ADR ADDITIONAL CASES occupancy of the subject property from the date of the filing of the action up to and
occupancy of the subject property from the date of the filing of the action up to and until the structures on the
G.R. No. 211966
JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN,
JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY ABAGATNAN,
Petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, Respondents,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 20, 2013
Decision1 and the February 3, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 which
dismissed, albeit without prejudice, the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages3 filed by petitioners Jose
Audie Abagatnan, Josephine A. Paree, Jimmy Abagatnan, John Abagatnan, Jenalyn A. De Leon, Joey Abagatnan,
Jojie Abagatnan and Joy Abagatnan against respondents spouses Jonathan Clarito and Elsa Clarito, for failure to
comply with the mandatory requirement of resorting to prior barangay conciliation, as required under Section 412
of Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC).
The Antecedent Facts
Wenceslao Abagatnan (Wenceslao) and his late wife, Lydia Capote (Lydia), acquired a parcel ofland designated
as Lot 1472-B, with a total land of 5,046 square meters, and located at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City from Mateo
Ambrad (Mateo) and Soterafia Clarito (Soterafia), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed on August 1,
1967.5
On October 4, 1999, Lydia died, leaving her children, who are copetitioners in this case, to succeed into the
ownership of her conjugal share of said property.6
In 1990, respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao and asked for permission to construct a residential house
made oflight materials on a 480-square meter portion of Lot 1472-B (subject property). Because respondent
Jonathan Clarito (Jonathan) is a distant relative, Wenceslao allowed them to do so subject to the condition that
respondents will vacate the subject property should he need the same for his own use.7
In September 2006, petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 14 72-B, including the subject property which was
then still being occupied by respondents. They offered to sell said portion to respondents, but the latter declined.8
Consequently, petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter9 dated October 2, 2006 requiring the latter to vacate
the subject property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter. The respondents, however, refused to heed
such demand.10
On November 10, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages11 against respondents
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City, where they claimed to have been
unlawfully deprived of the use and possession of a portion of their land.
Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-condition
for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City. Specifically, petitioner
Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in Laguna, while petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon (Jenalyn) resided in Pasig
City.12
In their Answer with Counterclaim,13 respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with, considering that Jimmy and J enalyn had already executed a Special
Power of Attomey14 (SPA) in favor of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine A. Paree (Josephine), who is a
resident of Roxas City.15
Respondents also insisted that Lot 14 72-B is only a portion of Lot 1472 which is covered by its mother title,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 9882, under the name of Nicolas Clarita, et al., Jonathan's predecessors-
in-interest. Unfortunately, said title was lost or destroyed during the war, but a copy of the owner's duplicate copy
was presented before the trial court and made part of the records.16
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities Ruling
In its Decision17 dated August 17, 2007, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ordered
respondents to remove the structures they erected on the subject property and to vacate the same. It also directed
respondents to pay petitioners the amount of ₱500.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and
property have been removed, as well as the cost of suit.18
The MTCC ruled that by preponderance of evidence, petitioners have a better right of material possession over
the subject property.1âwphi1 It gave merit to petitioners' proof of purchase of Lot 1472-B from Mateo and
Soterafia, the Demand Letter dated October 2, 2006 that they sent to respondents, and respondents' refusal to
vacate the property.19
Respondents thereafter appealed the MTCC Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Roxas
City.1âwphi1
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
In its Decision20 dated January 15, 2008, the RTC denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that since the
parties raised the issue of ownership to justify their claims of possession, and the evidence of ownership is
preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was justified in ruling the case in the latter's favor.21
The RTC, too, held that the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on appeal because it was
not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order.22
Following the denial, respondents filed a Petition for Review23 before the CA, assailing the RTC's January 15,
2008 Decision.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its Decision dated June 20, 2013, the CA ruled that the findings of fact of both the MTCC and the RTC are
supported by the evidence on record. It gave more probative value to the tax declarations and the Deed of
Absolute Sale submitted by petitioners, considering that only a copy of OCT No. 9882 was presented by
respondents in court and said copy contained clouded and blurred characters. The name of the alleged registered
owner, Francisco Clarito (Jonathan's father), is also not decipherable on the title.24
Nevertheless, the CA granted the Petition and dismissed the petitioners' Complaint, albeit without prejudice, for
lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay.25 It pointed out that majority of petitioners actually
resided in Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while the two non-residents of Roxas City already executed an SP A in
favor of Josephine, whom they authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents.
Since respondents also reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within the ambit of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority.26
The CA thus concluded that petitioners' Complaint had been prematurely filed with the MTCC, as it should have
been first brought before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation to accord the parties the chance for amicable
settlement.27
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated February 3, 2014. As
a consequence, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court on April 14, 2014,
assailing the CA's June 20, 2013 Decision and February 3, 2014 Resolution.
The Issue
Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with
the prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the fact that not all real parties
in interest resided in the same city or municipality.28
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
x x x Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court, thus:
SECTION 412. Conciliation - (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or
pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman [or unless the settlement has been repudiated
by the parties thereto. x x x]29 (Emphasis supplied)
The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes," subject to certain
exceptions enumerated in the law.30
One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.31
In effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-Trial Order barred its consideration during the trial. This is but
consistent with the rule that parties are bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-
trial proceedings.40
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated June 20, 2013 and the
Resolution dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 are REVERSED and
SETASIDE. The Decision dated January 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City in Civil
Case No. V-47-07 is REINSTATED.

Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not required
to submit their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court.

In Pascual v. Pascual,32 the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC
pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be
construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real
party in interest" as defined in Section 2,33 in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz34 where the Court held that "the requirement
under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its
filing in court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or
municipality."

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in
interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City:35 Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn
resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City.36 As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior
referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.

This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-petitioner,
Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC. As previously
explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual
residence" requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is concerned.
Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on
appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order, which only enumerates the following issues to be
resolved during the trial:
The following issues to be resolved by plaintiffs:
G.R. No. 212987, August 06, 2018
ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO S. CAISIP, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated January 23, 2014 and the Resolution3
dated May 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129824, which affirmed the Decision4
dated January 31, 2013 and the Order5 dated April 2, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66 (RTC) in Special Civil Action Case No. 58-C-12, upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner Elizabeth
M. Lansangan's (petitioner) complaint for failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings before
recourse to the courts.

1. Whether or not the defendants have unlawfully withheld the portion of Lot 1472 over which were occupied by
them, particularly Lot 1472-B;
2. Whether or not the defendants can be lawfully ejected from that portion of Lot 1472-B which are occupied by
them.
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages6 dated June 27, 2012 filed before the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac (MCTC) by petitioner against respondent
Antonio Caisip (respondent), docketed as Civil Case No. 2738-12.

3. Whether or not the prevailing parties can recover damages.
For the defendants, the issues to be resolved are as follows:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the defendants; and,
Petitioner, a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park, Concepcion, Tarlac, alleged that respondent, a
resident of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed a promissory note7 in her favor in the amount of
€2,522.00 payable in three (3) installments. As respondent defaulted in his obligation under the promissory note
and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply therewith, the latter was constrained to file the said
complaint.8

2. Whether or not the prevailing parties are entitled to an award of damages.37
On this point, it is important to stress that the issues to be tried between parties in a case is limited to those
defined in the pre-trial order38 as well as those which may be implied from those written in the order or inferred
from those listed by necessary implication.39
Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default and for the
MCTC to render judgment,9 which was granted in an Order10 dated August 28, 2012. Accordingly, the case was
submitted for resolution.11
The MCTC Ruling

