x x Hence, this case
must be dismissed.
And as plaintiffs filed this petition relying on their unilateral perception that plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-
Enriquez was prejudiced by the 2 lots for defendant Antonia Cruz, they and defendants shall each bear
their own costs of litigation and defense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Costs de-officio.
SO ORDERED.9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondents appealed before the CA, which completely reversed and set aside the RTC's judgment and
the parties' deed of extrajudicial settlement. The appellate court held:
The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by appellant Concepcion to the subject
extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily.
We hold that it was not.
Although the action commenced by appellants before the trial court was a declaration of nullity of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate,the case was clearly an action to annul the same. A distinction
between an action for annulment and one for declaration of nullity of an agreement is called for.
An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated by lack of legal capacity of one
of the contracting parties, or by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. By its very
nature, annulment contemplates a contract which is voidable, that is, valid until annulled. Such contract is
binding on all the contracting parties until annulled and set aside by a court of law. It may be ratified. An
action for annulment of contract has a four year prescriptive period.
On the other hand, an action tor declaration of nullity of contract presupposes a void contract or one where
a1l of the requisites prescribed by law for contracts are present but the cause, object or purpose is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, prohibited by law or declared by law to be
void. Such contract as a rule produces no legal and binding effect even if it is not set aside by direct legal
action. Neither may it be ratified. An action for the declaration of nullity of contract is imprescriptible.
The appellants' pleading was for declaration of nullity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate.
However, this did not necessarily mean that appellants' action was dismissible.
Granting that the action filed by appellants was incompatible with their allegations, it is not the caption of
the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the action. The court should grant the relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. In this case, the allegations
in the pleading and the evidence adduced point to no other remedy but to annul the extrajudicial settlement
of estate because of vitiated consent.
The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one
of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause
which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties deem
material or there is no consent at all.
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion
of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free; and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in
consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; and spontaneity by
fraud.
Here, appellant Concepcion clearly denied any knowledge of the import and implication of the subject
document she signed, the subject extra-judicial settlement. She asserted that she does not understand
English, the language in which the terms of the subject document she signed was written. To quote a part
of her testimony, translated in English, as follows:
Q:Did you have occasion to read that document before you affixed your signature on it?
A:The document was written in English and me as well as my brothers and sisters, we trusted our younger
sister, Sir.
Q:That is why you signed the document even though you did not understand the same?
A:Yes, sir.
Court:Did you not ask your younger sister Amparo to read this document considering it was in English? I
will reform the question.
Q:But you don't know how to read English?
A:No, your Honor.
Q:When you saw that the document was in English, did you not ask your younger sister to read the
document before you affixed your signature?
A:No, your Honor.
Q:Why did you not ask Amparo to read the document to you considering that it was in English and you
don't understand English?
A:Parti-partihan daw po at nagtiwala ako, your Honor.
Appellant Concepcion invoked Articles 24 and 1332 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provide:
ART. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant tor his protection.
ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by
him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof
have been fully explained to the former. x x x
Article 1332 was a provision taken from [A]merican law, necessitated by the fact that there continues to
be a fair number of people in this country without the benefit of a good education or documents have been
written in English or Spanish. Thee provision was intended to protect a party to a contract disadvantaged
by illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or some other handicap. It contemplates a situation wherein a
contract is entered into but the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud
committed by the other.
Thus, in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the
contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. Where a party is unable
to read, and he expressly pleads in his reply that he signed the voucher in question 'without knowing its
contents which have not been explained to him,' this plea is tantamount to one of mistake or fraud in the
execution of the voucher or receipt in question and the burden is shifted to the other party to show that the
former fully understood the contents of the document; and if he fails to prove this, the presumption of
mistake (if not fraud) stands unrebutted and controlling.
Here, at the time appellant Concepcion signed the document in question, she was with appellee Amparo.