In this case, a cursory reading of the issues listed in the Pre-Trial Order easily shows that the parties never agreed, In an Order12 dated September 3, 2012, the MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for
whether expressly or impliedly, to include the lack of prior barangay conciliation proceedings in the list of issues failure to comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160,13 otherwise known as "The Local
to be resolved before the MTCC.
Government Code of 1991," which requires the prior referral of the dispute between residents of the same
barangay for conciliation proceedings before the filing of a case in court.14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,15 which was, however, denied in an Order16 dated September 25, 2012. In
the said Order, the MCTC opined that petitioner's failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings
rendered it without jurisdiction to rule on her complaint.17 Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari18 before
the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated January 31, 2013, the RTC upheld the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint. It
ruled that prior barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing of the instant complaint is jurisdictional; thus,
non-compliance therewith warrants its dismissal.20
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,21 but the same was denied in an Order22 dated April 2, 2013. Undeterred,
she appealed23 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated January 23, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that since the party-litigants are
both residents of Concepcion Tarlac, petitioner's complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay
conciliation proceedings before raising the matter before the courts.25
Undaunted, Elizabeth moved for reconsideration,26 which was denied in a Resolution27 dated May 20, 2014;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner's complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a
complaint, to wit:
Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As a general rule, the above-listed grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the
courts may order the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.
In this case, the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's failure to refer the matter
for barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case in
court. As Section 412 (a) of RA 7160 provides, the conduct of barangay conciliation proceedings is a pre-
condition to the filing of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon, to wit:
Section 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No complaint, petition, action,
or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
Under Section 409 (a) of RA 7160, "[d]isputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay [(as in the
parties in this case)] shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay."
Lifted from Presidential Decree No. 1508,28 otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law," the
primordial objective of a prior barangay conciliation is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in courts.
Subject to certain exemptions,29 a party's failure to comply with this requirement before filing a case in court
would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent, pursuant to
Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.30
Notably, in Aquino v. Aure,31 the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise
acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant,32viz.:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent [of prior barangay conciliation] could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on [the] ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object
to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.33
Similarly, in Banares II v. Balising,34 it was mentioned that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation
when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading.35
Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation
proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for failure
to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court finds it
proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for its resolution on
the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 23, 2014 and the Resolution dated May
20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129824 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2738-12 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac for resolution on the merits, with reasonable dispatch.

G.R. No. 164594 April 22, 2015

MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Petitioner,
vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent.
BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by petitioner Michael Sebastian (Michael), assailing the
March 31, 2004 Decision,2 and the July 15, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
65450.

The CA decision reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palayan City, Branch
40, in SP. Proc. Case No. 0096-P.

Factual Background

Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daµghter
Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. She
sought to collect from Michael the sum of ₱350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed that Annabel
and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck.
She alleged that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of ₱350,000.00 to
purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael’s relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to
return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as
"kasunduan"4 wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of ₱250,000.00 on specific dates. The
kasunduan was signed by Angelita (on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo. The kasunduanreads: KASUNDUAN

Nagkasundo ang dalawang panig napagkayari ng labing apat na buwan (14 months) simula ngayong July 9, 1997
hanggang September 1998 ay kailangan ng maibigay ni Mr. Sebastian ang pera ni Ms. Anabelle Lagmay.

At napagkasunduan ay dalawang hulog ang halagang ₱250,000.00 na pera ni Ms.Lagmay at simula ng

pagbibigay ni Mr. Sebastian ay sa buwan ng September 1998.

At upang may katunayan ang lahat ng napag usapan ay lumagda sa ibaba nito at sa harap ng mga saksi ngayong
ika-9 ng Hulyo, 1997

Mrs. Angelita Lagmay – (Lagda)

Mr. Michael Sebastian – (Lagda)
Saksi: Kagawad Rolando Mendizabal – (Lagda)
Hepe Quirino Sapon – (Lagda)
Benjamin Sebastian – (Lagda)
Jun Roxas - (Lagda)

Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in
accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991 [Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160], and Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan,
Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and
instead, issued a Certification to File Action.

After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita
filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution
of the kasunduan.

Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita’s alleged violation of
Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On January 17, 2000, the MCTC rendered a decision5 in favor of Annabel, the dispositive portion of which reads,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff through counsel has satisfactorily proven by preponderance of evidence based on
Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," and "F," that defendant has obligation to the plaintiff in the amount of ₱250,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Execution filed by the plaintiff is hereby granted based on Sec.
2, Rule 7 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7160, and therefore, defendant is
hereby ordered within 15 days upon receipt of this decision to pay the plaintiff the amount of ₱250,000.00 as
evidenced by the Kasunduan (Exhibit "C") with legal interests from July 9, 1997 until said obligation is fully
paid, and to pay attorney’s fees for the plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the cost of the
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely
deciding the case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the petitioner to establish the
genuineness and due execution of the kasunduan. The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling
In its November 13, 2000 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 40 of Palayan City upheld the MCTC decision, finding
Michael liable to pay Annabel the sum of ₱250,000.00. It held that Michael failed to assail the validity of the
kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute Annabel’s claims or the applicability of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Order of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED in that the appellant is
ordered to pay the appellee the amount of Two hundred Fifty Thousand pesos (₱250,000.00) plus twelve percent
interest(12%) per annum from September,1998 up to the time it is actually paid and fifty Thousand
Pesos(₱50,000.00) representing attorney's fees.
Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be
enforced by the Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by
ordinary civil action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution;
and (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of ₱250,000.00 (as the subject
matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of ₱200,000.00.7
In its March 13, 2001 Order, the RTC granted Michael’s Motion for Reconsideration, and ruled that there is merit
in the jurisdictional issue he raised. It dismissed Angelita’s Motion for Execution, and set aside the MCTC
Decision. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated November 13, 2000 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Laur, Nueva Ecija dated January 17, 2000 is likewise SET ASIDE and the Motion for
Execution of Kasunduan is DISMISSED, the said court having had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter.8
Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13, 2001 Order, but the motion was subsequently denied.
Aggrieved, she filed a Petition for Review 9with the CA.
The Court of Appeal’s Ruling
On August 2, 2001, the CA initially dismissed the petition for review on a mere technical ground of failure to
attach the Affidavit of Service. Angelita moved for reconsideration, attaching in her motion the Affidavit of
Service. The CA granted the motion.
On March 31, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the petition, and reversing the RTC’s decision. The
CA declared that the "appropriate local trial court" stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of
R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael’s contention, the MCTC has
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount involved.
The CA also ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160, rendered the kasunduan final. Hence, Michael can no longer
assail the kasunduan on the ground of forgery.
Michael moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated July 15, 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Petition
In the present petition for review on certiorari, Michael alleges that the kasunduan cannot be given the force and
effect of a final judgment because it did not conform to the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay law
embodied in Book III, Title One, Chapter 7 of R.A. No. 7160. He points out the following irregularities in the
kasunduan’s execution, and claims that the agreement forged between him and Angelita was fictitious and
simulated:
(1) there was no record of the complaint in the Barangay;
(2) there was no notice of mediation sent to him;
(3) there was no constitution of the Pangkat Ng Tagapagasundo;
(4) the parties were never called upon to choose the three (3) members from among the Lupon members;
(5) he had no participation in the execution of the kasunduan;
(6) his signature in the kasunduan was forged;
(7) he did not personally appear before the Barangay;
(8) there was no attestation clause;
(9) the kasunduan was neither reported nor filed before the MCTC; and
(10) Annabel, the real party in interest, did not personally appear before the Barangay as required by the law.
Michael additionally claims that the kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private document. He also reiterates
that since the amount of ₱250,000.00 – the subject matter of the kasunduan – is in excess of MCTC’s
jurisdictional amount of ₱200,000.00, the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC’s jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.
Accordingly, the proceedings in the Barangay are all nullity.
The Issues
The issues to be resolved in the present petition are:
1. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the amount
involved;
2. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment; and
3. Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition.
A perusal of the body of the motion for
execution shows that it is actually in the
nature of an action for execution; hence, it
was a proper remedy;
We note at the outset that Michael raised – in his brief before the CA – the issue of wrong remedy. He alleged
that Angelita’s recourse should have been to file a civil action, not a mere motion for execution, in a regular
court. However, the CA failed to address this issue and only ruled on the issues of the kasunduan’s irregularities
and the MCTC’s jurisdiction.
A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement. The provision reads:
Section 417. Execution.- The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon
within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be
enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. [Emphasis ours.]
Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period of ten (10)
days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of
the settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months
from the date of settlement has already elapsed.
Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on mere motion of
the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay.10 The proceedings in this case are summary in nature and
are governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and
Regulations. to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.

The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resortedto through the
institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court.11 The proceedings shall
be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court. Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under
the second mode and filed a motion for execution, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45-99. The
question for our resolution is: Whether the MCTC, through Angelita’s motion for execution, is expressly
authorized to enforce the kasunduan under Section 417 of the Local Government Code?
The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC’s jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon.
We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the
six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate
city or municipal court.