Appellant could not possibly have read the contents of the extra-judicial settlement and could not have
consented to a contract whose terms she never knew nor understood. It cannot be presumed that appellant
Concepcion knew the contents of the extra-judicial settlement. Article 1332 of the Civil Code is applicable
in these circumstances.
Although under Art. 1332 there exists a presumption of mistake or error accorded by law to those who
have not had the benefit of a good education, one who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a
contract must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance of
evidence. Hence, even as the burden of proof shifts to the defendants x x x to rebut the presumption of
mistake, the plaintiff x x x who allege(s) such mistake (or fraud) must show that his personal
circumstances warrant the application of Art. 1332.
In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of appellant Concepcion was not sufficiently
rebutted by appellees. Appellees failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement of
estate was explained in a language known to the appellant Concepcion, i.e. in Pilipino. Clearly, appellant
Concepcion, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and spontaneous
consent without having the document, which was in English, explained to her in the Pilipino. She stated in
open court that she did not understand English. Her testimony as quoted above is instructive.
Due to her limited educational attainment, appellant Concepcion could not understand the document in
English. She wanted to seek assistance. However, due to the misrepresentation, deception and undue
pressure of her sister appellee Amparo, petitioner signed the document. Appellant Concepcion was
assured that she would receive her legitimate share in the estate of their late parents.
Later on, appellant Concepcion found out that appellee Antonia received two (2) lots compared to her
siblings, including appellant Concepcion, who respectively received one (1) lot each. This was a
substantial mistake clearly prejudicial to the substantive interests of appellant Concepcion in her parent's
estate. There is no doubt that, given her lack of education, appellant Concepcion is protected by Art. 1332
of the Civil Code. There is reason to believe that, had the provisions of the extrajudicial agreement been
explained to her in the Pilipino language, she would not have consented to the significant and
unreasonable diminution of her rights.
Atty. Edgardo C. Tagle, the officer who notarized the extrajudicial settlement did not state that he
explained the contents to all the parties concerned, The records or the subject document for that matter, do
not reflect that he explained the contents of the document to appellant Concepcion nor to the other parties
in a language or dialect known to all of them. Significantly, the appellants even denied their presence
during the notarization of the document.
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling, having remained unrebutted by
appellees. The evidence proving that the document was not fully explained to appellant Concepcion in a
language known to her, given her low educational attainment, remained uncontradicted by appellees x x x
the consent of petitioner was invalidated by a substantial mistake or error, rendering the agreement
voidable. The deed of extrajudicial settlement between appellants and appellees should therefore be
annulled and set aside on the ground of mistake.
In Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that a contract may be
annulled on the ground of vitiated consent, even if the act complained of is committed by a third party
without the connivance or complicity of one of the contracting parties. It found that a substantial mistake
arose from the employment of fraud or misrepresentation. The plaintiff in that case was a 70-year old
unschooled and unlettered woman who signed an unauthorized loan obtained by a third party on her
behalf. The Court annulled the contract due to a substantial mistake which invalidated her consent.
By the same reasoning, if it is one of the contracting parties who commits the fraud or misrepresentation,
such contract may all the more be annulled due to substantial mistake.
In Remalante v. Tibe, the Supreme Court ruled that misrepresentation to an illiterate woman who did not
know how to read and write, nor understand English, is fraudulent. Thus, the deed of sale was considered
vitiated with substantial error and fraud. x x x
xxxx
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of extrajudicial
settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De
Guzman.10 The records show that appellants' complaint was filed on 17 August 1998 or twelve (12) years
from the execution of the deed. However, as appellants are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of
the fraud upon the publication of the same in a newspaper on June 5, 10 and 27, 1995, this Court rules that
the present action has not prescribed.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in ruling as it did. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed Decision dated 1 June 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal is
REVERSED. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.11 (Other citations omitted)
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied via the second assailed January 29,
2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
In a November 9, 2015 Resolution,12 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.
Issues
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that the respondents' cause of action for annulment has not
prescribed, and that it ignored contemporaneous and subsequent acts of respondents indicating the absence
of fraud or vitiation of consent in the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix
Cruz.
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply13 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions, petitioners essentially insist
that respondents' cause of action for annulment has prescribed, since they filed Civil Case No. 1380-98
SM only in 1998, or 12 years after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate on July
31, 1986; that pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code,14 a cause of action based upon a written
contract - such as the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement - must be brought within 10 years from the
execution thereof; that even assuming that the four-year prescriptive period based on fraud applies as the
CA ruled, respondents' cause of action already prescribed, as the case was filed only in 1998, while the
supposed fraud may be said to have been discovered in 1986, when they learned of the survey being
conducted on the subject property; that respondents' actions belied their claim, in that they did not object
when petitioners built their home on the lots allotted to them and never registered any objection even
during family gatherings and occasions; that the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement - being a
notarized document - enjoys the presumption of regularity and integrity, and may only be set aside by
clear and convincing evidence of irregularity; that it is a matter of judicial notice that a pre-war third-
grader has the education of a high school student; and that the findings of the trial court must be given
weight and respect.
Respondents' Arguments
In their Comment15 seeking denial of the Petition, respondents reiterate the correctness of the CA's
assailed Decision; that the deed of extrajudicial settlement, being written in English, was calculated to
defraud Concepcion - who could not read nor write in said language; that owing to the fact that she trusted
petitioners, who were her sisters, she was cajoled into signing the deed without knowing it contents; that
the deed was notarized in the absence of most of the parties thereto; that the prescriptive period to be
applied is not the 10-year period under Article 1144, but the four year period as held by the CA, to be
computed from the discovery of the fraud - since respondents discovered the fraud only in 1998; and that
the factual issues raised by petitioners have been passed upon by the CA, and are thus not reviewable at
this stage.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able - through the expedient of an extrajudicial
settlement that was written in a language that is not understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in
the estate of her parents that was greater than that of her siblings, in violation of the principle in succession
that heirs should inherit in equal shares.
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her surviving heirs - received two lots as against her siblings,
including respondent Concepcion, who respectively received only one lot each in the subject 940 square-
meter property. This she was able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed of extrajudicial settlement -
which was written in English, a language that was not known to and understood by Concepcion given that
she finished only Grade 3 elementary education. With the help of Amparo, Antonia was able to secure
Concepcion's consent and signature without the benefit of explaining the contents of the subject deed of
extrajudicial settlement. For this reason, Concepcion did not have adequate knowledge of the contents and
ramifications of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was left unaware of the sharing
arrangement contained therein, and realized it only when Antonia attempted to subdivide the subject
property in 1998, and the plan of subdivision survey was shown to Concepcion- which revealed that
Antonia obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM on August 17,
1998.
In short, this is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession, where co-heirs were effectively deprived of
their rightful share to the estate of their parents who died without a will - by virtue of a defective deed of
extrajudicial settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to one of the heirs and was prepared in
such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of discovering and knowing its contents.
Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares."16 In this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced their shares in the
subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-heirs, in equal shares as well.17
In Bautista v. Bautista,18 it was held that —
As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive
periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.
The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid, however. So Segura v. Segura19
instructs:
x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, 'no extra-judicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the partition was a
total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years x x x
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not
prescribe.
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,20 where the Court ruled:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor
of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented
therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. x x x
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,
thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as
far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the rune heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from execution...
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject properties
made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but
only with respect to their proportionate shares therein. It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired
their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death and that, as owners
thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.
xxxx
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in
so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the
execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas,
who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides.. an 'action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe' in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil
Code. (Citations omitted)
Then again, in The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v. Prudencio,21 the above pronouncements
were echoed, thus:
Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extra-Judicial
Partition, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding upon them. Thus, in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,
which involves facts analogous to the present case, we ruled that:
[I]n the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria
were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein,
the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
xxx
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,
thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as
far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, while the CA was correct in ruling in favour of Concepcion and setting aside the subject deed of
extrajudicial settlement, it erred in appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud - thus applying the
four-year prescriptive period - when it should have simply held that the action for the declaration of nullity
of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe, under the circumstances, given that the
same was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that Concepcion was
effectively deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.