The Court rules in the affirmative. The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for the
execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority
It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was captioned "motion for execution," rather than a over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue
petition/complaint for execution. involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement
of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount. A basic principle of
A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the material requirements of an initiatory interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
action. where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.15

First, the motion is sufficient in form12 and substance.13 It is complete with allegations of the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it contains the prayer
for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a verification and certification against
forum shopping.
Furthermore, attached to the motion are: 1) the authenticated special power of attorney of Annabel, authorizing
Angelita to file the present action on her behalf; and 2) the copy of the kasunduan whose contents were quoted in
the body of the motion for execution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, and
AFFIRM the March 31, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65450.
Angelita Lagmay is ORDERED to pay the proper docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, with due consideration of what she had paid
when her motion for execution was docketed as a special proceeding.

It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in the body
and not the caption.14

Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed was intended to be an initiatory pleading or an original action
that is compliant with the requirement under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court that the complaint should
allege the plaintiff’s cause of action and the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant.

Angelita’s motion could therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely as a motion/special proceeding.
For this reason, Annabel has filed the proper remedy prescribed under Section 417 of the Local Government
Code.

However, Angelita should pay the proper docket fees corresponding to the filing of an action for execution. The
docket fees shall be computed by the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, with due consideration, of course, of what
Angelita had already paid when her motion for execution was docketed as a special proceeding.

The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its execution,
unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the
proper city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party’s
failure to repudiate the settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.

In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed
by the law.1âwphi1 Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment
that is ripe for execution.

Furthermore, the irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution, and the claim of forgery are deemed waived since
Michael never raised these defenses in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Local Government
Code. Thus, we see no reason to discuss these issues in the present case.