With the foregoing disposition, the other issues raised by the petitioners are deemed resolved.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The subject July 31, 1986 Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate is
hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and thus ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the
petitioners.
G.R. No. 42108 December 29, 1989
OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E. MENESES, respodents.
Godofredo V. Magbiray for petitioners.
Joselito Lim for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 7,
1975, 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case No. 4168,
entitled "Adelaida Ramos, et al. vs. Oscar D. Ramos, et al.," holding that the contracts between the parties
are not ventas con pacto de retro but are equitable mortgages.
Sometime in January 1959, private respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her brother, petitioner
Oscar D. Ramos, the amounts of P 5,000.00 and P 9,000.00 in connection with her business transaction
with one Flor Ramiro, Fred Naboa and Atty. Ruperto Sarandi involving the recovery of a parcel of land in
Tenejeros, Malabon. The said amount was used to finance the trip to Hawaii of Ramiro, Naboa and Atty.
Sarandi. As security for said loan, private respondent Adelaida Ramos executed in favor of petitioners two
(2) deeds of conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959, of her rights, shares, interests and
participation respectively over Lot No. 4033 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5125 registered
in the name of their parents, Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga, now deceased; 2 and Lot No. 4221
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10788 then registered in the names of Socorro Ramos,
Josefina Ramos and Adelaida Ramos, 3 said properties being of the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac.
Upon the failure of said private respondent as vendor a retro to exercise her right of repurchase within the
redemption period, aforenamed petitioner filed a petition for consolidation and approval of the conditional
sale of Lot No. 4033 in Special Proceedings No. 5174, entitled "Intestate Estate of the late Margarita
Denoga," 4 and a petition for approval of the pacto de retro sale of Lot No. 4221 in the former Court of
First Instance of Tarlac acting as a cadastral court. 5 On January 22, 1960, the said probate court issued an
order with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, the deed of CONDITIONAL SALE executed on May 27, 1959, by Adelaida Ramos in
favor of spouses Oscar D. Ramos and Luz Agudo, conveying to the latter by way of pacto de retro sale
whatever rights and interests the former may have in Lot No. 4033 of the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui,
which deed of conditional sale is known as Document No. 14, Page 26, Book VI, Series of 1959, of the
notarial register of Notary Public Jose P. Sibal, is hereby approved. 6
The cadastral Court also issued a similar order dated April 18, 1960, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, by way of granting the petition, the Court orders the consolidation of ownership and
dominion in petitioners-spouses Oscar D. Ramos and Luz Agudo over the rights, shares and interests of
Adelaida Ramos in Lot No. 4221 of the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac, which the latter sold to the
former under a pacto de retro sale executed in a public instrument known as Document No. 22, Page 28,
Book No. VI. Series of 1959, of the Notarial Registry of Notary Public Jose P. Sibal but which she failed
to repurchase within the period specified in said Document. 7
Private respondents had been and remained in possession of these properties until sometime in 1964 when
petitioner took possession thereof.
On February 28, 1968, private respondent filed Civil Case No. 4168 with the then Court of First Instance
of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of instrument, recovery of possession with
preliminary injunction and damages. The complaint therein alleged that the deeds of conditional sale,
dated May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959, are mere mortgages and were vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud and undue influence and that the orders dated January 22, 1960 and April 18, 1960, respectively
issued by the probate and cadastral courts, were null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners, in their
answer to the complaint, specifically deny the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and interposed as
defense the fact that the questioned conditional sales of May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959 were
voluntarily executed by private respondent Adelaida Ramos and truly expressed the intention of the
parties; that the action, if any, has long prescribed; that the questioned orders of January 22, 1960 and
April 18, 1960, approving the consolidation of ownership of the lands in question in favor of petitioner
were within the jurisdiction of the lower court, in its capacity as a probate court insofar as Lot No. 4033 is
concerned, and acting as a cadastral court with respect to Lot No. 4221; and that said lands subject of the
conditional sales were in custodia legis in connection with the settlement of the properties of the late
Margarita Denoga, the predecessor in interest of both petitioners and private respondents.
On January 7, 1970, the court below issued a pre-trial order to the effect that petitioners admit the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1 " and that the
principal triable issue is whether or not the documents purporting to be deeds of conditional sale, marked
as Exhibits "B", "B-1" and "G" were in fact intended to be equitable mortgages. 8 In its order dated
February 17, 1971, the trial court also declared: "Both parties agreed and manifested in open court the
principal obligation in the transaction reflected in Exhibits 'B' and 'B-l' and 'G' is one of loan. The parties
differ, however, on the nature of the security described therein. 9
On May 17, 1971, the court a quo rendered a decision the decretal part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Denying defendants' motion to dismiss of February 23, 1970;
2) Declaring Exhibits 'B', 'B-I' and 'G' as loan transaction secured by real estate mortgages;
3) Annulling and setting aside Exhibits 'D', 'D-l', 'I', 'I-l' and 'I-2';
4) Ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally to pay (within ninety [90] days from receipt of a copy of this
judgment) defendants the sum of P 5,000.00 specified in Exhibit 'B', with interest thereon at the legal rate
from November 28, 1959 until full payment together with the sum of P 9,308.00 specified in Exhibit 'G'
with interest thereon at the legal rate from December 1, 1959 until full payment, and in default of such
payment, let the properties mortgaged under Exhibits 'B', 'B-1' and 'G' be sold to realize the mortgage debt
and costs; and
5) Dismissing defendants' counter-claim.
With costs against defendants. 10
On June 14, 1971, petitioners appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals which, on October 7, 1975;
affirmed in all respects the judgment of the trial court. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said
decision was denied on November 27, 1975. 11
On January 8, 1976, petitioners filed the petition at bar anchored on the following assignments of errors:
1. The Hon. Court of Appeals erred in not applying the correct provisions of law interpreting the
conditional sales dated May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959, Exhibits 'B' and 'G' as equitable mortgages.
2. That as a consequence of its ruling that the conditional sales, Exhibits 'B' and 'G', are equitable
mortgages, the Hon. Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reformation of the same.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the order dated January 22, 1960, Exhibit C or 2,
and the order dated April 18, 1960, Exhibit H or 6, issued by the probate court in Sp. Proc. No. 5174 and
by the cadastral court in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 395, respectively, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
4. The Hon. Court of Appeals erred in not applying the applicable provisions of law on the prescription of
action and in not dismissing the complaint filed in the lower court. 12
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides:
The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or
otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that the two (2) deeds purporting to be pacto de retro sale contracts are
equitable mortgages, relied on the following factual findings of the trial court, to wit:
Several undisputed circumstances persuade this Court (that) the questioned deeds should be construed as
equitable mortgages as contemplated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code, namely: (1) plaintiff vendor
remained in possession until 1964 of the properties she allegedly sold in 1959 to defendants; (2) the sums
representing the alleged purchase price were actually advanced to plaintiff by way of loans, as expressly
admitted by the parties at the hearing of February 17, 1971, reflected in an Order of the same date: and (3)
the properties allegedly purchased by defendant Oscar Ramos and his wife have never been declared for
taxation purposes in their names. Exhibits K, K-1, L and L-1. 13
Even if we indulge the petitioners in their contention that they are justified in not taking possession of the
lots considering that what were allegedly sold to them were only the rights, shares, interests and
participation of private respondent Adelaida Ramos in the said lots which were under administration, 14
however, such fact will not justify a reversal of the conclusion reached by respondent court that the
purported deeds of sale con pacto de retro are equitable mortgages. Such a conclusion is buttressed by the
other circumstances catalogued by respondent court especially the undisputed fact that the two deeds were
executed by reason of the loan extended by petitioner Oscar Ramos to private respondent Adelaida Ramos
and that the purchase price stated therein was the amount of the loan itself.