The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction


ADR CASES
G.R. No. 191336 January 25, 2012
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, Petitioner, vs. JERRY D. MONTANEZ, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Crisanta
Alcaraz Miguel (Miguel) seeks the reversal and setting aside of the September 17, 2009 Decision1 and February
11, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100544, entitled "Jerry D. Montanez v.
Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel."
Antecedent Facts
On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-Three
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (₱143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002,
from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot located at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase
3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-
aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle
the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong
Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner.
On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, a
complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 the respondent raised the defense
of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in
San Mateo, Rizal.
After trial, on August 16, 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,4 which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Jerry D. Montanez to pay
plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of [Php147,893.00] representing the obligation with legal rate of interest from February 1, 2002
which was the date of the loan maturity until the account is fully paid;
2. The amount of Php10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, the respondent raised the same issues
cited in his Answer. In its March 14, 2007 Decision,6 the RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED, and the DECISION appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety for being in accordance
with law and evidence. SO ORDERED.7
Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the CA raising two issues, namely, (1) whether or not venue was
improperly laid, and (2) whether or not the Kasunduang Pag-aayos effectively novated the loan agreement. On
September 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated March 14,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is entered dismissing respondent’s complaint for collection of sum of money, without prejudice to her
right to file the necessary action to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. SO ORDERED.8
Anent the issue of whether or not there is novation of the loan contract, the CA ruled in the negative. It
ratiocinated as follows:
Judging from the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, it is clear that no novation of the old obligation has taken
place.1âwphi1 Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there was no reduction of the term or period originally
stipulated. The original period in the first agreement is one (1) year to be counted from February 1, 2001, or until
January 31, 2002. When the complaint was filed before the barangay on February 2003, the period of the original
agreement had long expired without compliance on the part of petitioner. Hence, there was nothing to reduce or
extend. There was only a change in the terms of payment which is not incompatible with the old agreement. In
other words, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos merely supplemented the old agreement.9
The CA went on saying that since the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before the Lupon ng
Barangay, such settlement has the force and effect of a court judgment, which may be enforced by execution
within six (6) months from the date of settlement by the Lupon ng Barangay, or by court action after the lapse of
such time.10 Considering that more than six (6) months had elapsed from the date of settlement, the CA ruled
that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and
not for collection of sum of money.11 Consequently, the CA deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue on
venue.12
The petitioner now comes to this Court.
Issues
(1) Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner, notwithstanding the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos;13 and
(2) Whether or not the CA should have decided the case on the merits rather than remand the case for the
enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.14
Our Ruling
Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is deemed
rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original demand.
Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that she should have followed the procedure for enforcement
of the amicable settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, instead of filing a
collection case. The petitioner points out that the cause of action did not arise from the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
but on the respondent’s breach of the original loan agreement.15
This Court agrees with the petitioner.
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory
insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public policy.16 This is in accord
with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except
in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force and
effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved.17 It transcends being a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules.18 Thus, under
Section 417 of the Local Government Code,19 such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to
enforce such settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to
determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another
chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement
itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.20
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the first
or the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within ten
(10) days from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the amicable
settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to
enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or
to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil
Code, which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037, viz:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In the case of Leonor v. Sycip,21 the Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to explain this provision of law. It
ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the breach of
compromise agreement, may just consider it already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of
annulment or rescission of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be annulled or rescinded"
for the cause therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041 confers
upon the party concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or the right to "demand" the rescission of a compromise,
but the authority, not only to "regard it as rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his original demand". The
language of this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no action for
rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement
may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration
of rescission, for he may "regard" the compromise agreement already "rescinded".22 (emphasis supplied)
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,23 a party's non-compliance with the amicable
settlement paved the way for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may either enforce the
compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or consider it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To quote:
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of
an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in
nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code.
The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the
amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action
in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the
procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain
had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the
application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure
laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of
unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming ₱150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the
"Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a
recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making
reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of
losing. Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising
from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that herein
petitioner did not.24 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be
bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner
has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action
for collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it
is error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy
under the circumstances.
Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed rescinded by the non-compliance of the respondent of the
terms thereof, remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of said agreement is clearly unwarranted.
The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos as it prolonged the process, "thereby putting off the case in an indefinite pendency."25
Thus, the petitioner insists that she should be allowed to ventilate her rights before this Court and not to repeat the
same proceedings just to comply with the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, in order to finally enforce
her right to payment.26
The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper remedy, and
therefore erred in its conclusion that the case should be remanded to the trial court. The fact that the petitioner
opted to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos means that she is insisting upon the undertaking of the respondent
under the original loan contract. Thus, the CA should have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it,
and not prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the trial court. Pertinently, evidence abounds
that the respondent has failed to comply with his loan obligation. In fact, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the well
nigh incontrovertible proof of the respondent’s indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed precisely to
give the respondent a second chance to make good on his undertaking. And since the respondent still reneged in
paying his indebtedness, justice demands that he must be held answerable therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City, dated March 14, 2007 is REINSTATED.
A.C. No. 12121 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322), June 27, 2018
CELESTINO MALECDAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, Respondent.
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed with the Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Baguio-Benguet Chapter (IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter) by Complainant Celestino Malecdan (Malecdan) against
Respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo (Atty. Baldo), for the latter's alleged violation of Section 9 of Presidential
Decree 1508 (P.D. 1508), otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which prohibits. the
participation of lawyers in the proceedings before the Lupon:
SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. - In all proceedings provided for herein, the parties must appear in
person without the assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents who may
be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Factual Antecedents
Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract and Damages against spouses James and
Josephine Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay Pico in La Trinidad, Benguet.
On August 14, 2014, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo during the hearing on the subject
complaint before the Punong Barangay.2
On August 18, 2014, Malecdan filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter
praying that proper sanctions be imposed on Atty. Baldo for violating Section 9 of P.D. 1508.
On August 20, 2014, the Committee on Ethics of the IBP Baguio -Benguet Chapter furnished Atty. Baldo with a
copy of the complaint and set the case for a conciliation conference on September 12, 2014.3