The above-stated circumstances are more than sufficient to show that the true intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of said debt and, therefore, shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage under Paragraph 6 of Article 1602 hereinbefore quoted. Settled is the rule that to
create the presumption enunciated by Article 1602, the existence of one circumstance is enough.15 The
said article expressly provides therefor "in any of the following cases," hence the existence of any of the
circumstances enumerated therein, not a concurrence nor an overwhelming number of such circumstances,
suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract with the right of repurchase is an equitable
mortgage. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
Thus, it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transactions in question were
entered into to secure the payment of the loan and not to sell the property (Article 1602, Civil Code).
Under Article 1603 of the Civil Code it is provided that 'in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale
with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage' in this case, we have no doubt that
the transaction between the parties is that of a loan secured by said properties by way of mortgage. Hence,
we find that Exhibits B and G do not reflect the true and real intention of the parties and should
accordingly be reformed and construed as equitable mortgages. 16
Equally puerile is the other contention of petitioners that respondent court erred in not applying the
exclusionary parol evidence rule in ascertaining the true intendment of the contracting parties. The present
case falls squarely under one of the exceptions to said rule as provided in then Section 7 of Rule 130, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;17
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, it is a well entrenched principle in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms thereof are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties the literal meaning of the stipulation
shall control but when the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail over the former.18
The admission of parol testimony to prove that a deed, absolute in form, was in fact given and accepted as
a mortgage does not violate the rule against the admission of oral evidence to vary or contradict the terms
of a written instrument.19 Sales with a right to repurchase, as defined by the Civil Code, are not favored.
We will not construe instruments to be sales with a right to repurchase, with the stringent and onerous
effects which follow, unless the terms of the document and the surrounding circumstances require it.
Whenever, under the terms of the writing, any other construction can fairly and reasonably be made, such
construction will be adopted and the contract will be construed as a mere loan unless the court can see
that, if enforced according to its terms, it is not an unconscionable one. 20
On the faces thereof, the contracts purport to be sales with pacto de retro; however, since the same were
actually executed in consideration of the aforesaid loans said contracts are indubitably equitable
mortgages. The rule is firmly settled that whenever it is clearly shown that a deed of sale with pacto de
retro, regular on its face, is given as security for a loan, it must be regarded as an equitable mortgage. 21
With respect to the orders dated January 22, 1960 and April 18, 1960, issued by the Court below acting as
a probate court and cadastral court, respectively, the same could not preclude the institution of the case
now under review.
A reading of the order of the probate court will show that it is merely an approval of the deed of
conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 executed by petitioner Adelaida Ramos in favor of petitioners. There
is nothing in said order providing for the consolidation of ownership over the lots allegedly sold to
petitioners nor was the issue of the validity of said contract discussed or resolved therein. "To give
approval" means in its essential and most obvious meaning, to confirm, ratify, sanction or consent to some
act or thing done by another. 22 The approval of the probate court of the conditional sale is not a
conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the
right of private respondent Adelaida Ramos as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her
inheritance even before partition. 23 As held in Duran, et al., vs. Duran 24 the approval by the settlement
court of the assignment pendente lite, made by one heir in favor of the other during the course of the
settlement proceedings, is not deemed final until the estate is closed and said order can still be vacated,
hence the assigning heir remains an interested person in the proceeding even after said approval.
Moreover, the probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the present regional trial court
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased
persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. Subject to
settled exceptions not present in this case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. The parties concerned may
choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence.
25 Obviously, the approval by the probate court of the conditional sale was without prejudice to the filing
of the proper action for consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument in the proper court
within the statutory period of prescription.
The same jurisdictional flaw obtains in the order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court. The court
of first instance or the regional trial court, acting as cadastral court, acts with limited competence. It has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much less to issue an order to
that effect, such action must have been filed in the former court of first instance, now in the regional trial
court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. That remedy, and the procedure therefor, is now governed
by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as a special civil action cognizable by the regional trial court in the
exercise of original general jurisdiction.
Antecedent thereto, Article 1607 of the Civil Code provided for consolidation as follows:
In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor
to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a
judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.
Hence in Crisologo, et al. vs. Centeno, et al., 26 we ruled that said Article 1607 contemplates a
contentious proceeding wherein the vendor a retro must be named respondent in the caption and title of
the petition for consolidation of ownership and duly summoned and heard. An order granting the vendee's
petition for consolidation of ownership, without the vendor a retro being named as respondent, summoned
and heard, is a patent nullity for want of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the latter.
The questioned order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court, being void for lack of jurisdiction, is
in contemplation of law non-existent and may be wholly disregarded. Such judgment may be assailed any
time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action or by resisting such judgment in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked. 27 It is not necessary to take any step to vacate or avoid a
void judgment; it may simply be ignored. 28
On the issue of prescription, in addition to what has been said, the present case, having been filed on
February 28, 1960, approximately seven (7) years from the execution of the questioned deeds, was
seasonably instituted. The prescriptive period for actions based upon a written contract and for
reformation is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Such right to reformation is expressly
recognized in Article 1365 of the same code. 29
Article 1602 of the Civil Code is designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale
with right of repurchase, such as the circumvention of the laws against usury and pactum
commissorium.30 In the present case before us, to rule otherwise would contravene the legislative intent
to accord the vendor a retro maximum safeguards for the protection of his legal rights under the true
agreement of the parties. The judicial experience in cases of this nature and the rationale for the remedial
legislation are worth reiterating, considering that such nefarious practices still persist:
It must be admitted that there are some cases where the parties really intend a sale with right to
repurchase. Although such cases are rare, still the freedom of contract must be maintained and respected.
Therefore, the contract under consideration is preserved, but with adequate safeguards and restrictions.
One of the gravest problems that must be solved is that raised by the contract of sale with right of
repurchase or pacto de retro. The evils arising from this contract have festered like a sore on the body
politic. ...
xxx xxx xxx
It is a matter of common knowledge that in practically all of the so-called contracts of sale with right of
repurchase, the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase-price is money loaned, and in
order to secure the payment of the loan a contract purporting to be a sale with pacto de retro is drawn up.
It is thus that the provisions contained in articles 1859 and 1858 of the present Civil Code which
respectively prohibit the creditor from appropriating the things given in pledge or mortgage and ordering
that said things be sold or alienated when the principal obligation becomes due, are circumvented.
Furthermore, it is well-known that the practice in these so-called contracts of sale with pacto de retro is to
draw up another contract purporting to be a lease of the property to the supposed vendor, who pays in
money or in crops a so-called rent. It is, however, no secret to anyone that this simulated rent is in truth
and in fact interest on the money loaned. In many instances, the interest is usurious. Thus, the usury law is
also circumvented.
It is high time these transgressions of the law were stopped. It is believed by the Commission that the plan
submitted for the solution of the problem will meet with the approval of an enlightened public opinion,
and in general, of everyone moved by a sense of justice.
During the deliberations of the Commission the question arose as to whether the contract of purchase with
pacto de retro should be abolished and forbidden. On first impression, this should be done, but there is
every reason to fear that in such a case the usurious money-lenders would demand of the borrowers that,
although the real agreement is one of loan secured with a mortgage, the instrument to be signed should
purport to be an absolute sale of the property involved. Should this happen, the problem would become
aggravated. Moreover, it must be admitted that there are some cases where the parties really intend a sale
with right to repurchase. Although such cases are rare, still the freedom of contract must be maintained
and respected. Therefore, the contract under consideration is preserved in the Project of Civil Code, but
with adequate safeguards and restrictions. 31

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.