On September 15, 2014, the Complaint was endorsed to the Committee on Bar Discipline-IBP (CBD-IBP) by the
Committee on Ethics of IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter after the parties failed to agree on a settlement.4
The CBD-IBP thereafter issued an Order5 dated September 17, 2014, requiring Atty. Baldo to submit a duly
verified Answer, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.6
On January 14, 2015, the CBD-IBP issued a Notice7 setting the mandatory conference/hearing of the subject
complaint on February 18, 2015.8
On February 12, 2015, Malecdan filed his Mandatory Conference Brief.9
On February 23, 2015, the mandatory conference of the case was rescheduled to March 24, 2015 after Atty.
Baldo failed to attend the same.10
In his Answer11 dated February 23, 2015, Atty. Baldo admitted that he was present during the proceedings
before the Punong Barangay. He explained that he was permitted by the parties to participate in the said hearing,
to wit:
1. The allegation in the complaint is admitted. However, the rest of the truth to the matter is that, before entering
the barangay session hall, respondent asked permission from the officer-in-charge if he will be allowed that
before any hearing be conducted, he and the respondent in the said barangay case, his uncle, James Baldo, be
allowed to talk to complainant Celestino Malecdan as they may be able to amicably settle the matter on their own,
of which the officer in charge granted on the reason that the proceeding was still in the dialogue stage;
2. Likewise, when he entered inside the barangay session hall where complainant and his companion, Laila
Alumno was waiting, respondent again asked permission from complainant and his companion, Laila Alumno if
the latter will allow the former to join them in the dialogue with James Baldo as the parties may amicably settle
the case on their own;
3. Since complainant already knew respondent as they had a previous meeting at the office of complainant's
lawyer, Atty. Melissa QuitanCorpuz concerning the same case against James Baldo, complainant readily
permitted and allowed that parties have a dialogue on their own with respondent joining them and without the
presence of any barangay officials.12 (Emphasis supplied)
In an Order13 dated March 24, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles gave Malecdan a period of
fifteen (15) days to file a supplemental complaint where he can incorporate other facts and circumstances which
he failed to indicate in his complaint. Atty. Baldo was likewise given a period of fifteen (15) days from his
receipt of the supplemental complaint within which to file his supplemental answer should he wish to do so.14
On March 31, 2015, Malecdan filed his Verified Supplemental Complaint Affidavit,15 wherein he insisted that
he vehemently objected to the presence of Atty. Baldo during the proceedings before the Punong Barangay, to
wit:
2. Using his influence as a lawyer, Atty. Baldo prevailed upon the Punong Barangay and the Barangay Secretary
to let him participate in the barangay proceedings intended for the settlement of our grievance against Spouses
Josephine Baldo and James Baldo on August 14, 2014.
3. He did this over my vehement objections. I told him that he was not supposed to be there but then he insisted.
It even got to the point that we were already arguing out loud. I resented the fact that he was there assisting and
representing his clients, the Spouses Baldo while I was not represented by counsel. We were in a situation that
Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 sought to prevent.16 (Emphasis supplied)
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and Recommendation17 on June 2,
2015, recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a warning. Commissioner Robles found that the language of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from appearing before the
Lupon, nor is the language that clear on the sanction imposable for such an appearance.18 Commissioner Robles
reasoned that the matter of appearance or non-appearance before the Lupon is clearly addressed to a lawyer's taste
of propriety:
x x x. The respondent ought to have known that his attendance thereat would have caused some ruckus. That
respondent chose to attend is some measure of his lack of propriety.
Although this Commission cannot legislate good taste or an acute sense of propriety, the Commission can
definitely remind the respondent that another act of insensitivity to the rules of good conduct will court
administrative sanctions.19
The dispositive portion of Commissioner Robles' Report and Recommendation reads as follows:
UPON THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo be given
a warning.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution21 reversing and setting aside the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead recommended that Atty. Baldo be reprimanded,
thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
considering Respondent's appearance as counsel for Spouses James and Josephine Baldo in a Katarungan[g]
Pambarangay hearing, Thus, Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED.22 (Emphasis in the original and italics
omitted)
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court upholds the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in barring
lawyers from appearing before the Lupon.
As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,23 Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation
of the parties because:
"x x x a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In other
words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level."
xxxx
"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the
effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted
provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction
dictating that 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius', the express exceptions made regarding minors and
incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned."24 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
CANON 1 -
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer, to the best of his
ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law: and thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary to the
same.25 A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires the public to
likewise respect and obey the law.26 Rule 1.01, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by
all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful.27 Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.28
Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay in
violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in connection with
Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and Josephine Baldo in a hearing before
the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad in Benguet.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the allegations against Atty. Baldo.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Simpson T. Baldo LIABLE for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.